A Pacific Industry: The History of Pineapple Canning in Hawaii 9780755698400, 9781848855960

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List of Figures

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LIST OF FIGURES

Frontispiece Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Packers Advertisement Production of Hawaiian Canned Pineapple and Figure 2.1 Californian Cling Peaches, 1901–14 Figure 3.1 Average Annual Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Pineapple Per Dozen No.2½ Cans, f.ob. California, 1913–20 Net Profit on Sales at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Figure 3.2 1907–30 Figure 3.3 Net Profit on Sales at the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd., 1910–34 Monthly Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Canned Figure 3.4 Pineapple and Californian Canned Cling Peaches Per Dozen No.2½ Cans f.o.b California, 1921–30 Annual Apparent Per Capita Civilian Consumption of Figure 3.5 Canned Fruit, 1909–41 Figure 4.1 Monthly Wholesale Price of Hawiian Canned Pineapple and Californian Cling Peaches Per Dozen No.2½ Cans f.o.b. California, 1931–41 Import Penetration of the American Canned Figure 4.2 Pineapple Market, 1924–41 Figure 4.3 Percentage Distribution of the Total Pack of Canned Pineapple by PPCA Members, 1926–40 Hawiian Pineapple Co.’s Output of Canned Figure 4.4 Pineapple, 1926–40

ii 40 44

49 50 51

52 74

81 84 85

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Figure 4.5 Annual Production of Canned Hawaiian Pineapple and American Grapefruit Juice, 1933–41 Figure 4.6 Net Operating Profits of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 1925–42 Figure 4.7 Monthly Retail Prices of No.2½ Cans of Pineapples and Peaches, 1934–41 Figure 5.1 Annual Budget of the Pineapple Experiment Station, 1924–38 Figure 5.2 The Lewis Peeler Figure 5.3 The Zastrow Machine Figure 5.4 The Ginaca Machine Figure 6.1 The Maui Pineapple Co. and Haiku Co.’s Relative Share of the Maui Canned Pineapple Pack, 1910–15 Figure 6.2 Pineapple Purchased from Outside Growers by the Pearl City Fruit Co., 1908–26 Figure 8.1 Philpak and Calpak-Hawaii’s Canned Pineapple Output, 1930–40

88 95 96 103 108 109 110 134 135 170

List of Figures

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7 Table 6.8 Table 7.1

Table 8.1

Cost of Operating the PPCA, 1934–38 Land Under Pineapple Cultivation in Hawaii, 1908 Land Owned or Leased by Hawwiian Pineapple Canners, 1920 Area and Approximate Value of Land Under Pineapple Cultivation in 1929 Cultivated Pineapple Land in Hawaii, 1931 Cultivated Pineapple Land in Hawaii, 1936 Pineapple Lands Owned or Leased by Hawaiian Pineapple Canners in 1921 and 1936 Ethnic Distribution of Hawaiian Pineapple Growers, 1920 Pineapple Harvested on HHC Molokai Project, 1929– 40 Comparison of Costs Between Hawaiian Pineapple Canning Industry and Californian Peach Canning Industry, 1934 Exports of Canned Pineapple from the Philippines, 1930–40

86 117 118 119 120 121 123 133 141 158

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AH BMA/THD&CP CFC CT DCAH DB DU/CSAMH EMBCDFN FEER f.o.b HA HJH HSB LM&LAC ML&PCA NYT NA PCA PGAHA PoP SFC

State Archives of Hawai’i Bishop Museum Archives, Theo. H. Davies Papers Commercial & Financial Chronicle The Trade/Canning Trade Dole Corporate Archive, Honolulu* Daily Bulletin (Honolulu) Duke University, John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising & Marketing History Empire Marketing Board Canned and Dried Fruit Notes Far Eastern Economic Review free on board Honolulu Advertiser Hawaiian Journal of History Honolulu Star-Bulletin Libby, McNeill & Libby Archive, Chicago Maui Land & Pineapple Co. Archive New York Times National Archives of the United States Pacific Commercial Advertiser Pineapple Growers’ Association of Hawaii Archive Paradise of the Pacific San Francisco Chronicle

List of Abbreviations TNA UH, DCA UK WCP

xi

United Kingdom National Archives University of Hawaii, Dole Corporate Archive United Kingdom Western Canner and Packer

* Most, but not all, of the corporate records that I used in 1984 have been donated to the University of Hawaii at Manoa

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is derived from my London School of Economics (LSE) doctoral thesis on ‘Economic Diversification in the American Pacific Territory of Hawai’i, 1893–1941’. It was inspired by the popular American TV series of the 1960s and 1970s, Hawaii Five-O. As I discovered during my fieldtrip in 1984, the ‘uniquely multiethnic, harmonious and tolerant’1 society suggested by the TV series was unrealistic. I would like to thank Professor Ed Beechert, formerly Professor of History at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, for his invaluable assistance with my research. It was he who introduced me to the late Colin Cameron, owner of the Maui Land & Pineapple Co. Cameron had a great interest in pineapple history and opened many doors to me that would otherwise have remained closed. In London my research was greatly assisted by John Pinfold, a former United States Government Publications Librarian at the British Library of Political Science and Economics. My doctorate was successfully completed in 1986. I would like to thank Lord Meghnad Desai, Professor of Economics at the LSE, for making that possible. My Ph.D. supervisor, Jim Potter, felt that my research could be taken much further. This book suggests that Mr. Potter was correct. The evolution of the internet during the last twenty-five years has transformed our ability to research and many historical resources can now be accessed in a way that was not possible when I started researching the Hawaiian pineapple industry in 1981. I am grateful to my former colleague, Professor Mark Phythian, formerly Director of the University of Wolverhampton History and Governance Research Institute, for providing the opportunity to complete this project. I would also like to thank the editors of Business History, the Maryland Historian, the Hawaiian Journal of History, the Journal of Macromarketing and South Pacific: Journal of Philosophy and Culture for allowing me to use material originally published as articles in their journals.

Acknowledgements

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The original doctoral research was partly funded by the Social Science Research Council. My fieldtrip to Hawaii was funded by the University of London Central Research Fund. Another fieldtrip to Hawaii was funded by the University of Wolverhampton History and Governance Institute.

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Introduction

1

INTRODUCTION

The Hawaiian Islands have entered the American popular imagination as a ‘paradise’. This is no accident, as Paul F. Hooper has shown, the business leaders of Hawaii have worked hard to create this image.1 The reality of the Islands has often been far from idyllic. The absence of written records from prehistoric Hawaii makes it difficult to reach a definitive view of the nature of the economic and social conditions before the rediscovery of the Islands by Captain James Cook in 1778. The arrival of Cook revolutionized the world of the indigenous Polynesian Hawaiians. There is no doubt that the period after 1778 was a time of great tragedy as the impact of Western diseases and ideas exacted a heavy toll on the native Hawaiian people.2  Historian David E. Stannard has referred to the post-1778 period as ‘the Horror’. However, Stannard’s estimate of the population of Hawaii in 1778 at around 800,000 is not supported by the archaeological evidence. Archaeologist Tom Dye’s estimate of a population in 1778 between 110,000 and 150,000 appears to be more credible. Nonetheless there was still a significant decline in population: a hundred years later the population of Hawaii was recorded in a census as less than 58,000.3 As this horrific demographic collapse was taking place, Hawaii experienced the arrival of Western missionaries and traders in the early nineteenth century. The Islands began their transition from a subsistence to a market economy. The surviving Hawaiians, especially the monarchy and aristocracy, fell increasingly under the influence of the white Caucasian missionaries and traders. In the mid-nineteenth century the monarchy was persuaded to introduce a Western style Land Reform: the alienation of land held in common to individual ownership. This was an essential prerequisite for the development of plantation agriculture by the white Caucasian community. The discovery that Hawaii was suitable for the cultivation of sugar cane resulted in a large expansion of the plantation sector. The

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wealth generated from sugar cane exports led to increasing economic and political power for the white Caucasian community. In 1874 American sugar interests linked to the sugar factor, C. Brewer & Co., helped rig the election of the pro-American David Kalakaua as King of Hawaii instead of Queen Emma, the leader of a ‘Hawaii for the Hawaiians’ movement. Once in power, Kalakaua’s American allies persuaded him to agree to a Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. Signed in 1875, this treaty allowed the dutyfree entry of Hawaiian sugar cane into the United States in return for the American Navy’s exclusive use of Pearl Harbour.4 The treaty led to a further expansion of the plantation sector through to the end of the 1880s. However, the plantation owners encountered a serious problem in sustaining this expansion. Although the acquisition of land after the Land Reform was relatively easy, this was not the case with respect to the recruitment of labour. As has been shown above the native Hawaiian population fell by as much as 80 per cent between 1778 and 1878. Even including part-Hawaiians, it continued to fall until the early twentieth century. Furthermore, native Hawaiians were not enthusiastic plantation labourers. So the plantation owners persuaded the Hawaiian monarchy to allow them to recruit Asian contract workers. As Ronald Takaki has shown, for these workers the Islands were no more a ‘paradise’ than for most native Hawaiians after 1778.5 In the late 1880s and early 1890s the Hawaiian monarchy tried to reduce the stranglehold of the plantation owners over the Hawaiian economy. In 1893 Hawaiians controlled only 15 per cent of the Kingdom’s land and two per cent of invested capital. Americans and other white Caucasians controlled the rest. However, in 1893 the Hawaiian monarchy was overthrown by part of the white Caucasian community with the assistance of a detachment of US marines acting without the authorization of the American government. After an interregnum from 1894 to 1898 when the Islands were governed as the ‘Republic of Hawaii’, they were annexed by the United States in 1898 and incorporated as an US Territory in 1900.6 The annexation of Hawaii had been a long term goal of part of the white Caucasian community. It was opposed by a majority of the native Hawaiians.7 After 1900 the Hawaiian Islands resembled in many ways a European colonial possession, although the word, ‘colony’, was never used by either the federal or territorial government. However, after the Second World War the federal government accepted the designation of Hawaii as a ‘non-self-governing territory’ under article 73e of the United Nations Charter. By this the federal government explicitly recognized Hawaii’s status was similar to the European colonies that were also designated non-self-governing territories.8

Introduction

3

From 1900 to 1941 the Hawaiian business environment was dominated by five sugar factors commonly known as the ‘Big Five’. The members of this group were Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., Hackfeld & Co., Ltd. (later to become American Factors, Ltd.), C. Brewer & Co., Ltd., Castle & Cooke, Ltd. and Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd. These companies controlled the sugar industry of Hawaii and acted in the capacity of factors or agents for the sugar plantations. Each factor had a list of plantations for which it acted and in which it had shareholdings. The factors furnished financial resources for the extended plantation work. There was another important group outside the ‘Big Five’ closely connected with these five companies. This was the Dillingham group which controlled the railroads of Hawaii. By the 1930s, the ‘Big Five’ had become unified and interlocked to an unusual degree through intermarriage and interlocking directorships so that the Hawaiian economy was largely under the control of this business oligarchy.9 This group of businessmen had a rather ambivalent attitude towards the rise of the pineapple canning industry. One of their principal objectives at all times was to prevent the emergence of groups which might challenge their economic hegemony over Hawaii. However, at some of these businessmen were involved in the formation of the pineapple canning industry.10 Nonetheless most of the businessmen involved in the sugar industry neither anticipated nor desired the development of a commercial pineapple canning industry. They appear to have supported fruit cultivation in an attempt to increase the white population of the Islands to compensate for the curtailment of the immigration of Asian sugar plantation workers by the federal government after the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. They promoted the immigration of white homesteaders who were to engage in small-scale cultivation and also of particular importance to the businessmen, to provide a pool of under-employed labour.11 However, the pineapple industry failed to develop in the way some of the sugar planters had anticipated. Although the first pineapple canning companies were indeed small, by the First World War the industry had become concentrated and dominated by just three companies. These companies relied on the plantation mode of production which required Asian immigrant wage labour in competition with the sugar industry.12 The pineapple industry appears to fit the hypothesis developed by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. in Scale and Scope.13 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the first pineapple company to build an organization which could fully exploit the pineapple canning industry’s economies of scale and scope. Hence it can clearly be considered to be a ‘first-mover’. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was soon joined by two first-movers in the Californian fruit canning industry

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the California Fruit Canner’s Association (CFCA) and Libby, McNeill & Libby. William Lazonick has observed that Chandler’s formulation of the source of first-mover advantage suggests that skills and knowledge are only of importance for the exploitation of the factors of production. Lazonick believes skills and knowledge are also important for the development of the factors of production in innovative enterprises. His theory of innovative enterprise focuses on how the structure of strategic control mobilizes the collective power of the skills and efforts of participants in the enterprise’s specialized division of labour to transform technological and market conditions.14 The success of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry was derived from its transformation of both technological and market conditions. In the case of the latter, it fits the model developed by Richard S. Tedlow in New and Improved.15 The Hawaiian canned pineapple industry would not have succeeded without its development of a mass market for its products in the continental US. The emergence of large companies in the industry with close ties with business interests outside Hawaii, especially in California, had not been foreseen by the sugar planters. While it is true that three of the Big Five were involved in the industry from a very early stage in its development as was also indirectly the case with the Dillingham group, it would also appear to be the case that the former were unhappy about the speed and scale at which it developed. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the pineapple industry had become a competitor with them for two of Hawaii’s scarce resources, labour and land.16 This rivalry was not resolved decisively until the early 1930s when the near bankruptcy of the first-mover, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., allowed Castle & Cooke to take control of it, thus giving the sugar planters’ control over more than half of the industry. Ironically the pineapple canning industry provided three of the Big Five, and in particular Castle & Cooke and Alexander & Baldwin, a means of diversification during the Great Depression. Pineapple canning was a more profitable business in the 1930s that the production of sugar cane and its level of production was not limited by the federal government.17 This study traces the development of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry during the period 1882 to 1941. It explains how pineapple canning became Hawaii’s second most important export industry after sugar cane. This is the first major scholarly study of the history of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry.

The Early Years

5

1 THE EARLY YEARS 1882–1898

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of political turmoil in the Hawaiian Islands. Throughout this period the Islands were within the United States’ economic sphere of influence. Its economy was dominated by sugar cane monoculture, the growth of which had been assisted by the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 which allowed the Hawaiian Islands to export raw sugar cane duty-free to the United States from 9 September 1876. However, Hawaii’s relationship with the United States was also an unequal one. The treaty did not permit Hawaii to export other products duty-free to the United States and this retarded the development of a more diversified agriculture. Both native Hawaiian nationalists and the mainly white American sugar planters were in favour of a more diversified agriculture albeit for different reasons. The Hawaiian nationalists such as George Washington Pilipo wished to reduce the dominance of the sugar planters while the planters and their allies such as Lorrin A. Thurston wanted to use diversified agriculture to promote the colonization of the Islands by small white American farmers. One of Thurston’s associates, Sereno E. Bishop, believed there was room for half a million American settlers.1 This chapter looks at the attempts made to develop a pineapple canning industry in Hawaii to further agricultural diversification during the period 1882 to 1898. During this period experiments were made with a variety of crops none of which proved to be a commercial success. One of these crops was the pineapple. The main problem with the pineapple was that in the absence of modern refrigerated shipping there was a high spoilage rate. This meant pineapples could only be shipped relatively short distances to their markets. At this time the main East Coast markets in the United States were supplied from the Bahamas and the British, German and Austrian markets were beginning to be supplied from the Azores, Portugal. The high spoilage rate

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experienced with the shipment of pineapple had led to the development of a pineapple canning industry in Baltimore, and later the Bahamas in the 1870s to supply the US East Coast, and in British Malaya in the 1880s to supply Britain.2 The pineapple is not an indigenous Hawaiian plant. It is believed to have originated in South and Central America. The first record of pineapples in the Hawaiian Islands is found in the journal of Don Francisco de Paula y Marin for the year 1813. It is not clear how they were introduced to the Islands. Pineapples appear to have been cultivated in small numbers during the first half of the nineteenth century. For example, when Commodore Charles Wilkes visited the Islands in 1840, as part of the United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-42, he reported pineapples were being cultivated near Kealakekua Bay, on the Island of Hawaii. Pineapples were exported to California during the ‘Gold Rush’ period of 1849-51. There are no surviving records of pineapple cultivation between 1856 and 1882. Pineapple cultivation in the Islands was revived in the early 1880s.3 Early attempts to export pineapples from Hawaii to the United States were largely unsuccessful. If Bahamian pineapple growers experienced considerable spoilage in transporting pineapples some 1,200 miles by sea to Baltimore in the late nineteenth century,4 the challenge facing the Hawaiian growers was even greater, because the nearest American port, San Francisco, is 2,100 nautical miles from Honolulu.5 Furthermore the pineapple, unlike the banana, does not become any sweeter if it is shipped green. Hence canned pineapple is likely to be sweeter than fresh fruit that is shipped before it is ripe.6 Canning appeared to offer a way of overcoming the problem of transporting fresh pineapples. The belief that the canning process might provide the answer to the problem of shipping pineapples to the United States can be traced back to the early 1880s. During the summer of 1882 an American and a German immigrant founded the Kona Fruit Preserving Co., the first pineapple canning company in Hawaii. John Douglas Ackerman and Waldemar Muller had built a pineapple cannery at Kaawalo, North Kona on the Island of Hawaii. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser observed in July that their product: ...we found to be of excellent flavor, and the slices were firm and of a good bright color…Nicely got up, with a handsome label, and packed in neat boxes, these canned pineapples are sure to take a first place in any market that may be chosen for them, and a constant and increasing demand for them secured. Everyone must wish success to

The Early Years

7

Messrs. Ackerman and Muller in this endeavor to turn to account one of the neglected resources of the country.7 The Daily Bulletin also sampled the product and found it to be ‘excellent.’ It also noted that George Washington Pilipo, the Representative for North Kona in the Kingdom’s Legislature, had sponsored a bill which would give the Minister of the Interior the authority to subsidize individuals and corporations in the establishment of factories for the preservation and preparation of fruits for export.8 Pilipo, known as the ‘Lion of North Kona’, was a native Hawaiian nationalist.9 The bill was passed and Ackerman and Muller applied for a grant of $1,000 in September of the same year. The Minister of the Interior denied their request.10 Their request probably failed because Pilipo had led the native Hawaiian opposition to the Hawaiian government’s controversial transfer of crown land to the sugar planter, Claus Spreckels, that summer.11 Ackerman and Muller failed in their attempt to market canned ‘wild’ pineapples in the United States, and their venture collapsed. The market for canned foods on the American West Coast at that time was extremely limited.12 That is not to say that a market for canned pineapples did not already exist in the United States. Canned pineapple had been produced in small quantities in Baltimore since at least 1865. As noted above, the United States had also imported small amounts of canned pineapple from the Bahamas since the second half of the 1870s.13 The failure of the Ackerman and Muller enterprise was soon followed by a second attempt to develop a pineapple canning industry in the Hawaiian Islands by another immigrant, an Englishman named John Kidwell. Kidwell was born in the small north Devonshire village of Marwood on 17 January 1849.14 In 1864, at the age of fifteen he left home to become an apprentice to a second cousin, who was a nurseryman in London. After learning his trade, Kidwell emigrated to the United States in 1872. He later claimed to have established himself as a nurseryman in San Francisco two years later in 1874.15 However, Kidwell is listed in the 1879–82 San Francisco Directories as a gardener. In the 1880 and 1881 directories he is listed as an employee of John H. Sievers.16 In San Francisco, some of his most regular customers were from Hawaii, and they repeatedly drew his attention to the profits that he might make from the establishment of a nursery in Honolulu. In 1882 Kidwell sailed to Honolulu with letters of introduction to many of the most prominent European and American residents of the Island of Oahu. Ironically, according to Kidwell, some of the people who were to reap the greatest individual profit from the development of the pineapple industry, were also the most active in trying to persuade Kidwell that a

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nursery would not be profitable. However, he established his nursery despite this adverse advice.17 At this time there was a great demand for fresh Hawaiian pineapples in San Francisco. They were picked green by Charles Hensen on the Island of Hawaii and transhipped to Honolulu before shipment to San Francisco. These pineapples grew wild and were of very poor quality. So with a view to avoiding the need to tranship these pineapples to Honolulu, Kidwell and Hensen secured the shoots of wild pineapples from the Island of Hawaii. Kidwell set out four or five acres of plants in the Manoa valley in 1885. Under cultivation, there was some improvement in the size of the pineapples produced, but the fruit was still of very poor quality, Kidwell started searching for better quality plants. He scanned the advertisements of the various nurserymen’s periodicals and finally in The Florida Agriculturist he read an advertisement relating to a variety called the ‘Smooth Cayenne’. In 1886 Kidwell ordered a dozen of this variety and a year later he ordered 1,000 plants from Jamaica, of which 600 grew and flourished.18 However, Kidwell was not satisfied with his initial success and ordered from London four specimens of every known variety of pineapple. He received 31 different species. In turn, these were carefully tested, but the Smooth Cayenne produced the best results and was selected for cultivation on a commercial scale. Before engaging in this experiment Kidwell had converted an old residence into a forcing plant and developed a number of ideas with respect to the propagation of plants from stumps, ideas which were closely followed by later Hawaiian agronomists. The early work was carried out in cooperation with Charles Hensen, but the latter died soon after the plantation had been established in the Manoa Valley. Kidwell carried on the work alone until 1889, selling as much of his produce locally as possible, the surplus being shipped to California. Until 1894 fresh pineapples entered the United States duty-free. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff imposed a duty of 20 per cent ad valorem which the Pacific Commercial Advertiser later observed ‘gave the industry a permanent set back…’19 It soon became apparent to Kidwell that the market for pineapple could be enlarged. He began to consider the possibilities of expanding the market by canning pineapples.20 Kidwell’s friend John Emmeluth21 began three years of experiments in pineapple canning in 1889. The first lots of a few dozen tins of canned pineapple were used by the families of those interested. However, Emmeluth discovered during a business trip to San Francisco, Chicago, New York City and Boston in 1889 that the US duty on canned fruit22 made it very difficult to compete in Hawaii’s principal overseas

The Early Years

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market, the United States, although the Hawaiian product was considered by the dealers to be superior to its rivals. He made a loss over the period 1889–91 of $400 out of an expenditure of $2,000.23 By the early 1890s, Kidwell had ten acres under cultivation in the Manoa valley. He later recalled that the problem of delivering the fresh fruit in marketable condition to San Francisco began to present almost insurmountable difficulties.24 In fact in 1891 Kidwell had been sued for breach of contract by the Honolulu fruit exporter, Peter Camarinos, who alleged that Kidwell had supplied him with poisoned pineapples. Camarinos won a judgment against Kidwell in April 1892. While it seems unlikely that Kidwell had deliberately inserted acid into the pineapples as Camarinos alleged, he admitted that he had removed the crowns from the pineapples when they were half grown in order to increase their size. The crowns were legally part of the fruit Kidwell was obliged to deliver to Camarinos. By removing the crowns Kidwell caused the pineapples to prematurely decay.25 The dispute between Kidwell and Camarinos has to be seen in the wider context of the political situation in Hawaii in the early 1890s. Kidwell was a supporter of the annexationist Reform Party and Camarinos was a prominent royalist businessman.26 While the case was still in litigation Camarinos developed his own pineapple plantation at Kahili. In August 1891 he also joined a group of businessmen who founded the Pearl City Fruit Co. Camarinos was the president of the new company, which established a pineapple plantation. By 1892 Camarinos and Kidwell were the largest growers of pineapples in Hawaii.27 During 1892 Kidwell leased 100 acres of land at Apokaa from a landowner, Mark Robinson, with the understanding that the lease might subsequently be turned over to a corporation still to be formed.28 The Hawaiian Fruit & Packing Co. was formed in October 1892 with Kidwell as president, Lorrin A. Thurston as vice-president, John Emmeluth as secretary, J. Gallagher as treasurer and J.J. Lecker as auditor. The company had a capital of $40,000 and Kidwell and Emmeluth were the principal shareholders. One of its purposes seems to have been to compete with the Pearl City Fruit Co. which had been founded in August 1891.29 The company was well connected. Thurston was a leader of the Reform Party. In 1887 he had organized a coup d’etat against King Kalakaua and forced him to sign the Bayonet Constitution which disenfranchised a large part of the native Hawaiian electorate. The Bayonet Constitution created an oligarchy of white Caucasian planters and businessmen.30

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During the early 1890s the Hawaiian Islands were experiencing an economic crisis. Under the McKinley Tariff of 1890 the United States had replaced its sugar duty with a domestic subsidy thus negating the benefit to Hawaii of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875.31 The sugar bubble burst. The McKinley Tariff Act resulted in an annual loss of $5 million to the sugar planters.32 The sugar planters established a Committee on Fruit Culture headed by Thurston and, as has been shown, he joined Kidwell’s pineapple enterprise.33 Queen Liliuokalani, who had succeeded her brother Kalakaua in 1891, also strongly supported agricultural diversification, most probably to undermine her enemies’ source of wealth. In her address at the Biennial State Opening of the Legislature on 30 May 1892 she announced: ...the appointment of a special commission…with a view to enable the small land-holders to add to the wealth and progress of the Kingdom by raising such products as the soil and climate of the country foster.34 The commission recommended the establishment of a Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry, the first government agency of this nature in Hawaii. It was intended that the Bureau would promote diversified agriculture based on small farms.35 Even before the commission had reported, Liliuokalani had begun to use the Crown lands to promote this objective. The Crown lands comprised of over one quarter of the land area of Hawaii.36 The sugar planters cannot have been very happy to read the following in the Daily Bulletin that Liliuokalani was ‘leasing crown lands, not in large tracts to planters but in small lots...to encourage diversified industries.’37 Sanford Ballard Dole, an ally of Thurston, had already begun a campaign to take control of the Crown lands away from Liliuokalani in August 1891.38 On 17 January 1893 Liliuokalani was overthrown in a coup d’etat led by Thurston.39 One of the first actions taken by the coup leaders was to expropriate the Crown lands.40 As a member of the Reform Party, and an annexationist since 1881, Emmeluth played a prominent role in the coup. He was a member of the committee of public safety which organized the coup. After the coup he served as a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government. He was also a member of the Council of State of the Republic of Hawaii formed in 1894. Emmeluth gained a reputation as a firebrand and in 1893 called for the deportation of Liliuokalani and in 1895 for the execution of Robert Wilcox, the unsuccessful leader of a counter-revolution in that year. In both cases he was overruled by the more

The Early Years

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moderate coup leader, Sanford Ballard Dole, President of the Republic of Hawaii between 1894 and 1900. Dole’s administration also got in the way of one of Emmeluth’s schemes to corral some mountain water and become a sugar planter. After Hawaii became an US Territory in 1900 Emmeluth continued his feud with Dole, who was appointed the first Governor of the Territory of Hawaii.41 Kidwell played a less prominent role in these events. He served as a sharpshooter in Company A of the armed insurgents who supported the leaders of the coup. Later that year in September he was commissioned as Captain of the First Company of Sharpshooters, which had been formed three months after the coup. He was to use the title of ‘Captain’ in the latter part of his life, although he resigned his commission in August 1895.42 The new Hawaiian Fruit & Packing Co. began its development of the Apokaa plantation by acquiring a unique device for raising water for irrigation. This was Young’s patent hydraulic ram, which was connected direct to a ten-inch bore artesian well drilled by the McCandless Brothers in 1892. Under a head of 18 feet this ram delivered enough water at an elevation of sixty feet through a six inch pipe to irrigate 35 to 40 acres of land.43 By the following year 100,000 plants were growing at Apokaa and the first cannery was established there. Since neither Kidwell nor Emmeluth had any expertise in canning pineapples, they hired at considerable expense an expert canner from Baltimore, the principal centre of the American canned food industry, where canned pineapple had been produced since at least 1865. However, he proved to know no more about canning pineapples than his employers. So Kidwell and Emmeluth had to learn how to can pineapples through a process of trial and error.44 They began canning fruit on a commercial scale in the summer of 1894.45 When the Oahu Railway & Land Co. completed a fifteen mile extension from Ewa Mill to Waianae in the summer of 1895, the cannery was conveniently located next to the railway line.46 One of the last laws passed by the Kingdom’s Legislative Assembly had been an act to encourage the cultivation, canning and preserving of pineapples in an attempt to diversify the economy away from sugar. For a period of ten years after 1892 all tools, machinery, appliances, buildings, and all other personal property used in the cultivation, canning or preserving of pineapples and held for export had been exempted from all taxes. Furthermore, all tools, machinery or appliances to be used exclusively in canning or preserving pineapples for export, or for the manufacture of containers for the same, and also all containers for use by the industry and the material for making them, could be imported into Hawaii free of duty

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for ten years. This law appears to have had the support of both factions in the Legislature.47 Kidwell was appointed the manager of the Hawaiian Fruit & Packing Co. The company’s cannery eventually had a capacity of ten thousand cans per day. According to Kidwell, he received testimony from his customers that no other canned pineapples had been put on the American market that came near to his in quality.48 This was not initially the result of the cannery’s primitive technology, where most of the work was done by hand, but rather the result of the rigid system of inspection he maintained.49 However, in the spring of 1895 Emmeluth travelled to the continental United States to purchase more advanced cannery machinery. It was not possible to acquire all of the machinery required in California and part of the machinery had to be acquired from New York and Baltimore.50 As a result by May their cannery had acquired every labour-saving device for can-making and fruit preserving that was found practical, with a view to lessening the running costs and achieving a product as uniform as possible.51 Between 1895 and 1898 Hawaiian exports of canned pineapple increased from 468 cases valued at $972 to 3,151 cases valued at $5,816.52 The Republic of Hawaii’s Commissioner of Agriculture, Joseph Marsden, expressed the belief in 1896 ‘[t]here is every reason to think that canning pineapples for the [US West] Coast and other markets can be made profitable.’53 However, as another observer of the pineapple industry, Dr. Auguste Jean Baptiste Marquès, was later to report, in reality the excessive shipping charges and the high American tariff duties meant that the pineapple industry was barely profitable.54 This was a view shared by Emmeluth.55 The exports of fresh pineapples appear to have been even less successful even although according to the US Department of Agriculture, during the 1890s, San Francisco and the markets of the West Coast were largely supplied from Hawaii. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser later suggested that the Hawaiian growers had found these fresh pineapple exports unprofitable.56 The duty introduced in the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act cannot have helped. Matters were made even worse in 1897 when the Dingley Tariff raised the duty to 7¢ per cubic foot and $7 per thousand in bulk.57 The first obstacle Kidwell met in exporting canned pineapple to the US West Coast was a combine of buyers who sought to compel him to accept $1.50 a dozen for his superior product. Kidwell forced them above that price, but it took continual warfare with the men who controlled the market to get a mutually satisfactory price. His last shipment secured $2.35 per dozen cans ex ship at San Francisco.58 Kidwell’s shipments were made to William, Dimond & Co. of San Francisco. However, the firm was unable

The Early Years

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to sell Kidwell’s canned pineapple, although their price of $2 a dozen tins was considered to be reasonable. After keeping the goods on hand for a long time, the firm cut its price to $1.25 a dozen and sold all of its stock. At this price there was strong demand from both wholesalers and retailers. The Hawaiian product was considered to be of a much higher quality than the British Malayan canned pineapple from Singapore which had previously been imported by the San Francisco merchants. But although these merchants made a big profit, the reduced price was below the cost of production and freight.59 Undoubtedly the tariff duty levied on canned fruit imports contributed to Kidwell’s loss. Although a market had been established for canned pineapple in the western United States by 1898, Kidwell’s cannery during its short life had produced nearly 14,000 cases, the business appears to have been unprofitable. Fortunately the Apokaa pineapple plantation was well adapted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The nearby Ewa plantation needed more cane for the profitable operation of its sugar mill. Ewa’s management wanted the Apokaa land adjoining their plantation, which they believed was being ‘wasted’ on pineapple.60 Every argument was brought to bear upon Kidwell to cause him to change from pineapple cultivation to sugar cane growing. Eventually Kidwell formed the Apokaa Sugar Co., sublet its fields to the sugar plantation and sold the cannery to the former rival Pearl City Fruit Co. His machinery was moved to Pearl City and some was reported to be still in use at Pearl City’s new cannery at Kipapa in 1924. Kidwell was able to retire at the age of fifty in 1898 with the rent from the Apokaa Sugar Co. and his share of the proceeds of around $5,000 from the sale of the cannery. He never had to work again. He spent his retirement travelling around the world,61 and died in Honolulu after an extended illness on 6 July 1922.62 John Emmeluth appears to have invested his share of the proceeds of the sale of the cannery in the Pearl City Fruit Co. He retained an interest in Pearl City even after Theo. H. Davies & Co. acquired a controlling interest in the company in November 1905. Emmeluth also continued to manage his successful plumbing business. He died in May 1910, aged 57, after an unsuccessful operation to relieve a bladder condition.63 The collapse of Kidwell and Emmeluth’s enterprise was due to a number of factors. First, they failed to capture a large enough share of the American canned pineapple market, which in the 1890s was probably in the region of 400,000 cases a year. As the Paradise of the Pacific had observed in 1897, ‘We have a market, but it is not an inexhaustible one. There are no millions to eat up our pines….’64 Second, they were unable to achieve the economies

14

A Pacific Industry

of scale necessary to offer their product at a price whereby it could compete with canned pineapple from other producers. Third, their enterprise was undoubtedly undercapitalized. As Joseph Marsden observed in 1896 ‘it is useless to come to the Islands without the necessary capital to develop the land that can be obtained.’65 Fourth, the American tariff on foreign canned pineapple also made their product less competitive. Fifth, they do not appear to have given any thought to the marketing of their product. Instead they relied on San Francisco wholesalers. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser also suggested the cost of transporting their product to the US West Coast was too high and the service was not regular enough. It also suggested a profitable industry required cooperation on the part of the pineapple growers.66 In 1898 it seemed that Kidwell and Emmeluth had proved conclusively that Hawaii did not have a comparative advantage in producing canned pineapple and its future lay in the production of sugar cane. However, in retrospect they had established the foundations of a commercial pineapple industry in Hawaii. It can also be noted that as a nurseryman, Kidwell’s contribution has parallels with the earlier work of nurserymen in California, where he had previously been employed as a gardener. With few exceptions it was nurserymen who had developed the major Californian fruit orchards of the mid-nineteenth century.67

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2 PINEAPPLE FEVER 1898–1914

After its annexation by the United States in 1898 Hawaii entered a long period of political stability. The period from annexation until the First World War saw substantial business and economic expansion in Hawaii. In this period the domination of the Hawaiian economy by the sugar plantations controlled by the sugar factors in Honolulu was both intensified and extended. As an US Territory from 1900 Hawaii was incorporated into the continental US marketplace and tariff system which benefited products like pineapples, given the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 had only granted duty-free status to sugar cane. The sugar industry underwent an enormous expansion.1 The fact that that white people were a minority in the new Territory was a major concern for the new rulers of Hawaii. They continued with the former Republic of Hawaii’s attempt to promote the white colonization of the Islands and its land laws were left in force.2 The failure of Kidwell’s enterprise did not discourage others from trying to develop a pineapple industry. Indeed as Peter H. Rolfs of the US Department of Agriculture observed in 1901, ‘The fact that plants may be shipped from the [Hawaiian] Islands to Florida and sell for less than the home-grown ones illustrates the fertility of the soil and the suitableness of the climate.’ 3 The Pearl City Fruit Co. continued to produce small quantities of canned pineapple using the cannery they had acquired from Kidwell. Indeed, Kidwell’s enterprise had shown that there was a small market for canned pineapple from Hawaii in the continental United States. The problem was how to supply that market at a profit and successfully compete with pineapple canned in Baltimore and imports from British Malaya and the Bahamas. This chapter shows how Hawaii displaced its American competitor and these two British colonies as the main source of canned pineapple in the continental United States.

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The year 1898 was to turn out in retrospect to have also marked the beginning of a new phase in the industry’s history, which was to lead to a much more permanent success for the industry.  The previous year a 42 year old agriculturist, Byron O. Clark, had arrived in Hawaii to seek his fortune. A contemporary later described him as an ‘experimenter in many things, a dreamer and an idealist.’ 4 He soon discovered that he could not afford to purchase or lease land from private landowners. However, he discovered that there was area of government land available for homesteading at Wahiawa, Oahu, under the terms of the 1895 Land Act. There was a danger that the likely annexation of Hawaii might bring about a change in the Islands’ land laws. Clark wrote to acquaintances in the area around Los Angeles and suggested that they form a settlement association under his leadership to obtain the 1,350 acre tract of land. In June 1898 Clark’s Wahiawa Settlement Association was granted the tract. Clark and over 80 associates obtained small individual holdings of land at Wahiawa on which they began the cultivation of grapes, oranges, limes, pineapples, coffee and vegetables. Wahiawa at that time was a park like stretch of third class pasture land. To get there from Honolulu was a five hour journey. The paved road only extended as far as Moanalua. Beyond that point there was only a dirt road which varied between mud and dust.  Conditions were extremely rudimentary. They lived in wooden shacks that were constructed by people without a technical education in carpentry. As James D. Dole later recalled some of the roofs of the shacks blew away in bad weather. The settlers received considerable support from businesses associated with the oligarchy, including the Oahu Railway & Land Co., without which they would have failed.5 The Californian settlers soon realized that pineapple cultivation had the greatest potential. In July 1902 Clark observed to the Commissioner of Public Lands that: I look upon the pineapple industry as a good, safe one for the farmer with a few acres of suitable land. It can never be conducted in so safe and satisfactory a manner in large plantations as in the sugar industry, for it will be only by close attention to detail and high cultural methods that the quality now produced will be maintained. It is the high quality of the Hawaiian pineapple that bespeaks a good market, and at profitable prices. To attain these results requires intelligent and individual attention of the grower such as is to be found on smaller estates. This ought to appeal to the man with a family who wishes to establish a home in this unparalleled climate.6

Pineapple Fever

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This was exactly what the sugar planters wanted to hear. But Clark’s forecast about the disadvantages of growing pineapples on plantations proved to be incorrect. In December 1902 Clark published a progress report in the Paradise of the Pacific. He noted that the Territory’s sole pineapple canning company, the Pearl City Fruit Co., could have sold ten times the present season’s pack. This revealed an extraordinary degree of optimism for an industry which had not yet proved itself. The colonists had found Wahiawa was well suited to the cultivation of pineapples based on the first crop of summer 1902. He further observed that: There is no industry on the Islands today that seems to promise as speedy and profitable returns to the investor of small means as the growing of pineapples for canning. The quality of canned goods placed on the markets from [Hawaii] has been pronounced very much superior to what is generally offered to consumers in the United States, as the fruit is allowed to fully mature and ripen on the plant before being put into cans.…I predict that when consumers once become acquainted with the excellence of properly packed pineapples they will be one of the most popular fruits in the markets, and the consumption will exceed the production of these Islands.…In laying the foundation for this industry the standard should be placed high and none but the best allowed on the market. Our profits will depend on maintaining this high standard.7 Clark’s forecast of the future of pineapple canning in Hawaii proved to be more or less correct, in marked contrast to similar prophecies made about other industries such as coffee, bananas, rubber, cotton and sisal. However, many observers were less optimistic than Clark, for example the Pacific Commercial Advertiser predicted that pineapples would prove to be as commercially unsuccessful as all the other crops. The Advertiser had observed on 19 August 1901: It is easy to theorize on making Hawaii rich by sending fruits and vegetables to the [US West] Coast, but those who have tried it have small patience with the theorizer.…[For example, i]f pineapples paid, the vacant lands near [Honolulu] would be covered with them…8 One of the pioneers at Wahiawa objected to this editorial by pointing out that the Pearl City Fruit Co. was making a profit from canned pineapple and

18

A Pacific Industry

that pineapples in general showed great promise. The Advertiser defended its editorial on 20 August recalling the failure of John Kidwell’s canned pineapple business9 and a couple of days later repeated its view that ‘it is ridiculous to think of getting rich by sending [fruits and vegetables] to the [US West] Coast.’ 10 The success of the Californian settlers led them to organize themselves along the lines of the sugar industry, that is to say they formed corporations and started to employ Asian workers to the manual work.11 This resulted in opposition from some of the sugar planters to the establishment of this new industry, because labour was the scarcest resource in Hawaii. They feared that the pineapple growers would become competitors in bidding for the labour of the Asian workers they had brought to Hawaii at great expense. The Californian settlers found it extremely difficult to raise capital in Hawaii, because there were practically no banks or financial institutions advancing money to growers in Hawaii at this time, the only secure source of capital being the sugar factors.12 Some members of the families that controlled the sugar industry were involved in the pineapple industry from a very early stage. On the Island of Maui, the Baldwin family was the first mover. David Dwight Baldwin, a former Librarian of Yale University in the 1870s, had been involved in pineapple growing on Maui since 1890 when he imported some eight varieties which he planted at Haiku. After a few years Baldwin chose the Smooth Cayenne as the best all round variety and the others were eliminated for commercial planting. By the early 1900s his crops had become too large for the local market, and he started fresh fruit shipments to California. This did not prove profitable and so the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd. was founded in October 1903. The new canning company purchased Baldwin’s pineapple plantation. Its sales agents were the CFCA. His son, William A. Baldwin, a graduate of Yale, was to serve the company as manager from 1904 to 1918.13 The British owned sugar factor, Theo. H. Davies & Co., was also involved in the pineapple canning industry from a very early stage. Indeed, even before it acquired a controlling interest in the Pearl City Fruit Co. in 1905 it had contracted for all of the output of this company’s cannery for several years. In 1906, Davies founded the first pineapple canning company on the Island of Kauai, the Kauai Fruit & Land Co.14 The Bank of Hawaii, which was linked to Castle & Cooke, also acted as treasurer for the Tropic Fruit Co.15 Although it has been observed above that Clark’s optimism in the future of the industry turned out not to have been misplaced, the success of the industry cannot be attributed to his own efforts. It is true that in

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September 1902 he organized the Tropic Fruit Co. to grow and pack pineapples. However, he put up his pack in white glass jars,16 which was not the most practical way of processing preserved pineapples destined for the continental United States’ market. Clark was undoubtedly copying the practice of some of the fruit canners in California, where before the First World War a considerable amount of fruit was packed in glass.17 Between 1902 and 1906 Tropic Fruit’s acreage increased from five acres in fee simple and 300 under lease to 200 in fee simple and 340 under lease. In 1906 his company merged with the Hawaiian Fruit & Plant Co. to become the Consolidated Pineapple Co.18 The president of the merged company was Leonard G. Kellogg, another of the Wahiawa pioneers. In the autumn of 1907 the transcontinental railway companies offered a special freight rate for pineapples shipped east from the port of San Francisco. This was in response to an initiative by the Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station which held out the prospect of the fruit surviving the shipment. In response Kellogg sought to develop a market in fresh Hawaiian pineapples in the eastern United States. Despite Kellogg’s initial optimism, this venture was not a success, probably because there was a high spoilage rate.19 The credit for the foundation of the modern Hawaiian pineapple canning industry lies with James D. Dole, second cousin of the Territory’s first Governor, Sanford B. Dole.20 Like Kidwell and Emmeluth before him, James D. Dole realized that canning was the only way to overcome the problem of transporting fresh fruit to the continental US.21 Unlike his predecessors, Dole was never fully accepted as a member of the business oligarchy that controlled the economy of Hawaii although he was a relative of Governor Dole. He had been born in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, in 1877, the son of a Unitarian church minister. His father, Charles F. Dole, was a member of an Abolitionist family. After attending Roxbury Latin School, Dole entered Harvard in 1895 and graduated with an AB degree in 1899. He had already secured enough credits to graduate in 1898 and for his last year at the university he enrolled in the Bussey Institution, Harvard’s School of Agriculture and Horticulture, which offered the only curriculum in agricultural science. Following his graduation Dole sought his fortune in Hawaii after reading in 1898 some highly misleading promotional literature relating to coffee growing in the Islands, published by the Hawaiian Agricultural Commissioner, Joseph Marsden. Dole took with him the proceeds of a savings bank book started at his birth with a $50 gift from one of his father’s parishioners. Although intended for his education at Harvard, Dole had lived within his allowance and not used the bankbook. However, when

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Dole arrived from Boston in Honolulu in November 1899, he found that coffee growing as a business was not all that it had been represented to be in the promotional literature.22 Furthermore two weeks after he had arrived, bubonic plague swept Honolulu, and he was forced to undergo quarantine for the winter.23 After his release he stayed with Sanford B. Dole and Anna, ‘his most hospitable wife’.24 In spring 1900, Dole learned of the colonizing venture at Wahiawa, where some discouraged Californian settler had relinquished a small 61 acre tract of land to the government and which was to be put up for sale at a public auction.25  Dole later recalled how the notion of his pineapple canning business arose after he had secured this small piece of land: I went out to look it over with [the colonists’ leaders] Byron O. Clark and L[eonard] G. Kellogg,…with the idea of securing this small homestead on which to engage in general farming for the local market. My capital was limited and I had no idea other than this at the time. There were then a few pineapples being grown in the district, together with tomatoes, papaia, and other fruits and vegetables, but I was soon convinced that pineapples were more adapted to the section than any other crop. But with this realization came another one, which was that if pineapples in any quantity were to be grown there, a cannery would be needed. This was so because pineapples mature with a rush at certain seasons of the year, steamers were uncertain and infrequent, and it would be almost impossible to get large quantities of fresh fruit to the mainland in marketable condition. So I reached the conclusion that the establishment of a cannery at Wahiawa was one of prime importance, if pineapple culture there was ever to amount to anything, and with this idea came the really important one that were the pineapples in cans there was the whole world for a market.26 On 28 July 1900, Dole acquired the 61 acre tract of public land for $4,000 at a government homestead auction in order to establish a pineapple plantation. This land was purchased under the ‘special agreement’ section of the Hawaiian Land Act of 1895. This allowed sales of public land at auction under special condition as to payments by instalments with requirements of cultivation with or without residence condition. Dole was allowed to pay for it one fifth in cash and the remainder in four equal instalments. It

Pineapple Fever

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appears to have been both the first and the largest piece of land alienated by the new Territory during its first year of existence.27  It has been alleged that Governor Dole abused his office by granting land to members of his family on very favourable terms.   There may have been some truth behind this allegation.28 James D. Dole also leased 300 acres of land from the Dowsett Estate, managed by his friend Walter F. Dillingham, at Wahiawa a few months later.29 The estate of James Isaac Dowsett comprised of between 30 and 40 thousand acres of land on Oahu. Dowsett, a prominent rancher and sugar planter, had died in 1898.30 On 4 December 1901 Dole founded the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Raising the company’s initial capital of about $20,000 took considerable ingenuity. Indeed only 812 of the $20 shares were subscribed. He found a number of people who would listen but not many who were prepared to invest in the stock.  For example, Sanford B. Dole refused to invest in his cousin’s new company. So, as he later recalled, he used the methods of a New England farmer’s wife who trades eggs for calico and butter for gingham.  In exchange for company stock the law firm of Judd and Atkinson handled the incorporation papers and other legal details; E.W. Jordan, who had some pineapples growing, contributed the pineapple plants; Thomas King, head of the California Feed Co., agreed to supply feed for work animals on the Wahiawa fields; the Oahu Railway & Land Co. agreed to haul supplies and other freight up its line to the nearest point to Wahiawa; and a surveyor did some work on the boundaries. Dole issued his stock on the basis of a simple typewritten prospectus.31 Dole had now been joined by his friend Fred Tracy, also from Massachusetts. Tracy is not mentioned in any of Dole’s published reminiscences of the early days of his company. Tracy became a partner in Dole’s enterprise. Dole and Tracy advanced their company $5,340 to cover its working capital requirements. Of the money advanced by Dole to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., $2,000 had been borrowed from his family. The money loaned by his family was later converted into 267 shares of stock. This left Dole with 200 shares which he owned outright and another 267 which he held as trustee. Richard Dole and Elizabeth Dole Porteus suggest that this indicates that their forebear originally controlled 467 shares, or 60 per cent of the outstanding stock, which gave him majority control. No other single stockholder originally held more than 50 shares. The remainder of the stock was held by Dole’s neighbours at Wahiawa and the company’s creditors. By the summer of 1902 it was clear that the company’s original capital was insufficient to start a canning enterprise. It was decided to increase the

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company’s capital stock to $45,000.   Dole then went back to Boston to try to raise an additional $28,000. While in Boston he had a prospectus printed. The printer was paid in company stock. The prospectus stated that the manager’s salary would be $900.  Dole later recalled in 1941 that he had not drawn any salary for the first two years while he was establishing his company. Dole succeeded in selling $7,700 worth of stock to Harvard classmates, family friends, and other people. However, he still had more than $20,000 of unsubscribed stock.32 After purchasing some cannery equipment in Maryland and New York, Dole travelled back west to California to call on Samuel Sussman, president of Sussman, Wormser and Co. (S & W), a wholesale grocery distribution partnership. Jacob Blumlein, Sussman’s nephew and S & W’s general manager and canned goods buyer, was already interested in canned pineapple because he had successfully distributed a shipment from Kidwell’s Hawaiian Fruit & Packing Co. Blumlein was a ‘top-flight’ salesman. S & W specialized in pioneering new products, which other distributors gradually picked up. S & W was one of the most prominent Jewish businesses in California. There were no significant Jewish businesses in Hawaii. Although Rudolf Glanz has argued that Hawaii was free of the anti-Semitism common elsewhere, nonetheless only a handful of Jews lived in Hawaii. After the meeting, Sussman proposed in December that he would invest $10,000 in Dole’s company in exchange for S & W being made sole agent for the Pacific Coast. Dole rejected Sussman’s proposition.33 However, Sussman had also suggested to a friend, the canner Joseph H. Hunt, that he take a look at Dole’s company. Hunt was the founder of the Hunt Brothers Packing Co. of Santa Rosa, California. Hunt took up Sussman’s suggestion, and with his partner August C. Baumgartner, visited Dole in Hawaii. Dole’s company was now experiencing financial problems. In March 1903 Dole accepted Hunt’s offer of a five year exclusive contract commencing on 4 April 1903 to become the sole distributor of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s entire output of canned pineapple for a commission of 5 per cent on gross sales. Hunt Bros. also agreed to arrange for Dole the supply of cans from the American Can Co.’s plant in San Francisco. The contract with Hunt Bros. was a great success.34 According to Richard Dole and Elizabeth Dole Porteus, James D. Dole later observed: We are very fortunate in having Hunt Bros. Co. as our sales agent. Its activity in introducing and placing our goods has built us up a splendid trade and I feel that this, together with our facilities for

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turning out our product at much less cost than most of the Island producers, puts us in an impregnable position as to competition.35 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. could now begin construction of its cannery. The company purchased a commercial site from Carol Pullman, a Wahiawa homesteader, where a 3,900 square foot cannery was completed before the end of 1903.  With the cannery in operation, Hunt purchased the 377 remaining unsubscribed shares in the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and 350 shares from the minority stockholders. Hunt now owned more shares than Dole. In November 1903 Dole was elected president of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. for the first time.36 Other entrepreneurs, including a number of his neighbours at Wahiawa, followed Dole’s successful example. By late 1905 the Pacific Commercial Advertiser predicted that Hawaii was on course to supply half of market for canned pineapple in the United States in 1906.37 The output of canned pineapples in the Territory was to increase from 9,800 cases in 1903 to 186,700 cases in 1907, thus exceeding the annual output of canned pineapple in Baltimore. In 1904 Samuel Sussman, Jacob Blumlein, Joseph H. Hunt, A.C. Baumgartner, and James D. Dole helped underwrite bank overdrafts of up to $20,000 from the Bank of Hawaii to finance the development of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Hunt and Sussman also granted the company a one year line of credit not exceeding $5,000.   Towards the end of 1904 the company decided to expand its Wahiawa plantation and upgrade its cannery so it could process a larger pack. It was decided to increase the company’s capital to $90,000. Although not all the new stock was sold, Hunt ended up holding 70 per cent of the company’s issued stock. Despite being the majority shareholder Hunt chose neither to become an officer nor a director of the company.38 However, he appears to have played an active role in the strategic development of the company. Hunt seems to have been responsible for moving the company’s pineapple cannery from Wahiawa to Honolulu. He felt it would be more efficient to have it located in the city. The transfer of the cannery was made possible by an extension of the Oahu Railway & Land Co. railway line to Wahiawa. In 1904 the US Army had decided to upgrade the Schofield Barracks, which were only a few miles from Wahiawa.  The army paid the Oahu Railway to build a railroad from Honolulu to the base. While Dole later claimed that the oligarchy had not supported the pineapple industry in the early twentieth century, in fact his friend Walter F. Dillingham, the son of the Oahu Railway’s owner, Benjamin F. Dillingham, a leading member of the oligarchy, served as a

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director of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. from at least July 1902 to May 1904. Later, in October 1905, the Oahu Railway agreed to build a branch line to Wahiawa. This contradicts Dole’s later recollection regarding the oligarchy.  In return to Dillingham, Dole and the other Wahiawa colonists signed long-term freight contracts with his railway. Construction began in December 1905 and was completed in the middle of 1906. The journey between Honolulu and Wahiawa was reduced by two hours to three and a half via Pearl City. The railroad extension allowed Dole to construct the new cannery employing 200 workers in Honolulu’s Iwilei District, where there was a much larger pool of casual seasonal labour than at Wahiawa. To finance the construction of the new cannery the company decided to increase its capital stock from $90,000 to $400,000, and the authorized stock to $500,000 in August 1907. Part of this increase consisted of a stock dividend and rights issue. As Hunt only purchased a few new shares, his holding in the company fell to just over 58 per cent. However, Dole’s share in the company had fallen to 3.4 per cent by this time. The new cannery came into production in 1907.39 Dole stated in January 1908: From our experience with the railroad company I can say that their officials are ready to do anything at all in reason to help the producer and get the fruit to our cannery in good shape. So far they have helped us in every way.40 Also at about the same time, 1906, the American Can Co. built a small can-making factory in Honolulu on a site 40 by 100 feet. This was a reflection of the adoption of mass production techniques by the leading pineapple canners (Dole’s Iwilei cannery being a good example), which resulted in the abandonment of the hand manufacture of cans. The Hawaiian pineapple canners did not attempt to internalize the manufacture of tin cans because the American Can Co. held patents on most of the machines and processes used in their manufacture. As a result, it had a monopoly of the market for manufactured tin cans in Hawaii. The first year’s output was about 1 million cans and the following year a new factory was constructed in a six story warehouse at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s new cannery at Iwilei.41 Surprisingly the labels placed on the cans continued to be imported from San Francisco until after the First World War. It was only in 1919 that Harry Haywood, general manager of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, suggested to Lawrence M. Judd, grocery manager of Theo H. Davies & Co., that the Star-Bulletin establish a lithographic plant to print pineapple can labels for

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the same price as the San Francisco ones. Judd agreed on behalf of Davies’ Pearl City Fruit Co. By 1926, the demand for labels had become sufficient to support the construction of a separate building for the lithographic plant. In 1934, in order to secure the business of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Libby and Calpak, a 50–50 joint venture, the Honolulu Lithograph Co., was formed with the Schmidt Lithograph Co. of San Francisco.42 Both Dole, who had just expanded his level of output, and the other pineapple canners were ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of the aftermath of the downturn in the business cycle which struck their principal market, the continental US, in 1907. It was only then that the industry began to look seriously at two proposals that they form a cooperative organization to deal with problems such as overproduction. Two alternative forms of cooperation had been proposed for the pineapple industry. The first form of cooperation proposed was the establishment of a cooperative cannery. The earliest proposal of this nature was made in 1892 by a pioneer pineapple grower, E.W. Jordan. He had believed that it would  be unprofitable for each grower to operate his own small-scale cannery.43 This proposal was revived in 1904 by a Californian canner, Charles P. Bentley.44 In California, with which Hawaii had close commercial ties, there had been a movement towards cooperative marketing associations in the agricultural sector.45  In June 1899, 18 companies, comprising about half of the canning establishments in California, had combined to form the CFCA.46 Bentley, who was one of the founder members of this association, believed that only one large cannery could be made profitable in the Hawaiian pineapple industry. The circumstances of the industry suggested that a large cannery should be established in some central location, where it could draw its supply of pineapples from all of the Islands. Several satellite canneries might then be set up connected with the central establishment.47 This had been the model adopted during the first great merger boom in the continental US between 1899 and 1904, of which the CFCA had been a part. The second proposal was for a trade association. As early as 1897, the Pearl City Fruit Co. had proposed the establishment of a pineapple growers’ association.48 A more detailed proposal was made in 1905 by John Emmeluth. He drew attention to the adverse effects of competition between the products of the Hawaiian pineapple canners in the continental US market. Falling profit margins and less concern with the quality of their product would provide an opening for competition from the Singapore canning industry.   To avoid bringing about such an undesirable state of affairs, the Hawaiian canners should form a cooperative association similar to that of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA). This association

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A Pacific Industry

would provide for the cooperative canning, warehousing and shipping of pineapples, but permit the various companies to retain the individual identity of their brands. Emmeluth also suggested that considerable economies of scale would result from a rationalization of the industry. He thought that his plan would probably result in a great saving of capital and in the standardization of the product.49 Initially both suggestions were rejected by the industry. In early 1907 the wholesale trade had shown a great interest in purchasing canned foods. There had been an active business in canned pineapple with the result that the Hawaiian pack for 1907 was almost completely in the hands of the jobbers before the beginning of the ‘financial panic’. The impact of the ‘panic’ which broke in October 1907 created a severe crisis in the industry.  The credit facilities from jobber to retailer were curtailed, business became very slow, and the wholesalers did not sell to the retail trade anywhere near the amount of canned pineapples that they had purchased. In the spring of 1908 the jobbers’ inventories still contained a large proportion of the previous year’s canned pineapple pack.50 However, by the beginning of 1908 Wahiawa was experiencing boomtime conditions. Roderick O. Matheson, in a special report for the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, observed that: Here everybody talks pineapples, plants pineapples, dreams pineapples; everything, in fact, but eat pineapples. Since I arrived here…I have had pineapple statistics poured into me until I have developed the fever and want to become a small farmer…51 Three of the five pineapple canneries on Oahu were in the process of acquiring new machinery. One of the three canneries was a new one, the Thomas Pineapple Co. The founder, Will B. Thomas, had formerly sold his crop to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.  Thomas had previously served as manager of the Hawaiian Fruit & Plant Co. He had first begun growing pineapples on his own account on a tract of Territorial government land at Pupukea opened up for settlement on the right-of-purchase lease plan at $25 an acre at eight per cent a year in mid-1905. He decided to establish a new cannery at Pearl City, which was accessible from his three pineapple patches at Pupukea, Halemano and Wahiawa. The growers were also in the process of increasing the acreage under pineapple.52 On the same day as it published the report on Wahiawa, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser observed in an editorial entitled the ‘Triumph of the Pineapple’:

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From an experiment entered upon after many previous failures, the culture of pineapples has become a business of magnitude.…And yet less than seven years ago the whole thing awoke the derision of the feudalists and the empty laughter of brat journalism. Today the pineapple industry offers the small grower a competency and the big one a fortune, and there is land enough to add to its area of production indefinitely.53 Obviously the Advertiser had forgotten that it had also dismissed the prospects of the pineapple industry less than seven years ago. In early January 1908 Dole showed a group of businessmen from California around the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s plantation at Wahiawa and his cannery at Iwilei. The head of the party was A.C. Baumgartner of Hunt Bros., the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s agents.54  Later in January the Pacific Commercial Advertiser published a report by Baumgartner on the Hawaiian pineapple industry. He observed that the Hawaiian canned pineapple had not displaced the Bahamian product from the American market.  (The main source of canned pineapple for the continental United States at the turn of the twentieth century was the Bahamas). The Hawaiian fruit was more tender and less acid. Nonetheless, many people preferred the taste of the Bahamian product. Nonetheless, the Bahamian product was not a table fruit unlike for example canned peaches. The principal use of Bahamian pineapple was in the manufacture of glacé fruits, and as a fruit for use at bars. However, the Hawaiian product being softer could be eaten as a table fruit and hence was in the process of capturing part of the market for table fruit. Baumgartner’s main fear was whether the American market could continue to absorb the exponential growth of the supply of the Hawaiian product for much longer. He argued that it would not be long before the canners would all have to unite in systematic methods for developing and increasing their market. Baumgartner was obviously unaware of the fact that in 1907 Hawaiian output of canned pineapple exceeded Bahamian exports of canned pineapple for the first time. By 1914 Bahamian exports were only 1.5 per cent of Hawaiian output.55 Baumgartner’s fears were reflected in the crisis facing the pineapple canners in spring 1908. The crisis was intensified by heavy planting in 1906. The 1908 pack was nearly double that of 1907 at some 400,000 cases. The bulk of the sales of Hawaiian pineapple usually took place in spring as future sales of the crop that was packed during the succeeding summer. In the spring of 1908, with a pack of 400,000 cases in process, their future sales amounted to about 120,000 cases. Business was so slow

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A Pacific Industry

that, despite considerable use of traditional merchandising methods, the Hawaiian canners’ sales of 120,000 cases on 1 July 1908 were only increased by about 20,000 cases during the entire seven succeeding months. Thus on 1 February 1909 they had on hand a carry-over of 280,000 cases in their warehouses, or approximately 70 per cent of the entire year’s output. Dole and his fellow pineapple canners were very concerned about the crisis facing their industry in the summer of 1908, and decided that something had to be done to increase the consumption of Hawaiian pineapple.56 On 7 May 1908, nine of the pineapple canners founded the Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ Association (HPGA). The member companies comprised of Dole’s Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd.; the Consolidated Pineapple Co., Ltd.; Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd.; Captain Cook Coffee Co.; Kauai Fruit & Land Co.; Pearl City Fruit Co.; Hilo Fruit & Packing Co.; Hawaiian Isles Packing Co.; and the Thomas Pineapple Co. Dole was elected as the first president of the HPGA.57 The canners’ sales agents in the continental US were dismayed by the crisis, and were doubtful as to what could be done to improve conditions. Nonetheless, the new association evaluated the situation and prepared a map of the United States showing the places where they were selling pineapple. The map revealed large areas where they were selling little if any pineapple. The HPGA also prepared a list of all the cities with a population over 100,000, and found that they had significant business in only a comparatively small number. From this evidence Dole concluded that it was of vital importance that salesmen should be sent to promote canned pineapple in areas where they had failed to penetrate the market. The question arose immediately as to where they should send these salesmen. A number of Dole’s associates suggested that salesmen should be sent to work in the Mid-West. This region had shown a recent growth in demand, and was comparatively prosperous at that time. A study of the map, however, showed that apart from a reasonable business in Boston, sales were insignificant in the large metropolitan centres of the East Coast. Traditionally this area had been supplied with canned pineapple produced in Baltimore and the Bahamas. (Dole failed to point this out in his later recollections.) Hence, they decided to concentrate their efforts on the East Coast rather than the Mid-West. Another problem arose over how much pineapple could be sold in these metropolitan centres. If, as they believed, Hawaiian pineapple could be marketed to a large proportion of the people living on the densely populated East Coast, there was the possibility of a large increase in business. It now

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seemed an appropriate time to find out whether this could be done or not. Thus despite various predictions on the part of large dealers and others that they would never sell large quantities of Hawaiian canned pineapple in New York and the East, they authorized a pilot study, and employed a number of salesmen to work in New York City. Dole saw this as the turning point in the fortunes of the canned pineapple industry. Although initially the salesmen were only moderately successful, within a short space of time they were able to put Hawaiian canned pineapple into about 1,000 stores in and around New York City, but at an enormous cost per case. It soon became obvious that the use of salesmen alone would not be sufficient to move the existing stock of canned pineapple before the next pack year. Some other and more radical measures would have to be taken to popularize the product. The results of the pilot study suggested that there was a large potential market on the East Coast for their product. The pineapple canners had been contemplating for several years the idea that when production exceeded consumption Hawaiian pineapple was a product which could easily lend itself to some form of national advertising. Since salesmen alone were insufficient, they now seriously considered the possibility of advertising their product. In late autumn 1908, at a conference in San Francisco between Dole and the other Hawaiian canners, the idea of cooperative advertising emerged. They decided that an expenditure of $50,000, or about three per cent of the existing value of their products, would be sufficient to carry out a national advertising campaign. With the necessary support, this would introduce enough new consumers to their product to restore the market to equilibrium.58 Following this meeting Dole’s fellow canner, Will B. Thomas, justified the use of advertising by the canners to find a market for their rapidly increasing production with the following rationale: the packers will have to do alot of missionary work among the consumers first.…Of the eighty million people in the United States, probably half of them have never tasted pineapples and the majority of the balance have looked upon them as a luxury to be indulged in only on special occasions, so it would seem there was a good field for advertising and the possibilities of creating a large demand first class.59 Given that Hawaiian canned pineapple was distributed under innumerable brands, many of them wholesalers’ brands, it was decided

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A Pacific Industry

it would not be practical to advertise Hawaiian canned pineapple with reference to individual brands. The campaign was planned in connection with the New York advertising agency, J.A. Richards & Staff, in October 1908.60 The advertising campaign was launched in December in time for the Christmas holiday. The advertising was placed in the January issues of 13 of the most widely circulated magazines in the United States, which had a combined circulation of about five million copies and an estimated readership of 25 million. The magazines were the Ladies’ Home Journal, Women’s Home Companion, Ladies’ World, Munsey’s, McClure’s, Good Housekeeping, Pacific Monthly, Everybody’s, Harper’s Bazar, Army and Navy Register, Sunset Magazine, Overland Monthly, and Delineator. The advertising slogan used in the advertisements was ‘No, you never tasted pineapple’. The advertisements appear to have been targeted in particular at female consumers and provide an example of what Pamela Walker Laird has described as ‘opening markets by persuasion.’ The advertisement stressed the quality of the Hawaiian product, for example the fact that the canners used ‘sanitary cans’,61 bought in, as has been shown above, from the American Can Co. These were the most modern type of cans and had been developed specifically to produce a higher standard of canned fruit. In emphasizing the quality of their product the Hawaiian canners were following the advice of Ernest F. Schwaab in his book The Secrets of Canning (1890), ‘Let quality not quantity be the packer’s watchword’.62 Richards accompanied their advertising campaign with a broadside to wholesalers and brokers; a broadside to retailers; a store card distributed amongst a large number of retailers and wholesalers; and a portfolio to canned goods buyers in the grocery houses, containing scenes in the pineapple plantations, together with samples of the advertisements they were planning to run. They also distributed about a million inexpensive illustrated booklets with information about pineapple growing and canning in Hawaii, with a few recipes showing different uses for the canned product. Promotional literature of this type was often used by companies to educate consumers in this period. Coincident with the distribution of their circulars to the retailers, the daily sales turned in by the salesmen were practically doubled, suggesting the effect on the retailers of the prospect of national advertising and assistance in selling canned pineapple.63 As the advertising campaign began, the canners were becoming increasingly worried about the size of the carry-overs in their warehouses, particularly with the prospect of another and still larger pack approaching within a few months. Retailers were also unhappy that the Hawaiian

