A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament (Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Biblical Criticism) 9780815352587, 9781351139021, 0815352581

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A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament

What do Old Testament scholars really believe about involving philosophical-theological categories when discussing depictions of YHWH in the world of the text? This book sets out an approach to something that has been generally considered impossible: a philosophical theology of the Old Testament. It demonstrates and addresses the neglect of a descriptive philosophical clarification of concepts in Old Testament theology, and in so doing treads new ground in biblical studies and philosophical theology. Recognizing the obvious problems with, and objections to, any form of interdisciplinary research combining philosophical and biblical theology, this study presents itself as introductory prolegomena to all related future research. The experimental approach adopted identifies philosophicaltheological concerns and concepts in the second-order discourse of past and present Old Testament scholarship and as condition of its possibility. An inclusive theoretical framework is designed and applied to scholarly constructions of YHWH as an entity with a nature, attributes and relations and with special attention to comparatively (in)commensurable analytic metaphysical problems and perspectives. This book offers a new vision of biblical and philosophical theology that brings them closer together in order that we might understand both more broadly and deeply. As such, it will be vital reading for scholars of theology, biblical studies and philosophy. Jaco Gericke is Associate Research Professor at North-West University, South Africa. His research focusses on the intersection between Old Testament studies and (mostly analytic) philosophy of religion. He has previously published two books in this area, What is a God? (2017) and The Hebrew Bible and Philosophy of Religion (2012).

Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Biblical Criticism

Gender-Play in the Hebrew Bible The Ways the Bible Challenges Its Gender Norms Amy Kalmanofsky Paul and Death A Question of Psychological Coping Linda Joelsson Biblical Narratives of Israelites and their Neighbors Strangers at the Gate Adriane Leveen Cain, Abel, and the Politics of God An Agambenian reading of Genesis 4:1–16 Julián Andrés González Holguín Epistemology and Biblical Theology From the Pentateuch to Mark’s Gospel Dru Johnson Thinking Sex with the Great Whore Deviant Sexualities and Empire in the Book of Revelation Luis Menéndez-Antuña A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament A Historical, Experimental, Comparative and Analytic Perspective Jaco Gericke

A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament A Historical, Experimental, Comparative and Analytic Perspective Jaco Gericke

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Jaco Gericke The right of Jaco Gericke to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-5258-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-13902-1 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Dru Johnson

Contents

Acknowledgementsviii 1 What OT scholars explicitly told us about philosophical theology

1

2 The complete OT scholar’s guide to the story of philosophical theology

22

3 When OT scholars behave philosophically-theologically

56

4 Paving the road to a philosophical theology of the OT with good intensions

88

5 How to make metaphysical restatements and alienate OT theologians

112

6 Philosophical theologies of the OT on the roads not taken

149

Index159

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the following institutions and persons without whom this book would most likely would never have been written. First of all, Dru Johnson for years of friendship, inspiration, support and the encouragement to write this book. Whatever I think I did for relations between Hebrew Bible scholarship and philosophy, these are merely ideas that Dru more than any other has put into practice as methodological missionary of applied philosophical exegesis par excellence. The many instances of gratitude and acknowledgement by him mean the world to me and the entire first paragraph therefore merits the same in return. I also wish to acknowledge the National Research Foundation (NRF) and their ongoing support for rated researchers in South Africa. I also herewith express my heartfelt gratitude to the North-West University (and the faculty of Theology) in general and to my colleague and friend on the Vanderbijlpark Campus, Professor Hans van Deventer in particular. Others whose support have never failed me include my wife, Charlotte, and my parents, George and Ezettte Gericke. Other recent related influences and support also came from Daryl Balia, Eckart Otto, Yoram Hazony, Jurie Le Roux, Dirk Human, Christo Lombaard, Alphonso Groenewald, Thomas Wagner, Jan Dietrich and Evangelia Dafni. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the role of staff at Routledge, specifically that of Mrs. Yuga Harini, Amy Doffegnies Joshua Wells, Ganesh Pawan Kumar Agoor and Paige Force. Jaco Gericke Pretoria, September 2019

1 What OT scholars explicitly told us about philosophical theology

OT scholars do not always refer to philosophical theology, but when they do they do so rarely, briefly and mostly negatively. In this chapter I intend to illustrate this claim through a relevant selection of samples from the writings of well-known and influential OT theologians (mainly). The samples themselves have been placed in a historical rather than thematic arrangement. An overview of associated themes will be provided in the summary of the overview afterwards. All citations are from English sources or translations, and are not assumed to be representative of the particular scholar’s view (as if one could generalise over time) or of what all OT scholars think. The focus is on verbatim references to “philosophical theology”, the purpose of which is to show the impression created thereby, which will be corrected, clarified and contradicted in the chapters to follow. To start with, one popular example appears in the context of a critique of how Hebrew (biblical) thought has been opposed to Greek (philosophical) thought (see Boman 1960), how the authors have allowed philosophical-theological and linguistic judgments to mingle confusedly. (Barr 1961, 196) That being said, a decade later, a new development had to be reckoned with. Philosophical theology, as distinct from biblically based theology, has again increased in influence. (Barr 1973, 5) In the next sample, “philosophical-theology” appears in the context of a discussion of the influence of 19th-century German idealist philosophy on the writings of the biblical theologian Johann Karl Wilhelm Vatke (1806–1882). The all important inspiration for and the further course of his thinking and his career came with his entrance into the University of Berlin in 1828, for he found himself attracted rapidly not only by Schleiermacher

2  What OT scholars explicitly told us and the university’s other philosophical theologian, Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780–1846), but especially by Hegel. (Hayes & Prussner 1985, 100) In this reference, philosophical theology refers to a field of specialisation in research that has influenced a particular biblical theologian in a particular way. But Vatke was not the only one. Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792– 1860) is also implicated. Hegel’s notion of development was becoming decisive for Baur also, but . . . the Hegelian accent was more upon the philosophical theology than on the historical development. (Barton 1986, 63) Popularly associated with the separation of OT and NT theology – after Johann Philipp Gabler (1753–1826) was credited with the separation of biblical and dogmatic theology – Baur was faulted for taking the separation from dogmatic theology as necessarily including a concurrent separation from philosophical theology. During the 20th century, “biblical theology” became more than a discipline; it became what would be called a movement (1930–1960). Allowing the intrusion of doctrinal theology in ways that Gabler’s distinction sought to prevent, the rejection of “natural theology” by Karl Barth (1886–1968) was taken a step further by OT scholars. As biblical theology became more separated from “natural theology”, it also identified itself as something over and against “philosophical theology”. Ironically, this could only be accomplished by depending on the philosophical-theological distinction between truths about the divine nature and attributes that can only be known on the authority of divine revelation (e.g. Scripture) and those available to human reason. The latter’s ability to be generated without appealing to the biblical texts was redefined to become a prohibition against involving the OT indirectly in philosophical theology and, more important for the present discussion, vice-versa. As has been pointed out, however, what was not mentioned was the fact that Karl Barth actually agreed with Vatke and Bauer that philosophy (not natural theology) was still as important as historical research in OT interpretation. But his model for the relationship of historical reconstruction and theological interpretation had more in common with Baur’s integration of historical research within a philosophical theology, than with most of the later liberals’ separation of religiously tinged historical work from theology proper. (Barton 1986, 90) In other words, OT theologians cannot really appeal to Barth for their wholesale rejection of philosophy (cf. Allen 1985, 4). Yet even where they do not,

What OT scholars explicitly told us 3 it is nevertheless quite popular to find other reasons as to why “philosophical theology” (and any other type, all of which have some philosophical elements) is out of place when attempting to understand the OT. Thus Robert P. Carroll, in his Wolf in the Sheepfold – The Bible as Problem for Christianity (the later version substituting “Christianity” with “Theology”), echoes a popular sentiment according to which the religious language of the Hebrew Bible (HB) is metaphorical in nature. For this reason, reified and personified, descriptions of YHWH in the world of the OT texts are not affected, as is philosophical theology by contradictions and contrarieties. But if the Bible is roped in the service of (such) theology, its conflicting images become problematic. (Carroll 1991, 38) In other words, just how problematic it is to use the OT as a source from which to do philosophical theology has been known for a long time – Spinoza splendidly analysed it – but Christian theology has inherited the Bible from a different culture and has nailed itself to that cross. (Carroll 1991, 56) The position taken by Carroll is not mainstream, opposing as it does not only the Bible and philosophy or biblical and philosophical theology but also OT and OT theology qua theology (which is said to be the outcome wherever religious language becomes a philosophical interest). What is more representative in such an assessment, however, it the idea that the OT’s depictions of YHWH and philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives mix only on the pain the death of divinity by category mistake. At least this is what seems to be the problem with some 19th-century biblical theologies that allowed themselves to be unduly influenced by great names in German idealism. Von Ammon took up ideas of Semler and the philosophers Lessing and Kant and presented actually more a “philosophical theology”. (Hasel 1991, 15) This snippet, the rest of which renders the reference to “philosophical ­theology” almost redundant, comes from a discussion of issues in the (then) current debate in OT theology (before the 1990s). Of interest is the obvious insinuation that if something is “a philosophical theology” (even if only “more”), then in virtue of being such it cannot be a theology of the OT. That being said, some rhetorical ambiguity has been imported into the syntax of the assessment. Was taking up the ideas of philosophers itself the problem, or was von Ammon’s actual methodological error simply the indiscrete

4  What OT scholars explicitly told us ways he went about it? Whatever the case may be, the associated research tradition is charged with a lack of family resemblances to the prototype of biblical theology and sentenced to go down in infamy. The consequences of such retrospective judgments linger on in the hermeneutical assumption that where philosophical-theological frameworks are concerned, the principle of being innocent until proven guilty need not be taken to apply. [n]or has the force of philosophical theology been exchanged in every case for a methodology that refused to lay a-priori grids of any sort over the text. (Kaiser 1991, 4) The exact wording reappears in several search items, having been reiterated by other “conservative” scholars who found Kaiser’s wording sufficient (see, inter alia, House 1998, 41). What is not in fact clear, however, is what exactly makes “philosophical theology” a “force”, not to mention what could possibly be meant by “a methodology that refuses to lay a-priori grids of any sort over the text” (emphasis mine). As incoherent as the idea may seem, the same rejection of philosophical theology as something alien to and over and against biblical theology has also taken the form of an apologetic assertion adapted to deal with more post-modern returns to philosophy. [n]or does a philosophical theology of narrativity of all human experience avoid the theological trap of transforming the theocentric centre of Scripture into anthropology. (Childs 1992, 709) Here “philosophical theology” does not refer to the discipline by the same name. Instead, it refers to revised versions of the earlier process metaphysics based varieties of biblical theology, purporting to be reflective of the OT’s own alleged emphasis on events rather than ideas. Though not saying it in so many words, the assumption is that a so-called philosophical theology of narrativity that sought to offer a valid substitute for the older “philosophical theology” was overly concerned with what is all too human. Others acknowledge some possibilities for interaction, but one must be cautious even thinking about it. While there are inferences that may be drawn from the Old Testament’s understanding of the nature of God, one should be careful of the use of later philosophical-theological categories of thought to set forth the Old Testament’s view of reality. (Preuss 1996, 239) In light of remarks like this and those that came before, where exactly is philosophical theology to be found where it is not wanted? In response to

What OT scholars explicitly told us 5 this question, I think it would be relatively unproblematic to suggest that most OT scholars are likely to think of philosophical-theological content as located in the world in front of the text rather than in the world of the text or the one behind it. More specifically, philosophical theology is present in OT scholars’ “assumptions”, “presuppositions”, “principles”, “frameworks”, “tendencies”, “grids”, “systems”, “thoughts”, “categories”, “abstractions”, “backgrounds”, “questions”, “problems”, “arguments”, “concepts”, “terms”, “language”, “perspectives”, “views”, “concerns”, “considerations”, “ideas”, “questions”, “reflections”, “methods”, “approaches”, “orientations”, “theories”, “influences” and “assorted”. These are seen as causing the OT scholar to commit many hermeneutical and exegetical fallacies, irrespective of the relative identity of such errors of reasoning based on ideological and other necessary/sufficient conditions for classifying them as such. Especially when they supervene intrusively on second-order discourse about “God” used to describe first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. That is why it may be more prudent, as in the next sample, consigning explicit references to philosophical theology to footnotes, especially when they are part of sources credited or referred to as recommended further reading, given the conundrums arising from the concept of “divine action”. See also William P. Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language, Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989); Vincent Brümmer, Speaking of a Personal God, An Essay on Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially 108–127; Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation, An Essay in Philosophical Theology (London, Adam, & Charles Black, 1967). (Brueggemann 1997, 124) Not everyone was so reticent to acknowledge methodological connections to philosophical theology, even if indirectly. Thus Norman Gottwald, who played a major role in the sociological turn in OT theology, prefers to think that when it comes to the Tribes of Yahweh, [s]cientific statements within social philosophy and within dogmatics as philosophical theology no longer stand against each other as scientific statements against scientific statements but as faith against faith or as one faith discovering itself in another. (Gottwald 1999, 801) Here the nature of biblical scholarship involving the scientific ideas in sociology and those of social philosophy is not seen as one form of scientific language vis-à-vis another, as vis-a-vis dogmatics as a variety of philosophical theology. Rather, instead of privileging reason in the reason vs faith binary opposition supervening on the philosophical theology vs biblical theology

6  What OT scholars explicitly told us one, faith is now emphasized as the only category into which everything is collapsed. The new trends that developed during the 1990s and the turn to social philosophy in the study of the OT was temporarily overlooked by James Barr in his The Concept of Biblical Theology – An Old Testament Perspective. First a word about terminology. In this book in general, I understand ‘Old Testament theology’ and ‘New Testament theology’ to be particular species within the genus of ‘Biblical theology’. I mean therefore biblical theology as contrasted with other kinds of theology, such as doctrinal theology or philosophical theology. This I believe to be in accord with most modern usage in English. (Barr 1999, 1) At this point still, Barr seems to have resigned himself to the continued existence of the binary as opposition in terms of confirming the traditional observations about the tense state of contemporary international relations between Athens and Jerusalem. It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree of alienation that the average biblical scholar has felt in relation to the work of disciplines like philosophical theology. (Barr 1999, 12) Barr (1999, 12–13) explains that, along with philosophy of religion, the problem seems to be a difference in “modes” of “discussion” and “decision” (being “remote” and “unreal”), and with regard to the “questions” and “criteria” (being seen as contrived and artificial). In other words, philosophical theology’s “world of discourse” (being remote and removed from that of the Bible with which the OT scholar feels that she or he has “direct” and “empirical” “access” to). With reference to “the English speaking world”, the interest of the OT theologian lies more with relating the subject to the interests of practical theology than worrying about “apparently theoretical matters” as “being and becoming”, “the nature of knowledge” or “the subject–object” relationship”. It would thus seem that, as far as most OT theologians as concerned, [t]here is little patience for the philosophical theologian with his ‘It depends on what you mean by God.’ (Barr 1999, 147) Yet Barr went on to offer insightful remarks on the philosophical concepts, concerns and categories that are in fact present and popular even in the biblical theologies of those who claim to reject philosophical frameworks. (Barr 1999, 146–168). Also, only one year later, Barr recanted from his earlier views on the relation between philosophy and OT theology, but only with reference to “social philosophy”, not philosophical theology (see Barr 2000, 27). There

What OT scholars explicitly told us 7 was one other reference to “philosophical theology” in the context of an endnote wherein Barr mentioned comparatively more interest from the side of philosophical theologians. STUMP, ELEANORE, and FLINT, THOMAS P. (eds). Hermes and Athena, Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). (Barr 2000, 190) Others too acknowledge the value of philosophical theology, only not in the context of doing OT theology. The many problems and aporias which arise from confrontation between an abstract philosophical theology, located on a quite a different social level, and family faith, are therefore often intrinsically meaningless. (Gerstenberger 2002, 84) On other occasions it is more directly applicable to the OT, but not to the canonical texts themselves. At the same time, the author of Wisdom of Solomon puts his knowledge of philosophical theology, a middle way between Stoicism and Platonism (like that attested in Posidonius), to demonstrate that Israel knows. (Kaiser 2004, 10) In the previous quote, philosophical theology is not so much a discipline but theology done by philosophers, or at least in a philosophical mode. However, not so in the following quote, where the author mentions the species of theology in the context of a leading commentary on Qoheleth. The mythical theology is that of the poets; the political, that of the public . . . and the allegorical interpretation of myths serve the communication of popular religion and of philosophical theology. (Krüger 2004, 112) Our next sample again features the words “philosophical theology”, once again only in a footnote, but this time featuring a German source in a discussion of forgotten parts of the legacy of those who contributed to the development of OT theology. In this case it is again Vatke whose work is thus classified. W. Vatkes philosophische Theologie im Streit der Polemik und Apologie, in: Vergessene Theologen des 19. und frühen 20. (Ollenburger 2004, 509) On closer inspection, however, this clearly refers only to a type of OT theology that is philosophical or can be called philosophical theology rather

8  What OT scholars explicitly told us than to philosophical theology as an academic discipline. The fact is that, for the most part, references to philosophical theology in OT theology are not so much to all philosophical-theological research per se as to a species of the genus theology, in whatever theological or philosophical context it functioned. Our next sample is indicative of this. Alston, W.P. How We Think of Divine Action. Twenty-Five Years of Travail for Biblical Language’, in Divine Action, Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer (eds. B. Hebblethwaite & E. Henderson; Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1990), 51–70. (Bartholomew 2004, 19) Like James Barr and Otto Kaiser, Craig Bartholomew is another biblical scholar with more philosophical-theological affinities than most of his peers. In this case, however, relations with philosophical theology is much more direct (note that this is the philosophical . . . appearance, see Brueggemann above). Though quite popular, so are other philosophical theologians not mentioned here simply because they are not part of explicit references to “philosophical theology” in the writings of OT theologians or scholars concerned with YHWH in the world of the text. For the most part, however, the second-order metaphysical discourse of philosophical theology is consistently placed within a binary opposition to Hebrew thinking in general and OT religious language in particular. This is also the case when discussing genres and literary techniques in biblical poetry, as when the focus is on the nature of religious language in the Book of Psalms. The songs, ranging from petitions to praises, are centered in the character of Yahweh. . . . The psalms present not a system of abstract philosophical theology, but rather a concrete relational theology as it is experienced in life. (Estes 2005, 151) Our next sample, this time from John Barton’s Perceptions of Ancient Prophecy in Israel After the Exile reiterates the now familiar perception, here with reference to religious language in the prophetic books, even if the author himself is also more open than most to possible interdisciplinary research. [I]n the negative way disliked by the Biblical Theology movement, but it did open the door for questions about the nature of God in his exalted splendour which are not far from the concerns of philosophical theology. (Barton 1986, 246) Where philosophical theology is tolerated, it tends to be that of the more existentialist, personalist and even post-modern Continental varieties.

What OT scholars explicitly told us 9 Thus even Brueggemann, who as we saw was probably not exactly someone implying an affinity for philosophical theology in the study of OT theology, nevertheless in his discussion of the concept of prayer writes with approval of God and the believer as expressed in Martin Buber’s classic work of Jewish philosophical theology, I and Thou, originally published as Ich und Du. (Brueggemann 2008, 46) Such concessions notwithstanding, the general sentiment is echoed once again John Goldingay offering the reader a parallel to different ways of understanding a lion in different scientific disciplines. Thus speaking of “the metaphysical lion”, we read the following: There are the angles of the systematic theologian and the philosophical theologian, the New Testament scholar – and the Old Testament scholar. The nature of the beast is such that no one angle and no one set of categories will reveal everything. (Goldingay 2010, 20) Clearly here once more, the assumption is that philosophical theology is more related to systematic theology than to OT and NT scholarship, the latter offering different angles distinct from philosophical-theological perspectives, and therein is its contribution said to lie. Our next sample, listed because samples with explicit verbatim references to “philosophical theology” are far and few in between, again makes one work hard to locate them, for they appear only in dense footnotes within titles of related relevant publications. In this case, the example comes from a commentary on Job, the author of which is himself also more willing and able to refer affirmatively to philosophy than most (see Clines 1980, 323–330). Stump, Eleanore. “Aquinas on the suffering of Job. In Reasoned faith, Essays in Philosophical Theology. Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. Ed. Eleanore Stump. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993, 328–57 [= Human and Divine Agency, Anglican, Catholic and Lutheran Perspectives. Ed F. Michael MacLain and W. Mark Richardson. MD, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1999, 191–215.] (Clines 2011, 1272) Nash, R. T. Job’s Misconception, A Critical Analysis of the Problem of Evil in the Philosophical Theology of Charles Hartshorne. Diss. Leuven, 1991. (Clines 2011, 1388)

10  What OT scholars explicitly told us The next case involves a bit more elaboration around the reference to “philosophical theology” within OT theology. Philosophical theology in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions, effected a major change in the way we think. Philosophical theology introduced the God of “omni – “adjectives, of conceptuality and of consistency. In doing so, philosophical theology abandoned the anthropopathic language of Scripture . . . I follow . . . firmly believing that the anthropopathic language of the non-philosophical tradition is closer to the language of the sacred texts, as well as far more imaginative and truer to the full range of human experience and theologically more flexible, and liturgically more powerful. (Blumental 2012, 46) At last, no more skirting around the elephant in the room. Here we see exactly what many OT theologians, to the extent they operate in faithbased contexts, seem to think, want to say, but don’t actually do so in so many words (that is, they say the same thing without including “philosophical theology”). It involves the suggestion that biblical theology is best done in opposition of philosophical theology, especially with reference to the OT’s religious language portraying the suffering of YHWH (see Fretheim 1984). Next up, in the Essays in Honour of David Clines, the binary opposition between biblical and philosophical theology surfaces once more. One of the challenges to the discipline of biblical theology lies in the history of Christian theology, especially the history of systematic and philosophical theology. (Talstra 2013, 174) Not only must the binary be constantly stabilised, the condition of possibility for doing so must itself be put into place. And what better way than to tell the story of how it came about. If not with idealism then perhaps historicism as the primary philosophical-theological antagonist. The new philosophy of religion or philosophical theology combines theory and history and finds the main cue for the link in a new interpretation of revelation, in a broad sense it bases the positive religions and the whole history on the will of God. The result was a metaphysic of history which could later be called “historicism”. Its first source has to be seen in the division between Old and New Testaments. . . . This philosophical theology and metaphysic of history, although neither accepted by orthodoxy nor by deism, solved a lot of problems. (Scholtz 2013, 81)

What OT scholars explicitly told us 11 In other words, the hermeneutical motivation for the historically conscious separation between OT and NT theology within biblical theology (as biblical theology from systematic theology), was itself a philosophical-theological decision (even if qualified as one based on a historicist metaphysics). The usual suspects are Dilthey, Spinoza and Herder, all of whom are often cited as implying that OT theology and philosophical theology are completely distinct. This, however, would be an invalid inference from what they did imply as regards the lack of certain forms of philosophical language within the Bible. Because historical studies must concentrate on particular individualities (of persons or cultures), it also has to look for universal progress; for Troeltsch, Leibniz on the one hand and Hegel on the other were the most important philosophers. In his strict philosophical theology, the strict division between human and divine spirit was abandoned, in the same way as the dualism of secular and salvation history. In this way, objective history cannot be valued as senseless and chaotic but shows a tendency towards a goal. This was the reason for Troeltsch’s hope that in the future religious history will even show “the glory of God in history” and will be fruitful for the Christian community. (Scholtz 2013, 87) As many OT scholars know, later biblical theology opposed Hegel and his philosophical theology despite privileging the idea of revelation in history rather than in nature or reason must have forgotten or repressed its original condition of possibility for constructing things this way in the first place. Also that the report of the obituary of philosophical theology had been a misprint, which Barr (posthumously), aiming at Childs, reiterates from the other side. Biblical theology had hoped to circumvent the influence of two other forces, the force of philosophical theology and the force of the history of religions. But today philosophical theology and the history of religions are flourishing like never before. (Barr 2013, 282) But Barton, who was instrumental in the creation of the collected volumes of, amongst others, Barr’s feedback to OT theologians with reference to the latest on “philosophical theology” cannot but feel the familiar need to remind the reader, even if in a good way, of the potentially distortive nature of “philosophical theology”, especially with regard to what it is held to involve when it comes to the nature and attributes of God. A place where we think of God’s willingness to be talked out of his original plans as a sign of greatness, rather than as an indication of weakness, as Western philosophical theology would understand it. (Barton 2014, 207)

12  What OT scholars explicitly told us Again we see a sample with an earlier related instance (see Gerstenberger above) wherein the focus is on the presumptuousness of making sense of “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” based on what “the God of the Philosophers” is assumed to be like (as the 17th century philosopher Blaise Pascal preconstructed the binary opposition via stereotypes of the deity itself). What is interesting is the ambiguity here, for despite the generalisation (there are many concepts of God in Western philosophical theology), it is possible to see Barton’s comment as granting the possibility of other more related philosophical-theological (presumably non-Western) frameworks. Elsewhere, back to the history of OT/HB interpretation, another contributor refers to philosophical theology, this time with reference to a position or department wherein a popular interlocutor with OT theologians was situated. From 1954 on Ricoeur taught regularly in the United States. In 1967, he succeeded Paul Tillich as professor in philosophical theology at the University of Chicago. (Føllesdal 2015, 37) Usually not called a philosophical theologian (more a philosopher, literary critic, reader of the Bible or such), Ricoeur has been tolerated in the context of philosophical disciplines in OT studies whose philosophical nature is considered less problematic (here “hermeneutics”, but also ethics and others). As we shall see in the next chapter, Continental philosophical theologians are more overtly acknowledged (i.e. more than analytic ones). Ultimately, there are still more explicit references to “philosophical theology” (in so many words) in the writings of OT scholars. That being said, since the references that were discussed are not meant as a detailed survey and discussion of what OT theologians think of philosophical theology, they suffice in revealing exactly the sort of first impression one is likely to get should one choose to look for associated data in related research. The fact remains that, in the bigger scheme of things, philosophical theology is rarely mentioned in so many words. As for the binary opposition between philosophical and biblical theology (with reference to OT theology), the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn on how it tends to be constructed and stabilized: 1 Philosophical theology and OT theology have mutually exclusive concerns 2 Philosophical theology deals in concepts and categories that, when used by OT theologians, ends up distortive of the theology of the OT on its own terms

What OT scholars explicitly told us 13 3 Philosophical theology offers discussions of questions that will arise in the doing of OT theology but which have to be deferred for being anachronistic in historical and descriptive readings of the biblical texts 4 Philosophical theology as based on presuppositions, problems and perspectives which have led to illusionary interests in OT theology as they appear utterly absent from the world of the text 5 Philosophical theology as operating with ideas of God that should not be projected onto the character of YHWH in biblical narratives 6 Philosophical theology as having been influential in the history of OT theology The problem with setting up binaries is that they tend to be unstable and deconstruct. As will become clear in the chapters to follow, the binary featuring biblical and philosophical theology must itself have been put up and retained only though repressing radical undecidability and the interplay of opposites. This is the short version of the story. The more elaborate and intricate tale of two cities (Athens and Jerusalem) features a philosophical-theological plot which can be untangled in the following way. In Chapter 2, I shall begin with the observation that, from a historical and metaphilosophical-theological perspective, “philosophical theology” is an essentially contested concept. The remaining discussion is then devoted to a brief history of the concept, written specifically for OT scholars. Despite the methodological challenges involved, the story told focusses on those developments in the theological ideas of Western philosophers that are often associated with the popularizing of concepts, concerns and categories that OT scholars have always felt compelled to relate their research to, even if only to oppose it. What makes this overview original as well as informative then is to be found in its aligning of the diachronic emergence of the identity of philosophical theology and of those metaphysical presuppositions, problems, perspectives, periods and persons that have coined the currencies which the second-order discourse of OT scholars trade in. By thus complicating what is and has and can be meant by “philosophical theology” in relation to OT scholarship in general and the archaeology of the concept of OT theology in particular, the first phase of showing the instability inherent in the binary opposition between biblical (OT) theology and philosophical theology is hereby initiated and completed. Chapter 3 takes the discussion to the next level. In this case, the level lies underground and there are many such levels. Here it is shown that the most basic and taken-for-granted concepts, concerns and categories indelible in biblical-theological (and OT scholarly) descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text have a history within metaphysics and

14  What OT scholars explicitly told us are philosophical-theological to the core. Form and content are shown to clash when anti-philosophical interpreters of the OT nevertheless discuss OT “concepts” of God and then go on to construct YHWH as an entity with a divine nature (or similar), divine attributes (or similar). and divine relations (or similar) to the world and things in the world (of the text). Even the specific issues of interest in OT theology are nothing but reconfigured philosophical-theological capita selecta. Contrary to the impression gained from explicit references to philosophical theology in the writings of OT scholars then, they not only accept the associated metaphysical second-order descriptions of the meaning ascribed to firstorder religious language. They also engage in comparative philosophicaltheological conceptual clarification of what OT texts seem to imply in relation to certain metaphysical worries. This tendency is shown to be present not only in OT theology but also in linguistic, literary-critical, historical-religious, comparative- religious and social-scientific descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. Doing so, however, is not meant to contribute to the debates within OT theology about its relations with philosophy. Instead, what is proven beyond reasonable doubt is that the possibility of there being a philosophical theology of the OT as a separate, independent new discipline within biblical scholarship has by implication already been granted. Chapter 4 assumes that what is meant by a philosophical theology of the OT is ambiguous, provocative, contentious and controversial and the strange and seemingly ridiculous proposal implicit in the title of this book therefore likely to be misunderstood. This is understandable in light of valid concerns included in reasons usually given for its rejection within biblical scholarship. Be that as it may, this chapter offers a hermeneutical and metaphilosophical-theological clarification and justification of the theoretical framework involved. It begins with the acknowledgement of the bits and pieces of covert comparative philosophical-theological commentary and the associated metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories already present in OT scholarship. Some of the informal fallacies involved in objecting to a philosophical theology of the OT in all possible formats are then identified before suggesting that what is already by implication allowed for in no way commits any of the fallacies associated with involvements of philosophical theology in the past. All that is required is that the philosophical-theological discourse already present in mainstream OT scholarship is imagined as being isolated, separated, regrouped, expanded and becoming the exclusive focus of the research. An inclusive neo-pragmatic epistemological framework is then adopted to show one possible configuration a philosophical theology of the OT could take that would be nearly impossible to reject for any reason that can be coherently restated. In order to accommodate and to acknowledge that what is proposed is still something the validity of which have to be hermeneutically established, this chapter

What OT scholars explicitly told us 15 designs an experimental theoretical prototype against the backdrop of certain metaphilosophical-theological variables as one possible format the new discipline could make use of. The experimental format opted for is one that is comparative, analytic, descriptive, historical and Christian, configured as such on the grounds of such a combination able to link to what is already and still happening on both sides of the binary of biblical and philosophical theology. In Chapter 5, the experimental theoretical framework designed in the previous chapter is applied, illustrated and practiced with reference to hypothetical scenarios arising from the particular combination of methodological variables supervening on the inquiry. A few complicated and controversial metaphysical presuppositions, problems and perspectives from contemporary Christian analytic philosophical theology are identified in a purely descriptive manner. These are then comparatively related to some of their counterparts already present in OT theology and mentioning some of the related pros and cons of doing so. The approach is limited to an introductory overview of some of the new possible issues of interest arising from looking at the second-order discourse’s constructs of YHWH’s divine nature and attributes in and relations to things in firstorder religious language descriptions of what are popularly assumed to be the counterparts in a particular world of the text. The themes discussed are precisely those where the lack of in-depth philosophical-theological discussion is most obvious and most controversial, e.g. the nature of divine existence and the question of if and in what way one can still refer to maximal greatness, perfect beings, divine immutability, impassibility, aseity, eternity, omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence. This is done as part of a nuanced religious-historical and culturally conceptual relative approach that takes seriously the variety of interpretations of both these second-order terms, their problems with stereotypical definitions and different possible ways of describing the world of the text accordingly. Without opting for any specific interpretation of any of the variables involved in the illustration of how the experimental framework adopted could function in practice, the viability and vulnerability of the new discipline suggested is hereby made apparent. Chapter 6 concludes the discussion. It starts with a summary and synthesis of what was discussed in the previous chapters. Then follow additional remarks on the perceived potential and limitations of the particular experimental theoretical framework adopted, adapted and applied, before moving on to show the possibilities, problems and prospects for future research. The latter includes both alternative ways of conceiving what a philosophical theology of the OT could involve. The metaphilosophicaltheological pluralism supervening on the outcomes are also noted with reference to metaphilosophical preliminaries that reveal the nearly limitless ways that original and novel research opportunities could present

16  What OT scholars explicitly told us themselves to anyone interested. The idea is to show the fluidity of the new approach that, in theory, could accommodate whatever background, assumptions, history, research problems and questions, arguments, methodology and method, objectives and goals, scopes and outlines, limitations and uses OT scholars are able to imagine in light of what they already imply to be possible. Thus the study ends with first thoughts about what initially seemed like a misguided idea from some pre-critical philosophical approach but now, hopefully, will be impossible to ignore, not only because it is already present within OT scholarship or will solve the problems associated with the discipline of OT theology. Instead, as a separate discipline, the effect is paradoxical within the present paradigm where biblical and philosophical theology stand opposed. A comparative philosophical theology of the OT limited to conceptual clarification is able to identify the conditions of possibility for why things in the firstorder religious language of the world of the text as described in secondorder discourse appear the way they do, or why they appear at all. This allows for new ways of making sense of the OT on its own terms, even if not in them. Negatively, the discussion to follow is also a demonstration of why it remains impossible for any argument against a philosophical theology of the OT to be coherently stated. Conversely, the reasoning represented by each chapter rebutting our rejections of philosophical-theological readings are rigorously related. If I can convince you what was, is and can be considered “philosophical theology” has included certain presuppositions, problems and perspectives (Chapter 2), that are still present and approved in certain concepts, concerns and categories always present in the writings of leading OT theologians (Chapter 3), then the binary opposition between biblical and philosophical theology is sufficiently destabilised to allow for the subsequent experimental idiosyncratic configuration of one hermeneutical framework for a comparative philosophical theology of the OT already present within second-order discourse on metaphysical assumptions about YHWH’s nature, attributes and relations in the first-order religious language used in the world of the text (Chapter 4) and to illustrate what the associated philosophical theology of the OT might look like when one extends already existing varieties of comparative philosophical conceptual clarification to become the exclusive concern, briefly applied to a selection of hypothetical scenarios from capita selecta in contemporary analytic Christian philosophical-theology (Chapter 5). Within each chapter to come, the reader will encounter random samples of related and relevant ideas in the discipline of OT theology and philosophical theology proper. As was the case in the present chapter, these samples are intended as useful illustrations of a particular point. They are not assumed to be representative of contemporary dominant theories in either discipline

What OT scholars explicitly told us 17 or those of the scholar quoted. They are not assumed to be unproblematic (or unduly problematic). The identification of philosophical-theological considerations, concepts and concerns indelibly present in the writings of OT scholars is also not meant as a precursor for a purification of all things philosophical from the meta-language or meant to discredit those who use them. Quite the opposite. Given the already accepted occasional practice of philosophical-theological commentary, the actual question is if and how it become an exclusive focus offering even more comprehensive an indepth comparative coverage of the meaning of the OT’s religious language on its own terms, even if not in them. The immediate focus is still not directly on the first-order discourse of the OT itself but on possibilities for the clarification of the concepts already in use and generally implied to be validated in OT theology and elsewhere. This means that this book is not only not part of OT theology, it is strictly not itself a philosophical theology in the familiar senses either. For it is written by OT scholars (me, my influences and I), for OT scholars and aimed at presenting the case for a philosophical theology of the OT in ways that must compensate for popular constructions of the binary opposition between biblical and philosophical theology. In the end everything said regarding particular aspects of the OT, OT theology, philosophy, philosophical theology and everything else is less important – and will be assumed to be fallible – without it in any way affecting the general idea, i.e. that of a philosophical theology as something conceivable in even the context of descriptive and historically orientated biblical interpretation working with what is generally considered to be non-philosophical literature. In other words, what follows are first thoughts showing that no last word is possible. It is not a philosophical theology of the OT itself, neither an OT theology insisting that practitioners of that discipline to make a philosophical turn. OT theology is relevant only because it remains the primary setting for focussing on OT perspectives on YHWH and, intentionally or not, putting up limits as to what could not and should not be done to supplement or complement it. The fact is, the viability of the general aspects of the case for a philosophical theology of the OT made in this book (which is not the same as a philosophical theology of the OT as such) presuppose no absolute dependence on the fate of related discussions in OT theology or philosophical theology proper, Even so, philosophical and theological concerns are not for everyone. The relevance and value of this study, though relative as all are, is to be found in potential service to all other approaches to the OT/HB for anyone who wishes to make use thereof (or make their own version). Even readers who would either prefer a different philosophical-theological format or apply the same one differently can find something of use within these preparatory pages of preliminary considerations.

18  What OT scholars explicitly told us To this end, the discussion to follow is intended as a diplomatic dreaming of new possibilities rather than as a series of ideologically invasive insistences that the ideas within these pages should be taken as the last word (impersonal, critical and assertive scientific rhetoric notwithstanding). It is about identifying and creating a research gap concurrently and then attempting to show how it could be filled rather than prescribing the forms it must take. It is not about denying the validity of the usual arguments against involving philosophy in the study of the OT so much as showing that they are neither accepted nor applied by those who put them forward in all possible forms of philosophical inquiry. And like OT theology itself, the possibilities for variation in research problems, questions, arguments, assumptions, objectives, methods, topics, scope, structure, ideology and assorted variables are as many as those choosing to reflect on it. The implied reader who is most likely to benefit most from the ideas expressed here are those biblical scholars like myself who specialise on the OT and like to do so within the new emerging trend of more exclusively philosophical approaches. This irrespective of whether one’s primary interest lies with offering philosophical perspectives on OT texts, investigating the role of philosophy in the history of interpretation, or looking at the reception of the OT in the history of philosophy. This turn to philosophy (or various sub-disciplines therein) in OT interpretation, especially from the 1990s onwards, would have been unthinkable a few decades earlier. The associated research, which is yet to be subsumed under and recognized as a distinct method in contemporary biblical interpretation (see Schmid 2019: 34) has already been discussed, also with regard to the question of whether there is philosophy in the OT/HB itself (see Gericke 2014, 583–598). Examples of studies attending to different types of philosophical approaches with different ideological, methodological and thematic frameworks include early overlooked instances among the so-called historical minimalists as well as later more substantial indepth research (see, among others, Thompson 1999; Davies 2005, n.p; Moore & Sherwood 2008; Hazony 2012; Gericke 2012; Sekine 2014, and especially the works of Dru Johnson, a leading and most prolific biblical scholar within the new “trend”, and specialising in biblical epistemology, e.g. inter alia, Johnson 2017). As regards this book’s topic’s relation to earlier research done by myself, some of the first stirrings of a similar view in embryo, i.e. that there can be a philosophical theology of the OT, was put forward 10 years ago (Gericke 2009, 21–45). That being said, what the reader will encounter here is completely novel and much more comprehensive and in-depth than anything I have previously suggested. Many ideas in fact represent a change of mind on certain aspects. As for some continuity, I would like to think of this book as the third part of a trilogy of publications all related to philosophical approaches to constructions of YHWH in the OT/HB. The first in the series was focussed on introducing and justifying the radical and

What OT scholars explicitly told us 19 new idea of involving analytic philosophy of religion in OT intepretation (see Gericke 2012), whereas the second book looked at possibilities of nuance in philosophical interpretations of the increasingly popular question of what (here according to the OT texts and OT scholarship), a god was assumed to be (Gericke 2017). The novelty of the original research presented in this third installment lies in its exclusive focus on and inclusive approach to the problem of metaphysical incommensurability as (de-) (re-)constructed within the second-order discourse OT scholars use in their covert comparative philosophical-theological perspectives on YHWH in the world of the text.

Bibliography Allen, D. 1985. Philosophy for understanding theology. Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press. Barr, J. 1961. The semantics of Biblical language. New York: Oxford University Press. Barr, J. 1973. The Bible in the modern world. New York: Harper & Row. Barr, J. 1999. The concept of Biblical theology. An old testament perspective. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Barr, J. 2000. History and ideology: Old testament studies at the end of a millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barr, J. 2013. Trends and prospects in Biblical theology. In J. Barton (ed.). Bible and interpretation: The collected essays of James Barr. Vol 1. Interpretation and theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 280–296. Bartholomew, C.G. 2004. Introduction. In C.G. Bartholomew, M. Healy and K. Möller (eds.). Out of Egypt, Biblical theology and Biblical interpretation. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series. Vol. 5. Carlisle, UK, Paternoster Press; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Barton, J. 1986. Oracles of God: Perceptions of ancient prophecy in Israel after the exile. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. Barton, J. 2014. Ethics in ancient Israel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blumental, D.R. 2012. Confronting the character of God, text and praxis. In T.K. Beal and T. Linafeldt (eds.). God in the fray: A tribute to Walter Brueggemann. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, pp. 38–52. Boman, T. 1960. Hebrew thought compared with Greek. Trans. J.L. Moreau. New York: Norton. Brueggemann, W. 1997. Old testament theology, testimony, dispute, advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Brueggemann, W. 2008. Living countertestimony: Conversations with Walter Brueggemann. With C. Sharp. Louisville: John Knox Press. Caroll, R.P. 1991. Wolf in the sheepfold. The Bible as problem for Christianity. London: SCM Press. Carroll, R.P. 1997. Wolf in the sheepfold. The Bible as problem for theology. London: SCM Press. Childs, B.S. 1992. Biblical theology of the old and new testaments. London: SCM Press.

20  What OT scholars explicitly told us Clines, D.J.A. 1980. Yahweh and the God of Christian theology. Theology, 83, 323–330. Clines, D.J.A. 2011. Job 38–42. Word Biblical commentary 18A. Nashville: Nelson Davies, P.R. 2005. Do we need Biblical scholars? The Bible and interpretation. Available from: [12 December 2018]. Estes, D.J. 2005. Handbook on the wisdom books and Psalms. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic. Føllesdal, D. 2015. Basic questions of hermeneutics as part of the cultural and philosophical framework of recent Bible studies. In M. Sæbø (ed.). Hebrew Bible/Old testament, the history of its interpretation. III/2. The twentieth century. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG., pp. 29–44 Gericke, J. 2009. Brave new world, towards a philosophical theology of the old testament. Old Testament Essays, 22/2, 21–45. Gericke, J. 2012. The Hebrew Bible and philosophy of religion. RBL 70. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. Gericke, J. 2014. Is there philosophy in the Hebrew Bible? Some recent affirmative perspectives. Journal for Semitics, 23/2, 583–598. Gericke, J. 2017. What is a God? Philosophical perspectives on divine essence in the Hebrew Bible. New York, London, Bloomsbury: T. & T. Clark. Gericke, J. 2018. The concept of philosophy in post – Apartheid Western historical overviews of South African old testament scholarship. Old Testament Essays, 31/2, 299–322. Gerstenberger, E.S. 2002. Theologies in the old testament. Minneapolis, MI: Fortress Press. Goldingay, J. 2010. Old testament theology: Israel’s Gospel. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. Gottwald, N.K. 1999. The tribes of Yahweh, a sociology of the religion of liberated Israel. 1250–1050 BCE. Continuum: Sheffield Academic Press. Hasel, G.F. 1991. Old testament theology: Basic issues in the current debate. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Hayes, J. and Prussner, F.C. 1985. Old testament theology: Its history and development. Atlanta: John Knox Press. Hazony, Y. 2012. The philosophy of Hebrew scripture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. House, P.R. 1998. Old testament theology. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. Johnson, D. 2017. Epistemology and Biblical theology, from the Pentateuch to mark’s Gospel. London: Routledge. Kaiser, O. 2004. The old testament Apocrypha, an introduction. Peabody, MA: Hendricksen Publishers. Kaiser, W.C. jr. 1991. Toward an old testament theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Krüger, T. 2004. Qoheleth: A commentary. Hermeneia, Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Moore, S.D. and Sherwood, Y. 2008. The invention of the Biblical scholar. A critical manifesto. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Ollenburger, B.C. 2004. Old testament theology: Flowering and future. 2nd ed. SBTS 1. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns. Scholtz, G. 2013. The phenomenon of historicism as backcloth of Biblical scholarship. In M. Sæbø (ed.). Hebrew Bible/Old testament, the history of its interpretation.

What OT scholars explicitly told us 21 III/1. The nineteenth century. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG., pp. 64–89. Sekine, S. 2014. Philosophical interpretations of the old testament. Trans. J. Short Randall. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 458. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Talstra, E. 2013. What you see is what you get. The passion of a literary character. In J.K. Aitken, J.S. Clines and C.M. Maier (eds.). Interested readers: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David J. A. Clines. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 169–182. Thompson, T.L. 1999. The Bible in history: How writers create a past. London: Jonathan Cape.

