A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption 1789904994, 9781789904994

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A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption

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Elgar Research Agendas outline the future of research in a given area. Leading scholars are given the space to explore their subject in provocative ways, and map out the potential directions of travel. They are relevant but also visionary. Forward-looking and innovative, Elgar Research Agendas are an essential resource for PhD students, scholars and anybody who wants to be at the forefront of research. Titles in the series include: A Research Agenda for Global Crime Edited by Tim Hall and Vincenzo Scalia A Research Agenda for Transport Policy Edited by John Stanley and David A. Hensher A Research Agenda for Tourism and Development Edited by Richard Sharpley and David Harrison A Research Agenda for Housing Edited by Markus Moos A Research Agenda for Economic Anthropology Edited by James G. Carrier A Research Agenda for Sustainable Tourism Edited by Stephen F. McCool and Keith Bosak A Research Agenda for New Urbanism Edited by Emily Talen A Research Agenda for Creative Industries Edited by Stuart Cunningham and Terry Flew

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A Research Agenda for Military Geographies Edited by Rachel Woodward A Research Agenda for Sustainable Consumption Governance Edited by Oksana Mont A Research Agenda for Migration and Health Edited by K. Bruce Newbold and Kathi Wilson A Research Agenda for Climate Justice Edited by Paul G. Harris A Research Agenda for Federalism Studies Edited by John Kincaid A Research Agenda for Media Economics Edited by Alan B. Albarran A Research Agenda for Environmental Geopolitics Edited by Shannon O’Lear A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption Edited by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Paul M. Heywood

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A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption Edited by ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI Director of the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS), Hertie School, Berlin, Germany

PAUL M. HEYWOOD Sir Francis Hill Professor of European Politics, University of Nottingham, UK

Elgar Research Agendas

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

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© Editors and Contributors Severally 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2019956710 This book is available electronically in the Social and Political Science subject collection DOI 10.4337/9781789905007

ISBN 978 1 78990 499 4 (cased) ISBN 978 1 78990 500 7 (eBook) Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire

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Contents

List of contributors vii List of abbreviations xi PART I  CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES   1 Making sense of corruption studies: an introduction Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Paul M. Heywood

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  2 How to define and measure corruption Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Mihály Fazekas

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  3 A political approach to corruption Paul M. Heywood

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  4 Recent approaches to the study of social norms and corruption Nils Köbis, David Jackson and Daniel Iragorri Carter

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PART II  VARIETIES AND CONNOTATIONS   5 Buying, expropriating and stealing votes Isabela Mares and Lauren Young

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  6 Gender and corruption: what we know and ways forward Ortrun Merkle

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  7 All that glitters . . . a closer look at the Nordic ‘exception’ Gissur Ó. Erlingsson and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson

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  8 Corruption and the media Carlo Berti, Roxana Bratu and Sofia Wickberg

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  9 Corruption and populism: the linkage Ina Kubbe and Miranda Loli

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PART III  THE ANTI-CORRUPTION REPERTORY 10 The long arm of the law versus the invisible hand of the market? Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka

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11 Digital anti-corruption: hopes and challenges Niklas Kossow

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12 Heroes or villains? A legislative, ethical and policy assessment of whistleblowing 158 Michele Bocchiola, Emanuela Ceva and Maria Chiara Vinciguerra References 172 Index 209

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Contributors

Carlo Berti is Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Studies, University of Trento, Italy. He holds a PhD in Communication Studies from Auckland University of Technology. His research interests include political corruption, European studies, political communication, and populism. His research on media representations of corruption has been published in international journals, ­including Journalism Studies and Australian Journalism Review. Michele Bocchiola is Research Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy. Previously, he held research positions at Luiss University, Rome, and the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, where he taught ethics and political philosophy. His research interests include contemporary political thought and public ethics. He is the author of Privacy (Luiss University Press 2014) and co-author of Is Whistleblowing a Duty? (Polity 2018). He has published articles in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Philosophy and Public Issues, Philosophy Compass and Global Policy. Roxana Bratu is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Sussex, School of Law, Politics and Sociology. She works on media and corruption, integrity, anti-­ corruption, transnational aid flows and the impact of new technologies on corruption. Before joining the University of Sussex, Roxana held postdoctoral positions at University College London and the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is an active consultant in the area of security and political risk for the private sector. Her latest book (2018) examines corruption, informality and entrepreneurship in Romania. Emanuela Ceva is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. She works on conflict and justice, democracy and corruption. In 2018, she was awarded a Fulbright Research Scholarship in Philosophy. She is the author of Interactive Justice (Routledge 2016) and co-author of Is Whistleblowing a Duty? (Polity 2018), and articles in such journals as The Journal of Political Philosophy; Social Philosophy & Policy; Politics, Philosophy & Economics; Philosophy Compass; Journal of Social Philosophy; and Journal of Applied Philosophy. Gissur Ó. Erlingsson is an associate professor of political science at Linköping University, Sweden. His research interests concern rule of law and corruption in mature democracies, political parties and political participation. He has published several monographs and chapters in edited volumes on these topics, and his journal vii

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articles appear in journals such as Governance, Political Geography, Acta Politica, Public Integrity and International Journal of Public Administration. Mihály Fazekas is an assistant professor at the Central European University, School of Public Policy, with a focus on using Big Data methods to understand the quality of government globally. He is also the scientific director of an innovative think-tank, the Government Transparency Institute, and serves as a non-resident research fellow at the University of Cambridge and as senior research associate at the University College London. He has a PhD from the University of Cambridge where he pioneered Big Data methods to measure and understand high-level ­corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Paul M. Heywood is Sir Francis Hill Professor of European Politics at the University of Nottingham. His research interests focus on corruption and anti-corruption, integrity management and state capacity. He is currently Academic Lead of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) Programme, 2018–21, and Lead Editor of CurbingCorruption.com. He is also a Trustee of Transparency International UK. Daniel Iragorri Carter finished his MSc in Social and Health Psychology at Maastricht University. Since then, he has co-written several pieces on the social psychology of corruption, with a particular focus on social norms. He is co-founder of a Colombian foundation dedicated to decreasing urban violence through emotional education training. He currently works as a UX researcher at HomeToGo in Berlin, Germany. David Jackson is Senior Researcher and Adviser at the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre based at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway. His research explores how an understanding of social norms, patron–client politics and nonstate actors can lead to anti-corruption interventions that are better suited to context. He holds degrees from University of Oxford and the Hertie School, Berlin, and a doctorate from the Freie Universität Berlin. Niklas Kossow is a PhD candidate at the Hertie School, Berlin. His research focuses on the use of digital technologies in the fight against corruption with a focus on the role of civil society actors and the use of distributed ledger technology in this context. Niklas also works as a freelance consultant for international governmental and non-governmental organizations on related issues and is a doctoral fellow of the German National Academic Foundation. Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Iceland. His main research emphases include legislative and executive relations, political corruption, political parties, public policy and administration. He has written extensively on several aspects of Icelandic and comparative politics, including several books, and chapters in edited volumes and journal articles. Journals he has published in include Acta Politica, Electoral Studies, European Journal

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CONTRIBUTORS ix

of Political Research, Party Politics, West European Politics and Scandinavian Political Studies. Ina Kubbe is Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Political Science, Government and International Relations, Tel Aviv University. She specializes in social science methodology and comparative research on empirical corruption, democracy and governance research and political psychology. She is also a founding member of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN) as well as of the new ECPR Standing Group on (Anti‑)Corruption and Integrity. Ina also works as an inter­national consultant for several organizations and institutions including the European Union, Transparency International, OSCE, OECD and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (Education for Justice), where she has developed university modules on anti-corruption. Nils Köbis obtained his PhD (cum laude), entitled ‘The Social Psychology of Corruption’ from the Department of Experimental and Social Psychology at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He works as a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Economics and the Center for Research on Economic and Political Decisionmaking (CREED) at the University of Amsterdam. As part of an ERC-funded project, his current work focuses on the behavioural roots of corruption. He is co-founder of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN) and cohosts KickBack – The Global AntiCorruption podcast. Miranda Loli is a PhD researcher at the University of Darmstadt and at the Cluster of Excellence ‘The Formation of Normative Orders’, Frankfurt, where she researches the nexus between corruption and conflict with a particular focus on international missions. Her research interests include international development, transnational actors and international political sociology. Her current work has appeared in scientific journals and edited volumes. She is an active member of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN) and a reviewer for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Isabela Mares received a PhD degree in political science from Harvard University. She was previously faculty member at Stanford University and Columbia University before joining Yale University as Professor of Political Science. Isabela is the author of The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (Cambridge University Press); Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment (Cambridge University Press); From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: The Adoption of Electoral Reforms Protecting Voter Autonomy (Cambridge University Press) and Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press), co-authored with Lauren Young. Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka is a PhD candidate at the Hertie School, Berlin, and has over ten years of experience in the anti-corruption field. He has worked in academic, public and non-governmental sectors in Latin America and Europe, and has served as a consultant for various development agencies and international

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organizations. Roberto has been part of Transparency International’s research team since 2016. Ortrun Merkle is a post-doctoral researcher at UNU-MERIT/Maastricht Graduate School of Governance in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on the interplay of gender, corruption and migration. Her PhD dissertation analysed the role of gender norms, in particular, patriarchy, in corruption. She is currently co-authoring a short reader on corruption and migration. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi is a policy scientist and Director of the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS) at the Hertie School, Berlin, where she is Democracy Studies Professor. Alina’s main work is on social transformation and institutional change. Her most recent monograph is Europe’s Burden: Promoting Good Governance across Borders (Cambridge University Press 2019), and she has published in Nature, Foreign Policy, Daedalus and the Journal of Democracy, among others. As a consultant on evidence-based good governance, Alina has recently worked for the World Bank Development Report, the International Monetary Fund, the European Parliament as principal investigator on ‘clean trade’, the Swedish Government on a strategy for international donors to increase effectiveness of good governance assistance programmes, the EU Dutch Presidency on trust and public integrity, and the European Commission DG Research on governance innovation. Maria Chiara Vinciguerra is a doctoral fellow at the Wiener – Anspach Foundation and PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge. She works on EU governance, migration and corruption. Before joining the University of Cambridge, Maria Chiara graduated from Bocconi University, Syracuse University and the Hertie School, Berlin. She has published articles in peer-reviewed journals and news­papers such as International Migration Review and Corriere della Sera, among others. Sofia Wickberg is a PhD candidate in political science at Sciences Po, Paris, where she is affiliated with the Center for European Studies and the Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policies. Her research focuses on the translation of anti-corruption policies in Western Europe, with a focus on parliamentary integrity. She is a lecturer at the University Versailles-St Quentin and a founding member of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network and regularly collaborates with the Open Government Partnership, the OECD, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Transparency International. Lauren Young is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis. Her research aims to understand how individuals make decisions when faced with the threat of violence or economic coercion. Her book Conditionality and Coercion (Oxford University Press), co-authored with Isabela Mares, came out in 2019.

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Abbreviations

ACA CoC CPI ESS EU GDP IAWJ ICT IPI ISSP IT NPM OECD OLS OPEN PACI PETS PR UN UNCAC UNODC

anti-corruption agency Control of Corruption Corruption Perceptions Index European Social Survey European Union gross domestic product International Association of Women Judges information and communication technology Index for Public Integrity International Social Survey Programme information technology New Public Management Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ordinary least squares Online Procedures ENhancement for civil applications Public Administration Corruption Index Public Expenditure Tracking Survey proportional representation United Nations United Nations Convention against Corruption United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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PART I Concepts and approaches

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Making sense of corruption studies: an introduction

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Paul M. Heywood

The study of corruption can best be conceptualized as an archipelago resulting from several streams flowing into the sea, with different degrees of prior communication through the channels of their tributaries. As the tide comes in, some common knowledge is left deposited across the most exposed areas by the returning sea: but others, further upstream, remain fairly isolated. Alongside some recently achieved coherence that this introduction and this book have had to struggle to find, a myriad of separate understandings exist, which do not share even a basic language. To do justice to such diversity is therefore impossible. Regardless of how wellintentioned, any collection that seeks to review the vast array of studies of corruption is bound to show some partiality. Choices need to be made: our first choice is to find sufficient commonalities across disciplines and approaches when it comes to concepts, methods and policies used in the empirical study of corruption, while still canvassing as many types as possible. We express regret for the many research areas and authors that we had to leave out in pursuing our choice of what the ­current state of the art in corruption research has to offer. On top of the desideratum of consistency across disciplines, we introduce a second desideratum, that of actionability, which informs many of the choices of topics in this volume. Corruption has always been a key concept in the science of government. Starting with Plato and Aristotle, students of government have conceived ‘good’ government as reflecting the universal welfare of the polity (as defined by the citizenry) versus the partial interest of the ruler and his clique (Mulgan 2012). The Renaissance and then the Enlightenment also promoted their own visions of good government/governance, a commitment later encompassed in formal documents that range from the 1879 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen to the 2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption. From the nineteenth century, historical sociology also started to study patterns of social allocation and their connection with power: Max Weber, a post-Marxist scholar, outlined the fundamental notions for the understanding of corruption, in particular through the ideas of patrimonialism and bureaucracy. Twentiethcentury political development scholars and sociologists have further advanced this approach. Anthropologists and social psychologists have also brought essential contributions to our understanding of political development through concepts such as reciprocity, gift-making, conformity and social capital. Economists became interested in corruption relatively later, as both Marxists and Liberals have long 2

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MAKING SENSE OF CORRUPTION STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 3

conceived the state in opposite ways, but equally isolated from the interests of people in government. This changed only with the emergence of the public choice school. A 1967 paper by Gordon Tullock focusing on the United States forecast high social costs for an economy of privilege versus a free market, since seeking a monopoly would imply a wasteful investment of resources (Tullock 1967). Tullock and Buchanan also introduced the distinction between profit-seeking and rent-seeking, with the former based on merit (providing a product or service that consumers would be willing to pay more for than the opportunity cost of the resources used) and the latter based on coercion by preventing others from competing equally or by forcibly taking their wealth (Buchanan et al. 1980). Unlike profit-seeking by market means, rent-seeking by political means doesn’t create wealth; it merely transfers privilege from one party to another and wastes the resources used to secure rents, because these are invested to produce an outcome in which nothing of value is created. Furthermore, acquiring rents through political power distorts the operation of market processes, affecting interest rates and the prices of goods and services, thereby actually destroying wealth (Buchanan et al. 1980). Rent-seeking itself is a concept coined by the economist Anne Krueger (1974) to indicate the situation when firms compete for privileges from the authorities (for instance, import licences) rather than in a free market. The 1990s saw the development of fully-fledged theories from economists, giving corruption a central role in explaining development and instituting what is known as the primacy of politics argument. Nobel prize-winning economist, Douglass North, advanced the preliminaries of a grand corruption theory, arguing that ‘as human beings became increasingly interdependent, and more complex institutional structures were necessary to capture the potential gains from trade’, societies needed to ‘develop institutions that will permit anonymous, impersonal exchange across time and space’; however, their success in creating the right institutions varied due to diverse ‘local experience’ (North 1993, p. 4). Societies that do not manage to create open access and impersonal, merit-based systems to govern both the market and the state–citizen relationship remain poor. Their economy remains one of privileged rents, and their state remains captured by particular interests, unable to evolve towards autonomy and the production of public goods in ­sufficient quantity. The economist Daron Acemoglu (1995) developed on similar theoretical foundations an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities, arguing that allocations of past generations, as well as expectations of future allocations, influence current rewards and a society may get trapped in a rent-seeking steady state equilibrium. Even if competition exists in such a society both in politics and in the economy, the main stake of politics amounts to the spoiling public resources for the benefit of particular groups, regardless of whether competitive elections exist (Mungiu 2006).

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The concept of corruption control as some form as equilibrium also informs much of the World Bank literature based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, which show the close linkage between regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice and accountability, and control of corruption (Huther and Shah 2000). Two recent works explicitly build on the equilibrium notion first and most famously introduced by economist Gary Becker (1968): Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) depicts a model of corruption control as the institutional equilibrium between resources for and constraints on corruption, while Fisman and Golden (2017) describe corruption as an equilibrium resulting from ‘mutual expectations’. This approach to corruption as an institution needs important qualifications if it is to cross disciplines. The followers of Douglass North define institutions as ‘rules of the game’ and therefore distinct from ‘organizations’, which are frequently called ‘institutions’ by political theorists and those in other social sciences (for a detailed discussion, see Hodgson 2006). ‘Institutions’ in institutional economics are both formal (such as constitutions) and informal (such as gift-giving to officials), making governance a complex set of interactions between formal and informal ones, which determine who gets what. Political scientists sometimes define as ‘institutionalists’ not this group of political and development economists (which also includes Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, Barry Weingast, Paul Collier, Mushtaq Khan and many others), but a quite distinct group within their discipline who argue that the formal political institutions (such as electoral systems or other constitutional arrangements) shape governance. Chapter 5 in this book by Mares and Young offers a review of this literature in relation to electoral corruption. Finally, an alternative understanding of institutional corruption – isolated from any broad schools of thought as described above – comes from Dennis Thompson (2018) and his followers, prompted by a US corruption scandal and more generally the attempt to argue that undue ‘institutional corruption’ in a democracy occurs ‘when individuals within the institution become dependent upon an influence that distracts them from the intended purpose of that institution’ (Lessig 2011, p. 15). The institution’s intended (constitutional) purpose thus needs to be specified to diagnose its ‘corruption’. Clearly, Thompson’s ‘institutions’ are North’s ‘organisations’, underlining that scholars of corruption, as in Oscar Wilde’s aphorism, can remain divided by a common language. So, while this volume does seek to identify some coherence across disciplines, tensions or sheer lack of communication and reciprocal understanding should not be downplayed. Golden and Mahdavi (2015) describe three separate tensions in the literature on corruption. First, they find some tension between studies that use cross-national data and those that use subnational data, with divergent results emerging even with similar research questions. An example in this book is the new literature on corruption at grassroots level in relation to social norms, which struggles to isolate corruption attitudes from broader normative contexts. Second, some tension emerges between studies that use observational data, on the one hand, and those that employ experimental or quasi-experimental research methods

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MAKING SENSE OF CORRUPTION STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 5

on the other – a tension that characterizes more than just corruption studies. In corruption studies, experimental research which does not control for national context invariably fails in the principal–agent paradigm, as remarked by Persson et al. (2013), as it focuses on the motivations and incentives of agents. We know, however, that those matter only in contexts where agents have reached a point of having actual autonomy from their ‘principals’, the rulers: in other words, where an autonomous bureaucracy exists already and corruption is an exception and not the rule (Mungiu 2006; Gächter and Schulz 2016). Such studies should therefore be contextualized: where the rule of the game is government based on partiality (particularism), the individual motivations of an agent are hardly relevant. The principal–agent paradigm should therefore be restricted to certain contexts only. Third, Golden and Mahdavi find a tension between formal institutional and noninstitutional explanations of corruption. An abundance of literature deals with the effect of constitutional factors on governance. Many development agents seem to believe that the introduction of formal institutions will be automatically followed by a change in norms and practices. Hence, the promotion of anti-corruption of the last two decades has also resulted in the largest implementation gap in history between formal and informal institutions of governance. A recent summary of evidence exists in the 2017 special issue of the journal Crime, Law and Social Change, edited by Mungiu-Pippidi (2017a). Some of the evidence is revisited in this ­collection in Chapter 10 by Kukutschka. The plan of this book, therefore, is as follows. The first part, ‘Concepts and approaches’, includes, alongside this very brief review of concepts, a further three chapters. Mungiu-Pippidi and Fazekas (Chapter 2) provide an appraisal of advances in the measurement of corruption, laying emphasis on the purposes of studying corruption, the importance of developing actionable measures and how to identify appropriate indicators. In turn, Heywood (Chapter 3) analyses how the meanings and modalities of political corruption in contemporary research have changed and developed in line with broader socio-economic developments in a more inter­ dependent world. Finally, a review of recent approaches to the study of social norms and corruption, by Köbis, Jackson and Iragorri Carter (Chapter 4), explores how recent empirical research aligns with the literature on injunctive and descriptive social norms as drivers of practice. In the second part, ‘Varieties and connotations’, Mares and Young (Chapter 5) offer a detailed analysis of how electoral clientelism varies both in type and strategy across regions, countries and individuals. In Chapter 6 on gender and corruption, Merkle highlights innovative new research on gendered forms of corruption and the role of gender norms. Then, Erlingsson and Kristinsson (Chapter 7) examine how the Nordic countries’ reputation for being low-corrupt becomes more complicated when factoring in citizens’ perceptions and more hidden forms of corruption. Chapter 8 by Berti, Bratu and Wickberg critically reviews research on the relationship between the media and corruption, laying emphasis on issues of freedom and control, on one side, as well as the social construction of the concept, on the other. In Chapter 9, Kubbe and Loli close this section by exploring the links between

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corruption and populism, emphasising the respective role of individuals and institutions and the importance of trust and emotion. In the third and final part of the volume, ‘The anti-corruption repertory’, Kukutschka (Chapter 10) argues that lack of success in combating corruption reflects a tension between the respective roles of market-based and legal approaches to tackling the issue. In Chapter 11, Kossow focuses on the role and promise of information and communication technology in developing anti-corruption tools, identifying key gaps in the research so far. Finally, in Chapter 12, Bocchiola, Ceva and Vinciguerra, address the most popular anti-corruption tool, whistleblowing, looking at current definitional debates and approaches before assessing its role and impact on curbing corruption and promoting good governance. To do justice to such a fast-developing area as corruption, further volumes could be added to this one. Corruption as policy failure in sectors such as public health or education, corruption and inequality, or corruption and business ethics are areas of increasing attention from scholars but are barely touched in this collection of essays. The ‘instrumentalization’ of anti-corruption and other approaches stemming from deconstructivism are also worth mentioning: Le Monde Diplomatique dedicated a whole issue to them in 2019, as the ascension of anti-corruption opened new avenues of contestation and manipulation. In particular, the new global antielite rage and the populist parties riding it have raised corruption high on the political agenda everywhere. The debate on corruption is here to stay: and therefore our understanding needs to progress, too.

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How to define and measure corruption

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Mihály Fazekas

2.1  Why do we study corruption? The expansion of corruption studies in our time has resulted from the incapacity of classic growth theories to explain development – or lack of it. The subsequent rise of the ‘institutional quality’ explanation for long-term economic performance (after the first generation of Washington Consensus reforms did not deliver the results expected in the 1990s) largely accounts for the promotion of corruption study by Bretton Woods Institutions since the 1990s. In the new paradigm centred on institutions, ‘what matters are the rules of the game in a society, as defined by prevailing explicit and implicit behavioral norms and the ability to create appropriate incentives for desirable economic behavior’ (Rodrik and Subramanian 2003, p. 31). In this vein, North et al. (2009), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Rodrik et al. (2002) developed theories that strengthened the argument favouring the primacy of institutions, thereby also implicitly increasing awareness of the role of corruption in the development process. Corruption studies have therefore emerged as a fundamental evidence basis for policies intended to develop states that cater to the largest possible social welfare rather than to narrow interest groups. As the topic has been extensively discussed since antiquity in its philosophical, moral and legal aspects, the main research question for contemporary scientists is the policy one: can less corrupt societies be engineered and less corrupt states be built, given that most of the classic and the best contemporary corruption theories largely account for why they are corrupt in the first place (and therefore may be expected to be ­corrupt, given the pre-conditions)? The measurement of corruption is an essential part of this policy-driven intellectual endeavour. As a United Nations Development Programme review report stated: ‘To put it plainly, there is little value in a measurement if it does not tell us what needs to be fixed’ (UNDP 2008, p. 8). While scholars are entitled to study corruption and anti-corruption from a variety of angles and to hope they will discover something new, measurement is inherently an actionable endeavour. The incidence of corruption and its evolution over time need to be established if we are to succeed in diagnosing and solving problems of governance or institutional quality. While the obstacles have proved great for obvious reasons, such as the hidden nature of corruption (although that varies greatly according to the prevalence of 7

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the phenomenon), such obstacles are also over-estimated because of limited communication across disciplines or simply the reluctance of policy actors to open access to publicly derived data. What this chapter will do is not simply offer yet another review of existing definitions and measurements, for we have offered that elsewhere (Mungiu 2006; Andersson and Heywood 2009; Heywood and Rose 2014; Heywood 2015a; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015a, 2015b; Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2016; Fazekas, Cingolani and Tóth 2018). Instead we shall propose a framework to assess current ‘measurements’ and a universal method to organize measurements which can be tailored to individual research needs. We have followed the lead of Johnston (2010) who argued that the kind of evidence that we should prioritize should help reformers identify anti-corruption priorities, apply effective countermeasures and track the effects of their efforts. The next sections will therefore first analyse the existing measures at the national level (governance contexts) primarily from the perspective of actionability, before describing the step-by-step approach to more specific measurements.

2.2  Understanding the national governance context The first generation of corruption indicators were concerned largely with country diagnoses – in other words, with the national governance context. The main reason for that was demand, for most of the interested customers were international investors, comparative social science students or diplomats. Most such measurements, though not all of them, came to users free of charge, which only increased their attractiveness. The most widely used corruption indicators to date therefore have the entire world as their universe and operate within nation states as observation units. For many years the indicators faced harsh criticism for their imprecision and lack of construct validity (Galtung 2006; Langbein and Knack 2008). The primary problem was their lack of an underpinning theory of what corruption at the national level was. For instance, how do various corruption phenomena observable in a country (e.g. political corruption, corruption in procurement, bribery in health services) relate to one another so that they can be quantified in one national measurement? In answer, those who created such measurements explained that: ‘The goal of the CPI [Corruption Perceptions Index] is to provide data on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries . . .’ (Lambsdorff 2005; see also Lambsdorff 2006). That approach labelled the first generation of indicators as ‘perception indicators’. By and large, they consist in relatively transparent expert scores (sometimes the questionnaires or indicators were available, sometimes not) or surveys of business people averaged more or less appropriately into one aggregate score. Daniel Kaufmann, the creator of the rival World Bank Control of Corruption (CoC) aggregate score argued that such ratings did not come out of thin air: perceptions are based on experience and observable indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2007b). In fact, what do aggregate scores measure? As shown by Kaufmann et al. (1999) and Knack (2007), most sources correlate, showing that underlying indicators exist which guide observations in similar directions. They correlate also at over 90 per

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cent with measurements of rule of law or government effectiveness as produced by the World Bank. In earlier work, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b, ch. 2) argued that they measure expectations that governance will deliver ethical universalism – fairness of government, in other words. Of course, that is far from a legal definition of corruption that a lawyer, businessman or administration expert would endorse, and might often include quite unrealistic expectations of governments’ ability to deliver equality of opportunity or create public good generally. Expectations might also vary according to who makes the estimate – intelligence agencies, investment risk experts or the general public. Such different standards might not hold good consistently across countries but still there is risk of their being imported into the aggregates (Hawken and Munck 2009). The act of aggregation itself recreates a degree of consistency, especially in the form of an extracted principal component as in the World Bank methodology, but creates other problems. The aggregate indicators have proved highly useful for comparative research, as they have allowed a whole cottage industry to grow up working on the causes and consequences of corruption. Indeed the indicators helped inform most current theories of corruption in academia or the Bretton Woods Institutions (for a synthesis, see Treisman 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b, ch. 3). They have proven to be strong predictors of levels of development, but they are just as well predicted by gross domestic product per capita, too (Kurtz and Schrank 2007). The rankings are not very precise, so without being wrong in general they can in specific cases err quite widely (Qatar appears less corrupt than Spain, for instance; Greece appeared more corrupt after reforms than before the crisis and so on). On the other hand, public opinion and expert perception validate one another, as they too correlate to a fair degree (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b, ch. 2). From the perspective of this chapter, two other limitations of the widely used aggregate indicators are worth discussing, namely their capacity to measure across time and their actionability. Due both to their general definition of corruption as a quality of governance and their constitutive process as aggregates, perception indicators have proved rather insensitive to change. Expert scores, as Daniel Treisman (2007) remarks, raise uncertainty as to what sort of lags one should expect before political or economic changes influence perceived corruption (p. 220). Comparing across averages may also be seen as problematic in itself, in particular since the number of sources varies across countries because certain countries have more experts rating them, others fewer, which may feed bias (as in the case of Qatar, consistently rated well in the years when corruption allegations over the World Cup and defence contract bribery were emerging). Furthermore, new sources keep being added and others discontinued. The World Bank researchers Kaufmann and Kraay (2002b) calculated transparently that about half the variance over time in the World Bank indexes for Rule of Law and CoC resulted not from evolution of scores within individual sources but from changes in the sources used and the weights assigned to different sources (pp. 13–14). Nevertheless, they later argued that certain changes over longer periods are indeed significant (Kaufmann and Kraay 2006). CoC has a confidence error built in that essentially measures consistency across sources and checks

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for significant change. If one considers it, no significant evolution of CoC took place for the interval 2000–15 across income groups as defined by the World Bank, with only slight backsliding of the upper-income and upper middle-income groups. Only a handful of countries evolved to the upper third of the scale, where corruption becomes an exception, and in fact hardly any did if we remove Caribbean tax havens (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017). There is not much actionability in such results, even if they might reflect the reality of governance lag. First, too little change exists for us to trust it to be real change. Second, the indicators cannot suggest reasons for change or lack of it and are too non-specific to tell us where government fails or where it improves. It is not even clear if what is measured is how corrupt a government is or how corrupt its society is: in fact it is probably both. Nevertheless, the available results are widely used by international aid donors, chancelleries of various governments and the media. More often than not they are misused, mostly by citing ranks across time for different numbers of countries assessed yearly (with CPI), or interpreting small differences which, given the arbitrariness of scaling, have no significance at all (Andersson and Heywood 2009). Overall then, while corruption aggregates have played a largely positive role in research and raising awareness of the problem of corruption they are not very useful as tools with which to guide action. And yet the capacity to control corruption and enforce public integrity at the country level could and should be measured, since the national context is both the arena for socializing citizens into the dominant norm of honesty and the site of major policy action (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b; Gächter and Schulz 2016). Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2016) offered an attempt to organize the empirical findings of the vast literature predicting corruption at national level so as to derive a measurement, the Index for Public Integrity (IPI).1 Corruption determinants can be divided either into factors which generate corruption – resources or opportunities – or constraints – factors which can hinder corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b, ch. 4). Resources and constraints are to a great extent development dependent (proxied by the Human Development Index, which explains about half the variance in corruption), and after testing their associations and interactions one most effective proxy per category was selected to illustrate the categories, with a principal component then extracted. The selected proxies are listed below, and their association with perception of corruption (with development control) is shown in Table 2.1. For resources/opportunities: ●●

●●

Administrative burden measures the extent of domestic bureaucratic regulation which results in a higher risk of corruption. The component is constructed by combining the average number of procedures and the time needed to start a business and pay corporate tax. The data stems from the World Bank’s Doing Business datasets. Trade openness measures the extent of regulation concerning a country’s external economic activity. The component uses data from the World Bank’s

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−3.470*** (−10.32) 105 0.581

0.188*** −5.56

2.973*** −5.48

Model 2

−3.560*** (−9.10) 105 0.511

0.051* −1.74

4.431*** −9.15

Model 3

−3.576*** (−16.19) 105 0.831

0.329*** −14.74

2.436*** −7.25

Model 4

−1.442** (−2.82) 105 0.584

0.312*** −4.22

−0.291 (−0.25)

Model 5

0.194*** −7.91 −3.310*** (−12.11) 105 0.68

3.031*** −8.03

Model 6

Notes:  OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the WGI CoC 2014. HDI = Human Development Index from the United Nations Development Programme; t statistics in parentheses with * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Robust standard errors are used. N=105. Source:  Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2016).

Countries Adj. R-squared

Constant

Freedom of the Press

E-Citizenship

Judicial Independence

Budget Transparency

Trade Openness

−4.087*** (−11.84) 105 0.549

3.873*** −7.8 0.162*** −4.26

HDI

Administrative Burden

Model 1

Proxy

Table 2.1  The predictive power of proxies of the Index for Public Integrity

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Doing Business datasets to combine the average number of procedures and time taken to export and import goods. Budget transparency measures to what extent the public has access to documents allowing it to control discretionary public spending. The component is based on selected questions which are used for the Open Budget Survey provided by the International Budget Partnership.

For constraints: ●●

●●

●●

Judicial independence captures to what extent the judicial system is autonomous from both government and private interests. The data stems from the Global Competitiveness survey developed by the World Economic Forum. E-citizenship captures the ability of citizens to use online tools and social media to exercise social accountability. The component is constructed by combining the number of broadband subscriptions and Internet users with the proportion of Facebook users among the population. The data stems from the International Telecommunication Union and Internet World Stats. Freedom of the press measures the degree of media independence resulting from a specific national legal, political and economic environment. Free media are indispensable for monitoring democratic institutions, public accountability and good government. The component is a fraction of the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press report.

IPI predicts 87 per cent of CPI, 52 per cent of the Global Corruption Barometer main question (‘How many officials are corrupt?’ for a universe of 91 countries) and correlates at over 60 per cent with non-competitive tenders for the 28-member European Union (EU). Some of its components are less heavily dependent than others on development, and so can be more easily changed by government action, such as reducing red tape or fiscal transparency. As the goal is actionability, IPI overlooks some factors reported in the literature as contributing to corruption, like ethnic fractionalization or natural resources. Proxies of IPI can be improved or changed as long as the theoretical model of factors generating opportunities versus constraints is kept as a baseline, allowing the calculation of a similar index for policy sectors and regions (Drapalova 2017). The index offers a basic starting point for redressing a country’s control of corruption, with the index webpage displaying comparisons on every component for countries from the same income group or region. However, not much change shows in the IPI either, in the short time run. In 2017 for instance, the world (109 countries, to be precise) scored only 6.64, up from 6.57 in 2015, the first year covered by the index. However change does show up in research done by country, for instance in Greece during EU-prompted reforms after the economic crisis. While perception indicators in Greece continued to degrade due to pessimism during those years, IPI shows that reforms have started to redress the governance context. Also the usual anomalies from the CPI (such as Qatar doing better than Spain) disappear in the IPI, whose 2019 version covers 120 countries.

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IPI is just a rough summary of knowledge of what determines corruption at the national level and can be affected by human agency, seriously limited by the existence of cross-national data. Once data improves, better indicators might be developed, which could prove useful in guiding action at the national level and offer a framework against which individual determinants can be assessed. Beyond the national governance context, however, more specific measurements need to be designed to measure specific corruption situations. The next two sections will provide a step-bystep method for measurement while also discussing the road to the future.

2.3  Defining for measurement First, to what extent do we need to agree on a single definition of corruption to be able to measure it? While some common elements are indispensable for a basic definition, corruption, as a pathology of governance, takes various forms according to the level of observation (individual, organization, sector, government), the nature of the relevant political regime (democratic versus autocratic) and a variety of other factors such as the extent of government intervention in the market or the government function in question (education, regulation, contracting and so on). There can never be a single measurement of corruption, so what one should measure is what one is interested in, provided that the basic elements of a definition are satisfied. Regardless of such variety there is consensus on the Aristotelian definition that good government is government in the general (universal) interest and bad government is government in favour of partial (particular) interests. Joseph Nye (1967) gave the first form of a modern definition, since simplified to define public corruption as abuse of entrusted public authority for undue private interest (p. 417). That presumes that public authority should be constitutionally designed to be exercised for the universal interest on the basis of ethical universalism (everybody treated similarly and fairly) and that any departure from that norm (other than motivated by the transparent and legally defined redress for some particular category or individual) should be seen as a deviation and sanctioned as such. In addition, it must be recognized that some lose and others win due to abuse (Philp 2016, p. 45). The definition also implies that a variety of what appear as corrupt actions but which do not imply any abuse of public authority should in fact be described as fraudulent, from vote buying to cheating on a public tender. It includes both a public and a private side, and an undue trespass of what should be the separate interests of the two, since affording one individual a favour deprives another equally entitled individual of his or her rights. It is universal entitlement that sets public corruption apart from private corruption, where two parties are private, although abuse of power and undue private profit can exist in private ­corruption too. If these basic diagnostic elements are present, corruption can be defined and approached in a variety of ways, the variety being needed given the complexity of the phenomenon. We may take the health sector for instance, where all forms of corruption and many forms of fraud coexist and feed one another. We cannot understand

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direct payments of public doctors by patients, the corruption of private physicians by the pharmaceutical industry to prescribe their expensive drugs, the crooked tenders for medical equipment for public hospitals and the public subsidies to some medicines versus others as just one type of corruption. We have public corruption, private corruption and plain fraud all tangled together in the one sector, as well as market and government failure mechanisms coexisting. What we observe is that the overall governance context is of essential importance. Where the rules of the game tend to be on the corrupt side these phenomena will occur jointly and complement one another. Where corruption is rare we may find isolated incidents of one or another according to individual need and opportunity. The former situation is the one that concerns economists and sociologists: the latter is for criminologists. As measurement presumes a phenomenon is not exceptional, the definition(s) of corruption which are measurable should be based less in politics, law or economics, and primarily in sociology (Brown 2016, p. 72). Each definition should account for its specific governance context, for instance democracy or autocracy (Warren 2004; Mungiu 2006). Given those qualifications, we should be able to assess corruption levels (prevalence) across comparable units and across time by one or more units of measurement (trend). But that also means that while each situation must qualify as corruption on the basis of a few common elements, it follows that equally careful diagnosis is needed of both the governance context and the specific nature of the sector or situation. The more specific the concept, the easier the diagnosis and the more effective the measurement. What we measure is what we define, so each act of measurement should be both grounded in a clear definition and limited by it. We do not need a single definition, but the first step towards good measurement is a good definition, setting clear boundaries of what is measured and what is left out. Some of the best measurements of corruption therefore each use their own specific definitions. For instance, corruption can be defined as ‘social loss’, as in the World Bank’s original and effective measurement called the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), which traces funds earmarked for sectors or sub-national units to their intended destination (Reinikka and Svensson 2004). Golden and Picci (2005) used a similar definition when counting the gap between built infrastructure and spending on infrastructure in Italy, and so did Olken (2006, 2009) when measuring waste in infrastructure construction in Indonesia. While critics argue that such measurements presume that inefficiency is identical to corruption, the PETS is actually a clear corruption measure, as the only way for money allocated by the Ministry of Finance for a school not to reach the school would be by abuse of public office for the purpose of some undue benefit (wherever the money actually went to, and was spent). It is also an actionable measurement. Corruption may be defined as ‘material inducement to abuse office or bribery’. Scholars have already investigated an alleged gap between perception and experience of bribery (Abramo 2008; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014; Charron 2016). Although results vary, the evidence seems to indicate that experience and perception are not disconnected but that perceptions simply reflect a broader range of experience of

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the rules of the governance game than just payment of bribes. There is nepotism, the use of connections, undue profit from office or advancement by other than merit and all are observable phenomena feeding perceptions of government corruption (Olken 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b). As long as the understanding exists, that favouritism by material inducement is only part of the broader favouritism phenomena defining corruption. It is even better if we can further establish what fraction of favouritism is represented by bribery, for instance by adding a question on use of connections in the victimization surveys of the type the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) carries out regularly. A more complex endeavour based on a similar definition (corruption as bribery) is the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act court sanctions weighted by the export volume of a country (Escresa and Picci 2015). The PACI correlates with perception measures, showing that more infringements and therefore sanctions take place in countries perceived by experts as more corrupt. Corruption indicators using criminal convictions have been developed across the globe, both in national and international contexts (for an innovative application using Spanish data, see López-Iturriaga and Sanz 2018). The problem is how to establish what fraction of corruption is detected. Brazil has more corruption convictions than Argentina, but few observers would consider Brazil the more corrupt country: rather, most would agree that anti-corruption is more developed in Brazil. Such measurements tend to be more reliable in high rule of law contexts, where the detection rate of corruption is high. One notable example is federal court prosecutions and convictions of federal employees in the United States, for which very long time series are available going back to 1986 (Cordis and Milyo 2016). Similarly, corruption can be approached from the angle of conflict of interest and the measurement can focus on infringements. For instance, Transparency International Europe measures ‘revolving door’ appointments for commissioners and members of the European Parliament (Freund 2017). Such measurements have the merit as they can show the evolution of a norm across time. That reveals to what extent such behaviour is deemed acceptable, and to what extent it becomes untenable, as well as its low-reputation cost. The measurements measure the prevalence of only a specific corruption practice and do not aim to measure all corruption at national level. Other measurable definitions of corruption are corruption as economic privilege (crony capitalism measures; see, for instance, Freund and Oliver 2015); as market distortion resulting from economic privilege; as infringement of rules, laws and procedures on the basis of ethical universalism; and as deviation from either procedures or expected outcomes of public services. Certain of those measurements are expensive and imprecise, but others are cheap and effective. A selection on how to measure government favouritism as deviation from the principle of ethical universalism resulting in favours for private actors based on objective data (such as public contracts and awards of concessions combined with ownership of private companies) may be found in the collection of research pieces published in Mungiu-Pippidi (2015a).

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Corruption may be defined as risk. Risk indicators can also be produced per sector and at micro level although few are grounded in any sound definition. A large group of indicators are based on a vague normative foundation relying on the presumption that specific rules, rather than a more complex mixture of conditions, reduce risk.2 Even when more rules might help reduce corruption, as for instance in public procurement, it is difficult to measure the likelihood of corruption by reference to any lack of legal safeguards. The least corrupt societies in the world are societies like Denmark or the Netherlands, where trust is high. They are also societies with relatively few integrity regulations, while some of the most corrupt societies are packed with ethical codes and – unenforced – regulation. Most of the evidence is actually against the intuitive presumption that more legal safeguards mean less corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2017). Another research area treats risk empirically, as circumstances most associated with corruption, such as procurement ‘red flags’ for auditors. This data mining approach can help detection as well as being a measurement and shows more promise (Fazekas, Cingolani and Tóth 2018). The first risk of error in corruption measurement is therefore poor conceptualization. A sound definition of corruption would include abuse of power and private– public trespass, but would further treat corruption as a policy problem applied to a governance context, not an individual one – in other words, what governance is, compared to what it should be. It would then clearly define what should be, as legal entitlements and access, rules and benchmarks, outcomes of distribution of resources and so on. The more applicable the definition is to the specific mission or goal of a public organization or role of a state (e.g. competitive markets free of favouritism, equal distribution of public education entitlements), the easier it is to measure deviant incidences against normal ones. UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), for instance, has a sound actionable definition of corruption in education as abuse of authority with consequences having a significant impact on access, quality or equity in education (Hallak and Poisson 2007). That definition relies on a clear benchmark (universality of education) and is measurable by connecting abuse with educational outcomes. Good measurements can thus be both direct and indirect (proxies), as long as a clear association can be established between corruption and the observable phenomena used for indirect measurement (such as procedures infringed or outcomes distorted). If, for instance, we measure corruption using procurement proxies (so standing for more than just procurement) a relationship must be identified between corruption in procurement and political corruption.3 Nowadays, when e-government and the digitalization of public data open wide avenues to monitor government performance, we have many indirect indicators of corruption. As part of various conditional aid packages a record number of countries have adopted mandatory financial disclosures, for instance for their officials, and that allows us to calculate the difference between assets that can be justified with reference to public income, and true assets. If the human agency exists, such monitoring is accessible to public agencies and investigative journalists alike. Market distortion and evidence of economic privilege is usually spread over

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headlines, if at least some free media exist in a corrupt country. What is missing is only a more systematic approach to assembling the data on economic rents in a country and its evolution across time. However, donors and investors have so far preferred to rely on expert scores rather than sponsor studies which could be of far greater specificity.

2.4  Establishing a universe and observation units Once a definition exists, the next question is ‘Can corruption in the area of interest be observed directly or indirectly?’ Corruption is far more observable in environments where it is widespread, where the difficulty of estimating it is often overstated. In commonly corrupt settings as against those in which it is exceptional, corruption can be measured both directly and indirectly, by observing both the private sector where there might be crony capitalism, and the public sector where positions might be occupied as a result of connections and nepotism, rather than on merit. Corruption can be measured only where its incidence is more than occasional or exceptional. Measurement is not meant to inform decisions in individual cases in the criminal court. Very different rules apply to the world of standard error estimates, normal distribution and sampling than are appropriate in the world of ‘reasonable doubt’. While a legal person has to get the details right in every case, a sociologist has only to get the pattern right. The next key step is then to establish the universe of observations and some framework for sampling. The error risks for sociologists here lie primarily in the wrong universe (e.g. a survey asking everybody about customs corruption, although less than 5 per cent use customs, and less than 10 per cent know anybody who does) or in the wrong selection of units (e.g. judging procurement only on the basis of published tenders, while most of the amount spent is not publicly advertised). But the measurement should not be submitted to some legal standard of proof intended to establish beyond reasonable doubt that each individual involved in every incident profited unduly. Rather, as Michael Johnston (2010) has argued, it is more actionable to measure government performance first to establish what is normal and what is deviant. A sound universe of observations should include all individuals or transactions where research tries to establish the incidence of particularism versus ethical universalism. Then, if possible all trans­ actions should be observed, or a random representative sample selected. Victimization surveys, for instance, where individuals are required to state if they have been asked for a bribe, have both advantages and limits in establishing favouritism. The question is clear and limited to a specific corruption phenomenon and sector. It is also phrased so as to minimize the responsibility of the respondent and blame the other side, which tends to encourage responses. A good guide to organizing such a survey exists from UNODC, who have the greatest experience with them (UNODC et al. 2018). The most important limitations of such surveys come from their general samples, which are seldom ideal as people are unevenly exposed

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to extortion by state agents. Users of some specific service, such as construction permit applicants, are underrepresented, so that there is the danger that this specific experience would fall beyond significance thresholds or perhaps be missed altogether. Victimization surveys are a positive step forward from general public opinion surveys, which are better for measuring trust overall than specific experiences. Furthermore, public opinion surveys often add the error of the wrong query (e.g. asking about matters of low importance or awareness for respondents, introducing hypothetical questions like ‘What would you do if confronted with . . . ?’ or inquiring about socially undesirable behaviour that people are reluctant to report). To study corruption in planning departments of city halls, specific universes should be circumscribed for the specific experience of getting a construction permit and specific samples drawn, limited to the people who share that experience and representative only of them. An example would be public service consumer surveys. Business surveys, such as the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey from the World Bank or the Flash Business Eurobarometer, represent such specific samples. But they have other problems. First, sampling businesses is more difficult than sampling voters, with many differences to be accounted for. Secondly, the researcher cannot control who in a busy company answers survey questions. A researcher cannot tell if the respondent is the manager or the office junior and consequently does not know how reliable the answers are. Thirdly, the subject of undesirability looms large, for unlike anonymous individual respondents who can blame bribes on extortion, businesses are more aware that they might share some legal responsibility (in the last 20 years, the national and international legislation has increasingly criminalized bribe-giving), so they might have a greater tendency to avoid giving answers. By and large, businesses indeed do tend to give a high proportion of non-answers or evasive answers, which explains why they correlate poorly with other indicators (Knack 2007). The researcher, whether practitioner or scholar, must also tailor the universe of observations to the specific question. What is the focus of the research? The market? Consumer satisfaction? Integrity of political parties? Public trust? Local corruption? Social loss? Whatever the area of interest, the universe should be established accordingly. According to size and availability, sampling might or might not be needed in procurement research. Open data means more and more researchers use all the data and do no sampling. While representative samples seem best, representativeness must be decided by more than one factor. If the top twenty business people ranked by assets in a country are far ahead of anyone else and made their fortunes from commercial relationships with government (e.g. mining concessions, public contracts, monopolies), they are representative enough to measure crony capitalism. Depending on the definition of corruption and the sector, observation units can be the most diverse in corruption studies. If the research question is about shell companies, then the universe will be companies; if the research question is about favouritism in administration, then the universe will be all the transactions of one administration in a given field. For research questions about political corruption,

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the universe might be Members of the European Parliament, mayors or members of a local council. How many members of an elected local council are in a position where there is conflict of interest? How many members in the French Senate employ family members on the public payrolls of their cabinets? How many administrative units comply with the legal obligation to publish their expenses at year end or whenever the law requires? How many companies comply with legal compliance rules? What percentage of all the mayors audited do auditors find problematic and what percentage are actually indicted? Such observation units allow close tabs to be kept on practices and they can be traced from year to year.

