A Novel Approach to China: What China Debaters Can Learn from Contemporary Chinese Novelists (China in Transformation) [1st ed. 2021] 9811665176, 9789811665172

Citation preview

A Novel Approach to China What China Debaters Can Learn from Contemporary Chinese Novelists Gengsong Gao

A Novel Approach to China

Gengsong Gao

A Novel Approach to China What China Debaters Can Learn from Contemporary Chinese Novelists

Gengsong Gao Chinese Studies University of Richmond Richmond, VA, USA

ISBN 978-981-16-6517-2 ISBN 978-981-16-6518-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

Taking “Obsession with China” on Its Own Terms New Criticism and “Obsession with China” “Obsession with China,” the well-known phrase in modern Chinese literary studies, was coined by C.T.Hsia in an essay called “Obsession with China: The Moral Burden of Modern Chinese Literature.” This essay was first published in an edited volume China in Perspective in 1967 and then reprinted as an appendix to Hsia’s second edition of A History of Modern Chinese Fiction in 1971, the first comprehensive history of modern Chinese literature written in English that assesses modern Chinese literary works mostly from the perspective of the mid-century American New Criticism’s favored languages of “irony,” “tension,” “paradox,” “ambiguity” and “unity.” In this essay, Hsia makes the well-known critique that modern China’s long series of defeats and humiliations by Western colonial powers led modern Chinese literary writers to be so morbidly obsessed with the questions of what’s wrong with China and what can be done that they were unable to explore more universal moral and religious issues. Hsia accuses modern Chinese writers of viewing the darkness of China as peculiarly Chinese without “the courage or insight to equate the Chinese scene with the condition of modern man.” Hsia argues that “the price he (modern Chinese writer) pays for his obsession with China is

v

vi

PREFACE

therefore a certain patriotic provinciality and a naiveté of faith with regard to better conditions elsewhere.”1 In 2014, more than four decades later, Howard Goldblatt, a prolific English translator of contemporary Chinese novels, extended Hsia’s critique of “obsession with China” from the Republican (1912–1949) to postsocialist (1978-present) Chinese writers. In an article titled “Why Does Chinese Literature Fail to Go Global” published in the renowned Chinese language literary newspaper Wenxuebao 文学报 (Literary Newspaper) that discusses the reasons for contemporary Chinese literature’s “failure” to gain popularity with Western readers, Goldblatt says “Hsia’s comment (on ‘obsession with China’) is directed mostly at modern Chinese writers like Lu Xun and Mao Dun. However, I think it applies to contemporary Chinese writers as well. They are so preoccupied with everything concerning China that they ignore one crucial point for literary creation: readers will not buy your novel unless it is a good read.”2 Then what constitutes “a good read” for Western readers? Like Hsia, Goldblatts believes that a Chinese literary piece must meet the New Criticism’s aesthetic criteria, that is, it must be coherent, unified, well-structured and eye-catching from the first page. Goldblatt rebukes Chinese novelists for including “absurd plots,” adding “numerous details irrelevant to the plot development” and often “digressing from the main plot to elaborate on small things.”3 For Goldblatt, these “unnecessary” characteriological descriptions and cultural details disrupt the smooth flow of narration and undermine contemporary Chinese novels’ appeal to Western readers. Goldblatt agrees with German sinologist Wolfgang Kubin’s attribution of the “mediocre” quality of contemporary Chinese literature to Chinese writers’ provincial mentality and narrow worldview that stem from their poor command of foreign languages and limited ability to communicate with foreign writers and readers.4 To turn Chinese novel into a good read and maximize sales in the English book market, Goldblatt and his editors, sometimes even with the cooperation of Chinese writers themselves, restructured the novels and removed many cultural and characteriological details and historical references that they 1 Ibid. 2 See Goldblatt (2012). 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

PREFACE

vii

perceived as “unnecessary” and “irrelevant” from the English translations.5 Some Chinese literary critics criticize Goldblatt for his truncation, redaction and domestication of Chinese literary texts to fit Western readers’ ideologies, aesthetic tastes and reading habits, but others show sympathetic understanding.6 They believe that were it not for Goldblatt’s translations, Mo Yan could not have won the Nobel Prize in Literature, a prize that Chinese literary writers and critics have coveted for more than a century. They take English translator’s reduction, redaction and restructuring of the original Chinese literary texts as an inevitable price that Chinese literary writers have to pay for acquiring a fair share of the Western book market and for internationalizing contemporary Chinese literature.7

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of “China” Chinese literature can be translated by translators into English. It can also be studied and written about in English by literary critics and scholars of Chinese literature. If the textual truncation and redaction and domestication are the prices for contemporary Chinese literature to pay for “go(ing) global,” then is there any price for modern Chinese literary studies to pay for its own “go(ing) global”? Prior to the 1990s, modern Chinese literary studies in the United States was mostly done by orthodox sinologists whose work was considered as part of Asian area studies and received little attention by scholars of other national literatures, literary theories and cultural studies. From the beginning

5 For instance, Mo Yan’s novel Fengru feidian丰乳肥殿 (Big Breasts and Wide Hips) has a very complicated non-linear plotline. Goldblatt’s English translation switched the order of Chapter Two and Chapter Seven to make the plotline more linear and easier for English readers to follow. For a detailed discussion on this restructuring, see Peng (2017, 125). For the discussion on English translation’s simplification of culturally and historically loaded words and the deletion of characters’ historical and social background introduction, see Shao (2013, 62–66). 6 For criticisms of Goldblatt’s translation, see Li (2013) and Liu and Xu (2014). For the sympathetic support of Goldblatt’s translation, see Xie (2013). 7 For a summary of defensive arguments for Goldblatt’s domesticating translation, see Liu and Xu (2014, 10–11).

viii

PREFACE

of the 1990s, a new generation of scholars of modern Chinese literature emerged.8 To get modern Chinese literary studies out of the silo of the narrow area studies, the new generation of scholars and critics employed various trendy poststructuralist and deconstruction theories that Anglo-American literary scholars were familiar with to their studies of modern and contemporary Chinese literature and culture. Poststructuralism and deconstruction are problematic terms that include “a diverse and often contradictory group of ideas on the specious basis of what preceded them in a chronology of Parsian thought.”9 However, despite their vast diversity and complexity, their general anti-mimetic and antirealist tendency is still recognizable. As Rey Chow puts it, “the one unmistakable accomplishment of ‘theory’ understood in this restricted sense is what one might call the fundamental problematization of referentiality.”10 As Elaine Jeffreys explains, Chow here is referring to “the general poststructuralist-deconstructive tendency to destabilize positivistic and universalizing conceptions of the ‘real,’ irrespective of whether ‘the real’ is defined as ‘language,’ ‘the author,’ ‘the individual,’ ‘Woman,’ ‘the Nation,’ and ‘the State,’ and so forth.”11 When this poststructuralist interrogative impetus was extended to the Anglophone modern Chinese literary studies, a series of foundational concepts and assumptions that had been taken for granted in governing previous modern Chinese literary studies were called into question. For the new generation of poststructuralist critics and scholars, previous sinologists mistook modern Chinese literature as a transparent representation of Chinese tradition, history or reality. To counter this naïve realist reading, the emerging poststructuralist critics and scholars do not treat modern Chinese literary text as a mirror of Chinese history and reality but as a body of discourses and formal artifices that expose the uncertainty of “the real” and that either subvert or reproduce various repressive ideologies and epistemologies (logocentrism, patriarchalism, colonialism, orientalism, imperialism, sexism, global capitalism and neoliberalism). After a decade of extensive application of various poststructuralist theories to modern Chinese literary studies in the

8 For a brief introduction to the new generation of scholars and critics in the 1990s, see Wang (2006, 132–136). 9 Barrett (1992, 201). 10 Chow (1998, xiii). 11 Jeffreys (2004, 23).

PREFACE

ix

1990s, the more radical poststructuralist practitioners were still unsatisfied, because they thought that although the previously dominant realist literary concepts and assumptions had been contested, “China,” the most foundational concept in modern Chinese studies, was still taken as a fixed racial and geopolitical entity without being sufficiently unmasked and deconstructed. In her much-quoted essay “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem,” Rey Chow contends that “Chineseness can no longer be held as a monolithic given tied to the mythic homeland but must rather be understood as a provisional ‘open signifier’.”12 By treating “Chinese” as “open signifier,” Chow proposes “splitting and multiplying” the monolithic identity (China and Chineseness) not only in abstract theoretical discussions but also in more specific studies of texts and media. Echoing Chow’s call, Shumei Shih, Chien-Hsin Tsai and Brian Bernards in 2013 proposed “Sinophone studies” that continue the poststructuralist deconstruction of China. Its primary target of critique is “the singular and all-consuming ‘obsession with China’.”13 Its primary research assumption, quoting Ien Ang, is to view “Chineseness” as “an open and indeterminate signifier whose meanings are constantly renegotiated and rearticulated in different sections of the Chinese diaspora.” Its primary goal is to unveil the “heterogeneous practices of language and culture of Sinophone communities in a variety of locales.” Sinophone studies could be considered as a push for furthering Chinese literary and cultural studies along the anti-realist and anti-nationalist poststructuralist line. The poststructuralist-informed Sinophone studies should take the credit for expanding the objects of research from a limited set of canonical Chinese Han writers to broad cross-cultural texts and phenomena, exposing the formal constructedness of modern Chinese literary text, unveiling its political implications, opposing various forms of sinocentrism, liberating linguistic and cultural differences in Chinese ethnic minorities and diaspora communities and pulling Chinese literary studies out of the isolated Asian area studies for the attention of other disciplinary and interdisciplinary scholars. Considering the current increasingly assertive Chinese government that often constructs and appropriates a 12 For similar poststructuralist deconstructions of the foundational conceptions such as “China,” “Chineseness” and “Chinese identity,” see Chun (1998), Ang (2000) and Davies (2000). 13 Shih, Tsai and Bernards (2013, 17).

x

PREFACE

homogeneous Chinese tradition and unified identity under the current Xi’s regime for authoritarian and expansionist purposes, it is not surprising that the poststructuralist-informed modern Chinese studies is gaining special popularity and praise among the Western academics. However, despite its remarkable academic achievements and selfavowedly progressive political agenda, the poststructuralist Chinese literary studies is subject to critiques on empirical, theoretical and political grounds. First, the poststructuralist Chinese studies is preoccupied with unmasking the fluidity and indeterminacy of the concepts “China” and “Chineseness,” but fails to seriously engage with empirical research that proves the relative stability and continuity of China and Chinese identity. For instance, in his influential book Zhai zi zhongguo宅兹中国 (Here in China I Dwell), Ge Zhaoguang, a renowned Chinese historian, has recognized the complicated and historically changing meanings of China as a concept, but not gone to the poststructuralist extreme of denying its existence as a relatively stable social reality and cultural tradition. Ge points out that the term Zhongguo 中国, literally means “the center of all under heaven,” has a long history from the early forms of oracle bone scripts and bronze inscriptions to later standardized characters written with a brush. From the Classic of Poetry to Zuo’s Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annuals and the Mencius , the term Zhongguo appears in more than 30 pre-Qin classical texts often in contrast to four kinds of yi or barbarians. It first emerged as a cultural concept and later acquired a political sense associated with modern nation-state. Drawing on solid historical evidences, Ge argues that the consciousness and the form of a nation had already appeared in China in the Song Dynasty (960–1279): A nation- state, which had clear borderlines to mark the territory and a sense of the Other to form an international relationship, already started in China since the Song dynasty, mainly because of the pressure from foreign countries with increasingly greater powers. This nation-state had a remarkably firm foundation for its cultural identity and historical tradition, a very deep and widely shared ethics of life, and a clear space of political governance; therefore, the spatiality and subjectivity of such a Chinese nation-state is not necessarily related to what is known as “modernity” in the West.14

14 Ge (2011, 25–26). For a similar argument, see Tackett (2017).

PREFACE

xi

For Ge, the relative stability of China is not an empty political talking point, but has both objective and subjective, spatial and temporal grounds. China has specific territories. While its exact borders have been changing, the central regions remain relatively stable. Zhang Longxi, a Chinese literary scholar who often draws upon empirical evidence to counter the poststructuralist deconstruction of China, joins Ge in arguing that although it is different from the construction of modern Western nation-state with a single race, ethnicity and language, “the majority of the people living on the Chinese territories have a relatively stable self-understanding of being Chinese despite the various differences in ethnicity, language, region, habits and customs, and despite their difference sense of residing at the center or in the peripheries with regard to living conditions and cultural development.”15 The poststructuralist literary critics are aware of these empiricist challenges. However, they have not made serious historical studies to refute those textual and archeological evidence-based argument for the relative stability of Chinese identity and tradition. Instead, they either completely ignore or facilely dismiss all these empiricist studies and challenges as complicit with the conventional area studies that serve imperialist purposes.16 They view the poststructuralist-deconstructionist approach as the sole effective approach to “unpacking” the rich meanings of China, Chinese identity, Chinese tradition and Chinese literature. While claiming to be epistemologically 15 See Zhang (2015, 201). 16 Zhang Longxi made numerous empirically-based criticisms of the poststructuralist

China scholars (Rey Chow, Allen Chun and Ien Ang) since the early 1990s. To my knowledge, none of the latter seem to have responded to his critiques and seriously considered how to learn from the empirical studies and challenges to improve their poststructuralist studies of Chinese literature and culture. Shumei Shih, the major proponent of Sinophone studies, makes a brief unsubstantiated poststructuralist critique of Zhang: “he appeared to be advocating authentic knowledge about ‘Chinese reality’.” See Shih (2010, 468). However, if Zhang does not present himself as a scholar “advocating authentic knowledge,” does Shih ask him to advocate “inauthentic knowledge about Chinese reality”? For poststructuralist critics, all claims to knowledge, truth and reality must be called into question. However, they cannot tackle the challenge: They write and speak to refute others’ claims to truth and authentic knowledge, isn’t it because they believe their writing and speaking are more truthful and authentic than others? If not, why should we bother to read their works and listen to their opinions? In a recent essay “Racializing Area Studies, Defetishing China,” Shih accuses the existing area studies of continuing the Cold War area studies to serve imperialist interest, but does not provide any convincing evidence to support her claim. See Shih (2019, 34–35).

xii

PREFACE

self-reflexive and politically progressive, they are lacking in a due respect for native Chinese intellectuals’ theoretical agency and fail to engage themselves in a critical self-reflection on their own poststructuralist epistemological flaws and their potential perpetuation of Western theoretical hegemony. For instance, Rey Chow condescendingly attributes Chinese intellectuals’ habitual emphasis on the Chinese dimension to universal questions (such as modernity, modernism, gender, feminism) to “the logic of the wound.”17 To Chow, Chinese intellectuals are still “sick” and have not recovered from the “wound” of modern Western powers’ invasion and domination and fallen into a consistently “paranoid” resistance to the West. Only those who unreservedly and masterfully apply the dominant poststructuralist theories in the Western academia are psychologically sound and theoretically sophisticated. While claiming to oppose hegemony and hierarchical dichotomy, Chow, together with other poststructuralist critics, ends up with creating a new hierarchical dichotomy of a superior anti-realist and anti-nationalist Western poststructuralist positionality and an inferior Chinese nationalist and realist intellectual positionality.18 However, as a matter of fact, modern Chinese intellectuals are a highly complicated group with diverse political leanings and methodological underpinnings. There are indeed many chauvinistic and xenophobic intellectuals; however, there are also many rational and universalist-leaning intellectuals who share nationalist and realist sympathies but are not pathologically anti-West. They have reservations or add a “Chinese” tag to the “universal” questions and theories (in particular the poststructuralist ones) not because they are pathologically attached to what Chow calls the “Chinese ethnic supplement,” but because some (not all) Western theories and problematics run counter to or remain indifferent to what they have seen, experienced, felt and expected in the different regions of China. The native intellectuals’ self-perceptions and self-understandings are far more complicated than poststructuralist critics portray. They are not only shaped by modern traumatic historical experience and memory, but also by an array of diverse nurturing national, regional and personal experiences and traditions that make their

17 Chow (2000, 2). 18 For a similar creation of hierarchical dichotomy of the superior non-nationalist

and non-positivistic poststructuralist theorists over the nationalist and positivistic Chinese intellectuals, see Davies (2007).

PREFACE

xiii

rational and evidence-based critique of Western theories, problematics and perspectives possible. Of course, native scholars’ empirically based arguments for the relative stability and rationality of Chinese tradition and identity are not free from empirical mistakes and methodological scrutiny. My purpose of citing their empirical studies here is not to turn down the poststructuralist multiplying of “China” nor to bring back the reified concept of China as “a monolithic given.” Instead, my point is that to better “unpack” the rich meanings of China and Chinese literary and intellectual texts, scholars and critics should seriously engage with the self-understandings of native intellectuals for the relative stability of China and Chinese identity and develop more dialogical and more inclusive theoretical perspectives to explore “the simultaneity and interaction of the global and the local, the inside and outside, the old and new, the centre and the periphery, the stable and the unstable, and so on, rather than seek to replace one by the other.”19 The criticism of the indiscriminate poststructuralist deconstruction of nation-state is not unique to Chinese intellectuals but also found in a group of local Southeast Asian scholars. As one of the leading Southeast Asian scholars Goh Beng-Lan observes that “the structures of rule and regimes of knowledge of the nation state remain important forces within and against which (local) scholars struggle to interpret their own lives and the societies around them.”20 Beng-Lan finds that Southeast Asian scholars’ experience of nation-state is complex. On the one hand, they reevaluate the nation-state and criticize its inherent hegemonies and limitations. On the other hand, “many remain committed to the national project,” because it provides intellectual and institutional resources to oppose colonialism and global capitalism and forge local and regional community and solidarity.21 In other words, local Southeast Asian scholars’ nationalist commitments and their progressive opposition against chauvinism are not mutually exclusive, but working hand in hand with each other. As is shown in the following chapters,

19 Beng-Lan (2011, 9). 20 Beng-Lan (2011, 41). 21 Ibid.

xiv

PREFACE

Beng-Lan’s observations on native Southeast Asian intellectuals’ complicated nationalist-informed critical inquiry are also applicable to Chinese intellectuals.

Poststructuralism, Modern Chinese Literature and Lu Xun If the poststructuralist deconstruction of “China” is challenged on both empirical, theoretical and political grounds, the poststructuralist rereading of the modern Chinese literature is no less questionable. The poststructuralist critics rely on the poststructuralist “fundamental problematization of referentiality” to criticize the previous sinologists’ treatment of modern Chinese literature as a passive reflection of modern Chinese history, and expose modern Chinese literature’s discursive constructedness and its hidden reproduction or subversion of dominant repressive power relations and political ideologies. For instance, Rey Chow criticizes Perry Link’s reading of Ducks and Butterflies fictions as transparent historical documents of Chinese non-elites for its “imperialistic effect.”22 She offers a rereading that unveils the fictions’ textual constructedness and their subversive ideological meanings. Marston Anderson, David Wang and Xiaobing Tang reread modern Chinese realist literature not as reflection of Chinese realities but as indication of the poststructuralist indeterminacy of language. Peter Button has noted the problem with these poststructuralist rereadings: “the general tact of all three critical readings of early Chinese realism is to square a semiotic theory of the sign against what is collectively understood as a certain naïve conviction about the referential power of language. That in the cases of specially Wang and Anderson this results in a problematically anachronistic confrontation between the poststructuralist likes of Roland Barthes and a Lu Xun at the time of his penning his first short stories is no small irony.”23 However, unlike Button, my critique is not the anachronistic use of poststructuralist theories but that the poststructuralist reinterpretations have not captured textual complexities and the complicated intellectual subjectivity that Chinese writers create. Moreover, they never allow the historical realities and realist textual moments to bite back at the poststructuralist 22 Chow (1991, 47). 23 Button (2009, 44).

PREFACE

xv

“fundamental problematization of referentiality,” develop more sophisticated understanding of modern Chinese literature and open up more critical and intellectual resources. In what follows, I will use Lydia Liu’s influential poststructuralist reinterpretation of Lu Xun’s canonical novella The True Story of Ah Q as an example to illustrate the achievements and problems of poststructuralist studies of modern Chinese literature. The reasons for this particular choice are as follows. First, while Liu’s book was published in 1995, a quarter century ago, its poststructuralist research paradigm continues to inform the current modern Chinese literary studies in the United States. Second, the object of Liu’s research is Lu Xun, the so-called “father of modern Chinese literature” and also the writer widely considered as most “obsessed with China.” A critical review of Liu’s paradigmatic poststructuralist reading of a canonical writer’s canonical literary text could serve my purpose of highlighting the poststructuralist approach’s failure to grasp the complicated dialogical subjectivity that the China-obsessed writers have created, a subjectivity that is first and foremost concerned with China, but not necessarily parochial, self-closed and sino-chauvinistic, a subjectivity that persists into the contemporary Chinese writers I will discuss in this book. Therefore, my critical review of Liu’s poststructuralist-informed Chinese literary studies and my thematization of the complicated intellectual subjectivity that Lu Xun builds can prepare a setup for my own literary readings in the following chapters. Unlike previous critics who read this story as a realist masterpiece that offers a truthful representation and insightful critique of the negative aspects of “Chinese national character,” Liu does not interpret it as a reflection of objective characteriological truth but as “a myth,” a product of Western literary and orientalist missionary discourse that serves the Western powers’ imperialistic purpose of dominating China.24 Liu starts with tracing “Chinese national character discourse” to American missionary Arthur Smith’s book Chinese Characteristics (1890). Liu finds that Smith’s portrayal of Chinese people’s negative dispositional features, such as “disregard of time,” “disregard of accuracy,” “disregard of foundations,” “contempt for foreigners,” “intellectual turbidity,” “absence of sincerity,” “absence of nerves,” “absence of sympathies,” “lack of altruism,” “absence of public spirit” and “mutual suspicion,”

24 Liu (1995, 47).

xvi

PREFACE

bears resemblance to Lu Xun’s depiction of Ah Q . Then, Liu examines how Lu Xun uses complicated narratological strategies to translate the Western missionary discourse on Chinese national character into the story and creates a local Chinese intellectual narratorial subjectivity that is able to criticize the illiterate Chinese masses and backward Chinese tradition.25 Simply speaking, Lu Xun’s story is not a truthful representation of Chinese people’s characteriological realities but a translation and internalization of the Western missionary orientalist discourse. Liu’s poststructuralist reading should take the credit for using narratological terms to give a more accurate description of the narrative strategies in the story and for drawing upon Said’s poststructuralist-informed postcolonial theories to unmask the ideological implications and unequal power relations behind the seemingly disinterested literary forms and devices. However, Liu’s reading suffers from several serious empirical mistakes and blatant historical elisions. First, there is no evidence to prove that Lu Xun had read Smith’s book prior to his writing of Ah Q . There is no denying that Western missionary’s gross generalizations about Chinese national character could have been exaggerated and employed by Western imperialists to rationalize their domination and subjugation of Chinese people. However, Qing Dynasty’s Chinese intellectuals, diplomats and officials themselves (such as Guo Songtao, Xue Fucheng, Zheng Guanying, Wang Tao, Hong Renxuan and Yan Fu), despite their different political positions and affiliations, had criticized some of the same dispositional defects even prior to Smith. They openly or privately praised the Western citizens’ “public spirit” and Western governments’ benign treatment of their own citizens in domestic politics (not including their imperialistic practices in international relations). Yet, their criticisms of China and praise of the West were immanent criticisms and praises, that is, not made from the perspective of modern Western political norms and principles but from China’s native Confucian moral codes and political ideals. For instance, Guo Songtao, one of China’s earliest emissaries to Britain and France, lamented that “prior to the Three Dynasties of Antiquity, only China achieved moral transformation through teaching….However, since Han Dynasty, China’s moral virtues have being decaying. By contrast, European countries excel at politics, education and morality. Today, they look at China in the same way as China looked at barbarians in the golden

25 Liu (1995, 69–76).

PREFACE

xvii

times of Three Dynasties.”26 Wang Tao, a reform-minded late Qing intellectual, praised the West for valorizing “liyi”礼义(rite and righteousness), “renxin” 仁信 (benevolence and trustworthiness), “jiaohua” 教化 (moral transformation through teaching) and “deze” 德泽 (moral nourishing).27 If the missionary discourse on Chinese national character was fabricated to serve imperialist purpose, then how could the early modern Chinese intellectuals make similar comments on China’s moral decadence even before the missionary discourse came out? Apparently, early modern Chinese intellectuals’ and officials’ critical observations on China’s weakness and shortcoming from their inherited Confucian worldview did not result from their blind internalization of prior Western discourse nor the result of their self-orientalization, but based upon their own first-hand experience and deep reflections on the harsh and indisputable realities of China’s continuous failures and frustrations in the China-West conflicts. However, unlike the Westerners, these Chinese intellectuals’ and officials’ disclosure of the national and dispositional weakness was not intended to legitimize foreign invasion, but to inspire solutions and empower China. Many reform-minded Qing intellectuals in the nineteenth century praised Western countries’ domestic politics while at the same time condemning and combating their imperialistic practices in their tackling of foreign relations with China. Meanwhile, these reform-minded Qing intellectuals also made immanent critiques of the shortcomings and weakness of Chinese people and institutions. It is true that criticisms of China’s dispositional and national defects could be appropriated by colonialists and imperialists to justify the Western invasion and domination of China, but they could also be made and used by Chinese intellectuals to stimulate critical self-reflections, raise Chinese people’s consciousness of national crisis and serve the progressive purpose of modernizing the oppressed China and liberating it from imperialist domination. Liu’s poststructuralist deconstruction of Chinese intellectual discourse on “national character” has not recognized that the political purposes and consequences of the negative portrayals and criticisms of China’s national and moral problems were too complicated to be simply characterized as being complicit with imperialist and colonialist interests. 26 Guo (1982, 439). 27 Zhong (1985, 152). For a detailed discussion on earlier modern Chinese intellectuals’

and diplomats’ Confucian-informed critical reflections upon the weaknesses and flaws of Chinese political and moral realities, see Qin (2015, 30–31).

xviii

PREFACE

Second, even if Lu Xun had read Smith’s book and was influenced by Smith’s problematic judgments concerning Chinese people as Liu claims, it does not automatically follow that Lu Xun must have unthinkingly internalized what he had read. While Liu mentions Lu Xun’s critique of enlisting missionary discourse by Westerners and Chinese upper social class people to justify their humiliation and domination of lower class people, her interpretation of Ah Q seems to suggest that Lu Xun fully absorbed Smith’s judgments on Chinese people. What Liu fails to recognize is that Lu Xun was not only critical of the use of missionary discourse for imperialist purpose, but also wary of the problems with the missionary discourse per se. It is true that Lu Xun appreciated Smith’s observations on Chinese people’s flawed intellectual habit and social custom, he also emphasized “there are many mistakes in Smith’s book.”28 Although Lu Xun did not specify the mistakes, what is clear is Lu Xun’s highly reflective and analytic attitude toward Western observations on China. He wrote: “after having read these (Western missionaries’ works on China), we should self-examine, analyze and understand what they say are right. Then we depend on ourselves to struggle for changes without having to ask for others’ mercy or praise to show how to be Chinese.”29 Lu Xun did not reject negative discourse and representation of China and Chinese people simply because they came from Western imperialists or anti-China forces. Instead, Lu Xun called for using one’s own agency, rationality and lived experience to carefully self-examine and self-analyze the truth and the falsity of Western discourses on China. Only if the criticisms rightly expose the real problems, Chinese people should face up to the harsh realities and address instead of dodging them. Lu Xun did not care much about where the criticisms came from as whether they were true or false. He even suggested that “young people might as well read imperialists’ works. This is what we call ‘know both ourselves and others’.”30 What Lu Xun was most concerned was not who made the observations on China or whether they were positive or negative, but whether the observations themselves were close to reality and whether they could provoke Chinese people’s critical reflection upon and positive transformation of their country and themselves. It must be pointed out

28 Lu (2005: vol. 12, 246). 29 Lu (2005: vol. 6, 649). 30 Lu (2005: vol. 5, 313).

PREFACE

xix

that Lu Xun did not rely only on external and foreign perspectives on China. Instead, Lu Xun thought that an informed and enlightened selfunderstanding and self-interpretation required both internal and external, first-person experiential perspective and third-person theoretical perspectives. In the preface to the English translation of a collection of his short stories, Lu Xun wrote: Up to now, Westerners have produced more works on China than Chinese people themselves. But they are Westerns’ viewpoints after all. An ancient Chinese proverb says ‘a doctor’s face will turn pale if his patient’s internal organs can speak out (their own illnesses)’. I think even if one’s internal organs can really speak out their illness, what they say may not be completely reliable. Yet, they could certainly reveal something surprising that is beyond doctor’s diagnosis and contains some truth.31

Here, Lu Xun likens the crisis-ridden China to a patient. To rightly diagnose and cure the disease requires both doctor’s third-person professional medical perspective and patient’s first-person self-description and selfexplanation. Lu Xun was aware that both external third-person point of view and the internal first-person point of view have their own limits and blind spots, but they could complement each other and foster a better understanding of one’s situation and problem. Lu Xun’s works are not mere products of foreigners’ and colonizers’ third-person external discourses, but the combined fruits of his lived experiences, felt emotions, deep reflections and his critical responsiveness to different points of view. It was such an analytic, thoughtful and capacious attitude and mentality that enabled Lu Xun’s works to reveal some if not all truth and reality about China that not only stroke deep chord with his contemporaries, but also resonate with many subsequent generations of Chinese readers. Liu deconstructs the “national character” discourse into “a myth” that serves imperialist interest; then, it is quite understandable that Liu does not follow the conventional interpretive line that focuses on whether Ah Q actually reflects the negative aspects of Chinese national character or a totality of national characteristics or only the lower social class. For Liu, all these previous interpretations are built upon a naïve reflectionist conception of literature. Liu opens up a new interpretive avenue by shifting the focus from the literary character to the novelistic narrator, 31 Lu (2005: vol. 6, 21–22).

xx

PREFACE

from what reality and personality the literary character represents to how the narratorial subjectivity is constructed within the literary text. Drawing upon Mikhail Bakhtin’s and Gérard Genette’s narratology, Liu reveals the narratorial subjectivity is constructed through a shift from a first-person to an omniscient third-person point of view, from a clear distinction between extradiegetic level and autodiegetic level into the collapse of the distinction, as well as through various narrative strategies such as parodic stylization, psycho-narration, thought language and free indirect speech. Liu emphasizes that by means of these narrative and rhetorical devices, Lu Xun creates an intellectual subjectivity that does not merely reproduce but rewrite the Western missionary discourse on all Chinese people into a Chinese literary elite’s voice that is able to speak to and about the Chinese lower social class from a superior Chinese intellectual point of view. Liu argues that “the presentation of the narrator as Ah Q’s opposite signals the vast chasm existing between them as members of two different classes known as shangdeng ren (people of upper social class) and xiadengren (people of lower social class).”32 Liu contends that by creating such a superior intellectual narratorial subjectivity, Lu Xun and his fellow May Fourth writers are able to “point an accusing finger at their own indigenous tradition” and “emerge as subject and agent of their own history.”33 However, a close reading of the novella shows that the narrator is not Ah Q’s opposite, not signaling a condescending Chinese intellectual position that only decries their own tradition and stupidity of their illiterate countrymen, but also represents a highly individuated, reflective, flexible, ironical, critical, skeptical and capacious subjectivity that is able to simultaneously criticize, learn from and identify with the lower social class. There is no such as “a vast chasm” between the intellectual narrator and social underdog character Ah Q as Liu claims. At the very beginning, the narrator deliberates on the limits of conventional Chinese and Western biographical genres that are exclusively devoted to emperors, courtiers and cultural elites. He feels it difficult to find a proper genre from the existing elitist ones to name and tell his story about the social underdog like Ah Q. Bringing this representational difficulty to the fore indicates

32 Liu (1995, 75). 33 Liu (1995, 76).

PREFACE

xxi

the narrator does not take the existing language as adequate and transparent, but cast critical reflection upon the established discursive system dominated by both Chinese and Western upper social classes. However, this doubt on existing discursive system does not lead the narrator to the poststructuralist wholesale rejection of language’s reference to truth and reality. After sardonically elaborating on the difficulty of fitting Ah Q into the extant elitist biographical genres, the narrator turns to the lowbrow folk language and genre: In short, this is really a “life,” but since I write in vulgar vein using the language of hucksters and peddlers, I dare not presume to give it so high-sounding a title. So from the stock phrase of the novelists, who are not reckoned among the Three Cults and Nine Schools. “Enough of this digression, and back to the true story!” I will take the last two words as my title.34

“Novelist,” xiaoshuo jia 小说家, literally means “small storyteller” in Chinese. Traditional Chinese novelists were associated less with writing for the upper social class than for the masses. Novel was the genre to entertain the laborers, small business owners and other lower social class. Traditional Chinese literati despised spoken language of the hucksters and peddlers as too vulgar and too trivial for writing and transmission of any lofty principles and moral messages. The narrator’s recourse to zhengzhuan 正传 (true story), the language and genre of the Chinese lowbrow storyteller, indicates that the intellectual subjectivity Lu Xun creates is able to draw upon not only the Western literary and missionary discourse as Liu claims, but also traditional Chinese folk discourse. Moreover, the objects of critique and ridicule the intellectual narrator targets at are not restricted to the uneducated masses’ (Ah Q) apathy, self-deception, self-aggrandizement and self-belittlement, but also the hypocrisy, pretentiousness and brutality of the traditional literati (such as the character Mr. Zhao) and Westernized intellectuals (such as the character Imitation of Foreign Devil). Ah Q in the story ends up being scapegoated and executed for the looting of the village landlord Zhao’s family. The narrator gets into Ah Q’s thought process and state of emotion when Ah Q is facing the cheering crowds who are eager to watch his execution: 34 Lu (1980: vol. 1, 103), emphasis mine.

xxii

PREFACE

At that instant his thoughts revolved again like a whirlwind. Four years before, at the foot of the mountain, he had met a hungry wolf which had followed him at a set distance, wanting to eat him. He had nearly died of fright, but luckily he happened to have an axe in his hand, which gave him the courage to get back to Weichuang. He had never forgotten that wolf’s eyes, fierce yet cowardly, gleaming like two will-o’-the-wisps, as if boring into him from a distance. Now he saw eyes more terrible even than the wolf’s: dull yet penetrating eyes that, having devoured his words, still seemed eager to devour something beyond his flesh and blood. And these eyes kept following him at a set distance.35

Liu is right in pointing out that Lu Xun’s fiction seeks to “redefine the role of the literary elite.” However, this new intellectual narratorial subjectivity is not constructed through setting up a rigid divide between educated intellectuals and illiterate masses as Liu argues, but through the former’s critical reflections upon and learning from the latter. As the ending shows, Ah Q perceives the unfeeling and brutalized crowds and the external world as illusively bestial and cannibalistic. Ah Q’s deep sense of alienation from the unfeeling masses and cruel society bears striking resemblance to that of the first-person narrator of the intellectual protagonist “madman” in Lu Xun’s another well-known story A Madman’s Diary. Like Ah Q, the enlightened and socially alienated first-person narrator “madman” in the short story also views the oppression and persecution imposed by the ignorant masses and neighbors on him as wolfish and cannibalistic: They only eat flesh! I remember reading somewhere of a hideous beast with an ugly look in its eye called “hyena,” which often easts dead flesh. Even the largest bones it crunches into fragments and swallows; the mere thought of this makes your hair stand on end. Hyenas are related to wolves, wolves belong to the canine species.36 In Lu Xun’s two most well-known stories, the ironic distance between the superior intellectual narrator and the lower underdog character is not fixed as Liu claims but porous and flexible. My rebuttal of Liu’s poststructuralist reading does not mean my unconditional support of the conventional realist reading of the story as a transparent mirroring of Chinese national character. Instead, my point is that Ah Q is not merely 35 Lu (1980: vol. 1, 153), emphasis mine. 36 Ibid.

PREFACE

xxiii

a product of orientalist missionary and literary discourse, but a combined result of China-West historical contacts, traditional Chinese folk literary discourse, Lu Xun’s own critical thinking and artistic skills. The intellectual narratorial subjectivity that Lu Xun constructs in Ah Q is not a superior intellectual subjectivity only rising above the illiterate lower social class, but also being able to identify with and learn from them, not only deploying Western discourses to criticize Chinese tradition, but also resorting to the marginalized Chinese folk oral tradition to disclose and oppose the hypocrisy and hegemony of modern upper social classes, not only being capable of recognizing the representational limits of established discursive system, but still striving to tell “a true story.” Lu Xun creates a highly complicated and sometimes contradictory native intellectual subjectivity that the poststructuralist Chinese literary studies fail to capture, an intellectual subjectivity that continued into the contemporary Chinese literary works and writers I will explore in following chapters. Lu Xun was obsessed with China, committed to exposing China’s national malaise and achieving China’s national perfection, but in ways far more complicated than the poststructuralist criticism portrays. Literary scholars and translators of New Criticism are conservative in political attitude and claim to take a purely literary and aesthetic approach. Poststructuralist critics are often considered as politically progressive and take their interpretive practices as political actions to expose and oppose various hegemonies and hierarchies in literary texts. However, despite their differences in methodologies and political positions, both the New Criticism critics and poststructuralist critics deplore Chinese intellectuals and writers’ “obsession with China.” The former consider it mostly as a psychological and epistemological flaw while the latter view it not only as a psychological and epistemological defect, but also as a political evil that is fed by and fuel sino-chauvinism and sino-jingoism. Both the latter and the former see “obsession with China” from an external theoretical perspective and lack a nuanced approach to examining different types of “obsession with China” and their different political and theoretical implications. This book examines post-Tiananmen Chinese intellectuals’ and writers’ “obsession with China” through exploring their discussions and representations of Chinese language, state power and Confucian tradition. In particular, I probe Chinese novelists’ contributions to the intellectual debate and discourse on the three key issues with regard to China’s national condition and perfection. Instead of only taking an external poststructuralist positionality to dismiss and denigrate the concern with

xxiv

PREFACE

China’s national malaise and perfection as provincial, pathological, positivistic and pragmatic, this book chooses to take Chinese intellectuals’ and writers’ “obsession with China” on its own terms. First, taking “obsession with China” on its own terms means a more nuanced study that pays attention to the differences between fanatic nationalism and rational nationalism, between intellectual/theoretical approach and literary approach. In particular, instead of only singling out the fanatic and chauvinistic nationalism for particular critique, I pay more attention to native Chinese intellectuals’ and writers’ ignored rational and dialogical approach to the exploration of China’s national condition and perfection. Second, my taking “obsession with China” on its own terms calls for the analysis and assessment of Chinese intellectual and literary discourse primarily according to their self-designated goal of understanding and solving China’s problems and envisioning for China’s future instead of assessing and judging it only from a single New Criticism or poststructuralist perspective. Such an immanent approach is by no means against the use of poststructuralist theories, but for more extensive use that includes not only the prevailing Foucaultian poststructuralist theory but also the anti- or non-poststructuralist theories (Bruno Latour’s theory on Actor-Network-Actor and Charles Taylor’s “social imaginary”). Contemporary China has been deeply involved in the cultural and academic globalization. Relying only on a single Western perspective can hardly do full justice to the diversities, achievements and problems with Chinese intellectual and literary discourses. In particular, my taking China on its own terms does not delete or ignore the textual moments that the New Criticism or poststructuralist critics perceived to be irrelevant, absurd or naively realist, but treats it as a site of departure into theoretical innovation. My proposal for taking Chinese writers and intellectuals’ nationalist commitment on its own terms hopes to stop the vicious cycle from

PREFACE

xxv

“obsession with China” to “obsession with deconstruction of China,” and from “fuck Chineseness” to “bravo, my country (China).”37 Richmond, USA

Gengsong Gao

37 “Fuck Chineseness” is a phrase from the title of a widely-read essay “Fuck Chine-

seness: on the Ambiguity of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity” authored by Taiwanese poststructuralist cultural critic Allen Chun, see Chun (1996, 111–138). The original Chinese of “bravado, my country (China)” is “lihai le wode guo” (厉害了我的国), a phrase often used by young jingoistic Chinese nationalists on the internet to glorify China’s progress and achievements. For a critical study of the fanatic Chinese online nationalism, see Huang (2021, 112–130).

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6

Introduction: Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Debate and Literature

1

Discussion on Pure Literature and Postsocialist Chinese Literary Thought

19

Han Shaogong: Revealing and Revising Chinese Linguistic Background

59

Wang Xiaobo: Work Through Power, Discourse and Subject Formation

107

Chen Zhongshi: Disclosing an Enchanted Local Everyday Confucian World

143

Conclusion: Toward Dialogical Chinese Studies

191

References

203

Index

227

xxvii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Debate and Literature

Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Debate and Discourse After the crackdown on the Tiananmen democratic movement in 1989, Chinese communist ideologues and officials felt very doubtful about China’s market-oriented reform and increasing contacts with the Western capitalist and liberal world. However, after Deng Xiaoping’s reaffirmation of his commitment to reform and opening-up policy in his well-known Southern Tour in 1992, China’s market-oriented reform gained a new momentum. Since then, China’s economy witnessed a breathtaking growth. China was gradually integrated into the Westdominated world economic system. However, what accompanied China’s rapid economic growth and integration with the rest of world were a series of pressing problems and predicaments: Wealth gap and economic inequalities are worsening, political corruption turns rampant, and social morality and natural environment are ruined on a large scale. With the traditional Chinese intellectuals’ strong moral passion and acute sense of social responsibility, many Chinese intellectuals are not contented with the increasingly professionalized and specialized academic research and publication, and commit themselves to thinking about how to understand, analyze and solve China’s problems and achieve China’s national perfection. They are what scholars of contemporary Chinese thought call “academic public intellectuals,” namely intellectuals with

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_1

1

2

G. GAO

solid disciplinary background, working at universities and research institutes, actively discussing public and political affairs on the basis of their academic standing.1 Because of their different personal experiences, knowledge genealogies and affiliations with different social and interest groups in an increasingly fragmented Chinese society, these academic public intellectuals gradually formed different political opinions and ideological positions. They debate vigorously and sometimes even vituperatively against each other over a wide range of political, economic, social, cultural and historical issues that are key to the rapidly developing China and its national perfection: What is the nature of post-Tiananmen China’s conditions? Is it still a socialist country with Chinese characteristics or has it been transformed into a capitalist country with Chinese characteristics? What is the root cause of China’s crisis? Repressive party state or exploitive global capitalism or loss of Confucian tradition? What Western concepts and theories are more appropriate to analyze and solve China’s problems? Classical liberalism, neoliberalism, communitarianism, neo-Marxism, post-colonialism, poststructuralism, authoritarianism or a mixture of selected theories and ideologies? What is the best route for China’s future? Move toward Western-style liberal democracy, a benign authoritarian state or a Confucian state or draw upon China’s Confucian tradition and socialist legacy to pursue an “alternative modernity” that transcends both Western liberal democracy and China’s indigenous Confucian tradition? As China is getting more involved into world affairs, should Chinese nationalism be strengthened to advance China’s national interest or be restrained to facilitate China’s smooth integration into the existing liberal world order? Are the political disasters and tragedies in contemporary China attributable to modern Chinese thought? If it does, is it radicalism or conservatism to blame? How to understand and evaluate modern Chinese history and its important events (the May Fourth Movement, the communist revolution and the Cultural Revolution)? What thoughts, institutions and practices in modern Chinese history should be criticized and discarded? What should be continued and further developed? What actually dominate Chinese intellectual and political tradition? Confucianism, legalism, Daoism or Buddhism? Is Chinese tradition is compatible with modernity? What elements in Chinese tradition are most useful for China’s better future and even the world development?

1 Cheek et al. (2018, 109).

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

3

As a result of the various heated debates over these scholarly topics and the intensifying social stratification, Chinese intellectual circle, which used to get relatively united in opposing the dogmatic party ideologues in the 1980s, split into different factions, such as liberals, democratic socialists, neo-authoritarians, nationalists, New Confucians, New Left, Maoists, statists and populists.2 However, these intellectual groups are not closely knit nor can be separated from each other in a static and clearcut manner. For instance, all these intellectual groups share a nationalist dimension in the sense of their commitment to China’s nation building and social progress.3 The difference lies in their intensity and strategy. Liberals view the Western liberal democracy (individual rights, representative democracy, market economy and rule of law) as the best strategy to solve the current problems and achieve national perfection. National sovereignty should not always rise above universal human rights. The neoauthoritarians prefer a combination of authoritarian political system and market economy. Other non-liberal intellectuals attempt to draw upon Confucian and/or socialist legacies to transcend Western liberal democracy. Meanwhile, one faction may overlap with another on certain issues. For instance, unlike their iconoclastic liberal predecessors, many postTiananmen liberal intellectuals display sympathies for Confucianism and seek to appropriate it to serve their liberal agenda. The non-liberal intellectuals are similar to each other in their common rejection of Western liberal democracy.4 Moreover, individual and factional position may experience minor or major changes. For instance, the New Left advocated “mass democracy” when they first appeared on the intellectual area in the mid-1990s, but took a statist turn since the mid-2000s that emphasizes the superiority of national sovereignty over democracy and rule of law.5 In addition, the same intellectual camp may witness internal division. For instance, in the early 2010s, a group of young liberal intellectuals labeled themselves as left-wing liberals to distinguish themselves from what they perceived as right-wing liberals who only oppose the 2 For detailed discussions on the grouping of post-Tiananmen intellectuals, see Ma (2015, ix–xvii) and Li (2015, 1–12). 3 Cheek et al. (2018, 110). 4 For detailed discussion on the split of liberal and non-liberal intellectuals, see Li

(2017, 196–221). 5 For detailed discussions on non-liberal intellectuals’ “statist turn,” see Veg (2019, 23–45).

4

G. GAO

repressive party state power and neglect other forms of oppression and the positive role that state could play in wealth redistribution and social governance.6 These emerging left-wing liberals’ emphasis on redistributive state and outcome equality adds a leftist color to the right-leaning contemporary Chinese liberalism and tips its scale a little bit toward nonliberal groups on economic issues. Yet, with the party state’s increasingly repressive measures since Xi came to power in 2012, liberal intellectuals’ anti-party state sentiment, regardless of its right-leaning or left-leaning, is growing and their split with non-liberal camps has been furthered on political issues. Simply speaking, homogenization, pluralization and polarization seem to be paradoxically coexisting with each other in the post-Tiananmen Chinese intelligentsia. Despite these overlaps, changes and internal splitting, both intellectual historians and empirical surveys show that liberals, the New Left and New Confucians are the major three intellectual factions.7 The above survey is far from capturing the complexity of Chinese intellectual landscape in its entirety but could give my readers a general sense of what it is going on in Chinese intellectual scene. Chinese intellectuals’ specific arguments on specific issues of language, power and tradition will be discussed in the following case-study chapters. Up to now, there are many English studies on post-Tiananmen intellectual debate and discourse. Generally speaking, the English scholarship can be divided into two types. One is more descriptive while the other 6 For a well-informed introduction to Chinese left-wing liberal intellectuals, see Li (2014). 7 See Cheek et al. (2018, 111). The leading Chinese intellectual historian Xu Jilin also agrees with the division of current Chinese public intellectuals into liberals, the New Left and the New Confucians. See Xu (2018). The journal of People’s Forum conducted annual surveys of the top 10 dominant sichao 思潮 (streams of thought) from 2010 to 2019. The result shows that “liberal stream of thought,” “New Left Thought” and “New Confucian Thought” consistently rank high. Oher dominant streams of thought in the survey can be considered as subdivisions of the dominant three intellectual factions. For instance, “universal values thought” (Western liberal values such as liberty, equality, democracy, human rights) and “constitutionalism” (separation of powers and rule of law) can be considered as liberal intellectuals’ political thought; “historical nihilism” (critiques of the official narrative of China’s communist revolution and Maoist socialist construction) can be viewed as liberals’ historical thought; “cultural conservatism” can be seen as belonging to the New Confucianism; “populism” and “nationalism” can be regarded as parts of New Left thoughts. See Pan and Zhou (2016, 14–19). For the largest collection of English translations of the three intellectual factions’ articles, see the website Reading the China Dream at https://www.readingthechinadream.com/about.html run by David Ownby.

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

5

is more theoretical. The descriptive type focuses on delineating different intellectual factions’ and individual intellectuals’ ideas as well as the historical background to these ideas.8 The theoretical type draws on various poststructuralist, neomarxist and psychoanalytic theories to disclose and analyze the institutional and intellectual flaws with Chinese intellectual debate and discourse. For instance, Guanjun Wu employs Lacan’s and Žižek’s psychoanalytic theories to criticize Chinese intellectuals’ obsession with the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization and characterize the “wholeness” of Chinese civilization as “a primordial lie, covering up the impossible real.”9 Gloria Davies deploys Foucault’s, Lyotard’s and Derrida’s postmodern and poststructuralist theories as a contrastive higher type of non-nationalist, non-realist and highly self-reflexive scholarship to expose the nationalist, positivistic and pragmatic presuppositions that undergird the seemingly Westernized Chinese intellectual discourse and prevent it from making any theoretical contributions. Giorgio Strafella uses the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to unveil the problematic assumption of the China-West dichotomy and elitist neglect of ordinary people’s diverse values and experiences in Chinese intellectuals’ discussion on the Humanistic Spirit.10 While these poststructuralist- and neomarxist-informed studies shed light on the major problems with Chinese intellectual discourse, they are also subject to critiques for their selection bias and West-centric epistemology. They look mostly at Chinese intellectuals’ hastily written polemical articles without paying due attention to their more serious scholarly works. This selection bias is not accidental, but reflective of a deeply entrenched habit of treating modern Chinese intellectuals and their works only as object of research rather than as subject of research.11 That is to say, despite their different foci, these theoretically informed studies are united in taking a pathological approach and treating Chinese intellectual discourse only as object to be diagnosed by Western poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories. They have seldom approached Chinese intellectuals as cognitive subjects 8 For book-length descriptive scholarship, see Wang (2003), Ma (2015), Li (2015), Veg (2019), and Lynch (2020). 9 Wu (2014, 318). 10 Strafella (2017, 1–13). 11 For a detailed discussion on the English scholarship’s treatment of Chinese intellectuals only as object of research rather than “cognitive subject,” see Wang (2007, 10–11).

6

G. GAO

and their peer scholars that are able to produce new understanding and knowledge of China’s past, present and future and provide critical insights that Western poststructuralists can learn from. This line of poststructuralist scholarship claims to counter dichotomies, hierarchies and hegemonies, but ends up creating new ones: The non-nationalist, nonpragmatic, highly self-reflexive and innovative Western poststructuralist intellectual discourse produced in an autonomous intellectual sphere must be superior to the nationalist, pragmatic, positivistic and derivative Chinese intellectual discourse engendered under a heteronomous intellectual sphere. Scholars reading both English and Chinese scholarship for research would most likely agree that Chinese intellectual discourse is more nationalist, instrumentalist and morally charged than their Western counterpart. However, what these poststructuralist-informed scholarship has missed is a more nuanced, more self-reflexive and more dialogical studies of Chinese intellectual discourse. For instance, Gloria Davies accuses Chinese intellectuals of falling prey to the illusion of “linguistic certitude” and attempting to close the gap between language and reality and use the authentic knowledge to work for China’s modernization and national perfection.12 However, she does not ask these crucial questions: Are Chinese intellectuals of different political persuasions and/or in different eras equally attached to the “linguistic certitude” without any doubt on the referentiality of language? Do literary scholars and critics also subscribe to the “linguistic certitude” to the same degree as the non-literary intellectuals? Could some Chinese intellectuals hold a belief in “linguistic certitude” tinged with a poststructuralist suspicion? Is a tempered belief in “linguistic certitude” be useful and meaningful to the pursuit of China’s national perfection? Should the poststructuralist preoccupation with the indeterminacy and aporia of language be freed from charge and challenge? Could we not take the poststructuralist “fundamental problematization of referentiality” for granted? Is there anything that poststructuralist critical inquiry could learn from the insistence on the referentiality of language? Is the non-Western local intellectuals’ commitment to national perfection necessarily detrimental to theoretical contribution? Could the non-Western intellectuals working in a nondemocratic environment generate something that can benefit

12 See Davies (2007, 24–25).

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

7

the knowledge production in general? Wu Guanjun, together with other poststructuralist critics, considers “the wholeness,” the “unity” and the “continuity” of Chinese civilization as a “lie,” a “myth” and a “construction” that serve China’s imperialistic and authoritarian purpose. However, are post-Tiananmen Chinese intellectuals of different political and disciplinary backgrounds equally and stubbornly sticking to the “lie” and “myth” without having any willingness and competence to explore the multiplicity, hybridity and fluidity within the centuries-old Chinese civilization? Are all narratives and arguments for the relative unity and continuity of Chinese civilization and Chinese identity fabricated without any objective evidences to serve certain pernicious political purposes and interests? How to engage with the empirically based historical studies that argue for the existence of a relatively stable Chinese identity and territorial integrity? Could we avoid replacing the sinocentric narrative of a homogeneous Chinese civilization and identity by the poststructuralist deconstruction of all stabilities and continuities, and develop a more sophisticated narrative about the simultaneous interaction of unity and disunity, stability and changeability of Chinese civilization and identity? As is shown in the following chapters, many Chinese academic intellectuals are indeed committed to China’s national perfection. However, they also have raised doubt on the fixed unity of “Chinese civilization” and recognized its internal complexity and fluidity. Yet, they refuse the poststructuralist extreme of treating China as “empty signifier” and insist on the relative stability of Chinese civilization and national identity. Their qualified nationalistic critical inquiry does not necessarily serve sinocentrism and sino-jingoism but could help to oppose the hegemony of universalizing West-centered globalization and poststructuralist theorization. Many Chinese intellectuals do share a belief in linguistic referentiality to some extent. However, some of them have also been inspired by poststructuralist theories, given up previous conception of a transparent language and begun to recognize the relative indeterminacy and materiality of language and its relationship with power relations. However, they do not absolutize linguistic indeterminacy, but hope to develop a more dialogical and dialectic understanding of language, literature and subjectivity. Their tempered emphasis on the relative linguistic certitude does not necessarily undermine theoretical innovation but could become a point of entry for the arrival of new theories and thoughts. Moreover, Chinese intellectuals’ ethical approach to critical inquiry and humanist

8

G. GAO

research as spiritual self-cultivation and subjectivity formation could address the problem with the poststructuralist obsession with decentered subjectivity and demystified human agency. In short, the nationalist- and instrumentalist-oriented Chinese intellectual discourse should not always be treated as a mere object, an inferior foil to be unmasked, reproached and ridiculed from a poststructuralist criterion. Instead, it could be viewed as a subject of critical inquiry that poststructuralists can benefit from for their self-reflection on their own epistemological and dispositional limits. By saying this, I do not mean to idealize Chinese intellectual discourse and whitewash its defects. Instead, I simply argue for a fairer assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, potentials and pitfalls on its own terms instead of judging it from a single poststructuralist anti-realist and antinationalist standard, and promote a dialogical and inclusive approach to critical inquiry instead of depending exclusively upon one approach. Recently, scholars have noted the problem of treating Chinese intellectual discourse only as object of research and suggested alternative approaches. For instance, Canadian intellectual historians Timothy Cheek, Joshua Fogel and David Ownby call for “working with” instead of condescendingly “working on” Chinese intellectuals.13 Scholar of comparative political philosophy Leigh Jenco seeks to “diversify knowledge production in the social sciences and humanities” by taking “Chinese thought as global theory.”14 These alternative approaches aim to correct the Westcentrism in the existing scholarship on Chinese intellectual discourse and tackle it as an equal participant in China and theoretical knowledge production. However, what these scholars have neglected is Chinese literary writers’ intervention and contribution to Chinese intellectual debate and discourse.