2 The complete OT scholar’s guide to the story of philosophical theology

How shall one then even begin to imagine what a philosophical theology of the OT could possibly involve? Here’s one way. First, we un-complicate and then re-complicate what could be understood by the concept of “philosophical theology”. Of course, the problem here, paraphrasing Nietzsche in another context and as one of his commentators succinctly remarked on the idea presented, [i]n section 12 of the Second Essay Nietzsche . . . GM, II, 13. . . says that only that which has no history can be defined, and draws attention to the ‘synthesis of meanings’ that accrues to any given phenomenon. His fundamental claim, one that needs, he says, to informal kinds of historical research, is that the origin of the development of a thing and its ‘ultimate usefulness’ are altogether separate. This is because what exists is ‘continually interpreted anew . . . transformed and redirected to a new purpose’. (Ansell-Pearson 2007, xviii) That being said, stories can still be told, neither of some elusive essential “it” philosophical theology is supposed to be about nor just becoming so fuzzy a concept that it can no longer be distinguished from anything else. Contrary to Michel Foucault’s influential reading of genealogy, Nietzsche does not simply oppose himself to the search for origins, and neither is he opposed to the attempt to show that the past actively exists in the present, secretly continuing to animate it. Much of what Nietzsche is doing in the book is only intelligible if we take him to be working with the idea that it does. Nietzsche opposes himself to the search for origins only where this involves what we might call a genealogical narcissism. Where it involves the discovery of difference at the origin, of the kind that surprises and disturbs us, Nietzsche is in favour of such a search. (Ansell-Pearson 2007, xx)

The complete OT scholar’s guide 23 I shall not attempt to justify the entirety of the present chapter on the reference to Nietzsche and assume said reference to be an appeal to authority. Rather, I found the idea attributed to the philosopher and as worded by the editor of the translation helpful in expressing something about what I would like to think the present chapter can achieve. That is, to trace the origins of some of the presuppositions, problems and perspectives in Western Christian philosophical theology that represent the conditions of possibility for the associated second-order metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories of first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH as an entity in the world of the text. To the best of my knowledge, this story of philosophical theology with special attention to the genealogy of capita selecta of relevance to OT theologians has never been told. It is also something quite different from the history of relations between OT theology and the philosophy of religion discussed elsewhere (see Gericke 2012, 41–80). To start off, like all concepts, “philosophical theology” is both fuzzy and essentially contested (cf. Shokhin 2010, 180 n. 3, “there are no generally recognized precise definitions of such fields”). The pro and con of this is that one must make either make an Derridean type “impossible decision” to start at some ultimately unjustifiable arbitrary point in the stories that be(come) or avoid all forms of comparative philosophical-theological chauvinism, scepticism, incommensurability and perennialism or never go nowhere and slowly (cf. Littlejohn 2010, n.p). It’s a veritable paradox in the history of ideas, how choosing a beginning for a concept (like philosophical theology) invariable involves choosing its end. Furthermore, what philosophical theology is seen to be (or not) will make sense only relative to a particular metaphilosophical-theological framework which changes past, present and future “reality” just by trying to write about it. The latter changes not only what we think we are looking for but also when, where, why, whereby and what for we do so to in the first place. Yet without any preconceived idea it is impossible to come up with inclusion and exclusion criteria for what counts as philosophical-theological research. What is to my mind a useful description to get things going can be had from a comparative perspective. One I found most helpful came from the writings of the Russian comparative philosophical theologian, Vladimir Shokin: It is not too common in the Anglo-American tradition to distinguish different fields within the discipline of “theology in connection with philosophy”. Nevertheless, there is good sense in doing so, and it would be reasonable to outline from the first even the simplest difference between “genus” and “species”. The genus I’d designate, for reasons of convenience, rational theology. One of its species, from the Middle-Ages entitled natural theology, can be, in my opinion, a component, in the strict sense, only of the Christian tradition. The reason is that Christianity

24  The complete OT scholar’s guide emphasizes more than any other tradition the gap between those religious truths which can be apprehended by human beings who, in Aquinas’ terms, are led by the natural light of reason (ducti naturalis lumine rationis) and those attainable only through the light of Revelation. (Shokhin 2010, 180) He continues, But the term philosophical theology could be suitable for designating all traditions (Christianity included) where the existence of God, his attributes and actions in the world have been made a subject of philosophical reflection. E.g., it’d be ridiculous to call the Stoics or Epicurus “natural theologians”, because they had no idea of Revelation (and, if they had, they would doubtlessly have rejected it), but they contributed much to the elaboration of philosophical arguments for the existence of a divine world and therefore delved into philosophical theology. Therefore philosophical theology may be designated as rational theology in the intercultural context, and its study could be very helpful for theisticminded persons of different traditions today, as it was, e.g., in the Middle Ages, when exchange of opinions (not without polemics) did much for the theology in connection with philosophy of all the three monotheistic religions. That the reference point should be classical Western theism has nothing to do with any Eurocentrism, at least no more than the need for a gauge in any measuring, weighing etc. of material things implies a bias. (Shokhin 2010, 181) But what is philosophical theology and what is its story that OT scholars require a revised introductory overview thereof? Perhaps one can justify doing so by noting what happens when OT theologians introduce their subject by tracing the origins of their discipline reluctantly to Greek philosophy (see Schmid 2015, 1). Usually this is done very briefly and includes a (dis) honourable mention of the etymological origins of the word “theology” and perhaps even a series of confessions of the sins of the fathers and of philosophical approaches to religious language “ever since Plato”. What is not even a trial or a sentencing but a reliving of the top worst moments in biblical-theological history usually concludes with a renewed commitment to reject a list of questionable and unpopular philosophical assumptions, principles, frameworks and systems. Thereby allegiance is pledged to discussing the so-called OT concept of God on its own terms, even if not in them. Truth be “sold”, I share many of the concerns related to philosophical approaches to the OT that purport to be descriptive but the historical consciousness of which is severely lacking. Whatever fault can be found with the proposals made from here onwards, it will not involve the familiar hermeneutical and exegetical fallacies associated with certain pre-critical,

The complete OT scholar’s guide 25 critical and post-critical philosophical-theological readings. At worst it will be responsible for committing new ones. I leave this for others to decide. The present chapter was not really written to either justify or criticize anyone in OT or philosophical theology. Rather, as stated previously, its business is to offer an aetiology of the relevant philosophical-theological background to what will ultimately be proposed as a completely separate and new discipline within OT scholarship beyond the worries of OT theologians and scholars who are still free to oppose biblical and philosophical theology, Hebrew and Greek thought, faith and reason, natural and revealed theology and all that jazz. This limitation of scope admittedly makes the exclusion and inclusion criteria for the sample population less than fair and representative of what is out there on all related matters. Yet the ones mentioned are those that, for better or worse, have been instrumental in creating those kinds, properties and relations of OT and philosophical theology where love and hate collide. The assumption behind the whole account is that this perspective on where OT scholar’s metaphysical meta-language comes from might contribute to the invention of new interesting problems, possibilities and prospects OT scholars could get all excited, perplexed and disgusted with before they retire. For reasons that will become clear as the plot thickens, we begin our genealogical philosophical theology for OT scholars with the informative relevant contributions in the historical section of the Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Religion by Taliaferro, Draper and Quinn (2010, vi). The stories told in these chapters and similar ones in other publications can be read as supplement to recent comprehensive histories of OT interpretation (cf. e.g. Sæbø 1996–2015). Together they allow OT scholars to become aware of the proverbial philosophical-theological tain in the biblicaltheological mirror. Philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives hover like an ominous anamorphic image in the otherwise serene sacred space that OT theology thinks itself to occupy. In the remainder of the discussion to follow in this chapter what is meant by this will be made clear. Because the aim of this study is to point to new ways of writing about YHWH relative to but also independent from how this has been done in the discipline of OT theology, the overview to follow will be limited to ancient Greek (and Roman) thought (as opposed to Hebrew) on the one hand and to contributions from Christian philosophical theology (as opposed to Jewish or generic) from more purely philosophical contexts on the other on the other. Writing about “ancient philosophical theology”, Flannery (2010, 83–90), though starting with Aristotle’s double-edged constructions of the concept of “theology” soon doubles back to related ideas associated with the socalled pre-Socratic philosophers of the 6th century BCE. [T]he Presocratics are for the most part not interested in cultic religion as such. They believe in “God” or “the gods,” but this divine element is

26  The complete OT scholar’s guide meant primarily to provide a relatively simple explanation of the order found in the universe (or kosmos – which word can mean both “universe” and “order”). The Presocratics are thus “rationalizers” of the divine. (Flannery 2010, 84) On this view, the basic idea is that the second-order discourse of the earliest philosophical-theologians are distinguishable from other varieties of religious language by their shared desire for a rational conception of the divine – that is, one that could be arrived at through the kind of logical argument already known in the proofs of geometry. The hope was to be able to discover some unified account for all reality. OT theologians tend not only to equate this project with the theology of the God of the Philosophers as such but to present everything about it as utterly foreign to the religious epistemologies implicit in the OT itself. The philosophers stereotyped as being concerned with Greek thinking, with reason, with proof, with unifying theories, whereas the texts, contexts and reception supposedly only deals in Hebraic thought, faith, experience and diversity. But the story of division does not end there and Flannery continues, The Presocratic philosophical theologians want to get behind the events to their principles (or archai), which, according to their very nature as explanations, need to be different from that which they explain; they need, that is, to be cleaner, less particular. Such an approach bears with it a certain ontological austerity, presupposing as it does that an explanation is better the more diverse the things it explains. (Flannery 2010, 84) Those familiar with the stories of 20th century biblical theologies and their acknowledged precursors will know that many leading OT theologians claim to hate are philosophical principles and abstractions. Belief in YHWH, even in the creation of the world, is not seen as a result of reasoning back to depersonalised prime matter. The personal nature of YHWH as living presence in history is emphasized, yet there is always the need to at least point out how the OT is different from philosophical theology. This is also evident with reference to how Flannery (2010, 84) includes in the discussion the relevant views of Xenophanes (ca. 565–470 BCE) and many OT scholars will perhaps recall the associated philosophical-theological critique of anthropomorphism via the analogy of animals engaged in theriomorphism. Whether or not they do, the fact is that to this day OT theologians feel the philosophical-theological urge to remark on the anthropomorphic first-order religious language used to describe YHWH in the world of the text. What they may not be aware of is that already by the 6th century BCE, philosophical theology of the type it took in Xenophanes also included the belief that there is one god greater than all the rest, incomparable to all other entities in terms of embodiment and states of consciousness. This is quite reminiscent of the poetic prophetic religious language in Isaiah 40–48, with the latter generally not called “philosophical

The complete OT scholar’s guide 27 theology” (though, as we shall see, often being hailed as more advanced that other OT texts in terms of approximating or pre-figuring philosophical (theoretical) monotheism). Both Hebrew and Greek thinking are here equally metaphysical and vague, with Xenophanes later being criticized by Aristotle for not clarifying his concepts (see the following discussion), and YHWH’s selfassertions being hailed for their rhetorical reticence. Perhaps also of interest is the absence in OT theologians’ interest in and research on Greek philosophical backgrounds to or obstacles to their disciplinary identity of what Lesher (2019, n.p.) explains about Xenophanes’ philosophical theology being little more than a metaphysical restatement of what was already believed about the divine nature in earlier varieties of Greek piety. Our next pre-Socratic, Parmenides, is often credited with a metaphysical idea many OT theologians, whether for linguistic, historical or philosophical reasons, or all of the above, love to hate, namely “Being”. Of interest is the kind of confessional language the philosophical-theological description involved. Many OT theologians have selectively and perhaps unwittingly borrowed therefrom whenever writing about YHWH as exemplifying one or more of the following characteristics, namely as being “uncreated, imperishable, one, continuous, unchangeable, and perfect” (Diels & Kranz 1951, 28Bb8.1–49, cited in Flannery 2010, 85). To be sure, there are many differences between Parmenides’ Being and the way OT theologians describe YHWH in the world of the text. But even where they differ, and especially the need to do so, presupposes the urge to clarify concepts of God in the OT comparatively vis-à-vis and through Parmenides’ notion of the divine as a “perfect being”. Granted, many OT theologians will say that the perfect-being theology they compare YHWH to is that of classical Christian theism in the medieval period. Yet the latter is in many ways what in Parmenides was still impersonal, now reified, deified and personified. So the buck in the genealogy of perfect being theology does not stop with Anselm. Furthermore, if one has not read Parmenides it is easy to overlook or forget that the narrator of his philosophical biography introduced his metaphysical views with a testimony about a direct experience of the effectual dynamic reality of a goddess who appeared to him revealing all these things (cf. Hazony 2012, 38). The introduction to “ancient philosophical theology” by Flannery (2010, 84) also helps clarifying what philosophical theology in these contexts meant and did not mean, specifically with reference to concepts of divinity among the Milesian cosmologists or “physicists” as Aristotle called them (see the following discussion). The philosophical-theological aspects of the metaphysical problems they confronted cannot be reduced to a worry about cosmic principles, prime matter or even the mereology of relations involved in the ontological dependence of beings on Being. Rather, it has everything to do with ontological distinctions between the axiological status of ultimate reality and ordinary beings. Add to become This second-order concern is something some OT scholars would not in principle have a problem with, even if the ontology distinctions supervening on the axiological status of YHWH in the world of the text is not the same as that of pre-Socratic Arches or divinities.

28  The complete OT scholar’s guide OT theologians do, however, make it a point to insist that belief in YHWH should not be thought of as being the result of speculating about first principles with abstract metaphysical concepts or reasoning back from the existence of the world as an effect in search of a cause, only explanatory sufficient if identified with divine creation. Of relevance to our story of philosophical-theological contributions to later biblical-theological worries in this case is the fact that Parmenides’ idea of Being as unchanging ultimate reality generated a number of very peculiar and interesting metaphysical puzzles that bothered many ancient philosophical theologians until they were considered partly resolved or dissolved in the neo-Platonism of Plotinus (Flannery 2010, 84). Here the discussion by Flannery acknowledges its indebtedness to earlier game-changing ideas by Werner Jaeger (1947). The latter’s discussion of the theology of the early Greek philosophers discredited the perspective of John Burnet (1920). Just as biblical theology took off and Hebrew thought was increasingly compared to Greek, specialists in the latter’s philosophical theology began to reflect on the possibility that the metaphysics involved did not see divinity related to a property of the cosmic rational principle (logos). Granting in the revised version of his Glifford Lectures series on The Origins of Natural Theology and the Greeks that this did not involve a concept of deity which modern Christian OT theologians assume when referring to “God” or “the Divine”, the point was that neither were they complete methodological naturalists who reasoned by way of abduction and inference to an abstract first principle (Jaeger 1947). The change in the way early Greek philosophical theology was viewed had a delayed reflection in the mirror later held up in OT theology almost 60 years later when, in 1991, another series of Glifford Lectures on natural theology were delivered, this time by an OT scholar we have come to know as Barr, James Barr. These were also subsequently revised and published under the title Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Barr 1993), and they were as revolutionary in light of biblical theology’s rejection of natural theology in Hebrew thought as Jaeger’s study following the rejection of philosophical theology in Greek thought. In that study, Barr does not really draw out the implication threads, given that natural theology and philosophical theology at the time and since then overlapped at certain points. Barr did briefly distinguish natural theology and philosophy of religion, but that was the end of it. Helping the guild to accept the presence of natural theology in the world of and behind the text of the OT is one thing; to speak of philosophical theology therein (the adjective being the deal-breaker) is quite another. OT theologians could still allow that YHWH was revealed indirectly in nature, but only to the extent of allowing certain understandings of YHWH’s presence, power and wisdom, as the OT itself suggests. What they could not do is respond to any madman rushing into their midst and announcing that the God of the Philosophers was dead and that they have killed him (with apologies to Nietzsche). Now, having wiped away the associated horizons to fuse, it might be time to rethink the relationship between the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, not only to natural but also philosophical theology. It would be too soon.

The complete OT scholar’s guide 29 Yet in hindsight, one could say that the study of Barr which showed the distinction between natural and revealed theology in the OT to be problematic was part of third-order ideas in play, mainly about what was owed by OT theologians to philosophical theologians for their mutual illusions. After four decades of research trying to explain how biblical theology relates to philosophy, for many being able to see how Barr could be right was an unmistakable relief. Whereas their historical gaze made them afraid, OT scholars in general and OT theologians in particular now saw for the very first time how easy it was to just let go of the fallacies identified in their anti-philosophicaltheological sentiment. Barr held up to them a mirror of what they were, of what the whole big drama of biblical theology as something over and against all forms of philosophical theology was. From his Semantics of Hebrew Language (Barr, 1961), criticizing the Hebrew-Greek thought opposition in the forms it took at the time to his History and Ideology on OT studies at the End of a Millennium (Barr 2000) wherein the turn to (post-modern) philosophy is predicted, the rage against philosophical theology was by implication shown by Barr to be based on residual meta-philosophical presumption. Who wants to think that their entire career and everything that they loved, hated, remembered and suffered because of philosophical-theological frameworks was all just a dream they had inside a closed metaphilosophical box – the dream of being a biblical rather than philosophical theologian. Back to the story. At this point we finally arrive at the time “ever since Plato” (427–348 BCE). Many OT theologians mention the philosopher by name, either to reluctantly give etymological credit for one of the earliest uses of the “theology” or to show their disdain for Plato’s Socrates’ quest for definitions or for his idealist metaphysics and critical aesthetics (dislike of rhetoric and poetry). But as Flannery (2010, 85) shows by implication, Plato’s philosophical-theological views are rather complex, diverse and not systematic at all. The associated texts involve both the use of myths used to illustrate by analogy metaphysical truths that cannot be constructed in the form of logical arguments and abstract concepts. Plato even offers a prophetic critique of cultic practices that are based on the assumption that sacrifices to the gods are “service in exchange for goods” (Flannery 2010, 86). Plato also rejected both older immoral conceptions of the divine and those philosophical theologies that claim there is no divine interest in the personal lives of mortals and no divine intervention in history. His reason? This would contradict the belief that the divine is good and, being good, divinity cannot be associated with injustice, which is exactly what deistic forms of theism would imply. Of course, OT theologies are not usually in the business of mentioning this (as we shall see more clearly in the next chapter; for a popular introduction to and translation of Plato’s works, see Cooper 1996; for a classic introduction to Plato’s theology, see Solmsen 1942). Perhaps one of the most overlooked legacies and contributions of Platonism (not necessarily the ideas of Plato himself) to the metaphysical assumptions of OT scholars involves providing them with a warrant for taking for granted the existence of “abstract objects” (not to be confused with what

30  The complete OT scholar’s guide OT theologians call “abstract concepts”). Abstract objects are technical philosophical terms like kinds, properties, relations, events, propositions, states of affairs. Another is the worry about perceiving the essential unity in what otherwise appears only as diversity. A third contribution of Platonism is the philosophical-theological concern with the relationship between divinity and the cosmic and moral orders. Interminable logical dilemmas arise whenever a classical analyses of key moral concepts is supervened on by the meta-ethical assumption that requires as necessary condition causal relata being metaphysically grounded in – and ontological dependent on – the nature and attributes of divinity. Besides Plato – and perhaps even more than Plato – Aristotle’s legacy in OT theology is something to behold, bordering as it does on the indelible. More detail and examples will follow in the net chapter. For the present, suffice it to note that, as Flannery (2010, 6–7, 84) shows, Aristotle does not offer a unified systematic view on what theology is or on relations between “philosophy” and “theology”. On the one hand, theology is equated with tales told by poets to seduce men and make them quiet (theomuthos rather than theologos). The problem for Aristotle is that such writers care little for the absurdities and vagueness involved in how they construct their conceptions of the divine. On the other hand, Aristotle identifies his own metaphysical ideas with theology to the extent of equating both as being concerned with “first philosophy” or “the science of being qua being”. OT theologians in general may be dismissive of Aristotle’s logic, ontological categories and his simplistic view of metaphor as compact simile. Yet many Aristotelian philosophical-theological ideas derived from Aristotle’s views of essence, predication, properties, rhetoric, poetry and other things are still present in the way OT theologians talk about YHWH (as the next chapter will show) (cf. Barnes 1984 for a helpful introduction and translation to Aristotle’s related writings). Research on Greek philosophical theology after Aristotle often identified the associated trends as “Hellenistic” (cf. Long & Sedley 1987). Flannery (2010, 88) also mentions the contributions of the Stoics to ancient philosophical theology, from the 3rd century BCE onwards. Some of these are relevant in the context of this chapter’s genealogical remarks on related philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories that keep re-appearing as residual anomalies within the secondorder discourse of OT scholarship. One is to assume that reflection on the nature, not of the divine but on its existence is necessary for piety. OT theologians can thank Cleanthes (330–230 BCE) for this idea, at least in its later theological formulations. He preceded Luther and Kant in the desire to remove theology from metaphysics. Also here we find more focussed discussion – long before the historical and literary-critical turns in biblical interpretation – of the meaning of non-philosophical and even mythological religious language on its own terms, rather than focussing on philosophical criticism aimed at perceived metaphysical, epistemological, logical, moral and aesthetic imperfections.

The complete OT scholar’s guide 31 Questions concerning the link between the second-order philosophicaltheological concepts of creation and providence also received early sustained attention from this point onwards. The lasting effects of these linger as traces in OT theologians ’remarks on philosophical-theological puzzles generated by older ancient Near Eastern and Greek notions of chaos (which is a Greek word) and divinity and the quest for teleology (purpose) in the cosmic order (logos), better known as divine revelation in and through history. And while few OT theologians might like to think of being indebted to ideas generally dated back to and located in postAristotelean Stoic philosophical theology, the links with and allusions to some of these ideas as indicated should be obvious. With reference to Epicureanism, the brief remarks by Flannery (2010, 88) can once again be used as part of a functional frame of reference. Here we find some of the relevant precursors to the concepts, concerns and categories more often popularly associated with the so-called classical theism of medieval Latin philosophical-theology. The latter, in turn, still supervene on the forms OT scholars choose to utilize when structuring their second-order discourse to comment on the implied metaphysical contents of first-order religious language constructions of YHWH in the world of the text. Particularly noteworthy is that with Epicureanism, and contrary to what we saw with the Stoics, truth about divine revelation in nature is no longer deemed transparent or as the kind of thing allowing itself to be restated in concise metaphysical terms. Furthermore, morality does not involve living “according to nature” and one infers the divine will purely from what happens and tends to happen in the world. To be sure, one major difference is that here the gods are constructed in far more apathetic terms than one finds in the OT. Even so, theological reflection is seen as needing to be converted from what was considered too abstract speculation about the nature of divinity for its own sake to more practical (wisdom) reflection on how one should live in relation to other humans and things in the world. When OT theologians echo the same terms and conditions, descriptively apt as it may be with reference to the world of the text or behind the text itself, the genealogy of the academic second-order biblical-theological rhetoric has Greek philosophical-theological ancestry written all over it. At this point of the discussion of ancient philosophical theology, we turn our attention temporarily away from “Greek thought” to what can accordingly be stereotyped as “Roman thought”. Interestingly, biblical theologians in general and OT theologians in particular seem to worry relatively less about Hebrew thought compared to Roman. One will not encounter too much emphasis on rejecting he concepts and categories of Latin philosophical theology. To be sure, some of the Latin terms in dogmatic theology have been considered as anachronistic and out of place in the context of OT theology. This is reiterated in many introductions to the Theological ­Encyclopedia first-year students of studying towards a degree in theology have to master. Those who end up as OT scholars often come from the same broad background. Therein they internalize the assumption that any

32  The complete OT scholar’s guide theology calling itself biblical in the historical as opposed to merely confessional sense should be aware of medieval origin of the second-order Latin philosophical currencies they trade in have to internalize to this day. Frequently systematic or dogmatic theologies make the claim that they are writing or teaching “biblical theology.” Their work is “biblical” because, in the spirit of traditional Protestantism, they look to Scripture as their primary norm for the statement of Christian doctrine. All well and good, but then these systems go on and discuss the divine attributes and essence by dividing the discussions into such categories as attributa incommunicabilia and attributa communicabilia. . . . I make the point with no intention of impugning on the value of these terms, but only to point out that the technical language of divine attributes arose during the Middle Ages. (Muller 1991, 38) No doubt many OT theologians and philosophical theologians operating in various contexts will agree with this. But as we shall see in the next chapter, all the leading OT theologians, employed Latin second-order concepts more than many might remember. Furthermore, it is easy to miss where exactly the problem is said to lie. On closer inspection, the point seems to be that one is mistaken if one thinks that second-order discourse operating with the specific medieval philosophical-theological distinctions between classes of divine attributes mentioned is still means confining oneself only to what is actually said within first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the OT itself, and that on its own terms. The problem is that the older Roman philosophical-theological terms are by now indelible in both ordinary and religious language in the Christian West. Latinisms with philosophical-theological roots in so-called Greek thought and a history Hellenistic metaphysics have been dissolved like ink in water and cannot be extracted without ending god-talk as we know it. The associated Latin theological jargon (Germanized and Anglicised) and the philosophical assumptions that constituted the conditions of possibility for their meaningful use are now the only language available for how OT theologians talk about YHWH even and perhaps especially on those occasions where they reject the use of philosophical-theological language by offering comparative philosophical perspectives. One of the reasons all this could happen includes the fact that for the longest time, Latin was the language of both Church and academia in much of the Latin Christian West to the extent that students of philosophy, theology and other subjects had to write their research on the OT in Latin until relatively recently. Other reasons supervening on the situation are more ­specifically philosophical-theological and perhaps more decisive for what was, is and were to come with the arrival of Christianity, which created OT theology as OT and as theology by combining the biblical texts with philosophical-theological interests, among others. This is readily apparent

The complete OT scholar’s guide 33 when we consider the Roman Latin contributions to metaphilosophicaltheological theorizing relevant to our discussion. A helpful overview of how philosophical, poetic and political varieties of theology became distinguished can be found in Cupitt (1997, 113). It was Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex (140–182 BCE) who argued that philosophers, poets and officials of state institutions use the concept of divinity in different ways and to different ends. This is an early precursor to the development of linguistic sensitivities and an appreciation of the relevance of pragmatics rather than just semantics when asking what religious language descriptions of the divine is supposed to be about. The contribution is forgotten, assimilated in the ways OT theologians assume as given in the nuances offered in different types of socio-literary varieties of biblical criticism. These involve reductionist distinctions between the ontological status and nature of YHWH in different social and literary contexts, e.g. worlds behind, of and in front of the text, personal and family religion, clan and tribal theologies as well as state or monarchic varieties (see Brueggemann 1997, 118; Gerstenberger 2002). As Cupitt (1997, 114) points out, the same philosophical-theological distinction would be further and more decisively refined by Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE) in the following ways (based on the reception in Augustine and here applied to the concerns of the present discussion): 1 Poetical theology (similar and different from later biblical and OT theology) is the kind that is engaged in and limited to the interpretation and actualisation of myths and anthropomorphic representations of the divine in sacred texts. 2 Philosophical theology (similar and different from later doctrinal and systematic theology) is that which is focussed on the nature of things in the world and stereotypically operates with methodological naturalism. 3 Civil theology (similar and different form later practical theology) deals with matters related to how one educates nations, suitable for schools and forums and interested in the socio-historical context of the worship of the gods. The next Roman philosophical theologian relevant to our OT scholar’s introduction to the stories of philosophical theology is Sextus Empiricus (160–210). As a member of the Sceptics, his contributions directly to philosophical theology and only indirectly to OT theology include the distinction between explicit and implicit second-order discourse. For example, he suggested that there might well be implicit philosophical theology within all form of theism as condition of their possibility. This irrespective of whether the associated philosophical contents can be identified or extracted with sufficient conceptual clarity. On this view, second-order thinking is present in the logic of prior reasoning involved and the metaphysical questions to which the first-order religious language appear to assume, include or imply different forms of answers to. This view was based on the observation of

34  The complete OT scholar’s guide and inferences from the ways in which any religion with a god or gods operate without fail operate with a set of unwritten metaphysical presuppositions, problems and perspectives implicit in the religious language and with reference to the relationship between the divine and the cosmic and moral orders. Whatever the mereology, it supervenes on everything one could infer about the nature, attributes and relations of the divine to the world and things in the world, thereby including both theological and ethical issues in its metaphysical framework, irrespective of whether these are formulated as part of a philosophical system or not. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, OT theologians believe likewise to the extent that they consider first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text as capable of being restated in comparative metaphysical terms. The discussion of ancient philosophical theology by Flannery (2010, 88–89) then moves on to Plotinus (204–270). His neo-Platonist framework led to a disdain for based on “fables” types of theology in academic settings that focussed only on reading their own confessions into sacred myths of poetic theology. Scholarship worthy of the name should not neglect philosophicaltheological interpretation that seeks to reconstruct the metaphysics and ontology required for the nature of reality in fictional (or metaphorical) religious language to be the way it is, or to be at all. Perhaps more interesting to many OT scholars is that here one encounters early traces of the concept of philosophical theology as narrative. This is often overlooked when OT theologians refer dismissively to concepts of divine aseity, which historians of philosophical theology have linked to Plotinus’ concept of “the One”. This is often conflated with paradoxes generated within monotheistic conceptions of the divine identity, another conundrum connected to Plotinus’ philosophical theology of ultimately reality as transcending the metaphysical distinctions between subject and object. Granted, Plotinus’ “the One” is nothing like the personal God of classical Christian theism. Yet the influence of his ideas on early medieval Christian philosophical theologians like Augustine and others lie behind the insatiable desire in biblical theology in general and OT theology in particular to dissociate themselves from the abstractions and paradoxes generated by neo-Platonist perfect being theology. The discussion in the section on philosophical theology within the history of philosophy of religion then turns to the medieval period. In discussing “The Christian Contribution”, Scott Macdonald (2010, 91) notes a development within philosophical theology that would become important, if partly forgotten. For it is here that we encounter the philosophical-theological theoretical innovations in response to various forces and influenced by various factors that are known by different names, also to OT theologians. What we find is something distinct from natural theology and the associated emphasis on proof without recourse to alleged sources of divine revelation or appeal to the authority sacred texts narrating religious experiences. Here philosophical theology opens itself up to be able to operate as part of historical inquiry in the form of “conceptual clarification”. The latter is still considered a philosophical activity, even though it is descriptive and concerned

The complete OT scholar’s guide 35 with questions of meaning prior to questions of truth and epistemic justification. Although it has included a concern with conceptual coherence and logical analysis, as we shall see in the next chapter, the relevance of this method lies in the fact that it is still in use today even within OT theology, despite stopping short of attempts at propositional justification and a philosophical-critical analysis of truth-claims and reasoning implicit in the OT’s first-order religious language. Augustine (354–430), as Macdonald (2010, 92) remarks, considered the task of philosophical theology to include not only reasoning from or to certain ideas but also as involving reflection on what religious language means when the perceived meaning is restated in certain metaphysical terms. This descriptive task was seen as complementing the more evaluative varieties of philosophical-theological commentary on biblical texts. The objective was to take what was given and offering a philosophical translation of what is said, whether or not it seems provable or doubtful. Of course this was still pre-critical inquiry with apologetic and polemical agendas and often lacking in historical consciousness. Yet the basic or general idea would never really again leave philosophical theology or biblical (here OT) theology again, the later turns to historical and socio-literary approaches notwithstanding. Consider one of the example of conceptual clarification in the philosophical theology of the time mentioned by MacDonald (2010, 93) and here adapted to show what is relevant to the context of related trends in the history of OT interpretation. What was involved was not so much philosophical commentators trying to prove YHWH as depicted in the world of the text exists but as scholars of sacred Scripture desiring to clarify the concept of divine existence by analysing the meaning of the proposition inferable from the religious language of the OT and according to which “YHWH exists”. The warrant for this descriptive metaphysics is found in Varro’s distinction between philosophical and poetical theology, using the former to make sense of ontological distinctions implicit in the latter and remaining even after considering literary nuances and tropes. Admittedly, as a Platonist Augustine is not fond of the ways in which poets dramatize older myths in their songs, plays and assorted other media (i.e. poetic theology). Yet analogous to how some of the Greek philosophers disliked earlier Greek mythology and drama yet in their metaphysical reflection still depended on constructing a depersonalised version of concepts of the divine identified therein, so too Augustine’s philosophical theology mixes in poetical theology to end up, not with pure philosophical theology, but with a philosophical version of what has been called narrative or epic theology (see Cupitt 1997, 115). Proclus (412–485), a Greek “pagan” neo-Platonist thinker of the time can be included here given the influence his philosophical theology had and the traces of it which still linger in the nooks and crannies of OT scholarship to this day. Building on Plato’s ideas about divine inspiration, here we encounter a further development of the theory that narrative (re-telling) rather than metaphysical concepts is the best genre for theology whose ultimate aim may still require more systematic philosophical expression.

36  The complete OT scholar’s guide Proclus was eager to demonstrate the harmony of the ancient religious revelations (the mythologies of Homer and Hesiod, the Orphic theogonies and the Chaldaean Oracles) and to integrate them in the philosophical tradition of Pythagoras and Plato. (Helmig and Steel 2019, n.p.) The reasons for this include the argument that religious language in sacred narratives involves concepts in ways not strictly in accordance with dialectic or classical logical criteria. Instead, it combines story and poetry with symbolism and imagination in ways which, may not be sufficiently explicit about its second-order philosophical background, Philosophical exegesis can nevertheless be used for identifying and clarifying the fuzzy folkmetaphysics incidentally included in any given written representation of a god. Again, and to the best of my knowledge, OT scholars writing about the way YHWH is depicted in the world of the text and how different the implicit metaphysical assumptions are from those in Greek philosophy do not as a rule show awareness of their method’s neo-Platonic philosophicaltheological roots. This is the case, not only in conservative canonical approaches to OT theology seeking to harmonise theological pluralism at the metaphysical level. It is also true of later liberal theological accounts of the history of Israelite religion or the narrative from Genesis to 2 Kings, acknowledging all the sources, traditions, redactions, etc. One might call this ironic, but as will be shown in the next chapter, there is very little that is new under the philosophical-theological sun, even in OT scholarship. Next up is Boethius (480–524) whose contribution included utilising Aristotelian logic to discuss the coherency of concepts associated with doctrines central to the Christian creed. Because the latter draws a lot on the OT, we here also see a further addition to the tradition of “philosophical reflection on revelation and Scripture” (Macdonald 2010, 93). Of course, this kind of philosophical theology was never universally accepted. As Macdonald (2010, 94) recounts, Christian institutions sometimes rejected philosophical-theological questions related to the OT because what were seen as the pagan roots of pagan roots were said to lead to critical exegesis and in turn to the contradiction of dogma. Furthermore, wherever philosophical theology was seen as concerned with reasoning about metaphysical attributes of YHWH without being able to appeal to the authority of revelation in Scripture, equally potentially heretical ideas seemed to follow. Also, not unlike what still happens to be the case in OT theology today, philosophical theology was disliked for being too abstract and intellectually vain and something to which the average devoted religious person could not relate to or possibly find edifying in any way. Paradoxically, it was in fact these objections to philosophical theology that reinvigorated attempts to reframe its task to show its worth in a given context. Incidentally, something analogous happens to be the motivating factor for the revised philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories to be discussed in some of the chapters to follow.

The complete OT scholar’s guide 37 Macdonald (2010, 93) also discusses a contribution to philosophical theology by Anselm (1033–1109) that OT scholars might wish to take note of. Well aware of the anti-philosophical sentiment among some authorities and biblical interpreters, he nevertheless bit the bullet and changed the title of the text wherein his ontological argument for the existence of God was what can be translated as “Faith seeking understanding” to the Proslogion. As for his own contribution to philosophical theology at the time and relevant to the purposes of our present discussion in relation the OT, Anselm is associated with having expanded the list of biblical topics in need of descriptive philosophical commentary. The task of the philosophical theologian, perhaps even the primary one, was seen as identifying what the OT texts imply to be metaphysical assumptions about the nature of God and contemporary questions raised in the interpretation of these. Here too the method adopted was one of philosophical analysis rather than philosophical argument. The objective was to offer a polemical comparative-philosophical perspective on (rather than a harmony of) what the texts might mean in metaphysical terms, e.g. in relation to the concepts, concerns and categories of particular metaphysical thinkers (e.g. Plato, Aristotle). The last but definitely not least of the presently named medieval contributors to the idea of philosophical theology as conceptual clarification will be Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). As Macdonald (2010, 96) mentions, a condition of possibility present involved a distinction between natural and philosophical theology. Natural theology appeals to reason and experience rather than to alleged sources of divine revelation. Philosophical theology, though not in a position to prove the truth of the Bible, had the task of asking the question of what an OT text could be said to mean when its implied assumptions related to philosophical-theological topics are restated in the idiom of a particular philosopher’s metaphysical terms. This approach to biblical interpretation should not be confused with the kind of philosophical commentary which focussed on different senses of Scripture, for example the kinds of allegory ancient Greek philosophers and neo-Platonist Christian mystics had recourse to in order to harmonize mythological conceptions of the divine with their esoteric second-order ontologies. Instead, the philosophical-theological exegete sought to determine the literal sense and then proceeded with the task of manifestatio or (conceptual) clarification. Admittedly, philosophical theology as a form of biblical translation aiming to make visible nascent metaphysical assumptions was no purely historical operation. On the contrary, it was part of polemical and apologetical arguments against readings of the OT whereby its religious language can be taken to contradict orthodox beliefs about the divine nature and attributes. By the time we come to “philosophical theology” in the time of the socalled Protestant Reformation, both philosophical and OT theologians tend to construct it falling into disrepute within the associated Christian traditions’ methods of biblical interpretation. For this is supposed to be the first stirrings of an independent variety of biblical theology. One might recall Luther’s

38  The complete OT scholar’s guide anti-Aristotelian logic dream within a pro-Platonist metaphysical dream in order to achieve a state of lucid dreaming before waking up to a return to the Bible (yet again). What is often bracketed is the fact that philosophicaltheological assumptions are part of and not something over and against the Reformation’s link with Gabler’s call for the separation of biblical theology and systematic theology (not all philosophical theology) and Baur’s more nuanced distinction between OT and NT theology within biblical theology. One example of this is hidden in the value of being convinced by “plain reason” (with or without Scripture) in the rationalist philosophies of Spinoza and in the Lutheran and Pietistic philosophical theology of German idealists like Kant and Hegel that in turn supervened on 18th- and 19th-century theologies of the OT nowadays considered redundant for the same reason. ­ erold With the arrival of modern Continental philosophical theology, as M Westphal (2010, 113) in his discussion of the associated currents notes, There seems to be no clear and consistent distinction between philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. Yet, on purely linguistic grounds one would seem to have God and the other religion as its primary subject matter. . . . from David Hume and Immanuel Kant to Friedrich Nietzsche the focus shifted from philosophizing about God to philosophizing about religion. The author subsequently continues to add some qualifications to the popular stereotype of the Western tradition, The matter is not that simple, for talking about religion cannot so easily be separated from talking about God. Still, . . . a sea change in modern philosophy, the transition from philosophical theology to philosophy of religion in the narrower sense of philosophizing about religion. . . . When philosophical theology will return in our own time, often as if nothing had happened in the meanwhile, it will call itself the philosophy of religion. (Westphal 2010, 113) From Westphal’s overview of how philosophical theology became philosophy of religion, the need for a more nuanced manner of speaking about related changes in the concurrent stories of OT interpretation becomes readily apparent. In response to the request for some specificity, the turn to comparative religious history (and to a form of biblical theology not subservient to philosophical readings in dogmatic theology) is not correctly constructed as amounting to a complete turn away from philosophical theology as philosophy of religion. On the contrary, the turn away from the older metaphysics and the emphasis on epistemology popularly associated with Kant as well as the rise of increasing historical consciousness connected with Hegel were part of the process that would eventually lead to the sublimation, transformation and assimilation of the associated philosophical assumptions in the form of

The complete OT scholar’s guide 39 OT hermeneutics, the already noted separation of biblical and dogmatic theology and later OT and NT theology, the distinction between the Yahwism in the OT and the history of Israelite religion, comparative ancient Near Eastern studies during the 19th century. As we shall see in the next chapter, all the major related developments in the 20th century were partly the result of philosophical-theological considerations. These include the emphasis on theology over and against religion, the turn to religious language (as metaphor) and the associated “paradigm shift” from historical criticism to varieties of literary and social-scientific approaches. The aforementioned events are all part of the same dream. The dream of philosophical theologians in the modern world looking to use reason to make room for faith, by constructing as binary opposites Hebrew and Greek thought, the Bible and philosophy, and everything related as initially a form of apologetics. The same dream that OT theologians have, and as will become clear in the next chapter, like all our intra-disciplinary dreams, there’s a philosophical “monster” waiting at the end of it. And while this may create unbearable suspense, rest assured that as with YHWH and Leviathan in Psalm 104, this kind of monster was created that one may play with it. Doubling back to the world of the Enlightenment dream, and we begin our descent into modern critical consciousness with a discussion of some of the associated contributions to philosophical theology of present relevance to OT scholars as encountered in the ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). As Shokhin (2011, 180) reminds us, Kant’s critique of “pure reason” presupposes “the term theologia rationalis, as the opposition to theologia revelata”, i.e. the opposition between rational and revealed theology. This opposition was not simply a faith-based assumption or a conclusion following validly from the premises that could be brought to bear to the variables involved. Rather, it was a deliberate and prudent move from Kant to deny that the relation between philosophy and theology was either one of harmony or one of conflict. Beyond the dichotomy Kant used critical reason to make room for revelation by showing that while the former cannot prove the latter, they are equally frail and fragile with reference to knowledge of the essence of God. Having thus created a safe and sacred space, what used to be called revelation (the OT) could be read without having to worry about real reference in the first-order religious language used to depict YHWH in any given world of the text. It allows also that world to be purely phenomenal, i.e. containing only what is apparent, thereby offering philosophical and biblical theologians a new way after Plato’s Forms and Aristotle’s categories to write about divine unity in diversity. As will become clear in the next chapter, numerous terms in our not, this formulation of second-order descriptions as well as the warrant for their use are forgotten Kantian currency and very much indebted to Kantian philosophical theology’s anti-metaphysical orientation (see Westphal 2010, 135–136). Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) is also a familiar name in the history of OT interpretation. His philosophical-theological ideas became a popular frame of reference for, many OT scholars interested in discussing

40  The complete OT scholar’s guide first-order religious language representations of YHWH in the world of the text yet fed up with the kind of metaphysical concerns that used to be all the rage in earlier and contemporary rationalist scholastic and deistic varieties of philosophical theology (see Westphal 2010, 136). The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our being and living is a being and living in and through God. But it is not necessary that the Deity should be presented as also one distinct object. (Schleiermacher, as cited in Westphal 2010, 135) To this day many OT theologians prefer to think likewise that all secondorder thinking about the divine nature, attributes and relations implicit in the OT is but a supplement to mere externals in biblical spirituality. They also have Schleiermacher’s related philosophical-theological ideas to thank or blame for distinguishing what they imply to be the essence of Yahwism from contingent ethical norms and offensive cultic rituals, which in turn warrants some distinction between OT theology and OT ethics. Another legacy of Schleiermacher’s philosophical theology is present wherever lived (religious) experience – and that based on profound feeling rather than abstract thought – is suggested as the primary point of orientation for any epistemology of Israelite religion. The latter philosophical-theological framework often operates with reference to conceiving of “faith” in the OT as an awareness of the absolute ontological dependence of all finite things on YHWH as infinite, rather than as a conclusion following from rational doubt, speculation or argument. G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1830) in the next name to drop, infamous for his (in)direct but pervasive influence on the games OT scholars play. What will get one disqualified from most exegetical events include his idealism, his systematic thinking, his developmentalism, his abstractions. They like his historical sense, his dialectic, his move beyond Kant by arguing against the essence/appearance binary with the suggestion that appearances are themselves part of what is essential. Hegel is too much the speculative thinker to be satisfied with either Kant’s reduction of religion to morality or Schleiermacher’s reduction to feeling. Religion must be the knowledge of God, and while Hegel finds Kant’s theology unconvincing, he finds Schleiermacher’s, to which he is more sympathetic, simply confused. He rejects all Romantic claims to immediacy on the grounds that they either are empty of all conceptual content whatsoever and thus compatible with every absurd belief and every immoral practice, or have a content that needs to be articulated and defended. The appeal to immediacy is merely dogmatism in disguise. Schleiermacher is just kidding himself when he thinks his own talk

The complete OT scholar’s guide 41 about the Infinite and Eternal is not already a conceptual mediation that requires analysis and argument as much as more traditional talk about Trinity, Incarnation, atonement, and so forth. Hegel thus assigns to himself the twin tasks of defending metaphysical theorizing in the aftermath of Kant and of developing a religiously significant metaphysics. (Westphal 2010, 136) From the associated Hegelian point of view, individual bits and pieces of theological perspectives in the OT or the logic of belief revision in the history of Israelite religions supervening thereon may not make sense or seem true, but everything moves towards the whole which itself is the truth. To be sure, Hegel’s views of ancient Judaism and the early application of Hegel’s adapted and mediated ideas were not so positive regarding the philosophicaltheological value of the OT. Even so, OT scholars who argued along the same lines but pro-Semitic were nevertheless indebted to elements indirectly derived from Hegel’s philosophical-theological framework, even if not so much on its actual contents. Perhaps the greatest philosophical-theological legacy of Hegel was the particular ways in which it contributed to a renewed appreciation of the historical and relational nature of both the religious language in the OT and of the second-order concepts OT construct to clarify it. Not that this is what Hegel wanted under ideal(ist) circumstances: Thus G. W. F. Hegel complains bitterly about the prevailing assumption that we do not know God, which, therefore, “permits us to speak merely of our relation to Him, to speak of religion and not of God Himself.” The result is that “we at least hear much talk . . . about religion, and therefore all the less about God Himself”. (Westphal 2010, 133) The dialectical logic operative in Hegel’s philosophical-theology also created a theoretical space in which biblical theology’s dependence on both muthos and logos did not have to be seen as involving incommensurable conditions of possibility. Hegelian idealism . . . becomes the basis for the radical reinterpretation (demythologizing) rather than the rejection of traditional theistic and Christian themes; and it is unlike the Spinozism of Schleiermacher in that it will not hide in claims to immediate feeling but will seek to articulate and defend itself in philosophical argument. (Westphal 2010, 137) Of course, there were also good reasons for OT scholars, theologians and philosophers to reject certain Hegelian philosophical-theological assumptions, questions and ideas. Of course, different people had different and even opposing reasons for doing so, all of which made sense in relation to their

42  The complete OT scholar’s guide own ideas about what philosophical-theologians want and what makes OT scholarship what it is, as well as relevant and different. And since what happened between philosophical and biblical theology did happen rather than the alternative, obviously one has to accept what is, have some “error theory” and “save the phenomena”. But it was never either/or and there are possible worlds where philosophical theology could have been a recognised part of OT scholarship. I say recognised because as will be argued in the next chapter, it never really left the building. It just became part of the furniture one could use rather than acknowledge. Interestingly, the first reference to philosophical theology in the title of a book in the English speaking world is popularly traced back to the publication by Frederick Robert Tennant. Tennant (1928–1929) wrote a two-volume work, Philosophical Theology, wherein we can see the beginning of a turn away from the historicist trends up to that point and a return to the descriptive tasks of philosophical theology. Yet for most of the first half of the 20th century, the effects of what Richard Rorty called the “linguistic turn” in philosophy on philosophical approaches in theology broadly construed initially privileged neither conceptual clarification nor propositional justification of particular doctrines in a particular religious tradition. Instead, the the focus was on preliminaries regarding the conditions of possibility for demonstrating internal and external conceptual coherency and the meaningfulness of religious language within the parameters presented by the contemporary metaphilosophical climate. An associated meta-epistemological distinction relevant to the present chapter’s historical introduction to constructions of the concept of philosophical theology for fellow OT scholars is succinctly outlined by Crisp and Rea (2009): A bit of history is needed to understand the genesis of this skepticism. It is common now to see the field of philosophy as divided broadly into two camps – ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’ – and to locate the origins of the division somewhere in the first half of the twentieth century. The two sides elude precise definition and cannot plausibly be seen as encompassing all philosophical work. Furthermore, it is misleading to treat them as either wholly discreet from one another or as anything more than loosely unified within themselves. Still at the risk of dramatically oversimplifying, we offer the following characterizations. The analytic tradition has, by and large, treated philosophy as an explanatory enterprise aimed at analyzing fundamental concepts (‘person’, ‘action’, ‘law’, etc.) and as using the analytic method to extend and clarify the theoretical work done in the natural sciences. The Continental tradition, on the other hand, has viewed philosophy as an autonomous discipline aimed, more or less, at exploring or promoting our understanding of the human condition in creatively and decidedly non-scientific ways. (Flint & Rea 2009, 1–2)

The complete OT scholar’s guide 43 The overview given by Flint and Rea (2009, 1) can be taken to conclude that the type of disagreements over the assumptions, questions, method and objectives and scope of philosophical theology during the first half of the 20th century effectively ruled out fruitful collaboration possibilities between philosophical and biblical theologians. Granted, this was not always, everywhere and in every way the case. As we shall see in the chapters to follow, there were always mixed feelings among OT theologians that led them to both reject philosophical theology and at the same time retain a residual hybrid philosophical-theological framework. The Continental tradition in philosophical theology, which seldom identified itself as such by name, developed in different directions that some of which were in fact welcomed by OT scholars in general and biblical theologians in particular, especially as a source of hermeneutic consultants. OT theologians at the time benefited from the doubt as to whether one could still meaningfully do philosophical theology in traditional ways. And so, during the decades to follow, roughly between 1930–1960, as philosophical theology drifted into the background, biblical theology in general and OT theology began to come into their own by way of a systematic process of immunising itself to the possible effects of cross-disciplinary conceptual contagion from the general criticism against philosophical theology as natural theology. How? By opposing itself to philosophical theology thereby making guilt by association appear redundant. The rest is history. Hebrew thought was held to be metaphysically, epistemologically, morally and even logically incommensurable with Greek Western philosophical traditions. By middle of the 20th century onwards, however, philosophical theology in the analytic tradition was starting to make a comeback. Not that OT theologians could afford to care much, being too busy thinking up ways to burn old bridges. The turn associated with the impetus of relevance in what was otherwise a general philosophical revival is usually linked to the publication by Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (1955). In this edited volume entitled New Essays in Philosophical Theology, it was argued that philosophical theology can meaningfully be revived as a species of—rather than separate from or as the outdated precursor to—the genus of general philosophy of religion. Thus whereas philosophy of religion was supposed to be concerned about religion in general, philosophical theology would be a more focused venture, the task of which was to look at philosophical issues arising from the study of particular religious traditions. In this way the reason/revelation distinction that demarcated philosophy from theology ended up being successfully blurred. Of course, while OT theology would include the odd reference to works that were being produced in the auxiliary discipline, the most prudent relation was to defer most common interest to the philosophical theologians. This deferral was a matter of convenience rather than conviction and, being made by biblical theologians, the implied philosophical-theological beneficiary was the one abiding in dogmatics or systematic theology rather than in philosophy proper.