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product was priced at 25¢ a can, whereas the British Malayan product from Singapore could be purchased for just 15¢. The Hawaiian canners were also quite disappointed at not achieving more immediate results after the advertisements first began to appear. The canners were spending large sums of money, and, while they realized that they had no reason to expect the demand created by the advertising campaign to have an immediate effect on sales, they nevertheless became very concerned.64 The result of this impatience was that on 1 February 1909 the canners embarked upon the third part of their strategy. Having made use of salesmen and then the national advertising campaign, they now cut the price of their product. The wholesale price of each case of canned pineapple was reduced by 50¢. Dole later observed that it was impossible to determine what part of the increase in sales which almost immediately followed was the result of the advertising, the salesmen or to the reduced price. He believed that it was most probably a combination of all three. The lack of any one might have been fatal, and it was a combination which was immediately effective.65 As early as 1 March 1909 the pineapple canners began to receive cables showing that stocks of their product in New York, Chicago and San Francisco were exhausted and requests for rush shipments.   The stocks which on 1 February, and even on 1 March threatened to bankrupt the canners and prevent them from processing the new crop later that year had almost disappeared by 1 July. On 1 February the jobbers probably had a carry-over equal to about two-thirds of the previous year’s purchase. The movement of canned pineapple into the hands of the retailers and baskets of the consumers was so fast, that the succeeding summer’s increased pack was easily taken care of and sold.66 However, competition among the Hawaiian canners in marketing the winter pack of 1909–10 reached the point in April 1910 where price cuts were resorted to to move their production. Jobbers in San Francisco cut their prices by 25¢ per dozen on sliced, whole and squares in No.2½ cans.67 The summer pack of 1910 was much larger than in previous years but demand increased to such an extent that most canners were oversold. Prices showed an advance over the opening rates of 1909.68 The HPGA also made use of another form of promotion in 1909. Ernest F. Schwaab had argued in 1890 that advertising canned goods at international expositions was a useful method to increase foreign demand. Perhaps with this in mind, the HPGA made sure that the pineapple industry was well represented in the Hawaii building at the Alaska-Yukon Exposition in Seattle in the summer of 1909. A huge pineapple made up of hundreds of large pineapples rose to a height of 25 feet. It was surrounded by miniature

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A Pacific Industry

fields showing growing plants. Beyond these were pyramids of canned pineapples showing the labels of all the pineapple exported from Hawaii. A large part of the floor space is given up to koa wood tables where sliced pineapple was served to the public at a nominal price.69 The HPGA also helped coordinate the industry’s strategy to insure that it was adequately protected by the US tariff regime. John Emmeluth had considered that the American duty on canned pineapple imports to be a major obstacle to the marketing of Hawaiian canned pineapples in the United States in the 1890s.70   The fact that the industry found itself on the other side of the American tariff barrier after 1900 had been a major stimulus to American investment in the canned pineapple industry. The Dingley Tariff of 1897 had placed a 25 per cent ad valorem duty on canned pineapples preserved in their own juice and a 35 per cent duty plus 1¢ per pound on canned pineapples preserved in sugar.71 There had been little to distinguish the Hawaiian product from its competitors in the early 1900s. When the hearings were held on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in 1908 and 1909 Hawaii had only just begun to produce a high quality standardized product. Through their inexperience they had succeeded in glutting the American market. However, they had reacted quickly by embarking upon an advertising campaign designed to differentiate their product from that produced by their competitors in Baltimore and Singapore. The results of this new marketing strategy were initially by no means clear, and the canners were keen to exclude foreign competitors from the American market. The political and business leaders of Hawaii vigorously lobbied for the maintenance of the tariff duty on imported canned pineapples and also on fresh pineapples, many of which were processed by the Baltimore canners. George B. McClellan, chief lobbyist of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, had already acted as special counsel for the federal government in an unsuccessful legal case over whether the US Customs Service should apply the higher duty to canned pineapples preserved in sugar. At the hearings on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, McClellan urged Congress to devise a stricter definition of the lower duty, to prevent the misapplication of the tariff.72 This was necessary according to James D. Dole, because the recent effective reduction of the duty by the US Customs Service did not provide sufficient protection to the Hawaiian industry. The Hawaiian canners paid more for their sugar, tin and labour than their principal competitors, the Singaporean canners. Dole estimated that the Hawaiian canners’ costs were nearly 60¢ higher per dozen cans than those of their Singaporean

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competitors.73 Dole’s testimony was supported by A.W. Eames, Sr. and a brief presented by the HPGA.74 Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, the Territorial Delegate in Congress,75 presented a brief advocating a rise in the duty on fresh pineapples. He argued that the Floridian and Hawaiian growers could supply most of the demand for fresh pineapples in the American market. It was unfair to subject them to ‘ruinous’ competition from foreign producers in a way which was not permitted in the case of any other fruit. As for the domestic producers of canned pineapple in Baltimore, there was no more reason for them to have duty-free pineapples, than the producers of orange marmalade should have duty-free oranges.76 Kuhio also thought that the duty on fresh pineapples should be raised to prevent ‘the dumping of surplus stock from Cuba.…’77 He might have also pointed out that the Baltimore pineapple canners were dependent upon imported pineapples from the Bahamas and Cuba. The Dingley tariff on fresh pineapples had undermined their ability to compete with both imported canned pineapple and also the rapidly growing Hawaiian industry.78 The Hawaiian case for the duty on canned pineapple was challenged by the New York City importers, J.S. Johnson & Co. They had been canning pineapple in the Bahamas since the 1870s.79 The company argued that the HPGA was clearly engaged in restraint of trade.  It also presented price lists which suggested that the Bahamian product’s wholesale price at $1.75 a case was ten cents more than the Hawaiian product.80  The company alleged that the Hawaiian canners’ demand for a higher duty must be aimed at the furtherance of their restraint of trade. It argued: The companies in the [HPGA] apparently include the entire pineapple packing industry of Hawaii, and they are undoubtedly able to control the price at which they purchase from the individual farmer. …[Furthermore] the Hawaiian packers have the latest improved machinery, and with the best possible quality of natural fruit in abundant and continuous crops, and with the additional advantage of the present duty, they will probably be able to drive all other pineapples out of the market and then fix prices to suit themselves.81 However, Johnson & Co. were unable to defeat the Hawaiian canners. The canned pineapple section in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 amended part of the Dingley Tariff to read ‘pineapples preserved in their own juice, not having sugar, spirits, or molasses added thereto, twenty-five per centum ad

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A Pacific Industry

valorem’. This meant that the effective duty on canned pineapples preserved in sugar was restored to 35 per cent ad valorem plus 1¢ per pound. The duty on fresh pineapples was increased from $7 to $8 per thousand, and from 7¢ to 8¢ per cubic foot, or 17.5¢ a crate to 20¢ a crate.82 The implications of the new Republican tariff were summarized by Henry A. Barnhart, a Democratic congressman from Indiana: [F]resh pineapples from Hawaii cannot be imported into the United States successfully, for the reason that…the cost of getting the fruit here is very high compared with the fruit imported from Cuba, and …the conditions of the climate are such that the fruit is not fit for use, especially for canning, when it reaches  the  United States.…It seems manifestly unfair and unjust that the canners in this country, employing a large number of men, should be forced out of business in order to help establish canneries in Hawaii, and that the entire American consumers of pineapples should be forced to pay a price much greater than they should pay that this business may be built up for people in Hawaii under artificial conditions.83 The strong recovery made by the industry in 1909 helped convince two continental US corporations, Libby, McNeill & Libby of Chicago, (one of the largest canners in the world and a subsidiary of one of the ‘big four’ Chicago meat packers, Swift & Co.), and the CFCA, the largest fruit canner on the West Coast and to a large extent a Jewish controlled corporation, to make substantial investments in the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry. In November 1910 Libby purchased half of the stock of the Hawaiian Cannery Co. from Fred W. MacFarlane, a prominent Honolulu businessman. The company, which had been founded the previous year, was renamed Libby, McNeill & Libby (Honolulu) Ltd. Libby subsequently purchased the remainder of the company’s stock. This allowed it to add canned pineapple to its growing range of products. MacFarlane became general manager of Libby’s Hawaiian subsidiary, a position he held until 1916. Libby invested $250,000 in the construction of a new cannery at Kahili with the very latest machinery on land leased from the Bishop Estate. It was completed at the end of June 1914. Libby’s rival meat-packer, Armour, also considered investing in the Hawaiian pineapple industry in autumn 1910. In January 1911 the CFCA purchased the Consolidated Pineapple Co., which had been hit hard during the crisis of 1908. Shortly before the crisis, James B. Castle had bought stock in the Consolidated Pineapple Co. after

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merger talks with the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had ended in failure. Castle had persuaded Castle & Cooke, which was partly owned by his family, to assist the Consolidated Pineapple Co. by liquidating its debts and to help harvest and pack its 1908 crop. Castle & Cooke invested $203,000 in the company. It appears to have been an unprofitable investment. Castle & Cooke were not to invest in a pineapple company again until the 1930s. The Consolidated Pineapple Co.’s assets were transferred to the Hawaiian Preserving Co., which had been incorporated by the CFCA in January 1911.84 By 1914 Libby and the CFCA were producing just under 40 per cent of the total output of canned pineapples in Hawaii.85 In late 1910 the American Can Co. had begun the construction of a new factory between the canneries of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and the Consolidated Pineapple Co., with a capacity twice that of the original one of 1906. The growth of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was largely responsible for the increased investment made by American Can. After the American Can Co. vacated its old factory, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. utilized the extra space to expand its own capacity. Another reason for the new American Can factory was its desire to introduce the new and improved machinery it had installed in its continental US plants. In 1910 American Can had seven manufacturing lines at its Honolulu factory. By 1934 it had 18 lines in its Honolulu factory and operated additional branch factories in Haiku, Kahului and Lahaina, Maui and Kapaa and Kalaheo, Kauai.86 While the investments by the CFCA and Hunt Bros. were the most important Californian investments in the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry before the First World War there were other Californian investments too. Isidor Jacobs, a prominent Californian canner, was vice-president of the Hawaiian Canneries Co. founded in July 1913 on Kauai.87 One of the most important of the company’s Hawaiian incorporators was its president, Albert Horner, Sr., a sugar planter and the successful inventor of sugar plantation machinery. His son, Albert Horner, Jr., was to play a leading role in the development of the company. After graduating from Cornell University in 1913, Albert Jr. spent a season with the California Canneries Co. He then joined his father’s company as cannery superintendent in 1915. Albert Jr. was appointed general manager of the company in 1921. In 1922 he succeeded his father as president of the company. Albert Jr. went on to invent many of the processing machines and pineapple products, which were widely used and sold in the inter-war period.88 The CFCA and Libby’s investment in the industry testified to the commercial success of the pineapple industry’s marketing strategy. The

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A Pacific Industry

industry’s subsequent close links with the continental US can also be seen from the practice of Californian canners handling Hawaiian canned pineapple to often ship it together with Californian canned fruits immediately before the First World War, according to Isidor Jacobs, president of the Central California Canneries Co.89 This was probably the practice of Hunt Bros., who acted as sole agents for the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. from 1903, and J.K. Armsby Co., who acted as agents for the Thomas Pineapple Co.90 In October 1912 many Hawaiian pineapple canners found that they were heavily oversold and that in some grades not more than a 50 per cent delivery was possible. By February 1913 all available stocks of the summer pack of 1912 had been absorbed by the market. However, the canners were aware that market conditions were unlikely to remain so favourable. They were to be proved correct. In summer 1913 the unsatisfactory financial situation in the continental US and the growing political tension in Europe was to have an adverse effect on the market for canned pineapple. On the eve of the First World War about ten per cent of the industry’s output was exported to markets outside the United States.91 Although the HPGA had been disbanded in 1910, on 12 December 1912, nine of Hawaii’s pineapple canners formed a new organization, the Hawaiian Pineapple Packers’ Association (HPPA).92 The HPPA’s aims were to promote the common interests of its membership, encourage the scientific development of the pineapple industry, to work for an adequate labour supply, to institute improvements in canning methods, to advance high standards for the finished products, to extend the demand for canned pineapple through judicious advertising, to improve transportation facilities, and to secure the enactment of laws beneficial to the industry.93 The HPPA voted an appropriation of 5¢ a case on the year’s pack, and launched a second cooperative national advertising campaign similar to that of its predecessor, the HPGA, throughout the spring and summer of 1913. This time the campaign was handled by Husband & Thomas of Chicago. The HPPA adopted the slogan ‘Always ask for Hawaiian pineapple, no matter what the brand, so long as it comes from Hawaii’ over their signature. Many of the advertisements appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. The Post was owned by Cyrus H.K. Curtis and was a man’s counterpart to his Ladies’ Home Journal. The Post had a circulation of over 2 million. The advertisements also appeared in magazines such as Good Housekeeping and daily newspapers across the continental US. As was the case with the first campaign, the second one included free recipe booklet offer. In 1914 the HPPA advertisements offered a free booklet, ‘How We Serve Hawaiian Pineapple’, written by 15 leading culinary experts. From 1915 the campaign

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started using full page advertisements featuring original artwork, including a drawing of a pineapple field. In November 1916, in a major innovation, an advertisement in Good Housekeeping featured surfers at Waikiki Beach with Diamond Head in the background (see Frontispiece). The second cooperative advertising campaign covered the period 1913– 7, the first three years appropriations being as follows: 1913, $26,000; 1914, $39,000; and 1915, $33,000. Once again, the first year of the second campaign, 1913, was accompanied by a price reduction of 34c a case, or approximately 11 per cent on the previous year’s price of $3.10.  The second campaign had been accompanied by a rapid movement of surplus stocks into consumption, and to a limited degree, further extended the distribution of canned pineapple in the United States.94  After 1917 there were to be no more cooperative advertising campaigns until 1921.95 During 1913 hearings were held on the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. While the HPPA may have had a strong case for tariff protection in 1908, this was no longer so in 1913. The success of the Hawaiian pineapple canners and the tariff on fresh pineapples had helped lead to the demise of pineapple canning in Baltimore.  However, during the 1900s annual production had fallen from a peak of 150,000 cases to 68,000 cases in 1909 and just 5,000 cases in 1910.96 The Hawaiian product had also forced down the price of its Baltimore counterpart.97  Furthermore, in the opinion of the Chicago correspondent of the Canning Trade: If Baltimore packers could exercise the same care and pack quality in pineapple [as the Hawaiian packers] and let the seconds and trash go into the sewer instead of the cans, and refuse to pack any but good, meritorious quality, they would soon regain their business in this article, as there are many who prefer the flavor of Bahama grown pineapple.98 In 1911 the high cost of production in Baltimore had persuaded most of the canners to cease canning pineapples, although this did not prevent production recovering to around 66,000 cases in 1914.99 The cost of production had increased at least in part as a result of the tariff imposed upon imported Caribbean fresh pineapples.100 During the same period Bahamian canned pineapple production had fallen and imports from British Malaya had also fallen by nearly 90 per cent between 1907 and 1913.101 Much the same arguments were made for and against the duty on pineapples as before. This time the Hawaiian canners were on the defensive,

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as the proposed tariff was aimed at reducing the barriers to foreign trade. During the presidential campaign of 1912 the Democrats had promised to reduce import duties. A.W. Eames, Sr., who had founded the Hawaiian Islands Packing Co., Ltd. in 1906, strongly refuted claims that the Hawaiian canners were engaged in restraint of trade in order to earn monopoly profits. All of the canners in Hawaii were independent of each other and few of them were especially profitable. Eames argued that the continued growth of the pineapple industry was a necessary condition for the economic development of Hawaii.102 To support the Hawaiian claim that their costs were higher than those of their competitors, Eames compared Hawaiian wage rates with those in British Malaya. Ordinary Malayan workers were paid from 8 to 10¢ a day and foremen and skilled workers 25¢ a day. By comparison labour in the Hawaiian pineapple plantations and canneries was paid from $1.10 to $1.33 for ordinary male workers, $2 to $3 a day for foremen and $5 to $8 a day for skilled workers and superintendents. The wages of Hawaiian pineapple workers had increased by 35 per cent since 1903 and would no doubt continue to increase. In Malaya the wage rates were stationary.103 Once again Hawaii’s case was opposed by J.S. Johnson & Co., and other East Coast import agencies. Robert Tynes Smith, the president of J.S. Johnson & Co., alleged that the Payne-Aldrich Tariff had had a disastrous impact upon their Bahamian subsidiary. Furthermore, prior to 1909, considerable quantities of canned pineapple had been imported from Malaya, increasing from 90,000 cases per annum in 1903 to 225,000 cases per annum by the end of the 1900s. As a result of the application of the higher duty on canned pineapple preserved in sugar, imports from Malaya had practically ceased. In 1912 only about 30,000 cases were imported, of which the greater part were unsweetened. Smith inferred that the high profits of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. were the result of the reduction in Malayan imports.104 The opponents of the Hawaiian canners were successful this time. The Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 reduced the duty on canned pineapples preserved in their own juice, or in sugar, to 20 per cent ad valorem. The duty on fresh pineapples was reduced to 6¢ per cubic foot, while the duty on pineapples in bulk was reduced to $5 per thousand. Given that the Underwood-Simmons Tariff represented a general reduction in duties compared with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the reduction in the pineapple duty is not surprising.105 The industry appears to fit the J.K. Galbraith’s theory of ‘contrived demand’ at a very early stage in its history. He argues that advertising

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and salesmanship, the management of consumer demand, are vital for planning in the industrial system. In the modern world few producers of consumer goods would want to leave the purchases of their products to the spontaneous and hence unmanaged responses of the public.   Hence wants are contrived by the manufacturer through advertising. There is no doubt that the industry attempted to contrive the demand for canned pineapple to allow for the increase in production.106 There was a conscious effort on the part of the pineapple canners to attract the middle class female consumer and her family through the advertising. This is clearly shown by the type of media used. As Mary Ellen Waller-Zuckerman has shown the advertisements in women’s journals ‘targeted. .. females with purchasing power. .. These women could be classified generally as middle class.’ 107  The advertisers appear to have assumed that most of the potential consumers of canned pineapple were middle class women. But Patricia Nelson Limerick cites an autobiography of a wife of a rancher in Montana that suggests in the late nineteenth century, most rural residents of this state lived on canned food, and a heap of empty cans could be seen outside every shack.108 Stephen Fox argues that from the 1890s it was routine for any new product to be introduced to the market by a wave of advertising, Van Camp pork and beans and Campbell’s soup being just two examples.109 However, the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry was the first American food industry to adopt nationwide cooperative advertising. The industry’s campaign antedated that of ‘Sunkist’ oranges and other citrus fruit by the Californian Fruit Growers’ Exchange (CFGE) by about a year. Although the CFGE’s cooperative campaign had begun a year earlier than the HPGA’s campaign, it only initially covered the State of Iowa. During 1908–09 it was extended to cover the rest of the Mid-West. In 1909–10 the campaign was further expanded to include the rest of the country with the exception of the Southeast. Furthermore the Sunkist brand was only used north of Oklahoma, Arkansas and the Ohio River. South of this line the ‘Red Ball’ brand was used instead. The first national advertising campaign for Sunkist citrus fruit did not take place until 1914.110 The pre-First World War advertising appears to have helped the Hawaiian canners capture a share of the growing market for convenience foods.111 Figure 2.1 shows how quickly the output of Hawaiian canned pineapple grew in this period. However, Figure 2.1 also shows that the output of Californian canned peaches, a close substitute, also grew in this period, albeit less consistently and from a relatively higher starting point. The Californian canned peach industry did not undertake any national cooperative advertising in this period. So it is important not to overestimate

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Figure 2.1: Production of Hawaiian Canned Pineapple and Californian Cling Peaches, 1901–14

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0

Year

Series 1 = Canned Pineapple Series 2 = Canned Peaches Source: PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P4; ‘Western Canner and Packer Product Survey: Canned Peaches’, WCP 26/6, October 1934, p.13.

the contribution of advertising to the success of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry in its formative years. The advertising campaigns would not have been possible without the establishment of a trade association by the Hawaiian pineapple industry. Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt have shown that institutions capable of coordinating the activities of industries in the United States began to be established through trade associations in the period before the First World War. This was the beginning of a more cooperative form of capitalism.  These trade associations, like the HPGA and HPPA, were to promote industrywide uniform standards, as for example in the case of the Baltimore Canned Goods Exchange and its successor the National Canners Association. These trade associations also financed research and development, as in the case of the HPGA’s successors. However, trade associations also had weaknesses, in particular their failure to suppress the competitive marketplace by preventing overproduction.112 Nonetheless William Lazonick, William Mass and Jonathan West have identified this kind of cooperation as an important form of competitive advantage.113

Pineapple Fever

41

Why did the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry succeed after 1903? In the early 1900s there already existed a market for canned pineapple in the United States of about 250,000 cases a year of which about two-thirds was canned in Baltimore from imported Caribbean pineapples and the remainder imported from British Malaya and the Bahamas. Furthermore, pineapples had been grown in Florida since about 1860. Florida was much closer to the principal American markets for pineapples than Hawaii and the fruit had been canned occasionally in the State. The Florida Experiment Station also worked hard to promote pineapple culture in the 1890s. However, the Floridian pineapple crop was susceptible to recurring periods of freezing weather every few years. Output of fresh pineapples peaked in 1910. Subsequently each winter gradually became colder and the pineapple plants were gradually destroyed. Those that survived produced small pineapples of inferior quality. Production was almost wiped out by the freeze of 1917. Attempts to revive the industry were unsuccessful.114 Hawaii was successful because its fresh pineapple production was both more reliable and lower in cost than that of Florida and its canning costs were also lower than those of Baltimore. However, this does not account for Hawaii’s success in displacing the Bahamas and British Malaya from the American market for canned pineapples. Singapore canned pineapple appears to have retailed at less than the price of the Hawaiian product throughout the pre-First World War period. Hawaiian canned pineapple was successfully established as a premium product in the American marketplace.  The early advertising placed great stress on the ‘fact’ that the Hawaiian product was a quality product. The speed at which the demand for Hawaiian canned pineapple increased in this period is remarkable. Although advertising and promotional efforts of enterprises attempt to increase demand for products and make the demand curve more inelastic by developing brand loyalties, tastes and preferences normally change slowly.115 The displacement of the Bahamian product has a simpler explanation. It was made uncompetitive by the tariff duty imposed upon it.

42

A Pacific Industry

3 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE INDUSTRY 1915–1930

The period 1915 to 1930 was in general a successful one for the Hawaiian pineapple canners. Figures 3.2 and 3.3, which show the profits for a major and minor pineapple canner, suggest that this was a profitable one for the industry, and not just during the First World War Boom. Figure 3.4 shows that the wholesale price of canned pineapple during this period was often substantially above that of its main substitute, Californian canned peaches. However, the differential in the wholesale price was partly related to the inelastic supply of canned pineapple throughout most of the 1920s. This was the result of two constraints on production. First, the low productivity of the plantations resulting from ‘pineapple wilt’, and second, the shortage of land for expansion. No such constraints existed in the case of the peach canning industry in California. In the continental US as a whole, capital investment in the canning industry almost quadrupled in the period 1914–29. Harvey Levenstein has argued that this partly reflected the virtual disappearance of domestic servants in middle-class households and the subsequent move to more convenient forms of cuisine. He argues it also reflected the rise of competing loyalties to peer groups and the new leisure activities of the 1920s.1 During the period 1915–30 all of the major Hawaiian pineapple canners entered what Richard S. Tedlow has called the second phase of marketing, the era of the national manufacturer’s brand. Previously their scale of production was insufficient to leave what Tedlow calls the era of commodities. Libby, McNeill & Libby had been a pioneer in the late nineteenth century in the second phase, long before it invested in the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry. Tedlow argues that during this phase a standardized, nationally

The Consolidation of the Industry

43

distributed product in a small package began to be individually named by the manufacturer. This led to the brand which could be advertised. Before the First World War, the Hawaiian pineapple industry had concentrated on cooperative advertising. This of course made it less easy for the individual canners to compete with each other for market share. Throughout the period 1915–30 there was a tension between the desire to cooperate and at the same time to compete.2 This chapter looks at the period 1915–30, which saw the consolidation of the industry. As will be shown, the Hawaiian pineapple canners survived the end of the post-war boom and expanded further during the 1920s, once again making use of advertising to introduce more American consumers to their product. However, all of the major companies found it increasingly difficult to gain access to the land they needed in Hawaii for expansion. The outbreak of the First World War in Europe had at first a very negative impact on the Hawaiian pineapple canners. The growing tension in Europe had already led to a fall in the wholesale price of canned pineapple from $2.05 to $1.64 between 1913 and 1914 as can be seen in Figure 3.1. During the first year of the war, the wholesale price fell to $1.48. The output of canned pineapples, which had risen by 36 per cent between 1913 and 1914, only rose by 17 per cent to 2.7 million cases in the following year.3 The fact that there was a rise at all was only a reflection of the two-year lag in the reaction of the producers to changes in demand. During 1914 and 1915, the Hawaiian pineapple canners on average made a loss on their sales of pineapples in the American market.   Many small independent pineapple growers on Oahu were compelled to let their crops rot in the fields because of their inability to sell their fruit, and for this reason a considerable acreage was allowed to fall into weeds.4 The price offered to Oahu growers for their fruit began to fall in 1913.  In the spring of 1913 the canners were offering $20 a ton for fruit. In the summer a cut in the price of the canned product was made and the price of green fruit fell to $15. Prices were further reduced in May 1914 so that growers who had contracts received about $11 a ton and the others even less.5 In August 1914 James D. Dole presented the canners’ side of the crisis of falling prices at a gathering of growers at Kuiaha. He stated that there were at least 7,000 tons of fruit ripening on Oahu which no canner would touch at any price, for the reason that he did not dare to spend the additional $40 to $50 to can it.  Some fruit was being offered at $5 a ton, but price had nothing to do with the crisis. He conceded that the cost of growing pineapple was about $15 a ton, and that growers were facing heavy losses, even where they had contracts.6 Although the low price of canned pineapple stimulated

44

A Pacific Industry

Figure 3.1: Average Annual Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Pineapple Per Dozen No.2½ Cans, f.o.b California, 1913–20*

5

Dollars

4 3 2 1 0 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920

Year

* Canners’ Quotations Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No.335, Wholesale Prices 1890–1922 (Washington, DC, 1923), pp.84–5.

demand, the 1914 pack was even larger than in 1913 and a considerable amount of it remained unsold at the beginning of 1915.7   However, the carryover was less than that after the 1913 summer season. This was at least in part the result of the low freight rates through the Panama Canal.8 On Maui the crop was also below expectations because the independent growers had not been planting heavily on account of price uncertainties. However, prices took longer to fall than on Oahu. The price paid to the independent growers on Maui in 1915 was $11.25 per ton for first class fruit, $10 down on 1914. This low rate accounted for the disinclination of these growers to extend their acreage. The fall in the independent cultivation of pineapples was not of immediate concern to the pineapple canners. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Libby, Haiku Fruit & Packing Co. and others, had large acreages of their own, and were only dependent on the independent growers for the marginal inputs of raw pineapples.  However, although these corporations had a large pineapple tonnage at their command throughout 1915, they did not wish to see the complete demise of the independent growers who were bearing a disproportionate part of the burden of adjustment to the downturn in demand. Thus in order to stimulate planting to ensure marginal supplies

The Consolidation of the Industry

45

in the long run, the canners decided to advance money to the independent growers in 1915, something that had not been done since the early years of the industry.9 The HPPA continued its advertising campaign in 1915 in an attempt to stimulate demand as has been shown in Chapter 2.10 The climax of that year’s campaign was the designation of November 10, 1915 as ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Day’ by the organizers of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco. This was one of a series of international expositions which had begun with the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London, England. Special entertainment features were provided. The 1915 event was widely advertised. Canned pineapple was placed before President Wilson and the State Governors on that day, and hotels and cafes throughout the United States featured Hawaiian pineapple.11 In San Francisco the day was observed in an impressive manner, the proceedings culminating in a celebration on the grounds of the Panama-Pacific Exposition that according to the San Francisco Chronicle was by far the most impressive of the events designed to promote a food product. An immense crowd was attracted and five thousand cans of pineapples were given away to visitors at the Palace of Horticulture.12 According to a report in the Canning Trade: Charles H. Bentley, of the California Fruit Canners’ Association, acted as chairman of the day and commented in a brief way on the importance of the pineapple canning industry, especially to California. His remarks were punctuated, as it were, by the gyrations of Art Smith, the aviator, far overhead, who looped the loop, wrote PINEAPPLE in the sky with his smoke pots and ended his performance with a sharp dip earthward, aptly termed ‘cutting the can’.…13 Research by the Hawaii Promotion Committee (soon to become the Hawaii Tourist Bureau) and the HPPA indicated that the ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Day’ had a satisfactory outcome.14 As noted in Chapter 2, the industry association continued its cooperative advertising for a further two years. In 1916 there was a slight recovery in the wholesale price to $1.53, as can be seen in Figure 3.1, though output was down two per cent on the previous year to 2.6 million cases, the first fall in production since the turn of the century.15 The over-production of 1914 and 1915, combined with the low prices for both fresh and canned pineapple, had practically exhausted the financially weak members of the industry, and had caused the sudden curtailment in production.16

46

A Pacific Industry

During August 1916 rumours swept the financial district of San Francisco to the effect that a merger would take place between the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., the Alaska Packers’ Association, the Central California Canneries, and J.K. Armsby Co.. The CFCA was also rumoured to be involved.17 On 17 August the rumour was reported in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser. The Advertiser was unable to get the Hawaiian Pineapple Company to respond to the rumour. Hence it would seem fair to assume that the company was probably involved in the negotiations.18  On 25 August 1916 Frank Anderson, president of the Bank of California announced a proposed merger between the CFCA, Central California Canneries, Griffin & Skelley Co., and J.K. Armsby Co., and the possible acquisition of 51 per cent of the stock of the Alaska Packers’ Association. The merger succeeded and on 19 October 1916 the California Packing Corporation (Calpak) was incorporated in New York.19 The merger was partly a response to the expansion of Libby, McNeill & Libby on the West Coast in the mid-1910s.20 It is significant that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. decided to retain its independence. The growing involvement of the United States in the First World War resulted in an upturn in the American economy.  This did not result in an immediate rise in the production of canned pineapple because of the two year lag between changes in demand and supply. Instead the increase in demand was reflected in a substantial rise in the wholesale price in 1917 to $2.00, which was almost the pre-war level, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. However, this increase in the wholesale price was also accompanied by an even more substantial rise in the cost of production. In 1916, the canners’ sugar cost $6.15 per bag of 100 pounds as against a price of $4.75 just before the First World War. By 1917 the price was $7.00 per bag. In a pack of a million cases of canned pineapple, the amount of sugar used was about 2,000 tons costing as much as $250,000.  At the same time the American Can Co. raised the cost of the tin cans used to pack the pineapples. In 1916, the cost of cans in Hawaii was about $17 per thousand. In 1917, the pineapple canners had to pay between $20 and $30 per thousand.21 The canners also had to deal with a major shortage of shipping space on the routes to their principal market, the continental US. Before the First World War a considerable part of Hawaii’s sugar exports were delivered to the US East Coast by the American Hawaiian Steamship Co., which used the Techuantepec Railroad, breaking bulk at ports on the east and west sides of the Isthmus of Panama. As sugar did not always fill these ships there was often space available for canned pineapple.22 In 1908, for example, the average freight rate per ton was $14.50.23 By the outbreak of the First World War, 60 per cent of the output of the biggest canner, the Hawaiian

The Consolidation of the Industry

47

Pineapple Co., was being shipped by the American Hawaiian line to East Coast ports (mainly Bush Terminal, New York City), at a freight rate of $12 per ton. The opening of the Panama Canal on 14 August 1914 initially resulted in lower freight rates. However, the First World War meant that they were short-lived.24 In February 1916, the American Hawaiian Line ships were withdrawn from this route and switched to other more remunerative routes because it was no longer profitable to operate the steamships in the Pacific.25  Thus the pineapple canners were faced with the difficulty of getting sufficient packaging materials into the Territory for the processing of their fruit and shipping their products to the continental US.26 In March 1916, the HPPA signed an agreement with the Matson Line to ship by that line a minimum of three-quarters of the annual pineapple pack for five years, the prevailing rate being $13.25 a ton.27 In 1917 the agreement was extended to guarantee space for shipping all of the canners’ materials to Hawaii, and for shipping their canned pineapple to San Francisco and further east by rail. The space was allotted on the basis of the output of the various members of the HPPA, and they agreed to pay Matson $1 per ton over the regular shipping rate.28 The demand for canned pineapple was boosted further in 1917 when the industry gained war contracts from the Navy Department.  Contracts for 1,687,500 pounds were awarded to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Pearl City Fruit Co., Libby and Calpak in mid-1917.29   In March 1918 the federal government purchased a large part of Calpak’s winter pack.30   In total Washington purchased 60 per cent of the industry’s winter pack. The pineapple canners fell far behind in filling orders for civilian consumption and were compelled to cancel some contracts. The federal government also requisitioned a large part of the summer pack of 1918 for Army and Navy consumption.31 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co., for example, received a contract for 180,000 cases.32 These war-time contracts probably had another indirect and long-term effect on demand. Many servicemen who were given canned pineapple to eat by the American Armed Forces had probably never encountered it before. There can be no doubt that subsequently there was a substantial increase in consumer awareness of the product.33 The economic recovery which began in 1916 was followed by further investments in the pineapple canning industry by the two continental US canners with subsidiaries in Hawaii. Libby increased its stake in the industry in 1916 by purchasing the Thomas Pineapple Co. The Thomas Pineapple Co. had been founded in 1906 by one of the original Wahiawa Californian settlers, Will P. Thomas, who had died the previous year.34 In May 1917,

48

A Pacific Industry

Calpak purchased the interests of the Hawaiian Islands Packing Co. for around $500,000.35 This company had been founded by another of the homesteaders at Wahiawa, A.W. Eames, Sr. His son, A.W., Jr., was hired by Calpak to manage its enlarged subsidiary.36 The intervention of the United States in the First World War and its immediate aftermath resulted in an enormous expansion of demand in the national economy. Between 1917 and 1919 production increased 195 per cent to 5.1 million cases, and the wholesale price increased 210 per cent to $4.23, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. Some of the industry’s leaders realized that this inflationary boom would eventually come to an end. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co., for example, counselled the wholesale trade in 1919 that it should distribute its purchases to its regular customers and not resale to speculators. The company suggested that the increase in demand for its product had been built up by keeping the price at a reasonable level, and that the Hawaiian pineapple canners had named the lowest price that year to keep the retail price within reason. James D. Dole declared that the opening prices in 1919 were made to enable retailers to sell No.2½ extra sliced or grated pineapple at 35¢ a can in the Eastern States and 30¢ on the Pacific Coast. He vigorously denounced speculators and profiteers, and declared that both were playing no small part in the inflation of 1919, particularly in the case of canned pineapple.37 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. gave a detailed explanation of why it had adopted this ‘far sighted policy’. In August 1919 A.C. Baumgartner, the company’s president and San Francisco sales manager,38 wrote  an open letter to a wholesaler in Chicago, to say that during this inflationary period where demand greatly exceeded supply the company occasionally paused to give thought to the future. The company had always given high priority to planning for the future. At the beginning of 1918, after careful consideration the company had issued prices for the year, not with the intention of charging ‘all the traffic could bear’, but with the idea of getting the products to the consumer at a fair price. In this there was nothing of altruism, the company was thinking of the industry, of the wholesale distributor, the retailer, the consumer, and the future. In March 1919 the company issued its 1919 season prices which were practically the same as in 1918. Baumgartner claimed that they were far below the market rate as the resale prices proved. He argued that in the inevitable readjustment, there would be competition of the strongest kind. During this period of excessive competition, who would be better able to meet the conditions? Would it be the man who has resold his contracts at speculative profits, or would it be the distributor

The Consolidation of the Industry

49

who had adopted the company’s policy and had supplied the trade upon the basis of his contract cost? Baumgartner argued that the buyer who had distributed his purchases among his customers at a reasonable profit would not only further the objective the company had in view when setting their low prices, but would also help to keep what had grown to be a very big business in a healthy condition in the future.39 This statement has to be seen in the context of an allegation made the following year that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had engaged in war profiteering during the First World War Boom. In April 1920, the leader of the Farm Bloc in the US Senate, Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, named the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. as one of a number of companies which had engaged in ‘prolonged, unlimited, and unconscionable profiteering.’ Capper believed businessmen who had engaged in profiteering should be prosecuted and sent to prison.40 Dole strongly refuted the charge. He argued that: We have been able to maintain prices to the trade at a level at which Hawaiian pineapple remains closer to normal pre-war prices than almost any other product, and the prices made by us in 1919 were approximately the same as those at which we first introduced our product upon the market in the years 1903, 1904 and 1905.41 Figure 3.2: Net Profit on Sales at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 1907–30 4

$ Million

3

2

1

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1925

1924

1923

1922

1921

1920

1919

1918

1917

1916

1915

1914

1913

1912

1911

1910

1909

1908

1907

0

Year

Source: Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities, No.20, Industrial Section, 1919 (New York, 1919), p.2888; Honolulu Stock Exchange, Manual of Hawaiian Securities: Statements of 1925 (Honolulu, 1925), p.99; Moody’s Manual of Industrials: American and Foreign Securities 1930 (New York, 1931), p.1334.

50

A Pacific Industry

Figure 3.3: Net Profit on Sales at the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd., 1910–34 400000 300000

Dollars

200000 100000 0 -100000 -200000 -300000 -400000 -500000 -600000 1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1925

1924

1923

1922

1921

1920

1919

1918

1917

1916

1915

1914

1913

1912

1911

1910

-700000

Year

Source: Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities, No.20, Industrial Section, 1919 (New York, 1919), p.2885; Honolulu Stock Exchange, Manual of Hawaiian Securities: Statements of 1934 (Honolulu, 1935), p.85.

However, it should be noted that Dole ‘had just purchased a fine home with land around it and a superb view over the sea and Diamond Head from the front, and up to the mountains on the other side.’ 42 Figure 3.2 shows that total net profits at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. did indeed more than treble between 1916 and 1920. But Figure 3.3 shows that profits at the much smaller Haiku Fruit & Packing Co. increased 27 times between 1916 and 1920. Calpak also took measures to stop speculators from exploiting the inflationary boom. From 1919 Calpak had the tops of the cans in which the ‘Del Monte’ brand was packed embossed with the ‘Del Monte’ trademark to discourage the activities of many speculators and exporters who stripped off the canner’s labels and relabelled the cans. This action was in line with a policy adopted at Calpak in 1918 to protect the whole line of products packed under this nationally advertised brand.43 In 1920, as the post-war boom started to falter, the supply of canned pineapples once again exceeded demand. The wholesale price, which had reached a peak of $4.48 in 1920, had slumped to $2.38 by December 1921, as Figures 3.1 and 3.4 show. Production also fell in 1921 and 1922. Output, which had risen from 3.8 million cases in 1918 to 6 million cases in 1920,

The Consolidation of the Industry

51

Figure 3.4: Monthly Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Canned Pineapple and Californian Canned Cling Peaches Per Dozen No.2½ Cans f.o.b. California, 1921–30* 4

Dollars

3

2

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1925

1924

1923

1922

1921

1

Year from January Series 1 Series 2

Series 1 = Canned Pineapple Series 2 = Cling Peaches * Canners’ Quotations Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins Nos.367 and 415, Wholesale Prices (Washington, DC, 1925–26); National Recovery Administration, Division of Review, Evidence Study No.47 of the Canning Industry Prepared by the Industry Statistics Unit (Washington, DC, 1935), p.12.

fell 12 per cent to 5.3 million cases in 1921, and a further 8 per cent to 4.8 million cases in 1922.44 The ‘conservative’ policy of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was proved to be well founded. Nonetheless, the industry was in a much stronger position at the beginning of the 1920s than it had been before the war. Figure 3.5 shows that in just ten years, 1909–18, the per capita consumption of canned fruit in the United States had risen threefold. The economic downturn which began in late 1920 caused the pineapple canners concern. However, although Hawaiian canned pineapple no longer commanded a premium price as it had done up to mid-1920, the wholesale trade was still accepting deliveries without question, something which was not true in all lines of canned fruit.45 Nonetheless at the dinner and annual

52

A Pacific Industry

meeting of the HPPA on 7 March 1921 James D. Dole suggested that it might be a good idea to begin another national advertising campaign. A committee of three, consisting of Dole, Robert I. Bentley and A.W. Eames, Jr. was appointed to investigate the matter.46 The committee decided to launch a third cooperative advertising campaign organized by the advertising agency, Erwin Waisey Co. of Chicago.47 The campaign began at the start of July. It cost a total of $185,000 and was conducted in continental US magazines and newspapers. Grocers were also encouraged to display Hawaiian canned pineapple in their windows. The CFGE had been using retailer window displays to promote Sunkist oranges since 1916. The HPPA believed the campaign to have been a success.48 However, Robert I. Bentley, president of Calpak, when reviewing the success of Calpak during the summer season of 1921 felt it was probably the result of the failure of the East Coast fruit crops.49 Figure 3.5: Annual Apparent Per Capita Civilian Consumption of Canned Fruit, 1909–41

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941

lbs

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Year

Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Bicentennial Edition, Part I (Washington, DC, 1975), p.330.

The Consolidation of the Industry

53

The HPPA also embarked upon a completely new initiative. During 12– 13 May a conference of factory superintendents was held in Honolulu, the first meeting of its kind.50 The conference led to the creation of the Hawaiian Canners’ Society within the framework of the HPPA on 3 June. Membership was open to all Hawaiian cannery superintendents or foremen.51 The society held annual conferences throughout the 1920s to consider a wide range of industry problems. In March 1922 it was decided to rename the HPPA the Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Canners (AHPC) placing the word ‘association’ first. The previous name had led to confusion with the names of individual member companies.52  The AHPC had exactly the same aims as the former HPPA.  In January 1923, as is shown in Chapter 5, the AHPC established an agricultural experiment station at Wahiawa, which was to play an important role in the Association’s work during the 1920s. The Hawaiian canners continued to lobby for the preservation of the duty on canned pineapple in the inter-war period.  During the hearings on the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, George B. McClellan alleged that the effective duty on fresh pineapples was much lower than that intended in the 1913 Act because of a loophole.  He argued that it should be closed to prevent the American market being flooded with cheap pineapples from Cuba. These undercut the market for the canned product. Fresh pineapples were a semi-luxury, not a standard staple of life, and could survive a higher rate of duty.53 He also argued: There is reason for this tariff correction being made because at the present time there are definite steps being taken to establish large fresh-fruit plantations both in Haiti and Jamaica, and there is reason to believe that a substantially large amount will come in.54 Victor Elting, who represented a large Chicagoan importer of Cuban pineapples, opposed McClellan. Elting stressed the financial contribution made by the importers of Cuban pineapples to American shipping, railroads and suppliers of packaging materials.55 A statement was also presented by Representatives William A. Rodenburg from Illinois and Harold Knutson from Minnesota opposing the proposed increase in the duty on canned pineapple. They argued that there was no justification for this increase. Ninety per cent of the canned pineapple consumed in America already came from Hawaii. Ninety-five per cent of all the workers employed in producing and canning pineapples in Hawaii were of Asian ancestry. It could hardly be argued that an increase in the

54

A Pacific Industry

duty would benefit ‘American’ workers. They also alleged that one of the Hawaiian canners, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., was earning monopoly profits. Furthermore the proposed increase in the duty did not have the unanimous support of the Hawaiian pineapple canners. Calpak and Libby, who produced a wide variety of canned fruit and vegetables in the continental US, were worried that an increase in the duty would result in retaliatory legislation on the part of other exporting nations, in particular Britain where there was a significant market for certain American canned foods. Rodenburg and Knutson proposed that the duty should be decreased rather than increased, otherwise the Hawaiian pineapple canners would gain a complete monopoly of the American market.56 This time, however, the opponents of Hawaii were defeated. The final paragraph in the Tariff Act of 1922 relating to pineapples was as follows: Pineapples, 22½ cents per crate of one and ninety-six one hundredths cubic feet; in bulk three-fourths of one cent each; candied, crystallized or glace, 35 per centum ad valorem; other prepared or preserved, and not specially provided for, 2 cents per pound.57 The effective duty on canned pineapple rose by over 300 per cent under the new tariff; under the 1913 Tariff a standard case of canned pineapple worth a hypothetical $1.5 would have been taxed 30¢, under the 1922 Tariff it was taxed 90¢. The effective duty on fresh pineapples imported in bulk rose 150 per cent. This increase has to be seen in the context of the 1922 Tariff Act as a whole, which raised average duties to about 33 per cent.58 In early 1922 the pineapple industry was faced with large accumulated inventories.  The success of the cooperative advertising campaign in 1921 led the AHPC to continue the campaign in 1922. Eight leading national women’s magazines with a total monthly circulation of 8.1 million and an estimated readership of 49 million were selected for the main thrust of the campaign.   Contracts were placed with the Ladies’ Home Journal, the Woman’s Home Companion, the Delineator, Good Housekeeping, Woman’s World, People’s Home Journal and The Modern Priscilla.  The campaign was focused on crushed or grated canned pineapple and began in the June issues of these magazines with both full colour and black and white advertisements. The campaign cost about $250,000.59 The AHPC used market research to estimate the total coverage of its 1922 advertising campaign. Formal market studies based on the sifting of population statistics had been pioneered by Stanley Resor of the J. Walter

The Consolidation of the Industry

55

Thompson (JWT) advertising agency.60 The AHPC estimated the total coverage of its campaign at 45.6 per cent of literate urban families and 34.6 per cent of the total number of literate families in the United States.  The distribution of the advertising media used by the AHPC meant that their campaign was skewed towards the North-East and Pacific Coast States, where total coverage was between 40 and 60 per cent, while in the SouthEast States coverage was between 10 and 30 per cent. Consumer advertising accounted for 89 per cent of the total expenses of the campaign, of which magazine space accounted for 93 per cent.61 From March 1922, the H.K. McCann Co. advertising agency handled the AHPC’s campaigns, which cost an average of $250,000 per year. They were designed to create a sustained consumer awareness of Hawaiian pineapple products in the United States through the medium of magazines and newspapers.  The advertising was followed up through the liberal use of recipe books showing the consumer how Hawaiian canned pineapple could be used in many ways. Schools where home economics and domestic science classes were conducted received a great deal of attention by the AHPC, and one of the members of the association reported in 1924 that ‘the response throughout continental United States had been remarkable.’ Window posting broadsides were also distributed to grocers. Supplementary advertising work included editorial matter in magazines wherever possible, publicity in schools and publicity in trade papers. The campaign was terminated in 1928 with an advertising campaign in the eight leading women’s magazines, which at that time had a combined circulation of 13.5 million. After 1928, the demand for canned pineapples outstripped the supply, so it was not considered necessary to continue the cooperative advertising campaign.62 As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, during the 1920s the canners experienced great difficulty securing additional land to produce sufficient pineapples to meet the demand for their product. This was despite the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s development of a huge new plantation on Lanai and less ambitious new developments on Molokai by Calpak and Libby. The experience of the first two cooperative advertising campaigns also brought to light the weaknesses of the individual Hawaiian pineapple canner’s marketing organizations. The national advertising, lacking the additional force of a coordinated sales strategy, had the effect of establishing an undesirable and sometimes uneconomic distribution pattern. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. decided to establish a sales department in the continental US. They hoped that salesmen, under the direction of a sales manager, could control the growth and direction of the company’s

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distribution in a coordinated manner. In 1915 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. established a sales department in San Francisco, in cooperation with their sales agent, Hunt Bros., and employed their first salesman. When the third cooperative advertising campaign began in 1921, the company ended its agreement with Hunt Bros. As a result the company subsequently expanded their sales force.63 Much the same sales strategy was adopted by the two minor pineapple companies controlled by the sugar factor Alexander & Baldwin—the Kauai Fruit & Land Co. and Baldwin Packers. During the formative years of these companies Alexander & Baldwin became increasingly dissatisfied with the sales agents of their pineapple companies, and assumed the responsibility for marketing their canned pineapples. Late in 1920 a salesman was employed to establish a Pineapple Department.64 The subsidiaries controlled by Alexander & Baldwin produced exclusively for the private brand market. This was also true for another minor pineapple canner in Hawaii, the Hawaiian Canneries Co.  Samuel F. Haserot was cofounder of the Haserot Co. based in Cleveland, Ohio, one of the most important American private brand canned food wholesalers. Haserot had visited Hawaii in 1913 and 1915 to investigate the pineapple industry. In June 1915 he became sales director for Hawaiian Canneries and acquired a stake in the company in order to secure a larger supply of canned pineapples for his private brand labels. Hawaiian Canneries expanded after the First World War. Land was leased from the neighbouring Lihue sugar plantation which was controlled by American Factors. This required allowing Lihue Plantation to acquire a share of the business in 1919, and American Factors to become the company’s agent in 1922. Later, during the Great Depression, the brief collapse of the pineapple industry resulted in American Factors temporarily increasing its stake in Hawaiian Canneries to 90 per cent. But the Haserot Co. remained one of the principal owners of Hawaiian Canneries until its dissolution at the beginning of the 1960s.65 Of the three major canners, only the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. produced for the private brand market. Indeed with such a large proportion of the company’s annual pack being sold to private brand buyers, no promotional effort was put on the brand names owned by the company. The company had marketed its products under a number of different brand names, including ‘Diamond Head’, ‘Outrigger’, ‘Hawaiian Club’, and ‘Paradise Island’. However by the 1920s production and consumer acceptance of the company’s products had reached a point where it became commercially unsound to continue on this basis.  The company decided that it was time to develop a single standard brand for its product. In a carefully devised

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plan, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. began a national advertising campaign in April 1927. This was the first time the company had advertised its product independently of the AHPC. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were earmarked for a campaign over several years. Dole planned to advertise in leading publications such as the Saturday Evening Post, Good Housekeeping, Pictorial Review and McCall’s Magazine. The advertisements were centred on the brand name ‘Dole’, which was stamped in bas-relief on the top of every can of pineapple produced by the company. This was a practice which had previously been adopted by Calpak during the First World War Boom. It was another kind of cooperative marketing venture, in as much as it added to the selling force of ‘own brand’ labels. In this period, pineapple was packed in three grades: fancy, choice and standard. The can tops were stamped ‘Dole 1’, ‘Dole 2’ and ‘Dole 3’ to identify those grades. The advertising was designed to enable consumers to identify the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s products from other company’s products, no matter what label the can carried.66 The advertising campaign was launched in a spectacular way. On 25 May 1927 James D. Dole offered $25,000 to the first flyer to cross from the North American continent to Honolulu, Hawaii, in a non-stop flight. Dole, a member of the National Aeronautic Association, set up the competition four days after Charles Lindbergh successfully completed his solo flight across the Atlantic from New York to Paris.67 The competition was held on 16 August 1927. Four airplanes left Oakland Airport, California, bound for Honolulu. On 17 August the two prizes of $25,000 and $10,000 were won respectively by Arthur C. Goebel’s ‘Woolaroc’ and Martin Jensen’s ‘Aloha’. Unfortunately, these men’s triumph over the ‘tyranny of distance’ was marred by the fact that the other two competitors who left Oakland failed to arrive. Despite an extensive search by the US Navy and one hundred sampans belonging to the Japanese-American fishing associations of Hawaii, nothing was ever seen of these two planes again. Indeed, to exacerbate the tragedy, an unsuccessful competitor in the ‘Dole Race’, who flew along the route taken by the competitors looking for the missing planes also disappeared and was never seen again. The Dole Race highlights the difficult relationship between Dole and Hawaii’s business leaders. Martin Jensen, whose plane won the second prize for Hawaii, had to mortgage everything he owned, borrow money on notes and rely on charity to secure funds to enter the race.  Although Hawaii’s sugar factors expected to get hundreds of thousands of dollars of free advertising out of the Dole Race, as Dole put up the prize money, they showed no generosity to the Territory’s own entry in the race. Neither the Honolulu

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Chamber of Commerce nor the Hawaii Tourist Bureau contributed any money. Jensen’s pilot, Paul Schluter, did not even have enough money to pay for his return trip to California. No steamship company was prepared to pay his fare, although the sugar factors’ steamship companies and hotels in Hawaii expected to benefit from the free advertising. Schluter’s passage home was eventually paid for by Dole.68 This confirmed Dole’s view that the oligarchy was after ‘his scalp’. Earlier in the year he had been involved in a public dispute with Lorrin A. Thurston, publisher of the Honolulu Advertiser, a leading member of the oligarchy. Dole had objected to the Advertiser’s support for a legislative appropriation to the Tourist Bureau on the grounds that it was no longer an infant industry. He alleged that ‘Unfortunately for me The Advertiser did not take the same interest in the pineapple business in the early stages that it now takes in the Tourist Business!’ Thurston strongly refuted the charge. He recalled that in the early days of the industry he had been attorney and adviser to James B. Castle, then the controlling owner of the Wahiawa Consolidated Pineapple Co. (Castle had also acted as Honolulu agent for the Captain Cook Coffee Co. in the early twentieth century. His brother, William Richards Castle, had purchased W.W. Brunner’s interest in the company around 1905.) Thurston recalled he was the representative of this company on the HPGA committee which under the leadership of Dole had initiated the first cooperative advertising campaign. Thurston recalled that he had backed the advertising campaign to the limit.69 The Dole Race established a general sales momentum for canned pineapple.   In 1928, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. packed more than 3.2 million cases, sold them for just under $16 million, and earned a net profit of $2.8 million.   During 1928 Robert I. Bentley, president of Calpak, visited Honolulu to discuss the possibility of a merger with the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. James D. Dole and his company’s board rejected Bentley’s terms as unsatisfactory.70 Dole declared that the ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is not making and has no intention of making any effort to sell out.’ 71 In retrospect, given what was to occur four years later, Dole should have accepted Calpak’s cash offer. However, at that time Dole could not have foreseen the collapse of his company. After Calpak’s cash offer had been rejected the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange for the first time at the end of November 1928.72  The company continued to face an expanding market for its products. In 1929 production was so short, that the company had prorate deliveries 15 per cent below sales. Stocks on hand fell to a bare minimum.  It was during this year that the company began a

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prolonged national advertising programme featuring the can top concept.73 On 1 November 1930 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. started an advertising campaign in continental US newspapers. This was the first time that the company adopted newspapers as an advertising medium. The company also increased its advertising space in magazines in 1931.74 The other two major canners in Hawaii produced canned pineapple exclusively for their own national standard brand labels, ‘Del Monte’ and ‘Libby’s’. They conducted separate advertising campaigns alongside their other lines in canned fruit. Libby, McNeill & Libby had used JWT to advertise its products since 1897. In autumn 1910 the Pacific Commercial Advertiser noted that Libby’s prolific Hawaiian canned pineapple advertisements mistakenly depicted Burmese rather than Hawaiian scenery and that Oahu was misspelt ‘Ohau’. This advertising campaign was before Libby invested in the industry that year. So Libby must have been already selling ‘Libby’s’ branded canned pineapple purchased from a canner already established in Hawaii. Later in 1916 Libby was persuaded by JWT’s Stanley and Helen Resor to undertake a radical new approach to food advertising. This consisted of 12 consecutive four-colour pages in all of the leading women’s magazines with each page devoted to pictures and recipes suggesting what the housewife could do with Libby’s canned foods.  This was at the time a revolutionary use of advertising space and copy treatment. Subsequently Libby’s canned pineapple advertisements were interspaced with others for their various different products and increased in frequency and number of media along with the evolution of advertising techniques.75 Calpak also marketed its canned pineapples under its own brand name after the formation of the corporation in 1916.   Calpak inherited more than 200 brand names from its predecessor companies. As Thomas Hine has observed, innumerable American canners produced very attractive cans emphasizing the quality of the produce inside. However, the cans did not establish the identity of the canner. This required the adoption of a clearly defined single brand. In early 1917 after a strenuous week of discussions between Calpak executives, H.K. McCann of the H.K. McCann Co. advertising agency and three executives from the Curtis Publishing Co., it was decided to make ‘Del Monte’ the brand to be nationally advertised. ‘Del Monte’ had been established in 1891, and originated with one of the CFCA’s founders, the Oakland Preserving Co. Calpak agreed on the former CFCA’s ‘Del Monte’ for various reasons: it already had the widest distribution of any brand owned by the new corporation, especially in the larger cities; its trademark was fully protected; and, it also had an attractive Spanish sound associating it with California.

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The first step was to impress the retailers and the second to attract housewives. A series of advertisements in the Saturday Evening Post beginning on 21 April 1917 acquainted the jobbers and retailers with the ‘Del Monte’ brand name and the ‘prestige’ of the corporation to which it belonged. The campaign was prepared by H.K. McCann Co. and it was continued for ten years in the Post to build up dealer acceptance. McCann, and its successor corporation, McCann-Erickson, handled Calpak’s advertising throughout the remainder of the inter-war period. When McCann merged with The Erickson Co. in 1930 the Calpak account was the new agency’s second largest. Subsequent advertisements aimed at the consumer were carried mainly in the pages of the six leading women’s magazines.  As was the case with Libby, coloured pictures were featured emphasizing the appearance of individual products which were accompanied by recipes. The advertising campaign succeeded in establishing the Del Monte brand name. Del Monte advertising was heavy, consistent and powerful, and Del Monte pineapple became a familiar sight in magazines and other publications, car card advertisements on trolley buses and underground railways, and on billboards in the 1920s. During this decade Del Monte pineapple was the brand leader in the United States.76 Just before the onset of the Great Depression demand for Hawaiian canned pineapple in the continental United States was so great that the canners were unable to fulfil all of their orders.77 However, after the Great Crash of October 1929 the demand for Hawaiian canned pineapples began to stagnate. In 1931 an expected pack of 16 million cases was cut back to 12.8 million.78 But this curtailment of production was not sufficient to prevent the wholesale price slumping from $2.20 in July 1929 to $1.50 in May 1931, as can be seen in Figures 3.4 and 4.1. Hence in July 1931 the AHPC voted an appropriation of $280,000 for an advertising campaign to be conducted principally in continental US women’s magazines with a combined monthly circulation of more than 12 million families, the Ladies’ Home Journal, Woman’s Home Companion, McCall’s, Good Housekeeping and Delineator, as well as some Sunday newspapers during 1931–32. The campaign, which began in August 1931, was handled by McCann-Erickson, Inc. This agency had also handled the AHPC’s previous campaigns in the 1920s. It was the first time in four years that the AHPC, as an organization, had launched an advertising campaign separate from those conducted by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Libby, and Calpak. It was hoped that this campaign would stimulate consumption, and be an important factor in moving the record-breaking pineapple pack of 1931.79 Unfortunately, it did

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not save the President of the AHPC, James D. Dole, from the financial collapse of his company. In 1929, hearings were held on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.  As in 1922, the canners in Hawaii were deeply divided. The AHPC took a neutral position, because Calpak decided to actively oppose the proposed increase in the canned pineapple duty, while Libby decided to take a neutral position.80 Hawaii’s Delegate in Congress, Victor S. Houston, acted on behalf of those canners in favour of the proposed increase.  He drew attention to the fact that although the 1922 duty on canned fruit was 35 per cent ad valorem, the duty on canned pineapple was 2¢ per pound. The effective duty on canned fruit was $1.32 per case, while that on canned pineapple was 90¢ per case. He proposed that the duty on Hawaiian canned pineapple be raised to 3¢ per pound which would bring the effective duty up to $1.35 per case. The Hawaiian canners adopted a different strategy at these tariff hearings.  Instead of emphasizing the fact that their costs were higher than those of their foreign competitors, they stressed their product’s image. Houston pointed out that the Hawaiian canners had pioneered cooperative advertising.  He argued that it was very easy to imitate a brand. It would be easy for a competitor like Cuba to use the name ‘Havana pineapple’ to confuse the American consumer. The image of the Hawaiian product could be destroyed by inferior imported products.81 James D. Dole argued that a considerable part of the imported canned pineapple, particularly that from Cuba, was sold to pie bakers and ice cream manufacturers, and consumers would not know they were not eating Hawaiian pineapple. The consumer who purchased a pie made from imported canned pineapple containing a high proportion of tough fibre was likely to be dissatisfied and stop ordering this product. A few thousand cases of the imported product would have a very serious effect upon the entire market for Hawaiian canned pineapple used for manufacturing purposes.82 The Hawaiian case was opposed by A.M. Lester, Vice-President of Calpak.   He argued that not only were imports of foreign canned pineapple declining, they were insignificant compared with Hawaiian production. Between 1924 and 1927 imported products averaged 70,000 cases compared with Hawaiian products which averaged 8,300,000 cases. Furthermore because British Malaya was the principal supplier of canned pineapple imports, the United States laid itself open to retaliation greatly more important on its large exports of canned fruit to Britain and Canada, than the comparatively small imports. Canned pineapple exports to Britain alone averaged 290,000 cases per annum between 1924 and 1927, while the exports of other canned fruits to Britain and Canada averaged 3,530,000 a

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year during the same period. As the United States was a surplus producing country, it was of particular interest to the domestic producers to see that no unnecessary steps were taken in the direction of antagonizing their foreign customers.83 Although average duties under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 rose from 33 per cent to 40 per cent, the duty on canned pineapple remained the same as under the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. Calpak and Libby were successful. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the duty on fresh pineapples imported in containers rose by 75 per cent and on those imported in bulk, by 50 per cent.84 During the period 1915–30 the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry underwent a process of consolidation. By 1930 three companies, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Calpak and Libby, accounted for over threequarters of total production. There is no doubt that there were considerable economies of scale in the processing of pineapple which could only be achieved by large companies, as will be shown in Chapter 5. However, there was also another important factor which contributed to the domination of the industry by large producers in this period. This played a major role in the case of the two continental US corporations, Calpak and Libby. During the 1910s the canned food brokers’ private label products began to be displaced by manufacturers’ standard branded products. Wholesalers and retailers concerned about the unreliable quality of private label products began to switch to the purchase of manufacturers’ standard branded products. In 1915 a Texan wholesaler, H.M. Hughes, had suggested that the growing importance of standard brands was also related to internal migration, particularly in the West and South-West.  Jobbers’ private label brands were highly localized.  So when people moved, the retailers in their new neighbourhood stocked completely different brands. Hughes believed that if retailers stocked standard brands which were sold throughout the United States, in many cases nationally advertised, they would gain an advantage over their competitors.85 As has been shown above, both Libby and Calpak produced exclusively standard brands by the late 1910s. The rise of standard brands was also closely linked to changes in the structure of the American retail sector in the 1920s. There was a sharp decline in the relative importance of independent retailers. This was mirrored by a steady rise in the number of chain stores from 4,606 to 69,534 during the period 1915–30.86 By 1929 chain stores sold nearly the same value of groceries at the end of the decade as the independent retailers.87 Unlike

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the independent retailers, many of the chain stores were indifferent to the private label brands of wholesalers, or their own brands. They favoured the standard brands in preference to private brands, because among other reasons they sold more quickly. The chain stores required fast moving lines because their margins were lower than those of the independent stores.88 In 1929 in Washington DC, for example, the margin, on an 1lb. 14oz. can of Del Monte sliced pineapple was 33 per cent for the independent stores, but only 26.4 per cent for the chain stores. Selling costs were virtually the same for each type of store, and the pineapple was retailed at 30¢ in the independent stores and 27¢ in the chain stores. A similar differential on a 1lb. 14oz. can of Libby’s sliced pineapple was recorded.89 Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported: the most frequently stated objection to private brands is the large amount of resistance which is encountered in their distribution. Extra selling effort and expense for advertising and promotion is necessary to build up consumer acceptance of such brands.90 One key measure of the success of the advertising campaigns for the standard brands is the degree of product differentiation which resulted. The aim of advertisers is to create innate product differences between their brand and the rival brands in order to charge a higher price.91 There is evidence to suggest that there was a significant degree of brand loyalty for Del Monte and Libby’s canned pineapple. The FTC found that a sample of standard brand canned pineapple retailed at $1.55, while a sample of private brand pineapples retailed at $1.43, a differential of 7.7 per cent. The principal substitute for canned pineapple, canned peaches, only had a differential of 1.8 per cent between the standard and private brands.92   The price differential in both cases was no reflection of the relative quality of private and standard brands. In the case of canned pineapple, the FTC data suggest an identical average quality rating of 88 points out of 100.93 It was its recognition of the changing structure of the American retail sector that led the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to begin its own advertising in 1927 with the embossed can top brand. However, this was not as effective as the standard brand labels. In 1929, in Washington DC, the retail price of Dole sliced pineapple was 29¢ as opposed to 30¢ for the Libby’s and Del Monte branded alternatives.94 The continued reliance on private brand distributors, and hence the failure to establish the same degree of brand

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loyalty for the company’s products, was to place the company in a weaker position in the market in the 1930s than its major rivals, both of which had established standard brands. However, the importance of standard brands in the period 1915–30 can be exaggerated. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. remained the largest producer of canned pineapple, even although it was dependent on the private brand market. The company believed that private brands would continue to be important in American internal trade. Like the minor canners, the company benefited from the cooperative advertising carried out by the industry in this period, which is no doubt why Dole was one of its principal advocates. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co., in common with some of the other companies, had embarked upon a major expansion of production in the 1920s, which will be looked at in Chapter 6. It could be argued that the industry overexpanded amid the exuberance of America’s Prosperity Decade. During the 1930s, as will be shown in Chapter 4, the industry was forced to undergo a painful readjustment.