2.5  Selecting indicators for direct and indirect measurement Once we have applied a clear definition of corruption to our research and have made the observations to study it, we are ready to move on to selection of the right indicators. That has often proved to be a challenge. Political favouritism in social allocation is one of the areas of direct measurement which includes all elements of the corruption definition. The percentage of public contracts won by bidders connected to officials or politicians, or illegal donations to parties’ campaigns, is a direct measurement of corruption. That particular measurement is simplified by the unprecedented transparency of party donations, registers of commerce, data on procurement awards and the mandatory conflict of interest disclosures by politicians. A computer programme in the Romanian National Integrity Agency called PREVENT checks all public contract awards against shareholders of companies and against another database to check for conflicts of interest with companies in which officials are involved. Of course, the measurement does not include more subtle links: shell companies behind which officials might be hiding, companies registered under friends’ or lawyers’ names and so forth. Although there is no corruption measurement able to measure all corruption (and there is a Nobel Prize waiting for whomever derives it) there is a succession of complementary measures which can trace an ever evolving phenomenon. Table 2.2 presents a selective review of papers assessing undue profit from political connections. A variety of approaches exist for public spending more generally, too. For instance, across four government cycles Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b, ch. 2) measures the allocation of funds for disaster relief (after eliminating disaster relief cases) by the political affiliation of the mayors receiving the funds (government versus opposition). Such partial allocation actually satisfies the basic corruption definition. Abuse is committed if funds with another destination are allocated to help government party mayors win votes (undue profit). Other direct measurements exist related to public employment. While many countries have formal regulations specifying that merit rather than cronyism should be the criterion for public appointment, such measures can seldom be sanctioned and enforced. Filling positions with loyalists is the main means by which corrupt officials channel social allocation to particular groups. There are means of direct

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Table 2.2  Measurement of favouritism based on undue political connection Source

Indicator used

Country

Year

Goldman et al. (2013)

Political office holders’ positions on company boards

US

1990–2004 General procurement

Luechinger & Moser (2014)

Political connections in companies US through board members

Akey (2013)

Firm’s connections to congressional candidates through campaign donations

US

Straub (2014)

Firm’s connections to political parties

Uruguay 2004–11

General procurement

Boas et al. (2014)

Firm’s political connections through campaign donations

Brazil

2004–10

General procurement

Bromberg (2014)

Firm’s political connections through campaign donations

US

2001–06

General procurement

Fazekas, Ferrali & Wachs (2018)

Firm’s political connections through campaign donations and procurement tendering risks

US

2004–15

General procurement

Denmark 2001–05

General procurement

Amore & Firm’s connections to political Bennedsen (2013) parties, directly or through family

20 year interval

Sector

Defence

1998–2010 Not sectorspecific

Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2015)

Companies’ illegal contributions to party finances before elections

Russia

1999–2000 General procurement

Cingano & Pinotti (2013)

Political office holders’ employment by companies

Italy

1985–97

General procurement

Doroftei & Dimulescu (2015)

Public contracts awarded to firms Romania 2003–07 associated with politicians; agency capture

Public infrastructure contracts

Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011)

Partisan allocation of disaster relief funds

Government emergency fund

Romania 2000–12

measurement of politicization of the civil service associated with certain tenure periods or simply non-competitive appointments (Gordon 2011; Meyer‐Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016; Volintiru 2016). The measurements fulfil all the definition criteria: attributing an official public position to a single bidder due to some particular link (party affiliation) deprives another equally or better qualified individual

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and distorts the principle of merit. Most administrations have quotas for politically filled jobs, which are frequently trespassed. That too is a measure of corruption as it involves the abuse of regulations which claim that appointment to public office should be competitive. Nepotism in public employment is direct evidence of corruption and can be measured; in fact, innovative political scientists even measure it across time to show how administrations even from previous centuries have evolved to meet the modern criteria of an autonomous and professional bureaucracy (Sundell 2013). Compliance with transparency and conflict of interest rules can also provide direct measurements of corruption when an association with corruption can be clearly established. What percentage of tenders are advertised publicly, as the law requires in many countries? The figure is not exactly known even for EU-28 members. What percentage of public contracts are awarded genuinely competitively? How many public contracts go to companies associated with the Mafia (Caneppele et al. 2009)? The European Commission (2018b) has set up a Single Market Scorecard where certain transparency and competitiveness criteria for procurement are listed, but they monitor only a minority of contracts, those being registered in the Tenders Electronic Daily.4 Nevertheless, problematic countries like Greece, Croatia and Romania topped the list in 2018 for both lack of competitiveness and transparency, in line with their national corruption indicators. Conflict of interest (and profit from it) can increasingly be traced and measured, which should also be seen as a direct measurement of corruption. Examples – from a much longer list – are the simultaneous holding of public and private offices (Etzioni 2009) or the ‘revolving door’ (Bó 2006; Dombrovsky 2008; Dávid-Barrett 2011; Amore and Bennedsen 2013; Freund 2017). Those measurements are particularly valid if they limit themselves to the cases where clear trespass exists (for instance, the revolving door only in the area an EU commissioner regulated during his tenure, rather than for all companies registered in the lobby register). The use of audit data wherever public audits are widespread is also a source of direct measurement. Audits are particularly well-developed for Brazil, where a series of audits such as federal audits are conducted at random to assess municipal spending of federal funds (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Vaz Mondo 2016). Similar audits are now being used in other countries (Gerardino et al. 2017). Audits can identify corruption (in the form of profit from conflict of interest), but more frequently they tend to unearth lack of compliance with rules, or simple fraud. While rarer, some corruption indicators are based on direct observation of bribes paid, either from court documents such as the Odebrecht plea agreement5 in the US Department of Justice case (Campos et al. 2019) or from companies’ internal records (Cole and Tran 2011). Large companies such as Siemens and Odebrecht seem to have kept very precise accounts of facilitation payments across countries they operated in, which is a novel source of data (Campos et al. 2019).

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Enforcement-based indicators already mentioned have the major disadvantage that they conflate detection capacity and corruption. They are certainly of value when detection is frequent enough: for instance, Golden and Picci (2006) have found an association between the proportion of Italian deputies charged with malfeasance during the Clean Hands campaign and measurement of public infrastructure based on public loss. Doroftei (2016) found a significant association between the number of public officials convicted of corruption by county and certain procurement malfeasance indicators. However, even if they capture correctly the difference among units (regions in these cases) except in very limited areas there is no way of ­calculating how much undetected corruption they miss. Where corruption cannot be observed directly or the corruption under study is more complex, then we resort to proxies. The search for the best proxies has triggered a real competition of innovation. Scholars are driven mostly by academic incentives and challenges, and less by the applicability of their work, so that many of them have a high degree of sophistication, but less impressive actionability. Still, many show an interest in other areas such as understanding and detecting corruption better, rather than measuring it. The most popular proxies can be classified in various ways. Two ways are more effective for the synthesis of a growing literature. First, proxies may be divided by level of observation: between macro (national governance context, sector), intermediate (agency or organization level) and micro (individual transaction). Each category has advantages and limitations, but to reiterate, a corruption measurement should be sought according to the goal followed by the researcher or policy-makers. At the micro level, research on proxies has produced a vast literature. The most widely used are proxies from public procurement, which try to capture corruption in terms both of processes and outcomes (Fazekas et al. 2016). After the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and after many states had joined the World Trade Organization, public procurement regulations around the world have aimed to establish transparent and efficient markets, with the result of increasing publicly available data. Procurement-based corruption proxies have been grouped in different ways following the logic of the procurement process (Transparency International 2006; OECD 2007) or simply differentiating processes and outcome-based measurements (Kenny and Musatova 2010). A recent paper (Fazekas, Cingolani and Tóth 2018) divides them as tendering risk indicators – what auditors call ‘red flags’; supplier risk indicators – for instance, shell companies (Christensen 2011); contracting body risk indicators, which capture the administrative weaknesses of the legal contracting body (Dahlström et al. 2019); and particularism indicators – particular connections between granters of contracts and the winners of them (Fazekas, Ferrali and Wachs 2018). The latter proxy can provide direct measurements of corruption. Evidence exists of cross-correlation among proxies, which increases their validity but suggests that only a combination of them can satisfy conditions for a full

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corruption definition and thus come close to a ‘corruption’ measurement (Fazekas and Kocsis 2017). An example of an effective proxy based on procurement data at the macro level is the public procurement market share of favoured government suppliers before and after changes in government (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2019). Changes in suppliers’ contract volume unexplained by economic and budgetary factors as governments change provides indirect evidence of systematic political favouritism. In addition, and as shown when comparing data for the United Kingdom and Hungary, such unexplained swings in a company’s fortunes when governments change tend to correlate with other tendering risk indicators such as single bidding (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2019). One of the most widely used tendering risk indicators featuring both in academic and policy research is single bidding in competitive markets (only one bid submitted). Substantial empirical evidence exists to validate the phenomenon as a corruption indicator (Fazekas and Kocsis 2017). First, a range of indirectly comparable perceptions of economic elites as well as businesses correlate with single bidding rates on the country-year level (Figure 2.1), suggesting that patterns of procurement tend to be national and observable, informing both expert and public perceptions of corruption. Second, other risk indicators too (the auditors ‘red flags’) correlate with single bidding at tender-level. Third, supplier risk indicators such as registration of bidders in tax havens also correlates with single bidding.

Source:  Fazekas and Kocsis (2017) and authors’ further compilation based on Government Transparency Institute data.

Figure 2.1  The association between single bidding and national corruption perception

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Fourth, overpricing is strongly associated with single bidding across a wide range of markets measured in terms both of discounts offered by bidders and the final unit price of the winning bid (Fazekas and Kocsis 2017). Measurements exist for organization level too. PETS is frequently a measurement at sub-national or agency level. An example is the measurement of Mafia infiltration per local government, developed by Caneppele et al. (2009; share of public contracts gained by companies with Mafia connections). Agency capture, the measurement developed by Mungiu-Pippidi (2015a) measures whether one contracting public authority grants more than half of either the volume or number of contracts to a single private entity. An estimate of compliance with transparency in procurement by contracting agency could inform a measurement to be further aggregated by geographical area or sector. Macro level survey-based measurements (experience, victimization) or proxies, such as the PACI or the IPI, have already been covered in previous sections of this chapter. A summary of the most-used measurements may be found in Table 2.3.

2.6  An agenda for the future We hope that the above review has demonstrated that measuring corruption is quite feasible if the right resources, analytical focus and sufficient patience is applied, as Kaufmann et al. (2003) have long argued. The dominance of expert, elite and population surveys in corruption measurement has gradually been eroded over the last five to ten years to give way to a more diverse landscape using a multitude of methods tailored to different forms of corruption. Many of those measurements are objective and actionable. The starting point for a future research agenda aiming to advance the corruption measurement landscape is to acknowledge that no single method is adequate on its own to measure all aspects and forms of corruption. As research has established (Acemoglu 1995; Gächter and Schulz 2016), the national context – the level where the rules of the game are set – is crucial. A comprehensive long-term national strategy to correct a suboptimal equilibrium is therefore indispensable whenever corruption is widespread. Tools like IPI cater for that need. However, any follow-up in terms of implementation per sector requires direct and indirect measurements at the micro and intermediate levels of the kind presented in this chapter. Only if we match measurement instruments to the right level and form of corruption shall we be able to derive effective measurement. The main limit on effective measurement remains transparency at national level, and the introduction of indicators of this sort (fiscal or procurement transparency, competitiveness of procurement) among any good governance conditions associated with foreign aid or trade treaties would be a major step forward. While corruption is clandestine, it is bound to leave traces in official records such as public tenders, company ownership, financial information and public sector employment

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Table 2.3  A synthetic comparison of corruption indicators Indicator

Specificity

National context level Perception indicators Expert scores first generation (Corruption Risk PRS, Low Business Index, Economist Intelligence Unit rating) Expert scores second generation (Global Medium Competitiveness Report survey), surveys based on reporters Public opinion surveys (Global Corruption Medium Barometer, continental surveys, victimization surveys)

Specific population surveys (consumers of a public service) Aggregates of expert scores and occasional public opinion surveys (CPI, CoC) Objective indicators IPI (6 proxies: 3 for corruption opportunities, 3 for constraints) PACI (FCPA cases/exports) Crony capitalism measurements Intermediate level Company level (compliance, political connections, ownership) Public agency level (transparency and conflict of interest measurements, ‘revolving door’, social loss, capture) Detection measurements (corruption convictions per county) Market distortion measures

Comparison across time

Comparison across units

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

High

Yes in principle Yes (in practice, too many changes across years) Yes Yes

Low

Yes

Yes

High

Yes

Yes

High High

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

High

Yes

Yes

High

Yes

Yes

High

Yes

Yes

High

Yes

Yes

Yes, at aggregate level

Yes, at aggregate level

Micro level Procurement based corruption risk indicators High transaction level (such as single bidding or red flag based indicators)

practice. As nearly all countries in the world have meanwhile adopted UNCAC (so far without any significant impact on control of corruption), the contradiction between rules and practices has been pushed to an unprecedented level. UNCAC makes open access, fair competition and transparency of public resources the new universal rules of the game, prescribed in nearly every country by legal frameworks.

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Consequently, measuring the implementation gap between formal integrity and merit-based rules and actual practice has never been easier. Non-governmental organizations, in particular corruption watchdogs, excel at such endeavours (for the particular case of PETS, see Sundet 2008), which also have a central role in increasing awareness of corruption and, if governments were willing, could become highly effective tools of public management. In the hope that constituencies for governance evolution will develop further, the next agenda on corruption measurement should draw on recent innovations, focusing on indicators based on publicly available data, and corresponding to the criteria listed in this chapter: ●● ●● ●● ●●

grounded in a theoretically sound understanding of the corruption process, based on objective data describing actor behaviour, defined at micro and intermediate levels and allowing for consistent comparison across time and units.

Sources of data are becoming increasingly transparent and even digital. They ­consist of: ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●●

public procurement allocations state subsidies and guarantees for enterprises public property sales and rentals public licences and permits public sector employment and appointments welfare payments the making of laws and regulations outsourced government services concessions for exploitation of natural resources sub-national transfers and allocations tax exemptions (from VAT, for example) international aid

The field of corruption measurement therefore looks increasingly fertile. In just three decades great strides have been made and first- and next-generation indicators validate and complement one another. The only obstacles to further development come not from science but from the lukewarm commitment to transparency and public integrity still shown by so many governments. However, indicators are ready for the moment when governments understand that every pubic expense should be posted in open format and every consumer with Internet access is empowered to be part of a feedback survey. NOTES 1 Available at https://www.integrity-index.org. 2 See, for instance, the defunct Public Integrity Index (Camerer 2006). 3 See, for instance, Hessami (2014) for an example of how this can be done. 4 More extensive data exists on https://www.opentender.eu for 35 European jurisdictions. 5 Available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/919916/download.

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3

A political approach to corruption

Paul M. Heywood

3.1 Introduction With a small number of very notable exceptions – Leys (1965), Heidenheimer (1970), Scott (1972), Johnston (1982) – comparative political scientists paid scant attention to corruption prior to the 1990s. Seen overwhelmingly as an issue that affected developing nations, corruption was viewed by Huntington (1968) as a by-product of modernization as societies progressed from more traditional forms of rule, even serving under certain circumstances to integrate new groups into evolving political systems and strengthening political parties. Certainly, there was little sense as the twentieth century entered its final decade that corruption would emerge as one of the dominant political issues of the next quarter century, widely seen as a key factor in the loss of trust in institutions and the rise of popular ­backlash against elite-led rule in a host of regime types across the globe. The ostensible precipitant of the intensified focus on corruption from the early 1990s was the mani pulite (clean hands) investigation in Italy, which uncovered a vast system of political corruption, dubbed Tangentopoli (Bribesville, or Kickback City) after the initial arrests in Milan. That there was widespread corruption in Italy hardly came as a surprise to anyone who knew anything about the country; instead, what made mani pulite so significant was the sheer scale and systemically embedded nature of the corruption, built upon a self-sustaining vicious circle of mal­ administration, clientelism and corrupt exchanges that encompassed not just the entire political class, but also bureaucrats, businesses and organized crime (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999). As might be expected, the Italian revelations prompted questions about whether similarly corrupt networks existed in other established Western democracies. Academic research, driven mainly by political scientists and area specialists, started to focus more attention on the issue, resulting in a number of edited collections that explored corruption in different countries, sometimes without any overarching analytic framework or approach. Instead, these studies offered broad and predominantly descriptive overviews of the emergence, development and impact of political corruption in Western Europe, sometimes seeking to distinguish between ‘least’, ‘somewhat’ and ‘most’ corrupt countries (Ridley and Doig 1995; Mény 1996; Della Porta and Mény 1997; Bull and Newell 2003). Other collections looked further 27

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afield, for instance at the post-Communist countries (Kotkin and Sajó 2002; Kornai and Rose-Ackerman 2004), Latin America (Little and Posada-Carbó 1996; Morris and Blake 2010) or Asia (Bakker and Schulte Nordholt 1996; Kang 2002). Some ostensibly more thematic volumes also tended to have a national case study focus, often in emerging democracies or the developing world (Levi and Nelken 1996; Girling 1997; Heywood, 1997; Doig and Theobald 2000; Johnson 2004). More generally, though, the interest in corruption sparked by the mani pulite scandal reinforced an emerging concern that insufficient attention had been paid by international actors – and not just academic researchers – to the issue of political corruption across the board. Of crucial importance in that regard was the collapse of the Soviet-backed Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. Where previously it had been possible to turn a blind eye to the more distasteful elements of various autocratic regimes, so long as they shared anti-communist sentiments, the democratic triumphalism of the post-Cold War order opened the space to raised expectations. Now that democracy was increasingly seen as the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 15) more attention began to be paid both to the need to support its further extension and also to assess the quality and functioning of existing democratic regimes. This chapter focuses on how research into political corruption has developed since the early 1990s, arguing that whereas the initial stimulus led to a predominant emphasis on the experience of individual countries, later work started to pay more attention to the causal drivers of both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance, though still with an emphasis on nation states as the primary unit of analysis. Only with the emergence of further scandals, arguably even more catalytic than the mani pulite revelations, did the research focus begin to change significantly: the Panama and Paradise Papers disclosures, LuxLeaks and the Lava Jato investigations in Latin America highlighted not only the increasingly transnational nature of corrupt networks, but also the limitations of looking at political corruption through the lens of individual nation states. Much of the literature on political corruption has focused on specific organizational factors, as discussed in the section below, which explores some of their main manifestations. However, in an ever more complex and interconnected world, such an understanding of political corruption can be seen as too narrow; indeed, it can be argued that all corruption is political since by definition it involves an abuse of power. The chapter’s third section therefore turns to broader approaches that focus on governance orders more generally and explores how the aspiration for ‘good governance’ has in turn been challenged by the impact of globalization on the nature and capacity of individual states. The final section offers suggestions for new directions in research in the context of these challenges.

3.2  Politics for sale: money, murk and malfeasance The mani pulite revelations, together with a host of other scandals implicating governments across the globe during the 1990s, prompted concern about three

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broad manifestations of political corruption: the relationship between money and politics, with a particular focus on party funding and elections; the abuse of state resources, with a focus on the distortion of decision-making and the purchasing of policy; and the undermining of public integrity and accountability, with a focus on favouritism and the impunity of politicians. Taken together, these trends have contributed significantly to a growing perception of corruption in political life, with political parties in particular routinely seen as the most corrupt institutions in survey after survey.

3.2.1  Money and politics Significant interest in the relationship between party financing and political corruption arose in parallel to the decline in mass membership of parties, notably in established European democracies (Katz et al. 1992; Mair and van Biezen 2001). As the costs of engagement in democratic political processes continued their seemingly inexorable rise – on account of ever more sophisticated electoral technologies, an increasing number of electoral arenas at sub- and supra-national levels, and inflationary pressures – so parties had to find ever more funding even as their income from membership dues continued to fall (Hopkin 2004). The result was an emerging ‘arms race’ in the search for finance. As direct party links with society have eroded, so political parties have become more dependent on the state both for resources and legitimacy. So-called rent-seeking activities by parties entailed a range of mechanisms that were crucially dependent on their relationship to the state, allowing them to act as gatekeepers for access to government expenditure. Thus, research on political corruption focused on the differing linkages between parties and states in established and new democracies, as well as regional differences in the latter (van Biezen and Kopecký 2007). Particular attention was paid to the regulatory framework for party funding in recently established democracies (Burnell and Ware 1998; Smilov and Toplak 2007), stressing the difficulty of establishing rules that were both equitable and also functional and enforceable. It was not clear that any of the key regulatory variables – direct public funding for parties, disclosure laws on sources of funds, donation and campaign spending limits, free political broadcasts – protected against corruption. In particular, neither the fact, nor the scale, of public subsidies for electoral politics appears to offer a clear outcome in terms of benefits and drawbacks (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). A plethora of party funding scandals has continued to emerge across all democratic regime types, established or not. Falguera et al. (2014) provide a comprehensive global analysis of political finance regulations, noting that ‘the penetration of illicit funds into politics poses a particular danger . . . In all regions of the world there is a deeply worrying trend of money in politics drowning out the voices of ordinary citizens.’ If the funding of political parties and elections has been one main focus in respect of corruption, another has been the mechanisms through which political parties secure electoral support. In particular, much attention has been paid to clientelism and clientelistic exchanges. Whilst political corruption and clientelism have significant commonalities, generally corruption is characterized by illegality and does

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not depend on vertical interrelationships, whereas clientelism entails asymmetric, vertical and subordinate ties between parties and voters (Kawata 2006). Much of the work on clientelism has stressed particularistic ties between parties and their supporters at the expense of programmatic policy positions, using the language of dyadic relationships (patron and clients, brokerage), hierarchy, reciprocity and predictability (for an overview, see Hicken 2011). The association with political corruption is underlined by evidence that where clientelistic practices are widespread, control of corruption is less effective; indeed, it has been suggested that indicators of corruption can be seen as a proxy for clientelism (Keefer 2007). Party political clientelism has been strongly associated with particular regions and newer democracies, with several studies focused on Latin America, where clientelism sits at the apex of a series of informal governance mechanisms that work alongside the formal rule of democracy (O’Donnell 1996; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Hilgers 2012). Other studies have looked at South East Asia, where ‘“money politics” often trumps ideology, and personal, clientelistic networks trump party discipline’ (Berenschot 2015). As in Latin America, Asian political parties often mix ostensibly programmatic policies – particularly in social welfare arenas such as healthcare or education – with personalized distribution of money and state resources through a complex network of brokers (Hutchcroft 1997; Khan and Jomo 2000; Tomsa and Ufen 2012). Similar mechanisms have also been observed in southern Europe, stimulated in large measure by Banfield’s influential, controversial and endlessly debated notion of ‘amoral familism’ as the moral basis of ‘backward’ societies (Banfield 1958; Ferragina 2009). The notion has also been applied to African states, where clientelism has been reinforced by ethnic cleavages that solidify patron–client relationships, though recent research has stressed similar overlaps between particularistic and programmatic policy offers to those seen in Latin America and Asia (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013).

3.2.2  Abuse of state resources As Scarrow (2007, p. 207) has observed, ‘wherever money has the power to influence the outcome of elections, there is the likelihood that politicians who need money to help them win may pay disproportionate attention to the opinions and wishes of their major funders.’ Thus, in addition to party funding and vote buying, a further key area of concern in terms of political corruption is the purchase of policy access – in particular, the risk that favourable policy outcomes may be bought. The spectrum runs from legitimate lobbying activity – a necessary mechanism for seeking to represent interests and influence officials and decision-makers – via distortion of public procurement as a result of corrupted tender and bidding processes, through to full-blown state capture in which politicians and public officials sell goods and services to individual firms as a deliberate rent-seeking mechanism. Whilst concern about the purchase of influence via lobbying has been increasing in established Western democracies, notably the United States, state capture has been seen as a key risk in many former Communist countries as well as in some Latin American and African states (Grzymala-Busse 2008; Innes 2014; Fazekas and Tóth 2016).

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The point at which lobbying as a form of political advocacy shades into illegitimate influence is imprecise, but critics point to a lack of transparency as the major issue. In a recent study, Teachout (2014) argues that when the founders of the American constitution originally embedded protections against corruption they saw lobbying as an illegitimate activity, but Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s subsequently narrowed the legal definition of corruption to direct quid pro quo acts. As a result, concern about lobbying influence on the policy process – especially in the US, but also across many developed democracies – has continued to grow, even if the evidence of its actual impact is keenly disputed (Lowery 2013). Kaufmann and Vicente (2011) included lobbying as one dimension of what they termed ‘legal corruption’, which entails lawful but unethical behaviour by companies and individuals to shape law or policies to their advantage. This growing concern has been paralleled by the emergence of so-called Astroturf lobbying, whereby vested interests are hidden behind a fake veneer of grassroots organizations (Miller 2009). In some senses, these arguments reflect Lindblom’s (1977) classic work, Politics and Markets, which noted the privileged position of business in capitalist democracies and argued that ‘controlled volitions’ ensured that the masses are persuaded to ask of elites only what the elites want to give them. Indeed, somewhat cynically, some see the term ‘lobbying’ in rich countries as a synonym for what would be called ­corruption in poor ones (Poutvaara 2015). Public procurement has been a focus of growing attention in relation to political corruption, especially in economics literature on incentives (Søreide 2002; RoseAckerman and Palifka 2016, part I). Government expenditure has increased massively over the course of the last century, largely driven by ever greater social expenditure. It represents over a third of gross domestic product in most developed countries, and in low- to middle-income countries, public procurement can account for around half of all government expenditure, offering often high-value contracts that are an obvious target for corruption. Moreover, in a context of deregulatory, market-driven shifts towards privatization, contracting-out, public– private partnerships and other mechanisms designed to promote competition, the value and frequency of procurement opportunities has continued to rise inexorably, increasing the risk of corrupt rent-seeking. The key corruption risks in procurement revolve especially around bidding processes (restricted competition and collusion, short tender periods, party political links, personal connections between bidders and decision-makers) and post-contract negotiations (revised budgets, oversight and accountability shortfalls). Whilst there is broad consensus on both the reasons for and the risks of procurement corruption (widely referred to as ‘red flags’), recent research has suggested that measures to tackle it in the context of development aid may simply displace it to other areas (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2018). When virtually all decisions over public expenditure are distorted by rent-seeking activities, it is common to refer to ‘state capture’ – that is, a situation in which firms shape the underlying rules of the game in the form of laws and regulations via illicit payments to public officials (Hellman et al. 2000b). Particular attention

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was paid following the post-Soviet transition to the issue of state capture in the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, where it is argued that key institutions have been ‘captured’ by private interests in order to bias policy-making decisions in favour of particular firms. Such capture includes the sale of parliamentary votes and presidential decrees as well as criminal and commercial court decisions, and the diversion of central bank funds to political parties and private interests. Research in the early 2000s suggested that those countries which had taken rapid and far-reaching steps towards liberalizing their economies – notably the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – were the least prone to state capture, particularly in comparison to the partial reform experiences of places such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine (Hellman et al. 2000a). However, more recent research offers clear evidence of backsliding, even in countries supposedly subject to the market discipline of European Union (EU) membership; this is particularly true of Hungary, where Fazekas and Tóth (2016) have demonstrated how the radical centralization of the governing elite following the 2010 elections has been reflected in a growing centralization of state capture. Similar trends have been evident in Poland, where opportunities for state capture have been linked to privatization and EU cohesion funds. Even in Bulgaria and Romania, where the EU introduced its Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to address corruption concerns, clientelism and state capture have remained major issues (DG Migration and Home Affairs 2019).

3.2.3  Undermining public integrity and accountability If state capture represents an extreme example of policy influencing and purchase, the perceived impunity of those engaged in it has been of increasing interest to scholars. Again, there is a spectrum of severity, ranging from the so-called revolving door (government officials leaving office to become lobbyists, consultants and strategists in the areas of their direct responsibility, and vice versa), through cronyism and nepotism in public sector appointments, to kleptocratic plunder of state coffers by political leaders who seem immune from prosecution. Research on the revolving door in established democracies has linked it directly to the growth of money in politics as well as ‘institutional corruption’ (Blanes i Vidal et al. 2012; Lessig 2013), again recalling Lindblom’s analysis from the mid1970s. Miller and Dinan (2009) in a report commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development saw revolving doors as playing an important role in the 2008 financial crisis, arguing for better rules and procedures to control conflicts of interest. Brezis and Cariolle (2014) developed a Revolving Door Indicator, seeking to capture the economic damage caused by the policy distortions that result from the movement of individuals between the highest levels of government and private financial groups. Crouch (2011) has argued giant firms are so dominant and so close to governments that they can break most of the rules of what economists understand by the free market. In the United Kingdom, for example, Wilks (2015) suggests that ‘a corporate elite . . . has succeeded in colonising government . . . Big corporations are literally making government in their own image.’

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These corporate elites are driven by a shared concern to pursue and retain their income and wealth, using their influence to manipulate political systems in their interest. In the 1990s, Della Porta and Pizzorno (1996) referred to ‘business politicians’, with skills in operating illegal exchanges within complicit networks; Fieschi and Heywood (2004) identified ‘entrepreneurial populists’, often shady business professionals who enter politics to exploit voters’ cynicism and play the system for their own reward; Wedel (2009) later coined the term ‘flexian’ to describe an elite professional class engaged in multiple overlapping roles across government and the business world. More recently, Michelutti et al. (2018) have described South Asian ‘gangster politicians’ as Mafia Raj, theorizing an art of bossing that links crime, corruption and the lure of the ‘strongman’. Cooley and Sharman (2017), in turn, have spoken of ‘globalized individuals’, wealthy politically powerful people able to operate across multiple jurisdictions on the margins of legality. Such developments have served to undermine standard accountability mechanisms and call into question the integrity of those political systems that allow them to operate. Favouring relatives (nepotism) and personal friends (cronyism) has historically been associated with non- and quasi-democratic regimes, where political integrity is already compromised. In such cases, it is often associated with embezzlement of state resources, sometimes referred to as kleptocracy. Historically most closely associated with sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, kleptocracies are states in which corruption serves as the main means of capital accumulation as exercised by elites and high-level state functionaries. Thus, kleptocratic impunity has usually been associated with leaders in the developing world, notably dictators like Gaddafi, Suharto, Marcos and Abacha. Charap and Harm (1999) wrote that kleptocratic states function on the basis of predatory hierarchies in which corrupt offices are created to satisfy the leader’s aim to foster loyalty through patronage, an extreme version of the clientelism discussed above. Originally coined by Andreski (1966), the idea of kleptocracy is increasingly being used as a criticism of formally democratic states, notably contemporary South Africa, where a judicial enquiry into allegations of state capture was established in 2018 to explore the influence of the Gupta family on the ruling African National Congress under Jacob Zuma (Southall 2019) and even the USA under Donald Trump (Foer 2019). The analysis of political corruption outlined so far has concentrated primarily on the demand and support side of the input–output process described by Easton (1953) in his seminal approach to political systems analysis. The next section will turn to approaches that focus more on the regulation and resource distribution side. However, it can be argued that any such approach is too broad to capture the many varieties of political corruption in a manner that is analytically helpful. To address that issue, Johnston (2005) identified four syndromes of corruption, associated with particular regime types. In influence markets, although institutions and legal systems are relatively strong, politicians may offer themselves for rent, thereby undermining faith in democracy. Elite cartels are characterized by a small group of families that sometime collaborate and sometimes compete to control national politics and business. In the case of oligarchs and clans, rival groups compete for

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government favour in states that are institutionally weak. Finally, under official moguls, political leaders act with impunity and no accountability, focusing as much on enriching themselves as on governing. What underpins all these examples is an understanding of political corruption as the promotion of special interests at public expense, whether operating within legal frameworks or circumventing them. Indeed, it reinforces the argument that if corruption entails an abuse of power, then all corruption is ultimately political. To that end, we need to broaden our focus away from a narrow emphasis on such things as the party funding, electoral competition or the policy process, to look instead at governance orders more broadly understood.

3.3  Good governance: the holy grail that lost its lustre The widespread acceptance in the developed world that the end of Soviet-led Communism would lead ineluctably to ever more countries embracing Westernstyle liberal democracy in turn prompted more focus on how democracies should best be organized – that is, what were the distinguishing features of ‘good’ governance. Once its core elements had been appropriately identified, the achievement of good governance was expected not only to ensure democratic stability, but also to serve – by definition – as a protection against corruption, given that lack of corruption was one of its characteristics. Good governance was in turn seen by critics as inextricably tied to a political agenda designed to reinforce Western dominance, recalling the 1960s view of corruption being a pathology primarily of developing states. In fact, the concept of good governance would come to assume an increasingly negative connotation amongst development scholars, notably Grindle (2004, 2007) and Levy (2014), who pointed to its normative nature, tautological underpinnings, unrealistic expectations and increasingly elastic application. From a social science perspective, the notion of ‘governance’ emerged in the mid1990s to highlight the contrast with more traditional understandings of government. Parallel with the globalizing trend that would result in what some described as a ‘flattened world’ (Greenhill 2009), this notion of governance sought to capture the changing and increasingly fluid relationship between the state and mechanisms of social coordination. The term ‘governance’ was thus designed to reflect a shift from hierarchical to more network-based approaches to decision-making (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998). Of particular importance was the recognition that traditional boundaries between private and public sectors and actors were becoming more blurred, while national states were increasingly dependent both on each other and on a growing array of international organizations (Sundström and Jacobsson 2007). This change in the environment within which states operate would become an increasingly important determinant of the ways in which political corruption developed, as will be discussed further below. A series of important macro-level studies in the fields of economics, historical sociology and political science have helped shape our understanding of variously

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described ‘governance orders’ – that is, the capacity of states to manage public versus private interests in overseeing resource allocation. These are seen as running on a continuum from negative (in which political corruption is routine) to positive (in which political corruption is an exception). In contrast to the focus on the input side of the policy-making process, as discussed above in the section on politics for sale, the work on political corruption as an expression of poor governance has often looked at the output side, paying more attention to the implementation than the design of policy. It therefore focuses predominantly on interactions between citizens and public officials, whether elected or appointed. Thus, Rothstein and Teorell (2008) see impartiality in the implementation of laws and policies as the core characteristic of a properly functioning governance order, in contrast to favouritism as its inverse (though it should be acknowledged that Rothstein has consistently rejected the term ‘governance’ on the grounds that it is too woolly a concept to be useful). Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) (see also Mungiu 2006) describes ethical universalism as a norm of distribution of goods and resources in line with laws, rules and the modern principles of administrative impartiality; the obverse is particularism, characterized by a norm of favouritism and discrimination. In similar vein, North et al. (2007, 2009) contrasted open access orders (market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party systems and a secure government monopoly over violence) with limited access orders (where political elites divide up control of the economy to oversee distribution of rents). And in turn, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) distinguish inclusive institutions (where many are involved in governing) from extractive ones (where a small group exploits the majority). It might be assumed that these approaches see political corruption as a deviation from how well-working governance orders should operate – that is, impartially, inclusively, based on ethical universalism and open access. In fact, unlike much of the academic literature that has understood corruption in terms of individual level transgressions, the focus on governance orders stresses the importance of analysing specific contexts. As pointed out by Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011, p. 11), particularism is a default pattern since resources are usually limited and therefore closely protected and restricted. Importantly, such an approach thereby shifts the focus away from addressing political corruption directly (in the sense of seeking to identify and tackle the kinds of manifestation outlined in the earlier part of this chapter) and instead emphasizes political corruption as a symptom of broader institutional shortcomings. The approach also demonstrates the need to explore underpinning concepts that are core to understanding political corruption, such as reciprocity, patrimonialism, modernization, development, democratic transition and so forth (Rothstein and Varraich 2017). Thus, it reflects a growing emphasis on obliquity as the best approach to addressing complex problems (Kay 2010; Rothstein 2018). The focus on governance orders represents a significant step forward in our understanding of political corruption at the macro level. Studies already mentioned in this genre, plus others such as You (2015) or Uslaner (2017), combine quantitative

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analysis with theoretical models, and emphasize the need to understand historical trajectories through the use of detailed case studies to explore and test propositions. A key lesson from all these works is that context is hugely important: to understand how states have managed to move from particularism/favouritism to impartiality/ ethical universalism we need to study their individual trajectories in appropriate historical perspective. Thus, for instance, Rothstein (2011a) explains the administrative reforms that helped Sweden and Denmark move from limited to openaccess orders as a ‘big bang’ following military defeats, while Mungiu-Pippidi’s (2015b) comprehensive account of how societies develop control of corruption outlines various different paths to good governance, focusing on the development of such things as efficient and meritocratic bureaucracies, budget transparency, free trade, engaged citizens, a free press, an independent judiciary and so forth. The detailed analysis of trajectories from particularism to ethical universalism reveals a highly complex set of factors at play, from which it is difficult to draw clear and applicable lessons about what leads to success. Indeed, it could be argued that the different ‘paths to success’ identified in the Scandinavian, Anglo-American and Continental European cases underpin a certain arbitrariness in developmental outcomes. For instance, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) argues that contemporary ‘achievers’ had different starting points, building on either crisis and existential threats or gradualist reforms, with popular pressure from below sometimes helping to challenge existing modes of government. The only constant appears to be the need for elite groups willing to challenge the status quo, although it is not clear why that should exist in some cases and not others. In You’s (2015) work examining land reforms in Asian states through the lens of inequality, a key contingent factor appears to be a perceived external threat to the prevailing particularistic order acting as a spur to reform. Thus, and in line with evolutionary theory in economics, the influence of random events counterweighs some more traditional structuralist approaches that play down the significance of chance and unpredictability in historical development (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979). The choice of examples of ‘success’ in regard to governance orders may run the risk of teleology, since the selection of these cases is based on ex post assessments of the outcomes that are being explained, leading to a certain circularity in the approach. More significantly, however, a common feature of all works on the importance of governance orders is a focus on nation states. Indeed, the positive end of the governance order spectrum appears to presuppose (at least implicitly) a particular kind of ideal-type state: a post-Westphalian model, entailing a clear separation of powers and an unambiguous differentiation between public and private sectors, with the former responsible for the equitable implementation of government policy. In such a framework, political corruption is understood as a pathology that belongs within the realm of public officials and the public sector, threatening the impartiality and ethical universalism that characterizes good governance/-ment. Leaving aside any issue of normative judgement (and many would be more than happy with such a nation state framework), the reality is that such a model is of increasingly questionable relevance in the developed world. In short, it no longer functions as a useful

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descriptor of the positive end of the governance order spectrum – and the principal reason for that, perhaps ironically, is the very success of a deregulatory market-led capitalist order over communism that was expected to cement good governance. Whilst the term remains deeply disputed, ‘globalization’ (as routinely used since the 1980s to describe an increasingly interpenetrated world) has had a profound impact on both the nature and capacity of modern states. Although nation states have not disappeared as physical entities – indeed, there has been a growth in their number in recent decades – the way they operate has changed. Amongst the most significant changes are the emergence of global markets, the impact of technological change on financial transactions and the financialization of ever more sectors of activity, the growth of massively powerful multinational corporations, the development of powerful trade blocs, the rise of migration and the internationalization of a host of activities from pressure groups to organized crime. Taken together, these changes have altered some of basic principles that underpinned any notion of good governance. Dasgupta (2018) argues that the core elements of nation states that allowed them to deliver inclusive, open-access and impartial governance for much of the twentieth century have been undermined in particular by deregulated finance and autonomous technology. Critically, the ‘fit’ between politics, economics and information – all of which had been organized at national scale through much of the twentieth century – has been disrupted by globalization. Management of the economy and of information now operates largely beyond the authority of individual nation states, with global capital and technology increasingly able to rule without appropriate mechanisms of democratic consultation. These developments are reflected in the nature of the scandals revealed through the Panama and Paradise Papers, LuxLeaks and the Odebrecht scandal, described by the US Justice Department as the ‘largest foreign bribery case in history’. These scandals have highlighted the close interpenetration between leading politicians and global corporations, the facilitation of illicit financial flows that shift resources from the developing world, the blurring of lines between public and private roles, and the capacity of the financial elite to avoid any form of national regulation. What these cases show is the loss of state authority over capital, which was arguably one of the aims of the global financial deregulation that underpinned the spread of globalization. As Innes (2018) observes in relation to such trends in the UK, ‘[a] relatively hidden dimension of today’s crisis of state failure is the increasingly pervasive role for private businesses throughout the entire state administration . . . State authority . . . has increasingly been gifted into private hands.’ In the USA, Kettl (2015) points to the increasing interweaving of public and private power, such as the provision of Medicare by private health insurance companies, arguing that such interwoven programmes are the most prone to fraud and mismanagement. Such developments, common across most industrialized nations, have undermined both accountability mechanisms and the principle of fiscal consent, as well as the idea that political corruption is something that operates within the realm of public officials.

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3.4  New directions for research We need to recalibrate our understanding of political corruption, recognizing that it is more wide-ranging and complex than has traditionally been thought. Although a myriad of scholarly studies has improved our understanding of the specific mechanics of political corruption and the factors that influence its propensity to occur, ongoing changes in the global context mean that we need further to extend and refine our research focus. In relation to the issues discussed in this chapter, the following interlinked areas require further research and analysis. First, we need to explore in greater depth what it means to move beyond a world view of corruption being seen as a problem of deviance within the governance of nation states that are assumed to function otherwise as rational, mostly Weberian units in a mostly Westphalian international system. Good governance turned out to be a hollow promise in many respects and the predominant focus on individual states has overlooked a host of other actors and processes that actually shape the reality of corruption. That poses a challenge not only to rethink how we understand the way corruption operates, but also the international system itself. Some research has started to move in that direction, notably work on informal governance and power networks in countries such as Russia, Mexico and Tanzania (Ledeneva 2013; Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017). But we need more, and more creative, use of different methodological approaches – process tracing and network analysis in particular – to understand better the reality of how and why corruption has developed, functions and adapts in non-Western settings, as well as the increasing interpenetration between the developing and developed worlds, especially via socalled professional enablers. Second, we need a better understanding of how changes in state capacity are being reflected in the emergence of new opportunities for corruption. In particular, the ever-greater blurring of distinctions in the remits of public and private sectors and the increased involvement of the latter in the design as well as the delivery of public policies, calls for further research into how these changes are shaping the opportunities for and modalities of political corruption. We need more detailed exploration of how conventional modes of accountability are being bypassed, thus calling into question how we should identify the operation of impartial or open access governance orders in a world of post-modern states. For instance, the growth of a private military industry as a result of privatization and outsourcing has both undermined state authority, with private firms ‘increasingly able to set security agendas and alter the understanding of interests’ (Leander 2006, p. 138), and also reinforced the role of unaccountable private actors in the broader policy process. A further example is the surge over recent years in the number of privately employed security personnel operating in Afghanistan under Pentagon contracts. Equally, we need further research on the intertwining of intelligence agencies, counterterrorism efforts and corrupt networks, notably in Latin America, Asia and some former Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Some important groundwork in this direction has been done by, for instance, Wedel (2009, 2014), Cockcroft (2012, 2016), Chayes (2015) and Shelley (2014).

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Third, we need to understand better how the changes associated with globalization and financial deregulation have been creating the opportunities to support corrupt activities within and between different jurisdictions. An important stimulus to such work has been the various leaks of documents made available via the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project as well as individual whistle-blowers. These documents have begun to reveal in ever more detail how a corrupt global elite has been able to game the international financial system to hide its illicit wealth, often stolen from the very poorest populations in the world. They also highlight the complexity and scale of illicit financial flows, their direct links to corruption and also the vehicles used to support their operation. Important initial work on these issues has been done by Christensen (2012), Findley et al. (2014) and Sharman (2017), but the availability of new material will allow further detailed research. Fourth, we need further research into how data and intelligence information are being used as sources of power to corrupt conventional political processes. In particular, the role of the data analytics industry in political communication has been at the centre of concerns about malign efforts to influence and disrupt politics in foreign jurisdictions, using corrupt means. Although there has been recent reporting on links between Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, following another ­whistle-blower leak revealing the misuse of data to behaviourally microtarget voters, the main focus has so far been on the activities of Russia and China. According to a recent assessment of annual secret service reports in 11 countries between 2014 and 2018 (Karlsen 2019), Russia targets the West through a divide and rule approach, using multiple tools of influence, including social media, human intelligence and cyber operations and, specifically, corruption in the energy and other strategically important sectors. These findings align with The Kremlin Playbook, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that sees corruption as the lubricant of an ‘unvirtuous circle’ of Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe (Conley et al. 2016). The report describes corruption as the conduit through which Russian influence is channelled, creating a circuitous and opaque network that reduces governance standards. Although China has so far attracted less attention, its massive investments over recent years in developing countries as part of its Belt and Road Initiative have helped create new opportunities for corruption, leading to the co-opting of political and economic elites – as, for example, in Malaysia under Najib Razak (Doig 2019; see also US–China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018, ch. 3). This chapter has argued that changes in the global political order that took place following the end of the Cold War have resulted in major challenges to the belief that democratic hegemony would be reflected in improved standards of governance. Rather than liberal democracies serving as beacons of good practice in relation to corruption, instead political scandals have emerged at a seemingly ever greater rate. Concerns about the influence of money in politics and the distortion of decision-making processes have been exacerbated by the rise of new modalities and opportunities for political corruption as classic mechanisms of accountability

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have failed to keep pace with the changing nature and capacity of nation states in an increasingly globalized and flattened world. In turn, the interpenetration of public and private sectors, alongside more porous physical and technological boundaries, has disrupted standard patterns of political practice. New expressions of political corruption have been revealed that operate through complex cross-border networks and involve a constellation of actors who cut across the political, financial and commercial world, able to take advantage of regulatory loopholes that they, in large part, have designed.

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4

Recent approaches to the study of social norms and corruption

Nils Köbis, David Jackson and Daniel Iragorri Carter

4.1 Introduction Empirical research on the social aspects of corruption ranges from interpersonal modes of exchange and social organization forms like networks and clans to the broader rules of the game (institutions) shaping state–society relations (Banfield 1958; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Lambsdorff et al. 2004; Mungiu 2006; Scott 1972). Yet only infrequently have researchers used social norms frameworks as the primary lens with which to analyse corrupt practices. Meanwhile, research on other socially embedded practices has increasingly emphasized the importance of social norms as an analytical and policy framework (Cialdini et al. 2006; Efferson et al. 2015; Bicchieri 2016; Tankard and Paluck 2016). This has enabled new empirical contributions to the key question ‘Why do people engage in corrupt behaviour that they themselves consider to be wrong?’ As a result, an increasing number of empirical studies across various disciplines have begun to analyse corruption through a social norms lens. Reviewing this strand of research reveals that new insights have emerged and begun to open up new frontiers for corruption research. Methodologically, they demonstrate the value of incorporating experimental methods into corruption research; empirically, they have sought to test hypotheses that relate to social norms and corruption; and theoretically, they have nuanced the picture, elaborating on the various ways in which social norms may help to explain corruption. The following section of this chapter briefly tours the broader landscape of research on the social dimension of corruption. The third section focuses on developments in social norms theory and shows how this social norms approach has provided an advantageous heuristic for empirical research. The fourth section then summarizes studies that the authors identified through a systematic search of several online databases. Finally, the concluding discussion describes the theoretical and empirical channels these studies may open up for future research.

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4.2  Research on the social dimension of corruption Recent empirical work on social norms owes much to previous studies that have demonstrated how social influences shape corruption. In his classic 1955 study of the Lucania region in southern Italy, for example, Banfield (1958) established the concept of ‘amoral familism’ to describe the importance of kinship obligations in shaping the rhythm of social interaction, a normative influence that made publicoriented cooperation challenging. Scholars have also demonstrated how norms around reciprocity create a permissive environment for corruption. Scott (1972) described how patron–client politics underpinned by reciprocal obligations have characterized many different regimes throughout modern history. Reaffirming the centrality of reciprocity to social orders, Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) examined the underpinnings of patron–client relations, highlighting the ubiquity of this social institution and putting it in historical and cross-national perspectives. Later, rational choice perspectives on clientelist exchanges became influential (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2014). Empirical work has provided further insights into the social dimension of clientelism (Fox 1994; Hilgers 2012). Auyero’s (2001) study of Peronist networks in a shantytown in Buenos Aires revealed that clientelist networks often do not result from opportunistic political constructions, but rather express already existing informal networks and cultural practices that are ‘key elements in the everyday lives’ of poor people (p. 13). Another ethnographic school has argued that the ‘larger fabric of everyday social practices’ shapes patterns of corruption (Olivier de Sardan 1999; see also Olivier de Sardan and Blundo 2006). These researchers have been interested in how social influences infiltrate public sector organizations. These empirical studies have been buttressed by more theoretical contributions emphasizing that instances of corruption can hardly be explained without reference to the broader institutional and normative context (Mungiu 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b). The type and extent of general normative forces in societies, including particularistic norms and universalistic norms, have been used to explain the extent to which corruption may spread (Schweitzer 2004). Cross-disciplinary approaches that combine institutional sociology and economics to connect corruption with underlying social patterns have also become influential (Lambsdorff et al. 2004). Scholars continue to advocate for the study of corruption as a social process (Warburton 2013). Recent empirical and theoretical contributions on elements of interpersonal relations, such as gift-giving and reciprocity (Ledeneva 2008; Graycar and Jancsics 2017), as well as on social networks (Szwarcberg 2011) and broader organizational forms like clans (Schatz 2005), continue to strengthen corruption research. This scholarship – and much more beyond the scope of this brief overview – ­provides a valuable and diverse basis for the study of the societal aspects of corruption. This chapter focuses on a discrete subset of that literature revolving around

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the concept of social norms, defined in this chapter as what people in a given group believe to be normal in that group; that is, what they believe to be a typical action, an appropriate action or both (Paluck and Ball 2010). A review is timely because there has been a proliferation of social norms and corruption studies in the past decade, creating a discernible body of work from which viable insights can be drawn. The next section elaborates on the social norms concept and the methodology for research.

4.3 Developments in social norms theory and the growth of empirical studies Looking back, elements of thinking on social norms have developed across a range of disciplines (for an interdisciplinary overview, see Hechter and Opp 2001). Scholars have tied together these strands in recent years to present a more consolidated theory of social norms. Influential in this endeavour has been Bicchieri (2006, 2016), who provides a ‘unified architecture’ of social norms (Mackie et al. 2015). This schema pays particular attention to different types of norms, links between norms and specific networks or reference groups that people identify closely with and care about, the role of social sanctions and the varied strength of norms (Cislaghi and Heise 2018). This recent theoretical work has made it possible to derive testable hypotheses, representing one of the main advances in thinking on social norms (Köbis et al. 2018). As a consequence, corruption researchers have also taken note of this more specific conceptualization of what constitutes a social norm. Indeed, the use of the term ‘norms’ within the corruption literature of the previous five decades or so has tended to operate on a higher level of abstraction compared to this definition of social norms. Studies influenced by the culturalist school (e.g. Banfield 1958) have tended to equate social norms with the more immutable realm of culture, a perspective that leaves little room for normative change. Meanwhile, those adopting normative institutionalist approaches have tended to use social norms interchangeably with informal institutions, a more capacious concept that could cover a wide range of possible sources of behaviour beyond the formal state. Hence, in pursuit of more specific definitions to counter these overly abstract approaches, recent work has emphasized the different types of norms (descriptive, injunctive), the role of reference groups and social sanctions. This theorizing has offered a nuanced and precise conceptual apparatus with which to analyse various social phenomena. Spurred by these conceptual developments, the number of studies explicitly tying such social norms framework to corruption has swelled in the past decade (Figure 4.1). The growing popularity of this social norms framework stems also from the recognition that the perspective can help address some of the puzzles presented by the persistence of corruption. First, social norms approaches reflect the view

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Figure 4.1  Number of records per year dealing with ‘social norms’ and ‘corruption’

that most corrupt practices are socially embedded. That is, people rarely make corrupt decisions merely on the basis of their own whims, or in response to material incentives, but instead pay (often very close) attention to social information before deciding on a course of action (Köbis et al. 2016; Fisman and Golden 2017). As a corollary of this view, recent theoretical perspectives emphasize that corruption is rooted in collective behavioural patterns rather than just being an outcome of institutional choices (Mungiu 2006; Persson et al. 2013). In stressing the importance of reference groups and social sanctions, an explicit social norms framework can help us understand how normative influences behind corruption are sustained. Second, an emphasis on social norms helps make clear that this social information consists of two main elements (Rothstein 2000). Descriptive norms indicate what other people actually do, while injunctive norms refer to what other people approve or disapprove of (Cialdini et al. 1990; Bicchieri and Mercier 2014). This distinction provides empirical insights into some of the apparent paradoxes around corruption, such as the observation that people will regularly engage in behaviour that they personally consider to be improper or wrong. What has emerged in the field of corruption is not necessarily a coherent research stream or recognized school, but rather a collection of studies across

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various disciplines that have empirically interrogated the relationship between social norms and corruption. Based on a systematic search, we find two distinct strands within this body of work.1 One line of research continues the ethnographic t­radition remaining close to case study and qualitative-based research. The second line of research draws on behavioural corruption research methods and is closer to variable-based research through either experiments or statistical approaches.