44  The complete OT scholar’s guide Things gained momentum from the 1960s onwards (see e.g., inter alia, Curtis 1967; Ross 1969; Howe 1970; Mavrodes 1970; Evans 1971; Farrer 1967, 1972; Roth 1975). Christian philosophers of religion, mostly in the analytic tradition, began to apply new ideas in analytic metaphysics with the aim of clarifying concepts related to what used to be truths known on authority of revelation only. OT theologians for their part still looked mostly to Continental philosophical theologians (like Gadamer, Ricoeur and others) for comfort. Yet most Continental thinkers had until relatively recently decided to interact with the OT quite independently from work done in biblical theology. Examples in philosophical theology specifically include, among others, Weischedel (1971) on the “God of the Philosophers”, “Weischedel (1973) on “philosophy of religion or philosophical theology” and Salaquarda (1971) on “philosophical theology in the shadow of nihilism”. During and after the 1980s more and more research was being done by philosophers (of religion) who had no problem calling what they were doing philosophical theology. The change involved a move away from the usual critical analysis of general natural theological theistic and atheistic arguments related to the nature and existence of God to the tasks next on the philosophical-theological agenda following earlier developments in metaphilosophical inquiry. In an influential essay on how philosophical theology became possible with the analytic tradition of philosophy, Woltersdorff (2009, 155–168) refers to an increased interest in the new modal metaphysics (over and against logical empiricism and Kantian scepticism), the revival of conceptual clarification (over and against dated varieties of conceptual history and conceptual analysis), changes in meta-epistemology (seeing the demise of classical foundationalism) and the idea that justified religious beliefs require adherence to evidentialism (as in Hume, Marx, Freud and others). In the wake of these broader philosophical ideas and inferences made to their implications in applied methodological contexts, the older positivist critiques and other forms of anti-metaphysical scepticism were seen as no longer decisive in opposing philosophical theology in its new forms. From this followed the revising and reviving of many topics a few decades ealier declared absurd or outdated (cf. Kenny 1987; Scharlemann 1989). The idiom of this particular variety of analytic Christian philosophical theology in the English speaking world is clearly what is in view in some of James Barr’s influential references to and comments on that discipline and its relation to biblical theology sampled in Chapter 1. This is evident in the way philosophical theology as something OT scholars have little use for is equated with abstraction, with questions like “it depends on what you mean by ‘God’ ”, with an interest in semantics and propositional statements and, of course, not clearly distinguished from natural theology. On occasion, the other OT theologians, otherwise more accepting of Continental perspectives, also involve analytic thinkers. This occurs mainly

The complete OT scholar’s guide 45 in the context of discussing pragmatic aspects of religious language and warranted by the new turn to epistemology in philosophical theology that left the older historical and linguistic concerns behind (often to an extent that bordered on fundamentalism in some Christian philosophical theologians). For the most part, however, the new developments in the analytic tradition never really infiltrated OT theology, which had by now all but forbidden philosophical-theological interests, at least officially. Their main concern still lied with whether and to what extent the claims they considered part of the essence of pure Yahwism (the claims of faith) are accessible to or certifiable by reason. From the side of philosophical theology done by analytic philosophers who were also Christians, philosophers of religion, natural theologians and metaphysicians, the reluctance to pair with biblical theology in general and OT/HB theology in particular seems to be less. To be sure, there were a lot of variability among analytic, Continental and other philosophical theologians (in the broad sense) as to how they chose to be related to the debates that plagued 20th-century OT theology. Here one encountered a range of hermeneutical orientations, that included but were hardly limited to the following types: 1 naïve-realist fundamentalist ways of interacting with the religious language in the world of the text in the OT (the text as window) (e.g. Alvin Plantinga); 2 critical-realist ways allowing themselves to be informed by ideas in various forms of biblical criticism (the text as painting) (e.g. Keith Ward); and 3 non-realist post-modern approaches that combine free-association and critical ways of reading as post-metaphysical theology/anthropology (the text as mirror) (e.g. Don Cupitt). These are, of course, oversimplified stereotypes. The fact is that for the most part philosophical theologians had less reservation than biblical (OT) theologians to engage in cross-disciplinary research. That being said, it must be admitted that the associated lack of methodological inhibition notwithstanding, neither philosophical theologians nor OT scholars themselves considered it to be proper (or even possible) for biblical scholars to engage the religious language of the OT philosophically-theologically and in a manner that was not simply an exegetical means to a apologetical end. The basic idea across the board (with very few exceptions) was that philosophical theology had no place in descriptive and historical OT interpretation. Offering philosophical-theological perspectives could and should be left to philosophical theologians proper. In exceptional cases, OT theologians were required to offer a critical, comparative, contrasting and corrective clarification of a particular second-order biblical theological concept. This could be

46  The complete OT scholar’s guide allowed to happen if and only if the meaning of said concept had or would have been misunderstood precisely as a result of anachronistic philosophical assumptions and thus needed to be explained by reluctantly restating it in the appropriate minimalist metaphysical terms. Yet concessions by like the following by a philosophical theologian were basically unheard-of among OT scholars. The Bible is not a textbook of philosophical theology. Its texts on God are thus neither as complete nor as specific as the philosophical theologian needs in order to be able to answer fully his conceptual, or philosophical questions. Are these questions then illegitimate from a biblical standpoint? I see no reason to think so at all. From the fact that the biblical documents, written as they were to deal with burning practical questions of the greatest personal significance, do not address all the possible philosophical questions, which can also, in their own way, be of the greatest personal significance, it does not follow at all that these more theoretical questions are illegitimate. (Morris 1991, 31) One might think that OT scholars were justified to leave philosophicaltheological perspectives on the OT to the philosophical theologians. The problem was, of course, that philosophical theology is a discipline more concerned with contemporary understandings of post-biblical Jewish and Christian theological doctrines. Its practitioners could not afford the luxury of being interested in conceptual clarification or epistemic justification or revisionary and constructive philosophical theology limited to the world of the OT text. Though philosophical theologians granted that they could, in theory, now stick to taking a particular religious tradition’s ideas as a given and only worry about problems related to meaning and coherency, this was never actually done in a way limited to YHWH in the world of the text. Instead, apologetic and polemical agendas supervened on philosophical theologians in their role as philosophers would refer to the OT only briefly as part of the historical background or as somehow contributing towards the construction of a contemporary relevant philosophicaltheological concept of “God” (cf. Frank 2009, 541–553; Hazony 2012, among others). Allow me, if you will, an excursion at this point in time, with some autobiographical background to where I myself first heard of “philosophical theology” vis-à-vis “biblical theology”. As a first-year student of theology in 1994 at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, one is introduced to an entire array of associated disciplines. Besides Hebrew and Greek, there was also OT, New Testament, Dogmatics and Ethics, Church History and Polity, Missiology and the Science of Religion, as well as Practical Theology. In turn, each of these had their own sub-disciplines. We also had to take at least one additional related humanities/social-sciences subject, e.g. philosophy, many others chose psychology, sociology, anthropology. It was also our

The complete OT scholar’s guide 47 responsibility to obtain a decent understanding of German so as to be able to at least read the primary source materials in many of the subjects. My first encounter with philosophical theology was in the Dogmatics 110 (semester) course where the focus was on the subject called Theological Encyclopaedia. In one of the prescribed books on the list of compulsory reading materials I learned about “biblical theology” and how it was different from “philosophical theology”. According to the author, “biblical theology” should not operate with systematic, dogmatic and/or doctrinal theological frameworks because these are philosophical. The separation of biblical from other types of theology was also interpreted to mean that it also had to operate by bracketing biblical assumptions related to topics of interest in “philosophical theology”. As for philosophical theology, it was to be limited to “the philosophical discussion of topics held in common by theology and philosophy” (Muller 1991, 138). Furthermore, philosophical theology, In order to be true to itself, must not utilize Scripture or churchly standards of truth, it rests on the truths of logic and reason – and occupies the ground of what has typically been called ‘natural theology. (Muller 1991, 139) The logic seemed irrefutable. If philosophical theology was not to appeal to authority in the form of divine revelation, and if the Bible was seen as such, it follows that, by default and design, philosophical theology and biblical theology could not be combined. The idea of a philosophical theology of the OT could not but have appeared, even to me, as some sort of category mistake, especially when the task of philosophical theology within theology is said to involve the provisioning of “a logical and rational check on dogmatic formulation” (Muller 1991, 41). On this view then, philosophical theology, “so long as it stands within the circle of the theological encyclopaedia, must be a Christian discipline, no matter how philosophically determined its contents” (Muller 1991, 41). This way of putting it effectively ruled out the possibility that an OT scholar, seeking to describe the ways in which YHWH is depicted in the world of the text, could begin to imagine a “philosophical theology of the OT”. On the underlying metaphilosophicaltheological assumptions, anything of the kind could not but have appeared as a most misguided enterprise, if ever there was one. Of course, there was the long list of hermeneutical fallacies typically risked or committed in philosophical interpretations of the OT that contributed to anti-philosophical sentiment within biblical scholarship. The form this took during the second-half of the 20th century meant that very few OT scholars could would or needed to bother with what the latest methodological developments in philosophical theology had to offer biblical scholarship in terms of new possibilities for cross-disciplinary research. Consequently, it was too soon to realize that doing philosophical theology can be as (un)problematic and use/harmful within OT exegesis as are linguistic, literary, historical, social-scientific or any other cross-disciplinary approach.

48  The complete OT scholar’s guide Since the start of the new millennium, philosophical theology has been constructed in such a way so as to focus on theological topics from philosophical perspectives (see Hyman & Walker 2004 for a post-modern orientation). OT scholars are in general not likely to be aware of the sheer variety publications in philosophical theology that include, among others The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (Flint & Rea 2009), A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology (Crisp 2009) and the Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology (Rea 2009a, 2009b), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology (Taliaferro & Meiser 2010). Though mostly analytically orientated and overlapping to a considerable extent with analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology, these publications either include or take note of other approaches in other traditions, including ones from continental, comparative, Jewish, Islamic, Chinese, African philosophical perspectives (see also Nagasawa & Wielenberg 2009). This broadening of cultural and methodological scope is evident in historical discussions or remarks on philosophical theology in the WileyBlackwell series’ Companion to Philosophy of Religion (Taliaferro, Draper, & Quinn 2010). Part II of this publication not only includes the helpful introductory overviews already noted, i.e. of ancient (mostly Greek) and medieval Christian philosophical theology (by Flannery 2010; MacDonald 2010 respectively). It also includes discussions of Jewish and Islamic contributions from various eras in the history of philosophical approaches to the study of particular religions (Rudavsky 2010, 106–113; Burrell 2010, 95–105 respectively). Even secular perspectives are noted in discussions since the days of early modern philosophical theology on the Continent and in Great Britain (Pereboom 2010, 114–123; Gorham 2010, 124–136 respectively). Thereafter follows an early termination of the discussion of the history of philosophical theology becoming philosophy of religion (Westphal 2010, 133–140). In Part III of Taliaferro, Draper and Quinn (2010, 141–224), the discussion remains in the format of a historical overview while turning the reader’s attention to more recent developments in “Philosophy of Religion and Religious Philosophy in the Twentieth Century”. What makes this relevant to our present discussion of contributions to philosophical theology supervening on OT theology is the inclusion of introductions to American pragmatism, personalism, process theology, phenomenology and existentialism, as well as the related ideas in, among others, Wittgenstein, Thomism, natural theology, the Reformed tradition, the Jewish tradition and the Christian East. OT scholars who are familiar with the philosophical influences on biblical theology during the previous century will recognise many associated presuppositions, problems and perspectives in these varieties of philosophical theology that were utilised specifically for the purpose of rejecting philosophical-theological frameworks (cf. Barr 1999, 146–168).

The complete OT scholar’s guide 49 Topics that are still popular in contemporary philosophical theology (i.e. “the concept of God”), the relevance of which for OT scholars will become apparent in the chapters to follow, are introduced in Part IV (see Taliaferro, Draper, & Quinn 2010, 226–327). These include perfect being theology, holiness, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, goodness, simplicity, eternity, necessity, incorporeality, beauty, divine action, creation and conservation, immutability and impassibility, providence, pantheism and religious language. With regard to relevant current trends and new directions, those mentioned overlap with earlier debates in both biblical and philosophical theology and include theological realism and antirealism, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, Continental philosophy of religion, Reformed epistemology, evidentialism, feminism, philosophical reflection on revelation and Scripture, philosophical reflection on mysticism, religious pluralism and comparative philosophy of religion (see Taliaferro, Draper, & Quinn 2010, 651–723). OT scholars who had become disillusioned with philosophical theology as a result of what seems to follow from having historical consciousness will perhaps for reasons that will become obvious in the next chapter actually be interested comparative approaches (Hisakazu & Nelson 2000; Littlejohn 2010, n.p. and for a historical introduction to developments in comparative philosophical theology since the time of Gabler, see Cristaudo & Wong 2011). Especially helpful are discussions where popular stereotypes of philosophical theology with reference to method, scope and objectives are taken to task. A good introduction to and insightful comments on these theoretical topics can be found in the writings of Vladimir Shokhin, a Russian philosophical theologian whose work has been somewhat neglected, especially by OT scholars (whether or not they take an interest in philosophical theology). Especially his contributions related to comparative philosophy of religion and the varieties of rational theology (Shokhin 2011), philosophical theology and the Christian traditions (2012), philosophical theology in relation to natural theology and illustrative argumentation (Shokhin 2016), and regarding the variability of the conceptual canon in philosophical theology (Shokhin 2018). On the Continental side, in theology Wachter (2007, 487) notes that where still pursued, philosophical theology done within Protestant theology today is often seen as distinct from philosophy of religion. While the latter is associated with any philosophical investigation into issues related to religion (as divine or human phenomenon), philosophical theology is supposed to be confined to the philosophical analysis of specific doctrines or practices within a particular religion (on Catholic perspectives, see Ernst 2006, 26–37). Philosophical theology is moreover related to philosophy in general by locating it within metaphysics, but not in the general sense (metaphysica generalis, which is ontology and concerned with the categories of being) but in the specific sense (metaphysica specialis). Here it stands alongside philosophy of mind

50  The complete OT scholar’s guide (psychologia rationalis, also concerned also with the nature of thought, e.g. concepts) and philosophical cosmology (cosmologia rationalis). (see Wachter 2007, 487) Deuser (2009, 45) suggests that in Continental theology nowadays, philosophical theology wants to be neither philosophy of religion nor Christian philosophy. Instead, its agenda is to consistently (in the sense of the theology of Aristotle) reflect on theology in a philosophical way, especially with reference to the concept of God. Philosophy and theology can combine and examine positional doctrines and attitudes, presuppose, interpret, think and methodically discuss how all humans may meaningfully speak about “the same God”. The legitimacy of philosophical theology as academic discipline can be contested from two sides, i.e. from epistemological perspectives within philosophy, methodological barriers can be insisted on, theoretical frameworks in a natural science can claim to explain religious phenomena and deem philosophical theology as being outdated. “As for the analytic tradition”, the concern with the limits of reason is often faulted for being motivated more by theological rather than by purely philosophical considerations (cf. Hosle 2013). A very helpful historical overview of all the intricacies philosophical theology, broadly construed, and that from a Continental perspective, can be found in a series akin to that edited by Magne Sæbø in the context of OT/HB scholarship (and by the same publisher; cf Sæbø 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012, 2015). In this case the editor is Wucherer-Huldenfeld, and the volumes have as their connecting theme “philosophical theology in a state of flux”, with assorted additional historical, methodological and thematic configurations in the subtitles, e.g. Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch. Erster Band, Ortsbestimmung. Philosophische Theologie inmitten von Philosophie und Theologie; (Wucherer-Huldenfeld 2011), Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch (II/1), Wider den ungöttlichen Gott – Infragestellung Philosophischer Theologie durch Fideismus und Atheismus (Wucherer-Huldenfeld 2014) and Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch (II/2), Wider den ungöttlichen Gott (II/2), Moderner Atheismus im Raum der Metaphysik (WuchererHuldenfeld 2015). In conclusion, when philosophical theology was exchanged for philosophy of religion, when dogmatic and biblical theology separated, after Old and New Testament theology were also distinguished from each other, when OT theology made way for the history of Israelite religion and comparative ancient Near Eastern religion and when biblical theology was about to be revived and Hebrew thought once again compared to Greek, there appeared to be a hermeneutical necessity for philosophical theology to be removed from OT studies. Contrary to the popular account however, as this chapter has shown, the history of philosophical theology is as rich and variable as the OT itself. The particular philosophical theological presuppositions, problems, perspectives, persons and programmes and bits of bearing on

The complete OT scholar’s guide 51 related OT theological concepts, concerns and categories were not simply randomly configured. The relevance of this as background for appreciating not only how philosophical-theological OT scholarship remains to this day but also regarding overlooked possibilities for future cross-disciplinary research will become clear in the chapters to follow.

Bibliography Ansell-Pearson, K. 2007. Introduction. In F.W. Nietzsche and K. Ansell-Pearson (eds.). On the genealogy of morality. Trans. C. Diethe. Cambridge Texts in the history of political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flew, A. and MacIntyre, A. 1955. New essays in philosophical theology. New York: The Macmillan Co. Balaguer, M. 2016. Platonism in metaphysics. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring. Available from: [9 March 2019] Barnes, J. (ed.). 1984. The complete works of Aristotle. 2 vols. The revised Oxford trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Barr, J. 1961. The semantics of Biblical language. New York: Oxford University Press. Barr, J. 1993. Biblical faith and natural theology: The Gifford lectures for 1991. Oxford: Claredon Press. Barr, J. 1999. The concept of Biblical theology. An Old Testament perspective. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Barr, J. 2000. History and ideology in the Old Testament. Biblical studies at the end of a millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bradshaw, D. (ed.). 2012. Philosophical theology and the Christian tradition: Russian and western perspectives. Series IVA, Vol. 44/Series VIII, Vol. 3. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values & Philosophy. Brueggemann, W. 1997. Old testament theology, testimony, dispute, advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Burnet, J. 1920. Early Greek philosophy. 3rd ed. London: A. & C. Black. Burrell, D. 2010. The Islamic contribution to medieval philosophical theology. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 95–105. Cooper, J. (ed.). 1996. The complete works of Plato. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Crisp, O.D. 2009. A reader in contemporary philosophical theology. London: T&T Clark. Crisp, O.D. and Rea, M.C. (eds.). 2009. Analytic theology. New essays in the philosophy of theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cristaudo, W. and Wong, H. (eds.). 2011. From faith in reason to reason in faith. Transformations in philosophical theology from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. Lanham: University Press of America. Cupitt, D. 1997. After God: The future of religion. New York: Basic Books. Curtis, C.J. 1967. The task of philosophical theology. New York: Philosophical Library. Davis, S.T. 2006. Christian philosophical theology. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

52  The complete OT scholar’s guide Deuser, H. 2009. Religionsphilosophie. Berlin, New York: Walter De Gruyter. Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds.). 1951. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 vols. 6th ed. Dublin, Zurich: Weidmann. Ernst, H.E. 2006. New horizons in Catholic philosophical theology, fides et ratio and the changed status of Thomism. Heythrop Journal, 47 (1), 26–37. Evans, R.A. (ed.). 1971. The future of philosophical theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. Farrer, A.M. 1967. Faith and speculation. An essay in philosophical theology. London: T. & T. Clark. Farrer, A.M. 1972. Reflective faith: Essays in philosophical theology. London: S.P.C.K. Flannery, K.L. 2010. Ancient philosophical theology. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II. Philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 81–90. Flew, A. 1955. New essays in philosophical theology. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Flint, T. and Rea, M. 2009. The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frank, D. 2009. Jewish philosophical theology. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 541–553. Gericke, J. 2012. The Hebrew Bible and philosophy of religion. RBL 70. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. Gerstenberger, E.S. 2002. Theologies of the old testament. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Gorham, G. 2010. Early modern philosophical theology in Great Britain. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper, P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 124–132. Hazony, Y. 2012. The philosophy of Hebrew scripture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hebblethwaite, B. 2005. Philosophical theology and Christian doctrine. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Helmig, C. and Steel, C. 2019. Proclus. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall ed). Available from: [24 August 2019]. Hisakazu, I. and Nelson, J.J. 2000. Philosophical theology and East – West dialogue. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Hosle, V. 2013. God as reason. Essays in philosophical theology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Howe, L.T. 1970. Philosophical theology as a venture of faith: Some theses for discussion. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 44, 205–213. Hyman, G. and Walker, R. 2004. New directions in philosophical theology. Essays in honour of Don Cupitt. Aldershot: Ashgate. Jaeger, W. 1947. The theology of the early Greek philosophers: The Gifford Lectures 1936. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The complete OT scholar’s guide 53 Kenny, A. 1987. Reason and religion. Essays in philosophical theology. Oxford: Blackwell. Leaman, O. 2009. Islamic philosophical theology. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 555–573. Lesher, J. Xenophanes. 2019. In E. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Available from: [3 April 2019]. Littlejohn, R. 2010. Comparative philosophy. In The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Available from: [17 May 2018]. Long, A. and Sedley, D. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacDonald, S. 2009. What is philosophical theology? In K. Timpe (ed.). Arguing about religion. New York: Routledge, pp. 17–29. MacDonald, S. 2010. The Christian contribution to medieval philosophical theology. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 91–98. Mavrodes, G.I. 1970. Some recent philosophical theology. Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1), 82–111. Mitchell, B. (ed.). 1957. Faith and logic. Oxford essays in philosophical theology. London: Routledge. Morris, T.V. 1991. Our idea of God. An introduction to philosophical theology. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. Muller, R.A. 1991. The study of theology: From Biblical interpretation to contemporary formulation. Foundations of theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Nagasawa, Y. and Wielenberg, E. (eds.). 2009. New waves in philosophy of religion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pereboom, D. 2010. Early modern philosophical theology on the continent. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 114–123. Rea, M. (ed.). 2009a. Oxford readings in philosophical theology. Vol. 1. Trinity, incarnation, and atonement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rea, M. (ed.). 2009b. Oxford readings in philosophical theology. Vol. 2. Providence, scripture, and resurrection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ross, J.F. 1969. Philosophical theology. Indianapolis: Bobbs – Merrill. Rossi, F. 1988. Philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 80 (2), 242–290. Roth, J.K. 1975. God and reason. A historical approach to philosophical theology. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (1), 125–127. Rudavsky, T. 2010. The Jewish contribution to medieval philosophical theology. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Part II: Philosophical theology and philosophy of religion in Western history. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 106–113. Sæbø, M. (ed.). 1996. Hebrew Bible/Old testament: The history of its interpretation. Vol. I/1. From the beginnings to the middle ages (until 1300). Part 1: Antiquity. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

54  The complete OT scholar’s guide Sæbø, M. (ed.). 2000. Hebrew Bible/Old testament: The history of its interpretation. Vol. I/2. From the beginnings to middle ages (until 1300). Part 2: The middle ages. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Sæbø, M. (ed.). 2008. Hebrew Bible/Old testament: The history of its interpretation. Vol. II/1. From the renaissance to the enlightenment. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Sæbø, M. (ed.). 2012. Hebrew Bible/Old testament: The history of its interpretation. Vol. III/1. The nineteenth century: A century of modernism and historicism. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Sæbø, M. (ed.). 2015. Hebrew Bible/Old testament: The history of its interpretation. Vol. III/2. The twentieth century: From modernism to post-modernism. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Salaquarda, J. 1971. Philosophische Theologie im Schatten des Nihilismus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Scharlemann, R. 1989. Inscriptions and reflections. Essays in philosophical theology. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Schmid, K. 2015. Is there theology in the Hebrew Bible? Translated by Peter Altmann. Critical studies in the Hebrew Bible. Vol. 4. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns. Shokhin, V.K. 2010. Philosophical theology and Indian versions of theodicy. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2 (2), 177–199. Shokhin, V.K. 2011. Philosophy of religion and the varieties of rational theology. In D. Bradshaw (ed.). 2012. Philosophical theology and the Christian tradition, Russian and western perspectives. Series IVA, Vol. 44/Series VIII, Vol. 3. Washington, Council for Research in Values & Philosophy, pp. 5–20. Shokhin, V.K. 2016. Natural theology, philosophical theology and illustrative argumentation. Open Theology, 2, 804–817. Shokhin, V.K. 2018. Philosophical theology, the canon and the variability. Saint Petersburg: Nestor – History. Solmsen, F. 1942. Plato’s theology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Taliaferro, C., Draper, P. and Quinn, P. (eds.). 2010. A companion to philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Taliaferro, C. and Meister, C. (eds.). 2010. The Cambridge companion to Christian philosophical theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tennant, F. 1928. Philosophical theology. Vol. 1. The soul and its faculties. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tennant, F. 1929. Philosophical theology. Vol. 2. The world, the soul and God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. von Wachter, D. 2007. Philosophy of religion in protestant theology. In P. Copan and C. Meister (eds.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of religion. London: Routledge, pp. 487–497. Weischedel, W. 1971. Der Gott der Philosophen. Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus. Zwei Bände, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Weischedel, W. 1973. Religionsphilosophie oder philosophische theologie? Eine Kontroverse zwischen Wolfgang Trillhaas und Wilhelm Weischedel. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie, 15 (1), 87–101. Westphal, M. 2010. The emergence of modern philosophy of religion. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P. Quinn et al. (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 133–140.

The complete OT scholar’s guide 55 Woltersdorff, N. 2009. How philosophical theology became possible with the analytic tradition of philosophy. In O.D. Crisp and M.C. Rea (eds.). Analytic theology. New essays in the philosophy of theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 155–168. Wucherer-Huldenfeld, A.K. 2011. Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch. Erster Band, Ortsbestimmung. Philosophische Theologie inmitten von Philosophie und Theologie. Böhlau, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Wucherer-Huldenfeld, A.K. 2014. Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch (II/1), Wider den ungöttlichen Gott – Infragestellung Philosophischer Theologie durch Fideismus und Atheismus. Böhlau, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Wucherer-Huldenfeld, A.K. 2015. Philosophische Theologie im Umbruch (II/2), Wider den ungöttlichen Gott (II/2), Moderner Atheismus im Raum der Metaphysik. Böhlau, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

3 When OT scholars behave philosophically-theologically

OT theologians have been living two lives. In one of these, they are biblical theologians. As literary critics of ancient sacred texts, they specialise in historically orientated research as part of respectable faith and academic communities. They teach courses on the Bible and kindly help the ignorant public correct their Marcionite misconceptions about the God of Israel. They reassure those burdened by certain philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories that the associated presuppositions, problems and perspective these give rise to can be left on the side. And they have hermeneutical warrant for this, given how every overtly philosophical interpretation of the religious language of the OT has been found guilty of committing every exegetical fallacy forbidden in their descriptive and historical ground rules. As is only proper, they seek to purify the discipline from all philosophical grids, frameworks and fashions, ever-ready to blow the whistle on whatever supervening philosophical-theological assumptions they can expose as distorting the world of the text on its own terms. Is that not why biblical theology separated from doctrinal theology? Does the OT as divine revelation not rule out it becoming an object of philosophicaltheological inquiry to appeal to? After all, philosophical theology, like natural theology, is commonly accepted to be theology without the Bible, not in the Bible, since neither YHWH nor ancient Israelites as characterized in OT texts appear passionate about philosophical wonder, doubt, speculation and argument, neither should the reader. OT scholars can be anything they want, including linguists, literary-critics, historians, social-scientists, theologians . . . just not philosophers in general and philosophical theologians in particular. The other life of the OT scholar, as this chapter will demonstrate, is lived as covert comparative and historical philosophical theologians, seeking to restate the meaning of biblical religious language in metaphysical terms. They hide these in comments only intending to clarify the concepts in the second-order discourse of OT theology to show how these differ from their distortive anachronistic and alien post-biblical philosophical-theological counterparts. They do not see this as opposed to their descriptive tasks since they claim to be only concerned with what is understood to be part of the

When OT scholars behave philosophically 57 implicit second-order content of the intellectual ideas of the OT on its own terms, even if not in them. They know that their own modern philosophicaltheological assumptions might be presumptuous; they know that the OT is not a philosophical-theological textbook; they know that one cannot construct a unified and systematic contemporary philosophical theology from the multiplicity of its genres and do justice to every detail of its diverse religious ideologies. But that provides only all the more reason for OT scholars to engage in conceptual clarification of the same topics philosophical theologians worry about. There are no Hebrew thoughts that cannot be compared to Greek ones. There is no philosophical mistranslation of a biblical word that cannot be rectified with the otherwise regrettable metaphysical vocabulary of the very same philosophical idiom. There is no need to go beyond questions of meaning to questions of truth; epistemic or propositional justification is thus not required even in philosophical mode. For their research focus is not on Jewish or Christian philosophical theology but on what the religious language of the OT in a given context seems to incidentally imply with regard to issues of philosophical-theological interest. Ask most OT theologians and philosophical theologians and they will tell you, officially, that only one of these lives have a future, i.e. the first. Any identified connection with the second means that the latter, in whatever form, must be abandoned. Doing philosophical theology on OT premises (pun intended) is not strictly speaking legal, at least not hermeneutically. Too much time spent living life in philosophical-theological form is said to be hazardous to the health of the collective, threatening its identity as essentially “biblical”. Since the latter is seen as what it is in virtue of not being “philosophical”, especially when it comes to theology, many gatekeeping strategies are in place to prevent wayward research behaviour showing symptoms of cross-disciplinary multi-tasking that fails to honour and respect hard-fought and long-established boundaries and borders. As has been noted even by those sympathetic enough to take cognisance of their existence, philosophical approaches to OT-based second-order theological concepts have yet to be acknowledged as unified, i.e. in terms of methodology and “international research collaboration” (see Schmid 2019, 38). The problem, of course, in the aftermath of the 20th century, on most academic pathways, everything is set-up against it. Experts in either biblical or philosophical theology undergo rigorous training. While many start standing in the same theological parade, one will eventually have to choose which skills one wants to develop and apply. It would seem that once beyond a certain advanced stage, one can no longer be a fully-active member of the other or both teams. It will only confuse everyone else as to what the mission is, including its protocol and modus operandi. There is no clearance level high enough that will give one ease of access to all the files related to all the relevant networks. The calls for a return to philosophy in OT scholarship, no matter how passionate, or how many times it went out and on how many wavelengths, has remained encrypted and unscrambled.

58  When OT scholars behave philosophically One would think that anyone in the tribe of biblical scholars actually acting on the idea will break more of the written and unwritten rules of the road than can prevent them being found sincerely misguided. OT scholars are allowed to make mistakes, just not of the “category” type, which a “philosophical” approach is by definition, default and design. Or so it would seem. In this chapter I intend to show that things are not, in fact, what they seem, nor are they otherwise. Though I understand that many fellow OT scholar will consider this chapter as whistle-blowing in the wrong direction, I can assure the reader that I have no interest in interdisciplinary metempsychosis in any other way than one that will leave us all in a better place. There are levels of philosophical existence imaginable in OT scholarship which even I am not prepared to accept. The fact is that the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT is more than the eventuality of an anomaly, which despite biblical theologians’ sincerest efforts they have been unable to eliminate from what is otherwise a harmony of hermeneutical precision. To multiply instead of resolve it, I shall begin by identifying what I take to be a series of fallacies committed by those blaming philosophical variables for necessarily distorting the meaning of the first-order religious language used to describe YHWH in any given world of the OT text. My hypothesis is that we are dealing with the complicated construction of a false cause, in a variety of forms. The OT may not be concerned with informal logic, but the second-order discourse of OT scholars can be so clarified by way of a thirdorder metacritical assessment. It’s not personal, it’s all part of quality control; the same epistemic values supervene on the hermeneutical principles of those who reject the use of philosophical theology in OT interpretation for many meta-philosophical reasons I happen to agree with: 1 Even if the meaning of the religious language of the OT has ended up being distorted subsequent to every new philosophical-theological perspective offered thereon, it does not follow that said perspective is the cause of the distortions purely in virtue of preceding their appearance. 2 Even if all past philosophical-theological perspectives on the OT can be shown to have involved the concurrent committing of certain hermeneutical or exegetical fallacies, it does not follow that said perspectives are the cause of said fallacies purely in virtue of their concurrent appearance in the related research. 3 Even if every philosophical-theological approach introduced in the history of OT interpretation ends up distorting what the texts seem to mean, the application of the approach and the resulting distortions may not mean the former is the cause of the latter when both have a common causal link to problematic supervening linguistic, literary, historical or other frameworks wherein the source of the problem might also lie.

When OT scholars behave philosophically 59 4 Even if every philosophical-theological approach introduced in the history of OT interpretation ends up distorting what the texts seem to mean, and the philosophical-theological grid is shown to involve distortion, it may be an oversimplification to say that the grid is the cause of the distortion when the situation leading to the committing of fallacies is actually more complicated. Of course, I can be accused of having simply identified possible instead of actual fallacies, or even of implying that having committed the indicated fallacies in reasoning the basic idea of philosophical theology as being problematic is not true. But this is not the case, and for the most part I would grant that one is more likely to commit fallacies when endorsing philosophicaltheological approaches to the OT than when criticizing those who have tried to do so. In the discussion to follow, I shall bite the bullet in order to show that, within OT scholars’ second-order discourse about depictions of YHWH in the first-order religious language of the OT, philosophical theology is like the “Matrix”. It is all around us, even now, in writings of famous biblical theologians who rage against philosophical principles, systems, abstractions, grids and assorted abominable practices. The point of exposing traces of crypto-philosophical tendencies is not to purify OT theology from philosophical presuppositions, problems and perspectives. Neither is it intended as a contribution to the debate within biblical theology as to how OT theology can or cannot relate to philosophy. Even the identification of inconsistent relations between biblical and philosophical-theological inquiries is not in itself assumed to be inherently problematic. On the contrary, all sampling from the recent history of writings by well-known OT scholars where philosophical theology is present, whatever the merits thereof, is merely a means to the complete opposite counterintuitive end. More specifically, by isolating already existing instances of philosophicaltheological inquiry, the possibility of a philosophical theology of the OT is by implication shown to be already granted. Not in so many words, of course. But given the extent to which philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories are indelible and allowed even by those leading OT scholars who reject them, what I wish to propose, namely a new discipline called OT philosophical theology will no longer appear absurd. To guide the reader from where they are to where I stand, I shall simply focus on what is already happening and accepted in terms of attempted comparative philosophical-theological restatement of the meaning of the OT’s religious language in metaphysical terms. There is in fact not really a need to offer arguments. One can simply witness some of the most popular OT scholars in action, and the possibilities will become obvious. So as ridiculous as some of the intended methodological innovations may sound, I can assure the reader that by the end of this chapter he or she will no longer be able to coherently state what exactly the problem with the idea is supposed to be.