Literary Intervention into the Intellectual Debate A host of contemporary Chinese literary writers share their fellow intellectuals’ concern with China’s national condition and perfection. Considering the inextricable relationship between literary and intellectual discourse, scholars of contemporary Chinese literature have examined 13 Cheek et al. (2018, 108). 14 Jenco (2016, 9–34).

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

9

literary writers’ intervention into the intellectual discourse and debate. It has become a common practice for these scholars to start with a survey of Chinese intellectual debate and discourse as background knowledge necessary for understanding literary works. However, more often than not this survey has predicted the meanings of literary works they are going to explore. The question of how the latter could benefit the former is not fully discussed. For instance, in his seminal studies of postTiananmen literature and culture, Jason McGrath starts by examining the humanistic spirit discussion as Chinese intellectuals’ critical response to marketization of the literary and cultural production. The reason for putting the intellectual discussion at the very beginning is that “‘humanistic spirit’ intellectuals offered a preview….of many of the critical positions that would be taken up later….by artists in the realms of literature, independent cinema, and even mainstream commercial cinema, as we will see in the following chapters.”15 Chen Yinghong contextualizes the experimental play Che Guerava in the liberals versus the New Left debate over China’s current condition, then arguing that the play displays strong sentiments of anti-liberalism, anti-globalization and antiAmericanism.16 In a similar vein, Ban Wang begins his edited volume China and New Left Visions with a preface to outline post-Tiananmen China’s historical conditions and the New Left ideas. The subsequent articles in this edited volume focus on showing how the post-Tiananmen subaltern novels, migrant workers’ poetry and short-short fictions illustrate the New Left critiques of social injustices and economic inequalities that they attribute to the neoliberalism and global capitalism.17 I applaud this move to relate contemporary literary works to intellectual debate and discourse and appreciate the important insight these studies provide into the political arguments of contemporary Chinese literary works. However, this reduction of literary intervention to particular ideological position has left literary works’ larger non-factional contributions and non-ideological dimensions unexamined. As a result, the reading of contemporary Chinese literature serves only to harden the ideological split instead of broadening the argumentative space and enriching

15 McGrath (2008, 28). 16 Cheng (2003, 1–43). 17 See Zhong (2012, 101–120), Lu (2012, 121–138), Gong (2012, 139–158), and Mu (2012, 159–182).

10

G. GAO

the public reasoning. This reduction of literary meanings and its attendant furthering of ideological division is not an isolated case, but to some extent exposes a general neglect of non-ideological epistemic and ethical meanings in the prevailing poststructuralist-informed modern Chinese literary studies. When commenting on the current state of modern Chinese literary studies in the United States, Wendy Larson writes: New historicism, cultural studies and postcolonial studies brought questions about the value of New Criticism and its methods of textual analysis, encouraging scholars to recognize literature as a social product and to integrate our discipline with intellectual currents outside the field. While this process was not without important benefits, the question of how literary aesthetics produced meaning withered, expanding the logic of historical investigation by turning literature into an example to be mined for larger trend.18

Larson emphasizes that she is not against applying Western theories to Chinese literary studies, but simply against “an overly historical logic that encourages us to disregard fundamental ontological or epistemological meanings that may underlie the work we analyze.”19 I praise Larson for pointing out current Chinese literary studies’ insufficient exploration of modern Chinese literary works’ non-ideological ontological, epistemological and aesthetic meanings under the dominant poststructuralist research paradigm. However, I disagree with her reduction and attribution. First, new historicism, cultural studies and postcolonial studies embody a long and complex body of literary scholarship. Not all of them encourage scholars “to recognize literature as a social product and to integrate our discipline with intellectual currents outside the field.” For instance, in his classical postcolonial work Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Dipesh Chakrabarty discusses Indian literature’s distinctive imagination in configuring “a non-totalizing conception of the political” that cannot be reduced to colonial discourse and existing sociological explanations.20 The British cultural studies led by Stuart Hall emphasizes the rich cultural meanings decoded by viewers and readers that defy the original meanings and intentions encoded by 18 Larson (2009, 7). 19 Larson (2009, 11). 20 Chakrabarty (2000, 149).

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

11

the dominant powers.21 Second, new historicism, cultural studies and postcolonial studies are influenced by the anti-realist and anti-nationalist poststructuralism in varying degrees. However, as is shown in the Preface, the real problem with the poststructuralist-informed literary studies is not its “overly historical logic” but its partial historical logic and its selective use of history to validate the poststructuralist anti-realist premise and serve its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist political agendas. Opposition against external colonialism, imperialism and global capitalism are praiseworthy, but resistance against domestic moral decay and authoritarian politics is no less important. This truncation of history to validate predetermined linguistic assumptions and serve political purposes leads to the neglect of the history of Chinese intellectuals’ critical self-reflections from the native Confucian perspective and literary writers’ more capacious and critical subjectivity that simultaneously criticizes and appropriates Chinese tradition and Western modernity. As literary scholar Meili Steele puts it, the real problem with poststructuralist-informed literary studies is not “expanding the logic of historical investigation,” but its “hiding from history.”22 It tells only half a historical story by focusing on unmasking how social actors (real or fictional) are oppressed and dominated by the structural, political and ideological forces, and ignore their complicated self-understandings, their working through the oppressive forces and envisioning alternative forms of life. Rigorous historically informed literary studies will not reduce the literary text to the product of historical and ideological conditions but can bring out its complicated meanings, receptions and functions it actually produced and performed in history. Despite my disagreement over the reason for the neglect of non-ideological, ontological and epistemological meanings in literary works, I very much endorse Wendy Larson’s rejection of imposing poststructuralist-informed psychoanalytic theory upon Chinese literature and her exploration of a distinctive modern Chinese revolutionary subjectivity. Larson is not alone in reaffirming the non-factional philosophical and ethical value of modern Chinese literature. Over the last fifteen years, more scholars have joined Larson in pursuing an alternative line of modern Chinese literary studies. For instance, Sabina Knight argues

21 Hall (2007, 402–414). 22 Steele (2005, 8–16).

12

G. GAO

that modern Chinese fiction, despite its gloominess, points to “a situated ethics that acknowledge the weight of given while still demanding moral action.” Jianguo Chen examines the transcendent philosophical meanings and musings of contemporary Chinese novels. Paola Iovene explores the transcendent power of post-Mao science fiction that can imagine a different world and future. Haiyan Lee retrieves the ethical and epistemic value of modern Chinese fictions and films by studying how literary works present the encounter with the stranger and cultivating readers’ moral imagination and sympathy for the other.23 However, except Larson, these studies do not situate contemporary Chinese literary works into the specific intellectual debate and elaborate on how the former could contribute to the latter on specific issues concerning the understanding of China’s past, present and future, one of Chinese literary writers’ primary concerns.

The Research Questions and Structure of the Book The two central questions this book explores are: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese intellectual discourse and debate on the issues of language, power and tradition? How to draw upon Chinese novels as non-factional resources to address the intellectual limits, broaden argumentative space and improve public reasoning? By exploring the Chinese intellectual discourse on language, power and tradition, I do not mean to discuss all Chinese scholars and professors’ specialized scholarly research on the three seminal issues, but only those academic public intellectuals’ works that relate the issues to social progress and national perfection. By arguing for literary works’ non-ideological and non-partisan dimensions, I do not mean to treat literature as a disinterested aesthetic object that has never been tarnished by preexisting economic structures, political ideologies, cultural mentalities and other literary texts. There is no denying that literary works are produced and embedded in particular textual network, historical conditions and power relations. My point is that a literary text is not only an object of ideological and discursive forces, but also a subject and agent of public reasoning. Its agency is shown not only in supporting, subverting and concretizing abstract values and particular

23 See Lee (2014).

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

13

political positions, but also in having the dimension and potential that can transcend the existing ideological divide to some extent and contribute to the intellectual and public debate by thematizing the common flaws plaguing different intellectual factions, dramatizing ignored problematics and offering novel ways of thinking, feeling, interpreting and acting. As the title of this book suggests, Chinese novels can provide a “novel” approach to China that intellectual China debaters can learn from. I argue that instead of reifying the ideological divide and furthering political tribalism, literary works could serve as intellectual resources and thought experiments to enlarge the ideological spectrum, broaden the argumentative space and enrich public reasoning. Literature may not be able to bring all debaters to consensus, but could provide them with more perspectives, issues, variables and hypotheses to think and argue about. In investigating the debate over China’s national perfection and modernity, I will bring polemical essays, scholarly works and literary texts together, because China’s national perfection is a concern shared by Chinese intellectuals, scholars and literary writers, which makes it possible for me to pursue such an interdisciplinary project. Only by opening up the boundaries between political debate, scholarly research and literary creation and looking at them not in isolation but in conversation with each other, we can gain a more informed understanding of contemporary Chinese intellectual and literary discourses. My research question of how contemporary Chinese literature could improve the intellectual discourse and debate over China’s national condition and perfection is not imposed from without but inherent to postsocialist Chinese literary thought. Chapter Two will examine postsocialist Chinese literary thought. Instead of offering a comprehensive historical account, I will focus on a seminal debate over “pure literature,” a debate that started at the beginning of the twenty-first century and persists to date. By examining this influential debate that has involved a host of leading Chinese literary critics, scholars and historians and covered key issues concerning the nature of literature, the writing of literary history and the assessment of post-Maoist literary history, I argue that the development of postsocialist Chinese literary thought is not a late reenactment of Western literary theory’s development from New Criticism to poststructuralism, but displays a critical agency by insisting on literature’s referential, epistemic and ethical value in disclosing, thinking

14

G. GAO

and changing China’s social realities, lived experiences and constituting dialogical subjectivity. The following three chapters are three case studies that focus on exploring three novelists’ (Han Shaogong, Wang Xiaobo and Chen Zhongshi) ignored non-factional contributions to the intellectual debate among the major three intellectual factions (liberals, New Left and New Confucians) over three key issues: language, power and tradition. The three chapters follow the same structure. The first section of each chapter discusses the merits and demerits of intellectual debate and discourse on the chosen topic. The second section turns to literary works as resources to address the intellectual limit and enrich the polemics and problematics. Both of these three literary writers and three polemical issues are not randomly selected but carefully chosen to support my central argument about contemporary Chinese literary works’ epistemic, ethical and political value that transcends the ideological divide. First, all the three selected issues are the central points of contention in post-Tiananmen Chinese intellectual debate. Focus on literary works’ new perspectives and ways of tackling these highly polemical issues can help to highlight contemporary Chinese literature’s non-sectarian value and contributions to the intellectual discourse and ideological debate. My focus on the issues of language, power and tradition does not mean that I view gender, race and class issues as unimportant. Instead, the latter are often entwined with the former in my discussions on literary contributions in the three case-study chapters. Second, the three novelists I select for discussion are often regarded as representing three major intellectual factions and ideological positions. Han Shaogong is often considered as a New Left writer, Wang Xiaobo a liberal writer and Chen Zhongshi a New Confucian writer. By examining their non-partisan and non-sectarian dimensions, I seek to correct the overly politicized and impoverished understanding of these three writers and demonstrate that instead of hardening the ideological divide, literary writers and works can enlarge the argumentative space and improve public reasoning. Third, these three writers are often considered as representing three major literary schools and styles in contemporary China: Chen Zhongshi is viewed as a realist writer, Han Shaogong a modernist writer and Wang Xiaobo a postmodernist writer. While literary scholars may not agree on this categorization, few would doubt that these three writers differ greatly from each other in terms of their languages, themes and narrative strategies. Focus on these three writers’ works could serve my purpose of highlighting that writers of

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

15

different literary styles could make their respective and distinctive contributions to the debate surrounding Chinese modernity. Fourth, the three novels I will focus on are Han Shaogong’s A Dictionary of Maqiao, Wang Xiaobo’s The Golden Age and Chen Zhongshi’s The White Deer Plain. Chen’s novel represents the first half of the twentieth century, the transition from premodern to modern China. Wang’s novel is centered upon the Maoist China. Han’s work portrays the transition from Maoist China to post-Maoist China. The three novels I will explore constitute an alternative literary perspective that can enrich the intellectual discourse on the twentieth-century China, a century intensely debated by Chinese intellectuals and China scholars. The three novels I choose were published in the 1990s. This particular choice lends support to my argument that the significance of literary works is not anchored into the time of their origin but could transcend their historical conditions of production and speak to the present ongoing intellectual debate and discourse. Lastly, this particular selection of writers and works does not mean any exclusion of other contemporary Chinese literary works,’ writers’ and genres’ nonfactional interventions and contributions. Instead, it only endeavors to set up a methodological example that can connect the studies of literature to studies of Chinese intellectual debate and discourse in a more reciprocal and mutually illuminating way.

References Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Cheek, Timothy, Joshua Fogel, and David Ownby. “Mapping the Intellectual Public Sphere in China Today.” China Information 32.1 (2018): 107–120. Cheng, Yinghong. “Che Guevara: Dramatizing China’s Divided Intelligentsia at the Turn of the Century.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 15.2 (2003): 1–43. Davies, Gloria. Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007. Gong, Haomin. “Toward a New Leftist Ecocriticism in Postsocialist China: Reading the ‘Poetry of Migrant Workers’ as Ecopoetry.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Hall, Stuart. “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse.” CCCS Selected Working Papers. London: Routledge, 2007. 402–414.

16

G. GAO

Iovene, Paola. Tales of Futures Past: Anticipation and the Ends of Literature in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014. Jenco, Leigh. “Introduction: On the Possibility of Chinese Thought as Global Theory.” Chinese Thought as Global Theory: Diversifying Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Ed. Leigh Jencon. Albany: Suny Press, 2016. Knight, Sabina. The Heart of Time: Moral Agency in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. Larson, Wendy. From Ah Q to Lei Feng: Freud and Revolutionary Spirit in 20th Century China. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Lee, Haiyan. The Stranger and the Chinese Moral Imagination. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014. Li Tuo 李陀. Xuebenghechu 雪崩何处 (Where Did the Avalanche Happen). Beijing: Zhongxin, 2015. Li, He. Political Thought and China’s Transformation: Ideas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Li, Junpeng. “The Making of Liberal Intellectuals in Post-Tiananmen China.” Diss. Columbia U, 2017. Li Dan 李丹. “Zhongguo zuoyi ziyouzhuyi de xianggang gongshi” 中国左翼 自 由主义的香港共识 (The Hong Kong Consensus of Chinese Left-wing Liberalism). Gongshiwang 共识网 (Consensus Net) 8 August 2014. https://www. gongfa.com/html/gongfaxinwen/201408/06-2649.html. Accessed 20 May 2021. Lu, Jie. “Constructing Agency: Challenges and Possibilities in Chinese New Left Literature.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Lynch, Daniel C. China’s Futures: PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics and Foreign Policy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2020. Ma, Licheng. Leading Schools of Thought in Contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015. McGrath, Jason. Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Mu, Aili. “The Rise of the Short-Short Genre.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Pan Lili 潘丽莉 and Zhou Suli周素丽. “2015 zhongwai shida sichao” 中外十 大思潮 (Top Ten Streams of Thought). Renmin luntan 人民论坛 (People’s Forum) 1 (2016): 14–19. Steele, Meili. Hiding from History: Politics and Public Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. Strafella, Giorgio. Intellectual Discourse in Reform Era China: The Debate on the Spirit of the Humanities in the 1990s. New York: Routledge, 2017. Veg, Sebastian. “The Rise of China’s Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and “Repoliticization”.” The China Journal 82.1 (2019): 23–45.

1

INTRODUCTION: POST-TIANANMEN …

17

Wang Hui 汪晖. China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition. Ed.Theodore Huters. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. Wang Xiaobo. 2007. Wang in Love and Bondage: Three Novellas by Wang Xiaobo. Trans. Hongling Zhang and Jason Sommer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. Wu, Shufang. “The Revival of Confucianism and the CCP’s Struggle for Cultural Leadership: A Content Analysis of the People’s Daily, 2000–2009.” Journal of Contemporary China 23.89 (2014): 971–991. Xu Jilin. “Rujia wenhua zhongguo wenhua yu zhonghua wenhua you qubie ma?” 儒家文化, 中国文 化与中华文化有区别吗? “Is There Any Difference Between Confucian Culture, Chinese Culture and Greater Chinese Culture?” Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 12 June 2018. https://www.aisixiang.com/ data/110423.html. Accessed 10 February 2020 Zhong Xueping. “International as Specter: Na’er, ‘Subaltern Literature,’ and Contemporary China’s ‘Left Bank.’” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012.

CHAPTER 2

Discussion on Pure Literature and Postsocialist Chinese Literary Thought

Introduction Modern Chinese literary thought was first formed around the turn of twentieth century under the influence of Western literary theories and criticisms. However, with a close reading of many prominent literary writers’ and critics’ writings, Kirk Denton argues that modern Chinese literary thought is not an exact facsimile of Western model, but conditioned by traditional Chinese philosophical thought and modern China’s sociopolitical imperatives. Modern Chinese literary critics did not passively embrace the Western aestheticist conception of art for art’s sake nor the realist conception of literature as mechanical reflection of social reality nor the romanticist understanding of literature as purely subjective selfexpression, but conceived of literature as embodying both self and the external world, as a subjective response to external occurrences.1 While admitting modern Chinese literary thought is not as rigorous and systematic as their Western counterpart, Denton seeks to reclaim “the creative agency of the Chinese intellectuals who appropriated it (Western model) to fulfill certain needs determined by their cultural tradition and the historical crisis that seemed to threaten their nation’s existence.”2 Denton

1 Denton (1996, 1–61). 2 Denton (1996, 2).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_2

19

20

G. GAO

attributes this pragmatic, moralist and nationalist conception of literature to the traditional Chinese “holistic ontology” that views writer, text, reader and the world as interconnected and “preclude(s) the emergence of a purely aesthetic conception of literature that would divorce the literary work from its origins in the joining of the poetic subject and the external object and its seamless connection with politics and morality.”3 Denton’s studies of modern Chinese literary thought are focused on the Late Qing and the Republican era. Then, how about Chinese literary thought in postsocialist era when various Western literary theories and criticisms were once again introduced to China on a massive scale? Do Chinese literary critics and scholars still consciously or unconsciously cling to the traditional “holistic ontology” and appropriate Western literary theories to shape the development of literature in the service of China’s cultural transformation and modernization project? How do they negotiate the tension between politics and poetics, literary autonomy and sociopolitical efficacy under the particular postsocialist conditions? This chapter will discuss postsocialist Chinese literary thought by addressing these crucial and curious questions. A well-informed understanding of Chinese literary critics’ and scholars’ thoughts on the nature, function and history of literature can shed light on postsocialist literary texts. Needless to say, modern Western literary works, theories and criticisms and postsocialist China’s historical conditions have informed postsocialist Chinese literature. However, it is also worth noting that local literary scholars’ and critics’ thoughts have exerted huge influence on literary writers’ fictional creations as well. As the prominent Chinese literary critic Wang Xiaoming comments, “unlike the formation of modern European literature, in China theory comes before creative practice; it is not that the later first emerged, then theory explains the existing literary works, but that theory was first put forward and then the writers follow these norms to create works.”4 By examining the frequent exchanges between writers and critics/editors, Paola Iovene makes a similar argument in her studies of contemporary Chinese avantgarde literature that Chinese literary editors’ and critics’ developmental

3 Denton (1996, 33). 4 Wang (1997, 262).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

21

vision of literature shaped the formation of avant-garde literature in postMaoist China.5 Wang and Iovene may have overstated the influence of literary critics and editors. However, considering the close relationship between writers and critics, few would object that the native literary critics’ and scholars’ thoughts and expectations provide us with a good point of entry to understand the problematics and meanings of contemporary Chinese literary works that will be discussed in the following three chapters. The existing scholarship highlights a paradigm shift in postsocialist Chinese literary thought, a shift viewed as a belated reenactment of the Western literary criticism’s paradigm shift from the New Criticism to the various poststructuralist-informed criticisms.6 This chapter takes a different track. Instead of underscoring the shift and rupture and portraying the development of postsocialist literary thought as a repetition of previous Western criticism, this chapter joins Denton in retrieving the continuity and critical agency of postsocialist literary critics and scholars who appropriate both the New Criticisms and various neomarxist and poststructuralist theories to fulfill the sociopolitical and cultural needs shaped by their cultural tradition and social imperatives. This chapter will examine the postsocialist literary thought from the end of the Cultural Revolution to present. It does not aim to offer a comprehensive historical account nor to rediscover the ignored or marginalized literary scholars and thoughts. Instead, I will examine postsocialist Chinese literary thought through a focus on the “Discussion on Pure Literature” that started from the beginning of the twenty-first century and persists to now. There are a couple of reasons for this particular choice of focus. First, as many leading Chinese literary critics and scholars have participated, “Discussion on Pure Literature” has become one of the most seminal events in the Chinese literary academia. Second, “Discussion on Pure Literature” covers not only the theoretical questions concerning the nature and function of literature, but also more specific questions with regard to the description and evaluation of the dominant postsocialist Chinese literature and literary thought. Therefore, it provides a crystallization of the important literary polemics and problematics in postsocialist China. My study of this Discussion may not capture a full

5 Iovene (2014, 81–106). 6 Wang (1996, 197–201), Shen and Zhou (2006, 139–155) and Zhang (2013, 28–35).

22

G. GAO

picture but at least can grasp the mainline of postsocialist Chinese literary thought. Third, many participating literary scholars and critics deploy poststructuralist and neomarxists theories in their arguments. Therefore, focus on the “Discussion on Pure Literature” offers an opportunity for us to examine native scholars’ use of Western theories under the specific Chinese postsocialist context. This examination of the “Discussion on Pure Literature” shows that despite their different ideological leanings and conflicting assessments of contemporary Chinese literature, many (if not all) prominent Chinese literary critics and scholars share an insistence on the distinctive cognitive, ethical and political value of literature. They do not follow the New Criticism in treating literary works as self-contained linguistic artefacts for mere aesthetic analysis nor join the neomarxist and poststructuralist literary critics in unmasking literary works as products of ideological forces or allegory of indeterminacy and aporia of language, but take literature as cherished intellectual and spiritual resources to illuminate complicated social realities, enlighten the mind, effect sociocultural changes, cultivate new ranges of sensibility and new modes of subjectivity, and envision new desirable future for China. Finally, the “Discussion on Pure Literature” broke out right after the breakout of the liberal versus the New Left intellectual debate. Neither of them was purely academic discussion but concerned with China’s national perfection. The former could be considered as an extension of the former into the literary sphere. The difference is that the latter is focused on the immediate political and economic causes of China’s crisis while the former is focused on how contemporary Chinese literature is related to the social and cultural crisis and how it can have literature and literary studies make distinctive contributions. The examination of the “Discussion on Pure Literature” can demonstrate that the following chapters’ exploration of Chinese literature’s contribution to the intellectual debate is not a problematic externally posed but inherent to the postsocialist Chinese thought. This internally-driven problematic does not seek to construct a fixed and essentialist Chinese literary tradition or a China-West dichotomy but resonates with the Western literary academy’s recent critical reflections on the poststructuralist-informed hermeneutics of suspicion and reaffirmation of distinctive literary value, a point I will discuss at the end of this chapter.

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

23

Beginning of the Discussion on Pure Literature As is shown in Chapter One, China’s growing economic inequality, political corruption and cultural degradation in the 1990s triggered Chinese intellectuals’ heated debate over what the causes of and solutions to those pressing problems and where China should go for the future. As important members of Chinese intellectual community that share the “worrying about China,” literary critics and scholars not only participated in the debate but also extended its polemics into the literary sphere and kindled a wide-ranging debate over chunwenxue 纯文学 (pure literature). This debate is centered on these questions: What notion of literature actually prevailed in postsocialist China? Formalist, aestheticist, realist or a combination of these contradictory notions? What are the actual cultural and political consequences of the prevailing literary notion? What kind of literary conception and works should contemporary China have? The term “pure literature” in the Chinese context basically means literature purified of political propaganda, moral didactics and commercial interest, similar to “literary autonomy” in the English literary scholarship. According to Chinese literary critic Kuang Xinnian’s research, the notion of “pure literature” first emerged in China under the influence of the imported Kant’s and Schiller’s classical German aesthetics that conceives of literature and art as “disinterested” and “purposeless.” It was initially used by the erudite scholar Wang Guowei to oppose China’s traditional didactic conception of wenyizaidao 文以载道 (writing conveys Dao) and establish the independence of literature from the spheres of morality and politics as a progressive indicator of Chinese cultural modernity.7 However, this aestheticist notion of pure literature was suppressed under the increasingly leftist politics that employed literature to serve the communist revolution and socialist construction. Yet, it regained popularity in the 1980s as the ultra-leftist Maoist politics receded. Li Tuo is a senior literary critic as well as a New Left public intellectual in the intellectual debate. He associates post-Tiananmen China’s political, economic and cultural crises with the notion of “pure literature.” In 2001, Li published an interview on the renowned journal of Beijing Literature to criticize both the notion and consequence of “pure literature.” Li thinks that the reemerging aestheticist notion of pure literature played a positive role in countering the excesses of party state interference in the 7 Kuang (2014, 21–22).

24

G. GAO

1980s; however, as the concept of “pure literature” gained dominance in the 1990s, it lost its critical edge and emancipatory political function. On the one hand, the pure literature’s emphasis on literature as an independent discursive system led serious literary writers to be preoccupied with experimenting with sophisticated narrative strategies and exploration of inner psyche. Such a formalist and inward turn made serious Chinese literary works increasingly obscure and become a game for a small circle of literary professionals. On the other hand, with the acceleration of China’s market-oriented reform, commercialized literature prevailed.8 The pure literature’s insistence on “individualized writing” and “personal feeling” under the growing influence of literary commercialization has deteriorated into the despicable “writing of body” or “writing of groin” to pander to the low market taste.9 Li contends that because of the prevalent notion of “pure literature,” both serious and pop literature failed to expose and criticize the harsh social realities in time. In other words, for Li Tuo, the notion of pure literature should be partly responsible for sociopolitical crisis in the 1990s, since it kept post-Tiananmen literary writers from fulfilling their due social and political missions. Li Tuo’s criticism of “pure literature” drew another senior literary critic Hong Zicheng’s rebuttal. Hong accuses Li of distorting the history of postsocialist Chinese literary thought and misdescribing the causal relationship. First, the notion of “pure literature” was welcomed by many young literary writers and scholars, but their pursuit of pure literature was not confined to languages, forms and rhetorical devices as Li Tuo claims.10 Second, the “pure literature” was not strengthened as Li says but weakened in the 1990s. Even if literary independence did exist to some extent in the 1990s, it performed emancipatory political function instead of ignoring or perpetuating oppression and injustices.11 Third, there may not be a real lack of politically and socially engaged literature in the 1990s as Li Tuo claims. However, even if there was such a lack, it should not be attributed to the notion of pure literature but to the oppressive political, economic and media systems.12 Hong Zicheng does not provide more 8 See Li (2001, 4–6). 9 See Li (2001, 7). 10 See Hong (2013, 6). 11 See Hong (2005, 4). 12 Ibid.

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

25

historical evidence for his rebuttal. However, a quick review of the postsocialist Chinese literary thought can show Hong’s criticisms make a lot of sense. In what follows, I will first examine leading Chinese literary scholars’ discussions on literature and rewriting of modern Chinese literary history in the 1980s and then analyze another group of major literary critics’ discussion on “pure literature” since the new millennial. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate Chinese literary critics’ consistent critical agency in the reception of Western theories for the sake of nation building.

Looking Back at the Literary Thought in the 1980s The New Criticism, structural linguistics and narratology were massively introduced to China in the 1980s. Chinese literary critics and scholars appropriated these formalist literary theories to oppose the Maoist reflectionist and instrumentalist conception of literature as a tool for class struggle, redefine literature as “an art of language” and justify its liberation from the party state’s excessive political interference. Li Tuo rightly notes the ironical phenomenon that the formalist literary theories that were believed to serve a conservative political agenda in the West in the mid-twentieth century were unexpectedly appropriated by rising Chinese literary critics to perform a progressively anti-authoritarian political function in the 1980s. However, Chinese literary thought in the 1980s was by no means a mere late replay of the Western formalist theories, but more critical, capacious and contradictory than an uncritical reduplication of the formalist Anglo-American New Criticism can describe. A notable example is Liu Zaifu, a major literary critic and ardent proponent of “pure literature.” In his influential book Reflections on Literature (1986), Liu praises New Criticism’s sophisticated analysis of literary language and form while at the same time also faulting its analysis for being “too minute to have a macroscopic perspective.”13 Liu rejects the New Criticism’s understanding of literary meaning as stemming only from forms. He quotes the then Kant-inflected Marxist philosopher Li Zehou’s theory on lishi jidian 历史积淀 (historical sedimentation) to argue that the meaning of form is not derived from itself but from historical and social practices.14 Therefore, literary writers and critics should 13 Liu (1986, 25). 14 Liu (1986) 26. According to Li Zehou, beauty or work of art is not a pure form

nor subjective sensibility, but a sedimentation, formed and transmitted through the social

26

G. GAO

concern themselves not only with the form of literature but also with its content and relationship with historical, social and cultural contexts. Liu proposes that Chinese literary scholars should draw critically and selectively upon psychoanalytic criticism, archetypal criticism, New Criticism and other social science theories to “develop a more effective critical model of our own.”15 While highlighting the individual will, emotion, desire and imagination of writer, character and reader in literary creation and interpretation, Liu does not construct a solipsistic and completely apolitical aesthetic subjectivity obsessed with private feelings and desires. Instead, he invests the aesthetic subjectivity with a Confucian youhuanyishi 忧患意识 (worrying consciousness) and shimingyishi 使命意识 (sense of mission).16 Liu contends that “these writers (with a sense of mission and worrying consciousness) are full of passion and desire to change realities and remedy social ills---. They use their works to express people’s sufferings, improve their spirituality and shape beautiful souls.”17 Liu is not a purely formalist nor a realist literary critic, but a critic who develops an inclusive understanding that highlights historical, aesthetic and ethical dimensions of literature as a critical response to the official interference with literary writing and criticism. Except for a few party ideologues, Liu’s theory of literary subjectivity was warmly welcomed by the Chinese literary circle in the mid-1980s. However, in late 1980s, more younger literary scholars, such as Li Jie, Wang Xiaoming, Sun Ge, Li Jiefei and Wu Jun, found Liu’s theory unsatisfying for its insufficient attention to literary form. They advocate xingshibentilun 形式本体论 “ontology of form,” contending that literature is first and foremost particular use of language, narrative strategy and structure.18 However, close reading of their writings shows that they did not prioritize literary language and form to the exclusion of content and social function. Li Jie, a then promising young critic, published an influential essay “On the Ontological Meanings of Literary Form” in 1987 that

and biological evolution of human beings and stemming from the material and spiritual production of historical and social process. For a detailed discussion on Li Zehou’s aesthetic theory of “sedimentation,” see Chandler (2018) 278–312. 15 Ibid. 16 Liu (1985, 24). 17 Liu (1985, 26). 18 Yang (2016, 60–67).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

27

was considered as representative text of “ontology of form.” Li draws upon Saussure’s structuralist linguistics to argue that the meaning of a literary text, just like the meaning of language as Saussure assumes, does not depend upon its reference to external reality, but upon its language and textual context. Therefore, what matters most in literature is not “what to write,” but “how to write.”19 Literary writers and critics should shift their attention from what content to be represented to how to represent through particular linguistic forms, techniques and strategies. Li Jie contends that “literature is a self-generating autonomous entity.”20 However, later in his article, Li Jie argues that literature is “emanation of the author’s feeling and emotion,” which obviously deviates from the structuralist linguistics that treats language and literature as an objective system beyond authorial intention and control, and focuses only on analyzing the inner textual structure and pattern of a text.21 LiJie emphasizes the author’s creative genius and rare sense of language in selecting the most appropriate and the most metaphorical words and syntaxes to express her image, emotion and feeling.22 Apparently, Li Jie’s conception and analysis of literature are not really structuralist and formalist but mixed with romanticist and humanist understanding of language and literature. In the same year, Li Jie published a book A New Theory on Literature as a Study of Human Beings in which he departs more radically from the “ontology of form” and comes closer to Liu Zifu’s more inclusive understanding of literature. He starts his book with criticizing the denigration of “literature as study of human beings” in the Maoist era and reaffirming literature’s positive role in studying and constructing human subjectivity. He writes: Literature is gaining more self-consciousness through its extension and celebration of the human self. As an aesthetic creative activity, literature is not an instrument to anything, but a manner of human self-constitution. The literary self-consciousness indicates that the nature of literature is not something but a process, not a passive reflection of the objective world, but an active creation facing the objective world. This literary subjectivity displays its humanist dimension once again, which is reflected in its modern 19 Li (1987, 78). 20 Li (1987, 79). 21 Li (1987, 82). 22 Li (1987, 85).

28

G. GAO

cultural consciousness such as consciousness of history, progress, sex, war, death and solitude.23 While citing structuralist linguistics and claiming to pursue “ontology of form,” Li Jie does not really treat literature as a self-contained linguistic system only for aesthetic and structuralist analysis nor does he take its function as constructing a highly self-centered and idiosyncratic self, but relates literature and its constituting function to the larger historical and social development.

Meanwhile, many literary scholars took an issue with the focus on the nature of literature and argued for the shift from the question of what literature is to the question of how literature exists in actual creative, interpretive and receptive processes and activities. Drawing upon cultural anthropology and Heideggerian existentialist philosophy, Zhu Liyuan, Wang Yueyuan, Wang Yuanxiang, Du Shuying and Xu Dai called for examining literature as an integrative practice and process between world, writer, work and reader instead of focusing only on the text or the writer. They emphasized that the development of literature is co-structured with the development of human existence.24 The 1980s Chinese literary scholars’ ambivalence toward or transcending of formalist literary theories is not only manifested in their theoretical discussions on the nature and function of literature but also in the rewriting of modern Chinese literary theory. A new generation of Beijing-based scholars of modern Chinese literature emerged in the mid-1980s. They were unsatisfied with the then dominant periodization of modern Chinese literary history into jindai 近代 (early modern), xiandai 现代(modern) and dangdai 当代 (contemporary) as an illustration of the CCP’s leftist revolutionary periodization of modern Chinese history into jiuminzhuzhuyi geming 旧民主主义革命 (Old Democratic Revolution), xinminzhuzhuyi geming 新民主主义革命 (New Democratic Revolution) and shehuizhuyi geming 社会主义革命 (Socialist Revolution). 23 Li (1987, 1–2). 24 For a detailed discussion on the anthropological and existentialist understanding of

literature in the 1980s, see Su (2006, 13–45).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

29

In 1985, the then emerging literary scholars Qian Liqun, Chen Pingyuan and Huang Ziping from Peking University put forward the concept of “twentieth century Chinese literature” that seeks for “the independence of literary history from the simplistic analogy to sociopolitical history and makes the literature’s own genesis and evolution as object of research.”25 Such a reconfiguration of modern Chinese literary history on the basis of “literature’s own genesis and evolution” is often perceived as being shaped by American literary historian C. T. Hsia’s New Criticisminformed A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, and as a political act to replace the Maoist left-wing revolutionary historical narrative with the Dengist right-wing modernization historical narrative.26 There are some elements of truth to this perception. First, Qian Liqun himself did admit in an interview that his positive reevaluation of Eileen Chang, Shi Tuo and Duanmu Hongliang was indeed influenced by Hsia’s literary history.27 Second, the understanding of “twentieth century Chinese literature” as a history of gradual transition from premodern to modern literature did echo the 1980s modernization theory that views modern Chinese history not as a history featuring series of CCP-led communist revolutions but as a history evolving from premodern society to modern society. To put it more simply, the proponents of “twentieth century Chinese literature” no longer take the leftist communist revolutions as exerting decisive influence on the development of modern Chinese literature. Instead, they emphasize literary history has its own aesthetic logic and law. However, if we look more closely into Qian’s, Chen’s and Huang’s manifesto, interview and practice of literary history rewriting, we will find that they are not devout advocates of Western formalism and absolute literary autonomy nor do they completely reject the leftist politics in favor of the right-wing modernization theory. Instead, like Liu Zaifu, their proposed “twentieth century Chinese literature” seeks mostly to counter the complete subjugation of literary history to political history and develop a more inclusive literary history. First, as the three literary scholars declared at the very beginning of their widely-read manifesto “On the 20th Century Chinese Literature,” their proposed new literary history is not only a process of forming “aesthetic consciousness,” but also a process of “integrating into

25 Qian et al. (2004, 29). 26 He (2010, 349–354). 27 For the interview, see Yang (2011, 181).

30

G. GAO

world literature” and “refracting and reflecting the renewal and rise of the centuries-old Chinese nation and its soul via the art of language at the moment of modern radical transformation.”28 Obviously, Qian’s, Chen’s and Huang’s conception of modern Chinese literary history not only comprises aesthetic and formalist dimensions but also nationalist and cosmopolitan dimensions. Second, Qian emphasized in an interview that Hsia’s New Criticism-informed literary history only shaped his reassessment of several novelists. Overall, he disliked Hsia’s literary history for its obvious anti-communist political bias and its overall literary historiographical framework.29 Qian made it clear that he read very few new Western literary theories and his literary thought was more informed by the Western Enlightenment, the Chinese New Culture Movement and the socialist revolutionary thought. He made a special note that his concept of “twentieth century Chinese literature” was also inspired by Lenin’s anti-imperialist and nationalist thought in his article “the Awakening of Asia” and the Chinese left-wing thought.30 That’s why their concept of twentieth-century Chinese literature comprises a strong nationalist dimension. Qian emphasized that modern Chinese literature is not simply a repetition of Western Renaissance, but a renaissance with Chinese characteristics.31 Then, it is no wonder that in his influential literary history textbook Thirty Years of Modern Chinese Literary History, Qian did not exclude nor marginalize leftist-leaning realist writers like Mao Dun, Jiang Guangci, Ding Ling, Xiao Hong, Zhang Tianyi and Zhao Shuli, but speaks highly of their nationalist and anti-imperialist discourse and formal innovations (Ding Ling’s psychological narration, Zhang Tianyi’s experimentation with various novelistic discourses).32 In 1988, three years after the concept of “twentieth century Chinese literature” was put forward, Shanghai-based young scholars Chen Sihe and Wang Xiaoming opened a column called “Rewriting Literary History” in the newly founded journal of Shanghai Literary Criticism. Like the proponents of the “twentieth century Chinese literature” in Beijing, Chen Sihe’s and Wang Xiaoming’s rewriting literary history also 28 Qian et al. (2004, 11). 29 For the interview, see Yang (2011, 181). 30 For the interview, see Yang (2011, 182). 31 For the interview, see Yang (2011, 183). 32 Qian (1998, 1–3).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

31

took aim at the Maoist subjugation of literature and literary historiography to revolutionary historiography and ultra-leftist politics. However, unlike Qian, Huang and Chen, Wang’s and Chen’s preface to the column gives more emphasis to literary historians’ own personal reading experience and emotion in their rewriting modern literary history and advocated diversified Chinese literary historiographies instead of writing literary history in line with the monolithic official historiography. If one only reads the preface, one is tempted to conclude that their proposed rewriting attempted to substitute political with personal and public with private, which was symptomatic of the rising individualist Western ideology in the 1980s. However, if we read more of Wang’s works, we will find that he does not take literary history rewriting as a purely subjective expression of a literary historian’s private self. In a later essay “From Longevity Temple to Jingpo Lake” that clarified his idea and the historical context of rewriting literary history, Wang insists that literary historiography not only has its subjective dimension, but also has its objective dimension. That means individual literary historians’ aesthetics, values and thinking mode are also informed by the tradition, culture and society they inhabit.33 Therefore, literary historians’ personal reading experience and their history writing are not absolutely subjective and arbitrary, but constrained by some objective realities and inherited collective ideas. By calling attention to the subjective dimension of literary historiography, Wang’s call for rewriting literary history did not seek to establish a purely detached private aesthetic sphere and separate it from the public and political realms but sought only to redress the overly suppression of personal reading experience to comply with the hegemonic official revolutionary historiography. From 1988 to 1989, the Rewriting Literary History Column published many young scholars’ articles that reassessed canonical leftist writers such as Ding Ning, Mao Dun, Shao Shuli and Liu Qing. These articles do not completely disavow these leftists writers’ canonical status in the 1920s and 1930s and their leftist political leaning. Instead, they praise the leftist writers’ literary debut with some individuality and authentic self, feeling and expression.34 They only charge that as these leftist writers got increasingly involved in communist revolution and intraparty struggle, they gradually lost their individual selves and their

33 Wang (1989, 35–41). 34 Liu (2015, 3–4).

32

G. GAO

later works produced under CCP leadership degraded into mere tools for class struggle and leftist political movements. These articles’ specific reevaluations of the canonical leftist writers’ early and later works are open to debate, but what is clear is that like the “the 20th Century Chinese Literature,” these rewritings do not preclude left-leaning literary works simply for their particular political agendas, but only counter literary writers’ complete surrender of their selves to CCP’s political directives and loss of literature’s potentially unique participation and contribution to social and political transformations. When asked if his rewriting of modern Chinese history is inspired by Kantian disinterested aesthetics, Chen Sihe replied: On the one hand, it is not derived from Kant but from Engels. Engels argued quite early on that literary works should be evaluated from both historical and aesthetic perspective, not partisan perspective. On the other hand, we still emphasize Lu Xun’s tradition, that is, we should shoulder social responsibilities and dislike the purely aesthetic things. Therefore, we propose that we need both historical and aesthetic analysis and they are inseparable from each other. By “historical,” I mean writers should be situated into her historical situation; by “aesthetic,” I mean literature has its distinctive features, its sociality and politics are expressed through aesthetic means.35

Chen Sihe’s and Wang Xiaoming’s rewriting of modern Chinese literary history is not intended to replace the politically engaged realist and leftist literature with a totally depoliticized formalist and conservative one. They understood that aesthetics and politics, literature and history cannot be detached from each other. Their rewriting of literary history took aim only at the Maoist complete subjugation of literary history to political history and called for more dialectical and dialogical understanding of aesthetics and politics. Then, it is not surprising that Wang Xiaoming made a twoprolonged critique of the debate over America’s modern Chinese literary studies in the early 1990s. In 1993, the Chinese American literary scholar Liu Kang drew upon the Foucaultian theory about power and knowledge to expose the hidden ideological nature of America’s modern Chinese literature and modern Chinese literary studies, in particular, C. T. Hsia’s New Criticism studies.

35 See Yang (2011, 232).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

33

On the one hand, Wang Xiaoming joins Liu Kang in exposing and criticizing Hsia’s anti-communist ideology behind his self-proclaimed apolitical aestheticist approach.36 On the other hand, Wang Xiaoming accuses Liu Kang of abusing Foucaultian theory and ignoring the Chinese political context. Wang highlights that since Mao Zedong’s Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art delivered in 1942, “politics” in Chinese literary criticism was widely understood as “the specific (CCP) power and ideological propaganda without the sense of the broadlydefined politics in the West that comprises all forms and influences of human political activities.”37 For Wang Xiaoming, Liu Kang made a mistaken move by appropriating Foucault’s insight into the inextricable relationship between power and discourse to justify all propagandist literary works produced under the highly repressive Maoist politics. In other words, For Wang Xiaoming, both Liu and Hsia failed to deal with the relationship between politics and literature in a proper way. Hsia hypocritically severed literature from politics while Liu hastily conflated the former with the latter. What Wang favors is a mutually enriching relationship between literature and politics in which the latter sheds light on the former while the former contributes to the latter. The above examination of major literary theorists,’ scholars’ and historians’ thoughts on the nature and function of literature and rewriting of modern Chinese literary history demonstrates that postsocialist Chinese literary thought was not a total rejection of previous leftist-leaning realism nor a late replay of the Anglo-American New Criticism obsessed with languages, rhetorics and forms, but a blend of a set of contradictory philosophical, political and aesthetic theories and thoughts such as Marxism, Leninism, European existentialism, Confucianism, socialist realism and cultural anthropology. It had not developed a systematic and highly sophisticated literary theory. Despite its internal differences, all these major literary scholars and literary historians rejected rigid dichotomies of form and content, aesthetics and politics, realism and formalism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and embrace more capacious, inclusive and dialogical understanding of literature’s nature, function and process.

36 Wang (1994, 137). 37 Wang (1994, 141).

34

G. GAO

Second, instead of treating literature as mere object of research for disengaged academic analysis, they expect literature to perform certain recuperative, constitutive and redemptive functions in uncovering and improving social and psychological realities, articulating and cultivating new modes of postsocialist subjectivity that is not only concerned with languages or private aesthetic pleasures, but also with broader national consciousness and social progress. Literary scholars’ emphasis on the distinctive public and political dimension and function of literature persisted into the post-Tiananmen China.

Discussion on Pure Literature in the Twenty-first Century The CCP’s brutal crackdown on the Tiananmen protest in 1989 was followed by stricter censorship and more limits on intellectuals’ intervention into politics. Because of the political pressure and their own critical reflections on the 1980s’ bombastic intellectual atmosphere and shallow scholarship, literary scholars launched the campaign for the construction of disciplinary norms and rigorous academic standards. Literary studies were more professionalized and specialized. Literary scholars were engaged in more concrete research activities such as editing and compiling literary works and studying particular literary schools and regions. However, this academicization and professionalization do not mean their retreat into academic ivory tower and separation of literature and literary studies from the pursuit of self-cultivation, social reform and national perfection. This insistence and expectation of literature’s distinctive public role was manifested in multiple important discussions among the literary circle. For instance, in the Humanistic Spirit Discussion from 1993 to 1995, renowned literary critics and scholars of philosophy and history, such as Wang Xiaoming, Chen Sihe, Cai Xiang, Hao Yuanbao, Wang Gan, Gao Ruiquan, Zhang Rulun, Xu Jilin, Zhu Xueqin and literary writers Zhang Chengzhi and Zhang Wei, joined the discussion. They lashed out at increasingly commercialized pop literature and cultural degradation, in particular, Wang Shuo’s hooligan literature and Zhang Yimou’s commercialized self-orientalist films to pander to the Western taste, and condemned their failure to fulfill positive spiritual and social functions. In 1997, the prestigious Chinese language journal of Modern Chinese Literary Studies invited prominent scholars to evaluate the status quo and plan the future of modern Chinese literary studies. All the

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

35

invited literary scholars called for more socially and politically engaged literary scholarship. For instance, Zhao Yuan, a senior scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, emphasizes that academicization should not be used as an excuse to dodge literary scholars’ responsibility of making timely response to vital social issues.38 Qian Liqun, who was an emerging scholar in the 1980s and has grown into an eminent scholar of modern Chinese literature since the 1990s, proposes the extension of modern literary studies into “PRC Cultural Studies” to recover literary studies’ broad social and political functions.39 In a similar vein, Chen Pingyuan urges literary scholars to integrate literary analysis with analysis of educational institution, campus politics and ideological studies so as to reconnect literary studies to society and reality.40 As is shown above, Li Tuo’s characterization of postsocialist literary thought as being dominated by formalist concentration on literary languages and forms, and its political consequences as changing from positive to negative are too simplistic to capture the complexity and diversity. However, Li Tuo’s critique of “pure literature” is supported by a host of many leading literary scholars and writers, such as Nan Fan, He Guimei, Cai Xiang, Chen Xiaoming, Luo Gang, Xue Yi, Han Shaogong and Zhang Wei. Their support has something less to do with Li’s depiction of the history of postsocialist literary thought than with their sharing of Li’s normative notion of what Chinese literature should be, namely a socially and politically engaged notion of literature. What distinguishes the post-Tiananmen arguments for literature’s political dimension and public function from the 1980s is their frequent use of the neomarxist and poststructuralist theories (Raymond Williams, Althusser, Foucault, Bourdieur, Jameson and Žižek) that reject a disinterested notion of pure literature and unmask its hidden political ideologies. While some of these theories (such as Jameson and Terry Eagleton) had been translated into Chinese in the 1980s, they were not extensively applied until the 1990s. There are two major reasons for this extensive use. First, with the growing internationalization of Chinese scholarship in the 1990s, Chinese literary scholars were more receptive to the dominant politicized

38 Zhao (1997, 4–6). 39 Qian (1997, 61–66). 40 Chen (1997, 67–73).

36

G. GAO

Western neomarxist and poststructuralist theories. Second, more importantly, these politicized literary theories echoed Chinese literary scholars’ reaffirmation of literature’s positive political and social functions under the increasingly depoliticized and commercialized social atmosphere. Meanwhile, there are also literary scholars taking an issue with Li Tuo’s unfair critique of pure literature and expressing worries about Li Tuo’s tendency to repoliticize Chinese literature. Unlike his supporters that repeatedly enlist and gloss imported poststructuralist and neoMarxist theories, Li Tuo’s critics resort less to Western theories than to the 1980s’ legacy, their rich knowledge of Chinese literary history and their personal reading experience to reject the excessive politicization of literature. However, despite their conflicting attitudes toward “pure literature,” both supporters and critics of Li Tuo have a recognizable point of similarity in affirming the distinctively positive referential, ethical and social value of literature. What they disagree over is less the socially engaged notion of literature than their assessments of contemporary Chinese literature and its future development under the particular postsocialist Chinese context. Like their predecessors in the 1980s, the post-Tiananmen scholars do not fully and uncritically accept those trendy Western theories and America’s modern Chinese literary studies, but hold on to their conception of literature as distinctively intellectual and spiritual resources that can unveil the complex social realities, criticize social injustices, cultivate new subjectivity and provide new visions for the future. In what follows, I will start by examining Li Tuo’s supporters’ and his critics’ arguments. This examination demonstrates that despite their different political leanings, both supporters and critics of pure literature have shared insistence on the epistemic and ethical value of literature and their common criticisms of neomarxist and poststructuralist-informed studies of modern Chinese literature. Then, I will discuss what the poststructuralist and neomarxist hermeneutics of suspicion can learn something from the postsocialist Chinese literary thought. Nan Fan, a renowned Fujian-based literary critic, took the first initiative to support Li Tuo in debunking the formalist transhistorical conception of “pure literature” as “an empty concept” and criticizing the contemporary Chinese practitioners of “pure literature” for ensconcing themselves in a fictional private sphere and refusing to enter the public

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

37

sphere and fulfill their protesting role.41 Like the neomarxist and poststructuralist critics, Nan Fan starts by rejecting the essentialist understanding of literature as something embodying certain fixed transhistorical essence and calls for “examining the concept of literature in the original historical context in which it was produced.”42 However, despite posing his anti-essentialist position at the very beginning, Nan Fan’s argument does not follow along the poststructuralist line in unmasking how the constructed concept of literature in China serves particular class, gender or race interest and how the literary discourse is no different from other social and political discourses. Instead, he turns to insisting on the concept’s contemporary relevance and the distinction between literature and non-literature: “after the concept of literature was produced at a particular history moment, it will set up a series of criteria with regard to what is literature. I still use these criteria to definite the difference between literary writing and society, news, IOU, contract and advertisement.”43 Nan Fan rejects the notion of disinterested pure literature but not the notion of literature itself. For him, the concept and meaning of literature could transcend its point of historical origin and speak to the present. Nan Fan invests literature with a particular illuminating and emancipatory function of preserving “rich emotional experience” and “emotional freedom” that can “challenge the domination by logic and technical analysis,” “heal the division between rationality and sensibility” and “liberate our horizon.”44 For Nan Fan, the rational and theoretical explanations that claim to “provide all ready answers to questions” are self-closed and “turned into a type of ideology,” but “the literary emotional experience represents an unwavering and unyielding attempt to break the grips of ideology.”45 For Nan Fan, literary discourse has a distinctive advantage over theoretical languages and accounts in terms of breaking the reified conclusions and opening up new problematics. Although Nan Fan views literary works as embedded in a particular historical and ideological context, he still considers literature as a distinctive site to sustain and express a distinctive sphere of emotion and sensibility that are not entirely 41 Nan (2001, 69–69). 42 Nan (2001, 69). 43 Nan (2001, 69). 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

38

G. GAO

occupied by historical and ideological forces and can be drawn upon to achieve human liberation. Moreover, Nan Fan emphasizes that literature should “cast its eye on the socially disadvantaged groups in contemporary China” such as “the lifeless faces in the crappy house, hunchbacked bike repairmen in the curbside and the migrant workers on the factory production line.”46 While rejecting the essentialist understanding, Nan Fan’s notion of literature is not a poststructuralist one, but a mixture of European romancist, humanist and the modern Chinese left-wing literary tradition. Like Li Tuo and Nan Fan, the well-known Shanghai-based literary critic Cai Xiang also rejects the notion of disinterested pure literature. In his oft-quoted essay “What Is Literature per se,” Cai Xiang starts by drawing upon Foucault’s power-discourse theory to unmask the intellectuals’ struggle for power and rights behind their pursuit of “pure literature” in the 1980s, arguing that “pure literature conception is actually fraught with intense pragmatic concerns and ideological coloring. It is no exaggeration to say that it is a cultural politics. It is not a nonideological literary claim that refused to enter into public realm as later critics assume.”47 Then, Cai Xiang cites Žižek and Jameson to disavow the traditional Marxist understanding of ideology as distortion of reality by certain dominant social class and argue for the inescapable ubiquity of ideology that penetrates into everyone’s social existence and everyday life. Cai Xiang applies this expanded conception of ideology to literature, proclaiming that “the so-called literature itself is nothing other than ideology or a site of ideological conflict.”48 Despite his frequent reference to Foucault, Jameson and Žižek, Cai Xiang does not fully and uncritically accept their ideas and theories. While highlighting the ideological dimension of literature, he does not go to the poststructuralist extreme of rejecting all literary works as ideological constructions. Instead, in the last section of his essay, he switches to exploring the question of how literature could represent the complex and ever-changing reality in “new writing

46 Ibid. 47 Cai (2002, 33). 48 Cai (2002, 35).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

39

possibilities.”49 He criticizes Jameson’s emphasis on the sheer difficulty and impossibility of representation for “too pessimistic.”50 He views two types of Chinese writing as embodying the potential to represent reality. One is the emerging detail-oriented Chinese novel. Cai Xiang thinks the details (such as an image, a hair salon and an advertisement) in this type of novel can spill over from the ideological penetration and “constitute a picture that not only forms an existential scene but also suggests the existential context itself in which we inhabit.”51 Cai views Han Shaogong as a representative writer of the emerging detail-oriented novel, a writer I will discuss in the next chapter. The second type of writing is allegorical writing. Cai holds that Jameson’s doubt on the possibility of allegorical representative of reality can be overcome by Chinese language, because “Chinese language’s special polysemy, associativeness and ambiguity, plus through a certain kind of editing and collaging, can provide linguistic support for allegorical writing that can grasp the complicated historical contexts and deep social realities.”52 Cai Xiang’s constant recourse to realist and existentialist formulations like shenhuo benshen 生活本身 (life itself) and shenghuo changhe 生活场合 (living situation) indicates his tempered belief in the existence of some unmediated and non-ideological realities and truths that poststructuralists would deny, but he believes his preferred Chinese literary works can access. Moreover, the poststructuralists view tradition primarily as oppressive and underscore their break with previous oppressive interpretive tradition. Western literary critics have noted the self-contradiction in the poststructuralist claims.53 That is, if tradition is totally oppressive, how could the poststructuralists themselves step out of this oppressive tradition in which they grow up and gain insight into the historical process? The poststructuralist overemphasis on the oppressiveness of tradition and on break with tradition does not do full justice to the complex historical process in which one’s current critical practice is both restricted and nourished by the tradition she inhabits. Cai Xiang seems to be aware of the self-contradiction in poststructuralist interpretation. He insists that his historicist critique of the concept of “pure 49 Cai (2002, 39). 50 Cai (2002, 41). 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 For criticisms of the poststructuralist approach to tradition, see Steele (1997, 15–61).