4.3.1  Ethnographic approaches Studies that used qualitative methods, nearly all of which have appeared in the last few years, often focus on a particular community or region to address the research question ‘What kind of social norms may matter for corruption – and how?’ By putting social norms and corruption front and centre, these studies nuance the relationship between the two, highlighting differences between descriptive and injunctive elements and examining the process by which norms are sustained, as well as how norms shape what counts as corruption. Many of these studies affirm the importance of ‘in-group’ obligations in generating norms that can indirectly facilitate corruption, a process closely linked to patronage, nepotism and particularistic treatment. These obligations tend to relate to the immediate family or ‘kin community’, but the breadth of the in-group can vary, with norms extending even to ‘long-lost cousins’ and members of a person’s ethnic group (Hoffmann and Patel 2017; Jackson 2018; Baez-Camargo et al. 2019). Nearly all the case studies make clear that these obligations tend to be rooted in firmly established forms of cooperative social behaviour, a finding that echoes a long line of scholarship (Scott 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Urinboyev and Svensson’s (2017) fieldwork in a village in the Fergana valley of Uzbekistan shows how ‘illegal’ practices reflect not only impulses of individual self-aggrandizement, but also on social norms that have been generated through a traditional system of mutual aid that aims to ensure basic welfare for all residents. In areas where the state has scant presence and provides few basic services for citizens, this system of self-help is maintained by mutual expectations, meaning that each villager can expect certain behaviours from other residents. Within a limited village context, these social norms may be considered pro-social. However, once applied to the context of public office, such norms can lead to corruption as villagers put pressure on public officials who may be their kin, or simply connected to the village, to provide patronage or largesse. This finding by Urinboyev and Svensson (2017) follows a long history of scholarship that foregrounds the tension between impartial institutions and particularism resulting from social pressures (Banfield 1958; Rothstein 2005; Mungiu 2006). These ethnographic and sociological studies point to a certain contradiction, namely that norms that can be considered positive or pro-social, such as ‘support thy neighbour’ and other such norms of reciprocity, may lead to corruption. Indeed, one exploratory study has shed light on how ostensibly pro-social norms

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may be necessary for corrupt transactions, refuting arguments that corruption is due to the absence of pro-social norms such as trust and altruism. Rosenbaum et al. (2013) review two lab experiments to show that, in a market setting, parties ‘need to rely on such social norms as trust and altruism to structure and enable market corrupt acts’ (p. 193). Most of the recent studies using qualitative methods emphasize that injunctive norms related to corruption are rarely internalized as a straightforward guide to appropriate behaviour, but rather are maintained in conjunction with social sanctions. In Nigeria, for example, if a public official shuns corruption, he or she may be cast out as a pariah (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). In Uzbekistan, the close-knit social structure of ‘kin communities’ means that public officials who fail to deliver expected benefits face social sanctions such as gossip, ridicule, loss of respect and reputation, humiliation and even exclusion from life-cycle rituals (Urinboyev and Svensson 2017). Public officials who try to keep the public office separate from the private sphere are maligned, while those who provide patronage for the village are afforded respect and social status. In this regard, ‘state officials have little room for individual choice and often find themselves torn between loyalty to their family, kin and mahalla [neighbourhood] and honesty at work’ (Urinboyev and Svensson 2017, p. 198). These findings also imply that the influence of social norms on corruption is nearly always relative, competing with other drivers of behaviour. In their research in East Africa, Baez-Camargo et al. (2019) found many individuals who felt burdened by the overlapping and often conflicting expectations stemming from social norms, on the one hand, and from their legal duties and responsibilities, on the other. This finding suggests that the way social norms relate to corruption is often the result of an interplay between institutional and normative factors, echoing much of the research on patron–client networks that finds norms to be interconnected with broader institutional forces (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Piattoni 2001). While a majority of these qualitative studies focus on social norms that affect the decision-making of public officials, two studies concentrate on the norms that influence ordinary citizens’ motivations to engage in corrupt practices. Jackson (2018), in his study of Kosovo’s municipalities, finds that descriptive norms, those that relate to perceptions of what others do, are an important driving force. Because residents tend to believe that other residents engage in these practices, shunning corruption oneself is perceived to be disadvantageous. With descriptive norms, unlike injunctive norms, the cost to the individual is tied not to a social sanction, but rather to a material sanction: the person who eschews corrupt acts will miss out on a share of the public resources that other community members are perceived to enjoy. Researchers have also explored how social norms shape what counts as ‘corruption’. An important contribution of these studies has been to show that a social norms perspective can help explain how local understandings of corruption and its boundaries may differ from the assumptions of international conventions and

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development practitioners (Funaki and Glencorse 2014). For example, a case study of Liberia revealed how social norms calibrate practices as corrupt or legitimate. Liberians have differing definitions of, and priorities relating to, corruption, challenging the notion that corruption is a universally understood and agreed upon concept (Funaki and Glencorse 2014). Studies at the community level provide insights into the complex ambiguities that generally shroud corruption, contesting the idea that it can be neatly summed up in terms of universal propositions and measurement indicators. Two case studies from our search put the social norms of corruption into historical perspective. Looking at nineteenth-century colonial India, Pani (2016) argues that the incongruity between the prevailing social norms of Indian society and the externally imposed British jurisprudence gave rise to a moral justification to defy the law. This eventually led to ‘even greater willingness to ignore it, so that breaking the law becomes the norm’ (Pani 2016), a dynamic that eventually embeds systemic corruption. Ocheje (2018) argues that this dissonance between laws and norms also unfolded in Nigeria, where the state, forged for the administrative convenience of the British colonial authority rather than constructed on a foundation of local politics, never attained a normative consensus that could constrain corruption. Instead, pro-corruption norms thrived in the vacuum, creating a ‘normative context of corruption’. Nearly all qualitative studies generated by our search focused on the global south. An exception is the work by Klinkhammer (2013), who assesses how organizational norms maintained corruption within the German multinational company Siemens. His study illustrates that bribery was an integral feature of Siemens’s business dealings in different areas of the company, a practice that over time acquired an injunctive element: ‘the prevailing opinion of a tacit consent among employees could temporarily provide formally illegitimate corrupt practices with the necessary informal approval’ (Klinkhammer 2013, p. 203).

4.3.2  Quantitative approaches 4.3.2.1  Macro level One of the first empirical studies on social norms and corruption was done by Fisman and Miguel (2007). The study draws on a unique data source, namely observational data documenting the parking violations of United Nations diplomats stationed in New York City. At the time, diplomats posted to that city enjoyed immunity. They could park even in prohibited locations without legal repercussions, and some abused this privilege by parking in the middle of Fifth Avenue. The authors correlated the observed parking violations with the scores of the diplomats’ home countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The results showed that diplomats from countries with higher corruption levels committed more parking violations. According to the authors’ interpretation, diplomats coming from ‘corrupt’ countries may have found it less reprehensible to abuse their immunity.

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The results provided early quantitative evidence that injunctive norms might be an important factor in explaining corrupt practices, especially in the absence of effective punishment. Using the same data set, Kapoor and Ravi (2012) challenge the interpretation that injunctive norms drive this effect. They show that when an additional variable is included in the regression analysis, namely ‘government effectiveness’ – one of the six dimensions of governance measured by Kaufmann et al. (2007a) – the correlation between home-country CPI and parking violations disappears. According to Kapoor and Ravi, it is the quality of a country’s institutions, not its cultural norms, that leads to the persistence of corruption. However, due to the large statistical overlap between the ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘control of corruption’ indicators tracked by Kaufmann and colleagues, these interpretations are somewhat undermined by endogeneity concerns. In other words, it remains unclear whether and how government effectiveness is different from corruption and which of the two plays a more important role in explaining the parking violations. Seeking to overcome the methodological complication of endogenous variables, Dong et al. (2012) combine the responses from several items on the World Values Survey and the European Values Study to test whether corruption is contagious – that is, whether individuals’ perceptions about the corrupt behaviour of others shape their own justifiability rating of corruption. Diverging from most macroeconomic research, the study does not test a vertical link between citizens and the state but instead focuses on horizontal ties, examining how citizens influence each other. The results indicate that higher perceived levels of corruption – in other words, descriptive norms – are positively correlated with the justifiability of corruption, or injunctive norms (Dong et al. 2012; for similar results, see McNally 2016). Taken together, these studies on the macro level present some support for the assumption that high levels of corruption in society correlate with higher acceptability of corruption. Further supporting evidence stems from large-scale efforts to compare cheating levels around the globe (Gächter and Schulz 2016), the results of which suggest that ‘corruption corrupts’ (Shalvi 2016). However, drawing on correlational data undermines the ability to draw causal inferences. Moreover, measuring corruption using survey design faces several challenges (Olken 2009), such as social desirability concerns, meaning that respondents give the answers they believe will be acceptable; for example, people might be reluctant to admit engaging in corruption when asked on the phone or face-to-face. Also, macro assessment of social norms of corruption hinders a much-needed differentiation of various corruption types (Heywood 2018; Köbis and Huss 2018). 4.3.2.2  Micro level To overcome the methodological limitations of correlational macro studies, more recent empirical endeavours have increasingly adopted experimental

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approaches to reveal the interplay of social norms and corrupt behaviour (Serra and Wantchekon 2012). Mainly using so-called corruption games, scientists from various disciplines have tried to model a situation that reflects the basic components of a given corrupt practice. Such experimental research aiming to uncover the influence of social norms on corruption has mostly studied bribery, using various bribery games. In one of the most influential studies on the subject, Barr and Serra (2010) asked foreign students at a British university to play a bribery game. Their results reveal that students coming from countries with high levels of (perceived) corruption, as measured by the CPI, were more likely to bribe in the game. The tendency to bribe decreased with the length of time that the students had stayed in the United Kingdom (Barr and Serra 2010). The results suggest that although injunctive norms seem to have an influence on willingness to bribe, people also recognize the ‘rules of the game’ and adjust to their environment. In another study, Salmon and Serra (2017) argue that people’s disapproval of corruption is directly correlated to the country that people identify with most strongly. Conducting an experiment in the United States, they asked participants ‘whether they and their families identify culturally with a country other than or in addition to the US’ (p. 67). The researchers then linked this information to behaviour in a bribery game, especially behaviour in which participants expressed disapproval of corruption to the other participants via a message. They find a positive correlation between the CPI of the country with which participants self-identify and their propensity to disapprove of corruption in the game. Put differently, identifying with a high-corruption country leads to lower disapproval of corruption – lending some support to the idea that corruption might be viewed as less reprehensible and more acceptable in countries with higher corruption levels. However, neither of these studies provides a basis for strong causal inferences, because neither entails a completely randomized design. For obvious reasons, participants were not randomly assigned to a home country, a duration of stay in the UK (Barr and Serra 2010) or a country that they identify most strongly with (Salmon and Serra 2017). Their own particulars were used. Hence, some of the above-mentioned endogeneity concerns also affect these behavioural studies. Using a fully experimental design, Banerjee (2016) tested the importance of social norms by using different descriptions of the same economic game. Testing for so-called framing effects, Banerjee’s research team asked participants in India to play structurally identical games. One was called the Ultimatum Game, while the other was described in more loaded language as a Harassment Bribery Game. Even though the economic cost–benefit calculations remained the same in both games, the name of the game and the terminology it used seemed to influence people’s willingness to engage in a bribery act. Fewer participants opted to engage in such a transaction when it was framed as ‘harassment bribery’ (in the Harassment Bribery Game) than when it was described simply as a ‘transfer’ (in the Ultimatum Game).

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The results indicate that the language used might trigger moral concerns: engaging in ‘bribery’ feels less acceptable than taking part in a neutral-sounding ‘transfer’. The fact that the effect occurred in India, a country that ranks relatively low on the CPI (78/180), qualifies the idea that a situation of widespread corruption (automatically) leads to wide acceptance of corruption. Banerjee’s (2016) results rather suggest that for people who are exposed to corruption in their daily lives, moral concerns about corruption do affect their decisions as to whether to take part in it. The finding also aligns with the widespread use of euphemisms to describe various corrupt practices (Tillen and Delman 2010). Relabelling a bribe as a ‘motivation fee’ or as a ‘sweetener’ or ‘tea money’ helps reduce the moral sting. In fact, one study by Ferreira et al. (2012) identified in the review explicitly examines the perceived meaning of the indigenous Brazilian concept of jeitinho (bending rules or social conventions). The results indicate that people perceive jeitinho both as a social norms violation and as corruption – adding credence to the claim that, in countries that suffer from corruption, at least some forms of corruption are considered as a social norms violation rather than as the accepted norm. Banerjee et al. (2017) provide additional insights into the factors that shape people’s moral evaluations of corrupt practices, in this case bribery. Using vignettes that described different bribery scenarios, they experimentally manipulated the size of the bribe. The results indicate that people disapprove of larger bribes more strongly than of smaller bribes. The researchers additionally manipulated the descriptive norm of corruption, informing participants that corruption either is widespread or is not. The results reveal a link between descriptive and injunctive norms, suggesting that when people know that corruption is widespread, they consider bribery to be more acceptable. Hence the results suggest that higher perceived descriptive norms might be related to more social disapproval of corruption, in other words, to injunctive norms. While Banerjee and colleagues tested the impact of descriptive norms on injunctive norms, other studies have examined a direct link between descriptive norms and willingness to bribe, showing that when people (are led to) believe that corruption is uncommon, they become less likely to engage in it. In one study by Köbis et al. (2015), participants received descriptive norms information prior to playing a bribery game (Köbis et al. 2017). Groups were randomly presented with one of three statements: a message that ‘almost nobody’ bribes (low descriptive norms condition), a message that ‘almost everybody’ bribes (high descriptive norms condition) or no message (control condition). The results reveal an 18 percentage point decrease in bribery in the low descriptive norms condition compared to the control, even though the economic cost (such as punishment) and benefit (such as financial rewards) were the same across all conditions. In line with that finding, Abbink et al. (2018) found that bribery levels doubled when participants knew that bribery was widespread (high descriptive norms condition). These results indicate that perceived descriptive norms are an important factor in the decision to engage in corruption.

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Taken together, these findings reveal that understanding the interplay of social norms and corruption requires specification. It appears that there is no single mono­lithic corruption norm that exists in a given society. Instead, people’s perceptions about the acceptability of corruption might differ according to their own background, the way corruption is framed and the size of the bribe, while their willingness to engage in corruption themselves appears to be largely shaped by their belief about the frequency of corruption, in other words, by the perceived descriptive norms. Understanding the social normative forces that sustain corruption thus requires a closer look – one that differentiates between various types of corruption. First attempts have been made to use such contextualized social norms information as a vehicle for anti-corruption reforms. Hoffmann and Patel (2017) conducted a survey into social norms of corruption in Nigeria entailing 4,200 respondents. In it, they assessed perceived descriptive and injunctive norms across various regions, accounting for demographic background and distinguishing between different corruption types – bribery, extortion, embezzlement and nepotism – across different sectors. The results further corroborate the view that social norms are heterogeneous (Efferson et al. 2015). For example, respondents perceived that bribing a police officer is less acceptable than bribing a nurse. Respondents also believed that women engage in corruption less frequently than men. At the same time, however, respondents condemned female corrupt actors more harshly than male. These results suggest that understanding the social normative forces that sustain corruption – and eventually contributing to its reduction – requires a nuanced analysis of the interplay of injunctive and descriptive norms (Jackson and Köbis 2018). Initial attempts have been made to use such contextualized social norms information as a vehicle for anti-corruption reforms. Köbis et al. (2019) made use of decreasing levels of bribery in the region of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, as evidenced by recent polls commissioned by Transparency International. They distributed posters containing contextualized social norms information about the reduced levels of bribery, targeting perceived descriptive norms. As a first social norms campaign to reduce bribery in the field, they set up a mobile behavioural lab in a busy shopping centre. Using incentivized economic games, they assessed people’s perceived social norms and their willingness to engage in bribery in a corruption game. Could information on posters about the declining prevalence of bribery affect beliefs and reduce bribery in the field, where people are exposed to a multiverse of information in their environment? The results provide first promising affirmative answers, illustrating changes in both perceived descriptive norms and bribery behaviour in the corruption game. The combination of contextualized social norms information and incentivized bribery games as a measure of corruption could point towards a new approach for evidence-based anti-corruption.

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4.4  Discussion: where to next? Quantitative research on the social norms of corruption has been shaped by two classic theoretical accounts, both aiming to explain the apparent persistence of corruption. Although not explicitly labelled in social norms terminology, both theoretical accounts recognize the aforementioned distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms. The first theoretical account argues that shared notions of acceptability and appropriateness maintain corrupt practices (Hauk and SaezMarti 2002; Scholl and Schermuly 2018). This theoretical work begins with the assumption that engaging in corruption generates guilt or shame. Yet in contexts where corruption has become widespread, such internal and social sanctioning mechanisms might be less effective because the number of people that adhere to a given norm determines its strength (Elster 1989). Put differently, people living in societies where exposure to corruption represents a part of everyday life might show higher tolerance for corruption. Such societies may even see the emergence of pro-corruption norms that sustain its existence, so the argument goes. In such settings people might bribe because they think this represents an acceptable course of action. Put into social norms terminology, corruption no longer reflects an injunctive norms violation. The second influential account argues that the persistence of corruption is not so much a matter of acceptability as a matter of coordination (Bardhan 1997; Fisman and Golden 2017). If corruption rarely occurs, one should refrain from paying bribes. Yet if bribes are standard procedure, paying them represents the best choice, independent of the moral evaluation of the individuals facing this situation. In the past decade, empirical research using the outlined distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms reported in this chapter has put both accounts to a test. Such work depicts a promising area of study that has gone through a growth spurt in the last few years. This review of qualitative and quantitative studies has provided an overview of empirical insights into a range of dynamics that connect social norms to corruption – but also points to several knowledge gaps that appear especially fruitful for future research to investigate. For instance, while studies employing quantitative methods such as surveys and experiments have largely focused on the distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms, qualitative research has mostly investigated the sources of normative pressures. Mixed-methods research that integrates both techniques more closely could open avenues for stronger theoretical and empirical understandings of social norms and corruption – and could foster a better appreciation of the types and sources of social norms that sustain a given corrupt practice. In particular, research that applies methodologies to track dynamic changes in the social norms that relate to corruption marks an important next step. The use of longitudinal methods could pave the way for insights into the conditions under which social norms shift and change.

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For these empirical endeavours it is important, moreover, to differentiate between various corrupt practices. In our review, we identify a strong focus on bribery and a lack of research on ‘grander’ forms of corruption, such as embezzlement. We hope that future research combining qualitative and quantitative methods and making more refined distinctions between types of corruption can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the social norms of corruption.2 NOTES 1 For more details on the search methodology employed, see Supplementary Material on the Open Science Framework, available at https://osf.io/7c4pg/. 2 This project received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreements ERC-StG-637915 and ERC-AdG 295707). Additional support was provided by the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway.

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PART II Varieties and connotations

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Buying, expropriating and stealing votes

Isabela Mares and Lauren Young

5.1 Introduction In elections around the world, voters are influenced by threats, promises or both. Throughout Africa, for example, 48 per cent of voters surveyed in 33 countries during the fifth round of the Afrobarometer survey reported fearing violence during elections, and 16 per cent reported being offered money or goods in exchange for their vote during the last election. Across Latin America, 15 per cent of voters surveyed during the 2010 and 2012 rounds of the AmericasBarometer reported that they had been offered something in exchange for their vote. These private inducements infringe on the rights of individuals and have substantial negative effects on the ability of elections to hold elected politicians accountable to citizens. Clientelism has been studied extensively by political scientists since the 1970s. Recently, however, scholars have made progress on several outstanding questions examining when clientelism is used and how it works. Our review addresses two main areas of recent progress. First, there has been an increasing focus on understanding brokers, the actors who mediate in the relationship between candidates and voters. As a result, we now know more about who brokers are, how they exert power over voters and what incentives they respond to. This progress has been driven both by increased theory focusing on the relationship between brokers and their politician principals (Larreguy 2012; Stokes et al. 2013), as well as new data from surveys and qualitative interviews with brokers and the politicians that employ them (Finan and Schechter 2012). Second, after a long period of focus only on vote buying, there has been a renewed interest in the variety of forms of clientelism. In recent years, studies have examined the use of coercive strategies that include threats of physical and economic sanctions. Recent studies have also paid significant attention to differentiating among the goods that are exchanged as part of clientelistic strategies, as well as distinguishing one-off payments from offers of more durable goods, such as land or access to long-term entitlements. There is increasing evidence and theoretical clarity around the heterogeneity of strategies that play a role in electoral mobilization. Explaining how politicians substitute between different forms of clientelism will remain an important area of methodological and theoretical innovation. 55

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In this chapter, we review the recent literature that explains the mix of clientelistic strategies, and particularly the mix between positive and negative strategies. We begin by conceptualizing the difference between positive and negative strategies. Next, we discuss the electoral strategies that are captured under the term electoral clientelism with the aim of illustrating the variation in types of strategies and brokers. To motivate this discussion, we begin by presenting a few empirical facts on the distribution of positive and negative strategies during elections, using Afrobarometer data about the use of inducements in elections.1 Two trends are apparent from the data. First, much larger proportions of respondents report fear of negative inducements than offers of positive inducements. Second, although there is an overall positive correlation between the proportion of respondents who report being exposed to positive and negative inducements (r = 0.26), it is not strong, and in the West African region it is actually negative (r = −0.28). The literature has only begun to explore the heterogeneity in the use of these and other positive and negative electoral inducements. We analyse two primary questions posed by the recent literature examining factors that influence the mix of clientelistic strategies. The first question pertains to the extent to which variation in context, particularly institutional frameworks and economic conditions, leads to different mixes of clientelistic strategies. There is growing evidence that electoral rules, such as the level of ballot secrecy, the punishment structure for different illicit strategies and whether a system is majoritarian or proportional representation (PR), are related to variation in the overall level of clientelism and in whether positive or negative strategies are used. A second question pertains to the characteristics of voters that increase their likelihood of experiencing or responding to illicit strategies. Such individual-level variables include not only socioeconomic status and gender, but also norms and psychological factors such as reciprocity and emotions. Such factors may decrease the cost of a citizen’s vote or increase the probability of her responding to threats with submission. Studies have identified factors that make it more likely that different types of citizens experience various strategies, and some studies have begun to empirically test which types of strategies are more effective with which types of citizens.

5.2 Definitions We begin by clarifying our definition of clientelism. We are talking about elections where politicians work, typically through brokers, to give voters individual incentives to vote in a particular way. This definition excludes promises of benefits that do not depend on how an individual or a small group of individuals personally votes. It also excludes fraud, which involves circumventing rather than influencing voters’ choices. Ultimately, we draw on Hicken’s (2011) definition of clientelism as

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chains of dyadic relationships between politicians, brokers and voters. Behaviour in clientelistic relationships is contingent or quid pro quo – a contract for an exchange of electoral support by an agent in exchange for some agreed behaviour by the principal. Most past scholars of clientelism have not differentiated between the use of positive and negative inducements to motivate voters, although this distinction is critical. Positive inducements, a category that includes vote buying, involve offers of rewards such as money, goods or favours. Negative inducements include the threat of economic or physical sanctions for an individual’s voting behaviour. Such negative inducements include cutting voters off from benefits on which they depend, removing them from their land or residences, or violence, including assault and death. Both positive and negative inducements are hard to measure. Both are usually illicit. In the case of positive inducements, both parties have an incentive to hide the transaction, particularly where vote buying or selling is a criminal offence. In the case of negative inducements, there is also a negative relationship between effectiveness and visibility that obscures true patterns of electoral coercion. The most effective threats never result in actual punishments because they convince voters to change their behaviour and the threatened punishments never need to be meted out. This implies that a situation in which no one is punished could be totally noncoercive or totally coercive, and the level of coercion can only be discerned through the beliefs of voters about what would have happened if they had voted differently. Voter expectations or beliefs also matter for distinguishing between positive and negative strategies. If a voter does not expect to receive a sack of grain in the week before an election, and then he does receive it in exchange for a promise to vote for a specific party, the grain serves as a positive inducement. However, if he expects to receive it or feels entitled to it, then an effort to use the grain to incentivize his vote would take the form of a negative inducement, a threat to withhold the grain if he votes for the principal’s non-preferred party. Although this difference is quite subtle (and again hard to measure without relying on micro-level measures of voters’ beliefs and expectations), it may impact behaviour. There is significant evidence that individuals think about gains and losses in very different ways. Being in the domain of gains (positive inducements) rather than losses (negative inducements) has implications for how individuals think about risk and how much utility they derive from various options (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), including on political issues such as taxation (Martin 2015). In general, the distinction between positive and negative electoral strategies is not apparent in the clientelism literature. In the case of access to entitlements or assets such as welfare transfers, jobs or land, a deeper understanding of voters’ expectations or reference points could explain why these are such effective patronage tools. Threatening to take away a job that a voter expects to keep for years may be a much more powerful inducement than offering to give him the same job. To date, jobs

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and welfare have typically been conceptualized as positive inducements that voters can take or leave.2 Another fundamental difference between positive and negative strategies may be in whether the incentive worsens a voter’s baseline condition, that is, his condition if he rejects the offer of the broker. When a broker offers a vote buying proposal – ‘If you vote for me, you get X, and if you don’t, you get nothing’ – a voter can either accept it or turn it down. The voter’s status quo is not affected by turning down the offer. Coercion, however, can be used to push a voter into accepting a deal to which he would not otherwise consent (Wertheimer 1987). For example, threatening to beat up citizens who fail to turn out to vote (regardless of whether or not those citizens consented to be clients of the party) can be conceptualized as reducing the attractiveness of the status quo, or outside options, of those voters. Strategies premised on coercion therefore have more severe normative implications than consensual exchanges of positive inducements for votes.

5.3 The multidimensionality of clientelism: variety of brokers and strategies In its first iterations, the literature on electoral clientelism established conceptual differences between programmatic competition – in which candidates vie for votes on the basis of programmatic appeals – and clientelistic competition, which is characterized by offers of goods, money or votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). ‘Electoral clientelism’ remains, however, a highly aggregated category. More recent studies examining clientelistic exchanges have disaggregated the middlemen deployed by candidates, as well as the strategies with which these candidates appeal to voters. We begin by considering the conceptual differentiation proposed by recent studies. Table 5.1 classifies the clientelistic practices that have been documented in recent research. We disaggregate electoral clientelism along two dimensions. On the horizontal dimension, we distinguish between positive and negative inducements. The vertical axis in Table 5.1 disaggregates the brokers deployed by politicians. A large proportion of the foundational and recent literature on electoral clientelism has examined the provision of positive inducements by partisan brokers (Krishna 2007; Szwarcberg 2012a, 2012b; Gingerich 2013; Gingerich and Medina 2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Zarazaga 2014a, 2014b). Stokes (2013) defines partisan brokers as ‘locally embedded agents of the machine [who] command the knowledge of voter preferences and partisan inclinations needed’ (p. 100). Finan and Schechter (2012) describe these political operatives as ‘village leaders, professionals in politics and the backbone of the election campaign . . . who know their fellow villagers well’ (p. 867).

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Table 5.1  Variation in clientelistic strategies depending on types of brokers and types of strategies Type of inducement Type of broker

Positive

Negative

Examples

Partisan brokers

Money, goods or favours Administrative favours

Violence

Stokes et al. (2013)

Administrative obstruction and punishment

Weitz-Shapiro (2012), Oliveros (2013), Larreguy et al. (2014), Mares & Young (2015) O’Brien (1975), Holland & Palmer-Rubin (2015), Sperber (2014) Hertel-Fernandez (2015), Mares (2015), Mares & Muntean (2015) Lemarchand (1972), van de Walle (2007), Koter (2013), Baldwin (2014)

State employees

Civil society and religious organizations Private actors (employers) Ethnic leaders

Gangs and militias

Social benefits, goods and services Monetary transfers and selective benefits, loans Communitarian ethos (‘deference patterns’ in Lemarchand 1972), access to social insurance Money

Social exclusion, exclusion from benefits Layoffs and exclusion from benefits Social exclusion, violence

Violence

Anderson (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2013), LeBas (2013), Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2014)

State employees comprise an important type of broker that can be mobilized by candidates. Although earlier studies of electoral clientelism have neglected their importance, state employees occupy a central role in recent studies of political clientelism. Examples of state employees who can be deployed at election time include policemen, tax collectors and employees of the local social policy administration. These brokers can influence the electoral choices of voters through either positive or negative inducements. They can provide favours, including assistance with administrative matters such as certificates of land ownership or various business licences. Administrators of social policy programmes (such as income support and housing assistance) can threaten to cut off benefits if the recipients make the incorrect electoral choice, and law-enforcement officers can threaten to investigate and punish infractions or offer to look the other way. The re-examination of the experience of electoral clientelism in first-wave democratizers during the nineteenth century and recent studies of electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe have shown that in these contexts the incidence of clientelistic exchanges mediated by state brokers is higher than the offer of money or goods by

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partisan-mediated brokers. The most entrenched electoral problems in nineteenthcentury France were patronage and the intimidation of voters by state employees, or pression gouvernamentale (Mares 2015). Several studies using list experiments to measure the incidence of various clientelistic strategies in three Eastern European countries – Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria – find a high reliance on statemediated brokers (Mares et al. 2014a, 2014b; Mares and Muntean 2015; Mares and Young 2015). This is in line with evidence from Latin America suggesting that state employees, including mayors and even teachers, are involved in pressuring or influencing voters (Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Larreguy et al. 2014). In a recent study, Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) add to the repertoire of political brokers by considering brokers who are linked to interest associations. These authors distinguish between ‘organizational brokers’, who represent the collective interests of voters in interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles, and ‘hybrid brokers’, who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party. Holland and Palmer-Rubin illustrate the operation of these alternative broker types through case studies of street-vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system (Colombia) and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system (Mexico). Firms are another type of political broker candidates can deploy during elections (Mares and Zhu 2015). Firms can either mobilize voters by bringing them to the polls or attempt to reduce electoral turnout by preventing their employees from voting. Managers or foremen within the firm can use their control over wages, work conditions and even employment for political influence. Baland and Robinson (2008), for instance, point out that in Chile, ‘the threat of being cast out into the subproletariat of migratory workers was the most powerful weapon at the landowner’s disposal. Most inquilinos families undoubtedly judged their welfare on the estate superior to life outside or in the nitrate fields of the northern desert’ (Bauer 1995, p. 28, quoted in Baland and Robinson 2008, p. 1748). Intimidation by ­employers was a pervasive form of electoral intimidation in many first-wave democratizers, particularly imperial Germany (Mares 2015). Yet such ‘private intimidation’ is not a historical phenomenon. Recent studies have found evidence of private economic intimidation in both post-Communist settings including Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, and more advanced democracies such as the United States (Frye et al. 2014; Mares et al. 2014a, 2014b; Hertel-Fernandez 2015). Several studies have highlighted candidates’ reliance on local leaders as political brokers (e.g. Baldwin 2013; Koter 2013). Examples of these local leaders include traditional chiefs, religious dignitaries and leaders of ethnic communities. These brokers control access to goods and services that are valued by voters and can use this control to influence voters’ behaviour. As Koter (2013) has argued, ‘the relationship between local leaders and their followers is complex in that it can be based both on reciprocity and on some degree of exploitation. Voters can trust and rely on their leaders but also feel trapped in their subordinate position’ (p. 193).

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Finally, a number of studies have pointed to the role of criminal organizations and militias during elections. Such organizations are typically considered to be specialists in violence, and politicians can reward them by allowing them to operate more easily in illegal activities. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that rightwing paramilitaries in Colombia were rewarded for delivering votes to politicians with an amnesty deal. In an analysis of clientelistic strategies present during the 2014 parliamentary election in Colombia, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2014) discuss a range of clientelistic strategies perpetuated by military groups operating alongside local politicians. These include offers of money (which often originates in illegal drug activities), offers of access to state favours (if local politicians are co-opted by military groups) and intimidation. Vigilante groups involved in a range of criminal activities are also implicated in electoral malfeasance in cities in Kenya and Nigeria (Anderson 2002; LeBas 2013). This relatively recent literature presents a rich picture of ongoing clientelistic practices with an increasingly extensive menu of possible brokers. What are the most important factors that account for this variation? Does the mix of brokers deployed in elections vary systematically across countries? Does it vary across localities? A new set of studies examining the historical, institutional and economic factors that determine where brokers are available and desirable has just started to answer these questions. One factor that this literature has identified as important for the functioning of brokers is the ability of politician principals to monitor their performance. There is ample qualitative evidence to suggest that monitoring brokers is not a trivial task for politician principals. Stokes et al. (2013) partially credit monitoring difficulties with the demise of clientelism in the USA and Europe in the late nineteenth century. According to one historical account, US politicians who had previously relied on brokers voted for the secret ballot because ‘the local machine was a source of insubordination and untrustworthiness – an increasingly expensive and unwieldy instrument for carrying out the will of the true party organization’ (Reynolds and McCormick 1986, p. 851, quoted in Stokes et al. 2013, pp. 205–6). Using data from Mexico, Larreguy (2012) shows that when it is harder to monitor the performance of brokers who use land to incentivize voters, the party that controls those brokers loses electoral support. Developing a better understanding of how monitoring capacity affects not just the level and effectiveness of clientelism but also the type of brokers that are deployed by politicians is an exciting future research agenda. In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss results that address two types of variation in clientelistic strategies. First, we examine the findings of studies linking national or regional political and economic conditions to the incidence of clientelistic strategies, and we highlight five explanations for the level and type of clientelism: ballot secrecy, monitoring and legal frameworks to detect and punish malfeasance, electoral systems, local institutions and economic conditions. Second, we explore studies that probe which voters are targeted with what strategies and

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focus on how voters’ partisan preferences, socioeconomic status and psychological characteristics influence the incidence and effectiveness of inducements.

5.4 Explaining mixes in clientelism: the role of institutions and economic conditions In this section, we explore how contextual factors, particularly the design and control of institutions as well as the structure of the economy, explain the mix of clientelistic strategies used in a country or locality. We focus on several explanations that recent research has highlighted as predictive of the level and type of clientelism. First, do institutional variables affect the mixes of clientelistic strategies? If so, what institutions and policies affect this variation? Studies examining the relationship between institutional variables and the use of different clientelistic strategies have yielded mixed results. Some of the most robust findings pertain to the relationship between ballot secrecy and the mix of electoral irregularities. Other studies have highlighted that micro regulations of electoral laws – more specifically the asymmetric punishment of different irregularities – have an important effect on mixes in clientelistic strategies. By contrast, studies examining the relationship between different electoral systems and mixes of clientelistic strategies have yielded inconclusive results. Second, numerous studies have identified the control of local political and social institutions as an important factor shaping the level and type of clientelism. Last, there is evidence that economic conditions shape the strategies that are available and desirable to politicians who want to influence voters.

5.4.1  Voting secrecy One robust finding of the literature examining clientelism in both historical and contemporary settings is that the protection of voter secrecy affects clientelistic strategies. Threats of post-electoral punishments of voters are extremely powerful if electoral secrecy is imperfectly protected (Mares 2015). This suggests that the use of strategies of intimidation should be higher when electoral secrecy is insufficiently protected but that their use should decline after legislation protecting voter secrecy is adopted. Changes in electoral legislation can improve protection of voter secrecy. Examples include changes in ballot design, such as adoption of the Australian ballot, and changes in voting technology, such as the design of the electoral urn. Some recent studies have examined the consequences of changes in electoral legislation for electoral competition and the mixes of clientelistic strategies. Such studies have examined both the direct effects of these electoral reforms and the heterogeneous effects for different districts that varied in their permissiveness of electoral intimidation.

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Cox and Kousser (1981) examine the consequences of the adoption of the secret ballot in the state of New York between 1879 and 1900 and find that this change in electoral law contributed to a change in the strategies pursued by parties. Prior to the adoption of the secret ballot, electoral strategies of parties were ‘inflationary’, attempting to increase voter turnout. After the secret ballot reform, the strategies of parties were ‘deflationary’ and consisted of efforts to convince voters to stay home on election day. In a recent study examining the production of electoral irregularities in US elections between 1860 and 1930, Kuo and Teorell (2017) find that the adoption of the Australian ballot reduced vote buying and intimidation. Examining the consequences of electoral reforms adopting the Australian ballot in Chile in 1958, Baland and Robinson (2008) find that secret ballot reforms reduced the vote share of right-wing conservative parties by reducing the influence of landowners over their workers and subsequently the benefits that landowners received in exchange. Mares (2015) examines how the 1903 German legislation that introduced ballot envelopes and isolating spaces affected the strength of support for the Social Democratic Party, the major anti-system party in Germany at that time. Prior to the introduction of this legislation, support for the party had been suppressed through intimidation by employers and state employees. The legislation protecting voter secrecy gave voters the opportunity to support the opposition party without fearing layoffs. The new literature examining the consequences of changes in legislation protecting electoral secrecy for electoral irregularities recognizes, however, that this legislation may also create incentives for actors to substitute into less costly electoral irregularities. The Cox and Kousser (1981) finding discussed above is precisely about substitution between illicit tactics. Several recent studies have documented substitutions following the adoption of reforms protecting voters against intimidation. Lehoucq and Molina’s (2002) study of electoral irregularities in Costa Rica found that voting secrecy reduced the use of vote buying or intimidation, but encouraged parties to turn to ballot stuffing. Similarly, Kuo and Teorell (2017) find that the adoption of the Australian ballot in the USA was followed by an increase in the use of other electoral irregularities, such as ballot stuffing and registration fraud. Although substitution between clientelism and fraud has been considered as a possible consequence of increases in ballot secrecy, there has been less inquiry into substitution between clientelistic strategies. The change in the mix between vote buying and coercion is an example. When the probability that a voter would be caught breaking his commitment to a broker is very low due to ballot secrecy, loss aversion may imply that voters’ utility is more sensitive to the small probability of a large punishment than to an equal gain. This suggests that brokers might substitute positive with negative inducements as ballot secrecy increases. Changes in ballot secrecy may also change the incentives of candidates and brokers to target different types of voters. For example, the more secret the ballot, the harder it is for brokers to monitor the contracts that they make with voters, which may diminish

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the attractiveness of contracts with swing voters relative to contracts with core supporters who may be easier to monitor (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Mares and Young 2015).

5.4.2  Monitoring and punishment of malfeasance A number of studies have estimated the impact of changes or variation in the severity or probability of punishment on a range of electoral malfeasances. In addition to showing that in most cases monitoring reduces malfeasance, these studies have provided some of the best evidence of how politicians substitute between strategies or areas when the likelihood of punishment increases. The political experience of European countries during the decades following the expansion of suffrage raises fascinating puzzles for the study of electoral clientelism. One such puzzle is the significant cross-national variation in the mix of electoral irregularities. The relative prevalence of vote buying, intimidation and ballot stuffing differed significantly across countries after the adoption of voter secrecy. One also encounters significant variation in the types of brokers deployed by candidates in different countries. Whereas practices of vote buying and treating were pervasive in British elections, such practices were virtually unknown in German national elections during the Second Empire (Klein 2003; Mares 2015). Patronage and the politics of extensive favours provided by mayors on behalf of candidates were a widespread electoral evil in France, but absent in nineteenthcentury Germany. Intimidation and harassment by employees of the state were frequent in nineteenth-century Germany and France but remarkably absent in Britain. And although one encounters intimidation by employers in all countries, this irregularity is particularly pervasive in German elections. One factor affecting cross-national differences in mixes among different electoral irregularities are the provisions of the electoral laws. Electoral rules in nineteenthcentury Europe punished different electoral irregularities with various levels of stringency, which created incentives for politicians to use electoral strategies that carried lower costs. This differential punishment structure also affected the incentives of possible brokers to exert effort on behalf of candidates during elections. Consider a few examples of this logic. German election law imposed very strict consequences for vote buying, which was placed under the jurisdiction of the penal code and could be punished with imprisonment. By contrast, intimidation by employees of the state was punished less stringently, and electoral intervention by employers was virtually unpenalized. Differential punishment for these irregularities created incentives for German politicians to avoid strategies premised on vote buying, but to rely on intimidation by employees of the state, such as policemen, or by employers. In contrast, British electoral laws did not single out vote buying as a particularly pernicious strategy. Politicians had incentives to use vote buying and treating alongside other illicit strategies, such as intimidation (Mares 2015).

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Scholars of irregularities in developing countries have also invoked differential punishment structure as a factor accounting for cross-national differences in levels of electoral irregularities. In contrast to the historical literature, these studies operate with a broader definition of the punishment structure as the strength of a range of rule-of-law institutions. Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) argue that in countries where institutions to punish electoral malfeasance are weak, including the judiciary, media and civil society, candidates should face fewer constraints on using coercive strategies. Similarly, Lindberg and van Ham (2015) argue that because democratic institutions punish more visible malfeasance such as fraud and intimidation, democratization leads parties to substitute from fraud and violence to consensual vote buying. However, in both of these studies it is difficult to identify the direction of causality. Last, the literature on election monitors provides insight into how parties and candidates respond to increases in the probability of punishment. The central conjecture in this literature is that the presence of international or domestic election monitors increases the likelihood that an illicit strategy will be discovered and punished. Much of this literature has exploited natural experiments such as arbitrary selection of polling stations for monitoring by an international organization (Hyde 2007) or actual random assignment of observers (Hyde 2010; Ichino and Schundeln 2012; Asunka et al. 2014) to provide causal estimates of the impact of monitoring. Although most studies of monitoring find that it decreases some types of electoral malfeasance (Hyde 2010 being an exception), these studies have also begun to amass evidence of spatial displacement and substitution between illicit strategies. There is convincing evidence that monitors cause spatial displacement of illicit strategies to neighbouring polling stations (Ichino and Schundeln 2012; Asunka et al. 2014), although in some cases these spillovers have also reduced the use of illicit strategies in neighbouring polling stations (Callen and Long 2015). Sjoberg (2014) shows that the presence of web cameras in polling stations during the 2008 election in Azerbaijan reduced officially reported turnout (which he interprets as ballot stuffing) by 7 per cent, while also causing increases in fraud during the counting process, which is not as easily caught on camera. There is little knowledge, however, of how the presence of monitors changes the timing of brokers’ pressure on voters. Most election-monitoring interventions focus their resources on having a large number of observers present on the day of the polls, engaging in very limited observation during the weeks or months prior to an election. It is possible that politicians and brokers who anticipate monitors may shift their efforts towards strategies of electoral intimidation and repression, rather than ballot stuffing. We believe that such temporal displacement should be an important consideration in future research. The existence of these strategies of substitution may account for the cross-national results reported by Simpser and Donno (2012), who argue that international election monitoring is associated with decreases in the quality of bureaucracy, media freedom, and law and order.

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5.4.3  Electoral systems and irregularities A third direction of active scholarship examines whether the electoral system affects the mix of electoral irregularities. A growing recent literature has examined the relationship between electoral systems and levels of electoral corruption. The results are inconclusive. Some studies argue that PR systems are associated with higher levels of electoral corruption than plurality systems (Persson and Tabellini 2003), whereas others find no relationship between PR and electoral malfeasance (Birch 2007). In an effort to reconcile these findings, some scholars have suggested that the relationship between electoral system and corruption is conditional on district magnitude (Chang and Golden 2007). A large and significant disagreement exists as to whether electoral systems with opened or closed rules for the selection of candidates lead to higher levels of electoral corruption (Carey and Shugart 1995; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Gingerich 2013). One fruitful direction of further comparative investigation is whether differences in electoral systems exert a systematic effect on the mix of clientelistic strategies. Our theoretical conjecture is that the costs of all clientelistic strategies are higher in PR countries than in countries with majoritarian electoral rules, owing to the higher district magnitudes of the latter. To the extent that different strategies vary in the cost per vote – for example, if vote buying is more expensive than the threat of cutting voters off from state benefits – we might expect less expensive strategies to be more prevalent in PR systems. Pellicer and Wegner (2013) argue that clientelistic parties do worse under PR systems because they depend on personal relationships between patrons and clients. The authors’ regression discontinuity design exploits a provision of the electoral law in Morocco that stipulates a population threshold below which the system is majoritarian (and above which it is PR). The study shows that once the threshold of proportionality is passed, the number of seats of clientelistic parties falls by 50 per cent, while the seat share of programmatic parties doubles.

5.4.4  Control of local institutions: incumbency and traditional leaders The degree of control that political parties have over institutions, particularly local institutions, is also important in explaining the level and distribution of clientelism. Of particular importance is the presence of local leaders, including incumbent mayors and traditional leaders, who are willing to influence voters for either economic or ideological reasons. Long-term incumbency affects the ability of candidates to access the resources of the state at times of elections. As a vast literature on bureaucracies has established, longer political incumbency allows mayors to appoint a higher number of loyal partisan activists in the local administration. These activists can become an important political resource during campaigns and can be used as state brokers at times of elections. This implies that candidates who are able to establish contacts to long-term mayors are more likely to deploy state resources at elections.

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Recent studies have found significant differences in the use of clientelistic strategies that involve state employees as brokers, such as the provision of administrative favours. Mares and Petrova (2014) document the existence of these differences in a comparison of a small number of Bulgarian localities. In a larger sample of 85 rural communities, Mares and Muntean (2015) demonstrate differences in the use of welfare coercion by state employees between localities with long-term incumbents and localities that experienced political turnover. The high reliance on state employees as brokers is not a characteristic of post-­ Communist countries alone. Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2014) document the existence of this clientelistic strategy in recent Colombian elections. Similarly to the Romanian results, the authors find evidence of a higher reliance on state employees as brokers in localities with long-term mayors than in more competitive localities. Other types of local elites function similarly to incumbents. Callen and Long (2015) find that candidates with connections to local electoral officials in Afghanistan are more likely to benefit from fraud at the polling stations that those officials oversee. Traditional leadership structures in Africa are also used by modern states as a way of extending government structures to the local level. These structures may affect variation in clientelistic strategies by shaping the strength and availability of local leaders who command the moral authority and resources to influence the electoral behaviour of voters. In a comparison of Senegal and Benin, Koter (2013) argues that the availability of strong traditional leaders in Senegal enables modern parties to effectively implement a clientelistic strategy. Similarly, de Kadt and Larreguy (2015) find that traditional leaders in ethnic enclaves in South Africa influence voters on behalf of their favoured parties, most likely through the use of positive and negative inducements.

5.4.5  Economic conditions In addition to state employees and partisan activists, employers can serve as brokers who can be mobilized by candidates during elections. Recent studies have documented practices of economic intimidation by employers both in historical and contemporary political settings (Baland and Robinson 2008, 2012; Mares 2015). Employers’ electoral influence is the result of their control over important dimensions affecting the welfare of workers, such as their wages, levels of employment or access to social policy benefits that are privately provided. Both the demand of candidates for electoral support from employers and the willingness of employers to provide political services to candidates vary, however, across districts. The provision of intimidation may be costly to firms. The literature has identified two variables that may affect the willingness of employers to engage in electoral intimidation. The first is the economic heterogeneity of a district. Several studies examining the incidence of economic intimidation in both historical and contemporary settings have found that employer political pressure is higher in economically concentrated localities or districts where one firm controls employment

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and output, and lower in economically fragmented localities (Mares et al. 2015; Mares and Zhu 2015). Three factors lower the costs of economic intimidation in localities with high levels of concentration. First, owing to their scale, larger firms incur lower costs in carrying out political activities, such as control of electoral turnout or the distribution of political material on behalf of a particular candidate. Second, in concentrated localities, workers have fewer employment opportunities outside the firm. Finally, the concentration of employment in the hands of a small number of actors reduces the possible coordination problems faced by employers in punishing workers with ‘dangerous’ political views by denying them employment opportunities. The willingness of employers to engage in electoral intimidation is also affected by labour market conditions such as labour scarcity. Labour scarcity increases both the costs of electoral intimidation by employers and the willingness of voters to take economic risks and support opposition candidates. Ardanaz and Mares (2014) tested this proposition by examining the consequences of a transition from labour abundance to labour scarcity in rural Prussian districts between 1870 and 1912. Using panel data that measure the scarcity of agricultural workers in Prussian communes over this period, the authors document that labour scarcity reduced the capacity of rural landlords to mobilize voters. As such, labour scarcity lowered the vote share for conservative candidates and increased the support for Social Democratic candidates.

5.5  Voter characteristics There is also compelling evidence that brokers and parties use different strategies against voters with different characteristics. Studies have developed three families of explanations about individual characteristics and the likelihood that voters are targeted. These explanations refer to voters’ partisan preferences, socioeconomic status and psychological attributes.

5.5.1  Policy or partisan preferences Much of the formal theory explaining who gets offered positive inducements during elections focuses on the role of voters’ preferences over parties or policies that determine the utility that voters get from voting for each party. The central question in this literature is whether core or swing voters are the focus of private inducements by parties. Most formal theory on this topic has predicted that, under most conditions, parties should target inducements on voters with weak ideological affiliations (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). Stokes et al. (2013) make this point clearly: ‘the main thrust of theories of distributive politics is that swing voters, or ones who are weakly opposed to the party machine, are its main targets’ (p. 36). However, most evidence shows that parties aim inducements at core supporters

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rather than swing voters in countries including Argentina (Nichter 2008), Chile (Calvo and Murillo 2013), Venezuela (Albertus 2015), Mexico (Stokes et al. 2013), India (Stokes et al. 2013), Kenya (Gutierrez-Romero 2014) and Nigeria (Bratton 2008). A major focus of recent research has attempted to reconcile the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings. On this question, increased attention to the organization of clientelism has provided significant traction. Some scholars have argued that core supporters are easier to target efficiently because they are embedded in partisan networks (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2013). Others have made a distinction between the use of inducements that seek to change vote choice versus inducements that seek to affect turnout (Nichter 2008; Gans-Morse et al. 2014). Finally, Stokes et al. (2013) propose a ‘broker-mediated’ theory of targeting in which politicians prefer to buy the votes of swing voters, but where the brokers who are imperfectly monitored end up mobilizing core supporters in order to capture rents. Some formal models of electoral intimidation have taken the opportunity to consider how parties substitute between vote buying, violence and in some cases, fraud. What happens when parties can use not only positive but also negative inducements like threats? Many formal models point to swing voters as the most likely targets of violence. Robinson and Torvik (2009) argue that parties should substitute violence for threats against swing voters because they are the most expensive to buy off if multiple parties are bidding for their votes – a finding that is taken as an assumption by Collier and Vicente (2012). However, the empirical evidence that swing voters are more likely to face intimidation is also weak. In Nigeria, where violence is typically controlled by the ruling party, people who are targeted with violence are less likely to vote for the ruling party (Bratton 2008). Parties competing in Kenya in 2007 were most likely to use violence against the core supporters of their opponents living in their own stronghold areas (Gutierrez-Romero 2014). Other qualitative and quantitative studies similarly note that violence is used in Kenyan elections to remove the supporters of opposing parties from areas that the violent party has a chance of winning (Klopp 2001; Kasara 2014). Negative strategies based on economic rather than physical coercion may even be targeted on one’s own core supporters. Although electoral violence is concentrated in a relatively small number of cases, threats to take away entitlements from voters – including land, employment or welfare benefits – are common across a much wider range of cases. Throughout Eastern Europe, threats to cut voters off from welfare benefits depending on how they vote are a powerful negative inducement wielded primarily by local officials such as mayors, or brokers known as the mayor’s men (Mares and Muntean 2015; Mares and Young 2015). Boone (2011) similarly shows that threats to remove entitlements to land are used as an electoral strategy to mobilize mainly co-ethnic supporters in Kenya.