60  When OT scholars behave philosophically To begin the demonstration of what is irredeemably anomalous in the current paradigm of OT scholarship, the shifting of which is prevented by ongoing attempts stabilising the reconstructed binary opposition between biblical and philosophical theology, consider the clash between form and content in following samples. They will allow us to see philosophicaltheological tain of the biblical-theological mirror, mostly invisible precisely because of the bracketing of philosophical theology and the lack of historical consciousness regarding the genealogy of the metaphysical currencies of the meta-language that OT theology continues to trade in. First of all, in the previous chapter we have seen some historical varieties of philosophical theology’s interest in “concepts” of divinity as candidates for “conceptual clarification”. Consider then, if you will, related (fuzzy) extensions of popular technical terms in the theological topics associated with OT scholarship, e.g. in titles of books, as the headings to chapters in books, as titles of journal articles, as headings in the body texts, as keywords, as part of phrases used in second-order discourse, in online platforms and as listed in presentations or their abstracts in conference programmes. • Names of God in the OT • OT ideas about God • The OT understanding of God • Images of God in the OT • OT concepts of God • Words for God in the OT These commonplace designations for what OT scholars are up to when writing about YHWH seem relatively unproblematic and, let us assume for the sake of the argument, they might well be. Yet their philosophical identity has been obscured, as if they had no history. They are all connected within an interesting and intricate metaphysical genealogy. Oversimplifying for the sake of brevity, not one of the samples mentioned on the bulleted list should be taken to imply that there is just one take on the associated matters and each is essentially contested. Yet as will become clear, all represent what is implied to be a case of biblical-theological faith making room for philosophicaltheological understanding. As the story goes, adapted from Cupitt (1997, 24), ancient Near Eastern metaphysical assumptions about what were actually signified by divine names linked them to pre-Greek second-order notions of divine essence. With Plato, essential natures were reinterpreted to become the ideal transcendental world of Ideas/Forms. In Augustine’s neo-Platonic Christian philosophical theology Universals are onto-theologically reinterpreted, now relocated as ideas in the Divine Mind. Many moons later, by the time Kant enters the story, the divine ideas are brought down to earth to constructed as “concepts” that the human mind’s cognitive structures use in categorizing the world of appearances of divinity (rather than essences). With Nietzsche the distinction between essences and appearances disappear completely, and

When OT scholars behave philosophically 61 Kant’s concepts become a mad mix of metaphors with reference to which true/false categories are misguided. Eventually, with Derrida, the metaphors are reinstated as metaphysics as itself a kind of writing or literary genre within which signs or marks endlessly deconstruct, along with the human subject utterly decentred within a hyper-differential ontology. Given what was said earlier regarding the objective of this chapter, the point being made here is not that OT theologians should or should not be using philosophical terms like “concepts” (or “names”, “ideas”, “understanding”, “images”, “words” and such) in their philosophical-theological senses, with reference to what the OT’s religious language implies about YHWH) (cf. Ward 1998). Rather, I am simply calling attention to the fact that constructing the diversity of YHWH-entities in the world in the text as thematically unified under the so-called OT’s “concept” (or “concepts” or related) of “God” is already a second-order philosophical-theological move within the same metaphysical idiom. In doing so they imply that the use of philosophical-theological currency in historical and descriptive metalanguage is both perfectly acceptable and even useful. Yet because they oppose biblical and philosophical theology as mutually exclusive and comparatively incommensurable, it is unclear even to them whether and how this describes the OT on its own terms, even if not in them. Thus with reference to cult and ritual, the following description is deemed perfectly legitimate, the inclusion of several philosophical-theological terms of art notwithstanding. By this means he comprehends the divine essence much more accurately than he would from any number of abstract concepts. The result is that the formation of such concepts in the OT lags far behind. Eichrodt (1961, 33) Note that while the OT does not show evidence of the formation of abstract concepts, it is still said to demonstrate a comprehension of the “divine essence”. The word “essence”, of course, has found its way into ordinary language. This makes it seem inconspicuous. Yet it is also a metaphysical term of art and an essentially contested one at that, very popular in philosophical theology. Where it is still used in a technical sense within contemporary philosophy, it is a fuzzy concept with a rich variety of possible constructions of what it supposedly does and does not involve. So it is difficult to believe that OT theologians with some background in Christian dogmatics and always ready to oppose biblical and philosophical theology use the term without any awareness whatsoever of the metaphysical ideas associated with it carries. Additional remarks often included in related discussions imply that they not only care about the differences between Hebrew and Greek thought but about what the religious language of the former means when restated in the philosophical vocabulary of the latter. The Hebrew’s slowness in forming abstract concepts is well known. But just try to imagine an intellectual encounter with and confrontation of the world without our workable abstract concepts! For Israel the world was

62  When OT scholars behave philosophically probably very much more of a process than a thing in being. Since the way of intellectual mastery of this process by means of the consideration of a first principle was not open to her, she was pointed to examination and classification of the individual phenomena, in order to familiarise herself with its external aspect, so far as it could be deciphered at all. . . . Expressing it somewhat exaggeratedly, to her “world” was a sustaining activity of Jahweh, In the unyielding assumption that in spite of all there must be an order in things was already inherent an implicit faith acquainted with the deep hiddenness of the divine coneuatio and gubematio. (von Rad 1962, 427) In other words, the OT’s own religious language does include concepts, but abstract ones are thought to be minimal. Views of “Hebrew thought compared to Greek” at the time required nothing more and nothing less (for which see, besides Boman 1960; Tresmontant 1960). Also very interesting is the variety in the philosophical jargon from the idiom of various philosophers despite the seeming insinuation that the OT should not be interpreted by way of structuring the the second-order scholarly descriptions around “abstract concepts”. That being said, what else is implied by the choice of words used within the very same critique but the acceptance and legitimacy of comparative philosophical-theological restating what the first-order religious language of the OT means in relation to abstract concepts? Furthermore, the way the critique is worded makes abstraction per seem what is alien to the OT, thereby failing to distinguish between abstract concepts and abstract objects, the latter which include not only concepts but also numbers, properties, relations, functions, events, propositions, states of affairs, etc. The point is, von Rad’s OT theology like Eichrodt and all others, has a form–content clash. The German publication loses little in translation when what has been insinuated about the lack of abstract concepts in first-order religious language seems at odds with the fact that re-telling what the OT itself says still involves him using the word concept (German, “Begriff”) with reference to everything in the world of the text, from God to covenant to time and death (the term appearing no less than 270 times, second only to “phenomenon”, another Kantian term presupposing an essence/appearance distinction and that OT scholars use without blinking). Yet because the “concept” of “concepts” have not been invented yet (like the “concept” of “gravity” before Newton), it seemed all the more important to clarify the indeterminate conceptual background of theological concepts by translating it into metaphysical terms simultaneously based on yet very different from the compromised counterparts of Western philosophy. Such thought is thus characterised by an inherent absence of differentiation between the ideal and the real, or between word and object; these coalesce as if both stood on one plane of being. In a way which defies

When OT scholars behave philosophically 63 precise rational clarification, every word contains something of the object itself. Thus, in a very realistic sense, what happens in language is that the world is given material expression. Objects are only given form and differentiation in the word that names them. (von Rad 1965, 81) On this view, precisely because the OT may be neither philosophy nor philosophical theology, there is all the more need for comparative philosophical commentary and lest the modern reader project their own “metaphysical assumptions” onto the plurality of minimalist first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. What we see here resembles an apologetic type of philosophical theology whereby one opposes Hebraic second-order thinking believed to have existed in the world behind the text of the OT to intellectually intimidating ideas in metaphysics so that what is written, once understood on its own terms, can be appreciated for being didactically superior precisely in virtue of what seems lacking. But this raises a question: how did OT theologians non-philosophically approach the analysis of religious language in the OT non-philosophically? At least according to Eichrodt (1961, 33), by way of “conceptual clarification”, a task which, as we saw in the previous chapter, has its counterparts in descriptive varieties of philosophical theology. Yet where exactly are these concepts waiting to be clarified found? Do they exist within the religious language of the OT itself or only in the second-order discourse of biblical (OT) theological interpretation? The same author, somewhat inconsistently, implies that not only some clearly philosophical-theological concepts but also their clarification are already present in the OT itself: The more consistently belief in providence was built up in all its aspects, the stronger was its effect on the conceptual clarification and enlargement of the picture of God. (Eichrodt 1967, 181) Others, equally inconsistently, imply that conceptual clarification exists only in our second-order discourses even when OT theology is better off without them on the grounds that the Old Testament tells a story and is based on “events” rather than concepts (cf. e.g. von Rad 1962, 162). Furthermore, any nascent “concepts” of God came about by wisdom, not philosophy: It will be apparent that there are two completely different forms of the apperception of truth for mankind – one systematic (philosophical and theological) and one empirical and gnomic. Empirical and gnomic wisdom starts from the unyielding presupposition that there is a hidden order in things and events – only, it has to be discerned in them, with great patience and at the cost of all kinds of painful experience. And this order is kindly and righteous. But, characteristically, it is not understood systematically – and therefore not in such a way as to reduce all

64  When OT scholars behave philosophically the variety experienced and perceived to a general principle of order, and least of all by the search for a formula which might be spacious enough to comprehend the infinitely varied world of phenomena. This would be the philosophic and systematic way. (von Rad 1962, 421) Again a binary opposition has been created between a selection of certain characteristics exhibited in some biblical (OT) texts displaying common interests with Greek philosophical thinking (wisdom) and those of popular stereotypes of certain philosophical texts, considered in isolation in order for it to be pitted against Hebraic thought. Of course, any historian of philosophy or comparative philosopher will know that philosophical works are never completely systematic and that the ideal of non-contradiction only supervene on intensive or extended logical arguments (with proofs in Euclidian geometry as ideal type). Many philosophical writings (or parts of these), for over 2500 years now, come in the form of dialogues aphorisms, narratives, paradoxes, poems, anecdotes or even myths, all of which are non-systematic and comfortable with contradiction (e.g. Plato’s inconclusive dialogues featuring Socrates). But wait, there is more: Von Rad himself is then on his own distinction more systematic and philosophical in that, while he allows the OT to contradict itself, his own arguments in any given case presuppose the need to avoid them like the plague. Otherwise, why so serious? Surely he would have written things like philosophy is both systematic and not systematic, and that biblical wisdom is both able and unable to deal with contradiction. But no OT theologian does that, lest their reviewers, colleagues, students, Churches and historians of the discipline make them go down in infamy for it. Their own recourse to and dependence on abstract conceptual thinking when talking about the OT vis-à-vis philosophy, cannot seem to mirror what they say about the OT itself, and about describing it in and on its own terms. But, as Jolles says, conceptual thinking cannot possibly apprehend the world to which gnomic thinking applies itself? Wisdom examines the phenomenal world to discern its secrets, but allows whatever it finds to stand in its own particular character absolutely. It is easy to confront certain proverbs with others completely different in content, indeed on occasion absolutely contradictory. Taken strictly, this incongruity is even the rule, for an experience would never have been mentioned or painstakingly formulated if it coincided with those already to hand. Thus wisdom shows not the slightest fear in occasionally formulating antinomies and leaving them unresolved. (von Rad 1962, 422) Adding injury to insult (inversion intended), in a footnote we read the following on conceptual thinking, according to which it would seem that

When OT scholars behave philosophically 65 wisdom does not need philosophy to complement it as earlier suggested. In fact, it would be better off: It is impossible to think this world through conceptually, for it is precisely conceptual thinking which this world resists and which on its part destroys this world. (von Rad 1962, 423 n. 16) Granted, not everyone is convinced that the givenness of narrativity ipso facto entails that conceptual scheming is problematic. For as Westermann (1978, 12) notes, it can still be useful for structuring and classifying the events and highlighting certain elements in the narratives, [a]nd what we know about the localities and the representatives of the various groups of tradition bears no comparison either with the real wealth of special formulations and theological concepts which we find collected in the major source documents. But let us put the mixed feelings about concepts aside; it might still be thought that biblical theology can at least be distinguished from philosophical theology in that it does think that there is metaphysics in the OT itself. Curiously, contrary to what almost everyone nowadays might take for granted, this is not the case. To be sure, some appearances of the term are distinctly negative and suggest that there is no metaphysics of the particular contexts of the OT under consideration: One obvious interpretation of this strange series of natural phenomena is that the powers of nature lying in the foreground of the story should make the reader aware of another world lying behind them, which is not, of course, conceived in terms of metaphysics, and is also not their extension or intensification, but rather their reverse side. The narrator cannot, of course, indulge in the abstractions of philosophy; even when he wants to suggest some quite immaterial and out of the way phenomenon, he has to keep within the realm of sense-perception. He therefore describes the manifestation of Jahweh in terms of “air, breath,” which though still lying within the natural realm, represent the extreme limit of apprehension by the senses. (von Rad 1962, 20) The comparative philosophical-theological perspective here, describing the OT’s first-order religious language in relation to a metaphysical concern as not unlike that of the pre-Socratic candidate for prima matter as postulated by Anaximander (everything is “air”) is obvious. Yet as was the case in the discussion of concepts, an easily overlooked condition

66  When OT scholars behave philosophically of possibility for clarifying how biblical (OT) theological ideas relate to unbiblical (philosophical) theological ones just is the practice of prior comparative philosophical theology, only the findings of which are thus present in what is only apparently a/anti-/non-metaphysical terms. Interestingly, and this is the curious even if more obviously overlooked part, there are also references to metaphysics in the literature that by implication actually ascribe the associated philosophical reflection to writers of parts of the OT itself, nabism never reached the stage of criticizing, but remained content with a metaphysical justification of the status quo. (Eichrodt 1961, 308) [T]his conception of history created a fruitful tension in national life by endowing men with the capacity for a deeper grasp of historical experience in metaphysical terms. (von Rad 1962, 382) Other instances of similarly positive references to “metaphysics” in the context of descriptive and historical remarks within OT theology are attested. Even so, these explicit references to metaphysics, like those to philosophical theology considered in Chapter 1, do not really give a fair impression of the extent to which the metaphysical jargon of philosophical theology are still present and accepted assuming an absolute distinction between and separation of biblical and philosophical theological language. A better way to demonstrate the clash of form and content requires us to consider how OT theologians have written about OT perspectives on YHWH reconstructed in second-order discourse as an entity with a divine nature and attributes (or in related terms from the history of philosophy). As it so happens, the metaphysical terms used in biblical (OT) theology are some of the most widely discussed terms past and contemporary varieties of philosophical theology (cf. Flint & Rea 2009). On the one hand then, consider the familiar idea of a god as something with a divine “nature”, or in alternative terms, or as having or being a divine “essence”, “being”, “character”, “person”, “subject”, “self”, “identity”, etc. (on the divine nature in philosophical theology, see Wierenga 1989; MacDonald 2001, 71–90; Moser 2004, 116–119; Turgeon 2004, 2–3; Maxwell 2013; for a comparative example, see Celestine 2015, 137– 151). All of these are part of the typical vocabulary of past and present philosophical theology, though the particular currency has long since lost its value in philosophy itself after it migrated to disciplines that later separated therefrom, e.g. linguistics, literary criticism, psychology, sociology, etc. This is true, even where there is the need for the biblical (OT) theologian to compare or contrast YHWH in relation to Western concepts of deity dependent

When OT scholars behave philosophically 67 on these terms and their conditions. Consider the following examples in this regard (cf. Gericke 2017). The fact that YHWH reveals Himself is fundamental. He appears to Abraham, Gen. 12, 7; He makes known His name and therefore His nature, Ex. 6, 3. (Köhler 1957, 55) Even those cases where originally the name of the God accurately and clearly describes his nature, the name can fall into utter insignificance. Yet the nature of the God can develop and even grow into something quite different. Philological theology is faulty theology. Such discrepancy between the significance of the name and that of the nature of the God is, however, always a phenomenon with a historical reason. Only God whose nature and significance have undergone a change forsake their name’s original context, and this naturally always constitutes a theological problem, admittedly of a secondary order but not unimportant. This is exactly what happened in the case of Jahweh. (Köhler 1957, 40–41) We have come to the end of our section on the nature of God as we find it in the Old Testament, and it is clear that we have really said very little. (Köhler 1957, 35) This was achieved primarily through the experience of the infinite superiority of the divine nature to all merely human attributes and capacities an experience which marks every encounter with the divine in the Old Testament. (Eichrodt 1959, 213) He learns about the nature of God by reasoning a posteriori from the standards and usages of law and cult . . . from the events in history . . . in short, from his daily experience of the rule of God. By this means he comprehends the divine essence much more accurately than he would from a number of abstract concepts. The result is that the formation of such concepts in the Old Testament lags far behind. (Eichrodt 1961, 33) But if the world is the product of the creative word, it is therefore, for one thing, sharply separated in its nature from god himself – it is neither an emanation nor a mythically understood manifestation of the divine nature and its power. (von Rad 1962, 142)

68  When OT scholars behave philosophically The reality of God is discovered and discussed as being activity. God’s being is action and his action being. The name betrays something of the essential character of the deity. . . . In such a sentence the Old Testament speaks unusually for once of God, not by describing his acts, but by describing (under wisdom influence) the essential nature of God in a fundamental way. (Schmidt 1983, 281) Those rare attempts within the Bible to reflect on Yahweh’s essential nature, specifically Exod 34, 6–7; Gen 18, 22–33; Job 1–2; and Jonah 4.4. (Crenshaw 1995, 192) The name of YHWH, which like his glory and his face are vehicles of his essential nature, is defined in terms of his compassionate acts of mercy. (Childs 2004, 596) In such a world, there is little reason to decide whether shem was the very essence of Yhwh, a local manifestation of Yhwh, or a hypostasis that overlapped with Yhwh while retaining a distinct nature. (Sommer 2009, 62) What all of these quotes from the writings of well-known OT scholars have in common, differences, nuances and questions as to what was meant notwithstanding, is that they involve a philosophical-theological concept of art, essentially contested as it is. For the divine nature is a metaphysical construct and stands in contrast to the “pre-philosophical” idea of a god’s “ways”, accepted to be historically and culturally relative. But in philosophy, the nature of a thing is supposed to be what it is always and everywhere, although in the context of OT theology this is usually assumed with reference to the specific world of the text of course. Like philosophical theologians in their capacity as descriptive metaphysicians OT scholars use the concept of divine nature as a comparatively apt abstraction of some mysterious component individual representations of YHWH “have” in the sense of exemplifying or instantiating them. If however there is no pronouncement in the Old Testament on God’s nature as such, the silence is nevertheless eloquent of at least one negative definition which must be set forth before the positive statements about God can be properly appreciated. The God of the Old Testament has no sexual characteristic; and that distinguishes Him immediately from all the other gods of the ancient world. (Köhler 1957, 21) This line of reasoning about the philosophical within OT theology or somehow presupposed or implicit therein (even if twice-removed) is by now familiar to biblical theologians (see Schmid 2019, 33). But the

When OT scholars behave philosophically 69 metaphysical vocabulary of philosophical theology has never left the building (of even the one occupied by historians of Israelite religions). First and foremost, all positive divine power and character resided in this God or Godhead. Whatever could be said positively about divinity in ancient Israel was predicated only of Israel’s god. (Smith 2014, 15) Note the use of words like “character” of which things are “predicated”, both as they related to the abstract category of “divinity”. While these nowadays a narrative-critical substituted for “nature” or “essence”, when things are “positively” “predicated”, we are still in the realm of metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories. It matters little if some of these comparative philosophicaltheological restatements in metaphysical terms are not only clarifying but also contrastive, critical and corrective. The point here is that OT scholars still use philosophical-theological concepts, often without blinking, within various forms of second-order biblical criticism when offering what is implied to be non-philosophical and even anti-metaphysical descriptions of YHWH as depicted in the first-order religious language of any given world of the text. Consider a few more examples, as we turn our attention to the other side of the same coin, namely OT scholars writing about YHWH’s divine attributes (or when using related metaphysical terms). According to ancient ideas, a name was not just “noise and smoke”, instead, there was a close and essential relationship between it and its subject. . . . If we understand them correctly, their concern was much rather to leave the phenomenon as it was, in precisely its quality as a thing. (von Rad 1962, 186) Ps. 103 speaks alternately of God’s epithets and of his actions, Yahweh works vindication and justice for all who are oppressed (v.6) Yahweh is merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love. (v. 8) The name . . . declares his characteristics or the place of his appearance . . . but even then, God’s properties are understood as being his deeds. (Schmidt 1983, 57, 281) The words of verses 6–7 provide a summary from the essential characteristics of Yahweh as Lord of the covenant. (Brueggemann 2010, n.p.) In the case of holiness, which is the quintessential quality of divinity. (Clines 2015, n.p.) The same OT theologians who deny that YHWH should be understood through the alien categories of philosophical systems clearly not only have no problem constructing YHWH as an entity with an essential nature. They

70  When OT scholars behave philosophically also have no problem using second-order descriptive discourse in which first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text is said to refer to the deity’s essential attributes. No wonder Gowan (1994, ix) could point out that one frequently encounters OT theologians engaged in a “distilling the Bible’s information into a list of ‘attributes,’ a kind of ‘essence of divinity’ ”. Consider the historical-philosophical genealogy of the term attributes, suggesting that a little more specificity as to how one is currently using it and not the metaphysical currency one is trading in and accepts as valuable would clearly be welcome. The word attribute has been and still is used more readily, with various implications, by substantialist systems. In the 17th century, for example, it denoted the actual manifestations of substance. . . . The change of the meaning of substance after Hume and Kant is diverges from Descartes by holding that what he has described as primary attributes of physical bodies are really the forms of internal relationships between actual occasions and within actual occasions. (Process & reality, 471) In philosophical theology, the use of the word “attribute”, however, is still used by contemporary thinkers. Its meaning overlaps with other philosophical terms, for example, a quality, a property, a characteristic, a peculiarity, a circumstance, a state, a category, a mode or accident, though there are differences in both the intension and extension of all these terms. Technically speaking, consider the following example of one such popular distinction, a quality is usually thought to be an inherent property (“the qualities of matter”) while an attribute typically refers to the actual properties of a thing, only indirectly known (the attributes of God). In the metaphysical idiom of contemporary analytic philosophical theology, divine attributes are also called “properties”, the associated concerns being about their existence conditions, criteria of identity, subtypes of properties, etc. The possible relevance of new developments in research on the semantic, ontological and metaphysical issues of interest related to properties as these have taken shape since the second half of the last century has been almost completely absent from contemporaneous second-order discourse descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text (see Galluzzo & Loux 2015). As is the case when remarking on YHWH’s divine attributes, OT scholars have no standarised terminology for additional conceptual clarification when referring to divine properties in the world of the text. The point of this observation is not so much the implied methodological negligence but how the ongoing accepted use of these metaphysical terms with various possible meanings presuppose that biblical and philosophical theologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On an even larger scale, the idea of YHWH as an entity with a nature and attributes also supervene on the way

When OT scholars behave philosophically 71 the contents of many an OT has been structured. Consider, if you will, once again the example of Köhler (1957, 206): Vi The nature of the covenant god A Affirmations about the divine being Part one God Page I The existence of God 1 God’s existence II The nature of God 1 Definitions 2 Anthropomorphisms and their meaning 3 Types of God 4 God the Lord III Names and designations of God 1 The problem 5 Logical order of meanings 6 God’s relatedness It is easy to attribute this a refusal to acknowledge the insight of Gabler’s call for the separation of biblical and dogmatic theology. The fact is that what the previous chapter showed to be even older philosophical theological concepts, concerns and categories behind both these modern species of the genus of theology discipline are not so easily discarded. Sometimes there is little in either the table of contents or the main sections to give the impression that metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories are being utilised. To find out if they are, one option would be to begin at the by looking for the usual suspects in topical parts of the indexing to witness self-incriminating testimony regarding the inability of some OT theologians or their translators/copy-editors to refrain from identifying their links with the biblical-theological underground of philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives: God,  . . . essence of, 186 eternity of, 182f., 191f, 415f existence of, I, 50 (Eichrodt 1967, 523) Other OT theologians have sought to avoid references to YHWH’s divine nature and attributes, only to adopt a third equally typical philosophicaltheological category. This is evident whenever one reads anything that is ultimately about what can be called YHWH’s relations to the world and to

72  When OT scholars behave philosophically things in the world. After the divine nature and attributes, this is the next theme in all contemporary philosophical and OT theologies, even if once again, alternative wordings are preferred to obscure (wittingly or not) the metaphysical connection with the particular ontological category. Of course, “relations” in philosophy are about much more than the word usually refers to in ordinary language. In many varieties of philosophical theology proper, standard topics are quasi-generic and generally accepted within biblical theology where intra- and inter-religious conceptual pluralism supervene on both first-order conceptual constructions and second-order conceptual clarifications. Examples include divine creation, providence, goodness, freedom, hiddenness and so on. OT theologians have followed suit. Even OT theologies purporting not to be based on what are seen as reductive and distorting systematic theological capita select a will contain remarks at some point on every single one of these specifically philosophical-theological interests. So even if the direct link is with doctrinal theology, it does not change the philosophical-theological connection. In other words, there is a realism about YHWH’s relations as there is about YHWH’s properties, at least within second-order descriptive metaphysical restatements of the perceived meanings of first-order religious language constructions of YHWH in the world of the text on their own terms, even if not in them. To be sure, when OT theologians discuss YHWH’s relations they do not appear to be engaged in philosophical theology, especially if the object at the other end of YHWH’s relations is casted in the role of a loved one (e.g. a partner). Yet the form that allows the contents to be the way it is, or to be at all, is philosophical-theological through and through. Even if our hypothetical OT scholar manages to operate with no other overlapping metaphysical terms, the very word “relation” is not from the firstorder religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text of the OT itself even if what it is supposed to signify can surely be found there. This acceptance of the second-order ontological category of YHWH’s relations within literary and historically orientated OT theology is often encountered in conjunction with a rejection of the idea of the OT as interested in YHWH’s nature for its own sake. Whatever one thinks of the metaphysical merits of the related mereological assumptions, the link with philosophical theology is clear. This partly explains why, usually after there has been a discussion related to YHWH’s divine nature and attributes, OT theologians in many and various ways turn their attention to how YHWH relates to the world of the text and things in that world. Even if the OT theological discussion seems only concerned with the divine-world dynamic in the context of OT ethics, the rationale for taking an interest in divine relations in the way they do, or taking any interest therein at all, is derived from transposed assumptions of philosophical-theological foci in turn motivated by the same abstract metaphysical worries they themselves would otherwise dismiss on socio-literary and religious-historical grounds.

When OT scholars behave philosophically 73 The assumption that the biblical idea of God can be clarified thusly gives the impression of Platonism in the metaphysical assumptions of OT theology. We find it not only in their referring to OT concepts, which are abstract objects, but also in the view that the first-order religious language provides us with imperfect ideas about YHWH in the world of the text which ultimately relate to the transcendent world of God in the worlds behind and in front of the world of the text. In other words, based on a revised version of the twoworld dualism of Platonist metaphysics, the ideas about YHWH in the OT are taken as contingent and variable and yet somehow all particulars instantiating the perfect being theology. That is why even theologians operating with radical pluralism – like Brueggemann’s court or Gerstenberger’s social strata – ultimately presume to speak about one and the same entity as an abstract concept derived from the diversity of more concrete conceptions. Or consider on the invention of “God”, referring to YHWH, Biblical monotheism, therefore, is not really a closed philosophical doctrine – it is pluralist, and invites the readers of its texts to reflect on the difficult relation between unity and diversity. (Römer 2015, 234) In other words, OT scholars can be as concerned with their own version of the one over many problem and with unifying principles and prime matter as any pre–Socratic; here, only, it is with reference to YHWH the world of the text, often colliding with the worlds behind and in front as needed. Not to bring in Greek thought, but let us for a moment set aside the metaphilosophical stereotype that philosophical doctrines are closed and biblical ones are open, It almost sounds like the OT is described as being concerned with its own version of Platonism in metaphysics and the one over many argument. In this case the question motivating discussions of YHWH’s relations is something along the following lines: How do all the different and changing samples of YHWH all refer to God? Thus even a historian of Israelite religion and comparative-religious expert can be expected to at least try and restate the OT’s implied perspectives on: on YHWH’s nature in relation to monotheism as a sort of philosophical argument about divine ontology. It is sometimes thought that monotheism is at its heart a modern philosophical construct, one that should not be retrojected to the biblical context prior to Greek philosophizing. This is a view that depends on what constitutes philosophy. While biblical texts do not approach the question of reality in terms of abstract treatises associated with early western philosophy, biblical texts do narrate and discuss reality; within these texts are embedded either explicit statements about reality or implicit representations of

74  When OT scholars behave philosophically reality. Within such statements or representations are embedded presuppositions or notions about reality, in other words implicit theory or theories of reality. Whether or not monotheism constitutes or embeds philosophy, it is the task of scholars to understand the worldview of the texts with their operating assumptions and procedures, in other worlds, their theories. Such biblical theorizing entails biblical passages prior to the Greco-Roman philosophical enterprise. It is to be noted as well that the same point applies to polytheistic representations of reality outside of the Bible, not to mention non-biblical discourse focused on a single deity. (Smith 2014, 8–9) OT theologians who are nominalists needn’t endorse this view and might take a fictionalist stance on the ontological status of YHWH’s properties. Doing so represents another way in which contradictory versions of what YHWH is like and does to refer to the same character, the paraconsistent logic of belief revision in the history of Israelite religion operative on the composition and redaction of the OT texts notwithstanding. The most popular way of unifying diversity in the religious language of the world of the OT texts does not see everything as ultimately water, earth, fire or air. Instead, working with the metaphysics of fiction and mythological mereology in language and literature, the one over the many problem with reference to YHWH as ultimate reality involves the claim that “all is metaphor”. Of course, for all practical purposes, metaphor is a philosophical category, especially since it represents a reductive response to the philosophical-theological question regarding the nature of religious language. Being fond of Continental theories of metaphor, OT theologians imply it to be acceptable to depend on philosophical abstractions and theories when the ontology of relations in first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text can be made to seem ontologically/epistemologically more fundamental than ordinary propositional language (on metaphor and phenomenology, see Theorou 2013, n.p.). In what borders on a most sophisticated form of neo-allegorical interpretation, it might help to be reminded that these are not the views or interests of biblical writers or the categories of the OT but of philosophers especially since Aristotle and more recently in the wake of Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida. OT theologians of the pan-metaphorical school also like to depend on the related views of philosophers of religion, including Janet Soskice and Sally MacFague. More recently, additional aid in support of the reduction has been forthcoming from philosophically-motivated approaches in linguistics. Cognitive semantics is all the rage in recent research on concepts of God in the OT, one quid pro quo perhaps not unrelated o the fact that a concern with concepts and/as metaphors lie at the heart thereof (for examples of related research based on cognitive-linguistic “conceptualising” of the divine in the OT, see Wardlaw 2008; McClellan 2013). Taking their cue from them and others in philosophical theology since Aquinas’ analogical predication OT theologians project the second-order philosophical category of metaphor onto the first-order religious language

When OT scholars behave philosophically 75 of the world of the text. There it is seen as always having been the foundational heuristic structure primarily designed to subvert ordinary reference and dismantle the truth-bearing claims of first-order propositional language as post-modern thinkers have only relatively recently coincidently also confirmed (cf. S. Theodorou, https: //www.iep.utm.edu/met-phen/). For the purposes of the present discussion, biblical theological interest in YHWH’s metaphorical relations is pointed out, not to reject the trend but to show that philosophical-theological frameworks are again already considered an acceptable part of descriptive and historically orientated tasks in OT theology. On closer inspection then, the case against philosophical theology within OT theology and the repeated rejection thereof is a distraction and unintentionally misleading if taken at face value. The classic break-up lines, that philosophical types of theology are alien, un-Hebraic, anachronistic, cannot handle pluralism, imperfection, metaphor and history are in fact equally possible to interpret as actually a displaced resentment at systematic theology’s continued intrusion before and after Gabler rather than being in principle against philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories per se. To this day, OT scholars often end up trying to argue why philosophical theological assumptions about YHWH’s great-making properties are nevertheless implicit in the first-order religious language descriptions in the world of the text since the non-philosophical god-talk is metaphorical and therefore actually a non-metaphysical way of saying the same metaphysical things. Relocating all such comparative philosophical theology to the metaphysics of fiction so that everything is said to apply only in virtue of being part of a literary ontology changes nothing, given how everything is about the world of the text anyway. In fact, it is just more “with it”. According to one classic OT theologian, the “conceptual clarification” by the OT authors themselves, played a not unimportant part in removing the last hindrances to universalisation of the idea of God in both thought and speech. Even clearer theoretical formulations were now arrived at for that which, even without adequate expression, had hitherto been an established part of the concerns of practical belief; and in this way the content of that which we are accustomed to term the metaphysical attributes of God was appositely described. (Eichrodt 1967, 181) Eichrodt then continues with comparative philosophical restatement, which wants to remain descriptive and historical but always threatens to topple over into apologetical and natural theological epistemic justification. First in relation to omnipotence: Thus it is certain that the faith of early Israel was unable to speak of the omnipotence of God; and even the prophets coined no word for this concept. Yet it is true that at no time was the devout Israelite capable of supposing that there was anything God could not do; it was simply

76  When OT scholars behave philosophically that it satisfied his practical concerns to think of God as more powerful than his opponents. . . . It is also well known that popular speech in its description of YHWH frequently remained bogged down in anthropomorphic limitations without facing clearly their real significance. (Eichrodt 1967, 182) The discussion of this divine metaphysical attribute is approached in a Socratic dialectical fashion, hoping to say what was and is meant by omnipotence by considering supposed examples and counter-examples (of YHWH’s power always concerned with specific peculiar forms of power). As the description unfolds we see the idea of YHWH’s power still assuming to have some sort of essential nature with common properties across all possible worlds in the text. After this, Eichrodt turns to the next “metaphysical attribute” of YHWH as clarified within the second-order discourse of supposedly anti-philosophical theological approaches to the OT on its own terms, even if not in them: The same is true of the sense of God’s omnipresence. The pious Israelite never doubted that God was present in every place where men turned to him in believing prayer. (Eichrodt 1967, 182) Again these claims are supported by anticipating possible objections related to locations of worship and other spatio-temporal limitations of divine presence that are argued as being only apparently in contradiction of the relevant perfect-being attribute. By way of an appeal to metaphor and the nature of religious language Eichrodt and others are able to harmonize the less-than-perfect-being theologies of the OT with the great-making properties of the perfect being theology of their choice. This is also evident when Eichrodt looks at the implied nature of YHWH in the OT in relation to the attribute divine omniscience: It also looks like a crude contradiction of YHWH’s omniscience that he should have to convince himself personally of the truth of a report. And yet this did not hinder men from believing that everything was open to him, that nothing could be hidden from him. (Eichrodt 1967, 183) In short, the literary character YHWH was actually assumed to be about a non-literary God who has a nature with the metaphysical attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence as these can be seen when restating the meaning of first-order metaphorical religious language in comparative philosophical second-order terms, not available to pious Israelites. Whether or not one agrees with Eichrodt’s assessment, let it be noted that comparative philosophical-theological perspectives are implied as in principle both possible and preferable, provided one can still speak of YHWH as having not only attributes but metaphysical ones at that; and that one can

When OT scholars behave philosophically 77 clarify the OT concept (singular) of God as part of historical and descriptive readings with the aim of identifying associated contents in the OT related to a particular great-making property. This is implied to be the case, even if the specific perspectives (named via technical terms) in philosophical theology and related to a particular metaphysical attribute are not also considered, e.g. middle-knowledge, etc. These too are not implied to be a problem, and OT theologians have sometimes simply made up their own. The reduction of the metaphysical assumptions of first order religious language in the world of the OT text to metaphor is able to harmonize theological pluralism in new apologetically sophisticated ways. It allows for a return to the philosophical-theological way of dealing with the classic embarrassment of “anthropomorphisms”. Of course, many OT theologians would ultimately admit to this. Perhaps they would simply say that the kind of philosophy they mean to reject in opposing the OT and metaphysics lies on the level of exegesis so that the biblical and philosophical-theological binary can be traced to the difference between Antiochene and Alexandrine schools of interpretation. These are supposed to contrast in the sense of the former being more historical and the latter more allegorical, mystical, philosophical and like the older critical philosophical tradition, aimed at reinterpreting the text to show that it actually presents a respectable metaphysical stance: It is hardly surprising that the anxious formalism of later Judaism and Alexandrian philosophy was unable to come to terms with such boldness of speech, and sought to render it innocuous by means of allegorical interpretation. (Eichrodt 1961, 212) Yet in a discussion of the OT on its own terms, we soon find ourselves no longer in them when Eichrodt clarifies a point under the heading entitled “affirmations of the divine being”. His jealousy is meant to express that He is not an unconscious natural force, which pours out its fullness in utter indifference, but that human love possesses real value in his eyes. His fear indicates that He is a god who sets a definite aim before Him, who constantly keeps the development of the world within the limits of His eternal decrees, and that His wisdom does not tolerate the self-assertion of short-sighted man, god’s wrath and hatred . . . are standard expressions for the self-asserting majesty of his living essence. (Eichrodt 1961, 216) The association of divinity with Being is controversial (see Brueggemann 1997, 117; Crenshaw 2009, 42; and in philosophical theology, e.g. Houser 2010, 113–132). Again, this example is representative and hardly idiosyncratic to Eichrodt even if many no longer follow him on a variety of issues regarding structure, method, purpose, scope and so on. Implied to be a

78  When OT scholars behave philosophically first-order category instead of a second-order theological description, the word and focus which began, as we saw, with Greek philosophical theology concerned with apparent problems with the reference of religious language in the older and even among contemporaneous metaphysical discourse: The anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament too can be understood from the didactic purposes. They make it possible to speak of God in connection with man and so make it possible to conceive of the reality of God in connection with time. (Schmidt 1983, 282) Note how rationalising or validating anthropomorphism is based on philosophical-theological concerns either originating in ancient critiques of the phenomenon or inherited from subsequent philosophical revaluing thereof in new theories on the nature of religious language as analogical, equivocal or metaphorical. Also keep in mind that the particular statement is found in a theology of the OT that was written in tandem with the history of Israelite religion. As such, what is implied is nothing less than that, contrary to anti-metaphysical rhetoric elsewhere, biblical theology and philosophical theology cannot be distinguished along stereotypical methodological lines suggesting that the former is all historical and descriptive and the latter mostly metaphysical and evaluative (cf. Patrick 1981, 1999). Of course, nothing may be said in so many words, either in the OT or OT theology. But precisely because philosophical-theological (metaphysical) questions and concerns tend to be implicit only (unless these can be clarified for comparative purposes), one can still ask the question of what, if anything, was assumed about the nature of divine existence, including spatial and temporal forms these took, e.g. contingent forms in theophany or with reference to the ontological status of YHWH in the dreamworld or even in view of the interesting and sophisticated implicit mereologies able to accommodate world of the text conceptions of divine corporeality in terms of multi-location, transtemporality and multiple realizability. This seems to be quite fashionable in contemporary historical and comparative approaches to the study of ancient Israelite religion where the latest focus is not on divine mental but physical states, a.k.a. embodiment and body parts. Here too, continental philosophy’s discussions about metaphor as metaphysics and cognitive linguistics of conceptual metaphors as “philosophy in the flesh” has revitalized the idea of the philosophical-theological defensibility and respectability OT anthropomorphism and anthropopathism. The philosophical-theological sophistication even in the poetic religious language of prayers: Different body parts serve commonly as parts for the whole (pars pro toto) in order to denote divine attitudes (human body parts show analogous uses of pars pro toto to denote various attitudes). Divine eyes denote watchfulness and knowledge of human activity (Psalms 5, 6, 11,

When OT scholars behave philosophically 79 4; cf. 9, 14, 10, 14); the divine hand and arm power and strength (Psalm 10, 12); the divine nose anger (Psalms 2, 11, 18, 9); the divine hands and fingers creation (Psalm 8, 4, 7) or trapping (Psalm 9, 17); the divine ears a capacity to receive human prayer (see Psalm 10, 17; cf. 5, 2); and the divine face access or presence (Psalms 17, 15, 42, 3) and blessing (Psalm 4, 7), as well as absence (Psalm 10, 11). Divine actions also presuppose a familiarity with divine body language, divine sitting denotes enthronement (Psalm 2, 4; cf. 9, 5, 8); and divine standing a lack of action or movement toward (i.e., on behalf of) the speaker (Psalm 10, 1). . . . Divine fatherhood can be expressed to denote patronage or support (see Psalm 2, 7), but the body language of genitalia rarely, if ever, comes into play. (Smith 2001, 92) Fretheim (1984) In his Suffering of God nearly writes a philosophical theology of the OT in all but name. All the metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories are there: the nature of religious language, reflections on the divine nature, attributes and relations, attributes being those typically considered in philosophical theology (metaphysical ones). The section on divine relations is concerned with contemporary philosophical-theological foci like creation, providence, revelation, incarnation, etc. The whole publication can be seen as an attempt to discover an underlying conceptual coherency within the conceptual pluralism characterising OT perspectives on “God”. Since all religious language is metaphorical, except the word (or maybe including the word) “God”, and has as its function to turn anthropomorphism into a didactic device better able to communicate truth than abstract concepts are able to. The perfect being theology of classical theism and its relevant ideas are taken to task, e.g. divine transcendence (monarchic metaphors suggest otherwise), impassibility (YHWH affects and is affected), the doctrine of divine omniscience (partial). Fretheim tries to preserve the idea of omnipresence by making ontological distinctions between kinds of presence and power (structural or general presence as opposed to being relative with reference to the “intensification of the divine presence”). This helps to show how “the finite form is capable of the infinite” (Fretheim 1984, 102). Brueggemann (1997, 118 and passim) rejects both church theology and the metaphysical categories of Hellenistic philosophy and questions of ontology. Insisting as consistently as he can that YHWH does not fit any preconceived categories, this is implied to mean that we must focus on speech about YHWH or “god-talk” in the OT. Instead of reducing the first-order religious language to ancient pre-modern philosophicaltheological categories, Brueggemann still reduces it to post-modern Continental ones (with ancient Greek roots). In a form of linguistic idealism, everything becomes “speech” (when it is obviously a kind of writing). Since all religious language is really metaphorical, albeit more than postAristotelian compact similes (as the philosophical-theological source credited in the footnote warrants), the organising principle and/or system can be

80  When OT scholars behave philosophically completely analogical. The new center of biblical theology becomes “testimony” in the “OT” by “Israel” about “YHWH” (all as universals wherein particulars within the different worlds of the text contingently and imperfectly participate). This makes the second-order discourse of OT theology into a Platonic idealist and non-realist post-modern philosophical biblical theology in all but game. How can this be the case? The discussion about positive assertions about God and his character involves literary-theological rephrasing of the older philosophical-theological concept of a divine nature. So what used to be called divine attributes become predicates or adjectives applied to God and indicate YHWH’s fundamental abiding characteristics. These include grace, mercy and steadfast love. Comparative philosophical commentary also pops up in noting that the OT has no adjectives like omniscient or omnipresent, though elsewhere he sees its theology as somehow responding to the question of aseity when reflecting on God’s constancy (i.e. personal identity over time, essential nature). Other philosophical-theological worries are scattered, rearranged from their typical sequential order and obscured with related but different jargon. The compatibilist worry that God’s forgiveness and judgment are incompatible is a philosophical-theological problem. “Israel’s Countertestimony” presupposes a logical, epistemological and metaphysical worry about unity in diversity. “Israel’s Unsolicited Testimony” involves reframing the older philosophical-theological concerns about God’s (here YHWH’s) relation to the world and things in the world (creation), providence, hiddenness, the problem of evil (here theodicy). “Israel’s Embodied Testimony” combines worries over the attribute of divine presence reconstructed as the legal analogy of “mediation”. So again, form and content clash when biblical (OT) theology and philosophical theology are made to appear as completely separated even though the former discipline continues to trade in and depend on the general and particular conceptual currencies of the latter. Consider another example, found in the titles of Otto Kaiser’s German Trilogy. For the sake of brevity I simply mention the titles so as to make readily apparent the mirroring of related philosophical-theological divisions, both with reference to distinctions and wording: • Der Gott des Alten Testaments. Theologie des Alten Testaments, 1, Grundlegung. • Der Gott des Alten Testaments, Wesen und Wirken. Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 2, Jahwe, der Gott Israels, Schöpfer der Welt und des Menschen. • Der Gott des Alten Testaments, Wesen und Wirken. Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 3, Jahwes Gerechtigkeit. Observe the philosophical-theological concepts reiterated in the titles: divine essence/being and action/agency. Also, in the first volume, the frame of reference is YHWH’s metaphysical nature and attributes, the second volume is

When OT scholars behave philosophically 81 about divine relations to the world, the third to YHWH’s moral attributes. Given all that has been shown thus far in the present chapter, one is reminded of Derrida’s discussion of the antinomy inherent in the logic of supplementation. In OT theology, philosophical-theological conceptual clarification in the form of metaphysical restatements are implied to be second-order and simply elaborating on what is “biblical” (“original”). Writing a theology of the OT (or anything about the OT for that matter) exemplifies this: If supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process, writing is the supplement par excellence since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, sign of a sign, taking the place of a speech already significant. (Derrida 1967, 281) What is supplementary second-order scholarly conceptual clarification in OT theology involving comparative philosophical restatement in metaphysical terms can always be interpreted two surprisingly positive ways that contradict the popular consensus on how biblical and philosophical theology are supposed to be related. On the one hand, it may suggest that since philosophical description is in the religious language used in the world of the OT text itself, metaphysical restatement acts as regrettable, risky but required corrective to our own anachronistic philosophical-theological assumptions. On the other hand, it might also be argued that such second-order descriptive philosophical translations merely enrich what the OT means in its historical context and on its own terms, even if not in them. Because of the supervening binary between biblical and philosophical theology, and even without it, which of these is the case is implied to be undecidable, even in the writings of OT theologians themselves. Ultimately, I would say that in OT theology and elsewhere, the philosophicaltheological supplement is both of these things, prefiguring the modal dichotomy (Derrida 1967, 315). What shall we say about all these things? One way of looking at it is to surmise that OT theologies are written by biblical scholars whose secondorder descriptions, no matter how much these appear to avoid philosophical language, are indelibly riddled with Graecisms and Latinisms that had origins in technical philosophical terminology, the genealogy of which has been obscured by becoming assimilated to the categories nascent in the folkmetaphysics implicit in ordinary everyday (religious) language. The present chapter therefore independently confirms and offers additional more extensive and intensive evidence in support of the general idea James Barr put forward several decades ago, even if not yet making a direct link to philosophical theological concepts, concerns and categories. By being contrasted with Greek thought in a philosophical framework of this kind, Hebrew thought is itself assimilated to a philosophical type. It takes on the character of a philosophy in everything but name. (see Barr 1961, 1966, 38–39)

82  When OT scholars behave philosophically Barr and those he criticized were perhaps prudent not to have called what was happening historical or comparative “philosophical theology”, nevertheless pointing out that those who are in view did not want such an association and consequently classified their own research as concerned with comparative or cross-cultural psychology or anthropology (cf. Pederson 1926–1940; Boman 1960). Ultimately what is clear is the different and creative in which every OT theology both rejects metaphysical presuppositions, problems and perspectives on YHWH as an entity with a divine nature, attributes and relations to the world and things in the world of the text. However, of interest is what is, when discussing “the concept of God” in the OT and engaging in “conceptual clarification”, by implication, granted: The issue is not between philosophy and theology, but between a proper historical-theological cultural study and an unhistorical use of philosophical categories. (Barr 1966, 39) But what exactly do OT scholars mean when referring to “philosophical categories” irrespective of how they are used? Traditionally, following Aristotle, these have been thought of as highest genera of entities (in the widest sense of the term), so that a system of categories provide an answer the most basic of metaphysical questions, “What is there?” Of course, it may be difficult to imagine how to spot a proper historical use of philosophical categories with reference to YHWH as constructed in the religious language of the OT itself. Perhaps it would help if we remember that if we cannot think of philosophical-theological categories as of the Aristotelian type, the Kantian kind, might be more useful. This would be the case if philosophical categories are not seen as in the OT itself but given in the conditions of possibility for the way our (and the biblical writers’) cognitive apparatus structure our reading experiences. Alternatively, if this does not work, since we live after the so-called linguistic turn about a century ago we could also think of philosophical categories as what is given in our contemporary second-order scholarly meta-languages and supervened on by the metaphysical concepts and concerns indelibly part thereof. Important for the present is to see the distinction here, “philosophical” categories are not per se the problem, the lack of a historically conscious use thereof is. Of course, the above is relevant only if OT theologians did in fact refer to “philosophical categories” in the technical sense. This is far from clear from the brief and vague references to it in their writings and one can for the most part not positively identify the presence of philosophical category theory (as opposed to the use of the word “category” in ordinary language, in cognitive linguistics, in psychological theories of concepts, etc.). Perhaps on these grounds Barr could admit that, [a]s has been indicated, theologies can take many different forms. It does not seem one can prescribe in advance for all cases the position

When OT scholars behave philosophically 83 which the biblical material will take or the point at which it will be introduced. One would only say that a theology of primarily philosophical form would have to be prepared at some point to consider in what way it relates to the God of the Bible. Conversely, a theology of “biblical” type, proceeding from ample biblical documentation, has to be prepared at some point to say how its thinking relates to extrabiblical considerations, of whatever kind. (Barr 1973, 136) Philosophical-theological considerations cannot be avoided. Either one thinks the OT texts present us with characterizations of YHWH in ways that correspond to aspects of how philosophical theologians have described divine nature, attributes and relations. Or one disagrees with this, or has some view in-between, or multiple context sensitive convictions. All of these presuppose comparative philosophical theology involving some form of written or unwritten attempt to restate (or rethink) what is incidentally implicit in the religious language of the OT in metaphysical terms is already present. The expressed rejection of philosophical theology is therefore the result of the OT theologian finding the associated contents lacking, inaccessible or incommensurable from the perspective of the second-order biblical theological idiom being utilized. In every single outcome, the warrant to at least do this type of comparative philosophical-theological conceptual clarification openly, exclusively, extensively and in-depth so concerned (and even if only to find out it is impossible or illegitimate), is already a conceded, irrespective of the relation, the merits of the views involved and the limits attributed to doing so. In other words, OT theologians are up against their own self-created horned dilemma. When they argue that the use of metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories are just wrong, they cannot themselves actually do so without introducing what are by implication acceptable and potentially helpful philosophical theological presuppositions, problems, perspectives, etc. On the one hand, if it is meant that all things philosophical should be absent in interpreting the OT’s religious language (or are absent from the world of the text itself), then OT theologians should do away not only with both their own and the text’s assumptions about the nature of reality, knowledge, right and wrong, valid reasoning but with OT theology and the idea of YHWH as entity with a divine nature, attributes, an essence, part of a world in the text, the idea of a text and most of their supposedly non-philosophical terms and conditions themselves (including second-order concepts like concepts, metaphor, events, hermeneutics, comparative Hebrew-Greek thought analysis, restatements in metaphysical terms). On the other hand, if they think that some philosophical grids, principles, systems, frameworks or disciplines are the problem, yet still oppose biblical and philosophical theology within a binary supposed to be absolute, they are inconsistent, and therefore do not mean, or cannot be taken to mean, that all philosophy or philosophical-theological grids are faulty or should

84  When OT scholars behave philosophically be avoided. The anti-philosophical sentiment is then either itself wrong or inconsistent with what is required by its own application. This is clearly a horned dilemma which, in this chapter and that to come, will be shown, thankfully, to be a false dilemma as well, and therefore no dilemma at all. The more OT scholars object along any of these lines, the more they lapse into the very idealism (ideas before experience) or nihilism (no inherent meaning) or positivism (meaning before truth) they both abhor and claim is alien to the world of the text. Of course, one must “save the phenomena” and understand what is “given” as to why philosophy may be a problem. Thus the same argument can help interaction and concessions to the critic as well. This would be, excuse the puns, both more ideal and realistic. This is how one can respond to the sceptic who keeps popping up whenever someone intends to offer philosophical perspectives on the OT, besides the samples of how “everyone is doing it” provided in the present chapter, a so-called transcendental argument of the Kantian analytic type can also prove quite convincing. To help wake the anti-philosopher-theologian of the OT from their “dogmatic slumbers”, one may employ the following procedure. Whatever hermeneutical arguments against a philosophical theology of the OT was, is or may be, it is given that the second-order language of OT scholars are not the Bible’s own. From linguistic inquiries to literarytheological analysis, they are bound to philosophical theological concepts, concerns and categories, past and present. And by each critique of the influence of the associated metaphysical assumptions on others and by every involvement of a more covert contemporary philosophical framework, they construct a new discipline’s loci. The philosophical theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives that supervene on their readings began long before they studied the texts for the first time and continue long after they have decided to try and bracket all all associated metaphysical systems, principles and abstractions. The OT may not be considered philosophy and what they are doing cannot be so described either. But that makes no difference to the fact that the conceptual currency their second-order scholarly discourses trade in for the sake of conceptual clarification often ends up attempting and accepting the legitimacy and value of comparative philosophical theological restatement in descriptive metaphysical terms the supposed perspectives related to philosophical-theological topics implicit within the first-order religious language. The fact is, the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT need not be seen as more scary or anachronistic or fallacious or absurd than if one’s approach was more linguistic, literary-critical, historical-religious, comparative-religious, social-scientific or, dare I say, biblical theological. For there is no such thing as OT scholarship simpliciter; interpretation of the texts is only available in the form or anachronistic reductive perspectives on what exactly YHWH as religious object is assumed to be. This in turn implies that whatever else was demonstrated in this chapter, is not really meant as a contribution to OT theology even if it could so be used.