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4 THE OCTOPUS STRIKES BACK 1931–1941

One might have expected the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry to be disproportionately effected by the Great Depression of the 1930s. After all canned pineapple was not a basic foodstuff like bread or milk. Indeed the pineapple industry did experience an implosion of demand from late 1931. In common with continental US canners the Hawaiian canners had huge quantities of unsold produce and experienced a collapse in the price of their products. Californian canners dumped their products on the market at below the cost of production. In Hawaii, as in the continental US, the large canners had more resources to restructure than the small canners. Small canners in both Hawaii and the continental US went out of business. The large national canners, such as Calpak, increased their domination of the industry. Price cutting meant consumers could still purchase canned foods in essentially the same quantity as before. In common with canners in the continental US the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry was also able to revive demand by taking advantage of a reducing diets craze. It effected the main consumers of its product and those of its new product, canned pineapple juice, that is to say the American middle class. This was reflected in the canned pineapple industry advertising from 1932 that claimed for example that canned pineapple was a source of vitamins hence it was good for you. Harvey Levenstein has referred to a ‘vitamin-mania’ in the 1930s. The magazines in which the pineapple canners advertised assured their readers that the scientific claims made by the canned food industry were true.1 This chapter looks at the experience of the canned pineapple industry during the Great Depression. It was the collapse of the canned pineapple industry and the construction industry in late 1931, rather than that of the sugar industry, which heralded the arrival of the depression in Hawaii. Before the late part of 1931 construction work in Hawaii had been at a peak, as had the pineapple

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industry. The construction industry had been competing with the pineapple industry for additional labour. The magnitude of the collapse of pineapple industry employment in late 1931 can be seen by the fact that a comparison with the first six months of 1931 and 1932 showed a decrease of over 55 per cent in total man days.2 Unlike in the continental US, the depression in Hawaii proved to be relatively short-lived. Perhaps this was a reflection of the institutional structure of Hawaii. Noel Kent argues that the sugar planters sought to protect the territory’s existing socio-economic structure during the 1930s. But he does not believe that this structure provided the Hawaiian economy with the capacity to isolate itself from the depression.3 However, in fact Hawaii’s business leaders did succeed in insulating the Hawaiian economy from the worst effects of the depression. The sugar planters sought to adjust to the depression by adopting three measures. The first was the repatriation of unemployed Filipino workers, as will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 7. Thus they exported a significant part of Hawaii’s unemployment to the Philippines. Unemployment peaked at estimated 6.9 per cent and a year later was only about 3.0 per cent of the civilian labour force, compared to 21.7 per cent in the continental US. The second was a reduction in their costs of production. The principal means of achieving this was to substitute machinery for labour. The third was economic diversification. As will be shown in this chapter the sugar industry diversified into pineapple canning.4 The immediate effects of the depression for the pineapple industry were catastrophic. Between 1931 and 1932 the production of canned pineapple fell by 60 per cent from 12.8 million cases to 5.1 million cases.5 There were already warning signs before the close of 1930 that the pineapple industry was on course for an extremely turbulent period. The wholesale price of canned pineapple had peaked in 1929. By mid-1931, inventories were rising at an alarming rate, and the pineapple canners decided to curtail production. Lower grade fruits were discarded and only the best quality fruits were canned. In late September both the Hawaiian Canneries Co. and the Kauai Pineapple Co. suspended production for the rest of the year. Other canners also suspended production too. It was estimated that only 75 per cent of the 1931 crop was harvested. The pineapple canners began to come under severe financial pressure, especially the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which had undertaken an ambitious expansion programme in the 1920s. They had begun to cut prices the previous year. In July 1930, prices were cut by 16.5 per cent below those of 1929. In April 1931 they were cut to 24 per cent. Late in October 1931,

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following the lead of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., the Hawaiian canners made further drastic cuts in prices, they were cut to 42.5 per cent below those of 1929. Prices were now at their lowest level in the history of the industry. Yet these reductions failed to achieve their objective, and there was a large carry-over into 1932.6 The industry was now marketing its output far below the costs of production, and this had a devastating effect on the weaker members of the industry. Two of the minor canners went bankrupt, and one of the three major canners also became a casualty of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The cost of its expansion of production during the 1920s, and in particular the Lanai development, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, meant that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. became financially over-exposed after the Great Depression began to adversely affect sales of their product in the continental United States. The company was already under severe financial pressure at the beginning of 1931. Figure 4.6 shows that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. posted a net loss of $3.8 million in 1931. In April, James D. Dole was forced to raise a $5 million loan. The loan was underwritten by a syndicate of banks and finance houses controlled by Hawaii’s business oligarchy, Bank of Hawaii, Bishop First National Bank, Hawaiian Trust Co., and the Bishop Trust Co., distributed through a continental group headed by the American Securities Co. of San Francisco and Pierce, Fair & Co.7 This was to prove in retrospect a fatal error of judgment on the part of Dole, as will be shown below. Dole sought to avert the impending crisis by adopting a ‘conservative financial policy’.8 One of the most important parts of this policy was the reduction of the excessive cost of shipping the company’s product to the United States. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had paid very little attention to this large component of their costs until after the beginning of the Great Depression in the continental US in late 1929. However, it seems to be the case that shipping costs had been high throughout most of the history of the company. During the First World War, according to Dole, the Matson Navigation Co. maintained rates during the war which under the circumstances were very low. So after the resumption of peace in November 1918, he was very reluctant to press them for a lower freight rate, or to force a considerable part of the movement of their goods back to their natural channel, which was by sea from Hawaiian ports to the large metropolitan centres on or near the East Coast. However, the matter was occasionally discussed by the Board of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., particularly as freight rates began to fall between the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic ports, thus leading to heavier

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shipments at low rates of canned fruits and other competitive products from Pacific ports to the Atlantic Coast. During the 1920s the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. established the practice of shipping canned pineapples by the Matson Line to San Francisco, rehandling it in the port, and reshipping it from San Francisco to the East Coast by the inter-coastal shipping lines.9 In 1924, for example, 83 per cent of direct water-borne trade in canned pineapple between Hawaiian and overseas ports was with San Francisco. Another 5.8 per cent was with other West Coast ports.  Only 10.3 per cent was with Gulf and East Coast ports.10 This was an inefficient method resulting in increased damage to the goods caused by the extra handling. It entailed the payment of the full freight rate from Honolulu to San Francisco and the full rate from San Francisco to the East Coast ports. The freight rate for this reached a peak of $14.95 per ton, and was later reduced to $13.95 per ton. The reduced profit margins on its products that followed the financial collapse in New York in autumn 1929 resulted in a need for lower costs, which led the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to give increasing attention to the desirability of taking advantage of the lower rates offered by shipping lines in the Pacific. It became apparent to Dole that the sugar planters were ahead of his company in this direction, shipping sugar from Hawaii by the Isthmian Steamship Co., a subsidiary of the US Steel Corp., to the East Coast at $7.5 per ton, later reduced to $7. In 1929, someone forcefully drew Dole’s attention to the fact that he was paying a price for cans based on a Honolulu price for tin plate, which was devised by adding to the f.o.b. East Coast price the full combination freight rate by way of San Francisco.   The same Isthmian Line ships were going through Honolulu with tin plate in their holds which they were delivering in Japan at a freight rate from the East Coast of between $7 and $8 per ton. Dole accordingly, requested the American Can Co. to take up the matter with the US Steel Corp. which immediately inaugurated a $9 freight rate from the East Coast to Honolulu. The new $9 freight rate for tin plate and the increasing volume of sugar being shipped from Hawaii at a low rate by this route caused Dole to give further attention to the subject.  He took it up ‘very vigorously’ with the Matson Navigation Co. over a period of many months, pointing out the necessity of direct shipment to the East Coast and lower rates between Honolulu and San Francisco. The Matson Line, after suggesting that they might be prepared to reduce the rate to $10, changed their minds, and decided not to take any action.

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In February 1931, after weeks without any action, Dole took up the matter in person with Edward D. Tenney, Chairman of Castle & Cooke, and Chairman of the Matson Navigation Co. (Castle & Cooke were the Honolulu agents for Matson).   After outlining the problem, Dole asked Tenney to advise him as to the best course of action. Tenney replied that it was clearly Dole’s duty to secure the desired freight rate for his stockholders if he could do it. He suggested that Dole ought to give Matson a chance at it. Shortly thereafter Dole received a communication from Matson, through Castle & Cooke, offering the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. an $11 rate to the East Coast, it being understood that Matson and the Isthmian Line would be working together. However, Dole thought that the $11 rate was altogether too high under the circumstances. He did not feel that his company would be justified in accepting it. He was fully convinced that shipping conditions in the world were such that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. could secure a rate of $10 or lower, even if he did not use the Isthmian Line. Dole decided to put the matter before the ten directors of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., five of whom were also directors of Castle & Cooke. After a full discussion of the subject, and with no arguments against following the example of the sugar planters in shipping to East Coast ports by the Isthmian Line, a motion was unanimously carried that the proposition on behalf of the Matson Navigation Co. be rejected. Furthermore, Dole, as president of the company, was given full authority to use his own judgment in negotiating a freight contract. However, Dole failed to note an important qualification ‘that the Matson Navigation Company are to participate in the agreement if such participation can be arranged without too great a sacrifice.’ 11 In May 1931 Dole concluded a three year contract with the Isthmian Line in New York. It provided for the direct shipment of canned pineapple from Hawaiian ports to Gulf and Atlantic ports at a freight rate of $10 per ton, as compared with the former rate of $13.95. It represented a saving of $72,000 compared with the $11 quoted by Matson. Even taking into account Dole’s assumption that direct eastern shipments would increase from 44 per cent to 60 per cent of the total the saving was still only $96,000.12 Dole  was aware of the wider implications of this agreement. As he said: it seems economically unsound to ship Honolulu-New York freight to San Francisco, break bulk and reload.…The San Francisco aim is that Hawaiian freight should move via San Francisco and take a rate equivalent to the rate from Honolulu to San Francisco, plus the rate

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A Pacific Industry from San Francisco to the East coast.…The heart of the matter is that over a period of time the cheaper we can get out Hawaiian products to the people of the United States, the sounder is the economic structure of Hawaii. To this end we must constantly be at work.13

The Isthmian agreement was welcomed by many of the opponents of the business oligarchy that controlled Hawaii. The editor of the Hawaii Hochi, Frederick Makino,14 regarded it as one of the most important recent developments affecting the interests of everyone in the Territory: The transportation tentacle of the Octopus which has held Hawaii in its grasp for so many years has been given a severe blow. It is writhing and twisting in a desperate attempt to renew its hold, but its suckers are loosening and slipping. Already a large share of the pineapple business has escaped from its clutches. Other shippers are threatening to follow the example of Jim Dole and break away from the monopoly… Jimmy Dole certainly started something when he slipped this one over on the people who had been squeezing him on freight rates.… Now [William P.] Roth [President of Matson] is frantically trying to repair the damage and prevent a stampede of competition that would free Hawaii from the grasp of the Octopus!…15 Unfortunately, for Dole, the businessmen who controlled the Matson Navigation Co. did not appreciate his unwillingness to accept their control over the Hawaiian economy.16 As the Hawaii Hochi had observed, in the 1920s Matson had secured a virtual monopoly of all freight and passenger shipping touching Hawaii. By the late 1930s Matson controlled over 98 per cent of the freight carried to and from Hawaii and the West Coast ports. This situation was the result of extensive advertising and the establishment of modern hotels and recreational facilities in Hawaii, and in particular its inter-corporate relationship with the sugar industry of Hawaii.17 They had no wish to see the re-introduction of open competition and deeply resented being forced to respond to this agreement by reducing to within fifty cents of the Isthmian rate, their rate for shipments from Hawaii to Atlantic and Gulf ports via San Francisco.18 After having made a net operating loss of $3.8 million in 1931, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. made losses of $5.5 million during the first nine months of 1932. Dole tried unsuccessfully to raise a new $5 million loan in San Francisco in April. This provided the opportunity for the sugar factor,

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Castle & Cooke, a minority shareholder in his company, to force through a plan for the reorganization of Dole’s company, under which they gained a 56.25 per cent share in the company, thus giving them majority control. Dole was removed from effective control of the reorganized company and replaced by Atherton Richards.19 Richards appeared to be a safe establishment figure.20 The Hawaii Hochi observed that the reorganization was cited by propagandists as an example of the care taken by the ‘local financial moguls’ to protect the interests of the small investors in the company. However, as the Hochi correctly observed in fact ‘it [took] Mr. Small Stockholder for a ride—and [left] him to walk home!’ Small investors who could not afford to participate in the reorganization were left with stock in a shell company worth a small fraction of their original investment.21 It is clear that Dole had not expected Castle & Cooke to take this course of action.22 As he despondently wrote in 1934: Apparently the conclusion of this contract with the [Isthmian Line] caused considerable stir, resentment and bad feeling in Honolulu. This is something I have never been able to understand. I think that the record…shows that my action throughout was clear, clean and that if any of the Castle & Cooke directors [on the board of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.] sensed danger to the…[c]ompany in allowing me to do what they authorized their warnings should have been expressed at the time of the directors’ meeting [of March 1931] either by their vote or by some word of caution.23 Castle & Cooke had also been worried that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. might be purchased by a continental US corporation. General Foods had offered to purchase the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. both in 1929 and in 1932.24 The idea of outsiders purchasing Hawaiian Pineapple [had] sent shivers up the spines of local business leaders, who prided themselves on the home ownership of practically every island industry.25 It is not entirely clear whether the disagreement over shipping rates was the only reason why Hawaii’s business leaders withdrew their support. One of the banks that refused to continue its credit accommodation was the Bishop First National Bank. Ironically, Dole was a director of this bank and had been one of the incorporators of a predecessor of this bank, the

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Bank of Bishop & Co., Ltd., in 1919. He had served as a director of this bank until July 1929, when it had been merged with a number of other banks to become the Bishop First National Bank. He was a director of Bishop Co., Ltd., the holding company for the Bishop First National Bank, and a director of the Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.26 One of the directors of the reorganized Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was George P. Rea, Executive VicePresident of the Bishop First National Bank.27 Contrary to some accounts Castle & Cooke did not seek to exclude Dole from any further role in the company which he had founded. They valued his invaluable knowledge of the canned pineapple industry. But Dole refused to believe that he had lost control of his company and tried to continue to manage the company. In July 1934 the situation became intolerable after Dole submitted a report to the company making several allegations including that the new regimé was trying to discredit him. However, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. believed that no such attitude to Dole had existed. ‘Certainly no group could spend so much money in the enthusiastic advancement of Mr. Dole’s name and at the same time do anything to disparage or belittle the person…’. No organization the size of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. could function with more than one executive head. Since Dole found it impossible to cooperate successfully with Richards it was in the best interests that he sever his relationship with the company as an executive officer. Dole was offered and accepted the position of consultant with a retainer from the company of $30,000 per annum when the net profits of the company for the previous year available to shareholders exceeded $2,500,000.28 Castle & Cooke exacted a heavy price for reorganizing the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. They made the reorganized company enter into an agency agreement with them, by which they gave the company (a) financial supervision, (b) auditing, accounting and tax supervision, (c) sales and distribution supervision, (d) purchasing supervision, (e) engineering, land and insurance advice and (f ) acted as stock transfer agent.29 Thus Hawaii was left with only two major pineapple canners, Libby and Calpak, outside the control of the Hawaiian sugar factors. The agency agreement meant that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was obliged to acquire all the goods and services it required to conduct its business from companies controlled by or affiliated to Castle & Cooke. This meant the company was no longer free to seek the lowest cost providers of these goods and services.30 In late 1939, Richards decided to establish a new pineapple plantation on Molokai in order to reduce the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s dependence on the Waialua Agricultural Co. Most of the company’s land on Oahu

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was leased from this plantation, which was controlled by Castle & Cooke. Negotiations were conducted for over a year with Charles M. Cooke, who owned the Molokai Ranch, the largest private land holding on the Island.31 Discussions were also held with the Hawaiian Homes Commission regarding the possibility of putting more of the Hoolehau lands under pineapple cultivation.32 The plan formed part of a challenge to Castle & Cooke’s control of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. In July, before the 1940 annual stockholders’ meeting Richards made his challenge public in a memorandum to the stockholders of Castle & Cooke, in which he made a number of allegations including the claim that the management of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was being subjected to ‘intrusion and harassment’ by Castle & Cooke.33 It can have been no surprise to Richards when his Molokai plantation plan was rejected his company’s board of directors on 20 September 1940.34 His fellow directors decided that he would have to resign. However, Richards’ uncle and fellow director, Frank Atherton, changed his mind and persuaded his fellow directors to give his nephew a second chance as president of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Nonetheless, from October Richards’ differences with Castle & Cooke became irreconcilable.35 On 28 April 1941 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s Board of Directors requested Richards’ resignation and in failing to receive it, removed him as President. He was replaced by Henry A. White.36 At the annual stockholders’ meeting of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. on 21 August 1941 A.E. Steadman raised the question as to why Richards had been dismissed as president five weeks before the end of the fiscal year.37 The company chairman, James D. Dole, was one of the representatives of the company who responded. It must have been with some irony that he gave the following explanation: in every corporation there may come a time when a situation arises when there is not complete harmony between stockholders, directors and the management. That happened in 1931 and 1932 under my regime.  Mr. Tenney and I disagreed as to the shipping of sugar and pineapple. That resulted in a condition where I was not able to get the wholehearted support of the powers behind the company and I was asked to resign, which I did. A situation has arisen in the Hawaiian Pineapple Company where something similar is necessary…38 The reorganization of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in 1932 temporarily solved the problem of over-production. Between 1931 and 1932, the

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Figure 4.1: Monthly Wholesale Price of Hawaiian Canned Pineapple and Californian Canned Cling Peaches Per Dozen No.2½ Cans f.o.b. California, 1931–41* 2 1.9 1.8

Dollars

1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2



Series 1



Series 2

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1931

1

1932

1.1

Year from January

Series 1 = Canned Pineapple Series 2 = Canned Cling Peaches * Canners’ Quotations Source: National Recovery Administration, Division of Review, Evidence Study No.47 of the Canning Industry Prepared by the Industry Statistics Unit (Washington, DC, 1935), p.12; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wholesale Prices (Washington, DC, 1936–42).

Hawaiian pineapple companies cut the canned pineapple pack from just under 13 million cases to just over 5 million cases. The wholesale price which had stood at $1.95 in January 1931, fell to $1.45 in October 1932, as can be seen in Figure 4.1. The fall in output was much greater than the fall in the per capita consumption of all canned fruits in the continental US, which in 1932, was only 20 per cent down on the peak in consumption of 12.8 pounds in 1930, as can be seen in Figure 3–5. The appalling over-production in the pineapple industry led to a strong movement towards the organization of an agricultural cooperative association to bring the supply back into equilibrium with the demand for canned pineapples. In a special session of the Territorial Legislature in the spring of 1932, changes were made in the laws governing cooperative associations to bring them in line with federal legislation, in particular the

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Casper-Volstead Marketing Act of 1922 and the Agricultural Marketing Act 0f 1929. These changes in the laws opened the way to the organization of a pineapple cooperative association.39 After long and protracted negotiations in mid-1932, seven of the canners agreed on 30 August 1932 to set up a non-profit making organization, the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association (PPCA) to cut back production. (The Canners’ League of California subsequently agreed to handle the statistical work for the PPCA.)40 There is no doubt that the failure of the Californian peach curtailment plan, which increased the possibility of a heavy supply of canned peaches, helped win over the waverers.41 Production was limited to 5.3 million cases in 1932, in the hope that this would effectively eliminate the stocks in the warehouses by the beginning of the new season of 1933. Only top grade pineapples were canned.   At the same time many thousands of inferior grade pineapples were left to rot in the fields, and the planting of new areas was restricted. The difficulties experienced at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which only produced 850,000 cases that year, meant that the target was easily met. The total pack was just over 5 million cases, and most of the accumulated stocks in the warehouses were sold.42 The PPCA did not restrict itself to the curtailment of production. It also adopted the by now old and well proven policy of stimulating demand by advertising their product in the continental US. In November 1932, the PPCA’s Advertising Committee completed plans for the launch of an aggressive advertising campaign costing $1 million. It was one of the largest advertising campaigns launched on a single food product up to that time. JWT was appointed to handle the campaign. Jonathan Silva suggests that JWT was an agency with unparalleled experience of working with food processing companies, which by the late 1920s had led it to begin to define its role as a marketing consultant to its clients. Thus it had ‘extended its role within its clients’ businesses to include packaging, sales force composition, product selection, product distribution, market identification, and market research…’. 43 After a thorough analysis of all the available media, the Advertising Committee decided to use leading women’s magazines to spearhead the campaign. The five chosen, together with the Saturday Evening Post, had a combined monthly circulation of 18 million households. The women’s magazines’ influence on the dietetic and food buying habits of the American public made them the valid medium of pineapple advertising. The Post was an important supplementary medium in homes receiving one or more of the women’s magazines, and a medium of great independent value too. In

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these homes the Post increased the advertising’s readership; it added to the number of advertising impressions per month, and because a pineapple advertisement in the Post might frequently be seen when it was overlooked in the women’s magazines. The Post had the further value of expanding the number of prospects created by the advertising in any one month. Moreover the Post’s high readership per copy of both men and women gave it special value in reaching both sexes, especially men. The Post also had a great influence on American culture. Over a period of many years it had influenced the selection of advertised goods no less than it had directed and shaped American public opinion on current affairs. As a food medium the Post exceeded every other general magazine except the Ladies’ Home Journal in amount of advertising investment. It was found on the lists of most of the leading food advertisers. An intensive campaign was also carried in daily newspapers in 75 of the larger metropolitan centres, with a combined circulation of 12 million households. In addition, full page and 1,000 line insertions were carried in the American Weekly with a circulation of 5 million households, a market of some 20 million people. The American Weekly was distributed with the Sunday editions of the 17 metropolitan newspapers published by William Randolph Hearst and was a means of reaching low income consumers. Nutritional and professional cookery, domestic science and hospital publications were also used. Trade journal displays were sent to wholesale and retail outlets, including grocers, confectioners, soda fountains, hotels, bakeries and hospitals. The nationwide campaign was inaugurated on 19 November 1932 with a double page display in the Saturday Evening Post. The campaign slogan was ‘follow the newest dietetic advice—start or end one meal a day with canned pineapple.’ A pamphlet entitled ‘The nutritional value of canned pineapple’ was also published for distribution to medical practitioners.44 The campaign was aimed at the upper segment of the American market for food products. It had been found in the past that only half of the 25 million white American households were consistent purchasers of packaged food products.  Repeated surveys by JWT had shown that this 50 per cent were responsible for purchasing between 75 and 80 per cent of the supply of quality foods.  This was the case in both prosperity and depression, because this group represented the United States’ major purchasing power; the people who in 1932 still had money to spend, were able to respond to food product advertising. JWT targeted concentrated groups of these people, living near the best shops, buying profit-carrying goods when it chose the magazines. Magazine readers, those whose budgets still allowed magazines, tended to

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be conservative. JWT argued that although these readers were slower to respond, once they accepted the product, they embraced it permanently. All of the PPCA’s advertising was concentrated on these known purchasers.45 JWT also persuaded some of its other clients to collaborate with the PPCA campaign after it was launched. The most important of these was the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., owner of one of the largest groups of chain stores in the United States, the A & P stores. This was the most important innovation in pineapple advertising for many years. Chain stores had attracted a growing proportion of retail sales in the 1920s. The A & P stores agreed to coordinate their own advertising with that of the PPCA.46 By the beginning of 1933 there was clear evidence of a revival in demand and sales. In late January, a second wave of national advertising was launched. By the beginning of March 1933 evidence had emerged which suggested that the recovery in sales was strongest in the chain store sector of the retail trade.47 In late April 1933, a third wave of the campaign was launched. A large part of the sales effort was concentrated upon leading American chain store groups such as A & P, Piggly Wiggly and Safeway, that had already cooperated with the PPCA’s activities. This wave of the campaign was begun by the distribution of display material to thousands of chain store and independent retail outlets to facilitate floor and counter displays.48 This campaign finished in July 1933, with generally satisfactory results. The carry-over of unsold products in Hawaiian warehouses on 20 June 1933 was estimated to be under two million cases, the smallest total for several years.49 JWT had insisted on a contract in which it reserved to itself the right to prepare all copy for publication, stressing whatever its staff considered the best-selling points. The PPCA placed its trust in the advertising agency and there is little evidence to suggest that it initially sought to influence the advertising strategy of JWT, even though the cooperative had an office in San Francisco. It is interesting to note that JWT also did all of the market analysis work for the PPCA, allowing JWT to assess the effectiveness of its own campaign.50 Later, as will be shown below, the PPCA began to question the efficacy of JWT’s advertising copy.51 At first the PPCA was principally concerned with the limitation of production and advertising.  This involved the sacrifice of large sums already invested in agricultural operations.   However, after the reorganization of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in late 1932, mere limitation was found to be increasingly ineffective.52 Although the first marketing agreement of the PPCA covered production control to some extent, it failed to bring about any substantial degree of orderly marketing.  There was no pooling

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of products and there was insufficient incentive to discourage discounts and other undesirable marketing practices. The PPCA had hoped that the agreement might be sufficient if a satisfactory balance of production with demand could be achieved by determining annually for each ensuing year the total market requirements, and by then allocating to each member a fixed percentage thereof, less in each case the carry-over of each member. However, the result of the agreement was that each member would be penalized if they failed to obtain sales for their entire quota. The penalty consisted of a proportionate reduction of such member’s quota pack for each ensuing year. The net effect of this was to put a premium on disorderly marketing. Each member was afraid that they would be their own and not a common industry problem, unless they ‘priced the goods so they would move.’ So each company exerted unusual energy and offered attractive inducements to obtain sales. There was great dissatisfaction. It soon became evident that in practice production control alone, without other measures specifically designed to bring about orderly marketing, was completely inadequate and would not accomplish that purpose.53 Hence some of the members of the PPCA decided that a more comprehensive marketing agreement should be carried out. In July 1933, a new cooperative agreement was drawn up and accepted by all the members. Under its terms all existing stocks were transferred to the ownership of the cooperative, and all pineapple canned thereafter was similarly transferred as soon as it was packed. The directors of the cooperative were to fix the total amount of the pack and the packing standards. Individual members were limited to a fixed percentage of the pack. When the canned pineapple had been transferred to the cooperative, each member could then draw on the combined pack for goods to sell to their customers. The sales of all the members were pooled, and the receipts prorated to the members on the basis of the value of the contributions of each to the pool. No profit was made on the sale by members to the pool, and all expenses of the cooperative were met by an assessment of ¼ to ½¢ per case against its members. Once again events in California dictated policy in Hawaii. An agreement on the restriction of the canned peach pack to 10 million cases had been adopted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.54 In 1933 the pack quota was set at 8 million cases. Production for that year recovered somewhat to 7.8 million cases. The carry-over at the end of the pack year on 31 May 1934 was just over a million cases. On 13 November 1933, the PPCA launched a new advertising campaign. As in their initial sales campaign launched the previous year, the PPCA’s advertising was based upon the newly discovered ‘vitamins’ present in pineapple, with

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authoritative advice to eat canned pineapple every day. In addition, the advertising copy personalized the ‘Pineapple for Health’ message by including portraits of healthy people and presenting evidence that ‘vitamins’ contribute to physical fitness. Otis Pease suggests that JWT had begun this temporary fashion of advertising nationally distributed brand foods as having medicinal value for genuine or imagined afflictions in 1925 with an advertising campaign for Velveeta processed cheese. However, Douglas Cazaux Sackman shows the CFGE had been associating Sunkist oranges with health since 1907.55 Ironically canned pineapple was less healthy than fresh fruit. But as Levenstein has observed, the rapidly increasing sales of canned and other prepared foods in the 1920s had reflected millions of individual decisions to sacrifice taste, and even nutrition, for a reduction in preparation time.56 In May 1934, the PPCA’s Advertising Committee inaugurated a summer advertising campaign for canned pineapples. The theme was built around the slogan ‘Canned pineapple for Summer Energy’.  JWT with a reduced budget had become more selective in its choice of advertising media, concentrating even more on specific areas, principally the major metropolitan centres. Advertising was carried in the American Weekly as before. Thirty-nine daily newspapers in 33 cities, purchased by over 5.8 million households, were chosen by JWT for full colour page advertising. Outdoor billboards were also used in 44 metropolitan centres which were seen by an estimated 73 million people. Once again, the A & P stores worked together with the PPCA campaign.57 The advertising helped restore continental US sales to 1931 levels. Indeed in 1934, shipments to the continental US reached 12 million cases, a level in excess of the previous all-time record of 1931, although in value terms the 1931 level was not attained.58 In September 1935, the PPCA assumed direct administrative control of cooperative advertising for the industry, which had hitherto been conducted by a group advertising committee representing the participating members. In previous contracts, JWT had insisted on separate contracts with each of the producers and, as noted above, had retained control over the advertising copy and content. The result was that the text of some of the advertisements went beyond what the canners considered truth in advertising. JWT focused on the supposed health benefits of canned pineapple. The agency argued it had the ‘Seal of Approval of the American Medical Association’ and that medical research could support its claims regarding the supposed health benefits of canned pineapple.59 However, in common with other sectors of the American economy, advertising was not free from the anticapitalist backlash during the Great Depression. As Inger Stole has shown,

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consumer pressure groups were lobbying for federal legislation to outlaw misleading advertisements, including those that made dubious claims about supposed health benefits. The Federal Trade Commission was eventually given more powers with the 1938 Wheeler-Lee Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, but even then it took many more years to curb abuses.60 Thus, it could be argued that the PPCA’s concerns seem quite commendable, maybe even unusual, for this period. The PPCA’s advertising was henceforth handled by a different agency, McCann Erickson Inc. This agency had handled the AHPC’s advertising campaigns during the 1920s and 1931–32. The contract with McCann Erickson reserved to the PPCA the sole right to decide the lines to be followed and the qualities to be stressed by the copywriters and artists. During the depression, the advertising agencies engaged in cut-throat competition. Hence, the PPCA’s switch to another agency was not out of the ordinary.61 However, it is clear that the PPCA had decided that it was a mistake to give an advertising agency the latitude demanded by JWT. In October, the PPCA launched a big advertising campaign with full colour advertisements in leading consumer publications calculated to reach practically every potential consumer in the United States.62 The McCann Erickson advertising stressed that canned pineapple was good value at the current low prices. Although it also mentioned pineapple contained vitamins A, B, and C, which were good for health, this was not the main focus, unlike the JWT advertisements.63 This was followed by another campaign during 1936–7, which led to what in many respects was the PPCA’s ‘most successful year’ since its foundation.64 In 1937–38, the production of 12.3 million cases almost matched the previous pack of 12.8 million cases in 1931. At the same time receipts from sales of canned pineapple to the continental US reached the record level of $42.7 million. However, after the change in the direction of federal government economic policy in 1937, there was a sharp setback in business conditions in the continental US the following year.  In 1938, production was cut to 10.5 million cases despite the rise in the retail price in 1937, shipments fell to 8.3 million cases, and receipts plummeted to $24.6 million, a fall of $18.1 million from the record of the previous year.65 The wholesale price was cut by 20¢ from $1.85 to $1.65 in June 1938.66 The advertising campaign was continued by the PPCA until 1942.67  Beginning in 1937, the PPCA also undertook and carried out a programme of market research.  The PPCA’s statistical services were supplemented by such economic and special research as the varying problems of the industry required.68 The PPCA also kept a close watch on the American tariff on canned

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Figure 4.2: Import Penetration of the American Canned Pineapple Market, 1924– 41



95%

90%

85%

80%

Series 1



Series 2



Series 3

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

Year

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1925

75% 1924

Percentage share of total market

100%

Series 1 = Hawaiian Share Series 2 = Insular (Puerto Rico and the Philippines) Share Series 3 = Imports’ Share Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States 1924–41 (Washington, DC, 1925–43).

pineapple and import penetration of the American market.   During the 1930s it became apparent that the Hawaiian case for a higher duty at the hearings on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff had had some justification. Import penetration of the American market by foreign canned pineapple increased from 0.7 per cent in 1931 to 6.3 per cent in 1940. This was largely accounted for by Japanese canners, such as Mitsubishi, based in Taiwan, who succeeded in producing a product similar in quality to that of Hawaii. During the same period import penetration of duty-free insular canned pineapple from Puerto Rico and the Philippines increased from 1 per cent to 8.8 per cent as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The increasing import penetration was also exacerbated by the reductions in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff by the Roosevelt Administration. Canned

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pineapple was admitted to the United States from Cuba at a preferential rate under the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903. In 1934 a further reciprocal trade agreement reduced the duty from 1.6¢ to 0.8¢ per pound.69 However, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 2¢ per pound remained in force on all other canned pineapple imports until November 1938 when the United States signed a reciprocal trade agreement with Britain. This agreement reduced the duty on imports from the British Empire to 1.5¢ per pound. This reduction was also applicable to imports from Taiwan because of the ‘most favoured nation’ clause in the 1911 Commercial Treaty between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, because of a provision in the 1903 Treaty with Cuba that the relative preferential tariff positions with the rates allowed other countries be maintained, the agreement with Britain automatically reduced the duty on imports from Cuba to 0.6¢ per pound.70 It is clear from Figure 4.2, which contains all the available data on canned pineapple imports into the United States, that foreign canned pineapple did not achieve a significant share of the American market during the period 1924–41. In only two years, 1939 and 1940, did the imported share exceed five per cent of the total market, whereas from 1937 the insular share was significant. Insular canned pineapple was not subject to the US tariff. The data has two possible explanations. First, the US tariff was very effective in keeping out imports. Second, the foreign products were not competitive. Both explanations seem to be valid. The foreign producers found it extremely difficult to produce a product equal in quality to the Hawaiian product at an equal cost of production. It was possible to produce a lower quality product at a lower cost of production, but this was not acceptable to most American consumers who demanded a high quality product.  Perhaps the US tariff, by raising the price of the imported product and hence preventing foreign products from gaining a significant share of the American market, denied foreign producers the possibility of achieving the economies of scale to equal the Hawaiian cost of production. One of the few successful entrants to the American market in the 1930s, Taiwan, had to cross-subsidize its canned pineapple exports to the United States in order to compete with Hawaii.71 So perhaps the effort the Hawaiian canners put into lobbying for the tariff on canned pineapple was worthwhile. Clearly, as will be shown in Chapter 8 with the case of Calpak’s Philippines subsidiary, it was possible to produce a product equal quality to the Hawaiian product without a subsidy, if the producer had tariff-free access to the American market. The work of the PPCA helped to bring about a recovery in continental US demand for canned pineapples. By 1940–41, production had increased to 11

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million cases, although shipments and receipts were not to exceed the peak of 1937 until 1941 when, under the stimulus of the pre-war mobilization campaign 14.4 million cases were shipped to the continental US. This was a new record for the industry. Receipts from the sale of canned pineapples at $42 million almost reached the record level of 1937 in 1941.72 However, not everybody in the pineapple industry was so sure that the PPCA had had such a beneficial effect on the progress of the industry. In the 1941 Annual Report of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., President Atherton Richards severely criticized the PPCA because he felt it had: established rigid restrictions and limitations upon the production by its members of sliced and crushed pineapple products, and has resulted in a sizeable decrease of the [Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s] share in the production and marketing of these products as compared with the business prior to the inauguration of the marketing agreement.73 Richards had ordered the representative of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to oppose the renewal of the marketing agreement with the PPCA and his company’s principal competitors during negotiations in San Francisco during February and March 1941. Richards particularly objected to the retention in the draft agreement of pooling and the use of the services of the Lawrence Warehouse Co. This company handled all of the PPCA’s pineapple stocks at eight locations in Hawaii, and 17 other locations in the continental US.  He was worried by the fact that the representatives of the several companies present thought that such features ought to be retained in the agreement to make sure that ‘the whole set-up [had] some semblance of legal qualification.’ Richards felt that the agreement was illegal because its primary objective ‘was to curtail the volume of pineapple products to be packed and marketed by its signatories by pack-quota allocations.’ He also felt that it undermined the financial position of his company and that it should regain and retain its independence in the marketing of its products.74 Figure 4.3 provides a comparison of the six years before and after 1932. It shows that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s share of production after 1932 was significantly below that of the period before 1932. The opposite can be shown in the case of the company’s principal competitors. Given the trend of production at the company before 1932, as shown in Figure 4.4, it might have expected its output to resume its previous upward trend after 1932. The data tend to support Richards’ belief that the PPCA served to retard the growth of his company.

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Figure 4.3: Percentage Share of the Total Pack of Canned Pineapple by PPCA Members, 1926–40* 100%

Percentage share

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%



Series 1



Series 2



Series 3



Series 4



Series 5

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

0%

1926

10%

Year

Series 1 = Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Series 2 = Libby Series 3 = Calpak Series 4 = A & B Group Series 5 = Hawaiian Canneries * From 1933 output is for the pack year ending 31 May the following year N.B. 1939 shares are estimates Sources: WCP 25th Annual Yearbook 27/5, 25 April 1935, p.116; PGAHA, An Analysis of the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association, 1939, p.38; PGAHA, PPCA Summary of Pool Operations, 1940, 1941, p.A1.

Richards also argued that the PPCA was an extremely inefficient organization.   Table 4.1 shows that in the period 1934–38, the cost of operating the PPCA rose by over 55 per cent. The costs of the Marketing Division rose by over 65 per cent; three-quarters of the expenses of this division were administrative.  In the same period the production of canned pineapple increased by less than 10 per cent.

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Figure 4.4: Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s Output of Canned Pineapple, 1926–40*

Cases (million)

5 4 3 2

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

Year

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

0

1926

1

* From 1933 output is for the pack year ending 31 May the following year. N.B. No data for 1939 Sources: WCP 25th Annual Yearbook 27/5, 25 April 1935, p.116; PGAHA, An Analysis of the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association, 1939, p.38; PGAHA, PPCA Summary of Pool Operations, 1940, 1941, p.A1.

The PPCA had already rejected the allegation that its administrative costs were too high in an internal; report published in 1939. It argued costs had risen for three reasons; firstly, increases in general clerical and secretarial work because of added functions, but not included in the direct cost of this item; increases in salaries paid to clerks at its San Francisco office when studies had shown them to be out of line with comparable salaries elsewhere in the United States; and thirdly, increases in executive salaries and expenses authorized by the PPCA Board of Directors in 1938 in recognition of the increased requirements for executive and general supervision. The PPCA also rejected the suggestion that it should eliminate the pooling and warehousing functions and perhaps, also, reduce the amount of statistical clerical work to substantially reduce costs. It felt that the money which could be saved by the reduction, or even the total elimination, of these items would be relatively small. Furthermore, without the warehousing, pooling and the statistical service the continued stabilization of the industry could not be assured.75 Indeed as the PPCA had observed in a confidential report prepared in 1940: warehousing is a function definitely required by the Marketing Agreement and is a feature in the basic legal theory underlying the qualification of the cooperative under the Capper-Volstead Act…76

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Table 4.1: Cost of Operating the PPCA, 1934–38 Year

1934 $

1935 $

1936 $

1937 $

1938 $

Marketing Division

104,065 (21.2)

99,486 (15.7)

97,109 (16.0)

117,516 (16.9)

154,375 (20.2)

San Francisco and General

74,700 (15.2)

71,148 (11.3)

69,155 (11.4)

88,236 (12.7)

124,234 (16.3)

Honolulu Office

3,858 (0.8)

2,997 (0.5)

3,459 (0.6)

3,580 (0.5)

4,766 (0.6)

Pack Inspection

5,508 (1.1)

5,341 (0.8)

4,494 (0.7)

5,699 (0.8)

5,375 (0.7)

Warehousing

20,000 (4.1)

20,000 (3.2)

20,000 (3.3)

20,000 (2.9)

20,000 (2.6)

Experiment Station

182,146 (37.1)

187,172 (29.6)

194,107 (31.9)

212,508 (30.6)

225,278 (29.5)

National Advertising

205,000 (41.7)

345,212 (54.6)

317,069 (52.1)

349,287 (50.3)

350,000 (45.8)

-

-

-

14,936 (2.2)

33,851 (4.4)

491,211 (100.0)

631,870 (99.9)

608,285 (100.0)

694,247 (100.0)

763,504 (99.9)

Market Research Total

Source: PGAHA, An Analysis of the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association, 1939, p.121.

Richards’ dismissal in April 1941 meant that the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. chose to reverse his decision not to renew the marketing agreement. However, his view that the agreement was illegal was subsequently vindicated. In May 1943 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. received new legal advice from its attorneys that the cooperative agreement was a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The directors of the company voted to withdraw from the marketing agreement from 31 May 1943. As a result the PPCA was dissolved in 1944. It was replaced by two new organizations, the Pineapple Growers’ Association of Hawaii and the Pineapple Research Institute of Hawaii, the latter having formerly operated as a department of the PPCA.77 Although the PPCA was responsible for part of the success of the Hawaiian pineapple industry in the 1930s, another crucial factor behind this success was the development of a new product, pineapple juice. The

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Hawaiian Pineapple Co. made the scientific breakthrough necessary for the production of clarified pineapple juice.  In 1932, two of the company’s engineers, Simes T. Hoyt and Richard Botley developed a process to capture the flavour and aroma of the fruit. The commercial exploitation of the scientific breakthrough at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. came in a period when there was a substantial and growing demand for non-alcoholic beverages in the United States. Before the 1930s almost all non-alcoholic beverages consumed in the United States took the form of soft drinks.78 However, in the 1930s, the growing health consciousness of many American consumers led a considerable number to switch to drinks made from pure fruit juices. Between 1933 and 1941, the consumption of canned pure fruit juices rose from 2.5 million cases to 45 million cases. The annual per capita consumption of fruit juices rose from 0.5 pounds in 1933 to 8.5 pounds in 1941.79 The remarkable growth of the American fruit juice industry appears to contradict all that is known about this decade. Vernon Charley and Travis Harrison argue American consumers became ‘fruit juice conscious’ in the 1930s. A considerable number switched to drinks made from pure fruit juices. The Western Canner and Packer attributed the popularity of pure fruit juices to the demise of the reducing diets craze of the early depression years. Fruit juices could make an important contribution to a normal diet. The CFGE had been encouraging American consumers to drink Sunkist oranges as well as to eat them since 1915. In a rigorous long-term advertising campaign, the CFGE stressed the benefits to health of drinking fresh orange juice at breakfast, and it promoted the distribution of electric juice extractors in restaurants and homes. The CFGE effectively prepared American consumers for the canned fruit juices of the 1930s.80 In the 1930s more fruit juice was produced in the United States than in any other country in the world.81 There were special factors associated with the American market which explain why this was so. The first was the trend towards packaged foods, which greatly increased the popularity of all foods in cans. The second was convenience, for the trend in that direction placed a premium on any food which was prepared and ready to serve. The third was the demand for juices that could be transported across to and from remote parts of the United States, without any need for refrigeration or other special preserving facilities. The fourth was the development of the domestic refrigerator, which allowed consumers to keep their juice chilled at all times of the year. The General Electric ‘Monitor Top’ air-cooled small household refrigerator had gone into mass production in 1926. The fifth was the fact that canned fruit juices were less expensive than equivalent amounts of fresh squeezed juice. The sixth, and probably most significant, was the

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Figure 4.5: Annual Production of Canned Hawaiian Pineapple and American Grapefruit Juice, 1933–41 20 18

Cases (million)

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941



Series 1



Series 2

Year

Series 1 = Pineapple Juice Series 2 = Grapefruit Juice Source: WCP 33rd Annual Yearbook and Statistical Review Number 35/5, 25 April 1943, p.133.

rise of advertising and national brands required a stable, staple product and a permanent supply, both characteristics of canned fruit juices.82 The Hawaiian pineapple juice industry was given a substantial uplift by the predicament which had led to the formation of the PPCA, that is to say the excessive production of fresh pineapples. The self-imposed restrictions on output were rigidly adhered to by the Hawaiian pineapple industry, especially after the pooling agreement of 1934. Hence the pineapple producers turned to the production of canned pineapple juice, which was unregulated, as an alternative way of making use of their surplus pineapples. The quantity of surplus pineapples was also increased by the pineapples rejected during the canning process, because the canned fruit of the 1930s was of a much higher quality than that produced previously.83 The growth of the pineapple juice industry between 1933 and 1941 was noteworthy, as can be seen in Figure 4.5. In 1933, the first year of production, 700,000 cases were produced. In 1934 production quadrupled to 3 million cases and then rose steadily to 8.9 million cases by 1938. After a slight setback in 1939, production reached 14 million cases by 1941. This

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represented nearly one-third of the total US fruit juice production for that year. The growth in production was similar to that of a close substitute produced mainly in Florida, grapefruit juice, as can be seen in Figure 4.5. Grapefruit juice had been produced commercially since 1926, but it was not until the early 1930s that an improved manufacturing technique prevented it from developing a turpentine flavour.84 Shipments of pineapple juice to the continental US also showed a remarkable growth in the 1930s, as can be seen in Appendix, Table 2. In 1933, shipments stood at just 6,000 cases, by 1941 they had reached a pre-war peak of 13.2 million cases. Receipts also showed a similar pattern in this period, although pineapple juice was only worth about half as much per case as canned pineapple. They grew from a mere $1,000 in 1933 to $21.3 million in 1941.85 The new product was featured prominently in the individual advertising campaigns of the Hawaiian pineapple producers. Libby acquired a different technology to produce pineapple juice because the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was not willing to license its proprietary technology. Libby began a campaign in the Mid-West in August 1933, which tied in with extensive distribution and sampling carried on at the Century of Progress Exposition held in Chicago that year. Libby’s pineapple products were well represented at the Exposition, both at its official exhibit in the Foods and Agricultural Building which consisted of a diorama depicting the sources of the various Libby products, including pineapple plantations and at a concession, a third of which consisted of 10 pineapple juice stands.86 Early Libby advertising stressed the health benefits of pineapple juice.87 Later, Libby used a free holiday in Hawaii competition to advertise its product.88 Libby was to invest heavily in fruit juice production, both in Hawaii and in the Far Western States. By the mid-1930s, Libby was the largest packer of citrus fruit juices in the Far West. It produced forty per cent of the total Californian orange juice pack. Libby also became the second largest producer of pineapple juice in Hawaii.89 The third of the three major pineapple canners in Hawaii, Calpak, did not acquire the technology to produce canned pineapple juice until 1935 and introduced its product in January 1936. Its advertising claimed that its product was superior to that of its rivals.90 One of the problems which the 1930s raised for the major pineapple producers in Hawaii was the need to carry year-round inventories, a result of the successful establishment of national brand names in the 1920s. Before the predominance of the brand name products of Libby and Calpak, most of the pack had been sold under the private brand labels of individual grocery companies, who bought their supplies at the close of the packing season. With the rise of the ‘Libby’s’ and ‘Del Monte’ brands, the responsibility

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of carrying inventories on a year-round basis started to shift back to the producers themselves, who since they owned the brand name and did the advertising, were as a result responsible for servicing the market on a year-round basis. The rate of this shift accelerated considerably during the Great Depression, as throughout the United States retailers sought to limit their risks.91 Calpak was badly hit by this trend, and in 1932 and 1933, had an operating deficit of approximately $10 million for the two years. The deficits of Calpak’s Hawaiian Division’s amounted to over $3.6 million exclusive of an estimated $1.5 million in inventory write-downs, and accounted for a disproportionate share of total deficits. Like Libby, Calpak invested heavily in advertising to revive the demand for its products. Considerable attention was paid to fruit juices, and although Calpak produced all kinds of juices, production considerations dictated that it concentrate its advertising budget on ‘Del Monte’ pineapple juice from 1936. Viewed as a whole, Calpak failed to recover from the Depression. Even in 1941, its net income was still only half the pre-Depression level. However, Calpak’s lacklustre performance was caused by the heavy losses made by its Californian Division. Calpak’s Hawaiian Division made a strong recovery and by 1937 was making substantial profits.92 Pineapple juice played a central role in the recovery of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., because pineapple juice was not included in the cooperative marketing agreement with the PPCA. In 1933 the company had a serious problem, for although it had become the world’s largest individual producer of canned pineapple, it did not have an established brand label. Unlike Libby and Calpak, it produced almost entirely for the private brand label market. There were considerable risks in this. First, there was no consumer acceptance of the company’s products by name, and therefore the company’s market could be eliminated overnight, if brokers, wholesalers, and retailers had the inclination. Second, the prospects for growth were limited in the private brand market. In August 1930 Michael J. Cullen had founded the first supermarket and begun what Richard S. Tedlow has called the ‘supermarket revolution’. Supermarkets were to rely on the consumers’ recognition of branded and nationally advertised products as opposed to private labels to stimulate business. Indeed Cullen did not stock any private brands.93 Branded goods signified to consumers a measure of quality and consistency, although in practice, considerable variability in the quality of goods remained.94 In fact, H.J. Heinz, the food processor, had understood this as early as the 1860s.95 For the company, a brand is also an intangible factor that gives an advantage it does not have to share.96

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The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. appears to have followed a similar trajectory to the one identified by Robert J. Keith at Pillsbury which shifted from a production-orientated approach to a sales-orientated approach in the 1930s.97 Although the Hawaiian Pineapple Co, had not been conservative in its personnel and research and development policies before the 1930s, it had been conservative with regard to the development of a brand label. Nonetheless the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had to be very careful if it wished to establish its own ‘Dole’ brand label. In the early 1930s it could not afford to alienate the private brand buyers, by promoting the ‘Dole’ brand in competition with them.98 Indeed the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 eliminated the chain stores’ advantage over other retailers. Most of the large chain store groups began to promote their own private brands on which they could make more profit, for example in the case of A & P, ‘A & P’ (choice grade) and ‘Iona’ (standard grade). The chain stores did not abandon manufacturers’ brands completely. In the case of Calpak’s ‘Del Monte’ brand, chain store purchases still accounted for about one-third of output in 1938, and A & P remained Calpak’s biggest customer.99 However, in retrospect, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s caution proved to be more than justified. In collaboration with the Philadelphia advertising agency, N.W. Ayer & Son, the company decided to use canned pineapple juice as the main focus of its national advertising campaign to establish the Dole brand, because no obligations were entailed in this new product. This was a strategy the company had used before between 1910 and 1913 when it had tried to create a national market for ‘Dole’s Pure Hawaiian Pineapple Juice’, an unsuccessful product sold in glass bottles. An enlarged signature of J.D. Dole had been registered as a trade mark at the US Patent Office in 1911. The campaign was launched in March 1933 initially using the company’s ‘Diamond Head’ brand, but featuring the Dole name prominently on the label.100 By October, the ‘Diamond Head’ brand had been replaced by the ‘Dole’ brand. The Canner suggested that the advertisement in the Saturday Evening Post, which opened the new campaign, was suggestive of Walter Chrysler’s advice to ride in a Ford, Chevrolet, and Plymouth before purchasing any low-price car. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s advertisement’s slogan was ‘Try All Three’ under a picture of glasses of tomato juice, orange juice, and pineapple juice. The copy in the advertisement suggested that pineapple juice would add variety to the breakfast routine. The campaign was at first confined to colour advertisements in national magazines in the United States.  The company’s advertising budget averaged from $200,000 to $500,000 a year, or more, especially during the introduction period for

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pineapple juice. In 1936, for example, the company spent nearly $366,000 on advertising.101 It is also worth noting that the early Dole advertisements featured the National Recovery Administration ‘Blue Eagle’ logo. As will be shown in Chapter 7, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 covered the canning of fruit and all members of the PPCA were part of the national code for the canned fruit industry.102 Libby and Calpak also used the blue eagle in their advertising.103 Initially the motif of the Ayer advertisements for the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the provision of information about Dole pineapple juice. However, from 1935 Ayer began to use modern art to emphasize the attraction of pineapple juice. Ayer sought through its advertising campaign to associate canned pineapple closely with a ‘romantic’ image of Hawaii. In common with the PPCA, Libby, and Calpak, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. tried to associate its product with an exotic image of the islands where it was produced. At this time, travel to Hawaii from the continental United States was very expensive and only the rich could afford a holiday in Hawaii. Hence, the advertisements drew on the imagery of Hollywood fantasy, such as King Vidor’s 1932 movie, Bird of Paradise, featuring Dolores Del Rio. One of the Dole advertisements was to feature fellow Mexican actress, Raquel Torres, in front of an exotic mural.104 ‘Atmosphere advertising’ was a style of advertising which had been devised in the 1910s. It made its pitch obliquely, by suggestion or association.105 The use of the soft sell approach went against the American trend toward the hard sell approach. Many American firms resorted to sensational advertising tactics that led to a nationwide spate of cheap and nasty copy.106 Richard W. Pollay has observed that the use of original art in the 1930s fell dramatically, displaced by photography, which was still predominantly black and white. However, photographs were often effective.107 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. advertising was obviously an exception to this trend. Charles T. Coiner, one of Ayer’s art directors, commissioned leading contemporary artists regarded by Harper’s Magazine as ‘outstanding’, including Maurice Sterne, Pierre Roy, Georgia O’Keeffe, Millard Sheets, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Miguel Covarrubias, and A.M. Cassandre to create the illustrations during the early years of the campaign, free from directive control and generously paid. Cassandre, for example, had created a famous poster in 1935 for the Normandie transatlantic passenger liner. Later, Pierre Roy, the French modern artist, visited Hawaii in spring 1939 and spent nearly two months painting for the company.108 Not all of the commissions were a success. O’Keeffe was commissioned by Ayer in the summer of 1938 to produce two new paintings for the pineapple

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juice advertising. To capture the atmosphere of the pineapple plantations, she wanted to stay on-site in the plantation workers’ housing during her visit to Hawaii in 1939. The company would not allow this because it violated the strict labour hierarchy of the company. As a result, O’Keeffe felt unable to paint pineapples although she painted other plants during her visit.109 It was only after her return to New York that Coiner succeeded in persuading O’Keeffe to finally paint a pineapple—a budding plant which was rushed from Hawaii to New York on the Pan-Am Clipper.110 Ayer also made use of colour photographs for a series of advertisements appearing in national magazines from January 1939. Grancel Fitz of New York, the German émigré, Martin Munkacsi, and the Australian commercial photographer, Anton Bruehl, were commissioned to take the photographs for the advertisements, which like the artwork, stressed Hawaiian atmosphere.111 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the first Hawaiian company to undertake a national radio advertising campaign, reviving a plan first devised by James D. Dole in 1931. Shortly before his overthrow, he had advocated radio advertising after a pilot advertising campaign for Dole pineapple in the New York metropolitan area. But his plan for a national radio advertising campaign was not adopted until several years after his overthrow.112 In 1932, radio advertising was still a relatively new medium, and the new management at the reorganized Hawaiian Pineapple Co. probably felt that its effectiveness was unproven, notwithstanding Dole’s pilot campaign. However, this view was not shared by Libby. It had been advertising on national radio since 1929 with Hawaiian canned pineapple among the featured products.113 Radio had become a new advertising medium during the 1920s. In 1924, N.W. Ayer & Son had produced the first sponsored broadcast to be presented to the American public over a radio network.114 By 1938, when Young & Rubicam, one of the United States’ leading radio advertising agencies, were employed to handle the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s campaign, radio advertising was a well-established medium. Ayer continued to handle all the company’s other advertising. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. chose not to sponsor a soap opera but instead adopted a format similar to that of the CBS radio show, Hollywood Hotel, which had been sponsored by the Campbell Soup Co. since the autumn of 1934. Hollywood Hotel had a talent line-up that included Louella Parsons, the well-known movie critic. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. advertising was incorporated into a weekly Saturday evening radio programme which was broadcast over 63 CBS stations. Honolulu Bound featured the radio and stage comedian Phil

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Baker. David Kaonohi, a native Hawaiian steel guitarist, also performed on the programme each week as ‘Johnny Pineapple’. The six months series of programmes began in January 1939. In October, The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. decided to sponsor another CBS radio programme, Al Pearce and his Gang, with the vaudeville artist, Pearce, as the star of the show. The Wednesday evening radio programme was discontinued in April 1940.115 The company announced that the ‘move is simply a revision of policy as far as media selection is concerned to fit the requirements of our business at this time.’116 Although it claimed radio advertising had been a success,117 it would appear that unlike Campbell Soup, it was not convinced radio was an effective advertising medium. Overall, the advertising campaign was successful. Sales of Dole pineapple juice increased quickly in the 1930s. The demand for Dole pineapple juice created a big market for the company’s other products by their brand name, even although the other products had not been given any real advertising support. According to Carl R. Havighorst, what had been a completely miscellaneous and private brand label business became by a substantial margin, a Dole brand business, and without harming the company’s relationships with its wholesalers and retailers. The latter began selling Dole brand pineapple products, because they found it easier than selling the same product under their own private brand labels.118 So the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. decided as of 1 June 1938, to eliminate the ‘Dole’ top embossing of all juice items and minor Fancy Sliced and Crushed items on the recommendation of the Sales Division.119 It has been suggested that Atherton Richards felt that the PPCA had served to retard the growth of his company. Figure 4.3 shows that this was at least in part related to the doubling of the A & B Group’s share of total PPCA canned pineapple production between 1932 and 1940. At the beginning of the 1930s the A & B Group consisted of two small canning companies located in the outer Islands for which the sugar factor, Alexander & Baldwin, acted as agents. One of these companies was the Kauai Pineapple Co. Until 1931 it was known as the Kauai Fruit & Land Co. The other canning company was Baldwin Packers. It had been founded in 1912 at Lahaina, Maui, and produced its first canned pineapple in 1914.120 Together the two companies accounted for about one-twelfth of total production. Like the other pineapple canners, the A & B Group suffered losses in 1931. By October of that year prices were below the cost of production. Further losses were made by both companies in 1932.121 However, this did not stop Alexander & Baldwin from undertaking a major investment programme in the pineapple industry from 1932.  It would appear in common with Castle

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Figure 4.6: Net Operating Profits of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 1925–42 6 5

$ (million)

4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2

1942

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1925

-4

1926

-3

Year

1933 = Five months to 31 May 1933 1934–42 = Twelve months to 31 May Sources: Moody’s Manual of Investments: Industrial Securities, New York, Moody’s Investors Service, 1931, p.1334; CFC: 136, 20 May 1933, p.3552; 137, 22 July 1933, p.699; 139, 4 August 1934, p.765; 147, 13 September 1938, p.1489; 154, 4 October 1941, p.431; 156, 12 October 1942, p.1327.

& Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin decided in the depths of the depression, which had hit sugar particularly hard, that direct investment in pineapple canning in addition to sugar might provide it with a more secure future. In April 1932 two pineapple plantations controlled by Alexander & Baldwin affiliates, the Haleakala Pineapple Co. and the Maui Agricultural Co. were merged to form the Maui Pineapple Co.122 The Maui Pineapple Co. became the third member of the A & B Group. In March 1934 the Maui Pineapple Co. acquired Calpak’s Kahului cannery.123 It enabled the A & B Group to increase its PPCA quota by 8.252 per cent from 1935–36. The A & B Group had initially planned to ask for a quota of 8.86 per cent for the Maui Pineapple Co. This was subsequently reduced to 8.5 per cent. Nonetheless, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and Libby felt that the quota asked was too high, hence the lower figure actually agreed.124  The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was forced to respond by acquiring the loss-making Haiku Pineapple Co. in 1934 in order to acquire its quota of 6.238 per cent.125 The Maui Pineapple Co. undertook a major investment program throughout the remainder of the 1930s.126 As a result, in the late 1930s

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Figure 4.7: Monthly Retail Prices of No.2½ Cans of Pineapples and Peaches, 1934–41 24 23 22

Cents

21 20 19 18 17



Series 1



Series 2

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1934

15

1935

16

Year from January

Series 1 = Canned Pineapple Series 2 = Canned Peaches Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retail Prices, December 1934 (Washington, DC, 1935), p.51; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retail Prices: Food, Electricity, and Gas, June 1939 (Washington, DC, 1939), pp.33–4; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retail Prices: Food and Coal, January 1941 and Year 1940 (Washington, DC, 1941), p.12.

the Maui Pineapple Co. was one of the most profitable pineapple canners in Hawaii.127 In common with three major pineapple canners, the A & B Group invested in the development of pineapple juice production. The records of the Maui Pineapple Co. show that it made substantial investments in pineapple juice production from 1934. Baldwin Packers also invested in the establishment of pineapple juice production. Both companies started producing pineapple juice in 1935.128 Although most of the juice was produced for the private brand market in the United States, the A & B Group also developed their own brands, Vitagold and Greetings, in the 1930s.129 By the mid-1930s the pineapple industry had recovered from the Great Depression. Figure 4.6 shows that average net operating profits made by

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the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. were substantially higher than those of the second half of the 1920s in the period 1935 to 1942. Although the records of Libby’s Hawaiian Division have been destroyed and those of Calpak’s Hawaiian Division are not available, there is every reason to believe that the other major companies’ pineapple businesses were as successful as the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in the second half of the 1930s. The success of the industry was the result of three factors. First, the PPCA created the stability so sadly lacking in the Californian fruit industry. Although Richards may have been correct in alleging that the PPCA discriminated against the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., this does not mean his company would have been any more successful in an unregulated environment. Second, the advertising appears to have had a major influence on the revival of canned pineapple sales and the success of the industry’s new product, pineapple juice. Figure 4.7 shows that the retail price of canned pineapple showed greater stability than that of canned peaches between 1934 and 1941. Third, the remarkably successful introduction of pineapple juice to the American market made a significant contribution to the industry’s recovery during the Great Depression. The pineapple industry’s great success was achieved despite the fact that continental American agriculture was suffering probably the worst depression in its history. However, on the eve of the Pacific War there were ominous signs that suggested that Hawaii’s domination of the American market for canned pineapple might be coming to an end. In December 1940 it was reported that Mexican pineapple was being imported into the United States and being converted into low-price juice by a Texan cannery. Calpak’s acreage in the Philippines had been increased to the point where the pack there could reach 1 million cases. (A full account of Calpak’s subsidiary in the Philippines can be found in Chapter 8). The production of Taiwanese canned pineapple had been increased and the flavour improved. Almost all of Hawaii’s foreign competitors had the advantage of cheap labour because of lower living standards.130

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5 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE PINEAPPLE INDUSTRY

One of the most important reasons why the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry remained competitive before the Second World War was the commitment by most of the Hawaiian canners to financing and exploiting innovation.  The first movers in this field were Libby and James D. Dole’s Hawaiian Pineapple Co., but most of the other canners were quick to follow their lead. Research and development on the plantation was organized collectively from the mid-1910s, while innovation in the cannery tended to be organized individually. Without the innovation that took place between 1903 and 1941 the industry would not have been able to produce the high quality standardized products for which it became renowned. As D.H. Grist, a former research officer of the British Malayan Department of Agriculture, observed in 1950: Pineapple growing in Hawaii is probably the most highly mechanised agricultural industry in the world. .. [T]his spectacular development has been primarily due to exhaustive research into planting, processing and canning and by careful planning and strict control of both field and factory operations…1

Scientific Innovation on the Pineapple Plantation Louis Ferleger and William Lazonick have suggested that funding for research and development in American agriculture came from state and federal governments unlike in American manufacturing industry where funding

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came from retained earnings. They see government support for agricultural research and development as representing an American-style developmental state. However, in the case of Hawaii this is only true for the period before the First World War when scientific research on the pineapple was carried out by the Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station (HAES). The federal agricultural experiment station programme was established in 1900 under the Hatch Act (1887) to disseminate agricultural knowledge to American farmers.  The Hatch Act had its origins in the eighteenth century movement for scientific agriculture.2  The Department of Agriculture (USDA) asked Congress to establish an agricultural experiment station in Hawaii because Secretary James Wilson wanted the United States to attain agricultural self-sufficiency through crop diversification.  Wilson believed that tropical agriculture was necessary to achieve this. The HAES was authorized in 1900 but not organized until 1901. It was planned principally upon the USDA’s preconceptions of what Hawaii should become.   Wilson wanted it to promote American-type small farming.  He directed the HAES not to engage in any research which might benefit the sugar industry.3 Richard A. Overfield has argued that: Most officials of the USDA at that time believed single crop systems were undesirable economically and socially because they viewed staple agriculture as the basis of Southern-style plantation society.   They hoped that diversification would threaten and eventually destroy the one-crop sugar economy, the basis of planter wealth and power. Likewise, diversification would free the land for homesteading and be attractive to Anglo-Americans from the mainland. Another important consideration was that with the end of plantations there would be no further need for Asian labor. ..  [I]t was obvious that the underlying social and political ideals went counter to those of most local leaders in the islands.4 These views were shared by the first director of the HAES, Jared G. Smith. However, from the very beginning he experienced opposition to the HAES’s policy from the dominant sugar planters and from a minority faction within the USDA led by Alfred Charles True, head of the Office of Experiment Stations which ran the HAES.   His principal task was to find profitable crops to supplement, if not replace sugar. One of the crops experimented with was pineapples. Smith’s initial investigations considered not only the feasibility of growing these crops in Hawaii but also a major study involving marketing the items in the continental US.