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Because many of the studies exploring which voters are targeted with violence at the individual level draw on data from only a single country, the Afrobarometer data (on positive and negative inducements during elections) again provide an opportunity to assess whether there is empirical support for predictions that vote buying and violence are focused on core or swing voters. For positive strategies, the Afrobarometer data show a negative and statistically significant relationship between being a swing voter and receiving a vote-buying offer in six of the ten cases in Africa where vote buying is most prevalent. This provides suggestive evidence from important cases that parties are more likely to offer positive inducements to their own core supporters, assuming that parties are not trying to buy the votes of the core supporters of their opponents. On negative strategies, there is little evidence of any targeting based on the strength of voters’ party identifications. This runs counter to the theoretical prediction that swing voters should be singled out for violence. Respondents who report being unaffiliated with any party are more likely to fear violence in only two of the ten countries where fear of electoral violence is most widespread. Furthermore, in Zimbabwe, where there is a positive correlation between respondents revealing that they are swing voters and reporting fear of electoral violence, several recent studies have argued that respondents who are exposed to violence are actually more likely to hide their political preferences for the opposition in the Afrobarometer survey, which could lead to a spurious negative correlation (Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale 2014; Young 2015a). In short, there is compelling evidence that in many cases, parties focus positive inducements and economic coercion on their own supporters. These trends are likely linked: giving core supporters access to entitlements or rents creates opportunities to threaten to take them away, which may be a particularly powerful incentive. The threat of electoral violence, however, does not appear to be strongly targeted on the basis of voters’ partisan preferences; other factors may play a bigger role in explaining heterogeneity in exposure to physical threats.

5.5.2  Socioeconomic status It is also likely that economic factors such as income play an important role in determining whether voters are targeted with both positive and negative inducements. Many have argued that positive inducements should have a greater impact on the voting behaviour of the poor because the marginal utility of income of low-income voters is higher (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). The evidence that vote buying is principally aimed at the poor is virtually uncontested. In cases ranging from Lebanon (Corstange 2011) to Nigeria (Bratton 2008) and Argentina (Stokes 2005), studies find that politicians target poor voters with positive inducements, such as gifts and offers of food or money. The predictions about the relationship between poverty and the use of coercive strategies or violence are less clear. If vote buying and violence are substitutes, then

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we might expect that parties would be less likely to use violence against poorer voters because vote buying is more effective. However, low-income voters may also be the most vulnerable to violence, as they are least capable of investing in security (e.g. buying weapons, building strong defence systems, fleeing). For this reason, we might expect that targeting of poorer voters with strategies of violence would have a higher payoff, and therefore candidates and their brokers would direct violence against low-income voters. There is surprisingly little evidence on whether electoral violence is aimed at those who are economically vulnerable, and the evidence is largely inconclusive. Gutierrez-Romero’s (2014) analysis of targeting of violence in Kenya provides some evidence that wealthier voters are more likely to be targeted with threats and have heard about violence. Bratton (2008) finds no relationship between poverty and the experience of violent threats in Nigeria, and Young (2015a) similarly finds that voters in poor parts of Zimbabwe were not more likely to experience violence than were voters in wealthier constituencies during the first few years in which violence was systematically used against voters. However, voters in poor parts of Zimbabwe are more likely to not vote for the opposition or hide their support for the opposition on an opinion survey after they are exposed to ruling-party violence (Young 2015a). Again, the Afrobarometer data provide an opportunity to test predictions about targeting. By regressing exposure to vote-buying offers and fear of electoral violence onto an individual-level measure of poverty, we tested whether voters with lower socioeconomic status are more or less likely to be offered positive and negative inducements in exchange for their votes. Interestingly, the relationship between poverty and exposure to inducements in the Afrobarometer data is not fully consistent with the predictions of many theories. There is a positive and significant relationship between poverty and exposure to vote buying in four of ten cases, but in two cases (Benin and Mali), poorer voters are significantly less likely to be targeted with vote-buying offers. Other studies in Latin America or in Africa, however, find that poverty is significantly associated with experiencing vote buying (Stokes et al. 2013; Jensen and Justesen 2014). On violence, however, there is a very clear pattern in the Afrobarometer data. Poorer voters are consistently more likely to be afraid of electoral violence in seven out of ten of the African countries with the most fear of electoral violence. Given that individual-level poverty has been the focus of relatively few studies of electoral violence, this is a relationship that future research should explore.

5.5.3  Psychological factors One of the major puzzles in the literature on electoral inducements is how brokers enforce contracts with voters despite the existence of the secret ballot. To address this puzzle, recent theory has highlighted the importance of norms of

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reciprocity as factors that sustain vote-buying strategies. Other explanations have drawn on psychological theories to understand the factors that increase the cost of illicit strategies and determine whether citizens submit or resist in the face of threats. First, several studies have suggested novel ways in which reciprocity might facilitate clientelistic contracts between brokers and voters despite the secret ballot. Using data from both surveys or voters and local operatives in Paraguay, Finan and Schechter (2012) show that brokers leverage social preferences when selecting which voters to target with vote-buying offers. Specifically, locally embedded brokers in Paraguay select voters whom they know to be highly reciprocal because these voters are more likely to honour their promise to vote for a certain party after receiving a gift. Reciprocal voters, Finan and Schechter argue, can be paid less because the receipt of money will engender in them a desire to reciprocate. Lawson and Greene (2014) use evidence from a series of survey experiments conducted in Mexico to come to a similar conclusion that receiving gifts from politicians creates feelings of obligation that are related to higher levels of support for clientelist ­candidates from reciprocal voters. Another recent body of research has focused on the role of beliefs about the acceptability of vote buying and coercion in shaping the costs that parties face when using inducements to win votes. A survey experiment conducted in several Latin American countries shows that vote buying is more stigmatized when the client is better off and less ideologically close to the party buying her vote (GonzalezOcantos et al. 2012). Bratton (2008, p. 623) also shows that the poorest quintile of voters is half as likely as the richest to think that selling votes is ‘wrong and punishable’. Using opinion data from Kenya, Rosenzweig (2015) argues that electoral violence reduces voter preference for the candidates that use it. This body of evidence suggests that voters who consent to sell their votes may face some disutility due to guilt or shame, but also that parties may lose supporters who are not the targets of violence but have normative preferences against illicit strategies. Experimental evidence also shows that norms against illicit strategies can be strengthened, and that such efforts make those strategies less effective in producing votes. An education campaign against vote buying that urged citizens to vote ‘in good conscience’ in São Tomé and Príncipe decreased the perceived influence of vote buying, increased voting ‘according to your conscience’, and may have decreased electoral irregularities (Vicente 2014). Similarly, a campaign encouraging voters to ‘vote against violent politicians’ in Nigeria had significant and substantively large negative effects on perceived political violence, as well as some effect on actual experienced violence (Collier and Vicente 2014). These effects also spread through social networks, particularly kinship networks (Fafchamps and Vicente 2013). While the mechanisms driving these effects are not explicitly tested, one interpretation could be that they increased the psychological cost of voting for a party that buys votes or intimidates voters.

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Last, there is some evidence that emotions shape citizens’ reactions to the threat of repression. Young (2015c) finds that emotions have a causal effect on how citizens perceive the threat of electoral violence. This research uses lab experimental methods to show that the emotion of fear – whether or not it originates from a political context – makes opposition supporters more pessimistic about the risk of repression and actions of other opposition supporters, as well as more risk averse. Emotions can also be invoked, however, by opposition organizers to increase participation. Young (2015b) finds that campaign ads shared by an opposition party in a repressive environment cause more pro-opposition political speech when they appeal to anger rather than enthusiasm, and that this effect is particularly strong among voters in higher-income areas. Taken together, these results suggest that citizens vary in their psychological propensity to feel mobilizing or demobilizing emotions in response to the threat of electoral violence that help explain how ­effective violence is from the perspective of the regime.

5.6 Conclusion In recent years, a vibrant literature has made significant advances in the study of clientelistic practices. Although the trade-off between programmatic and clientelistic mobilization was at the centre of an early literature on electoral clientelism, many recent studies have attempted to disaggregate the types of clientelistic exchanges and distinguish among the different brokers that mediate the relationship between candidates and voters. Our review has surveyed two broad questions that have informed this recent literature. First, what are the most salient variables that explain variation across countries, regions and localities in the mix of clientelistic strategies? Second, who are the voters targeted by different clientelistic strategies? Our review points to several avenues for further research. The study of variation in the mix of brokers deployed at elections is only beginning. There is increasingly robust evidence that local elites such as incumbents and traditional leaders are important brokers during elections, and that changing the cost of their involvement through monitoring and punishment schemes can reduce their influence. However, it is less understood whether politicians’ choice of other brokers – such as ethnic brokers, priests or union leaders – is affected by historical, political or economic variables that influence the ability of these brokers to manipulate voters, and politicians to monitor brokers. Furthermore, when multiple brokers are available, how do politicians choose which to deploy? Identifying these trade-offs is methodologically challenging, but has the potential to shed light on the determinants of different types of clientelism and also provide insight into how it might be prevented. Second, although there has been increasing conceptual clarity to the distinction between positive and negative strategies, more work should be done to understand how voters perceive the provision of entitlements contingent on political support. When do voters perceive these contingent relationships as gifts that they can take

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or leave, and when do they perceive their loss as a threat? Do politicians manipulate expectations in order to make voters more sensitive to changes in their material situations? These questions harken back to the earlier views of patron–client relationships as both mutually advantageous and coercive (Lemarchand 1972), but with new micro foundations from behavioural economics and psychology in mind. Third, the literature has begun to benefit from a number of studies that have looked beyond rational choice models to examine how psychological factors such as reciprocity and emotions influence the effectiveness of different illicit strategies. Are certain types of voters less costly to monitor, or more likely to respond to threats? Particularly in the case of violent threats, it is likely that real decision-making deviates in meaningful and predictable ways from the cost–benefit analysis that is often assumed to study individual decision-making. The experimental evidence showing that education campaigns to strengthen norms against illicit strategies can reduce the effectiveness of vote buying and coercion is promising, particularly given that such norms seem to spread through social networks. More work should also be done to build on the initial evidence that psychological characteristics such as reciprocity or susceptibility to fear may shape the effectiveness of threats and promises to voters.3 NOTES 1 Specifically, responses to the following questions: (1) ‘During [the last national election], how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?’ and (2) ‘During election campaigns in [this country], how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?’ 2 The work of Robinson and Verdier (2013) is an important exception. They analyse jobs as a clientelistic transfer that helps overcome commitment problems between patrons and clients because it generates rents over time and is selective and reversible. However, they still consider the potential loss of a client’s job not as a punishment but simply as the termination of a positive inducement. 3 For extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter, we are grateful to Kate Baldwin, Kimuli Kasara and Fabrice Lehoucq.

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6

Gender and corruption: what we know and ways forward

Ortrun Merkle

6.1 Introduction The release of the Panama Papers rocked the world in 2015, with journalists, academics and watchdogs toiling to analyse the magnitude of tax evasion and corruption presented in these documents. Large-scale corruption once again made international headlines throughout the world. One interesting aspect the Panama Papers revealed, that only attracted attention in a small segment of the media, was the gender disparity in those who benefit from this large-scale corruption and tax evasion.1 While some powerful women have been named by the Papers, the vast majority of tax evaders were rich, powerful men.2 What this illustrates is that benefits and burdens of corruption are unequally divided when one talks about corruption, not only between rich and poor but also between men and women.3 Over the last decades research has uncovered a clear pattern, namely a link between high levels of corruption and low levels of gender inequality, especially in political participation, and vice versa (Alexander and Bågenholm 2018), which has led to vivid discussions about the nature of the relationship between corruption and gender and potential underlying mechanisms. The discourse started with two seminal papers by Dollar et al. (2001), and Swamy et al. (2001) for the first time analysed how higher levels of political participation of women and lower corruption levels are linked. As a whole, the discussion of gender and corruption is one full of extremes – women as the new perfect anti-corruption force, on the one hand, or as the defenceless victims of corruption, on the other – yet, the nuances of this relationship are still debated. In the last decade numerous studies have emerged that have helped to untangle the relationship (e.g. Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Goetz 2007; Rothstein 2017; Stensöta and Wängnerud 2018; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001). As this chapter will show, an important aspect of the discussion around corruption is the question of power. Since corruption is an abuse of power, all corrupt acts display a particular power hierarchy, implying necessarily that one agent is powerful while the other is less so. Societies tend to organize along ‘group-based social hierarchies in which at least one group enjoys greater social status and power 75

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than other groups’ (Pratto et al. 2006) and one of the groups that is systemically less powerful is women. This difference in status is reflected in the differences in access to power, stereotypes and discrimination between men and women, which, as this chapter will show, are all directly related to corruption and the role women can play in the fight against corruption. Hence, women might simply be less associated with corruption, as they are typically among the powerless in society. Therefore, the chapter will reflect in more detail on power and gender dynamics, and on the current state of the research on gender and corruption, and highlight new areas of research on gendered forms of corruption and the role of gender norms, which should be an important element of the future research agenda on corruption.

6.2  Women in parliament: anti-corruption force or purity myth? A large body of research in the last decade has shown a strong correlation between higher levels of political participation of women and lower levels of corruption (Bauhr et al. 2018; Dollar et al. 2001; Jha and Sarangi 2018; Swamy et al. 2001; Wängnerud 2015). Yet while many issues have been discussed, much about the underlying mechanisms and the causality of this relationship still needs to be researched further. Analysing a considerable number of studies, Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) were the first to find that higher numbers of women in national parliament seem to be linked to lower levels of corruption. These findings were supported by subsequent studies that found the relationship to hold true both at national and regional levels (e.g. Bjarnegård 2013; Grimes and Wängnerud 2010, 2012; Jha and Sarangi 2018; Stockemer 2011; as an exception Vijayalakshmi 2008; Wängnerud 2015) as well as at cabinet level (Stockemer and Sundström 2019) and in local councils (Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). Bauhr et al. (2018) found in a study on European regions that an increase in local female political representation is linked to reductions of both petty and grand corruption. Using a non-perception-based measure of corruption, they find that both petty and grand corruption are reduced by the inclusion of women in local councils. The most recent study by Norris (2019) also confirms that high levels of political corruption and political violence lead to a lower number of women elected to parliament. She finds that where corruption is common, women constitute roughly 3.9 per cent of the legislatures, but when no corruption is present, the number of women in parliament triples to 13.6 per cent (Norris 2019, p. 12). These findings quite naturally raise questions about causality: whether indeed women’s participation in politics reduces corruption (and if so, how), or whether corruption hinders the participation of women in politics.

6.2.1  Do more women actually reduce corruption? The underlying mechanisms leading to the relationship between corruption and levels of female political participation are still debated. Some researchers have argued that higher gender equality leads to lower corruption (e.g. Dollar et al. 2001;

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Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018; Jha and Sarangi 2018); others assert that the relationship goes from corruption to gender inequality. For the former a large number of possible reasons have been discussed: for example, the assumption that women are more honest than men (e.g. Dollar et al. 2001), the argument that women are punished more harshly by voters for corruption and, as they are also more risk averse, are less likely to engage in corruption (e.g. Alatas et al. 2009; Esarey and Chirillo 2013) and lastly the discussion that women are simply excluded from positions that allow for corruption (Branisa and Ziegler 2011; Goetz 2007; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Tripp 2001). On the other hand, several ­researchers have argued that the causality runs from higher levels of corruption leading to lower levels of participation of women, as the climate of corruption privileges men: corrupt male networks exclude women to keep the profits to themselves (Bjarnegård 2013; Stockemer 2011; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). The most recent study, a working paper by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2019), finds that causality runs in both directions – higher levels of participation leading to lower levels of corruption, and vice versa – and concludes that ‘the two streams of argument are not mutually exclusive competition with one another: in our study, there is evidence for both’ (p. 27). Therefore future research should take an even closer look at underlying mechanisms and ask how and why questions rather than question the existence of the relationship overall (Esarey and SchwindtBayer 2019). The current debate on the question can be divided roughly into two strands: differences in attitudes towards corruption between men and women, and institutional factors impacting the influence of women’s participation on corruption levels. 6.2.1.1  Differences in attitudes towards corruption between men and women The first strand explaining the relationship focused on the question of why women might be less likely to engage in corruption, and that their increased participation might therefore lead to lower levels of corruption in a country overall. Dollar et al. (2001) explained this through the fact that women are more likely to sacrifice personal gain for the common good and therefore are less prone to be involved in corrupt behaviour. These arguments are in large part based on previous behaviour studies, showing that women have higher scores in integrity tests (Ones and Viswesvaran 1998) and showcase higher norms of ethical behaviour (Glover et al. 1997; Reiss and Mitra 1998). The findings of Dollar et al. (2001) were also corroborated by Swamy et al. (2001), who argued that women are less corrupt because of differences in self-control. Other studies arguing that women are less likely to engage in corrupt behaviour than men base this on differences between men and women in risk aversion (Byrnes et al. 1999; Eckel and Füllbrunn 2015; Harris et al. 2006) and willingness to engage in interactions with criminal or corrupt officials (Frank et al. 2011), or on the fact that women are simply less prone to criminal behaviour (including corruption) (Rothstein 2016). Additionally, women might feel greater pressure to conform to existing norms about corruption as they are more

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likely to be punished for corrupt behaviour (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). An apparent gender difference in attitudes towards corruption has especially been confirmed in a number of experimental studies (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Chaudhuri 2012; Frank et al. 2011; Rivas 2013; Schulze and Frank 2003). Importantly, these findings should not be interpreted as a claim that women are inherently less corrupt than men. This argument, which was popular for a short time, is also known as the ‘fairer-sex hypothesis’, and it led to a new focus on women as the ‘new anti-corruption cleaner force’ (Goetz 2007). However, this assertion has since been criticized for reinforcing gender stereotypes (UNDP 2012), where ‘[t]he very traits that traditionally branded women as deficient in moral development, their concern to help and to please, are now seen as a functional for good governance reforms in developing and transitional societies’ (Goetz 2007, p. 91). Hazarika (2016) continues this argument and notes that ‘traits ascribed to women once viewed as making for moral weakness are now seen as cornerstones of moral strength, that is, the definition of morality has changed. It may make little sense to consider women morally superior if notions of morality are mutable. Perhaps it is more useful to speak of honesty than morality’ (p. 8). 6.2.1.2  Institutional factors The discussion quickly moved to the role of institutional factors in mitigating the relationship. Several researchers have shown that the effect of increasing the number of women in parliament did not have a consistent effect on corruption (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2019; Karim 2011). Therefore, it seems likely that there are a number of other factors that impact if and when an increase in the number of women will lead to lower levels of corruption. Sung (2003) argues that it is not a causal relationship, but rather that both low levels of corruption and high levels of political participation of women should be attributed to ‘the presence of functioning liberal democratic institutions’ (p. 719). This argument is furthered by Esarey and Chirillo (2013), who show that female participation only has an impact on corruption levels when strong political institutions already exist. It might even be the case that only less corrupt governments are actually willing to include women in decision-making roles (Wängnerud 2014) because, for example, they are less based on tight networks but rather on merit. Looking at gender differences in attitudes towards corruption, AlhassanAlolo (2007) showed that male and female public servants in Ghana have similar attitudes towards corruption and are equally likely to engage in it. He hypothesizes that the question of whether an individual engages in corruption is a question of opportunity, networks and social norms, rather than one of gender differences. Alatas et al. (2009) came to similar conclusions. Using an experimental study in India and Indonesia, the authors find that there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. Vijayalakshmi (2008) also finds that there is no difference in rent-seeking attitudes or actual levels of corruption between male and female elected representatives in India.

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Wängnerud (2015) demonstrates that female participation in electoral politics has a larger impact on corruption than is achieved by women in senior administrative positions. Similarly, a study by Stensöta et al. (2015) argues that institutional characteristics matter in determining the role gender plays. Interestingly, they find that stronger bureaucratic principles decrease the effect of gender on both corruption behaviours and attitudes. Many scholars also argue that it is simply a question of access to opportunities for corrupt behaviour (e.g. Alhassan-Alolo 2007; Bjarnegård 2013; Goetz 2007; Grimes and Wängnerud 2012; Stockemer 2011). Research on women in politics has long shown that even once they are elected female politicians do not have access to the same power positions as their male counterparts (Barnes 2016; Heath et al. 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions several authors have confirmed that where the degree to which society accepts that power is distributed unequally is high (power distance) and in societies where gender roles are clearly separated and where male values, such as competitiveness, are valued more (masculinity) (Hofstede 2001), corruption levels are higher (Getz and Volkema 2001; Sanyal 2005; Yeganeh 2014). These are also societies where women have less power as a group and might have less opportunity to participate in politics and therefore corruption. For many aspects of corruption, a network is essential; for example, clientelism in democratic structures by definition contains a network (Stokes 2007). Women often do not have access to these clientelistic networks (Bjarnegård 2013), as this corruption relies on ‘homosocial’ capital, a type of social capital that is built on the relationship between men. Patronage networks are frequently dominated by men and exclude women from participation (Arriola and Johnson 2014; Beck 2003; Bjarnegård 2013). One could therefore assume that an increase in the number of women in politics could break up existing networks and reduce corruption. As women have been largely excluded from power and therefore also corrupt networks, they are more likely to criticize corrupt behaviour when they see it (Branisa and Ziegler 2011; Goetz 2007; Vijayalakshmi 2008). At the same time, however, it might be the case that even with higher numbers of women the corrupt networks would continue to exist, or include more women in those networks once they have achieved positions of power (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2019). More recently, the role of culture has also been explored as a mediating factor. A study by Debski et al. (2018) finds that underlying cultural factors explain much of the relationship between participation of women and corruption which should be explored further in future research. Other studies have discussed that the risks for involvement in corruption are higher for women, and therefore they are less likely to participate (e.g. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018). Another reason for avoiding corrupt behaviour is that women might also face starker punishments for their involvement. Yet the evidence on this is not clear at the moment (Barnes and Beaulieu 2019; Benstead and

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Lust 2018; Eggers et al. 2017; Schwindt-Bayer et al. 2018; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. 2017). Additionally, if women are really more risk averse than men, they should be less likely to engage in corruption even ‘if the objective probability of detection and/or the severity of punishment does not differ by gender’ (Esarey and SchwindtBayer 2019, p. 5). Interestingly, multiple research studies have shown that increased female political representation does indeed reduce corruption levels if it is especially risky to be involved in corrupt activities (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018). Alexander and Bågenholm (2018) find that ‘female politicians seem to be just as keen or even keener on fighting corruption than their male counterparts, at least when it comes to campaign promises’ (p. 187). They also advance causation that the promise to work against corruption does not necessarily lead to actual reductions in levels of corruption, especially as women might have significant difficulties in reaching positions of power from which to take up the fight (see next section). Yet their findings also show that women have an important contribution to make in the battle against corruption.

6.2.2  The impact of corruption on female political representation The causality of the relationship might also be reversed: corruption can have a negative impact on the political participation of women. As has been widely researched, pursuing a political career is full of opportunities but also, especially for women, obstacles (for an overview, see e.g. Paxton and Hughes 2017), one of which can be corruption. Corruption can be an additional barrier for women to actually run and be elected into public office when, for example, illicit funds are used in elections (Norris 2019). For the selection within parties, research shows that corruption can also severely hinder women’s access to political office. Clientelism can be an effective gatekeeper and hinder women from entering formal politics (e.g. Bjarnegård 2013 on Thailand; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). Bjarnegård (2013) argues that ‘whereas democracy has often been viewed as enabling participation, clientelism is here seen as constraining genuine political participation for the majority of people’ (p. 8). Therefore, it is important to study in more detail what makes ‘corruption systems prone to inclusion of already corrupt men while effectively excluding ­outsiders such as women’ (Bjarnegård 2018, p. 257). Oftentimes, access to political office also requires access to informal, often maledominated networks that exclude women (Bjarnegård 2013; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Stockemer and Sundström 2019). Stockemer (2011), analysing data on Africa, finds that ‘By reinforcing human rights violations, preventing the institutionalization of party structures and strengthening traditional power networks, high levels of corruption appear to be a major barrier against women’s efforts to gain office’ (p.  705). Furthermore, Sundström and Wängnerud (2016), analysing data on European local councils, argue that the selection process is impacted by corruption

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and that women are likely to be excluded from corrupt networks which are typically dominated by and designed to privilege men. Grimes and Wängnerud (2012) corroborate these findings, showing that in Mexico corruption also hinders women’s representation. Bjarnegård and Kenny (2016) show that when formal rules are weak or not properly enforced, informal practices of patronage and clientelism disadvantage women. In addition, several studies have identified the existence of male-dominated patronage networks as an obstacle for women to enter formal politics, which then also limits the possibilities for women to enter into corrupt exchanges (Alhassan-Alolo 2007; Goetz 2007; Stockemer 2011; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016).

6.3  Women as a potential anti-corruption force Once involved in politics, women also bring other issues to the policy agenda, especially those concerning women (e.g. Iyer et al. 2012; Rehavi 2007) and children (e.g. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Brollo and Troiano 2016). This also plays an important role for anti-corruption initiatives. Research has shown that men and women are differently impacted by corruption (e.g. Chêne et al. 2010; Ellis et al. 2006; Leach et al. 2014); hence one could expect that women are likely to focus specifically on those aspects of corruption where women are disproportionally affected. As female politicians have been shown to bring different issues to the table, one can hypothesize that they will also be more likely to focus on areas where women are especially affected by corruption. While evidence on this is still scarce, recent research has discussed that this focus of women on policies targeting the well-being of women and children also leads to an improvement in the delivery and monitoring of public services and therefore lower levels of corruption (Alexander and Bågenholm 2018, p. 173; Jha and Sarangi 2018). Bauhr et al. (2018) find that women have reduced both petty and grand corruption, but for very different reasons. They argue, for example (and as discussed by previous scholars), that they focus on sectors that are important traditionally for women and reduce petty corruption in them. Grand corruption, on the other hand, is fought by breaking up male-dominated networks, which, as discussed above, often exclude women and are necessary for corruption to persist. They find that both of these mechanisms play a role in European data at the regional level. Sometimes the increased presence of women might, however, not have the desired effect but might merely be a measure camouflaging issues that arise in a country: ‘Pervasive corruption and the failure of many authoritarian rulers to address developmental challenges faced by their countries make women’s promotion to senior bureaucratic positions a relatively cheap way to counteract threats to the regime emanating these problems’ (Nistotskaya and Stensöta 2018, p. 160).

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The process of candidate selection has been shown to be very different for men and women. Hence it might be that only the most hard-working and talented women can succeed, as voters tend to discriminate against female candidates (Anzia and Berry 2011). This can also explain different attitudes towards corruption by those women who are successful candidates. Similarly, women might be less corrupt in high-accountability contexts as they expect it more likely to be held accountable by voters (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018) or because voters are more attentive to misconduct by female politicians (Larcinese and Sircar 2017). Eggers et al. (2017) find that female voters respond more to corruption of female politicians than that of males, which adds another layer to the literature discussing how men and women are held accountable in different ways. The institutional and political context also plays a role in determining whether women are a likely anti-corruption force. Women are more likely to oppose corruption in democratic settings than in authoritarian ones, which supports the argument that democracy is a mediating factor in the relationship between political participation of women and corruption (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). The relationship is even stronger in democracies with high electoral accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2014). When electoral accountability and democratic institutions are improved, an increase in female political participation can reduce corruption further (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018). The question as to whether women can be an anti-corruption force also depends on which women are picked for office. If only ‘malleable’ women are chosen to fill the spots provided (Krook 2007, p. 371) one can expect that their selection will not lead to a change in the status quo of corruption. Therefore it seems to be an important step in researching the relationship between women’s political participation and levels of corruption to look not only at the number of women but also at how the women who came into office actually gained access to power.

6.4  The different effects of corruption on men and women Following the discussion that corruption might hinder the political participation of women (more than that of men), it is a logical next step to explore how corruption can affect men and women differently in other spheres of life. While discussions on corruption do argue that men and women are differently impacted by corruption (e.g. Chêne et al. 2010; Ellis et al. 2006; Leach et al. 2014), most research remains focused on a single sector or element where gendered effects can be found. This severely understates how important an analysis of gendered effects is by suggesting that they are anecdotal rather than systemic. To gain a comprehensive picture of the gendered effects of corruption, one needs to understand that the effects of corruption can be direct and indirect. A direct effect can be any event where an individual is directly participating in a corrupt act, from being asked to pay a bribe, to receiving a government service, to sexual

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extortion. However, equally important are the indirect effects corruption can have, since a corrupt act not only affects the parties involved but ‘its externalities usually indirectly affect third parties, including the general population, taxpayers, specific professions, or communities’ (Boehm and Sierra 2015, p. 2). Hence, the gendered effect of corruption must in future research also be looked at from two p ­ erspectives: direct and indirect. The underlying reason why men and women can be affected differently, both directly and indirectly, by corruption are unequal power relationships within societies and resulting gender roles (as will be discussed in more detail later). In most societies certain roles are typically assigned to men or women, and each of them will lead to different kinds of exposure to corruption. For example, when men are traditionally more active in roles where they encounter corruption (e.g. in businesses), and in absolute terms might encounter more corruption, women can ‘still be proportionally more vulnerable’ (Boehm and Sierra 2015, p. 2). Ellis et al. (2006), for example, show that even though more men work in the Ugandan private sector, women are targeted more frequently by corruption. Interestingly, there is little data available on the question of why women are often more vulnerable to corruption than men, as this goes beyond the question of exposure to corruption (Boehm and Sierra 2015). One underlying reason might be patriarchal power structures that create vulnerabilities for women, as will also be discussed later. Several areas have been identified where the effect of corruption differs for women and men. For example, corruption disproportionately affects the poor by taking up a larger share of their income (Hunt and Laszlo 2012; Justesen and Bjørnskov 2014). As is well known, gender plays a large role in poverty, where ‘[l]ower proportions of women than men have their own cash income from labour as a result of the unequal division of paid and unpaid work’, and women, especially when they have dependent children and no partners, are more likely to be poor than men (United Nations 2015, p. xiv). Furthermore, access to basic public services is an area where women are affected differently. Women in developing countries often do not have the financial resources to pay for bribes, as control over household resources lies with the men, and therefore are frequently denied service (Nyami Musembi 2007). As women spend more time in the healthcare system during pregnancy and in childcare, they are also more exposed to corruption in this sector than men (Chêne et al. 2010). Recently, more attention has been brought to the role of corruption during migration. Merkle et al. (2017) demonstrate that both women and men experience corruption as a constant throughout the journey; however, the way corruption is experienced differs fundamentally by gender. This research also highlights two important aspects that will be discussed in the next section: firstly, the forms of corruption experienced are highly gendered, and secondly, gender norms in the home and transit country play a fundamental role in how corruption is experienced.

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6.5  Gendered forms of corruption: sextortion Many advances have been made in the nuanced discussion around gender and corruption. However, when most people think about corruption, they still think about the exchange of money, goods and power. As this section will discuss, to truly understand the gendered nature of corruption, the definition of corruption must also include sexual acts as payment for the corrupt act. Only little research has so far focused on the exchange of sexual services (e.g. Goetz 2007; Merkle et al. 2017; Towns 2015; Wängnerud 2012). The most commonly used definition for this type of corruption is that provided by the International Association of Women Judges ([IAWJ] 2012), which defines ‘sextortion’ (sexual extortion) as ‘the abuse of power to obtain a sexual favor’ (p. 9). Surprisingly little academic research has discussed this form of corruption in more detail. Towns (2015) is among the first to give a more detailed analysis of sex as a currency in corruption, calling it ‘sexual corruption’. She specifically takes a closer look at instances of sexual corruption in the field of diplomacy and defines it as ‘transactional relationships that involve the trade of sex for services, benefits or goods tied to public office’ (p. 51). Towns argues that there are two main forms of sexual corruption: (1) an act that is similar to a traditional corrupt act, except that the currency is sex instead of cash and (2) instances where one participant in the corrupt act pays a third party to perform a sexual service. Lindberg and Stensöta (2018) take this definition further and define six forms of sexual corruption based on three features of sex as a currency: ‘care, temptation of sex through beauty, and actual sex’ (p. 253). While this is an interesting discussion that should be explored further, the complicated nature of the definition runs the risk of remaining in the theoretical realm and not leading to any practical implications. This would lead to devastating consequences for women who are in the most precarious situations and who experience acts of sexual extortion. Therefore, the concept of sextortion as defined by the IAWJ should be ­discussed as a separate and important form of corruption. Few studies in the legal, educational, employment or migration fields have shed light on the phenomenon. Sextortion, as a pervasive phenomenon in the workplace, has often been referred to as ‘quid pro quo harassment’. The phenomenon results in profound job-related, psychological and physical health outcomes (Fitzgerald 1993; O’Connell and Korabik 2000; Willness et al. 2007). Sextortion in the workplace is also associated with negative outcomes such as decreased job satisfaction, lower organizational commitment, withdrawal from work, physical and mental health issues and even symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Willness et al. 2007). Sextortion has also gained more attention recently in migration studies, as cases have been reported in several refugee camps. In an extensive field report, experts detected the prevalence of sexual violence including but not limited to early and forced marriage, transactional sex, sexual harassment and physical assault in the country of origin and on the migration journey (UNHCR et al. 2016). In high-risk migration, it is common that migrant women end up in a highly exploitative situation where they are coerced into sexual services to cover their most basic needs

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(Zimmermann et al. 2016). In a recent study, Merkle et al. (2017) show that while both men and women constantly experience corruption throughout their migration journey, there is a fundamental difference in the form of payment: men pay with money while women pay with their bodies. Sextortion happens for a variety of motives, from crossing borders to obtaining travel documents, accessing transportation or only to avoid being reported. Additionally, smugglers abuse their position as protectors and the urgency of the situation at borders to demand sex from migrant women. Hence, in irregular migration, women are not only subjects of sextortion but are the very means of exchange in the corrupt act. Importantly, women do not only pay for their own journey, but female migrants’ bodies are also used as a means of exchange for an entire group of migrants, for example when convoys are crossing checkpoints (Merkle et al. 2017). While much research is needed on the topic of sextortion or sexual corruption, one thing is very clear: this specific form of corruption is a phenomenon that shows the importance of broadening the classical male-centric view of corruption focusing on the exchange of money and goods to include the female body as a currency of exchange (Merkle et al. 2017).

6.6  Corruption and gender norms The discussion of gender and corruption is one full of extremes – women as the new perfect anti-corruption force, on the one hand, or as defenceless victims of corruption, on the other – yet an important aspect of the relationship has still been neglected: namely, how gender dynamics shape the forms and experiences of corruption of both men and women in society. Research on gender in other areas has long shown that rather than being a singular variable, gender is a multidimensional and complex concept. Gender is about much more than biological differences of being a man or a woman; rather it is about the socially constructed roles associated with being male or female and the different opportunities, relationships, power and influence attributed to men and women (Prince 2005). However, corruption research still focuses on an often simplistic understanding of gender as a lateral and one-dimensional variable to be included in the analysis. Because of this narrow conception, gender has too often been used as an equivalent of ‘women’. To this date, only very little research has considered how masculinity and the relative position of men in societies affect attitudes towards and experiences of corruption (e.g. Bjarnegård 2013, 2018). Additionally, while research has shown that the effects of corruption can be gendered, the act of corruption itself is mostly discussed as a gender-neutral phenomenon (Merkle 2018). Goetz (2007) for the first time highlighted that gendered power imbalances play a fundamental role in corruption. She discusses how these power imbalances not only exclude women from the participation in corruption but also lead to women being more affected by corruption due to the tasks that society assigns to women. She also discusses how the idea that women are ‘political cleaners’ – in other words,

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intrinsically more honest – is shaped by our understanding of power distribution within society. Lindberg and Stensöta (2018) continue this discussion on patriarchy – or as they call it, ‘asymmetrical opportunity structures’ (p. 247) – by focusing on feminist materialist theories. They argue that the traditional corruption definition’s division between the public and the private needs to be abolished, providing the alternative ‘that all power asymmetries may give rise to corrupt behaviour, regardless of whether this is “using public office for public gain in appropriate ways” or “using power for private gain”’ (Lindberg and Stensöta 2018, p. 253). By definition, designations of corruption all include a reference to power or authority, but what constitutes this power and how the power itself is gendered is not yet sufficiently discussed. Focusing on the gendered nature not only of the consequences or causes of corruption but the act itself should help reshape and broaden the definition of corruption and generally lead to a more inclusive conceptualization, which will also assist in describing women’s substantially different experiences of corruption (Merkle 2018). Furthermore, the language used to describe the phenomenon of sexual corruption or sextortion in itself should be seen as a power imbalance. In her analysis, Towns (2015) shows that the idea of using sex to get something from powerful actors is something that has a notable presence in public discourse. She uses the examples of ‘honey trap’ and ‘casting couch’, which are frequently used when referring to people (women) using sex as a currency to gain something, in a similar way to using money as a currency. This should, however, be discussed even further. The question of how sextortion is discussed is in itself a question of power imbalances. Hence, it is essential to use the term ‘sextortion’ as an ­explicitly defined concept. The first few studies on sextortion have approached it with different lexica such as sexual harassment, survival sex, transactional sex and so on. From quid pro quo harassment to transactional sex, a wide variety of terms are used across cultural and legal systems to describe the same phenomenon. This chapter argues that the term ‘sextortion’ allows us to uniformly and unequivocally name this reality at the intersection of corruption and sexual violence. The first attempts to criminalize sextortion are found with quid pro quo harassment in the workplace. As presented by Baker (1995), ‘In the workplace, quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when submission to sexual conduct is made a term or condition of an individual’s employment or when an individual’s submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting that individual’ (p. 213). Even if it is recognized by certain scholars, jurisprudence has shown that the concept of quid pro quo harassment remains unclear. Dickinson (1995) argues that courts are not recognizing a quid pro quo course of action since it does not involve typically tangible or economic harm. The complexity of the term has led others to call for the excision of the term ‘Occam’s razor’, with the argument that it is complex to prove and redundant of sex discrimination, and hence the latter loses strength as an ­argument in the justice process (Scalia 1997, p. 325).

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The approach of quid pro quo harassment is insufficient for various reasons. First, the term ‘quid pro quo harassment’ seems quite inaccessible and euphemistic, as it minimizes the victim’s experience of extortion and sexual violence. In fact, the term seems to emphasize the exchange itself and how women get something in return by highlighting the ‘this for that’ aspect instead of recognizing extortion. Second, quid pro quo harassment has only been referred to in the context of the workplace. Sextortion, instead, can apply not only to workplace harassment but also to a broader range of social spheres, as shown with migration, but also in many other sectors such as, for example, healthcare, politics or sports. In humanitarian settings, sextortion is referred to as transactional sex or survival sex. In contexts where women are particularly resource-less, they depend on men to cover their most basic needs. Some argue that the term ‘transactional sex’ allows us to consider the agency of women, a concept that was previously omitted, as women engage in rational, economically driven exchanges (Stoebenau et al. 2016; Weissman et al. 2006). While it is true that focusing mainly on vulnerability can be detrimental to gender empowerment, the notion of rational and economically driven sex fails to recognize the broader power system of patriarchy in which women are systematically coerced into sex. For instance, in the context of migration, it has been reported that women are asked for sexual favours in exchange for basic protection or even to avoid being reported. This can be interpreted as an exchange, but more properly as coercion. This is a paradigmatic example to show the pertinence of the term sextortion rather than transactional sex, in contexts where women’s agency is significantly reduced. What is also interesting to point out is how the different terms are employed in different regions. While terms such as harassment or sexual assault are used in developed countries, more drastic expressions such as transactional or survival sex are used very often for least-developed countries and in development works. However, as detailed earlier, sexual violence against women happens worldwide at relatively similar levels, with grave consequences for women globally. The fact that the terms employed for developed countries are much softer and euphemistic while the term employed in poorer contexts ­– transactional sex – is cruder reflects yet another dynamic of power at play: North–South power imbalances. Wealthy states would not use the terms transactional or survival sex when referring to the corruption experiences of women in the North, but rather to point at a violent reality that is supposedly proper of under-developed countries in the global South. However, sextortion is a reality, often a violent one, not only in contexts of economic deprivation but also in advanced economies. Indeed, what matters in sextortion is not the absolute but the relative deprivation of power of women in each region. Even across North–South power imbalances, the gender order of patriarchy remains and systematically leads to abuses of power. Overall, the terms used up until now to identify sextortion seem euphemistic. In that sense, the language used to refer to sextortion is also part of the process of making the power system and its oppressive institutions invisible. Once again, the

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misrecognition process has been successful in achieving the implicit legitimation of the patriarchal order. As happens with general sexual violence, the category of the powerful is left out of the conversation, and the dynamics of power are rendered invisible. For instance, when discussing sexual and gender-based violence, the discussion quickly focuses almost exclusively on ‘battered women’, referring to women in passive voice, rather than ‘male violent perpetrators’, in active voice (Katz 2012). This is a perverse phenomenon in that it moves the attention away from the root of the problem – power imbalances and abuses of power against women – to focus only on the result: the injured woman. This is again an example of how patriarchal dynamics are self-sustaining and successful in obscuring abusive power relations. Once more, power dynamics are reflected in the language and the way such events are spoken and thought about. This chapter therefore encourages the use of the term sextortion as a way to unveil patriarchal dynamics and bring to light how violent gender and power relations are embodied in corruption. The term sextortion makes the crime more recognizable by revealing grave abuses of power that were previously legitimized or made implicit, hence contributing to justice for the victims at the individual level and elimination of sextortion at the collective level. The recognition of sextortion as a form of corruption opens a field of study in corruption research, where women’s experiences of corruption have until now been widely under-reported.

6.7  Future trends and conclusions The research on corruption and gender has made important discoveries in the last decades, not just about the nature of corruption and anti-corruption efforts but also about the lived realities of men and women affected by corruption. Much of the research has focused on the relationship between the political participation of women and corruption. While this is an important facet, more focus should be directed towards understanding the how and why of the relationship rather than further studies analysing if the relationship exists or not (Esarey and SchwindtBayer 2019). More nuanced research is also needed in understanding the gendered effects of corruption. The current focus on single sectors is important but ­underestimates the systemic nature of gendered effects of corruption. While it is important to continue to research the empirical relationship between corruption and gender (and indeed corruption researchers have placed greater emphasis on gender and have worked to create a more nuanced picture of the relationship), additional focus should also be directed towards the inclusion of more theoretical discussions, especially those targeting different strands of literature, in particular feminist research. As this chapter shows, new areas of research need to be explored. Firstly, the role of sexual services as a currency of corruption is still under-theorized and has only been explored in a few areas. Secondly, more data needs to be collected on the lived

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experiences of corruption of men and women to explore the differences not only in effects but also in the forms of corruption each individual encounters. Thirdly, definitions of and discussions about corruption need to include a better understanding of the gendered nature of power. Once again, corruption research can learn from feminist research to gain a better and more nuanced understanding of how power structures in society impact the corrupt act and our understanding thereof. NOTES 1 This has been discussed by news outlets analysing the papers (e.g. Capraro and Rhodes 2016) but not yet by academic literature. 2 For information on the power players in the Panama Papers, see ICIJ (n.d.). 3 Corruption diverts money that should be used for public spending in, for example, healthcare. It is often women who have to compensate for the gap in public spending, and often through unpaid work. Women worldwide are responsible still for the majority of unpaid care work, which also has long-term consequences on their economic stability (see e.g. Ferrant et al. 2014).

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7

All that glitters . . . a closer look at the Nordic ‘exception’

Gissur Ó. Erlingsson and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson

7.1 Introduction The Nordic countries – Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden – have historically been hailed as benchmarks for clean, honest and low-corrupt government (e.g. Heidenheimer 1989; Delhey and Newton 2005; Andreasson 2017). For instance, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden held the top four spots in World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index in the 2019 edition;1 in addition, in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, all five Nordic countries have consistently scored high on indicators concerning rule of law and control of corruption. To further underscore the ‘clean and honest’ image, ever since Transparency International first launched its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995, the Nordic countries have occupied top-ten positions in most years.2 Although we do not dispute that the Nordic countries are low-corrupt compared to most others, the purpose here is to approach a topic we believe has been underdiscussed in the corruption literature: to explore what it entails to belong to the world’s least corrupt countries. Does it imply that the problems are insignificant, negligible and not too much to worry about? Or, could the problems be somewhat more serious and widespread than traditionally portrayed with reference to honourable placements in international rankings? The questions deserve deeper exploration. For, as Girling (1997) points out, just because a country modernizes and develops into a mature democracy, it does not guarantee that corruption automatically vanishes. It might be the case that the character of corruption changes, adopting what Papakostas (2012) calls ‘sophisticated’ forms. Such corruption could be tricky to detect, hence difficult to measure with methods traditionally employed, for example in Transparency International’s CPI. Curiously, from this perspective, questioning of a ‘Nordic utopia’ regarding impartiality and rule of law has begun to surface. Allern and Pollack (2018) have recently reminded us that anti-corruption norms are not necessarily integrated into the Nordic DNA: large corporations from the Nordic countries (e.g. in telecommunications, oil and defence industries) have been involved in large-scale bribery scandals. And notably, in the case of Iceland, the issue of corruption has received growing public attention after the financial crash in 2008 (see e.g. Erlingsson et al. 2016). 90

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As in other Nordic countries, everyday corruption in Finland has been deemed to be close to insignificant. However, some scholars argue that grand white collar corruption may exist in forms that are hard to expose, because – as Graycar (2015) puts it – ‘it is much harder to identify as it is woven into the fabric of business and public–private sector dealings and is less likely to come to the attention of the authorities’ (cf. Joutsen and Keränen 2009). Since the mid 2000s, corruption has come to be taken increasingly seriously in Sweden. For instance, we have witnessed criticisms regarding Sweden’s anti-­ corruption preparedness from, for example, the Group of States against Corruption, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Swedish National Audit and the Swedish Agency for Public Management (cf. Bergh et al. 2016). A fresh interest can be detected in Norway too, sparked in part by a recent scandal involving organized crime and a top-ranked police officer (e.g. Arbeidsnytt 2018; Henriksen 2018; Forsberg 2019), and even earlier when Gedde-Dahl et al. (2008) warned that there might be more than meets the eye to Norwegian corruption. Lastly, Denmark – a country consistently occupying top-three spots in the CPI and other indices – has recently been associated with scandals involving embezzlement and money laundering, forcing Danes to look in the mirror and reevaluate how clean and honest their country really is (Schwartzkopff and Levring 2018). The epic story of an employee at the National Board of Health and Welfare who embezzled approximately 10 million euros (Olsen 2018) and the scandal(s) in the municipality of Farum are sober reminders that even the cleanest of countries is not spared from irregularities (Langsted 2012). It is clear, therefore, that occupying top spots in international anti-corruption rankings in no way guarantees immunity against corruption problems. Against this backdrop, this chapter will ultimately make four claims about corruption in lowcorrupt countries. ●●

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The distinct paths of development taken towards state capacity by the Nordic countries has shielded them from certain types of corruption, although there are interesting variations within the region in this respect. However, this does not mean that they have found a final solution to the problem of corruption. There is a need for nuanced and fine-tuned measurements in order to more accurately capture the character of corruption understood precisely as ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ in mature welfare state settings. When zooming in on corruption problems exclusively in the Nordic region with more fine-tuned measurements, we maintain that interesting variations within the Nordic microcosm exist. Hence it could be misguided to automatically lump them together as representatives for a unitary system and paint a picture of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’. We hope to demonstrate that just because the Nordic countries receive honourable rankings in well-cited indices, corruption is not to be neglected and taken light-heartedly by their governments. Even among the best in class, active and conscious anti-corruption strategies are required. However,

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we suggest that the tools needed to counteract ‘sophisticated’ corruption in a low-corrupt, welfare state setting differ from those needed in developing countries where the whole public sector fabric is permeated by corruption. By way of introduction, we initially summarize historical studies that have analysed how these countries became incused by rule of law and minimized corruption problems. This is followed by a section on the historical and institutional features which substantially reduced corruption during the modern period. Nordic variations suggest the importance of historical sequences and institutions in deciding the prevalence of corruption. Moreover, each conjuncture has its own unique features, suggesting the importance of watching how the particular combination of factors preventing corruption in the twentieth century may not be enough to ­prevent it in the twenty-first century. Thereafter, we approach today’s situation by presenting data on corruption in Nordic countries based on different approaches: perceptions as well as personal experiences. We go on to estimate pros and cons of these approaches, before moving on to discuss how well the traditional understanding of corruption – that is, the giving and taking of bribes – travels to modern welfare state settings. We maintain that in order to understand ‘corruption, Nordic style’, we must look elsewhere – to more discreet forms such as clientelism, cronyism, patronage, embezzle­ment, nepotism and related violations of the norm of impartiality – not least when it comes to public procurement practices and hiring of public officials. We then move on to discuss danger zones for corruption found in mature welfare states; and what extensive New Public Management (NPM) reforms combined with the strong role given to local government in these countries implies for corruption risks in the Nordic welfare states. We conclude with a discussion of future avenues for corruption research in mature welfare states of the Nordic kind.