40

G. GAO

literature” formed in the 1980s of China does not mean a total break with the 1980s legacy. Instead, he calls it “a great tradition” and holds that “all choices are actually made in the continuation of tradition” and “only by inheriting the inheritable traditions can we avoid the dangerous path.”54 As is discussed above, the literary and intellectual ideas in the 1980s China are too capacious, critical and complex to be simplified as a repetition of the Western New Criticism and the rising neoliberal opposition to all leftist politics. Cai Xiang’s self-conscious continuation of the more inclusive 1980s is very relevant to the increasingly divisive cultural and political atmosphere. Although Cai Xiang does not offer rigorous theoretical reasoning and detailed textual analysis to substantiate his arguments, he should take the credit for his critical thinking in the use of Western theory and his turn to non-Western literary resources to address the fundamental problem with the basic poststructuralist assumptions concerning the relationship between reality, literature, history and subjectivity. In a similar vein, He Guimei, a professor of modern Chinese literature at Peking University, uses Terry Eagleton and Fredric Jameson to unmask the ideological nature of the “pure literature” formed in the 1980s. She argues that the so-called “pure literature” in China is not “pure” and so apolitical at all, but complicit with China’s neoliberal-oriented modernization ideology and the rise of Reagan-Thatcher’s political conservatism in the 1980s that attacks the leftist politics and constructs a series of hierarchical binary oppositions of the West over China, modernity over tradition, capitalism over socialism and literature over politics.55 However, as is discussed above, the Chinese literary thought in the 1980s was too complicated and dynamic to be structured as a series of binary oppositions. Instead, the leading literary scholars and literary historians were focused on countering ultra-Maoist politics, but not all leftist politics, not on building ideological oppositions but pursuing more dialogical and reciprocal interaction between politics and literature, socialist legacy and modernization project. Yet, He Guimei does not fully internalize the neomarxist and poststructuralist approach to literature. She concludes her genealogical analysis of the concept of “pure literature” with a utopian conception for China’s future literature: “the critique of pure literature

54 Cai (2002, 42). 55 He (2010, 331–358).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

41

is not meant to reject the pursuit of an ideal literature, but to explore an effective route to release the critical potential of literature and literary studies….Unmasking the ideology of ‘pure literature’ is not so much to disclose its ways of participating in history, but to unleash literature’s utopian energy of envisioning more reasonable mode of living.”56 Poststructuralists tend to think that the capitalist society is so corrupted that the truly oppositional and emancipatory potential of literature cannot be fully realized before a “total revolution” happens.57 Both He Guimei and Cai Xiang are left-leaning in terms of their political position, but neither of them thinks the Chinese society is so corrupted and infiltrated by oppressions of capitalism and logo-centric thinking that effective opposition is impossible without a fundamental political change and social transformation. Instead, both of them still believe in the illuminating and emancipatory function of literature under the current political and social conditions in which they live in. Luo Gang, another Shanghai-based literary scholar and New Left intellectual, also called the notion of “pure literature” into question. He goes a step further than Cai Xiang and He Guimei by extending the Foucaultian genealogical and Bourdieurian neomarxist sociological analysis from the formation of “pure literature” in the 1980s to the establishment of the whole modern Chinese literature in the first half of twentieth century. By situating the formation of modern Chinese literature into the modern global and national history, he argues that modern Chinese literature was the result of the combined forces of the expansion of Western capitalism, and establishment of modern Chinese educational institutions, language reform movements, modern publication and mass media market systems. However, like Nan Fan, Cai Xiang and He Guimei, Luo Gang does not blindly develop his argument along the poststructuralist and neomarxist line. Instead, he emphasizes that “in examining the relationship between literature and discipline under the Chinese historical context, we must be fully aware of the limits of Foucault’s theory,” in particular, Foucault’s neglect of the role that protest and resistance play in modern power and discipline.58 Therefore, Luo Gang does not think that modern Chinese literature has been completely disciplined and co-opted by the modern

56 He (2010, 41). 57 Steele (1997, 45). 58 Luo (2001, 76).

42

G. GAO

Chinese economic, cultural and educational institutions and only served the function of subjecting Chinese readers to the discipline of modern capitalist, colonialist and imperialist power structure. Instead, Luo insists on the positive referential, articulatory and constitutive function of literature. He writes “After all, we should acknowledge that the formation of new literature provides Chinese people with a privileged means to express their modern experience under the harsh conditions of censorship. Literature even played the role of preserving and protecting ‘national memory’.”59 He cites an American historian to support his argument for the referential function of literature that “the facts of history” are housed not only in scholarly works but also in literary works. Then, Luo Gang enlists Japanese cultural critic Yoshimi Takeuchi, who is known for his critique of Western cultural hegemony in Asia, to argue for a dialectical and dynamic conception of literature. Such a literature is “a floating mechanism that both negates and constructs itself” and “an ultimate dark hole that constantly absorbs and releases.”60 Luo Gang is often considered as belonging to the New Left camp and criticized by liberal critics for blindly applying Western leftist theories to the Chinese context. However, as my discussion shows, he does not narrowly and uncritically rely upon the Western poststructuralist theories on decentered subjectivity and omnipotence of modern power system. Instead, he moves beyond the repertoire of the familiar poststructuralist theories and drew upon non-Western anti-West-centric theoretical resources to develop more complicated understanding of modern Chinese literature that is simultaneously being constructed by political and material forces and constituting and liberating human subjectivity. Like Luo Gang, a promising Beijing-based literary critic Zhang Huiyu also seeks to go beyond the familiar poststructuralist theorists to develop more sophisticated understanding of politics and literature. Zhang endorses Li Tuo’s and his supporters’ exposure of the ideological construction and bourgeoisie nature of the concept of “pure literature.” However, Zhang views this ideological unmasking as inadequate for deepening understanding of politics and literature, for he chides critics of pure literature for still being confined to the conventional essentialist class-based conception of politics. He turns to post-Marxist political

59 Luo (2001, 76). 60 Luo (2001, 77).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

43

theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s works Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and the Return of the Political for intellectual resources to enrich Chinese critics’ political understanding. He quotes Mouffe and Laclau to reject the essentialist understanding of class-based politics and draws attention to the internal differences and diversities within the so-called proletariat or bourgeoisie classes, and the inevitability of perpetual conflicts and contradictions both within and across the conventional class lines.61 However, Zhang does not completely accept Laclau’s and Mouffe’s poststructuralist anti-realist approach, but cites Stuart Hall to rebuke their theories for bordering on linguistic determinism and discursive reductionism.62 To analyze and address this inadequacy, Zhang turns to Qu Qiubai’s critical reflection on his communist revolutionary career and the overall Marxist theories. Qu was a translator, cultural critic and the Chinese communist party’s earlier leader. He was arrested and executed by the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1935. Before his execution, he wrote a reflective essay “Redundant Words” that calls his own revolutionary career “a historical mistake.” This essay was often criticized as Qu’s “instrument of surrender” to the KMT and as evidence for his betrayal of the Chinese communist revolution. However, Zhang reads Qu’s first-person critical reflection on his communist revolutionary career as a source of insight into the problems with Marxism and into literary contribution to politics. Qu confessed that he had not formed authentic interest and steadfast faith in Marxism because the Marxist theories and concepts were too abstract and too general to give him a real sense and deep understanding of “equality,” “freedom,” “bourgeoisie,” “proletariat,” “oppression,” “revolution” and “class struggle.”63 This lack of deep understanding prevented him from eliminating his deeply rooted “traditional Chinese gentleman and scholar-official’s consciousness” and from developing a real proletariat class consciousness. Zhang thinks that this failure to develop a real proletariat class consciousness is not unique to Qu but represents a widespread and consistent problem confronting both conventional Marxist and post-Marxist theories that are focused on unmasking various forms of oppressions from a third-person structural perspective, but lacks a first-person experiential perspective on

61 Zhang (2006, 69–76). 62 Zhang (2006, 70–71). 63 Zhang (2006, 74).

44

G. GAO

how non-Western social actors engage with the Western Marxist theories of oppression and their inherited local tradition to pursue their own native revolutionary cause. Zhang attributes this lack to the Western Marxists’ West-centric intellectual horizon. While praising Laclau’s and Mouffe’s deconstruction of essentialist conception of “class,” Zhang also criticizes their neglect of the actual role of sinified class consciousness played in constituting the Chinese revolutionary subjectivity and Mao’s sinified Marxism. Zhang thinks Qu’s recourse to literature provides some potential antidote to both the class-centered orthodox Marxism and poststructuralist-informed post-Marxism. In his reflective essay, Qu discloses that deep in his heart, he prefers literature, because: I can learn from these literary works a better understanding of life and society, a better understanding of different individualities rather than the generalized and abstract conceptions of good people, bad people, bureaucrats and ordinary people, workers, rich farmers. What are laid out in front of you is well-rounded and fully embodied individual persons. Although they are embedded in a certain relation of production and a certain social class…these fully embodied and lifelike characters cannot be reduced to any single category of a particular class or relation of production.64

Zhang does not suggest that the success of communist revolution should rely on literature, but only emphasizes that literary critics should not be contented with exposing the ideological construction of pure literature, but take a step further to explore the contribution of literature to developing our more complicated understanding of politics and society. If Zhang’s attitude toward Li Tuo’s criticism of pure literature is mixed, Li’s friend Wu Liang, a Shanghai-based renowned literary critic, is more critical. Wu makes counter-attacks on two fronts. First, like Hong Zicheng, Wu Liang stresses that if there is really a dearth of political intervention and social critique in post-Tiananmen Chinese literature, it is not derived from the dissemination of the idea of “pure literature” as Li claims, nor from China’s growing commercialized cultural sphere as the participants in the humanistic spirit discussion argue, but from China’s censorship and political oppression. It is not that Chinese writers 64 Ibid.

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

45

do not want to speak to public and political affairs, but that they are not allowed by the oppressive political system. Second, even if Chinese literary writers enjoy the freedom of speech and press as their Western counterparts do, they still need to resist too many social and political responsibilities, for the immediate and more visible political injustices and economic inequalities should be solved through political and institutional reforms instead of change of literary ideas and theories.65 For Wu Liang, the authentic individualized pure literature is not too much but too little in post-Tiananmen China. However, Wu champions the notion of “pure literature” not because he intends to establish a disinterested autonomous sphere of aesthetics but because it can unveil and subvert the invisible and deeply rooted ideologies, cultural hegemonies and hierarchies.66 In other words, although Wu disagrees with Li over the assessment of the actual literary situation and function in the post-Tiananmen China and the object of critique that contemporary Chinese literature should target at, he shares with Li the expectation of the disclosive and emancipatory role that literature could play. Zhang Yiwu is one of the earliest Chinese literary scholars who applied Derrida’s and Lyotard’s postmodern theories to the analysis of contemporary Chinese literature and culture. He is often criticized for his misuse of poststructuralist theories to deconstruct the essentialist and hegemonic concept of Western culture on the one hand while fabricating a monolithic and reified concept of Chineseness on the other hand.67 Zhang Yiwu thinks of Li Tuo’s criticism of “pure literature” and anxiety about the decline of interventionist literature as unnecessary and irrelevant. To Zhang Yiwu, the rise of “pure literature” in the 1990s is not something to be condemned but to be celebrated, for it realized the goal of New Literature’s pursuit of literary autonomy and independence. This pursuit started in the early twentieth century during the New Culture Movement, but was deflected by China’s growing national crisis. Since the 1920s, the priority of the New Literature was shifted from the establishment of literary autonomy to the use of literature to serve the immediate

65 Wu Liang’s criticisms of Li Tuo are collected in Li Tuo’s book Xuebeng hechu 雪崩 何处 (Whither Did the Avalanche Happen). All the page numbers refer to Li’s book. See Li (2015, 8). 66 Li (2015, 8). 67 Many literary and cultural critics, including Xu Ben, Zhao Yiheng, Zhang Longxi

and Wang Hui, criticize Zhang Yiwu’s appropriation of radical poststructuralist theories to serve local conservative cultural and political purposes. For a review of these criticisms, see Lei (2007, 91–102)

46

G. GAO

social and political needs of enlightening and mobilizing the masses to strengthen China and overcome national crisis. Zhang Yiwu contends that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has bid farewell to the century of humiliation and victimization. China is no longer the victim but an important participant in the international order. Therefore, current Chinese literary writers do not have to shoulder the political and social responsibility as their predecessors did. Under this new situation, it is quite reasonable to reestablish literary autonomy and pursue a transcendent “pure literature” that has been delayed by the crisis- and war-ridden twentieth-century Chinese history.68 However, Zhang’s support of pure literature’s pursuit of literary autonomy and independence does not mean his wholesale rejection of literature’s social and public functions. Instead, he assigns these functions to popular culture and literature: “China’s popular culture has replaced elitist New Literature to become the new cultural space that can ‘speak to society and the masses’.”69 Differing from Li Tuo and his supporters that condemn the rise of pop culture and the increasingly commercialized literary field as a cultural degradation and a complicity with the domination of market ideology and global capitalism, Zhang Yiwu highlights the positive role of pop literature and culture: “they provide more vivid and more lively explanations for the current situation, ---more nuanced understanding of consumerist society and ---new understanding of the new century.”70 Zhang Yiwu concedes that pop cultural products have serious problems and contradictions that must be criticized and reflected upon, but he insists that pop literature and culture maintain flexibility and sensibility to new things and situations. The clear-cut boundary that Zhang draws between pure/elite literature and popular literature and his misuse of poststructuralist theories for the essentialist construction of Chineseness are subject to critique. Yet, his refusal to make indiscriminate attack against all pop literature and his call for attending to the referential and epistemic value of contemporary pop literature are worth serious consideration. If we search “pure literature” on CNKI (China’s largest database of academic publications), we will find 254 articles, many of which appeared

68 Zhang (2004, 17–20). 69 Zhang (2004, 19). 70 Ibid.

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

47

in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While the peak of the discussion has passed, “pure literature” continues to be discussed and debated by Chinese literary critics and scholars until now. The polemical articles examined above are only a small fraction of this large body of decadelong discussion, but they are the very influential ones that are to a large extent representative of leading Chinese literary scholars’ and critics’ opinions and approaches to literature. As is shown above, this discussion on “pure literature” is largely informed by the newly imported neomarxist and poststructuralist theories. However, despite their conflicting evaluations of postsocialist literature and literary thought, these leading Chinese literary scholars do not blindly reproduce the neomarxist and poststructuralist theories, but are aware of their limitations and insist on the positive referential and ethical value of literature to contemporary China and treating literature with tempered but persistent sense of trust and respect instead of suspicion and vigilance. As Chen Xiaoming, a literary critic who is well known for his poststructuralist studies of contemporary Chinese literature, comments: According to Derrida, literature may not exist. It does not have a fixed essence nor clear boundary….however, we should not give up the notion of ‘literature’ simply because of Derrida’s deconstruction of literature. We keep holding an ideal attitude in discussing literature….we stick to the idea of ‘pure literature’ because there still exists a literature that is closely connected to literary classics, that cannot be removed by any conceptual forces, bodily pleasures, consumerism or entertainment. It may be a text, factors in a text or traces of writing. All in all, there is something in the writing event that can enter humans’ spiritual world.71

Postcritique and Postsocialist Chinese Literary Thought As is shown above, postsocialist Chinese literary thought is informed by various Western literary theories. However, its development from the Dengist era in the 1980s to the post-Tiananmen era is not a belated replay of the Western literary criticism from the mid-century New Criticism to the poststructuralist and neomarxist literary theories. There is not a fundamental rupture or paradigm shift as the existing scholarship 71 Chen (2014, 153).

48

G. GAO

portrays. Despite their conflicting views on the prevailing postsocialist Chinese literary thought, its ideological causes and political consequences, major critics in the 1980s and in the post-Tiananmen era, opponents and proponents of “pure literature,” the New Left and the liberal literary critics, refuse to reduce literary text to a self-contained linguistic object for aesthetic analysis or a symptom and effect of ideological structures and political forces for poststructuralist unmasking and debunking. Instead, they hold on to a lingering notion of Chinese literature as intellectual and spiritual resources that can disclose social and psychological realities, nurture the formation of progressive human subjectivity and induce particular personal and sociopolitical changes that they consider as beneficial to China’s social and political improvement. While packaging their arguments in poststructuralist literary jargons and languages, Chinese literary critics and scholars (at least the leading ones in the influential literary debates and discussions) remain attached to the traditional holistic ontology that views author, text and world as interconnected, as illuminating and enriching each other instead of treating them as separate spheres that are detached from or concealing and distorting each other. Although they have not formulated rigorous argumentation and systematic theories, their literary thought demonstrates a mood and mode of “hermeneutics of trust” that may provide a corrective to the prevailing “hermeneutics of suspicion” in Western literary studies. Paul Ricoeur coins the term “hermeneutics of suspicion” to describe Marx’s, Nietzsche’s and Freud’s common interpretative practices that are suspicious of whatever is identified as “natural,” refuse to take text at face value, keeping digging for the hidden repressive ideologies beneath the textual surface.72 This particular mood and mode of interpretation was further developed and deepened by various poststructuralist-informed deconstructionist, psychoanalytic, feminist and Foucaultian historicist critics and came to dominate the literary studies since the late 1970s. This dominant “hermeneutics of suspicion” encouraged literary critics and scholars to treat literary text only as an object of research instead of subject that they can learn from, take a critical distance, read it with doubt and vigilance against its surface, unmask and criticize the hidden deep meanings (mostly various pernicious ideologies) beneath the deceptive façade. In Elizabeth Anker’s and Rita Felski’s words, the dominant 72 Ricoeur (1970, 32). For a detailed discussion on Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion,” see Felski (2011, 215–234).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

49

ethos of current interpretive practices under the hermeneutics of suspicion is “distrust,” “negativity,” “opposition” and “critique.”73 By contrast, Chinese literary critics, as is shown above, despite their different political positions and their awareness of the ideological and historical embeddedness of literary works, tend to view the text with more trust and respect, approach it as referential, spiritual and ethical resources they can identify with and learn from. Therefore, I call it “hermeneutics of trust.” By posing Chinese critics’ “hermeneutics of trust” and Western poststructuralist critics’ “hermeneutics of suspicion,” I do not mean to create absolute dichotomies between the two modes of interpretive practice, and literary studies based in two geographical locations (China and West). As is discussed above, many leading Chinese literary critics do not reject hermeneutics of suspicion in toto. Instead, they draw upon Jameson, Eagleton and Žižek to unmask the ideologies of global capitalism and political forces behind contemporary Chinese literary text (Cai Xiang), the establishment of the Chinese literary discipline (Luo Gang) and the notion of pure literature (He Guimei). However, meanwhile, they also draw upon the non-Western and non-poststructuralist works to argue for more inclusive and dialogical understanding of literature and subjectivity. Most of them insist that literary works within the existing Chinese literature are not totally corrupted by ideologies and can be trusted as useful epistemic, ethical and political resources that can illuminate social realities, cultivate new modes of subjectivity and benefit China’s conditions. Some “good” literature (e.g., detail-oriented novel) already exists in contemporary China before a total social and political revolution takes place. Chinese literary critics’ critique of “hermeneutics of suspicion” and their tempered insistence on “hermeneutics of trust” are not peculiarly Chinese but resonate with some Western literary academics’ critical reflections on the dominant “hermeneutics of suspicion” and suggestions for various alternative modes and moods of literary studies. Instead of presenting all the critical reflections on all the problems and flaws in the poststructuralist and neomarxist hermeneutics of suspicion, I will focus on those to which the postsocialist Chinese literary thought I have examined and the literary works I will interpret in the following three case studies chapters may provide correctives, pose new questions and point to new directions.

73 Anker and Felski (2017, 1–20).

50

G. GAO

First, neomarxists and poststructuralists view human subjectivity as decentered and embedded in ideologies and power relations, but never thematize how they are able to develop their own critical agency that enables them to step back from the ubiquitous ideology and power relations and unmask from a third-person perspective others’ domination and oppression by the ubiquitous ideology and power relations. If human agency does not completely disappear, neomarxists and poststructuralists grant it only to their like-minded intellectual elites and fail to explore ordinary social actors’ human agency.74 Second, this intellectual arrogance made them insist on the incommensurability of their theory with others, reformulate the claims of the opponent in terms of his/her own problematic and refuse to engage in any mutually correcting and mutually enriching dialogue.75 Third, neomarxist and poststructuralist critics mostly take a diagnostic approach that treats literary text as an ill object to be dissected, but seldom explore how their object of research could speak back to critics and enrich their own subjectivity.76 Fourth, while claiming to subvert hierarchies and hegemonies, the neomarxist and poststructuralist critics betray a West-centric bias that privileges the analytic and secular mode of interpretation and way of life over the non-Western spiritual beliefs and embodied practices that resist the preferred Western explanatory frame.77 Fifth, the widespread poststructuralist anti-mimetic suspicious method, mood and reflex resistance to any received “naturalness,” “reality” and “truth” are often associated with the progressive left. However, with the rise of the authoritarian populism, the same way of debunking and unmasking has been used by the right-wing conservatives to deny and discredit the basic facts as manipulated by particular interest groups and corrupt elites.78 Joseph North examines the development of the twentieth-century literary criticism in the West. He contends that what dominates the current Western literary studies is historicist-contextualist paradigm. The turn from internalist text-centered New Criticism in the middle of the twentieth century to the current historicist-contextualist paradigm in the late 1970s is often 74 Steele (1997, 1–2). 75 Steele (1997, 29–30). 76 Latour (2004, 228) and Anker and Felski (2017, 4–5). 77 Anker and Felski (2017, 13–14). 78 Anker and Felski (2017, 15).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

51

understood as victory of leftist progressive politics over the conservative right. However, North argues that “this has been largely an error. In fact, it is better to say that the opposite is true: in its most salient aspects, the turn to the current paradigm in the late 1970s and early 1980s was symptomatic of the wider retreat of the left in the neoliberal period and was thus a small part of the more general victory of the right.”79 Because this turn to historicist-contextualist paradigm is what North calls “a scholarly turn” that treats literary works as opportunities for merely academic cultural and historical analysis instead of using literary works to trigger general social and cultural changes. Moreover, the historicistcontextualist paradigm’s tendency to deconstruct the distinction between literary and non-literary discourses, elite and popular literature resonate with the neoliberal consumerist economy that privileges the sales quantity over the textual quality.80 North charges that the ostensibly politically radical literary studies that claim to struggle for justice, democracy and equality have lost its tangible social impact and served only to reinforce the status quo of the oppressive neoliberal social and political order. To sum up, the neomarxist and poststructuralist hermeneutics of suspicion does not treat text, truth, ordinary social actors, intellectual opponents and the non-West with due respect, care and attention. Its current problematic interpretive practices have not lead to their goals of achieving difference, democracy and justice but often produced opposite political results. As is previously discussed in this chapter, the postsocialist Chinese literary thought has been influenced by New Criticism, structuralism, neo-Marxism and poststructuralism. Many major Chinese literary critics are aware of the ideological embeddedness and discursive constructedness of human subjectivity, but they insist keeping a space for substantive human agency and literature’s value to the cultivation of a better human subjectivity. Although they do not theorize how to address the tension and contradiction between a constructed self and a constituting self, their more open-ended and inclusive conception of human subjectivity can inspire poststructuralists to give a more complicated account of how a third-person story of domination and a first-person story of liberation are

79 North (2017, 6). 80 North (2017, 56–80).

52

G. GAO

engaged with each other instead of having the former unilaterally overwhelm the latter. Second, Chinese literary scholars not only treat literary works as ideological products for scholarly analysis, but also view literature as a referential, ethical and social resource to illuminate social and psychological realities, facilitating social and cultural transformation and enrich both readers’ and critics’ own mind. Such a dual conception of literature and literary studies as both object of research and subject of personal growth and social progress can provide a corrective to the more analytic and more scholarly poststructuralist literary studies that may produce reactionary political consequences contrary to their original intention. Third, despite their different political positions, Chinese literary critics emphasize the complexity and nuances of Chinese textual and historical realities, which could compel the poststructuralist hermeneutics of suspicion to pay more respect and attention to the nuances of the non-Western literary texts, histories, experiences and expectations and take them as points of entry for theoretical innovation instead of only dismissing them as backward and obsolete. The Western critics of suspicious hermeneutics offer many insights into the problems with the dominant hermeneutics of suspicion and also provide various alternative interpretive practices. In 1997, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick published the famous essay “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading: or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction is About You” that accuses the dominant suspicious hermeneutics of dominating critical inquiry and excluding many other relationships a reader/interpreter can take to the text. To address the problem with paranoid hermeneutics of suspicion, Sedgwick proposes “reparative reading” that offers “many ways” that connect learning and reading to the experience and affect of multiplicity, surprise, rich divergence, consolation, creativity and love.81 In 2004, Bruno Latour wrote a highly readable and influential essay “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern” that satirizes the hermeneutics of suspicion’s simplistic deconstruction of all facts, reality and truth and proposes a renewed realism, or what he calls “Actor-Network-Theory” (ANT). Latour’s ANT focuses on adding, reassembling and describing the complicated real networks composed of multitudinous facts, details and actors and reconstructing a more nuanced understanding of what

81 Sedgwick (1997, 1–37).

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

53

is actually going on in the world.82 Echoing Latour, Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus propose “Surface Reading” that criticizes the hermeneutics of suspicion’s focus on the background, obscure meanings and hidden agendas and seeks to tease out the rich meanings of the foreground and the surface that are rendered invisible by “symptomatic reading.”83 Since the late 2000s, Rita Felski has applied Latour’s thoughts to analyze the limits of the suspicious literary criticisms and propose “postcritical reading” that “rather than looking behind the text for its hidden causes, determining conditions and noxious motives, we might place ourselves in front of the text, reflecting on what it unfurls, calls forth and makes possible.”84 These various alternative readings are united in affirming the value and status of literature over critics, but tend to polarize themselves against the hermeneutics of suspicion and disavow the contributions of the latter. Moreover, they do not elaborate on what the specific value of literature is to the non-Western sociopolitical and intellectual context and how the non-Western literary texts could contribute to the conversation on the hermeneutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of trust. Critics rebuke the suspicious hermeneutics for its West-centric secular bias and neglect of the alternative religious understanding of literature and interpretation. However, they lack a distinctive situated national and regional perspective in their interpretive practice. Chinese literary critics display a lingering preference for hermeneutics of trust and non-ideological dimension of literature. However, in examining the literary text in relation to the intellectual discourse in the highly charged intellectual atmosphere, they tend to criticize and praise contemporary Chinese literary works in light of their predetermined political position. As a result, the distinctive value and contribution of literature they claim to bring out do not actually appear in their interpretive practice. In other words, there is a mismatch between their claims and practices. As He Guimei, a Beijing-based literary scholar, comments upon the discussion of “pure literature”: “Calling for rebuilding the ties between literature and important social issues should not end up only with axiological slogans, but should be implemented through critical practices.”85 The following three case-study chapters seek to address this inadequacy by drawing upon both hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of trust.

82 Latour (2004, 225–248). 83 Best and Marcus (2009, 1–20). 84 Felski (2015, 12). 85 See He (2004, 22).

54

G. GAO

References Anker, Elizabeth S., and Rita Felski, ed. Critique and Postcritique. Durham: Duke UP, 2017. Best, Stephen, and Sharon Marcus. “Surface Reading: An Introduction.” Representations 108.1 (2009): 1–21. Cai Xiang 蔡翔. “Hewei wenxue benshen” 何谓文学本身 (What Is Literature per se). Dangdai zuojia pinglun 当代作家评论 (Contemporary Writer Review) 6 (2002): 31–42. Chandler, Marthe. “Li Zehou, Kant, and Darwin: The Theory of Sedimentation.” Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy. Ed. Roger T. Ames et al. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 2018. 278–312. Chen Pingyuan 陈平原. “Xueshushi shang de xiandai wenxue” 学术上的现代 文学 (Modern Literature in the Academic History). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies) 1 (1997): 67–73. Chen Xiaoming 陈晓明. “Chunwenxue de qinghuai” 纯文学的情怀 (Love of Pure Literature). Wenyi zhengming 文艺争鸣 (Literature and Art Forum) 1 (2014): 151–153. Denton, Kirk A. “General Introduction.” Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893–1945. Ed. Kirk A. Denton. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996. 1–64. Felski, Rita. “Suspicious Minds.” Poetics Today 32.2 (2011): 215–234. ———. The Limits of Critique. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015. He Guimei 贺桂梅. “Wenxuexing: “Dongxue” huo “feidi”—Guanyu wenxue zizuxing wenti de jianlue kaocha” 文学性: “洞穴”或“飞地”—关于文学”自足 性”问题的简略考察 (Literariness: Cave or Enclave—A Brief Exploration of Literary Autonomy). Nanfang wentan 南方文坛 (Southern Literary Forum) 3 (2004): 21–23. He Guimei 贺桂梅. Xinqimeng zhishi dangan: Bashiniandai zhongguo wenhua yanjiu 新启蒙知识档案: 八十年代中国文化研究 (The Knowledge Archive of the New Enlightenment: A Study of Chinese Culture in the 1980s). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2010. Hong Zicheng 洪子诚 et. “Xinlishi yujing xia de wenxue zizhuxing” 新历史 语境下的 文学自主性 (Literary Autonomy in the New Historical Context). Shanghai Wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 4 (2005): 4–11. Hong Zicheng 洪子诚 and Wu Xiaodong 吴晓东. “Guanyu wenxuexing 和 wenxue piping de duihua” 关于文学性和文学批评的对话 (Dialogue on Literariness and Literary Criticism). Xiandai zhongwen xuekan 现代中文学刊 (Journal of Modern Chinese Studies) 23.2 (2013): 4–13. Iovene, Paola. Tales of Futures Past: Anticipation and the Ends of Literature in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014. Kuang Xinian 旷新年. Xiandai zhongguo wenxue lilun piping gainian 现代中国 文学理论批评概念 (Modern Chinese Literary Theoretical Concepts). Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2014.

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

55

Latour, Bruno. “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225–248. Lei Qili 雷启立. “Duochong jiaol xia de chanshi: houxiandai yu houzhimin de lunzheng” 多重焦虑下的阐释: 后现代与后殖民文化的论争 (Interpretation under Multiple Anxieties: Debate Concerning Postmodernism and Poststructuralism). Qimeng de ziwo wajie 启蒙的自我瓦解 (Self-Disintegration of the Enlightenment). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2007. Li Jie 李劼. “Lun wenxue xingshi de benti yiwei” 论文学形式的本体意味 (On the Ontological Meanings of Literary Form). Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 3 (1987): 78–88. Li Tuo 李陀. Mantan chunwenxue 漫谈”纯文学” (A Random Talk on Pure Literature). Shanghai wenxue (上海文学) 182:3 (2001): 4–15. ———. Xuebenghechu 雪崩何处 (Where Did the Avalanche Happen). Beijing: Zhongxin, 2015. Liu Zaifu 刘再复. “Lun wenxue de zhutixing” 论文学的主体性 (On Literary Subjectivity). Wenxue pinglun 文学评论 (Literary Review) 6 (1985): 11–26. ———. Wenxue de fansi 文学的反思 (Reflections on Literature). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1986. Liu Zhong 刘忠. Chongxie wenxueshi zhuanlan de huiwang 重写文学史专栏 的回望 (Retrospect on the Rewriting Literary History Column). Zhongzhou daxue xuebao 中州大学学报 (Journal of Zhongzhou University) 32.1 (2015): 1–8. Luo Gang 罗岗. “Wenxue: shijian yu fansi” 文学: 实践与反思 (Literature: Practice and Reflection). Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 7 (2001): 72–78. Nan Fan 南帆. “Kongdong de linian: chunwenxue zhibian” 空洞的理念—纯文 学之辩 (Empty Concept: Debate on Pure Literature). Shanghai wenxue 上海 文学 (Shanghai Literature) 6 (2001): 68–69. North, Joseph. Literary Criticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2017. Qian Liqun 钱理群. “Wode xiandai wenxue yanjiu dagang” 我的现代文学研究大 纲 (My Plan for Modern Chinese Literature Studies). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies) 1 (1997): 61–66. ———, Huang Ziping 黄子平 and Chen Pingyuan 陈平原. Ershi shiji zhongguo wenxue sanrentan 二十世纪中国文学三人谈 (Three People’s Talk on 20th Century Chinese Literature). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004. Qian Liqun 钱理群, Wen Rumin 温儒敏 and Wu Fuhui 吴福辉. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue sanshinian 中国现代文学三十年 (Thirty Years of Modern Chinese Literary History). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1998. Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970.

56

G. GAO

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is about You.” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ed. Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction. Durham, Durham: Duke UP, 1997, 1–37. Shen, Dan, and Xiaoyi Zhou. “Western Literary Theories in China: Reception, Influence and Resistance.” Comparative Critical Studies 3.1–2 (2006): 139– 155. Steele, Meili. Theorizing Textual Subjects: Agency & Oppression. New York: Cambridge UP, 1997. Su Hongbin 苏宏斌. Wenxue bentilun yinlun 文学本体论引论 (An Introduction to Literary Ontology). Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2006. Wang Xiaobo 王小波. Siwei de lequ 思维的乐趣 (Pleasure of Thinking). Beijing: Beiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996. Wang Xiaoming 王晓明. Wang Xiaoming zixuanji 王晓明自选集 (Wang Xiaoming’s Selected Works). Nanning: Guangxi shifandaxue chubanshe, 1997. Wang Xiaoming 王晓明. “Cong wanshousi dao jingpo hu: guan yu ershi shiji zhongguo wenxue yanjiu” 从万寿寺到镜泊湖: 关于二十世纪中国文学研究 (From Longevity Temple to Jingpo Lake: On Twentieth Century Chinese Literature Studies). Wenyi yanjiu 文艺研究 (Art and Literature Studies) 3 (1989): 35–41. ———. “Zai pipai de zitai beihou” 在批判的姿态背后 (Behind the Critical Posture). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 22.4 (1994): 137–142. Yang Jiangang 杨建刚. “Xinshiqi wenxue shixing bentilun de yanjin lunzheng yu fansi” 新时期文学形式本体论的演进, 论争与反思 (The Evolution, Debate and Reflection on Literary Formalist Ontology in New Era). Renwen zazhi 人文杂志 (Journal of Humanities) 6 (2016): 60–67. Yang Qingxiang 杨庆祥. Chongxie de xiandu: chongxie wenxueshi de xiangxiang he shijian 重写的限度: 重写文学史的想象和实践 (The Limit of Rewriting: The Imagination and Practice of Literary History Rewriting). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011. Zhang Huiyu 张慧瑜. “Chunwenxue fansi yu zhengzhi de huigui” 纯文学反思与 政治的回归 (Reflection on Pure Literature and Return of the Political). Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论与批评 (Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art) 2 (2006): 69–76. Zhang Yiwu 张颐武. Chunwenxue taolun yu xinwenxue de zhongjie 纯文学讨论 与新文学的终结 (Pure Literature Discussion and the End of New Literature). Nanfang wentn 南方文坛 (Southern Literary Forum) 3 (2004): 17–20. Zhang Ying 张英进. “Cong wenxue zhenglun kan haiwai zhongguo xiandai wenxue yanjiu de fanshi bianqian” 从文学争论看海外中国现代文学研究的范 式变迁 (See the Paradigm Changes of Oversea Modern Chinese Literary

2

DISCUSSION ON PURE LITERATURE AND POSTSOCIALIST …

57

Studies from the Literary Debates). Wenyi lilun yanj 文艺理论研究 (Literary and Art Theory Studies) 33.1 (2013): 28–38. Zhao Yuan 赵园. “Xiandai wenxue yanjiu suixiang” 现代文学研究随想 (Random Thought on Modern Literature Studies). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现 代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies). 1 (1997): 4–6.

CHAPTER 3

Han Shaogong: Revealing and Revising Chinese Linguistic Background

Introduction Han Shaogong (1953–) emerged into the literary scene as a representative writer of Root-Seeking Literature in the 1980s that sought to unearth traditional Chinese culture, especially the folk culture, for serious reconsideration and recuperation to achieve China’s literary rejuvenation and cultural transformation. However, since the 1990s, Han Shaogong has moved beyond the literary circle and actively participated in the important Chinese intellectual debates such as the Humanistic Spirit Discussion, the debate on the emerging Chinese postmodernism and the debate between liberals and the New Left. Therefore, Han Shaogong is widely considered as “an intellectual literary writer” in contemporary China.1 He wrote a number of essays for public intellectuals’ journals, such as Dushu 读书 (Reading), Dongfang 东方 (The Oriental) and Huacheng 花城 (The City of Flower), to counter the blind embrace of neoliberalism, market ideology and postmodernism in contemporary China. Moreover, he founded an influential intellectual journal Tianya 天涯 (Frontier) in which he published his and many other New Left intellectuals’ articles. Because of this, Han Shaogong is widely viewed as a New Left intellectual and his journal as “New Left headquarters.”2 Up 1 See Wu (2006, 329). 2 See Han (2008c, 142).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_3

59

60

G. GAO

to now, scholars of contemporary Chinese thought have not made serious efforts to examine Han Shaogong’s extensive intervention into the intellectual debates.3 This neglect is redressed by politically engaged Chinese literary critics. The New Left literary scholars praise Han for his daring protest against the hegemony of homogenizing liberalism and globalization.4 By contrast, liberal critics deplore Han’s lack of critical reflection on the communist party state’s violence and oppression.5 Han’s intervention into the intellectual debate is measured and judged by the liberals and the New Left in terms of whether it conforms to their predetermined political agendas and critiques. As a result, the ideological split between the liberals and the New Left is reproduced in the literary scholarship, leaving Han’s non-factional contributions unexplored. Meanwhile, the English scholarship tends to put Han out of the context of China’s charged intellectual discourse and read his works as illustrations of Western philosophies of language and history, autobiographical theories or poststructuralist decentering of subjectivity.6 While these various theoretically informed readings provide important insights, they ignore how Han’s works could enrich the ongoing contemporary Chinese intellectual debate and the prevailing Sinophone studies in the English scholarship. This chapter will explore Han Shaogong’s contributions to the Chinese intellectual debate and the Sinophone studies in terms of how he addresses the relationship between language, subjectivity and modernity. I will focus on the following questions: What language should be used to describe and develop Chinese modernity? How to improve our understanding of China and the debate over China’s national condition and perfection by addressing the language issues, and the relationship between language and things? How to deal with the relationship of ordinary citizen’s subjectivity to his/her inherited linguistic background? Will Chinese writers’ concern with China’s national perfection and cultural identity

3 Only Wang Hui’s left-leaning account of the post-Tiananmen Chinese intellectual trends mentions Han Shaogong’s critique of market ideology, see Wang (2008, 134). 4 Kuang (2008, 417). 5 Yu (2008, 613). 6 For interpretations from the lens of Western language of philosophy, see MøllerOlsen (2017, 66–108) and Leenhouts (2005, 84–98); for interpretation from the angle of philosophy of history, see Lin (2005); for interpretation from the lens of autobiography theory, see Ying (2011, 633–647); for the poststructuralist reading, see Cai (1994, 64–77) and Feuerwerker (1998, 188–238).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

61

necessarily lead to the suppression of its internal linguistic, cultural and ethnic heterogeneities? Firstly, I will look at how different intellectual factions deal with these issues. Then, I will discuss how Han Shaogong’s writings could be drawn upon to overcome the limits of intellectuals’ reasoning and broaden the argumentative space for their debate. The first part of this chapter will demonstrate that, compared with Maoist intellectuals, postsocialist Chinese intellectuals under the influence of “the linguistic turn” are more aware of the importance of language in public reasoning. They reanimate the discussion of China’s national perfection and modernity from a linguistic point of view. However, they fail to tackle the relationship between language and modernity in a satisfying way. Liberals tend to isolate their principles from everyday speeches (Xu Youyu; Xu Jilin; Wang Dingding) or only assign a formal role to Chinese historical language (Qin Hui); the New Left intellectuals either treat Chinese historical language as an autonomous liberating system (Han Yuhai) or confine it to classical Chinese (Zheng Min) or objectify it for genealogical analysis, but never thematize the horizon from which they make their analysis (Wang Hui). They seem to believe that they are able to think outside of their own linguistic background and objectify the past from a detached subject position. Neither of them gives much space to the highly diverse languages of Chinese people’s everyday life. As a result, intellectuals of all persuasions have offered various impoverished accounts of the complex relationship of Chinese subjectivity to his/her linguistic background. The second part of this chapter will demonstrate how Han Shaogong’s critical essays and novels could enrich intellectuals’ ways of reasoning and arguing. Situating Han Shaogong’s works into the intellectual debate could help to illuminate their non-sectarian argumentative and speculative dimensions, which are missing from existing literary studies. I will show Han Shaogong’s contributions to the intellectual debate from the following aspects. Firstly, Han Shaogong dramatizes the inadequacy of putonghua 普通话 (Modern Standard Chinese) and thematizes the complex everyday linguistic background, a background that is logically prior to any individual talking about China’s national perfection. In other words, rather than illustrating any specific ideas and principles, Han Shaogong argues about modernity at a philosophical and transcendental level, a level that is deeper than commonly assumed. In so doing, Han Shaogong reopens the assumptions of modernity and displays the complex, conflicted historical inheritance that lies behind current intellectuals’ understandings. Secondly, Han Shaogong reveals the

62

G. GAO

linguistic background not through an outside observer but a narrator who is historically embedded in and resourcefully works through his linguistic background. Han’s novel The Dictionary of Maqiao suggests that revealing and revising one’s own linguistic background is not only a “descriptive” process, but also an interpretive and transformative event that could alter one’s own identity and self-understanding. Third, like other Chinese intellectuals, Han highlights the importance of language but refuses the poststructuralist totalistic “problematization of referentiality” and insists on the relatively reliable reference of language to things and objects. However, unlike the intellectuals’ anthropocentric approach to things and objects, Han dramatizes the agency of nonhuman things and objects that can right the imbalance in Chinese intellectual discourse that favors agency of human subjects over that of the object matters. Lastly, Han’s works and thoughts could not only be drawn upon as a resource to enrich China’s internal intellectual debate, but also address the problem with the currently prevailing Sinophone studies in the American academia that tends to cast the pursuit of the relative stability of Chinese language and identity, and the pursuit of ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences in mutually exclusive terms. Han’s case shows that the former and the latter could benefit rather than only hinder each other.

Chinese Language and Chinese Modernity In debating over Chinese modernity, the linguistic medium upon which contemporary Chinese intellectuals depend is called putonghua 普通 话 (Common Speech Mandarin or Modern Standard Chinese). It is a language based on baihua 白话 (Chinese vernacular) instead of wenyan 文言 (classical Chinese). The substitution of the latter by the former has been achieved through a series of language movements and reforms in modern China. A succession of defeats since the nineteenth century forced Chinese officials and scholars to reflect on the causes for and solutions to China’s national crisis. They thought that one major reason was the lack of general education, which could be partly attributed to the use of wenyan. It was believed that the pictographic wenyan was an extremely difficult language fraught with ambiguities that impeded universal education and national

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

63

development.7 Moreover, since medieval times, wenyan has become a written language and not been used in oral communication. The continued use of wenyan caused the “separation of writing from speech” and made the representation of the real world and authentic subjective feelings impossible. By contrast, one important contributing factor for the empowerment of Western countries and Japan was their replacement of imperial written languages by their own vernaculars. This linguistic replacement helped to increase mass literacy, achieve universal education and realize national empowerment. To empower and modernize China, different Chinese governments and intellectuals initiated a succession of language movements—The Guoyu (National Language) Movement, The Baihua Movement, The Dazhongyu (Mass Language) Movement—to reform and replace the obscure writing-based wenyan with the transparent speech-based baihua and phoneticize Chinese characters by the RomanLatin alphabets. The pursuit of Chinese modernity has been accompanied by a pursuit of linguistic clarity, instrumentality and script Westernization. However, the baihua movement has not gone unquestioned. There is no shortage of critiques against a complete replacement of wenyan by baihua, but most of the opposing opinions are “for literary and artistic reasons.”8 Wenyan may be superior in terms of literary writing, but few people seem to doubt that baihua is a language more suitable for political and practical reasoning.9 Baihua successfully replaced wenyan as the official language. However, the abolition of Chinese character and adoption of Latin-Roman alphabet were finally rejected at the height of thirdcountries’ decolonization and anti-imperialism in the late 1950s, for such a radically Westernizing script reform would undermine the construction of Chinese national identity and “exact indisputable violence against Chinese culture, philosophy and epistemology.”10 In 1958, a compromise was made by the CCP government: simplify the Chinese character

7 Kaske (2008, 76–77). 8 Criticisms of baihua movement in the Late Qing and early Republican Era, see

Kaske (2008, 325–348); in Republican Era, see Shen (1984, 151–155); throughout the twentieth century, see Zhang (2002, 86–102). 9 Shen (1984, 153). For detailed discussions on modern Chinese language reforms in different Chinese-speaking countries, regions and communities such as Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia, see Klöter et al. (2020). 10 Zhong (2019, 6). For a detailed discussion on the reasons for the failure of the script revolution, see Zhong (2019, 57–190).

64

G. GAO

and use pinyin, a romanization system and four tone marks developed by Chinese linguists, as a learning supplement to transcribe the Chinese speech sound. Since the Western “linguistic turn” was introduced to China in the 1980s, Chinese intellectuals have paid more attention to the issue of relationship between language, public reasoning and national perfection. They split not only over a range of political and economic issues but over linguistic and discursive issues. Liberal intellectuals, who take the Western liberal democracy as a universal model, continue the modern language reformers’ search for universal linguistic instrumentality and transparency. The New Left intellectuals, who valorize an alternative Chinese modernity, are committed to exploring Chinese linguistic particularity. Each faction associates their discussion on language with their political and cultural agendas. Unlike previous intellectuals, postsocialist intellectuals like drawing upon various new Western philosophies of language and critical theories to craft their arguments and make them more theoretical and philosophical. Instead of surveying all intellectuals’ scholarly discussions on Chinese language, I will focus on those who relate the linguistic issues to the intellectual debate over China’s national perfection and transition to modernity.

Liberal Intellectuals’ Approach to Language Xu Youyu, a professor of philosophy and leading liberal intellectual, studied the philosophy of language with the British philosopher Michael Dummett at Oxford University in the late 1980s. Although his influential book Copernican Revolution: The Linguistic Turn in Philosophy is an expository introduction rather than innovative research, it is very interesting to note that he wrote this book not because he is interested in philosophy of language per se but because he wants to import the logically rigorous Western philosophy to improve traditional Chinese public reasoning. Xu Youyu thinks that Chinese public reasoning is characterized by the “free association and habit of winning an argument not by grasping the nature of matter in question but by grandiose styles and literary skills.”11 To correct the flawed public reasoning, Xu Youyu resorts to analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, G. Frege, A. J.

11 Xu (1994, 3).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

65

Ayer, D. Davidson, R. Carnap, W.V.O. Quine and H. Patnam. Compared with previous intellectuals, Xu Youyu gives more space to the linguistic medium of public reasoning. He aims to use analytic philosophy to further reform baihua toward the direction of linguistic transparency and reshape Chinese public reasoning according to disengaged formal logic and rational thinking. Yet, Xu Youyu does not blindly accept the Western “linguistic turn.” Rather, he consciously resists analytic philosophy’s tendency to reduce all philosophical and substantive issues to issues of language and logic. He reminds his fellow Chinese intellectuals that they “cannot fully understand the method of analytic philosophy without being at the same time keenly aware of its limits.” Xu Youyu concedes that there is some truth to Western language philosophers’ central argument that the confusion and contradiction in previous philosophical discussions and public debates stem from the misuse of language or the logical flaws in language itself. However, Xu insists that this does not follow that all prior philosophical and political questions are falsely posed and that the task of language and political philosophy is simply to diagnose and cure the language disease. He criticizes Quine’s notion of “semantic ascent” for its turn (or “ascent”) from speaking of non-linguistic matters to speaking of the words and sentences correlated with the non-linguistic matters. Xu Youyu thinks that it is wise to replace talk about non-linguistic objects and things by talk about the expressions of objects and things when there is no empirical evidence or technology to study the objects and things per se. However, “semantic ascent” cannot hold for good and all, for “this method intentionally or unintentionally ignores some substantive and essential things and contentment with agreement on linguistic expressions will prevent deeper inquiry into the questions about things per se.” Xu Youyu cites the discovery of gene as an example to support his argument. There was a time when geneticists debated over whether gene actually exists or it is only a fictional conceptual tool. The different interpretations of gene did not obstruct geneticists’ discussions about gene. However, the question of whether gene is an actual thing or not does not disappear simply because geneticists could not reach some agreement on how to talk about gene. It is molecular biologists’ arduous research that confirmed the existence of gene and revealed its micromolecular structure. Xu Youyou contends that “if we only treat gene as a word and are satisfied only with using it to achieve conceptual exchange,

66

G. GAO

we could hardly discover its micro material structure.”12 Therefore, Xu Youyu emphasizes that Quine’s “semantic ascent” must be combined with “semantic descent,” namely study of the languages and expressions about objects and things must be complemented by study of objects and things themselves. Xu Youyu should take the credit for his critical use of Western analytic philosophy. However, he leaves out China’s historical linguistic background and never explores the potential of China’s historical and everyday languages to ameliorate the public reasoning and facilitate the transition to modernity. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that when debating with the New Left intellectuals, he largely relies on empirical evidence to attack his opponents’ arguments, but never connects his liberal principles to the diversity and historicity of Chinese languages and Chinese people’s self-understandings.13 Moreover, Xu Youyu unfairly takes literary languages and skills as something detrimental to public reasoning and rejects literary works as possible resources for productive political debate. It is true that Chinese literary languages and daily speeches do not have the logical rigor as the ideal transhistorical language that Xu Youyu envisions, but they also comprise referential and argumentative dimensions that can enrich the public reasoning and political debate, a point I will elaborate in my reading of Han Shaogong. Unlike Xu Youyu, Xu Jilin, a liberal historian, shows more interest in bridging the intellectual divide rather than chiding his opponents. He appreciates the New Left’s efforts to dispel the universalized conception of modernity and highlight China’s historical and cultural particularities, but he warns the New Left against the danger of collapsing all principles into history. He observes that “the New Left start with a historicist search for individuality and particularity, but gradually this individuality is no longer an individual’s individuality, only China’s national individuality…., a pragmatic statism and extreme nationalism which makes any dialogue between Chinese and western cultures impossible.”14 In spite of this, he believes that a common human culture is still possible:

12 See Xu (1994, 51). 13 For instance, Xu Youyu quotes economic statistics to refute Wang Hui’s arguments

that since the 1990s China has been deeply involved in global capitalism and that China’s internal crisis must be analyzed from a global perspective. See Xu (2002, 427–430). 14 Xu (2003b, 150).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

67

If we are still called human beings, there must be some common human features….Therefore, we are able to transcend the cultural, national and class differences. If we make full use of our imagination, we could enter into others’ souls, understanding their lives and realizing the commonality and diversity of human culture.15

Xu Jilin contends that Chinese intellectuals’ different responses to economic and social changes since the 1990s split up a relatively united intellectual community in the 1980s. Moreover, the professionalization of Chinese academia since the 1990s led to the rise of teshu zhishifenzi 特殊知识分子 (specific intellectuals) and fall of pubian zhishifenzi 普遍知 识分子 (universal intellectuals), which collapsed China’s public culture and further reinforced the intellectual split. To create a constructive public argumentative platform, Xu Jilin resorts to Habermas’s concept of “ideal speech situation”: “autonomy can be defended only after intellectuals have established standard rules for dialogue within the intellectual community, rules that facilitate equal opportunity among professional peers in undertaking pure and thoroughgoing contestation.”16 It is to Xu Jilin’s credit that he does not join his fellow liberal intellectuals in making one-sided attack against his rival the New Left camp. Instead, he is more dedicated to enlisting Western theories to building a more inclusive and independent Chinese intellectual sphere and argumentative space that can lead to constructive dialogues and generate better understandings of China. My critique is not Xu Jilin’s instrumentalist and nationalist reduction of Habermas’ complex arguments over universal issues of equality, justice and democracy to the narrow question of “what is good for China,” but his failure to properly deal with the linguistic and cultural diversities within China.17 Xu Jilin’s construction of normative discursive rules and procedures for Chinese intellectual autonomy and communication presupposes an unproblematic common language and culture that all Chinese intellectuals have equal access to and command of. It is true that putonghua is the language that most Chinese intellectuals are trained to use, but they do not have the equal mastery of this official language based upon Beijing-dialect, especially for those ethnic 15 Xu (2003b, 152). 16 Xu (2003a, 60–61). 17 For criticism of Xu’s nationalistic use of Habermas’ universal theory, see Davies

(2007b, 69–70).

68

G. GAO

minority intellectuals or those from the remote areas with distinctly dialect and local culture. Chinese intellectuals are not extralinguistic individuals living in a synchronic world. Instead, they are embedded in their different local linguistic, cultural and ethnic traditions. Given China’s heterogeneous linguistic and cultural conditions in different regions, we have every reason to ask: How could a free, fair and fruitful discursive and intellectual space be established on the problematic premise that Chinese intellectuals have an equal mastery of the dominant putonghua and mainstream Han culture? How could a Han intellectual enter into the souls of a Tibetan, Uyghur or Mongolian intellectual or a strongly dialect-inflected intellectual? It must be pointed out that I do not reject Xu Jilin’s call for dialogue on the grounds of any linguistic and cultural incommensurability, but simply call for attention to the potential linguistic barriers and discursive inequalities in the intellectual discussion and communication based solely upon the dominant modern standard Chinese. A truly productive and comprehensive intellectual dialogue on Chinese modernity can hardly be achieved without carefully attending to different interlocutors’ linguistic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds and differences. Qin Hui, a major liberal historian, is one of the few intellectuals who make serious efforts to explore the value of historical languages to the Chinese project of modernity. Like Xu Youyu and Xu Jilin, Qin Hui also underscores the universality of liberal principles and empirical studies, but points out that “different nations must understand liberal conceptions of humanity and freedom through their different national languages and symbols.”18 As for China, “Confucian languages and symbols can give modern Western values a Chinese expression.”19 He contends that compared with Western liberal thinkers’ words, Confucian languages and symbols are more effective linguistic tools to get liberal ideals and principles through to ordinary Chinese people. Qin Hui assigns only a formal not a substantive and constitutive role to China’s Confucian languages. In other words, Qin Hui’s purported employment of Confucian signs and languages serves only to “package modern values.”20 Although he is not unaware of the gap between Western principles and Confucian languages, he thinks this rupture could be easily sutured. For instance, he has noticed

18 Qin (2002, 96). 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

69

the problem with the translation of the Confucian phrase tian xia wei gong 天下为公 into “the world under heaven is for the public.”21 He points out that “gong ” in original Confucian language does not refer to the “public” in the modern sense, but to feudal aristocrats. However, he argues that this referential gap could be bridged with ease. It is very interesting to note that Qin Hui quotes Saussure’s theory of linguistics to support his argument that “the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary,” implying that human beings are able to transform the historical meanings of languages at will.22 It is true that Saussure points out the arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified in his Course in General Linguistics , but what Saussure intends this arbitrary relationship to be is nothing other than a deconstruction of the humanistic understanding of language as something under individual control. As a harbinger of structural linguistics, what Saussure wants to emphasize is that language is not the instrument of the subject and it has a life of its own, which is just diametrically opposed to Qin Hui’s humanistic and instrumentalist approach to language and sign. As Saussure puts it “the distinguishing characteristic of the sign –– is that in some way it always eludes the individual or social will.”23 In addition to his misappropriation of Saussure’s theory, Qin Hui conceives of a Chinese subject who is able to stand high above his inherited linguistic background and graft it to Western principles without any tension and contradiction. Moreover, the Confucian languages and signs that Qin Hui employs are mostly philosophical and political terms formulated by elite Confucian scholars such as Mencius, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi and Tan Sitong. We have every reason to doubt that these intellectual elites’ scholarly vocabularies and languages could be understood by ordinary Chinese people as Qin Hui expects. While Qin Hui does not separate his liberal ideals and principles completely from China’s linguistic particularity, he still does not deal with the relationship of subject to historical linguistic background in a satisfying way, either. He reduces China’s complex and conflicted linguistic background to elitist Confucian languages and deprives this background of any constitutive role in (re)shaping the identity of subject.