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By the late 1900s, Smith’s work had begun to show some indications of success, particularly in the case of pineapples. However, the USDA’s policy of social engineering was a total failure. The continued opposition to it from the sugar planters led to Smith’s resignation in March 1908. This policy threatened the very existence of HAES. By the end of the 1900’s the USDA had been forced to recognize the status quo and abandon its attempts at social engineering. As a result it was able to continue the promotion of diversified agriculture.5 Notwithstanding the controversy over the HAES’s policy of social engineering, the importance of the HAES’s early work to the progress of the canned pineapple industry cannot be underestimated. Indeed the USDA was correct to later argue that the work of the experiment station had much to do with the remarkable development of the pineapple industry.6 One of the most serious problems to face the pineapple growers in the formative years of their industry was a serious affliction of the pineapple plants in certain sectors of their plantations at Wahiawa. The afflicted plants turned yellow and always proved barren. With the expansion of the pineapple fields, the problem of afflicted plants was found to be much greater than initially thought. All the efforts of the growers, including the application for example of fertilizers and lime, good tillage and drainage, failed to change the growth patterns of the pineapples in the affected sectors. However, the growers observed that the malady was associated with black soils, and that plants grown on red soils grew perfectly normally. In September 1908 the HAES conducted two extensive series of fertilizer plot experiments; one on red soil, and one on black soil. The HAES discovered that there was one important difference in the chemical composition of these soils, the black soil contained many times as much manganese as the red soil. The black colour of these areas might in part be attributed to the presence of higher oxides of manganese. There was a close correlation between the degree of yellowing of the pineapples and the percentage of manganese in the soil. But the Station was unable to discover any remedy in 1908.7 A further study of the problems caused by the influence of manganese on pineapple plants in 1912 also failed to produce a remedy for the malady.8 It was not until 1916, that the HAES’s chemist, Maxwell  O. Johnson, discovered a solution to the problem of manganese soils. He discovered that the unhealthy growth on the manganese soil was the result of a lack of iron in the plants, and that the plants were suffering from an iron deficiency despite the abnormally large quantities of iron present in the manganese soils. A small amount of iron was necessary for the development of chlorophyll

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(the green colouring matter of the plant), and the consequent health and vigour of the plant. With the assistance of Simes T. Hoyt of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., an experimental iron sulphate sprayer was designed, and built at a low cost by a plantation blacksmith. At a cost of only 60¢ per spraying, this treatment proved to be a total success.9 The solution to this problem meant that large areas of the black or dark manganese soils of the principal pineapple-growing district lying on the sloping plateau between the Koolau and Waianae mountain ranges of Oahu could be developed. It also meant that identical soils in the very large potential pineapple growing regions of Molokai and Lanai, and to a lesser extent on Kauai and Maui could now be profitably utilized.10 In 1914, the HPPA recognized the necessity of the control of the growing number of pests and diseases of pineapples was crucial to the survival of the industry. It arranged with the HSPA Experiment Station for a certain amount of research work to be undertaken by various members of their staff.11 Charles Eckart of the HSPA Experiment Station invented an asphalt impregnated paper for mulching plants in 1914, and used it to suppress weeds on the sugar plantations. John L. Whitmore, the plantation manager of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.,12 was the first to recognize the possibilities of paper mulching in pineapple cultivation, and to use it on his company’s crop, with which it produced outstanding results. The company developed and patented the product and made it available to its competitors on a royalty basis. While originally experimented with for weed suppression, the principal advantages with pineapples were the greater yields secured. The main value of paper mulching lay in the quick start and early development of the new plantings. The average gains from paper mulching were from ten to 15 tons per acre. Of lesser importance were the savings in weeding costs. By the 1930s, over 200,000 rolls of paper mulch a year were used by the pineapple growers.13 In 1917 the HSPA began experimental work on a two acre plot purchased by the HPPA at Wahiawa. In 1919 an experiment station was established at Kapalamauka on 89 acres of land provided by the HPPA north of the Kamehameha School.14 At the beginning of the 1920s, the pineapple wilt disease, which had been observed in the fields before the First World War,15 became extremely serious.16 The great majority of pineapple fields, particularly the ones which had been longest in cultivation, died of wilt before producing the first ratoon, and in many cases before the plant crop had been harvested.17 The reduced pack of 1921 and 1922 was mainly the

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result of pineapple wilt. There was serious doubt as to the long term future of pineapple cultivation in Hawaii. In 1922, the newly formed AHPC leased 100 acres at Wahiawa. On 1 January 1923 the AHPC separated the pineapple experiment station from the HSPA experiment station in order to intensify efforts to find an answer to the wilt crisis. The pineapple station staff moved to Wahiawa on 12 June 1923 and the Kapalamauka Station was abandoned. The new experiment station represented an investment of $25,000 and consisted of one office building, three glass houses, one lath house, one combined warehouse, store room and implement shed, one stable, three houses for labourers and two residences for members of staff. However, still no solution to the problem of wilt was found. In September 1924, a cooperative agreement was reached between the trustees of the APHC and the regents of the University of Hawaii under which the canners turned over the management of their experiment station to the university supported by an annual assessment on the pineapple pack. The president of the university, Arthur L. Dean, was appointed director of the station.18 By 1926 the station had undergone considerable expansion. In addition to the director, there were 17 scientific workers on the staff in addition to clerks, labourers, and student helpers. The work was organized into six sections: agriculture; plant breeding; pathology and   physiology; nematology; entomology; and chemistry.19 As Figure 5.1 shows, expenditure on the AHPC Pineapple Experiment Station increased rapidly during the latter part of the 1920s. Not everyone in the pineapple industry felt that the money spent on the experiment station was worthwhile. But as James D. Dole observed in 1929: I fully believe that if we continue with our cooperative experimental work, we are in time bound to get results that will pay, and even though results may come slowly and perhaps be disappointing for a while. I think we may look upon it as insurance. If the business should be wiped out by some disease or blight or insect, which could have been dealt with if the experimental work had been continued, we may consider it cheap insurance even though it seems to run into a lot of money.20 Dole won the argument and a decision was taken in 1931 to invest $200,000 in new buildings, including modern laboratories, on the makai [seaward]

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Figure 5.1: Annual Budget of the Pineapple Experiment Station, 1924–38 300000

Dollars

250000 200000 150000 100000

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1925

0

1924

50000

Year

Sources: Chapman, Royal N., Cooperation in the Hawaiian Pineapple Business (New York, 1933), p.10; PGAHA, An Analysis of the PPCA (Honolulu, 1939), p.121.

side of the University of Hawaii campus to replace those at Wahiawa. This made it one of the best equipped institutions in the United States.21 It was not until 1930 that the cause of pineapple wilt was discovered. It was found that the disease was transmitted by the mealy bug, a tiny insect which is carried around by ants and which depends upon them for its protection. A programme for the control of the bug by oil emulsion sprays was adopted.22 It was put into operation with great success. Thus in the 1930s it was possible to bring fields through to ratoons23 in a healthier condition than plant crops were formerly maintained in the 1920s.  The greater part of the expense of the ratoons was eliminated, therefore the production of the ratoons meant the production of low cost fruit. This meant not only the saving of an enormous amount of fruit, it also meant that the production programme was much more certain than before because the chance of the fields wilting had been eliminated if proper precautions were taken. The eradication of wilt in the pineapple fields meant still more than the economic saving of the immediate crop. It meant that it was possible to undertake careful experimental work with such factors as fertilization and various field management policies which before 1930 were impossible because of the widespread interference of wilt. It was possible in the early 1930s to revise the fertilizer schedule based upon the requirement of individual fields, and make a material saving in the cost of producing a ton of pineapples.24

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Pineapple wilt was not the only disease to trouble the pineapple growers before 1941. Another disease, yellow spot disease, which appeared for the first time in 1925, also posed a serious threat to the industry for a time. Its incidence increased ten-fold each year for the next few years. However, at the end of the 1920s, the Pineapple Experiment Station discovered that it was caused by a virus disease.25 In March 1930 it was also discovered that this virus was transmitted by onion thrips.26 While control measures were far from perfect, this disease was reduced from the category of an unknown fear to a known virus with a well known transmitter. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. discovered that tobacco dusting was a suitable means for the control of this disease.27 Efforts were also made to establish parasites to control the populations of thrips which transmitted the disease.28 The individual canners were quick to take advantage of the results of the Pineapple Experiment Station’s work.   With qualified agriculturists in charge of the canners’ fields, they were able to put new methods into operation very quickly. In the early 1930s the method of mass planting was introduced and the number of plants per acre was increased from a range of 8,000 to 10,000, to one of 14,000 to 20,000, with a corresponding increase in the yield of fruit. Furthermore expansion into the drier areas of the Territory followed rapidly after the station demonstrated the pineapple’s ability to grow under conditions of low rainfall.29 The pineapple industry also funded research into the improvement of the Smooth Cayenne pineapple variety. This was an extension of the research begun by Valentine Holt at the HAES about 1914 to try to create a hybrid variety that was superior to the Smooth Cayenne. An expedition was made in 1922 to Brazil to secure the seeds of a wild pineapple. They were successfully used to create a superior hybrid. The programme was expanded after the hiring of a geneticist, Julius L. Collins, in 1929. He later led a further investigation into the potential of wild varieties of pineapple from South America during 1938–9. The expedition sought to obtain additional varieties and species of pineapple in the hope that new genes might be obtained which would give the industry improved quality and disease resistance in plants and in fruits. The expedition did not result in the creation of any successful hybrids.30 The genetic research raised some serious issues that led the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in 1939 to question its support for the PPCA’s experiment station. The company felt that it might lead to the profitable production of increased amounts of pineapple both within and outside Hawaii in am industry where there was an oversupply of fruit already. The company questioned the need for ‘research for science’s sake’ when fruit made up a very

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small proportion of the industry’s operating costs. The company proposed to the PPCA that the results of the genetic research should be restricted to the Hawaiian industry to prevent potentially ruinous competitors like Japan gaining access to the information. It also proposed that the experiment station should be prevented from exporting any pineapple planting material or seeds outside Hawaii for the same reason.31 Between the mid-1930s and America’s entry into the Second World War, the station carried out a number of other important projects including the development of an improved method of wilt control. Great improvements were made in the methods of applying the oil emulsion in the fields. The improvement in the efficiency of application by various new machines reduced the number of men previously required in the operation.32 During the 1920s the pineapple companies had introduced new gasoline powered machinery on their plantations. By the late 1920s, 95 per cent of the pineapple crop was cultivated with caterpillar tractors. The pineapple planters relied entirely on petrol powered tractors for all of the heavy field work. They had also begun to replace wagons with motor trucks.33 However, the pineapple planters were unable to find large farm machinery manufacturers prepared to develop specialist machines. This was the result of the relatively small land area devoted to the cultivation of pineapples compared with the major agricultural crops of the United States. So the industry was forced to begin the development and introduction of laboursaving field machinery itself.34 Early examples include a combination subsoiler and plough perfected by H.L. Denison and a paper-laying machine perfected by Ralph E. Doty and Walter A. Wendt, both in 1923.35 The labour shortages experienced during the Second World War were to result in the creation of a new agricultural engineering department of the Pineapple Research Institute (the Pineapple Experiment Station was renamed in 1941) in 1945, and the introduction of a new pineapple harvester in 1946. It has been alleged that this harvester was based on the invention of Kermit J. Jackson, who had contacted the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in February 1940 with material relating to a pineapple harvester he had invented, which was patented in 1943. However, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had already acquired the rights to a ‘field fruit carrier’ in 1937 from Conrad H. Matthiessen of Pasadena, California. This machine carried pineapples from the field to trucks at the roadside at the rate of five tons an hour.36 The use of government and industry scientific research to increase the productivity of the Hawaiian pineapple plantations was a significant contributor to the success of the pineapple canning industry. The assistance

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provided to the industry during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century by the HAES has a parallel with the experience of the continental US canning industry. Edward F. Keuchel, Jr., has shown that the New York State Agricultural Experiment Station played a significant role in the scientific development of the state’s canning industry and the productivity of its agricultural suppliers during the inter-war years.37 Technological Innovation in the Pineapple Cannery The processing of just one variety of fruit meant that unlike in some continental US fruit canneries the required machinery did not have to be moved or altered to meet the requirements of other varieties of fruit.  All the necessary machinery could be installed and left in one place ready for continuous service. This enabled the Hawaiian canners to spend much time and money on research and development into cannery design and the layout of their machinery. Many of the companies employed chemists and engineers to study their problems and devise new methods and processes to increase the efficiency of their canneries. The pineapple canneries operated every week of the year, thus providing an opportunity to develop and perfect new machinery during the slack season, fruit always being available for experiments.38 One of the principal reasons for the success of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry in the period before 1941 was its early adoption of the principles of mass production. This reduced the need for scarce and relatively expensive seasonal labour, and it resulted in the manufacture of a standardized high-quality product. This is similar to one of the two innovative strategies Martin Brown and Peter Philips have identified in the nineteenth century continental US canning industry. They argue that this ‘strategy was aimed at the problem of unreliable supplies of unskilled workers. This type of mechanization increased profitability by greatly increasing the throughput of product per worker.’ 39 The first cannery machinery used by the Hawaiian pineapple canners was developed for use in the first pineapple canning centre in the United States, Baltimore. Baltimore, the largest American canning centre in the 1870s and 1880s, attracted inventors who wanted to test their new machines. Brown and Philips have argued that between 1875 and 1890 there was a wave on inventions of cannery machinery. These helped to ‘deskill’ craft labour.40 By the mid-1890s the Baltimore canning equipment firm, Sinclair-Scott

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Co., offered a range of pineapple cannery machinery. It included a Power Pineapple and Vegetable Grater, a Pineapple Slicer and Scott’s Pineapple Parer, Corer, Sizer and Slicer Combined. Another Baltimore firm, John R. Mitchell Co., also developed a variety of pineapple cannery machinery, including a pineapple grater, pineapple sizer and a double pineapple grater.41 The first machine designed specifically for canning Bahamian pineapples was invented by George W. Zastrow, a Baltimore cannery equipment manufacturer. The Zastrow Machine removed the core and cut a cylinder from the fruit and sliced it. This machine was patented in 1892. This machine produced the original ring-shaped slice that came to characterize canned pineapple. This machine could only cut one slice at a time. Furthermore, the pineapples had to be peeled before being processed by the Zastrow Machine.42 In 1893, Elgie J. Lewis of Middleport, New York, invented a machine which mechanized the pineapple peeling process. It was patented in November 1893 as a ‘machine for paring fruit or vegetables’.   Lewis’s company later marketed this machine as the Lewis Pineapple Peeling Machine (See Figure 5.2). It peeled the pineapple on the contour, which was then passed through a Shaw Apple Grater and sold as ‘grated pineapple’. While the Lewis Peeler served its purpose well, it could process no more than four pineapples per minute. Lewis also developed a pineapple coring machine at a later date.43 None of these machines appear to have been used to produce canned pineapple in Hawaii before 1903. When Dole established his cannery in that year he purchased Lewis machines and Zastrow machines.   He later recalled that the Lewis machine peeled a great many fruits lopsided which resulted in much waste and fruit with an imperfect appearance.44 The other Hawaiian canners were also to find the existing machinery unsatisfactory. Perhaps in response to the demands of his Hawaiian customers Zastrow worked to improve his machine.   In about 1907 he replaced his original machine with an improved version.  As a result the Lewis Pineapple Peeling Machine was no longer required, and the cylinder was cut from the pineapple before peeling. Slitting knives were attached to the Zastrow machine to make this possible. The improved Zastrow machine (see Figure 5.3) was the forerunner of the Ginaca machine. However, the Zastrow machine itself was still far from perfect. It produced longitudinal halves of shells to which large amounts of fruit adhered. The flesh adhering to the shell represented a considerable loss in the recovery of commercial material from the fresh fruit and created an unsolvable sanitation and disposal problem.45

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Figure 5.2: The Lewis Peeler

Source: CT 26/36, 29 April 1904.

The less than perfect nature of the continental US cannery machinery encouraged the Hawaiian canners to develop their own machines.   The earliest recorded Hawaiian pineapple cannery machine was developed by Earl K. Ellsworth and Byron O. Clark for the Tropic Fruit Co. in about 1905.   It produced pineapple chunks.46 At the end of the 1900s the Hawaiian canners began to make significant progress in replacing the continental US machines with improved versions.   In 1909, Lewis E. Arnold,47 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s cannery superintendent, and later general manager of Libby’s Hawaiian subsidiary (1920–31)48 invented an improved power slicing machine which replaced the Zastrow Slicer. Two years later Arnold invented an improved version of his first machine with a tubular slicing knife with a saw tooth construction for the cutting edge. The tube also had a longitudinal blade on the outside to split the shell. However, the invention of a machine that could peel and core the fruit in one operation presented many problems.  In March 1911 James D. Dole employed Henry Ginaca to overcome this obstacle to mass production at a salary of $300 a month. Ginaca was born on 19 May 1876 in California. His father, Joseph Ginaca, was an immigrant Italian civil engineer who conceived the Humboldt canal project with Dr. A. Gintz in Nevada in the early 1860s.

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As a teenager Henry Ginaca became an apprentice at the Union Iron Works in San Francisco. He also took a course in mathematics to enable him to become a mechanical draftsman. He came to Hawaii as a representative of the Risdon Iron Works of San Francisco. He was subsequently hired by the Honolulu Iron Works, apparently to work on engine designs, and had risen to the position of head draftsman at the time he was hired by Dole. Ginaca had had some previous experience of the pineapple industry. He was a founding director of the Tropic Fruit Co. in September 1903. Furthermore, he and his brothers, Louis and Camille, held homesteads at Pupukea, Oahu, where they raised pineapples on some 800 acres of land, which they sold to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.49 It took Ginaca a considerable amount of time to design an appropriate machine. Figure 5.3: The Zastrow Machine

Source: CT 33/37, 6 May 1910, p.11.

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Figure 5.4: The Ginaca Machine, c.1939

Source: Gouvernement Général de L’Indochine, Institut des Recherches Agronomiques et Forestières, La Technologie de L’Ananas: Fabrication des Conserves et des Jus Applications Indochinoises (Hanoi, 1941), p.53.

In October 1912, Ginaca patented a machine which combined the principle of the tubular shearing knife of the Arnold Slicer, and the fruit centring principle invented by Charles Wilson Cookson of Wahiawa in 1911, but in a more convenient form for a power machine. This marked the first attempt at combining both operations with a view to achieving high volume production. However, this attempt was not a success. In April 1913, Ginaca patented an improved centring device consisting of spring actuated fingers on the inside of three sides of a frame, the fourth side being open so that fruit might be brought into position by means of a feeding chain and thus greatly accelerating production. By the end of September, Ginaca had perfected his machine (see Figure 5.4). A patent was issued to him for a device to trim the top and bottom, and to core the pineapple in a series of automatic operations after it was sized.50  Dole later recalled that the Ginaca machine would not have been ultimately successful without the use of the

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slitted knife which had been invented by Archie E. Lister, who was manager of the Pearl City Fruit Co.51 The perfected Ginaca Machine consisted of a turret with pockets on the periphery, the pockets being slightly larger than the cylinder of the fruit. The turret was moved by an interrupted movement. The fruit was discharged from the sizing machine into a pocket in the turret; at the first interruption the top was cut off; at the second the bottom; at the third the core was removed; and at the fourth the finished cylinder was discharged upon a conveyer belt to be carried to the hand trimming table. This machine, coupled with the feeding and sizing mechanism, represented the complete development of the principle of the automatic high speed machine of the inventor. It allowed an increase in production from 15 to over 45 pineapples per minute and made possible the design of efficient production lines. In turn this enabled the construction of canneries equipped for large scale production of canned pineapple products. The Ginaca machine was redesigned in 1919 to incorporate a vertical turret and this allowed speeds from 38 pineapples per minute for No.1 fruit to 60 per minute for No.3 fruit. In 1925 a further redesign led to an increase in speed that allowed between 84 and 100 pineapples to be processed a minute. This was achieved by a realignment of various parts of the machine. The 1925 Model Ginaca remained in use until about 1947.52 The original Ginaca machine was awarded a gold medal at the PanamaPacific Exposition in San Francisco in 1915. A year earlier Ginaca had decided to return to the continental US to become an engineer for a company that was mining manganese ore near Paterson in California. He refused to heed Dole’s advice to remain with the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. or, at least, not leave Hawaii. At the time he left Dole’s employment he received $1,350 in return for relinquishing royalties to his machine. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is also believed to have paid him $5,000 for the machine’s design. Ginaca died of influenza on 19 October 1918 at the old Mother Lode mining camp at Hornitos aged only 42.53 In Dole’s opinion Ginaca’s ‘untimely death…removed a real genius from the inventive field.’ 54 The original Ginaca machine did not incorporate an eradicator. This was invented by George E. Fisher in 1917 using a grid already designed and patented by Robert Lister. It was perfected in 1920. The Fisher machine ran separately and allowed the production of canned grated and crushed pineapple from the shell of the fruit. The eradicator used a drum and a knife with a shaving blade instead of a planer type. The pineapple shells were turned back downward to prevent the hard specks from dropping into the cut flesh. This machine and other similar devices were in general use

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until about 1923 when in some canneries it was replaced by the Stanley eradicator, invented by Albert Stanley of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. The Stanley eradicator incorporated the principles of eradication into the Ginaca machine.55 Dole’s Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was also responsible for the development and introduction between 1914 and 1933 of the Hapco slicing machine, the Ginaca can stamper, the Hill slicer feeder, Wilbert’s feed tables, and the Hoyt-Napier cooler.56 These innovations progressively increased the productivity of the Hawaiian canneries.57 The Hawaiian Canneries Co. was also responsible for two further significant innovations in canned pineapple machinery during the 1930s. In 1931 a patent was issued to Robert Brooks Taylor of Kapaa, Kauai for a press to squeeze the pulp from the pineapple shells as they came from the sizing machine. One roll had low close corrugations and the other, which came in direct contact with the pulp, was plain. In 1935, Albert Horner, Jr., the general manager and president of the company, developed a method of cutting the flesh on the peel into squares and then removing the same from the shell. The purpose was to make it more attractive and give it a higher value than the regular shredded product.58 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was also responsible for the perfection of the process of manufacturing pineapple juice. Dole began experimenting with the production of pineapple juice in the year the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. established its cannery, in an attempt to secure what Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. has described as ‘economies of scope’.59 In 1903, Dole packed a few cans with juice which had been separated from grated pineapple in the course of production. However, this product lacked a characteristic pineapple flavour and there was little demand for it. In 1909, Dole hired Elton P. Shaw of San Jose, California, a canner of high-grade specialties, to develop a processed pineapple juice. Shaw developed a filtered juice which was sold in clear glass bottles. A year later, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. acquired control of Shaw’s company, HydeShaw Co. and renamed it the Pineapple Products Co. It began to market his product under the brand name ‘Dole’s Pure Hawaiian Pineapple Juice’.60 However, it received a very poor reception from the American consumer who felt that it did not have a very agreeable flavour.61 The company began a national advertising campaign to stimulate interest in the product. The advertising campaign failed and in 1913 the product was withdrawn from the market because of the lack of demand. Subsequently, small quantities of pineapple juice consisting of liquids drained from crushed pineapple were packed and sold.

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In 1931, Dole made a renewed effort to develop a natural pineapple juice in an attempt to stimulate stagnating sales of sliced pineapple in the United States. In April 1932, the first successful extraction of a natural juice was achieved by Simes T. Hoyt and Richard Botley. The process they developed involved the addition to the pineapple pulp of substantial quantities of inert, coarse, sharp filter aid. The mixture of pulp and filter aid, when subjected to moderate pneumatic pressure, yielded a first class natural pineapple juice, the extraction rate was of the magnitude of 90 per cent of the weight of the in-going pulp. Up to April 1932 there had been no known method which would extract more than 25 per cent of the juice. Juice flowed freely from the combined pulp and filter aid. A part of the process involved the recovery and washing of the filter aid for re-use. A commercial plant went into production in September 1932.62 There was also a rival process based on an invention during the late 1920s by Henry G. Schwarz of Denver, Colorado. He was a manufacturer of beet pulp dryers and other equipment used by beet-sugar refineries, who had developed specialized equipment for handling pineapple wastes and syrup stocks. In 1932 Schwarz developed a mechanical comminutorextractor combining a number of the principles of a hammer-mill in the comminuting stage, and a suitable system of screens and centrifugal force in the extracting stage. This machine was patented during the mid-1930s. Schwarz’s invention allowed Libby to produce a rival pineapple juice and put in on the market at the same time as the one produced by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.63 Innovation on the plantation and in the cannery explains a considerable part of the success of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry in the period 1903–41. It provides a good example of what David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg have argued was the institutionalization of innovation in twentieth century America.64 Undoubtedly, the most important first mover was James D. Dole. He had an active policy of promoting innovation at the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. The innovations made in the canning process helped the company achieve the economies of scale necessary to provide the profits required for the expansion which was to make the company the largest pineapple canner in the world. Dole was also one of the first movers responsible for achieving economies of scope in the pineapple canning industry through the development of a commercially successful canned pineapple juice. Unfortunately for Dole, as has been shown in Chapter 4, the breakthrough came too late for him to prevent the company’s board of directors from removing him from control of the company in 1932.

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However, Dole was to revive his interest in food technology with a group of associates in the second half of the 1930s.  In 1938 they formed Schwarz Engineering Co., Inc. (later renamed the James Dole Engineering Co.) of Redwood City, California after four years of research and experimentation. They had already developed a process of packing natural carrot juice in 1937. In 1940 the company also developed a process for canning and bottling apple juice. The following year S & W Fine Foods formed a joint venture with Dole’s new company to produce canned apple juice at the S & W plant at Redwood City. As has been shown above, Henry G. Schwarz, the inventor of the apple juice process, had previously invented a comminutor extractor for the production of pineapple juice, which had been adopted by Libby in the early 1930s. Later the company perfected a canned milk process.65 Innovation on the Hawaiian pineapple plantation was also of great importance to the success of the industry. A few of its overseas competitors could produce canned pineapple equal in quality to that of Hawaii. But none were able to successfully compete with Hawaii because they had a lower level of productivity in both the cannery and the pineapple fields. The increase in production in Hawaii in 1930, for example, was the result of a new system of massed planting. This allowed more pineapples to be grown with the same amount of land.66 The territory achieved these high productivity rates through cooperative research into the problems of pineapple cultivation, as has been shown above.

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6 PINEAPPLE PLANTATIONS VERSUS SMALL FARMS

It was not inevitable that pineapples in Hawaii would be grown mostly on plantations rather than small farms. Lorrin A. Thurston in his 1892 report on the early Hawaiian pineapple industry observed that: The importance of establishing this industry cannot be over estimated, as it is a business which lends itself to small farming, and with a cannery in Honolulu at which small producers could sell their pineapples for cash it would revolutionize the character of the population around Honolulu, and for that matter throughout the Islands.…1 However, contrary to Thurston, pineapple growing proved ill suited to small farming. The adoption of the plantation form of agriculture by the Hawaiian pineapple industry was the result of at least two advantages over small farms. The first related to the difficulties in raising capital to finance the development of the industry. In 1909 a federal government report observed: There are practically no banks or institutions advancing money to farmers. The sugar industry is financed by a few large agencies who have little or no interest outside of this particular line. The fruit raiser or packer or the small farmer does not have the facilities of obtaining money possessed in most agricultural communities on the mainland…2 Plantation companies found it easier to raise capital and in some cases were able to attract continental US investors. Second, the plantation, as

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a result of its size, could take full advantage of the benefits arising from the division of labour. The plantation has the resources to make full use of expert knowledge and skills in developing new crop varieties and in improving cultivation methods, including weed and pest control. As has been shown in Chapter 5, the plantation also has the necessary control over a large enough area of the crop to put scientific research results into practice. Standardized methods of cultivation helped in the achievement of a uniform crop, made processing easier, and met the needs of the market, which usually demanded a standardized product.3 It is probable that the industry adopted the plantation system of agriculture for the second reason more than the first reason. The Growth and Development of Pineapple Plantations in Hawaii Unlike sugar cane, pineapples can be grown on a wide variety of types of land. Much of the public land in Hawaii could have been used for the cultivation of pineapples had the industry been able to secure access to it. While it is true at the beginning of the twentieth century many of the pineapple growers, on the 1,300 acre Wahiawa Homestead Settlement secured their land under the provisions of the Republic of Hawaii’s Land Act of 1895, it proved very difficult for them to either purchase or lease further public land. This was despite the fact that the Territory of Hawaii had at its disposal over 50,000 acres of available lands in 1900.4 Data published by the Territorial Commissioner of Public Lands show that only an insignificant area of public lands were leased to the pineapple growers before the Second World War.5 The public land policy of the Territory, which after 1903 was mainly orientated towards the promotion of the sugar industry, meant that the pineapple growers had to seek the greater part of the land that they required for the cultivation of pineapples from the private landowners of Hawaii. Unfortunately for the pineapple growers, land ownership in Hawaii was concentrated amongst a handful of owners.6 At first it was relatively easy for the pineapple canners to purchase or lease land from private land owners. There were many settlers at Wahiawa who willing sold their land to the pioneer pineapple canners. On the outer Islands, where the early pineapple canneries were established by members of the sugar planter families, there was no difficulty in securing land. Table 6.1 shows that by 1908, there were just under 6,000 acres under pineapple cultivation in the Islands. At about the same time there were over 200,000 acres under sugar cane cultivation.7 Table 6.1 also shows the predominance of Oahu in the early years of the pineapple canning industry. In the same

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Table 6.1: Land Under Pineapple Cultivation in Hawaii, 1908 Island

Area (acres)

% of Total

Oahu

4,565

79.2

Maui

600

10.4

Hawaii

350

6.1

Kauai

250

4.3

Total

5,765

100.0

Source: US Reclamation Service, Hawaii: Its Natural Resources and Opportunities for Home-Making (Washington, DC, 1909), p.41.

year James D. Dole, using a more conservative estimate of pineapple acreage than the federal government, estimated that 85 per cent of it was controlled by corporations. The balance was controlled by small growers, of whom he believed about half were white Caucasians and the remainder principally Japanese.8 As the industry grew, it became increasingly difficult to secure land on Oahu. During the period immediately before the First World War, a new pineapple growing district was developed on the narrower windward side of Oahu. The land there was unsuitable for sugar cane cultivation because it was extremely uneven. The district’s precipitous character required contour ploughing. Some of the mountainside ploughing could only be accomplished using mule teams. Despite these difficulties, the area under cultivation grew rapidly.9 But the clearing of side hills of sod, bushes, and often trees, resulted in devastation where the land was unsuited to pineapples. The soil was gradually washed away. James D. Dole did not believe contour ploughing was the solution. He favoured an engineering solution.10 However, although he purchased Koolau Fruit, a windward Oahu pineapple plantation company, in 1911, he soon realized that it was a bad investment. He sold the plantation to Libby in 1916.11 Those with less foresight than Dole abandoned the district during the early 1920s. Initially many of the pineapple canners were heavily reliant on purchases of raw pineapples from small independent producers. However, with the rapid growth of the industry and the failure of the homestead programme established under the Land Act of 1895, many of the canners internalized production.12 By 1917, only four out of the seven canners covered by a survey conducted by the US Federal Trade Commission were purchasing

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pineapples from independent growers. Of the four, two were minor companies established to encourage small scale farming in the outer Islands, the Maui Pineapple Co. and the Kauai Fruit & Land Co. It appears from the data that it was more cost-effective to produce pineapples on the canners’ own plantations than to purchase them from outside growers. In the case of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., which produced 75 per cent of its own pineapples, it cost $16 per ton to purchase pineapples from independent growers compared with $12 per ton to grow pineapples on their own plantations. An even larger differential could be observed in the case of the Thomas Pineapple Co., part of Libby, which produced over 60 per cent of its own pineapples. Pineapples purchased from independent growers cost $20.85 per ton and those produced on the company’s own plantation cost $10.43 per ton.13 Table 6.2: Land Owned or Leased by Hawaiian Pineapple Canners, 1920 Island

Area

% of Total

(acres) Oahu

32,800

 70.0

Maui

6,100

 13.0

Hawaii

6,045

 12.9

Kauai

1,900

4.1

Total

46,845

100.0

Source: Territory of Hawaii, Planning Board, First Progress Report (Honolulu, 1939), p.91.

At the beginning of the 1920s the production of pineapples was still concentrated predominantly on Oahu, as Table 6.2 illustrates. It suggests there had been a relative shift towards the outer Islands during the twelve years between 1908 and 1920. This may partly reflect that the sugar plantations were reluctant to sell or lease sufficient areas of land to the pineapple canners on Oahu. It may also partly reflect the fact that the cost of land in the outer Islands was less than in Oahu, as is suggested by Table 6.3. The Island of Hawaii was the only outer Island where pineapple cultivation was not a success. Initial enthusiasm in the Hilo District led to the organization of the Hilo Fruit & Packing Co. in 1905, which established a pineapple cannery. It was to end in failure. The same was true for the Kohala District. Samuel Parker Woods, a native Hawaiian, had begun cultivating pineapples in the Kohala district in 1909. However, he ceased production after the failure in

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Table 6.3: Area and Approximate Value of Land Under Pineapple Cultivation in 1929 County

Area

Value

Value per Acre

(acres)

($)

($)

Honolulu*

28,756

5,032,300

175

Maui+

30,000

4,500,000

150

Kauai

4,138

41,380

 10

Hawaii

1,143

85,754

 75

64,037

9,659,434

 151

Total

* Island of Oahu + Islands of Maui, Molokai and Lanai Source: US Senate, Committee on Finance, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., Tariff Act of 1929: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance, Vol.VII, Schedule 7, Agricultural Products and Provisions (Washington, DC, 1929), pp.409–10.

1912 of Hilo Fruit. In 1919 Woods helped form a new canning company, the Kohala Pineapple Co. This company survived for longer than the Hilo concern. It went out of business in 1932.14 During the 1920s the major pineapple canners secured new lands for expansion. However, these lands seem to have been only barely sufficient for the industry to meet the growing demand for its product in the continental US. Many of the land deals made by the canners to secure access to land owned or controlled by the sugar plantations and affiliated interests were made on disadvantageous terms. Calpak, for example, was obliged to enter a cooperative agreement with Alexander & Baldwin in order to gain access to land on the Island of Maui. This agreement was drawn up to ensure that the sugar agency retained ownership and absolute control of the land. In 1933, Alexander & Baldwin terminated their agreement with Calpak, and the canner was forced to withdraw from Maui.15 Most of the lands leased or sold by the sugar plantations and affiliated interests to the pineapple canners had been found to be unsuitable for sugar cane cultivation. This was true both for the Island of Lanai acquired by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in the early 1920s16 and the land owned or controlled by the Cooke family’s Molokai Ranch on Molokai,17 part of which was leased to Calpak and Libby in the 1920s. It was only under exceptional circumstances that sub-marginal sugar cane land was leased for pineapple cultivation.

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Table 6.4: Cultivated Pineapple Land in Hawaii, 1931 Island

Area

% of Total

(acres) Oahu

35,500

 43.6

Maui

19,400

 23.8

Lanai

 9,600

 11.8

Molokai

 9,000

 11.1

Kauai

 6,600

  8.1

Hawaii

 1,250

  1.5

Total

81,350

99.9

Source: ‘More pineapples than peaches’, WCP 23/1, May 1931, p.6.

By 1931, just before the beginning of the Great Depression in Hawaii, the pineapple canners controlled 81,350 acres of cultivated pineapple lands, nearly twice as much as they had done in 1920, as can be seen in Table 6.4. The data illustrate the decisive relative shift away from Oahu to the outer Islands of Maui, Lanai and Molokai in the 1920s. Yet despite the increase in the acreage under pineapples in this period, the pineapple companies required more land to meet the demand for their product. All three of the major canners conducted extensive investigations overseas in the 1920s, as is shown in Chapter 8. During the 1930s there were no major land transactions, and the pineapple canners spent the decade consolidating and developing their existing land holdings. Table 6.5 suggests that there was a relative and an absolute rise in the area under pineapple cultivation on Molokai and Lanai respectively. There was also an absolute increase in the area under cultivation on Oahu. Although the major pineapple canners internalized the production of fresh pineapples, a small number continued to purchase pineapples from small growers. Some of the sugar factors, most notably Alexander & Baldwin established pineapple canneries in the outer Islands to attract settlers. These settlers served as a useful pool of labour for the sugar plantations during the slack season of the pineapple industry. Many of the small-scale farmers in the Islands also cultivated pineapples, especially the Japanese. After the establishment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission in the early 1920s, many of the native Hawaiian homesteaders turned to pineapple cultivation as well.

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Table 6.5: Cultivated Pineapple Land in Hawaii, 1936 Island

Area

% of Total

(acres) Oahu

43,000

 46.2

Maui

15,000

 16.1

Lanai

18,000

 19.4

Molokai

12,000

 12.9

Kauai

5,000

  5.4

Total

93,000

100.0

Source: John Duthie, ‘Pineapple-growing in the Hawaiian Islands’, Queensland Agricultural Journal xlv/2 (1936), p.182.

Pineapple Plantations A closer analysis of the operations of the pineapple corporations and the small independent growers reveals how significant the land constraint was on the development of the Hawaiian pineapple industry. All three of the major canners between 1910 and 1941 found it very difficult to acquire sufficient land for the cultivation of pineapples. Of the three, the two continental US canners, Libby and Calpak, experienced the greatest problems. Unlike Calpak and the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Libby did not begin its operations in central Oahu at Wahiawa. Instead Libby began with the acquisition in 1910 of a company on windward Oahu, the Hawaiian Cannery Co. It also signed a five year contract with James B. Castle to purchase all of the pineapples grown on his 1,000 acre plantation at Ahuimanu and Heeia. In 1911 Libby built a model plantation village and a small cannery with an annual capacity of 250,000 cases per annum at Kahaluu. Between 1910 and 1912 it also acquired over 1,600 acres of land at Heeia, Kaneohe, Kailua, Waiahole and Waikane mostly under lease.18 In 1916 Libby purchased the Koolau Fruit Co., which had 500 acres of leased land at Heeia. During the following two years Libby acquired a 600 acre lease at Heeia and leased an additional 1,700 acres of land at Kaneohe, Kailua and elsewhere on windward Oahu. A considerable amount of land was subleased to small growers. While Libby managed the operation of large tracts of land, much of the pineapple production was carried out by Japanese and Chinese growers on small plots of five to ten acres.19

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In 1914, Libby had also established another plantation in central Oahu, several miles south of Wahiawa, and an additional and larger cannery was built at Kalihi in Honolulu. It took several years to put together the plantation in a piecemeal fashion beginning with 200 leased acres. In 1915 and 1916 over 1,200 acres of land was acquired from small growers both in fee simple and under lease. In 1917, Libby purchased the land holdings of the Waipio Pineapple Co., which comprised 400 acres leased from the John Ii Estate. Libby also purchased the Thomas Pineapple Co., which had 700 acres at Wahiawa. The following two years additional lands were acquired at Waipio, increasing Libby’s holdings in this area to over 1,900 acres.20 By the early 1920s, as can be seen in Table 6.6, Libby controlled about 11,000 acres of land for the cultivation of pineapples. Libby continued the expansion of its operations in central Oahu purchasing 456 acres in 1921. Two years later nearly 300 acres were leased at Pearl City. In 1928 Libby sub-leased 500 acres from the Oahu Railway & Land Co. at Wahiawa. These leases were subsequently renewed.21 However, on windward Oahu, Libby’s operation was in serious trouble. The pineapple crops had been struck by disease. The fields were smaller than on the leeward side of Oahu, and the cost of production was consequently higher. From 1923 plantings were reduced and large areas were sub-leased to independent growers. Libby decided to withdraw from windward Oahu and dismantled its cannery.22 In common with the other two major canners Libby decided to expand outside of Oahu into the outer Islands, and in 1922 went to the sparsely populated Island of Molokai. On 1 January 1923, a 5,000 acre lease was obtained from the American Sugar Co. (which was an affiliate of the Molokai Ranch) at Maunaloa on the west side. The sugar industry had failed on Molokai when groundwater development for American Sugar proved unfeasible. There were no paved roads in the area, existing housing, or harbour. Between 1923 and 1925 Libby constructed paved roads, a warehouse and a plantation village to house the field workers. A harbour was dredged and a wharf was constructed at Kolo on the south side of Molokai, ten miles from the Maunaloa plantation village. The first crop was satisfactorily harvested and delivered to the Honolulu cannery in 1925.24 Libby also established a plantation on Maui in the 1920s. In 1926 Libby signed a management agreement with the Pauwela Pineapple Co. of Kuiaha with a three-year option of purchase plan. Libby began a successful programme to increase the annual tonnage by contracting with 200 to 300 small growers. Libby expanded production at Pauwela’s cannery until its pack reached 900,000 cases in 1929, 700,000 cases more than the 1926 pack, just three years before.

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Table 6.6: Pineapple Lands Owned or Leased by Hawaiian Pineapple Canners in 1921 and 193623 Company

1921

1936

(acres)

(acres)

6,045

0

10,000

15,000

Hawaii Kohala Pineapple Co. Oahu Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Calpak Libby Pearl City Fruit Co. Hawaii Fruit Packers

8,000

7,500

11,000

3,500

3,000

0

800

0

0

8,500

Maui Libby Haiku Fruit & Packing Co. Baldwin Packers Pauwela Pineapple Co.

3,000

0

550

4,000

2,550

0

Maui Pineapple Co.

0

4,700

Hawaiian Pineapple Co.

0

3,900

1,500

4,500

400

3,400

0

20,000

Libby

0

10,000

Calpak

0

4,000

46,845

89,000

Kauai Kauai Fruit & Land Co. Hawaiian Canneries Co. Lanai Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Molokai

Total

Source: PCA, 9 February, p.P14; WCP 27/13, 25 April 1936, p.77.

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In December 1928 Libby agreed to purchase Pauwela. Pauwela’s assets included 3,773 acres of leased land and 961 acres of fee simple land, and also some growers’ contracts. After Libby assumed ownership of the company in 1929, they purchased an additional 750 acres and leased 1,118 acres of virgin land in the Makawao district from the landowner, Harold Waterhouse Rice. These additional lands assured Libby of a secure supply of pineapples for its Maui cannery without relying upon small growers to supply the major part of its fruit. They also enabled Libby to abandon Pauwela’s original plantation at Kahakuloa.25 Libby also founded a new plantation at Makawao. Small growers were also encouraged to plant, and by 1930 they numbered several hundreds. However, with the beginning of the Great Depression in Hawaii in 1931, Libby adopted a policy to dispense with all outside growers and to internalize production. Libby discouraged any further planting by growers, and as their ten year contracts with the growers expired, they were not renewed. Libby had adopted a very paternalistic attitude towards its growers and, as William A. Baldwin observed, their fate was unenviable.26 Between 1921 and 1936, Libby doubled its acreage under pineapple cultivation in Hawaii. Table 6.6 above shows that whereas all of Libby’s land had been on Oahu in 1921, only 16 per cent was on that Island in 1936. Of the remainder in 1936, 39 per cent was on Maui and 45 per cent on Molokai. Calpak’s land policy was different from that of Libby; the corporation preferred to lease almost all of its land. However, in the actual execution of this policy the results were very similar to those of Libby, except that Calpak’s share of production fell sharply in the late 1920s and early 1930s. It was during this period Calpak decided to found new plantations and canneries overseas as will be shown in Chapter 8. Unlike Libby, Calpak only increased its land holdings by just over 40 per cent between 1921 and 1936 as can be seen in Table 6.6. Furthermore the majority of Calpak’s land remained on Oahu unlike its competitors. This helps to explain why Calpak was the only canner to produce canned pineapple outside Hawaii in the 1930s.27 In 1911 the CFCA, Calpak’s predecessor, founded a plantation at Wahiawa and built a cannery in Honolulu. By 1916, when Calpak was formed, the CFCA controlled between 2,000 and 3,000 acres in central Oahu. In 1917 Calpak acquired the Wahiawa Consolidated Pineapple Co., which gave it control of another 3,000 acres of land. At the beginning of the 1920s Calpak controlled 8,000 acres of land in central Oahu, 2,000 acres leased from the Oahu Railway & Land Co., 800 acres leased from the

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125

Territory of Hawaii, and the remainder leased from various other landowners. Calpak also extended financial assistance to various independent growers, who contributed 20 per cent of the fruit canned by Calpak.28 Calpak, like its two principal rivals, expanded its operations into the outer Islands in the 1920s. In 1919, Calpak started growing pineapples at Kalae and Puu o Hoku on Molokai by financing Japanese growers on small farm holdings. In June 1927, Calpak leased a 3,000 acre section of land at Naiwa and Kahanui from the Molokai Ranch which was owned by the Cooke family. This virgin land was just east of Libby’s plantation. The development of this land was begun at once. Unlike Libby, Calpak did not have to build a new plantation camp because the section included the old American Sugar Co. camp at Kualapuu. This lease did not increase Calpak’s overall acreage in Hawaii, because other leases expiring in 1926 almost offset the new lease. In 1933 Calpak expanded its Molokai plantation by leasing some pigeon pea fields from the Molokai Ranch and purchased most of the Ranch’s worker’s homes at Mahalehua. They constructed a camp for their workers named after that section of land, Kipu.29 Calpak also went to Maui in the 1920s. On 2 January 1924 a cooperative agreement was reached between Calpak and the Maui Agricultural Co., under which Calpak would be responsible for the canning and marketing and the other company would produce the fruit. Each party would be reimbursed its costs and the profit or loss was divided 55 per cent to Maui Agricultural and 45 per cent to Calpak. In April, the Haleakala Ranch, which had decided to cultivate pineapples, also became party to the agreement. The plantings of the two companies grew very well, and in 1925 they began the delivery of the fruit to the Calpak cannery in Honolulu. However, the water transportation of the fruit from Kahului to Honolulu was not to the satisfaction of the Maui companies. So the agreement was amended. Calpak agreed to build a new pineapple cannery at Kahului and the Haleakala Ranch also agreed to supply Calpak with pineapples. The new cannery was completed in time to handle the fruit produced by the Maui companies in 1926.30 During the period 1925 to autumn 1929, the Maui companies’ plantations yielded very heavy crops. The Maui agreement was of critical importance to Calpak because of its lack of success in securing new leases and in some years accounted for as much as two-thirds of Calpak’s total output of canned pineapple in Hawaii. However, towards the end of the 1920s the pineapples produced on Calpak’s new plantation on Molokai began to reduce Kahului’s estimated share of the total pack. In the early 1930s the Maui pineapple plantations were consolidated and put under the

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control of a new company, the Maui Pineapple Co. On 1 March 1934, Maui Pineapple exercised an option in the agreement to acquire the interests of Calpak in the cannery at Kahului and the marketing of its production.31 Meanwhile in October 1932, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had been forced to transfer 2,500 acres of its land to Calpak in connection with the agreement for the allotment of production by the PPCA. The transfer restored to Calpak land that it had previously cultivated and which was under lease from the Waialua Agricultural Co. and the Oahu Railway & Land Co. This transfer gave Calpak a total of about 15,000 acres of leased pineapple lands on Oahu and Molokai.32 Of the three major canners, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the most successful in obtaining land for pineapple cultivation. The first plantation was founded by James D. Dole at Wahiawa in 1900, as has been shown above. In 1903, the year of the company’s foundation, Dole leased some additional land at Waiane Uka from the Dowsett Co. In 1908, the company leased 2,000 acres of first grade land from the Waialua Agricultural Co. Four years later the company became the first of the three major canners to expand into the outer Islands.33 In that year Dole acquired a controlling interest of 51 per cent in the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co. Dole was probably attracted by the fact that the Territorial Government had just opened up about 2,000 acres of good pineapple lands at Haiku, Maui. Dole’s ambition was to create a second Hawaiian Pineapple Co. on Maui, but market conditions were against him during his ownership of the Haiku Co. It never contributed more than 20 per cent to the total pack of canned pineapples produced by Dole. Profits slumped from $53,760 in 1912 to a loss of $19,913 in 1914, and even when Haiku returned to the black in 1916, profits were only $13,855, as can be seen in Figure 3–3. In 1917, Dole sold the Haiku Co. to a group of local businessmen led by Harold Waterhouse Rice.34 In 1919, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. considered buying out the John Ii Estate Waipio lands, some which were leased to Libby; leasing land from the Oahu Sugar Co.; or purchasing undeveloped land around Kohala on the Big Island of Hawaii.35 However, the company decided against all of these options. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. produced 90 per cent of its fruit on 10,000 acres of land owned or under lease to the company. The remaining ten per cent were bought from growers under a sliding scale contract, based on the price of the canned product. In 1922, the company made an agreement with the Waialua Agricultural Co., obtaining more permanent tenure of 4,000 acres of land which the company had leased before the war, and securing 8,000 additional acres. This gave the company a total of 18,000 acres of land on Oahu. The company also exercised an

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option to purchase the Island of Lanai from Harry A. and Frank F. Baldwin for $1,100,000. (The Baldwins had only paid $588,000 for Lanai in 1917). Lanai contained at least 20,000 acres of potential pineapple land out of a total of 89,000 acres. The deal was completed in December 1922, and the company began a huge development project, the transformation of a sparsely inhabited island into a pineapple plantation. A previous attempt around 1906 to develop a sugar plantation at Keamoku, opposite Lahaina, had failed. The company spent as much as $5,000,000 on the project between 1922 and the early 1930s.36 A windbreak five miles long was thrown up, and large gang ploughs and caterpillar tractors were set to work 24 hours a day, turning hundreds of acres of soil and preparing it for planting. The company’s development project included the construction of two reservoirs at Kaihoelana, with a capacity of 3,390,000 gallons of water. The water was lifted 750 feet by electric pumps from the tunnels in the bottom of the Maunalei Gulch and carried to the reservoirs in six inch redwood pipe over a distance of 5,300 feet. Water was distributed through an elaborate pipe system to the pineapple fields. The company spent $1,500,000 on the construction of the artificial Kaumalapu Harbour. On the shoreline the company blasted cliffs and threw out a 30 feet long breakwater of 116,000 tons of rock obtained by breaking up and moving a rock face, 65 feet deep and 300 feet at its base, creating a harbour with a depth of 27 feet and a channel entrance of 65 feet. Ships tied up at a wharf constructed from 4,000 cubic yards of concrete. At the back of the wharf, a large open square was built surrounded by the harbour buildings. From the harbour, through the pineapple fields, the company laid a seven mile 20 foot wide macadamized road rising 1,600 feet to the plantation village of Lanai City. Lanai City was built to house the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s plantation employees. Within its boundaries were schools, churches, a Buddhist temple, a bank, a hospital, model playgrounds, a baseball park, a boxing ring, a swimming pool, tennis courts, an auditorium, a cinema and radio telephones. Lanai City was conceived of as a model village, and did indeed contrast favourably with the deplorable conditions in many of the sugar plantation camps.37 However, in practice, as has been the case with many similar model housing projects, the company’s employees found the village to be far from ideal. Plantation rules regulated almost every aspect of their lives. The company’s manager, Australian-born Harold Bloomfield-Brown, even decided what plants employees might grow in their backyards; the cultivation of vegetables was expressly forbidden. Bloomfield-Brown is alleged to have ruled Lanai ‘like a dictator’. Indeed, a Honolulu Star-Bulletin

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reporter observed in 1924 that Bloomfield-Brown could ‘see a broken window or a bit of paper, or some hastily opened packing case a mile off, but he never sees them more than once!’. Bloomfield-Brown observed to the reporter, ‘all you have to do is point out the smallest untidiness and it disappears immediately’. Lanai City was also effectively racially segregated. The Asian and native Hawaiian employees lived in small homes without running water, no electricity or gas, and no inside bathrooms. The white Caucasian employees were separated from the rest of the workforce, and lived in palatial detached houses on what the other employees called ‘Snob Hill’, a parody on San Francisco’s pretentious ‘Nob Hill’.38 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s Lanai project was a great operational success. By 1929, the company was processing 50,000 tons of fresh fruit from Lanai, the equivalent of 1.5 million cases of canned fruit, more than one third of the company’s total pack.39 However, the cost of the project meant that the company became financially over-exposed after the Great Depression began to adversely affect sales of their product in the continental US. As a result, as has been shown in Chapter 4, the company was taken over by Castle & Cooke in 1932. From 1932, the company underwent a short period of retrenchment. However, in 1935 the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. resumed the expansion of its activities. The company reacquired the Haiku Pineapple Co. in order to gain control of its PPCA quota. With Haiku also came 4,750 acres of land on Maui. The Haiku plantation was closed down in 1938, probably because Alexander & Baldwin did not wish to lease more land to a competitor of its two Maui pineapple canners.40 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. continued to search for new land elsewhere. As has been shown in Chapter 4, in 1940 the company planned to establish a large new cannery on Molokai41 and Castle & Cooke vetoed the project.42 In the 1930s a fourth major pineapple canning group emerged in Hawaii, Alexander & Baldwin Ltd. (A & B Group). Unlike the other major canners, it was founded by the sugar factor, Alexander & Baldwin. David Dwight Baldwin had founded the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co. in October 1903. It was one of the less successful pineapple canners in Hawaii. In 1906, the company decided to encourage independent growers to plant for delivery of their crops to the Haiku cannery. A flat price of $25 per ton for first grade fruit delivered at the cannery was offered. The policy of encouraging independent growers was part of Alexander & Baldwin’s strategy to establish a pool of permanent rural labour for its sugar plantations. It was to play havoc with the financial performance of the Haiku Co., because the majority of the independent growers under contract

Pineapple Plantations Versus Small Farms

129

to the company were extremely inefficient. Nonetheless, the number of growers increased steadily. They were given ten year contracts for delivery of their fruit to the cannery, and financial assistance for the cultivation of their crops.43 The company was sold to James D. Dole in 1912 as already referred to above. Alexander & Baldwin also purchased an interest in another pineapple company before the First World War. It acquired control of the Kauai Fruit & Land Co., as part of the McBryde Sugar Co., from the Anglo-Hawaiian sugar factor, Theo. H. Davies & Co. on 31 December 1909. The Kauai Co. had been founded in February 1906, as the central part of a homesteading programme aimed at reducing the turnover of labour at the McBryde Sugar Co. The settlement tracts, like those of the Haiku Co., were small and inadequate to support a family, unless supplemented by an outside source of income. It was the opinion of the company that a small tract of land, owned or leased, would tie labour to the vicinity. This was borne out in practice. The McBryde Sugar Co. lands at Kaleho and Wahiawa in the Lehua district of Kauai had been opened for homesteading in 1904, and were purchased principally by Portuguese and Spanish workers from the plantation. Advances totalling $60,000 were made to the settlers by the sugar company to assist in the making of surveys, and the construction of water reservoirs and roads through the homestead tract. In 1905, the first pineapples were planted in the first series of homesteads opened on 800 acres of land. The company made the necessary advances on the cost of cultivation and harvesting and agreed to buy all the produce at an average price of $21.5 per ton. By the early 1920s, it had become clear that the settlement programme had failed with respect to the promotion of pineapple cultivation. After a period of pineapple cultivation following the first opening of the land, the settlers without exception switched to the growing of sugar cane, so that the pineapples grown on settlement lands in the early 1920s were on what was the third series of land to be opened to entry in 1917. There were about 1,500 acres planted to pineapples, of which 75 per cent were cultivated by the company itself. This compared with the 40 per cent produced by the company, when the homesteaders were more actively engaged in pineapple growing before the First World War.44 During the 1930s the Japanese growers who were dependent on the Kauai Co. were to bear the full burden of readjustment during the Great Depression. For example, in the 1933–4 season, the renamed Kauai Pineapple Co.’s Lawai cannery only contracted to buy 65 per cent of what the growers had raised as a winter crop.45

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The history of the Kauai Pineapple Co. differs from that of the other two companies in the A & B Group in the 1930s, for neither of these two companies employed any contract growers. Baldwin Packers was founded by the founder of Alexander & Baldwin, Henry P. Baldwin. In 1910, Henry P. Baldwin employed Scottish immigrant, David T. Fleming, as the manager of the Honolua Ranch. Baldwin hoped to transform the ranch into a profitable agricultural enterprise after unsuccessful attempts to raise cattle and grow coffee. Fleming had previously been manager of Baldwin’s Grove Ranch, where he had experimented with and grown pineapples for the Haiku Fruit & Land Co.46 After Baldwin’s death in 1911, his heirs, through the H.P. Baldwin Trust, showed their faith in Fleming, by giving him a free hand at the ranch. Fleming decided that the way to make the ranch successful was to diversify. One of the new enterprises established at the ranch was a pineapple plantation. The first pineapple planting in Honolua was in 1912. A cannery and canmaking plant was built at Honolua. The cannery began production in 1914, with a pack of 6,000 cases. The company’s pack grew steadily in volume and by 1935 it totalled about 450,000 cases. As the packs increased in volume, the Honolua cannery began to suffer a growing shortage of labour. In 1920, a new cannery was built in Lahaina, where there was no trouble in securing enough workers for the peak season.47 The H.P. Baldwin Trust was dissolved in 1923 and the Honolua Ranch was incorporated as Baldwin Packers, Ltd. The company controlled 20,000 acres of fee simple land. Fleming was reappointed as manager of the new company. During the 1920s, a considerable number of small plots of land were purchased from native Hawaiian landowners.48 In common with the rest of the pineapple industry, Baldwin Packers was badly affected by the Great Depression. However, as has been shown in Chapter 4 the company had fully recovered by the mid-1930s, and went on to expand in the second half of the decade. The third pineapple canner in the A & B Group, the Maui Pineapple Co., was founded in 1932. Like Baldwin Packers, it was part of the legacy of H.P. Baldwin. On 17 December 1909, H.P. Baldwin had founded the Kehua Ranch Co. to enable him to acquire additional lands to ‘round out’ his Haleakala Ranch titles. Under an amendment to the Organic Act in 1909 he could no longer acquire additional lands. During the period 1909 to 1929 the only activity of the Keahua Ranch was the acquisition and mere holding of title to land. By agreement of 22 April 1924 the Haleakala Ranch became a party to the cooperative agreement between Calpak and the Maui Agricultural Co. referred to above. Between 1924 and the end of 1928 a pineapple plantation was created by the Haleakala Ranch under the agreement.49

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In 1929 the difficulties in operating a cattle ranch and pineapple plantation at the same time led the two companies to partition their lands. The Haleakala Ranch Co. was given title to all ranch land and the Keahua Ranch Co. received 7,700 acres of land, all the buildings and personal property used in connection with Haleakala’s pineapple business, and the assignment of the latter’s interest in the agreement with Calpak. The Keahua Ranch Co. was renamed the Haleakala Pineapple Co.50 During the 1920s, H.P. Baldwin’s son, Harry A. Baldwin developed an interest in the production of fresh pineapples on the Maui Agricultural Co.’s plantations at Paia and Grove Ranch in Haiku. By 1923 his company had planted 270 acres of pineapples. The 1924 agreement with Calpak led to some 500 acres of land being planted with pineapples each year until 1931. He also sold several thousand tons of pineapples per year from Grove Ranch to the Haiku Pineapple Co. Profits from the company’s Pineapple Department rose steadily from $44,445 in 1926 to $428,500 in 1930. However, the impact of the Great Depression cut profits to $37,230 in 1931, and caused a loss of $285,200 in 1932.51 In 1931, J. Walter Cameron, manager of the Haleakala Pineapple Co. since 1929, was asked to draw up a plan to merge the interests of his company with those of the Maui Agricultural Co. in order to cut costs. Both companies had plantations in the same area of Maui, so there was considerable scope for greater economies of scale. On 29 February 1932 the Maui Pineapple Co. was founded in which the Maui Agricultural Co. had a 49 per cent share and the Haleakala Pineapple Co. had a 51 per cent share.52 In 1934, as has been shown above, the new company acquired Calpak’s Kahului cannery.53 The Maui Pineapple Co. became one of the most profitable pineapple canners in the late 1930s. Indeed in 1936 it became necessary to lease 14,000 acres of additional land from the Maui Agricultural Co. to add to the company’s existing 6,500 acres.54 The Small Pineapple Growers In 1924 the Irish writer Padraic Colum observed that Hawaii did not have sufficient population to provide its labour force. He believed that although plantation wages were relatively good, the regimented life on the plantations was a deterrent to prospective immigrants. He proposed breaking up the plantations and creating a body of homesteaders engaged in the cultivation of pineapples or sugar. However, the history of the small pineapple growers in Hawaii suggests that Colum’s solution was impractical.55

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In the early years of the industry most of the pineapples cultivated for canning were produced by white Caucasian homesteaders. As has been shown above in the example of Alexander & Baldwin, it was policy of some of the sugar plantation companies to offer homesteaders small plots of land adjacent to their plantations on which pineapples could be grown in order to provide themselves with a pool of labour. In the 1900s at least one of the sugar plantations used this strategy to promote the settlement of their plantation lands by European settlers. The Waialua Agricultural Co. leased 100 acres of their land in 1907 to a group of Portuguese settlers. Further land was also available in the gulches ‘rent free to the proper kind of people.’56 H.R. Grant, assistant manager of the Wahiawa Consolidated Pineapple Co., explained what the term ‘proper kind’ meant: I want to colonize this section of our land with a steady class of laborers, Portuguese preferred.…The Japanese are good laborers, but we want the Portuguese, and our plans now include the putting up of a number of good houses if we can get Portuguese to work for us and live in them. The Portuguese is an ideal agriculturist. He comes from a land where intense farming has been carried on and knows more or less about raising pines. There is work here for a good number, if they apply.57 However, not only did the Portuguese choose not to apply, most of the existing white Caucasian homesteaders were quickly displaced by large white Caucasian corporate growers and small independent Japanese growers.58 By 1913 the sugar planters had decided to discontinue the offering of homesteads because few immigrants had availed themselves of this opportunity.59 The contribution made by Japanese-Americans to the growth of the Hawaiian pineapple industry has largely been overlooked by historians. One Japanese-American historian has estimated that they had invested $700,000 in the pineapple industry on Oahu and cultivated 6,000 acres in 1913, half the total acreage of pineapples on that island.60 By the early 1910s the Japanese Consul-General, Hisakichi Eitaki, reported that the largest Japanese grower was the Waipio Pineapple Co., with a paid up capital of $50,000 and 700 leased acres under cultivation, although as noted above, it was acquired by Libby in 1917. The fast growing Japanese Pineapple Growers Cooperative had 400 acres under pineapples. He recorded numerous other examples of Japanese pineapple growing enterprises and independent growers on the

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Island of Oahu in the Wahiawa area, Pearl City-Mauka area, the Helemano District and North Oahu. In January 1913 over 220 Japanese growers formed the Oahu Island Pineapple Growers Cooperative, which had over 7,325 acres under cultivation. Although most Japanese growers before 1914 were located on Oahu, a number of Japanese entrepreneurs had formed the Maui Pineapple Co. in 1910, which had 500 acres under cultivation. Later in 1917 it was amalgamated with Haiku Fruit & Packing Co.61 The importance of the small growers was greatest in the 1920s when the canners purchased a sizable proportion of their pineapples from outside growers. This trend towards contracting out reached a peak in the mid1920s when the canners began to discover ways of increasing the yields per acre on their plantations. However, small growers continued to be of importance until 1931. After 1931 most the canners completely internalized the production of pineapples causing great hardship to their former contract growers. Before the 1920s small growers were used principally as a means of externalizing the need to adjust to market conditions. A good example is the period 1913–5, when the market for canned pineapples in the United States and Europe temporarily collapsed. Between 1912 and 1914 the canners’ price for fresh pineapples fell from an average of $27.5 per ton to $7 per ton. It cost an average of $12 to grow a ton of pineapples. On the 1913 price of $18 per ton there had been a profit of about $6 per ton to the grower. In 1914, if the growers were lucky enough to find a buyer for their pineapples they stood to take a loss of $5 per ton.62 Only the Japanese persisted in growing pineapples in significant numbers, as can be seen in Table 6.7. Table 6.7: Ethnic Distribution of Hawaiian Pineapple Growers, 1920 Ethnic Group

Number

%

Japanese

213

 87.7

White Caucasian

 18

  7.4

Chinese

  6

  2.5

Filipino

  3

  1.2

Hawaiian

  2

  0.8

Korean

  1

  0.4

Total

243

100.0

Source: US Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census, Vol.IV, Population 1920, Occupations (Washington, DC, 1923), p.1277.

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Figure 6.1: The Maui Pineapple Co. and Haiku Co.’s Relative Share of the Maui Canned Pineapple Pack, 1910-15 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0



1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915

Series 1

Year

Series 2

Series 1 = Maui Pineapple Co. Series 2 = Haiku Co. Source: J.P. Morgan, ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry’, Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1918, 44 (1917), p.47.

However, it would be wrong to suggest that the Japanese growers willingly accepted low returns. From the earliest days of the industry, the Japanese attempted to establish their own pineapple canneries on Oahu. James Okahata cites one example of a cannery founded by Japanese entrepreneurs at Kipapa, Oahu, in 1908.63 An attempt was also made on Maui in 1910 to establish an independent Japanese pineapple cannery. Many Japanese growers had become dissatisfied with the prices offered for their output by the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co.64 As shown above, they incorporated the Maui Pineapple Co. based at Pauwela with a capital of $20,000. Figure 6.1 shows that the company steadily increased its share of the Maui pack during its six years of Japanese ownership. However, during the recession in the early years of the First World War the bankers, Bishop & Co., took control of the company.65 In the 1920s the position of the Japanese small growers vis a vis the pineapple canners greatly improved as the latter found it increasingly difficult to secure new land for their plantations. Data from the Pearl City Fruit Co. in Figure 6.2 illustrate this trend towards an enormous increase

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Figure 6.2: Pineapples Purchased from Outside Growers by Pearl City Fruit Co., 1908–26 10000

Tons

8000

6000

4000

2000



Series 1



Series 2

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

1914

1912

1910

1908

0

Year

Series 1 = Pearl City Plantation Series 2 = Outside Growers Source: BMA/THD&CP, Ms. Group 239/182/289, Minute Book of Pearl City Fruit Co., June 1906–December 1922; BMA/THD&CP, MS. Group 239/182/290, Minute Book of Pearl City Fruit Co., March 1923–December 1927.

in the share of outside fruit canned by the pineapple canners in the early and mid-1920s. In May 1923 increasing competition among the pineapple canners for the small growers’ fruit led Libby, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and Calpak to increase the price they were paying for their outside fruit. The price for first grade fruit was reset at $43.85 per ton and the price for second grade fruit was reset at $23.93 per ton. The Pearl City Fruit Co. was forced to match these new prices in order to retain the loyalty of its small growers. In 1924 the price of first grade fruit was raised yet again to $47.20 by the pineapple canners. By 1926 Pearl City was forced to offer prices to its growers in excess of the market price in order to secure sufficient pineapples for its cannery.66 The competition for small growers’ fruit placed great pressure on the financial resources of the smaller canners. The small growers were not always very successful, and this had serious implications for the company with which they had a contract. This was because the canners loaned the contract growers money to cultivate their pineapple fields. The wife of an

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unsuccessful Pearl City Fruit Co. contract grower later suggested that this was one of the reasons why the company failed in 1927: if we spent money on the horses and…wagons, it is the same as the company providing them because we borrowed money from the company. Because we, ourselves, do not use our money for [sic] the fields.…So when we lost [financially], it didn’t affect us that much… and we did not have to repay the sum advanced by [Pearl City Fruit Co.] That company was not big like [the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.] and [Calpak], so it collapsed.67 Indeed by 1924 Pearl City had incurred $191,131 in contractor indebtedness, much of which had to be written off as irretrievable.68 Much the same situation existed at the Haiku Fruit & Land Co. on Maui in this period. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, as had been the case at the beginning of the First World War, the pineapple canners tried to shift the burden of readjustment onto the independent growers. This time the pineapple companies were less successful, but this did not save the unfortunate contract growers from considerable hardship as their contracts were renewed on adverse terms or not renewed at all. The Japanese growers on Kauai were particularly hard hit. In 1931, the Kauai pineapple canners were unable to take the fresh fruit produced by these growers, as they had not contracted for its sale, and the canneries had all the fruit that they could handle. Hence, several Japanese businessmen in Honolulu provided the finance for the Chinese owned Honolulu Fruit Co. to purchase the fruit.69 However, this measure provided only temporary relief. In January 1932, the Honolulu Fruit Co. became bankrupt after a considerable period of financial difficulties.70 Thirteen Japanese growers on Kauai decided to form a cooperative in early May 1932. They set up the Growers’ Canning Association with the assistance of a Californian businessman, Randolph Crossley. They constructed and operated Hawaii’s smallest cannery at Kapaa with an annual output of 50,000 cases per annum which packed fruit cultivated by Japanese growers on Kauai, many of whom had had selling contracts with the Hawaiian Canneries Co. The Association was only partially successful, and only purchased very small amounts of pineapples, for example 135 tons in 1936, enough to produce 4,000 cases of canned pineapples. In February 1937 Crossley acquired a controlling interest in the Growers Association which was renamed Hawaiian Fruit

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Packers, to which he added new equipment. Member growers also took over a large area of land given up by the Lihue Plantation.71 Although most of the small growers during the inter-war period were Asian-Americans, there were also some from the native Hawaiian community. They were ‘beneficiaries’ of Hawaiian Delegate in Congress Prince Kuhio’s Hawaiian Homes Act of 1921. This was a project which sought to rehabilitate the Hawaiian people by resettling them out of urban areas on public lands. In order to secure the support of the white Caucasian business community Kuhio was forced to make compromises. One of these compromises was his acceptance that first class public agricultural lands would not be made available to the project and that Hawaiians would be rehabilitated on third and fourth class agricultural lands. The Governor of Hawaii, Charles J. McCarthy, defended this compromise with respect to the lands designated for the project on Molokai on the grounds that some of the pineapple companies had shown an interest in assisting Hawaiians in planting, cultivating, and growing pineapples.72 The native Hawaiian homesteaders were not very successful and the opponents of the Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC) suggested that native Hawaiians were ill-suited to farming. A noted critic of the HHC, Wallace R. Farrington, Governor of Hawaii from 1921 to 1929, suggested that inexperience and lack of funds contributed to this failure.73 However, as Albert Horner, Sr., President of the Hawaiian Canneries Co., had observed before the HHC bill was enacted its main purpose was the rehabilitation of a few sugar companies and Hawaiian politicians. He argued that all of the lands allocated to the HHC were wholly unsuited to homesteading. The land on Molokai, for example, did not have access to irrigation water and to provide irrigation would cost $2 million. Furthermore ‘all cultivated sugar cane lands’ were excluded from the allocated lands. He concluded that the bill confined the lands available for the rehabilitation project to those upon which it is not possible for the Hawaiian or anyone else to make good. In short, it gives the plantations all arable and the Hawaiians all arid lands.74 The HHC would probably have been a complete failure without the cooperation of Libby and Calpak. These two corporations, as has been shown above, undertook an expansion programme on Molokai during the 1920s. In 1923, the HHC notified the major pineapple canners that they

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were opening up 6,000 acres of pineapple lands at Hoolehau and Palaau for the purpose of encouraging the homesteaders to cultivate pineapples. Although several of the canners submitted propositions to the HHC in 1924, it was Libby which showed the greatest interest in making an agreement satisfactory to the HHC. As a result Libby’s final proposition of purchasing fruit on a sliding scale price basis was accepted in November 1926. In 1927, 55 homesteaders signed an agreement with Libby, followed by another 77 between 1928 and 1932. In August 1929, when further lots were opened for settlement, the other major canner on Molokai, Calpak, whose lands were located at Kualapuu immediately bordering on the homestead area in the east, also negotiated 24 contracts under the same terms.75 The original contracts were for ten years. In 1931, the HHC secured from Libby a five year extension to 1941. These individual agreements gave the pineapple canners no control over the land itself, their concern was merely with the growing crops. To enable the homesteader and his family to have first preference in all the contract agreements the canners agreed to make the necessary advances and provide technical assistance in preparing the soil, planting, cultivation and harvesting. They also gave the homesteader and his family first preference in all work. On his part the homesteader pledged himself to sell to the companies all fruit classed as ‘merchantable’ under standards defined in the contract. The cash advances made, which usually totalled over $300 an acre on a plant crop, with further adjustments for ratoon crops became a first charge on the product, and were deducted along with six per cent interest by the company. A method was prescribed by which the contract price was fixed for each year on the basis of existing market rates. It was stipulated, however, that whatever fall in price might occur, the minimum amount paid to the homesteader was to be $23 per ton for first class fruit, with other classes scaled accordingly.76 During the 1930s the market price of fresh pineapples fell far below the minimum price set in the contract. In the summer of 1931 the market value fell to $19.92 and in 1932 there was a further fall to $13.87. In 1932, 10,000 tons of fruit for which payment was made, were dumped into a gulch because it had become unprofitable even to move the pineapples off the island. Nonetheless the minimum price in their contract meant that the homesteaders each received a nominal average net income of $1,300 per annum in 1931 and 1932.77 The reality of the homesteaders’ situation may not have been as comfortable as the HHC would have liked the outside world to believe. There were many complaints from the homesteaders in the early 1930s. Pressure from the native Hawaiian community forced Governor Lawrence M. Judd to appoint

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139

a special committee in October 1931 under the chairmanship of Princess Abigail Kawananakoa to investigate the complaints.78 Kawananakoa’s committee found that most of the homesteaders had signed contracts with a private corporation, the Royal Hawaiian Corporation, akin to those of post-Civil War African-American sharecroppers in the American South and most had become indebted. Although approximately $1.5 million had been spent on the project, the combined savings of the homesteaders amounted to only a few thousand dollars.79 The committee’s report presented to the Governor on 31 December 1931, who was also chairman of the HHC, was a damning indictment of the way the HHC was implementing the Hawaiian rehabilitation project.80 The committee found that: Instead of an anchor crop as was originally intended, pineapples had become the whole ship—diversified farming having been forgotten in the scramble to reap the golden harvest! Yet, the homesteaders owe $144,678.52 of record September 30, 1931…81 The committee also found that much of the land farmed by the homesteaders was dead.82 Judd’s response to the report was to impose a paternalistic regime on the homesteaders, which Kawananakoa condemned.83 In August 1932, the HHC negotiated a new 13 year agreement with Libby for a cooperative block system of growing pineapples. The stated purpose of this agreement was to reduce the losses from disease and infestation of insects and the excessive costs involved in the cultivation of small areas of land. The terms of the new agreement contained the same minimum price guarantee of the original agreement. Cultivation under this new scheme was no longer an individual undertaking. The corporation prepared the ground, planted, sprayed and harvested the fruit. The new scheme took the management of the homesteads largely out of the hands of their owners. Many of the homesteaders withdrew from active participation in the cultivation of their fields. They chose either to hire Filipinos or to leave the work of cultivation to the company employees.84 Lang Akana, a prominent native Hawaiian who was appointed executive secretary of the HHC in October 1935, thought the Commission was ‘rehabilitating Filipinos instead of Hawaiians’.85 The block system resulted in a reduction in the area of homesteaders’ land under pineapples. In 1934, there were 2,300 acres under pineapples

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of which 522 acres were under Libby’s block system. In 1936, of a total of 1,002 acres under pineapples, 826 were under Libby’s block system. In the mid-1930s Calpak also entered into a block system agreement with its homesteaders. By 1940, there were 1,322 acres under pineapple cultivation at the homestead settlement.86 One of the most persistent critics of the block system was native Hawaiian homesteader, Albert Lambert. He argued that the canners were not honouring a verbal agreement to cultivate the full area of land over which the homesteaders had relinquished control under the block system. In 1936, for example, Libby was only cultivating 40 per cent of the homestead land the Hawaiian homesteaders had signed over to it. Lambert also argued that the ‘Block System Agreement’ contained a clause whereby the companies had first lien on all the pineapples produced on the homesteaders’ land outside the block system. This prevented those homesteaders, like Lambert, who had signed the agreement, from borrowing money from institutions such as the US Farm Credit Administration to plant their own pineapples independently of the canners. It was also difficult to borrow money from the HHC to grow other crops such as grapes, because the HHC did not wish to jeopardize its position with the canners.87 However, in October 1941 Deputy Attorney General Edward N. Sylva ruled that the HHC pineapple contracts were illegal. He found that the lien provision in the contracts, that Lambert among others had objected to, was repugnant to the Hawaiian Homes Act.88 Lambert’s case seems to be supported, at least in part, by the data available. If the block system was designed to improve efficiency and increase the income of the homesteaders, then Table 6.8 suggests that this objective was not achieved, because it shows a downward trend in pineapple production, rather than an upward one. Furthermore in 1940 the average annual nominal net income of the Hawaiian homesteaders who had signed the Block System Agreement was under $1,200, less than what they had received in the depths of the Great Depression in 1931 and 1932.89 Indeed in the following year, except for a very limited profit made by 13 of the homesteaders, all of the rest made losses because of the extreme drought during the season 1940–41.90 Nonetheless in December 1941, after a public hearing sponsored and attended by members of the HHC, new pineapplegrowing contracts were agreed between the 150 Molokai homesteaders and Calpak and Libby. The new contracts included a payment of $72 a month as an advance on pineapple crops regardless of whether the land was planted or left fallow. The contracts embraced 6,000 acres, which would be divided in half for cultivation by the two corporations.91

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Table 6.8: Pineapple Harvested on HHC Molokai Project, 1929–40 Year

Tons

1929

8,373

1930

n.a.