When OT scholars behave philosophically 85 The agenda was and is not to purify biblical theology from philosophicaltheological contents. Instead, by showing the indelibility thereof, the binary opposition between biblical theology and philosophical theology has been destabilised to the point of revealing its deconstruction. This opens up a space for a philosophical theology of the OT that would involve simply doing what is already acceptable and happening but extending it to become the primary focus of one’s research. Imagining just what exactly I have in mind requires a bit more substance in the metaphilosophical theological theoretical framework before it can be properly envisaged and applied on a much larger scale and with more of the associated descriptive metaphysical nuance and specificity.

Bibliography Barr, J. 1961. The semantics of Biblical language. New York: Oxford University Press. Barr, J. 1966. Old and new in interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barr, J. 1973. The Bible in the modern world. New York: Harper & Row. Boman, T. 1960. Hebrew thought compared with Greek. 3rd rev. ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Brueggemann, W. 1997. Theology of the old testament, testimony, dispute, advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Brueggemann, W. 2010. Old testament theology, an introduction. Library of Biblical theology. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Burns, P. 1986. Questions and answers on the attributes of God. Heythrop Journal, 27 (2), 171–177. Carroll, R.P. 1991. Wolf in the Sheepfold. The Bible as problem for Christianity. London: SPCK Celestine, C.M. 2015. A philosophical investigation of the nature of God in Igbo ontology. Open Journal of Philosophy, 5 (2), 137–151. Childs, B.S. 2004. The book of Exodus. A critical theological commentary. OTL. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. Clines, D.J.A. 2015. The most-high male: Divine masculinity in the Bible. No pages. Paper read at the Feminist Section of the International Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Beunos Aires, Argentina. 22 July 2015. Crenshaw, J.L. 1995. Urgent advice and probing questions: Collected writings on old testament wisdom. Mercer, GA: Mercer University Press. Crenshaw, J.L. 2009. Sipping from the cup of wisdom. In P.K. Moser (ed.). Jesus and philosophy. New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–62. Cupitt, D. 1996. After God. A new theory of religion. London: SCM Press. Derrida, J. 1967. Of grammatology. Trans. G.C. Spivak. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Eichrodt, W. 1961. Theology of the old testament. Vol. 1. Trans. J.A. Baker. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox. Eichrodt, W. 1967. Theology of the old testament. Vol. 2. Trans. J.A. Baker. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox. Everitt, N. 2010. The divine attributes. Philosophy Compass, 5 (1), 78–90.

86  When OT scholars behave philosophically Farnell, L.R. 1925. The attributes of God. The Gifford lectures delivered in the university of St. Andrews in the Year 1924–1925. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Flint, T.P. 1992. The nature of God. Faith and Philosophy, 9 (3), 392–398. Flint, T.P. & Rea M. (eds.) 2009. The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fohrer, G. 1972. Theologische Grundstrukturen des Alten Testaments. Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, 24; Berlin: de Gruyter. Freddoso, A.J. (ed.). 1983. The existence and nature of God. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Fretheim, T.E. 1984. The suffering of God. An old testament perspective. Overtures to Biblical Theology. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Galluzzo, G. & Loux, M.J. (eds.) 2015. The problem of Universals in contemporary philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gericke, J. 2017. What is a God? Philosophical perspectives on divine essence in the Hebrew Bible. Bloomsbury: T&T Clark. Gerstenberger, E.S. 2002. Theologies of the old testament. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Gowan, D.E. 1994. Theology in Exodus. Biblical theology in the form of a commentary. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G.S. 2002. The divine attributes. Oxford: Blackwell. Houser, R.E. 2010. The language of being and the nature of God in the Aristotelian tradition. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 84, 113–132. Kaiser, O. 1993. Der Gott des Alten Testaments. Theologie des Alten Testaments, 1, Grundlegung. UTB 1747. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Kaiser, O. 1998. Der Gott des Alten Testaments, Wesen und Wirken. Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 2, Jahwe, der Gott Israels, Schöpfer der Welt und des Menschen. UTB 2024. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Kaiser, O. 2003. Der Gott des Alten Testaments, Wesen und Wirken. Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 3, Jahwes Gerechtigkeit. UTB 2392. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Köhler, L. 1957. Old testament theology. London, Lutterworth; Philadelphia: Westminster. MacDonald, S. 2001. The divine nature. In E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (eds.). The Cambridge companion to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 71–90. Maxwell, N. 2013. Taking the nature of God seriously. In J. Diller and A. Kasher (eds.). Models of God and other ultimate realities. New York: Springer, pp. 587–599. McClellan, D.O. 2013. You will be like the gods. The conceptualization of deity in the Bible in cognitive perspective. Unpublished Masters Dissertation: Langley, Trinity Western University. Moser, P.K. 2004. The divine attributes. Faith and Philosophy, 21 (1), 116–119. Oppy, G. 2014. Describing gods. An investigation of divine attributes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patrick, D. 1981. The rendering of God in the old testament. Overtures to Biblical theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Patrick, D. 1999. The rhetoric of revelation. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

When OT scholars behave philosophically 87 Pederson, J. 1926–1940. Israel, its life and culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pinnock, C.H., Rice, R., Sanders, J., Hasker, W. and Basinger, D. 1994. The openness god. A Biblical challenge to the traditional understanding of god. Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Rad, G. von. 1962. Old testament theology. Vol. 1. The theology of Israel’s historical traditions. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. Rad, G. von. 1965. Old testament theology. Vol. 2. The theology of Israel’s prophetic traditions. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. Römer, T. 2015. The invention of God. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schmid, K. 2019. A historical theology of the Hebrew Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2019. Schmidt, W.H. 1983. The faith of the old testament. A history. Oxford: Blackwell; Philadelphia, Westminster Press. Smith, M. 2014. Monotheism and the redefinition of divinity in ancient Israel. JISMOR, 9, 3–19. Smith, M.S. 2001. The origins of Biblical monotheism: Israel’s polytheistic background and the Ugaritic texts. Oxford: Oxford. University Press. Sommer, B.D. 2009. The bodies of God and the world of Ancient Israel. New York: Cambridge University Press. Terrien, S. 1978. The elusive presence. Towards a new Biblical theology. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Theodorou, S. 2013. Metaphor and phenomenology. Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Available from: [28 January 2019]. Tresmontant, C. 1960. A study of Hebrew thought. Trans. M.F. Gibson. New York: Desclee. Turgeon, W.C. 2004. The nature of God. Questions, 4, 2–3. Van den Brink, G. and Sarot, M. (eds.). 1999. Understanding the attributes of God. [Contributions to philosophical theology, volume 1]. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Vriezen, T.C. 1958. An outline of old testament theology. Oxford: Blackwell. Waltke, B.K. 2008. An old testament theology. An exegetical, canonical and thematic approach. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Ward, K. 1998. Concepts of God, images of the divine in five religious traditions. Oxford: One world Publications. Wardlaw, T.R. 2008. Conceptualizing words for “God” within the Pentateuch: A cognitive – Semantic investigation in literary context. New York: T&T Clark. Westermann, C. 1978. What does the old testament say about God? Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press. Wierenga, E. 1989. The nature of God: An inquiry into divine attributes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wright, G.E. 1952. God who acts. London: SCM Press.

4 Paving the road to a philosophical theology of the OT with good intensions

In the first chapter of this text it was established by way of OT scholars’ explicit references to “philosophical theology” that such a thing would be incompatible with descriptive and historical research on the theological content of biblical literature. Yet as we saw in the previous two chapters, the relationship status involving philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems, perspectives, persons and practices on the one hand and biblicaltheological concepts, concerns and categories in the second-order discourse of OT scholars on the other is, at present, well, complicated. Whether this is thought to be a good thing (or not), and however OT theologians would like to position themselves to philosophy (or not), are not the concern here. The point I wish to make is that comparative conceptual clarification involving restating the perceived meaning of the OT’s religious language in metaphysical terms related to the themes in philosophical theology associated with the divine nature, attributes and relations is implied to be a valid, viable and valuable interpretative endeavour. The aspirations of this chapter for a philosophical theology of the OT are not those of the target of Derrida’s polemic against the notion that speech is prior to writing. This here is no attempt to immortalise the associated research by seeing in advance the terms in which all possible problems are to be set, and attempting to set in stone the criteria for their resolution (cf. also Derrida 1982 on metaphor as metaphysics). If the “logocentric”, Platonic notion of speech as prior to writing were right, there might be a last word on YHWH in the OT. Whether we think this or not, for the purposes of this study I shall assume Richard Rorty’s suggestion that Derrida’s point is that no one can make sense of the notion of a last word (see Rorty 1978, 159; cf. Rorty 1979, 1982, 1989). A good contribution to research is one that facilitates the occasion for a better piece thereof. So I think we should take this outside. . . . the box. The present chapter asks the reader to imagine looking only at the already identified bits and pieces of philosophical-theological description. Now remove them from the discussion in OT theology and elsewhere where they are currently located. Next, imagine the activity and focus that are the conditions of possibility for such comments as representing the hermeneutical

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 89 warrant a new method and discipline, overlapping with but separate from the existing varieties of OT interpretation. Finally, imagine exclusively focusing on and expanding the conceptual clarification involved to include additional philosophical theological concerns and metaphysical categories that are more nuanced, allowing for more depth and specificity, all as part of a new and revised comprehensive comparative philosophical-theological approach that can be applied to reflect on first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text as well as on the secondorder discourses we use in doing so. What else would that be but one possible already acceptable form a philosophical theology of the OT could take? Even if one disagrees with regard to the details of any particular perspective, why not legalise it, make it explicit and official, so that it can be properly “on both ends not” and managed as specialist expert research? Would the objective and relevance of such inquiries not be what it was actually intended to be when OT theologians did it behind the scenes and in quick short bursts? Would it not help to show how our own philosophicaltheological assumptions can be distortive, where metaphysical frameworks can be presumptuous and how what seems to be related and implicit in a particular context within of the OT might be similar or different from later Jewish, Christian and secular philosophical-theological ideas in general? How would this be different or more problematic than a linguistic, socioliterary or comparative-historical research on the OT? Of course, no theoretical framework is in place yet, so it might take two more steps to sell the anti-philosophical reader (out). In this chapter an experimental preliminary grid will be laid that will enable the inclusion of any associated but also alternative related methodological innovations and in order to prepare for the idiosyncratic hypothetical illustration of their application to follow. As such it is not strictly speaking a philosophical theology of the OT. More like first thoughts about one possible form the relevant discussions could take (for we are legion). Also, none of the chosen variables involved are presented with prescriptive intent. I shall not be assuming that any particular view of OT scholarship, the OT itself, YHWH, God, theology, philosophy, philosophical theology, metaphysics and assorted is in itself either decisive or inherently problematic. Everything written here is only for the sake of the argument or, to be precise, facilitating experimentation with the basic idea. The latter and how it could look – that is what is assumed to be important. In other words, the merits of the argument for a philosophical theology of the OT as a viable project is so constructed so as in itself not to be dependent on the idiosyncratic and fallible details of my experiments therein. If it’s any consolation, this also means taking seriously the kinds of hermeneutical and exegetical fallacies usually involved when approaching the OT from a philosophical-theological perspective (see Gericke 2012). The case being made is not that the OT is philosophical theology or can be fitted into a systematic philosophical-theological presentation directly related

90  Paving the road to a philosophical theology to what Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians do. While others are free to pursue such options, in the discussion to follow I shall suggest that one way of doing so within OT scholarship could involve extending the descriptive, comparative and historical type of philosophical-theological conceptual clarification already being done by experimenting with a singular metaphilosophical-theological framework. The theoretical configurations proposed in this chapter will then be applied and illustrated with reference to hypothetical scenarios in the next. To start with, perhaps it helps to take a step back to consider the metaphilosophical assumptions that will be adopted for the sake of the argument only (on metaphilosophy, see Joll 2017, n.p). Surely the variability of both philosophy and theology, of philosophical theology, of metaphysics and of metaphilosophical assumptions makes the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT simply beg the question of what one means thereby. In the present context, metaphilosophical questions, the answers to which reveal one’s assumptions, are understood to include the following: What do the particular OT scholars interested in a philosophical theology of the OT understand by philosophy? • What do the particular OT scholars interested in a philosophical theology of the OT understand by philosophical theology? • What do the particular OT scholars interested in a philosophical theology of the OT understand by a philosophical theology of the OT? • What methodological assumptions are present as regards how one is to do philosophical theology in relation to the OT, and what are its assumptions, questions, themes, objectives and scope? • How does it relate to other forms of philosophical exegesis in the history of biblical interpretation and their hermeneutical and exegetical fallacies • How does it relate to what philosophers, OT scholars, OT theologians and philosophical-theologians are currently doing? • What are its limits, challenges, obstacles, risks, prospects and possibilities? •

The answers to these questions and the assumptions of this study as implied by them will become clear as the discussion progresses. What follows will be part of a multiplex approach that will involve experimenting with a neopragmatist hermeneutic as backdrop for the sake of illustrating how its application might look within the hypothetical illustrations of a combined comparative (in terms of method) and analytic (in terms of metaphysical idiom) philosophical-theological discussion to follow. The remainder of this study is basically therefore something analogous to a big thought experiment along the fictionalist lines of one possible response to the question “what if?” Here I take my que, for the sake of the argument, from Richard

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 91 Rorty’s paper on Derrida and the idea of philosophy as a kind of writing (Rorty 1978, 141–160). I cannot say I endorse or depend on everything it assumes, argues or implies. But I found some of the metaphilosophical angles therein interesting and useful for the inclusivist theoretical musings of the present chapter. In the paper, Rorty makes a distinction between what he calls “Kantian” and “Hegelian” traditions in metaphilosophical binaries supervening on philosophical practice (see Rorty 1978, 143). Here is one way of looking at philosophy: from the beginning, philosophy has worried about the relation between thought and its object, representation and represented. The old problem about reference to the inexistent, for example, has been handled in various unsatisfactory ways because of a failure to distinguish properly philosophical questions about meaning and reference from extraneous questions motivated by scientific, ethical, and religious concerns. Once these questions are properly isolated, however, we can see philosophy as a field which has its center in a series of questions about the relations between words and the world. The recent purifying move from talk of ideas to talk of meanings had dissipated the epistemological skepticism which motivated much of past philosophy. ‘This has left philosophy a more limited, but more self-conscious, rigorous, and coherent area of inquiry. (Rorty 1978, 142) But one can equally view it very differently: Here is another way of looking at philosophy: philosophy started off as a confused combination of the love of wisdom and the love of argument. It began with Plato’s notion that the rigor of mathematical argumentation exposed, and could be used to correct, the pretensions of the politicians and the poets. As philosophical thought changed and grew, inseminated by this ambivalent eriis, it produced shoots which took root on their own. Both wisdom and argumentation became far more various than Plato dreamed. Given such nineteenth-century complications as the Bildungsroman, non-Euclidean geometries, ideological historiography, the literary dandy, and the political anarchist, there is no way in which one can isolate philosophy as occupying a distinctive place in culture or concerned with a distinctive subject or proceeding by some distinctive method. One cannot even seek an essence for philosophy as an academic Fach (because one would first have to choose the country in whose universities’ catalogs one was to look). The philosophers’ own scholastic little definitions of “philosophy” are merely polemical devices – intended to exclude from the field of honor those whose pedigrees are unfamiliar. We can pick out

92  Paving the road to a philosophical theology “the philosophers” in the contemporary intellectual world only by noting who is commenting on a certain sequence of historical figures. Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida. (Rorty 1978, 143) Suppose one thinks along the same lines about what the point of a philosophical theology of the OT could possibly be. On the first view, there are many unwritten assumptions about the nature of reality in a specific world in the text (including YHWH). Some of these are about the nature and attributes of YHWH. Once identified, a historically conscious and literary-sensitive clarification of the relevant concepts in or derived from the religious language of a particular world in the text, insofar as these allow for a comparison with and in relation to a selective adoption and required adaptation of the generic topics discussed in philosophical theology. Eventually, with cognisance taken of the applicable insights from OT theology and various forms of biblical criticism, it will be possible to identify and discuss the details pertaining to the associated philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives more comprehensively and in-depth without committing any obvious hermeneutical fallacies associated with philosophical-theological exegesis in the past. This in turn will enable us to better elucidate the metaphysical ideas that must be postulated as incidentally implicit in the first-order religious language as a condition of its possibility thereby supplementing our knowledge of why the world of a given text and YHWH’s relation to everything therein are the way they are, or why they are at all (cf. Rorty 1978, 142). On the second view, philosophical theologians of the OT are third-order religious language analysts seeking to clarify second-order concepts in OT theology with reference to what they imply in comparison to the concerns and categories of a specific tradition in a particular era in philosophical theology proper. In doing so, the philosophical theologian of the OT will consciously and critically adopt and adapt a particular metaphysical idiom of a particular philosophical-theological tradition for the sake of constructing a comparative philosophical perspective on what particular OT theological constructions of YHWH mean on their own terms, even if not in them. Since this is already happening and accepted in OT scholarship on a small scale, the philosophical theologian of the OT can simply expand the project and as historical philosophical theologian, stick to with the question of meaning rather than worrying about the truth. Of course, this will never happen quite as planned any more than OT theology itself is a clear and coherent notion. What makes this a philosophical theology of the OT then is that it involves writing in the form of philosophical elaborative remarks and comments as footnotes to the already available bits and pieces in the writings

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 93 of philosophically more reluctant yet nevertheless so inclined OT theologians. This has little to do, however, with contributing to the development of a more unified and pure descriptive metaphysical idiom corresponding to what is actually assumed in the OT’s own first-order religious language, on its own terms, and towards which the associated research steadily converge (cf. Rorty 1978, 142). Thus adopting and adapting Rorty’s metaphysical fork, I have drawn them up as reminders of the differences that also exist among OT scholars. On the one hand, there are those who would like a philosophical theology of the OT to be something that could offer us truth in the form of “a vertical relationship between representations and what is represented” (see Rorty 1978, 143). On the other hand, some are content to allow a philosophical theology of the OT to be constructed more “horizontally as the culminating reinterpretation” of our OT scholarly ancestors’ philosophicaltheological reinterpretations of their predecessors’ reinterpretations (cf. Rorty 1978, 144). In such a Rortian metaphilosophical hermeneutic, the desire to legitimate the assumptions on which a philosophical-theological problem can be based would be tantamount to wanting to “establish that the terms we require to pose it are mandatory, that the vocabulary in which we encounter it is in principle inescapable” (see Ramberg 2009, n.p.). Accordingly, this study does not want to be prescriptive about how a philosophical theology of the OT should look. Not just to be diplomatic but also given the assumption that the question of whether the OT’s first-order or OT theologians’ second-order religious language is a system of representations is not the sort of question anybody (Kantian or non-Kantian OT scholar in Rorty’s sense) can decisively answer (cf. Rorty 1978, 154). In other words, an anti-representationalist metaphilosophical-hermeneutic is adopted, at least during this experimental stage of the methodological innovations. But the situation remains the same at all times. All our second-order discourse of what YHWH in the world of the text is like never really reaches the first-order religious language or the world of the text. “YHWH”, “first-order religious language”, “world of the text” and all that jazz is already second-order, as is even the concept of an “OT”. Granted, while all interpretations are equal, some are more equal than others. But both text and context are our constructs, and even the idea that we should interpret the OT and that on its own terms does not come from it but from us. All checking of our interpretations with the facts assume the latter to be more than interpretations. They are not, yet the reduction in meta-language perspectives gives an air of certainty (see Gericke 2017). If one looks at YHWH from a religious-historical perspective, the object will appear as a primitive idea with a mysterious origin and an evolutionary development, e.g. the early version of what “God” used to be. If one looks at YHWH from a literary-critical perspective, the religious object will be reduced to a character in a story and therefore appear as a literary construct,

94  Paving the road to a philosophical theology e.g. a fictional object. If one looks at YHWH from a social-scientific perspective, the deity will come across reductively as a cultural construct of a particular social context, e.g. clan/familial, village, tribal/state, etc. If one looks at YHWH from a psychological perspective, the religious object will be reductively construed as an epiphenomenon of mental processes, e.g. the imagination, neurosis, projection. If one looks at YHWH from a theological perspective, the deity will be reduced to a preferred profile of “God” in later Christian dogmatics. If one looks at YHWH from a linguistic perspective, the religious object is reduced to the name and the various linguistic issues related to it, e.g. grammar, semantics, pragmatics. Similarly, if one looks at YHWH from a philosophical perspective, the particular philosophical school, jargon, theory and period involved will determine what gets constructed and why, along with any value judgments in relation thereto, e.g. the will to power (Nietzsche), a sign (structuralism), etc. (see Gericke 2017, 623–641). One gets the picture. In those cases where the given perspective assumes itself to be both correct and sufficiently exhaustive, the fallacy of reductionism is present. But reduction as such, however, is neither per se problematic nor avoidable. The bad news is that there can be no pure or perfect philosophicaltheological method that is not just another perspective. This might demotivate us. Not unlike the narrator in Borges’ Library of Babel observes: At that same period there was also hope that the fundamental mysteries of mankind-the origin of the Library and of time-might be revealed. In all likelihood those profound mysteries can indeed be explained in words; if the language of the philosophers is not sufficient, then the multiform Library must surely have produced the extraordinary language that is required, together with the words and grammar of that language. For four centuries, men have been scouring the hexagons. . . . There are official searchers, the “inquisitors.” I have seen them about their tasks: they arrive exhausted at some hexagon, they talk about a staircase that nearly killed them-rungs were missing-they speak with the librarian about galleries and staircases, and, once in a while, they take up the nearest book and leaf through it, searching for disgraceful or dishonorable words. Clearly, no one expects to discover anything. (Borges 2000, 6) So if one can become comfortable, even post-modern hermeneutic nihilism flips over into a supermodern inverted image reflecting infinite possibilities. A philosophical theology of the OT then is not just about clarifying concepts only but also about creating them. This can be taken to be the implication of what Deleuze and Guattari sought to show when they discussed the way philosophy operates in relation to science and art. All involve forms of thought

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 95 and philosophy just is the creation of concepts, here seen as immanent and intensive multiplicities (see Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 164). So how do we bear the bearable heaviness of becoming a philosophical theologian of the OT? Up to this point in our discussion, there has been a fine line between biblical (OT) theology and philosophical theology. And now – alluding to the comedian Oscar Levant in another context – I will erase that line. One way to digest the implications of what has been perceived and what could be – without taking oneself too seriously – is to give up the idea that our second-order restatement of first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in a given world of the text are symmetrically related. At least this appears to be the case if we proceed by thinking of the history of OT interpretation by analogy with and adaptation of the successive phases of the sign-image as constructed in Baudrillard (1983, 11). 1 In the past, during the first stage, the objective of philosophicaltheological interpretations of OT perspectives on YHWH was to produce a faithful image/copy of YHWH, where we believe, that the sign is a “reflection of a profound reality”. 2 The second stage is awareness of a philosophical-theological perspective’s inevitable perversion of reality, with OT scholars coming to believe the signs from metaphysics as an unfaithful copy, which “masks and denatures” reality as an “evil appearance – it is of the order of maleficence”. Here OT signs and images do not faithfully reveal YHWH’s reality to us, but can hint at the existence of an obscure divine reality which the sign itself is incapable of encapsulating. 3 It is also different from the third stage in the history of interpretation which masks the absence of this allegedly profound divine reality, where covertly philosophical-theological interpretations of the OT sign that YHWH has become pretends to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no original. Signs and images nascent to non-philosophical varieties of biblical criticism claim to represent something real, but no representation is taking in any reduction and arbitrary images of the divine in the OT are merely suggested as things which they have no relationship to. 4 As in the fourth stage all concepts of God in OT theology, including the OT’s own first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text are pure simulacrum. Even the philosophicaltheological simulacrum conjured in this study is not intended to have any particular relationship to any divine reality whatsoever. Here, it is OK that signs in any of the worlds behind, of and in front of the text merely reflect other signs and that any claim to reality on the part of images or signs is only of the order of other such claims. This is a regime of total equivalency, where cultural products OT scholars produce, including that part of the Bible and interpretations thereof, need no longer even pretend to be real in a naïve sense, because the experiences of readerly

96  Paving the road to a philosophical theology consumers’ lives are so predominantly artificial that even claims to reality are expected to be phrased in artificial, “hyperreal” terms. Any naïve pretension to the reality of the situation involving YHWH in any context as such is perceived as bereft of critical self-awareness, and thus as oversentimental. Another way of doing the same, perhaps less pessimistic and more playful, can be had by adapting Nietzsche (1968, 44) in Twilight of the Idols or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer and on “How the True World Became a Fable” to “How the True World Became a Fable”. 1 The biblical theologian dwells in the real world of the text, which he attains through his Hebraic thinking (skills in perception warrant a more accurate view of the real world of the text). 2 The OT theologian doesn’t dwell in the real world of the text, but rather it is promised to him, a goal to work and read for (to the exegete who is self-critical). 3 The real world of the text is unattainable for any theological approach thereto and cannot be promised even to non-theological perspectives, yet remains a consolation when confronted with the perceived injustices of the apparent world of the text. 4 If the real world of the text is not attained in any way of reading aware of its own philosophical-theological assumptions or not, then it is unknown to everyone, including OT scholars. Therefore, there is no duty to discover and reconstruct the real world of the text, and no consolation derived from attempting to do so by approximating it as elusive presence. 5 The idea of a real world of the text and of the text itself has become useless amidst the plurality of possible approaches to it – it provides no consolation or motive for the most erudite and mainstream of interpreters safe to their research status. It is therefore cast aside as a useless Ricoeurian abstraction. 6 What world of the text is left? The concept of the real world of the text has been abolished, and with it, the idea of an apparent world of the text, each has a history, thereby initialising a crisis of infinite possibility from which dreams within dreams of new possible worlds within old actual ones are born. Think of OT scholars as mapmakers. Though the map should not be mistaken for the territory, neither is it desirable for it to be exactly on scale. As Borges showed by analogy in “On Exactitude in Science” in his Universal History of Infamy and other fictions, [i]n that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 97 of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography. Purportedly from Suárez Miranda, Travels of Prudent Men, Book Four, Ch. XLV, Lérida, 1658. (Borges 1975, 131) As Baudrillard responded: Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra – that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. The desert of the real itself. (Baudrillard 1994, 1) In other words, a completely precise 1:1 scale “map” of world of the text in the OT would be the OT. A map is not for corresponding in 3D or even 4D but for navigating in 2D. So too with a philosophical theology of the OT. It does not purport to be the world of the text, it simply marks aspects of the territory not visible on maps provided by other approaches. So with reference to what we call OT perspectives on or assumptions related to what can be called the nature and attributes of YHWH we can drop the ideal of developing any approach in OT philosophical theology done in the language of a particular historical metaphysical idiom that will allow us to think we are just stating the facts. This study does not look down on abstract philosophical-theological writing, or view it as a second-best (like Plato) or as an abnormal activity to which sin has condemned us all (like Rousseau), or as something which we can dispense with once reaching the secure path of other non-philosophical modes of biblical criticism (equally of no interest to any biblical author and just as alien as far as its concepts, concerns and categories go). Granted, this is not how those who wish to purify OT scholarship from all philosophical approaches to in our interpretations of the meaning of the

98  Paving the road to a philosophical theology OT’s religious language think. But as noted previously, this is not, strictly speaking, OT theology any longer. Whether or not we assume that within that discipline there is warrant for what is here envisaged. The remainder of this book, as noted, is technically not so much a philosophical theology of the OT but ideas about how it can become a valid option to pursue and therewith more concerned with original contributions to methodology. In light of this, what variables will form part of the experimental format in the proposed comparative philosophical theology of the OT? To begin with, I would like to make a few metaphilosophical-theological distinctions relevant to the theoretical framework from which the application will follow. Though referring to familiar names of categories in classifying other related phenomena, as they appear here they are my own (un)doing. Rest assure that the longer one looks at the different possible configurations, the more interesting it gets. Think of them as terms and conditions, not to restrict what is possible but to enable more interpretations of what could be involved than what can presented in the discussion to follow. • • •

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A broad philosophical theology of the OT is any form of interpretation of the OT’s religious language involving philosophical theology, while a narrow one involves an exclusive focus on such matters. An intra-disciplinary philosophical theology of the OT is what OT scholars do if they choose to work narrowly, while an extra-disciplinary one is what philosophical theologians and others do with reference to the OT. An explicit philosophical theology of the OT is present in discussions directly focussed on and involving issues of interest in narrow philosophical theology, while implicit philosophical theology is evident when such interests are not mentioned or pursued but can be seen as presupposed or are available via logical inference. A strong philosophical theology of the OT assumes or insists on the correctness of a particular philosophical-theological tradition, assumption, method, idiom, question or answer, while weak philosophical theology presents itself as a possible and fallible view on the same variables. A positive philosophical theology of the OT is present whenever the focus is on constructive arguments aimed at saying how things appear to be, while negative philosophical theology is limited to discussions of what seems or is known as now not to be the case. A hard philosophical theology of the OT involves attempts to identify philosophical theology in the OT or infer it therefrom, while a soft one does not, irrespective of whether it assumes it possible or present. A theoretical philosophical theology of the OT is any that presupposes a background knowledge of philosophical theology, while a practical one is whenever related content is present but purely due to having picked up bits of philosophical theology in ordinary or religious language. A descriptive philosophical theology of the OT limits itself to conceptual clarification for its own sake, while evaluative ones attempts

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 99

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epistemic justification or critique of the OT or OT theologies’ truthclaims made. A comparative philosophical theology of the OT looks at how certain topics feature in more than one religious tradition and seeks to show what these mean and do not mean when restated in the language of another, whereas consummate philosophical theology stays within a particular tradition only. An autological philosophical theology of the OT is about philosophical theology according to the OT, whereas a hetereological one offers a philosophical theological perspective on the OT (irrespective of whether the latter is assumed to have related contents). An enworlded philosophical theology of the OT seeks to limit itself as far as possible to discussing YHWH as concrete particular in the world of the text, whereas a transworld one views YHWH as depicted to have the ontological status of an abstract object (a concept) from the world behind/in front of the text. A realist philosophical theology of the OT thinks of reference in the religious language about YHWH either by analogy of a window as in naïve-realism or as like an impressionist painting as in critical realism, while a non-realist one thinks of the text as a mirror of the objects of the human imagination only. An intra-religious philosophical theology of the OT is one done by someone who is part of a religious community wherein the OT is a sacred text, whereas an extra-religious approach is not so orientated, whether secular or alternatively religious. A systematic philosophical theology of the OT seeks to relate particular parts to the canonical whole, while a fragmentary one is content to offer systematic discussions without extrapolating or generalizing. A metaphilosophical theology of the OT has only the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT in view, whereas an applied philosophical theology of the OT implements said idea as a philosophical-theological perspective on the OT itself. A synchronic philosophical theology of the OT looks at constructions of YHWH’s personal identity holding at a single time, while diachronic ones focus on how it holds over time. A first-order philosophical theology of the OT offers a restatement of the religious language of the OT in metaphysical terms, whereas a second-order one clarifies philosophical-theological concepts in OT theology. A simplex philosophical theology of the OT is one where the metaphilosophical traditions involved in the hermeneutical framework is mirrored in the exegetical discussion, whereas a multiplex one allows combinations of more than one. A pluralist philosophical theology of the OT offers different metaphilosophical traditions’ perspectives in the application phase, whereas a

100  Paving the road to a philosophical theology singular one only utilises one tradition’s philosophical-theological internally diverse framework. • An experimental philosophical theology plays with various hypothetical scenarios and configurations of philosophical-theological variables purely for the results and acknowledging every detected pro or con, whereas prototype versions try to test a particular model more extensively. • A historical philosophical theology of the OT discusses its perspectives on the associated metaphysical problems for their own sake while contemporary ones seek to relate everything to currently debated philosophicaltheological problems. These distinctions are not absolute, mutually exclusive, exhaustive or normative. They are considered useful, oversimplifying, dichotomous, problematic, and inclusive. I take them to have fuzzy boundaries and conceive of their ontological status along nominalist lines, as a pragmatist might. In short, I found them useful in discerning subtle differences that will come into play in any attempt to offer could possibly be meant by “a philosophical theology of the OT”. The latter is clearly a more fuzzy, ambiguous and vague notion than what prima facie might appear to be the case, e.g. “the OT’s philosophical theology” or “a definitive philosophical theology based on the OT” or “the correct philosophical-theological perspective on the OT”, etc. They also prevent certain possible misunderstandings as to what this study does and does not offer the reader. Last but not least, these distinctions and the coordinates of this study’s proposals therein not only illustrate how the theory can be applied but also in virtue of its specificity generate a series of unexplored alternative courses and possible configurations that others may or may not wish to pursue. As for the types of philosophical theology of the OT dominant in this book, these are the following: narrow, intra-disciplinary, explicit, weak, positive, soft, theoretical, descriptive, comparative, hetereological, enworlded, nonrealist, extra-religious, fragmentary, metaphilosophical, diachronic, secondorder, multiplex, singular, experimental and historical. Lest they be seen as incorrectly employed, cognisance should be taken where they diverge from identical terminological distinctions in other disciplinary contexts, e.g. synchrony and diachrony in structuralism or the history of religion, or realism in classic metaphysics instead of philosophy of religion. In the context of the new discipline of a philosophical theology of the OT, some border on neologisms. Furthermore, I shall not assume my idiosyncratic choice of variables is the best configuration, that others should be similar, or that it is in every way unique. I would, however, like to think that it represents an original contribution and that it is new. In terms of method, I have chosen analytic philosophical theology for the purposes of illustration. A classic albeit recent representative case of research in this idiom can be found exemplified in the Oxford Handbook of

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 101 Philosophical Theology (Flint & Rea 2009). This will be done, with reference to the so-called “metaphysical” (divine) attributes that have remained controversial in OT theology but popular topics within the analytic Christian tradition (see Murray & Rea 2018, n.p. for an easily accessible and helpful introductory overview of these and related issues). The historical and descriptive interests of OT scholarship are preserved by the use of applied metaphysics in contemporary varieties of conceptual clarification (for an overview of which, see Echavarria & Montoya 2016). Though some continuity with older concerns exist, much of the focus is and will be on problems constructed within the so-called New Metaphysics (on which, see the helpful historical and thematic overview by van Inwagen & Sullivan 2018, n.p.). Whether or not the context is analytic philosophical theology, the issues of interest include logical conundrums related to Modality, Space and Time, Persistence and Constitution, Causation, Freedom and Determinism, the Mental and Physical. The analytic tradition’s vocabulary has not been adopted, adapted and applied in biblical scholars’ comparative philosophical-theological reconstructions of the metaphysical assumptions underlying the OT’s religious language associated with the nature and attributes of YHWH. Included are the following complex notions, the meanings of which are theory dependent technical terms, problematic and essentially contested: • Objects • Particulars • Universals • Natures • Substances • Essences • Properties • Relations • Parts • Wholes • Identities • Propositions • Facts • Truth-makers • Events • States of affairs • Worlds • Possible worlds These are but some of the second-order concepts typically used on the comparative platform and which will reappear in the application of the experimental theoretical framework under construction. Not because metaphysics is assumed to be possible or the analytic approach correct or that the jargon

102  Paving the road to a philosophical theology or a particular interpretation thereof is assumed to be the best for a philosophical theology of the OT or in the context of (analytic) philosophical theology proper. They are simply part of the analytic metaphysical idiom adopted and adapted in the experimental design of one possible format a philosophical theology of the OT could take. They will also be part of its application and illustration in hypothetical comparative contexts as constructed in the chapter to follow. (cf. Matilal & Shaw 1985; Biletzki & Matar 1998). At this point I need a word with my fellow OT scholars who are more familiar or at home in the Continental traditions of philosophy and theology and/or who might find the chosen platform problematic, at least to the extent that the discussions related to metaphysics and the philosophicaltheological ideas come across as metaphilosophically, hermeneutically, ideologically and biblically-theologically problematic in the sense of outdated, presumptuous and/or of questionable absolute value. Rest assure, what seems to be the most important of concerns is actually the most irrelevant. It misses the point of what motivates this choice of an analytic philosophical theologian speaking in metaphysical terms as dialogue partner. First of all, the analytic Christian context is where “philosophical theology” in the English-speaking world is most popular and familiar and at the same time easily connects with OT scholars behaving philosophically theologically in its emphasis on conceptual clarification (see Chapter 3). • Second, there will be interested readers who are, like me, more familiar with the analytic tradition’s philosophical theology than that of the Continental and other varieties (the Continental elements in this chapter notwithstanding). Many OT scholars will also be more acquainted with the Christian concept of God that motivates most concerns in the analytic tradition of philosophical theology (especially since the OT qua OT is a Christian construct). This in turn allows for more comprehensible application and illustration of the chosen experimental and hypothetical framework, even if my personal position on the associated religious and philosophical commitments lie somewhere completely different. • Third, since the objective is not to end up with normative or systematic philosophical-theological findings about the OT, there is no reason why the ideological, hermeneutical and metaphilosophical problems associated with analytic philosophical theology cannot be taken as givens, and the methods and interests thereof still be adopted and adapted purely to see what such a comparative discussion for its own sake turns up. The pros and cons pros and cons as perceived from the perspective of other the cross-disciplinary reductions of the religious object readily acknowledged included. •

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 103 •

Fourth, given that the point of this chapter (and book) is purely to illustrate how methodology OT scholarship can incorporate philosophical theology without being dependent on the merits of the specifics chosen in the next chapter as hypothetical scenarios of an applied theoretical framework experimentally configured, there is no reason why what is presented in the discussion to follow cannot be taken as proving what is possible, rather than prescribing what is preferable.

The cluster of descriptive philosophical methods most OT scholars operating as historically-minded interpreters of ancient texts are likely to find least problematic on the level of exegesis are those that involve philosophical analysis (for varieties, see Soames 2003). More specifically, the approach adopted for present experimental purposes will be that of comparative philosophical theology in particular (see Shokhin 2010, 2011, 2016, 2018). Littlejohn (2010, n.p.), with reference to comparative-philosophy in general, summarises what are by implication some of the obstacles to doing so (cf. Wong 2017, n.p.). Included is “descriptive chauvinism”, involving recreating the other tradition in the image of one’s own. This should not be confused with trying to determine what, if anything, the OT might assume in relation to presuppositions, problems and perspectives in analytic Christian philosophical theology. Especially not if one is simply clarifying already available second-order concepts in OT theology which always and already created in the image of philosophical theology’s metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories by constructing YHWH in first-order religious language descriptions as an entity with a divine nature, attributes and relations to a given world of the text and things in that world. What I do take it to mean would involve reading the OT as presupposing the theory of analogical predication in religious language by viewing it as non-trivially metaphorical. Or presuming that all philosophical-theological grids are alien by default when the condition of possibility for such judgments is prior comparative philosophical-theological description ending up as metaphysical restatement of exactly the kind envisaged here. Another example is describing first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text as adding up to the OT concept of God when it does not pursue the same kind of conceptual coherence and clarification related to the God which, though being the plural realist God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the world of the text, is in critical-realist fashion identified with the offspring of the God of Abelard, Aquinas, Kant or Marion (cf. related discussions in Taliaferro, Draper, & Quinn 2010). Normative chauvinism is another obstacle to understanding to be avoided as much as possible and involves assuming either the OT (and a given perspective therein) or OT theology (and a perspective therein) or the Christian analytic tradition (or a perspective therein) is superior and others

104  Paving the road to a philosophical theology are inferior in proportion to how they are different. A common form of normative chauvinism is the belief that unless philosophical theology via metaphysical restatement is done in a certain kind of way (for example, ratiocinative argument), then it cannot properly be considered philosophy. Complicating matters is the fact tha of philosophy in the West in general either bracket or marginalize comparative philosophical research on the assumption that it does not belong to the domain of philosophy proper (see Littlejohn 2010, n.p.). A similar fate is then often suffered by philosophical theological approaches to other less familiar varieties of second-order thinking encountered in ancient Near Eastern, South-Asian, Far Eastern, African, Native-American and other popularly distinguished cultural contexts. Consequently, comparative philosophical-theological clarifications of concepts in OT theology via descriptive metaphysical restatement are still too transgressively amorphous not to appear as utterly anomalous within the contemporary paradigm’s dominant supervening metaphilosophical taxonomies. There is also the problem of incommensurability, whether methodological, metaphysical, epistemological, moral or otherwise (cf. Wong 1989). Here, we find the inability to translate some concepts in one tradition into meaning and reference in another. Something similar happens when philosophical models differ from others in such fundamental ways as to make it impossible for cultural traditions to understand each other. Alternatively, traditions may differ on what counts as evidence and grounds for decidability, thus making it impossible to make a judgment between them. There is no common or objective decision criterion justifying the preference for one set of claims over another, much less one tradition in its entirety over another. The idea is that each tradition infects the other with a way of seeing and the task is to understand how other conceptual schemes are tied to a life that people have found satisfying and meaningful. (Littlejohn 2010, n.p.) Finally, there is the illusion of perennialism. A mistake often made in comparative philosophy is to overlook conceptual-historical change. As those who study the history of Israelite religion from a critical and comparative ancient Near Eastern perspective know very well, biblical Yahwisms have multiple relative synchronic and diachronic identity criteria over time and across possible worlds of the text. Like all religions, including “Christianity” or even philosophical-theological traditions like the “analytic” one, [t]hey are not ‘perennial’ in the sense of being monolithic or static. They not only have tensions with other traditions, but contain internal conflict as well. (Littlejohn 2010, n.p.)