21 Qin (1999, 335). 22 Ibid. 23 Saussure (1966, 17).

70

G. GAO

The New Left’s Approach to Language Compared with liberals’ instrumentalist and transparent conception of language, the New Left, who draw mostly on the theories of poststructuralism and neo-Marxism, attach more importance to the relevance of language to their shared pursuit of China’s alternative modernity. Gan Yang, who appeared as a staunch critic of Chinese tradition in the mid1980s, has turned into a harsh attacker of liberalism and a major New Left intellectual since the 1990s. In his preface to the Chinese translation of Ernst Cassirer’s An Essay on Man, he rejects the dominant conception of language as an external instrument to reflect reality. Instead, drawing on Cassirer’s semiotics, Gan Yang proposes that “human nature is essentially semiotic and cultural” and “humans are able to create meanings for themselves by creating signs.”24 However, differing from Cassirer who underlines the relative autonomy of the linguistic medium, Gan Yang joins his intellectual rival Qin Hui in endowing human beings with a full control of language. In addition to calling for more attention to language in general, he does not cope with China’s linguistic particularity and historicity in any detail. Zheng Min, a Beijing-based poet and literary scholar, is one of the earliest contemporary Chinese intellectuals that have made concerted effort to challenge modern Chinese language reforms’ pursuit of linguistic transparency. Unlike previous conservative intellectuals’ denigration of baihua as a low-brow vulgar language, Zheng Min’s criticism is much informed by modern and postmodern language theories of Saussure, Derrida and Lacan. Unlike the above-mentioned liberal intellectual Qin Hui who misunderstands Saussure, Zheng Min has a correct understanding of Saussure’s emphasis on the priority of langue (language system) over parole (individual speech). Zheng Min uses this Saussurian insight to criticize modern Chinese language reformers’ subjective replacement of individual speech by objective language system beyond human control. Zheng Min emphasizes that language is an inherited social system that cannot be transformed simply by the decision of several language reformers. She rebukes modern Chinese language reformers’ substitution of writing-based wenyan by the speech-oriented baihua as what Derrida calls “phonocentrism.”25 For Zheng Min, such 24 Gan (1985, 9). 25 Zheng (2000, 181).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

71

a Westernizing phonocentrism eliminates the linguistic particularity and rich aesthetic meanings of the time-honored writing-based wenyan, and invents a semantically impoverished modern Chinese language. Zheng Min uses Derrida’s conception of “trace” to argue that modern Chinese language reformers’ invented baihua implicitly comprises many historical traces of the obsolete wenyan, the language they explicitly reject.26 In other words, there is a linguistic continuity in China’s transition to modernity. Zheng Min does not seek to attack baihua in toto, but wants to emphasize that baihua is not as transparent and transhistorical as modern Chinese language reformers envisioned. She contends that because of its transparency-orientation, the speech-based modern standard Chinese is inadequate for literary and scholarly communication. What’s worse, when this emphasis on linguistic transparency is carried to extremes during the socialist era, subversive and alternative meanings in language are left out and political oppression is taken to a record high. To improve modern Chinese language and make it into a semantically dense and politically liberating language, Zheng Min appeals to the time-honored and writing-based wenyan for recuperating the expressive and subversive power of Chinese language. Moreover, Zheng Min draws upon Heidegger’s existentialist idea of “our being in language” to criticize the dominant instrumentalist understanding of language as a mere tool. Zheng Min charges that modern Chinese language reforms not only deprived Chinese language of the semantic density and cultural meanings in wenyan, but also made Chinese people lose the ancient Chinese literati’s elegant and poetic form of life embodied in wenyan. Zheng Min should be praised for highlighting the limits of linguistic transparency and resorting to China’s indigenous linguistic resources to ameliorate Chinese literary and scholarly languages. My criticism is not the familiar charge that Zheng Min misapplies Derrida’s idea of “trace” to argue for Chinese cultural integrity and linguistic continuity, a point that is contrary to Derrida’s use of “trace” to interrogate the stability of meaning and “metaphysics of presence.”27 Instead, my critique is directed at Zheng Min’s dependence only upon the elegant high-brow wenyan to enrich modern Chinese semantics and facilitate opposition to

26 Zheng (2000, 182). 27 For criticism of Zheng Min’s misuse of Derrida’s poststructuralist theory, see Davies

(2007a, 22–23).

72

G. GAO

the hegemony of linguistic transparency. While Zheng Min has a better understanding of Saussure’s structuralist linguistics than Qin Hui, both of them have a linguistic elitism that fails to explore the Chinese historical languages and regional languages of everyday life as linguistic resources to improve the literary and scholarly languages and achieve linguistic modernity. Moreover, Zheng Min’s neglect of China’s diverse historical languages and everyday speeches results in a neglect of diverse local and regional forms of life that are different from premodern Chinese literati’s elegant and poetic way of being. Zheng Min seeks to oppose linguistic Westernization and reconstruct China’s cultural particularity and traditional poetic form of life by reaffirming the rich cultural meanings of wenyan and its continued hidden presence in modern Chinese language. However, Zheng Min’s opposition to Westernization and reconstruction of Chinese linguistic continuity and cultural identity presupposes a unified and monolithic wenyan-centered Chinese historical language and excludes other Chinese historical languages, low-brow regional dialects and everyday speeches within China. This exclusion leads her linguistic reconstruction project to replacing one hegemony of Westernized and speech-oriented baihua with another hegemony of the elitist writingbased wenyan and to the domination of literati’s way of life over ordinary citizens’ multifarious local forms of life.28

28 Some less politically engaged linguists are engaged in a debate over the particularity of Chinese language. Like Zheng Min, some linguists make similar efforts to oppose the Europeanization of modern Chinese language and reassert the linguistic particularity of Chinese language. A notable example is Chinese linguist Shen Xiaolong’s critique of modern Chinese linguistics for its use of Western grammatical categories and terms based on the inflectional Indo-European languages to describe and analyze Chinese language. Shen Xiaolong emphasizes that the “humanistic spirit” of Chinese language is distinct from the “scientism” of Western languages and that it is inappropriate to fit the former’s diverse and flexible sentence structures into the rigid “subject + verb + object” syntactical framework of the latter. Instead of following the scientific trend of modern Western linguistics, Chinese linguistics should take a different track of what he calls “cultural linguistics.” Wu Tieping, another renowned Chinese linguist, contends that Shen Xiaolong exaggerates the difference between Chinese language and Indo-European languages. For instance, both Chinese and modern English are “analytic language.” Instead of “causing bad consequences,” the use of modern Western linguistics makes huge contributions to the study of Chinese language. However, both Shen and Wu are focused on comparing Chinese and Western languages and fail to thematize the linguistic diversities within China. For a detailed introduction to Shen Xiaolong’s “cultural linguistics” and his critics, see McDonald (2011, 140–150).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

73

Han Yuhai, a scholar of modern Chinese literature and an active New Left intellectual, joins Zheng Min in making a pseudo-poststructuralist critique of the baihua movement and the May Fourth Movement for relegating language to a means to represent reality and enlighten the masses. Han Yuhai charges that such a reflectionist and instrumentalist notion of language leads to “vulgar pragmatism and absolute totalitarianism” and makes “a self-sufficient transcendental world and individualistic spirit disappear.”29 For Han Yuhai, the May Fourth Movement is not “qimeng ” 启蒙 (enlightening) but “fameng ” 发蒙 (stupefying). On the one hand, to oppose the dominant reflectionist notion of language, Han Yuhai draws on Lacan and Barthes to argue that language is “an autonomous and liberating system” and an “a priori structure prior to individuals.”30 He calls for restoring the “original nature” of language to arouse human imaginative power to subvert established cultures and texts. On the other hand, he regards language as “a creative invention” of human beings. Han Yuhai seems to oscillate between a conception of language as pure human invention and an a priori structure beyond human control. If language is “an autonomous liberating force,” then how could human beings employ it according to their own needs of freedom and individuality? Han Yuhai does not see the historical link between language and subject, nor does he recognize that the historicity of language could be both free and imprison human subjects. But unlike liberal intellectuals who fail to explore the contributions of literary works to China’s project of modernity, Han Yuhai credits poetry with the power to free language from the reflection of reality and release its emancipatory potential to create new subjectivity. He privileges poetry over novels because the latter “depend too much upon existing experience and imitation of this world.”31 He thinks that while the “novel plays an important part in challenging ruling class in social movements,” its role is very limited in challenging existing rationality and emotion because it “cannot form a new autonomous rationality and emotion.”32 While trying to get out of the Western enlightenment tradition and denounce its Chinese followers, Han Yuhai’s conception of language and literature is still complying with the disengaged Kantian

29 Han (1991, 22). 30 Han (1991, 23–24). 31 Han (1991, 27). 32 Han (1991, 28).

74

G. GAO

aesthetics, because he never discusses the historicity of Chinese language and literature and takes them as transhistorical spheres. Moreover, Han Yuhai’s privileging of poetry over novels is also unfounded. As I will show, there is no lack of disclosive and subversive power in Chinese novels. The aforementioned New Left’s neglect of China’s linguistic background is to some extent redressed in Wang Hui’s “historical linguistics.” Wang Hui shares his fellow New Left intellectuals’ pursuit of “an alternative modernity.” To him, China’s project of modernity is not an unproblematic application of Western principles; Chinese historical, cultural and linguistic particularities must be taken into serious consideration. For Wang Hui, the search for an alternative modernity should start with a rewriting of Chinese history, because it has always been described and assessed by a set of external Western criteria, the most important of which is the Weberian concept of “rationalization.” In his seminal article “Weber and the Question of China’s Modernity,” Wang Hui mounts a strong critique of Max Weber’s measure of Chinese history in terms of a universal conception of “rationalization.” Wang Hui alerts us to the fact that there are no such concepts as “rationality” and “rationalization” in Chinese language.33 To make up for this inadequacy, Wang Hui endeavors to use China’s own languages and categories to redescribe China’s transition to modernity. In the last section of his Weber article entitled “Calling Modernization Theory into Question: Historical Linguistic Convention, Intercultural Communicative Action and Social History Methodology,” Wang Hui spells out his analytical model as follows: To establish a new methodological horizon, first of all, we need to look for basic languages and categories to describe Chinese society and culture. These basic languages and categories are conventions agreed upon in the communicative practice within a specific linguistic community. The second step is to insert this language into its formative process and observe its function rather than taking it as something transparent and constant. Considering that linguistic community is not a closed existence, language translation and transformation accordingly involve intercultural studies. For instance, I will explore how the core concepts which are constitutive of modern China’s worldview, such as “gong 公 (public), qun 群 (collective), shehui 社会 (society), guojia 国家 (state), minzu 民族 (nation), geren 个 人 (individual), kexue 科学 (science), jinbu 进步 (progress), shehuizhuyi

33 Wang (1997, 31).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

75

社会主义 (socialism), geming 革命 (revolution)” are formed, constructed and disseminated, and what their referents and sociocultural functions and axiological orientations are. This is an analytic methodological attempt to integrate historical linguistics with sociocultural history.34

Wang Hui’s project is theoretically informed and makes important contributions to understanding Chinese modernity. Firstly, he draws attention to the limit of describing and evaluating Chinese history by the existing Chinese words and categories translated from the West. By situating these vocabularies into the historical and linguistic context of modern China, he seeks to offer a genealogical analysis of modern Chinese language. In his “historical linguistics,” Wang Hui does not take the modernization of Chinese language as an unproblematic and unconflicted process; instead, he highlights its tensions, contradictions and distortions in crosslinguistic exchanges. In so doing, he reveals the otherwise concealed linguistic complexities and resistances. Wang Hui’s theoretical model rectifies Weberian China research that drives out Chinese linguistic background. Secondly, Wang Hui’s concern with linguistic particularity is also reflected in his research of various language movements in modern China. In another important article “Regional Form, Dialect, Popular Speech and Debate over National Form during China-Japan War,” Wang Hui convincingly argues that China’s replacement of wenyan by baihua is not a parallel to Europe’s replacement of the imperial written language, Latin, by a variety of national vernaculars, nor a Chinese version of European phonocentrism, but a substitution of one written language by another. Wang Hui’s research shows that in its transition to modernity China’s linguistic transformation takes a track different from the West. Baihua is closer to Chinese speech than wenyan, but it is not speech itself. Baihua is mostly based upon an informal written language. Moreover, modern baihua absorbs many loan words and grammars imported from the West. As a result, baihua is further removed from ordinary Chinese people’s actual speeches. To transform modern Chinese into a more powerful tool that can really reach and mobilize the masses for political and revolutionary purposes, leftist intellectuals and revolutionaries started Dazongyu movement and discussions on dialects that called for inclusions of more spoken languages of the masses and dialects of different regions. In so doing, a real unification of writing and speaking could be achieved. 34 Wang (1997, 33).

76

G. GAO

However, the inclusion of diverse Chinese dialects and regional vernaculars will undermine the search for a common national language and unified modern nation-state. Wang Hui points out that these deeper and broader speech-oriented language reforms failed, because “in the process of seeking to establish a modern nation-state, a universal national language and region-transcending art form is the mainstreaming direction of forming cultural identity.”35 In other words, when the pursuit of linguistic transparency and unification of writing and speaking go so far as to deviate from the building of a unified modern nation-state, the former has to be subordinated to the latter, for building a unified and powerful modern nation-state is the predominating logic of modern Chinese history. Wang Hui laments that “the mainstream of modern Chinese language movement developed not only at the cost of vernacular diversity, but also went hand in hand with a cultural filtering.”36 My critique of Wang Hui here is not the familiar charges that his pursuit of “alternative modernity” is not based on solid empirical studies or that he overlooks the critical potential within the Enlightenment movement, but the way he deals with language and his political ideals.37 Firstly, while Wang Hui dramatizes the inadequacy of existing Chinese vocabularies to describe Chinese history, the linguistic inadequacy he has tackled is only concerning specific translated words. He does not raise a holistic challenge to putonghua (Modern Standard Mandarin) as a sufficient language to talk about Chinese modernity. As a matter of fact, China is composed of a huge variety of linguistic communities which are often unintelligible to each other, and most of them do not use putonghua in their daily lives. Although Wang Hui discusses many dialect movements during the Sino-Japanese War, he takes only a third-person perspective to look at the elite intellectuals’ arguments about dialects, keeping dialect users’ first-person perspectives and self-understandings off the table. For Wang Hui, the modern language reforms and movements have only impoverished and homogenized the local languages and cultures. He does not consider the possibility that the latter could also be enriched by the former from the dialect users’ first-person perspective. Wang Hui’s

35 Wang (1997, 374). 36 Wang (1997, 370). 37 For criticism of Wang Hui’s empirical rigor, see Qu (2000, 46–70); for criticism of

Wang’s neglect of the critical potential within the Enlightenment, see Qian (2000, 1–17).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

77

external third-person perspective results in a reductive account of the complicated linguistic process he seeks to uncover. Thirdly, Wang Hui endeavors to give a “really descriptive” history of the complex translingual practice. It seems to him that his “pure description” could not only be liberated from the Western narratives but also from any evaluative frameworks. He thinks of himself as an objective observer who is able to float free from his own historical linguistic background and give an absolutely objective description from the outside. Wang Dingding, a liberal economist, finds the problem with Wang Hui’s “historical linguistics”: Wang Hui’s research approach is too complicated and close to what I term as “purely historical school.” It is not difficult to find that this descriptor ends up having to take certain position and creating another “presence.” According to the above methodology, this descriptor’s position has to be re-analyzed by himself/herself. This is a limitless thought process which pushes the analyzing self into an endless internalizing process to such an extent that makes any “intersubjectivity” impossible. It seems to me that to get out of this predicament the only route for us is to hold on to the narrative consistency of formal logic. In this sense, I even call for “stopping self-reflection.”38

I agree with Wang Dingding’s critique but not his solution, because selfanalysis and self-reflection do not necessarily result in self-closure and erasure of dialogue. On the contrary, thematizing and articulating one’s own linguistic and intellectual horizon in a proper way could deepen one’s self-understanding and trigger productive dialogues. Wang Dingding is quite right in saying that Wang Hui has to actually “take a certain position.” This position is his pursuit of China’s “alternative modernity,” a modernity which he considers as superior to the Western modernity. To find historical resources, Wang Hui traces Chinese intellectuals’ pursuit of alternative modernity back to the Song Confucians in the eleventh century B.C. and looks for a historical continuity in the Ming and Qing dynasties and even the Republican era. But Wang Hui’s failure to thematize his own horizon covers up his dissimilarities from previous critics of modernity and his potential similarities to his contemporary liberal rivals. Wang Dingding rightly points out Wang Hui’s problem, but to solve it, he turns back to formal logic as other liberals do. As I have

38 Wang (2000, 230), emphasis mine.

78

G. GAO

explained, a disengaged formal logic and “universal” rationality does not lay a satisfactory foundation for cross- and intra-cultural understanding and communication. Fourthly, Wang Hui does not take the reception of Western concepts as a transparent and unproblematic process of translation, but as a linguistic process fraught with appropriations, confrontations and usurpations. For instance, in his studies of modern Chinese conceptions of geren 个人 (individual) and ziwo 自我 (self), Wang Hui comes to the conclusion that “while being deeply influenced by Western thought, China’s modern conception of individual and self are starkly different from their European counterparts. They keep changing in accordance with Chinese context.”39 However, Wang Hui does not go from this “changing” to the radical poststructuralist linguistic indeterminacy. Instead, he insists that “the relatively stable relationship between language and its referents is formed by linguistic communities’ lived history and communicative practice.”40 However, Wang Hui’s studies are focused only on elite intellectuals like Yan Fu, Zhang Taiyan and Lu Xun, and ignore Chinese citizens’ everyday engagements with their historical languages and modern translated words. In saying this, I do not mean that Wang Hui’s neglect of everyday languages has completely invalidated his achievements, but simply insist that Wang Hui’s approach does not match his goal. Since his pursuit of alternative modernity is not just for the intellectual elites, but for all the Chinese people. He often laments the fact that “Chinese liberals’ pursuit of liberty has become the liberty of the powerful.”41 By contrast, what he aims to realize are “broader freedom and democracy for all Chinese people.”42 Then, we have every reason to challenge him to the question that how his project which gives no space to ordinary Chinese people’s thinking, feeling and self-understanding could really bring them more freedom and democracy as he hopes. Like Wang Hui, Tong Qingsheng, a Guangzhou-based New Left literary critic, also takes historical linguistics approach to examine the process and consequence of modern Chinese language reforms from the perspective of China-West intellectual and cultural encounters. Through a careful study of the writings and biographies of Western missionaries, comparative philologist of the nineteenth century and modern Chinese

39 Wang (1997, 38). 40 Wang (1997, 33). 41 Wang (2000, 15). 42 Wang (2000, 43).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

79

intellectuals of the twentieth century, Tong’s book The Significance of Chinese Mandarin demonstrates the former’s negative conception and evaluation of Chinese language as an obscure premodern hieroglyph exerted a seminal influence on the latter’s language reforms. Tong draws upon Said’s postcolonial theory and Derrida’s deconstruction theory to characterize modern Chinese language reformers’ replacement of wenyan by baihua, phoneticization of Chinese characters as “phonocentric” and “self-orientalizating” reforms.43 Tong criticizes Chinese language reformers for being unaware of the imperial ideologies and colonialist practices behind the Western missionary and comparative philologists’ discourses on Chinese language.44 However, unlike Said and Derrida, Tong does not conceive of “phonocentric” and “self-orientalizing” as totally negative, oppressive and complicit with Western powers and Western hierarchical metaphysics of presence. Instead, Tong emphasizes that in the modern Chinese context, Chinese intellectuals’ proposed “phonocentric” and “self-orientalizing” language reforms were “not so much catering to Western powers as showing their critical reflections on China’s own problems and reflections on China’s past, present and future through appropriations of Western views on Chinese language and associated thoughts.”45 Tong is aware that while Western missionaries and comparative philologists had many biases and prejudices against Chinese language that directly or indirectly served the imperialist and colonialist purposes, they had also made great contributions to the transcription of Chinese speech, the facilitation of the reading and writing of Chinese language and the progress of knowledge production in China.46 Compared with Said, Tong develops a more balanced and complicated understanding of the consequences of the Western production and dissemination of knowledge about the non-West. That said, Tong still has not satisfactorily achieved his own selfdesignated goal. In the preface to his book, he makes it clear that his research is intended to “describe and reveal the dissemination process of Western views on Chinese language and their influence on modern

43 Tong (2019a, 223). 44 Tong (2019a, 233). 45 Tong (2019a, 222). 46 Tong (2019b).

80

G. GAO

Chinese culture, thought and conceptions of language.”47 However, he is focused only on how the Western missionaries and comparative philologists’ views on Chinese language shaped Chinese intellectual elites’ (such as Fu Sinian, Chen Duxiu, Qian Xuantong, Lu Xun, Hu Shi and Zhao Yuanren) self-understandings of their native language. While recognizing the linguistic diversities within China and Westerners’ use of Chinese dialects to translate Bible for missionary purpose in the nineteenth century, Tong does not explore how ordinary citizens received and appropriated these translations and the imported Western conceptions of Chinese language. Such a neglect leads Tong to offer only a partial picture of modern China’s change of self-understanding and self-perception of language. Moreover, although Tong reproaches the missionaries and comparative philologists’ imperialist and colonialist practice of critiquing Chinese language from the perspective of Western phonocentrism, Tong thinks phonocentrism is not unique to the West but also exists to some extent in Chinese tradition. China would develop a phonocentric language and literature even without the Western influences. Tong concludes that different national language reforms and literary development will develop in a similar fashion. Tong proposes that to avoid narrow-minded cultural nationalism, researchers should “focus on the similarities between different thoughts and research methods from different academic traditions.”48 Tong starts with Saidian and Derridian critique of phonocentrism and orientalism, but ironically ends up with echoing Chinese liberals’ linguistic universalism and rejecting alternative linguistic and literary developments. If phonocentrism is the only option, then why did the modern phoneticization of Chinese script fail and become what Tong calls “yesterday’s chrysanthemum,” something outdated and obsolete in contemporary China? Tong is worth the praise for not blindly following Said in dismissing the Western knowledge of the East as serving only pernicious colonial purposes, and insisting on the complicated consequences of phonocentric modern Chinese language reforms. However, Tong offers a reductive account of language reform itself. Tong’s reductive account could be rectified if his historical linguistics gives more space to ordinary social actors’ linguistic self-understandings and self-interpretations.

47 Tong (2019a, 13). 48 Tong (2019a, 347).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

81

When pursuing China’s national perfection and modernity, Chinese liberal intellectuals either completely neglect China’s historical languages or only regard them as linguistic tools to package their preferred Western liberal values and principles. Their ways of addressing the relationship between language and modernity prevent them from fully exploring the potential of China’s historical languages to describe, debate and develop China’s national condition and perfection. The New Left intellectuals seek to reconstruct a non-instrumentalized poetic language or classical Chinese, because they believe it comprises imaginary and emancipatory power that enables China to explore a route alternative to the Western model. Some of them (Wang Hui) also recognize the diversity of dialects and regional languages, and describe the process of linguistic and cultural homogenization caused by the standardization of modern Chinese language from a third-person perspective. However, they miss the dialect users’ self-understandings, oppositions and negotiations of the linguistic and cultural homogenization, offering a one-sided account of modern Chinese linguistic and cultural changes. Moreover, neither of the intellectual schools deals with the relationship of subject to his/her inherited linguistic institutions in a satisfying way, because both of them pay little attention to China’s diverse everyday languages and place themselves outside their own particular linguistic background. Pointing out the problems with liberals’ and the New Left’s pursuit of China’s national perfection and the improvement of political reasoning through their different linguistic inquiries does not mean any denial of their enormous contributions but simply shows that there is still room for their research to be enriched and improved, particularly, in terms of their dealing with the relationship of subject to historical linguistic background. In her studies of contemporary Chinese thought, Gloria Davies points out that despite their different political ideologies, Chinese intellectuals share a common belief in “linguistic certitude, presuppos(ing) in a positivistic fashion that the gap between language and reality, or between word and thing, could be progressively narrowed by the use of ever-more precise formulations.”49 Davies attributes Chinese intellectuals’ indifference or ambivalence toward the Western linguistic turn to their fear

49 Davies (2009, 50).

82

G. GAO

of “the danger of undermining the clarity and the certitude required for identifying [China’s]problems and offering solutions to them.”50 Davies holds that it is Chinese intellectuals’ commitment to linguistic certitude and refusal to fully accept the poststructuralist conviction in the inescapable separation of language from reality that has produced “reductionist, magisterial, and even somewhat arbitrarily prescriptive critical discourse” and resulted in a “textual closure.”51 Davies is insightful in identifying the similar belief in linguistic certitude behind Chinese intellectuals’ conflicting political ideologies and locating the nationalist reason for this linguistic conviction. However, the causal relationship she establishes between Chinese intellectuals’ commitment to a certain stable language and “textual disclosure” is subject to critical scrutiny. As is shown above, Chinese intellectuals of different ideological strips do share a certain tempered attachment to the linguistic referentiality. However, the latter does not necessarily lead to “textual closure” as Davies argues. Instead, their dedicated search for a better language to describe China’s problems and offer solutions has also fostered their critical thinking in receiving Western theories and disclosing the linguistic oppressions and diversities with China. Like Davies, some (not all) proponents and practitioners of the prevalent Sinophone studies, such as Shumei Shih and Rey Chow, have the same tendency to pose Chinese linguistic nativity/nationalism against pursuit of linguistic/cultural differences, mainland Chinese writers/intellectuals against their diaspora counterparts in opposite terms.52 What is missing is a more nuanced and dialogical approach. First, in addition to fanatic linguistic nationalism that stubbornly sticks to a fixed and monolithic Chinese language and unquestioningly links it to a sinocentric identity construction, there are also locally-based and dialogical nationalisms with egalitarian and cosmopolitan sympathies that hold on to a relatively stable notion of Chinese language while at the same time attending to the linguistic and cultural pluralities both inside and outside mainland China, both inside and outside the Han ethnic majority. Second, there are not only Chinese 50 Davies (2009, 53). 51 Davies (2009, 27–30). 52 For criticism of Shih’s dichotomous conception of China-centrism and local commit-

ments, see Wang and Tsu (2010, 1–13); for criticism of Chow’s polarization of nativist subject against the deconstructive posture towards language, see Thakkar (2017, 912–913).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

83

party state’s and intellectuals’ linguistic nationalisms, but also literary writers’. Conflation of the latter with the former will lead to the neglect of different renegotiations of the linguistic nativity and cultural/literary diversity in contemporary China. As China’s national power has been growing rapidly since the 1990s, Chinese writers’ pursuit of linguistic subjectivity has been accordingly intensified. A new round of critical reflection on putonghua and baihua movement took place. Many Chinese writers view the baihua movement as a Europeanized linguistic movement and its product—modern standard Chinese—has been “severely polluted” and fraught with translational style. To oppose linguistic hierarchy and rebuild China’s linguistic subjectivity, many novelists resorted not to a monolithic Chinese national language but to the unofficial vernaculars and regional dialects. For instance, Mo Yan’s use of Shandong dialects, Jia Pingwa’s Shanxi dialect, Li Rui’s Sanxi dialect and the Muslim writer Zhang Chengzhi’s Islamic Jahriyya languages often figure prominently in their narratives.53 Like their diaspora counterparts, these mainland China’s novelists’ reconstructions and reappropriations of their linguistic nativity have not reinforced but challenged the static and uniform conception of Chinese national language and brought to light the linguistic, literary and cultural diversities and contradictions within China. As early as the 1980s, Han Shaogong committed himself to the rejuvenation of Chinese literature through “root-seeking.” But Han’s “root-seeking” was not a nostalgic return to a nationally recognized original moment nor to construct a fixed and homogeneous mainstream Confucian tradition, but to recuperate his hometown Hunan’s marginalized and even the forgotten historical Chu language and culture. This recuperation is not intended to elevate a regional language and culture into a nationally dominant one nor to have the latter homogenize the former, but to have the former enrich the latter. As Han writes: “More importantly, the traditional culture embedded in our native soil mostly belongs to the non-paradigmatic: colloquialisms, unofficial histories, legends, jokes, folk songs, supernatural tales…when the time comes, the paradigmatic is reinvigorated by the non-paradigmatic.”54 For Han,

53 For a detailed discussion about the use of dialect in contemporary Chinese literature, see Gunn (2006, 157–203). 54 Han (2008d, 47).

84

G. GAO

China’s literary revival was not built upon constructing a hegemonic and exclusionist Han-dominated language and culture, but upon retrieving and reengaging with various historical, marginal and local languages and cultures. In what follows, I will explore Han Shaogong’s literary recuperation of his native Hunan dialect in order to show how his fictional and non-fictional works could point to the way of enriching, extending and exemplifying China’s internal intellectual debate over language and modernity as well as the prevailing Sinophone studies.

Han Shaogong’s Approach to Language, Public Reasoning and National Perfection Since the 1990s, Han Shaogong has been widely reading Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Habermas and Foucault, and is keenly aware of the “linguistic turn” in Western academia, but at the same time cautions against its move toward a radical textualism that takes knowledge as something only “from text to text” or “from books to books.”55 As a matter of fact, Han Shaogong does not commit himself to any particular intellectual faction. Instead, he is more concerned with the dogmatic intellectual discourse and reified modern knowledge production in general. For him, Chinese intellectuals, be they liberals or the New Left, tend to be alienated from ordinary Chinese people’s rich everyday languages, feelings and practices, and suffer from what he calls manxing lilun yanzheng 慢性理论炎症(chronic theoretical inflammation).56 That is, knowledge and theory production have been separated from concrete and complicated lived experiences and realities, and turned into repeated meaningless self-reduplication. Han Shaogong seeks to address the increasingly intellectual dogmatism, reification and alienation by provoking fairer and more productive intellectual debates. He explains: Human cognition is similar to blind men patting an elephant. No one can claim to capture the whole and absolute truth. Therefore, both the Right and the Left may have their own shallowness. However, it would be worse if there were only one dominating shallowness. Our shallowness could be

55 Han (1998, 27). 56 Han (2008a, 246).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

85

reduced only if we allow different types of shallowness to debate with each other. That’s the reason why Tianya gives more space to the New Left.57

Han’s decision to publish more New Left’s articles in his journal Tianya is not based on his predetermined New Left bias but out of his intention to oppose the liberal hegemony and build a more accommodating and more inclusive argumentative space. In other words, his criticisms of Chinese liberalism are more strategic than authentic. He emphasizes that his “(critical) arrows are targeted at both the Left and the Right.”58 What he really strives for is to improve Chinese public reasoning and invigorate knowledge production by “bringing about a high-quality debate and dialogue.”59 Han’s efforts to improve the intellectual debate and knowledge production are not simply to offer New Left’s minority opinion more publication space in the journal under his charge but also to create his own literary works to thematize and dramatize the issue of language, the presupposition for any productive debate and meaningful communication. For Han Shaogong, Chinese intellectuals should “walk on two legs,” one is theory and the other is literature. When theory production is ossified, it can be de-ossified and reinvigorated by literature, for the latter’s meticulous attending to details, nuances and subtleties of feelings, experiences and the world could offer a challenge and corrective to the former’s gross generalizations and disembodied abstractions.60 This does not mean that Han takes all literary works as being freed from ideological interpellation and political manipulation. Instead, he is acutely aware of Chinese mainstream literary works’ reproduction of the dominant neoliberal ideology or the CCP’s political propaganda. However, like the postsocialist literary critics discussed in the previous chapter, Han Shaogong still believes in the writerly agency to transcend the control of dominant ideologies and power relations to some extent and open up a new discursive space and argumentative mode through formal and thematic innovation. In what follows, I will offer a reading of Han Shaogong’s lexicon novel A Dictionary of Maqiao, as a literary thematization and dramatization of Chinese language to address the limits

57 Han (2008c, 142). 58 Han (2008c, 141). 59 Han (2008c, 142). 60 Han (2003, 238–239).

86

G. GAO

of intellectuals’ debate and discussion on language and challenge the prevailing poststructuralist-informed Sinophone studies’ polarization of Chinese nationalism against the disclosure of Sinophone heterogeneities. A Dictionary of Maqiao is a novel structured like a “dictionary” composed of 115 entries from a fictional village Maqiao’s dialect in Hunan Province. Because of its structural parallel to Serbian writer Milorad Pavi´c’s lexicon novel Dictionary of the Khazars , it is accused of plagiarizing Pavi´c’s novel “in both form and content.”61 However, a close reading can show the innovation of A Dictionary of Maqiao in both form and content. First, in terms of form, Pavi´c’s Dictionary of the Khazars tells a story about the mass religious conversion of the Khazar people to Judaism and their puzzling disappearance through a detached third-person perspective. Han’s A Dictionary of Maqiao is focused on the history and contemporary daily life of people in a fictional village Maqiao. The narrator, a zhiqing 知青 (sent-down youth) writer called Shaogong, is both a character and observer in Maqiao. He often comes forward to offer his own anecdotes, speculations and long theoretical reflections that disrupt the flow of narration. Han’s novel is not so much an imitation of a foreign postmodern novel as a reinvention of the Chinese writing tradition wenshizhe bufenjia via a dictionary format. Han Shaogong characterizes his writings since the 1990s as inheriting the Chinese writing tradition of wenshizhe bufenjia 文史哲不分家 (non-separation of literature, history and philosophy). He seeks to revive the indigenous Chinese writing tradition that combines anecdotes, short stories, expository prose, philosophical essays to break down the established boundaries between fiction and non-fiction, theory and literature. In his own words, he wants “to expel abstract conceptual system out of our classroom and seek for a transformation of genre by writing literature into theory, writing theory into literature.”62 Many of his novels since the 1990s, such as Anshi 暗 示 (Intimations), Riyeshu 日夜书 (Book of Day and Night) and Xiugai guocheng 修改过程 (Revising Process), combine and recombine a variety of traditional and new fictional and non-fictional genres, ranging from classical Chinese poetry, modern Misty poetry to emails and social media posts. Han’s experimentation with various genres is not simply for the

61 See Zhang (2008, 582). 62 Han (2008a, 2).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

87

purpose of formalist innovation but to retrieve and increase the referential and argumentative value of novel to the increasingly reified intellectual discourse and knowledge production. In terms of content, Pavi´c’s Dictionary of the Khazars is focused on the religious controversy and contrastive religious perspectives of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, whereas Han’s A Dictionary of Maqiao thematizes the issue of language. However, this thematization does not mean that the novel seeks to formulate a logically consistent and universally viable philosophy of language, but to improve the intellectual debate and reenergize the argumentative space. To Han, Chinese intellectuals cannot have a productive debate without a wellinformed understanding of and an appropriate approach to their own languages. For Han Shaogong, intellectuals are often debating with each other under the illusion that they share “a common language” (modern standard Chinese) to which they have an equal and unproblematic access. This illusion leads them to wrongly assume that they already own a language with limitless referentiality and that they have the same understanding when the same words are in use. The titles of the 115 entries in the novel are composed of two types of words. One are Maqiao words that do not exist in modern standard Chinese. The other are words that are part of modern standard Chinese, but their meanings and usages are different from the official definitions. This particular composition of the diverse entries poses a holistic challenge to the hegemony of the modern standard Chinese and serves as a reminder to Chinese intellectual debaters that the language they use to describe and debate China’s national conditions and national perfection is limited in referentiality and their conflict may not be conflict of substantive ideas but conflict of different understandings of the same words. The meanings of each word are beyond the meanings given in a formally published dictionary but informed by particular personal experiences and local history and culture in which one inhabits. As is discussed in the previous section, Chinese liberals also seek to improve the intellectual debate and argumentative space. They resort to Habermasian “ideal speech communication” that presupposes a transparent common language. Han Shaogong pokes fun at Chinese liberals’ reconstruction of Habermasian “ideal speech communication” that blots out linguistic particularity and historicity:

88

G. GAO

Mr. Habermas is like an innocent baby, holding a comprehensive dictionary to talk with women about feminine pads or with guys about “sperms”—He won’t say something wrong, he may even gain something, but no matter how much tolerance he has prepared, language—the means which contains both public and non-public characteristics—could hardly lead to his goals of “rational democracy and constitutional government.63

For Han Shaogong, effective and productive political communication cannot depend on the officially sanctioned disengaged meanings in a dictionary but requires a contextualized understanding of the particular embodied meanings associated with the dialogue participants’ personal experiences, local culture and national history. Han Shaogong remains doubtful of the assumed “equivalence” not only between national language and foreign language but also the equivalence within the same national language in different regions and eras. However, Han’s doubt on the hypothetical linguistic equivalence does not mean his embrace of the poststructuralist linguistic incommensurability or the impossibility of truthful representation. His thematization of the linguistic and semantic differences within the modern standard Chinese is intended to facilitate more constructive dialogues and more meaningful communications. As he says in the Afterword to the novel: Strictly speaking, what we might term a “common language” will forever remain a distant human objective. Providing we do not intend exchange to become a process of mutual neutralization, of mutual attrition, then we must maintain vigilance and resistance toward exchange, preserving in this compromise our own, indomitable forms of expression—this is an essential precondition for any kind of benign exchange. This implies, then, that when people speak, everyone really needs their own, unique dictionary.64

Like practitioners of suspicious hermeneutics, Han Shaogong also emphasizes the importance of “vigilance” and “resistance.” However, they are not used to eliminate dialogue and communication but for “benign exchange.” For Han Shaogong, only with an acute consciousness of the linguistic, semantic and cultural differences underlying the “common

63 Han (2008a, 296). 64 Han (2005, 388).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

89

language” can we have a deep and sympathetic understanding of our own and others’ positions and prevent a reciprocal dialogue from devolving into a meaningless monologue. A Dictionary of Maqiao A Dictionary of Maqiao is intended to be a “dictionary” of Maqiao dialect. But unlike a regular dictionary arranged in order of alphabets or strokes, the 115 entries are designed in a loose chronological order and thematic unity. It begins with entries describing its geographical location and Maqiao’s early history in 700 B.C., and ends up with entries relating Maqiao people’s experiences and thoughts in postsocialist China. The 115 entries cover almost every aspect of Maqiao people’s daily lives, ranging from their speaking, eating, drinking, dreaming, playing, learning and love-making to Maqiao’s persons, animals, places, institutions, customs, habits and legends, which constitute a marginalized rural local lifeworld featuring a paradoxical coexistence of the mystical and the rational, the patriarchal and the feminist, the ethnocentric and the culturally sympathetic, the premodern and the modern. Several characters are scattered in different entries, but no one can be called a “protagonist.” The narrator, who is a young sent-down youth writer called Shaogong, often comes out to make comments and speculations on the meanings and implications of these entries. A close look shows that the narrator’s exegesis on the 115 entries covers all the major polemical topics about China’s transition to modernity, ranging from science, democracy, individualism, capitalism, socialism, gender, land and language reforms. It is these words and their meanings that constitute the background understanding which makes Maqiao people’s normative frame of reference possible. It is through this linguistic background to everyday life that ordinary Chinese persons inhabit and work through their transition to modernity. In this sense, A Dictionary of Maqiao is an ambitious work that not only takes on local but also global importance. What interests Han Shaogong here is not reversing the hierarchic oppositions between periphery and center, local and standard language, tradition and modernity but investigating the presuppositions and preconditions that make understanding and communication possible. The first five entries focus on the geographical and historical origins of Maqiao. Instead of reconstructing a unified Han-dominated Confucian tradition, these historical entries bring to surface Maqiao’s ethnic minority origin that is not written into the official history. From the local proper

90

G. GAO

name of Luo River, the narrator finds Maqiao’s inhabitation by the southwestern ethnic minority Luo people in the Spring and Autumn Period (approximately 771 to 476 BCE). From Maqiao people’s addressing of their males as manzi 蛮子 (savage), the narrator discovers the traces of the chauvinistic Chu state’s colonization and stigmatization of the Luo people. From Maqiao people’s inverted use of xing 醒 to characterize the exiled patriotic poet Qu Yuan’s loyalty to the corrupt Chu king as “stupid” and “ignorant,” the narrator shows an ethnic minority’s alternative perspective on the state politics of power: “looking at things from the opposite angle, the way in which Maqiao people understood and used the word “xing” entailed another viewpoint, entailed the dislike of their forefathers for the politics and foreign culture of a powerful state, entailed the necessary ambiguity between different positions.”65 When the narrator attempts to recuperate more history and knowledge about Luo people, he is disappointed to find no more linguistic clues related to Luo people. However, the narrator does not give up. He is able to retrieve the ethnic minority’s lost history not only from the presence of Maqiao words, but also to surmise reasons and make political critiques from the absence of words and things: I could only suppose that following a cruel wave of persecution, a reign of terror that eludes both our knowledge and imagination, this word Luo became taboo, and the Luo people simply had to change their surname, obliterate their own history, or flee to distant parts, as is related by certain historians: gathered in groups, eating and sleeping in the wilds, they departed for Xiangxi, Guizhou, Guangxi, Yunnan, and the towering mountain ranges and lofty ridges of Southeast Asia, never to return.66

Like many other Chinese literary writers and intellectuals, Han Shaogong is considered as “China-obsessed” for his concerted pursuit of China’s literary and intellectual rejuvenation.67 However, his “obsession with China” does not translate into a sinocentric narratorial subjectivity that constructs a homogenous and seemingly benevolent Han ethnocentric tradition. On the contrary, through exploring the presence and absence of the local words and languages of the marginalized rural area 65 Han (2005, 49). 66 Han (2005, 8). 67 See Leenhouts (2005, 24).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

91

within China, his narratorial subjectivity seeks to expose the central China empire’s brutal oppression and extermination of the ethnic minorities and demonstrate the latter’s diasporic history and poignant critique of blind patriotic loyalty to a repressive and decadent empire. Han Shaogong is “obsessed with China,” but the China he is obsessed with is not a culturally homogenizing and politically controlling empire, but a country who will recognize and respect its own multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic histories, realities and worldviews. The Maqiao linguistic background the narrator uncovers is not a logically coherent and transparent linguistic medium as liberal intellectuals assume, but a medium full of ambiguities, conflicts and changes. Many words (dachezi, nilaorenjia, daxuanjiang, heixianggong, weizihua molihua, molihua) demonstrate Maqiao people’s vague and ambiguous ways of speaking and thinking: It’s going to rain, it doesn’t look as if it will I’m full, I’m full, one more bowl and then I’ll be full I reckon the bus isn’t going to come, you’d best keep waiting This newspaper article is well-written, I cannot understand a single word He is an honest man, but he just doesn’t talk honestly Anyone who came to Maqiao had to get used to this kind of double-talk: ambiguous, vague slippery, vacillating, first this, then that. This rather unsettling way of talking was what Maqiao people called “jasmine-not-jasmine.68

This is not to say that the novel argues for the replacement of linguistic clarity and logicality with ambiguity and contradiction, but merely insists that the identity law of formal logic cannot do full justice to the complexity and agency in Maqiao people’s everyday use of language: They cannot explain simple things clearly and precisely. They have to slip into an ever more ambiguous ‘jasmine-not-jasmine’ way of talking. This can only prove that Maqiao people are unable, or unwilling, to accept a fact this simple. Perhaps they feel that outside every factual link lie yet more facts beyond explanation and clarification; thrown into confusion, crushed

68 Han (2005, 352).

92

G. GAO

and scattered by all these blurred facts, their own remarks can only lapse into irrelevant nonsequitur.69

As the quotation shows, what Maqiao people’s ambiguous and contradictory ways of thinking and speaking unveil is not only a local linguistic feature or a particular concept of language but the ambiguous and conflicted linguistic background which underlies Maqiao people’s lifeworld. Han Shaogong’s investigation of this local social imaginary is not pursued through an external sociological perspective nor a local person’s “purely” internal angle, but shifting between third-person narration that looks at the holistic semantic structure and first-person renderings of the participants’ own language. Unlike the “pure description” of the New Left intellectual Wang Hui’s historical linguistics which never reveals his own horizon, Han Shaogong, via the first-person perspective of a young writer sent down to the countryside for intellectual reeducation during the Cultural Revolution, thematizes the evaluative framework from which he describes, interprets and evaluates the Maqiao world. The narrator is brought up with Marxist ideologies and revolutionary vocabularies. But unlike previous enlightened characters in modern Chinese novels who aim to remold traditional rural society and take local rural languages only as convenient tools to disseminate ready-made Marxist doctrines, the narrator does not sit above, but rather enters into the Maqiao world and engages rigorously with its words, concepts and customs beyond the realm of dictionary definition and historical linguistics. This subject of engagement is not standing ten miles up to look at Maqiao, nor totally assimilated into Maqiao’s internal perspective, but (re)positioning himself as a mediator to make the Maqiao and outside world intelligible to each other. The entry “zhuang hong ” 撞红 (striking red) shows Maqiao people’s fear of taking a virgin bride to wedding bed, which strikes the narrator as ridiculous at first sight. However, this fear begins to make sense to him when a folklorist comes to tell him that in the underdeveloped society, what matters is not female virginity but fertility and productivity.70 Nevertheless, many other entries are not understood by recourse to scientific

69 Han (2005, 353). 70 Han (2005, 54–55).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

93

or sociological explanation but to the narrator’s lived personal experience and embodied exploration under particular existential context. As the narrator realizes that “the process behind understanding a word is not just an intellectual process, it’s also a process of perception, inseparable from the surroundings in which the word is used and the actual events, environment, facts relating to it.”71 For instance, there is a word “qu”渠 (this him) in Maqiao dialect which is different from “ta”他 (that him). The difference is that “ta” refers to someone faraway, meaning “that him over there”; qu is people you can see, nearby people, meaning “this him over here.”72 There is no corresponding word in classical or modern Chinese or in any foreign languages. At the very beginning, this semantic distinction Maqiao people make between “this him” and “that him” strikes the narrator as “ludicrous” and “unnecessary.”73 However, long after leaving Maqiao, the narrator returns to see his friend Yan Zao, a local peasant, and discovers the huge difference between this Yan Zao in front of him and that Yan Zao in his distant memory. At that evening, he is acutely aware of “the difference between qu and ta, between near and far, between fact and description, between fact at a distance and actual fact itself,” coming to the conclusion that the distinction Maqiao people make is very “wise.”74 Dianding 碘酊 is a literal translation of “tincture of iodine” (20). Since it was translated into modern standard Chinese, it is seldom used in daily conversation, for it sounds too formal and exotic. What is used in its place are more colloquial renderings of dianjiu 碘酒 or hongyaoshui 红药水. However, the narrator is surprised to find that the exotic and academic literal translation is widely used in Maqiao dialect, a language that is considered as more backward, informal and vulgar than modern standard Chinese. The narrator’s curiosity drives him to explore the origin of this exotic word. With the clues provided by the village head, the narrator finds that dianding is introduced to Maqiao by a mysterious immigrant Long Stick Xi.75 He brought some new words and modern

71 Han (2005) 46. 72 Han (2005, 159). 73 Han (2005) 159. 74 Han (2005, 152). This “wise” 明智 (mingzhi) is not translated by the English translator Lovell. For the Chinese version of the novel, see Han (2008b, 146). 75 Han (2005, 21).

94

G. GAO

objects such as Western medicine, cloth and lighter to Maqiao in the 1930s. At the very beginning, Maqiao people find him a very eccentric and exotic figure for his strange appearance and eating habit. However, his unexpected success in using foreign modern medicine to heal illness and treat dystocia establishes his reputation and leads Maqiao people to accept and use the new modern words and things he imports into Maqiao. The narrator’s first-person ethnographical investigation shows that modern Chinese language is not only spread through a single channel of formal education and literary writing as promoted by political authorities and intellectual elites. It is also disseminated across China through many informal channels and marginal figures. Moreover, the arrival of modern Chinese language and loanwords into local and rural communities does not merely result in the elimination of linguistic diversity as Wang Hui’s external historical perspective shows, it also enriches the local vocabularies and adds a modern scientific dimension to the local way of speaking and living without subjugating the local mysteriousness to modern science. Instead, the former and the latter co-exist with each other. As the narrator gradually gets familiar with Maqiao’s words, he learns to look at things and persons from Maqiao’s internal perspective. Most characters’ thoughts and words are mostly presented in the form of direct or indirect speech. However, sometimes it switches to free indirect speech which merges insider’s and outsider’s perspectives. Yancha 颜茶 (colored tea) in Maqiao vocabulary refers to tea without spices, the lowest grade of tea. By contrast, leicha 擂茶 (pounded tea) is an elaborately-cooked tea Maqiao people like to drink. Benyi, Maqiao’s local official, cannot understand why city people insist on drinking “colored tea” instead of “pounded tea.” What merits our attention here is the use of free indirect speech in presenting Benyi’s thought: Benyi could never understand why it was that city people, who weren’t short of cash, insisted on drinking colored tea, tea with no spices in it, the lowest grade of tea. Colored tea wasn’t freshly boiled, it was usually heated up in a big pan and stored in a big pot, one batch lasting two or three days, its only function being to quench thirst.76

76 Han (2005, 173).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

95

Benyi’s conclusion continues to be presented in free indirect speech, but in a new one-sentence paragraph: “How could you fail to laugh at, or pity city people who drank only this and not pound tea?”77 This special paragraphing reinforces the impression that the contempt for “colored tea” is not only Benyi’s, but also the narrator’s. City often stands for civilization, progress and good manners while countryside for barbarity, backwardness and rudeness. As a young writer from the city, the narrator here does not look at the countryside from an external city-dweller’s point of view, but from the local peasants’ perspective which changes his understanding of the city-countryside relationship. The use of free indirect speech serves to remove the distance between outside narrator and inside characters, creating an effect of approaching and emphatic identification with the Maqiao world. However, while learning from the Maqiao words to address the referential limits of the modern standard Chinese and illuminate the perspectives obscured by the modern standard Chinese, the narrator also brings to surface the limits of Maqiao words and the problems with Maqiao values in light of modern standard Chinese and modern social science. The narrator finds Maqiao people have only one umbrella word tian 甜 (sweet) to describe anything that tastes good and only tang 糖 (candy) to name all sweet foods. Maqiao people do not have the rich food vocabulary in modern standard Chinese, which exposes the blind spots in their knowledge and experience of food and taste. However, the narrator does not take a sophisticated urban youth’s position to ridicule Maqiao people’s ignorance of refined foods and tastes. He emphasizes that “I cannot joke about them.”78 Because he learned a sympathetic understanding from his living experience in Maqiao that it is impossible for Maqiao people, who have been living below or just at the subsistence level, to make and enjoy a variety of refined foods and flavors that only the privileged urban residents have. Instead of laughing at Maqiao people’s incompetence to make subtle differentiations in the gustatory domain, the narrator chooses to employ it as a point of entry to reflect upon the similar epistemological flaw of bringing different categories under an umbrella category in Chinese intellectual discourse and Western political discourse. The narrator points out that Chinese intellectuals

77 Ibid. 78 Han (2005, 18).

96

G. GAO

are preoccupied with the dichotomies of China versus West, socialism and capitalism, but unable to find and analyze the national and cultural differences within the West. Western politicians are supportive of anticommunist Chinese intellectuals but unable to distinguish the authentic Chinese “anti-communist” dissidents from the scammers who pretend to be “anti-communist” to earn foreign residential rights. The narrator does not idealize either of the local and the national, Chinese and foreign languages, but engage them in a dialogue for mutual learning and mutual illumination of each other’s referential and cognitive limits. Maqiao people call all places outside Maqiao ranging from the nearby counties to America as “barbarian parts.”79 At the beginning of the entry “barbarian parts,” the narrator starts with a critique of Maqiao people’s local self-centeredness and then attributes it to premodern China’s sinocentrism and extends the local critique to a critique of China’s national self-importance and self-centeredness. After that, the narrator resorts to cultural anthropologists and historians who help him recognize the ignored Babylonian influence on the formation of ancient Chinese calendar and culture, and bring to light the ignored pre-Qin School of Logicians’ challenge to the widely held belief that China was the center of the world during the Warring States period. This entry shows that the critique of sinocentrism and ethno-political nationalism does not need to depend only upon the external anti-mimetic poststructuralist perspective. Empirical studies and local intellectuals also provide resources for such a critique. More often than not, Maqiao words break the stability of semantic structure into which the narrator finds himself. As he is constantly challenged by Maqiao’s words and world, he has to reposition himself through a new way of talking and being in the world. What his interpretive repositioning involves is not just a change of perspective but also a transformation of identity and self-understanding. The penultimate entry baihua serves as a good case in point to illustrate the narrator’s flexible engagement with Maqiao language. The narrator starts his exegesis on the word with an external third-person perspective as a dictionary compiler does:

79 Han (2005, 173).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

97

In Chinese, the word baihua has three meanings: (Modern Chinese) vernacular (as opposed to the classical, literary language). Unimportant, nonserious, unverifiable chatter, spoken only for idle amusement In Maqiao language, “bai” is also read “pa,” which is a homophone of the word meaning “scary,” so “empty talk” is also “scary talk,” often meaning stories of ghosts or crimes told for the titillation and enjoyment of listeners.80

Baihua, the language upon which modern Chinese literature depends, has been invested with a noble redemptive function to save the nation and enlighten its people. Though many May Fourth intellectuals attacked Confucian values and beliefs, their conception of language and literature still conforms to the dominant Confucian dictum of wenyizaidao (writing conveys moral and political messages). Maqiao people’s vulgarized and enchanted conception of baihua poses a challenge to the narrator’s elevated and politicized conception of baihua, leaving himself to figure out how to make sense of the latter. First, the narrator sets up a historical and comparative framework to understand Maqiao’s baihua. He turns to Sichuan longmenzhen 龙门阵, another similar, but more known local tradition of chatting “for passing the time which mostly on evenings or on rainy days—its roots lie in sources of vulgar diversion, in the records of the fantastic and bizarre, even in tales of horror.”81 Then, he brings out non-Confucian Chinese philosophy and literary works such as Zhuangzi 庄子, Tales of the Supernatural 搜神记 and Tales of Liaozhai 聊斋志异, all of which are close to Maqiao people’s conception of baihua as “spoken on the streets, in the alleys” and understanding of “fiction” as “trivial and superficial blather.”82 The narrator observes: Here there was no possible recourse to Confucian statesmanship, no saintly purification of mind and desire. The difference between baihua and the classical language was that the former has never been seen as a high, noble language, has never had the capacity to induce or depict states of spiritual extremity.83

80 Han (2005, 378). 81 Han (2005, 379). 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.

98

G. GAO

The narrator discovers the underlying historical continuity covered up by dominant Confucianism and modern intellectual convention. Then, the narrator moves back to talk about Maqiao’s conception of baihua. Returning with a historical and comparative reasoning framework, he realizes that baihua’s transformation by Western languages in the modern era “have made no difference to the prejudiced judgments made against it by the majority view—in the dictionary used by Maqiao people until the 1990s at the very least.”84 The dictionary classification of baihua introduced at the beginning of this entry is eliminated. What the narrator recognizes is not only Maqiao people’s notion of baihua, but also their perception of language in general. To them, clearly-expressed and logically-defined meanings of words are not sufficient: “as they saw it, true knowledge seemed to require another kind of expressive language, one that was mysterious, unfathomable, that lay beyond their powers of expression.”85 What is more interesting is that for the narrator, the process of coming to this understanding is not only an external interpretive act but also an internal transformative event which forces him to evoke his own memory and alter the understanding of his own identity as a novelist: The unfortunate fact of the matter is that my attempts at fiction and the most important linguistic memories of my youth were succored first of all by their baihua-filled evenings and rainy days, as we curled up in groups of threes and fours in preparation for the contented exchange of nonsense and tall stories…. Despite my love for fiction as a genre, fiction is, in the end, fiction—nothing more. We shouldn’t overstate the influence of fiction….I’ve written a fair amount of fiction, as I’ve idled away my time as a writer over the last ten years, but essentially I’ve no more than what anybody from Maqiao would have.86

What I want to emphasize here is not that the depoliticized and nonnationalistic conception of literature constitutes an implied critique of the mainstream notion of the novel as a redemptive genre, but that the novel shows the articulation of historical language of everyday life could not just be a disengaged third-person interpretation, but also a transformative 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Han (2005, 380).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

99

reading process which reworks the fabric of interpreter’s own memory and identity. In the second half of this story, the narrator is no longer the one who he was. His identity is transformed from an observer standing outside Maqiao to a character inside Maqiao working together with Fucha, a fictional local peasant. When taking a rest during their hole-digging work, they exchange their jokes and tall tales. The narrator is no longer a realist writer who sits above the “ignorant” peasants and produces novels to enlighten them into the modern era. As the narrator says “my volumes of fiction amount exactly to what Fucha was doing just that moment when he measured how deep we’d dug today.”87 This entry concludes with Fucha’s and the narrator’s disappointment with the fact that the hole they keep digging does not lead up to a new place as they expect. This conclusion seems to suggest that the novel alone cannot bring about an ideal new society and its role should not be exaggerated. However, this does not mean that the narrator has already understood and totally merged with the Maqiao world. In the last entry, guanlu 官路 (official road to Maqiao), the narrator suggests at the beginning that guanlu is not only a physical route to Maqiao in reality, but also “a word” in the narrator’s “manuscript paper” to be interpreted and understood.88 The narrator recalls his first trip to Maqiao via guan lu. When asking Fucha why it is called Maqiao, the narrator gets the answer “I don’t know,” which gives him a final psychological twist as the conclusion of the novel: “My heart sank, as I took one step after another into the unknown.”89 Guanlu to Maqiao is symbolic of the route of understanding, interpreting and approaching Maqiao. This ending suggests that such an interpretive process is an open-ended and inconclusive process for both insiders and outsiders of Maqiao.