1931 & 1932

56,810

1933

38,338

1934

28,209

1935

23,343

1936

27,641

1937

25,829

1938

23,203

1939

13,277

1940

19,574

Source: US Dept. of Interior, Annual Reports of the Governor of Hawaii, 1929–41 (Washington, DC, 1930–41).

The structure of land ownership in Hawaii constrained the growth of the pineapple industry in the Territory. Some of the sugar planters appear to have viewed the pineapple canners as a threat to the hegemony of the sugar industry over the Hawaiian economy. Even so, most of the canners managed to purchase or lease land from the sugar planters to grow pineapples on. Indeed some of the canning companies were actually owned by the sugar industry. The sugar planters hoped to use their canneries to promote settlement in the outer Islands to provide a larger pool of labour for their sugar plantations. Although they publicly stated they hoped that these settlers would be white Caucasians, in the event the overwhelming majority of the small independent growers who actually took up pineapple growing were Japanese. In the 1930s pineapple canning also provided a way for two of the Territory’s Big Five sugar factors to diversify. The largest landowner in Hawaii, the Territory itself, proved to be very reluctant to lease land directly to the pineapple canners for cultivation, as suggested above. On the other hand, the Territory proved to be very cooperative in surrendering land it did not own to the pineapple industry, as has been shown above in the case of the HHC. As Linda Parker has suggested, this was a subversion of the intention of the originator of the HHC, Prince Kuhio.92 Overall, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 1920s

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all three of the major pineapple canners of that decade investigated the possibility of relocating at least part of their operations outside of Hawaii, as will be shown in Chapter 8.

Labour

143

7 LABOUR

Most of the contemporary non-government publications on the Hawaiian pineapple industry ignore the labour force. This is especially true of the trade journals and the two leading Honolulu newspapers, the Star-Bulletin and the Advertiser. They give the impression that the labour force was the least important factor of production. While labour historians have looked at the sugar industry, for example Ronald Takaki’s Pau Hana,1 they have also overlooked the pineapple industry. Even Edward D. Beechert’s authoritative Working in Hawaii2 devotes almost no attention to the pre-1941 pineapple industry. The demographic collapse of the native Hawaiian population in the nineteenth century had led the sugar planters to recruit Asian contract labour. The first Asian workers were recruited from China. But anti-Chinese agitation led to a Chinese Exclusion Act in 1886 that supposedly banned Chinese immigration after 1888. However, the legislation proved to be ineffective and thousands more Chinese workers were brought to Hawaii during the 1890s. Furthermore thousands of workers were also recruited from Japan from 1885. The Organic Act of 1900, which established the Territory of Hawaii, abolished contract labour. Furthermore, as an US Territory, Hawaii was subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which meant the sugar planters were no longer able to recruit workers from China. A few years later the Gentlemen’s Agreement between Japan and the United States of 1908 put a stop to the immigration of Japanese and Korean men. But the agreement did permit the immigration of family members and so-called ‘picture brides’ to continue until the Immigration Act of 1924 (sometimes known as the Japanese Exclusion Act) put a stop to this as well. However, after 1900 the Japanese had fallen out of favour with the sugar planters. Freed from their contracts they sought to improve their conditions and terms of employment. As a result the sugar planters

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recruited workers from various parts of the world, including Puerto Rico, Korea until 1908, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Russia, in an attempt to find more compliant workers. By the First World War the sugar planters had decided that the least bad alternative source of migrant labour for the sugar plantations was the Philippines.3 One of the reasons why many of the sugar planters opposed the development of the pineapple industry was that they were afraid that the pineapple canners would compete with them for labour.4 Their fears appear to have been well-founded, because in general, working conditions were considerably better in the pineapple industry than in the sugar industry.5 Furthermore one of canners, James D. Dole, regularly took advantage of labour problems in the sugar industry to recruit his seasonal labour force. For example, Beechert observes that Dole placed advertisements offering plantation work in all of the Japanese language newspapers during the 1909 sugar strike.6 Romanzo Adams, the Territory’s leading authority on labour, believed that this was partly because the industry had been developed after the end of the contract labour system. He observed that: On the whole laborers prefer the pineapple fields. The character of the work may account for this in part, but of greater importance is the difference in plantation policies or customs. The pineapple plantation …labor policies…do not go back to the time of indentured labor. There is more freedom—less repression. The discipline is milder. The opportunity for advancement seems to be better.…On the average, living conditions are better.7

The Pineapple Plantation Labour Force The pineapple industry’s labour force can be divided into two, plantation labour and cannery labour. The plantation labour force was highly interrelated with the sugar plantation labour force throughout the period 1903 to 1941. The pineapple canners were in direct competition with the sugar planters for labour in the formative years of the industry on Oahu, where the bulk of the industry was located before the 1920s. Before the First World War the pineapple canners’ plantations relied almost exclusively on Japanese labour. In 1910 Japanese accounted for 90 per cent of male and 100 of female unskilled plantation workers.8 On the outer Islands of Maui, Kauai and Hawaii, pineapple plantations and canneries were established by the sugar corporations for the purpose of reducing their labour turn-over.

Labour

145

Thus on these Islands the two industries were in harmony. It should be noted that in 1910 a large quantity of pineapples were produced by independent growers. The pineapple industry grew very quickly between 1910 and the outbreak of the First World War. During this period the pineapple canners began to internalize the production of pineapples. There was a large expansion of the area of pineapple plantations, and the number of field workers employed by the pineapple companies rose from 261 in 1910 to 1,687 in 1915. The pineapple industry recruited most of its labour force from the immigrant workers brought to Hawaii by the sugar planters. The pineapple canners even succeeded in attracting some Filipinos and Koreans, the most recent immigrants. While Japanese workers remained by far the largest ethnic group amongst the workforce, as a proportion they fell to under half. Workers were enticed away from the from the sugar plantations by the prospect of higher wages and superior working conditions.  The wages paid on the pineapple plantations were considerably higher than those on the sugar plantations. The average weekly wages of unskilled male pineapple plantation workers in 1915 were $6 while those for unskilled male sugar plantation workers were $4.7 while for unskilled females were paid $4.6 and $2.3 respectively.9 The pineapple plantations continued to draw workers away from the sugar plantations during the First World War. The Japanese were attracted to the pineapple plantations. The proportion of Japanese workers employed rose significantly as a proportion of the workforce to over half again and had reached nearly 60 per cent by 1919. Filipino workers also rose from 13.3 to 20.9 per cent of the workforce between 1915 and 1919 reflecting the fact that the sugar industry had begun to recruit labour from the Philippines.10 In 1920 the Japanese organized an unsuccessful strike for equal pay and working conditions with white Caucasian workers. James D. Dole saw this as an opportunity to recruit workers and sought the assistance of the Hawaii Hochi.11 He also placed full page advertisements in the Japanese language press encouraging workers to apply for jobs in the forthcoming season.12 The observations of the Labor Commission sent to Hawaii in 1922 by the US Secretary of Labor to ascertain whether there was a labour shortage in the Territory are very illuminating: There was no apparent shortage in the Pineapple Industry, as the nature of the field work is much less laborious than in the sugar fields. The pineapple industry is preferred by labor…because it is relatively more remunerative from a labor standpoint.…The remarkable development and prosperity in the Pineapple Industry has contributed materially

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to the labor problems of the sugar…fields due to the more attractive and profitable working conditions which have drawn a large number of Japanese from the sugar plantations, so that…the Japanese… constitute 85% of the labor in the Pineapple fields today.13 The movement of the Japanese out of the sugar industry was closely related to the working and living conditions on the sugar plantations. A confidential report commissioned by the HSPA in 1925 suggested that living conditions on many sugar plantations were ‘foul and unsanitary’.14 These plantations fell ‘far short of compliance with the [Territorial Board of Health’s] standards, [with] management showing indifference, inefficiency and recalcitrance’.15 Many plantations faced serious problems with sewerage and waste disposal. The report also showed that some plantation camps had inadequate water supplies, and that as a direct consequence they were extremely dusty. This led to a high incidence of tropical eye diseases amongst sugar plantation employees.16 Richard K. Fleischman and Thomas N. Tyson have argued that race rather than efficiency served as the primary measuring calculus of sugar plantation work in Hawaii. Evidence presented by the Hawaiian pineapple industry to the US House of Representatives suggests that its labour force was also at least partially racially segmented. The Portuguese and Hawaiians drove mule teams, the Japanese specialized more on tasks such as contract work and road building and the Chinese, being old and weak, concentrated on hoe work. The Filipinos worked mostly on lighter jobs such as fertilizing and spraying. There was a consensus that the Japanese were the best workers because they had a very low labour turnover. The least favoured workers were the Filipinos because they had a very high labour turnover. Although the industry’s managers were for the most part white Caucasian, it is not clear whether the pineapple industry fits the thesis of Fleischman and Tyson.17 Despite the fact large numbers of Japanese were attracted to the pineapple plantations in the early 1920s, the decade saw a decline in the relative share of Japanese workers in the labour force. This may have partly been a reflection of the shift in the production of fresh pineapples to the outer Islands of Lanai, Molokai and Maui. Japanese workers were not prepared to move to plantation camps, which were isolated from the main centres of the Japanese community in Hawaii. Second generation Japanese-Americans also felt that plantation work was unbefitting employment for American citizens.18 In the mid-1920s, the major pineapple canners reached an understanding with the sugar planters whereby they gained access to about one-third of the

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workers recruited by the HSPA in the Philippines. The pineapple canners paid a pro-rata share of the recruitment costs for the Filipino workers. Robert L. Cushing, of the HSPA, believes that there was never a formal agreement between the sugar producers and the pineapple producers concerning recruitment of labour in the Philippines. Some of the contracts with the men who were brought to Hawaii provided for employment on sugar or pineapple plantations. Others stipulated that a worker assigned to a sugar plantation could not move to a pineapple plantation. However, in the 1920s it would appear that the pineapple canners did not receive recruits directly, but secured most of their field labour on a competitive basis from neighbouring sugar plantations. Unlike the sugar planters, the major pineapple canners were in active competition with each other, and thus were not in a position to initiate their own cooperative recruitment programme.19   As a result of the understanding with HSPA Filipinos replaced the Japanese as the predominant ethnic group on the pineapple plantations in the 1920s.20 When the pineapple canning industry temporarily collapsed in 1932, hundreds of the industry’s employees were made redundant. The HSPA helped reduce the level of unemployment in Hawaii by repatriating more than  2,000 unemployed Filipinos, mostly former pineapple plantation workers, between March 1932 and April 1933.21 However, the industry recovered very quickly and re-employed many of its former Filipino workers, and also attracted a considerable number from the sugar plantations. By the late 1930s the ethnic distribution of the plantation labour force was almost the same as that of the late 1920s, with Filipino workers comprising just over half and Japanese workers about a third.22 The Pineapple Cannery Labour Force During the formative years of the pineapple industry the cannery labour force was recruited from the same sources as the plantation labour force. However, as the industry grew, the pineapple canners realized that they would not be able to meet the labour requirements of the canneries in the rural districts. Unlike the plantations, the canneries recruited almost exclusively casual seasonal labour, because the main packing season was in the summer months of July and August. The US Bureau of the Census found in 1919 that the minimum monthly employment was only 17.1 per cent of the maximum monthly employment. There was a marked disparity between men and women, the corresponding figures being 19.8 and 9.7 per

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cent respectively.23 James D. Dole realized that Honolulu was more likely to contain the necessary pool of seasonal labour than the rural districts of Oahu. He relocated his cannery in the Iwilei district of Honolulu in 1907.24 He later recalled before he established his cannery there was no seasonal work available in Honolulu, ‘no place where housewives could pick up pin money and young people could earn money to help with their clothes and schooling.’ 25 His example was soon followed by the other pineapple canners. The new cannery built by Dole in Honolulu was especially designed for unskilled labour force. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. adopted mass production technology. The Acting British Consul, Ralph Forster, reported in 1908, that in Dole’s cannery: Throughout the processes of peeling, slicing, packing in cans, etc., the fruit is never touched by the human hand, all the work people employed in those departments wearing India rubber gloves…, and …every care is taken to provide an article of the highest quality…26 However, as Frances Blascoer, a Special Investigator for the Board of Trustees of the Kaiulani Home for Young Women and Girls, found in 1912, less care was taken to protect the female employees in the canneries: The only menace to the health of the workers in the pineapple canneries…is the effect of the pineapple juice on the skin. Chemical analysis shows that the acid is so strong, it digests the skin as secretions of the alimentary canal digest food. By order of the [Territorial] Health Department, rubber gloves are supplied by the companies to the workers handling the fruit; but most of them work barefooted, standing in the drippings from the tables, and their feet were badly eaten by the juice. On taking this up with the authorities, I was told that the reason the rubber gloves were ordered was not because of the probable injury to the workers, but in order to protect the product from possible contamination. It would be possible to slat the floors where the workers stand, and flush them well with water several times a day.27 Mass production technology allowed the pineapple canners to employ a high proportion of women and minors which helped them to contain labour costs. In 1910, about a fifth of unskilled pineapple cannery workers

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were women, compared with less than one-twentieth of the unskilled pineapple plantation labour force in that year.28 A significant number of native Hawaiian women were employed as unskilled cannery workers, representing 15.7 per cent of unskilled females in 1910, although Japanese women predominated, comprising 74.4 per cent of unskilled females. Data collected by Frances Blascoer from the two largest Honolulu pineapple canneries in 1912 which include skilled female workers, suggest that native Hawaiians formed a majority of all women employed by the canneries. This undoubtedly reflected an ethnic segmentation of the cannery workforce.29 However, unlike the Hawaiian sugar industry, the pineapple industry does not appear to have had differential wage rates paid to different ethnic groups for the same jobs.30 The canneries appear to have had no difficulty in recruiting native Hawaiian women. ‘An advertisement for help always brings more applicants than there are positions, except during the few heaviest weeks of the canning season.’ 31 The pineapple industry had a high productivity rate from the mid-1900s. By 1919 labour costs accounted for only 36 per cent of the total costs, with value added accounting for 46 per cent of the total output of the industry of that year. The industry was in a strong position, and could easily provide its workers with good working conditions.32 In the early 1920s some of the pineapple canners joined the welfare capitalism movement which had emerged in continental US industry in the period 1898 to 1918. Sanford M. Jacoby suggests that welfare work was particularly common in continental US industries that employed large numbers of women. His examples include the food processing industry, in which the food canner, H.J. Heinz Company of Pittsburgh, was a leader in welfare work.33 Stuart D. Brandes argues that welfare capitalism was a defensive strategy on the part of the employers. He believes that particularly after the First World War it was a protective device aimed at trade unionism.34 In Hawaii, the period immediately after the First World War was a time of labour unrest in Hawaii. There were nine strikes in 1920, of which the most important was a sugar industry strike of Japanese and Filipino plantation workers. The pineapple cannery skilled workers also struck in 1920.35  The pineapple canners may well have feared the situation was getting out of control. At least two of the canners joined the welfare capitalism movement during the early 1920s. Calpak, for example, established a Social Welfare Bureau for its Hawaiian Division. Welfare work was undertaken at the Honolulu cannery and even homes were visited in order that conditions might be improved. Lunches were served at a cost ranging from five to twenty cents

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and there was a nursery to care for the children of the employees. In the opinion of the San Francisco correspondent of the Canning Trade: The plants of this concern in Hawaii are not excelled in equipment, sanitation or in the morale of workers by any of its numerous establishments on the mainland.36 In 1922, in a talk given to the 2nd Annual Conference of the Hawaiian Canners’ Society, Grace Potter, head of the Social Welfare Bureau in the early 1920s, explained why Calpak had joined this movement: The pineapple industry had grown so rapidly that no consideration had been given to the human element, and with the misunderstandings due to language differences and the uncertainty and difficulties arising from a seasonal industry, a definite need was shown for many improvements affecting the human side of the industry.37 However, Potter was careful to point out that welfare work had no place in industry unless it had a direct economic benefit to the canner. She suggested that her bureau had indeed produced such a benefit by reducing labour turnover:38 In order to have the minimum working force on August 11, 1920, when the season was at its height, three times as many employes as were needed for that day were on the payroll between May 1 and August 31. In 1921, in order to have the necessary maximum force on August 5, only two times [sic] the number of employes needed on that day were employed between May 1 and August 31…The advantage of this is self-evident and while undoubtedly the better supply of labor in 1921 was a factor in this result, it is felt that the work of this department is primarily responsible for the lessened turnover.39 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. adopted a similar approach to its labour force in the 1920s. James D. Dole was a paternalistic Christian employer in the mould of the great nineteenth-century British Nonconformist businessmen, which was undoubtedly the result of his father’s influence. Beechert observes that Dole was noted for seeking to ensure that his

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supervisors were respectful to the company’s workers.40 Dole regarded as perhaps his greatest achievement the esprit de corps and teamwork of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company organization that was built up during my leadership. With few exceptions this existed from bottom to top; so far as possible every man an individual, treated as such and paid as such as many different rates of pay as could be justified; my office door open to any employee; a non-contributing pension system inaugurated in 1920; a profitsharing system that rewarded those and only those who could affect the profits and who could realize in advance and throughout the year the importance to themselves of the company’s success. For others, different incentives…41 Dole’s company provided a free medical service for the sick as well as the injured. A fully equipped dispensary was centrally located in the factory to provide first aid for injuries and treatment for minor ailments. A trained nurse also visited the homes of sick or injured employees. Comfortable seats were provided for the female employees, and constant efforts were made to improve the working conditions in the well-light and well-ventilated cannery. Spacious and well-appointed dressing-rooms, with showers, lavatories and lockers, were provided for all male and female employees. A recreation field of two acres adjoined the cannery, completely equipped for various sports. The company was always willing to adopt new ideas. In 1930 it installed a loud speaker system in its cannery and began broadcasting jazz music. As a result productivity increased. Russell P. Borthwick, the company’s production manager, observed that the workers enjoyed the music so much that ‘if the “concerts” seem a little delayed the women begin to howl for them.’ 42 A large, clean and modern cafeteria in the cannery offered every employee a substantial, inexpensive meal priced from five to thirty cents. The company provided the cafeteria with an annual subsidy of $18,000. A prominent Honolulu clergyman, the Rev. Albert W. Palmer, observed in 1924 that the company considered ‘the return in health, efficiency and morale well worth the cost.’ There was sufficient seating for all of the employees. A shelter was also provided for those who preferred to eat a lunch outdoors. Some employees appear to have chosen to eat elsewhere because they believed the cafeteria was for the ‘big shots’, that is to say the forewomen and foremen.43

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The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. also encouraged its employees to become shareholders,  in an early experiment in industrial democracy, by the purchase of stock, which was sold to them on certain conditions at a price well below the market rate.   There were also rewards for inventive ideas and helpful suggestions. Furthermore there was an old age pension scheme. The pineapple industry, unlike the sugar industry, succeeded in attracting second generation Asian immigrants as cannery employees.44 Welfare capitalism was not confined to the large canning companies. The Kauai Fruit & Land Co. also adopted this policy in the late 1910s. It constructed 40 to 50 individual modern houses at Lawai for its workers and their families to replace the original camp houses. At the same time the company laid out a well equipped playground for its workers’ children and a fully equipped basketball and baseball grounds. A hall was provided by the company where motion pictures were screened. The same hall was used by the Salvation Army and YMCA welfare workers when they visited Lawai. The workers’ spiritual welfare was also met by three Japanese places of worship, a Chinese temple and a native Hawaiian kahuna located near the cannery. The company introduced a wire-screened nursery, where the children of female workers were cared for during working hours. The manager of the company, Walter D. McBryde, made his beautiful private estate, Kukuiolono, available to the workers as a public park in all but name.45 The Hawaii Hochi was to cast doubt on the benefits which workers received from the ‘progressive working conditions’ resulting from industrial welfare: Local canneries [are] highly praised…for their attention to the health and comfort of their workers. The commendation may be deserved, but that does not in any sense make up for the shamefully low wages paid the girls for labor under a high pressure speed-up system which enables them to produce a greater volume of output than ever before. The arrangement made for the care of workers, the model rest rooms and restaurant, the attendant nurse and other health provisions are matters of business efficiency which pay ample dividends in higher individual production. The same is true of the splendid sanitary features and the close medical inspection.  These are necessary to maintain the high standard of a nationally known food product. Such things are not properly classified among the concessions to the workers for they are factors in mass production that increase the sales value of the product.46

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Although the pineapple canning industry relied on female casual labour in the peak season, the industry also employed a considerable number of minors. Until the ‘Second New Deal’, the Territory does not appear to have been over-zealous in enforcing its child labour laws. In October 1912, Blascoer found that minors aged under 16 formed 28 per cent of the labour force in three Honolulu canneries.47 During the aftermath of First World War, labour shortages48 led to an increase in the number of children under 16 employed in the outer Island canneries. At Baldwin Packers the number of children employed in its cannery rose from 13 to 145 between 1918 and 1920 and as a proportion of the workforce from 18 to 41 per cent. At the Kauai Fruit & Land Co. 25 per cent of the average cannery workforce were children during the peak employment months of 1920. It is possible that the same trend occurred at the Honolulu canneries but they chose not to place such data in the public domain.49 In California the proportion of children among cannery workers was much less than in Hawaii and was only 5 per cent in 1920.50 Child labour was a sensitive issue in Hawaii. In 1928 many of the pineapple canners refused an investigator from the US Women’s Bureau access to their employment records to ascertain how many minors were employed in their canneries.51 However, data from the Territorial Department of Public Instruction show that 2,511 minors were employed in the canneries in the summer of 1927, and in addition 836 were employed on the plantations. One sixth of those employed in the canneries, 413, were under 14. The summer employment of school children allowed them to meet the expenses incurred during the term for school books and other items.52 The canneries also provided employment for high school students and students at the University of Hawaii, providing them with money to continue their education.53 The early predominance of the Japanese in the cannery labour force was reduced by the growth in the numbers of other ethnic groups employed, especially the Chinese and Filipinos. However, after the beginning of the Great Depression in Hawaii in 1931, many Filipinos were repatriated by the HSPA. Subsequently the Territory’s industries resorted to the employment of citizen labour after the HSPA discontinued labour recruitment in the Philippines in 1932. Data from Calpak’s Honolulu cannery, expanded in the mid-1930s to replace the capacity at Calpak’s former cannery at Kahului, Maui, suggests that the non-Asian citizens were the principal beneficiaries of the citizen labour recruitment program. Both Iberians and native Hawaiians advanced at the expense of Asians.54 That native Hawaiian employment advanced in the 1930s is significant because it suggests how detrimental competition from the Asian immigrants had been to the

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indigenous community. Data from Calpk’s former Kahului cannery suggest that citizen labour had a similar effect in the outer Islands.55 Pineapple Industry Wages In 1893 the prevailing level of wages in Hawaii was probably only a small fraction of that of the United States. This had been one of the objectives of the sugar planters when they recruited Asian contract labour in the second half of the nineteenth century. After Hawaii became an US Territory, the sugar planters used every means available to them to maintain this differential by suppressing labour unions.56 The pineapple industry was too new to have been involved in the recruitment of Asian contract labour, and furthermore competed with the sugar industry for labour. Thus the pineapple canners paid higher wages to their labour force. In the early years of the twentieth century the canners only employed a few score people. In its first year of operation, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. employed 13 unskilled men at an average weekly wage of $5 and two skilled men at an average of $37.5 per week.57 The first detailed figures available for the industry in 1910, suggest that wages for unskilled workers remained at about the same level. Female pineapple workers were discriminated against in common with their counterparts in most American industries. They only received three-fifths of the wages of their male colleagues. In 1910 unskilled female plantation workers received average weekly wages of $3.2 compared to the $5.3 paid to their male colleagues. A similar difference can be seen for unskilled cannery workers where female average weekly wages were $3.3 compared to $5.2 for men.58 The prevailing level of wages in the pineapple canning industry was also very low compared with that of the continental US canning industry. In the same year, female cannery workers were earning an average of $7.5 per week in canneries in and around San Francisco. Hawaiian wages for female pineapple cannery workers were only 44 per cent of those of their Californian counterparts.59 This disparity can be accounted for in part by the very different ethnic distribution of the employees of the Californian fruit and vegetable canning industry. In 1910 only 12.8 per cent of Californian fruit and vegetable cannery workers were Asian,60 whereas in the same year, 93.1 per cent of Hawaiian pineapple cannery workers were Asian.61 This disparity is also a reflection of the fact that California had an open labour market, whereas Hawaii had a closed labour market, (there were relatively few alternative employment opportunities).

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Between 1910 and 1915 wages increased significantly. Unskilled male plantation and cannery workers saw their average weekly wages rise to $6 and $6.5 respectively while those of their female colleagues rose to $4.6 and $4.2 respectively.62 However, the Hawaiian cannery workers’ wages remained far below those in California. When the weekly wages of unskilled adult male cannery workers in Hawaii are compared with the average wages of male Californian fruit and vegetable cannery workers, they were only 45 per cent in 1915. A similar comparison of female adult workers suggests that Hawaiian weekly wages were only about half those in California.63 Data from two representative pineapple canners for the years 1918 to 1921, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and Baldwin Packers of Maui suggest that during the next few years, unskilled wages advanced between 25 and 60 per cent in the pineapple industry. At the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. average weekly wages for unskilled male cannery and plantation workers rose from $7.2 to $12 and $7.8 to $12.1 respectively while those of their female counterparts rose from $4.8 to $7.2 and $5.4 to $7.6 respectively. At Baldwin Packers average weekly wages for unskilled male workers rose from $9 to $13.1 while those for their female counterparts rose from $4.5 to $5.6. Baldwin Packers also employed minors whose wages increased from $3.8 to $4.5. The data show that there was a considerable disparity between wage rates on the Islands of Oahu and Maui. Women were paid less on Maui than Oahu, whereas men were paid more on Maui than on Oahu. This reflects the fact that there were fewer employment opportunities for women on Maui than Oahu. It also reflects the fact that during the war years the pineapple canners had to pay higher wages to draw men off the sugar plantations on Maui than on Oahu.64 In the early 1920s data from Calpak’s Oahu cannery suggest average weekly wages for female unskilled cannery workers advanced by a further 25 per cent to $9.3 in 1923. But they were still only about half of the average weekly wages of the Californian female fruit and vegetable cannery workers. In the mid-1920s wages seem to have remained virtually constant. At Calpak’s Oahu cannery average weekly wages of female cannery workers only increased from $9.3 in 1923 to $9.4 in 1927.65 This may be partly a reflection of the fact that the industry temporarily ceased expanding in this period. However, in the late 1920s wages for cannery workers advanced over $2. During the 1920s the disparity in wage rates between Oahu and Maui grew. The wages of both male and female cannery and plantation workers on Maui were lower than those on Oahu in 1929. Average weekly wages of male pineapple cannery and plantation workers on Oahu were $16.9 and

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$13.7 respectively while those for their female counterparts were $10.9 and $8 respectively. On Maui male cannery and plantation workers were paid $13.7 and $13.7 respectively and female workers $7.4 and $5.2 respectively. Cannery wages had advanced much more strongly than plantation wages since 1921. This was largely because in order to obtain Filipino contract plantation labour from the HSPA, the pineapple canners were obliged to keep plantation wages down to the level of the sugar plantations in the later 1920s. Perhaps this is why female plantation workers on Maui saw no increase in their wages during the 1920s.66 When the pineapple canning industry collapsed in 1932, the pineapple canners were forced to react swiftly by making large numbers of pineapple workers redundant and by reducing the wages of those remaining in their service by about 20 per cent. This was less than in the continental US where cannery wages fell by about 50 per cent.67 The economic collapse in the continental US led to a change of administration in 1933. The new President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, initiated a programme designed to alleviate the suffering caused by the Great Depression. A key element in this strategy was the restoration of pre-Depression wage and price levels. One part of the early New Deal programme, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), included the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry within its terms of reference. The ill-fated National Recovery Administration (NRA) was to have a long term impact on industrial conditions in the Hawaiian pineapple canning business.68 The NIRA marked the first serious attempt to regulate the hours and wages of the workers of Hawaii. It only applied to cannery workers because plantation workers were non-industrial. The National Code of Fair Competition for the Canning Industry (No.446) approved by Roosevelt on 29 May 1934, restored pineapple cannery wages to the minimum rate for the same work as on 15 July 1929, and set the maximum hours which could be worked at 44 a week, a reduction of 16 on the pre-Depression working week.69 However, the Code did not specify what the minimum rate paid in 1929 had been, and thus public hearings were held by the NRA in autumn 1934. The Hawaii Hochi contended that female cannery workers were underpaid before the Depression, and without wages higher than those in 1929, the highly desirable maximum hours clause would mean that the women would be worse off, especially because their pay was only half of what it had been before the Depression. The Hawaii Hochi believed that the Hawaiian pineapple canners could afford to pay continental US wage rates, because they produced a product under exactly the same conditions as the continental US canners.70

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At the hearings, the industry proposed wages of 22.5¢ per hour for men and 17.5¢ for women. The minor canners requested a differential of 15 per cent for canneries on the outer Islands, which was opposed by the three major canners.71 The pineapple canners had refused to cooperate with the NRA’s investigation into their labour costs.72 Thus the NRA was forced to conduct an independent survey which suggested that a wage rate of 26¢ for men and 21¢ for women were the minimum hourly rates sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the NIRA without damage to the industry. The NRA’s survey showed that labour costs were about one half of those of the Californian peach canning industry, as can be seen in Table 7.1. The NRA presented a strong case at the hearings, and in November 1934, the industry accepted a compromise proposal by A.W. Eames, Jr. of Calpak, which set minimum rates of 25¢ per hour for men and 20¢ for women, with a minimum rate elsewhere in the Territory at 90 per cent of the Oahu rate.73 The NIRA was declared unconstitutional in early 1935 by the US Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the NRA had created a momentum for change in the pineapple industry, and it is significant that the canners continued to honour their agreement with the NRA. Later in 1935, the US Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act which strengthened and extended the labour union guarantees of Section 7a of the NIRA. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) established under this act was to help labour unions to permanently establish themselves amongst unskilled workers for the first time in the Territory’s history. In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act restored the minimum wages and hours provisions of the NIRA and abolished child labour in Hawaii. In addition the Social Security Act of 1935 created the first universal system of unemployment insurance and old age insurance in Hawaii.74 The federal agents in Hawaii helped exert an upward pressure on wages in the Territory contrary to the trend in the continental US. At a representative cannery in the outer Islands, the Maui Pineapple Co., weekly minimum cannery wages appear to have risen by 80 per cent between 1934 and 1938, $7.7 to $14.3 for men and $6.2 to $11.4 for women. The disparity between the outer Islands and Oahu remained, although the gap appeared to have narrowed considerably. In 1938 male and female workers at Libby’s Honolulu cannery earned a minimum wage of $16.2 and $12 respectively per week.75 By 1938 wages in Hawaii had advanced considerably for male cannery workers who had earned $16.2 per week in 1929 and for female workers who had earned $10 per week. Actual average weekly earnings in the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry including overtime for men were $19

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Table 7.1: Comparison of Costs Between Hawaiian Pineapple Canning Industry and Californian Peach Canning Industry, 1934 Costs per Case by Item

Peaches

Pineapple

$

$

Fruit

0.31

0.49

Cans

0.30

0.31

Labour (Cannery)

0.14

0.08

Sugar

0.13

0.14

Freight

0.02

0.06

Interest

0.02

0.23

Warehouse Labour

0.03

0.03

Remaining Expense

0.10

0.27

Total Costs

1.05

1.61

Selling Price

1.60

1.80

Source: NA, RG9, Records of the National Recovery Administration, Series 626, File 199, Report on Survey of Cannery Wages, p.1.

and $12.9 for women for a 40 hour week. For plantation workers, who worked a 48 hour week, actual average weekly earnings including overtime were $15.8 for men and $10.6 for women.76 The wages earned by cannery workers in Hawaii were much closer to those earned in the Californian peach canneries in 1938 than they had been in 1910. In 1938 Californian male peach canners earned $21.1 per week and female canners earned $17.7 per week.77  Thus male canners in Hawaii earned 90 per cent of Californian average and female canners earned 70 per cent. There was also a significant increase in wages for female workers on the pineapple plantations compared with 1929. The difference between the Californian peach canning industry and the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry cannot be just seen in terms of the remuneration to their cannery workers as Bernard Butler, a senior executive at the Maui Pineapple Co. argued in 1935. He drew attention to the deplorable conditions of employment in the Californian peach orchards which employed mostly itinerant workers. As Butler observed: While these people are gainfully employed, there is no permanence of residence which will permit of a normal American life. In the

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vernacular of the industry, these people are termed ‘fruit tramps’, and the term is a very adequate description of their life.…The peach grower’s responsibility was entirely for himself.…The condition and outlook of the working people involved in the work were, according to [the] custom, not part of his problem.78 Butler contrasted the misery of the Californian peach pickers with the condition of the Hawaiian pineapple field workers. In addition to being paid just under 20¢ per hour, every worker was given a house and free cooking oil for himself and his family. The land surrounding his house was large enough to permit the family to have a backyard with chickens and vegetables. Complete medical attention was given free of charge. The children of the employees had access to the County of Maui schools, and free transportation, if the school was located at a great distance from the plantation camp. The industry also made provision for the care of retired plantation workers. However, the conditions in the plantation camps on Maui may have been superior to those on the other Islands.79 As well as improving the terms of employment for the pineapple cannery workers, the New Deal also gave a boost to the labour union movement in Hawaii. The business oligarchy always sought to keep unions out of the Territory. In spring 1937 Walter F. Dillingham, owner of the one of six largest business groups in Hawaii, led a NLRB investigator, Elwyn J. Eagen, to understand that plantations would not tolerate any unions among their Filipino workers. Eagen concluded from his meeting with Dillingham that Hawaii had a system of business which prevented workers joining unions.80 Eagen caused great upset among Hawaii’s business oligarchy and in June they succeeded in having him recalled by the NLRB to his Seattle office. In response Eagen observed to his superiors that ‘Our Board has restored hope to the masses in Hawaii. I trust that it will continue the fight until it has brought them liberty. ..’ 81 The NLRB did indeed do the utmost within its power to help the industrial workers of Hawaii organize. The first strike in the pineapple industry was by non-industrial workers. It was organized in June 1937 by a short-lived union called the United Pineapple Workers of Molokai (UPWM), Unit No.51 of the Honolulu Longshoremen’s Association (HLA), with the aim of achieving union recognition. The HLA became part of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) in October 1937.82 The union’s membership was mostly made up of Filipino seasonal workers from the Libby plantation on Molokai. The strike only lasted a short time. The union failed to achieve recognition but did gain a pay increase.83 It was followed by

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a second strike on 16 August 1937 when over 350 Filipino workers struck at the Calpak plantation on Molokai. The strike was sparked off by the dismissal of three officers of the UPWM.84 The workers also accused Calpak of breaking a promise during the earlier strike at Libby’s Molokai plantation to equal any pay increase achieved by the strikers. The Calpak workers had not taken part in the former strike because of this understanding. The strike was led by Alipio B. Yangson, president of the UPWM. On August 20 the strike spread to Libby’s Molokai plantation, when over 650 mainly Filipino workers struck after the dismissal of Yangson, who had not been working for a month because of illness. The following week the union presented Calpak and Libby with the following five demands: first, union recognition; second, non-interference with union activities; third, no union member to be dismissed without a written statement showing cause and reasons; fourth, contract work prices must be raised and a written agreement made; and fifth, equalization of wages for the same type of work. The Calpak strikers were evicted from their plantation homes on 21 August and from 23 August were allowed to camp in Kaunanakai Park.85 The strike was a remarkably peaceful one, and there was no violence of any kind. However, by the beginning of September it had begun to crumble. All the married strikers had reported back to work. Only a few of the Calpak strikers remained in the camp at Kaunanakai Park. Meanwhile the Libby strikers had been evicted from the Maunaloa plantation. They were allowed to camp temporarily at a coconut grove near Kauanakakai from 28 August as a health measure. By 2 September more than 400 of them had left by steamer for Maui and Honolulu and only about 350 remained at the camp. The camp was on HHC property without its consent. On 15 September Acting Governor Charles M. Hite flew to Molokai to try and persuade the Filipinos to vacate the camp. However, he only persuaded about 150 to leave immediately. The last remaining strikers refused to accept the fact that they had been defeated. It was not until 28 October that the last 130 strikers left the camp and Molokai. The Filipino workers had apparently been informed by their union that under the Wagner Act no worker could be dismissed, and if they were dismissed it was their duty as union members, in obedience to the Act, to strike. However, in fact as non-industrial workers, they were outside the authority of the NLRB. Calpak and Libby had not hesitated to dismiss the strikers. The UPWM failed to secure union recognition. After the strike, Libby preferred to employ family men, because they were more dependable than single men.86 Additional strikes occurred from time to time in the pineapple industry during 1937–39, but they received little publicity

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and ended quickly. As has already been observed, the pineapple industry maintained a strong anti-union stand throughout the period 1903 to 1941.87 In 1938, the labour unions affiliated to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began a major organization drive in Hawaii and won several important victories against the business oligarchy.88 In April 1938, Edward Berman, a CIO representative in Hawaii began organizing plantation workers for the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing & Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA).89 In 1937, Harry Bridges of the ILWU, which was to succeed in organizing the pineapple and sugar workers of Hawaii after the Second World War, had persuaded the leader of the CIO, John L. Lewis, that the cannery workers of California should be organized. As a result the UCAPAWA was founded in July 1937, at a national convention of agricultural and cannery workers held in Denver, Colorado. The UCAPAWA decided to concentrate on cannery workers because they, unlike farm workers, were overwhelmingly non-migratory, able to afford modest union dues, and eligible to claim the rights and protections afforded by the National Labor Relations Act. Unlike in the continental US, the UCAPAWA was unopposed in Hawaii by the American Federation of Labor. But apart from one great triumph, it was as unsuccessful in Hawaii as it was in California before America’s entry into the Second World War.90 The UCAPAWA’s one great triumph was on the Island of Kauai, where it brought honours to the CIO by winning its first NLRB election held in the Territory of Hawaii. The non-agricultural workers of the Kauai Pineapple Co. chose Local 76 as their sole bargaining agent in a secret election held on 20 May 1939. The union won 162 out of the 172 votes cast.91 The Hawaiian Voice of Labor reported that ‘For the first time in a century of bitter opposition to labor legislation, a union has been recognized by the employers in one of Hawaii’s basic industries.’ 92 The union had succeeded, argues Sanford Zalburg, because Rolland G. Bell, manager of the Kauai Pineapple Co. was receptive to the union organizers. After winning the election, the UCAPAWA lost no time in getting the company to sign the first union cannery contract won from a pineapple canner in Hawaii. The most important part of this contract was the introduction of paid holidays.93 The pineapple cannery workers won benefit rights in 1939. In July 1939 the Unemployment Compensation Board ruled that pineapple canning, processing and warehousing was a seasonal industry and that its workers were entitled to unemployment compensation. As a result of exhaustive probing and several hearings, the board found that the seasonal periods of pineapple processing, canning and warehousing in Hawaii varied

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according to climatic and geographical considerations. It established the following periods for the years 1938 and 1939: Island of Oahu, 1 June to 30 September; Haiku, Maui, 20 June to 9 September; Kahului, Maui, 23 June to 15 October; Lahaina, Maui, 12 June to 20 August; Kalaheo, Kauai, 26 June to 22 September; and Kapaa, Kauai, 1 June to 31 August. Louis E. Welch and John Hall of the CIO secured an amendment to the decision which obligated employers to inform their employees in writing at the time they ceased to be employed by them, that the facilities at the office of the Territorial employment service were available and that they should register for work thereat and also secure information as to his employment benefit rights, if any, under the Hawaiian unemployment compensation law. Welch and Hall asked that the printed forms given to be workers be written in plain language, and should explain exactly what to do. They also stated that many workers were forced to remain idle and entitled to compensation failed to take advantage through ignorance. The NLRB was insistent that those workers be protected. To protect those who could not read English, the ruling was printed in newspapers, in Korean, Japanese and two Filipino dialects.94 The pineapple canners had anticipated that labour unions would pose a much greater threat to their non-union policy after the NLRB set up office in Hawaii. Together with the HSPA, the PPCA hired one of America’s leading labour relations consultants, the Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. (IRC) of New York. The IRC had been founded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in 1914 as a division of his law firm and was incorporated in 1926. The IRC assisted employers in making studies of their labour problems and helping them establish industrial relations programmes. The IRC had previously undertaken a survey of industrial relations in the sugar industry for the HSPA in 1925.95 In January 1938, a team of six consultants headed by the IRC’s Director, T.H.A. Tiedemann, carried out an investigation, making industrial relations studies of the pineapple and sugar corporations in Hawaii.96 After making an extensive investigation, the IRC concluded that: [the] pineapple companies in Hawaii have an opportunity to develop their future labor relations…, avoiding the extremes and violent manifestations which unfortunately have characterized industrial relations on the mainland for the last few years. If the objectives of a peaceful and co-operative development of relations between employers and employes [sic] in the Hawaiian islands is to be achieved it will call for a sober realization of the

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reciprocal responsibilities involved on the part of both employers and employes.97 The IRC made three major recommendations to the pineapple canners on how they might improve their industrial relations. Their recommendations were designed to undermine the union organizers and grant the workers many of the benefits the unions had secured for their members in the continental US.98 The first recommendation was that the pineapple canners each establish industrial relations departments and that they each employ an industrial relations manager. Libby, for example, took up this recommendation in November 1938, when they appointed an industrial relations manager. He spent the next few years establishing an industrial relations programme at Libby, and educating managerial and supervisory personnel to take full advantage of Libby’s new Industrial Relations Department.99 The IRC’s second recommendation was that the industry comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act. In June 1938, in response, Libby introduced an eight hour day and 48 hour week for plantation workers and an eight hour day and 40 hour week in off season periods. A 40 hour week was introduced for factory workers during the canning season. Cannery employees were to be given a week’s vacation with pay after 12 months of continuous service, and two weeks after each year’s continuous service. One week’s vacation with pay would be given each plantation worker who had worked 23/28ths of available working days from July to November, both inclusive, and had one year’s continuous service. Cannery workers would be paid time and a half overtime for work beyond eight hours Monday to Friday, both inclusive, beyond four hours on Saturday, and time worked on Sunday or an observed legal holiday. Under a new Policy of Fair Treatment it was stated that when plantation employees so desired, Libby’s management was willing to meet them or their selected representatives to discuss any problem or requests. In addition free general medical service was made available at the company’s hospital and through the company’s doctor would be given to all hourly employees whose rate was 50¢ or less, and monthly employees who earned less than $100 a month. The company also announced that no cannery or plantation employee would be discharged or laid off without just cause, and furthermore ‘no employe will be reprimanded, dismissed or otherwise discriminated against because he has taken up any complaint or grievance’ with his superiors or the management.100 The other companies appear to have introduced similar packages at the same time.101

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The IRC’s third recommendation was that the industry should adopt a standardized pension scheme. At the Maui Pineapple Co., for example, the IRC presented its Employees’ Retirement Plan for acceptance by the directors in June 1939. The plan required a two per cent contribution on the earnings of salaried employees receiving up to $3,000 per year plus four per cent of the earnings on amounts in excess of $3,000 per year, the company to contribute similar amounts except on earnings not subject to the Social Security Act, employees would contribute four per cent and the company six per cent on the first $3,000 per year. Non-salaried employees not covered by the Act would contribute $1.5 per month and the company would contribute $2.25 per month. The joint contributions would be used to purchase annuities in amounts determined in accordance with the premium rates specified by a group annuity contract.102 In general labour conditions in the Hawaiian pineapple industry were much better than those of the sugar industry. The working conditions of plantation workers appear to have been superior to that of the Californian peach orchard workers, especially during the 1930s. However, in the case of the cannery workers the evidence suggests that the wages of unskilled cannery workers were significantly below those of Californian peach cannery workers or fruit and vegetable cannery workers, even if the gap narrowed significantly as a result of the work of the New Deal in Hawaii. This would suggest that the Hawaiian canning industry had a significant cost advantage over the Californian peach canning industry, which Table 7.1 seems to confirm. The gap between Hawaiian and Californian cannery wages must at least in part have been the result of the business oligarchy’s determined efforts to prevent the organization of the workers of Hawaii into labour unions.

Overseas Expansion

165

8 OVERSEAS EXPANSION

In Chapter 6 it was shown that the major canners in Hawaii also experienced difficulty in gaining access to public and private land for pineapple cultivation in the period before the Second World War. As a result, the major canners conducted extensive investigations overseas, with the assistance of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC), from the early 1920s until the early 1930s. The national Republican Administrations of the 1920s encouraged US foreign investment. They particularly favoured investment in less developed areas, in particular Latin America and China. However, Mira Wilkins suggests that Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce (1921–28) and then as President (1928–32) expressed concern over certain types of investment abroad. He was worried that US transplant investment would provide employment for foreign labour, transfer American technology, and promote the economic development of foreign countries at the expense of the US economy. Wilkins suggests that Hoover believed that such plants would also be in direct competition with US exports and should not be encouraged.  He considered that it would be unpatriotic to promote the sale of foreign goods competing with those of the United States, even when such goods were the results of investment of American capital.1 The experience of the Hawaiian pineapple industry would tend to suggest that Hoover’s viewpoint was not always followed by the BFDC during his period in government.   The BFDC and its predecessor agencies actively assisted the overseas investigations of the Hawaiian pineapple industry through its provision of economic intelligence reports on foreign rivals. This information was collected in cooperation with the Department of State. This role appears to date back to the early 1880s when the Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the Department of State began publishing miscellaneous unnumbered consular reports relating to special subjects as called for by the department.2 One of the earliest reports relating to canned pineapple dates back to 1882.3

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The BFDC was established in 1912 as part of the Department of Commerce and Labor to coordinate American international and domestic economic intelligence gathering.   By the First World War a wide variety of intelligence was being gathered by the US Consuls on the pineapple industries of the world. The consular officers collected the information and their reports were transmitted to the Department of Commerce4 through the Department of State. An important step in the development of direct contact with businessmen was taken when a chain of branch or district BFDC offices was established during the period 1913 to 1915.  The pineapple industry made considerable use of the BFDC’s San Francisco and Chicago offices. By the Second World War there were over two dozen of these offices across the United States. They had a complete set of BFDC publications available for reference or purchase, a file of the confidential information that was distributed only to American businessmen, and directories and other reference books. The pineapple industry made great use of the file of confidential information in the inter-war period. In 1915 an act provided for the provision of commercial attaches to be appointed by the Department of Commerce, and accredited through the Department of State, whose duties were to investigate and report upon such conditions in the manufacturing industries and trade of foreign countries, as might be of interest to the United States.5 As a result of a misunderstanding between the Department of State and the BFDC, manuscript copies of consular reports on commercial subjects, including canned pineapples, have not survived for the period between the mid-1910s and the late 1920s. However, it is clear from the surviving files of the BFDC that the majority of the reports on the various foreign pineapple industries were produced as a result of requests for information from the Hawaiian pineapple canning companies. Some of this information was used to choose areas of the world for their overseas investigations. The following account has been based to a considerable extent on the records of the BFDC and the reports produced on its behalf by the Department of State. The BFDC was also to provide information on investment opportunities in foreign countries. Largely as a corollary to its trade promotion work, from at least the beginning of the 1920s, the BFDC collected and distributed information regarding the opportunities for investment in foreign countries. The sources of this information were the BFDC representatives and consular officers. Furthermore the staff of the BFDC also supplied a great part of the economic background necessary to guide the investor.6   It will be shown below that the BFDC was of great assistance to the Hawaiian pineapple canners.

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Of the three major canners in Hawaii, Calpak was the least successful in gaining access to new lands for expansion in the Territory, especially in the late 1920s. Hence Calpak put the greatest effort into overseas exploration. Its predecessor corporation in Hawaii, the CFCA, had begun investigating the possibility of establishing a pineapple canning operation in the Philippines in 1912, one year after the establishment of its subsidiary in Hawaii. The US Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA), which had administrative control of the Philippines, was decidedly cool towards the CFCA’s enquiries.7 Perhaps the BIA did not wish to prejudice the prospects of the Philippine Pineapple Co. which had been incorporated in 1912 by American citizens. The company established a cannery and pineapple plantation in north-east Luzon. Although this cannery was equipped with modern Hawaiian and American machinery,8 it does not appear to have survived very long. Notwithstanding the BIA’s lack of enthusiasm, the CFCA’s successor, Calpak, was to continue to show interest in investing in the Philippines.9 After the conclusion of the First World War, the American colonial government in the Philippines changed its attitude towards Calpak, and began to actively promote the establishment of a pineapple canning industry in the colony.10 The Philippines government drew attention to the fact that under Filipino law, corporations could purchase or lease up to 2,500 acres of pineapple lands for as little as $4 an acre compared with a minimum of $50 an acre in Hawaii.11 The Philippines Bureau of Commerce and Industry also noted: Hawaii…has already reached the point where it can no longer expand its pineapple industry without sacrificing other basic industries such as sugar. It is said that pineapple producers in Hawaii are now in keen competition with the sugar interests in acquiring the necessary lands for cultivation, with the result that land for pineapple growing there now commands a very high price.…12 Nonetheless, Calpak was now less enthusiastic about investing in the Philippines because its directors were worried about the Filipino nationalist movement and the fate of any investments made, should the Philippines be granted independence.13 However, despite these reservations, Calpak decided to experiment with pineapple growing in the Philippines. In 1924 they went to the Southern Philippines, where labour was relatively cheap, and conducted an experiment at Makar, Cotabato Province, Mindanao. This experiment was unsuccessful

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and after preliminary investigations in 1925,14 a second experiment was begun at Bukidnon, Northern Mindanao, in 1926. This experiment was successful, and Calpak established a subsidiary, the Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpak) to set up a plantation at Bukidnon. Work commenced in 1928, and experimental seed plots totalling 350 acres were set out with plants imported from Hawaii. The American government in the Philippines, which was actively promoting Bukidnon, set aside a reservation of 35,000 acres in order to encourage the cultivation of pineapples by Filipino settlers from Luzon.15 However, Calpak did not reach a decision as to whether to establish an experimental cannery until it was certain it would be unable to obtain further lands for expansion in Hawaii. In September 1929, after a conference with Calpak executives in San Francisco, Bruno P. Pilorz, superintendent at Calpak’s Honolulu cannery visited the Philippines to make the final decision as to whether to establish an experimental cannery at Bukidnon.16 Pilorz cabled a favourable report to San Francisco, and Calpak installed a $500,000 cannery, including buildings, at the port of Bugo, Oriental Misamis Province, Mindanao, twenty miles from Bukidnon, in time to pack the 1930 pineapple crop.17 Philpak began exporting canned pineapples to the United States with its first pack in 1930. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. soon reacted to this competitive threat by requesting the assistance of the Governor of Hawaii and the Hawaiian Delegate in Congress. James D. Dole drew their attention to the fact that the people of the Philippines paid no federal income tax whereas the pineapple companies in Hawaii did. He also pointed out that unlike the canners in Hawaii, Calpak was not restricted to the use of American ships in shipping its products to the United States. Calpak was thus able to benefit from very low freight rates. The company obtained a freight rate from their cannery wharf in the Philippines to the US East Coast of $6 per ton compared with $13.95 per ton from Honolulu to the US East Coast. Dole was unsuccessful in securing protection for the Hawaiian industry.18 Exports from the Philippines steadily increased until 1933, when Calpak was forced to curtail production for two years as part of its agreement with the PPCA.19 Indeed, in 1933 the cannery was temporarily shut down and the plantation laid off most of its workers.20 However, Calpak managed to free Philpak from the PPCA’s restrictions in 1935, and there was a consistent increase in exports until the Japanese invasion of the Islands in 1941, as can be seen in Table 8.1. The data in Table 8.1 also suggest that the costs of production  in the Philippines may have been significantly lower than in Hawaii.  The average value of each case of canned pineapple produced in the Philippines was

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Table 8.1: Exports of Canned Pineapple from the Philippines, 1930–40 Year

Quantity

Value

(cases)

($)

Value per Case ($)

1930

23,885

96,004

4.02

1931

78,633

150,041

1.91

1932

127,618

298,485

2.34

1933

67,370

133,986

1.99

1934

149,765

409,244

2.73

1935

58,646

157,398

2.68

1936

186,046

501,523

2.70

1937

536,881

1,672,849

3.12

1938

436,573

1,064,740

2.44

1939

695,150

1,707,905

2.46

1940

919,702

2,499,106

2.72

Sources: US Tariff Commission, Report No.118, Second Series, United States-Philippine Trade, (Washington, DC, 1937), p.161; NA, RG59, Records of the US Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.12715, Pineapple Production and Canning in the Philippines, 12 May 1941, p.3.

about 20 per cent lower than the wholesale price of a standard case of Hawaiian canned pineapple.21 This at least partly explains why Philpak’s pack, as a percentage of Calpak’s total pack of canned pineapple in the Philippines and Hawaii, rose from 1.1 per cent in 1930 to 24.3 per cent in 1940 as can be seen in Figure 8.1. By the mid-1930s, Philpak controlled a plantation of 2,500 acres at Bukidnon, which with the cannery at Bugo represented an investment of $1,000,000. A colony of Americans were resident at the edge of the company’s plantation. In order to make the plantation a self-contained community, a nine-hole golf course and club house was set up; a cinema was set up; concrete tennis courts were laid out; and an airport was built to accommodate the twice weekly passenger- and mail-planes which took four hours to reach Manila. A school with an American teacher provided a dozen American children with a thorough training in the Calvert System of education. Although technicians from Hawaii and the continental US were necessary for the development of the plantation and cannery, Philpak was committed to Filipinizing the labour force as soon as the necessary technical

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Figure 8.1: Philpak and Calpak-Hawaii’s Canned Pineapple Output, 1930–40 4000 3500

'000 cases

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000



Series 1



Series 2

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1930

0

1931

500

Year

Series 1 = Philpak Series 2 = Calpak-Hawaii * 1939 + 1940 Calpak-Hawaii output estimate based on PPCA quota Sources: Table 8.1; WCP 32nd Annual Yearbook and Statistical Review Number 34/5, 25 April 1942, p.159; PGAHA, An Analysis of the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association (Honolulu, 1939), p.38.

training was acquired by the men employed locally. Philpak recruited 1,500 women locally and provided them with medical coverage.22 In the late 1930s Calpak decided to expand its operations in the Philippines. In 1938, through the assistance of the National Development Company,23 Philpak secured an additional 1,250 acres for pineapple cultivation in exchange for giving the government some interest in, and supervision of the industry. The National Development Company, was not subject, as were private sector corporations like Philpak, to restrictions on the amount of land that might be leased. However, the Commonwealth government, established after the American government granted autonomy to the Philippines in 1936, was less than enthusiastic about Calpak’s plans. As the American Vice-Consul in Manila reported in 1941, just before the Japanese invasion of the Islands, it appeared that Calpak would not be able to expand its operations any further.24

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Calpak also conducted investigations in Latin America in the 1920s in common with the other two major Hawaiian pineapple canners. In 1923, Calpak was granted a 50 year concession by the Republic of Haiti, then under occupation by the United States, to produce and export fruit.25 By 1930 Calpak had 5,000 acres under pineapple cultivation. On 1 June 1930, Calpak completed and operated a cannery for the purpose of canning the fruit grown on its plantation. In 1930 about 30,000 cases were packed, most of which were shipped to Europe.26 However, the project, set up for the purpose of supplying Calpak’s European markets was not a commercial success, and in 1934 Calpak withdrew from Haiti. Its subsidiary, the Haitian Pineapple Co., was sold to a syndicate of Belgian investors.27 Although Libby was more successful than its rival, Calpak, in securing new lands for expansion in Hawaii in the 1920s, it also began to consider the possibility of relocating some of its production outside Hawaii from 1921.28 Initially Libby seems to have restricted itself to requesting information on the overseas pineapple industry from the BFDC. In the early 1920s Libby appears to have been generally satisfied with its existing Hawaiian operation, as a corporate executive suggested to the BFDC in July 1921: It is my opinion now that the Hawaiian Islands are best adapted to the cultivation of pineapple and I believe that there is nothing else thus far produced to equal it in quality. [However] if there is any other locality equally adapted, we would like to find it, with the purpose of expanding our business in that territory.29 However, in the second half of the 1920s the directors of Libby, McNeill & Libby appear to have reached the decision that the big corporations in Hawaii were too powerful. They decided to seek an independent source of production,30 particularly because Hawaiian canned pineapples were the most important item amongst Libby’s canned fruit lines, representing over 40 per cent of their canned fruit pack.31 A good example of what the directors felt was the excessive power of Hawaii’s big corporations, was what Libby considered to be the unreasonable freight rate charged by the Oahu Railway and Land Co. on fruit grown on Libby’s new plantations on Molokai and Maui from the Honolulu quayside to Libby’s cannery. This view was upheld by the US Interstate Commerce Commission in March 1930.32 Libby sent investigators to many countries in Latin America, South East Asia and Africa between 1926 and 193033 in active competition with

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Calpak.34 However, Libby eventually decided to establish an experimental plantation in Kenya, after lengthy consultations with Britain’s Empire Marketing Board, who were keen to promote the development of canning within the Empire.35 In May 1930, Libby acquired an option in respect to two areas of land of about 10,000 acres each in the Trans Nzoia Province of Kenya. Libby proposed that if its experiments were successful to establish a large pineapple cannery in Mombasa, to grow pineapples on the areas over which they had acquired the option, and also to purchase fruit from other producers, both native and non-native, in the vicinity. By February 1931, Libby had imported 250,000 plants from Hawaii for their first experimental tests against what planting material they had been able to acquire locally.36 Their agent, Lewis Thornton Lyman, one of Hawaii’s leading agriculturists,37 arranged for the import of another million plants. Libby decided not to make a decision as to whether to establish a pineapple cannery, until Lyman had had another 18 months to two years to see how the plants grew and whether there was any brown fruit rot.38 Despite the support of the Governor of Kenya, Edward Grigg, the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, was less than enthusiastic about the development of a pineapple canning industry in Kenya. He was particularly concerned about whether there were any native rights in the lands over which Libby had acquired an option. So he ordered an investigation. Grigg countered Passfield’s objection with the argument that the pineapple was a crop well suited to native production as well as non-native production. Grigg also argued that the establishment of a cannery by Libby in the Coastal Province would be of great ‘material assistance in the development of that area’.39 By 1934, it had been established that the land in the Coastal Province was suitable for pineapple production.40 However, in 1934, after months of correspondence, Libby abandoned its scheme for a canning industry in Kenya. Libby decided that the prospects of an export trade were uncertain and that, while a local East African trade showed more potential, the corporation was not prepared to bear anything but a share of the cost of a cannery. Since the British government was not prepared to provide a subsidy, Libby decided to discontinue their African experiments, and not to exercise their land option.41 One of the factors that led Libby to consider investing in Kenya was the rising tariff barriers against American exports to the British Empire. Libby managed to find a way of maintaining its Canadian market in the 1930s, which had been one of the few major markets for Hawaiian

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canned pineapple outside the United States before 1929, by entering into an agreement with the Australian pineapple canning industry. Australia’s pineapple exports to Canada were placed under the control of Libby, twothirds of which could be sold with Libby’s brand labels. This agreement helped to ensure that Libby retained a share of the Canadian market during the Great Depression.42 Libby also cooperated with a pineapple canning company in Fiji, the West Coast Pines (Fiji) Limited, in the early 1930s. The company was founded in 1929, with a capital of £50,000, and had about 1,000 acres under lease which were subleased in blocks of five to ten acres to Indian tenants. Its cannery had a capacity of 150,000 cases per annum, which was more than sufficient to absorb the available supplies of pineapples.43 Expert supervision of canning operations was secured with the services of experienced technicians from Libby’s Hawaiian subsidiary, who asserted that Fijian canned pineapple was of first class quality. The company steadily increased production between 1930 and 1932 and hoped to establish a market in Canada and Britain.44 Libby may have been a ‘silent’ partner in this company, perhaps in order to avoid arousing the attention of its rivals. However, the glut of Hawaiian canned pineapple in 1932 led to the collapse of the company, and it was liquidated in May 1933.45 Of the three major canners, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was the most successful in obtaining new lands in Hawaii in the 1920s. Early investigations in the Philippines, Mexico, Fiji, the Dominican Republic, Malaya and Queensland were abandoned after Dole acquired the Island of Lanai.46 However, these investigations were resumed in the late 1920s because the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. wished to expand into the British Imperial market, and rising tariff barriers meant it needed a base within the British Empire.47 Of the various British colonies considered by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Fiji alone had natural advantages surpassed only by Hawaii. The soils and climate of Fiji were closely comparable with those of Hawaii, and the Smooth Cayenne variety of pineapple grew equally well in Fiji as it did in Hawaii. The labour available in Fiji was not as efficient as that of Hawaii, but the prevailing level of wages was much lower, so that the advantage probably lay with Fiji. Land values in Fiji were many times lower than those in Hawaii, and unlike there, the Fijian government was prepared to make available to the industry several thousand acres of public lands.48 In the late 1920s, the Fijian government was actively promoting the development of a pineapple canning industry in the colony. In 1928, the President of the Suva Chamber of Commerce visited Honolulu and

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attempted to interest the Hawaiian pineapple canners in the possibilities of developing the pineapple industry in Fiji. Sir J. Maynard Hedstrom, an expatriate businessman in Fiji, met with the board of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in April to discuss his ideas regarding the growing and canning of pineapples in Fiji. He mentioned recent experiments by the Fijian government and Canadian Canners Inc. in growing and canning pineapples in Fiji. Hedstrom suggested that Fiji would be ideal for exporting to the British Empire and in particular Canada. As a result Dole and the board decided to send one of its directors, Kenneth B. Barnes, and two of its technicians, a plant superintendent, W.A. Cleghorn, and its chief engineer, Simes T. Hoyt to Fiji in late 1928, to consider the possibility of extending its growing and canning activities to the colony. The company also agreed to share equally with Morris Hedstrom, Limited the costs of the cultivation of experimental plots previously planted by the Fijian government.49 As mentioned above this was not the first time the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. had considered producing canned pineapples in Fiji. It had previously undertaken a fieldtrip to Fiji in 1922.50 When the company’s board considered the report of the 1928 fieldtrip to Fiji in February 1929 Dole argued that the growing tariff barriers faced by Hawaiian canned pineapple in the various markets of the British Empire provided a powerful incentive to consider places outside Hawaii to produce canned pineapple. The company decided to send representatives to visit the Philippines, Malaya and Sumatra during the first half of 1929 in order to better judge whether Fiji offered the best place to produce canned pineapple for the British market. In the meantime, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. notified the Fijian government of its intention of experimenting in growing pineapples in Fiji for canning. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. took up an option from the colonial government of more than 60,000 acres for three years as an experimental stage on certain attractive concessional terms as regards rent, commencing at the end of 1929.51 In September 1929, Cleghorn and Walter A. Wendt, and an assistant, went to Fiji to conduct a series of experiments in the growing of pineapples. They were accompanied by four skilled Japanese mechanics, who were experienced in the operation of tractors and other important phases of field work. These were the first experiments conducted by the company outside of Hawaii.52 Twenty experimental plots were established and on the basis of the results from them, the company expected to be able to decide upon the advisability of expansion of pineapple production into this area to supply the British and Canadian markets.53 Barnes, Cleghorn and Hoyt made a further trip to Fiji in February 1931 to inspect the progress of the experimental

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175

plots.54 In April 1932 the company decided to discontinue the Fijian project as of 30 June, and not take up its land option from the Fijian government. The experiment showed that the Fijian weather conditions were worse than anticipated, and that early fruiting and the associated short cycles were not to be expected. The tonnage produced on the plant crop harvested in December and January was disappointing. However, the company still believed the rising levels of tariffs in the early 1930s made it desirable to find a place to produce canned pineapple within the British Empire.55 From the early 1930s the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. and Libby ceased their investigations and plans for overseas plants. Wilkins suggests that also true of some other American companies, with plans for foreign plants, particularly those in mining and agriculture.   She also observes that US investors in agricultural properties in Latin America met adversity during the period 1933 to 1939. This was one of the areas the pineapple canners had investigated in the 1920s. Although on the other hand she observes some manufacturers felt compelled to set up branch plants to avoid being on the wrong side of the rising tariff barriers of the 1930s. However given exports formed a relatively small proportion of the Hawaiian pineapple industry’s output and the commercial and political risks, perhaps it is not surprising like many American companies all but one of the canners felt overseas expansion was not worthwhile.56 The shortage of available land in the inter-war period led the three major canners to conclude that it might be appropriate to establish new pineapple plantations and canneries outside Hawaii. Although Calpak was the only canner to actually do this before the Second World War, it set a precedent for the other canners in Hawaii. After the war, as will be shown in Chapter 9, rising labour and land costs in Hawaii forced the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to follow Calpak’s example in the early 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s Libby decided to withdraw from Hawaii completely and relocate in Swaziland. The Hawaiian canners received invaluable information from the BFDC in the inter-war years which helped to start this process in the 1920s, although it was to near completion long after the dissolution of the BFDC in 1945.