7.2  How did they ‘get there’? Corruption does not have merely one root or cause any more than other composite phenomena, such as crime or disease. There may be different combinations of factors which contribute to prevailing types of corruption and their overall intensity (Johnston 2005). In the case of the Nordic region, it is fruitful to distinguish between early modern corruption, modern corruption and post-bureaucratic corruption. The distinction does not necessarily refer to particular points in time, but to major structural features and tasks of the state in different contexts. The Nordic region managed the transformation from early modern corruption to non-corruption in the modern state relatively successfully. Comprehensive state hierarchies and Weberian bureaucracy formed the foundations of the modern Nordic states, with minor exceptions, which consequently earned them their reputation as leading examples of strong rule of law as well as non-corruption (e.g. Frisk Jensen 2018). However, challenges to the modern state emerged towards the end of

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the twentieth century, as sovereign states became less able than before to manage their internal affairs. This led to a number of innovations in public management which may be associated with post-bureaucratic (e.g. governance and network) forms of organization and management. The early modern state developed in the Nordic region at an uneven speed from the end of the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century. A convenient reference point in this respect is the breakdown of the Kalmar Union (1397–1523), in which the region was united under a single crown. The Kalmar Union was succeeded by two leading states in the region, the kingdoms of Denmark (initially including Iceland and Norway) and Sweden (initially including Finland). The problem of corruption in the early modern state arose, above all, as the rulers of Denmark and Sweden attempted to strengthen the financial and administrative bases of their military endeavours. The early states were characterized by inefficiency and a high degree of corruption which, in this context, amounted to disloyalty to the king. In Europe, generally, it was only during the eighteenth century that loyalty to an impersonal state replaced loyalty to a ruler (Dyson 2009, p. 33). A key question concerns the nature of the transition from early modern corruption to its elimination in the modern state. In Rothstein’s (2011a) view, corruption is a phenomenon that is universally shunned, which makes anti-corruption reform essentially a collective action problem. How can those who dislike c­orruption act collectively to eliminate it? The main lesson to be drawn from the Swedish experience, he maintains, is that to be successful, reform needs to be swift, all-­ encompassing and ultimately signalling a completely new game in town – that public institutions and policies are permeated by universalism and impartiality. Thus, according to him, a series of reforms in Sweden throughout the nineteenth century transformed it from a state of relatively high corruption to a relatively noncorrupt modern state based on the principle of impartiality. As Rothstein (2011a) argues, the change towards a Weberian civil service, which came about between 1860 and 1875, was non-incremental as well as dramatic (p. 243). Although understanding corruption as a collective action problem undoubtedly contributes to our knowledge, Rothstein’s approach begs fundamental questions. Above all, it lacks an account of the context in which ‘insiders’ (such as political elites/nation-builders) might find it in their interests to eliminate the corrupt order which benefits them. The so-called big bang account of corruption reforms brings to mind Baron Munchausen’s account of how he pulled himself (and his horse!) out of a mire by his own hair: the argument fails to account for the context in which the Swedish state was willing and able to perform the trick. Sundell (2015) calls the big bang approach into question and argues that corruption perhaps was not that widespread in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, and conversely, that corruption was not entirely erased in the early twentieth century either. For instance, Sundell underscores that reforms towards meritocratization were already underway in the eighteenth century. Hence, Sundell’s analysis

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implies that anti-corruption reforms were incremental, rather than explosive and all-encompassing. Sundell’s approach resembles Frisk Jensen’s (2014) account of the Danish road to a modern non-corrupt state, an analysis which emphasizes the gradual nature of anti-corruption reform. Military losses to Sweden in 1658 preceded the introduction of an absolute monarchy in Denmark and demonstrated the need for effective administration for collecting taxes to finance wars (Frisk Jensen 2014, p. 6). Corruption was regarded as a potential threat to absolutist rule, which accounts for the crown putting such an effort into eradicating it as far as possible. As in Sweden, the final phase of anti-corruption reforms in nineteenth-century Denmark took place well before significant democratic reforms were introduced. While there were seemingly important differences between the Danish and Swedish paths to a modern universal state, they are perhaps not as striking as the different perspectives of gradualism and dramatic big bang reforms suggest. To be sure, absolutism never established a similar foothold in Sweden as in Denmark, and the estates remained an important factor of political life into the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the basic groundwork for anti-corruption reforms seems to have been in place in Sweden well before the nineteenth century. Above all, the need for effective tax collection, as the basis for military expansion, was a major stimulant for administrative reforms, aided by the state-run Lutheran Church. Several authors emphasize how Swedish kings were among the first in Europe to systematically register economic assets for purposes of taxation (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017; Papakostas 2018). Indeed, Nistotskaya and D’Arcy (2018) stress the importance of the early modern period for the subsequent development of the Swedish state: ‘the continuity between the aspects of the contemporary tax state that make it effective and the tax state that emerged in the early modern period suggests that the virtuous circle persisted over time’ (p. 35). Similarly, the pace of reform quickened in Denmark during the nineteenth century as corruption was specifically targeted by the government as a threat to the state (Frisk Jensen 2014). Many of the reforms introduced in Denmark in the nineteenth century were similar to the Swedish ones of the same period. By the end of the nineteenth century both Denmark and Sweden had a relatively well-established system of rule of law and strong, autonomous Weberian bureaucracies in place. Finland and Norway followed their controlling states in many respects up to a point during the Napoleonic Wars, when Norway was separated from Denmark and entered a union with Sweden (1814–1905) and Finland became a Grand Duchy of Russia (1809–1917). Key features of their political and administrative developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were shaped through a complicated relationship to the controlling states of Sweden and Russia. Early on, Norway established a relatively high degree of independence in its relations to Sweden, led by a bureaucratic elite which was, in many ways, unique with regard to autonomy and domestic influence. The Finnish nationalist elite, which replaced the former Swedish-speaking administration towards the end of

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the nineteenth century, similarly obtained a high degree of autonomy, based on the premise of loyalty to the emperor. Thus, as Alapuro (2019) points out, ‘bureaucrats were to constitute the central elite group both in Finland and in Norway during most of the nineteenth century to the extent that both of them were to be characterized as civil servant states . . . Civil servants were instrumental in state-making, including its ideological dimension, the nation-building’ (p. 1). Thus, Norway and Finland shared with Denmark and Sweden a crucial feature of political development: the emergence of a well-established and autonomous Weberian bureaucracy prior to the development of mass politics and democracy. This, we believe, is an important observation. As Shefter (1977, 1994) suggests, the development of an autonomous bureaucracy prior to the mobilization of mass political parties is a crucial factor affecting the very nature of political organizations. Political parties which attempted mass mobilization after the development of bureaucracy found their access to patronage and particularistic services within the public sector blocked. They therefore had to rely on non-material benefits for their members, primarily in the form of policy payoffs. On the other hand, in settings where a strong bureaucracy was not in place during the crucial phases of political mobilization, political parties were likely to develop as patronage or clientelistic organizations, handing out material benefits from the public sector on a case-bycase basis, in exchange for political support. Several scholars have emphasized the relevance of Shefter’s theorizing of the Nordic region (e.g. Kristinsson 1996; Papakostas 2002; Alapuro 2019). In four of the five Nordic countries, a relatively well-functioning bureaucracy was in place prior to democracy. The Icelandic pattern, although special in some respects, fits neatly with Shefter’s argument. At the start of the twentieth century it had most of the essential features of ‘Nordicness’, including relatively well-established rule of law, a Lutheran state Church, near universal literacy and tight associational networks. Crucially, however, it lacked a strong and autonomous bureaucracy. Until the establishment of Home Rule in 1904, the administration of the country was conducted by servants of the Danish Crown. Although these were mostly Icelanders by this time, they played a very limited role in legitimizing the idea of an Icelandic state. For all intents and purposes, the struggle for independence was in the hands of the elected assembly, the Althingi. After Home Rule was established, the Althingi took a firm lead in the political affairs of the country. When political parties began developing into membership organizations in the interwar period, the parties had access to various material benefits in the public sector which they could employ to reward their members and supporters. Thus, as Kristinsson (1996) notes, Iceland became the only Nordic country to develop clientelist-based parties on a significant scale. As the modern state evolved during the twentieth century in the Nordic region, corruption was conspicuous by its absence, and the Nordic countries were – with the partial exception of Iceland – generally characterized by strong respect for the rule of law, strong Weberian bureaucracies, policy-oriented political parties

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and universal welfare states. Every time and social context, however, deals with its own peculiar problems, and there are no final solutions to complex problems such as corruption. As the century drew to an end, a number of challenges to the modern Nordic state had emerged. Increasingly complex external pressures as well as the cost of running consensual and universalist welfare states took their toll in the Nordic societies and sent their governments in search of alternative solutions. Policy-makers with decreasing levels of actual control are increasingly held accountable, leaving governments ever more vulnerable to unpopularity and ­eventual electoral defeat (Bengtsson et al. 2011; Dahlström and Peters 2011). Key elements in the changing position of the state since the last decades of the twentieth century include increased reliance on networks to replace hierarchies, the declining capacity of the centre for direct control, blending of private and public resources for policy implementation and the use of multiple instruments for obtaining desired policy goals (see e.g. Peters and Pierre 1998). An important part of these developments in many countries relied on NPM techniques, but other management tools play a role as well, including those associated with New Public Governance and the Neo-Weberian State (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). All have had a significant impact in the Nordic countries. To a certain extent politicization has been offered as an alternative to loss of political control and re-enforcing accountability. Administrative change is likely to affect the incentive structures – hence the temptation to use a public position for private gain – which confront public officials (Andersson and Erlingsson 2012). More flexible organizational forms and practices may have opened up new avenues of corruption, and a fuzzier distinction between public administration and private interests could undermine established bureaucratic practices and norms, particularly when control systems – routines for oversight, auditing and evaluation – are not changed and adjusted to the new modes of governance (Andersson 2002). The introduction of post-bureaucratic, networkoriented organization and managerial techniques may thus spread corruption in systems which hitherto have been relatively corruption-free. Such corruption, however, may take forms which differ from the nepotism of the early modern state or the clientelism of mass political parties in the modern era. It may be more elitist and less detectable, more sophisticated in many ways and disputable. This, we maintain, calls for a fresh look at low-corrupt countries and a re-evaluation of the research methods available in corruption research.

7.3  What we know: measurement strategies and (some) findings For obvious reasons, corruption is not easily detectable through direct observation. As Jain (2001) concludes, by its very nature, corruption is ‘difficult to measure since it is carried out . . . clandestinely and away from the public eye and records’ (p. 76). The study of corruption therefore triangulates different methodological tools and relies to a large extent on proxies, that is, the study of substitutes which are considered indicative of less observable variables. While historical research traditionally

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relies on documentary evidence, in the following section, we primarily consider three types of proxies: perceptions, experiences and expert evaluations.

7.3.1  Perception-based strategies The most commonly used proxy in corruption studies is arguably perceptions of corruption. The availability of the CPI since the mid-1990s has bolstered comparative research. In this section, we will give a few examples of how the Nordic countries have fared in perception-based studies. Alas, very seldom have all the countries participated at the same time in the surveys. But there are examples when at least three (or more) have been compared. These can give us some indications regarding differences and similarities within the microcosm of the Nordic region. The latest such survey is the Eurobarometer 2017 (where Finland, Denmark and Sweden are represented). When these three countries are compared, Sweden stands out surprisingly negatively compared to Finland and Denmark. In Sweden almost four out of ten citizens believe corruption is widespread, compared with approximately two out of ten in Denmark and Finland. This of course could be due to some measurement error or quirk in the research design. However, the Eurobarometer from 2017 is not the only source. There are earlier studies, too. In the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), all Nordic countries except Iceland were represented. In the ISSP 2006, respondents were asked questions about how common they believe corruption to be among politicians, on the one hand, and public officials, on the other. In this survey, 22 per cent of the Swedes believed that ‘quite a lot’ or ‘almost all’ politicians were involved in corruption. From a worldwide perspective, the figures are impressive and fall well below the average for the 33 countries included in the survey (46 per cent). But, precisely as with the 2017 Eurobarometer, the share of respondents in the remaining Nordic countries who believes that politicians are involved in corruption was much lower. Almost the same pattern emerges in responses to the question about public officials’ degree of corruption: Swedes perceived more public corruption than their Nordic neighbours, with Danes being the most trusting in the ISSP 2006. Table 7.1  Perceptions of how widespread citizens think the problem of corruption is

Finland Denmark Sweden

Widespread

Rare

Doesn’t exist

Don’t know

21% 22% 37%

74% 75% 62%

1% 1% 0%

4% 2% 1%

Source:  European Commission 2017, p. 17 (responses to the question ‘How widespread do you think the problem of corruption is in your country?’).

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Source:  ISSP Research Group 2006 (responses to the questions ‘In your opinion, how many politicians in [your country] are involved in corruption?’ and ‘In your opinion, how many public officials in [your country] are involved in corruption?’).

Figure 7.1  Proportion of citizens in Nordic countries who believe politicians and/or officials are involved in corruption (2006)

An interesting strand in the corruption literature has evolved that relates favouritism in the exercise of public authority and violations of the principle of impartiality, to the concept of corruption. This comes down to whether officials treat citizens equitably and fairly, something to which, for example, the quality of government literature attaches great importance. For instance, Rothstein and Teorell (2008) claim that corruption should be defined as favouritism in the exercise of authority, that is, something altogether broader than bribery. The authors mention nepotism, cronyism and discrimination as examples of corruption, mounting to the conclusion ‘that corruption is to be regarded as departures from the norm of impartiality in the exercise of public duties’. Do we know anything about how citizens in the Nordic countries perceive violations of impartiality? Some comparative surveys have posed questions that gauge the level of impartiality. One is the European Social Survey (ESS). The 2004 survey included the item ‘How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly with people like you?’ Among the groups mentioned were ‘public officials’. The findings showed that approximately 18 per cent of Swedes ‘mistrusted’ or

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Norway Denmark Finland Iceland Sweden Avg. ESS 0% Distrust a lot

20% Distrust

40%

60%

Neither trust nor distrust

80% Trust

100% Trust a lot

Source:  ESS 2004.

Figure 7.2  Proportion who trust public officials to behave honestly

‘strongly mistrusted’ that officials would deal with them honestly. The Swedish mistrust was three percentage points below the average for the 25 countries covered in this enquiry, a somewhat mediocre result for a country consistently ranked by the World Justice Project, for example, as having the strongest rule of law in the world. Compared to its Nordic neighbours, Sweden did not come out well. The proportion expressing mistrust was 13 per cent in Finland, 13 per cent in Iceland, 11 per cent in Denmark and 8 per cent in Norway. Thus, precisely as with the questions about corruption mentioned previously, Sweden diverges negatively in a Nordic context. The ISSP asked a similar question in 2006: how frequently respondents thought officials treated them honestly. Almost 14 per cent of Swedes were of the view that this seldom or almost never happened. Here, again, a higher proportion expressed mistrust in civil servants in Sweden compared with other Nordic countries. In Denmark it was 6 per cent, Finland 9 per cent and Norway 11 per cent (Iceland was not included). The ISSP also asked ‘Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in Sweden depends on who they know?’, a question that explicitly deals with impartiality and favouritism, and hints at the presence of cronyism. The results were startling. Among the Swedish respondents, almost 90 per cent stated that personal contacts were ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ significant in their treatment by officials. It is noteworthy that, of the 32 other countries included in the survey, only Chile and Russia had a somewhat higher proportion of respondents claiming that this type of favouritism was ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ significant. Compared to other Nordic countries, Sweden stands out negatively and this time dramatically,

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Source:  ISSP Research Group 2006 (selected responses to the question ‘Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in your country depends on who they know?’).

Figure 7.3  Proportion of citizens who believe that treatment by officials depends on personal contacts

the figure in Denmark being 41 per cent, in Finland 56 per cent and in Norway 68 per cent. Two other surveys (the ISSP and the ESS), in which a number of different questions were included, tell similar stories. A significant proportion of Swedish citizens believe that officials do not treat them fairly and impartially. Even if it is difficult to determine what line to take on the exact percentages, it is striking that mistrust is consistently greater in Sweden than in the neighbouring Nordic countries. Beneath the surface, then, it seems that there may be a specific Swedish problem that international indices attempting to gauge rule of law and/or corruption do not seem to be able to pick up. How should these results be interpreted? At the end of the day, they merely measure perceptions. A problem with perception-based measures is that they may be biased since they are shaped by many factors and could reflect exposure to influences of various sorts aside from actual corruption (see e.g. Fischle 2000; O’Sullivan 2003; Burden and Hillygus 2009). Examples from various fields of social research, for example institutional performance and the frequency of crime, indicate that perceptions often differ from objective indicators (Flynn 2007; Baier et al. 2016).

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Even if perceptions are biased, however, they may constitute important social facts. So, even though perceptions of corruption are probably exaggerated, they seem to be closely related to political trust and legitimacy. As demonstrated by Linde and Erlingsson (2013) drawing on Swedish data, even in a low-corrupt setting, perceptions of corruption constitute an important determinant of support for the democratic system. It follows from this that if ever more people perceive corruption to have become widespread, it potentially damages democratic legitimacy.

7.3.2  Experience of corruption A more direct way to tackle the methodological pitfalls of perception studies is asking about experiences of corruption. This is done through questions concerning respondents’ direct personal experiences of corruption or whether the respondents personally know of acquaintances giving or taking bribes. Not many comparable data are available when it comes to Nordic corruption experiences. However, the Global Corruption Barometer has asked about direct personal experiences. Norway and Denmark were included in the sample in 2013, and Sweden was included in 2017. Not surprisingly, the share of respondents reporting direct personal experiences was minuscule: in Norway 3 per cent, and in Denmark and Sweden 1 per cent. The question was whether they had paid a bribe to access public services in the preceding year. In the Eurobarometer (2017), respondents were asked if they personally knew anyone who takes or had taken bribes. Again, only Sweden, Denmark and Finland were included in the sample. The mean value here was 12 per cent of respondents stating that they personally knew someone who takes or had taken bribes. Denmark and Finland were below that figure with 10 per cent answering ‘yes’, while Sweden once again stood out among the Nordics, with 17 per cent answering ‘yes’. Asking about personal experiences, or experiences that respondents may have firsthand knowledge of, has the potential advantage of avoiding perception bias to some extent. However, its usefulness is contingent upon the types of corruption which prevail. This method is likely to be more useful under conditions of mass clientelism, where political linkage is provided through particularistic exchange, than where politics is primarily programmatic, with non-clientelistic parties in the leading role, as in most Nordic countries. In the Icelandic case, with a history of clientelism, many respondents in a study from 2014/15 reported personal experience or claimed to know someone with personal experience of different forms of corruption at the local level. Such direct experiences are probably more common in Iceland than in the other Nordic countries. However, compared with perceptions of the levels of corruption, experiences are rare. Thus, while 51–72 per cent of the respondents believe favouritism, fraud and bribes to be common, only 7–19 per cent reported personal experience of such activities. In the case of bribes, 51 per cent of respondents believe them to be rather or very common, while 93 per cent

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have no personal experience of such activities (Erlingsson and Kristinsson 2016, p. 224).

7.3.3  Elite interviews and expert surveys Elite interviews and expert surveys are important tools in the study of corruption. We argue that this is particularly true in settings such as the Nordic ones, where corruption most certainly is isolated (as opposed to systemic) and citizens are not regularly exposed to direct corruption experiences. However, when aiming to survey this population, which experts or specialists should one consult? Impartial observers (e.g. foreign businessmen, social scientists or other external observers) may have only limited or superficial knowledge of the particular case in question, while observations by those with more or less direct experience may be coloured by institutional or organizational attachments (e.g. Erlingsson and Kristinsson 2016). Given a proper balance between insider knowledge and non-attachment, however, expert interviews and surveys have the potential to provide access to knowledge which is difficult to reach by other means. Expert interviews and surveys, among other things, have been used to study political appointments in the Nordic countries. Political appointments have in some cases been hailed as a method of regaining political control in a public sector that is increasingly fragmented through the use of non-hierarchical methods of governance. Politicization, nonetheless, may also indicate, and even create, corruption problems. Political appointments can be used as rewards in political exchange relationships, which constitute a certain type of corruption. They may also be strategic devices aimed at establishing political control, which could very well facilitate corruption at strategic levels of the administration, as well as undermining the independence and autonomy of the bureaucracy (e.g. Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2016). Politicization seems to have affected the Nordic countries differently. A study by Dahlström (2009) conducted among experts in 18 countries between 1975 and 2007 indicates that the four Nordic countries included (all except Iceland) have low levels of politicization, comparable with some of the English-speaking democracies (Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) and the Netherlands. Much higher levels of politicization are observed in the Napoleonic states, Switzerland, Germany, the United States and Australia. While politicization tended to increase in the period Dahlström studied in all the Nordic states (which was not necessarily the case elsewhere), there are important differences between them. Politicization increased most in Sweden – followed closely by Norway, less so in Finland – and remains low in Denmark. In a survey of 15 European democracies, another study covered three of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland and Norway; see Kopecký et al. 2012). An index of party patronage showed that only the UK and the Netherlands scored lower than the three Nordic states. Iceland’s low score (in between Denmark and Norway) indicates that anti-corruption measures, at least with regard to political appointments,

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have been successful to a significant extent. This is confirmed by a strong majority (84 per cent) of the 44-strong group of expert interviewees (Kristinsson 2012, p. 192). The Danish system, again, remains the least politicized of the Nordic states. The main challenge in expert surveys is, as said, finding the right experts. Data from Icelandic local government indicate considerable differences between the evaluations of public administration experts and local officials in their evaluations of corruption; the former tend to see more corruption (although far less than the public). There is no bulletproof method of choosing the right experts. Some combination of proximity and detachment, however, is desirable but also difficult to achieve. With regard to the levels of politicization in the Nordic countries the main patterns seem clear, however. They are generally low in comparative perspective, have been decreasing in Iceland, remain low in Denmark where the separation of politics and administration goes back a long way, but seem to have increased in the other states, especially Sweden.

7.4 NPM, danger zones and the special case of Nordic local government While their historical record of low corruption is noteworthy, this does not make the Nordic countries immune to corruption. As noted earlier, new governance trends have created new challenges, or danger zones, that seem to have caught policy-makers off guard. New managerial trends have given rise to unexpected moral hazards at the intersection between the public, private/business and civil society spheres – hazards that translate into danger zones for corrupt activities which can be different in nature from the cruder forms of corruption which these countries managed to escape for much of the twentieth century (e.g. Andersson and Erlingsson 2012; Papakostas 2012). If we take this perspective seriously, it is worth paying attention to the local government tier in the Nordic region. Although differences exist, there are distinct similarities among the Nordic countries regarding the structure of local government when it comes to historical background, constitutional framework, the competences given and the allocation of functions and responsibilities (e.g. Bäck et al. 2000). Indeed, comparative analyses measuring local autonomy and competences show that social democratic welfare states – that historically have had universalistic, egalitarian and publicly provided welfare services – are among the most decentralized in the world (Sellers and Lidström 2007; Ladner and Keuffer 2018). Nordic local government has taken market-inspired reforms comparatively far, e.g. by downplaying hierarchies in favour of network modes of governance, introduction of public–private partnerships and quasi-markets, contracting out of publicly financed but privately implemented welfare services and in addition, encouraging private sector styles of management. These reforms – often lumped under the umbrella concept of NPM – have, several scholars argue, had a deteriorating

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impact on the quality of public sector accountability (e.g. Hondeghem 1998; Fredricksson 1999; van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004; Aars and Fimreite 2005; Papadopoulos 2007). In line with this reasoning, Andersson (2002) identifies a broad range of danger zones for corruption in local government of the Nordic kind, in particular for socalled grey corruption (e.g. Masters and Graycar 2016). These danger zones have become more pronounced since the boundaries between public institutions and private businesses have become blurred, underlined by the fact that much public procurement now takes place in local government. This implies that administration of public procurement has become an increasingly important part of local government activity, a practice which is highly sensitive to corruption: it involves trans­ actions that are costly to oversee and, in addition, enormously important economic interests are at stake for the private entrepreneur who is awarded a contract (e.g. OECD 2005; Anechiarico and Goldstock 2007). Organizational solutions associated with NPM have further increased the number of danger zones for corruption in local government (Andersson 2002). Particularly alarming is the fact that local government has not adequately adjusted control systems to the new hazards (i.e. systems for securing accountability through checks and balances, oversight, evaluation and auditing). Again, Sweden is an interesting case. Corruption scandals have increasingly been exposed, particularly in local government. These are generally not uncovered by formal institutions for oversight and auditing: more than 70 per cent of the cases were exposed by investigative journalists or whistle-blowing by private individuals (see also Andersson and Erlingsson 2012). In sum, when NPM reforms are combined with the Nordic countries’ high reliance on local government to implement the lion’s share of welfare services, the end result could be potentially explosive from a corruption perspective. In general, corruption studies have paid relatively scant attention to local government. This is a drawback in the literature since there is evidence indicating that local government is vulnerable to corruption because its responsibilities are intimately linked to danger zones for corruption, for instance, zoning, inspections of various sorts, licencing and public procurement (e.g. Fjeldstad 2004; Huberts et al. 2008). In addition, local government tends to be subject to less scrutiny and attention than the national level by external parties such as the media and non-governmental organizations. The combination of these three things – (1) that NPM has had an impact on local government in the Nordic region, (2) that local government tends to be responsible for public services associated with danger zones for corruption and (3) control mechanisms lagging behind (making it difficult to uncover improprieties in local government) – makes it important to take problems related to corruption seriously in low-corrupt settings such as the Nordic ones.

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7.5 Conclusions The premise for our endeavour is that it would be premature to assume that everything is fine and dandy in the Nordic countries simply by referring to their ­honourable positions in international comparative corruption indices. In order to see if anti-corruption treatment may be required, we need to take an in-depth look at these ‘healthiest patients’ so that we can be forewarned of future challenges if political reforms seem to have unwanted side effects, for instance, creating danger zones or new venues for corruption. In other words, irrespective of whether the problem is relatively minor today or not, it is important to strengthen our knowledge about the real corruption problems that also exist de facto in the Nordic region. This is so that more resilient institutions can be designed and a constructive discussion held about what steps are needed to safeguard against new danger zones that NPM seems to have brought about. The message we wish to underline is that if we lack adequate knowledge of the specific nature of corruption in mature welfare states, we cannot know how to prevent and combat it. With this as the chapter’s point of departure, we maintain that we have made at least three contributions. First, ‘giving and taking of bribes’ is a very narrow conceptualization of corruption, in particular if we are genuinely interested in understanding the nature of corruption in mature welfare state settings. When we fine-tune our instruments and consciously search for sophisticated (or grey) corruption, and pay closer attention to activities and responsibilities carried out by local government, more irregularities are observed compared to what international indices are capable of picking up. Therefore, in order to attain an enhanced understanding of the nature and scope of corruption in mature welfare states, more finely tuned measurement instruments are needed, and stronger attention needs to be paid to the subnational level. Secondly, when we tentatively did precisely this in this chapter, a non-trivial variation within the microcosm of Nordic countries was observed. This tells us that it is misguided to automatically lump them together as representatives for ‘Nordic exceptionalism’. Rather, the country differences beg for explanations, and hence further studies asking questions such as: why does Sweden regularly perform worse than its neighbouring countries when citizens are asked about corruption (and related maladies) in their home country? What consequences does it have for corruption risks and political culture in Iceland that state capacity was developed long after political parties and representative democracy were in place, when the situation was reversed in the other Nordic countries? Thirdly, just because a country is given favourable rankings in popular indices, this does not mean that corruption can be neglected and taken light-heartedly. Recent scandals tell us that countries that are best in class also need a conscious and active anti-corruption strategy. Obviously, however, anti-corruption instruments needed in a Nordic context – where corruption is best described as isolated – differ from

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those needed in developing states where the whole system is permeated by systemic corruption. An important step is to ensure that control mechanisms and instruments for accountability are adjusted and tailor-made for the new danger zones that have developed in the wake of NPM reforms, especially in local government. NOTES 1 Iceland was not included in the 2019 ranking. 2 However, note how Norway struggled just above and below the tenth position from 1995 to 2010; and Iceland’s dramatic drop from 2007 onwards.

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8

Corruption and the media

Carlo Berti, Roxana Bratu and Sofia Wickberg

8.1 Introduction The link between corruption, media and journalism is a fundamental one. The watchdog role of the media can have an important impact in tackling corruption, yet this entails a potential conflict between the need to protect media freedom, on the one hand, and the will of corrupt governments and institutions to control the media and reduce their freedom, on the other. This chapter critically reviews the most relevant aspects of the relationship between corruption and the media. In the following section, the most important conceptualizations of the media’s role in curbing corruption are presented, together with evidence of the importance of press freedom in the struggle against corruption. The third section deals with the phenomenon of media capture, describing what happens when politics tries to take control of the media, and media become politicized. The fourth section reviews the most relevant research in a relatively new and still under-explored field, which is that of media (and social) representations of corruption. Overall, the chapter offers a general overview of the ways in which media and corruption can be intertwined, of the factors that influence (positively and negatively) the role of the media in controlling corruption, and of how media contribute to the social construction of corruption in different contexts and countries.

8.2  The role of the media in curbing corruption The concept of corruption has fuelled academic controversies since the second half of the twentieth century. Is there a universal definition or is it context-specific? Does it apply to all social actors? Is it necessarily transactional? In the introduction to his Handbook of Political Corruption, Heywood (2015b, p. 1) notes that ‘there remains a striking lack of scholarly agreement over even the most basic questions about corruption. Amongst the core issues that continue to generate dispute are the very definition of “corruption” as a concept.’ The relationship between term, meaning and referents creates a high degree of interpretive ambiguity and leads to corruption being pinned as a contested concept (Rothstein 2014). The media are a particularly relevant arena for the study of the (re)presentations of corruption, and a crucial source of sense-making about political and social issues (Gamson et al. 1992). Corruption is indeed a largely hidden and complex phenomenon which 107

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can be categorized, especially in a low-corruption context, as a high-threshold issue (Lang and Lang 1981), meaning that ordinary citizens have very little or no firsthand experience of the problem in their daily lives. Transparency International underlines the importance of the media in curbing corruption in its Global Corruption Report 2003, stating that ‘media can shape the climate of democratic debate and help the establishment and maintenance of good governance’, and that ‘freedom of the press . . . is fundamental to open, democratic society’ (Peters 2003, p. 44). Coronel (2010, p. 131) argues that ‘by playing its watchdog role, the media help bring about reforms and in the long term, assist in creating a culture of civic discourse, transparency, and government accountability.’ In assessing the role of the media in covering cases of corruption, Tumber and Waisbord (2004a) argue that scandals can be defined as cases of corruption that are revealed to the public. An increase in news about scandals, therefore, does not necessarily reflect an increase in the levels of corruption, but might be a signal that media’s attention to scandal politics is growing. This increasing attention of journalism on corruption scandals turns news media into an ‘arena for battling out political confrontations and . . . a means of promoting government accountability’ (Tumber and Waisbord 2004a, p. 1034). Research has found that changes within the media industry have changed journalists’ approach to their profession, making scandals more attractive. Marchetti (2002) explains that the change in the nature of competition within the media industry contributed to the emergence of investigative journalism as a new form of journalism in France in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn contributed to the multiplication of scandals in the late twentieth century. In Finland, younger journalists tend to identify stronger than their older colleagues with their watchdog role (Kantola 2012). More recently, investigative journalists have started to collaborate institutionally, sharing resources and data, through networks such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists or the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, which opens a whole new field of research. In his work about the relationships among media, politics and corruption scandals in Australia, Tiffen (1999, pp. 206–39) outlines five models that describe how the media can relate to political corruption. The ‘watchdog’ model sees the media as watchmen of the public sector, with the task of keeping an eye on public officers’ behaviour and promptly exposing power abuses and wrong-doing; the ‘muzzled watchdog’ model suggests the media’s watchdog role may sometimes be limited by external factors such as restrictive laws; the ‘lapdog’ model includes those media manipulated by power and incapable of offering proper coverage of scandals; the ‘wolf’ model depicts media as excessively market-oriented, inaccurate and often misleading; the last model, the ‘yapping pack’, describes those media that ‘move in packs’ (Tiffen 1999, p. 207) and are unable to seriously dig for original stories, maintaining their focus on those stories that are most appealing at a certain moment, and often getting lost in petty details. These models, according to Tiffen, may all be true in different times and different contexts, and describe a quite heterogeneous system that may lead to very different outcomes in representing corruption.

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Stapenhurst (2000) lists a series of ways, some tangible, some more subtle, in which a free press can help to fight corruption. Media reporting can go hand in hand with the judicial system of a country and its anti-corruption agencies. A media report can be the starting point of a formal investigation. On the other hand, an anti-corruption investigation or trial can be publicized in the media, resulting in a r­ einforcement of the legitimacy of anti-corruption bodies. Finally, reporting can draw attention to flaws in the anti-corruption bodies, functioning as a way to encourage improvements and reform. The French case is illustrative in two ways: first, because most corruption cases revealed in the last decades originated from investigative journalists rather than the relatively new anti-corruption institutions. Second, as Lascoumes (2013) and others have noted, most anti-corruption reforms in France have – at least partly – been a reaction to scandals revealed by journalists, giving anti-corruption policies the nickname ‘panic laws’. By reporting on corruption, moreover, the news media can enhance the public’s awareness about the topic, causing reactions that affect, for instance, voting behaviour. The simple possibility of a certain action or event being covered by the media acts as a deterrent for politicians and public officers in engaging in corruption (or, as well, in legislating in such a way as to facilitate corruption). Information is an important check on what politicians do. Furthermore, free media that include several points of view and complete information foster public debate and increase public participation. Participation, in turn, is considered an important feature of democracy and, as Chowdhury (2004) shows, the factor that correlates the most with corruption (higher levels of participation are correlated with lower levels of corruption). Part of the research on the link between media and corruption focuses on the potential effects of a free and independent press on levels of corruption. Results, obtained with different methods and using different measures of corruption and press freedom, often present evidence of an association between a free and independent press and low levels of corruption, with the causal arrow going in the direction from free press to reduced corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003), using a sample of 125 countries, find a strong association between levels of press freedom and levels of corruption and argue that the causal arrow is in the direction of more press freedom to less corruption. These findings are confirmed by Chowdhury (2004) and by Freille et al. (2007). In this last work, economic and political influences on the press are found to be strongly associated with higher levels of corruption, suggesting that corruption levels may be decreased through a reduction in the political parties’ and firms’ influence on the media. Negative influences of politics, businesses and even secret services in the media reporting of corruption have been investigated, as well, by Gerli et al. (2018). Using a panel dataset that follows the evolution of corruption levels and press freedom in 130 countries over a period of 12 years, Ahrend (2002) finds no evidence of corruption leading to less freedom of the press, but strong evidence in the other direction, that is, more press freedom leading towards lower levels of corruption.

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Camaj (2013) tests the correlation between media freedom and corruption accounting for several factors (electoral competitiveness, civil society, voter turnout, judicial independence, political system). Results confirm the causal direction from higher press freedom to lower corruption levels, and suggest that parliamentary systems (as opposed to presidential systems) and an independent judiciary strengthen this effect. Scholars have pointed to the fact that, despite media freedom being essential to unmasking and maybe even curbing corruption, it is important to take other factors into account to better understand how the former impacts the latter. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) suggest that free media must be accompanied by sanctioning mechanisms giving citizens the capacity to act upon the revealed information. Färdigh (2013) adds another layer of sophistication in the form of media accessibility. In his thesis, he indeed finds that the possibilities for citizens to obtain information conveyed to them by the free media is an essential element for the media to have a positive effect. Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013), using two datasets of over 170 countries, find that a certain level of press freedom is a necessary condition for democratic elections to effectively keep corruption levels under control. Their explanation is that press freedom is fundamental to reveal corruption, allowing citizens to punish corrupt politicians through elections. The complementary role of democratic rules and freedom of the press in controlling corruption is confirmed by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2015), whose results are based on a dataset of 129 countries over a period of 27 years (1980–2007). Suphachalasai (2005) constructs a model to analyse the interplay between mass media, bureaucracy and corruption, searching for media effects on low-level corruption. This model suggests that, despite press freedom having a role in curbing corruption, media competition has an even stronger effect. The combined effect of press freedom and media competition is described here as fundamental for ­controlling bureaucratic corruption. Using a mathematical model based on a sequential-move game, Vaidya (2005) claims that the watchdog role of the media is far from obvious. Several factors may interfere with this role, such as the possibility of the media itself exploiting its power to bargain with corrupt actors and share the profits of corruption, or to raise false allegations, or again the difficulties for the public to recognize the truth of allegations when governments face media accusations with self-defensive campaigns or publicity aimed at discrediting the media. In conclusion, general evidence seems to suggest the importance of freedom of the press as a strong and generally effective barrier to widespread corruption. Therefore, many suggest that it is important to support a free press in every possible way, and in particular by reinforcing the legal and regulatory environments that protect the media (Coronel 2010). This can be done, for instance, through legislation in favour of information accessibility, protection of journalists who report on corruption, less control of governments on media content (resulting in more independence of the

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media system) and the suppression of repressive laws that punish journalists for doing their job (Stapenhurst 2000; Peters 2003). The potential damage of restrictions to media freedom in the form of repressive legislation is demonstrated, for instance, in an analysis of the Mexican press (Stanig 2015): by looking at different regulations across states in a federal country, a causal link is shown between more repressive defamation laws and less attention to corruption in the media. Another related issue is that of media liberalization. Research on Taiwan has shown that media liberalization can have positive effects for tackling corruption (Fell 2005). However, while media freedom is potentially a strong weapon for fighting corruption, the other side of the coin needs to be investigated as well. What happens, for instance, when the media is not free? And what is the situation of the press in contexts of widespread, systemic corruption? In the next section, we outline this aspect of the relationship between media and corruption, focusing in particular on the issues of media capture and politicization of the media.

8.3  Media capture and politicization of the media Our discussion of the media in less than ideal circumstances, characterized by lack of press freedom, is organized around two concepts: media capture and politicization of the media. In a wide understanding, media capture denotes various modes of controlling the gathering, dissemination and reporting of news content by power­ful interests of public or private entities. The very concept of capture comes from economics (Stigler 1971) and denotes the unorthodox and supportive links between the regulators and regulated, essentially pointing to the fact that in some contexts – whether they be geographical (e.g. China) or socio-economic (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis) – the regulators fail to properly issue and enforce regulations on the context they are supposed to. Schiffrin (2017, p. 4) argues that the ‘term capture provides a broad analytical framework that can be used to consider the contemporary challenges to media freedom’. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013c) provides a working definition of media capture as ‘a situation in which the media have not succeeded in becoming autonomous in manifesting a will of their own, nor able to exercise their main function, notably of informing people. Instead, they have persisted in an intermediate state, with vested interests, and not just the government, using them for other purposes’ (p. 41). Under such circumstances, the media cannot fulfil its critical societal role (Stiglitz 2017). Some contexts in which formal censorship exists, such as in China, are easier to interpret. However, other contexts that have undergone dramatic political transitions are far more complex. For example, in Mexico, Thailand, Italy and India, even when censorship had formally been abolished, formal press freedom coexisted with substantial political or corporate influences on the media (Besley and Prat 2006), and this influence had political outcomes (Dyck et al. 2013). Corneo (2006) identified a relationship between media capture and wealth concentration, showing that societies with high levels of wealth concentration display a higher risk of

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collusion between powerful interest groups and the media (with the former swaying media coverage to promote their own interests irrespective of whether or not that would be in the public interests) as the population relies on the media to formulate informed decisions and choose between alternative policy options. Petrova (2008) shows that media capture increases economic inequality. She further argues that media capture by economic interests and rich people is more damaging in the long term than the capture by politicians. The literature distinguishes between various types of media capture: ●●

●●

Coercive versus non-coercive, depending on whether the public office interferes in news production by use of practical or symbolic violence. In non-coercive media capture, media outlets suppress information in the public interest without a direct official intervention. In this case, the coercive force of the public office has been already internalized and has become part of the news production process. Direct versus indirect, according to how the pressure is manifested; for example, the state taking a monopoly of the media or exerting indirect (e.g. financial) pressure on the media outlets (Leeson 2008) in the form of ‘soft censorship’ (Lansner 2013). Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011) find that increases in government advertising funding in Argentina are associated with reduced coverage of corruption issues. Lam (2017) shows that media capture can be exercised by private interests when advertising funds are not directed to outlets that promote news that are contrary to the interests of the private actor.

So, media capture occurs in situations in which media deliberately deviate from truthful reporting in order to manipulate the opinions of the public to the advantage of the government or private entities. An even more common occurrence, which we denote by the concept of politicization of the media, is the situation in which media organizations engage in biased reporting for political reasons: ‘the central idea underpinning the concept of politicization is that media output is affected to some degree by a political rationality and a political logic of action’ (Esmark 2014, p. 149). Following Mancini (2018b), we contend that media does not exist in a sociopolitical vacuum that would perfectly filter journalists’ political values, motives and attitudes, thus not impacting on editorial practices. The idea of a completely non-political media is more of a normative categorical imperative than an empirical reality. For example, Esmark (2014) shows that the culture of political communication in Europe is significantly based on politicization of the media, but there are large national variations. Countries closer to the Mediterranean tradition (e.g. France, Spain) are significantly different from countries in the Nordic tradition and perceived as displaying more politicized environments. However, examples can be found of the use of mediated scandals for political purposes in Nordic countries as well (e.g. Jenssen and Fladmoe 2012). When analysing the coverage of corruption across Europe, Mancini et al. (2016, p. 38) show that representations of corruption are ‘very much “country based”’, in the sense that deeply ingrained traits of political

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culture trigger the coverage of corruption. For example, in Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia there is a major focus on vernacular political and administrative corruption, while French and British newspapers focus more on corruption abroad and international transactions (Mancini et al. 2016). This issue becomes particularly problematic when it involves the coverage of corruption cases. Mancini (2018a, p. 4) uncovers the blurred boundaries between ethics, professional integrity and practical demands of the profession showing that the very coverage of corruption cases can become part of the political agenda to counter a political opponent when ‘the leaks from which corruption stories originate derive from dubious sources, first of all from secret service agents; the interests that motivate the leaks are often obscure; journalists themselves play blurred and contradictory roles and, not rarely, they are exposed to a number of pressures that are inserted within networks of unfair and illegal behaviours.’ They further argue that these traits are not confined to new/transitional democracies, and that wider political characteristics of the context (e.g. political instability, frequent rule changes, hybrid elites with overlapping links in business, politics and media, personalized politics) and lack of economic resources heavily impact on media independency.

8.4 Corruption headlines: media as enabler, barrier and interpreter Having established the media’s informative and normative role(s) regarding corruption, this section focuses on the way corruption is talked about and represented in the media. A free press is often seen as a barrier to corruption, but as Bratu and Kazoka (2018, p. 57) ask, ‘how can a journalist observe the principle of truth . . . when the very meaning of the concepts [they] used . . . is vague and contested?’ In Section 8.2, we underlined how corruption is a hidden phenomenon and an essentially contested issue, and how the media are fundamental actors in the social construction of the concept of corruption and its surrounding ideas. However, only a small number of scholarly works has looked at how corruption has been socially constructed and represented in the media between the 1990s and today. An upsurge of interest is, however, noticeable in the last five years. Scholars have applied different theoretical approaches and methods to their shared topic of interests. The first studies in the field focused particularly on media representation of scandals (Tiffen 1999; Thompson 2000; Jiménez 2004; Tumber and Waisbord 2004a, 2004b; Sanders and Canel 2006; Ekström and Johansson 2008; Rønning 2009; Allern and Pollack 2012; Entman 2012). Those interested in corruption more broadly have focused on the practices of the media industry (Kramer 2013), while others have borrowed from the policy literature on problem definition (Wickberg 2016a), from critical discourse analysis (Breit 2010), from cognitive sciences and linguistics (Bratu and Kazoka 2018) and from communication and media studies (Berti 2018a). Various methods have been employed to decipher media representation

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of corruption, from keyword-based quantitative studies (Hajdu et al. 2018) and ­computer-assisted content analysis (Mancini et al. 2017), to more in-depth analyses of metaphors, frames or intertextuality (Breit 2010; Bratu and Kazoka 2016; Wickberg 2016a; Berti 2018a). Finally, both case studies (Breit 2010; Kramer 2013; Chen and Zhang 2016; Panayırcı et al., 2016) and international comparisons have been used (Mancini et al. 2017; Berti 2018a; Bratu and Kazoka 2018). The literature on scandalization is the most developed field of research looking at media representations of corruption. Research on media representations of scandals has shown that scandals (including corruption cases) are a favourite topic of journalism worldwide, and that an increase in news about corruption does not necessarily reflect an increase in levels of corruption, but could just be a signal of the popularity of scandal news and politics (Tumber and Waisbord 2004a, 2004b). Indeed, this literature posits that scandals are not facts of nature, but rather social constructions of events notably by the media. As Thompson (2000, p. 61) puts it, scandals are mediated events because ‘they are constituted in part by mediated forms of communication’. Lascoumes (2016) and Wickberg (2016a) argue that scandal is just one of the possible frames that can be given to an event, and Lull and Hinerman (1997, p. 13) specify that to become a scandal an event needs to be ‘effectively narrativized into a story which . . . inspires widespread interest and discussion’. A growing literature that uses pragmatic sociology considers scandals as ‘moments that test our collective attachment to norms’ (de Blic and Lemieux 2005, p. 9) and sheds light on the role of different actors in the construction of scandals. Entman (2012) offers a detailed description of what makes a scandal frame, namely (1) a classification of the misconduct as a significant threat to government or society; (2) an attribution of blame to an agent; (3) a moral condemnation by political actors and (4) calls for remedial action involving sanctions. Analysing the media coverage of the Pechiney case, Hamidi (2009) and Lascoumes (2016) show that, through the reframing of events by the media over time, what was once a scandal progressively became a technical problem freed from moral condemnation. Scandalization can indeed be a strategy of journalists to hook readers with sensationalist news (Ekström and Johansson 2008). Kramer (2013) similarly refers to the Indonesian media coverage of corruption and its tendency to scandalize and trivialize cases as politics-as-entertainment, driven by the media’s desire to increase readership. Beyond scandalization, media representations of corruption tend to simplify a complex phenomenon to make it understandable in a few sentences. In his analysis of the media coverage of a corruption scandal in Norway, Breit (2010, p. 630) for instance points out that the media ‘need to provide concrete and simplified representations of acts of misbehaviour that audiences can easily follow’ and ‘need to elucidate identifiable transgressors’. Giglioli (1996) examines the role of the media in covering one of the biggest corruption scandals in the political history of Italy, noticing how the press was able to construct corrupt politicians as villains, in opposition to an almost heroic judiciary and an honest civil society. A similar separation between honest citizens and corrupt politicians, socially constructed in the media, is highlighted by Gupta (1995) in an analysis of an Indian case.

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Others have tried to unpack the relationship between media representations, public definitions and culturally widespread conceptions about this issue. Wickberg (2016a) and Berti (2018a) show that corruption can be constructed differently as a widespread problem affecting political systems and societies, or as the action of corrupt individuals. To link media framing to public problem definition, Wickberg (2016a) argues for the use of Iyengar’s distinction between episodic framing, ‘depicting an issue in terms of specific instances’, attributing responsibility to the accused and calling for sanctions, and thematic framing, depicting ‘political issues more broadly and abstractly’ (Iyengar 1992, p. 62), suggesting societal attributions of responsibility and a need for reforms. The media generally tend to portray corruption through episodic frames, following Gitlin’s (1980, p. 28) traditional assumptions of newsworthiness: ‘news concerns the event, not the underlying condition; the person, not the group . . . ; the facts that advances the story, not the ones that explain it.’ Comparing media coverage of corruption in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Wickberg (2016b) finds that Swedish journalists use a thematic frame more often than their European peers, pointing to flaws in the institutional system rather than moral flaws in individuals. Berti (2018b) shows the importance and power of the media in (re)defining issues related to corruption when they shift from the cultural to the political realm. By analysing the media construction of lafo and koha (gift-giving practices rooted in the tribal tradition of the Pacific Islands) in New Zealand politics, he shows the development of a contest between a cultural and a political frame, which generates a public debate and eventually triggers formal changes of government rules for gift-giving practices. Differences in framing are most certainly linked to the type of corruption news that is covered by journalists. Mancini et al. (2017) find that the Italian press tends to emphasize corruption cases involving domestic public administrators and politicians, while the French and British press are mainly interested in foreign cases, or cases involving private companies or sport associations, explaining these differences by media market segmentation, political parallelism and media instrumentalization. Hajdu et al. (2018) similarly compare corruption coverage in old and new members of the European Union and find that, more than the date of joining, the perceptions of corruption in the different countries is a helpful variable to categorize countries, since journalists in ‘cleaner’ environments (the UK, France) place more focus on reporting corruption cases in the international arena. Metaphors have also recently been used to decipher media representations of corruption. The theoretical foundations of these studies lie in the idea that metaphors are at the basis of people’s understanding and organization of conceptual systems (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and that frames are socially shared principles that give meaning and structure to the world. Bratu and Kazoka (2016, 2018) show that corruption (together with other related issues such as nepotism and clientelism) is constructed in the media of seven European countries (the UK, France, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary) using metaphors belonging to the domains of food, plants, animals, disease and medicine, war and entertainment. Berti (2018a), in a study comparing New Zealand and Italy, suggests that the use

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of these metaphors is linked to levels of perceived corruption: while war, disease and disaster metaphors (together with the personification of corruption) are widespread in the media coverage of corruption cases in Italy (a country with high levels of corruption), they are absent in the coverage of corruption in New Zealand (a nation with one of the lowest perceived levels of corruption). Depending on the situation, this strategic construction of corruption may serve different purposes. In ‘highly corrupt’ countries, constructing corruption as a widespread, deep-rooted problem may generate fatalistic attitudes and act to the detriment of reform; on the other hand, if corruption is constructed as a purely individual action, disconnected from the structural nature of the problem, this may hide the reality of systemic corruption. In contexts characterized by low levels of corruption such as New Zealand, instead, constructing corruption as the action of single individuals in opposition to the integrity of the system may work as a strategy for maintaining low levels of corruption. This field of research, however, needs further theoretical elaboration and more empirical research, with the aim of fully unpacking the relationship between media framing, social representations and public policies in relation to corruption. Unconventional media outlets remain largely under-researched. Chen and Zhang’s (2016) comparison of frames used by news media, government and micro-bloggers – ‘netizens’, as they refer to the latter – is a welcome exception, which also bridges the research on media representation and censorship. More research of this kind is needed, also to better understand the origin of media frames, their similarities or differences with the representations of corruption offered by other actors such as governments, opposition groups, civil society or international organizations. Lastly, more attention should be given to the reception and effects of media representations of corruption to understand the broader consequences of framing on this high-threshold issue.