From Words to Things As is discussed in the previous section, contemporary Chinese intellectuals, under the influence of the Western “linguistic turn” in humanities and social sciences, have attached great importance to the issue of

87 Han (2005, 381). 88 Han (2005, 383). 89 Han (2005, 384).

100

G. GAO

language and discourse in their shared pursuit of China’s modernity and national perfection. Liberal intellectuals seek to reform modern standard Chinese putonghua into a more transparent, more logical and more universal language that is more instrumental to the development of modern science, liberal democracy and rational debate. The New Left are committed to exploring the unique features of classical Chinese and the particular replacement of the writing-based classical Chinese by another writing-based modern standard Chinese, a linguistic history that is different from the replacement of writing-based Medieval Latin by different speech-based national languages in Europe. They appropriate the particularities of Chinese national language and linguistic and conceptual history as intellectual resources and rationales to serve their pursuit of China’s alternative cultural and social modernity. However, despite their different positions on the language issues and the related political and cultural agendas, both liberal and the New Left intellectuals do not follow Western structuralist and poststructuralist linguistics in treating language as an independent system out of human control or exaggerating indeterminacy of language. Most (if not all) of them refuse to embrace a linguistic determinism that reduces all problematics to the issues of language. Instead, they insist on the existence of nonhuman things and their own human agency to represent and research these nonhuman things through modern Chinese language. However, both liberal and the New Left intellectuals take an anthropocentric approach that treats nonhuman things and entities as passive objects for either scientist or historicist investigation. What are missing from their intellectualistic accounts are the independent agency and multifarious functions of nonhuman things and entities. The entry fenggui 枫鬼 (Maple Demon) in A Dictionary of Maqiao can be understood as a remedy to the intellectual anthropocentrism. This entry starts with a long narratorial remark on the inadequacies of the traditional plot-driven and character-centered novels and then switches to tracing the history and nonhuman agency of two hightowering maple trees in Maqiao. So far critics focus only on the beginning narratorial remark, interpreting it as a manifesto for a new type of novel that “opposes the classical well-knit plot characterized by a single, predominant plotline and proposes a network structure with multiple

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

101

causalities.”90 The existing scholarship’s neglect of the rest of the entry leads to the neglect of the larger point of the entry. It is not simply an argument for a new novelistic narratology but also an argument for a new type of Latourian sociology of Actor-Network-Theory that expands the concept of agency from human intentionality and social structural forces to specific inanimate things and objects. Bruno Latour criticizes the conventional sociology for reducing the social to a fixed set of predetermined laws, functions and structures and ignoring various other specific “actors” that can make a difference to the state of affairs, in particular, “nonhuman actors.” To give more nuanced and fine-grained sociological description and explanation, Latour calls for tracing how the different human and nonhuman actors are associating, interacting and reassembling with each other in an extended constellation of cause and effect instead of attributing everything to a pre-established scheme or a Foucaultian episteme.91 Latour’s ANT can help illuminate the narrator’s “writing the biography of two (maple) trees” in the rest of the entry. The narrator does not treat the two maple trees as two passive inanimate objects waiting for botanical classification and explanation, but endows them with a nonhuman agency that produces various soothing and ailing, magic and pragmatic effects on Maqiao people: They offer “cool shade” for Maqiao kids, “induce bizarre and terrified imaginings” for the drunkards, “provide company for the lonely,” “ward off evil….and misforture,” serve as a “landmark” for cartography that unexpectedly attracts Japanese bombers that kill four Maqiao people.92 Finally, the two maple trees are cut down “under the commune orders to make rows of seats for the newly built commune assembly hall and also dispel the superstitions surrounding the Maple Demons,” which mystically causes numerous villagers to suffer from a strange kind of skin irritation.93 These two trees in the fiction are not mere symbols of Maqiao people’s moral traits nor symptoms of commodity fetish in the Marxist sense. Instead, they are invested with a certain independence and agency that make a difference to the history and the current life of Maqiao people. As the narrator realizes that “a tree

90 See Choy (2008, 33). 91 For a detailed introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, see Latour (2005, 1–20). 92 Han (2005, 72–73). 93 Han (2005, 76).

102

G. GAO

lack human will and freedom, but in life’s complex network of cause and effect it can often occupy a position of quiet importance.”94 The narrator’s “biography of two trees” is not irrelevant digression but crucial to a nuanced and sophisticated portrayal of the complicated Maqiao world in which human and nonhuman actors are acting together and cannot be reduced to any anthropocentric causal explanation. In the novel A Dictionary of Maqiao, Han creates a historical and dialogical textual subject who does not declare to be a “pure descriptor” detached from any evaluative frameworks, but an embedded interpreter who articulates and works through China’s diverse linguistic backgrounds. Such a self-articulation is not only a never-ceasing interpretive act but also a transformative event which broadens the articulator’s horizon and reworks his identity and memory. Han Shaogong has not offered us a definite answer to the question of which language is the best language to describe, debate and develop China’s national condition and national perfection. What we can learn from A Dictionary of Maqiao is that contemporary China cannot be fully described and debated using any existing languages. China’s public reasoning and nation building can be achieved only through cultivating a keen awareness of the linguistic and cultural differences within China, employing the differences to question the naturalness and coherence of one’s own positions and worldviews, fostering self-correcting dialogues and communications between local languages and national language, researchers of language and the users of language. Moreover, inquiry into human language needs to be complemented by inquiry into nonhuman things and nonhuman agency.

References Cai, Rong. “The Subject in Crisis: Han Shaogong’s Cripple (s).” The Journal of Contemporary China 3.5 (1994): 64–77. Choy, Howard Y.F. Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China, 1979–1997. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Davies, Gloria. Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007a. Davies, Gloria. “Habermas in China: Theory as Catalyst.” The China Journal 57 (2007b): 61–85.

94 Han (2005, 75).

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

103

Davies, Gloria. Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2009. Fang Weigui 方维规. “Yige youbei shishi de shengzao yanzhi fuhao” 一个有悖史 实 的生造衍指符号 (A Fabricated Super Sign that Runs Counter to Historical Fact). Wenyi yanju 文艺研究 (Literature & Art Studies) 2 (2013): 138–145. Feuerwerker, Yi-tsi Mei. “The Post-Modern ‘Search for Roots’ in Han Shaogong, Mo Yan, and Wang Anyi.” Ideology, Power, Text: Self-Representation and the Peasant “Other” in Modern Chinese Literature. Ed. Feuerwerker. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998, 188–238. Gan Yang 甘阳. Foreword. Renlun人论 (An Essay on Man). By Ernst Cassirer. Trans. Gan Yang. Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe, 1985. Gunn, Edward. Rendering the Regional: Local Language in Contemporary Chinese Media. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i P, 2006. Han Shaogong. A Dictionary of Maqiao. Trans. Julia Lovell. New York: Dial Press, 2005. ———. Anshi 暗示 (Intimations). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2008a. ———. Maqiao cidian 马桥词典 (A Dictionary of Maqiao). Beijing: Renminwenxue chubanshe, 2008b. ———. “Wo yu tianya”我与天涯 (Tianya and Me). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖 述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008c. ———. “Wenxue de gen” 文学的根 (The Root of Literature). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao韩少功研究资料(Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008d. ———, and Wang Yao 韩少功 王尧. Han Shaogong Wang Yao duihualu 韩少功 王尧对话录 (A Dialogue Between Han Shaogong and Wang Yao). Suzhou: Suzhou daxue chubanshe, 2003. Han Yuhai 韩毓海. “Xinwenxue de hongguan shijiao: Lun zhongguo xinwenxue de sanci yuyan geming” 新文学的宏观视角: 论中国新文学的三次语言革命 (New Literature’s Macro Perspective: Three Linguistic Revolutions in Chinese New Literature). Dangdai zuojia pinglun 当代作家评论 (Review on Contemporary Writers) 12.2 (1991): 22–32. Kaske, Elisabeth. Politics of Language in Chinese Education, 1895–1919. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Klöter, Henning and Mårten Söderblom Saarela, eds. Language Diversity in the Sinophone World: Historical Trajectories, Language Planning, and Multilingual Practices. London: Routledge, 2020. Kuang Xinian 旷新年. Xiaoshuo de jingshen 小说的精神 (The Spirit of Novel). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008.

104

G. GAO

Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Leenhouts, Mark. Leaving the World to Enter the World: Han Shaogong and Chinese Root-Seeking Literature. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005. Lin, Qingxin. Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999). Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2005. McDonald, Edward. Learning Chinese, Turning Chinese: Challenges to Becoming Sinophone in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2011. Qian Yongxiang 钱永祥. “Xiandaixing yeyi haojin le pipan yiyi ma” 现代性业 已耗尽了批判意义吗 (Is the Potential of Modernity Exhausted). Houfazhan guoji de xiandaixing wenti 后发展国家的现代性问题 (Modernity Issue in Developing Countries). Ed. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2000. Qin Hui秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). Wenti yu zhuyi: Qin Hui wenxuan 问题与主 义: 秦晖文选 (Question and Ism: Selected Works of Qin Hui). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999. ———. “Kaiqi xirurongrui de xinlu (shang)” 开启西儒汇融的新路(上) (Opening a New Path for the Fusion of Western Theories and Confucianism: Part 1). Zhanlue yu guanli战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30.4 (2002): 104– 118. Qu Wanwen 瞿宛文. “Quanqiuhua he houjin guojia zhi jingji fazhan” 全球化 与后进国家之经济发展 (Globalization and Economic Development in Backward Countries). Houfazhan guoji de xiandaixing wenti 后发展国家的现代性 问题 (Modernity Issue in Developing Countries). Ed. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2000. Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. Shen Songqiao 沈松侨. Xuehengpai yu wusishiqi de fanxinwenhua yundong 学 衡派与五四时期的反新文化运动 (Xue Heng School and Anti- New Culture Movement in May Fourth Era). Taipai: Guoli taiwandaxue chubanshe, 1984. Thakkar, Sonali. Rev. of Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as a Postcolonial Experience, by Rey Chow. Critical Inquiry Summer (2017): 912–913. Tong Qingsheng 童庆生. Hanyu de yiyi: yuwenxue, shijie wenxue he xifang hanyuguan 汉语的意义: 语文学, 世界文学和西方汉语观 (The Significance of Chinese Mandarin: Philology, World Literature and Western Views on Chinese Mandarin). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2019a. Tong Qingsheng 童庆生. “Tong Qingsheng tan xifang hanyu guan” 童庆生 谈西方汉语观 (Tong Qingsheng on Western Views on Chinese Language). Pengpai xinwen 澎湃新闻 (The Paper) 7 July. 2019b. https://www.thepaper. cn/newsDetail_forward_3743968. Accessed 10 February 2021.

3

HAN SHAOGONG: REVEALING AND REVISING …

105

Veg, Sebastian. “Utopian Fiction and Critical Examination: The Cultural Revolution in Wang Xiaobo’s The Golden Age.” China Perspective 4 (2007): 75–87. Wang Dingding 汪丁丁. “Qimeng sile, qimeng wansui—Ping Wang Hui guanyu zhongguo wenti de xushuo” 启蒙死了, 启蒙万岁—评汪晖关于中国问题的 叙说 (Enlightenment Dies, Enlightenment Survives—Wang Hui’s Narrative about China Problem). Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Wang Hui 汪晖. Wanghui zixuanji 汪晖自选集 (Self-Selected Works of Wang Hui). Guiling: Guangxi shifandaxue chubanshe, 1997. Wang Hui 汪晖. Quzhengzhi de zhengzhi: Duan ershi shiji de zhongjie he jiushi niandai 去政治的政治: 短二十世纪的终结与90年代 (The Politics of Depoliticization: The End of Short Twentieth Century and the 1990s). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2008. Wu Yiqin 吴义勤, ed. Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Jinan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe, 2006. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. “Cong teshu zuoxiang pubian” 从特殊走向普遍 (From the Specific to the Universal). Gonggongxing yu gonggong zhishifenzi 公共性与公 共知识分子 (Publicity and Public Intellectuals). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2003a. ———. Zhishifenzi shilun知识分子十论 (Ten Essays on Intellectuals). Shanghai: Fudan Daxue chubanshe, 2003b. Xu Youyu 徐友渔. Gebainishi de gemming: Zhexue zhong de yuyanxue zhuanxiang 哥白尼式的革命: 哲学中的语言学转向 (Copernican Revolution: Linguistic Turn in Philosophy). Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1994. ———. “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo” 自由主义与当代中国 (Liberalism and Contemporary China). Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2002. Yu Jie 余杰. Pintie de yinxiang pibei de zhongnian 拼贴的印象 疲惫的中年 (Collage Impression and Exhausted Middle-Age). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. Zhang Yiwu 张颐武. “Ershi shiji hanyu wenxue de yuyan wenti” 二十世纪汉语文 学的语言问题 (Language Issue in 20th Century Chinese Literature). Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30: 5 (2002): 86–102.

106

G. GAO

Zhang Yiwu 张颐武.“ Jingshen de kuifa” 精神的匮乏 (Lack of Spirit). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. Zheng Min 郑敏. “Shiji mo de huigu: hanyu yuyan biange yu zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo” 世纪末的回顾: 汉语语言变革与中国新诗创作 (Retrospect at the Centurial End: Chinese Linguistic Change and Chinese New Poetry Creation). Zhishifenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou de dongdang 知识分子立场: 激进与保守的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤. Shuzhai li de geming 书斋里的革命: 朱学勤文选 (Revolution in the Study: Selected Works of Zhu Xueqin). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999.

CHAPTER 4

Wang Xiaobo: Work Through Power, Discourse and Subject Formation

Introduction In 1997, the Chinese public intellectual journal Frontier (Tianya) published “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity” by the leading New Left intellectual Wang Hui. In this controversial article, Wang makes a harsh critique of burgeoning Chinese liberalism and global capitalism. The article triggered harsh counter-attacks from liberals and initiated a vigorous and vituperative debate between liberals and the New Left, a debate that became one of the most important intellectual events in the 1990s.1 It was within such a highly charged and divisive intellectual atmosphere that Wang Xiaobo’s life and works emerged from obscurity and began to receive wide public and intellectual attention. Unlike many other contemporary novelists, Wang Xiaobo’s initial fame did not come from the professional literary circle but from the public intellectual circle. From this debate, we can see that intellectuals and scholars from different disciplines and factions use Wang Xiaobo’s works and life experience to support their favored positions, principles and theories.2 1 The important debating articles are collected in Li Shitao’s edited volume, see Li (2000a, b, c). For an English introduction to the 1990s Chinese intellectual debate and landscape, see Liu (2001, 47–70), and Wang (2005, 9–46). 2 The first collection of critical articles on Wang Xiaobo was published in 1998 under the title Bu zai chenmo: Renwen xuezhe lun Wang Xiaobo 不再沉默: 人文学者论王小

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_4

107

108

G. GAO

Liberals enthusiastically extol Wang Xiaobo’s works as exemplifying liberal and humanistic values (such as rationality, empiricism, individualism, critical thinking, negative freedom) and contributing to liberalism’s re-entrance into public and intellectual discourse.3 Within this liberal interpretative paradigm, Wang’s value for intellectual debate and discourse consists mostly in concretizing and popularizing abstract liberal values and principles, which are generally unfamiliar to the public. The New Left intellectuals and postmodern literary critics challenge this liberal interpretive model, arguing that Wang’s understanding of liberty and humanity is much more sophisticated than liberals assume. They contend that Wang’s works do not illustrate but deconstruct liberals’ essentialist understanding of humanistic values and demonstrate a postmodern valorization of the mundane and the sensual.4 Despite their differences and disagreements, liberals, the New Left and postmodernists tend to treat Wang Xiaobo’s works as illustrations of their own ideas and theories. As a result, instead of enriching intellectual debate and discourse, these intellectuals’ interpretations of Wang’s works serve only to harden the intellectual divides. To redress this interpretive shortcoming, Wendy Larson focuses on uncovering how Wang’s works could benefit intellectual debate instead of taking them as mere examples of preexisting intellectual ideas and ideological positions. Larson’s analysis of Wang Xiaobo’s most acclaimed novella, The Golden Age, concludes that Wang’s contributions are neither his anti-authoritarianism nor his postmodern deconstruction of humanistic ideals and liberal values but rather his creation of “an alternative to violent revolutionary time, an alternative that evokes an all-encompassing intellectual aestheticism.”5 However, considering the two protagonists’ voluntary return from the mountains to the Maoist production team, Sebastian Veg refutes Larson’s argument and rightly points out that what Wang Xiaobo configures is not a transhistorical and transpolitical “intellectual aestheticism” or “any forms of utopia” but “an active engagement 波 (Not Silent Any More: Humanities Scholars on Wang Xiaobo). Most articles in this collection are not written by literary scholars but by economists, historians, philosophers, sociologists and columnists, see Wang (1998). For a comprehensive bibliography of Wang Xiaobo, see Han (2009, 789–834). 3 Qin (2009, 329), Xu (2009, 574), Wang (2009, 611) and Zhu (1999, 387). 4 Dai (2009, 297), and Zhang (2009, 729). 5 Larson (2003, 37).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

109

with the world and... a shaping role in history.”6 While Veg notes that the human agency reconstructed in Wang’s works can counter intellectuals’ growing sense of self-victimization and self-isolation in the post-Mao era, he does not elaborate on the discursive and dialogical ways Wang Xiaobo configures a positive subject position and how it could benefit Chinese intellectual debate and discourse in a highly polemical atmosphere. By placing Wang Xiaobo’s fiction and essays within the 1990s Chinese intellectual context, this chapter attempts to offer a better articulation of Wang Xiaobo’s contributions to the debate over key issues of power, discourse and subject formation. I argue that Wang’s works do not merely illustrate and popularize preexisting liberal, the New Left or postmodern ideas but enrich ways of talking about power, discourse and subjectivity. I draw on Foucault’s theories of discourse to probe Wang’s intellectual contributions. My interpretation shows that Wang Xiaobo’s focus on everyday interpretive agency and discursive practices can supplement intellectuals’ state-centered and top-down approach to power and discourse. In addition, although he read Foucault and his writings are informed by Foucault’s ideas on power and discourse, Wang Xiaobo constructs a more positive and dialogical subject position that is able to evoke and work through modern power relations by bringing past and present, stories of oppression and stories of agency, experiencing first-person perspective and detached third-person perspective into a productive tension and conversation with each other. Wang Xiaobo’s linguistically and dialogically mediated construction of human subjectivity can deepen our reflection on ways of pursuing liberty, identity and meaning under a crushingly authoritarian rule.

Wang Xiaobo and Intellectual Debate in the 1990s While identifying himself primarily as a novelist devoted to exploring the beauty of fiction, Wang Xiaobo never abandoned his social responsibilities as a critical intellectual. He emphasizes, “I write novels, but I am an intellectual.”7 To him, being an intellectual means criticizing unreasonable realities, debunking popular misconceptions and improving the public good. Wang’s writing is not merely motivated by his pursuit of

6 Veg (2007, 86). 7 Wang (2009d, 37).

110

G. GAO

new literary forms but accompanied by a sense of social critique and an active intervention into intellectual discourse. To fully understand Wang’s literary works, we need to first examine Chinese sociopolitical and intellectual contexts of the 1990s. As its market reform accelerated in the 1990s, China’s economy developed rapidly. Meanwhile, disparities in wealth increased and political corruption and environmental pollution became increasingly serious. Intellectuals began to heatedly debate the causes of and solutions to China’s problems in the hope of facilitating its transition to modernity. The intellectual circle, which was relatively united in the 1980s in opposing totalitarian Maoism, split into three major camps in the 1990s: liberals, the New Left and New Confucians. The New Left contend that China has entered a new historical era in which the fundamental cause for its crisis is no longer the oppressive state but exploitive global capitalism. To solve this problem, they argue, China needs to reform and reinforce state power to resist global capitalism and pursue an alternative modernity that is superior to the Western model.8 Meanwhile, liberals cite empirical studies to refute the New Left’s arguments, highlighting the fact that China is still under the communist party state’s tight control.9 Liberals lay blame for China’s problems not with market per se, but the market distorted and manipulated by unchecked state power. Liberal historian Zhu Xueqin characterizes China in the 1990s as facing “a new situation, but still an old problem.”10 To liberals, Chinese intellectuals’ political and social critiques should be directed at oppressive state power. Unlike the New Left and liberals, contemporary New Confucians locate the source of China’s crisis not in global capitalism nor in repressive authoritarianism but in the loss and misuse of Confucian tradition. Chinese New Confucians criticize oversea Confucian scholars for their complicity with capitalism and their narrow focus

8 For details of the New Left’ arguments, see Wang Hui’s influential essay “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity.” Wang (2000b, 83–123). 9 For instance, the leading liberal intellectual Xu Youyu draws attention to the partystate’s predominant role in controlling China’s economy and criticizes the New Left’ assertion of China’s full integration into global capitalism. To support his claim, Xu cites the economic statistics in 1995, showing that Chinese government’s investment still constituted 52.5% of the total investment and foreign investment made up only 7.8%. See Xu (2000). 10 Zhu (1999, 419).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

111

on xinxing ruxue 心性儒学 (spiritual Confucianism), the cultivation of individual spiritual virtues that ignores political commitments and public issues. To revive Confucianism and push China toward an alternative future, New Confucians are committed to reorienting Confucianism from this “spiritual” dimension toward what they call zhengzhi ruxue 政治儒 学(political Confucianism), which is focused on rebuilding the Chinese political system according to Confucian values and principles.11 Despite their conflicting political viewpoints, the analyses of all three factions’ polemics are centered on state power. Their central bone of contention is whether China’s state power should be reduced or reinforced.12 Whereas the intellectual scene in the 1980s was concerned with issues of culture and aesthetic, intellectual debate and discourse in the 1990s were more concerned with power and politics. With very few exceptions, a variety of Chinese intellectuals shared a state-centered approach to power. Foucault talks about the shortcomings of such a state-centered approach: I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power and, hence, the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. This is true in two senses: first of all, because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth.13

To Foucault, a narrow focus on state power leads to a reductive account of complex modern power relations and operations. Therefore, Foucault calls for shifting our attention from “macro-politics to “micro-politics”— that is, from government, legislatures and courts to power relations and their effects infiltrated into various sites and aspects of everyday life (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, 11 For an introduction to contemporary New Confucianism in mainland China, see Bell (2013, 1–26). 12 The China model debate since the early 2000s is also centered on the role of state as an organizing force to lead China’s modernization. For a review of this debate, see Zhao (2015, 1–16). 13 Foucault (1984, 64).

112

G. GAO

family and sexual relations).14 Extending the analysis of power beyond the institutionalized political system into everyday life produces a richer and deeper understanding of modern power operation. Second, Foucault notes that modern power does not merely rest on repressing and negating individual desires, acts and speeches; instead, it operates in a positive and productive manner.15 Third, for Foucault, modern power is not dependent only on a set of economic, political and military institutions but also bound to discourse and notions of truth.16 He reminds us that truth should not be naively sought in purely objective statements and descriptions; instead, “truth isn’t outside power or lacking in power.”17 It is inseparably entwined with the power system: “truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power, which produce and sustain it, to effects of power, which it induces and which extend it. A regime of truth.”18 Foucauldian archaeology is not intended to investigate what is essentially true or false; instead, it examines the discursive system that enables one to distinguish true and false statements and the effects of truth. Fourth, Foucault relates his analysis of power to subject formation. To him, human subjects are constituted not by transhistorical humanistic characteristics but by historically specific practices of power of which they are unaware.19 In modern times, panopticon and confessional practices play important roles in shaping modern subjectivity, a point I address later in my reading of Wang Xiaobo’s novella The Golden Age.20 Obviously, the above is not an exhaustive summary of Foucault’s complex thoughts, but it provides relevant points of departure for me to discuss Wang Xiaobo’s contribution to Chinese intellectual discourse and debate on power. Chinese liberals often highlight the influence of the philosopher Bertrand Russell on Wang Xiaobo. However, a closer examination shows 14 Foucault (1984, 68). 15 Foucault (1978, 105–106). 16 Foucault (1978, 73–74). 17 Foucault (1984, 72). This does not mean that Foucault denies all objective and scientific truths. Rather, he is not interested in such truths. Instead, he is concerned with the interrelation between truth and power. C. G. Prado discusses in detail the differences and similarities between Foucauldian and scientific conceptions of truth, see Prado (2006, 1–30). 18 Foucault (1978, 73–74). 19 Foucault (1984, 18–19). 20 Foucault (1978, 59), and (1984, 18).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

113

that while Wang does not mention Foucault as many times as Russell, the former plays a more substantial role in shaping his thought and writing.21 Wang’s fiction is focused on the issue of power. However, instead of focusing on state and government power, his fictional protagonists engage with power and search for freedom through everyday spaces: a farm (The Golden Age); a factory (Love in an Age of Revolution); a university (Years Lapse like Water); a hospital (The Yin-Yang Spheres of My Life); a private company (The Silver Age); a research institute and a remote village (The Temple of Longevity); and a merchandise market (Looking for Wushuang ). Although the figures and institutions of state power are present, the works thematize the complexity and multiplicity of (self-)oppression, (self-)subjection, opposition and subversion of everyday life. Such a bottom-up approach to power serves as an effective complement to intellectuals’ state-centered analysis of power. Moreover, unlike the intellectuals, whose analysis of the workings of power is overwhelmingly geared toward either reducing or reinforcing formal political institutions, Wang Xiaobo’s approach to power is closely connected with discourse and truth, and the domination of and opposition to power are often enacted in the spheres of discourse and truth. Wang’s fiction and essays are saturated with Foucauldian words and idioms, such as huayu (discourse), huayu quan (discursive power), huayu ji quanli (discourse is power) and quanli ji huayu (power is discourse).22 In his essay “The Silent Majority,” Wang likens discourse to tax and coins the term huayu juan (discursive tax) to satirize the phenomenon that Chinese people have been transformed from being forced to speak to being willing to speak.23 He laments the fact that paying a “discursive tax” to authorities is no longer imposed by the external power but has become a voluntary act and a self-induced mode of everyday behavior. This metaphor suggests that Wang does not idealize the oppressed but recognizes that they too actively participate in their self-submission and self-subjection in ways they may not be aware of. In addition, while understanding the importance of empirical studies and logical rigor in public debate and reasoning, Wang

21 Wang Xiaobo’s wife, Li Yinhe, is an influential sociologist and Foucault scholar. Wang Xiaobo most likely first came to know Foucault’s thought and work from her. 22 Wang (1998, 121, 127, 2009c, 183) and (2009c, 188). 23 Wang (1998, 129).

114

G. GAO

is more concerned with the underlying power and discursive structure that make particular arguments and statements possible. He says: “logically speaking, anything can be inferred from a flawed premise, indicating his concern with the deeper discursive and power conditions that inform reasoning and argumentation.”24 Wang often satirizes those who make judgments with only an abstract sense of justice, calling such decontextualized reasoning “yuchun” (folly).25 To Wang Xiaobo, reasoning only through fact, logic and abstract principles is pointless and even selfdefeating. Constructive public reasoning and political dialogue require the exploration of the discursive and power systems that underwrite particular statements and arguments. Foucault’s insights into power, discourse and subjectivity provide us with a good point of entry for understanding Wang’s approach to power. As Dai Jinhua remarks: “If we need to search for a theory as a secret key to open up our interpretation of Wang Xiaobo’s works, it is not Freud but Foucault.”26 Critics understand the sadistic and masochistic scenes in Wang’s fiction not as an exploration of the unconscious but as a metaphor for political power.27 These Foucauldian interpretations shed light on the hidden political meanings of sex and sexuality in Wang’s works but ignore his deviation from the Foucauldian approach to power and discourse. Foucault talks not only about the complex modern power mechanism but also about human resistance, opposition and positive subject formation within it. Nevertheless, many scholars note that evident tensions and contradictions exist in Foucault’s arguments about power and agency. Steven Best and Douglas Keller put this issue sharply: “there is also tension between the emphases on the ubiquity of domination and the possibility of resistance insofar as the balance of description is tipped toward the side of a domination that shapes every aspect of mental and physical existence, while very few specifics about resistance are given, and the efficacy of human agency, at least theoretically, is denied.”28 Although 24 Wang (1998, 29). 25 Wang (1998, 3). 26 Dai (2009, 295). 27 Dai (2009, 295–303), and Li (2009, 373–384). 28 Best and Kellner (1991, 58). Another scholar of Foucault, Beatrice Han, also

observes: “The Foucaultian analysis of subjectivity therefore appears to oscillate in a contradictory manner, between a definition of subjectivity as self-constitution on the one hand, and on the other hand, the need, in order to understand the games of truth

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

115

this Foucauldian tension between domination and resistance also exists in Wang Xiaobo, Wang has a more affirmative and dialogical conception of human agency and discursive resistance. My effort to describe the differences between Foucault and Wang Xiaobo is not intended to establish a reified West–East contrast but to complement the existing Foucauldian studies of Wang Xiaobo, reveal Wang’s distinctive approach to power and highlight his creative appropriation of Western theory to enrich the Chinese intellectual debate and discourse. In the following, I offer a detailed comparative reading of Wang Xiaobo’s representation of the Cultural Revolution in The Golden Age and the Chinese intellectual approaches to this unprecedented political movement. I make this particular comparison because the Cultural Revolution is widely considered the most politicized and oppressive era in modern China during which Maoist political power, relations, language, images and narratives penetrated into every aspect of society. Chinese intellectuals’ debate over current issues is often associated with a reinterpretation and reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution. As Lowell Dittmer remarks: “The Chinese people have been fascinated by the CR [Cultural Revolution] and have obsessively reverted to it.... On the one hand, they seem desirous of learning from the event, that is, learning why it occurred and how to prevent it. On the other hand, they have been intent ‘using’ such historical reconstructions to advance one political agenda or the other.”29 As an intellectual, Wang Xiaobo is also intensely interested in the Cultural Revolution; many of his literary works and essays are focused on this extraordinary historical era. Comparing the different intellectual and literary approaches to the same historical era can highlight Wang Xiaobo’s distinctive engagement with power, discourse and subjectivity and demonstrate his remarkable contributions to intellectual debate. In addition, many studies have analyzed literature and literary representations of the Cultural Revolution; most of them focus on retrieving the artistic value of Mao-era literature or exploring how changing literary representations echo changing historical conditions and socio-psychological needs. Few of them make any serious attempt to discuss the question of how literary representations contribute to the through which recognition itself operates, to go back to the practices of power of which subjects are not masters and are usually not even aware.” See Han (2002, 71). For a similar critique of Foucault’s contradiction, see Steele (2005, 71–72). 29 Dittmer (2002, 20).

116

G. GAO

intellectual debate over Chinese modernity and the existing research on the Cultural Revolution.30 In what follows, I first make a critical review of intellectuals’ reinterpretations of the Cultural Revolution with a focus on the issues of power, discourse and subjectivity and then offer an analysis of The Golden Age as an important resource for enriching the intellectual debate and supplementing the existing scholarship on the Cultural Revolution.

Debating the Cultural Revolution In 1981, five years after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese communist party issued an important party document entitled “The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Historical Issues” that imputes the tragedies and sufferings brought about by the Cultural Revolution to the Gang of Four. The Resolution throws the Cultural Revolution into the dustbin of history: “The Culture Revolution is neither a revolution nor social progress in any sense.”31 The Resolution’s outright dismissal of the Cultural Revolution was a consensus widely shared by intellectuals, officials and ordinary Chinese people in the 1980s. However, this consensus disappeared in the 1990s. As China’s market reforms accelerated in the 1990s, economic inequality and social injustice intensified. Neo-leftist intellectuals were the first to challenge the official narrative’s wholesale critique of the Cultural Revolution. They endeavored to overcome post-Mao political corruption and economic injustice by retrieving the positive institutional innovations (e.g., rural communal building and worker’s self-rule constitution) and political ideals (e.g., open political debate and direct political participation) of the Cultural Revolution. These ideas sparked opposition from the liberals, who argued that what the New Left describe as

30 For the value of Maoist literature and art, see Mittler (2016) and Pang (2017). For scholarship on the aesthetic influences of the Cultural Revolution, see Huang (2014). For research into the interrelation between the changing literary representation of the Cultural Revolution and the specific historical and cultural contexts, see Li (2016). 31 Party Documents (183, 30).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

117

positive socialist innovations and ideals were essentially oppressive practices and institutions imposed by the totalitarian state.32 They agreed with the total rejection of the Cultural Revolution in the official narrative but insisted that the latter’s imputation of the catastrophes to a few political villains conceals the anti-democratic political structures and institutionalized social injustices that existed prior to the Cultural Revolution and were endemic to the political system itself. Indeed, these oppressive sociopolitical institutions and systems caused the Cultural Revolution to occur and sustained its development. More important, liberals also emphasized that Maoist ideological indoctrination led to the Red Guards’ blind worship of Mao and notoriously brutal acts during the Cultural Revolution. Liberals’ research sought to underscore the totalitarian nature of the Cultural Revolution and state power. They believed that studying the Cultural Revolution could help raise awareness of the disasters and traumas caused by the deeply rooted exploitative state power and enable people to learn from history that China’s major obstacle to modernity is not capitalism but repressive state power.33 The New Left’s positive reappraisal of the Cultural Revolution is associated with their pursuit of an alternative modernity, whereas liberals’ negative reappraisal reflects their consistent opposition to the oppressive party state and their goal of realizing Western liberal democracy in China. Their sharply divided positions on the Cultural Revolution are derived from their conflicting political agendas. The debate over the reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution became an important part of the 1990s intellectual debate.34 Examining this debate can help us better understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing factions’ arguments and illuminate the argumentative and discursive space in which Wang Xiaobo’s fiction and intellectual contributions are positioned. Liberal analyses of the Cultural Revolution should

32 Refer to the New Left political economist Cui Zhiyuan’s and liberal historian Qin Hui’s articles for the details of the debate over the reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution in the 1990s. See Cui (1994, 5–16), and Qin (1996, 4–17). 33 For Chinese liberals’ reinterpretation of the Cultural Revolution, see Xu (1999, 16–22). 34 Other important disputes between the liberals and the New Left include the reevaluations of the New Culture Movement, the Chinese communist revolution and the Cultural Fever in the 1980s.

118

G. GAO

be credited with uncovering unjust socioeconomic structures and an ideological system that the official narrative glosses over. However, liberals treat the Red Guards, the major participants of the Cultural Revolution, as mere dupes of Maoist ideological indoctrination who blindly implemented the orders and directives issued from the supreme leader. The participants’ agency and self-consciousness receive little attention. To liberals, constructing a new political subjectivity is based on a break with the Cultural Revolution’s political ideals and a reconnection to universal humanity. In addition, the important role played by language and discourse is left out of the liberals’ discussions of the Cultural Revolution. These weaknesses in the liberals’ position are addressed by the more theoretically informed New Left intellectuals. Li Tuo, a neo-leftist and literary critic, is dissatisfied with existing studies of the Maoist era for their narrow focus on the structural and sociopolitical analyses. He calls for an examination of the Cultural Revolution from the new perspective of language and discourse. Inspired by Foucault’s discursive approach to power, he coins the term “Mao style” (Mao wenti) to describe the discourse and writing style during the Maoist regime. According to Li Tuo, Mao wenti is monologic and hegemonic in its sweeping exclusion of competing discourses and styles, and it has been deeply internalized by Chinese people, even including those who rebelled against Maoism. To learn to speak and write in Mao wenti becomes a process of Maoist subjection.35 Li Tuo’s efforts to highlight the linguistic norms and practices shed new light on our understanding of the operation of power during the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, he treats Mao wenti as an inescapable linguistic prison in which the Chinese people are passive victims and interpretive agency and discursive resistance from within impossible. Other scholars, drawing from sociolinguistic theories, have investigated the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era through the lens of discourse, rhetoric and symbol,36 but like Li Tuo, they examine these issues mostly from a top-down approach and focus on the linguistic, 35 Li Tuo’s discursive approach to the Cultural Revolution is demonstrated in a couple of his critical essays written after his reading of Foucault’s theories in the late 1980s. These essays are recollected in Li Tuo’s book Xuebeng hechu (Where did the avalanche happen). See Li (2015, 107–156). For a summary of Li Tuo’s arguments, see Wang (1996, 313–314). 36 See Anagnost (1997), Apter/Saich (1998), Ji (2004), Lu (2004), and Leese (2011).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

119

rhetorical and semiotic means employed by political authorities to subjugate the masses. Such a top-down approach is blind to the complex reception, adaption and appropriation by ordinary social actors of those discursive means and practices. The neglect of ordinary social actors’ interpretations and practices is addressed by the New Left political scientist Wang Shaoguang. Unlike other social scientists who prefer to focus on social structures and the political system, Wang Shaoguang stresses the importance of language and interpretation in the Cultural Revolution. However, unlike Li Tuo, Wang Shaoguang refuses to treat the participants as irrational and blind followers of the supreme leader. Instead, he argues that they are rational social actors and self-interested interpreters. The semantic ambiguities and uncertainties offer the participants some leeway to appropriate the supreme political directives in the service of their own purposes. Wang’s research is praiseworthy for reasserting participants’ interpretive agency and behavioral rationality, but he reduces that agency to a calculation of instrumental ends and fails to probe participants’ yearning for emotional and existential meaning within the extremely harsh conditions of the Cultural Revolution.37 The above overview shows that studies of the Cultural Revolution have improved our understandings of the operation of power, political persecution and subjection by highlighting its sociopolitical structure and discursive system. However, the analyses each have their respective limits and shortcomings. Liberals focus on the unjust sociopolitical systems and dismiss issues of language and discourse. The New Left are aware of the importance of language and discourse in the Maoist power operation, but they either treat them as totally oppressive or reduce them to mere tools serving participants’ instrumental interests. Regardless of their conflicting political positions, Chinese intellectuals and scholars tend to look at the Cultural Revolution from various external third-person perspectives. The first-person exercise of discursive and interpretive agency in opposing power and creating new ways of speaking, writing and being is neglected. Wang Xiaobo’s approach to the Cultural Revolution is different. On the one hand, while sharing the liberals’ rejection of the utopian political 37 This summary of Wang’s arguments is based on the conclusion of his dissertation. See Wang (1990, 873–897). Regrettably, most of the insightful analyses of the Maoist discourse and the social actors’ interpretations are removed from his dissertation-turnedbook Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan.

120

G. GAO

ideals of the Cultural Revolution, he refuses to treat social actors as products or pawns of Maoist ideology; instead, he thematizes the possibility of human agency and resistance under an extreme authoritarian rule. On the other hand, like the New Left, Wang takes a discursive approach to power and oppression, but he differs from them in that he does not treat ordinary participants as passive victims of the Maoist discursive system or as instrumentalists who appropriate it to serve their own purposes. Moreover, unlike both liberals and the New Left, who focus on the important political players and institutions of the Cultural Revolution, Wang shifts his focus to marginal figures and their everyday lives.38 His recurring protagonist, Wang Er, is a peripheral figure, but he never fails to engage actively and creatively with those in power and to search for his own meaning and way of being under an authoritarian rule. In what follows, I offer a reading of Wang Xiaobo’s novella The Golden Age as an imaginative reexamination and reconfiguration of the Cultural Revolution that dramatizes the discursive agency and oppositional practices of everyday life. I argue that Wang’s political subject is not a extralinguistic liberal subject that takes language as a mere tool nor a Foucauldian subject embroiled in an ontology of omnipotent power, but a linguistically mediated and dialogically informed agent who is not only embedded in but also capable of working through modern power relations and the discursive structure.

Working Through Power, Discourse and Subject Formation The Golden Age tells the story about how Wang Er and Chen Qingyang cope with false accusations, forced confessions, humiliating trials and tortures, a chain of traumatic events that often befell the victims of the Cultural Revolution. Many works of Scar fiction in the early 1980s start with highly melodramatic representations of these sorts of events, with villainous characters persecuting innocent protagonist, but end up happily

38 Yiching Wu’s book, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in

Crisis, is intended to address the lack of research into the peripheral figures, events and institutions during the Cultural Revolution. However, as Joel Andreas notes, the student Red Guards in Beijing and the rebel workers in Shanghai that are the focus of Wu’s book are far from being marginal figures; they are “at the very center of the Cultural Revolution.” See Andreas (2015, 281).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

121

with virtuous statesmen saving the good and punishing the bad. This narrative mode conforms to the popular belief that justice will finally be served and offered a cathartic outlet for unleashing pent-up trauma and emotions.39 For instance, at the very beginning of Lu Xinhua’s short story, “Scar” (Shanghen), the female protagonist Wang Xiaohua’s mother is framed and branded a “traitor” by the Gang of Four. Xiaohua sees her mother write the confessions “in tears.” Her mother is imprisoned and Xiaohua goes to the countryside for reeducation. Both mother and daughter submissively bear this unfair treatment. In the end, the new party leader, Chairman Hua, removes the wicked Gang of Four and restores the reputation of Xiaohua’s mother. Throughout the story, both the protagonist and her mother remain docile before the political authorities and show little agency or resistance in the face of persecution and oppression. Some intellectuals and writers began to realize that they are far from being innocent victims, like the characters in Scar fiction. Instead, their suffering and oppression are to some extent derived from their own cowardice and complicity. Ba Jin’s Random Thoughts (Suixiang lu), for instance, is widely extolled for its profound reflection on intellectuals’ collusion and complicity during the Cultural Revolution. Rather than laying all the blame on the Gang of Four, Ba Jin repents for his complicity in framing and persecuting his fellow intellectuals. Xu Zidong describes such a narrative as representative of the “historical selfreflection mode,”40 which displays intellectuals’ conscience and courage to admit their own guilt and bear their due responsibilities for the atrocities and tragedies of the Cultural Revolution. However, such a narrative mode is sometimes carried to such extremes that writers and intellectuals become obsessed with self-repentance and self-remorse, preventing them from examining and opposing the deep power and discursive structure that make persecution and oppression possible. Later in the 1980s, avant-garde fiction emerged and disrupted the moral order found in 39 This narrative mode can be found in many works of Scar fiction, such as Lu Xinhua’s short story “Scar,” Liu Xinwu’s short story “Class Counselor” (Ban zhuren) and Gu Hua’s novel Hibiscus Town. For a detailed discussion of this narrative mode, see Xu (2000 156–165). 40 Xu (2000 167–168). More examples of the historical self-reflection mode can be found in Dai Houying’s novel Stones in the Wall, Xiao Ping’s short story Graveyard and Flower and Wang Meng’s novella Butterfly. For a detailed discussion of this narrative mode, see Xu (2000, 166–179).

122

G. GAO

previous narratives and depicted the Cultural Revolution as a totally irrational and incomprehensible era.41 Neither the excessive sentimentality and popular narrative formula of “good triumphs over evil,” characteristic of Scar literature, nor the “historical self-reflection narrative” can be found in avant-garde fictions. In short, the major literary narratives about the Cultural Revolution are either structured by an oppressor-oppressed relationship or characterized by a lack of moral and ethical meaning. Neglected in fictional narratives are the ordinary social actors’ discursive agencies and the tactics they use to pursue freedom, identity and a positive form of being under a harsh authoritarian rule. Wang Xiaobo consciously breaks with previous narratives of the Cultural Revolution— in his own words, “no one has written out our life in such a way.”42 The Golden Age opens with the female protagonist Chen Qingyang asking the male protagonist Wang Er to help her prove to others that she is not a “worn-out shoe” (poxie), a curse word referring to a loose woman.43 This is a familiar opening of conventional Cultural Revolution narratives: The innocent protagonist is faced with a false accusation. What often follows is that the protagonist is either forced to plead guilty or has to arduously defend his/her innocence. However, when Chen Qingyang asks Wang Er to prove her innocence, he is acutely aware that the framed cannot free themselves simply by resorting to fact and logic. He realizes that social conventions and power relations rather than extralinguistic fact determine what can be uttered and what can be deemed true. He seems to have gained the Foucauldian insight that truth is not something beyond the realm of discourse; instead, truth is embedded in discourse, which is itself informed and inflected by power. With such an insight into the operation of power, Wang Er refuses to prove Qingyang’s innocence by referring to 41 The avant-garde representations of the Cultural Revolution include Can Xue’s novella Huangni Street, Wang Anyi’s novella Uncle’s Story and Yu Hua’s novella 1986. For a detailed discussion of this narrative mode, see Xu (2000, 179–188). 42 Wang (2009a, 412). 43 Wang Xiaobo’s novellas 2015, The Golden Age and East Palace, West Palace, have

been translated into English by Hongling Zhang and Jason Sommer and published under the title of Wang in Love and Bondage: Three Novellas by Wang Xiaobo. This essay relies mostly on Zhang and Sommer’s translation. However, I replace their liberal translation of the original word “poxie” into “damaged goods” with a more literal translation (“wornout shoe”) to better interpret Chen Qingyang’s symbolic wearing worn-out shoes in the struggle session. I use “[]” to indicate this replacement in my following quotations from Zhang and Sommer’s translation.

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

123

the fact that she did not actually sleep with other men; instead, he tells her: so-called [worn-out shoe] was just a denotation. If people [dajia] say you are [a worn-out shoe], then you must be [worn-out shoe]—there isn’t much logic to it; if people say you slept with another man, you must have done it—there is not much logic to that either. As for why they say you’re [worn-out shoe], in my opinion, it’s because of this: People generally agree that if a married woman hasn’t cheated on her husband, her face must be leathery, and her breasts must sag. Now your face is not dark but fair, and your breasts are not hanging down but jutting out, so you must be [a worn-out shoe]. If you don’t want to be, you should try to darken your face and make your breasts sag, so people won’t accuse you of being [a worn-out shoe], which, of course, is a raw deal for you. If you don’t want a raw deal, sleep with another man so you can think of yourself as a [worn-out shoe], too.44

First, Wang Er’s response shows his realization that the meaning of the signifier “worn-out shoe” is not determined by its reference to extralinguistic fact, as common sense might tell us, but by conventional discursive practice. Second, according to Wang Er’s analysis, Chen Qingyang is not framed by any political villains nor by the oppressive state, but by “people” (dajia). This dajia is never specified, which suggests that oppression and persecution are not derived from state power alone nor from any particular individuals but from the pervasive social and power relations of everyday life. Wang Er’s insights about the operation of power and discursive mechanisms indicate that although the story is told from Wang Er’s first-person perspective, it is not the conventional first-person perspective that is restricted to one character’s experiences and feelings; rather, Wang Er’s first-person perspective is mediated and broadened by a Foucauldian third-person perspective that enables the protagonist to step back from his personal experience and view the entire power structure and discursive system from a critical distance. Wang Er’s Foucauldian third-person perspective helps Chen Qingyang see the system that works behind her back and that her first-person point of view fails to grasp. Third, the ability to see the otherwise invisible power-discourse system is not enough.

44 Wang (2007, 62–63), emphasis mine.

124

G. GAO

What remains is how to translate the third-person perspective into firstperson practice to engage with the established power-discourse system and achieve freedom and identity. Instead of launching a total revolution to overthrow and replace the existing system, Wang Er chooses to coopt it and parody it to his advantage. He employs a parodic syllogism to answer Chen Qingyang’s question as to why she is called a “worn-out shoe”: Major Premise: “People generally agree that if a married woman hasn’t cheated on her husband, her face must be leathery, and her breasts must sag.” Minor Premise: “Now your face is not dark but fair, and your breasts are not hanging down but jutting out.” Conclusion: “So you must be [a worn-out shoe].”45

In terms of argumentative form, Wang Er’s reasoning is impeccably logical and rigorous, but it sounds funny and ridiculous. Because it is built on a highly problematic major premise: “if a married woman hasn’t cheated on her husband, her face must be leathery, and her breasts must sag,” a premise that is derived from pervasive social relations and discursive practices. Wang Er’s parodic reasoning indicates that the mere use of rigorous formal logic is useless and ridiculous when it is twisted and manipulated by discursive power. Therefore, Wang Er refuses to help Chen Qingyang through the assertion of fact and logical reasoning. Instead, he encourages her to accept her label as a “worn-out shoe” and “have sex with another man.” Such an acceptance does not mean forced self-criminalization and self-subjection but is an intentional tactical opposition and a subversive appropriation of the existing power relations. Wang Xiaobo invests his characters with interpretive agency and intellectual agility to expose and parody the arbitrariness of the existing discursive power. Unlike the familiar framed protagonists of other Cultural Revolution narratives who try to save themselves by reconstructing what actually occurred and reaffirming the gap between fact and false charges, Wang Er induces Chen Qingyang to appropriate the gap for her own sexual advantage. Wang Er is surprised to find that “ever since she [Chen Qingyang] admitted in public she was [a worn-out shoe], and I was her lover, no one said she was [a worn-out shoe] anymore.... People were so afraid of this kind of [worn-out shoe] behavior in broad daylight that they didn’t 45 Wang (2007, 63).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

125

even dare talk about it.”46 The two protagonists turn the table on their slanderers and persecutors by disclosing the hidden discursive operation informed by power and employing it for their own sexual interest. Wang Er’s agency not only lies in his penetrating observation and parodic reasoning but also in his disruptive action. For instance, when Wang Er is wrongly accused by the production team leader of shooting his dog’s left eye, he does not choose to defend himself by asserting facts and logical reasoning. Although he witnesses his friend Luo Xiaosi shoot the dog and blind its left eye, Wang Er doesn’t defend himself by exposing the actual perpetrator, because he insightfully recognizes that “if the team leader could have handled Luo Xiaosi, he wouldn’t have accused me.”47 This reasoning signals Wang Er’s ability to see through the unequal power structure behind the accusation. Therefore, he does not refute it by referring to fact. His initial reaction is silence. However, before long, he realizes that “to keep silent meant to acquiesce.”48 Therefore, he secretly blinds the dog’s right eye and gets it to stray into the mountains to eliminate the evidence of the crime. Wang Er’s destructive action may be considered morally dubious within normal social conditions, but within the extreme circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, it suggests his relentless pursuit of positive freedom. Wang Xiaobo’s protagonist is not a mere example of “negative freedom,” as Chinese liberals assume; rather, he actively resists hegemony and achieves “positive freedom.” However, the way Wang Er refutes the false accusation and strives for freedom is not by entering into direct confrontation with oppressive forces but by dealing with them obliquely and surreptitiously. He is sufficiently astute to know that the false accusation is based on a presupposition structured by an unequal power relation to his disadvantage. He therefore decides not to oppose the oppressor directly but to eliminate the premise that underlies the false charge. Wang Er’s dealing with the false accusations of being a “worn-out shoe” and “blinding the dog’s eye” demonstrates that he is not only invested with a Foucauldian third-person perspective that allows him to see through the arbitrariness of the entire power relations that

46 Wang (2007, 77). 47 Wang (2007, 64). 48 Ibid.

126

G. GAO

work behind his back, he is also capable of translating the detached thirdperson perspective into committed and effective first-person subversion of and resistance to power relations. To avoid being persecuted by the newly appointed military deputy, Wang Er and Chen Qingyang flee from their production team to a thatched hut up the mountain where they are able to have sex at will. Considering that sex and sexuality are taboo topics in public discourse in China, liberal intellectuals and critics praise Wang Xiaobo’s bold descriptions of sex as liberating repressed sexual desires, expressing natural humanity and defying the political authorities.49 However, a close reading of the sex scenes shows that Wang Er and Chen Qingyang’s sexual experience is far from being satisfying. Passionate release and ecstatic fulfillment of sexual desires are seldom found in their unfettered intercourse in the mountains. Instead, their lovemaking is filled with a deep sense of loneliness and sadness: Chen Qingyang said on Mount Zhang Feng, when she rode up and down on my body, she looked far and near, and saw nothing but gray, watery fog floating in the air. All of a sudden, she felt very alone, very lonely. Even though a part of me was rubbing inside her body, she still felt sad and lonely.50 When Chen Qingyang and I lay on the blue clay with our eyes closed, we felt like a pair of dolphins swimming in the sea. It was getting darker and the sunlight gradually reddened. A cloud came over the horizon, pale as countless dead fish bellies turned up and countless dead fish eyes gaping. A current of wind slipped down the mountain without a sound, without a breath, and a sadness in the air filled every space between the sky and the earth.51

The Mao era is often portrayed as a desexualized one, and Wang’s fiction clearly seeks to insert sex back into socialist China. But The Golden Age is not a simple progressive story about how a desexualized Maoist subject is enlightened and initiated into a sexualized subject. Both Chen Qingyang and Wang Er feel that “it’s no fun doing the same things over and

49 Ai (2009, 418); Li (2009, 377). 50 Wang (2007, 99). 51 Wang (2007, 104).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

127

over” in an isolated space.52 Wang Er’s and Chen Qingyang’s solitary and somber sexual experience in the mountains seems to suggest that isolation from human society cannot bring them true happiness and that being fully human and modern requires positioning oneself into certain social and political relations. This conception of the human subject as inevitably socially constituted brings Wang Er and Chen Qingyang from their isolated sexual utopia back to the Maoist production team to “put up with the torment of human society.”53 After their return to the production team, Chen Qingyang and Wang Er are confronted with various forms of physical and psychological torment: forced confessions, humiliating public struggle meetings and shame parades. Differing from those characters in Scar literature who accept their persecutions and passively wait for salvation from higher political authorities, Wang Er and Chen Qingyang coopt, toy with the oppressive forces and beat them at their own games. When imprisoned in the public security office, Wang Er and Chen Qingyang are ordered to write confessions about their “crimes.” According to Foucault, human subjects are constituted not by any transhistorical essences but by historically specific practices of power of which they are unaware. Confession is crucial to modern subjection. It subjects people to the power that draws confession from them. However, in modern times, confession is no longer a forced act. Rather, there is an “institutional incitement to speak” that urges each to tell the most intimate details of every act, thought, idea, image and emotion. Only through a detailed expurgation of all of our aberrations and deviations from the norm can we discover who we really are.54 This requirement for detail pushes confessors to further self-subjection.55 However, Wang Xiaobo’s protagonists reject the self-subjection that is inherent in confessional practices; instead, they carve out an active position for themselves through rewriting and overwriting.