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9 THE HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE INDUSTRY SINCE 1941

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 marks a watershed in Hawaiian economic history. In the immediate aftermath of the attack Hawaii was placed under martial law, which lasted until October 1944.1 After the American victory over Japan in August 1945 the oligarchy was unable to regain its former dominance. The outbreak of war meant Hawaii no longer had any competition from the Philippines and Taiwan in the continental US market. After the termination of the PPCA agreement on 31 May 1942 the quota system was abandoned because labour shortages meant production was curtailed. At the same time wartime demand was so great that the market could absorb everything that was produced. Government purchases of both canned pineapple and juice increased rapidly. In 1944 they amounted to two-thirds of total production. The pack of canned pineapple remained below its prewar peak throughout the war years reaching a low point of 7.5 million actual cases in 1945 while canned pineapple juice production reached a low point of 5.8 million actual cases in 1944.2 Hawaii was the only major producer of canned pineapple to emerge from the Second World War with its industry unscathed. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines and British Malaya had resulted in the destruction of their pineapple industries. The industry in Taiwan was also destroyed as a result of the war. Japanese rule came to an end and the island came under the control of the Kuomintang, which caused severe disruption to the Taiwanese economy. However, the Taiwanese pineapple industry was reconstructed during the first half of the 1950s. In British Malaya the industry was also gradually rehabilitated in the early post-war years and its canneries were modernised. In the Philippines Calpak (hereafter Del Monte)3 built a new modern cannery to replace the one destroyed by the Japanese and resumed

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production in the second quarter of 1948. Production reached pre-war levels in the early 1950s.4 In the immediate post-war years the Hawaiian industry dominated the global canned pineapple market. However, the war had empowered Hawaii’s Asian-American plantation labour force. Many Asian-Americans, born in the Islands to immigrant parents or grandparents, had served in the American armed forces, and as a result of veterans’ loans and other benefits, were able to go to university or obtain professional qualifications that enabled them to enter the white collar labour force en masse, the first generation to do so. Those that remained on the plantations were no longer prepared to accept wages that were significantly lower than those paid to workers in comparable industries on the US West Coast. In the decade after the Second World War there was a sharp rise in unit labour costs in large part because the pineapple packers were forced to accept the unionization of their industry by the ILWU.5 Shelley M. Mark and Seiji Naya argue that the short-term impact of the resulting rapid rise in labour costs on Hawaiian canned pineapple prices can be exaggerated. They suggest that while absolute wage rates in Hawaii may have been much higher than those of its competitors, productivity was also higher.6 Indeed by the pack year 1950 output of canned pineapple in Hawaii had recovered to its pre-war level of 11 million standard cases.7 The individual Hawaiian pineapple producers’ responded differently to changes in the post-war global market. The minor canners had not invested in the creation of brands for the continental United States market. They mostly produced canned pineapple that was sold with wholesaler or retailer brand labels. Most of these canners went out of business in the 1950s. Only two, Baldwin Packers and the Maui Pineapple Co., survived as a merged company, which took the name Maui Pineapple Co. in 1963.8 On the other hand the major canners continued what were some of the most identifiable national advertising campaigns, with the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. (hereafter Dole) using the new medium of television in addition to magazines from the early 1950s.9 However, for Libby this advertising failed to counterbalance its rising costs of production. In 1961 Libby decided to close down its pineapple operations on Maui. Higher labour costs in Hawaii meant that the Hawaiian product had to be sold at prices 20 to 25 per cent above that produced in countries such as Taiwan or South Africa.10 Libby withdrew completely from Hawaii in 1970. Its 12,500 acre Molokai plantation and its Honolulu cannery were acquired by Dole.11 Production of canned pineapple in Hawaii peaked at 13.7 million standard cases in the pack year 1955, and despite the subsequent reduction in the number

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of canners in Hawaii, production stabilised at between 11 and 13 million standard cases between the pack years 1956 and 1972.12 Hawaii had supplied much of the growing European market for canned pineapple during the early post-war period. However, from the mid-1950s much of it was lost to Taiwanese, Malayan, South African and Australian competitors because their products were cheaper13 and because there were periodic efforts by Britain to promote the sale of British Commonwealth produced goods in Europe. Nevertheless, Mark and Naya suggest that during the early 1960s Hawaii’s crucial technological lead was narrowing. This was partly a result of the post-war recovery and development that had occurred in other pineapple producing areas, in some cases supported by American overseas aid.14 In the mid-1960s the industry began to experience a severe labour shortage, and started to reduce the scale of its operations and move production overseas.15 In 1965 Del Monte agreed with the Kenyan government to take over the management of Kenya Canners Ltd., a small, neglected pineapple plantation and cannery. Three years later Del Monte decided to purchase the company and use it to establish a new subsidiary, in addition to its existing subsidiary in the Philippines, thus benefiting from Kenya’s privileged access to the European Economic Community market. It increased its share especially of the British market because Kenyan canned pineapple was perceived to be of higher quality than that of competitors such as Malaya.16 Libby adopted a similar strategy with the acquisition a small cannery in Swaziland in 1968, hoping to benefit from the African kingdom’s low costs of production. The cannery did not prove to be viable over the long-term and was sold in 1982.17 In 1963, Dole decided to follow the example of Del Monte by establishing a subsidiary in the Philippines. This decision was partly because of the increased militancy of the Hawaiian labour force and partly because land values rose with the growth of the tourism industry. Apart from the large military bases and possessions in Hawaii, the only potential source of land available for residential and tourist development was pineapple or sugar plantation land. There was immense pressure to sell plantation land for development. Like Del Monte, Dole leased land in the Philippines through the state controlled National Development Company. In a technical violation of the Philippines constitution, no limit was set on the area that could be acquired. The company subsequently acquired land owned by private farmers and minority tribes. The latter were allegedly coerced by the government into making way for its expanded plantation, although the company denied this. The expansion of the company’s operations enabled it to meet foreign competition and open new markets in low income

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countries.18 Amos Gitai suggests that by shifting production from Hawaii to the Philippines the company saved itself from possible collapse.19 This investment allowed it to win back part of its lost market in Europe by allowing it to take advantage of lower costs of production and established trading and distribution networks.20 By the early 1970s Taiwan had emerged as a significant competitor in the global market,21 exporting up to 5 million cases a year. However, during the 1970s Taiwan upgraded its economy from agriculture to light industry and its pineapple industry began to contract. The leading canner, the Taiwan Pineapple Corporation, relocated production to the Ivory Coast.22 Taiwan was replaced by Thailand as a major challenger to Hawaii from the late 1970s. Before the late 1960s pineapples had been grown only for the domestic Thai fresh fruit market. However, in 1967 Mitsubishi established the first post-war pineapple cannery in Thailand. Other companies soon entered the industry, including Dole.23 In 1970 it established a new venture in Thailand with the acquisition of a 20 per cent shareholding in the Island Canning Co., which was developing a new plantation in Prachaup Khiri Khan Province and a new cannery at Raj Buri, Ratchaburi Province. The company also made a long-term agreement with Island Canning to purchase up to 45 per cent of the Thai cannery’s annual pineapple production. The Raj Buri cannery served the new subsidiary for three years.  The following year the company acquired majority control of the Thai venture. However, there were difficulties in transporting raw pineapples from the plantation to the cannery. In 1972 the company acquired virgin land near Hua Hin, Prachaup Khiri Khan Province, and began the construction of a new cannery at Hua Hin, which replaced the Raj Buri cannery in 1974. The construction of the cannery and the availability of King’s Project lands adjacent to the new plantation drew landless farmers to the area.24 Both Dole and Del Monte still had a large amount of fixed capital in Hawaii. There was a growing market for fresh fruit in the United States. From the 1970s advances in transportation technology made it possible for fresh pineapples to be transported thousands of miles with no significant loss in freshness and quality and at ever lower costs. At first the Hawaiian industry responded successfully by marketing fresh pineapples in the continental United States as a premium product. However, as William Coyle, William Hall and Nicole Ballenger have observed lower transportation costs have a similar effect on trade as a tariff cut. Taken together with actual cuts in the tariff on fresh pineapples this has meant an increasing proportion of them are imported.25 From 1976 Del Monte sought to rebuild its competitive advantage by capturing a share of this market by developing a major fresh

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pineapple business. This new business was subsequently integrated with the corporation’s fresh banana business. By the early 1980s Del Monte’s Hawaiian plantations grew about 60 per cent of their crop for canning and 40 per cent for the fresh fruit market. The switch to fresh pineapple production is reflected in the gradual decline in canned pineapple production from 1972, although production was still an estimated 9.5 million cases in 1982. By the early 1980s Del Monte was making substantial losses at its Hawaiian pineapple cannery. An added concern for the corporation was litigation resulting from its use of the highly toxic pesticide, heptachlor, which had created a health hazard on the island of Oahu and devastated the local dairy industry. In 1983 it closed its Honolulu cannery26 and announced the closure of its plantation on the island of Molokai. At the same time the company invested $35 million in an 11,000 acre plantation in Costa Rica to produce fresh pineapples for Europe and the eastern half of the United States. Undoubtedly the fact that Costa Rica was part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) influenced Del Monte’s investment. (Since 1983 the CBI has provided over 20 Caribbean and Central American countries duty-free access to the United States.) The Costa Rican operation was very successful. Nonetheless, the Molokai plantation was given a temporary reprieve and was not closed until 1988.27 A plantation was retained on the island of Oahu. While canned pineapple pack statistics are not available for the period after 1980, data do exist for the amount of fresh pineapples processed in Hawaii. Between 1983 and 1990 the amount fell from 602,000 to 434,000 tons while production for the fresh market rose from 120,000 to 141,000 tons.28 While a growing proportion of the pineapples produced in Hawaii were sold as higher margin fresh fruit, the major Hawaiian pineapple companies sourced more of their canned pineapple from their expanding south-east Asian subsidiaries. This was because it had become very difficult to differentiate Hawaiian canned pineapple. American consumers could not distinguish between Del Monte and Dole pineapple canned in Hawaii and that which was canned in the Philippines.29 In the 1980s Thailand displaced the Philippines as the largest exporter of canned pineapple to the United States. By the end of the decade Thailand was the world’s largest producer of canned pineapples, accounting for two-fifths of total production, and having a 33 per cent share of the most important world market, the United States.30 To a large degree this was a success for Dole, which became the largest foreign-owned pineapple processing firm in Thailand. At the beginning of the 1990s its subsidiary produced over 11 million standard cases of canned pineapple a year, and its plantation had expanded from about 500 to 5,600 acres. At first many of the pineapples

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canned were purchased from over 800 local peasant farmers. However, the company avoided buying through the farmers’ organisations closest to its cannery preferring to buy pineapples from farmers living farther away who had less bargaining power. The company purchased both from the open market and regular suppliers under a quota system and did not engage in contract markets or contract farming.31 Dole, unlike Del Monte, has not eschewed smallholders despite the fact, as Amos Gitai noted in his 1983 documentary film Ananas, it has endeavoured to maximize control to ensure smooth production.32 While canned pineapple production expanded in Thailand, communist insurgency in the pineapple growing region in the Philippines during the 1980s reduced the area under cultivation. Moreover, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, enacted in the aftermath of the downfall of the Filipino dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, created uncertainty. This revived the initial plan of the interwar American Insular Government that the Del Monte subsidiary, Philpak, should source its pineapples from Filipino homesteaders (people involved in government schemes to colonise underdeveloped parts of the Philippines). The CARL timetable specified that all public lands under lease or management, grower or service contracts to multinational firms had to be redistributed by June 1991. It was predicted that the multinational pineapple operations might be adversely affected by the inefficient systems of dealing with the new owners of the subdivided land. Del Monte, in common with the major Hawaiian pineapple packers, had historically grown pineapples on its own plantations rather than outsourcing to smallholders. It argued that plantation production was more suited to its standardised product because it allowed them to control the quality and size of pineapples, and bring fruit into production at a time convenient for their timetable. This challenged the view of some development economists, for example Peter Bauer, that smallholders can be more efficient than plantations. Del Monte is believed to have threatened to relocate its operations in Thailand or Indonesia. Dole and Del Monte succeeded in ensuring that the land in question was redistributed to worker cooperatives on their plantations.33 Although the CARL was subsequently renewed for another 10 years, both firms have succeeded in increasing the size of their plantations in the Philippines during the decade and a half since the law’s implementation.34 From 1979 Del Monte underwent a complicated series of changes of ownership which resulted in the fragmentation of the corporation. In 1988 Del Monte was eventually acquired by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), the leveraged buyout specialist. In September 1989 a group led by the Del Monte

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management agreed to purchase the processed food side of their business from KKR for $1.5 billion. The buy-out group, Del Monte Foods, USA, decided to sell off most of the overseas subsidiaries, although it retained the pineapple canning subsidiaries in the Philippines and Thailand.35 Since the beginning of the 1990s these former subsidiaries, which produce fresh and canned fruit under license from Del Monte Foods, USA, have undergone several changes of ownership. For example, Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc, which produces fresh tropical fruit in various parts of the world, is now owned by the Abu-Ghazaleh family of the United Arab Emirates. Del Monte Foods, USA was also later acquired by the Texas Pacific Group, a private investment firm.36 The fragmentation of Del Monte is further complicated by developments at the former subsidiary in the Philippines. It was renamed Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) in 1987. Del Monte Foods, USA divested a majority of its ownership of DMPI in January 1991 and the remainder in March 1996. DMPI was subsequently acquired by NutriAsia Pacific, a joint venture between NutriAsia Group of Companies and San Miguel Corporation, both of the Philippines.37 DMPI owns rights for the Del Monte brand in the Philippines and India, a huge emerging market. Though the company’s plantations and canneries are based in the Philippines, 60 per cent of its revenue comes from long-term contracts to supply canned pineapple juice and tropical fruits to North America, Europe and Asia.38 Dole also experienced a change in ownership during the 1980s, although unlike Del Monte it was not broken up. In March 1985, David Murdock, a multimillionaire, gained control of the company’s near-bankrupt parent corporation, Castle & Cooke. He invested $21 million in 1987 to improve the company’s Honolulu pineapple cannery to make it ‘one of the most advanced in the world.’ Murdock also extended the use of the Dole brand from canned fruit and juice, fresh pineapples and bananas to other fresh products.39 Despite the investments made by the company in its Hawaiian canned pineapple operation during the second half of the 1980s, it would appear that its commitment to Hawaii was weakening. In 1987 the company decided to take advantage of the CBI and established a new subsidiary in the Dominican Republic.40 The company also established a second cannery at Chumphon in southern Thailand to process pineapples and other tropical fruits in the early 1990s.41 The Dominican subsidiary was not a success and was wound down in 1996.42 In September 1990 Dole decided to phase out its remaining 6,000 to 7,000 acres under pineapple cultivation on Lanai by 1993 and redevelop the island primarily as a tourist resort. The company argued that with labour

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costs in Hawaii as much as 25 times higher than those in Thailand, Dole pineapple produced in Hawaii could no longer compete on the basis of price. Both its Lanai plantation and Honolulu cannery were closed during 1992.43 Dole continued to grow pineapples in Hawaii on Oahu. The company marketed these pineapples in North America alongside those grown on plantations it had developed in Costa Rica, Ecuador and Honduras during the 1990s.44 During the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s the major suppliers of fresh Hawaiian pineapples in the continental United States developed new sweet varieties of pineapple that responded to the changing tastes and preferences of consumers. These included Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc.’s Extra Sweet Gold, launched in the mid-1990s, Dole Tropical Gold, launched in 1999 and Maui Gold launched in late 2005. Krisnawati Suryanata argues that Del Monte, Dole and Maui Land & Pineapple successfully captured a premium value of place association as a result of the social construction of Hawaii as a place with the development of Hawaii as a major tourist destination after the Second World War. This further popularised Hawaiian pineapple in the American and international markets. But this premium was only temporary because these varieties could be grown elsewhere in places such as Costa Rica and Indonesia using the same brand names.45 Trade union activists also argue that transnational companies, such as Dole, choose to produce fruit in countries such as Costa Rica because they can adopt an anti-union policy on their plantations and thus maintain a competitive advantage through low wages and poor working conditions.46 However, labour productivity appears to be an issue in Costa Rica and it is probable that this country’s low cost of land and water are equally, or more, important.47 Since the beginning of the twentieth-first century Dole has expanded its operations in the Philippines. It has developed a new pineapple plantation at Barangay Tahakayo in an area of the island of Mindanao formerly controlled by Communist guerrillas. In addition to the new plantation established in 2004 the company has signed contracts with independent growers.48 Dole has made considerable use of independent growers in the Philippines, as in the case of Thailand. In 2003 it had contracts with 1,250 pineapple growers.49 Dole also acquired a bankrupt competitor, the T’boli Agro-Industrial Development Inc. (Tadi), in 2006. Tadi operated a cannery in Surallah, South Cotabato.50 Fresh Del Monte also underwent a major expansion in October 2004 when it acquired Del Monte’s European off-shoot. Among the tangible assets acquired in this transaction were the Del Monte pineapple plantation and cannery in Kenya and the Siam Agro Industry Pineapple and Others

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Public Company Ltd. of Thailand.51 Fresh Del Monte ended its pineapple operations in Hawaii in November 2006.52 It has relocated production to the Philippines where it has a partnership with the Antonio Floirendo Management and investment Corporation which manages the Davao Agricultural Ventures Corporation (DAVCO). Fresh Del Monte has a 40 per cent equity stake in DAVCO.53 As noted above the Maui Pineapple Co. was the only one minor producer of pineapple in Hawaii that survived the shakeout of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1969 Colin Cameron took control of Maui Pineapple and renamed it Maui Land & Pineapple Co. Inc. (ML&P).54 Under Cameron it became the world’s largest supplier of private label canned pineapple.55 However, as a result of problems it experienced in the 1990s ML&P decided to invest in offshore production as Dole and Del Monte had done many years before. In 1997, a joint venture was established with an Indonesian pineapple grower and canner. Two years later, a majority owned subsidiary was established in Costa Rica to export fresh fruit from that country and El Salvador to the United States and Europe.56 During the same year Stephen M. Case, the internet multimillionaire, acquired 41.2 per cent of ML&P. He divested substantially all of ML&P’s Costa Rican pineapple assets in December 2003 although he acknowledged the subsidiary had been profitable and well run. ML&P also withdrew from the Indonesian joint venture at the same time. In 2007 ML&P ceased producing canned pineapple in Hawaii citing fierce foreign competition. This failed to curb its Hawaiian pineapple operation’s losses. In November 2009 the company decided to cease producing fresh pineapples in Hawaii. The following month the final crop was harvested leaving the Dole Food Co. as the last big grower of pineapple in Hawaii.57 Transferring canned pineapple production from Hawaii to less developed countries may not be a permanent long-term growth strategy. Since the beginning of the 1970s there has been a major reduction in canned food consumption in the developed countries as consumers have become increasingly health conscious. Consumption of canned fruits and vegetables in the United States, for example, has been falling since the late 1970s, while that of fresh fruits and vegetables has been rising.58 Dole and Del Monte recognized the beginning of this trend in the mid-1970s and switched from the production of fruit in Hawaii for canning to production for the premium fresh fruit market. This gave their operations in Hawaii at least a temporary respite. Nonetheless between 1980 and 2006 there was a contraction in the acreage under pineapples in Hawaii from 43,000 to 13,900 acres. The production of fresh pineapples (including those processed) fell from 657,000 tons in 1980 to 188,000 tons in 2006.59 Between the late 1980s and early

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2000s Hawaii’s share of the United States’ market for fresh pineapples fell from about 60 per cent to just over 20 per cent. As a result of the CBI Costa Rica has emerged as the dominant supplier of fresh pineapples to the United States. In 2005 it supplied 76 per cent of fresh imports and over 60 per cent of the total market including Hawaiian production.60 As Francesca Beauman has observed, ‘The toppling of Hawaii’s dominance is one of the most dramatic developments in the post-war period within the [world] pineapple industry.’ 61 Consumers have ceased to be able to differentiate canned pineapple produced in Hawaii as a premium product. This was in large part the result of technology transfer to less developed countries by the Hawaiian pineapple producers whose businesses have become multinational. Del Monte or Dole branded canned pineapple produced in the Philippines or Thailand was indistinguishable from the Hawaiian product. Furthermore post-war Del Monte pineapple advertising had ceased to explicitly associate the canned product with Hawaii as did the Dole pineapple advertising from the later 1970s. In Hawaii, in order to continue to benefit from their fixed capital investment, they developed a market for premium fresh pineapples in the United States and Europe. However, once again consumers were unable to distinguish between fresh pineapples produced in Hawaii and elsewhere in the world bearing the same trusted brand names. Therefore, by the end of the first decade of the twentyfirst century the remaining pineapple producers could no longer sustain their remaining pineapple production in Hawaii.

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CONCLUSION

The development of the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry fits at least in part Richard S. Tedlow’s three phases of marketing. It fits phase one because the Hawaiian canners did realize scale economies by expanding their distribution throughout the continental US in the early part of the twentieth century. Although the canners may not have produced the lowest priced canned pineapple they certainly achieved higher volume and hence higher total profits to assist their further expansion. It also fits phase two, the unification phase, where it did indeed internalize much of its marketing process in the inter-war period and two of the three major canners adopted national brands from the late 1910s. The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. lagged behind Calpak and Libby, but it too adopted a national brand during the course of the 1930s. With respect to the third phase, it is probably fair to suggest that the scope for market segmentation in the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry was limited. However, during the 1930s the Hawaiian pineapple canners developed a highly successful new product, canned pineapple juice, which captured a significant part of a different segment of the processed food and drink marked from canned pineapple.1 This phase also represents what Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. defines as an ‘economy of scope’.2 The Hawaiian pineapple canning industry might well have not been a commercial success if James D. Dole had not moved to Hawaii in 1899. For while pioneers in the industry like Ackerman & Muller and Kidwell & Emmeluth discovered that canning pineapples would overcome the problems of exporting a perishable product to the US West Coast, they were unable to market their product at a high enough level of profit. It was Dole who first realized that the industry could only become a commercial success if its output was marketed scientifically in the continental US. Dole

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had the characteristics of one of Chandler’s ‘first movers’.3 Dole’s Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was to retain what Chandler calls a ‘first mover advantage’ despite the entrance of two powerful continental US challengers, the CFCA and Libby, McNeill & Libby during the years 1909–11.4 Dole also put into practice the concept of industry-wide cooperative advertising. From the very beginning, the cooperative advertising stressed the quality of the Hawaiian product. This helped the Hawaiian canners to capture most of the market from the cheaper lower quality canned pineapple exported to the United States from places like British Malaya. The producers in British Malaya were not organized and could not afford to advertise their products.5 From the early part of the twentieth century the Hawaiian pineapple canning industry became effectively an oligopoly dominated by three, and later four, canners, as Chandler’s theory would suggest.5 Contrary to neo-classical economic theory this does not appear to have impeded the development of the industry. Indeed  both at an industry-wide level, and at a company level, the industry engaged in a high level of research and development into both the production process and into product development. Throughout much of the twentieth century the Hawaiian industry was the most scientifically and technologically developed of all the pineapple canning industries of the world, as Chapter 5 shows. Furthermore in times of economic crisis or depression, instead of just competing against each other, the Hawaiian pineapple canners also cooperated with each other in order to stabilize the market. During the Great Depression of the 1930s this would appear to have been one of the principal factors that contributed to the recovery of the Hawaiian industry. The Hawaiian pineapple canners were able to retain their dominance in the American marketplace from the end of the first decade of the twentieth century until the early 1960s. This was despite the fact that in much of the tropical regions of the world the unit cost of labour and land was significantly lower than in Hawaii. It might be argued that the US tariff on canned pineapple imports overcame Hawaii’s higher labour and land unit costs. In fact even with the US tariff, imported canned pineapple often had a lower retail price than the Hawaiian product. Hawaii’s competitors, at least until the 1930s, suffered from lack of organization, below optimum size and under-capitalization. Unlike the Hawaiian pineapple canners, most of them were unable to produce a product up to the quality of the Hawaiian product demanded by America’s consumers. Furthermore, a significantly higher productivity level than its overseas competitors counterbalanced higher unit Hawaiian labour and land costs. The only successful competition faced by

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Hawaii in the American market before the Second World War was from the Japanese colony of Taiwan during the 1930s. However, Taiwan had to crosssubsidize its canned pineapple exports to the United States.6 The success of the Hawaiian pineapple canners is all the more remarkable when the business environment in Hawaii is considered. There is some evidence to suggest that the dominant sugar cane industry had mixed feelings about the success of the pineapple canners in the period 1908 to 1941. Some members of the families who controlled the sugar industry were actively involved in the development of the pineapple industry. However, the pioneer canners who were not related to the sugar industry families appear to have found it very difficult to raise capital in Hawaii. It is probable that Californian investors financed much of the development of the canning industry during the 1900s, as was the case with James D. Dole’s Hawaiian Pineapple Co. The control of Hawaii’s sugar industry over the Territory’s resources began to curtail the expansion of the industry during the 1920s as the canners found it increasingly difficult to gain access to more land. Hawaii’s three leading pineapple canners began to search abroad for an alternative to the Territory in the less developed parts of the tropics where it would be easier to acquire suitable land. By the late 1920s and early 1930s all three canners planned to relocate at least part of their production outside Hawaii. The Great Depression of the 1930s prevented two of these canners from proceeding with their plans. However, Calpak went ahead with its plans and established a subsidiary in the Philippines. This subsidiary proved that the less developed parts of the tropics could produce a product up to Hawaiian standards, albeit under transnational management and control. As has been shown in Chapter 9, after the Second World War the business environment in Hawaii changed dramatically. Furthermore, two of the major pineapple canners in Hawaii, Dole and Del Monte, developed successful overseas subsidiaries, thus helping to create their own foreign competition. Nonetheless, Hawaii’s pineapple industry was remarkably successful in managing the end of its dominant position in the US marketplace, and later from the 1970s, its gradual loss of comparative advantage. Pineapples continued to be produced in Hawaii until the first decade of the twenty-first century. It was during this decade that the industry finally collapsed. By the end of the decade only Dole was still producing a small quantity of fresh pineapples on the island of Oahu.7

Appendix

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Production of Hawaiian Canned Pineapples, 1895–1941 Year

       Cases

        Year

Cases

1895#*

468

1919#

5,071,976

1896#*

539

1920#

5,986,982

1897#*

115

1921+

5,262,503

1898#*

3,151

1922+

4,770,239

1899#*

1,064

1923+

5,895,747

1900#*¤

712

1924+

6,825,904

1901#

2,000

1925+

8,728,580

1902#

6,000

1926+

8,939,590

1903#

9,800

1927+

8,879,252

1904#

25,500

1928+

8,663,056

1905#

51,300

1929+

9,210,240

1906#

84,300

1930+

12,672,296

1907#

186,700

1931+

12,807,919

1908#

410,000

1932+

5,063,793

1909#

498,300

1933–34+

7,985,499

1910#

650,000

1934–35+

9,689,730

1911#

730,000

1935–36+

10,380,392

1912#

1,318,336

1936–37+

10,922,883

1913#

1,667,122

1937–38+

12,203,012

1914#

2,268,781

1938–39+

10,521,047

1915#

2,669,616

1939–40+

10,998,956

...cont.

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Table 1 continued 1916#

2,600,483

1940–41+

11,056,491

1917#

2,607,031

1941–42+

11,010,008

1918#

3,847,315

* Exports ¤ Six months to 14 June # Standard cases of 48 lbs + Actual cases N.B. Beginning in 1933 data are for the pack year ending 31 May of the following year. Thus the figure for 1933–34 covers 15 months. Source: PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P4; WCP 33rd Annual Yearbook and Statistical Review Number 35/5, 25 April 1943, p.156.

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Table 2: Exports of Canned Pineapples and Pineapple Juice from Hawaii to the continental United States by Volume, 1923–41 Year

Pineapple             (cases)

1923

6,343,507

1924

6,266,406

1925

8,945,723

1926

9,117,462

1927

9,070,251

1928

11,015,250

1929

9,774,820

Pineapple Juice     (cases)

1930

9,403,788

1931

10,761,691

1932

8,623,752

1933

9,664,090

1934

12,020,791

678,492

1935

9,706,686

3,450,978

1936

12,709,943

7,767,644

1937

13,239,812

9,461,657

1938

8,300,804

7,354,052

1939

12,518,383

10,389,219

1940

9,653,912

11,728,250

1941

14,411,689

13,216,868

5,834

Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Monthly Foreign Commerce Reports, 1923–41 (Washington, DC, 1924–42).

192

A Pacific Industry

Table 3: Exports of Canned Pineapples and Pineapple Juice from Hawaii to the continental United States by Value, 1895–1941 Year

       Canned Pineapples       $

Pineapple       Juice     $

1895

972

1896

2,276

1897

348

1898

5,816

1899

3,849

1900 1901

5,033

1902+

18,000

1903

27,934

1904

56,798

1905

135,808

1906

250,990

1907

601,748

1908

721,859

1909

1,434,036

1910

2,263,075

153,797

1911

2,440,015

184,195

1912

3,329,097

58,562

1913

4,054,711

106,510

1914

5,924,741

48,365

1915

5,111,922

11,836

1916

9,125,684

22,360

1917

8,273,345

24,141

1918

11,553,243

1,495

1919

17,640,710

52,690

1920

29,176,104

45,197

1921

19,905,416

109,439

1922

22,648,905

3,450

1923

26,721,850

3,940

Appendix

193

Table 3 continued 1924

25,371,036

1925

35,561,665

823

1926

33,928,263

1927

33,501,587

1928

39,298,591

1929

28,430,805

1930

37,727,761

1931

35,341,062

1932

20,591,503

1933

23,925,003

1,182

1934

34,156,106

115,972

1935

28,239,449

5,647,112

1936

38,835,794

12,616,689

1937

42,705,114

16,689,976

1938

24,631,405

13,216,988

1939

34,098,779

16,723,754

1940

27,829,668

17,843,367

1941

42,052,000

21,256,000

+ estimate Source: A. Marquès, ‘The Pineapple Industry in Hawaii’, Thrum’s Hawaiian Annual, (1909), p.59; US Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1903), p.398; US Dept. of Commerce, Monthly Commerce Reports, 1903-41 (Washington, DC, 1904–42).

194

A Pacific Industry

Table 4: Production of Hawaiian Canned Pineapple Juice and other American Canned Fruit Juices, 1933–41 Year

Hawaiian

American

American

Other

All Fruit

Pineapple

Grapefruit

Orange

Juices

Juices

(cases)

(cases)

Juice

Juice

Juice

(cases)

(cases)

(cases)

1933

700,000

738,691

110,597

1,000,000

2,549,238

1934

3,000,000

739,844

342,678

843,000

4,925,522

1935

4,086,930

2,617,155

1,108,199

1,566,027

9,378,311

1936

6,811,475

2,462,902

1,227,186

1,480,355

11,981,918

1937

7,161,918

6,399,078

1,464,059

4,980,799

20,187,854

1938

8,870,987

8,420,833

1,306,183

4,894,714

23,492,717

1939

8,551,201

10,560,630

1,740,841

5,316,761

26,169,433

1940

11,284,938

10,226,942

3,844,336

6,609,833

31,966,049

1941

14,000,000

16,758,893

4,386,921

9,878,486

44,922,300

Source: WCP 33rd Annual Yearbook and Statistical Review Number 35/5, 25 April 1943, p.133; UK Imperial Bureau of Horticulture and Plantation Crops, Technical Communication No.11, Fruit Juices and Related Products (East Maling, 1939), p.10.

Appendix

195

Table 5: Hawaiian Canned Pineapple Exports, 1922–41+ Year

   Great

Canada

France

Germany

Britain

Other

Total

Countries

1922

239

98

66

5

106

513

1923

91

136

35

6

119

387

1924

271

68

51

36

207

633

1925

349

81

80

131

165

806

1926

228

120

49

118

208

692

1927

322

140

44

308

208

1,022

1928

316

186

79

395

233

1,209

1929

298

150

97

258

221

1,026

1930

274

129

57

180

201

840

1931

199

60

56

100

129

544

1932

115

12

48

95

116

386

1933

144

4

55

115

136

454

1934

143

22

46

84

157

453

1935

209

17

48

62

152

488

1936

239

42

74

30

148

532

1937

249

88

84

19

214

654

1938

210

14

25

11

150

410

1939

287

26

16

5

186

519

1940

78

26

2

42

148

1941

*

2

41

43

+ ‘000 standard cases * Statistically insignificant Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Commerce of the United States 1922–41 (Washington, DC, 1923–42).

196

A Pacific Industry

NOTES

Acknowledgements 1

Hooper, Paul F., Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawaii (Honolulu, 1980), p.22.

Introduction 1 2

Hooper, Elusive Destiny, pp.5–29. Trask, Haunani-Kay, ‘Cultures in collision: Hawai’i and England, 1778’, Pacific Studies 7/1 (1983), pp.91–117. 3 Stannard, David E., Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai’i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu, 1989); Schmitt, Robert C., Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1977), p.8; Dye, Tom, ‘Population Trends in Hawai’i Before 1778’, Hawaiian Journal of History 28 (1994), p.4. 4 Morgan, Theodore, Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 1778–1876 (Cambridge, MA, 1948); Chinen, Jon J., The Great Mahele: Hawaii’s Land Division of 1848 (Honolulu, 1958); Rigby, Barry, ‘The Origins of American expansion in Hawaii and Samoa, 1865–1900’, International History Review x/2 (1988), pp.224–6. See also Hawkins, Richard A., ‘The impact of sugar cane cultivation on the economy and society of Hawaii, 1835–1900’, Iiles i Imperis: Estudis d’història de les societats en el món colonial i postcolonial 9 (December 2006), pp.59–77. 5 Takaki, Ronald, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835–1920 (Honolulu, 1983). 6 Bell, Roger, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu, 1984), pp.1–37; Rigby, ‘American expansion’, p.228. 7 The events of the 1890s remain highly controversial over a hundred years later. Thurston Twigg-Smith and Haunani-Kay Trask are representative respectively of a pro-annexationist and a pro-sovereignty viewpoint. Twigg-Smith correctly argues that not all native Hawaiians opposed annexation. However, in 1900, in the first election since the late 1880s when all adult male native Hawaiians were able to vote, a Home Rule party won a landslide victory. Divisions among the native Hawaiians meant that this party was unable to capitalize on its victory and within a decade had become defunct.

Notes

197

Twigg-Smith, Thurston, Hawaiian Sovereignty: Do the facts matter? (Honolulu, 1998); Trask, Haunani-Kay, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai’i (Revised Edition) (Honolulu, 1999), pp.12–16, 65, 87, 118–9. 8 www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapt11.shtml; United Nations General Assembly, 6th Session, A/1823, 29 June 1951, Information From Non-SelfGoverning Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter, Report of the Secretary-General: Summary of Information Transmitted by the Government of the United States of America, (Lake Success, NY, 1951). 9 White, Henry A., ‘The Sugar Industry and Plantation Agencies’, in 13th New Americans Conference (Honolulu, 1939), pp.14–31; Whitehead, John S., ‘Western Progressives, Old South Planters, or colonial oppressors: The enigma of Hawai’i’s “Big Five,” 1898–1940’, Western Historical Quarterly 30/3 (1999), pp.295–326; US Dept. of Justice, Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii (Washington, DC, 1932), pp.4–5, 185. 10 Lorrin A. Thurston chaired the Planters’ Labor and Supply Company’s’ Committee of Fruit Cultivation in the early 1890s. He later became one of the founder members of the first pineapple canners’ association in Hawaii, the Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ Association, which was founded in 1908. He was also director of two early pineapple canning companies. David Dwight Baldwin, a member of one of the families which controlled Alexander & Baldwin, pioneered the development of pineapple canning of the Island of Maui in the 1900s, and had been involved in pineapple growing on Maui since the early 1890s. Thurston, Lorrin A., ‘Report of Committee on Fruit Culture’, Planters’ Monthly xi/11 (1892), pp.518–26; Hawaiian Gazette, 25 October 1892, p.9; ‘The Pineapple Men Organize: Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ Association is Formed’, PCA, 8 May 1908, p.6; ‘Koolau Fruit Company Formed’, PCA, 20 May 1908, p.1; Baldwin, William A., A Brief History and Commentary of the Pineapple Industry on Maui, Hawaii (Wailuku, 1938), pp.8–9. 11 US Immigration Commission, Abstract of Report of the Immigration Commission, Vol.I (Washington, DC, 1911), pp.702, 716–7; US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 60th Cong., 2d. Sess., 1908–09, Tariff Hearings, Vol.IV (Washington, DC, 1909), pp.3894–5. 12 US Dept. of Labor, Report on the Commissioner of Labor Statistics on Labor Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii for the Year 1915 (Washington, DC, 1916), p.41. 13 Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA, 1990). 14 Lazonick, William, ‘Understanding Innovative Enterprise: Toward the Integration of Economic Theory and Business History’, in Franco Amatori and Geoffrey Jones, eds., Business History Around the World (Cambridge, 2003), pp.54, 60. 15 Tedlow, Richard S., New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America (Oxford, 1990), pp.3–21. 16 The rivalry between part of the sugar industry and the pineapple canners appears to be largely undocumented. The following source provides some indication of its existence in the 1900s.

198 17

A Pacific Industry

US Reclamation Service, Hawaii: Its Natural Resources and Opportunities for Home-Making (Washington, DC, 1909), pp.41, 46–7. See infra Chapter 4.

1. The Early Years: 1882–1898 1

Bishop, Sereno E., ‘How Has Hawaii Become Americanized?’, Overland Monthly 25 (1895), p.601. 2 Krauss, Beatrice, Experiment Station of the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association Research Report No.19: Pineapple Culture on the Island of São Miguel, Azores (Honolulu,1940), pp.7–9; Allen, G.C., and Audrey G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in Economic Development (London, 1957), p.250; NA, R.G.59, Records of the Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.40008, Review of the Malayan Pineapple Industry, Singapore, April 1, 1935, p.2; US Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce, Special Agents Series No.91, Pineapple Canning Industry of the World (Washington, DC, 1915), p.19; ‘Tinned Pine-Apples in Johore’, Bulletin of the [Jamaican] Department of Agriculture ii/2 (1904), p.44; Hawkins, Richard A., ‘The Baltimore Canning Industry and the Bahamian Pineapple Trade, c.1865–1926’, Maryland Historian 26/2, (1995), pp.1–22. 3 Collins, J.L., ‘Introduction of pineapples into Hawaii and some brief accounts of pioneer pineapple growing’, Pineapple Quarterly iv/3 (1934), pp.119–20; Emmeluth, John, ‘Growing Pineapples’, PoP 11/6 (1898), p.87; ‘Pineapple Culture’, PoP 10/10 (1897), p.147. 4 Hawkins, ‘Baltimore Canning Industry’, p.12. 5 US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin No.473, Hawaii: Its Resources and Trade (Washington, DC, 1927), p.3. 6 Dole, James D., ‘The ripening of pineapples’, The Nation 93/2420 (16 November 1911), p.466. 7 Hawaiian Gazette, 12 April 1882, p.3; ‘A new industry’, PCA, 18 July 1882, p.2. 8 ‘Fruit growing and preserving’, DB, 17 July 1882, p.2. 9 George Washington Pilipo (1828–1887) served in the Hawaiian Legislature continuously from 1870 to 1886. He supported Queen Emma against David Kalakaua in 1874. Kalakaua became so incensed by Pilipo’s criticisms of his governance that he personally intervened in the general election of 1886 to ensure his critic was not reelected. Adler, Jacob, ‘The Maui land deal: A chapter in Claus Spreckels’ Hawaiian career’, Agricultural History xxxix/3 (1965), p.158; ‘The Late Hon. G.W. Pilipo’, Hawaiian Gazette, 29 March 1887, p.1; Hawaiian Gazette, 5 April 1887, p.1; Alexander, W.D., History of the Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893 (Honolulu, 1896), p.13; Thurston, Lorrin A., Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu, 1936), p.59. 10 AH, Interior Dept. Letters, Vol.21, 13 June to 13 December, 1882, J.A. Hassinger to J.D. Ackerman and Woldemar [sic] Muller, 7 September 1882. 11 Adler, ‘Maui land deal’, pp.155–63.

Notes 12



13 14 15 16

17 18



19 20

21



199

Pineapple canning was briefly revived by W.W. Brunner in South Kona in the early 1900s. In 1905 Brunner sold the cannery to the Captain Cook Coffee Co. Marquès reports that it canned a few thousand cases of canned pineapple a year in the latter part of the first decade of the twentieth century. However, the Captain Cook Coffee Co. failed to make a success of the cannery and converted it into a coffee mill sometime in the 1910s. Saturday Press, 14 October 1882, p.2; ‘History from the Advertiser Files’, HA, 20 August 1933, p.5; Marquès, A., L’Ananas: Culture et Industrie: Étude faite aux îles Hawaï (Paris, 1909), pp.11, 16, 46; Marquès, A., ‘The Pineapple Industry in Hawaii’, Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1909 35 (1908), p.65; Fukunaga, Edward T., ‘Coffee’ in Kona District Fair (Kealalekua, c.1955), p.87; Collection of Patti Stratton, Captain Cook Coffee Co., ‘Foresight Develops Coffee Industry in Kona’, Advertisement (c.1955); CT 34/32 (17 April 1911), pp.15–6. Hawkins, ‘Baltimore Canning Industry’, p.12. United Kingdom Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths, Birth Certificates, March 1849, Barnstaple, Vol.X, 37. ‘Captain John Kidwell tells of Smooth Cayenne’s introduction and industry’s start in Hawaii’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3. Langley, H.G., San Francisco Directory for the Year Commencing April 1879 (San Francisco, 1879), p.492; Langley’s San Francisco Directory for the Year Commencing April, 1880 (San Francisco, 1880), p.508; Langley’s San Francisco Directory for the Year Commencing April, 1881 (San Francisco, 1881), p.535; Langley’s San Francisco Directory for the Year Commencing April, 1882 (San Francisco, 1882), p.561. PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3. Kidwell was not the only horticulturist on Oahu to import Smooth Cayenne pineapples at that time. Edward Lycan also imported several hundred smooth leaf Cayenne plants in 1885–86 which he planted at Kalihi, Oahu. When he returned to the United States these plants were disposed of to different parties and were to become the nucleus of various pineapple plantations in the 1890s. Emmeluth, ‘Growing Pineapples’, p.87 ‘Pineapple industry: Island agricultural product second to none’, PCA, 10 March 1897, p.9. Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, pp.522–3; PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3.; ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry’, CT 45/6, 3 October 1921, p.14; Statutes At Large of the United States of America, August 1893 to March 1895, Vol.XXVIII, Chap.349, An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes [27 August 1894] (Washington, DC, 1894), p.524. Emmeluth had been born in Cincinnati in 1853, the son of German immigrants. He had emigrated to Hawaii in February 1878 and become the manager of the house furnishing goods company of Segelken Bros. which had been founded in 1868. Emmeluth bought out the Segelken interests and in 1881 the firm’s name was changed to John Emmeluth and Co. By the late 1880s, the firm had become Honolulu’s principal plumbing and household furnishings business and hardware importers. ‘Affidavit of John Emmeluth’, in US Senate, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations in Relation to the Hawaiian Islands (Washington, DC, 1894), p.418; ‘John Emmeluth, well-known citizen, died last night’, PCA, 21 May 1910,

200

A Pacific Industry

pp.1, 4; Tate, Merze, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History (New Haven, 1965), p.165. 22 The 1883 Tariff levied a duty of 20 per cent ad valorem on canned fruit in its own juice and 35 per cent ad valorem on canned fruit in syrup. In the McKinley Tariff of 1890 the duty on fruit in its own juice was raised to 30 per cent ad valorem. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 reduced the duty on fruit in its own juice to 20 per cent ad valorem and fruit in syrup to 30 per cent ad valorem. The Dingley Tariff of 1897 raised the duty on fruit in its own juice to 25 per cent and fruit in syrup to 25 per cent ad valorem. Statutes At Large of the United States of America, December 1881 to March 1883, Vol.XXII, Chap.121, An Act to reduce internal-revenue taxation, and for other purposes [3 March 1883] (Washington, DC, 1883), p.504; Statutes At Large of the United States of America, December 1889 to March 1891, Vol. XXVI, Chap.1244, An Act to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports and for other purposes [1 October 1890] (Washington, DC, 1891), p.587; Statutes at Large, ’27 August 1894’, p.524; Statutes At Large of the United States of America, March 1897 to March 1899, Vol.XXX, Chap.11, An Act to provide revenue for the government and to encourage the industries of the United States [24 July 1897] (Washington, DC, 1899), p.171. 23 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.523; Kuykendall, Ralph S., The Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol.III, 1874–1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty (Honolulu, 1967), p.109. 24 CT, 45/6, 3 October 1921, p.14. 25 Kidwell, John, ‘Poisoned pineapples!’, DB, 16 June 1891, p.2; AH, Law 3043, P.G. Camarinos vs. John Kidwell. 26 Tate, Hawaiian Kingdom, pp.197–8; PCA, 3 November 1900, p.4. 27 Chapin, Helen G., ‘The Queen’s “Greek Artillery Fire”: Greek Royalists in the Hawaiian Revolution and Counterrevolution’, HJH 15 (1981), p.5; BMA/ THD&CP, Manuscript Group 239/126/8, Pearl City Fruit Co. Minute Book August 1891–November 1905, pp.5, 11, 14, 16; Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.520; ‘First Pineapple Co. in Hawaii will have thirteenth birthday’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B12. 28 PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3.; CT 45/6, 3 October 1921, p.14. 29 DB, 17 October 1892, p.2; Hawaiian Gazette, 25 October 1892, p.9; Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.522. 30 Silva, Noenoe K., Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism (Durham, NC, 2004), p.47. 31 Tate, Hawaiian Kingdom, p.114. 32 ‘Commerce and Industries of Hawaii’ in Reports from the Consuls of the United States xxxix/142 (July 1892), p.412. 33 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, pp.522–3. 34 ‘Queen Liliuokalani’s address at the biennial opening of the Hawaiian legislature’, PCA, 30 May 1892, p.2. 35 ‘An Agricultural Bureau’, PCA, 17 December 1892, p.2; Laws of Her Majesty Liliuokalani Queen of the Hawaiian Islands Passed by the Legislative Assembly at its Session 1892 (Honolulu, 1893), pp.238–41. 36 ‘Iaukea is doing it’, PCA, 15 February 1892, p.2; ‘Official Notice: Crown Lands for Lease on the Island of Hawaii’, PCA, 12 April 1892, p.2.

Notes 37

201

Quoted in Mellen, Kathleen Dickenson, An Island Kingdom Passes (New York, 1958), p.253. 38 ‘Homesteading: Part II’, PCA, 15 August 1891, p.3. 39 Loomis, Albertine, For Whom are the Stars: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Hawaii, 1893–1895 (Honolulu, 1976), p.6. 40 US Senate Subcommittee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., Hawiian Investigation: Part 1, Report on General Conditions in Hawaii (Washington, DC, 1902), p.83. 41 ‘Affidavit of John Emmeluth’, pp.418–20; PCA, 3 November 1900, p.4; PCA, 4 May 1901, p.4; PCA, 9 May 1901, p.4; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol. III,, pp.505, 518, 587. 42 Chapin, ‘Greek Royalists’, p.21; AH, Digital Collections, Government Office Holders, Hawaii National Guard – Commissions; ‘Kidwell is Captain no more: Sharpshooters met in regular session last night’, Hawaiian Gazette, 27 August 1895, p.1. 43 ‘The New Pineapple Plantation’, DB, 17 November 1892, p.3; Emmeluth, ‘Growing Pineapples’, p.88; McCandless, James Sutton, A Brief History of the McCandless Brothers and Their Part in the Development of Artesian Well Water of the Hawaiian Islands, 1880–1936 (Honolulu, 1936, p.74. 44 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, pp.522–3; PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3; ‘Hawaiian Pineapples: Something about a fine Industry: The extent of cultivation near Honolulu – An interesting talk with a leading grower’, Hawaiian Star, 2 May, 1893, p.5. 45 Emmeluth, ‘Growing Pineapples’, p.88. 46 ‘Whirled to Waianae’, Honolulu Independent, 3 July 1895, p.3; Yardley, Paul T., Millstones and Milestones: The Career of B.F. Dillingham, 1844–1918 (Honolulu, 1981), pp.184, 188–9. 47 Laws of Her Majesty Liliuokalani, pp.126–7; Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.525. 48 Kidwell, John, ‘The Cultivation of Pineapples in Hawaii’, Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 1/12 (1904), p.342. 49 PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3. 50 ‘Pineapple canning factory: Mr. Emmeluth has purchased a plant of the latest pattern’, Hawaiian Gazette, April 5, 1895, p.3. 51 PoP 10/10 (1897), p.147; PCA, 10 March 1897, p.9. 52 Marquès, ‘Pineapple Industry’, p.59. 53 Republic of Hawaii, Department of Foreign Affairs, The Hawaiian Islands: Their resources, agricultural, commercial and financial: Coffee, the coming staple product (Honolulu, 1896), p.14. 54 Marquès, Pineapple Industry, p.59. 55 Emmeluth, ‘Growing Pineapples’, p.88. 56 Webber, H.J., ‘The Pineapple Industry in the United States’ in US Dept. of Agriculture, Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture 1895 (Washington, DC, 1896), pp.269–70; ‘An Export Fallacy’, PCA, 20 August 1901, p.4. 57 Statutes at Large, ’24 July 1897’, p.172. 58 PCA, 20 August 1901, p.4; Kidwell, ‘Cultivation of pineapples’, p.342. 59 ‘Pineapples sold cheap: San Francisco is treated to a surprise: Gets one cargo at

202

60

61

62 63

64 65 66 67

A Pacific Industry

low rates, now cries for more’, PCA, 18 June 1903, p.3. This article appears to be about Kidwell’s business. PCA, 18 June 1903, p.3; Taylor, Frank J., and Earl M. Welty and David W. Eyre, From Land and Sea: The Story of Castle & Cooke of Hawaii (San Francisco, 1976), p.163; Morgan, J.P., ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry’, Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1918 44 (1917), p.36. PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B3; BMA/THD/CP, Manuscript Group 239/126/8, Pearl City Fruit Co. Minute Book August 1891–November 1905, (Stockholders’ Meeting, 23 September 1898), p.44; ‘How “Faith and Works” built an industry: Commercial and human side of Hawaii’s second major business, pineapples’, HSB Progress and Opportunity Edition, 20 October 1924, p.26. ‘Man who developed pines dies: Capt. John Kidwell, father of pineapple industry, is summoned’, HSB, 6 July 1922, pp.1, 10. ‘Emmeluth & Co.’, PoP 13/12 (1900), p.42; PCA, 21 May 1910, pp.1, 4; PCA, 9 February 1921, p.B12; ‘Pineapple stock deal: Davies & Co. in control of the Pearl City Fruit Co.’, PCA, 3 November 1905, p.14. PoP 10/10 (1897), p.147. Republic of Hawaii, Coffee, p.15. PCA, 10 March 1897, p.9. Gates, Paul W. (ed), California Ranchos and Farms 1846–1862: Including the Letters of John Quincy Adams Warren of 1861, Being Largely Devoted to Livestock, Wheat Farming, Fruit Raising, and the Wine Industry (Madison, 1967), pp.69– 74.

2: Pineapple Fever: 1989–1914 1

2 3 4

5

Vandercook, John W., King Cane: The Story of Sugar in Hawaii (New York, 1939); Kalanianaole, Jonah Kuhio, The Complaint of Hon. Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, Delegate in Congress from Hawaii, Against the Administration of Hon. Walter F. Frear, Governor of Hawaii (Washington, DC, 1911), p.2; Baker, Ray Stannard, ‘Wonderful Hawaii: A World Experiment Station: I: How King Sugar Rules in Hawaii’, American Magazine 73 (November 1911), pp.28–38. Sheridan, Sol N., ‘Small Farming Succeeds to a Demonstration’, PCA, 5 March 1905, pp.5–6. US Dept. of Agriculture, Farmers’ Bulletin No.140, Pineapple Growing (Washington, DC, 1901), p.14. Bryon Orlando Clark was born in Hartwick, Iowa on 24 May 1855. He spent 18 years of his life in Hawaii before returning to California where he died on 10 June 1929. Smith, Jared G., ‘Byron O. Clark’, HA, 27 June 1929, p.18; http://www. familysearch.org. US Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1901), pp.233–7; US Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., Immigration Into Hawaii (Washington, DC, 1921), p.16; Gill, Lorin Tarr, ‘Hawaiian Pineapples’, MidPacific Magazine xlv/1 (1933), p.51; Nedbalek, Lani, ‘The Pioneers of Wahiawa’, Honolulu Magazine (August 1984), pp.62–3; Commissioner of Public Lands, Diversified Industries of the Territory of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1903), pp.10–4;

Notes

203

Dole, James D., ‘Some Recollections of Twenty-Five Years of the Pineapple Industry’, Mid-Pacific Magazine xxxvii/5 (1929), pp.403–5; Dole, James D., ‘Clear Warning: Hawaii Faces Economic Tragedy’, HA, 18 August 1951, p.4. 6 Commissioner of Public Lands, Diversified Industries, p.17. 7 Clark, Byron O., ‘Pineapple Culture’, PoP 14/12 (1902), pp.34–5. 8 ‘Theory vs. Fact’, PCA, 19 August 1901, p.4. 9 ‘An Export Fallacy’, PCA, 20 August 1901, p.4. 10 PCA, 22 August 1901, p.4. 11 US Dept. of Labor, Report of the Commissioner of Labor Statistics on Labor Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii for the Year 1915 (Washington, DC, 1916), p.41. 12 US Reclamation Service, Hawaii, pp.41, 46–7. 13 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, pp.518–26; Baldwin, William A., A Brief History and Commentary on the Pineapple Industry of Maui, Hawaii (Wailuku, 1938), pp.8– 9; Nellist, George F. (ed.), The Story of Hawaii and Its Builders With Which is Incorporated Volume III Men of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1925), pp.253–4; ‘Pineapple Industry Is Important On Valley Isle’, Maui News Supplement: Haleakala Souvenir Edition, 23 February 1935, pp.13–4. 14 ‘Contour planting is practiced by the Kauai Fruit and Land Company and employes have many advantages’, PCA, 5 February 1921, p.P11; PCA, 3 November 1905, p.14. 15 ‘The Tropic Fruit Co.’, PCA, 2 July 1906, p.76. 16 These were known as sanitary hermetically closed jars. The inside of the tin cover (the only metal that could come into contact with the fruit) was coated with gold lacquer, which was guaranteed by the manufacturers to be acid proof and impervious to the action of all fruit juices. PCA, 2 July 1906, p.76. 17 PCA, 2 July 1906, p.76; ‘Survey of the Canned Pineapple Industry’, WCP 26/2 (1934), p.22; ‘Pineapple Progress’, PoP xix/11 (1906), p.12; Zavalla, Justo P., The Canning of Fruits and Vegetables (New York, 1916), p.63. 18 PCA, 2 July 1906, p.76; PoP xix/11 (1906), p.12. 19 US Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report of the Office of Experiment Stations for the Year Ended June 30, 1906 (Washington, DC, 1907), p.25; ‘Railroads encourage Hawaii’s new industry’, San Francisco Call, 9 August 1907, p.13; San Francisco Call, 29 January 1908, p.5; San Francisco Call, 25 June 1908, p.15. 20 Damon, Ethel M., Sanford Ballard Dole and his Hawaii (Palo Alto, 1957), p.348. 21 Dole, James D., ‘The Pineapple Industry’, in Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1904), pp.280–1. 22 Dole, Charles F., My Eighty Years (New York, 1927), pp.57, 187, 273–4, Dole, Richard and Elizabeth Dole Porteus, The Story of James Dole, 2nd ed. (Aiea, 1991), pp.19, 24; Taylor, Ernest H. (ed), The Story of Preserved Foods (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1921), p.166; Dole, James D., ‘The History of the Pineapple Industry from the Early Days’, PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. The most important details of Dole’s recollections in 1921 are corroborated in a pre-First World War newspaper article: ‘Fear pineapples may glut market’, PCA, 11 September 1913, p.9. The promotional literature read by Dole is almost certainly the following

204

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booklet issued in 1896 by the Republic of Hawaii’s Department of Foreign Affairs for potential investors. The agricultural section was written by Joseph Marsden: Republic of Hawaii, Coffee. 23 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 24 Dole, Eighty Years, pp.274, 423. 25 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.25. 26 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 27 Territory of Hawaii, Report of the Commission of Public Lands for the Year Ending December 31, 1900 (Honolulu, 1901), p.32; US Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1901), pp.237, 252–3; Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.25–7. 28 Agard, Louis K. Jr., Hawaii Sandalwood Trees: Politics and Hope (Honolulu, 1982), p.36. Dole was also appointed by his cousin to the Territorial Board of Agriculture and Forestry for one term, 1903–4. Fiftieth Anniversary Report of the Harvard Class of 1899 (Cambridge, MA, 1949), p.235. 29 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.35. 30 ‘The Big Dowsett Ranch’, PoP 14/12 (1901), p.60. 31 Jim Dole peddled pine stock just 40 years ago’, HSB, 29 August 1941, p.13; Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.35. 32 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.35–7; HSB, 29 August 1941, p.13. 33 Samuel Sussman was no stranger to America’s outlying territories. He was born in Germany in 1844. His father was a Californian pioneer. Sussman had spent many years in Alaska as an agent for the Alaska Commercial Co. from its foundation in 1868 and had run some of their trading posts, including the one at Kodiak. He was related to Louis Sloss, who was the principal owner of the Alaska Commercial Co. After Sussman had accumulated some capital he came to San Francisco, where he founded S & W with his brother-in-law, Samuel I. Wormser and Wormser’s cousin, Gustav Wormser, in 1896. He died on 31 August 1911. German-born Gustav Wormser succeeded Sussman as senior partner. University of California at Berkeley, Regional Cultural History Project, An Interview With Adrien J. Falk [Ms.] (Berkeley, 1955), pp.41, 81; CT 35/1, 1 September 1911, p.16; CT 44/29, 14 March 1921, p.12; Glanz, Rudolf, The Jews in American Alaska (1867–1880) (New York, 1953), pp.20, 40–1; Johnston, Samuel P. (ed), Alaska Commercial Company, 1868–1940 (San Francisco, 1940), pp.7, 15, 25; Meyer, Martin A., Western Jewry: An Account of the Achievements of the Jews and Judaism in California (San Francisco, 1916), p.11; Glanz, Rudolf, ‘The Jews in the Sandwich Islands’, Western States Jewish Historical Quarterly vi/3 (1974), pp.177–87; Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.40–42; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Minutes: 6 December 1901 to 2 May 1909, pp.11, 13. 34 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.40–42; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Minutes: December 6, 1901 to May 2, 1909, p.19. Joseph Hancock Hunt was born in California on 25 September 1864. In 1888 he started a small-scale canning venture on his father’s ranch near Sebastopol, California. A year later his younger brother, William Cunningham Hunt, built a small cannery in Sebastopol which was removed to Santa Rosa the following

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year. In 1890 the two brothers organized the Hunt Brothers Fruit Packing Co. which took over William’s cannery. The company was incorporated in 1896. After William’s death in 1897 Joseph assumed control of the business which had expanded with the growth of the Californian fruit canning industry. In March 1918 Joseph disposed of his controlling interest in Hunt Brothers. At that time the company was agent for the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. in both the United States and Canada. CT 41/30, 25 March 1918, p.38; http://www.usgennet.org/usa/ca/state1/ biographies/jhhunt.html 35 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.42. 36 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.42; PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 37 ‘Hawaii Will Supply Half Pineapple Demand in US’, PCA, 14 November 1905, p.1. 38 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.48. 39 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.50–51; ‘The OR&L Co. may build road to Wahiawa’, PCA, 26 October 1905, p.1; Yardley, Millstones and Milestones, pp.265–6, 282; Carriel, Cruse, ‘Chronology of the pineapple industry’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P2; ‘Big fruit cannery coming to Honolulu’, PCA, 10 December 1905, p.1; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Minutes: 6 December 1901 to 2 May 1909, pp.15, 69, 81; HA, 18 August 1951, p.4. 40 Matheson, Roderick O., ‘Enormous product of pineapples at Wahiawa’, PCA, 4 January 1908, p.4. 41 US Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1911), p.646; ‘World trade in pineapple due to cans’, HSB, 26 July 1934, p.10; Interview with Joseph W. Hartley, Jr., Chief Operating Officer of the Maui Land and Pineapple Company, Ltd., Kahului, Maui, 30 August 1984. 42 Judd, Lawrence M., Lawrence M. Judd and Hawaii: An Autobiography (Rutland, VT, 1971), pp.97, 125; ‘Star Bulletin to Build Unit for Lithograph’, HSB, 13 January 1926, pp.1–2; ‘Star-Bulletin Lithographing Plant Amazes’, HSB, 13 September 1930, p.2; University of California Regional Oral History Office – Bancroft Library/Berkeley, The Schmidt Lithograph Company, Volume II [Ms.] (Berkeley, 1969), pp.23–7, 146–7. 43 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.520. 44 ‘The pineapple question: Report of the annual meeting, Agricultural Society of Hilo’, Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 1/2 (1904), pp.45–6. 45 Blackford, Mansel G., The Politics of Business in California, 1890–1920 (Columbus, 1977), pp.13–39. 46 Braznell, William, California’s Finest: The History of Del Monte Corporation and the Del Monte Brand (San Francisco, 1982), p.29. 47 Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 1/2 (1904), pp.45–6. 48 BMA/THD&CP, Manuscript Group 239/126–8, Pearl City Fruit Co., Ltd. Minute Book, August 1891 to November 1905, (Board of Directors’ Meeting, 30 January 1897), p.33. 49 Emmeluth, John, ‘Co-operation in the pineapple industry’, Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 2/9 (1905), pp.251–4. 50 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 51 PCA, 4 January 1908, p.1.

206 52 53 54 55

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PCA, 4 January 1908, pp.1, 4. ‘Triumph of the pineapple’, PCA, 4 January 1908, p.4. PCA, 4 January 1908, p.4. Baumgartner, August C., ‘The Pineapple Industry and Its Growing Market’, PCA, 23 January 1908, p.2. 56 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 57 ‘The pineapple men organize: Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ Association is formed’, PCA, 8 May 1908, p.6. 58 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 59 Thomas, W.B., ‘Pineapple Industry’, PoP 21/12 (1908), p.45. 60 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 61 ‘Pineapple facts for many millions’, PCA, 22 December 1908, p.5; Laird, Pamela Walker, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore, 1998), pp.222, 284–8, 346–7. 62 Schwaab, Ernest F., The Secrets of Canning: A Complete Exposition of the Theory and Art of the Canning Industry (Baltimore, 1890), p.14. 63 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6; ‘It pays to advertise’, WCP 23/7, November 1931, p.10; Strasser, Susan, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass Market (New York, 1989), p.131. 64 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6; ‘Are Hawaiian pineapples too highly priced?’, PCA, 24 April 1909, p.5. The Bahamian product had averaged between 17¢ and 20¢ per can between 1899 and 1901. So the Hawaiian product was also expensive compared with the Bahamian product. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 October 1899, p.6; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 11 September 1900, p.5; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 22 September 1901, p.32. 65 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 66 PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6. 67 CT 33/34, 15 April 1910, p.14. 68 CT 34/11, 11 November 1910, p.15. 69 Schwaab, Secrets, pp.26–7; ‘Kilauea smokes visitors at Seattle Exposition’, PCA, 27 June 1909, pp.1, 8. 70 Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.523. 71 Statutes at Large, ’24 July 1897’, p.171. 72 US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 60th Cong., 2d. Sess, Tariff Hearings 1908–09, Vol.IV, Schedule G. Agricultural Products and Provisions (Washington, DC, 1909), pp.3888–91. 73 House of Representatives, Agricultural Products, pp.3891–2. 74 House of Representatives, Agricultural Products, pp.3892–7. 75 Under the Organic Act of 1900 Hawaii was allowed to elect one delegate to serve in the national House of Representatives for a two-year term. The Delegate had no vote. The Territory had neither a voice nor a vote in the national Senate. However, Hawaii was subject to all federal taxes, import duties, and other obligations which were imposed on the existing States. Bell, Last Among Equals, pp.39–42. 76 US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., Tariff Hearings 1908–09, Vol.VIII, Appendix (Washington, DC, 1909), pp.8112–3.