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 105 The point at which comparative philosophical theologians of the OT interact with the OT, OT theology, the history of Israelite religion, comparative ancient Near Eastern religion, various linguistic, literary, social-scientific and other varieties of biblical criticism as well as with the presuppositions, problems, perspectives, periods and persons associated with the history of philosophical theology is important to note and remain aware of. They must understand not only the reasons for why a particular view is held in another tradition, but also that it is only one view amongst others that are possible within that particular tradition. (Littlejohn 2010, n.p.) Properly speaking then, comparative philosophical of the kind envisaged in the experimental design in this chapter at least is not about attempting as earlier biblical theologies in retrospect judged to be philosophical theologies have done, that is, arriving at a synthesis of OT and philosophical traditions. What this chapter suggests is not a new theory for which arguments are provided but imagining unexplored roles for the hypothetical OT scholar using philosophical theology to experiment with restating the perceived meanings already available in the second-order discourse of OT theology about YHWH in descriptive metaphysical terms and with reference to some of the presuppositions, problems and perspectives in the comparative philosophical theological platform chosen for the purpose of conceptual clarification. The objective of a comparative philosophical theology of the OT and of this experimental type is assimilating a new descriptive second- or third-order metalanguage, a new kind of writing about old ideas OT scholars still have about YHWH in the world of the text. This kind of comparative approach in a philosophical theology of the OT can but does not need to personally subscribe to any of the views represented by the OT-theological and philosophical traditions chosen for cross-disciplinary conceptual clarification. Even as they imagine empathetically doing so from somewhere within OT scholarship while reading the text in dialogue with the chosen philosophicaltheological framework, and fully conscious and explicit about the problems, possibilities, pros and prospects of doing so. At least in the present context and the envisaged metaphilosophical theological framework, there is no direct interest in epistemic or propositional justification, unless the latter appears as internal to the OT or OT theology itself and therefore also able to be included in descriptive varieties of comparative philosophical theological conceptual clarification. Whether or not this self-imposed limitation and the related experimental configurations – e.g., analytic, historical, comparative, descriptive, experimental – are seen as amounting to something worthy of being called a philosophical theology of the OT (whatever the form of the genitive in this syntax is taken to be), will of course depend on the metaphilosophical theological assumptions of those who sit in judgment (and may be right, if such a notion is still meaningful at

106  Paving the road to a philosophical theology all). Even if it is, the application and illustration with reference to hypothetical scenarios to follow in the next chapter might include details regarding the meaning of OT texts on which there is also disagreement. As for method, the dominant approach adopted in this study is actually a third-order metaphilosophical theological reflection. The rationale for this classification comes from the adopted point of view involving one to stand back and reflect on new possibilities for comparative conceptual clarification as inferred from bits and pieces of existing scholarly second-order philosophical theological discourse. In turn, the latter purports to describe a divine nature, attributes and relations and aimed at clarifying the relevant metaphysical concepts seen as implicit in the associated assumptions underlying first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. On this point, Scott MacDonald’s What is Philosophical Theology? (MacDonald 2009, 17–29) shows the fallacy inherent in the belief that philosophical theology without epistemic justification is not “real” philosophy, especially with reference to the obsession with normativity: The sheer weight of this tradition in philosophy since the seventeenth century and the negligence of other models for philosophical theology make it natural to assume philosophical theology is co-extensive with this kind of natural theology. If we give in to this temptation we implicitly agree to two kinds of limitations on philosophical theology, one limiting the kinds of philosophical activity open to the philosophical theologian, the other limiting the range of issues she can legitimately pursue. (MacDonald 2009, 17) In defence of making room for clarification, the author continues: It is not the case that all philosophical activity is concerned primarily with the truth or epistemic justification of a particular theory or set of propositions or beliefs. In order to have a handy way of referring to the sorts of philosophical reflection I want to call attention to here I will borrow a phrase from Aquinas’ philosophical theology ‘clarification’ (manifestatio). A great deal of philosophical activity is concerned not with justifying but with clarifying propositions or theories. (MacDonald 2009, 23) Another challenge involved lies in selecting topics to provide the hypothetical scenarios chosen for the application and illustration of the experimental comparative philosophical-theological framework configured in this chapter. One possible approach would be to list the main topics in analytic philosophical theologies and then to restate what OT texts can and cannot be said to mean in relation to them and in the associated metaphysical terms.

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 107 This is exactly what we shall do, albeit with some modification and selectiveness. In addition, certain assumptions will be taken for granted simply for the sake of the argument without implying they should be shared or considered set in stone. 1 In second-order descriptions of YHWH as character in a text, the deity depicted in any given sample of first-order religious language is implied to have the ontological status of a fictional entity in the technical and trivial sense (irrespective of what one believes about YHWH in terms of identity and existence conditions for the property of being YHWH, i.e. about the nature, meaning and reference of the first- and second-order religious language used in different versions of YHWH’s in and between the worlds of, behind and in front of the texts). 2 For illustrative purposes, the descriptive dimension is limited to comparative philosophical restatements of the meaning of first-order religious language used in constructions of YHWH in the world of the text (or similar) on its own terms, even if not in them and as found in already existing second-order discourse relevant to a particular point being made. 3 The findings of such restatements do not allow for default generalisation about “the OT’s concept of God” in that first and second-order discourses seen as related to the nature and attributes of YHWH in any given literary context is part of a plurality of theologies co-existing in the canon(s) as a whole. 4 Alterative possible interpretations and the fallibility of any interpretation referred to are taken for granted without also assuming that the validity and functionality of a philosophical theology of the OT is thereby compromised or that the diversity in Israelite religions reflected in the biblical texts must be understood as internally related in a way that is necessarily supplementary, complementary, conflicting or contradictory. 5 The essentially contested nature of the OT, terms derived from metaphysics, the latter’s validity and that of the disciplines of philosophy, theology and philosophical theology itself is accepted despite choosing to operate with any given set of second-order comparative philosophical theological and descriptive metaphysical categories and being nominalist about their ontogical status. 6 A philosophical theology of the OT is not only not intended to replace any other theological approach to the OT, it does not seek to solve the problems or answer the questions OT theologians have in terms of their discipline’s relation to philosophy (the same goes for how the discussion is related to how philosophical theologians relate to the OT and what they take to be the relevant presuppositions, problems and perspectives on the matter). As such, it should neither be confused with a theology

108  Paving the road to a philosophical theology of the OT that is philosophical or with a philosophical perspective on God in the OT a Christian theologian might wish to offer for its own sake (or to be “biblical”). Since the context of the present study is neither biblical theology or OT theology as such, nor Christian or Jewish philosophical theology proper, but an experimental descriptive and historical philosophical theology about what a comparative metaphysics would call the nature and attributes of YHWH in the world of the text of the OT, I adopt, adapt and apply the chosen analytic idiom with caution. Since in the present study the ultimate goal is not to identify a philosophical theology in the text, to construct one from it, or to show its similarities and contrast with a philosophical-theological tradition and its concepts, concerns and categories in the sense of oneself ascribing thereto, and since it is not intended as a contribution to the discipline of OT theology itself, the older objections against philosophical-theological approaches to first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH’s nature, attributes and relations in the world of the text do not apply. That some would not call this theology, philosophy, philosophical theology or metaphysics or find it spiritually edifying or sufficiently atheisticis, at least in the context of the objectives of this book, irrelevant. Of course it will be found wanting or misguided if approached with the presumption that it purports to do or replace what OT theologians, systematic theologians, philosophical theologians or philosophers of religion do. When offering a hypothetical perspective on YHWH reconstructed in metaphysical terms as an entity with a nature and attributes in the world of the text of the OT, the discussion to follow should also not be wholly equated with the kind of serious comparative philosophical restatement in metaphysical terms in the way OT theologians have thus far gone about it. The analytic philosophical perspective adopted, adapted and applied what OT theologians had done with pre-Socratic, Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, Augustinian, Anselmian, Thomistic, Kantian, Hegelian or any other philosophical-theological system, scheme or such. Instead, speaking for myself, the analytic philosophical-theological “grid” is taken as a useful and far more unified, nuanced and comparatively rich fiction and applied to hypothetical scenarios purely out of curiosity as to how things in our second-order discourse about the world of the text look from its point of view. I neither accept nor reject everything about it. Also, there is not just one (analytic) philosophical-theological approach. And there is not just one metaphysical analytic idiom with a single accompanying set of presuppositions, problems and perspectives and persons. If comparing the second-order discourse of OT theology to a particular analytic philosophical-theological view and its metaphysical language seems to generate as much questions as it answers and problems as it solves, this need only be admitted, and is already a form of knowledge, as

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 109 it would be with any other form of biblical interpretation. Assumptions and ideas related to philosophical-theological interests (or suggesting new ones) and metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality (including divine reality in the world of the text) are present in the OT, whatever one otherwise makes of its language, its theology, its relation to philosophy and philosophical theology, and everything else that might have some bearing on the matter. Just as no one considered a historical-theology of the OT or a socio-literary one, or a theology of whatever kind, when it turns out to be problematic, to imply that one cannot any longer learn anything therefrom, so too there is nothing whatsoever that cannot accommodate some form of philosophical-theological comparative conceptual clarification in metaphysical language. In sum then, the only thing really strange about the new idea of a philosophical theology of the OT of the type proposed for experimental application purposes only is that it makes its sole and exclusive focus extending and intensifying what both OT scholars in general and OT theologians in particular have already been doing as part of acceptable descriptive historically orientated conceptual clarification. It is simply what everybody does from time to time, in one philosophical idiom or another, except that it is simply more comprehensive and in-depth in terms of sustained comparative engagement and metaphysical restatement in relation to problems and perspectives in a particular philosophical-theological tradition. In the hypothetical examples to in the next chapter as illustration of what it could involve for the sake of the argument, I shall provide an introductory overview of the outlines of the applied experimental analytic format of a comparative philosophical theology of the OT.

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110  Paving the road to a philosophical theology Flint, T. and Rea, M. 2009. The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gericke, J. 2012. The Hebrew Bible and philosophy of religion. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature. Gericke, J. 2017. What is a God? Philosophical perspectives on divine essence in the Hebrew Bible. London: Bloomsbury. Joll, N. 2017. Metaphilosophy. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Available from: [23 May 2018]. Littlejohn, R. 2010. Comparative philosophy. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Available from: [17 May 2018]. MacDonald, S. 2009. What is philosophical theology? In K. Timpe (ed.). Arguing about religion. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 17–29. Matilal, B. and Shaw, J. (eds.). 1985. Analytical philosophy in comparative perspective, exploratory essays in current theories & classical Indian theories of meaning. London: Kluwer Publishing. Murray, M.J. and Rea, M. 2018. Philosophy and Christian theology. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.). Available from: [3 February 2018]. Nietzsche, F.W. 1968. Twilight of the idols; and the Anti-Christ. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ramberg, B. 2009. Richard Rorty. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [13 August 2018]. Rorty, R. 1978. Philosophy as a kind of writing. The New Literary History, 10/1, Literary Hermeneutics, pp. 141–160. Rorty, R. 1979. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rorty, R. 1982. Consequences of pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rorty, R. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shokhin, V.K. 2010. Philosophical theology and Indian versions of theodicy. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2 (2), 177–199. Shokhin, V.K. 2011. Philosophy of religion and the varieties of rational theology. In D. Bradshaw (ed.). 2012. Philosophical theology and the Christian tradition, Russian and Western perspectives. Series IVA, Vol. 44/Series VIII, Vol. 3. Washington: Council for Research in Values & Philosophy, pp. 5–20. Shokhin, V.K. 2016. Natural theology, philosophical theology and illustrative argumentation. Open Theology, 2, 804–817. Shokhin, V.K. 2018. Philosophical theology, the canon and the variability. Saint Petersburg: Nestor – History. Soames, S. 2003. Philosophical analysis in the twentieth century. 2 vols. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Taliaferro, C., Draper, P. and Quinn, P. (eds.). 2010. A companion to philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Van Inwagen, P. and Sullivan, M. 2018. Metaphysics. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [24 April 2019].

Paving the road to a philosophical theology 111 Wong, D. 1989. Three kinds of incommensurability. In M. Krausz (ed.). Relativism, interpretation and confrontation. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, pp. 140–159. Wong, D. 2017. Comparative philosophy: Chinese and Western. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [29 June 2018].

5 How to make metaphysical restatements and alienate OT theologians

As suggested in the previous chapter, this chapter will be configured as follows: • Exclusively focussed on philosophical-theological issues • A comparative approach featuring analytic Christian philosophical theology • A limiting of the topics to familiar metaphysical divine attributes • A limiting of the mode to historical and descriptive orientation • A limiting of scope to conceptual clarification of concepts in OT theology • A limiting of the ontological domain to YHWH in a given world of the text • A limiting of statements as relatively applicable to a given context • A limiting of sources to functional, relevant, semi-representative sampling The combining of presuppositions, problems and perspectives from the analytic Christian philosophical-theological framework with samples of metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories already used by OT theologians is purely done as illustration of what could happen when this occurs. This means accepting both the pros and cons of doing so. Comparative conceptual construction is at this time favoured over conceptual clarification proper, including the question of conceptual coherence which is a major focus among analytic philosophical theologians proper (see e.g. the title of Swinburne 2016). Furthermore, the samples from OT theological or analytic Christian philosophical-theological texts, whether quotes, references, sources or summaries are not assumed to be or require being the most recent, representative or the right interpretation of any given matter. Also, under each topic chosen for comparison, only a few samples of related ideas from OT scholars will be commented on. This suffices to the extent that the point of this chapter and at this stage of the case for a philosophical theology of the OT is simply to illustrate what applying the experimental format looks like in applied hypothetical scenarios and relative to relevant related bits of second-order discourse already

How to make metaphysical restatements 113 out there. As for those aspects of the divine nature, attributes and relations to be discussed, these will not mirror the entire capita selecta in analytic Christian philosophical theology (on which, see e.g. Flint & Rea 2009; Taliaferro & Meister 2010; Shokhin 2018). Instead, a choice of the most contested and controversial ideas about the associated concept of God in the context of OT scholarship over the last century will be revisited. If I can convince the reader of one possible way in which the related comparative philosophical-theological scenario could be reimagined and revitalised, rethinking the ways in which others could also be restated in metaphysical terms will be much easier to infer in future explorations, also by others and in other ways than the hypothetical reasoning utilized in this chapter for the sake of illustrative purposes only. To start the application, suffice it to note that in the associated analytic metaphysics it is popular to construct discussions of the divine nature in philosophical theology with reference to so-called great-making properties (see classically Wierenga 1989). In the case of Christian thinkers, associated divine attributes would be those assumed to be exemplified in a particular Christian concept of God. What is Interesting, however, in much of contemporary analytic Christian philosophical theology, the focus is not always on arguments for the existence of God but instead on clarifying concepts related to the question of what the nature of divine existence was assumed to be. This is both like and unlike what one finds in the writings of many OT theologians. Like philosophical theologians, they are not so much concerned with either the OT or anything assumptions therein related to ideas about what justifies belief in the existence of YHWH. Unlike them, however, they do not seem to wonder what, even assuming that the OT is not concerned with proving YHWH exists (or belief in YHWH’s existing being warranted by the conclusion of a philosophical-theological argument), it implies about the nature of YHWH’s existence in the world of the text. Whether the writers of the OT were interested in these questions is as irrelevant as whether they were interested in questions of Hebrew morphology, literary theory, historical-critical problems or sociological models. The fact is that the OT theologians describe YHWH in the world of the text and as depicted in first-order religious language as an entity of which one can validly say that for any given version thereof, YHWH was assumed to exist in some sense. To clarify what is meant by this, consider the following samples irrespective of their representative value, current status in the research or the OT contexts with reference which the particular scholar’s perspective might be limited to. The thought of the Old Testament is centred in God. Yet nowhere is there an attempt to prove that God exists. For the God of the Old Testament is the God of experience and not of speculation. They no more questioned the reality of God than they questioned that of the world around them and of themselves. The philosopher may raise doubts about the reality of all things, but the plain man is content to base his

114  How to make metaphysical restatements belief in the existence of God on what seemed to him the experience of God granted to himself or to his people, and especially of the experience of God given to the nation in the great moments of history. (Rowley 1956) The assumption that God exists is the Old Testament’s greatest gift to mankind. In the Old Testament God’s existence is entirely a foregone conclusion, always presupposed; reference is continually being made to it; it is never denied or questioned. The fool says in his heart “there is no God”, Ps. 14:1, Ps. 53:1, and the foolish women may speak like that (Job 2: 10); or man may deny Him and say “this is not He” (Jer. 5:12). But these are the words of people who are lacking in understanding, so lacking that they can be described in the same breath as corrupt and having done abominable works. They speak like that not in order to deny God but in order to evade His judgment and His claims upon them. They call in question His action as it affects their lives, but they do not call in question His existence. It is practical atheism, as the sinner practises it; not theoretical atheism. The latter is unknown to the Old Testament. (Köhler 1957, 21) For the existence of God is quite independently retained as the basic assumption of all thinking, as the unshakable cornerstone of man’s whole attempt to construct a picture of life and the world. (Eichrodt 1961, 210) [A] form of scepticism arose which was specific to Israel, not doubt about the existence of Jahweh – neither Job’s despair nor that of the psalms of lamentation led to any dubiety about Jahweh’s existence and power – but doubt about his readiness to interfere drastically in history or in the life of the individual. (von Rad 1965, 453) The existence of God is contested only either by the godless on the basis of practical, but not theoretical, atheism (Pss 10:4; 14:1 = 53:2; cf. Job 2:10). Consequently, while YHWH’s existence is not doubted, it is also not the subject of theological reflection. (Preuss 1995, 139) The fact that YHWH’s existence is taken for granted, never denied or questioned, seems to have been taken to imply that acknowledging this is as little or much as the OT scholar can say about it. But it is not. At least not from a comparative philosophical-theological perspective that can be applied in this context to wonder what kind of existence is the entity YHWH in the world of the text implied to have when related unwritten ideas are restated

How to make metaphysical restatements 115 in descriptive analytic metaphysical terms. In other words, given what OT theologians already say about YHWH’s existence, there is nothing inherently distortive about wanting to clarify the concepts related to conditions of possibility for presupposing the proposition that YHWH exists as inferred from either the associated first-order religious language of the OT or the second-order discourse of OT theologians (and others). To make the comparative philosophical-theological question concerning the implied nature of YHWH’s existence more palatable to OT scholars, one might rephrase it in terms of what is already been said, whether it is technically correct or not. Here one thinks of the way OT scholars write about YHWH’s being, its modes, the ontological variables involves, the way YHWH is part of the world of the text in relation to the whole, the properties, not of YHWH so much as of the kind of “life” or “reality” YHWH was assumed to have. A popular context for doing all of the above and not worrying about being too comparatively philosophical theological is with reference to the divine name in Exodus 3:14. Consider a sample from a history of Israelite religion that quickly moves from comparative philology to comparative philosophical theology in order to clarify the associated concept of God descriptively. What is interesting is the way the author does not admit but simply assumes that the best way to do this is not purely linguistic, literarycritical, historical-critical, social-scientific or merely biblical-theological. Instead what is said follows from a realization of the need for metaphysical restatement in Greek philosophical and existential, personalist and process philosophical terms even as one rejects the usual suspects. There is no agreement on the meaning of the name “Yahweh”. The number of opinions and attempted interpretations is legion, it would be an almost hopeless undertaking to summarize them all. . . . It was formerly common to explain the name as . . . emphasis on the reality of God, his unchanging presence, his actuality and existentiality, his indeterminable fullness of being, “Being,” “Being” in the sense of “active existential being”;. . . . According to the only Israelite explanation, that found in Exod. 3:14, the name means that this God is the one of whom hāyâ can be fully predicated. Since this word in Hebrew refers not merely to static existence but to dynamic and effectual presence, the name ascribes dynamic, powerful, effectual being to Yahweh. Yahweh’s nature as expressed by his “name”, is a union of being, becoming and acting. An effectual existence that is always becoming and yet remains identical with itself. (Fohrer 1972, 76–77) On this relatively more elaborative outline, with philosophical-theological terms from various idioms (Platonist, Aristotelian, Hegelian, Whiteheadian) it would seem that historical and philosophical concerns are not opposites, even

116  How to make metaphysical restatements where philosophical readings that are distortive are rejected so as to make room for better ones. Moreover, accepting that YHWH’s existence is not questioned and that certain philosophical-theological assumptions are absent, it still offers remarks on the nature YHWH’s existence was assumed to have and implies the legitimacy and value of doing so. What follows thereafter are some of the related metaphysical descriptions regarding YHWH’s ontological status implicit in Fohrer’s conceptual clarification, whether they are considered correct or not. The OT in this context, without needing to generalise, is implied by Fohrer to have assumed that the nature of YHWH’s existence could be understood in binary terms. Moving on to our next example: The reality of God is discovered and confessed as being activity. (Schmidt 1983, 281) The statement above follows from the idea that, from early times onwards, the concept of YHWH’s existence as involving the “being” of YHWH or YHWH as divine “being” has been alternated with more impersonal references to YHWH and other deities whose mode of existence as divine “powers”. The metaphysical assumption behind such changes is not trivial and includes the notion that “force” was a more fundamental ancient Near Eastern ontological category that being. This inference, however, is the result of certain etymological interpretations of the roots for “god” as common name, acknowledging the lack of ontological reflection in the OT itself as well as supervening the dynamic/static Hebrew/Greek thought and biblical theology/philosophical theology binary oppositions. It did not come from actual purposeful engagement in descriptive metaphysical restatement via comparative conceptual clarification. As noted earlier, the concern of the present discussion must also be distinguished from the bracketed question of whether YHWH exists or is really real in the worlds behind or in front of the text (or not). While classic OT theologies had no problem speaking of the “being” of YHWH, by the time of Brueggemann (1997, 118) this had become a problem. Many an OT scholar infers from this that one cannot ask ontological questions concerned with what is really real. Perhaps, but why not ask what the text assumed about ontological matters? Furthermore, there is more to ontology in philosophical theology than a concern with whether YHWH or Being exists (cf. Crenshaw 2009, 41). Thus as already suggested, one can still ask, not so much why YHWH was assumed to exist, but what a given text implies was meant by divine existence in the world of the text. The OT may not ever have asked such a question or have provided a systematic outline and argument in favour of whatever view is held to be a given. Yet any text that assumed YHWH existed in its world cannot but also imply certain things about the perceived nature of that existence as conditions of possibility for it to be constructed in the way it was, or to be constructed at all.

How to make metaphysical restatements 117 For example, there may be controversy as to whether the logical form of a second- order sentence like ‘YHWH exists’ is really subject–predicate in structure and so whether the English verb “exists” really was by implication predicated of YHWH as individual. Given differences regarding conceptions of properties the question can also be raised as to whether with reference to the religious language of a particular text existence was assumed to be a property of YHWH given the fact that YHWH’s existence is taken for granted. In all these and other ways, the second-order descriptions of YHWH in OT scholarship already offer much metaphysical and ontological food for comparative philosophical thought. But there is more. In analytic philosophical theology, the nature of divine existence, in the language of the related modal metaphysics, is also said to be “necessary”. Now while this may sound a bit formal and foreign, I do not think that OT scholars will disagree with the descriptive aptness of this predicate. At least not with reference to what is implicit with regard to YHWH’s ontological status within the world of the text and once what has been meant by “necessary existence” is made clear as can be. In fact, what has gone unnoticed is that this very topic has already entered the research and has been discussed in terms similar to the above, only not in a consistent comparative philosophical-theological manner involving restating and elaborating on the findings in analytic metaphysical terms. An introduction to the concept of “God and other necessary beings” by Davidson (2019, n.p.) can be taken to suggest that any comparative philosophical-theological attempt to restate the perceived nature of YHWH’s existence in a particular world of the text in analytic metaphysical terms has a number of different ontological perspectives to experiment with. It includes the question of whether YHWH was assumed to exist necessarily in the world in the text and whether in the present idiom such existence can be taken to imply that it was assumed to be one of YHWH’s great-making properties, if not the most fundamental within a given ontological frame of reference. Or was it perhaps something else completely? In other words, one way the theme of the present chapter’s interest can be introduced is to start with a fundamental question (according to the analytic metaphysical framework, at least). Granted that YHWH’s existence was taken for granted in a particular world of the text, do OT theologians imply that YHWH’s existence was assumed to be some kind of property of YHWH as concrete particular? This question is here interpreted as not so much about whether YHWH had the same ontological status as other entities in the world of the text or whether YHWH was a being capable of fitting into certain ontological categories whereby the OT is roped in the service of having to be harmonize with or justify a particular philosophical-theological system. Rather, given that OT theologians have described YHWH as an entity existing in the world of the text, was the fact that YHWH “exists” in a given text interpreted to mean that it was exemplified by YHWH’s nature?

118  How to make metaphysical restatements The other question, as noted, is whether YHWH’s divine existence was, in the context of the metaphysical assumptions of a particular OT text, assumed to be a divine attribute of sorts. In other words, was YHWH’s reality implied to be some quality similar to other divine attributes, e.g. was being there something like being holy and being powerful? Alternatively, was existence as such assumed to be a more fundamental ontological category of being or state of affairs in which YHWH, insofar as he was part of the world of the text, was implied to participate in? Of course, no metaphysical assumptions related to these distinctions might be discernible, a real possibility that can be readily admitted. But before one does, perhaps consider the fact that in relation to the philosophical problem of the nature of existence in relation to properties in the history of metaphysics, several different views might need to be identified and distinguished as potentially supervening, for better or worse, on the ontological assumptions of the comparative analytic philosophical theologian. These include, inter alia, implying that YHWH’s existence looks very much to be part of the divine nature which seems to have been constituted as some sort of common essence (Socratic), form (Platonist) or substance (Aristotelian), as not a substance but more like a bundle of qualities (Stoic, Humean), as not a property at all, because existence is not a property of entities but something else (Kantian, Russell), as not being an ontological category at all but merely a second-order semantic property within our descriptions of first-order concepts (Fregean). Others are, of course, possible. But these should suffice to show that even in the analytic metaphysical idiom of the comparative philosophical framework here adopted, adapted and applied for the sake of the argument, there is not settled idiom for talking about what its nature is in relation to the philosophical concept of properties/attributes/qualities, etc. Nevertheless, from the questions mentioned previously it would seem that another higherorder distinction can be validly inferred, namely between whether YHWH’s existence, if assumed prior on every ontological level in world of the text under consideration, was assumed to cause or ground necessary abstract objects like properties, relations, events, states of affairs and propositions, metaphysically? Given the aforegoing considerations, what can be said comparative philosophically-theologically about YHWH reconstructed here as necessary being with the analytic metaphysical idiom is taken to imply testing the assumption that it for any given world of the text, YHWH’s nature instantiated whatever was understood by compossible perfections essentially, and thus, at least in these modal metaphysical terms, necessarily. The existence of one individual YHWH character and its properties may contradict the existence of another in another world of the text, but for the paraconsistent logic in the metaphysics of possible worlds operating with trans world of the text identities, this is not a problem. In the case of YHWH’s compossible

How to make metaphysical restatements 119 properties, includes all the great-making properties that can simultaneously be instantiated by YHWH’s character in all possible worlds, but of a given text. Within the axiology of this ontological framework, necessary existence in the world of the text is a great-making property for a god and YHWH, being such an entity was implied to exemplify it. That is, if existing was indeed assumed to be something approximating what is understood by the concept of a property in general and of the divine nature (i.e. a divine attribute) in particular. Within the logical structure of the associated metaphysics of the philosophical-theological framework adopted for comparative purposes, one could deny that however YHWH was assumed to exist, this was understood as necessary in the present sense associated with modal essentialism. Furthermore, the alternative does not imply one thinks it being implied that YHWH in a particular world of the text could cease to exist. Thus one may imagine something along the lines of the axiom that for any world of the text that is such that YHWH in that particular world of the text was assumed to exist at some time in that world, YHWH in the particular world of the text was assumed to exist at every other time therein. The ideas expressed here appear to be descriptively apt – at least within the language game of analytic metaphysics used for the purposes hypothetical illustration of our experimental comparative philosophical-theological perspective. From within the confines and constructions such a perspective generates, the second-order scholarly discourses within which YHWH is descriptively reconstructed to “exist” in the world of the text seem to imply the validity of postulating the covert operations of unwritten ontological distinctions between different types of entities. For example, OT theologians imply that for any given the world of the text, the supervening ontology assumes a distinction between necessary and contingent entities as well as between concrete and abstract ones. Any given characterization of YHWH in the world of the text would be an example of a necessary entity that is also concrete. Whatever properties, relations, propositions, states of affairs and others (in general, not just involving YHWH) are assumed to be present are abstract necessary ones. What makes both YHWH and the assorted entities necessary is that they appear to be part of the conditions of possibility for things in the world of the OT text to be the way they are, or to be at all. Though these ontological distinctions and the notions of necessity/contingency concrete/abstract in the modal metaphysical idiom may sound alien to the identity criteria “Hebraic thought” popularly associated with the OT or to the metaphysical idioms mixed and matched covertly within existing second-order OT scholarly descriptive discourses, it is not. At least no more so than saying that, from a narrative critical perspective, for there to be any story featuring YHWH, of necessity there must be characters (entities), characteristics (properties), a plot (propositions, events), spatial and

120  How to make metaphysical restatements temporal settings (relations, states of affairs), etc. If this analogy is accepted as strong for the sake of the argument and in the context of the hypothetical example of analytic metaphysical distinctions as illustration only, some philosophical-theological questions can now be asked without worrying whether they are anachronistic to the point of being distortive. • What ontological assumptions (in the OT or in OT theology) are involved in concept of necessary existence if applied for experimental purposes to YHWH in the world of the text? • Does the mereology of world of a given text (un)wittingly, (in)coherently and incidentally assume there to be some sort of metaphysical grounding as condition of possibility for YHWH’s necessary existence? • What exactly within the ontology of a given world of the text was assumed or implied to depend on YHWH’s existence and what, if anything, was and for what reason, not considered as such? • What other metaphysical issues might be of interest for the purpose of conceptual clarification as far as the world of the text’s presupposed or implied dependence relations between YHWH and other entities are concerned? How can the hypothetical philosophical theologian of the OT even begin to imagine a response to such a seemingly abstract and anachronistic worry in relation to what one finds in the first-order religious language about YHWH in the world of the text? Perhaps one way might be to ask what, if anything, a related second-order description by OT theologians (or others) appears to assume or imply that has some relevance to the particular metaphysical concern? This can get complicated, and interesting, especially when it would seem that some OT texts imply there to be mereological underlap in the relations between YHWH and certain parts of the world of the text, e.g. Sheol, certain contingent states of affairs, accidental properties and such. In such cases, while the OT theologian might wish to make everything ontologically dependent on YHWH because it only seems fitting, a philosophical-theological working comparatively might want a little more analytic metaphysical specificity about the implied about causal or grounding relata as warranted by the logic of belief revision in the history of Israelite religion. Perhaps at this point, the comparative philosophical theologian of the OT choosing the analytic metaphysical tradition as interlocutor will want to consider what in a given context might be the case with reference to the mereology of YHWH’s relations implicit in the ontological assumptions of the world of the text. For example, can we say anything meaningful about what may be presupposed in the OT regarding the relation between necessary abstract objects and YHWH’s mental states? Were properties, relations, events, states of affairs and propositions in the world of the OT text assumed to be caused by YHWH’s non-contingent cognitive or conative states? What

How to make metaphysical restatements 121 about YHWH’s own properties and relations to the world and things in the world of the text? Does this not lead to paradoxes of the kind associated with medieval philosophical theological concepts like divine simplicity and divine aseity (cf. Brower 2009, 105–128)? Would associated metaphysical and meta-metaphilosophical technical terms like theistic Platonism, voluntarism, mentalism be sufficient to represent the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of a given piece of first- and or second-order religious language with reference to which the comparative philosophical-theological conceptual clarification through descriptive metaphysical restatement is performed? Consider the discussion by Davidson (2019, n.p.) who refers to OT texts like Psalm 89, 11, “The heavens are yours, the earth also is yours; the world and all that is in it – you have founded them” and Nehemiah 9, 6, where Ezra said, “You are the Lord, you alone; you have made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth and all that is on it, the seas and all that is in them. To all of them you give life, and the host of heaven worships you”. In the context of philosophical theology proper, has to operate on the assumption that, coming from an alleged source of divine revelation, any related ideas present in the OT may not be taken decisive or conclusive. Fortunately, however, what might have gone unnoticed to both OT scholars and philosophical theologians is that a condition of possibility for the same fallacy involving an appeal to authority need not occur here. Our hypothetical historically orientated OT scholar operating as comparative philosophical theologian is not using the OT to conclude a metaphysical argument about something outside it (if one could). Rather, here the movement is in the reverse direction. We use ideas from philosophical theology to see what happens when they are put in the service of potential and problematic conceptual clarification of the world of the text as an end in itself. One can do so experimentally and historically and irrespective of whether its ontological assumptions are believed to be divine revelation or epistemically justified or not. Of course, while one may say that YHWH in a particular world of the text exists in all metaphysically possible worlds, this is still not an account of a sine qua non mode of necessity, which has historically been grounded in the philosophical theological concept of divine simplicity. Since no version of YHWH in the OT fit the criteria for a divine simplicity as understood within most interpretations of the associated philosophical theological doctrine, one can simply acknowledge that the implied nature of YHWH’s existence includes the assumption that YHWH exists as a complex entity. To be sure, many OT scholars imply as much, yet prefer not to discuss the associated metaphysical assumptions in light of the metaphorical elements present in first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. Consequently, it can be unclear whether a particular OT scholar working historically also considers it a fallacy of anachronism to say that

122  How to make metaphysical restatements YHWH differs not only in his properties but also in his very ontological structure, from any and all created beings. Ultimately it would seem that, for most OT theologians, the quick dismissal of concerns with YHWH’s existence allows one to infer that on their views, nothing in the world of the text itself was assumed or is implied to account for YHWH’s necessary existence. It is a “brute” fact that YHWH exists necessarily, but if we take YHWH’s nature to be an individual essence (see Plantinga 1980), we have not done much explaining at all. Still part of such a discussion is asking whether OT theologians in particular contexts have operated with a philosophical-theological distinction between YHWH’s existence and essence. That is, of course, to the extent that these metaphysical categories are implicit in their own comparative philosophical restatements. In other words, do OT theologians making remarks about YHWH as existing in the world of the text concurrently offer comparative philosophical restatements that presuppose a more recent modal metaphysical distinction between so-called necessary and contingent properties? If so, which metaphysical framework from the history of philosophy is involved in how these properties and their relations are understood (e.g. in Aristotelian assumptions YHWH who clearly exists as concrete particular in the world of the text is implied to do so in a way that involves instantiating necessary properties that are nevertheless also accidental ones)? In this case there are many examples in OT theology, all fuzzy and none actually proper instances of conceptual clarification. When the tribes, then, in the course of further historical developments suddenly experienced Yahweh’s power also in the sacral form of wars, that was a new revelation of his essence. (von Rad 1962, 73) It makes a difference whether one makes from God’s hiddenness a statement of being, such that it belongs to God’s essence, that he is a deus absconditus, or whether one can speak of the possibility of God to hide him from a person. (Westermann 1984, 172) The poet can speak of the YHWH that is to come only in relation to the departed god and through the intermediary concepts of divinity and the holy, “Only from the essence of the holy can the essence of divinity be thought. These sentences can also stand in a book of ancient Near Eastern ontology!” (Knierim 1995, 192) Thus YHWH has spoken to the prophets through what happened to them. . . . Having to do with a state of affairs, the event becomes the essence of God’s reality. (Preuss 1996, 74)

How to make metaphysical restatements 123 What is the kind of “essentialism” the second-order discourse here ascribes to YHWH as depicted in the first-order religious language of the world of the text itself? For example, does it involve a form of so-called origin essentialism, perhaps implicit when reconstructing YHWH’s nature and attributes in the early history of Israelite religion as an indelible residual core component constitutive of YHWH’s relative personal identity over time and across possible worlds in the text? Or do OT scholars operate with some form of sortal essentialism in the sense that the property of being divine was assumed to be essential to YHWH? These are questions concerning kind; others of degree are also possible. For example, does a given description in second-order discourse where OT scholars refer to something about YHWH as “essential” operate with the idea of minimal essentialism in the sense of allowing for infinite possible contextual variance with only YHWH’s being self-identical and being one thing? Or does it lean more in the opposite direction of maximal essentialism in the sense of implying that all of YHWH’s divine attributes, whether in a given text or across possible worlds, were assumed to be essential to YHWH’s divine nature? It can be hard to tell, especially given a lack of nuance and specificity in references to YHWH’s essence or essential nature in OT theologians’ second-order comparative philosophical restatements in metaphysical terms. Add to this that what they say has to be taken in context and might only be a descriptive of a particular OT text or theological tradition’s associated ideas, and it becomes problematic to infer and generalise in any manner offering sufficient conceptual clarity. Given the theological pluralism of the canonical texts and the logic of belief revision in the history of Israelite religion and on redaction and composition processes, it would seem a piecemeal analysis of both first- and second-order descriptions is as good as it gets. On such a small scale one could then seek to locate any given description more precisely on the spectrum between the extremes of maximal and minimal essentialism. This can be done by asking whether a piece of first- or secondorder discourse about YHWH in the world of the text can be restated to imply, for example, a distinction between the proportion of essential and/ or non-trivial necessary and accidental divine attributes (with or without the idea of accidental one is present. While many varieties of perfect-being philosophical theology operating with a doctrine of divine simplicity do not assume God to be part of a genus or instantiate any accidental attributes, a philosophical theologian of the OT operating descriptively and historically should at least consider the possibility of earlier religious language (or later OT theologian’s restatements) implying as much. Just because a given construction of YHWH may be different does not mean it involves any less metaphysical ideas, whatever these may be (cf. Hazony & Johnson 2018). Of course, the analytic and earlier Aristotelian entities and distinctions postulated when writing about essential/necessary and accidental properties of the divine nature as constructed in OT scholars’ second-order discourse about first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of

124  How to make metaphysical restatements the text are not assumed to be valid or normative in themselves. It is simply suggested that because OT scholars and analytic philosophical theologians do so, it might be worthwhile to experiment with a descriptive metaphysical restatement of what the second-order descriptions assume, assert or imply about the first-order religious language with reference to YHWH in any given world of the text. Consider, for example, the following remark in the context of comparative history of religion, nevertheless operating on the assumption of these very same metaphysical distinctions as being descriptively apt: The very point of difference between humans and god, then, is accidental rather than essential; it was not there from the beginning. (van der Toorn 1999, 360) In other words, perhaps contrary to popular assumptions, also with reference to this metaphysical conundrum, second-order comparative philosophicaltheological comments involving restating something about what the firstorder religious language assumes or implies about YHWH are already present, even if brief to the point of vagueness. Furthermore, even brief remarks hide a wealth of philosophical baggage that represents the condition of possibility for even using such jargon in the first place. The comparative philosophical theologian of the OT can accordingly either seek to offer an alternative take on what a given context in the OT itself assumes that has any relation to the matter. Or one can agree an existing restatement and aim to elaborate on what this would further imply, when related to other connected comparative philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives. Based on the discussion by Robertson and Atkins (2018, n.p.), the distinction between essential vs accidental properties above can additionally be characterized in various though mostly modal ways, one example of which can be taken to imply that the said accidental “point of difference” is thus an attribute of YHWH assumed as not necessarily exemplified by divine natures only (cf. Robertson & Atkins 2018, n.p.). Depending on what was meant in the particular second-order philosophical-theological distinction between YHWH’s essential and accidental divine attributes, one can seek to argue that that the OT scholar in question has used the metaphysical terms incorrectly. The error might be located in what the technical terms in the second-order philosophical-theological discourse are taken as able to mean, in the way they are used, or as inference from the first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text itself. And one can do all this even if one personally considers analytic philosophy, metaphysics and Christian philosophical-theological ideas problematic. One then simply mentions the pros and cons of offering the conceptual clarification required within the limited readerly ideological or metaphilosophical perspective supervening on the use of the particular metaphysical idiom.

How to make metaphysical restatements 125 In historical and descriptive comparative philosophical-theological mode, one is thus not necessarily insisting that the OT says exactly the same, that it is clear on the matter, or that whatever is said about it is normative or decisive for contemporary philosophical arguments about these and related matters. Of course one could if one wanted to, but as a historically conscious and literary sensitive scholar not limited to purely biblical theological interests, one need not. Hence these the presence or absence of these distinctions in the many genres constituting the first-order religious language used to describe YHWH in the world of the text can at first be difficult to discern. This is because the comparative philosophical-theological perspectives and the metaphysical restatements they involve are rarely sufficiently elaborate, in-depth or metaphysical idiom–consistent. Perhaps a good way to start is to combine an inquiry on first- and or second-order religious language descriptions of YHWH’s so-called essential nature or essential attributes with one concerned with what such descriptions might imply (or not) in relation to the philosophical-theological concept of divine simplicity (on which, see Pruss 2008, 150–167; Brower 2009, 105–128; Stump 2010, 270–277; Vallicella 2019, n.p.). The stereotypical philosophical theological idea here would be that the divine nature has no parts or real distinctions, an idea more clearly formulated in ancient philosophical theology since neo-Platonism (Plotinus). This seems problematic, since OT theology still recognizes the legitimacy of talk of YHWH’s divine attributes as reflective of ontological distinctions in the world of the text itself. Yet some OT scholars operating in historical and descriptive mode no longer write like Aquinas by saying that YHWH is not a member of a genus, incorporeal and identical to his nature, not a member of a class that shares a common nature. They do, however, still depend on medieval philosophicaltheological distinctions whereby they refer to YHWH’s divine attributes as not the subject of speculation yet being constituted in a mysterious unity making the reality referred to by the OT’s religious language elusive. In its function, God’s name suggests its pragmatic presence. The sense of God’s being can be captured in the English phrase “I am who I am for you”. His simplicity shows there is no shadow of variability in him. God is dependable, he can be counted upon. . . . God’s uncompromised simplicity guarantees the success of Moses’ mission. (Waltke 2011, 366–367) To be sure, not all OT scholars operate with so anachronistic a notion as philosophical theology’s doctrine of divine simplicity as in the sample shown previously. Whether or not we agree with the author, it is still interesting to ask how YHWH’s “simplicity” is understood in any second-order description using the concept. Is it used loosely and perhaps wrongly? Which version of the doctrine of divine simplicity (if any) seems to supervene on the particular metaphysical assumptions associated with the use of this

126  How to make metaphysical restatements philosophical-theological term? What alternative descriptions do OT scholars use when they do not write about YHWH in terms of divine simplicity? With the latter question it gets tricky, especially since some of the concerns related to divine simplicity also appear in relation to other philosophicaltheological terms in the philosophical-theological assumptions of OT theologians whose Christian background is that of classical theism. Ultimately, let us for the moment put aside the comparative philosophicaltheological concept of divine simplicity in the form of the question whether in the second-order discourse of OT theology restated in analytic metaphysical terms YHWH’s existence was assumed to be identical to his essence. Instead, let us ask whether OT theologians assume that YHWH’s divine nature or being was identical to his divine attributes. In other words, might OT theology be operating with a conception of divine simplicity by implying that YHWH in a particular world of the text was assumed to be identical with the properties he is interpreted to instantiate? How can one tell? Perhaps in relation to the associated views in OT ethics. After all, another reason why simplicity lies in the background of many OT theologies concerns the need to show that depictions of YHWH do not fall foul of the dilemma first presented by Plato in the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro concerning the nature of goodness (either divine commands are relative or YHWH’s morality and moral attributes are ontologically dependent on a deeper moral order). That is, of course, to the extent to which this concern is implicit in OT theologians’ writings and whether it is implied to constitute a dilemma (on divine goodness in analytic philosophical theology, see Murphy 2019, n.p.; as well as Murphy 2019a, 2019b for a recent discussion). There is another conceptual challenge to any attempted coherent secondorder metaphysical restatement of the idea that YHWH has a nature in the sense implied by certain interpretations of divine simplicity (Plantinga 1980). For if YHWH in a particular world of the text was assumed to be identical to his properties, then is YHWH not also a property. Furthermore, if all properties are abstract entities then so is YHWH, who is clearly a concrete particular, at least in the metaphysical assumptions of the world of the text. Therefore the nature of YHWH cannot be metaphysically identical to his divine attributes. Of course, this assumes a specific interpretation of these variables and that the OT is metaphysically, ontologically and logically conceptually coherent. Wolterstorff (1991, 531–552) implies an alternative. In a more relational ontology, YHWH, even if assumed to have a simple nature, was not assumed to be identical to his properties. Instead of being abstract entities externally related to YHWH’s divine nature, YHWH’s divine attributes could have been implied to be exemplified as ontological constituents. Also, if YHWH was not assumed to be a metaphysical substance and the alternative view of properties in bundle theories noted previously supervenes on the philosophical-theological idiom used in the OT scholar’s descriptive metaphysical restatement, then the earlier objection against divine simplicity or against the idea of YHWH having a nature does not apply.