52 Wang (2007, 100). 53 Wang (2007, 102). 54 Foucault (1978, 18). 55 For a detailed discussion of the confession’s importance in modern subjection, see Foucault (1978, 59–73).

128

G. GAO

At the very beginning, Wang Er is “a tall man of few words.”56 His initial confession is rejected by his commissar for being “too simple.”57 Wang Er’s subjection is insufficient, and he is told to rewrite the confession. Confronted with further self-subjection through more detailed confession, Wang Er’s tactic of resistance is not an open refusal or a direct opposition but pushes the requirement for detail to extremes. The self-repentance and self-remorse that are often found in conventional confessions during the Cultural Revolution are absent from Wang Er’s confessions. He fills his confessions with excessively detailed descriptions of his sexual intercourse with Chen Qingyang. As a result, Wang Er is no longer an oppressed confessor forced to write but a prolific and eloquent author, working “like a professional writer.”58 As Foucault suggests, modern power mechanisms do not operate merely by repression, by negation, or by saying “no”; they also encourage human subjects to speak and write. For Wang Er, the “institutional incitement to speak” and the encouragement for detailed confession do not, however, serve to further his subjection to power, they help develop his new identity as a creative literary writer. More interesting, Wang Er’s confessions not only constitute a discursively empowered self but also transform the relationship among confessor, oppressor and reader. Confession is originally deployed to subjugate Wang Er, but he turns the table on his oppressors by creatively overwriting it to sexually stimulate those in power and subject them to their own sexual desires. Lyotard thinks of communist subjects as victims of language who not only internalize the official master narrative as listeners but also coproduce it as narrators and co-enact it as actors. Communist subjects produce and enact not their authentic voices and selves but only their own spokenness and self-subjection.59 By contrast, Wang Xiaobo’s protagonist Wang Er demonstrates human agency in all three narrative roles; he is not the totally subjected listener, narrator and actor that Lyotard portrays. Rather, he is a creative interpreter, narrator and actor who is able to overcome his victimhood and assert an empowered subjectivity through his overwriting and over-narration of the imposed official master narrative.

56 Wang (2007) 70. 57 Wang (2007, 82). 58 Wang (2007, 83). 59 Lyotard (1977, 31–32).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

129

If Wang Er’s tactics to engage with power are overwriting and overnarration, Chen Qingyang’s are specularization and self-exhibition. Not long after returning from the mountain, Qingyang is ordered by the regiment to attend a struggle session, a regular form of public humiliation during the Cultural Revolution. In the struggle session, the accused persons are verbally and physically abused before a large crowd of people and submissively bow their heads to avoid the crowd’s gaze. However, Qingyang “would straighten her head, see some unfamiliar face, and smile at the person.”60 She reverses the power relation between the dominating gazer and the dominated gazed and turns the struggle session into a sexual spectacle: “Whenever she heard our names called, she would take out a pair of clean ‘Liberation-brand’ shoes from her backpack, tied together with a hemp string, hang them around her neck, and wait to step onto the stage.”61 Qingyang is not forced to do so, but she takes the initiative to wear the symbol of her illicit love affair around her neck to dramatize and parody the struggle session. Moreover, she brings her own cotton ropes to make it easier for others to tie her up and exhibit her before the crowd. As a result, “the curves of her body were completely on display. She noticed all the jutting out at the crotches of the men at the meeting. She knew it was because of her.”62 Qingyang’s purposeful display of her body for the male gaze unmasks the structure of the gazer and the gazed, flips their relationship on its head and eroticizes the otherwise political event into a sexualized party. Qingyang’s exhibitionism is both a seductive gesture and a subversive engagement with the patriarchal order and the dominant power structure. Michel de Certeau insists that while modern society features a complex power and disciplinary system, ordinary social actors do not always live submissively and docilely within it. He makes the distinction between “strategies” and “tactics,” the former referring to the means and institutions deployed by those with power to manage, control, discipline and subjugate people and the latter to the ruses that ordinary social actors adopt in their everyday lives to re-appropriate and repurpose the “strategies” to meet their needs and desires. They are “the ingenious ways in

60 Wang (2007, 109). 61 Wang (2007, 109). 62 Ibid.

130

G. GAO

which the weak make use of the strong.” De Certeau holds that instead of launching a comprehensive revolution to overthrow the existing power system, ordinary people figure out various “tactics” of writing, reading, walking and doing to change and appropriate the disciplinary and subjugating “strategies” to satisfy their own needs and desires.63 His thoughts about human agency and resistance are relevant here. Wang Er and Chen Qingyang live in an authoritarian system, but they are actively engaged with those in power and invent various “tactics” that enable them to retool the otherwise oppressive discourses and practices to serve their subversive and constructive functions. They often get the upper hand over those in power. However, we have every reason to wonder if Wang Xiaobo doesn’t over-idealize the power of human agency within the ubiquitous and complex power system. To answer this question, we need to take a close look at the novella’s narrative voice. This story is narrated through Wang Er’s first-person retrospective point of view. However, a closer reading of the text shows that there are actually two first-person voices: the younger Wang Er, a 21-yearold sent-down youth living in and experiencing the Cultural Revolution, and the middle-aged Wang Er looking back at the Cultural Revolution from twenty years later. The middle-aged retrospective Wang Er is a person weakened by established power and institutions, while the younger experiencing Wang Er is a self vigorously pursuing freedom and self-identity. The story is told through a constant shifting between these two contrasting first-person voices. The optimistic and robust voice of the younger self is often tempered by the pessimistic and somber voice of the middle-aged self. For instance, after the younger Wang Er’s agency and freedom are fully demonstrated at the very beginning, he falls asleep on the grass by riverside like Adam in his Eden, waking up to find nothing on his body. At that time, his sexual potency reaches an unprecedented climax: “my little Buddha pointed to the sky like an arrow, bigger than ever.”64 However, at this orgasmic moment, the middle-aged Wang Er jumps in to tone down the voice of the younger Wang Er: That day I was twenty-one and in the golden age of my life. I had so many desires; I wanted to love, to eat, and to be turned in a flash into the 63 For a detailed discussion on the differences between “strategies” and “tactics,” see de Certeau (1984, 29–42). 64 Wang (2007, 65).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

131

half bright and half-dark cloud in the sky. Only much later did I realize that life is a slow process of being hammered. People grow old day after day, their desire disappears little by little, and finally they become like those hammered bulls.65

The intervention of retrospective narrative voice imbues the narrative with a nostalgic and melancholic tone. However, this is not a story of degradation from an experiencing self of youthful vigor and liberation into a middle-aged narrating self of submission and subjection. Instead, the narrative maintains both a tension and communication between the younger self and the elder self, with the present elder self constantly drawing from the past younger self for inspiration and recuperation. For instance, after the Cultural Revolution, Wang Er returns to Beijing and Chen Qingyang to Shanghai. Wang Er becomes a public-school teacher, and Qingyang a doctor in a public hospital. Both of them work submissively within the system. When they meet in a hotel in Beijing twenty years after writing their confessions, Qingyang finds that “Wang Er has become civilized,” and the elder Wang Er also feels “I had changed a lot.”66 However, this change does not mean they have been totally subjected to power. When recalling his experience in the Cultural Revolution with Qingyang, the narrating self says: “We talked about everything we could have done back then, the confessions I wrote, and even the little Buddha of mine. As soon as the thing heard people talking about him, he became excited and began to stir.... After all, that was my golden age.”67 This description indicates that the dynamic younger self’s empowering struggles, desires and writings have become resources that can nourish and reconstitute the present middle-aged self. Unlike many other victims of the communist regime, the middle-aged Wang Er’s remembrance of the Cultural Revolution is not traumatic but therapeutic and recuperative. The splitting of the narrative voice into a younger emerging self and a present declining self that are in dialogue with each other is found in many other stories by Wang Xiaobo. For instance, Love in the Age of Revolution also has two Wang Ers: a young worker in a tofu factory and a middleaged engineer. Years Lapse like Waters includes a middle school student and a Ph.D. graduate from abroad. More often than not, the past stories 65 Wang (2007, 66), emphasis mine. 66 Wang (2007, 94). 67 Wang (2007, 111).

132

G. GAO

are stories of agency and liberation, while the present stories are stories of oppression and submission. In all these works, Wang Xiaobo does not idealize agency and liberation, nor does he absolutize oppression and subjection. Rather, he often engages a narrating self, a story of submission and oppression in a productive dialogue with an experiencing self, a story of agency and liberation. This double narrative voice and temporal structure are echoed by a double spatial structure. Wang Xiaobo’s works often provide the protagonist Wang Er with an alternative space that enables him to step out of the power system and reflect on what occurs within it. Such an alternative free space is juxtaposed with the disciplined and normalized space, for instance, up the mountain versus down the mountain in The Golden Age, a private tofu-making room in a tall tower versus a state-owned factory on the ground in the Love in the Age of Revolution, and a research institute in Beijing versus a remote village stronghold in West Hunan in the novel Longevity Temple. The protagonist Wang Er’s constant shuttling back and forth between the two contrasting spaces and narrative voices demonstrates his ability to work both outside and inside the power system and displays his author Wang Xiaobo’s dynamic and dialogical approach to the power-discourse system. With such a double narrative and spatial structure, Wang Xiaobo’s fictional works open a dialogical textual space for positive subject formation. This dialogical subject position is not in a totally solipsistic shape, not configured and confined to an inner interaction between the younger Wang Er and the older Wang Er but is also complicated and complemented by another contrast and communication between the male protagonist Wang Er and the female protagonist Chen Qingyang. If the young experiencing Wang Er tells a story of agency and liberation and the middle-aged narrating Wang Er tells a story of domination and subjection, then Qingyang’s story is a story of common sense and adherence that further enriches the narrative structure and texture. Throughout the story, Wang Er works with Qingyang to engage with the established power relations and discursive system. Their alliance could be seen as one between marginal and weak figures against the established order. Wang Er acts like Qingyang’s master and teacher; he often teaches the seemingly ignorant Qingyang to outgrow her common sense and gain some counterintuitive understandings of language, truth and power. However, Qingyang does not blindly buy into Wang Er’s persuasion. At the very beginning of the story, for instance, Wang Er tries to convince Qingyang to stay cool about being called “a worn-out shoe” by

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

133

employing the counterintuitive conception of truth as being determined by power and convention rather than as something transcendent. But Qingyang finds it hard to accept such a separation of language from fact. Unlike other fictional protagonists who are accused of being a “worn-out shoe,” Qingyang is more concerned about truth than she is about the taint of immorality: “She is not in the least afraid of becoming an actual worn-out shoe. Being an actual worn-out shoe is much better than being called a worn-out shoe when she is actually not. What she hates is the thing that causes her to be called a worn-out shoe.”68 Apparently, “the thing” refers to the power relations and social conventions that distort the truth by disconnecting it from objective fact. In other words, what Qingyang cannot tolerate is not truth itself but the distortion of truth and separation of language from fact caused by social and political forces. She seems to adhere to the widely held “correspondence theory of truth” that takes truth as corresponding to, or with, a fact. Chen Qingyang’s adherence to the commonsensical understanding of truth as corresponding to fact leads Wang Er to question his constructivist understanding of truth and the veracity and authenticity of his existence under the communist power-inflected discursive system. At the beginning of the novella, Wang Er lives confidently in and comfortably by his conception of truth as socially constructed discourse divorced from fact and reality. However, as the story unfolds, Qingyang’s commonsense understanding of truth destabilizes Wang Er’s sense of being and compels him to ponder his existence and prove it to others. Chen Qingyang is often juxtaposed with Wang Er. In Wang Er’s own words, “Chen Qingyang is different from me in every respect.”69 Wang Er might be seen as a flexible structuralist who considers meaning as socially and politically constructed and is able to see the power and discursive structure beneath the surface of things. By contrast, Qingyang is an adamant empiricist who holds on to notions of fact and reality, living by common sense and remaining innocent and ignorant. For all these contrasts and oppositions, Qingyang and Wang Er are not antagonists. Instead, they are often kept in a mutually illuminating and nurturing tension. Chen Qingyang often plays the role of an apprentice to Wang

68 This is my translation. For the original Chinese text, see Wang (2009a, 22). 69 Wang (2007, 116.0

134

G. GAO

Er, but she is also able to “help me [Wang Er] to understand” why what they do matters to the authorities.70 As the previous section shows, the New Left intellectuals and scholars of the Cultural Revolution employ Foucauldian discourse theory or sociolinguistic theory to talk about how language was mediated and manipulated by the communist power system to exercise control in such a way that “language was most separated from meaning.”71 Intellectuals and scholars generally adopt various third-person theoretical perspectives to describe the separation of language from reality and the resulting political persecution. Generally missing from those analyses is the first-person experiential perspective of those who are able to live with and work through the communist power system. Wang Er and Chen Qingyang’s philosophical confusion about, reflection on and active pursuit of existential meaning point sharply to this lack in current scholarly works and intellectual debate. There is an important passage about Qingyang’s reflection on the Cultural Revolution at the end of the story that has escaped critical attention: After the “not bad at all,” she still said it was no sin. Because she was like Socrates, ignorant of everything. Even though she had lived more than forty years, the world before her eyes still appeared miraculous and new. She didn’t know why they dispatched her to a desolate place like Yunnan, nor did she know the reason for letting her return; she didn’t know why they accused her of being [a worn-out shoe] and escorted her to the stage to be denounced, nor could she figure out why they said she was not [a worn-out shoe] and removed the confessions she had written from her file. There were all kinds of explanations for these things, but she understood none of them. She was so ignorant that she had to be innocent. So, it is written in all the law books.72

Different intellectual factions and scholars of different disciplines have described and explained the origin, development and consequence of the Cultural Revolution from various broad third-person (sociological/genealogical/economic/discursive) perspectives. However, as the above quote shows, none of them makes any sense to Qingyang. Her 70 Wang (2007, 94). 71 Mitter (2004, 209). 72 Wang (2007, 112), emphasis mine.

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

135

“ignorance” should not be taken literally. Instead, it is a Socratic ignorance that poses an intellectual challenge to the various theoretical explanations that fail to do full justice to the needs, desires, struggles and practices in ordinary people’s everyday lives. At the end of the story, Chen Qingyang submits a confession that finally liberates Wang Er and herself from custody. She tells the regimental commander that “This is what really occurred. Not a word should be changed.”73 If viewed in isolation, this proclamation might lead some to conclude that the story as a whole supports the idea that facts and conventional conceptions of truth will eventually be rewarded with freedom. However, if we look at the overall narrative structure and its voices, we can see that Qingyang’s adherence to factual truth and innocence is always complemented, complicated and moderated by Wang Er’s Foucauldian conceptions of discourse and truth. This dramatic tension and interaction between contrasting narrative voices sustains the development of the plot and nourishes the growth of the protagonists’ subject formation. Wang Xiaobo configures a linguistically mediated and dialogically empowered subjectivity that is able to engage with and work through the existing power system and discursive structure by putting past and present, agency and subjection, and first- and third-person perspectives into a productive conversation with each other. The empowered subjectivity that Wang Xiaobo envisions is far more than simply sexual fulfillment, bodily pleasures, instrumental ends or negative freedom; instead, they point to deep epistemological and existential concerns that propel the protagonists to ponder and pursue the meaning of discourse, truth and existence.

Wang Xiaobo’s Contribution to Foucault, Intellectual Discourse and Post-Truth Politics Since the mid-2010s, a small group of self-styled “Chinese left-wing liberals” emerged and began to recognize the limitation of the dominant Chinese right-wing liberals’ preoccupation with opposition against the oppressive state power. They argue for “opposition against all (gender, sexual, racial, ethnic and class) forms of oppression” instead of restricting themselves to anti-state struggle. However, except for following the American left-wing liberal intellectuals in pushing for social movements,

73 Wang (2007, 117).

136

G. GAO

they have not provided any specific individual struggle tactics and subject formation visions befitting the highly repressive Chinese political context in which any large-scale organized protest and confrontation with the party state often do not lead to any desirable results but only violence and bloodshed. Not unlike their rivals both outside and inside the liberal camp, these left-wing liberals have paid little attention to ordinary social actors’ subtle tactics and resistance. He Zhaotian notes that one perceived blind spot in contemporary Chinese intellectual debate and discourse is the general neglect of ordinary people’s everyday lives. According to He, modern Chinese intellectuals have inherited the Confucian scholarofficial tradition of using knowledge to serve their country and people. They often claim to speak for the people but in fact impose their designs and projects on them. He contends that Chinese scholars and intellectuals should move beyond the problematics and polemics of current debate and give more attention to “ordinary citizens’ values, living logic, subjective feeling and spiritual needs” to refine the various broad theoretical accounts and develop them into new theories that have stronger explanatory power.74 Wang Xiaobo often emphasizes that he attempts to bring to light the “silent majority” in his writings. To him, the silent majority’s everyday lives, experiences and language are drowned out, but not totally destroyed by, dominant discursive structures and narratives. Instead, they constitute a “dormant smoldering chaos” that can be excavated, articulated and reworked.75 Wang Xiaobo’s works are not intended to give a truthful representation of ordinary Chinese people’s lived experience during the Cultural Revolution. Rather, they open avenues for the serious exploration of ordinary people’s interpretive agency, language and pursuits of self and meaning, avenues that can supplement intellectuals’ state-centered top-down approach to power. Moreover, the inspirations and recourses that Wang Xiaobo’s The Golden Age provides for the intellectual discourse and scholarly research of the Cultural Revolution are not only the understudied discursive practices and interpretative innovations of everyday life, but also the way he copes with them. Rather than looking at the everyday practices and innovations only from a third-person theoretical perspective or a first-person experiential perspective, Wang Xiaobo gets these two perspectives into

74 He (2006, 11). 75 Wang (2009e, 46).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

137

interplaying and interacting with each other. As my previous interpretation shows, the story of The Golden Age is narrated from the young and the middle-aged Wang Er’s alternating first-person perspectives. This alternating first-person perspective is not a conventional first-person perspective that is restricted to one’s individual experience, but a firstperson perspective informed and inflected by a Foucaultian third-person perspective that enables the protagonists to see through the entire power and discursive system that work behind their backs. This Foucaultian third-person perspective not only allows the protagonists to observe the entire power system from a critical distance, but also translates back into the protagonists’ deep first-person reflections upon self-identity and effective oppositions against those in power at everyday sites. In other words, Wang Xiaobo’s fiction does not simply recuperate the everyday dimension from a single first-person’s experiential perspective, but also get it in conversation with contrastive third-person theoretical perspectives to reveal each other’s limits, broaden each other’s horizon and set up a dialogical model to deal with the relationship between power, discourse and subjectivity, a model that can enrich the Chinese intellectual discourse and inspire new forms of life under modern power and discursive system. Although I have in this chapter placed Wang Xiaobo’s works within a Foucauldian framework, my interpretation highlights their differences, arguing that Wang Xiaobo’s works grant a more prominent role to human agency and resistance in everyday life and add a more dialogical and interactive dimension to the relationships between power and individual agency, between constructivist conceptions of language and positivist conceptions of language, and between committed first-person perspectives and detached third-person perspective. Not only can such a dialogical and dialectic approach enrich the Chinese intellectual discourse but also complement the current Foucaultian studies on the issues of power, language, positive formation of subjectivity and their interrelation. Reading Wang Xiaobo’s fiction also has implications for current real politics. We are entering an age of “post-truth politics” in which political debate is largely framed not by appeals to fact and truth but by appeals to emotion and identity. The left-wing media blame the spread of misinformation and disinformation on the right-wing populist authoritarian ideologues and politicians. The major American left-wing media outlets, such as New York Times, Washington Post and CNN, have organized various fact-checking campaigns and platforms to combat misinformation and change people’s thoughts. However, numerous empirical studies

138

G. GAO

show that the effect of fact-checking is limited and even counterproductive under the highly politically polarized moments, for the fact-checkers fail to address the misinformation consumers’ deeply felt emotions, beliefs and desires for identity construction and recognition.76 Most of Wang Xiaobo’s fictions are set in a Maoist post-truth politics in which basic empirical facts are ignored or distorted to persecute deviants and dissidents. Then what can we learn from Wang Xiaobo’s fiction to deal with the post-truth politics? Wang Xiaobo has predated those empirically studies that call into question the effect of fact-checking in political communication. His fictional male protagonist Wang Er tells us that factchecking alone is insufficient. To combat false information and protect democracy, we need a third-person theoretical perspective to unveil the power relations and structures that work behind the production of false information. Moreover, we need a first-person experiential perspective to attend to the false information believers’ deeply held emotions, needs and desires for identity and recognition. Instead of only debunking the rumors and false information, we need to show how social actors could build their own identity and gain recognition in an alternative manner that does not depend on the absorption of false information. Simply speaking, we need the double-edged perspective and voice in Wang Xiaobo’s narration to counter the populist authoritarianism-backed spread of rumors and sustain our pursuit of democracy and freedom.

References Anagnost, Ann. National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997. Andreas, Joe. “Review of The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism Crisis, by Yiching Wu.” The China Journal 73.1 (2015): 279–282. Apter, David E., and Tony Saich. 1998. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Bell, Daniel. “Introduction.” A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Ed. Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013. Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern Theory: Critical Integrations. Guilford: Guilford Press, 1991. 76 For a brief review of empirical studies on the limited effect of fact-checking in political communication, see Drutman (2020). For a detailed discussion on fact-checkers’ failure to address the identity and motivation issues, see Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler (2017).

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

139

Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元 “Zhidu chuanxin yu dierci sixiang jiefang” 制度创新与第二 次思想解放 (Institutional Innovation and The Second Thought Liberation) Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 24.8 (1994): 5–16. Dai Jinhua 戴锦华. “zhizhe xixue” 智者戏谑 (The Wise Man’s Play). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. De Certeau, Michel. Practice of Everyday Life. Trans. Steven F. Rendall. Berkeley: California UP, 1984. Dittmer, Lowell. “Rethinking China’s Cultural Revolution Amid Reform.” China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and PostMao Counternarratives. Ed. Woei Lien Chong. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 3–26. Drutman, Lee. “Fact-Checking Misinformation Can Work. But It Might Not Be Enough.” FiveThirtyEight. 3 June 2020. https://fivethirtyeight.com/fea tures/why-twitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-mis information/. Accessed 14 June 2021. Flynn, D. J., Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. “The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics.” Political Psychology 38 (2017): 127–150. Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurely. New York: Vintage, 1978. ———. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Han, Xing. “Xiangyue 98, gaobie 98” 相约98, 告别98 (See you in 1998, farewell in 1998). In Li Shitao 李世涛, ed., Zhishifenzi lichang : ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场: 自由主义之争与中国思想界 的分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Changchun: Shidai wenyi, 2000, 221–231. Han, Beatrice. Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical. Trans. Edward Pile. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红, ed. Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research materials on Wang Xiaobo). Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Dangdai zhongguo de zhishiganjue 当代中国的知识感 觉和观念感觉 (Contemporary China’s Knowledge Feeling and Conceptual Feeling). Guiling: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2006. Huang, Yiju. Tapestry of Light: Aesthetic Afterlives of the Cultural Revolution. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Ji, Yuanfeng. Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao’s China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Larson, Wendy. “Okay, Whatever: Intellectuals, Sex, and Time in Wang Xiaobo’s Golden Age Years.” The China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China 3.1 (2003): 29–56.

140

G. GAO

Leese, Daniel. Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 2011. Li, He. Political Thought and China’s Transformation: Ideas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Li, Li. Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of Remembering: The Representations of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in English-Speaking Countries. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Li Shitao 李世涛, ed. Zhishifenzi lichang : Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000a. ———. Zhishifenzi lichang : Minzuzhuyi yu zhuanxing shiqi zhongguo de mingyun 民族主义与转型时期中国的命运 (Nationalism and China’s Fate in Transitional Period). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000b. ———. Zhishifenzi lichang : Jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang 激进与 保守之间的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000c. Li Tuo 李陀. Xuebenghechu 雪崩何处 (Where Did the Avalanche Happen). Beijing: Zhongxin, 2015. Liu, Qingfeng. “The Topography of Intellectual Culture in 1990s.” Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry. Ed. Davies, Gloria and Geremie R. Barmé. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 47–70. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. Instructions Paiennes. Paris: Galilee, 1997. Lu, Xing. Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Impacts on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2004. Mittler, Barbara. A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2016. Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. Pang, Laikwan. The Art of Cloning: Creative Production During China’s Cultural Revolution. New York: Verso, 2017. Qin Hui 秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). “Ping zhongguoshi de xinzuopai he houxue” 评 中国式的新左派和后学 (Comment on Chinese the New Left and postmodernist studies). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 33. 1 (1996): 4–17. ———. Tianyuanshi yu kuangxiangqu 田园诗与狂想曲(Pastorals and Rhapsodies: A Research for Peasant Society and Peasant Culture). Beijing: Zhongyangbianyi chubanshe, 1996. ———. “Ping zhongguoshi de xinzuopai he houxue” 评中国式的新左派和后学 (Comment on Chinese Neo-Leftists and Postmodernist Studies). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty-First Century) 33.1 (1996): 5–16.

4

WANG XIAOBO: WORK THROUGH POWER …

141

Qin Hui 秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). “Lun Wang Xiaobo yu dangdai pipan xianshizhuyi wenxue de mingyun” 论王小波与当代批判现实主义文学的命运 (On Wang Xiaobo and the Fate of Contemporary Critical Realist Literature). Han Yuanhong 韩袁红, Ed. Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Prado, C.G. Searle and Foucault on Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Steele, Meili. Hiding from History: Politics and Public Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005. Veg, Sebastian. “Utopian Fiction and Critical Examination: The Cultural Revolution in Wang Xiaobo’s The Golden Age.” China Perspective 4 (2007): 75–87. Wang Xiaobo 王小波. Siwei de lequ 思维的乐趣 (Pleasure of Thinking). Beijing: Beiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996. Wang, Shaoguang. “Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan.” Diss. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990. Wang Xiaobo 王小波. Wode jingshen jiayuan 我的精神家园 (My Spiritual Home). Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 1998. Wang Yi 王毅, ed. Bu zai chenmo—Renwen xuezhe lun Wang Xiaobo 不再沉 默 —人文学者论王小波 (Not silent any more: humanities scholars on Wang Xiaobo). Shanghai: Guangming ribao, 1998. Wang Hui 汪晖. Sihuo chongwen 死火重温 (Dead Fire Revisited). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2000a. ———. 2000. “Dangdai zhongguo de sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing wenti” 当代中国思想状况与现代性问题 (Contemporary Chinese thought and the question of modernity). Zhishifenzi lichang : ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场: 自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi, 2000b. 83–123. Wang Binbin 王彬彬. “Yiweiluanzhen he huaweiweizhen: liuhe yuji shuxie, kuayuji shijian de wenti yishi” 以伪乱真和化伪为真: 刘禾 《语际书写》 《 , 跨语际 实践》 的问题意识 (Distort Truth with Falsehood and Turn Truth into Falsehood: Problematics in Liu He’s and Discursive Writing and Translingual Practice). Wenyi yanjiu 文艺研究 (Literature and Art Studies) 4 (2007a): 150–157. Wang, Chaohua, ed. One China, Many Paths. New York: Verso, 2005. Wang Mingming 王铭铭. Xifang zuowei tazhe: lun zhongguo xifangxue de puxi yu yiyi 西方作为他者: 论中国西方学的谱系与意义 (the West as the Other: on the Genealogy and Meaning of China’s Western Studies). Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi, 2007b.

142

G. GAO

———. 2007. Wang in Love and Bondage: Three Novellas by Wang Xiaobo. Trans. Hongling Zhang and Jason Sommer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. Wang Xiaobo 王小波. Huangjin shidai 黄金时代 (The Golden Age). Xi’an: Shanxi shifan daxue, 2009a. ———.Qingtong shidai 青铜时代 (The Bronze Age). Xi’an: Shanxi shifan daxue, 2009c. ———. “Weilai shijie zixu” 未来世界自序 (Preface to the Future World). Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009d. 37–38. ———. “Huaiyi sanbuqu xu” 怀疑三部曲序 (Preface to Trilogy of Doubt). Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009e. 43–47. ———. Xingxingsese de zaofan: Hongweibing jingshen suzhi de xingcheng ji yanbian 形形色色的造反: 红卫兵精神素质的形成及演 (Various Rebellions: Red Guards’ Spiritual Formation and Transformation). Hong Kong: The Chinese U of Hong Kong, 1999. Xu Jilin 许纪霖.. “Ta si gu ta zai” 他思故他在 (He Thinks, Therefore He Is). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Xu Youyu 徐友渔. “Ping jiushinian de xinzuopai” 评九十年代的新左派 (On the New Left in the 1990s). Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 (Contemporary Chinese Studies) 4 (2000). https://www.modernchinastud ies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/71-mcs-2000-issue-4/549-2012-01-03-12-1140.html. Accessed 20 May. 2020. Zhang Yiwu 张颐武. “Shinian hou zaisi Wang Xiaobo de jiazhi” 十年以后再思 王小波的价值 Rethinking on Wang Xiaobo’s Value after A Decade). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Zhao, Suisheng. “Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 961–982. Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤. Shuzhai li de geming 书斋里的革命: 朱学勤文选 (Revolution in the Study: Selected Works of Zhu Xueqin). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999.

CHAPTER 5

Chen Zhongshi: Disclosing an Enchanted Local Everyday Confucian World

Confucian Revival in Contemporary China In modern China, Confucianism was often regarded as a huge impediment to China’s modernization and social progress. The radical antitradition and anti-Confucianism movements started from the New Culture Movement and culminated during the Cultural Revolution when traditional thought, culture, customs and habits were denigrated and discarded, and Confucian statues and symbols were burned down. However, with the end of the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism and Chinese tradition witnessed reconsideration and resurrection in the 1980s. Quite a number of research centers, scholarly projects, conferences, journals and monographs concerning Confucianism and Chinese tradition mushroomed in the first decade of Reform and Opening-up era. Senior government and party officials attended and made laudatory speeches in the highly publicized events to celebrate the anniversaries of the birth of Confucius. A couple of political, economic, cultural and academic reasons can account for the reconsideration and revival of Confucianism in the 1980s. First, scholars of Chinese philosophy and history wanted to redress the politicalized stigmatization of Confucianism and make fairer reevaluation. Second, the Cultural Revolution undermined social morality and socialist ideology. The CCP government attempted to appropriate Confucian moral and spiritual cultivation to restore social order, fill up the ideological void, counter the growing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_5

143

144

G. GAO

Westernization and boost Chinese national identity construction. Third, the economic success of Confucianism-informed Asian countries and regions like Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea made many Chinese intellectuals and government officials realize that Confucianism was not necessarily at odds with economic modernization. On the contrary, Confucian ethics’ emphasis on education, self-discipline, collective cooperation and social harmony can produce high-quality workforce, social stability and rapid economic development. Fourth, the importation of overseas Chinese new Confucians’ thoughts to the Chinese academia reinforced the revival of Confucianism.1 However, the government and senior professors’ revival of Confucianism in the 1980s was accompanied by the young liberal-leaning intellectuals’ continuation of the New Culture Movement’s iconoclasm and anti-Confucianism. This iconoclasm was shaped by the critical reflection on the Cultural Revolution.2 The then liberal-leaning intellectuals dared not to call themselves “liberals” because of the Dengist regime’s continued campaign against the so-called bourgeois liberalization. These liberal-leaning reform-minded intellectuals thought the Cultural Revolution claimed to promote the most progressive communist ideals but its actual bloody power struggle and personal cult indicated that it was by nature a return of the most backward and reactionary feudalism and despotism that was deeply rooted in Chinese imperial history. To get out of the Cultural Revolution and move toward modernization and liberalization, China must continue the unfinished task of opposing the autocratic tradition and its accomplice Confucianism. There were “four famous generals” (Bao Zunxin, Jin Guantao, Liu Xiaofeng and Liu Xiaobo) who stood at the forefront of anti-traditionalism and antiConfucianism.3 From various Western perspectives of the Enlightenment values, scientism, Christianity and Nietzsche, these liberal-leaning intellectuals criticized Chinese tradition and Confucianism for lacking in freedom, democracy, science, authentic faith and fostering “enslaving

1 For a detailed discussion on the revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, see Makeham (2008, 42–57). 2 For a detailed discussion on the iconoclastic liberal intellectuals, see Wang (1996, 79–90). 3 Li (2018). Liu Xiaofeng turned into a Straussian critic of liberalism in the 2000s. See Marchal (2017, 173–196).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

145

personality.”4 Liberals’ anti-traditionalism reached its climax in the widely watched TV documentary Heshang in which Chinese civilization is deprecated as backward, stagnant autocratic agricultural civilization while Western civilization is glorified as advanced open oceanic commercial civilization. However, the enormous sociopolitical transformations around the 1990s changed the iconoclasm of contemporary Chinese liberalism. First, the Tiananmen protest was ruthlessly cracked down. The antiauthoritarian liberal intellectuals were not only critical of the authoritarian CCP government, but also recognized the immaturity and chaos of the radical iconoclastic protest movement. Second, the collapse of communist regimes and drastic socioeconomic transformation in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s did not bring about economic prosperity and social stability as expected, but led to prolonged political chaos and economic recessions. Although liberal intellectuals were dissatisfied with CCP’s brutal crackdown on the protest, the undesirable consequences of overthrowing communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led them to reflect critically upon modern China’s radical revolutions and iconoclastic cultural movements. Third, the imported Hayek’s tradition-based liberalism, overseas conservative liberal intellectuals’ and the Republican China’s and overseas liberal-leaning new Confucians’ thoughts facilitated post-Tiananmen native liberal intellectuals’ anti-radical reflections. They attribute modern China’s nihilism and totalitarianism to violent radical revolutions’ destruction of traditional morality and autonomous institutions.5 They thought that China’s realization of personal liberty and constitutional democracy should not be based upon break with but evolution from China’s own Confucian tradition. As a result, the post-Tiananmen liberal intellectuals gradually turned from their liberal predecessors’ denigration of Confucianism to the use of Confucianism to advance their anti-authoritarian liberal agenda and develop a robust Chinese liberalism anchored on its own tradition. The New Left intellectuals emerged in the mid-1990s as liberal intellectuals’ opponents. Unlike the liberals that blame China’s problem upon

4 See Wang (2009, 49–50). 5 See Song (2007, 51–52).

146

G. GAO

the party state’s authoritarianism, the New Left view the dominant neoliberal ideas and reforms as the root cause of contemporary China’s crisis. They see China’s socialist legacy and Confucian tradition as intellectual and institutional sources to counter the prevailing Western liberal democracy and develop China’s own alternative modernity that they believe to be superior to the Western liberal model. The mainland new Confucian intellectuals were also formed in the 1990s as a critical response to other intellectual factions and streams of thought.6 They not only criticize native liberals’ and overseas liberal-leaning new Confucians’ subjection to Western liberalism, but also rebuke the New Left’s recourse to socialist legacy as misguided. The mainland new Confucians are committed to recuperating a Confucian tradition that is authentically Chinese and can be conducive to contemporary China’s distinctive moral and political reconstruction. As a result, since the late 1990s, there has emerged an interesting intellectual phenomenon that despite their ideological conflicts, different intellectual factions use Confucian tradition to advance their respective political agendas. The existing English scholarship on contemporary China’s use of Confucian tradition is fairly deep. However, most of it gives a negative evaluation. First, scholars from the disciplines of political science and international relations criticize contemporary intellectuals for being complicit with the government in distorting and idealizing Confucian tradition and Chinese history in a joint effort to justify the one-party authoritarian system at home and promote the hierarchical China model abroad.7 Second, scholars of Chinese intellectual history

6 Xinrujia 新儒家 (New Confucian) is a polysemous word referring to different groups of Confucians. It can mean Song New Confucians as opposed to pre-Qin Confucians or modern New Confucians (Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, Feng Youlan) or contemporary new Confucians. I focus on dangdai dalu xinrujia 当代大陆新儒家 (contemporary mainland new Confucians), a word first coined by Chinese Confucian scholar Fang Keli to refer to the Confucian intellectuals since the 1990s in mainland China. Differing from diaspora New Confucians from Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America, mainland New Confucians are more concerned with the problems and crisis that People’s Republic of China have been facing and the political value of Confucianism. Representative figures include Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiaoguang, Sheng Hong, Zeng Yi, Tang Wenming and Yu Chunsong. For a detailed introduction to their thoughts, see Cui (2012) and Makeham (2008, 192–276). 7 For book-length criticisms, see French (2017), Ai (2014) and Horner (2011). For article- or chapter-length criticisms, see Zhao (2015, 961–982), Callahan (2015, 983– 1001), Ford (2015, 1032–1047) and Wu (2014, 971–991).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

147

reproach Chinese intellectuals for taking a pragmatic approach to cherrypicking history for current political use and ignoring the complexities of Confucian tradition and Chinese history.8 Third, the poststructuralist and psychoanalytic studies of Chinese thought dismiss Chinese intellectuals’ preoccupation with the construction of a monolithic and static Chinese tradition as impossible and pathological.9 There are some elements of truth to these arguments and criticisms, but the English scholarship’s description and assessment of contemporary Chinese intellectuals’ studies and uses of Confucian tradition are partial and problematic. First, the extant scholarship tends to treat Chinese intellectuals as a homogeneous pro-government group and overlook the internal differences within the Chinese intelligentsia. It is true that many New Left, New Confucian and statist intellectuals consciously or unconsciously join the government in appropriating Confucian tradition for authoritarian and expansionist purposes, but a host of anti-authoritarian liberal intellectuals are committed to studying the Confucian tradition to understand the historical origin of contemporary China’s repressive politics, and to retrieve its useful elements to provide a native and historical rationale for an institutionalized check on the party state power and for implementation of liberal values and institutions. For instance, Liu Junning, a leading liberal scholar of political philosophy, admits that China does not have a rich tradition of freedom as that in the West, but this does not follow that there is no freedom at all. Liu emphasizes Confucian tradition has “free elements and factors” that are compatible with liberal values. For example, the Confucian tenets “do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” and “all men are brothers” entail the seeds of equal and free interpersonal relation that is instrumental to building modern equal and free social and political relations.10 Xu Zhangrun, a liberal legal scholar known for his courageous critique of Xi Jinping’s increasingly repressive regime, emphasizes that liberalism cannot be realized without being connected to China’s inherited concepts and institutions. He argues that Confucianism’s emphasis on “moral subjectivit” lays the foundation of personal freedom and independent individuality. The advancement

8 See Cheek (2005, 204–222). 9 See Wu (2014, 318). 10 Liu (2006, 165–172).

148

G. GAO

of the latter must be grounded upon the reanimation of the former.11 Zhang Qianfan, a liberal professor of law at Peking University, reinterprets early Confucianism as a political philosophy treating human beings as ends in themselves rather than as means to other purposes, which resonates with the modern liberalism’s prioritization of individual liberties and rights. Even the non-liberal intellectuals do not uniformly make authoritarian use of Chinese tradition, either. Instead, some of them with liberal sympathies make liberal-leaning interpretations and extensions of Chinese tradition. For instance, Bai Tongdong, a renowned Shanghaibased Confucian scholar with liberal sympathies, interprets Confucius’ political philosophy as “a thin version” of Rawlsian left-leaning liberalism.12 Deng Xiaojun, a Beijing-based New Confucian scholar, argues that the Confucian “heavenly principle” is inherently compatible with the Western natural law that he perceives as the core of liberal democracy.13 The journalist-turned legal scholar Qiu Feng finds the prototype of the AngloAmerican case law in the Han Dynasty’s “deciding the cases by the Annals ” (春秋决狱), for the latter is like the former in following historical precedents instead of codified laws to judge a legal case.14 Second, despite their different political positions, most Chinese intellectuals’ studies of Confucian tradition are indeed pragmatic in the sense that they seek to find its contemporary relevance for China and the rest of the world. However, this pragmatical approach to Confucian tradition does not necessarily follow that all engaged Chinese intellectuals would sacrifice historical reality for political efficacy. If we look at more liberal intellectuals’ historical discourses, in particular, their more scholarly works, we will find that many sobering intellectuals with a strong historical research background, such as Xu Jilin, Ge Zhaoguang, Qin Hui, Jin Yan, Lei Yi, Yuan Weishi and Xue Yong, take aim at their fellow Chinese intellectuals’ simplification or glorification of Confucian tradition for particular political agendas.15 They seek to retrieve ethical and/or political value of Confucianism for current use, but also caution that this 11 Xu (2017, 114–121). 12 Bai (2009, 38–40). 13 For the English discussion on Deng Xiaojun’s thought, see Elstein (2014, 123–143). 14 Qiu (2005, 318–334). Qiu used to be a liberal intellectual who translated and

introduced many works of Hayek and Austrian School for the Chinese academia. However, since the mid-2000s, his position has been more leaning toward the New Confucians and less critical of the CCP regime. 15 Qin (2000, 526–535), Jin (2000, 514–525), Zhu (1999, 419–422), Ge (2017, 241–284), Xue (2008), Yuan (2010).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

149

pragmatic retrieval must be based upon the respect for historical realities.16 For instance, Xu Jilin, Shanghai-based liberal historian, rejects New Confucians’ exaggeration that Confucian tradition has already constituted “Confucian Constitutionalism” by resorting to historical fact. He points out that the Confucian concepts and institutions of “dual authority of Confucian Way and Orthodox tradition of governance” (道统与政统的双 重权威), “co-governance by Confucian scholar-official and emperor” (士 大夫与君主共治天下), “censorate system” (御史制度) and “critical public opinion” (清议) were established in imperial China to limit the monarchial power.17 However, the historical reality is that these institutions were not strictly practiced and did not form hard and fast rules that can place substantive check on the monarchial power. Xu emphasizes that there is some political wisdom in these Confucian political institutions but they must be developed and reformed to fit modern China’s political context. Based on his meticulous studies of Chinese intellectual history, the leading New Left intellectual Wang Hui finds the post-Song Confucian intellectual tradition is not a simple expansion of Western scientific spirit and liberal values, but a complicated intellectual tradition responding critically to the modern separation of norms from facts, ethics from politics. Chinese intellectuals’ pragmatic scholarship does not necessarily lead to their neglect of historical realities and fabrication of an unchanged and homogenous tradition. Instead, their politically engaged historical research could disclose historical ruptures and complexities. Despite their conflicting political ideologies, most Chinese intellectuals refuse to take a poststructuralist approach to tackle the notion of tradition as an empty floating signifier without any actual referent, but insist on the relative stability of Chinese tradition and develop a more flexible understanding of the historical continuity and discontinuity, unity and diversity. For instance, the liberal historian Ge Zhaoguang, on the one hand, employs his rich knowledge of Chinese history to make a scathing critique of the Confucian fundamentalists’ idealized version of a monolithic Confucian tradition; on the other hand, with solid historical evidence, he convincingly argues that the cultural concept of China could be traced back to pre-Qin China and ordinary historical actors have had a

16 Xu (2007). 17 Xu (2012, 44–59).

150

G. GAO

relative stable sense of Chinese national identity since the Song Dynasty.18 The poststructuralist indiscriminate dismissal of all Chinese intellectuals’ reconstructions of their own tradition and history as impossible and pathological exposes nothing but a West-centric and poststructuralist antirealist theoretical bias. It is neither consistent with basic historical fact nor conducive to a more complicated understanding of Chinese tradition and history. The above discussion on the problems with the existing English scholarship does not mean that Chinese intellectuals’ reconstructions of their own tradition and history are impeccable and free from factual errors and methodological flaws but simply suggests that instead of taking only a poststructuralist or a liberal political perspective to selectively single out a particular intellectual faction for critique of Chinese intellectuals’ nationalism, authoritarianism and pragmatism, China scholars need more nuanced description and fairer evaluation of contemporary Chinese Confucian and historical discourse. To address the problems with the current scholarship, the first part of this chapter tries to discuss the achievements and limits of Chinese intellectuals’ studies and uses of Confucian tradition on their own terms. Instead of surveying all the contemporary arguments and scholarship about Chinese tradition, I focus on three intellectual debaters: liberal historian Qin Hui, the New Left intellectual historian and cultural critic Wang Hui and the New Confucian intellectual Jiang Qing. These three debaters are selected because they are the representative figures of the major three intellectual camps. Their works represent three major approaches to Chinese tradition from three distinctive political positions. In the second part of this chapter, I offer an interpretation of Chen Zhongshi’s novel The White Deer Plain as a useful resource that can overcome the limits of intellectuals’ reinterpretations of Confucian tradition. I argue that The White Deer Plain’ s disclosure of and historical engagement with an enchanted local everyday Confucian world opens up a new argumentative space for talking about Chinese tradition and Confucianism, a space elided by different intellectual groups that are focused only on elite Confucian thinkers and thoughts.

18 Ge (2011, 25–28).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

151

Liberals’ Reinterpretation and Re-appropriation of Confucian Tradition To Chinese liberals, the fundamental cause for political corruption, social injustice and economic inequality in contemporary China is the authoritarian state. Their solution is to set restraint on the repressive state power by recourse to Western liberal democracy. As a liberal historian, Qin Hui situates the issue of repressive state into Chinese history, arguing that it is not only a contemporary evil but also a long-standing problem that has been deeply entrenched in Chinese tradition for more than two thousand years. Qin Hui’s research into traditional Chinese society and social thought should not be considered as disinterested historical scholarship but as his political efforts to gain a profound understanding of the historical origin of the current repressive state power and search for indigineous resources for solutions. Qin Hui’s historical research starts with his critique of both Chinese Marxist and nativist understandings of traditional Chinese society. Influenced by Marxist social theory, Chinese Marxist historians and communist leaders hold that traditional Chinese society had always been torn by the class struggle between landlords and tenant peasants and that all social relations are based on a high concentration of land upon the landlords who live off exploiting the landless tenants. Chinese communist revolution was launched to wipe out the exploitive landlord class, establish public ownership and found a proletariat/peasant-led socialist state. By contrast, nativist historians and Confucian scholars insist that traditional Chinese society was not marked by the landlord-peasant class conflict but by affective harmony based on an extended family system that is guided by Confucian principles of sangang wuchang 三纲五常 (three bonds and five norms).19 They argue that the chaos and disasters in modern China should be imputed to the destruction of this virtuous Chinese tradition caused by various radical political and cultural revolutions. Qin Hui finds defects in both Marxist and nativist arguments. On the one hand, nativists’ harmonious view of traditional Chinese society cannot account for the cyclic nation-wide peasants’ uprisings in Chinese history; on the

19 “Sangang ” (Three Bonds) are “junweichengang ” 君为臣纲 (rulers guides subject), “fuweizigang ” 父为子纲 (father guides son), “fuweiqigang ” 夫为妻纲 (husband guides wife) and “wu chang ” are ren 仁 (benevolence), yi义 (righteousness), li 礼 (propriety), “zhi” 智 (wisdom) and “xin” 信 (fidelity).

152

G. GAO

other hand, Marxist description of traditional Chinese society riven by the class struggle between landlords and peasants is empirically false. Qin Hui makes a statistical study of ancient title deeds. His empirical research shows that since the tenth century, land concentration had not been so severe as Marxist historians describe. In particular, more than 80% peasants living in North China cultivated their own lands without having to suffer from the exploitation of landlords. Therefore, the intense class struggle between landlords and landless peasants as described by Marxist historians did not actually exist in Chinese history.20 Then how to explain the persistent large-scale peasants’ uprisings in Chinese history? With his solid empirical studies, Qin Hui points out that it is not the oppression by landlords but the oppression by autocratic state that led to Chinese peasants’ continuous uprisings in history. Qin Hui observes that despite their different political attitudes, both Marxist and nativist scholars mistakenly take Confucianism as the dominant Chinese tradition. The reason for this misconception is that both of them base their studies of Chinese history upon what he calls dianji sixiang 典籍思想 (thoughts reflected in classic and elitist texts). Qin Hui insists that dianji sixiang is not reliable because they only reflect ideals and principles that were not actually believed and practiced in reality. Qin Hui takes a different approach to Chinese history by looking at shehui sixiang 社会思想 (social thought reflected in popular texts, primers, pamphlets, proverbs and sayings).21 Qin Hui’s studies of social thought enable him to discover that what really dominated Chinese tradition is not the family-centered Confucianism but the state-centered fajia 法家 (legalism). In Qin Hui’s words, Chinese tradition is not characterized by Confucianism nor by “rushidaoheyi” 儒释道合一 (combination of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism) but by “rubiaofali” 儒表法里 (Confucianism in appearance and Legalism in essence) and “fadaohubu” 法道互补 (Legalism and Daoism complement each other).22 By “Confucianism in appearance and Legalism in essence,” Qin Hui means “what are said are Confucians’ ren 仁 (benevolence), yi义 (righteousness), li礼 (propriety), but what are actually believed and practiced are legalists’ fa 法 (law and statue), shu 20 According to a survey conducted in 1950, prior to communist party’s land reform, landlords made up only 2% of population and 5% of land; more than 80% of land was owned by self-cultivating farmers. See Qin (1996, 49–50). 21 Qin (2002, 104). 22 Qin (2002, 105–111).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

153

术 (tactics and strategies) and shi 势 (power and violence)”; by “Legalism and Daoism complement each other,” Qin Hui means that when one seizes power, he follows legalism; when he loses his power, he uses the escapist Daoism as an excuse to lead the life of a recluse and eschew his social responsibility as a critical intellectual.23 Qin Hui argues that many modern Chinese intellectuals’ critiques of the oppression of familycentered Confucianism and individual despots are misplaced, because the real obstacle to Chinese modernity is not the oppression of big family but the repressive big state and its accompanying ideologies of statecentered legalism and escapist Daoism.24 While Qin Hui gives a mostly negative reevaluation of Chinese political tradition, he is not like previous Chinese liberals who go to the extreme of “totalistic anti-traditionalism.” Instead, he is consciously making use of Confucian resources to solve the problem of repressive state that has been plaguing both ancient and contemporary China. He makes a distinction between chunru 纯 儒 (pure Confucianism), daoru 道儒 (Daoist Confucianism) and faru 法 儒(legalist Confucianism), and commits himself to recuperating the “pure Confucianism” that was first formulated by Confucius and Mencius, and subsequently maintained and developed by Huang Zhongxi 黄宗 羲, Wang Fuzi 王夫之 and Tang Sitong 谭嗣同.25 To him, pure Confucianism embodies functional and transcendental value that can be used to build modern Chinese democracy and culture. Confucianism is functionally valuable for two reasons. First, its emphasis on family and small community can resist the pervasive state power and create modern local autonomy; second, its insistence on intellectuals’ responsibility of political critique can dismantle the escapist Daoism and foster a spirit of positive freedom and political intervention. By recuperating the pure Confucianism, Qin Hui does not seek for a return to Chinese tradition, but for what he calls xiru huirong 西儒汇融 (fusion of pure Confucianism with Western liberalism) to solve the problem of repressive state in contemporary China. In terms of transcendental value, Qin Hui remains reserved about it. He does not deny the possibility that Confucianism can provide

23 Qin (2002, 109–111). 24 Qin (2002, 94–95). 25 Qin (2002, 89–90).

154

G. GAO

something that transcends Western modernity, but he insists that it must be premised upon its combination with Western liberalism.26 There is no denying that Qin Hui’s historical research sheds light on the complexity and conflict within the Chinese intellectual and political tradition. Unlike those who focus on ideals and thoughts of the elites, Qin Hui looks more closely at the practices and thoughts of the masses. Instead of approaching Chinese tradition from the Marxist perspective of class struggle or from the idealistic Confucian norms, Qin Hui seeks to reinterpret Chinese tradition from Chinese historical subjects’ own perspective. This move pushes him to the problematic of social imaginary of everyday life and enables him to discover that Chinese tradition is not unified and unproblematic but fraught with gaps and contradictions between ideals and practices, elites and masses. However, Qin Hui still fails to fully address the complexity and richness of Chinese historical social imaginary. First, his studies of “social thought” show that ordinary Chinese historical actors’ social imaginary is mostly not shaped by Confucianism but by legalism. However, to Qin Hui, this everyday social imaginary is a totally fixed and damaged one from which no resources and changes appeared. The only useful resource from Chinese tradition is the anti-autocratic “pure Confucianism” that consists of the norms and principles of elite Confucian scholars and philosophers. Qin Hui starts with a critique of Confucian elitism, but ends with another kind of Confucian elitism. What he misses is a rich corpus of daily speeches, self-understandings, narratives, institutions and legends in the Chinese historical social imaginary of everyday life upon which other critical and argumentative resources can be drawn and from which a particular form of life and being in the world could emerge to nourish the withering modern lifeworld. Second, Qin Hui’s exploration of social imaginary helps him to find that, unlike the West, the first and foremost impediment to Chinese modernity is not the oppression and exploitation of small community (feudal family/tribe/clan/manor) but of the large community (state/government). Therefore, Qin Hui argues that unlike the West whose transition to modernity is facilitated by “an alliance between citizens and kings fighting against the exploitive small communities,” China should take a different track by pursuing “an alliance between citizens

26 Qin (2002, 96–97).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

155

and small communities” that fight together to oppose the exploitive large communities.27 Unlike previous Chinese liberals who take China’s transition to modernity as a replication of the Western model, Qin Hui should be credited for paying more attention to China’s particular route to modernity. Nonetheless, to Qin Hui, the general roadmap remains the same for all the countries across the world: “from feudal to civil society, from hierarchical to contractual system, from human dependence to independence, from command to market economy.”28 This liberal and teleological conception of human development makes it impossible for Qin Hui to uncover other problems and provide other possibilities for the future of China. In Qin Hui’s eyes, there is only one problem (state oppression) that needs to be resisted and one resource (pure Confucianism) that can be drawn from premodern and modern China. Such a narrow understanding of Chinese history blocks out all the ethical and religious problematics. Qin’s historical studies reach for the universality of political oppression and political opposition, but never deal with the particular shifts and changes of Chinese intellectual history over time and the particular oppression and opposition specific to China. As a result, Qin Hui’s studies of Chinese intellectual history end up not with exploring the possibility of any alternative modernity but with showing the universality of Western liberalism. Third, it is praiseworthy that Qin Hui does not isolate and idealize pure Confucianism, but ties it into external intellectual tradition. Nevertheless, his agenda of “fusion of pure Confucianism and western liberalism” is not to bring the former into a productive dialogue with, but to assimilate it into the latter. The fundamental rationale for a smooth integration of Chinese tradition into Western liberalism is a transhistorical conception of humanity and public reasoning, what he calls rentongcixing, xingtongcili 人同此心, 心同此理 (people have a common heart in which lies a common reason).29 Such a transhistorical and disengaged approach drives out the historical particularities and shifts of humanity and public rationality.