8.5 Conclusion: state of the art and future research on media and corruption The previous sections offer a brief summary of the current state of research on media and corruption. As we have shown, corruption and the media are deeply intertwined: while free and independent media are an important means to combat corruption, it has also been shown that corruption can involve the media themselves, and that systemic corruption is a threat to the freedom and independence of the media. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that both the media and corruption are part of a larger environment, and interact with other elements of societies: rather than being studied in isolation, they have been investigated in relation to other societal and political factors such as democracy, cultures, political systems, the role of institutions and even economics and market systems. Most of the literature on media and corruption has focused on traditional media, and in particular on the role of journalism and the press. Quantitative studies tend

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to focus on measurable factors such as press freedom (e.g. Chowdhury 2004), while qualitative studies generally investigate how the press constructs corruption scandals and discourses on corruption, both in terms of journalistic practice (e.g. Breit 2010; Berti 2018b) and rhetorical/linguistic devices (e.g. Bratu and Kazoka 2016). Another stream of studies focuses on the complex relationship between media and politics in different contexts (e.g. Gerli et al. 2018). While the positive correlation between media freedom and a low-corruption environment has been thoroughly investigated and is supported by strong evidence, further research would be useful to unpack other aspects of the topic. In particular, new studies (and especially comparative research) on rhetorical, linguistic and cultural aspects of corruption would help to develop a stronger theoretical ground for the critical analysis of social representations of corruption. While recent research has demonstrated that corruption can be socially constructed (and not just in the media) very differently in different contexts (e.g. Wickberg 2016b; Bratu and Kazoka 2018), and that the concept of corruption is continuously negotiated in the public debate (e.g. Berti 2018b), there is not yet enough evidence to allow a full theoretical elaboration of the relationship between socio-political aspects of corruption, and the role of the media and public debate. Further comparative research, as well as historical studies, might help towards this objective. In the current media environment, however, research on traditional media and journalism is not enough. New media, and especially social media, should also be investigated regarding their relationship with scandal and corruption. While there is some research on the relationship between the Internet and corruption, it tends to focus in particular on the use of information and communication technology as a form of e-government (see, for instance, Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes 2010; Lio et al. 2011). Others have broadly investigated the impact of online content on the perception and incidence of corruption (see Goel et al. 2012). However, there is a remarkable absence of studies on the role of social media in relation to journalism, politics and corruption. Aspects of social media such as disintermediation or filter bubbles, which have been put in relation to other socio-political issues (e.g. populism) might have an impact on how corruption is socially constructed, perceived and dealt with in the public sphere. In conclusion, the challenge of unveiling the relationship between media and corruption is a broad and exciting one. It is not limited to the role and freedom of the press, but it also involves a range of socio-political and cultural aspects, the introduction of new technologies and the growing importance of social media for political communication. Quantitative analyses, comparative research and in-depth case studies have already offered significant contributions to this field. Such contributions are not just relevant in academia, but can offer valuable insights to journalists and newsrooms, as well as politicians and public institutions. The battle against corruption, after all, is not just fought at the level of public institutions and policymaking, but also at the level of its discursive and social construction in every­day public debate. In this perspective, the role of the media is a fundamental one.

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9

Corruption and populism: the linkage

Ina Kubbe and Miranda Loli

9.1 Introduction With the surge of populist movements throughout the globe there have been few attempts to understand the role corruption has played in these movements. We argue that corruption can be understood as an important aspect of the moral underpinnings of populist ideology. This chapter focuses on the following questions: how is the phenomenon of corruption examined in the research on populism, and vice versa? Which concepts and approaches already exist? And where are there significant research gaps that remain to be filled? Current developments illustrate that on the one hand, populist leaders use the term corruption as a narrative to describe the ‘corrupt elite’, ‘corrupt migrants’ and other alleged out-groups to gain support from disaffected voters. For instance, the elite is often described as a parasitical class that enriches itself and systematically ignores the people’s grievances (Betz and Johnson 2004) in a clear display of the instrumentalization of corruption. On the other hand, populist leaders themselves are reportedly involved in numerous corrupt networks and clientelism (Barr 2009). Often they are willing to transgress the law to gain power and enrich themselves and their supporters, while at the same time rolling back anti-corruption laws and openly violating ethical standards of public life. The problem is certainly exacerbated by deliberate misinformation as well as their own involvement in corruption scandals and misuse of institutions. Furthermore, to go full circle, there is a link between corruption scandals in the past and strong support for populist leaders today. Aassve et al. (2018), for instance, have demonstrated that the exposure of young citizens to corruption scandals in Italy between 1992 and 1994 has lowered their institutional trust and affected their current voting behaviour. In particular, citizens were more likely to prefer populist parties in the national elections in Italy 2018, an illustration of the corruption–trust–populism link. Due to these developments, we aim to go more in depth into the interrelation of corruption and populism and ultimately systematize how and through which mechanisms corruption becomes an important theme of populist movements. Our main contributions consist in first of all, making these two subfields of literature speak to one another. Secondly, we organize the state of the art by focusing on current definitions, theories, approaches, paradigms, methods and main findings of 118

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the existing literature. Finally, our chapter demonstrates and reveals research gaps and suggests directions for future research. This chapter on the corruption–populism intersection is structured as follows: first, we describe the role of corruption in the research on populism, followed by a description of the role of populism in corruption research, drawing from academic contributions and the reactions of international organizations on the subject. Subsequently, we identify research gaps by focusing on corruption of individuals versus corruption of institutions, the logics of populist communication, the role of trust as mediator between corruption and populism, the role of emotions and the power of the ‘corrupt’ label.

9.2  Defining and conceptualizing populism 9.2.1  The role of corruption in populism research As essentially disputed and contextual concepts, the detrimental nature of corruption and populism is a recurring theme in both academic and political debates. At the European Union (EU) level this sentiment was more recently reiterated by Donald Tusk lamenting the ‘submission to populist arguments’ (Gray 2017). While Betz (1994) spoke of populism as a pathological form of democracy, others diagnose its entry into the mainstream of politics around the globe (Mudde 2004). In examining factors that feed populist strategies and styles, different authors identify different triggers, such as political culture (Urbinati 2013), economic crisis and unfair economic redistribution (Kriesi 2014) or a political crisis (Taggart 2004; Kriesi 2014), which often leads to distrust in the democratic representative system as well as support for authoritarianism (Norris 2017). In terms of a deeper critique of representative politics, Taggart (2004) examines populism as an integral component of representative politics, whereas Canovan (1999) depicts it as a reflection of its limitations. In the end, political phenomena such as populism are products of a more or less specific cultural, political, economic and social context. As a result, universal definitions of populism are hard to come by, and rather contextual conditions need to be kept in mind (Priester 2007; Barr 2009); indeed, many speak of populisms as opposed to populism. As with corruption, despite current media depictions, this is far from a new phenomenon. The emergence of a so-called populist moment has been declared in 1978 by Goodwin in regard to the agrarian revolts in the United States, by Krastev in 2007 and continuously by Mouffe, most recently in 2018. Manifestations of populism can be found in Russia and the USA since the late nineteenth century, as well as in Latin America since the 1930s (Mazzuca 2013; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). These experiences leave long-lasting, path-dependent marks in the form of troublesome institutional and cultural legacies of political polarization, weak institutions, economic crises, lack of institutional trust and recurrent

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authoritarianism. Yet while populists in Latin America in the 1940s criticized the economic elite, recent populists primarily target the political elite. Yet the mechanism of powerful players taking advantage of the dissatisfaction of ordinary citizens who feel a lack of power, mismanagement, government failures and an immense disparity between them and those in power, persists in both cases (Pereira 1991; Barr 2009; Mazzuca 2013). Due to the nature of the disputed term, the success of completely opposite political camps is interpreted under the umbrella of populism and is demonstrated by the success of right-wing parties (e.g. the French National Front, the United Kingdom Independence Party or the Danish People’s Party in the European election in 2014) as well as the simultaneous success of left-wing parties (e.g. Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece). While some point to the chance of transnational populism as a means of addressing the deep-rooted issues of the current economic system, leading scholars have concluded that ‘Now, like then, the significance of populism cannot be doubted, though now, like then, it is unclear just what populism is’ (Krastev 2017). In attempting to identify certain shared characteristics, Higgins (2017) defines populism as ‘a political alignment with the ordinary people against the interests of the governing, cultural and corporate classes. It assumes that formal elites are dedicated to self-enrichment and the retention of power, and only the aggressive animation of popular interests can counter their protective norms and tactics.’ Well-established definitions include several manifestations and describe populism as ‘a set of ideas’ (Hawkins 2009, p. 1045; Rooduijn, 2014, p. 3)1 which simplify complex political issues (Eatwell 2004) by dichotomizing them into yes/no questions and eventually play a constitutive role in political realignments in which moral boundaries between groups are redrawn and categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ emerge (Laclau 2005; Barr 2009; Fella and Ruzza 2013). Notoriously, Mudde (2004) speaks of the ‘populist Zeitgeist’, implying that populist discourses have become mainstream in everyday politics. Furthermore, he proposes corruption as an integral part of delineating populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, p. 8; see also Mudde 2004, p. 543). In this sense, the virtuous general will is placed in opposition to the moral corruption of elite actors. Certainly, populism also embodies a discursive style (Kazin 1995; Hawkins 2009; and de la Torre 2000, p. 4, as cited in Barr 2009). Similarly to Mudde, Kazin (1995) argues that the political style of US populism is built on the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Yet for Kazin, populism is not an ideology that captures the core beliefs of particular political actors, but rather a mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by ­liberals, conservatives and progressives alike. Populism has also been analysed as

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a mode of political strategy (Madrid 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2011) comprising three variants that focus on different aspects of political strategy: policy choices, political organization and forms of mobilization. These three approaches to populism – as ideology, discursive style and political strategy – are certainly not mutually exclusive. The most commonly used methods in the field of populism range from qualitative text analysis focusing on speeches to comparative, historical case studies. Table 9.1 illustrates the characteristics of the three mentioned approaches, including definitions, units of analysis, used methods and exemplars. Table 9.1  Characteristics of the three approaches to populism research Definition of populism Political A set of interrelated ideology ideas about the nature of politics and society Political A way of making style claims about politics; characteristics of discourse Political A form of strategy mobilization and organization

Unit of analysis

Relevant methods

Exemplars

Parties and party leaders

Qualitative or automated text analysis, mostly of partisan literature Interpretive textual analysis

Mudde (2004, 2007), Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012)

Texts, speeches, public discourse about politics

Parties (with a focus Comparative on structures), social historical analysis, movements, leaders case studies

Kazin (1995), Laclau (2005), Panizza (2005) Roberts (2006), Weyland (2001), Jansen (2011)

Source:  Adapted from Gidron and Bonikowski (2013, p. 17).

Here, it is crucial to distinguish between varieties of populism. Inclusionary populism, common among left-wing parties in Latin America, calls for material benefits and political rights to be extended to historically disadvantaged and excluded groups. In contrast, exclusionary populism, the more dominant form in Europe, seeks to exclude certain groups from ‘the people’, and thus limit their access to these same benefits and rights based on cultural, religious, ethnic, or gender-based criteria. For the purposes of this chapter, it is the role of the perceived rise of corruption (Fieschi and Heywood 2004) which interests us. While both varieties of populism can instrumentalize the anti-corruption discourse to gain broader support, this might exhibit variations. Both problematize corruption within economic and political elites, whereas exclusionary populism and its far-right rhetoric might even connect the issues of corruption with anti-immigration rhetoric. For instance, in the context of the Brexit leave campaign, Nigel Farage’s rhetoric denouncing corruption had a racial anti-immigrant component as well. For example, when he decries the EU’s enlargement of ‘former communist countries in which corruption is so rife that these countries have not made the transition to being full Western democracies’ and simultaneously decries the ‘unprecedented

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flow into Britain’, he is thereby presuming a danger to the UK’s liberal democracy. In this particular instance, the corruption rhetoric is used as a form of othering the newest members of the EU by implying that they will be the ones to bring corruption to Britain.2 To sum up, the populist baseline ideology consists of the following key elements: the pure, good, paramount people who are considered as sovereign, as common people, as the nation. They are constructed as a homogeneous, monolith group, a social unity or national community which is often defined either in civic or ethnic terms and in contrast to the ‘corrupt elite’. This implies an anti-elite impetus together with a critique of the performance of existing institutions, such as political parties. One of the main claims is that the so-called elite favours the interests of immigrants over those of native people. For instance, Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, aims to protect the Hungarian people from outside threats and other politicians who want to weaken the country.3 This helps construct a clear demarcation between the pure and the ‘dangerous other’ (Rooduijn 2014), who do not belong to the demos and are considered as a threat from outside or within the people (a horizontal threat) and as a consequence are explicitly ostracized. This rhetoric legitimizes authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on anyone who (­ allegedly) threatens the homogeneity of the people. The corrupt elite (‘the establishment’), on the other hand, is in contrast to the pure people elite and presented as a danger from above (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015). By depicting the elite as actively working against the interests of the good people, populist leaders stylize themselves as outsiders and the only true r­ epresentatives of the people’s interests (Müller 2017; Kossow 2019). The ‘elite’ can span beyond the national sphere and acquires a transnational character, for example, speaking of the ‘corrupt European elites’, not only in the Brexit case. However, the elite as a target for populist resentments remains quite fuzzy and rather serves as a floating signifier oscillating between the ‘political establishment’, the ‘economic elite’, the ‘cultural elite’ and the ‘media elite’: in short, one homogenous corrupt group that works against the ‘general will’. However, while the economic elite is usually attacked by left-wing politicians, the media elite is usually attacked by right-wing populists (Engesser et al. 2016). Corruption plays a significant role here. By pointing to potential acts of corruption perpetrated by the reigning elites, populists de-legitimize them as well as the institutions that failed to prevent or sanction said acts of corruption (Kossow 2019). In general, corruption becomes an inherent part of populist rhetoric and policies. While emphasizing and permanently repeating the message that the elite works against the interests of the people and denouncing corruption in government, populist leaders stylize themselves as outsiders and the only representatives of the people’s interests. Yet populist leaders once in power generally do not effectively fight corruption and rather use the populist rhetoric as ‘a smoke screen to redistribute the spoils of corruption amongst their allies’ (Kossow 2019, p. 1). In several cases, populism can even facilitate and advance new forms of corruption. Although fighting corruption

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is often advanced as a policy priority by populists, there is strong evidence that they largely fail to counter corruption and may even increase it (Müller 2017). Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Donald Trump in the USA, far-right populist Jörg Haider in Austria, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel are just a few examples demonstrating that corruption has risen since they have been in office and that it rarely harms their position or reputation. According to Müller (2017) corruption and mass clientelism – the latter defined as ‘trading material benefits or bureaucratic favors for political support by citizens who become the populist “clients”’ (p. 4) – are one of the three features of populist governance, besides attempts to hijack the state apparatus and efforts to suppress civil society. In particular, clientelism can become so dominant that it can turn into ‘a machine party’, as Levitsky (2003) demonstrates with the example of Argentina’s Peronist Party. He also provides similar evidence from Mexico, Venezuela and Chile (Levitsky 2007; see also Mouzelis 1985; Knight 1998; Weyland 2001;4 Barr 2009, holding opposing positions). In summary, the combination of these elements results in an understanding of populism that necessarily entails the element of ‘the corrupt elite’, on the one hand, and the ‘pure people’, on the other (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017).

9.3  The role of populism in corruption research Turning to the contributions exploring corruption in the literature, the ­corruption– populism intersection remains under-examined, but the few existing cases focus on the link in the context of elections. In the bibliography of the Global Anticorruption Blog, a known research source for scholars of (anti-)corruption, there were only six contributions with the term ‘populist’ or ‘populism’ in the title as of September 2019; we found 11 publications on Google Scholar (using the search term ‘populism’ in conjunction with ‘corruption’) in October 2019. This is especially low, considering the prominent position of corruption in definitions of populism. A particularly interesting endeavour here would be to see how the policy and academic approaches intersect or diverge. Curini’s (2018) contribution, focusing on valence campaigning and particularly on the incentives of focusing on corruption in campaigns, illustrates this point. He especially examines the populist undertones that appear when corruption achieves a prominent level during electoral campaigns. In the same vein, Thompson (2016) discusses the moral underpinnings of elections or what he refers to as ‘the moral economy’, particularly focusing on the case of Thailand and the Philippines. Political campaigning therefore seems to function as an important site for e­ xploring the ­corruption–populism nexus. Furthermore, in the review of the corruption literature, the role of corruption as it pertains to the quality of government in strengthening populist parties cannot go

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unnoticed. Agerberg (2017) inquires on the relationship between the distribution of local services and support for populist parties and highlights two mechanisms, namely the perception of ‘low-quality exchanges’ with the state (Klasnja, as cited in Agerberg 2017) and reiterates the known variable of political trust. Ultimately, in terms of the intersection between corruption and populism, in this case it is the mechanism employed by populism narratives as a ‘politicization’ of the low quality of government, thereby putting corruption at the centre of discussion and opening up new alternatives during elections. While Curini (2018) and Agerberg (2017) focus particularly on the role of elections, Ferreira and Campante (2007) analyse how populism can also be related to perceptions about lobbying and propose an interesting framework for examining the interplay between lobbying, populism and oligarchy. In concordance to their economic perspective, they speak of oligarchic and populist equilibria in the way demands are brought to the political arena, which they see respectively as ‘pro-rich’ and ‘pro-poor’. While considering the two only in separation might be simplistic, it is important to see how the authors relate negative perceptions on lobbying, specifically the ‘bias towards pro-rich lobbying’, as a catalyst for populist tendencies. Moving away from quantitative analysis, Thompson (2016) contextualizes populism in a specific corrupt practice, namely vote selling and vote buying as a clientelistic technique of cementing power. In an in-depth study of the Philippines and Thailand, he discusses these practices and their relation to the rise of support for anti-establishment populist leaders. One dimension to consider here is drumming up support by a broad law and order campaign that promises to eradicate corruption and crime. Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines, promising a quick fix to corruption and the particular theatrical nature of his anti-corruption claims illustrates this (Thompson 2016, p. 258). While zero tolerance towards corruption narrative can reach authoritarian heights in different contexts, particularly interesting in this case is, however, the populist mechanism of focusing exclusively on the local level. As a result, the practice of vote selling is self-legitimated as a means to increase the well-being of one’s immediate environment. The intersection of corruption and populism can also be viewed through the lenses of horizontal accountability and delegative democracy. In this regard, O’Donnell (1993) explores delegative democracies in opposition to representative ones and the role that populist sentiments can assume. In his view these types of democracies are systems that are not necessarily institutionalized in the strict sense, but that does not make them less enduring, and they neither regress to authoritarian types nor progress to representative systems. Weyland (2011) explores the conceptual confusion of the populism concept. As he notes, very often in discussions on populism authors tend to ‘talk past each other’ and the inflationary use of the term has led some to either abandon the term a­ ltogether, or most of the populism studies have multiplied it. While a similar

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argument can be made for the definition of corruption as well, the Transparency International definition of abuse of entrusted power for private gain (originally from Nye 1967) has not lost its footing in the literature. However, much discussion has ensued over the opposite of corruption or its location in a continuum of modes of governance. While earlier work from economists located it in the ‘bad extreme’ as one of the many government restrictions, more recent authors discuss corruption as a key systematic feature of governance orders. An extensive literature review from Mungiu-Pippidi and Hartmann (2019) elaborates on the two extremes of the continuum, locating corruption as a part of a particularist and favouritistic system (see also Mungiu 2006; Rothstein and Teorell 2008), a feature of a society that severely limits access to goods, services and rights for its members (North et al. 2009) or an example of extractive institutions as opposed to inclusive ones (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Ultimately, corruption in itself is tightly connected to the perception of the state. This can be viewed quite broadly in theoretical terms of the public good or narrowly in terms of ‘the capacity of the state to alter the existing distribution of resources, activities, and interpersonal connections’, by which many authors mean particular tasks such as the collection of taxes and control of criminal activities and a regulation of patrimonial networks (interpersonal connections) (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In conditions of endemic corruption, populist structures are consistently present, as in Ecuador and Greece, or at the very least there is a ‘continuous struggle’ in the political realm (e.g. Argentina and Slovakia) (Munde and Kaltwasser 2017). Beyond the delegative democracy perspective, de la Torre (2007) elucidates on how populist parties sustain themselves through clientelist networks. Ultimately, by bringing the local level ‘centre stage’ (de la Torre 2007), populist leaders not only mobilize engagement in corrupt transactions but also facilitate the self-legitimation of voters in vote selling, by referring to the immediate benefits for the community. While this intersection has received increasing attention by international organizations such as Transparency International, Global Integrity and Global Witness, who have all put forward a number of reports on the subject, there is a need for systematization of possible focus areas. In the following section, we elaborate on a few elements that can help us examine the interrelation between populism and corruption.

9.4  Interpretative steps and research gaps 9.4.1  Corruption of individuals versus corruption of institutions In analysing how populist communicative and political strategy employs corruption narratives, we propose that a crucial distinction should be made, namely whether the focus is on corruption of people at the individual level – meaning particular officials and elites – or whether populist rhetoric focuses more on corruption of institutions, for example in terms of repeating the ‘system is rigged’ mantra. In

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this sense anti-corruption in populist terms has important intersections with antipolitics, broadly defined by Webster’s Dictionary as a ‘reaction against or rejection of the practices or attitudes associated with traditional politics’. Higgins (2017) also discusses ‘constructions of anti-politics and authenticity’ as a fundamental basis of populist practice. Furthermore, certainly elements of populism are closely linked to the rise of democratic (reverse) waves throughout the globe. Both phenomena were relatively rare at the end of the nineteenth century, and both are widespread today. Populists frequently include aspects of democratic theory in their arguments by either generally referring to the people as the origin of power in democracy or demanding implementation or enhancement of direct democratic elements, such as plebiscites and referenda to bring back power to the people. On the one hand, populists in office target those institutions of liberal democracy that protect the independence of the media, civil society and other mechanisms which ensure the principle of governmental accountability and rule of law. If they are successful, they might result in the concentration of power in the executive, clientelism in the legal system and the dismantling of the system of governmental checks and balances, as countries such as Hungary, Turkey, Brazil, the USA and Israel (partly) illustrate (e.g. Norris 2017; Spektor 2018; Wittes and Mizrahi-Arnaud 2019). On the other hand, they often engage in open confrontation with the media and civil society organizations and use state resources to control oppositional social movements and civil society organizations. Following de la Torre and Peruzzotti (2018), this is ‘the road map populist leaders propose to overcome the democratic shortcomings of the liberal representative model’ (p. 15) by attempting to silence critical media, restrict the opposition’s institutional space or co-opt and repress autonomous sectors of civil society to completely dispose of political dissent. The demonization of the media can be employed quite effectively as a protective weapon. For instance, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has referred to the investigations of several corruption scandals he is presumably involved in as a continuing ‘witch hunt’.5 Puddington and Roylance (2017) speak of ‘the dual threat of populists and autocrats’ as a challenge to democracy. Yet this does not suggest that the two are necessarily connected. Populism can exist within authoritarian regimes, and many democracies exist with relevant populist actors. But as an ideology that exalts the general will of the people, populism profits from a growing global hegemony of the democratic ideal and both the possibilities of electoral democracy and the frustrations with liberal democracy. According to de la Torre and Peruzzotti (2018), ‘Populism does not necessarily produce authoritarian or democratic outcomes. Yet, it is more likely to generate threats in democratic outcomes in pre-democratic contexts and authoritarian threats in democratic ones’ (p. 16). These developments also have far-reaching negative consequences for the fight against corruption. If the necessary democratic institutions and forces such as investigative journalists that foster transparency, accountability, fairness and equality are limited or even eliminated, corruption can boundlessly flourish by opening the door for facilitating

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corruption acts from the newly formed populist elite (Kossow 2019). Thus, we consider the corruption–populism nexus as a triangle between (1) the rise of populism, which can lead to lower levels of (2) the quality of democracy, which in turn, may lead to (3) higher levels of corruption (see Figure 9A.1, p. 130).

9.4.2  Logics of populist communication The relationship between populism and the media has been analysed from a theoretical and empirical angle in various communication channels (Krämer 2014), such as party and election manifestos (Rooduijn et al. 2014), political speeches (Cranmer 2011), television and radio newscasts (Bos et al. 2013) and political talk shows (Cranmer 2011). Basically, there are two main traditions in the literature: populist communication has either been defined as an ideology (Mudde 2004) or a communication style (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). However, they are not mutually exclusive and only represent different aspects of populism (Engesser and Esser 2017). Populist communication is generally defined as ‘the communicative representation of the populist ideology (what is being said) and use of populism-related stylistic elements (how something is being said) by all sorts of political actors’ (Ernst et al. 2019, p. 2). The conceptualization of a populist communication logic can be distinguished as: (1) populist ideology that conceives populism as a set of ideas and focuses on the content – the what – of populist communication, (2) populism as a style that emphasizes populism as a mode of presentation and focuses on the form and way content is presented or (3) a political strategy that conceives populism as a means to an end and is interested in the strategic motives and aims of populist communication. In general, ‘populist content and populist style tend to go together’ (Kriesi 2018, p. 13). In more detail, populist style is often characterized by elements such as negativism (for instance, targets are accused of being corrupt, malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid or racist, or are denied being benevolent, likeable, intelligent, credible, loyal or consistent); emergency rhetoric (rhetorical elements of immorality, exaggeration, scandal or war); emotionalization (sharing positive [directed to the people] or negative emotions [against the dangerous others or elites] or revealing feelings); assertive/absolutist (painting the society in black-andwhite terms without any shades of grey); patriotism (referencing an idealized and sometimes utopic vision of the country or heartland) or colloquial, simple language to reduce complexity. According to Mincigrucci and Stanziano (2018), the coverage of corruption in the media can be pretty harmful in the example of Italy as ‘news about corruption has to shock the public, stir resentments and sometimes even entertain, in order to get readers’ attention’. This demonstrates how politics and media operate together and complement each other within this developing political environment called ‘mediated populism’, as the socially mediated type of populist communication is determined by the nature of the social media (Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). In the literature on populism, Ekström et al. (2018) look at certain examples of populist communicative style in the media, but the particular aspect of corruption could be explored more in depth.

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9.4.3  Trust, emotions and the power of the corrupt label In considering the essential role of trust, the intuition would be that a lowered level of trust in institutions and the state more broadly is not only highly connected to corruption, but ultimately also emboldens populist anti-establishment ideology. In exploring the interrelations between trust and populism, Fieschi and Heywood (2004, p. 290) go beyond just looking at corruption as a factor in the decrease of trust, arguing that it is reinforced by the way corruption closes up ‘political space’, thereby allowing populism to flourish as an alternative.6 More differentiations in terms of interpersonal trust and institutional trust as well as its relation to populism should be explored. Furthermore, corruption as a highly emotional topic should be connected to the study of how populists employ emotions to gain power (Rico et al. 2017). Demagogic speeches of populists emphasize potential threats from outsiders and criticize elites, but instead of presenting detailed policy platforms (Norris 2017), they utilize emotions of fear and anxiety as part of their communication strategy. In relation to corruption, the crucial emotional reaction instrumentalized here is anger. Rage and anger as a guiding emotion of populist movements are particularly fuelled by massive corruption scandals. A few scholarly contributions look particularly at the role of emotions and populism in terms of contentious politics (e.g. Aminzade and McAdam 2002), work on ‘the emotional demons’ of white populism (e.g. Hustvedt 2017) or examinations of the age of anger (e.g. Mishra 2017).

9.5  Conclusion and future prospects Populism and corruption are closely interlinked phenomena that share many similar characteristics and negative implications for a society. Firstly, both are contested concepts and are difficult to capture and precisely measure. Thus, both terms at times seem deflated. Secondly, both strongly depend on context and regional specificities and emerge in many different shades. Thirdly, due to their contextspecificity and chameleonic manifestation, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for either populism or corruption. Fourthly, both are strongly path-dependent and deeply rooted in a society’s history (e.g. Aassve et al. 2018; Maya 2018). Finally, both phenomena threaten the future of democracy around the globe by their detrimental effects on transparency, accountability and fairness (both of and within political systems), institutional trust, electoral behaviour and voting preferences. Specifically, populists advocate extreme policies, divide the electorate and strengthen social intolerance by activating resentment towards the existing power structure and the dominant values in society (Betz 1994). By most accounts, populism is both ­spreading and intensifying both in well-established electoral democracies and in developing democracies around the world, including in South East Asia, the Middle East and states in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Based on our literature review, we have discovered the following research gaps that future studies should focus on. Theoretically and conceptually, scholars and practitioners have to rethink the common definition of corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain by taking into account the chamaeleonic and contextualized nature not only of populism (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013) but also of corruption. This means refraining from depicting everything bad as either populism, corrupt or both. Empirically, a range of potential research questions emerges, such as: how corrupt are populist leaders? Are there any specific forms of corruption they use more frequently, such as clientelism or vote buying, for example? As most current examples of populist leaders have roots in the private sector, such as Trump (the USA), Netanyahu (Israel) or Shinawatra (Thailand), the relationship with the private sector in terms of furthering anti-corruption as anti-big government rhetoric should be explored, and looking at particular regions might be helpful. Furthermore, studies can take a stronger look at gender aspects in the field of populism and corruption. Are (corrupt) populist leaders mainly men, or is it only a question of time until more women are in office? The further study of the corruption–populism link will also require an expansion of methodological imagination beyond current comparative studies, but also integrating ethnographic biographical studies, network analysis and expert interviews as well as qualitative and quantitative content analysis. The intersection of populism with the concept of corruption as part of the moral economy, on the one hand, and as an element of the quality of government, on the other, requires further exploration. In terms of future prospects, perceptions about privatization as a cornerstone of many anti-corruption packages should also be further studied in how they fuel the essential populist sentiment of ‘being forgotten’ or ‘left behind’ by the state. When discussing the corruption–populism link, the explicit role of social safety and social security needs to be further examined. This is, of course, connected to the quality of government discussed above. Populism certainly ‘asks the right questions but provides the wrong answers’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). However, the answers cannot be technocratic as they have been so far, or else, as populist communicative strategies illustrate, they will be demonized as distanced from the struggles in society. Often populist anti-corruption rhetoric shares a problematic need to put outsiders at the centre of ‘a messianic politics of redemption’ and ultimately of an understanding of anti-corruption as anti-politics (Fogel 2018). Furthermore, the moralistic tone of anti-corruption is easy to weaponize with populist ideology. The answer then might be to pursue curbing corruption not as a goal in itself, but as a means of ‘expanding the reach of democracy’ (Fogel 2018). In summary, we must strive for an understanding of the corruption–populism intersection that does not ignore the roots of the issue. If we agree that populism is the ‘illiberal democratic response to an undemocratic liberalism’ (Mudde and

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Kaltwasser 2017), the future study of (anti-)corruption needs to engage with its role as a prevalent part of liberal policies which have caused the outrage, disillusionment and general low expectations that populists feed into.7 NOTES 1 This refers to one of the well-established definitions by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008), who drew on Mudde (2004, p. 543). 2 See UK political speech archive, available at http://www.ukpol.co.uk, accessed on 22 March, 2020. 3 In a similar tone, Matteo Salvini, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Italy speaks of ‘migrants as a tide of delinquents, drug dealers, rapists, burglars’ (Financial Times 2018). In a similar vein, Donald Trump argued in 2015, ‘When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people’ (Real Clear Politics 2015). 4 For example, Weyland (2001) claims that ‘where proliferating clientelism transforms the relationship of leader and followers into a purely pragmatic exchange, political rule based on command over large numbers of followers ­eventually loses its populist character’ (p. 14). 5 The commonly used trope of a witch hunt is also present in his assertion that it is not ‘healthy that the police in a democracy investigate relations between politicians and journalists. But if you do, then do it thoroughly . . . If it’s not Bibi there’s no investigation’ (Peleg 2018). In a similar vein, Likud parliament member, Miki Zohar, said the police ‘continue to cross all lines’ (Haaretz Editorial 2018). 6 Interestingly, Fieschi and Heywood (2004) also differentiate between ‘traditional alienated populism’ on the one hand and ‘entrepreneurial populism’ on the other. 7 We are very grateful for valuable comments from the editors of this book, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Paul M. Heywood, as well as those from Jonathan Mendilow and Paul Baader.

Appendix Increased Perception of Corruption

Lower Quality of Democracy

Rise of Populism

Source:  Authors’ illustration.

Figure 9A.1  Linkages between corruption, populism and democracy

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PART III The anti-corruption repertory

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10 The long arm of the law versus the invisible hand of the market? Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka

10.1 Introduction There has been an abundance of studies into corruption by a wide variety of institutions and organizations over the last three decades. Yet, despite the accumulation of research, anti-corruption scholars and practitioners decry the lack of progress in attempts to control corruption, as measured by rankings such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b), for example, identifies a maximum of ten countries that have managed to reduce corruption significantly in the past 20 years. This leads to the question of whether there is a gap between corruption theory and anti-corruption practice, and if so, what can explain it? This chapter reviews the relevant literature to argue that what appears to be a possible disconnect between theory and practice is partly the product of a lack of conceptual clarity and insufficient cross-pollination between the different strands of academic literature. I consider two of the main streams of literature: one favouring less governmental intervention with anti-corruption policies based on incentive manipulation rather than repression; the other in favour of governmental intervention and legal deterrence. I attempt to bring some clarity to the debate around the effectiveness of market and legal solutions for anti-corruption by combining the latest findings and lessons learned from the anti-corruption literature with the main theories of change originating from economic literature. In addition to the theoretical discussion, I run a few tests of the theories I discuss to ­substantiate my argument.

10.2  The market as an anti-corruption tool A long tradition of economists, dating back to Adam Smith, see government intervention in the economy as a source of inefficiency. Classical economists tend to argue in favour of ‘small’ governments that limit themselves to guaranteeing the proper functioning of the market by administering justice, enforcing private property rights, defending the nation against aggression and providing the necessary infrastructure for trade to take place (Smith 1776). This idea, despite being over two centuries old, remains relevant today and has shaped the study of corruption. The theory of rent-seeking and of regulatory capture are salient examples of economic theories that frame corruption as a product of government failure. The concept of 132

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the state as a source of market inefficiency and corruption is perhaps best captured, in its most radical form, by Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) concept of the ‘grabbing hand’, that is, the notion that government regulation tends to be introduced only to enrich and empower politicians or their close supporters and that the more laws are introduced, the easier it will be for those in power to steal from the public. The search for rents – defined as rewards not earned or not consistent with competitive market returns – was first analysed in the context of social losses from public policies and monopolies. This strand of literature argues that the resources used to establish, maintain or eliminate trade restrictions and monopolies should be considered a social cost. Tullock’s (1967) paper ‘Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ is considered the foundation of the rent-seeking literature and argues that actors benefitting from inefficient policies have incentives to further influence the creation and assignment of resources and wealth created by political decisions. The quest for personal advantages, however, can be masked with the rhetoric of social advantage (Congleton et al. 2008). These ideas took time to be integrated into new research. It was only in the mid1970s that other authors started using the concept of rent-seeking in their work. Krueger (1974) analysed the effect of introducing import licences in an economy and found that restricting imports leads to the creation of a ‘rent’, which provides incentives for firms to compete to obtain it. She suggests that the value of rents associated with import licences can be relatively large and that the welfare cost of such restrictions on trade comes with economic, social and political costs since: (1) the same level of production can be achieved more efficiently without tariffs; (2) competition for rents results in a welfare loss since resources can be used for other (more productive) activities that benefit society as a whole and (3) the presence of rent-seeking fuels the perception of favouritism and those without access to government rents may blame the economic system and the market mechanism for their situation (Krueger 1974). By the late 1970s, the idea that government intervention in the economy led to increased opportunities for corruption gained traction and other studies looking into the effects of anti-trust policies started to emerge. Posner (1975) and Cowling and Mueller (1978), for example, analysed the social costs of monopolies. The theory of regulatory capture complements the theory of rent-seeking by arguing that government regulation, even when it is introduced to promote the general public interest, creates rents and distorts the market by benefitting pre-existing firms and increasing the entry barriers for new actors (Stigler 1971). The under­ lying assumption is that an industry has incentives to use (or abuse) the power of the state to establish rules to obtain private benefits. Since firms within an industry know more than the general population about the sector in which they operate, they can more easily organize themselves to pressure governments for regulation that benefits them, to the detriment of the public interest. Whether this constitutes corruption or not depends on the means used, but Djankov et al. (2002) argue that politicians can also use regulation to trade rents for campaign contributions, votes

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and bribes: public officials in charge of enforcing regulations can use their position to generate political support from the industry or develop personal relationships that lead to future employment prospects. Rose-Ackerman (1997a) also argues that government regulation may introduce incentives for bribery since actors in the private sector are likely to pay bribes to profit from government benefits or avoid the additional costs of taxes and regulation. Similarly, public officials may use their discretionary power to extract bribes in exchange for certain benefits – undue or not – or to refrain from enforcing regulation. The idea that regulation is a source of corruption and that free markets are the best solution became prevalent after the fall of communism in the late 1980s. World Bank economists working on the centrally planned economies of the Eastern bloc documented the waste of resources and talent derived from overregulation and argued that these economies would benefit from simpler trade policies (see Djankov et al. 2002). The idea that reducing the involvement of the state in the market could help curb corruption started to be tested empirically particularly on trade flows. Goldsmith (1999, p. 878) finds a ‘solid relationship between greater economic liberalization . . . and less perceived corruption’ when looking at a sample of 34 countries. Similarly, when looking at the levels of corruption between 1980 and 1983 in a sample of 52 countries, Ades and Di Tella (1999, pp. 987–8) find that countries with higher shares of imports to gross domestic product (GDP) tend to have lower levels of corruption, thus concluding that ‘competition from foreign firms reduces the rents enjoyed by domestic firms, and this reduces the rewards from corruption’. Using a sample of 60 countries for the 1996–98 period, Treisman (2000) also suggests a relationship between exposure to imports and lower corruption, but the effect is rather small: increases of 10 per cent in the share of imports in gross national product yield only a decrease of 0.1 to 0.2 points on a country’s corruption score. This result is largely supported by Paldam’s (2002) multivariate analysis of a sample of 86 countries for the year 1999. Djankov et al. (2002) look at the number of procedures, time and costs of starting a company in 85 different countries and found that countries with heavier regulation had higher levels of corruption and larger informal economies but not a better quality of public or private goods. More recently, Gokcekus and Knörich (2006) show that higher ratios of total trade to GDP are linked to lower levels of corruption. These results were based on an analysis of 133 countries for the year 2003. Gerring and Thacker (2005) test the relationship between trade, investment, regulatory policies and the overall size of the public sector on corruption. Using a cross-national dataset for 181 countries covering the mid- to late-1990s, they conclude that market-oriented economic policies are associated with lower levels of corruption; open trade and investment policies and low regulatory burdens correlate with lower levels of corruption. Finally, Fazekas (2017) uses country-level panel regression analysis and finds evidence that deregulating the various channels through which governments and businesses interact often decreases the perception of bribery and petty corruption.

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To summarize, different types of government interventions in the economy have been linked to higher levels of corruption in the form of bribery and favouritism. The literature identifies three mechanisms that explain this relationship. First, barriers to international trade can create incentives for corrupt behaviour, as argued by Krueger (1974): by raising the price of goods above their market price, trade barriers may induce businesspeople to bribe their way to exemptions or special treatment, including higher levels of market protection. Second, by limiting competition from foreign firms, protectionist trade policies incentivize businesspeople to look towards the government and compete to secure benefits rather than create profits in a competitive manner. Under such circumstances, interest groups have more to gain from the political process and their political connections than from their economic productivity (Olson 1982). This situation also generates an atmosphere that is non-conducive to reducing corruption since groups benefitting from government regulation are likely to seek to broaden their government-granted advantages and will thus rarely speak up against corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2005). Finally, since trade barriers often involve an intricate set of rules and procedures, they are difficult to administer and provide bureaucrats with discretionary power to apply them unevenly and seek advantages for themselves by helping certain firms or individuals get around the regulation. The policy implications are clear: since protectionist policies dis-incentivize competition and foster rent-seeking, competition is key to reducing corruption. Therefore, by eliminating burdensome regulation and administrative barriers to trade, the incentives to engage in certain types of corruption are likely to disappear. Beyond the direct effects that reducing trade barriers may have on corruption, other studies suggest indirect benefits. Charron (2009) argues that by becoming part of the growing chain of interdependencies that sustain global trade, there is an increased chance that anti-corruption norms and better governance will spread and help counter corruption since foreign investors prefer transparent bureaucracies and a strong rule of law. If firms show a preference for low corruption environments and they can move from one jurisdiction to another at a relatively low cost, corrupt governments may have to clean house if they wish to attract foreign capital (Gerring and Thacker 2005). Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) find that lower degrees of integration in the world economy are associated with higher levels of corruption, but later studies fail to find a straightforward relationship between these two ­variables (Lalountas et al. 2011).

10.3  The state as an anti-corruption tool The arguments and evidence in the previous section frame corruption as a product of government regulation and highlight the importance of market-oriented solutions, but they make it easy to forget that corruption is an umbrella term that encompasses different behaviours and phenomena with a multitude of causes and, more importantly, that markets are not perfect either. The Public Interest Theory (Pigou 1929), or what Shleifer and Vishny (1998) call the ‘helping hand’ approach,

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sees the government as a more benign entity and regulation as an attempt to help the market achieve the best possible allocation of scarce resources for individual and collective goods and services in society. While this theory still acknowledges the importance of the market as the mechanism to allocate resources, it incorporates the idea that the conditions for markets to operate are not always met and thus government is needed to help markets reach a better equilibrium. This theory holds that unregulated markets will likely suffer from constant market failures, such as in situations where scarce resources are not put to their highest valued uses (Bator 1958). This is attributed to a variety of factors that violate the pre-requisites of a proper functioning market, such as time-inconsistent preferences, monopolistic or oligopolistic practices, information asymmetries, principal–agent problems or externalities (Stiglitz 1989). The policy implications of this theory are simple: to prevent corruption from arising as the product of market failures, government intervention is required. At first glance, this recommendation might seem to contradict those in the previous section, but this is not necessarily the case given that the legislation required to control corruption focuses not on the economic role of the state but on reducing the expected returns of corruption by increasing the probability of detection and prosecution. Becker’s (1974) work on deterrence proved particularly influential. Although originally developed to explain crime, the logic can be extrapolated to the study of corruption given that the pay-off in both cases depends mostly on not being caught. The essence of Becker’s model is that, as rational individuals, offenders face a gamble when deciding whether to engage in illegal activities or not. As explained by Huther and Shah (2000), increasing the probability of penalties is a three-step process that involves improving detection, prosecution and punishment. Over the past 25 years, regulation to make government information more accessible to the public and introducing registers of interests and finances for public officials have been popular approaches to increase the probability of detection of certain acts of corruption such as illicit enrichment, embezzlement, abuse of office and so on. Scholars in the 1990s treated corruption as a deviation from an established norm of integrity, using micro-level models, which explained the incentives of individuals to engage in corruption or refrain from doing so. These models, such as the deterrence theory, view corruption as the result of a balance between resources and costs (Nye 1967; Rose-Ackerman 1999): when costs are low and resources/opportunities are high, it is rational for an individual to be corrupt. Robert Klitgaard (1988) understands corruption as the result of an information and interest asymmetry between an agent (either in the form of a bureaucrat or a ruler) – assumed to act in their own self-interest – and a principal (either in the form of a ruler or citizens), typically assumed to embody the public interest. He explains how the individual decision to engage in corruption is fuelled by the presence of monopolistic power (M) and administrative discretion (D) and hindered by the presence of accountability mechanisms (A), in short: Corruption = Monopoly (M) + Discretion (D) − Accountability (A)

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The main implication of this theory is that corruption can be reduced by negatively affecting the agent’s motivations by increasing competition between agents and the likelihood of being held accountable for corrupt behaviour, while decreasing the level of discretion in the decision-making power of the individual. The reason why these recommendations sound oddly familiar is that they are similar to those issued by economists dealing with rent-seeking and regulatory capture: they put the individual at the centre of the equation and assume, even if not consciously, that the overall level of corruption in a society is the result of millions of rational actors facing the same dilemma and incentive structure on a daily basis. The deterrence approach to anti-corruption is best exemplified by the emergence of international anti-corruption conventions such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. These international legal instruments establish legally binding standards for the prevention, criminalization and prosecution of corruption. UNCAC, for example, recommends establishing anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) (Articles 6 and 36), formulating domestic legislation against bribery (Article 15) and protecting whistle-blowers (Article 33) with the expectation that these measures will ‘help prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively’ (Article 1). The empirical literature on the topic, however, suggests that the deterrence effect that Becker’s theory would predict has not manifested itself for many of these policies. The number of ACAs with the mandate to investigate – and some to prosecute – allegations of corruption, for example, soared from just 12 in 1990 to almost 99 in 2010. Despite this increase, the levels of corruption according to the CPI or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator remained more or less the same. Based on a sample of 99 countries, Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) report no significant improvement in averaged corruption scores when comparing the period of five years before the introduction of the ACA to the five years after. In short, while these bodies are often credited with being drivers of change in Hong Kong and Singapore (see Quah 2007 and Heilbrunn 2004), their success has not been replicated elsewhere. Other legal mechanisms to fight corruption also seem to fall short. Looking at the relationship between the extent of anti-corruption legislation and levels of corruption in a sample of 90 countries, Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) find a positive relationship between the extent of the anti-corruption legal and framework in a country and the level of corruption; that is, the countries with the most laws seem to be the most corrupt ones. Similarly, Fazekas (2017) and Fazekas and Cingolani (2017) obtain similar findings when looking at the effects of conflicts of interest, political party finance or whistle-blower protection on the levels of corruption. Transparency has a somewhat better, although mixed record than direct repression (Islam 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013b; Vargas and Schultz 2016), pointing to the idea that even straightforward tools, like financial disclosures for public officials, are more effective in some contexts versus others.

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While the theory of change behind the legal solutions to corruption is relatively clear, the empirical evidence has widely questioned its effectiveness. Buscaglia and Ulen (1997) offer a potential explanation for this phenomenon. They suggest that laws will bring little change in a context where the main actors in charge of enforcing the law – police forces, prosecutors and the judicial branch – are weak or dysfunctional. Kugler et al. (2003) argue that, in weak governance environments, increasing traditional judicial sanctions can increase, rather than reduce, corruption in the public sector because higher sanctions provide high-level public officials with incentives to profit from expanding their protective corrupt networks and guarantee impunity to offenders, thus reducing the likelihood of punishment.

10.4  Institutions as the missing link The review of the literature in the previous section explains how the reduction of government intervention in the economy and the use of legislation as a deterrence mechanism can help control corruption: limiting the intervention of the government in the economy reduces the incentives for rent-seeking, which leads to a drop in the levels of corruption and legislation that increases the likelihood (and the severity) of punishment and help to re-shape an actor’s rational calculation of whether to engage in acts of corruption or not. The empirical literature, however, provides a more complicated picture of reality with often contradicting findings. Moreover, different definitions of the corruption concept are used along with different levels of analysis. The economic or legal literature has focused on corruption at the individual level. This changed with the new wave of institutional quality literature, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), which defined corruption as institutional frameworks (extractive or inclusive), and brought it closer to the original rent-seeking concept of Krueger. More recently, political science has started to see corruption as a broader particularism, that is, the allocation of resources not based on merit or universal principles but according to identity or other individual characteristics (see Rothstein 2011b and Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b). The reconciliation of micro and macro perspectives is possible, however. From an analytical perspective, the main distinction to keep in mind is not the many forms corruption can take or the level of public officials involved, but rather whether the problem is corruption with a small ‘c’ (exceptional or isolated acts of corruption with a small or limited effect on quality of government and society) or with a big ‘C’ (particularism or extractive institutions as a rule rather than an exception). While this might seem a merely theoretical issue, it could have deep practical consequences given that the incentive structure behind each of these types of corruption is different. While small ‘c’ corruption is likely to respond to targeted policies, big ‘C’ corruption will likely emerge unscathed from the specific intervention, being grounded in a broader context. If the broader context matters, the underlying assumptions of a principal–agent understanding of corruption are put into question. Two main points of criticism

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emerge in the literature. The first is that corruption can be curbed simply by changing the incentive structure of individual agents by increasing the probability and the costs of getting caught. Second is that the principals – the top-level bureaucrats and/or politicians who hold the decision-making power over the bureaucracies – are mostly righteous actors with society’s best interests at heart. Johnston (2005), Teorell (2007), Wedel (2012) and Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) note, however, that this is not always the case since principals themselves are often the ones who stand to gain the most from corruption and thus have little to no incentive to change the system. For these reasons, scholars have started considering contextual factors and societal-level determinants of corruption. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) suggests the f­ ollowing formula: Corruption = Constraints (Legal + Normative) − Opportunities (Power discretion + Material resources) The level of corruption in a country is thus the equilibrium that emerges from the interaction between the opportunities to engage in corruption – power discretion (uneven political resources, monopolistic practices, red tape and so on) and material resources (foreign aid, discretionary budget lines, natural resources, public sector employment, public contracting and so on) – and constraints, which can either be legal (laws and regulation) or normative (media, civil society, public opinion, informed electorate and so on) (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b). This understanding of corruption as a societal equilibrium explains the failure of policies targeted at individual behaviour: when corruption is systemic, bureaucrats at the bottom of the chain have little incentive to refrain from soliciting bribes because ‘even if they as individuals start behaving honestly, nothing will change’ (Rothstein 2011b, p. 231).