How to make metaphysical restatements 127 As analytic philosophical-theologians know, another metaphysical problem presents itself over and above all the aforementioned. It emerges once we reflect on those divine attributes that are shared in some way by both YHWH in a particular world of the text and things in that world, like being holy, just, merciful, etc. Here one may either deny that these are essential divine attributes in the same sense as later interpreted with reference to the concept of God in post-Anselmian perfect being theology’s view on divine simplicity where there is no mereological overlap and the religious language is analogical or equivocal. Or one may argue that in the metaphysical assumptions identified in a particular OT text, the divine properties vary in degree, rather than kind, which would still present a problem for any perspective on YHWH as metaphysically simple. Of course, the problem does not only arise with reference to so-called divine attributes, for even if only YHWH is assumed to be perfectly powerful, wise, good and so on, what about trivial properties that YHWH in a particular world of the text and things in the world of the text share, e.g. of being related, of participating in events and states of affairs, of being the subject of propositions, of having properties. Especially where YHWH is not assumed to transcend “nature” as God is in later philosophical theology and where there is mereological overlap between parts of YHWH and parts of other things in the world of the text (e.g. the divine spirit/breath as wind or human spirit). Whatever one may make of this, it is important to distinguish the question of OT scholars’ views on how YHWH as depicted in the world of the text does or does not relate to ideas about divine simplicity (even contrastively and metaphorically) from the question of whether the OT can be said to assume anything with some bearing on related but different philosophical theological concepts divine aseity and immutability. While all of these divine attributes may be interlinked in the metaphysical conceptions of God in classical Western Christian monotheism, they can and should be metaphysically distinguished the further back in time one goes religious-historically speaking. Thus even if the OT or OT theologians conceived of YHWH in a given world of the text as metaphysically complex, the question can still be asked how the metaphysical assumptions that must be postulated as conditions of possibility for YHWH to be depicted in the ways in which YHWH was, or to be depicted at all, are related to the question of YHWH’s existence as personal identity, relative, over time, transworld. Traditionally, the belief in divine aseity was one of the main reasons for wanting to think of the divine as metaphysically simple. Here the rhetoric used, and the absence of theogony and in-text philosophical-theological reflection actually make the reader more interesting and unsure if either/ both the OT or/and OT theologians seem to imply that YHWH was not assumed to be self-caused (in the sense of the idea even being remotely present) or obviously so (even if conceptually incoherent). This is certainly not a matter of Being in the metaphysical sense of aseity, absolute existence, pure self-determination or any other ideas of the same kind. . . . It is possible to speak of the Being of God in very

128  How to make metaphysical restatements different ways. . . . At a time like that, metaphysical speculation would have been no more helpful than the revelation of some power in nature, were it the Thunder god with his bolts of lightning or the Wind god riding upon the storm. (Eichrodt 1961, 190) Connected with this is the “definition” of the name Jahwch, which has from the very beginning keenly attracted the interest of theologians, because they believed that here at last was a reference giving a comprehensive and fundamental account of the nature of the revelation of Jahweh, and reducing it, so to speak, to a final axiomatic formula (Ex. III. 14). But caution has to be exercised at this point; for nothing is farther from what is envisaged in this etymology of the name of Jahwch than a definition of his nature in the sense of a philosophical statement about his being (LXX) – a suggestion, for example, of his absoluteness, aseity, etc. (von Rad 1962, 180) One may insist that ancient notions of causality (not to mention selfcausation) are no longer warranted in philosophy in general or metaphysics in particular. But if they are indeed ancient, as is the OT, then historically such notions have a better chance (if any) of being implicit in the world of the text in embryo than modern views (as thought the OT always assumed what philosophical theologians only now realise, or what OT theologians would like it to mean to be metaphysically respectable). It does not help if one’s historical take on the world of the text denies an implicit metaphysics of causal relata but one’s Hebrew grammar operates with causatives, if one implies the presence of prior questions of free will and determinism in the text (or the plot of a narrative) in finding therein notions of “dual causality”, if one speaks of YHWH as dynamic effectual presence, if one talks about YHWH’s creation or providence as basically amounting to causing things to be, if one speaks of historical, social, physical or other causes, if one denies causality as answer to “why?” but assumes them with reference to “how” or “what for”, or if one uses semantically overlapping metaphysical jargon (reasons, conditions, influences, effects, consequences and all that jazz). After aseity, consider the concept of divine immutability (see Leftow 2005, 2016, n.p.). OT scholars do not always use this metaphysical term verbatim in their second-order discourse descriptions of first-order religious language representations of YHWH in the world of the text. When they do, the challenge to offer an OT counterpart of perfect being theology tends to be part of an agenda and divine immutability is often conflated with divine impassibility in the process of comparative philosophical commentary. All the perfections of God’s freedom and therefore of his love, and therefore the one whole divine essence, can and must be recognized by saying that YHWH is constant. But this does not mean that God

How to make metaphysical restatements 129 is immutable, which would be close to saying God is dead. His constancy consists of the fact that he is always the same in every change, for instance showing integrity to people of integrity but refractoriness to people that are crooked (Ps. 18, 25 [MT 26]). Indeed, God’s omnipotence requires that he is not immutable and therefore powerless, like the Persian king lampooned in Daniel 6. The common Christian understanding of God’s immutability derives from the influence of Greek thinking on the Church fathers, via the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo. It is a philosophical assumption about God that has to be tested by Scripture. In fact, while affirming God’s consistency, the first testament also describes God as changing, and that in several cases. (Goldingay 2006, 89) Here the preferred second-order term is “constancy” over and against divine immutability. Yet “constancy” is still very much a metaphysical term (in discussions of philosophical problems related to personal identity over time). This way of putting it presupposes a distinction that the analytic metaphysical idiom in philosophical theology makes between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” changes. YHWH is implied as not involved in the former, but can undergo the latter. The reason this represents a conflation of divine immutability and divine impassibility is because, from a comparative philosophical-theological perspective, YHWH could, hypothetically speaking, be impassible (“constant”?) and also mutable. Such metaphysical terms and distinctions can be interpreted or applied incorrectly, but they need not be considered as being inherently problematic (although any OT scholar will perhaps be likely to be found guilty by association). Ultimately, based on the the interpretation of these metaphysical terms in some philosophicaltheological perspectives, YHWH could have been implied to be both mutable and impassible when changing his own temporal parts, i.e. when appearing in certain forms, not all parts of which are proper divine parts. The aforementioned distinction between immutability and impassibility may be relevant to research that is focussed on the comparative philosophicaltheological interest in anthropomorphism and anthropopathism (and the nature of religious language) in linguistic, literary and psychological perspectives on first-order religious language constructions of divine mental states in the OT. Though such research may not approach the matter from a dualist perspective and may assume divine cognition, affection and volition to be “embodied”, the focus is usually on the “divine mind” and all the epistemological processes supervening on YHWH’s thoughts, feelings and desires. The question a comparative philosophical theologian of the OT might wish to ask is how the relation between immutability or impassibility has already been constructed in the associated second-order discourse, even where such attributes are assumed, asserted or implied to be uninstantiated. Consider the following two questions as examples of what could be possible philosophical theological concerns with reference to the merit of existing

130  How to make metaphysical restatements second-order metaphysical restatements of related meanings attributed to first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. Does it entail the belief that YHWH was not immutable in virtue of being able to change certain aspects of the divine nature in some (minimal and contingent ways) and still being impassible in virtue of being the only one who could thus effect it? Conversely, is YHWH in a particular world of the text implied to be immutable but passible in being constructed as changelessly (in some sense, “caused” to be) aware of external events supervening on experiencing responsive emotions as grief which, in virtue of always being felt, does not require a corresponding internal change? Whether YHWH in a particular world of the text is seen as temporal or timeless, the notion of divine immutability in itself implies nothing religioushistorically odd here. Most worlds of the text in the OT do not assume that YHWH can undergo real intrinsic change. Even if what it says of YHWH in a particular world of the text is clearly metaphorical, it has also been popular to suggest that OT texts which ascribe change to YHWH such religious language could be speaking metaphorically. Furthermore, the OT’s forms of theism clearly exclude many sorts of change in YHWH in a particular world of the text, e.g. that YHWH in a particular world of the text can begin or cease to be. If YHWH in a particular world of the text cannot, YHWH is immutable with respect to existence. Yet many OT theologians appear to equate philosophical theology with perfect being theology, and with specific interpretations of the associated divine attributes. On discovering that YHWH as represented in the world of the text does not correspond to the metaphysical profile that was once constructed, their concern to stay true to the text on its own terms (even if not in them) leads them to insinuate that all such discussion is problematic because it supposedly cannot tolerate the unsettled polyphonic character of the text. . . . Thus, for example, if theology, in its metaphysical propensity, holds to an affirmation of God’s omnipotence, an interpreter must disregard texts to the contrary. . . . If it is claimed that God is morally perfect, the rather devious ways of the God of the Old Testament must either be disregarded or explained away. (Brueggemann 1997, 106) To be sure, some of the problems with reading medieval notions of Anselmian or other later versions of perfect being theology into OT texts arise with the awareness of how whatever can be said to be YHWH’s great-making properties are metaphorical role related. In other words, to the extent that YHWH is viewed as perfect, one can always observe that the view of perfection involved in any given text is not only historically and culturally but also linguistically and socially relative. Thus what makes an entity a maximally great creator, warrior, king, lover, judge, etc. are not the same sets of

How to make metaphysical restatements 131 properties. Thus the existence and identity conditions of compossable properties in different worlds of the text are not only variable but exponentially so when multiple typologies and functions of divinity supervene on how YHWH’s greatness and/or perfection was understood. Of course, one might sneer at still speaking of maximal greatness and perfection with reference to a text where none of the great-making properties of perfect being theology seems to be instantiated. But what is happening in this chapter should not be confused with historical philosophical-theological down-scaling and retrograde redefining great-making properties to the point of dying the death of a thousand qualifications. Instead, a historical overview of philosophical theologies operating with notions of “perfection” will show that what was understood by a “being” and being “perfect” did vary over time and even among contemporaries. In other words, a consistent critical historical consciousness and avoidance of philosophical-theological presumptuousness is precisely what is lacking in the inability to realise that even notions of greatness and perfection have no timeless essence to them. Both have histories, and how they have been constructed was always relative and limited to what the second-order socio-cultural and religioushistorical conceptual background allowed for. Earlier and other notions of divinity not conforming to what OT scholars might consider as being the more familiar philosophical-theological views on divine perfection and maximal greatness can only be seen as coming up short precisely if one does not reckon with the fact that there is no such thing as perfection and greatness simpliciter (perfect what? great in what way?). The above-mentioned diachronic and synchronic variation in the logic of belief revision supervene on inclusion and exclusion criteria behind any implied maximally compossible set of great-making divine attributes, and since every role ascribed to YHWH is socio-culturally and religioushistorically contextual – each with its own criteria for maximal greatness in the particular divine function – one has to reckon with the relative identity also of the other great-making properties involved. This is the case with YHWH’s divine attributes and their identity over time and across possible worlds of the OT text. The idea that YHWH was not assumed to represent maximal greatness or understood in the categories of perfect being theology, whatever one thinks of this, is therefore technically only of relative informative value. Even the latter depends on which OT texts one is writing about, which interpretations thereof, which version of Anselmian and other constructions of maximal greatness are in view. Determining what the case may be given certain configurations of the variables on account of mainstream tendencies is, however, not presently the concern. What is of interest is that even to arrive at any conclusion in our second-order discourse on how first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the OT text relate to perfect being theology presupposes as condition of its own possibility the need for a comparative philosophical theology involving descriptive metaphysical

132  How to make metaphysical restatements restatement in relation to a particular presupposition, problem and perspective that keeps returning in the repressed part of biblical theology. This shows why the binary between biblical (or OT) and philosophical theology is continuously deconstructed even by those who constantly testify to the abiding constancy of its stability. In other words, from the current chapter’s experimental comparative philosophical-theological perspective, whether or not YHWH was assumed to be a perfect being is thus not necessarily problematic. The converse is also true: neither is it necessarily inherently unproblematic. The ambivalence is partly caused by supervening indeterminacies in translation and interpretations and the underdetermination of the data any philosophical-theological theoretical framework generates given the metaphysical currency it trades in. So one can still even comparatively say YHWH was not a perfect being, but a philosophicaltheologian of the OT might wish to go into more detail to discern in what sense it was not the case and with reference to what interpretation, both of the OT text(s) in view and the metaphysical assumptions of the particular perspective, the identity of which has temporally been fixed for comparative interlocutionary purposes. Then one can reason that a given sample of firstorder religious language used to describe YHWH in a given world of the text, when restated certain second-order metaphysical terms does not seem to conform to the concept of God as interpreted in the perspective put up for the sake of offering a comparative philosophical-theological perspective related to a particular interpretation of great-making properties. If some OT scholars wish to be apologetic about it and attempt to harmonize a given interpretation of both first- and second-order discourses in order to argue in favour of taking a particular Christian doctrinal framework as hermeneutically and theologically normative, they are free to do so. If others wish to try and either bracket such concerns or argue against them, they they should also be heard. What remains is a seemingly inevitable conclusion, at least as long as one stays within the parameters of the current experimental framework and with reference to hermeneutical legitimation of the new discipline all that is required for a philosophical theology of the OT of whatever format, scope, scale and focus to get going is to offer a meta philosophical-theological explication and replication of what OT scholars already do so as to be able to compare, correlate, contrast or criticize certain philosophical-theological ideas the way they do, or bother doing so at all. Besides the perceived problems with “maximal greatness”, “perfect beings” and assorted allegedly anachronistic distortions, three other related “metaphysical attributes” – “divine unity”, “divine incorporeality” and “divine omnipresence” – can be mentioned as among those that have become a conflated supervening interest within contemporary OT scholarship. This is evident in the popularity in recent research on the way the first-order religious language constructions of divine embodiment YHWH

How to make metaphysical restatements 133 in the world of the text in different contexts relate to monotheism as a second-order philosophical-theological category. If “oneness” becomes an essential feature of the deity, what might this mean in comparative terms? (Smith 2010, 146) Here “oneness” is not identical to but related to notions of metaphysical simplicity. YHWH’s “essential feature” is not really much different from working with the idea of YHWH as an entity with a divine nature and essential attributes. Also, “comparative terms” is understood primarily with reference to ancient Near Eastern rather than comparative philosophicaltheological terms. Yet comparative philosophical-theological interests and counterparts are clearly present; and they are so as conditions of possibility for using the currency of metaphysical language in the first place (no matter how fragmented and secondary). When philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories are then rejected, it is once again the result of first adopting them hypothetically and not finding first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the OT text able to adapt to what second-order scholarly discourses interested in the divine nature, attributes and relations consider to be the minimal requirements for any attempted comparative and descriptive metaphysical restatements to be warranted. Next, consider the divine attribute which, in perfect being theology, has been called omnipresence. In philosophical theology, it has attracted less philosophical attention than such properties as omnipotence, omniscience or being eternal (cf. Wainwright 2010, 46–65; Stump 2011, 243–263). In OT studies the situation is almost inverted, there is more the interest metaphysical puzzles and presuppositions associated with OT perspectives of YHWH’s divine presence than on YHWH’s divine power and knowledge combined. On the one hand, every aspect of the divine nature has been linked to the property of being present. Familiar samples include “divine revelation” and relations (“God and the world”), different religious historical locations (from kinsman, mountain, tabernacle, ark to Israelite territory, to temple to heaven, etc.), naming a biblical theology with presence in mind (Terrien 1978), and discussions of YHWH’s name as primarily referring to his essence as “dynamic effectual presence” (which mixes an ontology of force with one of being). On the other hand, there is what OT scholars have been doing a lot since the turn of the millennium but what analytic philosophical theologians like Richard Swinburne (Swinburne 1977, rev. 1993) have done much earlier, namely to discuss divine omnipresence by asking what do we mean by calling YHWH a person and what was it assumed to be for a god to have a body, in descriptive metaphysical terms. In analytic Christian philosophical theology proper, other recent work draws on contemporary discussions

134  How to make metaphysical restatements on the metaphysics of material objects and their relation to space-time, distinguishing between the ontological status of regions, the mereology of possible “occupation” relations, as well as between pertending and entending (technical terms, as used by Hudson 2009, 209). Stump (2008, 59–82) adds an argument for incorporating second-person perspectives on analogy to what happens in personal relationships (reminiscent of Martin Buber’s reception in OT theology at times) and given what is required for it to be of religious or theological importance. Also briefly consider the attribute of divine omniscience often defined as the property of having complete or maximal knowledge (on which, see Zagzebski 2007, 261–269; Wierenga 2009, 129–144, 2018, n.p.). OT theologians’ second-order discourses also recognise variation in first-order religious-language representations regarding the nature and scope of YHWH’s knowledge in a given world of the text. Usually here too what YHWH was assumed to know is distinguished from omniscience as stereotyped from discussions in philosophical theology. The conviction that perfect wisdom is with God alone was certainly inherent in Jahwism from the beginning. 3 Indeed, it was precisely at the point of the boundlessness of the divine knowledge that man’s mad ambition to be like God (Gen. III; Ezek. XXVIII. off.), and his desire to “usurp” (Job xv. 8) something of this wisdom broke out. The same holds true of the idea that Jahweh could grant to specially chosen men a certain share in this superhuman knowledge. n.3 The references which speak explicitly of Jahweh’s wisdom do not start until comparatively late. Is. XXVIII. 29, XXXI. 2; Ps. CXLVII. 5 ; Prov. III. Igf. ; Job IX. 4, XII. 13. (von Rad 1965, 442) Many philosophical-theological issues of interest are available with reference to YHWH in a particular world of the text’s knowledge or wisdom given statements like these (which often deny that YHWH was assumed to be omniscient in the sense a perfect being was assumed to be, see Fretheim 1984). These questions can still be asked, even if divine knowledge is always constructed relative to the constraints of contexts of supervening metaphors of the divine as creator, warrior, king, judge, shepherd, parent, partner, etc. (all of which have variable associative meanings in different OT texts and contexts). Philosophical-theological perspectives also offer a variety of possible takes on the matter that OT scholars can use to experiment with when they seek to clarify what appears implicit about the concept of YHWH’s divine knowledge in the first-order religious language of a given world of the text with the aid of related concepts in second-order metaphysical discourse. For example, it might seem that YHWH’s knowledge in a particular world of the text did not involve discursive (successive individual) thought.

How to make metaphysical restatements 135 YHWH is usually not depicted as logically reasoning from known premises to initially unknown conclusions, even if the propositional content of YHWH’s beliefs are implied to stand in logical relations with each other. Alternatively, one can suggest that such is exactly the way YHWH’s knowledge is represented, irrespective of whether one sees this as metaphorical and anthropomorphic or not. Thus at least in the world of the OT text, when restated in hypothetical and experimental comparative analytic philosophical-theological metaphysical terms, YHWH’s omniscience as constructed in second-order OT theological discourse has been described as involving both discursive thinking and inferential knowledge. Reflections on YHWH’s knowledge also construct divine cognition as metaphoricalrole specific. Usually what YHWH knows is implied to be things YHWH believes (thus in dispositional states) about divine relations to the world and about the relations of things in that world. For the most part, however OT theologians and others have not, because of the aversion to propositional justification of textual truth claims, considered the option of a conceptual clarification of the implied logical status and varieties of epistemic warranting incidentally associated with YHWH’s own knowledge as are implicit in a particular world of the text. The second-order discourse of OT theology mimics that of philosophical theology to the extent that they share the view that first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text represent what Cupitt (1980) and others think of as inexact metaphysics. Of course, it is inexact relative to certain Anselmian notions of maximal greatness in perfect-being theological expectations of what it means to be all-knowing. But while Cupitt and others fail to try and restate the meaning of the biblical texts in their own metaphysical terms, it is said to be impossible to identify what the OT texts assume about divine knowledge because it is too poetical and rhetorical. Indeed it is, if one tries to reconstruct how what is said in the world of the text relates to a particular philosophical theological concept of God as believed to exist in the world behind and in front of it. But if one sticks to the world in the text, it is irrelevant if what is there appears like inexact metaphysics or a lack of concern with metaphysics. On the contrary, it is interesting that YHWH is seldom depicted as just knowing what others do for its own sake. As in philosophical theology, also in OT scholarship in general and in OT theology in particular, “most discussions of omniscience do not focus on whether it includes infallibility, essential omniscience, being ‘non-discursive’, or not involving belief. Instead, they primarily address the range of the knowledge that omniscient requires” (Wierenga 2018, n.p.). In other words, from this perspective it would appear that what was thought to be divine omniscience in the OT related to YHWH does not involve the deity accumulating or revealing or possessing as much information as possible and on every topic under the sun. Rather, in the world of the text, YHWH is usually “watching, seeking, testing shifting, discerning,

136  How to make metaphysical restatements weighing, confirming, thinking” (see Cupitt 1980, 132) about moral, judicial and anthropocentric comic interests. So, instead of trying to make sense of this purely by way of apologetic or atheological expositions, why not also attempt to clarify the concept of divine knowledge thus constructed by way of a comparative philosophical perspective purely interested in restating in metaphysical terms what this means with reference to the presuppositions, problems and perspectives of the analytic tradition. Surely this is not using the OT as metaphysics (or philosophical theology) or for metaphysics (or philosophical theology) but using metaphysics (and philosophical theology) to clarify metaphysical (and philosophically-theologically related) concepts in the OT or in second-order discourse about it. The fact that YHWH is assumed to know is not just any knowledge but of mysteries and secrets and what humans generally are not able to know in the same way (and probably wish they could) but require it to be revealed to them can be taken in two ways. Either one can piously try to explain this as focussed only on what is theologically relevant and not philosophical in focus. Or one can easily show how it could be pure projection of human ideals and desires expressed in mythological language, still not philosophical. But both of these are concerned with the view that the text itself is alleged divine revelation and that the world of the text is ultimately about something or someone behind and in front of it. That may be so, but if one focussed on the world of the text only, even if for the sake of the argument, what one can do is ask what the condition of possibility must be to write about YHWH in this way and interested in and able to know these things. Then, whether or not the religious language implies an interest in or takes the form of metaphysics, metaphysical assumptions must be postulated to account for how the world of the text can be constructed so as to include the divine knowledge (of whatever form) to be the way it is, or to be at all. In some worlds of the text of the OT, there are assumed to be truths about the future which YHWH is implied to know. The philosophical-theological concern with the concept of foreknowledge has spilled over into OT scholarship in general and OT theology in particular wherever anything is written that alludes to OT perspectives on or related to the problem of reconciling such an idea with a (concurrent) belief in free will, whether divine or human. The supervening framework is usually metaphysical and especially ethical (both philosophical) given the broader ideas of Christian soteriology or modern human conceptions of the self as individual with rights and responsibilities, choices and accountability in view. Here some conservative and critical approaches might wish to argue for compatibilism, i.e. where any text that does not seem to suggest foreknowledge (as omniscience) is argued to actually do so and only appear not to because it is unconcerned with our modern philosophical (especially logical) concerns. Of course, others might opt for a more pluralist perspective, suggesting that not only do some texts assume omniscience and foreknowledge while others do not, sometimes humans are not assumed to have the kind of free will as this was

How to make metaphysical restatements 137 later construed, even if at other times it does and irrespective of whether or not this is taken to be problematic or the result of a lack or abundance of (philosophical-) theological sophistication on the part of the writers. The dominant philosophical-theological second-order idea is that of “divine freedom”, wherein ideas related to YHWH’s foreknowledge implicit in acts of creation, revelation, election and providence get taken up. [R]evelation is an act of God’s free will. (Köhler 1957, 60) If the world was called into being by the free will of God, it is his very own possession and he is its Lord. (von Rad 1962, 143) The sovereign Lord of the world, who accomplishes his creation as the utterly free decision of his will. (Eichrodt 1967, 492) Yahweh still remains free, making his presence known among his people according to his own free decision. (Zimmerli 1978, 73) In the election of Israel God manifested his freedom. (Childs 1985, 355) YHWH retains YHWH’s freedom to be YHWH in every circumstance. . . . YHWH is free to act without obligation according to YHWH’s own inclination. (Brueggemann 1997, 322) What follows is a covenant revelation that reflects God’s freedom and sovereignty in choosing and relating to Israel. (House 1998, 173) YHWH, the holy god, acts with freedom, is not bound by necessity. (cf. Ex 33, 19) (Anderson 1999, 32) Emphasis on YHWH’s sovereignty and human responsibility has led to many metaphysically inexact and incompatible readings, often justified by appealing to the same perceived inexactness and incompatibility, perceived in and/or projected onto the religious language related to these matters in the world of a given text itself. The fact is, there is not a position implicit or explicit within the second-order discourse of associated research in OT scholarship on the problems involved and with reference to the OT itself that does not have a comparative philosophical-theological counterpart

138  How to make metaphysical restatements offering a more nuanced metaphysical restatement of that position. This can be the job of the philosophical theologian of the OT, whatever position one chooses to take or argue is present in a given OT text or in a given scholarly interpretation thereof. Similar reasoning on the recent comparative philosophical-theological platform can be used to test the clarifying capabilities of limited incompatibilist accounts of divine omniscience as foreknowledge in relation to human free will. YHWH in a particular world of the text’s foreknowledge might be presented in reduced fashion if it can be shown that the narrator implies, even if only incidentally and not in so many words of course, that unlimited foreknowledge would be incompatible with some of YHWH’s own free action (e.g. Swinburne 2016, 183). Also, it might be considered to what extent either the OT or OT theology might be motivated to see a particular type of divine knowledge as a result of supervening assumptions about the nature of divine providence in the world of the text. In philosophical theology, the term “eternity” has been used in different ways (see Leftow 2005, 2010, 168–206; Craig 2009, 145–165; Melamed 2016; Deng 2018, n.p). In comparative philosophical-theological terms, this concerns the metaphysics and mereology involved in the implied relationship YHWH in a particular world of the text was assumed to have with time. Interestingly, many studies on YHWH and time already exist despite the metaphysical and philosophical concepts, categories and concerns involved. In this bit, we can skip right to the comparative philosophical-theological issues in analytic metaphysics that represent original research problems and questions. That being said, as the topic is the construction of YHWH’s relation to eternity in the second-order metaphysical discourses of OT theology, there are constraints arising from the OT and from what other approaches in OT interpretation have already surmised. Yet either the OT itself or OT theology or both surmise many things, and what makes the present discussion new is not the questions per se but recontextualising them for experimenting with the possibility of more exclusive, more in-depth and more comprehensive descriptive analytic metaphysical restatement of already familiar issues and that in the context of a comparative philosophical-theological perspective: • whether, and if so, in what ways YHWH in a particular world of the text is implied to be (co-)located in the spatio-temporal world of other entities; and • whether, and if so, in what senses YHWH in a particular world of the text was assumed to be eternal or everlasting. (Note that this is the terminology not employed here.) Different concerns are present. One is about YHWH in a particular world of the text’s life, or, for want of a better phrase, the nature of YHWH in a particular world of the text’s experience. Another is the implied nature of YHWH’s experience. In recent discussions in analytic philosophical

How to make metaphysical restatements 139 theology, a variety of different views are available with which to compare what seems to be the case with regard to YHWH’s implied relation to time. Here is another problem which has been discussed in OT scholarship in general and in OT theology in particular that is essentially metaphysical in nature in all but name. What makes the present discussion different is then providing a background of the related philosophical-theological views that may or may not be considered relevant to clarify the concept of divine eternity in relation to spatio-temporality in a given first- or second-order context of discourse. Though perhaps the answers seem obvious, one can theoretically consider all the different (analytic) philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives as well as the associated metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories to discuss how the OT differs more from some than others, which in itself is a form of comparative commentary of the kind already accepted and practiced in OT theology and elsewhere. Here it is just more extensive, overt, explicit and aligned to a distinct contemporary philosophical-theological idiom without any assumption that descriptively or normatively apt statements are being made. This is, after all, still experimental mode with the application pertaining only to hypothetical comparative possibilities in terms of the scenarios used for illustrative purposes. Not of how things are so much as how the application of the new discipline in one possible format could look in practice, with even the latter being but a brief introductory “trailer” of sorts (to tickle philosophical-theological tastebuds (or trigger anti-philosophical trained responses, or both or neither). Whatever the case may be, whatever one thinks of YHWH’s relations to time in different worlds of the text, in transworld contexts and in secondorder descriptions in the history of philosophical-theological biblical interpretation, several hypothetical possibilities are ready and able to be experimented with. It is likely that not many OT scholars will wish to attempt to correlate first-order religious language descriptions locating YHWH in the space-time of the world of the text, with so-called atemporal views in which the divine eternity is connected with the idea of timelessness. Even if they believe this about “God” as transcending time and space, the popularity of thinking of Hebrew thought as concrete, dynamic and temporally ordered will incline many to suggest that OT narratives and poetry work with anthropomorphic and metaphysical representations in which YHWH appears as a temporal (not contingent) entity experiencing time in succession (without physical as opposed to psychological weariness and teariness). In other words, so-called pure atemporalism locating the divine wholly outside space and time does not seem to be part of the OT’s descriptions of YHWH. Moreover, philosophical-theological readings in the past that sought to argue this, e.g. in Aquinas or Maimonides, are faulted precisely for reading metaphysical ideas into the text that are not there and forcing its contents into foreign philosophical frameworks. Earlier interpreters did

140  How to make metaphysical restatements the same with more allegorical Platonist readings. Historical consciousness since the Reformation and more specifically the Enlightenment and the 19th century after Hegel is supposed to have changed all this. But literary criticism and biblical theology’s second-order philosophical-theological categories of anthropomorphism, metaphor, rhetoric and pragmatics can easily revitalise a more subtle and sophisticated hermeneutically tolerable neo-allegorical reading constantly making distinctions between what it takes to be manifest onto-theological but latent post- metaphysical content. Revelant related examples from OT scholarship come from the Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible (van der Toorn, Becking, & van der Horst 1999). Some entries of which touch on the topic at hand. While much of what is written there appears completely unphilosophical, it can easily be forgotten that the concern with clarifying ancient concepts of divine eternity by contrasting them with later metaphysical ideas in philosophical theology is itself already comparative philosophical theology in all but name. The form is philosophical-theological and the contents metaphysical, even if the rhetoric is traditional linguistic, literary-critical, comparative-religious, religious historical and biblical theological. More specifically, the illustrations appear with reference to Ugaritic, Egyptian, Mesopotamian and OT contexts respectively, generalizing about the particular traditions’ perspectives related to the philosophical-theological concept of divine eternity and relation to other metaphysical attributes in comparison to those of the perfectbeing theological stereotype in classical theism: It should be stressed that the Egyptian gods are not eternal, not all-seeing and all-knowing and not all-powerful. The gods are not eternal because they have a beginning and an end; gods are born and eventually die. (van der Toorn 1999, 354) In contrast to humans and animals then, gods have access to an abundance of vitality and life. “When the gods created humankind, they gave death to humankind, life they kept in their own hands” (Gi/g. OB X ‘Meissner Tablet’ iii 3–5). Unlimited life is pictured as a divine prerogative. Gods are eternal, not because they live in a zone of timelessness, but because they constantly renew themselves, like stars (CAD E s.V. edddu). Unlimited life is pictured as a divine prerogative. Gods are eternal, not because they live in a zone of timelessness, but because they constantly renew themselves, like stars. (CAD E s.V. edddu) (van der Toorn 1999, 359) The kingship of EI and Baal is different in that El’s kingship is more static (‘eternal king’), he remains the head of the gods, whereas Baal’s kingship is dynamic, he gives fertility and life to the world. Along with the name, Yahweh inherited various traits of EI. One of them is divine eternity. Ugaritic texts call EI the ‘father of years’ (ab snm) and depict

How to make metaphysical restatements 141 him as a bearded patriarch. . . . The God of Israel may be reverentially qualified as ‘eternal’, but there is no biblical text which uses the abstraction ‘eternity’ as a divine designation. (van der Toorn 1999, 313) Clearly philosophical-theological (metaphysical) concepts, concerns and categories are influencing and motivating such comments to be included at all, even if only in comparative mode and for the purpose of conceptual clarification through contrasting. This is sufficient for the purposes it serves, but it both implies the possibility of elaborating further on the topic and extending the comparative perspective not only in relation to bits and pieces of metaphysical jargon but within the context of the broader ideas within which these are situated within philosophical theology. A more in-depth and nuanced discussion of these same matters is where a philosophical theologian of the OT can come in. That is, the new discipline and its discussion of “divine eternity” can be seen as potentially supplementing and complementing what is already done in other approaches as well as being informed by them. Philosophical-theological and historical or literary-theological approaches could thus be joined within a holistic approach where, if one is allowed to say so, all can contribute to more precise second-order discourse with the aim of contributing to the bigger picture of possible meanings implicit within the first-order religious language of the world of the text itself. Neglecting each other’s insights is as hazardous for non-philosophical approaches if they use philosophical-theological metaphysical jargon wrongly as it is for philosophical-theological ones to try and operate without allowing insights from non-philosophical approaches to enrich and corroborate what is being said (all relative and tentative, of course). Again, everything is still descriptive and historical, one is not here in philosophical theology proper and wanting to have it dictate to OT scholarship what the ideal is. Of course many will still operate like that, but those who would otherwise object to the new discipline on the grounds that such things happen cannot dismiss it on these counts since it happens in all varieties of biblical interpretation and is not inherent to the new approach itself. Based on the overview of Deng (2018, n.p.), several pro- and antitimelessness views are discussed, most of which stereotypical OT scholars might either find too foreign, abstract, or of only relative contextual heuristic value. On “pure atemporalism” YHWH’s relation to time in the world of the text is seen as asymmetrical in the sense of YHWH being completely outside that world’s space-time. The next view mentioned implies YHWH could be considered to have an eternal existence involving “atemporal duration” in the sense of the events in YHWH’s life being ultimately simultaneous with both each other and with those of temporal entities. More “intermediate” views include pure temporalism according to which YHWH “is located at all times, experiences succession, and lives through a

142  How to make metaphysical restatements non-finite past and future in the way other entities are, except being temporally infinite”. Another perspective to test is to see to what extent YHWH was assumed to be timeless, but only relatively so in that divine time as part of divine eternity would be construed as not measured or experienced subjectively as humans do theirs and without suffering constitutionally (in the metaphysical sense) from temporal passage. One need not assume any of these views are applicable. They could even completely contrast what one thinks is the case in the world of the text or in OT theology, and discussing differences is itself a form of comparative philosophical-theological clarification that may aid in helping create a better understanding for modern readers who might have metaphysical assumptions obscuring certain subtle levels of meaning in the first-order religious language. There are thus also other equally philosophical-theological views that have nothing to do with the divine as timeless in the senses previously discussed. It even includes arguments that attempt to correlate the particular perspective with other ideas about divine attributes also involved. Against the views above, it would seem that based on views of divine knowledge, YHWH must be temporal to know the temporal order of reality and be aware of it as such. Also, divine actions in biblical narrative which cannot in first-order religious language be reduced to metaphor beyond the trivial is incompatible with a timeless state. Additionally, if YHWH is anything like a person, it is hard to think of this metaphysical concept in relation to a timeless state of affairs, which seem a contradiction in terms. Whenever YHWH speaks in past, present and future tenses, the presupposition is that YHWH is aligned with temporality, even if there are transtemporal elements involved in the way YHWH knows the future. But whether the latter knowledge is because there are assumed to be facts about the future as somehow already existing outside of divine expectation or intention can be hard to tell in many contexts. The fact that YHWH cannot change the past in a given world of the text (though the world itself may be the result of world-behind-the-text reconfiguration of “history”) is an interesting topic that has not received sufficient philosophical-theological clarification in the past. Perhaps this is because it is assumed or implied that the moral order would thereby be rendered superfluous or undesirably permeable by the social and cosmic orders. When OT theologians talk about YHWH’s power as constructed in the religious language of a given world of the text, they do so with reference to linguistic, literary-critical, historical-religious, socio-cultural and politicalideological reductions of divinity supervening on a given representation. Thus the property of being powerful supervenes on the relations in which power is exercised; therefore being an emergent property of external relations, i.e. power over. Included are relative identities in the associated polymorphisms in configurations of YHWH as exemplifying by what is part of the unspecified extensional and intentional criteria for God as personal name (ipseity or what makes YHWH a god) and god as kind (quiddity or

How to make metaphysical restatements 143 what makes anything a god) and its relation to YHWH as individual (haecceity or what makes YHWH YHWH) in a given context. YHWH’s specific powers relates to his role as god of the family, clan, tribe or state, as warrior, king, judge, partner, parent, as storm god, mountain god, solar deity, etc. These texts thereby construe God as a single entity whose power cannot be read in linear fashion from or defined by the political, economic or demographic realities of the present, but instead transcends them. (Schmid 2019, 3) Because the different senses of power overlap in any given world of the OT text, and because what is understood by each vary over time and across possible worlds of the text, with different metaphors functioning in different intensities at any given time or space, the whole of any contextual configuration of YHWH’s power transcends the sum of its parts. Also in stereotypical philosophical theology, divine omnipotence is a popular topic (see Flint & Freddoso 1983, 81–113; Leftow 2009, 167–198; Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 2010, 143–150; Wainright 2010, 45–65). In many ways, the OT shares the interest in the nature and scope of YHWH’s divine power, even if again it construes YHWH’s power in very different ways. The OT does not seem to answer logical puzzles e.g., of the kind that would wonder if YHWH in a particular world of the text can create a spherical cube, or make a stone so massive that he cannot move it. The comparative philosophical theologian of the OT might wish to ask whether there is some consistent analytic analysis of divine omnipotence and what these might be taken to imply with reference to the nature of YHWH in a particular world of the text. The point is that philosophical-theological reflection on constructions of YHWH’s power can raise puzzling questions about conceptual coherency. And though for the most part the OT is not concerned with attending to the associated metaphysical issues, as with OT theologians, one can imagine that some related speculation is possible in order to account for why things in the world of the text related to divine power were the way they were, or why they were at all. One tends to take for granted that the deity is constructed as a powerful entity but some sufficient reason along the lines of metaphysical assumptions can be postulated with regards to clarifying specific configurations and updates and revision in the underlying logic of the beliefs involved. To write about YHWH’s power in a way assumed to be meaningful and different from other available ways presupposes some form of comparative metaphysical conceptual history. It is part of what supervenes on theological pluralism in the OT, sociomorphic metaphors notwithstanding and however intertextual relations are construed. Here certain things are clearly assumed to be too hard for YHWH in all possible worlds of the text despite the rhetoric of hyperbolic praise asking rhetorical questions to the contrary. One of these involves changing the past, ending his own life, creating another or more powerful entity than himself,

144  How to make metaphysical restatements committing certain kinds of evil, turning into a fly forever, making a completely different world where nothing makes sense and so on. This, besides obviously logical contradictions like making seven times one add up to more than seven, and other by implication less than omnipotent actions, even if for literary-aesthetic sakes, e.g. creating in six days before resting, as well as in contexts where other attributes involve configurations different from the perfect-being stereotype, e.g. moving about (not being omnipresent), confirming reports and testing hearts (not being omniscient), causing certain forms of harm intentionally (not omnibenevolent in the later modern senses of the word, i.e. never deliberately cause harm in unjust ways). If such readings are correct, then certain assumptions about the nature and scope of YHWH’s other divine attributes themselves rule out the possible presence of a belief in absolute omnipotence. But all this has been noted in OT theology with different ways of making sense of and responding to such religious language. This includes everything from salvaging some notion of omnipotence (by relativizing the metaphysical referent of religious language by appealing to anthropomorphism and metaphor) or discarding the notion altogether and suggesting it is either a good thing (as in existentialist, personalist and process metaphysics supervening on OT theology) or a deal-breaker (certain varieties of naïve-realist atheist readings). Another is to dismiss all such interests as too foreign and philosophical and therefore (thankfully) not worth bothering with. Even if the OT has nothing in common with certain worries about the metaphysics of divine omnipotence, was the concept of YHWH’s power not clarified in OT theology precisely by engaging in comparative philosophical theology and discovering contrasts? How else could one know that biblical and philosophical theology differ unless one read the OT text and found the world of the text absent of such things after trying to find it there? So clearly again the covert operations of an embryonic comparative philosophical theology of the OT, the findings of which either did not yield enough data for metaphysical restatement or did but such restatement implied YHWH to be either less than perfect or the OT to not deal with the associated puzzles. This is all well and good, but again the problem is the same. It does not follow if the first-order religious language or second-order discourse descriptions in OT theology do not align with how certain conceptions of deity in philosophical theology construe divine power that all philosophical theology of the OT is thereby rendered irrelevant and/or useless. One must really think in reductionist, stereotyping and binary terms to end it all like that. For there are many alternative views on divine power in philosophical theology, with the associated problems and perspectives which might offer more than contrasting food for thought. Furthermore, as with maximal greatness, why not be thoroughly historical and instead of looking for anachronistic conceptions of divine power and, not finding them in the OT deny that it has any conceptions of omnipotence, try to determine what, if anything, a given world in the text thought being all-powerful involved in its own contexts, with its own puzzles?

How to make metaphysical restatements 145 One sense of “omnipotence” that can be applied in any historical or literary context would have us ask comparatively and admitting to all pros and cons, what states of affairs were YHWH assumed to be able to bring about that has the idea of maximal attached to it? Furthermore, what puzzles would the implied states of affairs generate that can be inferred as known in some way given how such states of affairs are either avoided or very particularly and eclectically (and vaguely) configured? A second sense of “omnipotence” of potential comparative interest would be to clarify what was assumed in a given world of the text by the idea of YHWH having maximal power in the sense that no other entity instantiated the property of being powerful in ways qualitatively and quantitatively more abundant. From this it seems that it need not at all be the case that YHWH, who was obviously assumed to be a maximally powerful being in the context of first-order religious language used to construct the concept of divine power in a given world of the text, has to be able to bring about any state of affairs. For omnipotence is not something existing in isolation but is supervened on by other metaphysical and moral divine attributes, both in biblical and philosophical theology. Interestingly, this also means it is not an objection if YHWH cannot be imagined to be bringing about something less powerful entities can, e.g. being infertile like Sarah. Here philosophical theologians often distinguish power from ability and agent-related ones at that. At this point, the discussion illustrating the practice of applying the experimental framework of a comparative analytic philosophical-theological approach to the OT and/or OT theology/OT scholarship will terminate. Traditionally it has been observed that the OT does not attend to the kind of metaphysical concepts stereotypes of certain views of the divine nature, attributes and relations in Christian theology, and trying to read the texts as though they did would be distorted. This has been taken to imply that the absence of such conceptions and interest in the associate conceptual clarification in the world of the text makes such interests altogether invalid for OT scholars focussed on their meaning. In the present discussion, several problems were noted with this line of reasoning. It included the covert comparative philosophical theology that made such rejections of philosophicaltheological questions seem devastating in the first place, but on the pain of rejecting its own conditions of possibility. Ultimately, a comparative philosophical-theology approach need not involve crude ahistorical eisegesis but can limit itself to contrasting and correcting errant philosophical assumptions of readers. Alternatively, it can pick any philosophical-theological platform for comparative interlocution as this chapter has done with hypothetical application scenarios involving metaphysical presuppositions, problems and perspectives associated with recent developments in the analytic Christian philosophical-theological tradition. It was demonstrated that doing so not only does not involve any of the fallacies associated with philosophical-theological interpretations but that a new discipline exclusively devoted to doing so is nothing more than a potentially informative extension of what is already happening and accepted on a small scale.