Notes 77 78

207

House of Representatives, Appendix, pp.8117–8. NA, RG233, Records of the US House of Representatives, H.R.61A-F48.1 (Schedule G)–6347, The Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Baltimore Canned Goods Exchange to the Chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, 29 March 1909. 79 Hawkins, ‘Baltimore Canning Industry’, pp.11–12. 80 House of Representatives, Appendix, pp.8117–8. 81 House of Representatives, Appendix, p.8118. 82 The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from March 1909 to March 1911, Vol.XXXVI, Part I, Chap. 6, An Act to Provide Revenue, Equalize Duties and Encourage Industries of the United States and for other Purposes [5 August 1909] (Washington, DC, 1911), p.38. 83 Congressional Record xliv/iv (1909), p.1217. 84 In 1926 the US Justice Department forced Swift to agree to divest itself of its non-meat affiliated food lines, that is to say its canning subsidiary, Libby, McNeill & Libby. The Story of a Pantry Shelf: An Outline History of Grocery Specialties (New York, 1925), p.155; LM&LAC, Section 1, Chronological Review of Libby Expansion in Hawaii 1909/1953, p.2; LM&LAC, Section 4, Management 1911–1953: General Plantations, Canneries, and Honolulu Office, p.17; Keuchel, Edward F. Jr., The Development of the Canning Industry in New York State to 1960, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1970, p.38; PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P2; Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, p.165; CT 34/24, 10 February 1911, p.14; CT 34/22, 27 January 1911, p.16; Meyer, Western Jewry, p.11; ‘Another big consolidation: Oahu’s two pineapple companies may merge under one management’, PCA, 19 September 1907, p.1; ‘Libby enters pine business’, PCA, 17 November 1910, p.1; CT 36/31, 30 March 1914, p.26; ‘Pineapple cannery completed: Will give work to 1000 Persons’, PCA, 1 July 1914, p.9. 85 See infra Figure 6.1. 86 CT 33/50, 5 August 1910, p.15; CT 34/27, 3 March 1911, p.16; HSB, 26 July 1934, p.10. The American Can Co. had been founded in 1901 as part of a consolidation of the can making industry. Robert Tynes Smith was the owner of one of the most important companies in the merger, the R. Tynes Smith Can Company of Baltimore. Earlier, in 1876, a predecessor company, Smith & Wicks of Baltimore, had founded a pineapple cannery subsidiary in the Bahamas in partnership with local businessmen. In 1892, the Bahamian company was acquired by American capital and reorganized as the New Jersey corporation, J.S. Johnson & Co. Smith retained an active interest in the company and, as shown above, defended its interests against those of the Hawaiian pineapple industry. Howard, George W., The Monumental City: Its Past History and Present Resources (Baltimore, 1889), pp. 797–800; ‘Formation of the can trust’, Washington Times, 3 April 1901, p.3; US House of Representatives, Committee on Waya and Means, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., Tariff Schedules Hearings, Vol. III, Schedules D,E, F, G and H (Washington, DC, 1913), p.2879; ‘Obituary: Mr. R. Tynes Smith’, Nassau Guardian, 7 February 1931, p.4.

208 87

88

89

90 91

92



93 94

95 96



97 98 99

A Pacific Industry

Jacobs was president of two Californian canning concerns, the Central California Canneries Co. and the California Canneries Co. The former became part of the California Packing Corporation in 1916 but the latter remained independent and Jacobs continued to serve as its president. ‘Kauai to have new cannery: Hawaiian Canneries Company with capitalization of $100,000 organized’, PCA, 24 July 1913, p.3. CT 36/51, 18 August 1913, p.30; CT 37/27, 2 March 1914, p.27; Simpich, Frederick Jr., Dynasty in the Pacific: 125 Years of American Factors (New York, 1974), pp.117–8; Nellist, Volume III Men of Hawaii, p.530; Nellist, George F. (ed.), Men of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1935), pp.235–7. Jacobs, Isidor, ‘The Rise and Progress of the Canning Industry in California’, in Arthur I. Judge (ed), A History of the Canning Industry (Baltimore, 1914), pp.38–9. US House of Representatives, Appendix (Washington, DC, 1909), p.8119. United Kingdom, Diplomatic and Consular Reports: No.5047, Report for the Year 1911–12 on the Trade and Commerce of the Territory of Hawaii (London, 1913), p.8; No.5253, Report for the Year 1912–13 on the Trade and Commerce of the Territory of Hawaii (London, 1914), pp.8–9; CT 36/8, 21 October 1912, p.30; CT 36/26, 24 February 1913, p.35; CT 36/37, 12 May 1913, p.32. The name of the organization caused confusion with the names of some of the members, in particular the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., and from 1915 an alternative unofficial name, Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Packers, was used in the advertisements. ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 9 October 1915, p.64. ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry’, CT 45/8, 17 October 1921, p.12; HSB Progress and Opportunity Edition, 20 October 1924, p.26. CT 36/33, 14 April 1913, p.36; CT 36/37, 12 May 1913, p.32; CT 37/50, 9 August 1915, p.32; ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 3 May 1913, p.36; ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 14 March 1914, p.31; ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 6 November 1915, p.55; ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Good Housekeeping, November 1916, p.220; ‘HPPA Advertisement’, Ladies’ Home Journal, February 1917, p.46; United Kingdom, Report No.5253, pp.8–9; United Kingdom, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No.5459, Report for the Year 1913–14 on the Trade and Commerce of the Territory of Hawaii (London, 1915), p.5; Fox, Stephen, The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising (London, 1990), pp.32–3; Hawaiian Pineapple Packers’ Association, How we serve canned pineapple: 2nd edition (Honolulu, 1914). PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P5–6; ‘Pineapple packers act on proof that it pays to advertise’, HSB, 8 February 1922, p.14. The total production for the continental United States was 78,557 cases. US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States: Vol.X, Manufactures 1909, Reports for Principal Industries (Washington, DC, 1913), p.396; ‘Short pineapple supply’, CT 34/11, 11 November 1910, p.23. ‘Defends Hawaiian pineapple’, CT 36/9, 28 October 1912, p.28. CT 35/51, 19 August 1912, p.11. CT 34/43, 23 June 1911, p.8; US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures 1914, Vol.I, Reports by States (Washington, DC, 1918),

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p.572; US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States: Vol.X, Manufactures 1919, Reports for Selected Industries (Washington, DC, 1923), p.73. 100 ‘Pineapples by the schooner load’, CT 36/40, 2 June 1913, p.26. 101 CT 34/11, 1 November 1910, p.23. 102 US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., Tariff Schedules Hearings, Vol.III, Schedules D, E, F, G and H (Washington, DC, 1913), pp.3146–7. 103 House of Representatives, Tariff Schedules Hearings, p.3148. 104 House of Representatives, Tariff Schedules Hearings, pp.2876–83. 105 The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from March 1913 to March 1915, Vol.XXXVIII, Part I, Chap.16, An Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenue for the Government, and for other Purposes [3 October 1913] (Washington, DC, 1915), p.134; Robertson, Ross M., History of the American Economy, 3rd ed (New York, 1973), p.371. 106 Galbraith, John Kenneth, The New Industrial State (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp.272–4. 107 Waller-Zuckerman, Mary Ellen, ‘Marketing the Women’s Journals, 1873– 1900’, Business and Economic History 18 (1989), p.105; Survey 1934. 108 Limerick, Patricia Nelson, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York, 1987), pp.17–18. 109 Fox, Mirror Makers, p.38. 110 MacCurdy, Rahno Mabel, The History of the California Fruit Growers Exchange (Los Angeles, 1925), pp.59–64; Sackman, Douglas Cazaux, Orange Empire: California and the Fruits of Eden (Berkeley, 2005), p.104. 111 Kessler-Harris, Alice, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (New York, 1983), pp.112–3. 112 Galambos, Louis, and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth: United States Business and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1988), pp.92–9. 113 Lazonick, William, William Mass and Jonathan West, ‘Strategy, Structure, and Performance: Comparative-Historical Foundations of the Theory of Competitive Advantage’ in Mila Davids, Ferry de Goey and Dirk de Wit (eds), Proceedings of the Conference on Business History, October 24 and 25, 1994 (Rotterdam, 1995), p.295. 114 US Dept. of Agriculture, Division of Pomology, Bulletin No.1, Report on the Condition of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Fruits in 1887 (Washington, DC, 1891), pp.7–8; US Dept. of Agriculture, Yearbook 1895, p.270; ‘Florida Pineapple Industry Is Dying: Cold Weather Is Wiping It Out; Some Growers Erect Sheds Over Their Fields’, PCA, 30 September 1918, p.5; Collins, J.L., The Pineapple: Botany, Cultivation, and Utilization (New York, 1960), p.184; US Dept. of Agriculture, Farmers Bulletin No.1237, Pineapple Culture in Florida (Washington, DC, 1921), pp.4–5; Samuel Proctor, ‘The Early Years of the Florida Experiment Station, 1888–1906’, Agricultural History 36/4 (1962), p.217. 115 Cramer, Gail L., and Clarence W. Jensen, Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness: An Introduction (New York, 1979), p.61.

210

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1

Levenstein, Harvey A., Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet (New York, 1988), pp.152, 162–4. 2 Tedlow, New and Improved, p.14. 3 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 4 CT 37/3, 14 September 1914, p.24. 5 CT 36/38, 18 May 1914, p.26. 6 CT 36/51, 17 August 1914, p.24. 7 CT 37/20, 11 January 1915, p.32. 8 CT 37/24, 8 February 1915, p.38. 9 Taylor, A.P., ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Prospects’, Daily Consular and Trade Reports 3/29, 4 February 1916, pp.492–3; NA, RG122, Records of the Federal Trade Commission, General Records 1914–21, Food Investigation: Hawaiian Pineapple Industry, Correspondence, Reports, e.t.c., Files 9385/24/1–7, 30 June 1917. 10 ‘Pineapple Survey’, WCP 26/2, June 1934, p.28. 11 CT 37/49, 2 August 1915, p.32; Greenhalgh, Paul, Ephemeral vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World’s Fairs, 1851–1939 (Manchester, 1988), pp.28, 46–7, 128. 12 ‘Hawaiian pineapple has day at exposition’, SFC, 11 November 1915, p.9. 13 ‘Pineapple Day’, CT 38/13, 22 November 1915, p.19. 14 Taylor, ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Prospects’, pp.492–3. 15 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 16 Taylor, A.P., ‘Reduced Pack of Hawaiian Pineapples’, Daily Consular and Trade Reports 3/32, 6 June 1916, p.882. 17 CT 38/52, 21 August 1916, p.22. 18 ‘Great merger of packers is being formed to economize: Hawaiian Pineapple Company reported negotiating to combine with immense Coast interests to centralize distribution’, PCA, 17 August 1916, p.1. 19 Braznell, California’s Finest, pp.35–7. 20 CT 39/26, 19 February 1917, p.31. 21 Morgan, ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry’, pp.42–3. 22 Castle & Cooke Inc. Archives, Memorandum from James D. Dole Regarding the Hawaiian Pineapple Company’s Freight Contract with the Isthmian Line of 1931, 26 January 1934, p.1; Chapman, Royal N., Cooperation in the Hawaiian Pineapple Business (New York, 1933), p.10. 23 House of Representatives, Agricultural Products, p.3896. 24 Dole, Memorandum, p.1. 25 CT 38/26, 21 February 1916, p.31. 26 Dole, Memorandum, p.10; ‘Glut in freight to Coast is bad’, PCA, 17 March 1916, p.5. 27 CT 38/29, 13 March 1916, p.24. 28 Chapman, Cooperation, p.10. 29 Taylor, A.P., ‘Pineapple Growers in Hawaii Get Contract’, Daily Consular and Trade Reports 4/209, 7 September 1917, p.911. 30 CT 41/32, 9 April 1918, p.12. 31 CT 41/33, 15 April 1918, p.12.

Notes 32

211

‘All records broken for output by pineapple company’, PCA, 6 August 1918, p.4. 33 Hoshino, Saki, The Canning Industry of Japan (Tokyo, 1940), p.2. Furthermore, as R.W. van Deusen, president of the Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., pointed out, the purchases of the Army Commissary Dept. resulted in many people in France, Belgium and Great Britain becoming acquainted with canned pineapple for the first time. This led to an increase in demand for canned pineapple in these countries. CT 43/39, 24 May 1920, p.36. 34 ‘Two canneries on Oahu operated by Libby, M’Neill & Libby; Honolulu’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P12. 35 ‘Eames cannery now in merger: California packers take over one more pineapple plant on half million basis’, PCA, 23 May 1917, p.7; ‘California Packing Corporation – Acquisition’, CFC 104, 16 June 1917, p.2454. 36 CT 42/6, 7 October 1918, p.12. 37 CT 43/2, 8 September 1919, p.12. 38 After Baumgartner’s death on 1 August 1921 he was replaced by Harry E. MacConnaughey as San Francisco sales manager. UHM, DCA, Minutes – Board of Directors’ Meetings of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 January 1917 to 15 January 1929: (I) 1917–1923, pp.152; CT 45/4, 19 September 1921, p.16. 39 ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Company Ltd., San Francisco’, CT 42/52, 25 August 1919, p.12. 40 Congressional Record, lix/6, 24 April 1920, pp.6109–11. 41 ‘Pineapple packer replies effectively to profiteering charge’, CT 43/13, 21 June 1920, p.38. 42 Dole, Eighty Years, p.433. 43 CT 42/52, 25 August 1919, p.14. 44 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 45 CT 44/11, 8 November 1920, p.20. 46 ‘Pineapple packers send committee to coast on publicity’, HSB, 8 March 1921, p.2. 47 ‘Pine packers elect new members’, HSB, 14 April 1921, p.8. 48 ‘The romance of the pineapple’, HSB, 2 July 1921, p.B1; ‘Advertising spurs demand for Hawaii canned pineapples’, HSB, July 16, 1921, p.11; HSB, 8 February 1922, p.1; Sackman, Orange Empire, pp.98–99. 49 ‘Business prospect is brighter, says packing co. head’, HSB, 20 February 1922, p.8. 50 HSB, 14 March 1921, p.8. 51 ‘Hawaiian Canners’ Society Organized’, HSB, 4 June 1921, p.12. 52 Chapman, Cooperation, p.9; HSB Progress and Opportunity Edition, 20 October 1924, p.26. 53 US Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on the Proposed Tariff Act of 1921, Vol.4 (revised and indexed) (Washington, DC, 1922), pp.3105–7. 54 US Senate, Tariff Act of 1921, p.3107. 55 US Senate, Tariff Act of 1921, p.3105. 56 US Senate, Tariff Act of 1921, pp.3107–8.

212 57

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US Dept. of State, The Statutes at Large of the United States from April 1921 to March 1923, Vol.XLII, Part I, Chap.356, An Act to Provide Revenue to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Countries and to Encourage the Industries of the United States and for other Purposes [21 September 1922] (Washington, DC, 1923), p.894. 58 Robertson, American Economy, p.663. 59 ‘Pineapple canners to launch nation-wide advertising campaign’, HSB, 29 March 1922, p.10; ‘Advertised by our pineapple men’, HSB, 3 July 1922, p.7. 60 Fox, Mirror Makers, pp.84–5. 61 DCAH, Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Canners’ Analysis of 1922–23 Cooperative Advertising Campaign. 62 HSB, 29 March 1922, p.10; Judd, Lawrence M., ‘Selling Hawaiian Pineapple’, Proceedings of the Third Annual Short Course in Pineapple Production, 26–9 March 1924 (Honolulu, 1924), p.137; HSB Progress and Opportunity Edition, 20 October 1924, p.26; ‘Hawaiian pineapple campaign’, WCP 20/3, July 1928, p.28; Coulter, John Wesley, ‘Pineapple industry in Hawaii’, Economic Geography 10/3 (1934), p.292; ‘Pineapple advertising campaign launched’, WCP 27/5, September 1935, p.5. 63 Havighorst, C.R., ‘How Dole built marketing leadership’, Food Industries 21/6 (1949), pp.76–7. 64 Dean, Arthur L., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., and the Predecessor Partnerships (Honolulu, 1950), pp.141–2, 172–80. 65 CT 36/35, 28 April 1913, p.26; CT 37/41, 7 June 1915, p.34; ‘Mr. Haserot enters pineapple canning’, CT 37/47, 12 July 1915, p.6; CT 42/47, 21 July 1919, p.14; Coates, William R., A History of Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland (Chicago and New York, 1924), pp.174–5; Simpich, Dynasty in the Pacific, pp.117–8; ‘Kauai canneries firm going out of business’, HSB, 27 January 1960, p.A-7; ‘Kauai canneries to close’, HA, 27 January 1960, pp.A1–4. 66 Havighorst, ‘Marketing leadership’, p.77; Hawaiian Pineapple Company, A Great American Industry (Honolulu, 1924), p.6; ‘Dole in big campaign of advertising’, HA, 13 April 1927, pp.1, 12. 67 ‘“Pineapple” Dole puts up $35,000 in prizes for first flights to Hawaii’, PoP 40/6, June 1927, p.25; Rasmussen, C., ‘Pacific quest brought dark days for aviation’, Los Angeles Times, 12 October 1997, p.B3. 68 ‘Poor advertising for Hawaii’, Weekly Times, 3 September 1927, p.5. 69 Thurston, Lorrin A., ‘James D. Dole and the Tourist Bureau’, HA, 5 April 1927, pp.1–2; Marquès, L’Ananas, p.46; Fukunaga, Kona District Fair, p.87. 70 Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.9–10; UHM, DCA, Minutes – Board of Directors’ Meetings of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 January 1917 to 15 January 1929, p.222. 71 ‘Dole defines H.P. policy on C.P.C. offers’, HSB, 20 August 1928, p.1. 72 As quoted in Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.10. 73 Havighorst, ‘Marketing leadership’, p.77. 74 ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co. uses newspaper ads.’, WCP 22/7, October 1930, p.16. 75 ‘New era ahead for pineapples’, Hawaiian Gazette, 14 October 1910, p.3; ‘The centennial of the J. Walter Thompson Company: Commemorating 100 years of American advertising’, Advertising Age 35/49:2 (1964), pp.60–2; ‘It pays to advertise’, WCP 23/7, November 1931, p.10.

Notes 76

77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89

90 91

92 93

94

213

‘Calpak: The adventures of Del Monte brand’, Fortune 18/11 (1938), p.81; Fitzgerald, Philip J., California Packing Corporation: A Study of Impressive Progress (San Francisco, 1950), pp.14–6; CT 39/32, 2 April 1917, p.25; WCP 23/7, November 1931, p.10; Eames, Alfred W. Jr. and Richard G. Landis, ‘The Business of Feeding People’: The Story of Del Monte Corporation (New York, 1974), p.9; Alter, Stewart, Truth Well Told: McCann-Erickson and the Pioneering of Global Advertising (New York, 1995), pp.27, 54, 67–8; Hine, Thomas, The Total Package: The Evolution and Secret Meanings of Boxes, Bottles, Cans, and Tubes (Boston, 1995), pp.83–4, 86–7. ‘Hawaii unable to fill demand for pineapples’, HSB, 24 July 1929, p.1. WCP 23/6, October 1931, p.36. ‘Pineapple producers in $280,000 drive to market crop’, HSB, 16 July 1931, p.1; ‘Association will advertise pineapple’, WCP 23/4, August 1931, p.36. ‘Honolulu C.C. defers fruit tariff action: Proposal to boost rates on canned pineapples is causing debate’, SFC, 4 June 1929, p.26. US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings on Tariff Readjustment 1929, Vol.VII, Schedule 7, Agricultural Products and Provisions (Washington, DC, 1929), pp.4623–4. House of Representatives, Tariff Readjustment, p.4624. House of Representatives, Tariff Readjustment, pp.407–10, 442. US Dept. of State, The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from April 1929 to March 1930, Vol.XLVI, Part I, Chap.497, An Act to Provide Revenue, to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Countries, to Encourage Commerce with Foreign Countries, to Encourage the Industries of the United States, to Protect American Labor, and for other Purposes [17 June 1930] (Washington, DC, 1931), p.636; Robertson, American Economy, p.663. Hughes, H.M., ‘Wholesaler’s opinion of jobbers’ brands’, CT 38/4, 20 September 1915, p.18. US Federal Trade Commission, Chain Stores: Growth and Development of Chain Stores (Washington, DC, 1932), p.41. US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census: 1930– Distribution, Vol.1, Retail Distribution, Part I (Washington, DC, 1933), p.71. US Federal Trade Commission, Chain Stores: Chain Store Private Brands (Washington, DC, 1933), p.xiv. US Federal Trade Commission, Chain Stores: Prices and Margins of Chain and Independent Distributors, Washington DC–Grocery (Washington, DC, 1933), p.68. Federal Trade Commission, Private Brands, p.93. Albion, Mark S., and Paul W. Farris, The Advertising Controversy: Evidence on the Economic Effects of Advertising (Boston, 1981), pp.87–97; Connor, John M., and Robert L. Willis, ‘Marketing and Market Structure of the US Food Processing Industries’ in Chester O. McCorkle, Jr. (ed), Economics of Food Processing in the United States (San Diego, 1988), 158–61. Federal Trade Commission, Private Brands, p.xiv. US Federal Trade Commission, Chain Stores: Quality of Canned Vegetables and Fruits (Under Brands of Manufacturers, Chains, and Other Distributors (Washington, DC, 1933), pp.39–41. Federal Trade Commission, Prices and Margins, p.68.

214

A Pacific Industry 4: The Octopus Strikes Back: 1931–1941

1

Levenstein, Harvey A., Paradox of Plenty: A Social History of Eating in Modern America (New York, 1993), pp.9–16, 24–5, 32–3. 2 Mountain, H.A., ‘Unemployment Relief in Hawaii’, The Friend 103/4 (1933), p.81; Johnson, Donald D., The City and County of Honolulu: A Government Chronicle (Honolulu, 1991), p.125. 3 Kent, Noel J., Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence (Honolulu, 1993), pp.69–91. 4 Schmitt, Robert C., ‘Unemployment Rates in Hawaii During the 1930’s’, HJH 12 (1976), p.94; NA, RG9, Records of the National Recovery Administration, 8410/E39, Report of the Legal Adviser (R.E. Elwell) on Status of Proposed Codes and Administration of the N.R.A. in the Territory of Hawaii, 1934, p.20; US Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Vol. I (Washington, DC, 1975), p.135; US Dept. of Labor, Labor in the Territory of Hawaii, 1939 (Washington, DC, 1940), pp.16, 20. 5 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 6 The Kauai Pineapple Co. was the former Kauai Fruit & Land Co. ‘Canneries lay off Kauai men’, HSB, 24 September 1931, p.7; ‘Pineapple prices are sharply cut’, WCP 23/7, November 1931, p.36; ‘Pineapples lead canned fruit trade’, HA, 1 January 1932, p.1; Dean, Arthur L., ‘Into the Depression and Out’, Hawaiian Annual for 1938, (1938), p.90. 7 CFC 132, 4 April 1931, p.2595. 8 CFC 133, 14 November 1931, p.3263. 9 DCAH, Memorandum from James D. Dole Regarding Hawaiian Pineapple Company’s Freight Contract with the Isthmian Line of 1931, 26 January 1934, pp.2–7. 10 US Dept. of War, Army Corps of Engineers and United States Shipping Board, Port Series No.17, The Ports of the Territory of Hawaii (Washington DC, 1926), pp.82–91. 11 DCAH, Memorandum, pp.2–7; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932 and Stockholders’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 13 March 1932, p.130. 12 DCAH, Memorandum, pp.2–7; ‘Hawaiian pines obtains lower freight rates’, HSB, 27 May 1931, pp.1, 6; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932 and Stockholders’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 13 March 1932, p.130. 13 ‘Routing explained: Dole says economic problem solved by direct shipment to New York’, WCP 23/4, August 1931, p.36. 14 Makino’s Hawaii Hochi had introduced an English language section in 1925 called the Bee for its sting. Chapin, Helen G., Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawai’i (Honolulu, 1996), p.144. 15 ‘The freight rate war’, Hawaii Hochi, 4 June 1931, pp.1–2. 16 Fuchs, Lawrence H., Hawaii Pono: A Social History (New York, 1964), pp.241– 2. 17 US Maritime Commission, Decisions, Vol.1, No.465, Dollar-Matson Agreements No.1253 and 1253–1: Decided 17 August 1938 (Washington, DC, 1942), pp.750–9.

Notes 18 DCAH, Memorandum, pp.2–7. 19 CFC 134, 19 March 1932, p.2159;

215

‘Growth of Hawaiian Pineapple Co. outlined’, SFC, 22 April 1931, p.15; ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd.- Plans reorganization’, CFC 135, 22 October 1932, p.2839; ‘Richards at the helm’, WCP, Vol.24, No.8, December 1932, p.18. 20 Nellist, Men of Hawaii, p.366. 21 ‘Deflating Hawaiian Pines’, Hawaii Hochi, 21 December 1932, pp.1–2. 22 Perhaps he had been misguided by the success of Libby against the Oahu Railway & Land Co. in 1930. The Interstate Commerce Commission had ruled that the railway’s carload rate from the wharves at Honolulu to the Libby cannery was unreasonable and unduly prejudicial. United States Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, Vol.163, Case No.22409: Libby, McNeill & Libby (of Honolulu), Limited, v. Oahu Railway & Land Company (Washington, DC, 1930), pp.61–2. 23 DCAH, Memorandum, pp.7–8. 24 Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, p.170; UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932 and Stockholders’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 13 March 1932, p.285. 25 Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, p.170. 26 Tilton, Cecil G., The History of Banking in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1927), pp.65–7; Moody’s Manual of Investments, Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Trusts and Real Estate Finance and Credit Companies (New York, 1931), pp.1066, 1495. 27 CFC 135, 22 October 1932, p.2839. 28 UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Company: Minutes: Board of Directors’ Meetings, 30 December 1932–27 December 1934, p.176; UHM, DCA, Minutes Board of Directors, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 7 October 1941 to 28 December 1943, pp.175–86. 29 ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd. – Reorganization plan’, CFC 135, 3 December 1932, p.3864. 30 BMA/THD&CP, Ms. Group 239/101–5, Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., Correspondence Reports, 1939–42, Atherton Richards to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Board of Directors, Letter No.2, 11 July 1942. 31 BMA/THD&CP, Ms. Group 239/101–5, Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., Correspondence Reports, 1939–42, Atherton Richards to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Board of Directors, Letter No.1, 11 July 1942. 32 ‘Hawn. Pines to place Hoolehau land in cultivation’, HA, 22 August 1940, p.1. 33 Richards, Atherton, A Memorandum to the Stockholders of Castle & Cooke, Limited (Honolulu, 1940). 34 ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co. plans to abandon land on Molokai’, HA, 20 September 1940, p.1. 35 Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, pp.172–7. 36 ‘Richards out as HP Head; White named’, HSB, 28 April 1941, p.1. 37 ‘Hawaiian Pine directors tell why Atherton Richards was dismissed’, HA, 22 August 1941, p.1. 38 HA, 22 August 1941, p.1. 39 US Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Governor of Hawaii for 1932 (Washington,

216

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DC, 1932), p.11; California Packing Corporation, Eighteenth Annual Report (San Francisco, 1934), pp.10–11. 40 EMBCDFN 2/6, October 1932, pp.15–6. The full text of the agreement can be found in the following article: ‘Pineapple details given’, WCP 24/6, October 1932, pp.9–10; HSB, 24 February 1933, p.1. A detailed account of the background to the Capper-Volstead Act can be found in Saker’s Ph.D. thesis on the Californian raisin industry: Saker, Victoria A., Benevolent Monopoly: The Legal Transformation of Agricultural Cooperation, 1890–1943, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1990, pp.134–57. 41 EMBCDFN 2/5, September 1932, p.17. The Canners’ League of California, the PPCA’s sister organization, had been founded in 1905. Jacobs, ‘Canning Industry in California’, p.25. 42 EMBCDFN 2/3, July 1932, p.16; EMBCDFN 2/4, August 1932, p.16; EMBCDFN 2/7, November 1932, p.15; EMBCDFN 3/4, August 1933, p.23. 43 ‘Million dollar advertising campaign for canned pineapple’, Fruit Products Journal 12/4 (1932), pp.99–100; ‘Nationwide advertising for pineapple producers’, WCP 24/8, December 1932, p.12; Silva, Jonathan, ‘The Marketing Complex: The J. Walter Thompson Company, 1916–1929’, Essays in Economic and Business History 14 (1996), p.214. 44 DCAH, PPCA/JWT Newsflashes, 1932–33 Advertising Campaign, 16 November 1932, pp.1–2; DU/HC, J. Walter Thompson Archives, Market Research Reports, Reel 197, Marketing Research Reports, Reel 147, Pineapple Producers Cooperative Ass’n., Ltd.: Report for Year Ending 1 June 1934 & Recommendations for 1934–35 Pack Year, 1 July 1934, pp.36–9; Killian, John A., The Nutritional Value of Canned Pineapple (San Francisco, 1933). 45 DCAH, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1932–33 Advertising Campaign, No.8, 3 April 1933, p.1. 46 DCAH, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.3, 22 December 1932, p.4. 47 ‘Pineapple ad campaign gets sales increase’, HSB, 24 February 1933, pp.1, 3; DCAH, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.4, 10 January 1933, p.1; ‘Pineapple campaign a lively one’, WCP 24/10, February 1933, p.30; DCAH, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.6, 1 March 1933, p.1; ‘Advertising going into third wave’, WCP 25/1, May 1933, p.30. 48 DCAH, PPCA/JWT News Flashes, 1933 Advertising Campaign, No.9, 19 April 1933, p.1; WCP 25/1, May 1933, p.30. 49 ‘Carryover stocks below 2,000,000’, WCP 25/3, July 1933, p.30. 50 DU/HC, JWT Archives, Market Research Reports, Reel 197, Report on wholesale and retail sales movement of pineapple for half year ending 1 January 1934. 51 ‘Pineapple producers sign new advertising contract’, HA, 11 September 1935, p.15. 52 EMBCDFN 2/12, April 1933, p.16.

Notes

217

53 PGAHA, An Analysis of the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association, Limited,

December 1939, pp.19–20. ‘Waterhouse president, Pineapple producers choose new leader and enlarge their activities’, WCP 25/3, July 1933, p.30; US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1939, p.85. 55 ‘Pack on unit basis’, WCP 25/4, August 1933, p.24; EMBCDFN 4/3, July 1934, p.20; ‘New pineapple advertising’, WCP 25/7, November 1933, p.28; Pease, Otis, The Responsibilities of American Advertising: Private Control and Public Influence, 1920–1940 (New Haven, 1958), pp.94–5; DU/HC, J. Walter Thompson Archives, Marketing Research Reports, Reel 197, The Nutritional Value of Canned Pineapple, March 1933; Sackman, Orange Empire, pp.101–14. 56 Levenstein, Revolution at the Table, p.163. 57 DCAH, PPCA/JWT  News Flashes, 1934 Advertising Campaign 2/5, 1 June 1934, pp.1–3, 6; ‘Campaign for canned pineapple’, Fruit Products Journal 13/10 (1934), p.313. 58 See infra Appendix, Tables 2 and 3. 59 DU/HC, JWT Archives, Market Research Reports, Reel 197, Pineapple adv.: 1934. 1935., August 1934. 60 Stole, Inger J., Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public Relations in the 1930s (Urbana and Chicago, 2006), pp.49–158; Witkowski, Terry H., ‘Promise them anything: A cultural history of cigarette advertising health claims’, Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising 13/2 (1991), pp.400, 402–3. 61 PGAHA, An Analysis, p.33; ‘Pineapple producers sign new advertising contract’, HA, 11 September 1935, p.15; Marchand, Roland, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940 (Berkeley, 1985), p.287; Fox, Mirror Makers, pp.118–26. 62 ‘Pineapple advertising campaign launched’, WCP 27/5, September 1935, p.5. 63 ‘PPCA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 16 November 1935, p.97; ‘PPCA Advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 23 November 1935, p.80. 64 ‘New pineapple campaign’, WCP 28/6, October 1936, p.31; ‘New high mark in pineapple consumption’, WCP 29/8, August 1937, p.9. 65 See infra Appendix, Tables 1, 2 and 3. 66 See Figure 4–1. 67 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Economy of Hawaii in 1947: With Special Reference to Wages, Working Conditions, and Industrial Relations (Washington, DC, 1948), p.76. 68 PGAHA, An Analysis, p.33. 69 US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939 (Washington, DC, 1939), p.4; Hawkins, Richard A., ‘The pineapple canning industry during the world depression of the 1930s’, Business History 31/4 (1989), p.61. 70 Dept. of the Interior, Hawaii Annual Report 1939, p.4. 71 Hawkins, ‘World depression’, p.61. 72 See infra Appendix, Tables 2 and 3; ‘Pine shipments high’, WCP 33/13, December 1941, p.15. 73 ‘Canned pineapple and pineapple juice’, WCP 33/5, 30 April 1941, p.131. 54

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74 BMA/THD&CP, Letter No.2; PGAHA, An Analysis, pp.43–4. 75 PGAHA, An Analysis, pp.67–75. 76 PGAHA, Memorandum on Warehousing, 5 February 1940, p.7. 77 ‘Hawn. Pine to withdraw from PPCA’, HSB, 1 June 1943,

p.4; ‘Two new organizations formed by Hawaiian pineapple industry’, HSB, 1 March 1944, p.2. 78 Tressler, Donald K. and Maynard A. Joslyn, The Chemistry and Technology of Fruit and Vegetable Juice Production (New York, 1954), pp.338–9. 79 Imperial Bureau of Horticulture and Plantation Crops, Technical Communication No.11, Fruit Juices and Related Products [by Vernon L.S. Charley and Travis H.J. Harrison] (East Maling, 1939), pp.11–14; Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics Vol.I, p.330. 80 Imperial Bureau, Fruit Juices, p.11; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, 11; ‘WCP Product Survey No.11, Canned and bottled fruit juices’, WCP 28/4, October 1936, p.11. 81 Imperial Bureau, Fruit Juices, pp.9–10. 82 WCP 28/4, October 1936, pp.11–12; Woolrich, Willis R., ‘The History of Refrigeration: 220 Years of Mechanical and Chemical Cold: 1748–1968’, ASHRAE Journal 11/7 (1969), p.38. 83 Imperial Economic Committee, 32nd Report, A Survey of the Trade in Canned Fruit (London, 1939), p.48. 84 Steadman, A.E., ‘Canning of Grapefruit and Grapefruit Juice’, Tin, October 1934, pp.6–9; Tressler, Donald K., Maynard A. Joslyn and George L. Marsh, Fruit and Vegetable Juices (New York, 1939), pp.1, 174. 85 See infra Appendix, Tables 4, 2 and 3. 86 ‘Pineapple juice advertiser’, WCP 25/5, September 1933, p.33; 1933: A Century of Progress: Chicago: Official Guide Book of the Fair (Chicago, 1933), pp.171, 187. 87 ‘Libby’s pineapple juice advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 14 October 1933, p.28. 88 ‘Libby’s pineapple juice advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 12 October 1935, p.57. 89 WCP 28/4, October 1936, p.28. 90 ‘Del Monte pineapple juice advertisement’, Saturday Evening Post, 11 January 1936, p.73. 91 Fitzgerald, California Packing Corporation, p.17. 92 Fitzgerald, California Packing Corporation, p.17; Braznell, California’s Finest, pp.76, 92; ‘Calpak: The Adventures of Del Monte Brand’, Fortune 18/11 (1938), p.80. 93 Tedlow, New and Improved, pp.226–33, 238. 94 Carsky, Mary L., Roger A. Dickenson, and Charles R. Canedy III,, ‘The revolution of quality in consumer goods’, Journal of Macromarketing 18/2 (1998), p.134. 95 Koehn, Nancy F., ‘Henry Heinz and brand creation in the late nineteenth century: Making markets for processed food’, Business History Review 73/3 (1999), pp.349–93. 96 Olins, Wally, ‘How brands are taking over the corporation’ in Majken Schultz,

Notes

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Mary Jo Hatch, and Mogens Holten Larsen (eds), Expressive Organization: Linking Identity, Reputation, and the Corporate Brand (Oxford, 2000), p.49. 97 Keith, Robert J., ‘The Marketing Revolution’, Journal of Marketing 24/3 (1960), pp.35–6. 98 Taylor, Frank J., ‘The billion-dollar rainbow’, Advertising Agency and Advertising & Selling 47/48 (1954), p.73; Havighorst, ‘Marketing Leadership’, pp.188–90. 99 Fortune 18/11 (1938), p.104. 100 CT 35/13, 24 November 1911, p.3; ‘Sees possibility of juice outselling all other pineapple items’, The Canner 76/15, 25 March 1933, p.14; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, p.338; Wilcox, Earley Vernon, Tropical Agriculture (New York, 1916), p.100; ‘Advertisement for “Dole’s Pure Hawaiian Pineapple Juice”’, Ladies’ Home Journal, 1 October 1910, p.82. 101 ‘Suggestive of Walter Chrysler’s Advice’, The Canner, 14 October 1933, p.9; Havighorst, ‘Marketing Leadership’, pp.188–90; ‘Pine co. buys big ad space’, HSB, 7 January 1938, p.12. 102 NA, RG9, Series 37, Memorandum from Frederick Simpich, High Spots of the NRA in Hawaii, January 31, 1936, p.1; NA, RG9, Series 626, 076.111, Report on Survey of Cannery Wages by Research and Planning Division of the NRA in the Territory of Hawaii, c.1935, pp.1–3. 103 Saturday Evening Post, 14 October 1933, p.28; ‘Del Monte peaches advertisement’, McCalls, May 1934, p.77. 104 Chain Store Age: Grocery Managers Edition, June 1936, p.7. 105 Fox, Mirror Makers, p.70. 106 Hower, Ralph M., The History of an Advertising Agency: N.W. Ayer & Son at Work, 1869–1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1949), pp.147–9. 107 Hower, Advertising Agency, p.148; Pollay, Richard W., ‘The subsiding sizzle: A descriptive history of print advertising, 1900–1980’, Journal of Marketing 49/3 (1985), pp.31–2. 108 Biddle, George, ‘Can artists make a living?: How the market for art is changing’, Harper’s Magazine, September 1941, p.401; Taylor, ‘Billion-dollar rainbow’, p.73; ‘Hawn. Pineapple Co. wins awards for advertising art’, HSB, 5 April 1940, p.8; Marchand, American Dream, p.28; Olins, Wally, Corporate Identity: Making Business Strategy Visible Through Design (London, 1989), p.51; Saville, Jennifer, Georgia O’Keeffe: Paintings of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1990), p.12. 109 Robinson, Roxana, Georgia O’Keeffe: A Life (New York, 1989), p.427. 110 ‘Pineapple for papaya’, Time [Online], 12 February 1940. 111 ‘Hawaiian Pines ads will feature color photos’, HSB, 10 September 1938, p.10; ‘New technique in color photos for Hawn. Pines’, HSB, 26 November 1938, p.12; ‘Famed camera artist coming for Hawn. Pines’, HSB, 20 December 1938, p.7; Fox, Mirror Makers, pp.70–1. 112 UHM, DCA, Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932 and Stockholders’ Meetings 28 February 1929 to 13 March 1932, p.226; UHM, DCA, Minutes: Board of Directors, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 June 1937 to 29 August 1939, pp.235, 239. 113 WCP 23/7, November 1931, p.10. 114 Hower, Advertising Agency, p.136. 115 ‘Campbell Soup on air this fall with ‘Hollywood Hotel’, The Canner, 7 July

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1934, p.10; ‘Hawaiian Pine has plans for radio campaign’, HSB, 23 November 1938, p.17; ‘Hawn. Pine radio program to go over 63 CBS radio stations’, HSB, 25 November 1938, p.14; ‘Phil Baker is signed for Hawaiian Pines programs’, HSB, 6 December 1938, p.15; ‘David Kaonohi, Honoluluan, to play on pine program’, HSB, 11 January 1939, p.3; ‘Delegate King will open Hawaiian Pine program’, HSB, 13 January 1939, p.2; ‘Hawaiian Pine air debut is fast-moving program’, HSB, 16 January 1939, p.2; Chain Store Age: Grocery Managers Edition, October 1939, p.83. 116 ‘Hawn. Pine drops CBS program’, HSB, 29 March 1940, p.17. 117 HSB, 29 March 1940, p.17. 118 Havighorst, ‘Marketing Leadership’, p.190. 119 UHM, DCA, Minutes: Board of Directors, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 June 1937 to 29 August 1939, p.167. 120 WCP 26/2, June 1934, p.22. 121 Annual Report of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. for the Year Ending December 31, 1931 (Honolulu, 1932), p.4; Annual Report of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. for the Year Ending December 31, 1932 (Honolulu, 1933), p.5. 122 Annual Report of Maui Agricultural Company, Ltd. for the Year Ending December 31, 1932 (Honolulu, 1933), p.9. 123 ML&PCA, Minutes of Maui Pineapple Co., Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, (Board of Directors’ Meeting, 6 April 1934), p.37. 124 ML&PCA, Minutes of Maui Pineapple Co., Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, (Board of Directors’ Meeting, 6 April 1934), p.36 and (Board of Directors’ Meeting, 9 March 1934), p.26; PGAHA, An Analysis, p.37. 125 The Haiku Pineapple Co. was the former Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd. ML&PCA, Minutes of Maui Pineapple Co., Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, (Board of Directors Meeting, March 5, 1935), p.42; PGAHA, An Analysis, p.37. 126 Dean, Alexander & Baldwin, p.234. 127 Annual Report of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. for the Year ending December 31, 1937 (Honolulu, 1938), p.5; ML&PCA, Maui Pineapple Minute Book, pp.63, 70, 81. 128 ML&PCA, Maui Pineapple Minute Book, pp.42, 49, 53, 68; Baldwin, William A., Supplement to a Brief History and Commentary on the Pineapple Industry on Maui, Hawaii (Wailuku, 1946), p.17. 129 WCP 31st Annual Yearbook 33/5, 25 April 1941, p.132. 130 ‘Foreign pineapple competition becoming increasing factor’, HA, 20 December 1940, p.15.

5: Scientific and Technological Innovation in the Pineapple Industry 1

Grist, D.H., ‘The pineapple industry of the Hawaiian Islands: A triumph of mechanisation’, World Crops 2/7 (1950), p.283. 2 Ferleger, Louis, and William Lazonick, ‘The managerial revolution and the developmental state: The Case of US agriculture’, Business and Economic History 22/2 (1993), pp.75, 90–5; McConnell, Grant, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (New York, 1969), p.22. 3 Overfield, Richard A., ‘The agricultural experiment station and Americanization:

Notes

221

The Hawaiian experience, 1900–1910’, Agricultural History 60/2 (1986), pp.256–8. 4 Overfield, ‘Hawaiian experience’, p.258. 5 Overfield, ‘Hawaiian experience’, pp.258–66. 6 CT 45/41, 5 June 1922, p.22. 7 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Press Bulletin No.23, The Influence of Manganese on the Growth of Pineapples (Honolulu, c.1908), p.1–2, 13–4. 8 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No.28, The Effect of Manganese on Pineapple Plants and the Ripening of the Pineapple Fruit (Washington, DC, 1912), pp.1–20. 9 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Press Bulletin No.51, The Spraying of Yellow Pineapple Plants on Manganese Soils with Iron Sulphate Solution (Honolulu, 1916), pp.2–6. 10 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No.52, Manganese Chlorosis of Pineapples: Its Cause and Control (Washington, DC, 1924), p.1. 11 Chapman, Cooperation, p.8. 12 Whitmore was born in Southwest Harbor, Maine on 2 September 1870. He came to Hawaii in 1902 after being recruited by James D. Dole. He worked in the Hawaiian Pineapple Co.’s original cannery at Wahiawa during his first year in Honolulu. In the following year he entered the company’s plantation department where he directed the company’s plantation operations for the next 30 years until his death on 30 April 1933. ‘J.L. Whitmore, H.P. official stricken, dies’, HSB, 1 May 1933, p.1; ‘John Whitmore taken by death’, HA, 1 May 1933, p.3. 13 Johnson, Maxwell O., The Pineapple (Honolulu, 1935), pp.70–2; Hawaiian Pineapple Co., What it Means to Grow Big in Twenty-Five Years (Honolulu, 1927), pp.12–3; WCP 26/2, June 1934, p.24. 14 ‘History of Hawaiian Packers’ Association since 1910’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P4. 15 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Press Bulletin No.36, The Pineapple in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1912), p.30. 16 ‘Pineapples, the second industry in Hawaii’, HSB Centenary Number 1820– 1920, April 1920, p.64. 17 Chapman, Royal N., ‘The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry in Depression Years’, Hawaiian Annual 61 (1935), pp.88–9. 18 Chapman, Cooperation, pp.8–9; Baldwin, Supplement, p.12; Bindt, Henry M., ‘Experiment Station developing strains are not known here’, HA, 21 October 1923, p.B1; ‘Pines canners and university to cooperate’, HA, 17 September 1924, p.1. The Hawaiian pineapple industry continued to fund agricultural research until 1973. Since that time research has been carried out by the USDA. Rohrbach, K.G., ‘Pineapple Research and Development in a World Market’, in Pierre Martin-Prével (ed), Second International Pineapple Symposium (Neuve, 1997), pp.126–32. 19 Dean, Arthur L., ‘Pineapple Culture’, Mid-Pacific Magazine xxxii/5 (1926), pp.409–12; Dean, Arthur L., ‘Science aids Hawaiian industry’, WCP 18/10, February 1927, p.10. 20 Dole, ‘Some recollections’, p.410.

222 21

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‘Big building program is under way: Experiment station at university to exceed $200,000’, HA, 2 April 1931, pp.1, 3. 22 Illingworth, J.F., ‘Preliminary report on mealy bugs and pineapple wilt’, Pineapple News iv/2 (1930), pp.22–9; Territory of Hawaii: Department of Public Instruction, Hawaii Economic Education Series Instructional Booklet No.3: Pineapple in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1956), p.12. 23 A ratoon was an offshoot from a subterranean bud on the stem or trunk of the plant which springs out of the ground at a small distance of the mother plant. When transplanted these produce very vigorous and rapidly bearing plants. They are limited in numbers, generally to two to three a year, but they continue to crop out as long as the mother plant remains sufficiently strong. Marquès, Pineapple Industry, p.70. 24 Chapman, ‘Depression years’, p.89. 25 Paxton, G.E., ‘“Side Rot” or “Yellow Spot” disease’, Pineapple News iii/6 (1929), pp.85–91. 26 Linford, M.B., ‘Pineapple yellow-spot transmitted by thrips’, Pineapple News iv/3 (1930), pp.43–51. 27 Pratt, J. Dickson, ‘Tobacco Dusting as a Control for Side Rot of Yellow Spot, with Correlative Observations on the Control of Mealy Bugs’, Pineapple News iv/5 (1930), pp.65–8. 28 Chapman, ‘Depression years’, p.88. 29 Chapman, Cooperation, pp.9–10. 30 ‘Experimenters conduct search for Smooth Cayenne substitute’, PCA, 9 February 1921, pp.P9–10; ‘Search for wild pineapples: Scientists from Hawaii seek varieties to cross with types grown in Islands to fight diseases’, WCP 31/6, May 1939, p.14; Williams, D.D.F., and H. Fleisch, ‘Historical Review of Pineapple Breeding in Hawaii’, in D.P. Bartholomew and K.G. Rohrbach (eds), First International Pineapple Symposium (Honolulu, 1992), pp.68–9, 74. 31 UHM, DCA, Minutes of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings, 15 June 1937 to 29 August 1939, pp.267–8. 32 Baldwin, Supplement, pp.24–5. 33 Dunn, Ariel E.V., ‘Growing and canning pineapples in the Hawaiian Islands’, Dun’s International Review, April 1928, p.44. 34 Collins, J.L., ‘History, Taxonomy and Culture of the Pineapple’, Economic Botany 3/4 (1949), p.355. 35 HA, 21 October 1923, p.B1. 36 ‘New machine eliminates pineapple field drudgery’, HSB, 6 August 1937, p.13; ‘Odd pineapple harvester speeds field work’, Popular Mechanics, 70/3, September 1938, p.401; Jackson, Frances O., ‘Of credit unions, medical unions, and pineapple harvesters: Three vignettes from the 1930s’, HJH 22 (1988), pp.236–9; WCP 29/9, September 1937, p.23. 37 Keuchel, Canning Industry in New York, pp.362–72. 38 Barter, C.P., ‘The Hawaiian pineapple cannery’, Canning Age 3/6 (1922), pp.5– 6. 39 Brown, Martin, and Peter Philips, ‘Craft Labor and Mechanization in Nineteenth-Century American Canning’, Journal of Economic History, xlvi/3 (1986), p.756. 40 Brown, Martin, and Peter Philips, ‘The Historical origin of job ladders in the US

Notes

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canning industry and their effects on the gender division of labour’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 10/2 (1986), p.133. 41 Sinclair-Scott Co., Complete Outfit for Canning Factories (Baltimore, c.1896), pp.45–7; CT 26/36, 29 April 1904; CT 33/30, 18 March 1910, p.27; CT 33/31, 25 March 1910, p.27. 42 US Patent No.482,493, ‘Machine for Treating Pineapples’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 60 (1892), p.1537. 43 US Patent No.508,729, ‘Machine for Paring Fruit or Vegetables’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 65 (1893), p.1001. 44 CT 26/36, 29 April 1904; ‘The Hawaiian pineapple industry’, CT 45/7, 10 October 1921, p.16; Dole and Porteus, James Dole, p.40. 45 US Patent No.952,150, ‘Machine for Treating Pineapples’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 143 (1909), p.747; CT 26/36, 29 April 1904; CT 36/22, 27 January 1913, p.28; Bitting, Arvill Wayne, Appertizing or the Art of Canning: Its History and Development (San Francisco, 1937), pp.331–41; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.350–1. 46 US Patent No.862,241, ‘Machine for Cutting Pineapples’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 129 (1907), p.2150. 47 Bitting, Appertizing, pp.331–41; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.350– 1. 48 Dole-Hawaii, Historical Highlights, p.2; Libby, McNeill & Libby Archives, Section 4, Management 1911–53, General Plantations, Canneries, and Honolulu Office, p.17; ‘Arnold to Chicago’, WCP 23/6, Otober 1931, p.36. 49 ‘Fabulous machine is key to pineapple industry’, HA, 1–7 July 1956, p. II10; Dole Packaged Foods Company, Ginaca: Pineapple Processing Machine (Honolulu, 1993), p.8; ‘Wahiawa; Birthplace of the pineapple industry’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P9; UHM, DCA, Cab.1, Dr.1, Fldr.10A, Biography, Henry Ginaca: 1912–1993, Memorandum, 8 November 1955 and Gladys R. Ebbert (formerly Mrs. Henry Ginaca) to Mrs. E. Leigh Stevens, 4 June 1956. 50 Bitting, Appertizing, pp.331–4; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.350–1. 51 CT 45/7, 10 October 1921, p.18. 52 Bitting, Appertizing, pp.331–4; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.350–1; Dole, Pineapple Processing Machine, pp.4–6; Barter, ‘Pineapple cannery’, p.7; King, Norman, ‘The Canned Pineapple Industry in Hawaii’, Tin, November 1931, p.4; US Dept. of Labor, Labor 1939, p.103. 53 HA, 1–7 July 1956, p.II-10; ’50-year-old machine spurred pine’, Sunday StarBulletin and Advertiser, 18 November 1962, p.A22; Dole, Pineapple Processing Machine, p.8; UHM, DCA, Cab.1, Dr.1, Fldr.10A, Biography, Henry Ginaca: 1912–1993, Hawaiian Pineapple Co. to Henry Ginaca, 10 August 1915 and Memorandum, November 8, 1955. 54 CT 45/7, 10 October 1921, p.18. 55 Bitting, Appertizing, pp.331–4; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.350–1; Barter, ‘Pineapple cannery’, p.12. 56 May, Earl Chapin, The Canning Clan: A Pageant of Pioneering Americans (New York, 1937), p.274. 57 US Dept. of Labor, Labor 1939, p.103. 58 Bitting, Appertizing, pp.331–4; US Dept. of Agriculture, The Pineapple: Chemistry and Products (Washington, DC, 1941), pp.10–11.

224

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59 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.17. 60 ‘New product from pines’, Hawaiian

61 62 63

64 65

66

Gazette, 27 May 1910, p.3; CT 33/46, 8 July 1910, p.14; ‘Advertisement’, San Francisco Call, 26 August 1910, p.5; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, p.338. Wilcox, Earley Vernon, Tropical Agriculture (New York, 1916), p.100. Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, pp.338–9; ‘Dole gratified at juice development’, WCP 29/10, October 1937, p.25. US Patent No.1,781,250, ‘Press for Extracting Liquids’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 400 (1930), p.372; US Patent 2,054,342, ‘Centrifugal Extractor’, Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 470 (1936), p.602; Tressler and Joslyn, Juice Production, p.338–9; ‘Pineapple juice advertised’, WCP 25/5, September 1933, p.33. Mowery, David C., and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century America (Cambridge, 1999), pp.11–3. ‘J.D. Dole heads apple juice firm’, HSB, 19 August 1941, p.3; Havighorst, C.R., ‘Quality Apple Juice Made’, Food Industries 20/12 (1948), pp.92–5; ‘James Dole, pineapple pioneer, dies’, HA, 15 May 1958, pp.A1–6; Dole and Porteus, James Dole, pp.103–4. ‘1930 big year in pineapple production’, SFC, 3 March 1931, California’s Canning Industry Section, p.2C.

6: Pineapple Plantations Versus Small Farms 1 2 3

Thurston, ‘Fruit Culture’, p.525. US Reclamation Service, Hawaii, p.47. Courtenay, P.P., Plantation Agriculture (rev. ed.) (London, 1980), pp.55, 179– 81. 4 US Senate, Subcommittee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on General Conditions in Hawaii, Part I (Washington, DC, 1902), p.43. 5 Territory of Hawaii, Report of the Commissioner of Public Lands for the Two Years Ending 30 June 1930 (Honolulu, 1930), pp.4–36; Territory of Hawaii, Report of the Commissioner of Public Lands for the Two Years Ending December 31, 1920 (Honolulu, 1921), pp.114–30; Territory of Hawaii, Report of the Commissioner of Public Lands and Surveys of the Territory of Hawaii for the Two Years Ending June 30, 1940 (Honolulu, 1941), pp.4–46. 6 The following Territorial government report, although from a much later period, gives some indication of the concentration of land ownership. It is fair to assume that land ownership was even more concentrated before 1941. Territory of Hawaii, Economic Planning and Coordination Authority Staff Report No.14, Major Landholdings in Hawaii: Ownership Patterns and Leasing Policies (Honolulu, 1957). 7 US Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Misc. Series, No.53, The Cane Sugar Industry, Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Marketing Costs in Hawaii, Porto Rico, Louisiana and Cuba (Washington, DC, 1917), p.88. 8 Dole, ‘The Pineapple Industry’, pp.116. 9 US Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Pineapple Canning Industry of the World, p.17.

Notes 10

225

Judd, C.S., ‘The Relation of Forestry to Pineapple Production’ in the Proceedings of the Pineapple Men’s Conference, 2–3 April 1928 (Honolulu, 1928), pp.6–12. 11 ‘“Hawaii” spells “pineapple” as all the world well knows’, PoP 39/4 (1926), p.24. 12 US Dept. of Labor, Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor Statistics on Labor Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii for the Year 1915 (Washington, DC, 1916), p.41. 13 NA, RG122, Records of the Federal Trade Commission, General Records 1914–21, Food Investigation, Correspondence, Reports, Etc., File 9385/24/1– 7, Hawaiian Canners, 30 June 1917. 14 ‘Pineapple boom on: Lands about Hilo are being pooled in company’, PCA, 6 November 1905, p.8; ‘Kohala Pineapple Company’, HSB Centenary Number 1820–1920, April 1920, pp.111–2; ‘James Woods, one of the pioneers of Kohala’, HSB Centenary Number 1820–1920, April 1920, p.111; Marquès, ‘Pineapple Industry’, pp.64–5, 82; ‘First pack of the Kohala Pineapple Company on Island of Hawaii in 1921’, PCA, 5 February 1921, p.P14; ‘Pineapple packers agree on stabilization’, WCP 24/5, September 1932, p.5. 15 ‘Merger is effected’, WCP 23/13, April 1932, p.38. 16 Tabrah, Ruth, Lanai (Norfolk Island, 1976), p.80–3. 17 Cooke, George Paul, Moolelo O Molokai: A Ranch Story of Molokai (Honolulu, 1949), pp.1–3, 90–1. 18 Devaney, Dennis M., et. al., Kaneohe: A History of Change, 1778–1950 (Honolulu, 1976), p.61; LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 1, Review of Libby Expansion in Hawaii 1909–32, pp.2–3; ‘Libby enters pine business’, Hawaiian Gazette, 18 November 1910, p.5. The ‘model village’ at Kahaluu was later found to be the exact opposite. In 1919, a Dr. George Cady from the continental US surveyed the Oahu sugar and pineapple industries. He reported that the ‘worst housing conditions I have found on this island are at the Libby, McNeill & Libby pineapple cannery [at Kahaluu]. That bunch of houses, no, they’re shacks, or really pigpens, are the worst I have ever seen controlled by any corporation anywhere. They can be compared only to the shacks occupied by the negroes [sic] in the worst parts of cities on the mainland.’ ‘Packing concern’s houses declared to be disgrace’, PCA, 4 July 1919, pp.1–2. 19 LM&LAC, Libby Expansion, pp.3–4; Devaney, Kaneohe, pp.61–2. 20 ‘Libby enters pine business’, Hawaiian Gazette, 18 November 1910, p.5; LM&LAC, Libby Expansion, pp.3–4; ‘Libby, McNeill & Libby, Honolulu’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P12. 21 LM&LAC, Libby Expansion, pp.4–5. 22 LM&LAC, Libby Expansion, pp.4–5; Devaney, Kaneohe, pp.62–4. 23 Not all the land in 1921 was under cultivation. The Kohala Pineapple Co. only had 300 acres of its land under pineapples in 1921. On the other hand Baldwin Packers could draw upon land used by neighboring sugar plantations controlled by the Baldwin family if the need arose. 24 ‘Libbys Lease Molokai land for pineapples’, HSB, 3 January 1923, p.1; ‘Molokai pines project makes rapid progress’, HSB, 25 April 1923, p.1; LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 2-A, The Development of Mauna Loa, Molokai, p.6; Cox, Richard H., ‘Groundwater Technology in Hawai’i’, in Faith N. Fujimura and

226

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Williamson B.C. Chang (eds), Groundwater in Hawai’i: A Century of Progress (Honolulu, 1981), p.28. 25 LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 2-C, The Early Development of Makawao & Haiku, Maui, p.8; LM&LAC, Press Release No.3, Libby History, 15 August 1961; LM&LAC, Section 4, Management 1911–53, General Plantations, Canneries, and Honolulu Office, p.17; ‘Pineapple plant sold to Libby for $151,215.55’, HA, 7 December 1928, p.1. 26 Baldwin, Brief History, pp.20–1. 27 ‘California Packing Corporation’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P3–4; Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, 1976, p.165; Cooke, Ranch Story of Molokai, p.91; ‘CPC leases island land’, WCP 19/3, June 1926, p.51; Baldwin, Brief History, pp.23–7; ‘The man of Maui & Pineapple: J. Walter Cameron’, Pine Review 10/2 (October 1969), p.6; ML&PCA, Minute Book of Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, p.37; ‘Calpak gets 2500 acres from the HP’, WCP 24/7, November 1932, p.32. 28 ‘California Packing Corporation’, PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P3–4; Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, 1976, p.165. 29 Cooke, Ranch Story, 1949, p.91; ‘CPC leases island land’, WCP 19/3, June 1926, p.51; ’3,000 acres leased for pineapples’, HA, 10 June 1927, p.1. 30 Baldwin, Brief History, pp.23–5; ‘New industry for Kahului is assured: Pineapple cannery will be built by California Packers’, HA, 6 October 1925, p.1; Dean, Alexander & Baldwin, pp.174–6. 31 Baldwin, Brief History, pp.25–7; ML&PCA, Minute Book of Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, p.37; Maui Agricultural Company, Ltd., Annual Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1932 (Honolulu, 1933), pp.9–10. 32 ‘Calpak gets 2500 acres from the HP’, WCP 24/7, November 1932, p.32. 33 Taylor, Welty and Eyre, From Land and Sea, p.165. 34 Baldwin, Brief History, p.12; ‘A History of the Haiku Company’, PCA, 5 February 1921, p.P6; Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities, No.20, Industrial Section, 1919 (New York, 1919), p.2885. 35 UHM, DCA, Cab.2, Dr.2, Fldr.56, Dole, James D.: 1919–1983, James Dole to Kenneth Barnes, 23 July 1919. 36 ‘Hawaiian Pines buys Island of Lanai’, HSB, 15 November 1922, p.1; DoleHawaii, Historical Highlights, Honolulu, 1977, p.4; ‘Lanai new pineapple principality bearing first fruits this year’, WCP 18/3, July 1926, pp.5–7; Tabrah, Lanai, p.93; ‘Hawaiian island transformed into a vast pineapple farm’, NYT, April 12, 1931, p.XX7; Pleasant, E.E., ‘Lanai’, The Friend 109/9 (1939), p.171. 37 Dougherty, H.E., ‘“Isle of Pines” Reveals Epic in Development to Honoluluans’, in Lanai ‘The Pineapple Kingdom’–Reprints of Newspaper Articles Published in the Honolulu Advertiser, 1–2 February 1926, pp.5–6; Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Twenty Five Years, p.23; Dole Highlights, p.5; WCP 18/3, July 1926, p.7; NYT, 12 April 1931, p.XX7. 38 Tabrah, Lanai, p.105; ‘Rice and Roses’, Dub Tape No.1307, Working People of Lanai, KHET/Hawaii Public Television, 1983; Armitage, George T., ‘Lanai, land of Hawaii’s pineapple industry of the future’, HSB, 30 August 1924, pp.II–3. 39 ‘1929 pineapple crop beats 1928’, WCP 21/9, January 1930, p.44.

Notes 40

227

Dole-Hawaii, Historical Highlights, p.6; Baldwin, Brief History, p.13; Baldwin, Supplement, p.14. 41 ‘Hawn. Pines to place Hoolehau land in cultivation’, HA, 22 August 1940, pp.1, 7. 42 ‘Hawaiian Pineapple Co. abandons plans to acquire land on Molokai’, HA, 20 September 1940, p.1. 43 ‘Sucecess of pineapple industry on Maui’, PCA, 23 July 1905, p.2; Baldwin, Brief History, pp.8–10. 44 Marquès, Pineapple Industry, p.63; ‘“New,” a land of homes’, PCA, 14 January 1909, p.10; PCA, 5 February 1921, p.P11; ‘Kauai Fruit and Land Company’, HSB Centenary Number 1820–1920, April 1920, p.133; Dean, Alexander & Baldwin, pp.106–8, 169–73. 45 Coulter, John Wesley, ‘Small Farming on Kauai’, Economic Geography, 11/4 (1935), p.406. 46 Ashdown, Inez, History of Honolua Ranch [ms] (Kahului, c.1972), pp.35–6; Baldwin, Brief History, p.16. 47 Baldwin, Brief History, pp.16–7; Bruce, Lesley, Background: Maui Land & Pineapple Company Inc. [ms] (Kahului, 1976); Ashdown, Honolua Ranch, p.36. 48 ML&PCA, Minute Book of Baldwin Packers, Limited, 20 December 1923 to 3 November 1962, pp.35–44, 85, 103, 107, 128, 149. 49 ML&PCA, Doc. 72, History of the Corporate Status, Operations and Lands of Keahua Ranch Co. Ltd. (Renamed the Haleakala Pineapple Co. Ltd. in 1929), March 6, 1934, pp.1–3; ML&PCA, Book of Records, Keahua Ranch Co., pp.1–27. 50 ML&PCA, History of Keahua Ranch Co., p.3. 51 Annual Report of the Maui Agricultural Company, Limited, for the Year ending December 31, 1923 (Honolulu, 1924), pp.8–9; Annual Report…for the Year ending December 31, 1924 (Honolulu, 1925), p.4; Annual Report…for the Year ending December 31, 1927 (Honolulu, 1928), pp.8, 16; Annual Report…for the Year ending December 31, 1929 (Honolulu, 1930), p.5–6; Annual Report… for the Year ending December 31, 1930 (Honolulu, 1931), pp.5, 11; Annual Report…for the Year ending December 31, 1931 (Honolulu, 1932), p.9; Annual Report…for the Year ending December 31, 1932 (Honolulu, 1933), p.9. 52 ML&PCA, Keahua Ranch, pp.6–8; Bruce, Background, p.6. 53 ML&PCA, Book of Records, Keahua Ranch Co., pp.75, 78. 54 ML&PCA, Minute Book pp.56, 63, 70, 81; Annual Report of the Maui Agricultural Company, Limited for the Year ending December 31, 1935 (Honolulu, 1936), p.8. 55 Colum, Padraic, ‘America in Polynesia: I. Where sugar is king’, The Nation 118/3057 (6 February 1924), pp.139–41. 56 PCA, 4 January 1908, p.1. 57 PCA, 4 January 1908, p.1. 58 Baker, Ray Stannard, ‘Wonderful Hawaii: A World Experiment Station: II: The Land and the Landless’, American Magazine 73, December 1911, pp.205–9; PCA, 11 September 1913, p.13. 59 US Commissioner General of Immigration, Industrial Conditions in Hawaiian Islands (Washington, DC, 1913), p.9.