27 Qin (1999, 70–71). 28 Qin (1999, 353). 29 Qin (2002, 92).

156

G. GAO

The New Left’s Reinterpretation and Re-appropriation of Confucian Tradition Unlike liberal intellectuals, the New Left think that the political corruption, social injustice and economic inequality in contemporary China do not stem from the domestic authoritarianism but from the exploitive global capitalism. They do not disavow the problem of present repressive state, but to them, liberals’ focus on critiquing the party state misses the point because modern nation-state is only a political form of modern capitalist society and the state is an internal element of global capitalism. According to this understanding, capitalism is not just an economic structure that is based on private property and separate from the state; rather, it is a social dynamic that encompasses what we call “state and society.” The New Left castigate liberalism as the ideology of global capitalism and product of Western modernity that serve only to maintain the existing injustice and inequality embedded in the world order. Therefore, Western liberal modernity should not be set as the only goal for China’s future, because it is built upon a flawed teleology and heavy exploitation of the third-world countries by the first-world capitalist countries. What China should search for is “an alternative modernity” that is superior to the Western model. Like Qin Hui, the leading New Left intellectual Wang Hui also places his political diagnosis and agenda into China’s historical and intellectual context and develops his arguments through his ambitious and innovative reinterpretation of Chinese intellectual history in his tetralogy The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought . He makes it very clear at the very beginning of this book that his aim is not to write a comprehensive history but “by interpreting thought historically, to propose a number of different understandings of modern problems.”30 As Viren Murphy says: “The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought is not just an immense contribution to historical scholarship, but also a self-consciously political intervention” (137). Wang Hui’s work is intended to draw upon the traditional resources to overcome the limit of Western modernity and envision an alternative and better future for China. As he writes, “the history that modernity

30 Wang (2004, 3).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

157

loftily and even proudly rejects contains the inspiration and possibilities for overcoming its crisis.”31 Wang Hui’s reinterpretation of Chinese intellectual history develops in three steps. First, he starts by criticizing the familiar depiction of China’s transition to modernity as a transition from a premodern autocratic empire to a modern nation-state. This critique implicitly challenges Qin Hui’s understanding of Chinese history as a history deeply and invariably mired in authoritarianism. To Wang Hui, various forms of the dominant empire/nation-state narrative are all subjected to an external Western point of view. Underlying such an external angle is a historical teleology and universalism to assimilate Chinese history into the Western model. What this external perspective leaves out is the valuable reflections upon and critiques of Western modernity from within and the pursuit of an alternative modernity by native Chinese intellectuals. Second, to oppose the external Western point of view and unveil the diversities of Chinese history, Wang Hui seeks to reinterpret Chinese history from a “neizai shijiao” 内在视角 (internal historical perspective).32 Meanwhile, Wang Hui is also aware that his “internal horizon” is not purely Chinese but informed by Western China studies.33 Wang Hui spells out this internal horizon by recuperating Song-dynasty Confucians’ worldview of “tianli” 天理 (heavenly principle). According to Wang Hui, Song-dynasty Confucians acutely experienced the separation of liyue 礼乐 (rituals and music) from zhidu 制度 (institutions), which is reflected in the “shift from a system of enfeoffment to a system of centralized administration, the shift from nonofficial schools and academies to the civil examination system, the decline of the well-field(jingtian) system to the rise of the equalfield (juntian) system, the sinicization of foreigners, China’s conversion

31 Wang (2004) 138. 32 Wang (2008) 117. 33 For instance, Thomas Metzger’s Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and

China’s Evolving Political Culture, Paul Kuhn’s Discovering Chinese History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past and Prasenjit Duara’s Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Despite their different research foci, all these studies seek to explore Chinese history from its internal and distinctvie logic, motivation and Chinese intellectuals’ self-understanding instead of imposing Western perspective upon it. However, unlike American scholars, Wang Hui is not only interested in how to better interpret Chinese history, but also how to look for historical intellectual resources for the solution to China’s current crisis and future route.

158

G. GAO

to foreign customs.”34 As a result, the external political and educational institutions became merely functional without embodying heavenly significance and moral foundation. Confucians have to turn to their internal “heavenly principle” as foundation for their identity construction and critical intervention into political and daily life. “Heaven” comprises a moral and ethical authority that resonates with the cosmic law. The “heavenly principle” can provide an inexhaustible resource for moral evaluation and political restructuring. By situating Song-dynasty Confucianism into the larger historical and intellectual context, Wang Hui argues that it is true that Song Dynasty witnessed the rise of market economy, centralized government, national consciousness and popular culture, features often associated with Western modernity, but Song Confucianism is not an expression of this early modernity. Instead, it constitutes an early critique of modernity. Third, Wang Hui continues to reinterpret subsequent Chinese history of thought not as a history of how modern Western features (positivism/individualism/capitalism/scientism) developed but as a history of how the dominant Confucian worldview structured by “Heavenly Principle” was debated and challenged within itself and how it responded critically to the emergence of Western modernity. Wang Hui argues that this critical tradition of Song Confucianism can explain why many modern Chinese intellectuals, starting from Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, Zhang Taiyan through Liao Qichao, Lu Xun and Mao Zedong, did not uncritically embrace Western modernity, but persisted in pursuing an “alternative modernity” or “anti-modern modernity.”35 By combining institutional and intellectual histories, Wang Hui reconstructs a flexible yet continuous, receptive yet critical self-understanding and self-interpretation of Chinese intellectuals. While situating Chinese intellectuals’ self-understanding and self-interpretation into their historical and institutional contexts, Wang Hui does not reduce them to products and effects of ideological forces and social structures, but emphasizes their “constitutive power” that can transform political relations and create new sociopolitical order.36 By retrieving the ignored Confucian heavenly principle, Wang Hui wants to let the distinctive shape and shift of Chinese intellectuals’ self-understanding appear, liberate Chinese past and present

34 Wang (2004, 54). 35 Wang (2004, 67). 36 Wang (2004, 3).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

159

from the Eurocentric and teleological episteme, and provide intellectual resources for contemporary Chinese intellectuals to explore the historical specificity and different ways that China can negotiate its transition to modernity. Despite his profound insights and praiseworthy intentions, there are still some shortcomings in Wang Hui’s treatment of Chinese selfunderstanding and its changes over time. First, according to Wang Hui, Song-dynasty Confucians’ “heavenly principle” emerged as a critique of the rift between Confucian ideal and actual system. Because since the Qin Dynasty, Confucian political and social systems and institutions had been gradually divorced from moral implication and become increasingly formalized and proceduralized. This change is celebrated by some scholars as a process of “modern rationalization.” But Wang Hui argues that the heavenly principle opens up a new space for Song Confucians to reintegrate Confucian ideal and actual system and reinscribe the moral significance and criteria into the political and social institutions. Wang Hui calls this Song Confucian approach to social and political system as “antirational rationalization.”37 It is anti-rational because it dispels the political and legal formalism of the modern West; but it is still rational because it is targeted at the then influential Buddhist nihilism and mysticism. However, this characterization of Song Confucianism as “anti-rational rationalization” leaves out an enchanted and mystified social imaginary that exists in ordinary historical citizens’ everyday life. Wang Hui emphasizes that Song Confucians’ worldview of heavenly principle is different from the Western scientific and positivistic worldview, because to the former, one’s understanding of things is inextricably bound with moral relations and transcendental values. However, this moralized transcendental Confucian worldview that Wang Hui rescues from the Western narratives still gives no place to the presence and agency of personified or animal gods, spirits and other spectral beings in the social imaginary of everyday life. Wang Hui’s neglect of the mythical and religious meanings in Chinese daily life is largely due to his focus on the elite Song Confucian scholars and philosophers, such as Zhu Xi, Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao. Wang Hui recognizes that Song Confucians’ understanding of heavenly principle differs from previous Confucians’ understanding, because they emphasize that heaven principle is not something abstract

37 Wang (2004, 263).

160

G. GAO

but must be carried out in the everyday practice.38 However, Wang Hui’s reinterpretation is still limited to the elitist discourses and positions that fail to seriously consider the rich languages, meanings and resources embodied in the non-rational and enchanted social imaginary of everyday life.39 Therefore, to some extent, Wang Hui is not unlike Qin Hui, for both of them attempt to capture ordinary historical citizens’ self-understandings, but end up with a disenchanted and demystified Confucian elitism. In his studies of the historical narratives about colonial India, Dipesh Chakrabarty points out both Western and Indian elite intellectuals’ narratives are handicapped by a unitary and secular conception of time and reject the ubiquitous presences and agencies of gods and spirits in Indian peasants’ uprisings as “backward” and “prepolitical.” Chakrabarty argues that “this view is not an adequate intellectual resource for thinking about the conditions of political modernity.”40 Indian peasants’ imagining of their being with gods, spirits and other supernatural beings plays a crucial role in their struggle for self-government and selfrule, values that are widely cherished in modern world. Chakrabarty’s insight is quite relevant here, for when retrieving the traditional resources, Chinese elite intellectuals also tend to leave out the existence and positive role of local gods and spirits in the enchanted everyday Confucian

38 Wang (2004, 284). 39 Prasenjit Duara also hints at Wang Hui’s neglect of diversities of Chinese thought.

In his commentary on Wang Hui’s The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought, Duara makes his critique in a very oblique way: “At the very least we will have to acknowledge as well the role of Buddhism, Daoism and popular thought as shaping this indigenous perspective.” See Duara (1997, 238). 40 Chakrabarty (2000, 15).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

161

world.41 My interpretation of the novel The White Deer Plain will address this point at length.

The Mainland New Confucians’ Reinterpretation and Re-appropriation of Confucian Tradition New Confucians in contemporary mainland China share the New Left’s rejection of Western liberal democracy and pursuit of an alternative modernity they consider as superior to the Western modernity.42 But unlike the New Left and liberals, they locate the source of China’s 41 Gan Yang is another leading New Left intellectual. He is currently dean of Xinya College at Tsinghua University. Like Wang Hui, Gan Yang endeavors to search for China’s internal historical, cultural and political continuities ignored by the Western modernization narrative. He reinterprets and reworks the Confucian historical narrative to propose “unify three traditions,” namely the Confucian tradition (elitism, affective personal and local relationships), the Maoist tradition (equality and justice) and the Dengist tradition (markets and competition). For Gan Yang, current China’s remarkable economic achievements are not based upon break with but upon continuation of China’s previous traditions. The Confucian tradition’s emphasis on the attachment to one’s ancestral roots drives oversea Chinese entrepreneurs to make huge investment in China that helped China’s economy take off. The economic decentralization and the mass mobilization and education in the Maoist era provide both institutional and human resources for China’s comprehensive and successful industrialization in the Dengist era. For Gan Yang, “unify three traditions” is not only a historical reality, but also the direction along which future China should move forward. Instead of following the Western liberal democracy, China should build on and integrate its own Confucian, socialist and liberal legacies to blaze a new and better trail. See Gan (2007, 3–49). However, Gan Yang does not make deep historical research on his own. His argumentation is mostly anecdotal and impressionistic. Unlike other leading intellectuals discussed here, Gan emphasizes only China’s historical and cultural continuity without exploring the ruptures, splits and diversities within Confucian tradition. Nor does he examine the horrors and losses caused by the three traditions he advocates. While gaining much public attention due to his simple language and catchy message, Gan’s discussion on “unify three tradition” is a severely reductive explanation and recuperation of Chinese history and tradition. 42 Xinrujia 新儒家 (New Confucian) is a polysemous word referring to different groups of Confucians. It can mean Song New Confucians as opposed to pre-Qin Confucians or modern New Confucians (Xiong Shili 熊十力, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Feng Youlan 冯友 兰) or contemporary New Confucians. I focus on dangdai dalu xinrujia 当代大陆新儒 家 (Contemporary New Confucians in mainland China), a word first coined by Fang Keli 方克立 to refer to Confucian intellectuals since 1990s in mainland China. Differing from contemporary neo-Confucians from Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America, mainland China New Confucians are more concerned with the problems and crisis that People’s Republic of China have been facing since it is increasingly involved in market economy and global capitalism from the 1990s. Their representative figures include Jiang Qing

162

G. GAO

present political and cultural crisis not in the global capitalism nor in the repressive authoritarianism but primarily in the loss and misuse of Confucian tradition. To them, both liberals and the New Left consciously or unconsciously subscribe to Westernization. The contemporary Chinese mainland New Confucians emphasize that Chinese modernity must be based upon Confucian values and beliefs. As a representative mainland New Confucian, Jiang Qing clarifies what Confucianism China needs by his reinterpretation of China’s complex Confucian traditions. Jiang Qing’s reinterpretation and re-appropriation of Confucianism unfold in three moves. First, he starts by criticizing both modern New Confucians and contemporary overseas New Confucians in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States. He criticizes the former for its overemphasis on the cultivation of individual and moral betterment and the latter for its integration into Western capitalism and liberalism. To him, modern New Confucianism and contemporary overseas New Confucianism are in complicit with Western liberalism to deprive China of its own political identity and consciousness. Second, Jiang Qing proposes what he calls “zhengzhi ruxue” 政治儒学 (political Confucianism) that can be traced back to the Gong Yang School, a Confucian school in Han Dynasty that emphasizes discovering the political messages hidden in Confucian classics. By uncovering the political implications of Confucian classics, Jiang Qing projects a distinctive Chinese political tradition that stresses harmony, affection, obligation, morality, substantive reason and transcendental legitimacy vis-à-vis formal equality, universal human rights, popular sovereignty and instrumental reason characterizing Western liberal democracy. Third, unlike liberals and the New Left who only draw upon Confucian intellectual resources to support their arguments, Jiang Qing formulates a concrete political system built upon the distinctive Confucian principles and norms that he retrieves from the Gong Yang School.43

蒋庆, Chen Ming 陈明, Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 and Sheng Hong 盛洪. For a detailed introduction to their thoughts, see Cui (2012) and Makeham (2008, 192–276). 43 The above summary of Jiang Qing’s thought comes from the first chapters of his Political Confucianism: Contemporary Confucianism’s Transformation, Characteristics and Development and An Introductory Treatise on Gong Yang School: Confucian Wisdom and Historical Faith, see Jiang (1995, 1–8; 2003, 11–38). For a detailed account of Jiang Qing’s thought, see Bell (2013, 1–26).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

163

Instead of surveying Jiang Qing’s political thoughts, I will focus on his central conception of “tiandao” 天道 (legitimacy of the heaven) that can show both the strength and weakness in his arguments. Jiang Qing contends that the first and foremost political crisis for contemporary China is the flawed conception of legitimacy that is derived only from the sovereignty of the people. This overstress on the will of the people will lead to the politics of desire and personal interests without any sacred and moral values. What Jiang Qing favors is a political system that is based upon three kinds of legitimacy: that of heaven, earth and the human, the three kinds of legitimacy reflected in Confucian classics. The legitimacy of heaven refers to a transcendent ruling will and a sacred sense of human morality. The legitimacy of earth refers to a legitimacy that comes from history and culture. The legitimacy of the human refers to the will of the people that determines whether or not the people will obey political authorities. Jiang Qing emphasizes that the three kinds of legitimacy are not equal and the legitimacy of the heaven is privileged over the other two. He draws on several classic Confucian passages to argue that “the ultimate holder of the highest political power is heaven and not a human person, that is, sovereignty lies with heaven…, it is natural that the transcendent, sacred legitimacy of heaven is higher in terms of legitimacy than legitimacy based on the people.”44 Then how can we know heaven’s will? Jiang Qing’s answer is that it can be gained from prominent Confucians’ studies of classic Confucian texts. Jiang Qing is praised for his efforts to move beyond Western liberal democracy and search for a different political path that is grounded upon China’s own political and cultural traditions. My challenge to Jiang Qing is not his utopianism nor his mischaracterization of overseas new Confucians’ separation of “spiritual Confucianism” from “political Confucianism” but the questionable way he proposes to acquire the legitimacy of heaven, his crucial concept of political legitimacy.45 How could a 44 Jiang (2003, 202–210). 45 Taiwanese Confucian scholar Li Minghui argues that oversea Chinese Confucians,

such as Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan, are not merely concerned with “spiritual Confucianism” as Jiang Qing claims, but also very committed to the implementation of Confucian political ideals and norms. Jiang Qing responds by making two points. First, what the oversea Confucians seek to implement are not the authentic Confucian political principles but the liberalized and Westernized ones. Second, contemporary oversea Confucians and historical Confucians (like Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming) do not turn a blind eye to politics, but attribute the success and loss of politics to individual

164

G. GAO

contemporary Confucian gain an unproblematic access to the exact meanings of texts that were written more than two thousand years ago? Jiang Qing never deals with the problems of historical distance between text and reader and the interpretive difficulty posed by the linguistic differences of text and interpreter. Second, it is laudable that Jiang Qing’s reinterpretation seeks to recover Chinese thought and history not only from Western narratives but also from China’s own non-political narrative of Confucianism. However, he never investigates political Confucianism’s shifts and changes in history, particularly, its encounter with the West in modern times. To him, there is only one political Confucianism, which has not experienced any changes, revisions and transformations from the second century B.C to the twenty-first century A.D. What has happened over the last 2,000 years is only a voluntary or involuntary neglect of political Confucianism. Like Hannah Arendt’s retrieval of the political tradition in ancient Greece, Jiang Qing also thinks of modern subjects so deracinated from the resources of their cultural inheritance that the only task is to pull out moments from a distant past.46 “What is missing,” as Meili Steele observes in his critique of Arendt, “is a fine-grained account of historical consciousness of the subjects of the contemporary public to whom she is speaking.”47 The self-understandings and interpretative innovations of local and ordinary Confucian citizens are given no important place in Jiang Qing’s conception of Chinese political modernity. While there is a democratically elected House of People (shuminyuan 庶民院) in his proposed tricameral legislature, Jiang Qing argues that this democratically elected house must be subordinated to the House of Confucians (tongruyuan 通儒院) and the House of Nation (guotiyuan 国体院), both of which consist only of Confucian scholars and descendants of Confucius. In Jiang Qing’s argument, granting ordinary people a place in political deliberation and legislature is only a political strategy and compromise in modern times. He does not think seriously of the possibility that any useful resources and values could be recuperated from the thoughts and practices of ordinary historical actors.

morality and mentality, failing to prioritize politics as a relatively independent sphere over moral and spiritual sphere, see Jiang (2015). 46 See Arendt (1998, 248–284). 47 Steele (2005, 122).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

165

Since the 2010s, there emerged the second generation of mainland new Confucian scholars and intellectuals. The representative figures are Zeng Yi, Tang Wenming and Gan Chunsong. They follow Jiang Qing and other first generation of mainland new Confucians in rejecting the “spiritual Confucianism” and diaspora liberalized Confucianism and reaffirming the ignored native “political Confucianism.” However, the second generation do not think of the first generation’s focus on restructuring the political system at the highest level as desirable and possible in contemporary China. Instead, they take an “intermediate approach.” That is, instead of attempting to remake China’s current constitution and central legislature, the second generation mainland new Confucians attach more importance to reforming the increasingly specialized and professionalized educational and academic institutions, and reestablishing Confucian holistic educational tradition and academic horizon.48 However, the intellectual resources they resort to are still confined to Confucian elites (in particular, Kang Youwei) and Confucian classics (in particular, New Text School). They seek to get Confucianism out of the academic ivory tower to make it exert tangible impact on ordinary people’s education and social engineering. However, they treat ordinary social actors only as passive receivers waiting to be civilized and enlightened by Confucian elites and classics without considering if there is any linguistic, political and interpretive wisdom they can learn from the commoners. To sum up, all the three representative liberal, the New Left and the New Confucian intellectuals seek to gain a deeper understanding of China’s current predicament by recovering Chinese tradition and history from conventional narratives at different levels and in different ways. They are also devoted to overcoming contemporary crisis by retrieving intellectual and institutional resources from Confucian tradition. Their reinterpretations and re-appropriations have unveiled the complexities and diversities within the Confucian tradition. But they still fail to treat ordinary historical actors’ everyday life and thought in a satisfactory way. To Qin Hui, the folk tradition is useless and totally damaged by the state-centered legalism; to Wang Hui, it is a disenchanted imaginary stripped of local gods, spirits and other spectral beings; to Jiang Qing, it is deployed only as a political compromise to satisfy liberal critics. All of them are restricted to various Confucian elitisms and give various 48 For a detailed discussion on the second generation of mainland new Confucians, see Zhang (2017, 98–107).

166

G. GAO

reductive portraits of historical social imaginaries and ordinary subjects’ embeddedness in history and language. In what follows, I will situate Chen Zhongshi’s novel The White Deer Plain into the intellectual debate and offer an interpretation that shows how this novel can make a nonfactional contribution to the debate by uncovering an enchanted local everyday Confucian world elided by the leading intellectuals’ reinterpretations. Moreover, instead of essentializing this everyday Confucian world, White Deer Plain brings it to encounter the modern social and political transformations and examine their failures and successes, losses and gains, adaptations and critiques in the historical process. The novel’s local, historical and existential account can broaden the argumentative space by opening up more linguistic, intellectual and ritual resources and problematics for further and deeper political discussions and debates.

White Deer Plain: Disclosing an Enchanted Local Everyday Confucian World Except for several flashbacks, most stories in the White Deer Plain are narrated in a chronological order with a focus on how the village called White Deer Plain deals with challenges and crises one after another under its Confucian patriarch’s leadership: birth failure, horrible famine and plague, villagers’ protests, violent revolutions, political reforms, ruthless party struggles and civil wars. It starts with the late Qing Dynasty and ends up with the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949. The novel was published in 1993 and sold more than 500,000 copies within half a year. Since then, it has never ceased to be republished almost every year. Moreover, the novel has been adapted to a film and a TV drama which gained popularity with Chinese audience. However, despite its enormous popularity among ordinary readers, the novel is often reviewed negatively by leading Chinese literary critics. For instance, Meng Fanhua ascribes its popularity to detailed descriptions of sex and violence and condemns its author for pandering to the increasingly commercialized literary market since the 1990s.49 Han Yuhai chides the novel for its promotion of the outmoded humanistic ideology in the 1980s.50 Zhang Yiwu criticizes the novel’s portrayal of superstitious customs and rituals 49 Meng (1993, 66–68). 50 Han (2008, 60–73).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

167

as a gesture of self-orientalization catering to Western readers’ curiosity about an exotic oriental country.51 While praising the novel for its bold challenge to the official narrative about modern Chinese history, Li Yang reads it as a reflection of the Confucian revival and the anti-radical revolution trend in the dominant intellectual discourse of postsocialist China.52 As the novel has not been translated into English, it received little attention in English scholarship. The limited English studies interpret the novel either as an illustration of the Chinese official nationalism or as a Foucaultian “technologies of self.”53 In short, both the existing Chinese scholarship and English scholarship tend to reduce the significance of this novel to an illustration of China’s domestic ideological positions or Western poststructuralist theory. As a result, the novel’s potential contribution to the intellectual and theoretical discourse is left unexplored. In what follows, I argue that White Deer Plain does not simply illustrate the different versions of Confucian tradition as reconstructed by Chinese intellectual debaters, but uncovers an enchanted Confucian everyday world featuring a hybrid matrix of concepts, practices, rituals, myths, legends and images of Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, Buddhism, folk religion and local legend. This enchanted everyday world is often ignored by existing intellectual discourse, but deeply ingrained in ordinary people’s collective mentality and self-understanding. The novel does not treat this rural everyday world on its surface, but like what Charles Taylor calls “social imaginary.” According to Taylor, “the social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society.”54 Differing from social theory expressed in theoretical terms and shared by a small group of intellectual elites, social imaginary is carried in everyday images, stories and legends possessed by a large group of ordinary people. It is not focused on particular abstract ideas and principles, but on “the ways how ordinary people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met.”55 In deploying the problematic of social imaginary, 51 Zhang (1993, 61–62). 52 Li (2013, 172–180). 53 Gao (2014, 517–542) and Shu (2013, 257–260). 54 Taylor (2004, 2). 55 Taylor (2004, 12).

168

G. GAO

Taylor is working to overcome what he calls “a cultural” or “subtraction” accounts of social change that conceive of Western modernity “as a set of transformations which any and every culture will be forced to undergo”— e.g., the growth of reason, social differentiation, industrialization, rise of secularity. 56 These theories tend to view Western modernity as only viable society left “after the held myths and legends have been exploded.”57 The problematic of the social imaginary permits the historical specificity and contingency of these collective formations to appear, so that we are not tempted to ignore the different ways societies negotiate change. Reading White Deer Plain from the perspective of social imaginary can help us understand that the novel does not merely reconstruct particular Confucian principles and norms, but also argue at a deeper level by exploring the question of what underlies and enable the appearance and intelligibility of particular principles and ideas. To be more specific, it does not simply exemplify what Confucian norms are, but also investigates how they came to be what they are. Instead of idealizing and essentializing this enchanted everyday Confucian world, the novel brings it to encounter the modern social and political transformations and disclose its failures and successes, losses and gains, adaptations and critiques in the historical process that can enrich the intellectual discourse by offering more linguistic, institutional, ethical and politics problematics and resources to be discussed, debated or deployed for Chinese intellectuals’ shared pursuit of a better China. Taylor’s problematic of social imaginary points to a richer historical account of transition from tradition to modernity in different societies and cultures. Yet, Taylor’s own exploration of historical emergence of modern self “has little to say about the historical horrors of modernity— the Holocaust, sexism, racism, imperialism, or the rise of global systems” nor does he give space to how literature is complicit with regimes of power and historical disasters or how it works to resist such pressures.”58 Reading White Deer Plain could be illuminated by Taylor’s problematic of social imaginary. Meanwhile, the Chinese novel’s fine-grained fictional account of both liberation and oppression in a local Chinese village’s transition from tradition to modernity can also rectify Taylor’s neglect of the negative side of history and the progressive dimension of literature.

56 Taylor (2004, 173). 57 Taylor (2004, 176). 58 For sympathetic criticisms of Taylor, see Steele (2005, 100).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

169

Chen Zhongshi (1942–2016), the author of the White Deer Plain, is a contemporary Chinese novelist who was born into a peasant family and received no college education. He spent most of his life in the countryside of Shaanxi Province, even when he became a well-known writer. He wrote his lengthiest novel The White Deer Plain in the general intellectual atmosphere of the growing Confucian revival in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Like the three leading intellectuals I have discussed, Chen Zhongshi also tries to understand modern China and overcome its crisis by drawing upon Confucian resources. Nevertheless, his lack of formal college education and his long-term living in the rural area turns him to look at Chinese tradition less from the perspective of intellectual elites but more from that of ordinary local peasants. Despite their different prioritizing of Confucians values and norms, Chinese intellectuals tend to focus on clarifying and reconstructing the original meanings of Confucian classics without paying due attention to ordinary social actors’ self-understandings and self-interpretations of everyday life. This neglect of everyday world results in a reductive account of Chinese tradition. Moreover, the preoccupation with the recuperation of the original moments and texts prevents Confucian scholars and intellectuals from examining the historical shifts of Confucianism and Chinese tradition in its encounter with the arrival and intensification of modernity. Unlike the intellectual elites, Chen Zhongshi takes a different approach to Confucianism and Chinese tradition. When talking about the central question explored in the novel, Chen Zhongshi writes: My hometown, Weihe Plain of Shaanxi Province, surrounds the ancient capital of Chang’an. What time has given men and women on this plain is more than terra cotta artifacts. What kind of spirit and psychological structure have people inherited? How did the villagers in White Deer Plain, after losing the emperor in the early twentieth century, journey to 1949? This is the primary question I ask in White Deer Plain.59

For Chen Zhongshi, Confucianism is not a dead object to be unearthed from underground for archeological analysis, nor esoteric thoughts hidden in Confucian classics waiting to be decoded by erudite philosophers, but a living tradition that still informs contemporary Chinese people’s thought, behavior, emotion and mode of existence. To bring this 59 Chen (2007, 46).

170

G. GAO

living tradition to light, Chen Zhongshi does not look up to Confucian classics and philosophical texts, but looks down to local gazetteers, family histories, stories and anecdotes gleaned from local archives, elder neighbors and personal experience in the rural society. Chen Zhongshi intends his novel to explore the self-understandings and self-interpretations of the local rural people in the process of their historical encounters with both internal and external changes and crises. In his own words, he strives to sort out “lishi de mailuo” 历史的脉络 (the veins and arteries of history) rather than merely clarify and glorify particular lofty Confucian norms in an ahistorical and disengaged manner.60 Unlike conventional historiography, the novel does not give a causal or structural analysis of historical events, but offers an affective and interpretive history and highlights ordinary social actors’ self-understanding, evaluative framework and discursive agency. While actively exploring and tapping the critical and ethical resources in Confucianism and local tradition, White Deer Plain does not turn a blind eye to their failures, losses, weaknesses and oppressiveness in the historical process of China’s transition to modernity. The novel’s fine-grained historical account enables the often ignored local particularities and complex cultural heritages to emerge and make sense. With a few flashbacks, the story is mostly narrated in a chronological order and focused on how the Bai and the Lu families cope with personal, familial, local, provincial and national changes and challenges from the eve of the Republican Revolution in 1911 to the founding of PRC in 1949. Its characterization and plot basically follow the Confucian guideline for personal growth and development: “cultivate your self, look after your family, manage the country and put all under heaven in order” (修身齐家 治国平天下). Not limited to social and intellectual elites, the novel puts on the table a wide range of characters from all walks of life, ranging from Confucian scholars, landlord, chieftain/patriarch revolutionaries to peasants, artisans, doctors, merchants, officials, soldiers and bandits. The first half of the novel is focused on the older generation: the patriarch and landlord Bai Jiaxuan, his brother-in-law and Confucian scholar Mr. Zhu, hired hand Lu San, rival landlord Lu Zilin. The second half has the younger generation coming to the fore: Bai Jiaxuan’s two sons Bai Xiaowen and Bai Xiaowu, daughter Bailin, Lu San’s son Heiwa, Lu Zilin’s two sons Lu Zhaopeng and Lu Zhaohai.

60 Chen (2007, 48).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

171

The novel starts with the protagonist Bai Jiaxuan’s failure to continue his family line. He marries six wives one after another without giving birth to a single baby. Bai Jiaxuan’s birth failure raises worries and anxieties in the Bai family, because failure to produce offspring and continue the family line is considered as one of major three unfilial acts. This birth crisis is magically overcome by Bai Jiaxuan’s relocation of his family tomb to a hillside land where he sees a white deer spirit. Legends and stories about the white deer date back hundreds of years and become part of local spiritual history that “has seeped into villagers’ psyche.”61 According to the local belief, those who happen to see the deer will be blessed with fortune and prosperity. Bai Jiaxuan hires a yinyang xiansheng 阴阳 先生, a traditional folk Daoist who makes a living by practicing physiognomy, divination and fortune-telling to make sure the new tomb location can gather natural energy, balance nature and human world, and sustain the family property and prosperity. In the ceremony of tomb relocation, Bai Jiaxuan invites three Buddhist monks to sing Buddhist scriptures all the way down from the old tomb to the new location. From the very beginning, the novel presents a culturally complex everyday world that comprises a mix of Confucian values, Buddhist and Daoist rituals and folk legends and myths that are little discussed in the discourse of elite Confucians and intellectuals. This everyday rural world is enchanted and haunted by spirits, ghosts and supernatural beings that deviate from Confucius’ teachings to avoid the spectral and the supernatural: “do not talk about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorders and ghosts” and “stay at a respectful distance from gods and ghosts.”62 Confucius’ refusal to talk about gods and ghosts is often commended as what Max Weber calls modern “disenchantment,” a defining feature of modern rationality and secularity. However, the rural everyday world uncovered by the novel is different from the rational and disenchanted Confucian world as reconstructed by modern Confucian intellectuals. On the contrary, it is a world filled with gods, spirits, ghosts and supernatural practices such as auspicious white deer spirit, the ominous white wolf spirit, tuo meng 托梦 (a dead person delivering a message to the living in his/her dream), qiyu 祈雨 (pray to rain god for rain) and zhuogui 捉鬼 (catch ghosts).

61 Chen (2012, 29). 62 Confucius (1992, 88).

172

G. GAO

The “irrational” and “superstitious” are not only found in the ordinary illiterate villagers, but also in Mr. Zhu, an erudite Confucian scholar regarded as an incarnation of orthodox Confucian principles and norms. Nevertheless, Mr. Zhu accepts the invitation from Bai Jiaxuan to give divine revelation and exorcise adulteress’ ghost. Obviously, his actions violate Confucius’ teachings about not getting involved in spectral and magical affairs. These descriptions of superstitious beliefs and practices are not orientalist details to satisfy the Western readers’ curiosity for the “exotic” China, but have critical and progressive political meanings. Sometimes the novel depicts those supernatural and spectral practices and rituals as backward, oppressive and misogynist. For instance, a “monstersuppressing” pagoda is built above the seductress Tian Xiao’e’s grave. Villagers believe it can prevent Tian Xiao’e’s ghost from plaguing the villager. At other moments, the supernatural spirits and beliefs play a very positive role in comforting the disaster-inflicted villagers and mobilizing them to oppose the oppressive state power and strive for their rights and self-rule. For instance, the appearance of ominous white wolf removes Bai Jiaxuan’s hesitation and convinces him that the added head tax is a public evil that must be resisted. He draws upon the local folk tradition of using feather letter as a secret communication means to mobilize and inspire villagers and peasants to stage a well-organized protest against the newly established Republican government’s increased taxation. What is written into the feather letter is “tyrant is worse than tiger, grey wolf devours meat, white wolf drinks blood.”63 “Tyrant is worse than tiger” is a well-known quote from Confucius’ Analects that is often cited to justify the commoners’ opposition to imperial government’s heavy taxes and harsh laws. This classical Confucian quote is followed by the folk supernatural belief “grey wolf devours meat, white wolf drinks blood” that compares the human exploitation to animal brutality. The political motivational discourse in the feather letter is not composed of Western liberal concepts like “freedom,” “democracy” and “human rights” nor the Marxist vocabularies like “oppression” and “exploitation” but a blending of classical Confucian discourse and folk supernatural beliefs. By drawing upon the traditional local communication practice of feather letter and the discursive resources of both canonical Confucianism and folk supernatural legend, Bai Jiaxuan successfully mobilizes the involved peasants to turn in

63 Chen (2012, 100).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

173

their agricultural instruments to the county government as a gesture of civil disobedience that impels the republican government to abolish the heavy taxation and implement public policies in peasants’ interest. In his studies of the historical narratives about colonial India, Dipesh Chakrabarty points out that both Western and Indian intellectuals’ narratives are handicapped by a secular conception of time that rejects the ubiquitous presences and agencies of gods and spirits in Indian peasants’ uprisings as “backward” and “prepolitical.” Chakrabarty emphasizes that “this view is not an adequate intellectual resource for thinking about the conditions of political modernity.”64 Indian peasants’ imagining of their being with gods, spirits and other supernatural beings plays a crucial role in their struggle for their rights and self-government. Chakrabarty’s insight is quite relevant here. When retrieving the traditional resources, Chinese elite intellectuals tend to leave out the existence and positive role of local spirits and supernatural beings. The novel points to this neglect and displays supernatural spirits, beings and practices as potential resources for political mobilization and participatory politics. However, the rural people’s political participation and rebellion are not merely based upon a rational analysis of economic cost and benefit, but upon a historically embodied sense of morality and justice. At the moment of deciding whether or not to organize the protest, what Bai Jiaxuan thinks about is not whether the rebellious act will break modern law but whether it will breach the traditional moral code of loyalty and piety. He asks the Confucian teacher Mr. Xu: “Will protest violate the superior and cause a chaos? Is it disloyal and unfilial?”65 Mr. Xu’s answer is “obeying a wise emperor is loyal, disobeying an unwise emperor is more loyal.”66 It is this confirmation of the moral legitimacy that finally removes Bai Jiaxuan’s hesitation and drives him to initiate resistance and opposition against the exploitive government. Unlike the wicked landlord characters in socialist revolutionary novels who ruthlessly exploit and enslave landless peasants, Bai Jiaxuan treats his peasants and villagers like brothers and sisters. For instance, Lu San is a landless peasant working for Bai Jiaxuan’s family. Bai treats him as his own elder brother and asks his daughter Bai Ling and his son Bai Xiaowen

64 Chakrabarty (2000, 15). 65 Chen (2012, 100). 66 Chen (2012, 101).

174

G. GAO

to recognize Lu San as their godfather (gandie 干爹) and also allows Lu San’s son Heiwa to call him gandie as well. Such an intimate and brotherly relationship between landlords and peasants rewrites the rural social relations in terms of interpersonal harmony rather than class conflict that characterizes socialist revolutionary novels. More often than not, the depictions of Bai Jiaxuan’s diligence, benevolence and generosity are followed by historical stories that trace Bai Jiaxuan’s personal merits and virtues back to his ancestors hundreds of years ago and have been deeply ingrained in Bai’s family tradition and local custom. In other words, the novel does not treat personal virtues and ethical norms as disengaged concepts or subjective expressions but a diffusionary historical process. With personal maturity realized and familial fortune secured, Bai Jiaxuan and Mr. Zhu actively manage the village, county, province and state issues of increasing public interest and political importance. Bai Jiaxuan founds a community school and rebuilds the deserted an citing 祠堂 (ancestral hall) to reinforce the community unity and restore the moral disorder around the breakout of the republican revolution in 1911. The Confucian school is the locus where Confucian principles are taught, understood and passed on to posterity; the citang is the ancestral hall that serves as a permanent location to honor ancestors, hold funerals, weddings and discuss family- and clan-related issues. After Bai Xiaowen succeeds his father as patriarch, he begins to update the clan’s record book (zupu 族谱) to honor the clan’s tradition and perpetuate its continuation. The novel is mostly plot-centered, but at the same time fraught with detailed descriptions of these traditional social institutions, rituals and practices that seem to serve little plot function. The excesses of Confucian institutional and ritual details could make sense to us if we do not construe the novel as a mere illustration and reconstruction of Confucian principles and norms but as a deeper investigation of what the institutional and organizational forces and histories that underlie the continuation and operation of the principles and norms. In other words, what matters in the novel is not only the definitions of what is right but also the historical and institutional contexts in which it makes sense to strive for and achieve the rights. The revolution overthrows the Qing Dynasty and establishes the first Republic nation-state in Chinese history. Many revolutionaries and progressive intellectuals enthusiastically celebrate the end of the imperial rule and the implementation of modern Western democratic political

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

175

principles and institutions. However, when learning the breakout of revolution, Bai Jiaxuan and Mr. Zhu do not join the celebration like the urban intellectuals nor lament the fall of Qing Dynasty like its loyalists. Instead, both of them raise the same ethically and existentially challenging question: “how to lead a life without an emperor.”67 Farmers of the White Deer Plain get used to living under the social and political order sustained by an imperial and tribal rule. However, what the republican revolution seeks to break down is not only an individual emperor or a particular dynasty, but also the fundamental normative order and the way of life that underlie the traditional political rule. The newly established republican government sets up many modern political institutions and organizations but do not connect them to ordinary peasants’ traditions and self-understandings. Ba Jiaxuan’ and Mr. Zhu’s simple question “how to lead a life without an emperor” is not so much a practical economic question of how to do a particular job to make a living as a deep philosophical question how they ought to live their lives, imagine their social existence and fit with each other under the new regime, a series of questions that constitute the constellation of conditions that underwrite the new political order. While the Republican government codifies the imported modern political into formal laws and regulations, they do not manage to address these deeper existential and moral questions facing ordinary peasants and villagers. This gap between the modern political institutions and rural people’s inherited institution of meanings results in what is called the “incompleteness of Xinhai revolution.” Lu Xun portrays numerous rural characters in his famed short story Al Q who do not really understand the revolution, but appropriate it to serve their selfish interests. Lu Xun’s short story makes a sharp satirical critique of the incompleteness of the Revolution; that is, this revolution replaces the imperial dynastic rule with republican government, but does not actually transform peasants’ deeply entrenched feudalistic modes of acting and thinking. Unlike Lu Xun’s opportunist characters who abuse the revolution in the service of their selfish and vulgarized ends, Bai Jiaxuan does not take advantage of the social chaos for personal gains, but dedicates himself to restore the community order and foster rural ethics by drawing upon a local village code formulated by Guanxue (关学), a local Confucianism of Song Dynasty in Guanzhong

67 Chen (2012, 82, 92).

176

G. GAO

area. Countering the elitist over-theorizing and over-metaphysicalizing Song Confucianism, Guanxue emphasizes practice, unity of thought and action, cultivation of local ordinary people’s virtues and self-rule.68 Its village code is made up of four cardinal imperatives: “persuade each other to be virtuous, restrict each other for misconduct, use courtesy in interactions, and provide help to those facing difficulty” (德业相劝, 过失相 规, 礼俗相交, 患难相恤).69 In terms of rural governance, this village code prioritizes morality and rite over law and punishment, but does not exclude the latter. It seeks to integrate the rule of law, rule of morality and rule of rite. It is not a moral code and behavioral regulation imposed by the state from above, but an agreement voluntarily made and practiced by rural people from below. The implementation of village code in the novel leads to “the disappearance of gambling, stealing” and makes “the villagers become civilized, acting and speaking very politely and gently.”70 Such an integration of rule of law, morality and rite from bottom-up restores the rural moral order and provides an alternative model for rural governance and self-rule.71 What the republican revolution brings to the village is not more democracy and freedom but more hierarchical political institutions and oppressive state power that encroach on the traditional rural social order and self-rule. The traditional Xian-Cang (县-仓) two administrative levels are replaced by three-level government: Xian—Cang—Baozhangsuo (县仓-保障所).72 Instead of passively bearing the expansion of modern political power, villagers and peasants actively oppose oppression, defend their rights and demonstrate the agency of the local everyday world to deal with modern political changes. The new county mayor persuades Bai Jiaxuan to serve as a local senator in the new government by recourse to modern political rhetoric: “promoting democratic politics,” “eliminating feudalistic political evils,” “participate in county management” and “supervise government and communicate public opinions.”73 At first, Bai Jiaxuan is

68 For a detailed discussion on Guanxue, see Han (2016, 30–33). 69 Chen (2012, 93). 70 Chen (2012, 93–94). 71 For a detailed discussion on village code in premodern China, see Yang (2015,

3–27). For a brief introduction, see Bol (2010, 249–250). 72 Chen (2012, 95). 73 Chen (2012, 115).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

177

completely perplexed by these new political vocabularies imported from the West. However, he comes to capture the general meaning of being a senator once it is rephrased by the mayor in everyday language as “speaking for the people.”74 It could hardly be said that Bai Jiaxuan understands the exact political functions of senator and Senate operating on the modern principles of checks and balance of power. However, no sooner has he gained a superficial understanding of senator than he begins to use this modern political position to protest the newly stationed army in the village as a way of fulfilling the senator’s role of “speaking for the people.” He justifies his protest through a historical comparison: “even the Qing Dynasty did not have permanent army stationed at our village.”75 Bai Jiaxuan’s interrogation shows his flexibility and capability of deploying argumentative resources provided by both historical reference and modern political institution to contest the penetration of modern state power into local life. Unlike Bai Jiaxuan’s questioning of expanding modern political institution and state power, Bai Jiaxuan’s rival Lu Zilin coopts with the government and is appointed as village head. In the face of famines, plagues and natural disasters, it is not the new political institution that Lu Zilin represents but the Confucian institutions Bai Jiaxuan represents that play a more effective role in uniting and organizing villagers and peasants to foster rural spirit and solidarity, overcome the crises, and rebuild moral and social order. Bai Jiaxuan’s rebuilding and reconstitution of Confucian institutions and rituals do not follow that he is a Confucian fundamentalist that is resistant to all social changes and political transformation. While being an inheritor and rebuilder of Confucian values and institutions, Bai Jiaxuan and Mr. Zhu are not stubbornly attached to traditional customs and practices, but willing to adapt themselves to social, political and economic changes at times. Bai Jiaxuan serves as senator for the republican government, cuts off his braided pigtail, supports the abolition of female foot-binding and sends his daughter Bai Ling to school, an action that breaks the Confucian directive that “a girl without ability is virtuous.” Mr. Zhu justifies these progressive actions through pragmatic reasons: “pigtail is not a part of human body, cutting them off can save us a lot of combing time every day. Women’s feet are born for walking. Releasing

74 Chen (2012, 116). 75 Ibid.

178

G. GAO

them from foot-binding makes it easier to walk and move.”76 Mr. Zhu’s pragmatic approach suggests that the behaviors of the rural community are not always predicated upon fixed a priori Confucian moral codes but could be evolving according to proper human needs and ever-changing social context. After the Republican Revolution, the younger generation is grown up as the conflicts and struggles between KMT and CCP are intensifying. The brutal party politics and bloody civil wars divide the family and the rural community, pitting neighbors, lovers, brothers, sons and fathers against each other and engendering so many deaths and sufferings. The once peaceful rural community becomes brutalized and hardened to violence and human miseries. The younger generation of the White Deer Village is put under spotlight in the second half of the novel. These young characters could be divided into three sets in terms of their different reactions to tradition and modern changes. In what follows, I will examine the younger generation’s different experiences of and the older generation’s reactions to the brutalizing KMT-CCP struggles and the Second China-Japan War. My analysis will show that instead of presenting a onesided idealizing picture of Confucianism, White Deer Plain reveals both its successes and failures, adaptations and stagnations, oppressions and oppositions, offering us a complex historical account that can redress the blind spots and shortcomings in the elite intellectuals’ reconstruction of Confucian tradition. The first set of characters hold on to tradition and convention. Bai Jiaxuan’s second son Xiaowu inherits his patriarch position and grows into a mature upholder of Confucian values and norms. Bai Jiaxuan’s youngest son Xiaoyi and Lu San’s youngest son Tuwa are innocent and ignorant countryside lads only interested in farming. Unlike those who receive modern education in the city and get deeply involved in party politics, these characters hold on to traditional lifestyles and lead uneventful lives and undergo no intellectual and moral growth. However, unlike their traditionalist parents, these young traditionalist characters never play important roles in the historical stage and are gradually pushed to the margins as the plot unfolds. The second set of characters are rebels and revolutionaries: Bai Jiaxuan’s daughter Bai Ling, Lu Zilin’s two sons Zhaohai and Zhaopeng,

76 Chen (2012, 93).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

179

seducer Tian Xiao’e, bandit leader Da Muzhi. They get out of the Confucian sexual and moral norms and experience betrayals and miseries. Bailing receives modern education in the provincial capital Xi’an and throws herself into communist revolution. She falls in love with Zhaohai and Zhaopeng one after another. When Bailing and Zhaohai decide to join the revolutionary cause, they have no idea of which party they should join. Without any informed understanding of their own tradition and modern revolution, they join the CCP and the KMT respectively by “the flip of a coin.”77 Such an arbitrary political decision turns out to be a tragedy. When the two parties’ initial cooperation breaks down, the lovers and brothers are also turned against each other. Both Bailing and Zhaohai die from the party conflicts. Bailing’s and Zhaohai’s tragic story makes a satirical critique of blind participation in modern revolution and party politics that are severed from one’s own tradition and cultural embedding. Tian Xiao’e is the central female character in the novel. She is born into a poor family and sold to an old landlord as concubine. She cannot tolerate the sexual persecution and leave with Heiwa. She is eager to get accepted into Heiwa’s family and reform herself into a faithful and virtuous wife. However, when Heiwa takes her home to see his father Lu San, she is ruthlessly rejected by Lu San and cursed by all the villagers for her record of being an adulteress. Later, she is used by Lu Zilin to seduce Xiaowen to take revenge upon his rival Bai Jiaxuan. She is finally stabbed to death by Lu San, who believes her to be the source of family discordance and community decadence. Villagers build a devilsuppressing pagoda upon Xiao’e grave to eliminate the plague that is inflicting the village. A devil-suppressing pagoda is derived from the Legend of White Snake and symbolizes the oppression of the brave female white snake spirit who dares to break the moral conventions and marry a human being. This use of pagoda image casts an accusing finger at the sexual oppressions and social injustices that Xiao’e suffers. When speaking of the origin of the character Xiao’e, Chen Zhongshi writes: When reading the county gazetteers, I found a huge amount of biographies of “Chaste Married Woman and Virtuous Woman” (Zhenfu Lienü 贞妇烈 女). These women’s biographies tell similar stories: virgins resist molestations or young widows refuse remarriages and serve their kids and in-laws faithfully until their deaths, ending up with being awarded gilded plaques 77 Chen (2012, 193–194).

180

G. GAO

placed on their houses’ front doors. Sometimes, these women’s deeds and full names are not even mentioned with only their husbands’ last names and village names written into the biographies.78

Chen Zhongshi feels a great pity for those who sacrifice the vigor and vitality of their lives to fulfill the feudalistic requirement of chastity and earn a tiny space in the officially approved county gazetteers. For Chen Zhongshi, what comes out of reading these repetitive didactic stories is not an appreciation of these women’s self-sacrifice, but a strong sense of injustice, rage and curiosity that inspires him to read against the grain of these Confucian-informed biographies: “a rebellious and even vicious idea came to my mind….what I first feel in reading the lists of female role models exemplifying feudal morality is the destruction of the fundamental nature of being a woman.”79 To bring women’s forgotten lives and repressed desires to light, Chen Zhongshi turns to the folk stories and jokes about “vixens and whores” (泼妇淫女). While these women are left out of the official county gazetteers, their stories are widely circulating among the folk world and forming a juxtaposition with those written in the official county gazetteers. These counter-narratives about “vixens and whores” point to the oppression resulting from Confucian gender norms and make a poignant critique of its fixation upon chastity, virginity and filial piety, the oppression and the critique that are missing from the intellectuals’ male-centered approach to Confucian tradition. The third set of characters are Heiwa and Xiaowen who experience more complicated fates and come in a full circle. They are “seduced” by Xiao’e and kicked out of their respective families one after another. Persuaded by Zhaopeng, Heiwa joins the communist-led peasant rebellions to mobilize poor peasants to execute evil local gentries. Then, he turns into a bandit leader when the movement is cracked down. After being expelled from home, Xiaowen lives an undisciplined and dissolute life for a while. Later, he joins the KMT and becomes a county security regimental commander. His father forgives his rebellious past and allows him to be readmitted into the ancestral hall. After his return to the established power and institution, he persuades Heiwa to receive amnesty offered by the county government. Heiwa accepts his advice and is recruited to be a KMT battalion commander. Heiwa’s return to the 78 Chen (2007, 48–49). 79 Ibid.

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

181

established regime is accompanied by his conversion to Confucianism. He becomes a dedicated student of Mr. Zhu. However, persuaded by Zhaohai, he rejoins CCP on the eve of the CCP’s victory over the KMT and becomes deputy county mayor. At the end of the novel, Heiwa is framed by Xiaowen who is afraid of his past decadence and extravagances being exposed. Xiaowen’s framing leads to Heiwa’s execution. Xiaowen and Heiwa’s political commitments and cultural allegiances are pushed back and forth between the KMT, the CCP and Confucianism. Heiwa’s final reversion from rebellion to the established Confucian institutions does not prevent his tragic death while Xiaowen’s return to Confucian ancestral hall turns out to be only a titular act that does not keep him from selfish self-defense and moral degeneration. These betrayals and untimely deaths expose the failures of Confucianism in the face of violent revolutions and radical political changes. As representatives and upholders of Confucian tradition and convention, Bai Jiaxuan and Mr. Zhu do not take sides in the increasingly polarized modern party politics, nor remain detached and withdrawn. They make their critiques of the prolonged CCP-KMT conflict from a local everyday perspective. Mr. Zhu often speaks of the KMT versus the CCP party conflict in terms of “fan aozi” 翻鏊子 (turning flatbread pan). By this home-style metaphor, Zhu means that no matter which party holds power, those who get burnt are always common people. Zhu’s home-style metaphorical critique gets widely circulated in the village. Previous writers often condemn the phenomenon that the change of regime makes no difference to the masses by citing Yuan-dynasty poet Zhang Yanghao’s a classical poem “The empire’s rise is people’s woe; The empire’s fall is also people’s woe.” Yet, Mr. Zhu switches to the language and imagery familiar to local peasants. His critique shows the argumentative dimension and critical potential of local everyday speech that could be employed to evaluate and criticize modern party politics and political changes. The following dialogue between Mr. Zhu and communist revolutionary Zhaopeng further demonstrates the former’s agency in contesting the CCP’s political ideals and exposing their hidden coercion: “You want to wipe out the institution of “people oppress people, people exploit people. It sounds good. But what do you do if there is someone willing to be oppressed and exploited?” “How come there are such people in the world?”

182

G. GAO

“How about those who live by carrying people across Run River? You are so kind-hearted to free them from oppression, but then they are not able to earn money to buy shaobing (a type of baked, unleavened, layered flatbread in Chinese cuisine).” “People’s government will give them a better job.” “What if they’ve been addicted to carrying others across the river and would do nothing but carry people and refuse to accept your better job offer.” “People’s government will build a bridge over the river and charge passengers no fee. Then they could carry nothing even if they want to.” “Your people’s government is never short of solutions.”80

The CCP characterizes the rural laborers as the exploited social class and sets itself the task of liberating them from the oppression by landlord and local gentry. However, Mr. Zhu raises the possibility that the poor laborers themselves may not think so, highlighting CCP narrative’s neglect of the self-understanding of the supposedly “oppressed” laborers. Mr. Zhu’s question discloses the disjuncture between the communist narrative of oppression and the self-understandings of the oppressed. When questioned by Mr. Zhu what he would do if the laborer would stick to their “oppressively” low job, Zhaopeng “gets anxious” and give an answer that unwittingly exposes the hidden hegemony and coercion in the CCP’s oppression-liberation narrative: “People’s government will build a bridge over the river and charge passengers no fee. Then they could carry nothing even if they want to.” Zhaopeng’s answer indicates that his communist government would take every possible measure to force the laborers to give up the job that he regards as a form of oppression. This well-meant forced work transfer ironically leads to a new form of oppression and domination, the social evils that CCP’s revolution seeks to exterminate. Mr. Zhu’s Socratic rigorous questioning pushes Zhaopeng to self-disclose the inherent contradiction within his communist discourse on oppression and liberation, and undermines the legitimacy of the communist revolution. Challenging the legitimacy of the CCP’s revolution does not mean Mr. Zhu’s support of the KMT. Instead, Mr. Zhu rises above the partisan politics, looking at their conflicting political agendas and ideologies from a daily Confucian point of view. Looking at the repaired village code

80 Chen (2012, 429).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

183

inscriptions ruined by revolutions and rebellions, Mr. Zhu laments “could human heart repaired?”, demonstrating his worries about the rural ethics and morality ruined by constant and violent conflicts and clashes. When asked by Zhaopeng about his opinion on the CCP versus the KMT party struggle, Zhu says: I see no difference between communism and the KMT’s Three Principles of People. The latter advocate tianxia wei g¯ ong 天下为公 (what is under heaven is for all)” and the former believe “tianxia wei gòng 天下为共 (what is under heaven is for sharing), then putting them together is tianxia wei g¯ onggòng 天下为公共 (what is under heaven is for the public).81 Then how come the two parties kill each other instead of working with each other?...Your party strife is nothing but gongpo zhizheng 公婆之争 (quarrels between daughter-in-law and parents-in-law).82

The KMT’s political agenda is summarized by Mr. Zhu into g¯ ong 公 and CCP’s into gòng 共, which shows his grasp of both the CCP’s and the KMT’s discursive systems. Moreover, Mr. Zhu cleverly combines them into g¯ onggòng (public公共), a widely used loan word imported from Japan. In so doing, Mr. Zhu synthetizes the opposing political parties’ political agendas into tianxia wei g¯ onggòng 天下为公共 (what is under heaven is for the public), a goal that neither party would object. Secondly, by quoting the popular idiom “gongpo zhizheng ” to rephrase the political fighting in terms of familial bickering, the novel trivializes politics into domestics and reconsiders political competitions from a familial angle. In so doing, Mr. Zhu reduces political tension and facilitates political negotiation and cooperation. Mr. Zhu’s interpretive and translational agency clearly shows that he is not merely an elite Confucian scholar who only knows Confucian vocabularies, but a flexible discursive agent who is able to work across folk, communist, nationalist and transnational discursive systems to figure out linguistic solutions to diminish political difference and establish common ground for political dialogue and communication. However, the problem is that Mr. Zhu’s discursive and interpretive agency cannot translate into effective political and military actions that can get rid of foreign invasion and domestic conflicts. In the first half of 81 公 g¯ ong (all) and 共 gòng(sharing) are two different words in Chinese. Combined together, they form a new word 公共 g¯onggòng (public). 82 Chen (2012, 327).