146  How to make metaphysical restatements

Bibliography Anderson, B.W. 1999. Contours of old testament theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Brower, J., 2009. Simplicity and aseity. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105–128. Brueggemann, W. 1997. Theology of the old testament, testimony, dispute, advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Childs, B.S. 1985. Old Testament theology in a canonical context. London: SCM Press. Craig, W.L. 2009. Divine eternity. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–165. Crenshaw, J.L. 2009. Sipping from the Cup of Wisdom. In P.K. Moser (ed.). Jesus and philosophy: New essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–62. Cupitt, D. 1980. Taking leave of God. London: SCM Press. Davidson, M. 2019. God and other necessary beings. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall ed.). Available from: [8 June 2019]. Deng, N. 2018. Eternity in Christian thought. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall ed.). Available from: [17 March 2019]. Eichrodt, W. 1961. Theology of the old testament. Vol. 1. Trans. J.A. Baker. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox. Eichrodt, W. 1967. Theology of the Old Testament. Vol 2. Trans. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. Flint, T. and Freddoso, A. 1983. Maximal Power. In A. Freddoso (ed.). The Existence and Nature God. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 81–113. Flint, T. and Rea, M. 2009. The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fohrer, G. 1972. History of Israelite religion. Trans. E. Green. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Fretheim, T.E. 1984. The suffering of God. An old testament perspective. OBT. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Goldingay, J.E. 2006. Old testament theology, II, Israel’s faith. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press; Milton Keynes: Paternoster. Hazony, Y. and Johnson, D. (eds.). 2018. The question of God’s perfection, Jewish and Christian essays on the God of the Bible and Talmud. Leiden: Brill. Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G.S. 2002. The divine attributes. Oxford: Blackwell. Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G.S. 2010. Omnipotence. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P.L. Quinn (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 243–250. House, P.R. 1998. Old Testament theology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press. Hudson, H. 2009. Omnipresence. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 199–216. Knierim, R.P. 1995. The task of old testament theology, substance, method, and cases. Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans. Köhler, L. 1957. Old testament theology. Philadelphia: Westminster. Leftow, B. 2005. Eternity and immutability. In W. Mann (ed.). The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of religion. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

How to make metaphysical restatements 147 Leftow, B. 2009. Omnipotence. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167–198. Leftow, B. 2010. Eternity. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P.L. Quinn (eds.). A Companion to philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Philosophy of Religion, 8. Oxford and New York: Blackwell, pp. 168–206. Leftow, B. 2016. Immutability. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). E.N. Zalta (ed.). Available from: [3 January 2019]. Melamed, Y.Y. (ed.). 2016. Eternity: A history. New York: Oxford University Press. Murphy, M.C. 2019a. Is an absolutely perfect being morally perfect? In P. Draper (ed.). Current controversies in philosophy of religion. New York: Routledge. Murphy, M.C. 2019b. Perfect goodness. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall ed.). Available from: [17 January 2019] Murphy, M.C. 2019c. The perfect goodness of God in the Hebrew Scriptures. In M.L. Peterson and R.J. Van Arragon (eds.). Contemporary debates in philosophy of religion. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Plantinga, A. 1980. Does God have a nature? Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. Preuss, H.D. 1995. Old testament theology. Vol. 1. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox. Preuss, H.D. 1996. Old testament theology. Vol. 2. Edinburgh: T & T Clark. Pruss, A.R. 2008. On two problems of divine simplicity. In J. Kvanvig (ed.). Oxford studies in philosophy of religion. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150–167. Pruss, A.R. 2013. Omnipresence, multilocation, the real presence and time travel. Journal of Analytic Theology, 1 (1), 60–72. Rad, G. von. 1962. Old testament theology. Vol. I. The theology of Israel’s historical traditions. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. Rad, G. von. 1965. Old testament theology. Vol. 2. The theology of Israel’s prophetic traditions. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. Robertson, T. and Atkins, P. 2018. Essential vs. Accidental properties. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [10 February 2019]. Rowley, H.H. 1956. The faith of Israel. Aspects of Old Testament thought. London: SCM Press. Schmid, K. 2019. A historical theology of the Hebrew Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Schmidt, W.H. 1983. The faith of the old testament: A history. Oxford: Blackwell. Shokhin, V.K. 2018. Philosophical theology, the canon and the variability. Saint Petersburg: Nestor-History. Smith, M. 2010. God in translation: Deities in cross – Cultural discourse in the Biblical world. Grand Rapids, MI: William, B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Stump, E. 2008. Presence and omnipresence. In P. Weithman (ed.). Liberal faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 59–82. Stump, E. 2010. Simplicity. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P.L. Quinn (eds.). A companion to philosophy of religion. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 270–277.

148  How to make metaphysical restatements Stump, E. 2011. Eternity, simplicity, and presence. In G.T. Doolan (ed.). The science of being and being, metaphysical investigations. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, pp. 243–263. Swinburne, R. 1977. The coherence of Theism. Clarendon: Oxford University Press. Swinburne, R. 2016. The coherence of theism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Taliaferro, C. & Meister, C. (eds.). 2010. The Cambridge companion to Christian philosophical theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Terrien, S. 1978. The elusive presence, towards a new Biblical theology. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Vallicella, W.F. 2019. Divine simplicity. In E.N. Zalta. (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [24 March 2019]. Van der Toorn, K. 1999. God 1. In K van der Toorn, B. Becking and P.W. van der Horst (eds.). Dictionary of deities and demons in the Bible. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill. Wainwright, W. 2010. Omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. In C. Taliaferro and C.V. Meister (eds.). The Cambridge companion to Christian philosophical theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 46–65. Waltke, B.K. 2011. An old testament theology. An exegetical, canonical, and thematic Approach. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Westermann, C. 1984. Genesis 1–11. Trans. J. Scullion. London: SPCK. Wierenga, E.R. 1989. The nature of God. An inquiry into the divine attributes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wierenga, E.R. 2009. Omniscience. In T.P. Flint and M.C. Rea (eds.). The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–144. Wierenga, E.R. 2010. Omnipresence. In C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P.L. Quinn (eds.). A companion to the philosophy of religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 258–262. Wierenga, E.R. 2018. Omniscience. In E.N. Zalta. (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). Available from: [29 October 2018]. Wolterstorff, N. 1991. Divine simplicity. In J. Tomberlin (ed.). Philosophical perspectives. Vol. 5. Philosophy of religion. Atascadero: Ridgeview, pp. 531–552. Zagzebski, L.T. 2007. Omniscience. In C. Meister and P. Copan (eds.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of religion. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 261–269. Zimmerli, W. 1978. Old testament theology in outline. Atlanta, GA: John Knox.

6 Philosophical theologies of the OT on the roads not taken

What shall we say of all these things? It’s hard to say. In Chapter 1 we began with a seemingly ridiculous notion part of a question asking about something called a philosophical theology of the OT. It was then demonstrated by way of sampling that OT scholars do not often refer explicitly to philosophical theology, but when they do, it tends to be opposed to varieties of biblical theology. Furthermore, such references tend to appear in the context of what is distortive in discussions of OT theology: e.g., inter alia, unhistorical varieties of allegorical exegesis now superseded by varieties of biblical criticism, wrongheaded past formats for OT theology based on systems ascribed to certain influential philosophers, the intrusive metaphysical assumptions it imports into modern day descriptive tasks aimed at offering a better understanding of the world of the text, and the discipline which OT scholars can refer to for more elaborate discussions of questions out of place in the study of the OT that went with dogmatic/ doctrinal and systematic theology when biblical theology became an independent discipline. The chapter ended by asking whether these explicit references by OT scholars to philosophical theology is all there is to it, what philosophical theology has actually been seen as and whether some other unconsidered data is available that might allow us to reconsider the unthinkable and seemingly misguided category mistake that a new discipline called a philosophical theology of the OT would seem to be. In Chapter 2 a brief historical overview was provided of what philosophical theology has been said to involve since the early days of Greek philosophy up to the present research still pursued in some departments of theology and philosophy. Written especially for OT scholars, the story was told in such a manner that it identified the major names and traditions popularly associated with the origins of certain philosophical-theological presuppositions, problems and perspectives, especially within the major Greek, Latin, German and English Western Christian traditions. This was done in tandem with brief references to the way the samples correlated with certain corresponding research contributions in the study of the OT itself. The chapter demonstrated that there is no one thing called philosophical theology and that a neglected variety thereof is concerned not so much with epistemic

150  Philosophical theologies of the OT justification and natural theology as something opposed to revealed theology but instead focussed on the clarification of metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories within specific religious traditions where some form of theism is present. From this chapter it became clear that much of what makes biblical theology theological had philosophical-theological origins without which it would lose its identity, not as biblical but as theological. In Chapter 3 the discussion turned ugly when evidence was provided proving that no matter how much OT theologians reject philosophicaltheological frameworks, for both more and less valid reasons, the secondorder discourses discipline itself is indelibly riddled with concepts, concerns and categories from the same metaphysical idiom. Beginning not as is traditional merely with the term “theology” the chapter showed that seemingly unphilosophical second-order jargon had a history that presupposed more metaphysical problems and perspectives than are readily admitted. Perhaps the most philosophical-theological of all was the way OT scholars still construct YHWH, not only as part of the biblical “concept” of God but as an entity with a divine nature and attributes and who is related to the world and things in the world (of the text). Not always in so many words, of course, for sometimes similar but alternative metaphysical language that has forgotten its origins in the history of philosophical theology have obscured this. Examples included discussions of the divine essence, character, person, being and its names, properties, features, qualities, characteristics, traits and so on. Also the philosophical-theological concepts concerned with divine relations were shown to have been transmuted into biblical-theological concepts like creation, revelation, providence, agency, relationships and in takenfor-granted philosophical-theological assumptions about the metaphorical nature of religious language. It was argued that in some cases, these three categories structure OT theologies explicitly, restated or rearranged, or minimally simply in the brief comparative philosophical restatements of the perceived implied meaning of first-order religious language descriptions of YHWH in the world of the text. In Chapter 4, instead of now arguing that all such philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories should be removed, the fact that they are already an acceptable part of historical research on the OT and utilised in the descriptive task in OT theology were taken in the opposite direction. Given what are currently only marginal comparative philosophical-theological comments and remarks, it was asked why the associated second-order metaphysical presuppositions, problems and perspectives cannot become the sole interest of a new discipline called a philosophical theology of the OT. Since most OT scholars operate on the assumption of their validity, irrespective of the merit of individual interpretations and applications, why not separate the present discussion from the debates in biblical and OT theology about its relations to philosophy. Is it not then possible to isolate, and relocate the same interest and make it the exclusive focus of a new, more in-depth and comprehensive approach within OT studies? For doing so would is

Philosophical theologies of the OT 151 something very different from the hermeneutically fallacious ways of involving philosophical-theological issues in metaphysical restatements of what is seen to be implicit in the OT on its own terms even if not in them. To this end, an inclusive neo-pragmatic metaphilosophical-theological theoretical framework was constructed to provide the warrant for an experimental design configuring one possible way of making such a move. There it was suggested that to provide the last convincing grounds to do so descriptive and historical approach will be adopted that will be limited to comparative philosophical-theological inquiries involving the contemporary analytic Christian philosophical-theological tradition as hypothetical interlocutor. In Chapter 5, the envisaged comparative conceptual clarification of associated analytic metaphysical themes was applied and illustrated within the parameters specified and with reference to some of the most elevant but also likely the most contested philosophical-theological concepts, concerns and categories. Here it was again shown that OT scholars, especially theologians but also historians of Israelite religions, specialists in comparative ancient Near Eastern religions and others (e.g. Hebrew linguists) not only already take interest in related issues but do so by opposing it even though it remains a condition of possibility for them to do so in the first place. Again the point was not that they are wrong about everything or should become philosophical theologians. Rather with reference to essentially contested second-order terms like divine existence, essence, immutability, aseity, presence, power and knowledge, it was shown that OT scholars not only do discuss these. Also, their stereotype of philosophical-theological views and their conflation of the metaphysical terms involved tend to obscure the alternatives they themselves suggest. It was then shown that every one of the supposedly problematic presuppositions, problems and perspectives can be adopted, adapted and applied if one wanted to and was willing to consider other possible interpretations of these. This was all based on different associated perspectives in contemporary analytic philosophical theology put up for comparative philosophical discussion as part of the hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the actual practice of the experimental format configured earlier. In this way, if nothing else, the variety, indelibility and possibility of philosophical-theological issues of interest one can engage with as OT scholars without either repeating exegetical fallacies of the past or replicating what OT theologians and philosophical theologians do were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Last but not least, doing so was not done in what was assumed to be a decisive and prescriptive format, so as to allow anyone interested whatever their metaphilosophical-theological views and commitments (or lack thereof) to join the fun, should they so wish, and without claiming that biblical theologians need to do so if they do not want. So far so good. The end result was not technically itself yet a philosophical theology of the OT in the sense of a comprehensive and systematic presentation as one might expect. More like a voice in the desert of the real, preparing the way for one to come. Hopefully at this point the announcement of

152  Philosophical theologies of the OT what seemed an impossible notion at the start now seems not only possible but palpable and for some, even preferable. It is certainly something different not only from what Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians, whether as theologians or philosophers, do. For a philosophical theology of the OT, at least in the format experimented with, was designed to render itself immune to all the traditional objections to philosophical perspective on the meaning of first-order religious language used to describe YHWH in the world of the text. This was done for the sake of the general idea and by adopting the following variables in its configuration:   1 It was not, as in the past, an apologetic attempt to harmonize OT theology with a philosophical system (e.g. Aristotelianism).   2 It was not, as in the past, about finding philosophical truths via allegory (as in non-historical modes of interpretation).   3 It was not, as in the past, an attempt to show why the OT is a relevant voice in the contemporary philosophical-theological debates.   4 It was not, as in the past, to present a systematic philosophical theology of the OT based on what might be inferred from its contents.   5 It was not, as in the past, about arguing that the OT contains philosophical theology not visible because of bias.   6 It was not, as in the past, an attempt to impose a philosophical grid onto the text with reference to which a theology of the OT can be structured.   7 It was not, as in the past, to contrast and oppose philosophical and OT theology to show how the latter is nevertheless as intellectually respectable as and something unrelated to the former.   8 It was not, as in the past, an attempt to show how all philosophical categories are distortive and a subsequent suggestion of how to purify OT theology therefrom.  9 It was not, as in the past, to criticize OT theologians based on their philosophical assumptions. 10 It was not, as in the past, an attempt to discuss the reception of the OT within philosophical theology. If these forms are what the experimental theoretical framework constructed with the aim of applying it to hypothetical scenarios already part of OT studies, are not, what is the one possible shape a philosophical theology of the OT of this type could take all about, in sum?   1 A philosophical theology of the OT can be a discipline for OT scholars in that it presupposes specialization in OT studies.   2 A philosophical theology of the OT can be distinguished from OT theology as a new discipline that supplements and interacts with rather than replaces or reforms it.   3 A philosophical theology of the OT can be a historical type of philosophical theology that is interested in the meaning of related ideas in the

Philosophical theologies of the OT 153 OT for their own sake and without being dependent on whether these are philosophically-theologically meritorious, relevant or in vogue.   4 A philosophical theology of the OT can take the format of comparative philosophy irrespective of what turns up in such an approach, and irrespective of what one thinks of the OT and the chosen philosophicaltheological framework offering the perspective of choice.  5 A philosophical theology of the OT involves what is already legitimated and practiced anomalously within OT theology but making such endeavours one’s sole focus.   6 A philosophical theology thus seeks to restate what the OT assumes, asserts or implies in relation to the capita selecta of the chosen philosophical-theological framework in the idiom of its metaphysical terms.   7 A philosophical theology as a form of biblical interpretation can choose to limit itself to the descriptive task and thus to conceptual clarification as opposed to propositional or epistemic justification.   8 A philosophical theology of this type can choose to do this with reference to its own exegesis of the religious language of the OT.   9 A philosophical theology of this type can also choose to offer a philosophical analysis of the language used by OT theologians in their discussions from the perspective of the selected philosophical-theological framework chosen for comparative purposes. 10 A philosophical theology of the OT can limit itself to the world of the text and further to comments on what the findings are with reference to specific texts. An experimental configuration of a philosophical theology of the OT of this type simply took what was already happening all over OT scholarship and positioned itself to where theoretical discussions in the field of biblical scholarship is now in relation to philosophical theology and suggested where they could be, if so desired. The way showed here, with reference to analytic Christian philosophical theology, adopted in comparative mode and applied for descriptive and historical purposes only, represents some samples of one journey that one can take if choosing to become a practitioner of the newly proposed discipline. Not only are others ways possible, I would hope alternative approaches, formats and even perspectives within the same analytic and/or comparative approach could come to the party. Why would anyone want to do so? Well why not? Bluntly, because nobody has, and research thinks kindly on novel cross-disciplinary inventions. But seriously, not because one has to, not because one has to, but as noted, and to appeal to the current paradigm’s general framework, to prevent philosophical-theological assumptions from running amok. As with linguistic, literary, historical, social-scientific and theological approaches, we need a philosophical-theological take on the OT precisely because it does not offer one and was not meant to. Note that what used to be an excuse to avoid or reject philosophical-theological concerns and concepts is here the primary

154  Philosophical theologies of the OT motivation, albeit not in the same old way that used to be the enemy. All of the relevant data, all the examples how to do so, all the warnings how not to, all this is implicit and freely available to any discerning eye within the writings of OT scholars. And perhaps one can admit at last that just as there is no such thing as the God of linguists, literary-critics, historians, social scientists or theologians, so the God of the Philosophers was itself a philosophical notion that OT scholars have stereotyped and need not fear at all. One can involve philosophical theology and metaphysical language with the same awareness of how it harms and helps as we already do with modern theories of Hebrew grammar, poetry, history, society and thought. Of course, my attempted justification of the idea of a new discipline called a philosophical theology of the OT may be considered by some as “trying too hard” (if not contradicting my open-ended neo-Pragmatist hermeneutics). That might very well be the case, but at least I think I have managed to use reason to make room for the faith of others in a similar project. What do I mean by this? Well, it does not have to be a philosophical theology of the OT, it could also be one of the HB. And it does not have to be analytic in the way described, it could be differently analytic (e.g. in the sense of philosophical or theological commitments) or even Continental, pragmatic, a particular view from the history of philosophical theology (e.g. Platonist, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Kantian, Hegelian) or even an overview of what a plurality of perspectives show and compare or adjudicate among these. One can do so, purely to see what turns up and admit to all pros and cons perceived to be involved. Alternatively, one could be more serious, polemical and apologetic or even atheological and critical about it, should one wish to do so. One can try to focus on the worlds behind or in front of the text, or ditch Ricoeur’s trichotomy altogether. One could focus on Western or Eastern philosophy, or world philosophy. On could offer a particular African, Asian or American comparative perspective or along more ideologicalcritical lines, e.g. from a feminist, critical-theorist, eco-theological, postmodern or any other cross-disciplinary and metaphilosophical-theological approach. One can choose to broaden one’s perspective to operate more closely connected to specific ideas in other types of biblical criticism, e.g. in conjunction with a particular topic or problem in linguistic, literary-critical, historical-critical, ideological-critical or reception-historical research. One can even choose to relate to philosophical theology done by philosophers or theologians as one wishes or as the context of employment would consider optimal. A philosophical theology of the OT can thus be thought of, with regard to possibilities for actualisation, to be as open as OT scholarship and philosophy themselves, and like its counterparts there, no one has to get involved or take note if they do not want. Whether or not one thinks they should, like everything else, in practice it will be only for those who find the form of inquiry interesting and meaningful, and only for as long as they do. And

Philosophical theologies of the OT 155 if one would otherwise like to participate but finds nothing that makes sense or seems worthwhile, why not invent new philosophical-theological approaches to the text. For I would like to believe that “philosophical” in philosophical theology can mean anything (not only metaphysics) and theological can either be theology as a faith-based enterprise or can be purely historical and descriptive and theological only in the sense of a philosophical take on the perceived meaning of religious language wherein the focus is on the divine by default. One can also choose to limit or expand the scope of the enquiry, involving anything from a philosophical-theological perspective on a word or a verse as one would do in exegetical research hoping to show alternative ways the object of analysis can be understood (or wrong ways it has been understood, as a result of philosophical-theological assumptions and metaphysical second-order language in second-order question framing and descriptive discourse or not). Or one can choose to involve the entire OT, be canonical and systematic in some sense or another, seek to relate parts to the whole and offer what many would think a philosophical theology of the OT would look like by analogy with a theology of the OT. Or one can go piece-meal and still do the entire OT, structuring one’s discussion either synchronically or diachronically, in tandem with the history of Israelite religion, sources and traditions in the OT, different theological perspectives in the canonical texts (whether seen as supplementary, complementary or contradictory) and so on. There could even be a commentary series called something along the lines of philosophical-theological commentary on the OT, where different scholars contribute to discussing different books or parts of books in the OT as in other commentary series. These could be ideologically and methodologically aligned as well, whether conservative, critical or otherwise so as to suggest the need for different series of philosophical-theological commentary. One can do so either with an exclusive focus on philosophical-theological issues, whether in first- or second-order discourse (or neither or both) or in tandem with or based on the findings in other methods in biblical scholarship, whether to be informed by these, or show how philosophical-theological considerations can contribute to them (or neither or both). Ultimately, the limits of what is possible and objections thereto will be dependent on what one is able to imagine, do and make of this and how others find it congenial to their own projects or not. All the potential is there, even if historically, the current paradigm’s assumptions still renders the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT of whatever form and done by OT scholars to be anomalous. If this study has contributed anything new, besides ideas, it is also hoped that it proved (whatever this is taken to mean) that the binary opposition between biblical and philosophical theology, though put up often for good reasons, is neither necessary nor stable as in many ways is already deconstructed on its own terms and conditions.

156  Philosophical theologies of the OT With no remaining absolutely devastating objections to a philosophical theology possible, a space has been created for it to be built from the ground up. This study has laid the foundations, which itself requires maintenance and is only the first building. Others can lay other foundations, or operate without them. In this sense, one could say I follow the philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, at least with reference to his idea that methodological anarchism is a good thing, very much in the way I used the ideas of Richard Rorty earlier. It might also be the case that my idealist frame of mind (in the psychological sense here) made me blind to many flaws in my own presenting of the case for a philosophical theology of the OT. I guess that beneath the surface I myself did operate rather more rigid. The reader will no doubt have picked up contradictions in my own reasoning also involving the very same clash of form and content I identified in the writings of others. I did, after all, operate on the same assumptions that made philosophical theology seem problematic and as something over and against philosophical theology in the first place. On these premises I then attempted to justify it in relation to these. I also purported simply to put ideas out there without assuming they are correct or that others are wrong, yet much of my reasoning depended on just that assumption. Furthermore, despite having the ideal of pure description and experimentation, even in the doing so prescriptive and applied (implicitly normative) statements were made. I chose the analytic tradition not only for comparative experimental purposes but also because it does allow one to focus on conceptual clarification in ways more congenial to descriptive and historical tasks in biblical scholarship. I also wanted it to be so received, i.e. with all the pros and cons associated with the analytic tradition, philosophical theology, philosophy, theology, metaphysics, OT theology and biblical interpretation that conceives of its task as primarily concerned with what it meant for its own sake. In times like these, some might observe a clash between the claim that all we have are our perspectives and the ideal of presenting one that in one way or another purports to be more accurate and warranted, even if only as inferable from the desire to avoid exegetical fallacies and read the text in context. Of course, this begs as many questions as it solves and some might call it naïve and ironic. I don’t think it is possible to write consistently about these matters. Not only because deconstruction is everywhere and nowhere but because either my own implied critique of others or others’ of me will always involve both the idea that what is said is a particular point of view among many and does so on the assumption that it is relatively more correct than whatever it opposes. It does not seem possible to avoid doing so, and I admit to all of this. Hopefully the reader can, without looking past any perceived problems, still see why the idea of a philosophical theology of the OT is not as absurd as prima facie appears to be the case – or does not have to be

Philosophical theologies of the OT 157 construed as such. Furthermore, hopefully I have managed to show that, on the assumption that mistakes were made, by myself and not only others, the merits of the proposal of there being a new discipline involving philosophical theology in one way or form or another as its exclusive focus is not, at least not wholly, dependent on my own case made in favour of the idea. If I did not succeed in laying the foundations, or announcing what is to come, perhaps I have incoherently dreamt it and this in itself can inspire others to dream further than I ever could. At least now we can do so more lucidly, and if others can come up with better ways to articulate what I tried to do – if they can see a point to doing so – I will surely welcome it. Without wanting to resort to clichés, I do believe this thing is bigger than me and my attempts to describe what I envision. If it turns out that others see the use of it, or alternatively, if it dies stillborn, I would still like to believe that the case made here for a philosophical theology of the OT was original in formulating the general idea, novel with regard to many specifics and as regards the merits of the case, should it not be taken up by others, as good as it gets. After all, biblical scholarship is about more than applying methods and offering new exegetical perspectives. At the other end of the known world in front of the text there are also those of us contributing by offering firstthoughts about new possible activities to keep ourselves busy until either disillusionment or retirement (or both). One may sneer at theoretical as opposed to applied work, but that is how every methodological innovation takes place that lies behind the exegetical nitty-gritty of its application. I suppose personality type also has a lot to do with it (e.g. some are better with imagining new ideas but not all that good at or interested in applying them or what is already out there). Speaking for myself (and an incoherent self at that) then, what else is there for innovations in research but to push the boundaries of how their discipline is defined (like artists) and imagining new ways, sure to be criticized but if nothing else, what some will consider a dead-end has now at least been repaved, remapped and reestablished as such? This then, is what I personally mean when talking about a philosophical theology of the OT in the form of an illustration of one hypothetical possible format. Of course, this does not that things cannot go badly wrong in the application either. It can and it has, and it will. If a particular philosophicaltheological framework only ends up leading to fallacies of presumption in question framing and analysis, this can also be the fault of the exegete and not necessarily be a flaw inherent to the new discipline or a given methodology adopted therein itself. So yes, philosophical-theological ideas may still be distortive, but no more inherently so than all second-order discourse which, when you come to think about it, is all we have. One cannot coherently state anything about the OT that does not involve a second-order construction. And one cannot compare one’s interpretation or second-order description with first-order religious language without what one says about

158  Philosophical theologies of the OT the latter turning out to be the former. Yet for die-hard biblical scholars who believe meaning can be had pure and simple if one gets it right (by implication, even if to be hermeneutically correct they would deny believing this) the new approach is in fact necessary. Precisely those wanting nothing to do with philosophical theology will be in danger of being oblivious to the philosophical-theological assumptions everywhere in their field that they cannot see because they deprive themselves of the desire to look, the opportunity to discern and the ability to understand. So what are the findings one can take home assuming for the sake of the argument that the perspectives offered have something to say that one would be willing to hear? Perhaps it is this, on the assumptions of the framework, it would seem that there are conditions of possibility for the world of the text – any of them – involving unwritten implicit ideas and related to what is called YHWH’s nature and attributes that can be restated in metaphysical concepts, concerns and categories in philosophical theology – that can contribute to a better understanding of why things are the way they are, or why they are at all. Just as linguistic, literary, historical, sociological and theological approaches to the text enrich our understanding of it – despite in retrospect usually always turning out to have been fallible – so too a philosophical-theological perspective can allow us to see more and better what the OT assumed about what we call the divine nature and attributes, on its own terms, even if not in them. And when looking at the initial proposal from this perspective, how is it still necessary, required or useful not to imagine a philosophical theology of the OT?

Index

Note: Figures are in italic; tables are in bold. 1 Kings (Book of) 114 2 Kings (Book of) 36 Abraham 12, 28, 67, 103 abstract objects 29, 62, 72, 118, 120 – 121 analytic philosophy 42, 124; of religion 19, 48 Anaximander 65 Anselm 27, 37, 108, 127, 130 – 131, 135 anthropomorphism 26, 41, 70, 76 – 79, 129, 140, 143 anthropopathism 78, 129 Aquinas, Thomas 9, 24, 37, 74, 103, 106, 108, 125, 139 Aristotelianism 108, 152 Aristotle 25, 27, 30, 37, 39, 49, 82 atemporalism 138 – 140 atheism 114 Athens 6, 13 Augustine 33 – 35, 60 Barr, James 1, 6 – 8, 11, 28 – 29, 44, 48, 50, 81 – 82 Barth, Karl 2 Baudrillard, J. 97 Baur, Ferdinand Christian 2, 38 “Being” 27 – 28, 77, 115 – 116, 127 biblical criticism 18, 33, 45, 92, 95, 97, 105, 149, 154 biblical scholars 6, 8, 18, 35, 45, 58, 95, 124, 149, 157 biblical scholarship 5, 14, 47, 153, 155 –1   57 biblical theology 2, 4 – 6, 10 – 13, 17, 28 – 29, 32, 34, 38 – 39, 42 – 48, 50, 56, 59, 65, 68, 75, 78, 84, 108, 116, 131 – 132, 139, 149 – 150

Biblical Theology movement 8 Boethius 36 – 37 Borges, J. L. 94, 96 – 97 Brueggemann, Walter 5, 8 – 9, 33, 69, 73, 77, 79, 116, 130, 137 Buber, Martin 9 canonical texts 7, 123, 155 capita selecta 14, 23, 113, 153 chauvinism 23, 103; normative 103 Christianity 3, 23 – 24, 32, 104 Christian theology 3, 10, 145 Church fathers 129 civil theology 33 Cleanthes 30 cognitive semantics 74 compatibilism 136 Continental philosophy 12, 42, 48, 74, 78, 102 Daniel (Book of) 129 deism 10; theistic 29; see also theism Deity, the 40, 66, 72, 94, 106, 132 – 133, 135, 143 Deleuze, G. 95 Derrida, J. 61, 74, 80 – 81, 88, 91 – 92 Descartes, R. 69 Dilthey 11 Divine, the 28 divine aseity 34, 121, 126 – 127 divine attributes/properties 14, 32, 70 – 71, 79, 101, 112, 117 – 118, 123, 125 – 126, 129 – 130, 142, 144 – 145; metaphysical 76, 100 divine immutability 15, 128 – 129 divine nature 2, 14 – 15, 27, 32, 40 – 41, 66 – 68, 71 – 72, 76, 79, 83, 88, 103,

160 Index 112 – 113, 117 – 118, 123 – 126, 130, 133, 145, 150, 158 divine power 68, 133, 143 – 145 divine revelation 2, 31, 34, 37, 47, 56, 121, 133, 136 divine simplicity 72, 121, 123 – 126 divinity 3, 27 – 31, 33, 60, 68 – 69, 77, 122, 131, 142 doctrinal theology 2, 6, 56, 71 dogmatic theology 2, 31, 39 dualism 11, 72 Empiricus, Sextus 33 English (language) 1, 6, 42, 44, 102, 116, 125, 149 English translations 1 Enlightenment 140 Epicureanism 31 Epicurus 24 essentialism 122 – 123; modal 118; origin 123; sortal 123 eternity 15, 48, 71, 137 – 141 Eurocentrism 24 existentialism 48 Exodus (Book of) 67 – 68, 115, 128, 137 Ezra 121 Feyerabend, Paul 156 Foucault, Michel 22 free will 128, 136, 137 – 138; of God 137 Freud, Sigmund 44 Gabler, Johann Philipp 2, 38, 49, 74 Gadamer 44 Genesis (Book of) 36, 67 – 68, 134 Gerstenberger, E. S. 7, 12, 33, 73 God 5 – 6, 9 – 14, 24 – 25, 28, 38 – 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 56, 60, 62 – 63, 67 – 69, 70 – 73, 75, 77, 79, 89, 93, 103, 107 – 108, 113 – 117, 122 – 123, 125 – 128, 130, 132 – 133, 137, 138, 142; of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 12, 28, 103; attributes of 11, 70, 75, 82; of the Bible 82; concept of 12, 14, 24, 27, 48 – 49, 61, 63, 76, 95, 103, 113, 126, 131, 150; existence of 24, 37, 44, 70, 113 – 114; free will of 136 – 137; of Israel 56, 141; idea of 30, 75; name of 60, 125, 150; nature of 4, 8, 11, 37, 44, 67, 70, 82; of the Old Testament 68, 113, 130; personal 34; of the Philosophers 12, 26, 28, 44, 154 – 155; relations of 82; see also Deity, the; Divine, the; divine

attributes/properties; divine nature; free will; Godhead; Jahweh; Yahweh; YHWH Godhead 68 gods 25 – 26, 29, 31, 33 – 34, 68, 72, 139 – 140 “god-talk” 32, 79 Graecisms 32, 81 Greek (language) 31, 72 Greek thought/thinking 1, 25, 26 – 29, 31, 39, 50, 62, 73, 81, 83, 116, 129 Guattari, F. 95 Hebrew (language) 46, 57, 115, 128, 154 Hebrew Bible (HB) 3, 12, 18, 45 – 46, 50, 154 Hebrew/Hebraic thought/thinking 8, 25 – 26, 28, 31, 43, 50, 62, 81, 96, 119, 138 Hegel, G. W. F. 2, 11, 36, 38 – 41, 91, 108, 115, 139, 154 Herder 11 Hesiod 36 historicism 10 history 10 – 11, 16, 22, 26, 29, 31 – 32, 42 – 44, 50 – 51, 60, 66 – 67, 74, 81, 113 – 114, 141 – 142, 154; biblical-theological 24; of Christian theology 10; of descriptions of YHWH 14, 41; of ideas 23, 154; of Israelite religion 36, 39, 41, 50, 57, 72, 78, 104, 115, 122 – 123, 155; metaphysics of 10; of metaphysics 118, 151; of OT/HB interpretation 12 – 13, 36, 38 – 40, 90, 95, 138, 150; of philosophical theology 10, 104, 149 – 150, 156; of philosophy 18, 34, 70, 122; religious 11, 100, 123; salvation 11; secular 11; of systematic theology 10; of text 96 Homer 36 Hume, David 38, 44, 69, 118 idealism 10, 40 – 41, 79, 83; German 3 incarnation 41, 79 incommensurability 19, 23, 104 Isaac 12, 28, 103 Isaiah (Book of) 26, 134 Israel 7, 56, 61, 68, 75, 114, 137, 141 Israelite religion 40, 50, 73, 151; history of 36, 39, 41, 51, 57, 72, 78, 104, 115, 123, 155 Israelites 39, 56, 76

Index  161 Jacob 12, 28, 103 Jahweh 62, 65 – 66, 114, 128, 134 Jeremiah (Book of) 114 Jerusalem 6, 13 Job 9, 114 Job (Book of) 9, 67, 114, 134 Jonah (Book of) 67 Judaism 41, 77 Kant, Immanuel 3, 30, 38 – 41, 44, 60, 62, 69, 83, 91, 93, 103, 108, 118, 154 Latin (language) 31 – 32, 72, 149 Latinisms 32, 81 Leibniz 11 Lessing 3 less-than-perfect-being theologies 76 linguistic perspective 94 linguistic turn 42 literary-critical perspective 14, 31, 84, 93, 115, 139, 142, 154, 154 logos 28, 31 Luther 30, 38 MacFague 74 Maimonides 139 Marheineke, Philipp Konrad 2 Marx 44 medieval period 27, 31 – 32, 34, 37, 48, 125, 130; see also Middle Ages mereology 27, 34, 120, 134, 138 metaphysics 14, 28 – 30, 32, 39, 41, 49, 61, 63, 65 – 66, 70, 73, 75, 78 – 79, 88 – 90, 100 – 102, 106 – 108, 118, 124, 128, 134 – 135, 144, 154, 155, 156; analytic 44, 62, 120, 138; applied 100; Aristotelian 108; existentialist 144; folk- 81; historicist 11; history of 118; inexact 135; modal 44, 117; personalist 144; of philosophical theology 70; Platonist 72; process 36, 144; see also New Metaphysics Middle Ages 23 – 24, 32 Milesian cosmologists 27 monotheism 73, 127, 133 Moses 125 mythical theology 7 natural theology 2, 23, 28, 34, 37, 43 – 44, 47 – 51, 56, 106, 150 Near Eastern religion 50, 104, 151 Nehemiah (Book of) 121 neo-Platonism 28, 125

New Metaphysics 101 New Testament scholar 9 New Testament theology 6, 50 Nietzsche, Friedrich 22 – 23, 38, 60, 94, 96 nihilism 44, 83, 94 Old Testament (OT): authors of 75, 113; ethics 29, 40, 72, 126; God in 60 – 61; hermeneutics 39; interpretation 2, 12, 18, 25, 38, 40, 95, 138; perspectives on YHWH 17, 19, 32, 66, 72 – 73, 76, 88, 93 – 95, 139; religious language of 8, 10, 17, 32, 35, 45, 56 – 59, 61 – 63, 65, 74, 82 – 83, 88, 97 – 99, 101, 115, 125, 153; scholarship 9, 14 – 16, 19, 25, 30, 36, 42, 45, 47, 57 – 58, 60, 81, 84, 89, 101, 102, 105, 113, 117, 119, 132, 134 – 135, 137 – 140, 145, 153, 154, 155; studies 12, 50, 133, 150, 152; texts 3, 14, 18 – 19, 28, 45, 58 – 59, 106, 108, 120, 123, 129 – 131, 135, 137 – 138, 142 – 143, 155; see also Old Testament (OT) scholars; Old Testament (OT) theologians; Old Testament (OT) theology; philosophical theology of the Old Testament (OT) Old Testament (OT) scholars 1 – 2, 5, 11 – 14, 16 – 17, 19, 24 – 26, 29 – 31, 33 – 37, 39 – 43, 45 – 51, 57 – 60, 62, 68 – 69, 72, 74, 83, 88, 90, 93, 95 – 96, 98, 102, 109, 112, 115, 117, 120, 123 – 126, 128, 131 – 133, 138, 141, 145, 149 – 152, 155, 156 Old Testament (OT) theologians 1 – 2, 6, 8, 10 – 12, 16, 23 – 34, 38 – 41, 43 – 45, 56 – 57, 59, 61, 63, 66, 68 – 69, 71 – 74, 76, 79, 82 – 83, 88 – 90, 92 – 93, 102, 107 – 109, 112 – 117, 119 – 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 133 – 134, 141 – 142, 150 – 153 Old Testament (OT) theology 3, 5 – 18, 23, 25, 28 – 30, 33 – 38, 40, 43 – 45, 48, 51, 56, 59 – 60, 62, 70 – 72, 74, 78 – 81, 83 – 84, 88 – 89, 92, 95, 97, 99 – 100, 103 – 105, 107 – 109, 112, 116, 119, 124 – 125, 134 – 135, 137 – 138, 141, 143 – 144, 149 – 150, 152 – 154, 156; history of 13; the sociological turn in 5 omnipotence 15, 48, 75 – 76, 128 – 129, 133, 142 – 144

162 Index omnipresence 15, 48, 75 – 76, 79, 131 – 133 omniscience 15, 48, 76, 79, 133 – 137 One, the 34 “oneness” 133 ontology 49, 61, 71, 73, 75, 79, 116, 119, 122, 126, 133 Parmenides 27 – 28, 92 pataphysics 79 perennialism 23, 104 perfect-being theology 27, 34, 48, 72, 76, 126, 128 – 130, 132 personalism 48 phenomenology 48, 74 Philo 129 Philosophers 12, 26, 28, 44, 154 – 155 philosophers of religion 44 – 45, 108 philosophical perspective 18, 32, 47, 83, 92, 94, 108, 136, 152 philosophical theologians 7 – 8, 12 – 13, 26, 28, 32, 34, 39, 42, 44 – 46, 56 – 57, 70, 72, 83, 90, 92, 98, 104, 107 – 108, 112 – 113, 120, 123, 126, 133, 134 – 135, 145, 151 – 152 philosophical theology: analytic 15, 101 – 102, 117, 126, 138, 151; ancient 25, 27, 30 – 31, 34, 48, 124; Christian 25, 44, 48, 50, 57, 60, 72, 103, 108, 112 – 113, 134, 153; comparative 16, 49, 65, 75, 81 – 82, 98 – 99, 102 – 105, 109, 115 – 116, 131, 139, 143 – 144; contemporary 48, 57, 70; Continental 8, 12, 38, 43 – 45, 49 – 50, 154; descriptive 98, 105; early modern 48; experimental 100, 101, 106; Greek 28, 30, 48, 77; history of 104, 150, 154; Jewish 9, 57, 108; Kantian 40; Latin 31; medieval 48; of narrativity 4; Pietistic 38; revisionary and constructive 46; stereotypes of 49; Stoic 31; story of 23; types of 98 – 100; Western 11 – 12; Western Christian 23; see also philosophical theology of the Old Testament (OT) philosophical theology of the Old Testament (OT) 13 – 18, 22, 47, 51, 58 – 59, 79, 83 – 84, 88 – 90, 92 – 94, 97 – 101, 105 – 107, 109, 131, 143, 149 – 150, 152 – 153, 155 – 158 philosophical-theological perspective 9, 13, 19, 46, 58, 65, 76, 89, 95,

99 – 100, 107 – 108, 114, 119, 124, 129, 132, 134, 137, 155, 158 philosophy: Alexandrian 77; comparative 49, 103 – 105, 153; German idealist 1; Greek 24, 149; Hellenistic 30, 79; history of 18, 34, 70, 122; meta- 90; of mind 49; of religion 6, 10, 23 – 25, 28, 34, 38 – 39, 43 – 44, 48 – 49, 50, 100; and theology 28, 39, 47, 49, 81, 90, 102, 149; Western 62, 73; world 154; see also analytic philosophy; Continental philosophy; social philosophy Plato 24, 29 – 30, 36 – 37, 60, 91, 97, 108, 126, 154 Platonism 7, 30, 72 – 73, 121; see also neo-Platonism Plotinus 28, 34, 125 poetical theology 33, 35 Pontifex, Quintus Mucius Scaevola 33 popular religion 7 positivism 83 pragmatism 48 Presocratics 25 – 26 process theology 48 Proclus 36 Protestantism 32 Protestant Reformation 38, 139 Psalms 8, 39, 78, 114, 121, 129, 134 psychological perspective 94 Pythagoras 36 Qoheleth 7 Reformation see Protestant Reformation religious-historical perspective 93 religious language: first-order 5, 14 – 16, 23, 26, 32, 34 – 35, 39 – 40, 43, 58 – 59, 62, 65, 72 – 74, 79, 92 – 93, 95, 103, 106, 113, 115, 119, 122 – 124, 128 – 129, 131 – 134, 139, 140 – 141, 144, 150, 152, 157; second-order 72 – 73, 93, 106, 120, 124; third-order 92 Ricoeur 12, 44, 74, 96, 154 Roman thought 25, 31 Rorty, Richard 42, 88, 91 – 93, 156 Rousseau 97 Russell 118 scepticism 23, 44, 114 Sceptics 33

Index  163 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 1, 40 – 41 Scripture 2, 4, 10, 32, 36 –  3 8, 47 – 48, 129 Semler 3 social philosophy 5 – 7 social-scientific perspective 14, 39, 47, 56, 84, 94, 105, 115, 155 Socrates 29, 126 Solomon, Wisdom of 7 Soskice 74 Spinoza 3, 11, 38 Stoicism 7 Stoics 24, 30 – 31 structuralism 94, 100 systematic theologians 9, 108 systematic theology 9 – 11, 33, 38, 73 – 74, 149 teleology 31 temporalism 141; see also atemporalism Tennant, Frederick Robert 42 theism 29, 31, 33, 126, 130, 140, 150; Christian 27, 34; Western 24; see also atheism theodicy 29, 80 theogony 127 theological perspective 94 theological pluralism 36, 76, 123, 143; metaphilosophical- 15 theology: see biblical theology; Christian theology; civil theology; doctrinal theology; dogmatic theology; mythical theology; natural theology; New Testament theology; Old Testament theology; perfectbeing theology; philosophical theology; philosophical theology of the Old Testament (OT); poetical theology; systematic theology theriomorphism 26 Thomism 48 Tillich, Paul 12 Trinity, the 41, 72 Troeltsch 11

Varro, Marcus Terentius 33 Vatke, Johann Karl Wilhelm 1 – 2, 7 von Ammon 3 – 4 Whitehead 115 wisdom 28, 31, 63 – 64, 67, 77, 91, 134 Wittgenstein 48 Xenophanes 26 – 27 Yahweh 8, 67, 69, 115, 122, 137, 140; see also YHWH Yahwism 40, 45, 104 YHWH: attributes of 41, 80, 92, 97, 101, 108, 123, 158; belief in 26 – 27, 113; character of 13, 118; constructions of 18, 31, 69 – 70, 81, 92, 99, 103, 107, 118 – 119, 123, 142, 150; depictions of 3, 36, 39, 47, 59, 125 – 126, 135; descriptions of 3, 5, 14, 23, 26, 32, 43, 58, 68, 95, 103, 106 – 107, 113, 115 – 117, 124, 131, 138 – 139, 150, 152; divine attributes of 123 – 125; divine nature of 15, 41, 126; existence of 78, 113 – 120, 121 – 122, 126, 127, 140 – 141; freedom of 136 – 137; ideas about 72, 105; identity of 72; immutability of 129 – 130; knowledge of 133 – 135; morality of 126; name of 67, 72, 133; nature of 26, 33, 39, 72 – 73, 76, 80, 92, 97, 101, 108, 113, 115 – 118, 121 – 122, 126, 138, 142, 158; omniscience of 76, 134; OT perspectives on 17, 19, 66, 93 – 95; personal identity of 99, 123; philosophical-theological perspective on 108; power of 75, 141 – 143; properties of 71, 74, 117, 120, 126, 130; relations of 71 – 72, 74, 80, 92, 120, 137 – 138, 140; religious language about 99, 120; representations of 40, 68, 128, 139; and time 137, 141