228 60

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Okahata, James H. (ed), A History of the Japanese in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1971), p.205. 61 The Rainbow: A History of the Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce (Honolulu, 1970), pp.106, 114. 62 PCA, 11 September 1913, p.9; Clark, Thomas Dole, ‘The Story of Pineapple in Hawaii’, Mid-Pacific Magazine iii/5 (1912), p.457; Wilcox, Tropical Agriculture, p.41. 63 Okahata, Japanese in Hawaii, p.28. 64 ‘New pineapple cannery on Maui: Japanese hui looking for a site’, PCA, 18 January 1909, p.10. 65 PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P6. 66 BMA/THD&CP, Ms. Group 239/290, Pearl City Fruit Co., Ltd. Minute Book, March 1923 to December 1927, pp.14, 28, 45. 67 Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, Women Workers in Hawaii’s Pineapple Industry, Vol. II (Honolulu, 1979), p.849. 68 BMA/THD&CP, PCFC Minute Book 1923–7, p.35. 69 ‘Independent growers aided’, WCP 23/4, August 1931, p.36. 70 ‘Honolulu Fruit Co. foreclosure’, WCP 23/10, February 1932, p.3. 71 ‘Kauai growers form company’, HSB, 9 May 1932, p.13; ‘Japanese build cannery’, WCP 24/2, June 1932, p.32; ‘Kauai growers organize cooperative’, HSB, 28 June 1932, p.7; Okahata, Japanese in Hawaii, p.203; ‘Crossley buys growers’ coop’, WCP 29/3, March 1937, p.39; ‘Pine cannery in new hands’, HA, 4 February 1937, pp.1–2; Holmes, T. Michael, ‘Randolph Crossley and his half-century in Hawai’i’, HJH 36 (2002), pp.124–5; ’1904–2004: Millionaire businessman, politician Randolph Crossley, dead at 99’, HSB [Online Edition], 25 February 2004. 72 Keesing, Felix M., Hawaiian Homesteading on Molokai (Honolulu, 1936), pp.18–9; McGregor, Davianna Pōmaika’i, ‘Aina Ho’opulapula: Hawaiian Homesteading’, HJH 24 (1990), pp.1–38. 73 Hardy, Thornton Sherburne, Wallace Rider Farrington (Honolulu, 1935), p.61. 74 US Senate, Committee on Territories, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess., Hearings on H.R.13500: A Bill to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii,’ Approved April 30, 1900, as Amended, to Establish an Hawaiian Homes Commission, and for Other Purposes (Washington, DC, 1921), pp.79–81. 75 LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 2-B, The Development of the Hoolehau Homestead Pineapple Planting Project, p.7; Keesing, Homesteading, p.72. 76 Keesing, Homesteading, p.72; US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC, 1930), p.9. 77 Keesing, Homesteading, p.73; US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior 1931 (Washington, DC, 1931), p.8; US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior 1932 (Washington, DC, 1932), p.15. 78 Humphries, Grace, Hawaiian Homesteading: A Chapter in the Economic Development of Hawaii, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1937, pp.53–5. Abigail Campbell Kawananakoa was a prominent native Hawaiian and the widow of Prince David Kawananakoa. She had succeeded Prince Kuhio as a

Notes

79



80



81 82 83 84 85



86



87



88



89 90



91 92



229

leader of the native Hawaiian community after his death in 1922. She was well known for her defense of native Hawaiian rights. Hawkins, Richard A., ‘Princess Abigail Kawananakoa: The forgotten territorial native Hawaiian leader’, HJH 37 (2003), pp.163–77. ‘Homesteaders blame “Exhibit A” for trouble: It authorizes creditors to collect funds’, HSB, 5 November 1931, pp.1–16; ‘Special committee urges changes in homesteading’, HSB, 3 February 1932, p.8; Keesing, Homesteading, p.89. HSB, 3 February 1932, pp.8, 15; ‘Homesteader exploitation alleged, denied in three reports to commissioners’, HSB, 3 February 1932, pp.1, 3. HSB, 3 February 1932, p.8. HSB, 3 February 1932, p.8. Judd, Judd and Hawaii, pp.137–8. Humphries, Hawaiian Homesteading, 1937, pp.70–2. ‘F.L. Akana to succeed Woolley as executive secretary’, HSB, 30 October 1935, p.1; AH, Delegate Samuel Wilder King’s File, Hawaiian Homes Commission 1935–June 1942, Lang Akana to S.W. King, 24 December 1935. US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1934 (Washington, DC, 1934), p.8; US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1936 (Washington, DC, 1936), pp.8–9; US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1940 (Washington, DC, 1940), pp.50–1. AH, Delegate Samuel Wilder King’s File, Hawaiian Homes Commission 1935– June 1942, Albert Lambert to S.W. King, 7 March 1936. ‘Homestead pine contracts illegal, Deputy Attorney General rules’, HA, 31 October 1941, pp.1, 11. Dept. of the Interior, Governor’s Report 1940, pp.50–1. US Dept. of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1941 (Washington, DC, 1941), p.49. ‘Calpack and Libby get new acreage’, WCP 33/13, December 1941, p.15. Parker, Linda S., Native American Estate: The Struggle over Indian and Hawaiian Lands (Honolulu, 1989), p.158.

7: Labour 1 Takaki, Pau Hana. 2 Beechert, Edward D., Working in 3 Wakukawa, Ernest K., A History

Hawaii: A Labor History (Honolulu, 1985). of the Japanese People in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1938), pp.124–6, 143–5; La Croix, Sumner J., and Price Fishback, ‘Migration, Labor Market Dynamics, and Wage Differentials in Hawaii’s Sugar Industry, 1901–1915’, Advances in Agricultural Economic History 1 (2000), pp.34–42; Beechert, Working in Hawaii, pp.61–191. 4 US Reclamation Service, Hawaii, p.46; NA, RG350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, File 3037/104, Pt.2, The HSPA and the labor problem in Hawaii, 1933, pp.4–5.

230 5

A Pacific Industry

Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.182; there were exceptions such as Libby’s plantation village at Kahaluu, as noted in Chapter 6. 6 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.182. 7 Adams, Romanzo, ‘Present Status and Future of Labor in Hawaii’, Proceedings of the Pineapple Men’s Conference, 23–26 March 1927 (Honolulu, 1927), p.197. 8 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, pp.167–75. 9 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, p.45. 10 US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census, Vol.IV, Population 1920: Occupations (Washington, DC, 1923), pp.1277–8. 11 Duus, Masayo Umezawa, The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920 (Berkeley, 1999), p.118. 12 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.207. 13 NA, RG280, Records of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, File 165/342, Report of the Hawaiian Labor Commission, 1922, pp.7–8. 14 Industrial Relations Counselors Inc., Report on Industrial Relations in the Hawaiian Sugar Industry, Vol. II (Honolulu, 1926), p.232. 15 Industrial Relations Counselors, Sugar Industry, Vol. II, p.230. 16 Industrial Relations Counselors, Sugar Industry, Vol. II, pp.209–17. 17 Fleischman, Richard K. and Thomas N. Tyson, ‘Accounting in a Racist Society: The Hawaiian Sugar Plantations, 1835–1920’, Paper Presented at 8th World Congress of Accounting Historians, Madrid, Spain, 18–21 July 2000; US House of Representatives, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 67th Cong. 1st Sess., Hearings on Labor Problems in Hawaii: Part I (Washington, DC, 1921), pp.523–31. 18 Adams, Romanzo, and Dan Kane-Zo, Kai, The Education of the Boys of Hawaii and their Economic Outlook: A Study in the Field of Race Relationship (Honolulu, 1928), pp.37–9, 46–53. 19 Industrial Relations Counselors Inc., Report on Industrial Relations in the Hawaiian Sugar Industry, Vol.I (Honolulu, 1926), p.34; Lasker, Bruno, Filipino Immigration to Continental United States and to Hawaii (Chicago, 1931), pp.161–2; Crawford, David L., ‘Humanity in Sugar’, PoP 44/12, December 1933, p.76; Letter from Robert L. Cushing, Secretary Director Emeritus HSPA Experiment Station to Richard Hawkins, 10 October 1984. 20 US Dept. of Labor, Labor Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii 1929–1930 (Washington, DC, 1931), p.79. 21 NA, RG350, File 3037/104/2, p.10. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported in March 1934 that in the two years ending 30 September 1933, a total of 10,369 persons had been returned to the Philippines at a cost of approximately $1 million. ‘Labor envoy would stop P.I. immigration’, HSB, 19 March 1934, p.1. 22 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1939, pp.93–5. 23 US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census, Vol.IX, Manufactures 1919 (Washington, DC, 1922), p.1672. 24 PCA, 9 February 1921, p.P6. 25 HA, 18 August 1951, p.4. 26 UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No.3979, Report for the Year 1906–7 on the Trade and Commerce of the Territory of Hawaii (London, 1908), p.14.

Notes 27

231

Blascoer, Frances, The Industrial Condition of Women and Girls in Honolulu: A Social Study (Honolulu, 1912), p.77. 28 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, pp.167–75. 29 Blascoer, Honolulu, p.78. 30 La Croix and Fishback, ‘Migration’, p.62. 31 Blascoer, Honolulu, pp.42–3. 32 US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census, Vol.IX, Manufactures 1919 (Washington, DC, 1922), p.1673. 33 Jacoby, Sanford M., Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900–1945 (New York, 1985), pp.51–2. 34 Brandes, Stuart D., American Welfare Capitalism, 1880–1940 (Chicago, 1976), pp.9, 32. 35 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.152. 36 ‘The Hawaiian pineapple industry’, CT 45/9, 24 October 1921, p.12. 37 ‘Results of welfare work in Hawaii related to canneries’, HSB, 31 March 1922, p.2. 38 HSB, 31 March 1922, p.2. 39 HSB, 31 March 1922, p.2. 40 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.187. 41 It was one of Dole’s greatest regrets that when he was removed from leadership of his company in 1932 that ‘this personnel structure was destroyed in toto.’ Fiftieth Anniversary Report of the Harvard Class of 1899, p.236. 42 ‘Jazz canning a wow’, HA, 30 July 1930, p.1. 43 Hawaiian Pineapple Company, A Great American Industry (Honolulu, 1924), p.7; Palmer, Albert W., The Human Side of Hawaii: Race Problems in the MidPacific (Boston and Chicago, 1924), p.102; Ethnic Studies, Women Workers, Vol. II, p.925. 44 Palmer, Race Problems, pp.102–3. 45 ‘Kauai Fruit and Land Company’, HSB Centenary Number 1820–1920, April 1920, p.133; PCA, 5 February 1921, p.P11. 46 ‘Pines and the Canners’ Code’, Hawaii Hochi, 5 July 1934, p.2. 47 Blascoer, Honolulu, p.78. 48 ‘Kauai canneries open their year’, PCA, 8 July 1919, p.3. 49 House of Representatives, Labor Problems Part I, pp.523, 528. 50 Brown, Martin, Jens Christiansen, and Peter Philips, ‘The Decline of Child Labor in the US Fruit and Vegetable Canning Industry: Law or Economics?’, Business History Review 66/4 (1992), p.744. 51 US Dept. of Labor, Women’s Bureau Bulletin No.82, The Employment of Women in the Pineapple Canneries of Hawaii (Washington, DC, 1930), p.10. 52 NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.82, File 34–10–2, Child Labor. 53 NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.117, Cannery Schedules, File 432, California Packing Corporation. 54 NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.177, Cannery Schedules, File 432, California Packing Corporation. 55 NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.117, Cannery Schedules, File 432, Maui Pineapple Co.

232 56

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Reinecke, John E., Feigned Necessity: Hawaii’s Attempt to Obtain Chinese Contract Labor, 1921–23 (San Francisco, 1979), pp.87–136. 57 Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Twenty-Five Years, p.7. 58 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, pp.167–75. 59 State of California, Special Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Conditions in the Canning Industry (Sacramento, 1913), p.25. 60 US Dept. of Commerce, Immigrants in Industries, Part 25: Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain States, Vol.II: Agriculture (Washington, DC, 1911), p.252. 61 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, pp.167–75. 62 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1915, p.43. 63 State of California, Seventeenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1915–16 (Sacramento, 1916), pp.189, 275. 64 US House of Representatives, Labor Problems Part I, pp.526, 528. 65 State of California, Twenty-First Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1923–24 (Sacramento, 1925), p.238; NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.82, File 1–14–30, California Packing Corporation. 66 Lasker, Filipino Immigration, p.162; US Dept. of Labor, Labor Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii, 1929–30 (Washington, DC, 1931), pp.57, 71. 67 US National Recovery Administration, Division of Review, Evidence Study No.47, The Canning Industry (Washington, DC, 1935), p.8. 68 US National Recovery Administration, Evidence Study No.47, pp.1–4. 69 NA, RG9, Records of the National Recovery Administration, Series 626, Pt.199, Canning-Hawaii, Brief History of the Code of Fair Competition for the Canning Industry in the Territory of Hawaii (Washington, DC, c.1936), p.1. 70 ‘Pines and the Canners’ Code’, Hawaii Hochi, 5 July 1934, pp.1–2. 71 US National Recovery Administration, Brief History of Code, p.1. 72 ‘Cannery code discussed at session here’, HSB, 30 October 1934, p.2. 73 US National Recovery Administration, Brief History of Code, p.4. 74 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1939, pp.204–5. 75 NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.177, Cannery Schedules, File 432, Maui Pineapple Co.; NA, RG86, Records of the Women’s Bureau, Survey Material, Bulletin No.177, Cannery Schedules, File 432, Libby, McNeill & Libby. 76 US Dept. of Labor, Hawaii 1939, p.91. 77 US Dept. of Labor, Women’s Bureau Bulletin No.176, Application of Labor Legislation to the Fruit and Vegetable Canning and Preserving Industries (Washington, DC, 1940), p.101. 78 US House of Representatives, Committee on the Territories, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Statehood for Hawaii: Hearing Before the Subcomiittee on Territories (Washington, DC, 1936), pp.217–9. 79 US House of Representatives, Statehood for Hawaii, p.219. 80 US House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Hearings: Vol. 22: 2–3 May 1940 (Washington, DC, 1940), p.4530. Dillingham’s businesses included the Oahu Railway & Land Co. and the Hawaiian Dredging Co., Ltd.

Notes

233

Nellist, Volume III Men of Hawaii, pp.401–4. 81 US House of Representatives, Special Committee, pp.4522–3. 82 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, p.260. 83 Matsumoto, Joyce A., The 1947 Hawaiian Pineapple Strike (Honolulu, 1958), p.4. 84 ‘400 Molokai pine workers strike’, HSB, 16 August 1937, p.2; ‘Molokai hopes for strike end’, HSB, 17 August 1937, p.3. 85 ‘650 men leave jobs on Molokai’, HSB, 20 August 1937, p.1; ‘Molokai strikers begin evacuation of firm’s property’, HSB, 21 August 1937, p.1; ‘Strikers Camp at Kaunakakai’, HSB, 23 August 1937, p.14. 86 ‘Married strikers return to work’, HSB, 2 September 1937, p.6; ‘Hite to Molokai over strikes’, HSB, 15 September 1937, p.5; ‘Evacuation of strikers seen’, HSB, 16 September 1937, p.3; ‘Strikers leaving Molokai grove’, HSB, 18 September 1937, p.4; ‘Hite called on by labor men’, HSB, 23 September 1937, p.17; ‘Strikers leave Homes property’, HSB, 29 October 1937, p.10; Cooke, Ranch Story, pp.92–3. 87 US Department of Labor, Hawaii 1939, p.201. 88 TNA, FO371/31529, General Correspondence: Honolulu, Political Dispatch No.4, British Consul to Foreign Office, 9 February 1938; No.7, 25 April 1938; No.9, 27 May 1938; No.11, 29 June 1938; No.17, 16 August 1938; No.21, 30 September 1938. 89 TNA, FO371/31529, General Correspondence: Honolulu, Political Dispatch No.7, 25 April 1938. 90 Daniel, Cletus E., Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers, 1870– 1941 (Ithaca, NY, 1981), pp.276–80; Fink, Gary M., Historical Sketches of American Labor Unions (Westport, CT, 1977), pp.106–8. 91 ‘UCAPAWA wins in Hawaii’, UCAPAWA News 1/2 (1939), p.7. 92 Quoted in Zalburg, Sanford, A Spark is Struck! Jack Hall and the ILWU in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1979), p.46. 93 ‘Contract won in Hawaii’, UCAPAWA News 1/4 (1939), p.10; Zalburg, Spark is Struck!, p.46. 94 ‘Pine cannery workers win benefit rights’, HA, 6 July 1939, pp.1–2. 95 ‘The future of labor relations in Hawaii’, HSB, 1 January 1940, p.9; Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., IRC Prospectus (New York, 1983), pp.2–3; IRC Archives, Survey of Industrial Relations for the HSPA, 31 January 1925. 96 ‘Pineapple labor relations policy’, WCP 30/3, March 1938, p.37. 97 HSB, 1 January 1940, p.9 98 US Dept. of Labor, Labor 1939, p.74. 99 LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 5-A, Development of the ‘Industrial Relations Dept.’ by Libby Hawaii, p.18. 100 ‘Libby outlines labor policies’, HSB, 20 June 1938, p.7. 101 ‘Improved labor conditions announced’, WCP 30/6, June 1938, p.51. 102 ML&PCA, Minutes of the Maui Pineapple Co. Ltd., 30 April 1932 to 5 November 1962, pp.72–3.

234

A Pacific Industry 8: Overseas Expansion

1

Wilkins, Mira, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, MA, 1974), pp.52–3. 2 Schmeckebier, Laurence F. and Gustavus A. Weber, The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: Its History, Activities, and Organization (Baltimore, 1924), p.22. 3 McLain, T.J., ‘The Pineapple Trade of the Bahamas’, Planters’ Monthly xi/12 (1892), pp.564–70. 4 In 1913 the department was renamed the Department of Commerce following the creation of the Department of Labor. 5 Schmeckebier and Weber, The Bureau, pp.26–32; US Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Economic Series No.40, The Businessman’s Bureau (Washington DC, 1944), p.6–7. 6 Schmeckebier and Webber, The Bureau, p.69. 7 NA, RG350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, General 1898–1935, File 26939, Pineapples – Philippine Islands, General Manager of the CFCA to Bureau, 7 October 1912. 8 US Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Special Agents Series No.91, Pineapple Canning Industry of the World (Washington, DC, 1915), p.18. 9 NA, RG350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, General Correspondence 1898–1935, File 26939, Pineapples – Philippine Islands, Office of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands to the California Packing Corporation, 11 April 1919. 10 NA, RG350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, General Correspondence 1898–1935, File 26959, Pineapples – Philippine Islands, Philippine Government Commercial Agency, San Francisco, Bulletin No.9, Philippine Pineapple and Taxes, December 1921; NA, RG350, Philippine Islands, Bureau of Commerce and Industry, Manila, The Possibilities of the Pineapple Industry in the Philippines, c.1923. 11 NA, RG350, Pineapple Possibilities, p.3. 12 ‘Conditions favorable for development of Philippine pineapple industry’, Commerce and Industry Journal 1/1 (1925), p.3. 13 NA, RG151, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, File 31.4, Fruits-Pineapples-Philippine Islands, Calpak to Bureau’s Foodstuffs Division, 11 December 1923. 14 Higgins, J.E., ‘Philippine Pineapples – A future big industry’, American Chamber of Commerce Journal (Manila) 5 (December 1925), p.6. 15 ‘Gigantic Bukidnon grant for pineapples’, American Chamber of Commerce Journal (Manila) 9 (May 1929), p.5; Elayda, Aniano, ‘Pineapple culture in the Philippines’, Philippine Journal of Agriculture 2 (1931), pp.281, 297, 302–3. 16 ‘C.P.C. looks to the Philippines’, WCP 21/5, September 1929, p.52; ‘Calpak’, WCP 21/6, October 1929, p.40. 17 ‘Experiment with PI pineapples’, WCP 21/8, December 1929, p.44; US Tariff Commission, Report No.118, Second Series, United States – Philippine Trade: With Special Reference to the Philippine Independence Act and Other Recent Legislation (Washington, DC, 1937), p.160. The accessibility of the public lands in the Southern Philippines was the most

Notes

18



19 20 21 22



23



24





25



26 27



28



29



235

important factor behind Calpak’s decision. Another factor was that it was a logical step to relocate part of the corporation’s activities in the country where the greater part of its labour was recruited. ‘Aid is sought against pines of Philippines: Dole asks Judd and Houston for support in meeting competition’, HSB, 28 November 1930, p.1; DCAH, Memorandum, p.5. ‘Pineapple packers agree on stabilization’, WCP 24/5, September 1932, p.1. Del Monte Pacific Limited: Our Milestones: http://delmontepacific.com/ See Figures 3–4 and 4–1. Gambell, Alice, ‘Philippine Packing Corporation has yearly output of 4,000,000 Cans’, Manila Daily Bulletin, 4 March 1936, p.5.; US Tariff Commission, Report No.118, pp.160–1. The National Development Company had been founded in 1919 to ‘engage in commercial, industrial, and other enterprises which may be necessary or contributory to the economic development of the country or important in the public interest.’ Brown, Ian, ‘Some Comments on Industrialisation in the Philippines During the 1930s’, in Ian Brown (ed), The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression (London, 1989), p.206. NA, RG59, Records of the Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.12715, Pineapple Production and Canning in the Philippines, Manila, 12 May 1941, pp.2–7. Lorenzo M. Tanada, the Filipino politician, has argued that many Filipinos consider investments by transnational corporations to be detrimental to their country’s long-term national interest. He suggests that the agreement between the National Development Company and Philpak on 18 August 1938 violated Filipino law, which prevented corporations owning or controlling more than 1,024 hectares (2,500 acres) of public agricultural lands. People with Tanada’s views had a much greater influence in the Philippines before the Pacific War, hence the US Vice-Consul’s pessimistic view of Philpak’s future in 1941. Tanada, Lorenzo M., ‘The Reckless Alienation of the National Patrimony’, in Lorenzo M. Tanada, Nationalism: A Summons to Greatness (Quezon City, 1965), pp.54, 61. NA, RG151, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, File 331.4, Fruits-Pineapples-Haiti, Bureau to California Packing Corporation, 19 December 1923. ‘Haitian pineapple cannery’, WCP 23/1, May 1931, p.28. ‘Calpak head in statement: Bentley denies published quotation on Haitian plan of company’, SFC, 7 June 1929, p.17; Karnes, Thomas L., Tropical Enterprise: The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton Rouge, 1978), p.238. NA, RG151, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, File 331.4, Fruits-Pineapples-General 1921–44, BFDC to Libby, McNeill & Libby, Chicago, 12 July 1921. NA, RG151 Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, File 331.4, Fruits-Pineapples-General 1921–44, Philip Larmon, Libby, McNeill & Libby, Chicago to BFDC, 16 July 1921.

236 30

A Pacific Industry

TNA, CO533/388/3, Kenya – No.14146 – Pineapple Growing, Pineapples in Kenya, 15 May 1932, p.8. 31 US Federal Trade Commission, Food Investigation, Report on the Meat Packing Industry, Part IV, The Five Largest Packers in Produce and Grocery Foods (Washington, DC, 1920), pp.242–3. 32 US Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, Vol.163, Case No.22409: Libby, McNeill & Libby (of Honolulu), Limited, v. Oahu Railway & Land Company, March 1930, (Washington, DC, 1930), pp.61–2. 33 LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 2-F, Investigation Re.Pineapple Possibilities Foreign Countries, p.10. 34 These investigations were conducted in strict secrecy to ensure Calpak was kept in the dark, as the US Commercial Attaché in Guatemala City reported in January 1929. NA, RG151, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Fruits-Pineapples-Guatemala, Commercial Attaché, Guatemala City to Bureau, 4 January 1929. 35 TNA, CO533/399/3, Kenya – No.16146 – Pineapple Canning, Memorandum from F.A. Stockdale to Colonial Secretary, 1 May 1930, p.2. 36 TNA, CO533/399/3, Kenya – No.16146 – Pineapple Growing, F.A. Stockdale to Colonial Office, Mombassa, 16 February 1931, p.10. 37 Nellist, Volume III Men of Hawaii, p.615. 38 TNA, CO533/399/3, Kenya – No.16146 – Pineapple Growing, F.A. Stockdale to Colonial Office, Mombassa, 16 February 1931, p.10. 39 TNA, CO533/399/3, Kenya – No.16146 – Pineapple Growing, Dispatch No.486 from Lord Passfield to Governor Edward Grigg, 27 June 1930; TNA, CO533/399/3, Dispatch No.377 from Grigg to Passfield, 20 May 1920, p.2. An investigation conducted in Kenya apparently found no native rights in the lands over which Libby had acquired an option. TNA, CO533/399/3, Dispatch No.32 from Grigg to Passfield, 2 May 1930. 40 TNA, CO852/88/12, Economic (Commodities), Pineapples Kenya, 1937, Memorandum by Sir Henry Moore, 9 August 1937; Mombassa Chamber of Commerce, ‘Economic Development in the Coast Area’, East African Standard, 25 August 1934, p.5. 41 Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1934, Vol.2 (Nairobi, 1936), p.124; LM&LAC, Foreign Countries, p.10. As a postscript to this episode, another one of the ‘Big Three’, Calpak, was to establish a pineapple plantation and cannery in Kenya during the 1960s as will be shown in Chapter 9. 42 NA, RG59, Records of the Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.3410, The Pineapple Canning Industry of Queensland, Australia, Brisbane, 15 January 1938, pp.3–5. 43 NA, RG59, Records of the Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.302507, Pineapple Canning Industry in Fiji, Suva, 13 February 1929, pp.23–4. 44 Colony of Fiji, Legislative Council Paper, No.42, Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Suva, 1930), p.3; Colony of Fiji, Legislative Council Paper, No.56, Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report for the Year 1930 (Suva, 1931), p.5; Colony of Fiji, Legislative Council Paper, No.20, Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report for the Year 1931 (Suva, 1932), p.6.

Notes

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45 46 47

‘West Coast Pines, Ltd.’, Fiji Times & Herald, 8 May 1933, p.4. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Twenty-Five Years, p.23. NA, RG59, Records of the Dept. of State, Consular Trade Report No.315183, Fiji Pineapple Canning Industry, Suva, 31 July 1929, pp.1–2. 48 Wright, Arthur Alban, The Colony of Fiji 1873–1931, 3rd ed (Suva, 1931), p.97. 49 NA, RG59, Report No.302507, pp.25–6; UHM, DCA, Minutes – Board of Directors’ Meetings of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 January 1917 to 15 January 1929(II) 1924–1929, pp.225–6, 230; UHM, DCA, Minutes of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings, 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932, p.37. 50 UHM, DCA, Minutes – Board of Directors’ Meetings of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 January 1917 to 15 January 1929 (I) 1917–1923, pp.161, 176, 183. 51 NA, RG59, Report No.315183, pp.1–2; UHM, DCA, Minutes – Board of Directors’ Meetings of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Limited, 15 January 1917 to 15 January 1929 (II) 1924–1929, pp.225–6, 248; UHM, DCA, Minutes of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings, 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932, p.36. 52 ‘H.P.C. seek new pineapple product’, WCP 21/6, October 1929, p.40. 53 ‘Experiments to guide expansion’, WCP 22/2, March 1930, p.44. 54 ‘Pines experts will inspect work in Fiji’, HA, 9 February 1931, p.7. 55 Derrick, Ronald Albert, The Fiji Islands: A Geographical Handbook (Suva, 1951), p.170; UHM, DCA, Minutes of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company Board of Directors’ Meetings, 28 February 1929 to 23 December 1932, p.281. 56 Wilkins, American Business Abroad, pp.171–2, 194, 203–4.

9: The Hawaiian Pineapple Industry Since 1941 1

Daws, Gavan, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu, 1968), pp.344–57. 2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hawaii in 1947, pp.76–7. 3 Calpak was renamed the Del Monte Corporation in June 1967. The corporation is referred to as Del Monte throughout this chapter. Braznell, California’s Finest, p.166. 4 Collins, The Pineapple, p.156; ‘Taiwan Pineapple Output Nears High Pre-War Level’, NYT, 23 June 1958, p.33; Taiwan Pineapple Corporation, A Five Year Plan for the Rehabilitation of Pineapple Plantation & Its Cannery Industry in Taiwan, 1951–1955 (Taipei, 1950); Wee, Y.C., ‘The development of pineapple cultivation in West Malaysia’, Journal of Tropical Geography 30 (1970), pp.68, 70, 73. 5 Taylor, Frank J., ‘Labor Moves in on Hawaii’, Saturday Evening Post, June 28, 1949, 24–5, 99–102; Territory of Hawaii: Department of Public Instruction, Hawaii Economic Education Series Instructional Booklet No.3: Pineapple in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1956), p.31; Zalburg, A Spark is Struck!, pp.116–319. 6 Mark, Shelley M., and Seiji Naya, Current Economic Condition of the Hawaiian Pineapple Industry (Honolulu, 1962), p.19. 7 Schmitt, Historical Statistics, p.415.

238 8

A Pacific Industry

‘Baldwin Packers, Maui Pineapple Co. will merge’, HSB, 17 July 1962, p.C1; ‘Maui pine firms’ merger approved’, HA, 6 November 1962, p.A6; ‘Cannery out at Lahaina’, HA, 21 November 1963, p.A2. 9 The Hawaiian Pineapple Co. was renamed the Dole Corporation in 1960. The company is referred to as Dole throughout this chapter. Taylor, ‘Billion-Dollar Rainbow’, p.73. 10 ‘Libby to end pine operations on Maui’, HA, 16 August 1961, p.A1–6; ‘Libby operates Pauwela cannery for last time’, Pine Review 4/3 (November 1963), p.1; ‘Libby-McNeill to end pineapple operations on Hawaii’s Maui island’, Wall Street Journal, 17 August 1961, p.9. 11 ‘Castle & Cooke’s Dole is set to buy properties in Hawaii from Libby’, Wall Street Journal, 13 January 1970, p.14; ‘Castle & Cooke unit buy’s Libby’s pineapple operations’, Wall Street Journal, 24 June, 1970, p.19. 12 Schmitt, Historical Statistics, pp.415–6. 13 Dole Hawaii, Historical Highlights, p.13; 14 Mark and Naya, Current Economic Condition, p.19. 15 ‘Labor shortage squeezing isle pineapple industry’, HSB, 19 August 1966, p.C3; ‘Pine Research Institute will narrow operations’, HA, 21 April 1966, p.C5. 16 Braznell, California’s Finest, pp.135, 166; Tropical Development and Research Institute, Report G186, The World Market for Canned Pineapple and Pineapple Juice (London, 1984), p.48; Collins, The Pineapple, pp.170–1; Jabbar, Syed, ‘A case study of production orientation: Malayan canned pineapple’, European Journal of Marketing 6/3 (1972), p.151; Kaplinsky, Raphael, ‘Export-orientated growth: A large international firm in a small developing country’, World Development 7/8–9 (1979), pp.825–34. 17 LM&LAC, File No.105, Section 2-F, Investigation Re Pineapple Production Possibilities Foreign Countries, p.10; ‘Libby Offers To Sell Hawaii Pine Operations’, Pine Review 10/2 (October 1969), p.3; ‘Libby discovers commercial facts of life’, The Times, 9 September 1970, p.20; Letter from N. Peaty, Joint Managing Director of Peaty Mills plc, 15 April 1993; Tropical Development and Research Institute, World Market, p.48; ‘Foreign interests seek three seats on Libby’s board’, NYT, 9 August 1963, pp.27, 31. 18 HSB, 17 June 1963, p.2; Miller, Brad, ‘Land-Grab in the Philippines: US corporations make their own law’, The Progressive 53/11 (1989), p.32; Ananas: A Film by Amos Gitai, 1983; Kaplinsky, ‘Export-Orientated Growth’, p.825. 19 Ananas: A Film by Amos Gitai. 20 Gonzaga, Leo, ‘The foreigners prevail: Two multinationals dominate the Philippine pineapple industry and attempts to boost local operations have backfired’, FEER, 17 March 1983, pp.94–5. 21 State of Hawaii, Department of Agriculture, The Impact of Foreign Pineapple Production on the Hawaiian Pineapple Industry: Problems and Recommendations (Honolulu, 1972). 22 Manuel, Susan, ‘A Perceptive look at World Pineapple Market’, HSB, 25 November 1982, p.A10; Tropical Development and Research Institute, World Market, p.29; Rapley, John, Ivoirien Capitalism: African Entrepreneurs in Côte d’Ivoire (Boulder, 1993), p.154. 23 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit on Transnational Corporations, Working Paper No.3,

Notes

239

Transnational Corporations and the International Commercialization of Pineapple Canned in Thailand (Bangkok, 1979), pp.3–6; HSB, November 25, 1982, p.A10; Hawkins, ‘World depression’, pp.58–9. 24 ‘Dole Company and Island Canning’, NYT, 3 September 1970, p.49; United Nations, Transnational Corporations, p.5; ‘A global pineapple boom brings gloom to Thailand’, FEER, 11 July 1980, p.54; Sjerven, Jay, ‘Dole Thailand: a pioneer of the Thai pineapple industry: Dole finds Thailand an excellent place to grow’, Agribusiness, May/June 1991, p.8. 25 Coyle, William, Wiliam Hall, and Nicole Ballenger, ‘Transportation Technology and the Rising Share of US Perishable Food Trade’, in Anita Regni, ed., Agriculture and Trade Report WRS-01–1, Changing Structure of Global Food Consumption and Trade (Washington, DC, 2001), p.31. 26 Braznell, California’s Finest, pp.149–50; ‘The Hawaiian Division: King Pineapple’s Realm’, Del Monte Shield, Spring 1981, pp.2–6; ‘Del Monte will close cannery’, HA, 28 November 1982, pp.A1, A3; Manuel, Susan, ‘Hawaii’s once-booming pineapple industry has become increasingly uncompetitive and is now shrinking’, FEER, 17 March 1983, p.96; ‘Hawaii recalls pesticidelaced milk from stores and schools’, NYT, 29 March 1982, p.I-8; Rothschild, Matthew, ‘Del Monte accused of contaminating dairy cattle feed’, The Multinational Monitor 3/5 (May 1982); Schmitt, Historical Statistics, p.416; Sricharatchanya, Paisal, ‘The pineapple crusher’, FEER, 17 March 1983, p.94. 27 ‘As Del Monte leaves Molokai: Big plans for pine in Costa Rica’, HA, 12 October 1983, p.A1; ‘Molokai residents sad about Del Monte’, HSB, 8 May 1987, pp.A1-A8; ‘Pine production down because of Molokai phaseout’, HA, 28 February 1989, p.C7; Kehlor, Robert R., The History of Del Monte Pineapple in Hawaii (Kunia, 1992), p.7. 28 Hawaii Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Pineapples: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 1988; 1993). 29 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Commodity Bulletin Series, No.51, Processed Tropical Fruit: Trends and outlook for production and trade of canned pineapple and processed exotic fruit (Rome, 1972), pp.10–11. 30 Hawaii Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Pineapples: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 2002), p.1; The Almanac of the Canning, Freezing, Preserving Industries (Westminster, MD, 1992), pp.276–7; ‘Commodity Factsheet, 2001: Pineapple’ at http://www.da.gov.ph/agricbiz/commodityfactsheet_pine.html. 31 ‘A global pineapple boom brings gloom to Thailand’, FEER, 11 July 1980, p.54; Sjerven, ‘Dole Thailand’, pp.9–10; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board, TD/B/C.6/AC.6/5, Problems and Issues Concerning the Transfer, Application and Development of technology in the Food Processing Sector: Technology and Food Processing in Thailand: The Case of Cassava Pelletizing and Pineapple Canning (Geneva, 1982), p.20; Manarungsan, Sompop, and Suebskun Suwanjindar, ‘Contract Farming and Outgrower Schemes in Thailand’, in David Glover and Lim Teck Ghee (eds), Contract Farming in Southeast Asia: Three Country Studies (Kuala Lumpur, 1992), pp.20– 1, 49. 32 Ananas: A Film by Amos Gitai. 33 Colayco, Maria Teresa, Crowning the Land: The History of Philippine Packing Corporation (Makati, 1987), pp.15–6; Goldstein, Carl, ‘Asia’s supermarket: Thai

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food processing industry enjoys an investment boom’, FEER, 29 December 1988, p.49; Galang, Jose, ‘Manila land reform plans hit plantation investment’, FEER, 23 February 1989, pp.64–5; US Dept. of Agriculture, Horticultural Products Review, November 1991, p.12; The Almanac, pp.271, 276–7; Banks, Tony, ‘The Politics of Agrarian Reform Implementation: The Case of the Multinational Corporate Pineapple Plantations under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme’, Pilipinas 23/3 (1994), pp.39–60; Dinham, Barbara and Colin Hines, Agribusiness in Africa (London, 1983), p.106; UK Colonial Office, Report on a Visit to the Rubber Growing Smallholdings of Malaya July-September 1946 by P.T. Bauer (London, 1948), pp.22–3. 34 http://www.delmontepacific.com/;  Securities and Exchange Commission, Dole Food Company Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ended 1 January 1994 (Washington, DC, 2004), p.13; Securities and Exchange Commission, Dole Food Company Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2005 (Washington, DC, 2006), p.18. 35 http://www.delmontepacific.com/; ‘Del Monte sells European offshoot’, Financial Times, 18 April 1990, p.25; Letter from Dee Ann Campbell, Vice President, Corporate Communications, Del Monte Foods, San Francisco, 29 August 1990. 36 ‘KKR puts Del Monte in window for $3bn’, Sunday Times, 5 March 1989, p.B2.; ‘KKR ‘may sell’ Del Monte unit’, Financial Times, 6 January 1989, p.18; Beckett, Jaime, ‘Decline of California’s Canners’, SFC, 25 September 1989, pp.C1, C5; Beckett, Jaime, ‘Del Monte is Looking to Double Sales’, SFC, 29 September 1989, pp.C1, C4; ‘Del Monte to sell fruit business: Hawaii operations are included in the $875 million sale to a British-based company’, HSB, 7 September 1989, p.D1; ‘Polly Peck tries on Carmen Miranda’s hat’, Financial Times, 26 September 1989, p.29; ‘Administrators at Polly Peck will meet DTI’, The Times, 26 October 1990, p.27; ‘Del Monte in Thai Move’, Financial Times, 18 May 1999, p.31. 37 San Miguel sold its short-lived minority stake in Del Monte in 2007. http:// www.delmontepacific.com; ‘San Miguel – NutriAsia JV to buy Del Monte’, 2 December 2005, http;//www.ap-foodtechnology.com; ‘San Miguel cans Del Monte venture’, 13 April 2007, http;//www.ap-foodtechnology.com 38 ‘San Miguel in Del Monte Deal’, Financial Times, 3 December 2005, p.21. 39 ‘Castle & Cooke in default’, Financial Times, 26 February 1985, p.20; ‘David Murdock in Castle & Cooke takeover’, Financial Times, 14 March 1985, p.34; ‘What’s next for Lanai’, Hawaii Business, May 1985, pp.50–1, 54–5, 60–1; ‘Dole cannery to get $21 million upgrade’, HSB, 20 July 1987, pp.A1-A6; ‘New life for Dole cannery’, Pacific Business News, 19 October 1987, p.1; Koeppel, Dan, ‘Dole wants the whole produce aisle: Branded fruits and vegetables are turning the nation’s supermarkets into Dole country’, Adweek’s Marketing Week, 22 October 1990, pp.20–1, 24, 26. 40 ‘Dole Dominicana’, Caribbean Update 6/12 (1991), p.7; ‘Dole Dominicana SA’, Caribbean Update 7/6 (1991), p.15; Financial Times, January 17, 1990, p.40. 41 ‘Dole expects growth to continue’, Bangkok Post [Online Edition], 29 January 2007.

Notes 42

241

Securities and Exchange Commission, Dole Food Company Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ended 30 December 1995 (Washington, DC, 1996), p.3; Securities and Exchange Commission, Dole Food Company Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 1996 (Washington, DC, 1997), p.3. 43 Reinhold, Robert, ‘Pineapple, after long affair, jilts Hawaii for Asian suitors’, NYT, 26 December 1991, pp.A1, A18; US Dept. of Agriculture, Horticultural Products Review, November 1991, p.11; Eagar, Harry, ‘ML&P stands pat’, Hawaii Investor 12/11 (1992), p.16. 44 Securities and Exchange Commission, Dole Food Company, Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ended 30 December 2000 (Washington, DC, 2001). 45 Fruit and Tree Nuts Outlook, 21 November 2003, p.16; Dole Food Company Inc. 10-K Annual report for the fiscal year ending 31 December 2005, p.5; Suryanata, Krisnawati, ‘Products from Paradise: The social construction of Hawaii crops’, Agriculture and Human Values 17/2 (2000), pp.181–9; David C. Cole, ‘A new beginning’, HA [Online], 29 July 2007. 46 Dole, Behind the Smoke Screen: An Investigation into Dole’s Banana Plantations in Latin America (Chicago, 2006). 47 Digal, Larry N., ‘Benefit diffusion and linkage development in the Philippines tropical fruits sector’, Paper Presented at ‘Closing the Productivity Gap’, Asian Institute of Management Policy Center, Makati City, Philippines, 27 June 2005, pp.29–30. 48 ‘Ex-rebel stronghold now a vast pineapple area’, Sun-Star: General Santos [Online Edition], 23 January 2006; ‘Maasim’s big turnaround’, Sun-Star: General Santos, 20 March 2006. 49 SA8000 Signatory Public Report – 2003: Dole Food Company, www.sa-intl. org. 50 ‘Dolefil sets eyes on bankrupt firm’, Sun-Star: General Santos [Online Edition], 16 January 2006. 51 Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., Annual Report 2005, pp.24, 37. 52 ‘Del Monte shuts down; 551 will lose jobs’, HA [Online Edition], 18 November 2006. 53 Digal, Philippine Tropical Fruits, pp.28, 30; Fresh Del Monte, Annual Report 2005, p.40. 54 ‘Camerons buy Maui Pineapple Company in major move’, Pine Review 10/2 (October 1969), p.1; ‘Businesses that built Hawaii: Commitment keeps Maui Pine running’, HSB [Online Edition], 29 September 2002. Colin Cameron died in June 1992. After his death his family ceased to be actively involved in the management of the Maui Land & Pineapple Co. ‘Colin Cameron, 65, Hawaiian Who Led Pineapple Company’, NYT, 14 June 1992, p.54. 55 Hillinger, Charles, ‘Pineapple firms in Hawaii bounce back from slump’, Los Angeles Times, 31 August 1985, p.IV-2. 56 Maui Land & Pineapple Company, Inc., Annual Report, 1999; ‘Japan seeks more steel tariff concessions’, HA [Online Edition], 12 June 2002; ‘Maui Land & Pine reports $4 million quarterly loss’, HA [Online Edition], 6 August 2003; ‘Hawai’i’s pineapple growers convert fields to extra-sweet crop’, HA [Online Edition], 9 October 2003; Hadi, Prayogo U., ‘The Case Study of Canned

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Pineapple in Indonesia’, Paper Presented at UNCTAD Workshop on Commodity Export Diversification and Poverty Reduction in South and South-East Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, 3–5 April 2001, p.3; Torres-Kitamura, Maria, ‘The pine payoff plan’, Hawaii Business 42/11 (1997), pp.27, 29–31. 57 ‘AOL’s Case buys stake in Maui Land & Pine’, HSB [Online Edition], 1 July 1999; ‘Maui Land & Pineapple announces sale of Costa Rican unit’, Business Wire, 16 December 2003; ‘Former eBay, AOL execs buy into Maui Land & Pine’, HSB [Online Edition], 13 March 2007; ‘Maui packer to sell only fresh pineapple’, HSB [Online Edition], 1 May 2007; ‘”Sad day”: County leaders fear more losses to come’, Maui News [Online Edition], 25 July 2008; ‘Maui Pine CEO on layoff hot seat’, HA [Online Edition], 10 August 2008; ‘Maui Land dropping pineapple production’, HA [Online Edition], 4 November 2009; ‘Maui Pineapple harvests final crop’, HSB [Online Edition], 24 December 2009. 58 SFC, 25 September 1989, pp.C1, C5. 59 HSB, 25 November 1982, p.A10; National Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Pineapples: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 2007); US Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Fruit and Tree Nuts: Situation and Outlook Report Yearbook (1991), p.36. After 2006 the NAAS stopped collecting statistics on the Hawaiian pineapple industry to avoid disclosure of individual operations. National Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Fruits: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 2010). 60 Hawaii Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Pineapples: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 1987), p.1: 1991, p.1; US Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Statistical Bulletin No.821, US Markets for Caribbean Basin Fruits and Vegetables: Selected Characteristics for 17 Fresh and Frozen Imports (Washington, DC, 1991), pp.1, 36–7, 65, 112–4; US Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Fruit and Tree Nuts: Situation and Outlook Report, March 1992, p.42; National Agricultural Statistics Service, Hawaii Pineapples: Annual Summary (Honolulu, 2006), p.1; Fruit and Tree Nuts Outlook, 21 November 2003, pp.13–7; ‘The international pineapple trade: The great years’, FruiTrop 132, March 2006, pp.2–6. 61 Beauman, Fran, The Pineapple: King of Fruits (London, 2005), p.244.

Conclusion 1 Tedlow, New and Improved, pp.4–6. 2 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.24. 3 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.34. 4 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp.34–6. 5 Hawkins, ‘World depression’, p.57. 5 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp.35–8. 7 Hawkins, ‘World depression’, p.61. 6 Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole Worldwide

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Index

265

INDEX

A & B Group, 84, 94–96, 128, 130 A & P stores, 77, 79, 91 Abu-Ghazaleh family, 182 Ackerman, John Douglas, 6–7, 186 Adams, Romanzo, 144 Agricultural Marketing Act (1929), 74–75 Akana, (F.) Lang, 139 Al Pearce and his Gang (radio programme), 94 Alaska Packers’ Association, 46 Alaska-Yukon Exposition (1909), 31–32 Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., 3–4, 56, 94–95, 119–120, 129–130, 132 American Can Co., 22, 24, 30, 35, 46, 54, 68 American Factors, 3, 56 American Federation of Labor, 161 American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 46–47 American Medical Association, 79 American Securities Co., 67 American Sugar Co., 122, 125 American Weekly, 76, 79 Anderson, Frank, 46 Anglo-American Reciprocal Trade Agreement (1938), 82 Apokaa Sugar Co., 13 Armitage, George T., 127–128 Armour, 34 Army and Navy Register, 30 Arnold, Lewis E., 108, 110

Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Canners (AHPC), 53–55, 57, 60–61, 80, 102 Atherton, Frank, 73 Baker, Phil, 94 Baldwin, David Dwight, 18, 128 Baldwin, Harry A. (Alexander), 127, 131 Baldwin, Henry P. (Perrine), 130 Baldwin, Frank F. (Fowler), 127 Baldwin Packers, 56, 94, 96, 123, 130, 153, 155, 177 Baldwin, William A. (Atwater), 18, 124 Ballenger, Nicole, 179 Baltimore Canned Goods Exchange, 40 Bank of Bishop & Co. Ltd., 71 Bank of California, 46 Bank of Hawaii, 18, 23, 67 Barnes, Kenneth B. (Bigham), 174 Barnhart, Henry A., 34 Bauer, Peter, 181 Baumgartner, A. (August) C., 22–23, 27, 48–49 Beauman, Francesca, 185 Beechert, Edward D., 143–144, 151 Bell, Rolland G., 161 Bentley, Charles H., 45 Bentley, Charles P., 25 Bentley, Robert I., 52, 58 Berman, Edward, 161

266

A Pacific Industry

Big Five, 3, 4, 141 Bishop & Co. (bankers), 134 Bishop Co. Ltd., 72 Bishop Estate, 34 Bishop First National Bank, 67, 71–72, 134 Bishop, Sereno E., 5 Bishop Trust Co., 67, 72 Blascoer, Frances, 148 Bloomfield-Brown, Harold, 128 Blue Eagle, 92 Blumlein, Jacob, 22–23 Board of Health (Territory of Hawaii), 146, 148 Borthwick, Russell P., 151 Botley, Richard, 87, 113 Brandes, Stuart M., 149 Brown, Martin, 106 Bruehl, Anton, 93 Brunner, W.W., 58 Butler, Bernard, 158–159 C. Brewer & Co., 2–3 California Canneries Co., 35 California Feed Co., 21 California Fruit Canners’ Association (CFCA), 4, 18, 25, 34–35, 46, 59, 124, 167, 187 California Fruit Growers’ Exchange (CFGE), 39, 52, 79, 87 California Packing Corporation (Calpak), 46–48, 50, 52, 54–55, 57–62, 65, 72, 82, 84, 89–92, 95, 97, 119, 121, 123–126, 130– 131, 135–138, 140, 149–150, 153, 155, 157, 160, 167–172, 175, 186, 188 Camarinos, Peter, 9 Cameron, Colin, 184 Cameron, J. Walter, 131 Campbell Soup Co., 39, 93 Canadian Canners Inc., 174 Canners’ League of California, 75, 215–216 Canning Trade, 37, 45, 150 Capper-Volstead Co-operative Associations Marketing Act (1922), 74–75, 85

Capper, Arthur, 49 Captain Cook Coffee Co., 28, 58 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (1983), 180, 182, 185 Case, Stephen M., 184 Cassandre, A.M., 92 Castle & Cooke, Ltd., 3–4, 18, 35, 69–73, 94–95, 128, 182 Castle, James B., 35, 58, 121 Castle, William Richards, 58 Central California Canneries Co., 36, 46, 207 Century of Progress Exposition (1933), 89 Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., 3–4, 112, 186–187 Charley, Vernon, 87 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 143 Chinese Exclusion Act (Kingdom of Hawaii) (1886), 143 Chrysler, Walter, 91 Citizen Labour Program (Territory of Hawaii), 153–154 Clark, Byron O. (Orlando), 16–20, 108, 202 Cleghorn, W.A., 174 Coiner, Charles T., 92–93 Collins, Julius L., 104 Colum, Padraic, 131–132 Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 93–94 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (1988) (Philippines), (CARL), 181 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 161–162 Consolidated Pineapple Co., Ltd., 19, 28, 34–35 Cooke, Charles M., 73 Cookson, Charles Wilson, 110 County of Maui, 159 Covarrubias, Miguel, 92 Coyle, William, 179 Cullen, Michael J., 90 Curtis, Cyrus H.K., 36 Curtis Publishing Co., 59 Cushing, Robert L., 147

Index de Paula y Marin, Don Francisco, 6 Daily Bulletin (Honolulu), 7, 10 Davao Agricultural Ventures Corporation (DAVCO), 184 Dean, Arthur L., 102 Del Monte brand, 50, 59–60, 63, 90–91, 182 Del Monte Corp., 176, 178–181 Del Monte Foods Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), 182 Del Monte Foods, USA, 182 Del Rio, Dolores, 92 Delineator, 30, 54, 60 Denison, H.L., 105 Department of Public Instruction (Territory of Hawaii), 153 Dillingham Group, 3–4, 159, 232 Dillingham, Benjamin F., 23 Dillingham, Walter F., 21, 23–24, 159 Dingley Tariff (1897), 12, 32–33, 200 Dole, Anna, 20 Dole brand, 57, 91–94, 182, 185 Dole, James D. (Drummond), 16, 20– 25, 28–29, 32–33, 43, 48–50, 52, 57–58, 61, 63–64, 67–73, 91, 93, 98, 102, 107–114, 117, 126–129, 144–145, 148, 150– 151, 168, 173–174, 186–188 Dole Race (1927), 57–58 Dole, Rev. Charles F. (Fletcher), 19 Dole, Richard, 21 Dole, Sanford B. (Ballard), 11, 19–21 Doty, Ralph E., 105 Dowsett Co., 126 Dowsett Estate, 21 Dye, Tom, 1 Eagen, Elwyn J., 159 Eames, A.W. (Alfred Warner) Jr., 48, 52, 157 Eames, A.W. (Alfred Warner) Sr., 33, 38, 48 Eckart, Charles, 101 Eitaki, Hisakichi, 132–133 Ellsworth, Earl K., 108 Elting, Victor, 53 Emma, Queen, 2, 198

267

Emmeluth, John, 8–14, 25–26, 32, 186 Empire Marketing Board (United Kingdom), 172 Erwin Waisey Co., 52 European Economic Community, 178 Everybody’s, 30 Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 157, 163 Farrington, Wallace R. (Rider), 137 Ferleger, Louis, 98 Fisher, George E., 111 Fleischman, Richard K., 146 Fleming, David T., 130 Florida Agriculturist, 8 Florida Experiment Station, 41 Fordney-McCumber Tariff (1922), 53–54, 62 Fox, Stephen, 39 Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., 182–184 Galambos, Louis, 40 Galbraith, J.K. (John Kenneth), 38–39 Gallagher, J., 9 General Electric, 87 General Foods, 71 Gentlemen’s Agreement between Japan and the US (1908), 143 Ginaca, Camille, 109 Ginaca, Henry, 107–112 Ginaca, Joseph, 108–109 Ginaca, Louis, 109 Gitai, Amos, 179, 181 Glanz, Rudolf, 22 Goebel, Arthur C., 57 Good Housekeeping, 30, 36–37, 54, 57, 60 Grant, H.R., 132 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A & P), 77, 79, 91 Griffin & Skelley Co., 46 Grigg, Edward, 172 Grist, D.H., 98 Grove Ranch, 130–131 Growers’ Canning Association, 136

268

A Pacific Industry

H.J. Heinz, 90–91, 149 H.K. McCann Co., 55, 59–60 H.P. Baldwin Trust, 130 Hackfeld & Co., Ltd., 3 Haiku Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd./ Haiku Pineapple Co., 18, 28, 44, 50, 95, 123, 126, 128–131, 133–134, 136 Haitian Pineapple Co., 171 Haleakala Pineapple Co., 95, 131 Haleakala Ranch Co., 125, 130–131 Hall, John (aka Jack), 162 Hall, William, 179 Harper’s Bazar, 30 Harper’s Magazine, 92 Harrison, Travis, 87 Haserot Co., 56 Haserot, Samuel F., 56 Hatch Act (1887), 99 Havighorst, Carl R., 94 Hawaii, Territory of, 11, 116, 125, 143, 161 as landowner, 16, 116, 124–125, 141 Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station (HAES), 19, 99–106 Hawaii Hochi, 70–71, 145, 152, 156 Hawaii Promotion Committee, 45 Hawaii Tourist Bureau, 45, 58 Hawaiian Canneries Co., 35, 56, 66, 84, 112, 123, 136–137 Hawaiian Canners’ Society, 53, 150 Hawaiian Cannery Co., 34, 121 Hawaiian Homes Act of 1921, 137, 140 Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC), 137–141, 160 Hawaiian Fruit & Packing Co., Ltd., 9, 11–12, 19, 22, 26 Hawaiian Fruit & Plant Co., 19, 26 Hawaiian Fruit Packers, 136–137 Hawaiian Islands Packing Co., Ltd., 38, 48 Hawaiian Isles Packing Co., 28 Hawaiian Labor Commission, 145 Hawaiian Pineapple Co./Dole Corporation/Dole Food Co., Inc.,, 3–4, 21–24, 26–28, 35–36,

38, 44, 46–51, 54–60, 62–64, 66–75, 77, 83–87, 89–95, 97–98, 101, 104–105, 108–109, 111–113, 118–119, 121, 123, 126–128, 135–136, 148, 150, 152, 154–155, 168, 173–175, 177–184, 186, 188 Lanai Plantation, 55, 67, 119–121, 123, 127–128, 173, 182–183 Hawaiian Pineapple Day, 45 Hawaiian Pineapple Growers’ Association (HPGA), 28–33, 36, 39–40 Hawaiian Pineapple Packers’ Association (HPPA), 36–37, 40, 45, 47, 52–53, 101 Hawaiian Preserving Co., 35 Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA), 25–26, 101–102, 146–147, 156, 162 Hawaiian Trust Co., 67 Hawaiian Voice of Labor, 161 Haywood, Harry, 24 Hearst, William Randolph, 76 Hedstrom, J. Maynard, 174 Hensen, Charles, 8 Hilo Fruit and Packing Co., 28, 118–119 Hine, Thomas, 59 Hite, Charles M., 160 Hollywood Hotel (radio programme), 93 Holt, Valentine, 104 Horner, Albert Jr., 35, 112 Horner, Albert Sr., 35, 137 Honolua Ranch, 130 Honolulu Bound (radio programme), 93–94 Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, 32, 57–58 Honolulu Fruit Co., 136 Honolulu Iron Works, 109 Honolulu Lithograph Co., 25 Honolulu Longshoremen’s Association (HLA), 159 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 24–25, 143, 230 Hooper, Paul F., 1

Index Hoover, Herbert, 165 Houston, Victor S., 61, 168 Hoyt, Simes T., 87, 101, 113, 174 Hughes, H.M., 62 Hunt, Joseph Hancock, 22–24 Hunt Brothers Packing Co., 22–23, 27, 36, 56 Husband & Thomas, 36–37 Immigration Act (1924), 143 Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. (IRC), 162–164 International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), 159, 161, 177 Island Canning Co. (Thailand), 179 Isthmian Steamship Co., 68–71 J.A. Richards & Staff, 30 J.K. Armsby Co., 36, 46 J.S. Johnson & Co., 33, 38 J. Walter Thompson (JWT), 54–55, 59, 75–77, 79–80 Jackson, Kermit J., 105 Jacobs, Isidor, 35–36 Jacoby, Sanford M., 149 James Dole Engineering Co., 114 Japanese Pineapple Growers Cooperative, 132 Jensen, Martin, 57 John Ii Estate, 122, 126 John R. Mitchell Co., 107 Jordan, E.W., 21, 25 Judd & Atkinson, 21 Judd, Lawrence M., 24–25, 138–139, 168 Kaiulani Home for Young Women and Girls, 148 Kalakaua, King David, 2, 9–10, 198 Kalanianole, Prince Jonah Kuhio, 33, 137, 141 Kaonohi, David (aka Johnny Pineapple), 94 Kauai Fruit & Land Co./Kauai Pineapple Co., 18, 28, 56, 66, 94, 118, 123, 129–130, 152–153, 161

269

Kawananakoa, Princess Abigail, 139 Keahua Ranch Co., 130–131 Keith, Robert J., 91 Kellogg, Leonard G., 19–20 Kent, Noel, 66 Kenya Canners Ltd., 178 Keuchel, Edward F. Jr., 106 Kidwell, John, 7–15, 18–19, 22, 25, 186 King, Thomas, 21 Knutson, Harold, 53–54 Kohala Pineapple Co., 119, 123 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), 181–182 Kona Fruit Preserving Co., 6–7 Koolau Fruit Co., 117, 121 Kuniyoshi, Yasuo, 92 Ladies’ Home Journal, 30, 36, 54, 60, 76 Ladies’ World, 30 Laird, Pamela Walker, 30 Lambert, Albert, 140 Land Act (1895), 16, 20, 116–117 Lawrence Warehouse Co., 83 Lazonick, William, 4, 40, 98 Lecker, J.J., 9 Lester, A.M., 61–62 Levenstein, Harvey, 42, 65, 79 Lewis, Elgie J., 107–108 Lewis, John L., 161 Libby, McNeill & Libby, 4, 34–35, 42, 44, 46–47, 54–55, 59–63, 72, 84, 89–90, 92–93, 97–98, 108, 113–114, 117–119, 121–126, 132, 135, 137–140, 157, 159–160, 163, 171–173, 175, 177–178, 186–187 Libby’s brand, 59, 63, 89–90, 173 Lihue Plantation, 56, 137 Liliuokalani, Queen, 10 Limerick, Patricia Nelson, 39 Lister, Archie E., 111 Lister, Robert, 111 Lyman, Lewis Thornton, 172 MacFarlane, Fred W., 34 McBryde Sugar Co., 129

270

A Pacific Industry

McBryde, Walter D., 152 McCall’s Magazine/McCall’s, 57, 60 McCandless Brothers, 11 McCann, H.K., 59 McCann-Erickson Inc., 60, 80 McCarthy, Charles J., 137 McClellan, George B., 32, 53 McClure’s, 30 McKinley Tariff (1890), 10 Makino, Frederick, 70 Mark, Shelley M., 177 Marquès, Dr. Auguste Jean Baptiste, 12 Marsden, Joseph, 12, 14, 19 Mass, William, 40 Matheson, Roderick O., 26 Matson Navigation Co., 47, 67–70 Matthiessen, Conrad K., 105 Maui Agricultural Co., 95, 125, 130–131 Maui Pineapple Co. (founded in 1910), 133–134 Maui Pineapple Co. (founded in 1932), 95–96, 118, 123, 126, 130–131, 157–158, 164, 177, 184 Maui Land & Pineapple Co. (ML&P), 183–184 Mitsubishi, 81, 179 Molokai Ranch, 73, 119, 122, 125 Morris Hedstrom, Limited, 174 Muller, Waldemar, 6–7, 186 Munkacsi, Martin, 93 Munsey’s, 30 Murdock, David, 182 N.W. Ayer & Son, 91–93 National Canners Association, 40 National Code of Fair Competition for the Canning Industry (N0.446), 156 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 92, 156–157 National Labor Relations Act (1935), 157, 161 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 157, 159–162 National Recovery Administration (NRA), 92, 156–157

Naya, Seiji, 171 New Deal, 153, 156, 159, 164 New York State Agricultural Experiment Station, 106 NutriAsia Group, 182 NutriAsia Pacific, 182 O’Keeffe, Georgia, 92–93 Oahu Island Pineapple Growers Cooperative, 133 Oahu Railway & Land Co., Ltd., 11, 16, 21, 23–24, 122, 124, 126, 171 Oakland Preserving Co., 59 Office of Experiment Stations, 99 Organic Act (1900), 143 Overfield, Richard A., 99 Overland Monthly, 30 Pacific Commercial Advertiser/Honolulu Advertiser, 6, 8, 12, 14, 17–18, 23, 26–27, 46, 58–59, 143 Pacific Monthly, 30 Palmer, Rev. Albert W., 151 Panama-Pacific International Exposition (1915), 45, 111 Paradise of the Pacific, 13, 17 Parker, Linda, 141 Parsons, Louella, 93 Pauwela Pineapple Co., 122–124 Payne-Aldrich Tariff (1909), 32–34, 38 Pearce, Al, 94 Pearl City Fruit Co., Ltd., 9, 13, 15, 17–18, 25, 28, 47, 111, 123, 134–136 Pease, Otis, 79 People’s Home Journal, 54 Philippines Bureau of Commerce and Industry, 167 Philippines National Development Company, 170, 178 Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpak), 97, 168–170, 176–177, 181 Philips, Peter, 106 Pictorial Review, 57 Pierce, Fair & Co., 67 Piggly Wiggly, 77

Index Pilipo, George Washington, 5, 7 Pillsbury, 91 Pilorz, Bruno P., 168 Pineapple Canning Industry Baltimore, 6–7, 11, 15, 23, 28, 32–33, 37, 41, 106 Pineapple Experiment Station, 53, 86, 102–105 Pineapple Growers’ Association of Hawaii (PGAH), 86 Pineapple Industry - Australia, 173, 178 Azores (Portugal), 5–6 Bahamas, 5–7, 15, 27–28, 33, 37–38, 41, 107 British Malaya/Singapore, 6, 13, 15, 31–33, 37–38, 41, 61, 176, 178, 187 Costa Rica, 180, 183–185 Cuba, 33–34, 53, 61, 81–82 Ecuador, 183 Haiti, 171 Honduras, 183 Indonesia, 181, 183–184 Ivory Coast, 179 Kenya, 172, 178, 183 Mexico, 97 Philippines, 81–82, 97, 167–169, 173–174, 176, 178–185, 188 Puerto Rico, 81 South Africa, 177–178 Swaziland, 175, 178 Taiwan, 81–82, 97, 176–179, 188 Thailand, 179–183, 185 Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association (PPCA), 75, 77–80, 82–86, 88. 90, 92, 94–95, 97, 105, 126, 128, 162, 168, 175 Pineapple Research Institute of Hawaii, 86, 105 Pineapple Wilt, 42, 101–105 Pollay, Richard W., 92 Porteus, Elizabeth Dole, 21–22 Potter, Grace, 150 Pratt, Joseph, 40 Pullman, Carol, 23

271

Rea, George P., 72 Resor, Stanley, 54–55, 59 Resor, Helen, 59 Rice, Harold Waterhouse, 124, 126 Richards, Atherton, 71–73, 83–84, 86, 94, 97 Risdon Iron Works, 109 Robinson, Mark, 9 Robinson-Patman Act (1936), 91 Rockefeller, John D. Jr., 162 Rodenburg, William A., 53–54 Rolfs, Peter H., 15 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 81, 156 Roth, William P., 70 Roy, Pierre, 92 Royal Hawaiian Corporation, 139 Sackman, Douglas Cazaux, 79 Safeway, 77 Salvation Army, 152 San Miguel Corporation, 182 Saturday Evening Post, 36, 57, 60, 75–76, 91 Schluter, Paul, 58 Schwaab, Ernest F., 30–31 Schwarz, Henry G., 113–114 Schwarz Engineering Co., Inc., 114 Shaw Apple Grater, 107 Shaw, Elton P., 112 Sheets, Millard, 92 Siam Agro Industry Pineapple and Others Public Company Ltd. of Thailand, 183–184 Sievers, John H., 7 Silva, Jonathan, 75 Sinclair-Scott Co., 106–107 Sloss, Louis, 204 Smith, Jared G., 99–100 Smith, Robert Tynes, 38, 207 Smooth Cayenne Pineapple, 8, 18, 104, 173 Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930), 61–62, 80–82 Social Security Act (1935), 157, 164 Stanley, Albert, 112 Stannard, David E., 1 Steadman, A.E., 73 Sterne, Maurice, 92

272

A Pacific Industry

Stole, Inger, 79 Sunset Magazine, 30 Suryanata, Krisnawati, 183 Sussman, Samuel, 22–23 Sussman, Wormser and Co. (S & W), 22, 114 Suva Chamber of Commerce, 173–174 Swift & Co., 34 Sylva, Edward N., 140 Taiwan Pineapple Corporation, 179 Takaki, Ronald, 2, 143 Taylor, Robert Brooks, 112 T’boli Agro-Industrial Development Inc. (Tadi), 183 Techuantepec Railroad, 46 Tedlow, Richard S., 4, 42, 90, 186 Tenney, Edward D., 69, 73 Texas Pacific Group, 182 The Canner, 91 The Modern Priscilla, 54 Theo. H. Davies & Co. Ltd., 3, 13, 18, 24–25, 129 Thomas Pineapple Co., 26, 28, 36, 47, 118, 122 Thomas, Will B., 26, 29, 47 Thurston, Lorrin A., 5, 9, 58, 115 Tiedemann, T.H.A., 162 Torres, Raquel, 92 Tracy, Fred, 21 Tropic Fruit Co., 18–19, 108–109 True, Alfred Charles, 99 Tyson, Thomas N., 146 US-Cuban Reciprocity Treaty (1903), 82 US-Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty (1875), 2, 5, 10, 15 US-Japanese Commercial Treaty (1911), 82 US Steel Corp., 68 Underwood-Simmons Tariff (1913), 37–38 Unemployment Compensation Board (Territory of Hawaii), 161 Union Iron Works, 109

United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing & Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), 161 United Pineapple Workers of Molokai (UPWM), 159–160 United States Army, 23, 47 United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC), 165–166, 171, 175 United States Bureau of Foreign Commerce, 165 United States Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA), 167 United States Bureau of the Census, 147 United States Customs Service, 32 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 13, 15, 99–100 United States Department of Commerce, 166 United States Department of Commerce and Labor, 166 United States Department of State, 165–166 United States Farm Credit Administration, 140 United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 63, 80, 117–118 United States House of Representatives, 146 United States Interstate Commerce Commission, 171 United States Navy, 2, 47, 57 United States Supreme Court, 157 United States Women’s Bureau, 153 University of Hawaii, 102–103, 153 Van Camp Pork (Van Camp Packing Co.), 39 Velveeta processed cheese (KraftPhenix Cheese Corp.), 79 Vidor, King, 92

Index Wahiawa Consolidated Pineapple Co., 58, 124, 132 Wahiawa Homestead Settlement, 16–26, 47–48, 116, 126 Wahiawa Settlement Association, 16–18 Waialua Agricultural Co., 72, 126–127, 132 Waipio Pineapple Co., 122, 132 Waller-Zuckerman, Mary Ellen, 39 Webb, Sidney James (Lord Passfield), 172 Welch, Louis E., 162 Wendt, Walter A., 105, 174 West, Jonathan, 40 West Coast Pines (Fiji) Limited, 173 Western Canner & Packer, 87 Wheeler-Lee Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act (1938), 80 White, Henry A., 73 Whitmore, John L., 101 Wilkes, Commodore Charles, 6 William, Dimond & Co., 12–13 Wilkins, Mira, 165, 175 Wilson-Gorman Tariff (1894), 8, 12 Wilson, James, 99 Wilson, Woodrow, 45 Women’s Home Companion, 30, 54, 60 Woman’s World, 54 Woods, Samuel Parker (aka Sam), 118–119 Yangson, Alipio B., 160 Yellow Spot Disease, 104 Young & Rubicam, 93 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), 152 Zalburg, Sanford, 161 Zastrow, George W., 107–109

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A Pacific Industry