10.5  Testing both types of intervention within their context The literature stressing the importance of national context was advanced by the work of authors such as North et al. (2009), who argue that social orders in developing economies are based on personal connections and favourable treatment of individuals who have accumulated power rather than on the rule of law. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 144) advance the idea that economic and political institutions can determine a country’s economic success as they can either promote competition and support the market (inclusive institutions) or restrict the access to power and resources to an elite group that, instead of creating new opportunities, uses its position to extract wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset (extractive institutions). Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Niskanen (2003) have analysed political institutions in which political power and survival depends on the support of vested economic interests. These authors claim that entrepreneurial activity under such conditions will be hindered given that individuals have incentives to work towards obtaining positions in which they can benefit from political favouritism rather than engaging in economically productive activity. Finally, Johnston (2005) looks at differences in patterns of

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­ articipation and strength of institutions and in how the political and economic p arenas are linked. He then diagnoses four syndromes of corruption: influence markets, elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, and official moguls, which reflect ‘different combinations of political and economic participation and institutions’ (Johnston 2005, p. 3). Mungiu-Pippidi (2015b) links the discussion of national governance contexts to the anti-corruption debate. She argues that under different governance regimes (placed on a continuum of social allocation distribution with particularism at one end and ethical universalism at the other) corruption should be interpreted differently. In regimes where universalism has succeeded in becoming the norm, corruption should indeed be seen as individual cases of infringement of the norm of integrity. Under such circumstances, principal–agent approaches could deliver results. In particularistic democracies and autocracies, in contrast, corruption is ‘a mode of social organization characterized by the regular distribution of public goods on a non-universalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within such societies’ (Mungiu 2006, pp. 86–7). Changing the incentives for corruption in this context thus requires efforts to reset the whole governance equilibrium. Contextual factors might thus make or break an intervention. For example, the anticipated deterrence effect of legal interventions is more likely to appear if they are accompanied by a relatively strong public sector governance framework (Buscaglia and Ulen 1997). Similarly, trade liberalization can fail to deliver the promised anti-corruption effects in a context of weak governance where de-­ regulation and privatization could be designed to favour only a few privileged groups rather than society as a whole. This chapter argues that, by themselves, neither deterrence strategies nor market liberalization are capable of controlling corruption and, in line with the new theoretical and empirical literature, anti-corruption interventions can only be effective if sensitive to the context where they are implemented. To conclude the argument, I will test if anti-corruption effects of legal and economic reforms depend on institutional context (H1) by creating an interaction between the context component and the two different anti-corruption strategies of interest. I use multivariate cross-sectional ordinary least-squares (OLS) models with interaction terms to test my hypothesis. The reason behind this methodological choice is that many of the variables necessary for the analysis, particularly the dependent one, show little change within cases over time. This is a known issue with composite corruption indicators (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002a; Kaufmann et al. 2005). The lack of change over time is also a problem for institutional variables. North (1990) argues that change in institutions is fundamentally gradual and incremental because long-standing beliefs and conventions are usually slow to change, even when formal institutions change rapidly. North et al. (2009) also suggest that institutional change results from a long process of incremental changes. Due to this lack of change ‘within cases’, a panel regression was not deemed appropriate for the analysis. Instead, a time dimension will be incorporated to the OLS analysis.

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The dependent variable is measured using the Control of Corruption indicator. This measure captures ‘perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests’ (Kaufmann et al. 2010). This indicator was chosen for its geographical coverage, comparability across time, which makes it possible to track long-term changes in corruption, and its methodological consistency. For ease of interpretation, the indicator was transformed from its original scale (−2.5 to 2.5) to a scale of 1 to 10, where lower values imply better control of corruption. The main independent variables capture the trade liberalization and the adoption of special anti-corruption legal instruments. The economic globalization component of the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher 2006) is used to capture the former. This index incorporates several dimensions often cited in the literature for influencing the levels of corruption in a country, including trade in goods and services as a share of GDP, trade partner diversification and absence of tariffs and other barriers to trade. The latest version covers over 200 countries and territories and is coded in a scale from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more integration to the global market. For the legal anti-corruption interventions, the extent of specialized regulation was calculated using data from the World Bank’s Public Accountability Mechanisms database by adding the scores for political finance, financial disclosure and conflict of interest legislation. The values of dummy variables representing the presence of ACAs were also considered. The index ranges from 0 (lowest extent of anti-corruption legislation) to 5 (highest coverage of anti-corruption legislation). Finally, independence of the judiciary is used as a proxy for institutional settings, given that it signals the strength of checks and balances on the executive. Judicial independence is deemed relevant for the effectiveness of both market and legal anti-corruption policies for two reasons (see Hayek 1960). First, while legislatures are in charge of the law-making process, it takes independent judges to enforce them without interference from other interests or branches of government. Second, the judiciary serves as a review mechanism for law- and policy-making. For these reasons, the independence of the judiciary is expected to play a role in determining the success of anti-corruption interventions. The data comes from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, which is based on a business survey conducted in over 150 countries. The average scores for the period 2006–17 were used to reduce measurement error from potential peaks and dips in the data. The indicator runs from a scale of 1 (least independent) to 7 (most independent). To account for other factors such as level of development, GDP per capita is used as control variable. The models in Table 10.1 test whether the impact of legal reforms on corruption depends on context factors. Model I tests the relationship between the extent of the legal anti-corruption legislation and corruption with GDP per capita as a control. Surprisingly, the relationship does not prove statistically significant. This indicates that, at a global level, countries with more extensive anti-corruption legal

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Table 10.1  Impact of legal anti-corruption interventions on Control of Corruption 2016 Variables

Extent of legal anti-corruption framework Judicial independence (2007–15) Extent of legal anti-corruption framework x judicial independence GDP per capita (2015) Constant Observations R-squared Adj. R-squared

(1) Model I

(2) Model II

0.12 (0.142) 0.78*** (0.115)

(3) Model III 0.29** (0.134) 0.86*** (0.120)

(4) Model IV 0.68* (0.393) 1.09*** (0.262) −0.12 (0.110)

0.0001*** (0.000) 3.27*** (0.355)

0.00004*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 1.15*** 0.26 −0.54 (0.361) (0.562) (0.991)

86 0.63 0.63

76 0.77 0.77

76 0.79 0.78

76 0.79 0.78

Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

frameworks do not necessarily do better in controlling corruption. In contrast, the level of judicial independence on control of corruption is positive and highly significant (see Model II). As expected, this institutional factor is a powerful predictor of the variation in control of corruption across countries. These findings suggest that more stringent anti-corruption laws do not translate into better control of corruption, thus questioning the deterrence effect of such laws. When combined in a single statistical model, however, judicial independence and the extent of the legal anti-corruption framework both turn out to be statistically significant (Model III). While this could point to an issue of multi-collinearity, an analysis of the correlations shows that the two independent variables in Model III are not significantly correlated; neither do they help predict one another. This points to the fact that when combined in a single regression, the extent of anticorruption legislation, which on its own is not statistically significant to explain the variation in control of corruption across countries, absorbs some of the residual variability not captured by the independence of the judiciary. In short, while the extent of legislation by itself is a poor predictor of the variation in the levels of corruption across countries, it adds explanatory power to the effects of judicial independence. Moreover, the direction of the effect is positive for both variables, meaning that anti-corruption legislation does have a statistically significant deterrence effect controlling for judicial independence. In other words, if two countries have similar levels of judicial independence, the one with stricter anti-corruption legislation is likely to do better in controlling corruption. Finally, Model IV tests

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whether the deterrence effect of a stricter anti-corruption legal framework is strengthened by the presence of an independent judiciary. This is tested by including an interaction effect between these two variables in the model. The results, however, do not turn out to be significant. Table 10.2  Impact of economic anti-corruption interventions on Control of Corruption 2016 Variables

Economic globalization (2015)

(1) Model V 0.03*** (0.005)

Judicial independence (2007–15) Economic globalization x judicial independence GDP per capita (2015) Constant Observations R-squared Adj. R-squared

0.00007*** (0.000) 2.1*** (0.268) 146 0.7 0.67

(2) Model VI 0.03*** (0.005) 0.97*** (0.088)

0.00003*** (0.000) −0.68* (0.346) 146 0.85 0.84

(3) Model VII 0.005 (0.013) 0.61** (0.235) 0.006* (0.004) 0.00002*** (0.000) 0.56 (0.828) 146 0.85 0.84

Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

The results of the analysis of market-oriented reforms are displayed in Table 10.2. The independent variable, that is, the level of integration in the market economy, is first tested in isolation controlling only for the level of development (Model V). The results reveal a positive and statistically significant relationship between economic globalization and control of corruption. As predicted by economic theory, countries with higher levels of integration in the global economy have lower levels of corruption. This effect remains statistically significant when the institutional element is added to the regression (Model VI). When combined, both the level of judicial independence and of economic globalization show positive, statistically significant effects on the dependent variable. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model also increases from an R-square of 0.70 to 0.85. Model VII exemplifies the relevance of the interaction mechanism. While the interaction between legal reforms and judicial independence was not statistically significant, the interaction term between economic globalization and judicial independence is significant and positive. This means that the positive effects of economic globalization on control of corruption are strengthened in an environment where the judiciary is independent. The final test in this chapter supports my theoretical argument and that of other governance scholars, that context can validate both market and deterrence

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approaches. The index constructed based on the extent of a country’s specialized anti-corruption legal framework – including conflict of interest, political finance and financial disclosure – proved not to be a statistically significant predictor of control of corruption on its own. When combined in a single model with institutional variables, such as judicial independence, however, these tools proved to have a statistically significant, albeit small, effect on the control of corruption. This seems to suggest that anti-corruption legislation on its own does not explain the variation in levels of corruption across countries and that the institutional ­component in the regression (judicial independence) is a key determinant. The statistical models showed a strong, positive and statistically significant relationship between economic globalization and control of corruption. While this effect was not dependent on the level of judicial independence, the interaction between these two variables proved to be statistically significant, and higher levels of judicial independence can help increase the positive impact of trade liberalization on the control of corruption. The importance of a country’s institutional setting also proved to be significant to trigger the anti-corruption effects of economic policies. The findings in this chapter could help manage expectations when introducing new anti-corruption interventions and stress the importance of having clarity around the type of corruption one is trying to target with a specific intervention. While both legal and economic interventions might be effective in the long run, their short-term effect is heavily reliant on the existing governance equilibrium in a society, which in this chapter was captured by using a key political variable, that is, judicial independence.

10.6  Challenges ahead in the fight against corruption This chapter has shown that, as argued by Heywood (2016, p. 45), the dominance of economistic analyses, which often stresses the importance of shifting incentive structures through increased competition and a reduction of government intervention in the economy, has given rise to anti-corruption policies that are often too abstracted from reality and fail to deliver the promised results. Perhaps as an unintended consequence, the influence of economics on our understanding of corruption has also helped create the impression that the issue can be addressed from a technical perspective. While useful to understand the underlying mechanisms, economic models need to simplify reality and, in the case of anti-corruption, this comes at the cost of ignoring the relevance of the contextual factors. For this reason, to harness the lessons of the past 25 years of anti-corruption research, policy-makers need to acknowledge the complex nature of the phenomenon. As mentioned above, corruption has many faces and various underlying mechanisms, but while the complexity of the phenomenon is almost universally accepted, policies designed to control it often acknowledge this fact in theory but fail to do so in practice. More clarity on the type

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of corruption one hopes to reduce and at what level, will thus be decisive for greater success in future anti-corruption interventions. Given the importance of the governance context for the failure or success of anticorruption interventions, politics cannot be left out of the equation. The quantitative analysis in this chapter shows how judicial independence is a central element that determines the anti-corruption effect of market-oriented policies and legal constraints. Developing the independence of the judiciary or of any other institution meant to serve as an anti-corruption watchdog, however, is no easy feat. In countries where corruption is systemic and where those benefitting from it depend on the lack of checks and balances to continue extracting rents and other benefits for themselves and their supporters, efforts to strengthen these institutions will likely encounter a lack of ‘political will’ to strengthen them. Since building political will would be equivalent to asking the winners of corruption to voluntarily renounce their gains, the political nature of anti-corruption must be acknowledged. Finding ways to organize ‘the losers in this system against the status groups and the predatory elites’ (Mungiu 2006, p. 97) could be a good starting point in those situations. As a final note, it is worth acknowledging some of the areas where further research is required. Among others, this chapter has shown how market-oriented policies can have an anti-corruption effect, particularly when they encounter the right institutional setting. Since the global financial crisis, however, economists, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists alike have suggested that the so-called ‘invisible hand of the market’ is broken and that the increasing levels of inequality and unprecedented levels of wealth accumulation by the wealthiest 1 per cent are evidence of this. Here, too, corruption is the culprit. According to Wedel (2009), for example, private actors have managed to blur the previously clear divide between the public and the private realms in Western democracies. In so doing, these actors have translated their economic power into political influence that allows them to remain above the law. Stiglitz (2013) argues that the rising levels of inequality and the 2008 financial crisis are the outcome of rent-seeking, political connections and pressure from corporations to restrict competition. Similarly, Reich (2015) attributes the growing levels of inequality to a departure from the strong anti-trust laws and a concentration of market power that allows private companies to amass and exercise political power to remain above the law. These developments, combined with the increasing levels of globalization, have given rise to new manifestations of corruption that will likely lead the research and policy agenda in the coming decade.

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11 Digital anti-corruption: hopes and challenges Niklas Kossow

11.1 Introduction The digitalization of anti-corruption is progressing at full steam. The rise of information and communication technology (ICT) has for many years influenced anticorruption programming around the world. Non-governmental organizations and governments are eager to try new tactics to fight corruption, while international donors seem more than willing to support such projects and contribute to their documentation (Davies and Fumega 2014; Kossow and Dykes 2018b). This chapter collects references to establish a state-of-the-art explanation of what we know about the use of ICT in anti-corruption with an emphasis on peerreviewed, academic literature. In doing so, it evaluates how far ICT can be seen as an effective contributory factor to the control of corruption. The term ICT is used in this context to encompass all types of digital tools, starting with the Internet or mobile phone access and ending in more specific technologies. The chapter will also identify gaps in the literature and formulate calls for future research. This chapter provides a similar overview of the literature to the ones produced by Chêne (2016) and Adam and Fazekas (2018). However, it focuses specifically on academic literature and provides a structure to understand the literature that helps the reader to spot gaps in the current state of the art. The structure presented here follows a deductive logic. Based on the available literature, it looks at the similarities and differences between the topics and ICT tools covered and thus structures the literature review as follows: ●●

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Theoretical and macro-level studies that look at the correlation between Internet access and a better control of corruption; E-government access and the effect of e-government tools, in particular e-procurement; Tools enabling downward transparency, including open data and transparency platforms, as well as social media use by governments; Tools enabling upward transparency, including crowdsourcing and whistleblowing tools and Tools used for the mobilization of anti-corruption movements.

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Following the presentation of the literature, the chapter will point to gaps within the research looking at digitalization of the anti-corruption sphere. Listing these unexplored areas will help formulate a call for a future research agenda.

11.2  Theoretical and macro-level approaches While this chapter does not review general anti-corruption theory and the variations in how to understand corruption, it will consider the work of scholars who theorize specifically on the questions as to how and why ICT use relates to ­corruption levels. The most widely cited work in this context is an article by Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes (2010). Reviewing relevant literature, they argue that ICT, e-government and social media can increase transparency and provide citizens with information to hold governments to account. They see a potential for social media to have a transformative impact on society, creating ‘an atmosphere of openness that identifies and stems corrupt behaviour’ (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes 2010, p. 269). While identifying several obstacles that need to be overcome, they maintain a positive view of the potential of ICT and social media to create a link between citizens and their governments, as they also do in a later paper (Bertot et al. 2012). Already, several years earlier, Sturges (2004) had made a similar argument. For Sturges, the use of ICT in government could induce greater transparency, yet both political will and a strong civil society are needed to make it useful for anti-corruption. Looking at African countries, Schroth and Scharma (2003) argue that technology more generally, and Internet access in particular, could help to fight corruption by providing information, contributing to education and helping coordinate action against corruption. Klitgaard (2012) also argues that ‘social media are growing in prominence in the fight against corruption’ (p. 56), citing several projects around the world that are using ICT tools to mobilize citizens. He stresses the importance of cooperation between civil society actors, the public and state institutions in order to make the best use of such technologies. Similarly, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013a) stresses the potential of social media and ICT to support collective action against corruption. For Mungiu-Pippidi, Internet and social media access help to turn citizens into watchdogs, ready to exert ‘normative constraints’ on government officials and thus contribute to the control of corruption. Looking at e-government, Shim and Eon (2008) argue that its use reduces the discretion of civil servants by removing ­decision-making powers and increasing the possibility of being monitored through the internal collection of data.

11.2.1  Macro-level studies DiRienzo et al. (2007) offer a study summarizing different perspectives on corruption and arguing that access to information through ICT can be a useful tool against it. They use Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index

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(CPI) to measure corruption and a Digital Access Index to measure access to information by the number of fixed and mobile telephones and Internet connections, the quality of ICT services and the actual usage of Internet and education levels, finding it to be positively correlated to lower levels of corruption. A similar analysis is conducted by Garcia-Murillo (2009). Pointing at the complexity of corruption as a topic for analysis, she puts together a cross-sectional model taking into account economic, political and technological factors and argues that Internet and information access ‘can support democratisation efforts, law enforcement, investment, and education’ (Garcia-Murillo 2009, p. 28). She finds Internet access to be significantly correlated with corruption levels. A slightly more nuanced approach is taken by Lio et al. (2011). They provide a dynamic panel model regressing Internet adoption on the CPI, including several controls. They also present positive results using a Granger causality test where the causality runs both ways and the effect remains small. A panel analysis by Bailard (2009) finds a strong negative correlation between the CPI and mobile phone penetration. Bailard substantiates this result by also providing analysis of a country-level analysis using Afrobarometer data on different Namibian regions. Some of these contributions note that while correlation between Internet access and lower corruption levels seems to be established, the direction of the causation is not so clearly defined (Bailard 2009; Lio et al. 2011). This argument is also made by Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel (2014). They run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with panel data from 42 countries observed between 2003 and 2007, focusing on investment in information technology (IT) infrastructure, as provided by the World Development Indicators database. They find a significant correlation between IT investment and the CPI; however, it is presented as a U-curve: IT investment can lower corruption up to a certain point, but over-investment might even increase corruption as available resources might lead to additional ­opportunities for corruption. Another interesting approach is taken by Andersen et al. (2011). They argue for a causal relationship between changes in Internet diffusion and the control of corruption by providing an instrumental variable analysis, using lightning as an instrument for Internet diffusion. While the authors are successful in establishing this significant link, they do not theorize about a mechanism linking corruption levels and Internet diffusion. Such a mechanism is very clearly provided by Goel et al. (2012). Using a dataset compiled of Internet searches about respective countries and ‘corruption’ or ‘bribery’, they use these as an indicator for corruption awareness. Their analysis shows fairly robust and significant results, suggesting that more Internet searches correlate with lower corruption levels. The authors link this to work, arguing that press freedom also has a positive impact on the control of corruption. In a working paper, Sorak (2016) makes a similar point, arguing that ‘the internet has the potential to act as a new form of press freedom’ (p. 57). He points out in particular that online censorship will thus limit the effect of Internet access on the control of corruption, which is thus often moderated by other factors.

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11.3 E-government While for the most part the studies above examine Internet access generally, the topic of e-government use and its effect on corruption has been subject to a large number of academic studies. Summaries of related literature are provided by AbuShanab et al. (2013) and Makowski (2017). The latter presents the development of e-government in the tradition of the Weberian bureaucracy and as a way to open up governments and enable information sharing. In this context he also highlights the role of open data for greater transparency.1 An overview of both quantitative and qualitative research linking e-government to the control of corruption is ­provided below.

11.3.1  Quantitative studies Shim and Eom (2008, 2009) test the relationship between e-government and corruption using a score for e-government based on a review of government websites, as well as the United Nations (UN) E-Participation Index, which also measures whether e-government stimulates deliberation between government and citizens. Regressing these measures on the CPI, both papers find evidence that e-­government use is correlated with lower corruption levels. Shim and Eom (2009) additionally find that besides e-government, social capital, as measured by data taken from the World Values Survey, represents a major factor in reducing corruption but that the relationship between social capital and ICT is inconclusive. Starke et al. (2016) look at ICT and anti-corruption from three perspectives: media freedom, Internet access and e-government, with the latter measured by the Online Service Index of the UN E-Government Survey. They run hierarchical OLS models at three data points (2003, 2008, 2013) and find all three factors to be significant in reducing corruption, with the effect of e-government increasing significantly between 2003 and 2013. Interesting results from an econometric perspective are delivered by Andersen (2009). He regresses the e-government website score on the Control of Corruption component of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Andersen tests the change in Control of Corruption between 1996 and 2006 and finds it positively correlated with better e-government scores. E-government proves to be an important factor in supporting the control of corruption, however, only in the context of non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. Kim (2014) also uses the CPI and the UN E-Government Development Index to show the impact of e-government on corruption levels. In a pooled OLS model, the analysis presented here covers up to 190 countries between 2005 and 2007. Kim argues that e-government is more effective in contributing to the control of corruption if applied in a setting with effective bureaucracy and the rule of law. Choi (2014) takes the three dimensions of the UN E-Government Index into account separately: online service provision, telecommunications infrastructure and human capital (referring to the ability to use online tools effectively). Choi finds a positive

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correlation between all three dimensions of e-government and the control of corruption, both individually and collectively. Analysing regression results including the UN E-Government Survey and data on national cultures, Nam (2018) finds that e-government can be effective in controlling corruption, but this effect is often mitigated by national culture. Quite widely cited is Elbahnasawy (2014), who provides evidence from a large panel dataset. He runs a variety of panel data models, including dynamic models. His results show that e-government reduces corruption across all models and proves to be fairly robust, including causality tests that e-government reduces corruption without reverse causality. Another interesting study is provided by GarciaMurillo (2013). Using a fixed effects model based on the UN E-Government Readiness Survey, Garcia-Murillo finds strong evidence for a positive relationship between a higher government web presence and better control of corruption, and grounds these findings in anti-corruption theory. The paper also gives some indication of potential mechanisms based on a short case study description looking at ­government procurement in Peru.

11.3.2  Case studies In the context of e-government, one case that stands out is the OPEN (Online Procedures ENhancement for civil applications) system that was introduced in Seoul in 1999. The system helps citizens to track and review public procedures, such as applications for construction permits, through an online system. Kim et al. (2009) present OPEN as an anti-corruption tool, based on survey data, qualitative interviews, and internal and external assessments. They identify three mechanisms through which OPEN helps to fight corruption: normative mechanisms (demand by citizens for better services and transparency), regulatory mechanisms (helping to track decisions leading to better enforcement and corruption prevention) and better training of public officials. OPEN was also documented by Choi and Ahn (2001) and Iqbal and Seo (2008), as well as in several reports by international organizations. It has inspired governments and researchers to release a number of speculative studies on the potential of e-government to reduce corruption. Nurunnabi and Ullah (2009) and Seo and Mehedi (2016) consider the case of Bangladesh. Both describe the efforts of the government to introduce e-government applications as a means to fight corruption. However, their articles demonstrate that while public offices were computerized, the introduction of e-government fell short due to poor IT infrastructure and lack of political commitment. Based on survey results, Pathak et al. (2009) analysed the potential for e-government in reducing corruption in Fiji, arguing that the introduction of e-government services could support the fight against corruption by reducing red tape and leading to greater access to information and social accountability. Similar results were found in a study carried out in Ethiopia by Pathak et al. (2007), in a comparison of these two cases by Pathak et al. (2008), as well as by analysing survey data from India (Pathak and Prasad, 2006). The case of India highlights, however, that the

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citizen–government relationship seems to be comparatively more important in Ethiopia (Singh et al. 2010). Additional studies looking at Nigeria (Eddy and Akpan 2008) and Albania (Hasani and Beleraj 2013) make similar points but lack sufficient data to back up their claims. Sheryazdanova and Butterfield (2017) provide an analysis of the e-government system introduced in Kazakhstan since 2004. Analysing secondary sources they show that the country’s e-government initiative has been fairly successful in limiting contact between citizens and public officials: where e-services were introduced, Kazakhstan showed advances in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. They conclude that e-government does not address the entrenched high-level corruption in the country, but was successful in lowering petty corruption. Based on a survey of 101 managers of domestic and multinational companies in India, Prasad and Shivarajan (2015) developed a transaction cost approach to the applicability of e-government as an anti-corruption tool. They argue that e-government can reduce corruption by providing information (and thus reducing uncertainty resulting from information asymmetries) and by reducing the need for face-to-face interaction between public officials and managers. They also review Indian government websites and find them to lack interactivity. 11.3.2.1 E-procurement A subset of e-government applications that have been subject to anti-corruption research come from the field of public procurement. The OECD notes that an increasing number of its member states are introducing e-procurement systems, ‘enabling more open, innovative and trustworthy government’ (OECD 2017, p. 175). These benefits of e-procurement are also highlighted by Neupane et al. (2012b). They look at corruption in procurement through a principal–agent approach and analyse risk factors in relation to different stakeholders. Citing several case studies, they argue that e-procurement can reduce information asymmetries, power monopolies and opportunities for corruption. The Republic of Korea is also a widely cited case study in reference to e-­procurement. The country’s Government e-Procurement System was introduced in 2002 and soon after was handling 80 per cent of its bidding processes.2 The system enables transparency in the procurement process and competitive bidding and minimizes face-to-face interactions between public servants and bidders (Iqbal and Seo 2008). A recent OECD (2016) report on the system also highlights this and notes that the system ‘greatly expanded’ transparency in the procurement process. E-procurement is also argued to create efficiency gains, as Singer et al. (2009) demonstrate in reference to the case of Chile where, however, the system did not apparently lead to less corruption. Using data gained through digital procurement should make measuring corruption in this context a possibility, as Fazekas et al. (2016) show with their suggestion of a corruption risk index based on procurement data.

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Rotchanakitumnuai (2013) presents research on the Thai e-procurement system, which includes procurement auctions. Based on a survey among 169 procurement professionals, the study argues that despite the e-procurement system, interactions between vendors and service providers are still commonplace and offer opportunities for corruption, implying that greater transparency in the procurement process does not always mean less corruption. Coppier and Piga (2006) share this view in reference to game theoretical models. They argue that ‘countries where corruption is more pervasive and less easy to eradicate will stop short of implementing the level of transparency in procurement that would dissolve corruption’ (p. 203). However, they also write that e-­procurement might change this as transparency becomes less costly and makes it easier to involve citizens in monitoring procurement. In a working paper on an unnamed Asian country, Tran (2008) presents data from 562 contracts between a firm that imports electronics and its government buyers, all but three of which involved a bribe (hence the anonymity). Looking at the e-procurement auction process that the government introduced, Tran finds that best-value auctions did not reduce corruption. However, best-price auctions that were introduced later significantly reduced corruption since they gave public officials less discretion on whom to award the contract to. Further studies on Nepal (Neupane et al. 2012a) and on South Africa (Habtemichael and Cloete 2009) argue for potential benefits of e-procurement in these countries, while remaining speculative as they cover systems that were not yet introduced. As shown above, e-government tools are seen to be an effective contributor to the control of corruption, albeit within certain limitations.

11.4  Downward transparency The overall review of literature also found a number of scholars who looked at different ICT tools in anti-corruption that work in different ways. The first to be listed is ICT promoting downward transparency. These tools aim at providing information from the government to citizens, civil society organizations or the private sector. They can in theory use this information to hold the government accountable. There are two types of tools using this mechanism: transparency or open data platforms, and citizen outreach tools, such as specific websites or social media applications.

11.4.1  Open data and transparency platforms Gurin (2014) looks at the provision of open data from a conceptual perspective, writing that ‘open data can boost economic development, improve trust in government, and fight corruption’ (p. 72). He also highlights that thus far the main efforts in publishing government data in open formats were concentrated in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as other developed nations. Further papers also take the perspective that these platforms can contribute to greater transpar-

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ency and thus support the fight against corruption (Davies and Fumega 2014; Gray 2016; Lourenço et al. 2017). However, there is only little empirical evidence supporting this claim. In a conference paper Matheus et al. (2011) compared different transparency platforms in 16 countries in the region. They highlighted the potential of these platforms to contribute to transparency and anti-corruption efforts by promoting ‘social control of public administration’ (p. 27). Matheus et al. (2012) explored online monitoring systems of the Brazilian court of accounts. They mapped the existence of such transparency platforms that show characteristics of an anti-corruption tool. Those platforms seemingly do contribute to increased transparency, but not necessarily to a decrease in corruption. An interesting perspective on this question comes from Murillo (2015). Looking at an Latin American transparency platform from a ­principal–agent perspective, he develops a Data Openness Index for 16 Latin American countries that takes into account legislation, as well as specific indicators assessing the provision and availability of data. Despite decent data availability, in many cases the data were neither relevant nor accessible enough to affect areas in which corruption is generally present. This case study points out that, at least in Latin America, these platforms fail due to bad implementation, but could work in principle. Looking at potential further developments of these platforms, Sieber and Johnson (2015) outline four different models along which government data publication could develop, showing a poss­ ible way forward for anti-corruption programming using open data. Mattoni (2017) also highlights the importance of data not only to enable activists to hold governments to account, but also to form coalitions and inspire collective action.

11.4.2  Government outreach and social media It has also been argued that governments can use digital technologies to reach out to citizens and form connections between them and government officials. This was applied in particular to social media which can also help citizens organize and share information. Bertot, Jaeger, Munson and Glaisyer (2010) show how several governmental agencies in the USA embraced social media for citizen outreach already prior to 2010. They stress that to make social media a useful tool in creating more transparent and open government they also need to be properly used, for instance, by enabling participation in governance processes. A related paper (Bertot, Jaeger and Hansen 2012) argues that social media use by governments depends on underlying policies which often have not been adapted to provide for the use of social media in government. Magro (2012) also stresses the need for change in policy and governance culture if social media is supposed to be a successful addition to e-government efforts. Evaluating the use of social media in local governments Bonsón et al. (2012) and Bonsón et al. (2015) both see potential for social media to improve

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citizen–government relations but argue, however, that is has not yet been fulfilled. Song and Lee (2016) base their analysis of social media interaction of citizens with governments on a US-based survey. Their results suggest ‘that social media in government enable citizens to gain easier access to government and be more informed about current events, policies, or programs, heightening their perception of transparency in government’ (Song and Lee 2016, p. 443). In a study looking at citizens’ perceptions of local governments in Mexico, Valle-Cruz et al. (2016) find that citizen perception of transparency, efficiency and corruption can be improved by governments’ use of technology, specifically websites, Twitter and mobile technologies. An analysis conducted by Jha and Sarangi (2017), using quantitative methods, also supports this argument. Building cross-sectional OLS models with data from over 150 countries, they show that Internet access and Facebook penetration are positively correlated with the control of corruption. They also run falsification tests, precluding potential bias from omitted variables. Furthermore, Jha and Sarangi argue that press freedom and Facebook penetration have complementary effects, with their data suggesting that Facebook use has a stronger effect on the control of corruption where press freedom is weak. Another quantitative study in this context is put forward by Kossow and Kukutschka (2017). Also relying on data on Internet access (Internet users and broadband subscriptions) and the percentage of Facebook users in the population, they construct an Online Connectivity Index which in a series of OLS models covering 154 countries they show to be positively correlated with the control of corruption. Further, they argue that civil society and online connectivity not only both positively i­ nfluence the control of corruption, but also reinforce their effect.

11.5  Upward transparency Another way of engaging citizens against corruption is through tools supporting upward transparency; that is, the transfer of information from citizens to different levels of government or from lower-ranked public officials to their superiors. In this context there are several studies that have looked at the use of crowdsourcing in anti-corruption.3 Additionally, the use of whistle-blowing tools also contributes to upward transparency. The most widely known corruption reporting tools using crowdsourcing is ipaidabribe.com, based in India where it has been seen as a success story since it managed to engage a large number of people in corruption reporting. To assess how effective this type of project can be, Ryvkin et al. (2017) provide insight from bribe-paying experiments. They find that in its current form, a system like ipaidabribe.com does not reduce the demand for bribes on the part of public officials. To them, this is not surprising since the application was not intended as a tool to fight corruption, but rather to raise awareness. An interesting case study is provided by Ang (2014) who looks at why the project was successful in India, but failed when it was

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introduced in China. Ang attributes the failure not only to direct restraints on the functioning of the website (i.e. censorship), but also to indirect restraints like libel, failure to organize and undermining the discourse advanced by the project. Ang’s study shows that the mere provision of a tool is not enough: it needs an appropriate organization to back it up. Hellström and Bocast (2013) consider the Ugandan project Not In My Country, a tool soliciting reports on bribes from Ugandan university students that proved to be unsuccessful. Based on a survey and a focus group, they argue that motive alignment is key in ensuring crowdsourcing success: students were often themselves benefitting from corrupt practices and thus had no motive to report bribery cases – even if they were in principle supportive of anti-corruption ideals. Another crowdsourcing anti-corruption tool called Bribecaster is discussed in a conference paper by Mittal and Rubin (2012) without, however, an assessment of its practical merit. Looking at the Philippines, San Juan and Resurreccion (2015) make an argument for crowdsourcing based in principal–agent theory. They propose that crowd­sourcing tools have the ability to engage the public (as the principal) in direct participation and thus help to ensure that governments (as the agent) fulfil their mandates. Zinnbauer (2015) takes into account several implementations of crowdsourcing tools. He brings in the perspective of corruption as a collective action problem. He argues that the design of many platforms often does not focus on solutions and gives several recommendations on the design of anti-corruption crowd­sourcing platforms. Suggestions on the future of crowdsourcing in anti-corruption also come from Noveck et al. (2018) who lay out an approach they title ‘smart crowdsourcing’ in a report for the Inter-American Development Bank. Noveck et al. (2018) also highlight the importance of online whistle-blowing systems in the context of anti-corruption strategies. These are said to be more secure and thus could encourage whistle-blowers to come forward and report corruption. Academic evidence for this is, however, quite rare. Apaza and Chang (2011) noted the general need for whistle-blower protection and better systems to make sure cases of whistle-blowing are followed up and lead to proper investigations with regard to corruption. Online whistle-blowing tools are considered by Asiimwe et al. (2013). They examined two case studies from Uganda where ICT tools were used to encourage whistle-blowing based on interviews and focus group discussions. They argue that users were more likely to report corruption thanks to the efficiency of the systems and the ease of use. However, lack of ICT skills and mistrust in officers handling complaints both contributed to deterring reports.

11.6 Mobilization The final group of tools considered in this chapter are those aimed at mobilizing citizens against corruption. This can, on the one hand, be news reporting websites

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providing information on corruption-related issues and, on the other hand, social media tools, including different types of social networks and blogs. An interesting case study in this context is Russia. Alexanyan et al. (2012) present results from a three-year research project analysing the Russian Internet. They found several examples of collective action that were inspired by online movements, as well as a public sphere based around blogs. In this context they found several examples where cases of corruption generated a strong online response. In a recent paper Enikolopov et al. (2018) present highly interesting results from an analysis of blog posts about corruption in Russian state-controlled companies, published by blogger Alexey Navalny. They are able to show that blog posts reporting on corruption have a direct negative effect on stock prices of the companies covered in the blog posts, as well as an indirect effect through higher staff turnover and fewer conflicts with minority shareholders. Blog posts are thus associated with ‘increased accountability within state-controlled companies’. The researchers conclude that ‘social media can improve the quality of governance in places that need it the most’ (Enikolopov et al. 2018, p. 171). An analysis of an online anti-corruption campaign using social media is provided in a conference paper by Breuer and Farooq (2012), who look at the Brazilian anticorruption campaign Ficha Limpa. While not calling the campaign successful on a policy level, they highlight survey results showing that the use of online campaigns was efficient and cost-effective: having taken part in a targeted campaign seems to be associated with people taking ‘offline’ political action. Writing about the 2011 Indian anti-corruption movement, Rodrigues (2014) argues that the movement that started on social media and through online activism successfully managed to push the issue onto the agenda of the traditional media. It was thus able to influence the policy agenda.

11.7 Looking ahead: what have we learned and where are the gaps? This chapter has presented a rich array of studies that look at the use of information and communication technology in anti-corruption. Clearly, the digitalization of the anti-corruption sphere is already well advanced and the link between ICT access, e-government use and better control of corruption is well-established. Reviewing studies looking at different types of ICT helps us to boil down this key mechanism that links ICT and anti-corruption: e-government, downward transparency, upward transparency and mobilization. These case studies give some indication of why and in what way ICT tools were able to support better control of corruption. Overall the theoretical and empirical field on the use of e-government as an anticorruption tool is well-researched. Yet, it leads us to look at the questions which are still open for research.

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Case studies leave open some specific questions on how ICT tools can be effective in controlling corruption. This applies in particular to open data and transparency platforms, whistle-blowing tools and e-procurement. Research suggests that these tools can be used to lower corruption, but not under what circumstances or how. This points at fairly specific research questions that look at the interaction of ICT tools with other factors contributing to the control of corruption. It also raises questions about what other policies and institutions are necessary to make ICT tools effective against corruption. Furthermore, new ICT tools such as distributed ledger technology or machine learning are increasingly noted as anti-corruption tools, but little is known about how big their potential is.4 The same goes for digital whistleblowing tools and actual data leaks that might lead to better data availability. One key area that has not yet been investigated sufficiently is the effect of ICT anticorruption tools on individuals’ motivations to engage in corruption: ●●

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How do individual decisions whether or not to engage in corrupt acts take into account greater transparency provided through ICT? What effect does social media have on those calculations in comparison to traditional media? In what settings do e-government tools change the behaviour of civil servants?

At the same time, researchers also need to look into possible unintended consequences of technological innovations. ICT tools can also contribute to corruption. Machine learning can potentially contribute to efforts in predicting and uncovering corruption, as López-Iturriaga and Pastor Sanz (2018) highlight in a study predicting corruption in Spanish provinces. However, as Aarvik (2019) points out, besides its anti-corruption potential, machine learning also has ethical concerns and is often feared to lead to a loss of jobs. Distributed ledger technology, for instance, is often referred to as a potential tool to address corruption risks (Kim and Kang 2017; Kossow and Dykes 2018a). However, it is also associated with digital currencies which have in some cases been associated with money laundering. Social media is increasingly associated with fostering political discourse that weakens democracy and thus can support more corruption. Finally, as Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel (2014) point out, IT infrastructure investment can also lead to more corruption. Yet, this aspect is rarely studied and should be an issue for research in the future. Overall, anti-corruption scholars have established the importance of ICT tools in the control of corruption. Yet, more research is needed to understand how these tools can be used effectively and what their unintended consequences might be. NOTES 1 Open data in this context refers to data that are freely available, machine readable and in an open format. In the context of this paper it refers to open government data. 2 Also called KONEPS (Korean ON-line E-Procurement System). 3 Acquiring resources by engaging a large and open group of individuals, mostly Internet users. 4 Distributed ledger technology is commonly referred to as blockchain technology.

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12 Heroes or villains? A legislative, ethical and policy assessment of whistleblowing

Michele Bocchiola, Emanuela Ceva and Maria Chiara Vinciguerra

12.1 Introduction Whistleblowing has been characterized in a number of ways (Vandekerckhove 2006, ch. 1). The term ‘whistleblowing’ was initially used to identify the actions of members of an organization who voluntarily report possible threats to customer safety deriving from weaknesses or errors in an artefact’s design (De George 1980). More recently, ‘whistleblowing’ has been increasingly used with reference to cases of corruption, fraud and abuse of political power exposed through the public disclosure of some secret or classified information. This extension in the practical use of the term has also been reflected in recent scholarly works that have developed more nuanced accounts of whistleblowing capable of making sense of its many faces (Ceva and Bocchiola 2018, ch. 1; Jubb 1999). Generally speaking, whistleblowers are members of private or public organizations who become aware of or suspect the occurrence of wrongful or hazardous individual behaviours or organizational practices, and decide to voice their concerns either to higher-level management (through internal channels) or, if this proves ineffective, by going public. Besides the different nuances in the way whistleblowing is described, there seems to be no major disagreement on the fact that a whistleblower is ‘an organizational or institutional “insider” who reveals wrong­doing within or by that organization or institution, to someone else’ (Lewis et al. 2014, p. 4; see also Near and Miceli 1985). In this chapter, we survey some of the most common legal, philosophical and policy approaches currently in use to clarify what represents an instance of whistleblowing. To this end, we focus on the role ascribed to whistleblowing in the fight against corruption as it emerges in institutional theory and from a survey of existing whistleblower protection laws and their impact on societal levels of corruption and the quality of governance in the geopolitical context of Europe. We have divided our work into two parts. In the first part, we offer a general characterization of whistleblowing, with the aim of providing a comprehensive description of this phenomenon. We then elaborate on the role of whistleblowing 158

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in the fight against corruption, introducing two theoretical approaches to whistle­ blowing in the contemporary debate in public ethics, which interpret whistle­ blowing, respectively, as a last resort against grave organizational wrongdoing and as one of the best organizational practices of answerability. In the second part, we outline current whistleblowing policy and legal practices, and analyse their impact on curbing corruption and promoting good governance. We show how such policies and laws follow either of the theoretical approaches to the role of whistle­blowing that we introduced in the first part of the chapter. In conclusion, we point at some possible directions in the research agenda of corruption and whistleblowing studies.

12.2 Characterizing whistleblowing in the fight against corruption 12.2.1  The features of whistleblowing Whistleblowing is a complex phenomenon and its description quite controversial. Although there is a general agreement that whistleblowing is a form of reporting, many current characterizations embed evaluative components. So some commentators portray whistleblowers as praiseworthy individuals, who stand against crime and injustice (e.g. Grant 2002) whereas others refer to them in the detracting terms of ‘moles’ or ‘leakers’ (Sagar 2013). This condition makes it particularly difficult both to understand what whistleblowing is and to distinguish this practice from other forms of reporting – such as, for example, bell-ringing (a form of active and participatory citizenry alerting us to crimes and misdemeanours) (Miceli et al. 2014) and spying (which is the action of revealing information on the activities of an enemy or a competitor). But these difficulties make it all the more urgent to start an inquiry into whistleblowing by offering a precise analytical characterization of this practice and its components. Such a characterization is crucial both to provide a common term of reference for the analysis of current whistleblower protection legislation and to better understand the importance of whistleblowing in the fight against corruption. To this aim, Ceva and Bocchiola (2018) have singled out six general defining elements of whistleblowing. The first element concerns the kind of reporting activity of which whistleblowing consists. The report can be either open or anonymous, according to the specific circumstances in which it occurs. While anonymous reports typically take the form of disclosures of classified information intentionally revealed to the media, open reports are usually a form of public accusation (Jubb 1999). Reports may also be either authorized or unauthorized, depending on the object of the report under a country’s specific legislation (Sagar 2013, ch. 6; Delmas 2015). The second element concerns the agent who reports: a whistleblower is a member of the organization where the reported facts occur (Miceli and Near 1992; Miceli et al. 2014). To be a permanent or temporary member of an organization means to occupy a role within it, performing formal and regulated functions, which are

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coordinated with those assigned to other members. A whistleblower is a member of an organization who has privileged access to some relevant information about some questionable facts in virtue of the role covered within the organization. Typically, whistleblowers are company employees, officers of a public institution, volunteers in a charity organization and so on. This leads to the third element, which is about the locus where the reported facts have occurred: an organization. Organizations, viewed as embodied structures of interdependent roles (see Miller 2014), may be private (corporations) or public (hospitals), governmental (state offices) or non-governmental (civil society associations). All kinds of organizations are defined by their performing of certain functions that qualify what their members do collectively and establish their respective role-based rights and duties. Not all organizations are relevant for the definition of whistleblowing. Only legitimate organizations are considered. Following Ceva and Bocchiola (2018), organizations are legitimate when they are entitled (from a legal or moral point of view) to the power they exercise through the actions of their members. The broad qualification of organizations as ‘legitimate’ is necessary for distinguishing whistleblowers from informants – those who report, for example, on such criminal (hence illegitimate) organizations as the Mafia (Davis 1996). The object of a whistleblower’s report is the fourth defining element of whistleblowing. Whistleblowers report on a wrongful fact that allegedly occurs within an organization. Relevant wrongful facts include those regarding the uses of power associated with the roles organizational members perform. One such wrongful use of power is corruption. Corruption may entail either systematic organizational practices (e.g. nepotism) or individual occasional behaviours (e.g. embezzlement). As Ceva and Ferretti (2018) explain, the common qualifying feature is that there is an arbitrary deviation from the mandate with which either certain rule-based practices should occur or certain members should perform their role within the organization. In either case, the deviation is wrongful to the extent that it contradicts the logic on the basis of which role-occupants ought to use their role-based powers and that ensures that an organization functions as it should. In this sense, the object of whistleblowing is an organizational wrongdoing. It should be noted that referring to the alleged occurrence of organizational wrongdoings excludes normative restrictions regarding either the ‘seriousness’ of the wrongdoing or the epistemic status of the reported information (Davis 1996). Moreover, relevant organizational wrongdoing may stem from either unlawful (e.g. bribery) or illicit activities (e.g. the violation of some organizational standards), or actions that, although not necessarily unlawful, are nevertheless either contrary to the spirit of some organizational rule or morally impermissible. For example, an organization might not have a written policy about sexual harassment, and the current legislation may be vague about what counts as a criminal offence in this case. Nevertheless, to receive unwelcome sexual advances by a colleague is morally problematic and may be the object of a whistleblower’s report.

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The fifth element concerns the addressee of whistleblowing. Addressees can be either internal or external to the organization where the wrongdoing allegedly occurs (see Davis 1996). Whistleblowing is internal when the report is addressed to the whistleblower’s direct superior, to higher levels of management or to a dedicated office (e.g. ombudsman). Whistleblowing is external when it is addressed to such entities as the police or the media. The last defining element of whistleblowing is about its underpinning motivation. Whistleblowing is usually aimed at initiating a corrective action either to prevent an organizational wrongdoing from occurring or to stop it. For this reason, whistleblowing has often been presented as a pro-social action, whose aim is the promotion of justice and moral rectitude within an organization (Miceli and Near 1992, pp. 28–30). This is, however, a generalization, since it is not always possible to establish the ‘real’ motivation behind a whistleblower’s decision to report. Whether selfish or altruistic, the whistleblowers’ actual psychological motivations do not seem particularly significant to offer a general characterization of this practice. It should suffice to characterize the whistleblowers’ motivations in terms of a commitment to bringing about a positive change of the status quo by urging that corrective action be taken to address the alleged occurrence of an organizational wrongdoing. Putting these elements together, we obtain the following working definition of whistleblowing: Whistleblowing is the practice through which a member of a legitimate organization voluntarily reports some wrongdoing, allegedly occurring within that organization, with the intention that corrective action should be taken to address it. (Ceva and Bocchiola 2018, p. 21)

Having identified the core features of whistleblowing, we can analyse its specific role.

12.2.2  The role of whistleblowing The definition above offers important analytical insights but, while we can apply it across various accounts of whistleblowing, we must still come to terms with some substantial disagreement concerning the specific role of whistleblowing (and the evaluation thereof) as a way to initiate remedial action against such forms of organizational wrongdoing as corruption. The normative debate in this regard is divided into two broad approaches that, for the sake of illustration, we call the ‘Extrema Ratio’ and the ‘Deontic’ views (Ceva and Bocchiola 2020). The Extrema Ratio View understands whistleblowing as an individual act of dissent and indictment, akin to civil disobedience. The Deontic View presents whistleblowing as one of the standard organizational practices of answerability vis-à-vis organizational wrongdoing. We briefly discuss these two normative approaches, which may provide different and possibly contrasting perspectives on the evaluation of current whistleblowing policies and legislation.

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According to the Extrema Ratio View, whistleblowing is an exceptional individual response to some grave organizational wrongdoing, which exceeds the standard duties and responsibility associated with organizational membership. It is the last resort available to a member of a legitimate organization, recurrence to which is justified only after all internal control mechanisms have been exhausted. From this perspective, whistleblowing is mainly directed outside the organization and typically aims at the preservation of the whistleblower’s personal integrity (Brenkert 2010), the need to avoid complicity in serious wrongdoing (Boot 2019) or to comply with general duties of justice (Delmas 2015). The Deontic View provides, instead, a broader perspective, according to which whistleblowing is a generally binding organizational duty pertaining to the standard set of answerability provisions that any legitimate rule-based organization should implement to monitor its overall performance and the contribution that its members give towards – or against – it (Ceva and Bocchiola 2018). It is a twofold duty. It is a perfect and positive organizational duty that mandates to establish effective reporting mechanisms and adequate protections for whistleblowers, so that alleged organizational wrongdoings can be brought to light and investigated and, consequently, corrective actions may be taken. As Ceva and Bocchiola (2019) have shown, whistleblowing is a conditional duty for the individual members of an organization, in the sense that they ought to blow the whistle so long as effective reporting mechanisms and adequate protections are in place. If we move from theory to practice, we can appreciate that a growing number of organizations have established whistleblowing policies, which introduce reporting mechanisms among the best practices to remedy infractions of the internal rules and general wrongdoings stemming from organizational practices or individual behaviours. These innovations lend support to the growing importance of conceiving whistleblowing within the broader framework of organizational answerability practices, as the Deontic View emphasizes. However, the state of current legislation in many other countries seems to preserve the emergency-driven piecemeal approach to whistleblowing as an individual exceptional act of resistance, as the Extrema Ratio View has it. Whistleblowing legislation is now widely supported as a fundamental instrument in the international fight against corruption. Recent studies (e.g. White 2000; Drew 2003; Maxwell et al. 2008; Transparency International 2015; Thüsing and Forst 2016; Transparency International Ireland 2017) show the importance of reporting mechanisms of this sort. And various international consultations have also taken places in recent times relating to the phenomenon of whistleblowing (Thüsing and Forst 2016), such as the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the G20 and so forth.1 However, these initiatives, as we illustrate in the following section with reference to the Whistleblower Index (Vinciguerra 2018), seem to presuppose the conception of whistleblowing as an individual extreme act of resistance put forward

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in the Extrema Ratio View. This presupposition has problematic implications as we illustrate and discuss in the next section.

12.3 Whistleblowing policies and legal protections in the fight against corruption 12.3.1  An overview of current whistleblowing policies and practices Following recent whistleblower scandals,2 whistleblowing policies and protection legislation have become an increasingly common initiative in the fight against such forms of organizational wrongdoing as corruption. In this sense, whistleblowing is seen as an integral part of the process of critical engagement with a certain societal culture of silence; that is, when certain behavioural standards embedded in organizational or societal cultures disincentivize individuals from speaking up when a crime or deviation from the norm occurs (Skolnick 2001; Rothwell and Baldwin 2007; Loyens 2013). On a similar note, some view whistleblowing as a public manifestation of disagreement with various kinds of organizational wrongdoing (Hirschman 1970), including corruption, as an open challenge to some ­degenerative behaviour nested in organizations (Jubb 1999). A noteworthy example of this tendency is the recognition by the OECD that whistleblowing is a crucial instrument facilitating the detection of bribery, fraud and other forms of corruption along with compliance with anticorruption laws (OECD 2011). The Council of Europe has regarded it as a key aspect of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience for the purposes of detecting hidden wrongdoing and organizational mismanagement, while also strengthening democratic accountability and transparency as fundamental organizational virtues (Council of Europe 2014). This systemic interest in the role of whistleblowing seems to suggest a broadening of the practical consensus on the importance of the Deontic View presented in the previous section. On the legislative front, however, we can still see a prominence of the conception of whistleblowing as an extrema ratio, which requires extraordinary legal measures ensuring that individuals who willingly expose organizational wrongdoings are rewarded, or at least protected from the potential repercussions of reporting. In 2003, 140 countries signed (137 of which also formally ratified) the UN Convention against Corruption, recognizing whistleblower protection as part of international law.3 In the European arena, the Council of Europe also ratified its Civic Law Convention on Corruption in 1999, including some provisions in Article 9 for the ‘appropriate protection’ and encouragement of whistleblowers. As of 2019, 34 members of the Council of Europe (of which 22 are European Union [EU] member states) have formally enacted the Convention.4 In order to ensure a coherent system for the protection of whistleblowers, in late April 2018 the European Commission proposed an EU-wide scheme of minimum standards for the protection of persons reporting on breaches of EU law:5 the primary objective of the Commission’s proposal is to protect persons reporting on unlawful activities, often occurring in the

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form of corruption or fraud, as they ‘can sometimes result in serious harm to the public interest’, and whistleblowers ‘help prevent damage and detect threat or harm to the public interest that may otherwise remain hidden’ (European Commission 2018a, p. 1). The proposal was passed by the Court of Auditors in late September 2018, was in its first reading at the Council of the EU as of March 2019,6 and was turned into Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on 19 December, 2019. While we can see a widespread legislative and policy commitment to protecting whistleblowers, national legislation globally differs widely in the way it defines the conditions under which a whistleblower should be protected. Even the legal basis for the protection of whistleblowers varies widely across countries, in that it can be special, grounded in administrative procedures or in non-binding codes of best practice of conduct for the private sector, or granted by courts (Thüsing and Forst 2016). As further analysed by Thüsing and Forst (2016), other disparities in best practice include the application of this protection (e.g. public or private sector, military, issue-based) and the scope of definition of reportable wrongdoing (e.g. illegal conduct, potential danger of breaking the law, unethical behaviour and breach of codes of conduct). As we will hereby argue, however, modelling the regulation of whistleblowing on the Extrema Ratio View is problematic because it does not recognize the structural role of whistleblowing and only considers it as a residual endeavour in the interstices of organizational action. In so doing, as recently argued (Brown 2017), there is the risk of limiting the appropriateness and effectiveness of whistle­ blowing in the fight against organizational wrongdoings to extraordinary circumstances. This view thus fails to see the systemic potential and binding nature of whistleblowing. By reducing whistleblowing to an exceptional act of heroism, this view in fact casts on individual organizational members a seemingly daunting responsibility to react to organizational wrongdoing and face a dilemma between reporting such w ­ rongdoing and protecting their personal life or career (Brown 2017, pp. 361–2). Because (as seen in Section 12.2.1) organizations are structures of interrelated rulegoverned roles, for an organization to function as it should, it is crucial that each role-occupant exercises their role-based powers in keeping with their mandate. It is sufficient that one role-occupant fails to act as they should for the interrelated work of all role-occupants to be affected in such a way that may incapacitate organizational action (Ferretti 2018). Because of this structural feature, the members of an organization are accountable to each other for the uses they make of their rolebased powers. They are, notably, under what Ceva (2019) has dubbed a ‘duty of office accountability’. When there is a deficit of office accountability, in virtue of the reasoning above, a serious and fundamental kind of organizational wrongdoing occurs, which alters an organization’s internal governing logic. Corruption – the use of powers of office for the pursuit of an agenda whose rationale is incoherent with the terms of those

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powers’ mandate (Ceva and Ferretti 2018) – is one such kind of wrongdoing. The members of an organization who come to know or suspect such a wrongdoing derivatively acquire the normative position to hold their failing fellow members answerable for their conduct. Whistleblowing, on the characterization as an organizational practice offered in the Deontic View, is a crucial mechanism to exercise this kind of control. We can thus appreciate how legitimate organizations have a duty to establish reporting channels and the members of those organizations have a duty to engage in them to prevent organizational wrongdoing from occurring or initiate corrective action against it when it nevertheless occurs. In this Deontic View of whistleblowing, the primary channels for the members of an organization to engage in answerability practices are internal to the organization. When whistleblowing is internal, procedures are in place for whistleblowers to report an organizational wrongdoing, to their superiors or a dedicated office (such as an ethical committee), for example. Some organizations have adopted hotlines, for example, with guarantees that the whistleblower’s report will be kept confidential. However, not all organizations have the culture or the human capital or are in the condition of establishing these kinds of practices or initiating a process of self-correction. As Brown (2018) has recently shown, even within the same country not all organizations achieve similar outcomes due to inherent differences in the organizational culture of addressing wrongdoings. The explanations for such a gap are manifold. Some organizations may be too small to establish a dedicated office for gathering whistleblowers’ reports or entrust someone with the dedicated task of following up on them. Some others may be just too compromised in their functioning (e.g. cases of systemic corruption). In these cases, the question emerges of whether those organizational members who know or suspect an accountability deficit should or may seek external interlocutors for their disclosures. This is the question of the justification for external whistleblowing. When whistleblowing is external, a report is made to a third party: the police or a governmental body entrusted with, for example, anti-corruption powers, or the media. This latter is the case, for example, of Edward Snowden, a Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency computer analyst who leaked classified documents from the United States and United Kingdom governmental mass surveillance programmes to journalists with The Guardian and The Washington Post. It is an implication of the Deontic View that institutional action should be taken to ensure that potential whistleblowers have access to safe external reporting channels and adequate legal protection for their actions. Facing a general institutional failure, both within and outside an organization, individuals may be morally permitted, but not required, to refer to the media. This conclusion shows how the Deontic and the Extrema Ratio views of whistleblowing can be complementary to each other: the former provides the general framework for understanding the ordinary role of whistleblowing within a public ethics of office (what the duties of an organization are), while the latter offers guidance for extraordinary circumstances (what should be done when an organization fails to fulfil its duties).

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As the following section will show, the implications of acknowledging the significance of the Deontic View of whistleblowing in theory, yet operationalizing an Extrema Ratio approach in practice, is mirrored in the erratic effectiveness of whistleblower protection laws in the fight against corruption.

12.3.2 The impact of whistleblowing policies and protection laws on the fight against corruption To analyse the impact of whistleblowing policies and whistleblower protection laws in the fight against corruption is a novel and complex undertaking. Part of the difficulty that such an analysis encounters concerns issues of definition and measurement of the effectiveness of whistleblowing and whistleblowing regulations on societal levels of corruption and the quality of governance. A particular challenge concerns the exact establishment of the kind of relationship between whistle­blowing and good governance, whether direct or indirect and, in the latter case, the identification of its mediating factor(s). Concerning the first line of enquiry, the scholarly and policy literature has often offered clashing accounts of how we determine whistleblowing’s effectiveness (Apaza and Chang 2017). Dworkin and Baucus (1998) suggest that we can deem whistleblowing effective when the organization where it occurs has launched an investigation based on the whistleblower’s allegation and has taken ‘steps to change policies, procedures, or eliminate wrongdoing’ (p. 1289). A similar stand is taken by Brown (2018), who measures whistleblowers’ effectiveness on the basis of actual employees’ reports. In an attempt to widen the definition of effective whistle­ blowing, Apaza and Chang (2011) present it as an action in which not only all of the above-mentioned applies (Dworkin and Bacus 1998), but also the wrongdoing under analysis is terminated within a reasonable timeframe without causing any kind of retaliation on, or additional costs to, the whistleblowers. Another way of looking at this question is to consider the environment in which the report has occurred by measuring the effectiveness of the protection that whistleblowers have enjoyed against international best practices. As detailed by Vinciguerra (2018), some of the common international best practices for drafting a whistleblower protection law include: ●●

●● ●●

a broad definition of whistleblowing, covering all those individuals that carry out disclosures relevant to the public service mission and those who are otherwise actively taking part in activities related to the organization’s mission (Devine and Walden 2013), as well as all individuals assisting the reporting persons to blow the whistle (Blueprint for Free Speech 2016); sanctions for retaliation and interference (Blueprint for Free Speech 2018); comprehensive remedies for whistleblowers, covering all direct, indirect and future consequences of any retaliation (Transparency International 2013, 2015), interim relief, transfer option, coverage for attorney fees and personal accountability for reprisals (Devine and Walden 2013);

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provisions and protections for anonymous reporting and confidentiality, including technological infrastructure that secure the anonymity of online whistleblowers (Blueprint for Free Speech 2016), personal protection against harassment and retaliation, and the entitlement to a fair hearing.

On the basis of these elements, Vinciguerra (2018) recently developed a Whistleblower Index, measuring the quality of whistleblowing protection laws based on international best practice. The index encompasses scope and coverage, reporting and administration, protection and thresholds, sanctions and remedies against retaliation, transparency and due process. This analysis found that it is not always the case that EU member states that have become well known for comprehensive whistleblowing legislation also score highly on the Whistleblower Index. This discrepancy suggests that there may be ‘other factors, such as the implementation of the law or the pre-existing quality of governance or/and the freedom of the press in the country, [that] may have an impact on the success of the law as a tool to combat corruption’ (Vinciguerra 2018, p. 25). In light of the theoretical framework set out in the previous section of this chapter, we can now add that this discrepancy may be a symptom of the general shortcomings of the approach that such legislation presupposes. By favouring the piecemeal and limited view of whistleblowing as an individual extrema ratio, current whistleblowing legislation fails to do justice to this measure as an answerability practice, an integrated component of an encompassing organizational and institutional action to fight corruption as an insidious form of organizational wrongdoing. With reference to the impact of whistleblowing on curbing corruption and its relationship with promoting good governance, classic literature on corruption identifies two pathways to good governance: (1) the modernization of society, whereby countries transition towards an enhanced – more universalistic – societal culture ‘with an incremental change of institutions until open access, free competition, and meritocracy become dominant’ (Mungiu-Pippidi 2017b); and (2) the modernization of the state, in which countries that, in Max Weber’s terms, have not yet achieved the full rationalization of the state (see, for instance, Weber 1968; Kalberg 1980) seek to combat corrupt acts once they have already occurred, instead of preventing their occurrence (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017, p. 24; see also Mungiu-Pippidi 2017b). The latter is the paradigm followed when introducing laws for the protection of whistleblowers, among other anti-corruption measures. While many countries have attempted this pathway, the literature reports very few success cases. The reason can be found in the condition that the modernization of the state generally requires the presence of an enlightened engine of transformation, an individual truthfully committed to reforming the country and addressing the root flaws of the state. When corruption is spread at all societal levels including the government, this path is deemed undesirable (Rose-Ackerman 1997b). In fact, unless a balance is found between reducing opportunities for corruption by increasing open access, while increasing societal constraints to corrupt behaviour, top-down ­anti-corruption measures alone are found not to work (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018).

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While there are many studies investigating the relationship between anti-­ corruption measures and the promotion of good governance (see, for instance, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b, 2018; Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017), not much has been written on the relationship between whistleblower protection laws and good governance or control of corruption. In contrast to other anti-corruption measures, whistleblower protection laws do not target whistleblowing as a direct tool to counter corruption. Whistleblowing is standardly viewed as a general reporting instrument, whose relationship with anti-corruption can be circumstantial but indirect: whistleblowing laws are introduced in principle with the aim of encouraging and protecting reporting persons, thus incentivizing organizational reactions against corruption. However, since disclosures are neither made obligatory or routinary, but retain their ultimately voluntary nature, the effectiveness of such legislation to foster anti-corruption is erratic and not at all straightforward. In light of this general approach, along with the above-mentioned difficulties in determining what makes whistleblowing effective, it becomes clear why the study of the impact of whistleblowing in curbing corruption and promoting good governance has often been inconsistent in the past. Among the handful of attempts to measure the impact of whistleblowing legislation on corruption and the quality of governance, Goel and Nelson (2013) constructed an index of Internet-based awareness about whistleblower laws in order to measure ‘the impact of awareness about whistleblower laws on the level of observed corrupt activity’ (p. 16). Their study suggested that, across US states, ‘greater internet awareness about whistleblower laws results in more corruption coming to light and being successfully prosecuted’ (p. 16) and that the latter causal mechanism is more effective at exposing corruption than the quantity and quality of whistleblower laws themselves. Mungiu-Pippidi (2017b) undertook a pairwise t-test to compare levels of Control of Corruption7 before and after the introduction of a specific law for the protection of whistleblowers and did not find any statistically significant effect at the EU-28 level. Vinciguerra (2018) researched whether the presence of a specific law for the protection of whistleblowers and its inherent strength compared to inter­national best practice can have an impact on a country’s Control of Corruption. The analysis found that the introduction of a specific whistleblower law alone does not significantly impact on a country’s Control of Corruption. Nevertheless, this study evidenced that there is a slightly upward relationship between the Whistleblower Index and Control of Corruption, such that higher levels on the Whistleblower Index – in other words, a better law – are associated with higher levels of Control of Corruption and vice versa (Vinciguerra 2018). According to Mungiu-Pippidi (2017b), the success of whistleblowing legislation relies to a large extent on collective action. It seems therefore fundamental to strengthen the constraining factors that may undercut corruption, such as promoting freedom of the press, e-citizenship (Internet users, broadband subscriptions and Facebook users) and judicial independence (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov

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2016). Vinciguerra’s (2018) analysis further confirms the latter hypothesis as it suggests that, for the number of whistleblowing scandals uncovered to increase, both Control of Corruption and Freedom of the Press (Freedom House8) ought to be high in principle and that ‘ignoring the potential impact of captive media and lack of ethical universalism on the success of whistleblower protection legislation leads to considerable ineffectiveness and no progress’ (p. 38). These empirical findings are further reinforced by looking at them through the lenses of our theoretical framework. The piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, approach to address whistleblowing as an anti-corruption tool premised in the Extrema Ratio View can account for the erratic results of current top-down and state-centred regulative initiatives.9 To sustain the current shift to an overall approach to whistleblowing premised in the Deontic View has, instead, the potential of strengthening the impact of whistleblowing on curbing corruption and promoting good governance. This effect can be envisaged as a consequence of developing whistleblowing regulation in the broader context of ordinary practices of organizational answerability, rather than as a remedial response to individual extraordinary actions in emergency circumstances. In this sense, whistleblowing can rightfully be seen as a critical component of a public ethics of office accountability, which spells out the duties binding on organizations and organizational members in the exercise of their functions (Ceva and Ferretti 2019).

12.4 Conclusions In the chapter, we have offered a broad theory- and policy-driven review of whistleblowing regulation within the framework of anti-corruption initiatives, trying to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary scholarly debate. We have shown how whistleblowing could be an effective tool to enhance the functioning of organizations, but we have also suggested that current whistleblowing policies and protection laws seem quite ineffective, especially when it comes to curbing corruption. For this reason, further analysis needs to be carried out, especially on the relationship between the enhancement of whistleblowing regulation and the promotion of good governance and the fight against corruption. As Vinciguerra (2018) and Mungiu-Pippidi (2017b) have shown, in the European geopolitical context, the introduction of a specific legislation on whistleblowing has not, by itself, impacted on a country’s Control of Corruption in a significant way. This result could be explained by a number of contingent factors, stemming from the quality of the whistleblower protection law introduced compared to inter­ national best practice and its implementation, to most importantly the pre-existing state of freedom of the press, corruption and quality of governance in the country under analysis (Vinciguerra 2018). These empirical findings find justification in that, if no or little institutional infrastructure is in place to support the whistleblower and protect him/her from potential repercussions, whistleblowing remains

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a voluntary act of heroism rather than an essential component of a systemic organizational effort against corruption (Brown 2017). We have thus pinpointed a deeper problem with much of the current whistleblower protection legislation and policies, which limit its effectiveness in the fight against corruption. In view of our theoretical framework, we can appreciate how this problem is deep-rooted in the very rationale of many existing policies and legislation, which appeal to whistleblowing as an individual tool of last resort, rather than as a systemic organizational practice. The current policy and legislative approach to the regulation of whistleblowing risks sanctioning the idea that phenomena like corruption cannot be eradicated from society through systemic institutional and social action, but that these can at most be resisted with the exceptional intervention of a hero who sacrifices everything for the sake of higher moral ideals (Brown 2017). But no legislation or concrete policy could possibly fit, or be tailored to, the profile of a hero. For legislation to be effective, it needs to be grounded in a collective effort (Mungiu-Pippidi 2017b), where whistleblowing is seen as one of the best practices that any legitimate organization should implement against general wrongdoing and corruption. This is the sense in which, following the lead of Ceva and Bocchiola (2018), we need further research to develop whistleblowing regulation within the framework of a broader public ethics of office. This paradigm shift in the understanding of whistleblowing and its role can provide the basis for developing laws and policies whose primary aim is not limited to the (nevertheless important) piecemeal protection of single whistleblowers – who, in fact, are often isolated at work or in society despite such formal protection and sources of legal support. Rather, a transformation of the organizational culture seems in order. Further research is therefore necessary to provide the theoretical and empirical foundations to sustain a novel understanding of whistleblowing as an answerability practice: to do so would make whistleblowing one of the ordinary organizational procedures by which the members of an organization can call on each other to answer for the uses they make of their role-based powers. From this perspective, whistleblowing legislation becomes a matter of institutional design and policy-setting integral to the actions that any legitimate organization should undertake to stand clear of such forms of organizational wrongdoing as corruption, or respond to them effectively and appropriately when they nevertheless occur. NOTES 1 Cf. Art. 33 of the Convention against Corruption of the United Nations and principle No. 10 of the United Nations Global Compact; Art. 5 lit. c of ILO-Convention No. 158: Convention concerning termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, of 22.6.1982; OECD, Recommendation of the Council for further combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions, of 26.11.2009 as at 18.2.2010 (Annex II-A Abs. 11 lit. ii); G-20 Agenda for Action on combating corruption, promoting market integrity, and supporting a clean business environment, of 12.11.2010 (Annex III No. 7). 2 Among them, there is the well-known case of Edward Snowden, who leaked between 9,000 and 10,000 classified documents from the National Security Agency’s surveillance programme. Recent scandals include the Panama Papers, LuxLeaks and Cambridge Analytica. 3 Articles 32 and 33 of the UN Convention against Corruption endorse the protection of whistleblowers, seen as

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A LEGISLATIVE, ETHICAL AND POLICY ASSESSMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING 171 ‘reporting persons’ or ‘witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention’. 4 For the full list of signatories, see https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/174/ signatures. 5 For more information about this procedure, see European Commission, COM(2018) 218 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, Brussels, 23.04.2018. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=eca:ECA_OPI_2018_4. 6 Court of Auditors Opinion (2018), ECA OPI 2018-4. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2018​ _106#2018-09-26_OPI_byECA. 7 This indicator, developed by the World Bank Group as one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, captures public perceptions of the extent to which power is exercised for undue private gain (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 8 For reports on freedom, the media, corruption, the Internet and many other issues, see https://freedomhouse.org/. 9 For a critical view on the failure of standard whistleblowing protection policies based on an anti-retaliation approach, see Dworkin and Brown (2013).

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Tran, A. (2008). Can procurement auctions reduce corruption? Evidence from the internal records of a bribe-paying firm (Working Paper). Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication​ /228549999_​Can_​Procurement_​Auctions_​Reduce_​Corruption_​Evidence_​from_​the_​Internal_​Rec​or​ d​s​_​of_​a_​Bribe-Paying_​Firm Transparency International (2006). Handbook for Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement. Berlin: Transparency International. Transparency International (2013). International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation: Best Practices for Laws to Protect Whistleblowers and Support Whistleblowing in the Public Interest. Berlin: Transparency International. Transparency International (2015). Speak Up Report 2015: Empowering Citizens Against Corruption. Berlin: Transparency International. Transparency International Ireland (2017). Speak Up Report 2017. Dublin: Transparency International. Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399–457. Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of crossnational empirical research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211–44. Tripp, A. M. (2001). The politics of autonomy and cooptation in Africa: The case of the Ugandan women’s movement. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(1), 101–28. Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare cost of tariffs, monopoly, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224–32. Tumber, H., & Waisbord, S. R. (2004a). Political scandals and media across democracies, volume I. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47(8), 1031–9. Tumber, H., & Waisbord, S. R. (2004b). Political scandals and media across democracies, volume II. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47(9), 1143–52. UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] (2008). A users’ guide to measuring corruption. Oslo: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre. UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] (2012). Seeing beyond the state: Grassroots women’s perspectives on corruption and anti-corruption. Retrieved from https://www.unwomen.org/en/ docs/2012/10/grassroots-womens-perspectives-on-corruption UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees], UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund], & Women’s Refugee Commission (2016). Initial assessment report: Protection risks for women and girls in the European refugee and migrant crisis. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/569f8f419.pdf United Nations (2015). The World’s Women 2015: Trends and Statistics. New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime], UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], & UNODC-INEGI Center of Excellence in Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice (2018). Manual on corruption surveys. Vienna: UNODC. Urbinati, N. (2013). The populist phenomenon. Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.) Raisons politiques, 51(3), 137–54. Urinboyev, R., & Svensson, M. (2017). Corruption, social norms and everyday life in Uzbekistan. In I. Kubbe & A. Engelbert (Eds), Corruption and Norms (pp. 187–210). Cham, CH: Springer International. US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2018). 2018 Report to Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office. Uslaner, E. M. (2017). The Historical Roots of Corruption. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vaidya, S. (2005). Corruption in the media’s gaze. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), 667–87. Valle-Cruz, D., Sandoval-Almazan, R., & Gil-Garcia, J. R. (2016). Citizens’ perceptions of the impact of information technology use on transparency, efficiency and corruption in local governments. Information Polity, 21(3), 321–34. van Biezen, I., & Kopecký, P. (2007). The state and the parties: Public funding, public regulation and rent-seeking in contemporary democracies. Party Politics, 13(2), 235–54.

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Index Aarvik, P. 157 Aassve et al. 118 Abbink et al. 50 abuse 14, 19, 21, 28, 29, 34, 75, 125 of authority 13, 16 Abu-Shanab et al. 149 ACAs (anti-corruption agencies) 137, 141 access orders 35, 36 accountability 39–40, 82, 124, 128, 164 Acemoglu, D. 7, 35, 138, 139 Acemoglu et al. 61 Adam, I. 146 Ades, A. 134 administrative burden 10 advertising funding 112 Afghanistan 38, 67 Africa 30, 46, 55, 56, 67, 70, 71 and female political representation 80 South 33, 51, 67, 152 African National Congress 33 Afrobarometer 56, 70, 71, 148 agency, women’s 87 agency capture 24 agents 136, 137, 138–9, 159–60 Agerberg, M. 124 aggregate scores 8–9 Ahn, M.-S. 150 Ahrend, R. 109 Alapuro, R. 95 Alatas et al. 78 Albania 151 Alexander, A. C. 80 Alexanyan et al. 156 Alhassan-Alolo, N. 78 Allern, S. 90 Althingi 95 American constitution 31 AmericasBarometer 55 amoral familism 30, 42 Andersen, T. B. 149 Andersen et al. 148 Andersson, S. 104 Andreski, S. 33 Ang, Y. Y. 154–5

anger 128 anti-corruption legislation 141–3, 144, 163, 166–7, 168 anti-corruption reforms 51 anti-trust laws 145 Apaza, C. R. 155, 166 Ardanaz, M. 68 Argentina 112 Asia 30, 33, 36 Asiimwe et al. 155 Astroturf lobbying 31 audits 21 Australia 63, 102 authority, abuse of 13, 16 Auyero, J. 42 Azerbaijan 65 bad governance 28 bad government 13 Baez-Camargo et al. 46 Bågenholm, A. 80 Bailard, C. S. 148 Baker, C. N. 86 Baland, J.-M. 60, 63 ballot design 62 ballot secrecy 62–4 ballot stuffing 65 Baltic states 32 Banerjee, R. 49–50 Banerjee et al. 50 Banfield, E. C. 30, 42 Bangladesh 150 Barr, A. 49 battered women 88 Baucus, M. S. 166 Bauhr et al. 76, 81 Becker, G. S. 4, 136 bell-ringing 159 Belt and Road Initiative 39 Benin 67 Berti, C. 115, 115–16 Bertot, J. C. 147, 153 Betz, H.-G. 119 Bhattacharyya, S. 110

209

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Bicchieri, C. 43 bidding 23–4, 30, 151 big bang approach 93–4 Bjarnegård, E. 80, 81 blogs 156 Bocast, B. 155 Bocchiola, M. 159, 160, 162, 170 Boehm, F. 83 Bonson et al. 153–4 Boone, C. 69 Bratton, M. 71, 72 Bratu, R. 113, 115 Brazil 15, 21, 153, 156 Breit, E. 114 Breuer, A. 156 Brexit leave campaign 122 Brezis, E. S. 32 Bribecaster 155 bribery 49–50, 51, 135 bribes 17, 21, 52, 101–2, 105, 134 from Ugandan university students 155 and women 83 Britain 47, 49, 64, 113, 115, 122 see also UK (United Kingdom) brokers 30, 55, 58–61, 63–4, 64, 66–7, 73 leverage social preferences 72 mayor’s men 69 Brown, A. J. 165, 166 Brunetti, A. 109 Buchanan, J. M. 3 budget transparency 12 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 139 Buenos Aires 42 Bulgaria 32, 60, 67 Buscaglia, E. 138 business surveys 18 Butterfield, J. 151 Callen, M. 67 Camaj, L. 110 Cambridge Analytica 39 campaigning 123–4 Campante, F. R. 124 Caneppele et al. 24 Canovan, M. 119 capital accumulation 33 Cariolle, J. 32 Center for Strategic and International Studies 39 Central Europe 28, 39 Ceva, E. 159, 160, 162, 164, 170 Chang, Y. 155, 166

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Charap, J. 33 Charoensukmongkol, P. 148, 157 Charron, N. 135 Chen, M. 116 Chêne, M. 146 Chile 60, 63, 151 China 39, 155 Chirillo, G. 78 Choi, J.-W. 149–50 Chowdhury, S. K. 109 Christensen, J. 39 Cingolani, L. 137 citizen–government relations 153–4 Civic Law Convention on Corruption 163 civil society 103, 114, 123, 126, 147, 154 clans 33–4, 42 Clean Hands campaign 22 clientelism 29, 30, 42, 55, 56–68, 69, 73 in Iceland 101 and network 79 ‘a party machine’ 123 and women 80, 81 coercion 58, 63, 74, 87 Collier, P. 69 Colombia 61, 67 communication, populist 127–8 see also media Communist regimes 28 competition 21, 25, 58, 110, 135, 144, 145 conflict of interest 15, 21 connections, use of 15, 17 contracting body risk indicators 22 Control of Corruption (CoC) 8, 9–10, 137, 141, 142, 149 and whistleblowing 168, 169 Cooley, A. 33 Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 32 Coppier, R. 152 core supporters 68–9, 70 Corneo, G. 111–12 Coronel, S. 108 corporate elites 32–3 corrupt elite 118, 122, 123 corruption games 49, 51 corruption watchdogs 26 Costa Rica 63 Council of Europe 163 Cox, G. W. 63 CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) 12, 49, 97, 132, 137, 147–8, 149 goal 8 India 50

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INDEX 211 and Nordic countries 90 and parking violations 47, 48 Crime, Law and Social Change (Mungiu-Pippidi) 5 Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 39 criminal organizations 61 crony capitalism 15, 17 cronyism 32, 33 Crouch, C. 32 crowdsourcing 154–5 cultural elite 122 culturalist school 43 culture 43 Curini, L. 123, 124 Czech Republic 32 Dadašov, R. 10, 137 Dahlström, C. 102 danger zones 104, 105 D’Arcy, M. 94 Dasgupta, R. 37 de Blic, D. 114 Debski et al. 79 de Kadt, D. 67 de la Torre, C. 125, 126 delegative democracy 124 Della Porta, D. 32 democracy 124, 126, 127 democratization 65 Denmark 36, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 101 and favouritism 100 and mistrust 99 and politicization 102, 103 Deontic View 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 169 deregulated finance 37, 39 descriptive norms 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 52 detection 15, 16, 22, 136, 163 deterrence 136, 137, 140 Dickinson, L. T. 86 Digital Access Index 148 digitalization 16, 146–57 Dinan, W. 32 diplomats 47–8 DiRienzo et al. 147–8 distributed ledger technology 157 Di Tella, R. 112, 134 Djankov et al. 133–4 Doing Business Index 151 Dollar et al. 75, 76, 77 Dong et al. 48 Donno, D. 65 Doroftei, I. M. 22

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downward transparency 146, 152–4 Duterte, Rodrigo 123, 124 Dworkin, T. M. 166 dyadic relationships 30 early modern corruption 92 East Africa 46 Eastern Europe 28, 32, 39, 60, 69 Easton, D. 33 e-citizenship 12, 168 economic conditions 67–8 economic elite 39, 120, 122 economic globalization 143, 144 economic inequality 112 economic intimidation 67–8 economic privilege 15, 16–17 education, definition of corruption in 16 effectiveness 166, 170 Eggers et al. 82 e-government 117, 146, 147, 149–52 E-Government Readiness Survey 150 Eisenstadt, S. N. 42 Ekstrom et al. 128 Elbahnasawy, N. G. 150 elections 55, 56, 58–74 electoral accountability 82 electoral behaviour 128 electoral campaigns 123–4 electoral systems, and irregularities 66 elite cartels 33 elite interviews 102–3 elites 32–3, 37, 39, 73, 120 corrupt 118, 122, 123 Ellis et al. 83 embezzlement 33, 51, 91 emergency rhetoric 127 emotionalization 127 emotions 73, 127, 128 employees of the state 64 employers 67–8 enforcement-based indicators 22 Enikolopov et al. 156 Entman, R. M. 114 entrepreneurial populists 33 Eom, T. H. 147, 149 E-Participation Index 149 episodic framing 115 e-procurement 151–2 equilibrium 3, 4, 24, 136, 139, 140, 144 Erlingsson, G. O. 101 Esarey, J. 77, 78, 80 Esmark, A. 112

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ethical universalism 15, 17, 35, 36 Ethiopia 150, 151 ethnographic approaches 45–7 EU (European Union) 32, 115, 119 Eurobarometer 2017 97, 101 Europe, southern 30 European Commission 21, 163–4 European Social Survey (ESS) 98–9 European Values Study 48 exclusionary populism 121 experiences of corruption 101–2 expert surveys 102–3 extractive institutions 35, 138 Extrema Ratio View 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169 Facebook 39, 154 fairer-sex hypothesis 78 fairness 128 Falguera et al. 29 familism (amoral) 30, 42 Farage, Nigel 122 Färdigh, M. 110 Farooq, B. 156 favouritism 15, 20, 23, 35, 98, 101, 135 in France 64 political 19 relatives 33 in Sweden 99–100 Fazekas, M. 32, 134, 137, 146 Fazekas et al. 151 female political representation 76–81 Ferreira, F. H. G. 124 Ferreira et al. 50 Ferretti, M. P. 160 Ficha Limpa 156 Fieschi, C. 33, 128 Finan, F. 58, 72 financial deregulation 37, 39 financial elite 37 financialization 37 Findley et al. 39 Finland 90, 91, 94–5, 97, 102, 108 and favouritism 100 and mistrust 99 firms, as political brokers 60 Fisman, R. 4, 47 Flash Business Eurobarometer 18 flexian 33 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 15 formal institutions 4, 5 Forst, G. 164

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framing 49, 115, 116 France 60, 64, 109, 113, 115 Franceschelli, I. 112 fraud 63, 101 freedom of the press 12, 109–11, 169 Freille et al. 109 friends, favouring 33 Frisk Jensen, M. 94 funding, party 29 gains 57 see also positive inducements gangster politicians 33 Garcia-Murillo, M. 148, 150 Garcia-Sanchez et al. 61, 67 GDP 134, 141 Gedde-Dahl et al. 91 gender 75–89 Georgia 32 Gerli et al. 109 Germany 63, 64, 102 Gerring, J. 134 Ghana 78 gift-giving 42, 115 Giglioli, P. P. 114 Girling, J. 90 Gitlin, T. 115 Glaisyer, T. 153 Global Anticorruption Blog 123 global capital 37 Global Competitiveness Report 12, 141 Global Corruption Barometer 12, 101 Global Corruption Report 2003 108 global elite 39 global financial deregulation 37 Global Integrity 125 globalization 28, 37, 39, 143, 144, 145 globalized individuals 33 Global Witness 125 Goel, R. K. 168 Goel et al. 148 Goetz, A.-M. 78, 85–6 Gokcekus, O. 134 Golden, M. A. 4–5, 14, 22 Goldsmith, A. A. 134 good governance 2, 28, 34–7, 38, 166, 167–8, 169 good government 2, 13 governance 34–7, 166, 167–8, 169 governance orders 35–7, 38 governance regimes 140 government

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INDEX 213 local 104, 105 and social media 153–4 government effectiveness 48 government intervention/regulation 132, 133–6, 138, 144 grand corruption 76, 81 Graycar, A. 91 Greece 12 Greene, K. F. 72 grey corruption 104, 105 Grimes, J. M. 147 Grimes, M. 81 Grindle, M. S. 34 ‘in-group’ obligations 45 The Guardian 165 guilt 52 Gupta, A. 114 Gupta family 33 Gurin, J. 152 Gutierrez-Romero, R. 71 Hafner-Burton et al. 65 Haider, Jörg 123 Hajdu et al. 115 Hamidi, C. 114 Handbook of Political Corruption (Heywood) 107 harassment 64, 86–7 Harassment Bribery Game 49 Harm, C. 33 Hartmann, T. 125 Hawkins, K. A. 120 Hazarika, G. 78 health sector 13–14 Hellström, J. 155 ‘helping hand’ approach 135 Heywood, P. M. 33, 107, 128, 144 Hicken, A. 56–7 Higgins, M. 120, 126 Hinerman, S. 114 Hodler, R. 110 Hoffmann, L. K. 51 Hofstede, G. 79 Holland, A. 60 Home Rule, Iceland 95 ‘homosocial’ capital 79 Hong Kong 137 horizontal accountability 124 horizontal ties 48 Hungary 32, 60, 113, 122 Huntington, S. 27 Huther, J. 136 hybrid brokers 60

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Iceland 90, 95, 99, 101, 102–3 ICT (information and communication technology) 146, 147–57 immigrants 122 impartiality 35, 98–9 import licences 133 imports 134 inclusionary populism 121 inclusive institutions 35, 138 income 10, 29, 33, 70, 71, 73, 83 incumbency 66–7 Index for Public Integrity (IPI) 10–13, 24 India 47, 49–50, 78, 111, 114, 150–1, 154, 156 Indonesia 78, 114 inducements 68–9, 70 inequality 112, 145 informal institutions 4, 5 infrastructure, public 22 infringements 15 injunctive norms 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 Innes, A. 37 innovation 55 institutional equilibrium 4 institutional factors 78–80 institutional trust 118, 128 institutions 4, 7, 62, 66–7, 127, 139, 140–4 inclusive and extractive 35, 138 Inter-American Development Bank 155 International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) 84 International Budget Partnership 12 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 39, 108 internationalization 37 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 97, 99 international trade 135 Internet 117, 147, 148, 149, 154, 156 interpersonal relations 42 intimidation 60, 61, 64, 67–8 investigative journalism 108, 109 Iqbal, M. S. 150 Israel 126 Italy 111, 113, 114, 115–16, 118 Iyengar, S. 115 Jackson, D. 46 Jaeger, P. T. 147, 153 Jain, A. K. 96 jeitinho 50 Jha, C. K. 154 Johnson, P. A. 153

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Johnston, M. 8, 17, 33, 139–40 journalism 108, 109 judicial independence 12, 141, 142, 144, 145 Kalenborn, C. 110 Kalmar Union 93 Kaltwasser, C. R. 120 Kapoor, M. 48 Kaufmann, D. 8, 9, 31 Kaufmann et al. 8, 24, 48 Kazakhstan 151 Kazin, M. 120–1 Kazoka, I. 113, 115 Kenny, M. 81 Kenya 61, 69, 71, 72 Kettl, D. F. 37 Kim, C.-K. 149 Kim et al. 150 ‘kin communities’ 45, 46 kinship 42 kleptocracies 33 Klinkhammer, J. 47 Klitgaard, R. 136, 147 Knack, S. 8 Knorich, J. 134 Kobis et al. 50, 51 Koetzle, W. 135 KOF Globalization Index 141 koha 115 Korea 151 Kosovo 46 Kossow, N. 123, 154 Koter, D. 60, 67 Kousser, M. 63 Kraay, A. 9 Kramer, E. 114 Krastev, I. 119 The Kremlin Playbook 39 Kriesi, H. 127 Kristinsson, G. H. 95 Krueger, A. O. 3, 133, 135 Kugler et al. 138 Kukutschka, R. M. B. 154 Kuo, D. 63 KwaZulu-Natal 51 labour scarcity 68 lafo 115 Lam, O. 112 ‘lapdog’ model 108 Larreguy, H. A. 61, 67 Lascoumes, P. 109, 114

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Latin America 28, 30, 55, 60, 71, 72, 153 and populism 119, 120, 121 Latvia 113 Lava Jato 28 Lawson, C. 72 leaders 60, 66–7 Leander, A. 38 Lee, J. 154 left-wing parties 120 legal corruption 31 legislation anti-corruption 141–3, 144, 163, 166–7, 168 electoral 64 legitimate organizations 160 Lehoucq, F. 63 Lemieux, C. 114 Lessmann, C. 110 Levitsky, S. 123 Levy, B. 34 liberalization, media 111 Liberia 47 limited access orders 35, 36 Lindberg, S. 65, 84, 86 Lindblom, C. 31, 32 Linde, J. 101 Lindstedt, C. 110 Linz, J. J. 28 Lio et al. 148 lobbying 30–1, 124 local elites 73 local government 104, 105 local institutions 66–7 local leaders 60, 66–7 local officials 69 Long, J. 67 López-Iturriaga, F. J. 157 losses 57 low-corrupt countries 90–106 low-income voters 71 Lull, J. 114 LuxLeaks 28, 37 machine learning 157 macro level studies 47–8 Mafia 24 Mafia Raj 33 Magro, M. J. 153 Mahdavi, P. 4–5 majoritarian electoral rules 66 Makowski, G. 149 Malaysia 39 malfeasance 64–5

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INDEX 215 Mancini, P. 112, 113 Mancini et al. 112–13, 115 mani pulite 27, 28–9 Marchetti, D. 108 Mares, I. 63, 67, 68 the market 33, 132–6, 140, 145 Matheus et al. 153 Mattoni, A. 153 mayors 66, 69 mayor’s men 69 measurement 7–26 media 12, 107–17, 122, 126, 148, 149, 154 mediated populism 127–8 Medicare 37 Mehedi, H. M. 150 merit 21 meritocratization 93 Merkle et al. 83, 85 metaphors 115–16 Mexico 61, 72, 81, 111, 154 Michelutti et al. 33 micro level studies 48–51 migration 37, 84–5, 87 Miguel, E. 47 militias 61 Miller, D. 32 Mincigrucci, M. 127 mistrust 98–9, 100 Mittal, M. 155 mixed-methods research 52 moguls, official 33–4 Molina, I. 63 money and politics 29–30 monitoring 65, 73, 74 Moqbel, M. 148, 157 Morocco 66 motivation 161 motivation fee 50 Mudde, C. 120 Müller, J.-W. 123 multinational corporations 37 Mungiu, A. 145 Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 4, 9, 10, 125, 132, 137, 139 on agency capture 24 on ethical universalism and particularism 35, 36 on governance regimes 140 on media capture 111 on social media and ICT 147 on whistleblowing 168, 169 Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 35 Munson, S. 153

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Muntean, A. 67 Murillo, M. J. 153 mutual aid 45 ‘muzzled watchdog’ model 108 Najib Razak 39 Nam, T. 150 Namibia 148 Napoleonic states 102 nation states 37, 40 Naurin, D. 110 Navalny, Alexey 156 negative emotions 127 negative inducements 57, 59, 63, 67, 69, 70, 71 negative strategies 56, 57–8 negativism 127 Nelson, M. A. 168 Neo-Weberian State 96 Nepal 152 nepotism 15, 17, 21, 32, 33, 45 Netanyahu, Benjamin 123, 126 networks 79 Neupane et al. 151 New Public Governance 96 news reporting websites 155–6 New York 47–8, 63 New Zealand 115–16 Nigeria 46, 47, 51, 61, 69, 151 and political violence 71, 72 Niskanen, W. A. 139 Nistotskaya, M. 81, 94 non-coercive media capture 112 non-governmental organizations 26, 104, 146 Nordic countries 90–106, 112 norms 41, 42, 43–51, 83, 85–8 Norris, P. 76 North, Douglass 3, 4 North et al. 7, 35, 139, 140 Norway 90, 91, 94, 95, 101, 102, 114 and favouritism 100 and mistrust 99 Noveck et al. 155 NPM (New Public Management) 96, 103–4, 105 Nurunnabi, A. A. 150 Nye, Joseph 13 obliquity 35 Occam’s razor 86 Ocheje, P. D. 47 Odebrecht scandal 21, 37 O’Donnell, G. 124 OECD 151, 163

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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 137 oligarchs 33–4, 124 Olken, B. A. 14 Online Service Index 149 OPEN 150–1 open access orders 35, 36, 38 Open Budget Survey 12 open data 152–3 Orbán, Viktor 122, 123 Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 108 organizational brokers 60 organizational wrongdoing 160, 162, 164–5 organizations, legitimate 160 overpricing 24 Paldam, M. 134 Palmer-Rubin, B. 60 Panama Papers 28, 37, 75 Pani, N. 47 ‘panic laws’ 109 Papakostas, A. 90 Paradise Papers 28, 37 Paraguay 72 paramilitaries 61 parking violations 47–8 parliament 76–81 particularism 17, 22, 35, 36, 45, 140 partisan brokers 58, 60 partisan preferences 68–70 party financing 29 party patronage 102–3 Pastor Sanz, I. 157 Patel, R. N. 51 Pathak et al. 150 patriarchy 86, 87 patriotism 127 patronage 33, 45, 46, 60, 64, 81 networks 79 party 102–3 patron–client relations 30, 42, 46 Pellicer, M. 66 perceptions 97–101, 141 Persson et al. 5 Peru 150 Peruzzotti, E. 126 Peters, B. 108 Petrova, T. 67, 112 PETS (Public Expenditure Tracking Survey) 14, 24

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petty corruption 76, 81 Philippines 124, 155 Picci, L. 14, 22 Piga, G. 152 Pizzorno, A. 32 Poland 32 political appointments 102–3 political brokers 60 political cleaners 85–6 political clientelism 59 political connections 19, 20 political corruption 27–40 political elite 39, 120 political favouritism 19 political ideology 121 political participation, and women 76–81 political parties 29–30, 95 political power 145 political strategy 121 political style 121 political trust 124 political violence 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 76 politicians 133–4 politicization 102–3, 112–13 politics and money 29–30 and populism 119 Politics and Markets (Lindblom) 31 Pollack, E. 90 populism 118–30 positive inducements 57, 58, 59, 63, 67, 69, 70, 71 positive strategies 56, 57–8 post-contract negotiations 31 poverty 70–1, 83 power abuse of 16 imbalances 75–6, 79, 80, 85–6, 87 market 145 and populists 128 power relations 83, 88 Prasad, A. 151 press freedom 12, 109–11, 148, 154 pression gouvernamentale 60 PREVENT 19 primacy of politics 3 principal–agent approach 5, 138–9, 140, 151, 153, 155 Principe 72 private–public trespass 16 private sector 17 procurement 22, 23, 24, 30, 31, 104, 151–2 procurement proxies 16

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INDEX 217 profit-seeking, definition 3 programmatic competition 58 pro-poor/pro-rich lobbying 124 prosecution 136 pro-social norms 45–6 protectionist policies 135 proxies 22–4, 30 PR systems 66 Prussia 68 psychological factors 71–3 Public Accountability Mechanisms 141 Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI) 15 public authority 13, 98 public choice school 3 public corruption, definition 13 public employment 19–20, 21 public infrastructure 22 Public Interest Theory 135–6 public officials 46, 134 public opinion surveys 18 public participation 109 public procurement 22, 23, 30, 31, 104 public sector 17 public service consumer surveys 18 public spending 19 Puddington, A. 126 punishment 64, 65, 73 pure people 122, 123 qualitative studies 52, 117 quantitative studies 47–51, 52, 116–17, 149–50 quid pro quo harassment 86–7 rational choice 42 Ravi, S. 48 reciprocity 30, 42, 72 red flags 22 regulatory capture 133–4 Reich, R. B. 145 relatives, favouring 33 rents 133 rent-seeking 3, 29, 30, 78, 133, 135, 145 reporting 159 representative politics 119 see also elections representative samples 18 repression 73 Resurreccion, E. I. 155 revolving door 32 rhetoric, emergency 127 right-wing parties 120

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risk 16, 22, 23, 25, 31, 68 risk aversion 77, 80 Robinson, J. A. 7, 35, 60, 63, 69, 138, 139 Rodrigues, U. M. 156 Rodrik, D. 7 Rodrik et al. 7 Romania 32, 60, 113 Romanian National Integrity Agency 19 Roniger, L. 42 Rooduijn, M. 120 Rose-Ackerman, S. 134 Rosenbaum et al. 46 Rosenzweig, S. C. 72 Rotchanakitumnuai, S. 152 Rothstein, B. 36, 93, 98, 125, 139 Roylance, T. 126 Rubin, S. 155 rule of law 9, 15, 126, 135, 149 Nordic countries 90, 92, 94, 95, 99 Russia 32, 39, 94, 119, 156 Ryvkin et al. 154 Salmon, T. C. 49 Sandholtz, W. 135 San Juan, R. R. 155 Sao Tome 72 Sarangi, S. 154 scandals 108, 114 Scandinavia 90–106 Scharma, P. 147 Schechter, L. 58, 72 Schiffrin, A. 111 Schroth, P. W. 147 Schwindt-Bayer, L. 77, 80 Scott, J. C. 42 secret ballot 62–4, 72 self-help 45 Senegal 67 Seo, J.-W. 150 Serra, D. 49 sextortion 84–5, 86, 87, 88 sexual corruption 84, 86 sexual violence 84, 87, 88 Shah, A. 136 shame 52, 72 Sharman, J. C. 33, 39 Shefter, M. 95 Sheryazdanova, G. 151 Shim, D. C. 147, 149 Shivarajan, S. 151 Shleifer, A. 133, 135 Sieber, R. E. 153

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Siemens 47 Sierra, E. 83 Simpser, A. 65 Singapore 137 Singer et al. 151 single bidding 23–4 Single Market Scorecard 21 Sjoberg, F. M. 65 Slovakia 113 Snowden, Edward 165 social capital 79, 149 Social Democratic Party (Germany) 63 social loss 14 social media 117, 128, 147, 153–4, 156, 157 social networks 42 social norms 41, 42, 43–51 social orders 42 socioeconomic status 70–1 soft censorship 112 Song, C. 154 Sorak, N. 148 South Africa 33, 51, 67, 152 southern Europe 30 South/South East Asia 30, 33 Spain 157 spying 159 Stanziano, A. 127 Stapenhurst, R. 109 Starke et al. 149 state capacity 38 state capture 30, 31–2 state employees 59–60, 64, 67 Stensöta, H. 81, 84, 86 Stensöta et al. 79 Stepan, A. C. 28 Stiglitz, J. E. 145 Stockemer, D. 80 Stokes, S. C. 58 Stokes et al. 61, 68, 69 Sturges, P. 147 Subramanian, A. 7 sub-Saharan Africa 33 Sundell, A. 93–4 Sundstrom, A. 80–1 Sung, H.-E. 78 Suphachalasai, S. 110 supplier risk indicators 22 Supreme Court (US) 31 surveys 17–18, 24 survival sex 87 Svensson, M. 45 Swamy et al. 75, 76, 77

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Sweden 36, 90, 91, 93, 94, 104, 115 and Eurobarometer 2017 97 and mistrust 98–9, 100 and politicization 102, 103 sweetener 50 swing voters 64, 68, 70 Switzerland 102 Taggart, P. 119 Taiwan 111 Tangentopoli 27 taxation 10, 94, 134 evasion 75 exemptions 26 Teachout, Z. 31 tea money 50 technology 37, 62, 117, 146, 147–57 tendering 30 tendering risk indicators 22 Tenders Electronic Daily 21 Teorell, J. 35, 63, 98, 125, 139 Thacker, C. 134 Thailand 111, 124, 152 thematic framing 115 Thompson, M. R. 114, 123, 124 threats 69, 74 Thusing, G. 164 Tiffen, R. 108 Torvik, R. 69 Tóth, I. J. 32 Towns, A. 84, 86 trade 10, 12, 37, 134, 135, 141, 144 Tran, A. 152 transactional sex 87 transparency 21, 24, 25, 128, 137, 146, 152–5 and ICT 147 and procurement 151 Transparency International 51, 90, 108, 125, 147–8 Treisman, D. 9, 134 Trump, Donald 33, 123 trust 46, 98–9, 118, 124, 128 Tullock, Gordon 3, 133 Tumber, H. 108 Tusk, Donald 119 Uganda 83, 155 UK (United Kingdom) 32, 37, 113 Ukraine 32 Ulen, T. 138 Ullah, K. T. 150 Ultimatum Game 49

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INDEX 219 UN (United Nations) 149, 150 diplomats 47–8 UNCAC 22, 25, 137, 163 UNDP 7–8 UNESCO 16 UNODC 17 universalism 35, 36, 140 upward transparency 146, 154–5 Urinboyev, R. 45 USA (United States) 31, 33, 37, 102, 119, 168 elections 61, 63 Uslaner, E. M. 35 Uzbekistan 45, 46 Vaidya, S. 110 valence campaigning 123 Valle-Cruz et al. 154 van Ham, C. 65 Vicente, P. 31, 69 victimization surveys 17–18 vigilante groups 61 Vijayalakshmi, V. 78 Vinciguerra, M. C. 166–7, 168, 169 violence political 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 76 sexual 84, 87, 88 Vishny, R. W. 133, 135 vote buying 63, 64, 65, 66, 70–1, 72, 74, 124 voters 55, 56, 57–8, 60, 68–73 voter secrecy 62–4 vote selling 124 voting preferences 68–70, 128 Waisbord, S. R. 108 Wångnerud, L. 79, 80–1

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watchdog role of the media 108, 110 wealth 3, 33, 39, 111–12, 133, 139, 145 Weber, Max 2 Weberian bureaucracy 95 Wedel, J. 33, 139, 145 Weder, B. 109 Wegner, E. 66 ‘Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ (Tullock) 133 welfare states 96 West Africa 56 Weyland, K. 125 Whistleblower Index 167, 168 whistleblowing 39, 155, 158–70 Wickberg, S. 114, 115 ‘wolf’ model 108 women, and corruption 75, 76–89 World Bank 8, 14, 18, 90, 137, 141, 151 World Development Indicators 148 World Economic Forum 12, 141 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 90 World Values Survey 48, 149 Worldwide Governance Indicators 4, 90 wrongdoing, organizational 160, 162, 164–5 wrongful facts 160 ‘yapping pack’ 108 You, J.-S. 35, 36 Young, L. 71, 73 Zhang, C. 116 Zimbabwe 70, 71 Zinnbauer, D. 155 Zuma, Jacob 33

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