184

G. GAO

the novel, when the revolutionized provincial capital Xi’an is surrounded by the Qing Dynasty’s troops, Mr. Zhu is able to persuade the Qing general to withdraw his troops and save thousands of civilians’ lives via his eloquent Confucian rhetoric and his personal relationship with the general. In the second half of the novel when the Japan invades China and its troops penetrate into inland China, Mr. Zhu decides to quit his writing project and go out of his study to fight the Japanese invaders face to face. He makes a public anti-Japan announcement and goes with other senior Confucian scholars to the forefront. However, when approaching the war zone, they are unexpectedly arrested for their impulsive and imprudent behavior and forced to return home. Their passionate patriotism and self-sacrifice spirit turn out to be laughing stocks. Confronted with the large-scale international war, Mr. Zhu and his fellow Confucian scholars are portrayed as clueless, helpless and useless characters. What they could do is only making empty high-profile condemnation of Japan that contributes nothing to their country’s peace. “Cultivate your self, look after your family, manage the country and put all under heaven in order” is the imperative Confucian roadmap for personal growth and selfactualization. In the first half of the novel, Mr. Zhu and Bai Jiaxuan could be said to have successfully constructed their moral selves and fulfilled their responsibilities to families and communities. However, as national party politics and international wars unfold, Mr. Zhu and Bai Jiaxuan are not able to fulfill the higher Confucian political ideal of “manage the country and put all under heaven in order” in the modern world. Their failures are not so much their personal failures as the failures of Confucianism’s prioritizing of ethics and morality over military force and political power. Confucianism’s overemphasis on ethics and deemphasis on power struggle result in its inability to rebuild national order and take an effective intervention into modern world politics. At the end of the novel, Heiwa and two former KMT officials Tian Fuxian and Yue Weishan are shot to death in public by the newly established CCP government. Bai Jiaxuan loses the sight in his left eye and is excluded from the public and political affairs. What he could do is only “pasturing his cattle on the green grass of the plain with one hand holding his crutch and the other leading his cattle.”83

83 Chen (2012, 674).

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

185

Chen Zhongshi’s White Deer Plain is often considered as reflective of Confucianism’s revival and intellectuals’ critique of violent modern revolutions in post-Mao China. However, as my interpretation shows, Chen Zhongshi’s oeuvre does not merely repeat the preexisting intellectual discourses. Rather, by drawing upon county gazetteers, family history, folklores and legends, Chen Zhongshi opens up a complex enchanted rural Confucian world of everyday life that is ignored by modern Confucians and intellectual elites. Instead of essentializing and idealizing this Confucian rural everyday world, White Deer Plain takes it into modern history and examines its losses and gains, failures and successes, lessons and resources in this historical process. As my previous interpretation shows, this enchanted Confucian everyday world displays its adaptation and agency in drawing upon local supernatural beliefs, moral codes and practices to rebuild social order, enhance rural solidarity, oppose expanding state power and reassert the ethical bottom line of modern party politics. Meanwhile, the novel also unmasks the rural everyday world’s oppressive patriarchal rule and vulnerability before the largescale modern wars. The novel takes a perspective from ground up and discloses the cultural complexities and historical specificities. The significance of White Deer Plain consists not only in offering a complex historical account and improving our understanding of China’s past but also in providing intellectual resources that can enrich the intellectual reconstruction of Confucian tradition. First, the novel addresses the intellectuals’ neglect of ordinary historical actors’ self-understandings and self-interpretations. These ordinary rural people’s self-understandings and self-interpretations mediated by everyday languages and speeches are not totally subjected to the modern power relations or the Foucaultian “technologies of self” but display their resistance, critical agency and interpretive agility. What I suggest here is not that the intellectuals’ and China scholars’ historical account should rely only upon the ordinary historical actors’ self-understandings and self-interpretations but that their historical account and reconstruction of Confucian tradition could be improved by giving consideration to both elite thinkers’ and ordinary people’s thoughts, emotions and practices, to both structural forces (expansion of state power, development of market economy and technology) and subjective ideas, and their interactions. Second, White Deer Plain can complement the intellectual discourse on Confucian tradition by uncovering the potential critical and recuperative power of supernatural folk beliefs, traditional moral codes and practices to oppose the

186

G. GAO

modern expansion of oppressive state power, rebuild rural moral order and enhance social solidarity. While what White Deer Plain describes may be not factually true and cannot get the debaters into consensus, it can enlarge the argumentative space and enrich the intellectual debate by thematizing complexities and specificities of the everyday thoughts, beliefs and practices for further and deeper discussion and debate. Not only can the novel be drawn upon to enrich China’s domestic intellectual debate, but also to complement the existing scholarship on contemporary China’s reconstruction of Confucian tradition. As is shown at the beginning of this section, the extant research focuses only on Chinese political leaders’ and elite intellectuals’ reconstruction of Confucian tradition, denouncing their authoritarian use of tradition from the liberal perspective or deploring their essentialist reconstruction of a monolithic tradition from the anti-essentialist poststructuralist perspective. However, exploring the novel White Deer Plain helps us see more complicated reconstructions of Confucian tradition from ordinary historical actors’ everyday perspective. This alternative bottom-up reconstruction demonstrates that Chinese tradition is not dominated by Confucianism but also by Taoism, Buddhism and enchanted local beliefs, narratives and practices. This enchanted hybrid quotidian rural tradition has not only produced gender oppression but also facilitated opposition against the expansion of modern state power. The tradition the novel reconstructs is not a set of fixed high-sounding norms and principles, but brought into historical encounter with modern transformations in the process of which its inherited institutions and adaptations, successes in rebuilding local political order and failures in tackling large-scale modern nation building and international politics are brought to light.

References Ai, Janette Jiawen. Politics and Traditional Culture: The Political Use of Traditions in Contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific, 2014. Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2nd. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998. Bai Tongdong 白彤东. Jiubangxinming: gujin zhongxi canzhaoxia de gudian rujia zhengzhi zhexue 旧邦新命: 古今中西参照下的古典儒家政治哲学 (Old State, New Mandate: Classical Confucian Political Philosophy Viewed in the Light of Ancient and Modern, China and West). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009.

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

187

Bell, Daniel. “Introduction.” A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Ed. Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013. Bol, Peter. Neo-Confucianism in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010. Callahan, William A. “History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist Modernization in the World of Great Harmony.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 983–1001. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Cheek, Timothy. “Historians as Public Intellectuals in Contemporary China.” Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market. Ed. Edward Gu, and Merle Goldman. London: Routledge, 2005. 218–236. Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实. Bailuyuan 白鹿原 (White Deer Plain). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2012. ———. “Xunzhao shuyu ziji de juzi” 寻找属于自己的句子 (Search for My Own Sentence). Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 (Novel Review) 4 (2007): 44–50. Confucius. Analects. Trans. D.C. Lau. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chinese UP, 1992. Cui Gang 崔罡. Xinshiji dalu xinrujia yanjiu 新世纪大陆新儒家研究 (A Study of Neo-Confucians of Mainland China in the New Century). Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2012. Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997. Elstein, David. Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2014. Ford, Christopher A. “The Party and the Sage: Communist China’s Use of Quasi-Confucian Rationalizations for One-Party Dictatorship and Imperial Ambition.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 1032–1047. French, Howard W. Everything Under the Heaven: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power. New York: Knopf, 2017. Gao, Yuan. “Completing a New Official History: Significance of White-Deer Plain.” Neohelicon 41.2 (2014): 517–542. Gan Yang 甘阳. Tongsantong 通三统 (Unify Three Traditions). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007. Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光. Zhai zi Zhongguo: Chongjian youguan Zhongguo de lishilunshu 宅兹中国: 重建有关中国的历史论述 (Here in China I Dwell: Reconstruct a Historical Discourse on China). Beijing: Zhonghua, 2011. ———. “Yixiangtiankai—jinnianlai dalu xinruxue de zhengzhi suqiu” 异想天 开—近年来大陆新儒学的政治诉求 (Indulging in Fantasy—Mainland Chinese New Confucians’ Political Appeal). Sixiang 思想 (Thought) 33 (2017): 241–284.

188

G. GAO

Han Shaogong. Anshi 暗示 (Intimations). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2008a. ———. Maqiao cidian 马桥词典 (A Dictionary of Maqiao). Beijing: Renminwenxue chubanshe, 2008b. Han, Xing. “White Deer Plain, Confucian Culture and Guanzhong School.” Confucian Academy 3.2 (2016): 21–34. Horner, Charles. Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2011. Jiang Qing 蒋庆. Gongyangxue yinlun: Rujia de zhengzhi zhihui he lishi xinyang 公羊学引论: 儒家的政治智慧和历史信仰 (An Introductory Treatise on Gongyang Scholarship: Confucian Political Wisdom and Historical Faith). Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995. Jiang Qing 蒋庆. Zhengzhi ruxue: Dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi he fazhan 政治儒学: 当代儒学的转向, 特质和发展 (Political Confucianism: Contemporary Confucianism’s Transformation, Characteristics and Development). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2003. ———. “Jiang Qing huiying Li Minghui de piping: zhengzhi bushi wutuobang” 蒋庆回应李明辉的批评: 政治不是乌托邦 (Jiang Qing’s Response to Li Minghui’s Critique: Political Confucianism Is Not Utopia). Pengpai 澎湃新 闻 (The Paper) 7 April 2015. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_ 1318656. Accessed 8 April 2020. Jin Yan (Jin Yan) 金雁 (苏文). ‘Zhiyou yici, dengyu meiyou’ 只有一次, 等于没 有 (Only Once Means Nothing). Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化(Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Li Jianjun 李建军. “Zhiyi Mo Yan yu nuojiang” 直议莫言与诺奖 (Candid Remarks on Mo Yan and the Nobel Prize in Literature). Wenxuebao 文学 报 (Literary Newspaper) 10 January 2013. Li Zehou 李泽厚. “Guanyu bashi niandai de jibenshu” 关于八十年代的几本书 ( On Several Books in the 1980s), Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 19 November. 2018. http://www.aisixiang.com/data/113481-3.html. Accessed 20 June. 2021. Liu Junning 刘军宁. ‘Kaifang de chuantong: cong baoshou zhuyi de shijiao kan’ 开 放的传统: 从保守主义的视角看 (Open Tradition Viewed from a Conservative Perspective), Tianya 天涯 (Frontier) 1 (2006): 165–172. Makeham, John. Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008. Marchal, Kai. “Modernity, Tyranny, and Crisis: Leo Strauss in China.” Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Ed. Kai Marchal and Carl K.Y.Shaw. London: Lexington Books, 2017, 173–196.

5

CHEN ZHONGSHI: DISCLOSING AN ENCHANTED …

189

Meng Fanhua 孟繁华. Bailuyuan: Yinmi suiyue de xiaoxian zhilu 白鹿原: 隐秘 岁月的消闲之旅 (White Deer Plain: A Leisured Journey at a Mysterious Age) Wenyi zhengming 文艺争鸣 6 (1993): 66–68. Qin Hui秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). “Ping zhongguoshi de xinzuopai he houxue” 评中 国式的新左派和后学 (Comment on Chinese the New Left and Postmodernist Studies). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 33.1 (1996): 4–17. Qin Hui秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). “Zhenjia hengtingdun yu dongxi hengtingdun” 真假亨廷顿与东西亨廷顿 (‘True and False Huntington, Eastern and Western Huntington’). Zhishifenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou de dongdang 知识 分子立场: 激进与保守的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. ———. “Kaiqi xirurongrui de xinlu (shang)” 开启西儒汇融的新路(上) (Opening a New Path for the Fusion of Western Theories and Confucianism: Part 1). Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30.4 (2002): 104–118. Qiu Feng 秋风. Lixian de jiyi 立宪的技艺 (The Art of Constitutionalism). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005. Song Hong 宋宏. ‘Nanyi zhengtuo de kunjing: guanyu jijin yu bao shou de zhenglun’ 难以挣脱的困境: 关于激进与保守的争论 (Inescapable Predicament: Debate on Radicalism and Conservatism). Qimeng de ziwo wajie启蒙 的自我瓦解 (Self-Disintegration of the Enlightenment). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2007. Steele, Meili. Hiding from History: Politics and Public Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell U P, 2005. Shu, Yunzhong. “Technologies of the Self as Antidotes to Chaos: A Foucauldian Reading of White Deer Plain.” Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée 40.3 (2013): 257–270. Taylor, Charles. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke UP, 2004. Wang Dingding 汪丁丁. “Wang Xiaobo de shuo yu si” 王小波的说与思 (Wang Xiaobo’s Speaking and Thinking). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Wang Hui 汪晖. Xiandai zhongguo sixiang de xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起 (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004. ———. Quzhengzhi de zhengzhi: Duan ershi shiji de zhongjie he jiushi niandai 去政治的政治: 短二十世纪的终结与90年代 (The Politics of Depoliticization: The End of Short Twentieth Century and the 1990s). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2008. Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996.

190

G. GAO

Wu, Guanjun 吴冠军. Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Thought. Singapore: World Scientific, 2014. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. “Rujia xianzheng de xianshi yu lishi” 儒家宪政的现实与历史 (The History and Reality of Confucian Constitutionalism). Kaifang shidai 开 放时代 (Open Times) 1 (2012): 44–59. Xu Youyu 徐友渔. “Jinru ershiyi shiji de ziyouzhuyi he xinzuopai” 进入 二十一世纪 的自由主义和新左派 (Liberalism and New Left in the 21st century). Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 (Contemporary China Studies) 2 (2007). https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-iss ues/96-mcs-2007-issue-2/1006-21.html. Accessed 27 March 2021. Xue Yong 薛涌. “Cong zhongguo wenhua de shibai kan kongzi de jiazhi” 从中 国文化的失败看孔子的价值 (The Value of Confucius Seen from the Failure of Traditional Culture). Nanfang zhoumo 南方周末 (Southern Weekly) 1 January 2008. Xu Zhangrun 许章润. ‘Ziyou zhuyi ruhe zai zhongguo luodi?’ 自由主义如何在 中国落地 (How Could Liberalism Land on China?], Dongfang lishi pinglun 东方历史评论 (Oriental Historical Review) 22 February. 2017. https://www. gongfa.com/html/gongfapinglun/20100429/1133.html. Accessed 10 June. 2020. Yang Kaidao 杨开道. Zhongguo xiangyue zhidu 中国乡约制度 (Chinese Village Code Institution). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2015. Yuan Weishi 袁伟时. “Jiujing zenyang duidai chuantong wenhua” 究竟怎样对 待传统文化 (How to Treat Traditional Culture). Nanfang zhoumo南方周末 (Southern Weekly). 2 December 2010. Zhang, Longxi. “Out of the Cultural Ghetto: Theory, Politics, and the Study of Chinese Literature.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 71–101. Zhao, Suisheng. “Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 961–982. Zhang Xu 张旭. “Dalu xinrujia yu Kang Youwei zhuyi de qingqi” 大陆新儒 家与康有为主义的兴起 (The Rise of Mainland New Confucians and New Kangyouwei-ism). Wenhua zongheng 文化纵横 (Cultural Warp and Weft) 3 (2017): 98–107. Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤. Shuzhai li de geming 书斋里的革命: 朱学勤文选 (Revolution in the Study: Selected Works of Zhu Xueqin). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Toward Dialogical Chinese Studies

This book sets itself two tasks: First, examine the achievements and the shortcomings of contemporary Chinese intellectual discourse and debate over the key issues concerning Chinese modernity and national perfection, namely language, power and tradition; second, explore how contemporary Chinese novelists’ works could address the intellectual limits and enrich the intellectual discourse and public reasoning. Contemporary Chinese intellectuals are indeed committed to a certain degree of linguistic certitude and hope to use their critical inquiry to achieve China’s national perfection and cultural integrity. However, this nationalist and instrumentalist dimension does not necessarily follow that Chinese intellectual discourse and debate must be impoverished and pathologized. By looking at Chinese intellectuals’ polemical essays and scholarly works, I argue that Chinese intellectuals of different ideological persuasions draw critically upon Western theories to have produced valuable understandings of Chinese language, power and tradition. They are “obsessed with China” to some extent. However, this “obsession” with a relative stability of China and Chinese identity does not block the unpacking of internal complexities and diversities of Chinese linguistic communities, power operations and Confucian tradition. My research of the Chinese intellectual debate and discourse demonstrates that exploration of the linguistic, ethnic and cultural differences in China does not necessarily proceed along the poststructuralist line of deconstructing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9_6

191

192

G. GAO

China. However, despite their achievements, Chinese intellectuals do not effectively connect their pursuit of China’s national perfection to ordinary people’s daily lives and their first-person experiential perspectives. This intellectual shortcoming could be addressed by looking into contemporary Chinese novels. I argue that novelistic works do not merely illustrate preexisting intellectual and ideological positions, but provide rich linguistic, ethical, cognitive and existential resources, problematics and hypotheses of everyday life that could enlarge the argumentative space and provide alternative possibilities. By use of a pun, I find and recommend a “novel” approach to China. That is, our understanding and research of contemporary China can benefit from reading contemporary Chinese novels, for the latter can inspire us to develop new perspectives and raise new questions. What unites my dual tasks of exploring Chinese intellectuals’ and literary writers’ achievements is a deep theoretical and methodological concern with the widespread analyses and assessments of modern Chinese intellectual discourse and Chinese literature only in terms of poststructuralist and neo-Marxist problematics, assumptions and criteria. These poststructuralist- and neo-Marxist-informed studies of Chinese intellectual discourse and literary text treat Chinese intellectuals and literary writers only as objects of research for pathological analysis and critique rather than as subjects of research that can make valuable contributions to our understanding of China and production of theory. In Chinese anthropologist Wang Mingming’s words, native Chinese people are seldom viewed as “cognitive subjects” that are capable of knowing and studying themselves and the outside world.1 With the assumed positional superiority of Western academia, the practitioners of poststructuralist and neo-Marxist China studies allow their preferred concepts and theories to reproach and ridicule the nationalistic, positivistic and recuperative concerns and assumptions that govern the Chinese intellectual and literary discourse, but rarely allow the latter to bite back in turn. Contemporary Chinese intellectual interlocutors’ and literary writers’ tempered yet lingering adherence to the referential and ethical value of language and literature, their commitment to national perfection and their call for equal cross-cultural dialogue are seldom considered as a welcome

1 Wang (2007), 10–11.

6

CONCLUSION: TOWARD DIALOGICAL CHINESE STUDIES

193

corrective to the poststructuralist indiscriminate deconstruction of referentiality, subjectivity and nationality and to the neo-Marxist reduction of literary works to effects of particular historical conditions and ideologies. The complexity and dialogicality of Chinese texts, experiences and expectations are dismissed or bended to validate the universality of the poststructuralist assumptions and premises. The poststructuralist-inspired China studies that claim to subvert various hierarchies and hegemonies ironically end up reproducing and reinforcing the West’s positional and theoretical superiority. This unfortunate consequence is not accidental, but derived from what Mingdong Gu calls Western academia’s deeply rooted “sinologism”: An undeclared but tacitly administered institutionalization of the ways of observing China from the perspective of Western epistemology that refuses, or is reluctant, to view China on its own terms, and of doing scholarship on Chinese materials and producing knowledge on Chinese civilization in terms of western methodology that tends to disregard the real conditions of China and reduce the complexity of Chinese civilization into simplistic patterns of development modelled on those of the West.2

Unlike the postcolonial politicized critique of the flawed Western orientalist representations of the non-West, Gu does not attribute the Western misrepresentations of complicated Chinese texts and realities to some hidden evil imperialist agendas but to the deeply entrenched Western epistemological habit and methodological inertia. Gu concedes that Western scholarship on China cannot be completely freed from power and politics, but insists that this does not necessarily follow that all Western misrepresentations, misinterpretations or harsh criticisms of China are derived from and actually serving imperial interests and colonialist exploitation. To counter “sinologism” and combat West-centrism, Gu proposes “taking China on its own terms” and pursuing a more objective and judicious mode of China knowledge production. Gu is aware that a completely objective and neutral China scholarship freed from all ideological influences and subjective biases is impossible. However, he insists that it is not an impossible and unreasonable goal for a China scholar to pursue relatively objective scholarship and free herself from ideological and political interferences as much as she can. Gu’s rejection of an over-politicized 2 Gu (2012, 218–219).

194

G. GAO

critique of Western China scholarship is commendable. However, he tends to polarize “observing of China from the perspective of Western epistemology” against “taking China on its own terms,” or in more familiar terms, “Western theory” against “Chinese reality.” With his rich knowledge of primary Chinese sources, Gu spares no efforts to expose and criticize the Western misdescriptions and misrepresentations of Chinese language, literature and culture. However, he does not seriously discuss how Western China scholarship has also provided important insights and advanced our understanding of China nor has he recognized his own selfcontradiction: He severely reproaches the description and evaluation of China from the Western perspective on the one hand and dogmatically proposes that “the only solution to sinologism is the (Heideggerian and Gadamerian) hermeneutic approach to knowledge” on the other hand.3 Gu’s self-contradiction is to a large extent derived from his insufficient awareness of the inextricable entanglement and entwinement of modern China and the West. Gu’s call for the replacement of “looking at China from western perspective” by “viewing China on its own terms” seems to presuppose an unalloyed and uncontaminated internal Chinese empirical perspective vis-à-vis an external Western theoretical perspective. However, such a rigid binary opposition does not exist. Gu’s use of Chinese textual and historical realities to diagnose the problems with the Western scholarship on Chinese language and literature and his suggested solution and vision for future Chinese studies is not made through a purely empirical and factual approach but informed by the German hermeneutic philosophical concepts of “pre-understanding” and “fusion of horizons.” Gu is not the first to criticize the Western theoretically informed scholarship’s simplification or distortion of China by deploying the complexity and particularity of Chinese textual, historical and political realities. From the very beginning of the application of poststructuralist theories to Chinese literary studies in the 1990s, there have been the more empirically based criticisms of the more theoretically informed poststructuralist Chinese studies. Michael Duke uses the literary historical facts to criticize Liu Kang’s over-sweepingly Foucaultian characterization of all America’s post-War Chinese literary studies as complicit with Cold War ideology and America’s imperialist interest.4 Zhang Longxi deploys the indisputable

3 Gu (2011, 140). 4 Duke (1993, 41–70).

6

CONCLUSION: TOWARD DIALOGICAL CHINESE STUDIES

195

student deaths to criticize Rey Chow’s deconstructive reading of Western media’s reports on the Tiananmen protest.5 Native Chinese critics resort to Chinese translation history and modern political history to question Lydia Liu’s discrediting of Lu Xun’s and Chinese intellectuals’ critical reflection on Chinese national character.6 This type of fact-based criticisms is also found in the studies of Chinese history. For instance, Joseph W. Esherick and Ge Jianxiong use premodern Chinese historical and textual realities of foreign relations to rebuke James Hevia’s poststructuralist reinterpretation of Qing Dynasty’s treatment of foreign relations not as premodern sinocentric but as flexible diplomatic tactics.7 Ping-ti Ho takes to task Evelyn S. Rawski’s de-sinified New Qing History.8 Philip Huang criticizes the distortion of historical realities resulting from the complicity of postmodern-informed study of Chinese history with the market fundamentalism and proposes “develop(ing) theoretical concepts that would be anchored on those realities.”9 The founder of Sinophone studies Shumei Shil thinks of these empirically based criticisms as unproductive because all of them are still attached to the reified dichotomies of China versus the West, Chinese reality versus Western theory, dichotomies stemming from China’s modern wounding by the West. Shih calls such dichotomy “majoritarian opposition” that helped China oppose Western hegemony but ended up suppressing the internal racialized minorities and other peripheral subjects who are not authentic either in the West or in Asia.10 Shih makes the critique that “this wounding by the Western colonialism—political as well as epistemological—and Asia’s response to it through something that can be generally called nationalism has persistently allowed Asia to exercise domination over the various others with its own midst.”11 Shih notes that the majoritarian opposition-based resistance to the external West may result in the oppression of the internal racialized others. What is ironical is that while

5 Zhang (1992, 105–130), and (1993, 71–101). 6 See Huang (2007, 149–163), Tao (2006), Fang (2013, 138–145) and Wang (2007,

150–157). 7 Esherick (1998, 135–161), and Ge (1998, 135–139). 8 Ho (1998, 123–155). 9 Huang (2016, 155–183), and Huang (2019, 3–36). 10 Shih (2010, 466). 11 Ibid.

196

G. GAO

destabilizing the China-West binary opposition, Shih falls prey to another new binary opposition of Chinese nationalism and racialized localism. Her proposed Sinophone studies seem to suggest that the liberation of the racialized local and diaspora minorities must be dependent upon the deconstruction of Chinese identity and cultural integrity. However, as my interpretation of Han Shaogong’s and Chen Zhongshi’s works demonstrates, their locally based nationalism does not lead them to essentializing Chinese identity at the cost of local and ethnic differences but to bringing out the ignored internal cultural and linguistic differences of ethnic minorities and the differences within the dominant Han majority and the dominant elite Confucianism. Han’s and Chen’s literary works remind the Sinophone studies that not all forms of Chinese nationalism are opposed to the voices and subjectivities of racialized minorities inside or outside China. Indiscriminate deconstruction of different types of Chinese nationalism may end up engendering new forms of political and epistemological domination of the non-West. We need more nuanced understandings and evaluations of and response to different forms of Chinese nationalism and different constructions of Chinese national identity and cultural integrity. Chinese anthropologist Wang Mingming finds it interesting that some Chinese critics and scholars view Western theories as “poisonous” to Chinese studies. However, their critiques of Western Chinese studies consciously or unconsciously rely on the Western theories, categories and concepts they perceive as “poisonous.” Wang calls the local Chinese scholars’ theoretical strategy yidugongdu 以毒攻毒 (fight poison with poison).12 However, theories derived from the Western textual and historical realities are not poisonous. Every concept, category and theory has its own limits and strengths, insights and blind spots. What is “poisonous” is not theory per se but the inappropriate attitude and approach to theory. The common problems found in the use of Western theories in Chinese studies are: (1) refuse to use Western theories in the name of the nonWestern particularities and complexities; (2) depend solely on one theory or one type of theory without considering alternative theories; (3) only use theories without critical reflections; (4) critical reflections are focused only on minor issues without extending to the fundamental theoretical assumption, motivation, method and mood; (5) critical reflections go to the extreme of eliminating all realities, stabilities, continuities, identities and normative notions; (6) either sever theory from or conflate theory

12 Wang (2007, 149).

6

CONCLUSION: TOWARD DIALOGICAL CHINESE STUDIES

197

with politics; (7) detach the third-person theoretical inquiry from the first-person individual experience or have the latter implicitly or explicitly determine and control the former. Contemporary China is neither purely Chinese nor totally Westernized. It is deeply entwined with but differentiated from the West. Therefore, disuse or use of only one theory or uncritical application of the Western theories will not significantly advance our understanding of China and effectively address the opportunities and challenges it poses to the rest of the world. Although I cannot claim to have satisfactorily avoided all the familiar pitfalls I identified in the use of Western theory in the study of China, I have tried to address them in different chapters of this book. In Chapter Two, by looking into major Chinese literary critics and literary historians’ works, I argue the development of postsocialist Chinese literary thought, while deeply influenced by Western literary theories, is not a belated reenactment of the development of Western literary criticism from the mid-century New Criticism to the neo-Marxism and poststructuralism characterized by a hermeneutics of suspicion, but insists on the referential, epistemic and ethical value of literature. This emphasis on the positive value of literature instead of treating it as product of historical conditions and ideological forces resonates with Western literary academia’s recent critical reflections on the dominant suspicious hermeneutics of poststructuralism and neo-Marxism and call for a hermeneutics of trust. Yet, it still differs from the latter in its distinctive expectation of literature to serve China’s national perfection and social progress. Chinese literary thought’s nationalist dimension is not necessarily a sign of oppressive essentialism, sinocentrism and identity politics, but could contribute to both poststructuralist and anti-poststructuralist literary studies by posing the question of whether national consciousness and adherence to the use of literature for national purpose are really outdated and whether it could be at work in a positive and egalitarian manner under the West-dominated unequal liberal order. The following three chapters are three case studies of three Chinese novelists’ contributions to the intellectual debate and discourse on China’s national perfection. My examination of Chinese literary discourse uses both Foucault poststructuralist theories and Charles Taylor’s and Rita Felski’s anti-poststructuralist theories. Instead of interpreting Chinese texts to confirm the universal validity of Western theories, I draw attention to their possible corrective and remedial significance. In studying Wang Xiaobo’s novella The Golden Age, I find Foucault’s theory on the

198

G. GAO

constructivist notion of truth and subjectivity very relevant, but argue that Wang’s fiction is not a mere illustration of Foucaultian conception of truth and subjectivity as constructed and dominated by power relations, but configures a dialogical subjectivity who is able to work through power structure by an interplay between constructionist and realist conceptions of truth, first-person experiential perspective and third-person theoretical perspective. Such a subjectivity can remedy Foucaultian overemphasis on the story of domination and contribute to more complicated understandings regarding the basic assumptions concerning subjectivity, truth and power. In studying Chen Zhongshi’s epic novel White Deer Plain, I approach it through Charles Taylor’s social imaginary, but argue that Chen Zhongshi’s novel provides a more nuanced and find-grained account of transition from tradition to modernity than Taylor’s account that is centered on a philosophical argument for the diverse routes to modernity and neglects the actual historical losses and horrors of modernity. My research points to a dialogical Chinese studies under an age of theory. It is not something brand new, but continues a line of existing scholarly call for dialogues in Asian studies: dialogue between theory and reality,13 between area studies and disciplinary studies, between Marxist analytic tradition and Heiddeger hermeneutic tradition,14 between native scholars and Western scholars,15 between Asian countries themselves.16 This book contributes to this line of scholarship by arguing for the dialogue between literary studies and non-literary studies. As is shown in the three case-study chapters, Chinese literary works could be more fruitfully explored by viewing them as dialogues with intellectual debates and discourses of different non-literary intellectual and disciplinary perspectives. Situating contemporary Chinese novels into the Chinese intellectual debate and disciplinary discourse can shed light on the particular problematics and contributions of literary works that are ignored by the existing literary criticism. Inclusion of literary works into the studies of the Chinese intellectual debate and disciplinary discourse can help us gain a fuller and more nuanced picture of Chinese critical inquiry.

13 Huang (2019, 31–32). 14 Chakrabarty (2000, 254–255). 15 Beng-Lan (2011, 13–14). 16 Chen (2010, 254–255).

6

CONCLUSION: TOWARD DIALOGICAL CHINESE STUDIES

199

However, modern knowledge production and information circulation are increasingly bound up with global capitalist system. To transform the existing West-centric and unilateral Chinese studies into a truly dialogical Chinese studies cannot depend solely upon the transformation of individual scholars’ change of his/her epistemologies and methodologies, but also upon a fundamental transformation of the current global capitalist mode of production, distribution and consumption. Hong Kong-based scholar Daniel Vukovich employs Marxist political economics to expose the economic logic of capitalism behind the Western China knowledge production, circulation and consumption: to maximize profit needs to mass-produce commodities and services on demand. Mass-production requires standardized and unified production process to make sure the commodities and services can be easily and economically distributed, circulated and consumed across the world. With the rise of China and its ever-increasing role on the world stage, China knowledge is also a much-needed commodity in the Western market. Then, given the logic of capitalism and economies of scale, it is not surprising that the complexity and hybridity of Chinese texts, experiences and history are truncated and packaged into various existing Western theoretical concepts and theoretical frameworks so as to be more easily recognized, purchased and consumed by Western scholars and readers. This capitalist mode of China knowledge production is instrumental to lifting the isolated Chinese studies out of the narrow bunker of area studies and pushing it to the more broader disciplinary debates and public discussions. However, what are lost in this process are the complicated Chinese experiences, expectations and conditions that do not fit into the existing theoretical formulations and frameworks. Vukovich seems to be very pessimistic about the situation of China knowledge production under the context of intensifying global capitalist mode of production.17 My challenge to Vukovich is: if the capitalist commodity logic and production of mode are so ubiquitous and so deeply penetrate into the Western China knowledge production system, then how could Vukovich himself, who was raised in the largest capitalist country United States and currently teaches at the highly commercialized Hong Kong, step back from the global capitalist system and reveal the complicated realities about China’s Great Leap 17 This summary is based on Vukovich’s chapter “The China-reference and Orientalism in the Global Economy” in his book China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C, see Vukuvich (2013, 126–150).

200

G. GAO

Forward Movement, the Great Chinese Famine, the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square Protest, the realities that are often distorted and misrepresented by other Western China scholars and journalists? How could other scholars who still work under the neoliberal-dominated knowledge production make a third-person structural unmasking and critique? If previous tradition and current knowledge production system are so airtight oppressive, where is their critical agency from? If previous tradition and present political and economic system behind the knowledge production are not so bad, what are their positive discrete or institutional factors and elements? Is it still possible to resist the capitalist China knowledge production and produce more well-informed China knowledge from within the existing economic and political system? If overthrowing the global capitalist economic and knowledge production system is not possible in the short run, then could China scholars appropriate the existing system to produce relatively more well-informed China knowledge. Answering all these complicated questions is beyond the scope of this book. However, I’d like to conclude with a note of hope and optimism. Lu Xun likened the old oppressive China to an indestructible dark “iron house” in which the unenlightened Chinese people are like sound sleepers without being aware of their irrevocable death. Lu Xun once gave up literary writing, because he feared that his writings may wake up a few light sleepers in the iron house and make them suffer the agony of realizing their irrevocable death. Lu Xun thought that would be worse than shut himself up and keep Chinese people in their sound sleep in the iron house. However, Lu Xun’s friend convinced Lu Xun of restoring his writing by pointing to the possibility that “if a few awake, you can’t say there is no hope of destroying the iron house.”18 By referring to Lu Xun’s metaphor, I never mean to say that the majority of Western readers and scholars are ignorant and unenlightened. Instead, I only want to emphasize that when facing the dominant and ubiquitous capitalistic mode of China knowledge production, let’s hold on to Lu Xun’s hope that resistance to oppression, domination and envisioning for alternatives is still possible and that a fairer and reciprocal cross-cultural learning and engagement between Chinese studies in China and Chinese in the rest of the world, Chinese literary studies and non-literary studies should not be removed from our wish list.

18 Lu (1980, vol. 1 38).

6

CONCLUSION: TOWARD DIALOGICAL CHINESE STUDIES

201

References Beng-Lan, Goh. “Disciplines and Area Studies in the Global Age: Southeast Asian Reflections.” Decentring and Diversifying Southeast Asian Studies. Ed. Goh Beng-Lan. Singopore: ISEAS Publishing, 2011. 1–59. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Chen, Kuang-Hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham: Duke UP, 2010. Duke, Michael S. “Thoughts on Politics and Critical Paradigms in Modern Chinese Literature Studies.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 41–70. Esherick, Joseph W. “Cherishing Sources from Afar.” Modern China 24.2 (1998): 135–161. Fang Weigui 方维规. “Yige youbei shishi de shengzao yanzhi fuhao” 一个有悖史 实 的生造衍指符号 (A Fabricated Super Sign that Runs Counter to Historical Fact). Wenyi yanju 文艺研究 (Literature & Art Studies) 2 (2013): 138–145. Ge Jianxiong 葛建雄. “Jiushilunshi yu bu jiushilunshi: wo kan huairouyuanren zhizheng” 就事论事与不就事论事: 我看怀柔远人之争 (Take or not Take the Matter on Its Merits: My View on the Dispute on Cherishing Men from Afar). Ershiyishiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty-First Century) 46.4 (1998): 135–139. Gu, Mingdong 顾明栋. “Hanxue zhuyi: zhongguo shishi shengchan de fangfalun piping” 汉学主义: 中国知识生产的方法论批评 (Methodological Critique of China Knowledge Production). Qinghua daxue xuebao 清华大学学报 (Journal of Tsinghua University) 26.2 (2011): 128–140. Ho, Ping-ti. “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’.” Journal of Asian Studies 57.1 (1998): 123–155. Huang Xingtao 黄兴涛. “Huayu fenxi yu zhongguo jindai sixiang wenhua shi yanjiu” 话语分析与中国近代思想文化史研究 (Discourse Analysis and Studies of Modern Chinese Intellectual and Cultural History). Lishi yanjiu 历史研究 (Historical Studies) 2 (2007): 149–163. Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智. “Women de wenti yishi: dui meiguo de zhongguo yanjiu de fansi” 我们的问题意识: 对美国的中国研究的反思 (Our Problematic: Reflection on America’s Chinese Studies). Kaifang shidai 开放时代 (Open Times) 1 (2016): 155–183. ———. “In Search of a Social Science Anchored in (Chinese) Realities.” Modern China 45.1 (2019): 3–36. Lu Xun 鲁迅. Selected Works. Trans. Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang. Vol. 4. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. Shih, Shumei. “Theory, Asia and the Sinophone.” Postcolonial Studies 13.4 (2010): 465–484. Tao Dongfeng 陶东风. “Dui ‘guominxing lilun zhiyi’ de zhiyi” 对 《国民性理论 质疑》 的质疑 (Questioning ‘the Questioning of National character Theory’).

202

G. GAO

Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 23 November 2006. http://www.aisixi ang.com/data/38654-3.html. Accessed 22 May 2021. Vukovich, Daniel. China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC. New York: Routledge, 2013. Wang Binbin 王彬彬. “Yiweiluanzhen he huaweiweizhen: liuhe yuji shuxie, kuayuji shijian de wenti yishi” 以伪乱真和化伪为真: 刘禾 《语际书写》 《 , 跨语际 实践》 的问题意识 (Distort Truth with Falsehood and Turn Truth into Falsehood: Problematics in Liu He’s and Discursive Writing and Translingual Practice). Wenyi yanjiu 文艺研究 (Literature and Art Studies) 4 (2007a): 150–157. Wang Mingming 王铭铭. Xifang zuowei tazhe: lun zhongguo xifangxue de puxi yu yiyi 西方作为他者: 论中国西方学的谱系与意义 (the West as the Other: on the Genealogy and Meaning of China’s Western Studies). Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi, 2007. Wang Xiabo Wang in Love and Bondage: Three Novellas by Wang Xiaobo. Trans. Hongling Zhang and Jason Sommer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007c. Zhang, Longxi. “Western Theory and Chinese Reality.” Critical Inquiry 19.1 (1992): 105–130. ———. “Out of the Cultural Ghetto: Theory, Politics, and the Study of Chinese Literature.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 71–101.

References

Ai, Janette Jiawen. Politics and Traditional Culture: The Political Use of Traditions in Contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific, 2014. Anagnost, Ann. National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997. Anderson, Marston. The Limits of Realism: Chinese Fiction in the Revolutionary Period. Berkeley: U of California P, 1990. Ang, Ien. “Can One Say No to Chineseness? Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic Paradigm.” Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field. Ed. Rey Chow. Durham: Duke UP, 2000. 281–300. Anker, Elizabeth S., and Rita Felski, ed. Critique and Postcritique. Durham: Duke UP, 2017. Apter, David E., and Tony Saich. 1998. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2nd. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998. Bai Tongdong 白彤东. Jiubangxinming: gujin zhongxi canzhaoxia de gudian rujia zhengzhi zhexue 旧邦新命: 古今中西参照下的古典儒家政治哲学 (Old State, New Mandate: Classical Confucian Political Philosophy Viewed in the Light of Ancient and Modern, China and West). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009. Bandurski, David. Investigative Journalism in China: Eight Cases in Chinese Watchdog Journalism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2010. Barme, Geremie, and Gloria Davies, ed. Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9

203

204

REFERENCES

Barrett, Michele. “Words and Things: Materialism and Method in Contemporary Feminist Analysis.” Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates. Ed. Michele Barrett and Anne Philips. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. Bell, Daniel. “Introduction.” A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Ed. Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013. Beng-Lan, Goh. “Disciplines and Area Studies in the Global Age: Southeast Asian Reflections.” Decentring and Diversifying Southeast Asian Studies. Ed. Goh Beng-Lan. Singopore: ISEAS Publishing, 2011. 1–59. Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern Theory: Critical Integrations. Guilford: Guilford Press, 1991. Best, Stephen, and Sharon Marcus. “Surface Reading: An Introduction.” Representations 108.1 (2009): 1–21. Bol, Peter. Neo-Confucianism in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010. Button, Peter. Configurations of the Real in Chinese Literary and Aesthetic Modernity. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Callahan, William A. “History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist Modernization in the World of Great Harmony.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 983–1001. Cai, Rong. “The Subject in Crisis: Han Shaogong’s Cripple (s).” The Journal of Contemporary China 3.5 (1994): 64–77. Cai Xiang 蔡翔. “Hewei wenxue benshen” 何谓文学本身 (What Is Literature per se). Dangdai zuojia pinglun 当代作家评论 (Contemporary Writer Review) 6 (2002): 31–42. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Chandler, Marthe. “Li Zehou, Kant, and Darwin: The Theory of Sedimentation.” Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy. Ed. Roger T. Ames et al. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 2018. 278–312. Cheek, Timothy. “Historians as Public Intellectuals in Contemporary China.” Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market. Ed. Edward Gu, and Merle Goldman. London: Routledge, 2005. 218–236. Cheek, Timothy, Joshua Fogel, and David Ownby. “Mapping the Intellectual Public Sphere in China Today.” China Information 32.1 (2018): 107–120. Cheek, Timothy, Joshua Fogel, and David Ownby, ed. Voices from the Chinese Century: Public Intellectual Debate from Contemporary China. New York: Columbia UP, 2019. Chen, Jianguo. The Aesthetics of the “Beyond”: Phantasm, Nostalgia, and the Literary Practice in Contemporary China. Newark: U of Delaware P, 2009. Chen, Kuang-Hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham: Duke UP, 2010.

REFERENCES

205

Chen Sihe 陈思和. “Maqiao cidian: Zhongguo dangdai wenxue de shijiexing yinsu zhi yili” 马桥词典: 中国当代文学的世界性因素之一例 (A Dictionary of Maqiao: A Case for Contemporary Chinese Literature as Part of World Literature). Han Shaogong yanjiu ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Wu Yiqin 吴义勤. Jinan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe, 2006. Chen Pingyuan 陈平原. “Xueshushi shang de xiandai wenxue” 学术上的现代 文学 (Modern Literature in the Academic History). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies) 1 (1997): 67–73. Chen Xiaoming 陈晓明. “Chunwenxue de qinghuai” 纯文学的情怀 (Love of Pure Literature). Wenyi zhengming 文艺争鸣 (Literature and Art Forum) 1 (2014): 151–153. Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实. “Guanyu bailuyuan de wenda” 关于白鹿原的答问 (Q&A on The White Deer Plain). Xiaoshuojia tan (Novelists’ Talks). 6 (1993): 4–13. ———. Bailuyuan 白鹿原 (White Deer Plain). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2012. ———. “Xunzhao shuyu ziji de juzi” 寻找属于自己的句子 (Search for My Own Sentence). Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 (Novel Review) 4 (2007): 44–50. Cheng, Yinghong. “Che Guevara: Dramatizing China’s Divided Intelligentsia at the Turn of the Century.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 15.2 (2003): 1–43. Chow, Rey. Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading Between West and East. Minnesota: U of Minnesota Press, 1991. ———. Ethics After Idealism: Theory, Culture, Ethnicity, Reading. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. ———. “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem.” Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field. Ed. Rey Chow. Durham: Duke UP, 2000. 1–25. Choy, Howard Y.F. Remapping the Past: Fictions of History in Deng’s China, 1979–1997. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Chun, Allen. “Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity.” Boundary 2 23.2 (1996): 111–138. Cohen, Paul A. Discovering Chinese History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. NY: Columbia UP, 1984. Confucius. Analects. Trans. D.C. Lau. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chinese UP, 1992. Cui Gang 崔罡. Xinshiji dalu xinrujia yanjiu 新世纪大陆新儒家研究 (A Study of Neo-Confucians of Mainland China in the New Century). Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2012.

206

REFERENCES

Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元 “Zhidu chuanxin yu dierci sixiang jiefang” 制度创新与第二 次思想解放 (Institutional Innovation and The Second Thought Liberation) Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 24.8 (1994): 5–16. Dai Jinhua 戴锦华. “zhizhe xixue” 智者戏谑 (The Wise Man’s Play). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Davies, Gloria. “Theory, Professionalism, and Chinese Studies.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 12.1 (2000): 1–42. ———. Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007. ———. “Habermas in China: Theory as Catalyst.” The China Journal 57 (2007): 61–85. De Certeau, Michel. Practice of Everyday Life. Trans. Steven F. Rendall. Berkeley: California UP, 1984. Denton, Kirk A. “General Introduction.” Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893–1945. Ed. Kirk A. Denton. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996. 1–64. Dittmer, Lowell. “Rethinking China’s Cultural Revolution Amid Reform.” China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and PostMao Counternarratives. Ed. Woei Lien Chong. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 3–26. Dirlik, Arif. “Asia Pacific Studies in an Age of Global Modernity.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6.2 (2006): 158–170. Drutman, Lee. “Fact-Checking Misinformation Can Work. But It Might Not Be Enough.” FiveThirtyEight. 3 June 2020. https://fivethirtyeight.com/fea tures/why-twitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-mis information/. Accessed 14 June 2021. Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997. Duke, Michael S. “Thoughts on Politics and Critical Paradigms in Modern Chinese Literature Studies.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 41–70. Du Weiming 杜维明. Du weiming wenji 杜维明文集 (A Selection of Du Weiming’s Works). Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 2002. Elstein, David. Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2014. Esherick, Joseph W. “Cherishing Sources from Afar.” Modern China 24.2 (1998): 135–161. Evans, Alona E., et al., eds. China in Perspective. Wellesley: Wellesley College, 1967. Fang Weigui 方维规. “Yige youbei shishi de shengzao yanzhi fuhao” 一个有悖史 实 的生造衍指符号 (A Fabricated Super Sign that Runs Counter to Historical Fact). Wenyi yanju 文艺研究 (Literature & Art Studies) 2 (2013): 138–145.

REFERENCES

207

Felski, Rita. Uses of Literature. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. ———. “Suspicious Minds.” Poetics Today 32.2 (2011): 215–234. ———. The Limits of Critique. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015. Feuerwerker, Yi-tsi Mei. “The Post-Modern ‘Search for Roots’ in Han Shaogong, Mo Yan, and Wang Anyi.” Ideology, Power, Text: Self-Representation and the Peasant “Other” in Modern Chinese Literature. Ed. Feuerwerker. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998, 188–238. Flynn, D. J., Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. “The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics.” Political Psychology 38 (2017): 127–150. Ford, Christopher A. “The Party and the Sage: Communist China’s Use of Quasi-Confucian Rationalizations for One-Party Dictatorship and Imperial Ambition.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 1032–1047. Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurely. New York: Vintage, 1978. ———. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. ———. Discipline and Punishment. Trans. Allan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1995. French, Howard W. Everything Under the Heaven: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power. New York: Knopf, 2017. Gan Yang 甘阳. Foreword. Renlun人论 (An Essay on Man). By Ernst Cassirer. Trans. Gan Yang. Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe, 1985. ———. Tongsantong 通三统 (Unify Three Traditions). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007. Gao, Yuan. “Completing a New Official History: Significance of White-Deer Plain.” Neohelicon 41.2 (2014): 517–542. Ge Jianxiong 葛建雄. “Jiushilunshi yu bu jiushilunshi: wo kan huairouyuanren zhizheng” 就事论事与不就事论事: 我看怀柔远人之争 (Take or not Take the Matter on Its Merits: My View on the Dispute on Cherishing Men from Afar). Ershiyishiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty-First Century) 46.4 (1998): 135–139. Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光. Zhongguo sixiangshi 中国思想史 (A Chinese Intellectual History). Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2002. ——— Zhai zi Zhongguo: Chongjian youguan Zhongguo de lishilunshu 宅兹中国: 重建有关中国的历史论述 (Here in China I Dwell: Reconstruct a Historical Discourse on China). Beijing: Zhonghua, 2011. ———. “Yixiangtiankai—jinnianlai dalu xinruxue de zhengzhi suqiu” 异想天 开—近年来大陆新儒学的政治诉求 (Indulging in Fantasy—Mainland Chinese New Confucians’ Political Appeal). Sixiang 思想 (Thought) 33 (2017): 241–284.

208

REFERENCES

Goldblatt, Howard 葛浩文. “Zhongguo wenxue ruhe zouchuqu” 中国文学如何 走出去 (How Chinese Literature Walks Out). Wenxuebao 文学报 (Literary Newspaper) 3 July 2014. Gong, Haomin. “Toward a New Leftist Ecocriticism in Postsocialist China: Reading the ‘Poetry of Migrant Workers’ as Ecopoetry.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Gu, Mingdong 顾明栋. “Hanxue zhuyi: zhongguo shishi shengchan de fangfalun piping” 汉学主义: 中国知识生产的方法论批评 (Methodological Critique of China Knowledge Production). Qinghua daxue xuebao 清华大学学报 (Journal of Tsinghua University) 26.2 (2011): 128–140. ———. Sinologism: An Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism. London: Routledge, 2012. Gunn, Edward. Rendering the Regional: Local Language in Contemporary Chinese Media. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i P, 2006. Guo Songtao 郭嵩焘. Guo Songtao riji 郭嵩焘日记 (Guo Songtao’s Diary). Vol. 3. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982. Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. Hall, Stuart. “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse.” CCCS Selected Working Papers. London: Routledge, 2007. 402–414. Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988. Han, Beatrice. Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical. Trans. Edward Pile. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Han Shaogong. Han Shaogong sanwen 韩少功散文 (Essays by Han Shaogong). Beijing: Zhongguo guangbodianshi chubanshe, 1998. ———. A Dictionary of Maqiao. Trans. Julia Lovell. New York: Dial Press, 2005. ———, and Wang Yao 韩少功 王尧. Han Shaogong Wang Yao duihualu 韩少功 王尧对话录 (A Dialogue Between Han Shaogong and Wang Yao). Suzhou: Suzhou daxue chubanshe, 2003. ———. Anshi 暗示 (Intimations). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2008a. ———. Maqiao cidian 马桥词典 (A Dictionary of Maqiao). Beijing: Renminwenxue chubanshe, 2008b. ———. “Wo yu tianya” 我与天涯 (Tianya and Me). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖 述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008c. ———. “Wenxue de gen” 文学的根 (The Root of Literature). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008d.

REFERENCES

209

———. “Wo suanshi gongmin xiezuo” 我算是公民写作 (I Rate My Writing as Public Writing). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008e. ———. Zai xianshuo de houtai 在小说的后台 (On the Backstage of Novel). Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008f. Han, Xing. “White Deer Plain, Confucian Culture and Guanzhong School.” Confucian Academy 3.2 (2016): 21–34. Han Yuhai 韩毓海. “Xinwenxue de hongguan shijiao: Lun zhongguo xinwenxue de sanci yuyan geming” 新文学的宏观视角: 论中国新文学的三次语言革命 (New Literature’s Macro Perspective: Three Linguistic Revolutions in Chinese New Literature). Dangdai zuojia pinglun当代作家评论 (Review on Contemporary Writers) 12.2 (1991): 22–32. ———. “Xiangyue 98, gaobie 98” 相约98, 告别98 (See you in 1998, farewell in 1998). In Li Shitao 李世涛, ed., Zhishifenzi lichang: ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场: 自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Changchun: Shidai wenyi, 2000, 221–231. ———. Renwenzhuyi yishixingtai de weizhongzhiji: Cong jiushiniandai sanbu xiaoshuo kan shehuisixiang zhuanxing 人文主义意识形态的危中之机—— 从90年代三部小说看社会思想转型 (Opportunity in the Crisis of Humanistic Ideology: Seeing the Social Thought Transformation in Three Novels of the ` 1990s). Lüye绿叶 (Green Leaves) 6 (2008): 60–73. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红, ed. Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research materials on Wang Xiaobo). Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009. Hayot, Eric. Chinese Dreams: Pound, Brecht, Tel quel. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2004. He Yanhong 何言宏. Jingshen de zhengci 精神的证词 (Spiritual Testament). Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2009. He Guimei 贺桂梅. “Wenxuexing: “Dongxue” huo “feidi”—Guanyu wenxue zizuxing wenti de jianlue kaocha” 文学性: “洞穴”或“飞地”—关于文学”自足 性”问题的简略考察 (Literariness: Cave or Enclave—A Brief Exploration of Literary Autonomy). Nanfang wentan 南方文坛 (Southern Literary Forum) 3 (2004): 21–23. ———. Xinqimeng zhishi dangan: Bashiniandai zhongguo wenhua yanjiu 新启 蒙知识档案: 八十年代中国文化研究 (The Knowledge Archive of the New Enlightenment: A Study of Chinese Culture in the 1980s). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2010. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Dangdai zhongguo de zhishiganjue 当代中国的知识感 觉和观念感觉 (Contemporary China’s Knowledge Feeling and Conceptual Feeling). Guiling: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2006.

210

REFERENCES

Ho, Ping-ti. “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’.” Journal of Asian Studies 57.1 (1998): 123–155. Hofstede, Geert. “Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context.” Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2.1 (2011). https://scholarworks. gvsu.edu/orpc/vol2/iss1/8/. Accessed 10 May 2021. Hong Zicheng 洪子诚 et. “Xinlishi yujing xia de wenxue zizhuxing” 新历史 语境下的 文学自主性 (Literary Autonomy in the New Historical Context). Shanghai Wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 4 (2005): 4–11. ———, and Wu Xiaodong 吴晓东. “Guanyu wenxuexing yu wenxue piping de duihua” 关于文学性与文学批评的对话 (Dialogue on Literariness and Literary Criticism ). Xiandai zhongwen xuekan 现代中文学刊 (Modern Chinese Studies) 23. 2(2013): 4–13. Horner, Charles. Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2011. Hsia, C.T. A History of Modern Chinese Fiction. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale UP, 1971. Huang, Haifeng. “From ‘The Moon Is Rounder Abroad’ to ‘Bravo, My Country’: How China Misperceives the World.” Studies in Comparative International Development 56.1 (2021): 112–130. Huang Xingtao 黄兴涛. “Huayu fenxi yu zhongguo jindai sixiang wenhua shi yanjiu” 话语分析与中国近代思想文化史研究 (Discourse Analysis and Studies of Modern Chinese Intellectual and Cultural History). Lishi yanjiu 历史研究 (Historical Studies) 2 (2007): 149–163. Huang, Yiju. Tapestry of Light: Aesthetic Afterlives of the Cultural Revolution. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智. Zhongguo yanjiu de fanshi wenti de taolun中国研究 的范式问题讨论 (Discussions on the Paradigms of China Studies ). Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003. ———. “Zhongguo geming zhong de nongcun jiejidouzheng” 中国革命中的农 村阶级斗争 (Rural Class Struggle in Chinese Revolution). Huang Zongzhi 黄 宗智, Ed. Zhongguo xiangcun yanjiu dierji 中国乡村研究第二辑 (The Second Study of Rural China). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003. ———. “Women de wenti yishi: dui meiguo de zhongguo yanjiu de fansi” 我们的问题意识: 对美国的中国研究的反思 (Our Problematic: Reflection on America’s Chinese Studies). Kaifang shidai 开放时代 (Open Times) 1 (2016): 155–183. ———. “In Search of a Social Science Anchored in (Chinese) Realities.” Modern China 45.1 (2019): 3–36. Huters, Theodore. “Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900–1937.” (1998): 568–580. Iovene, Paola. Tales of Futures Past: Anticipation and the Ends of Literature in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014.

REFERENCES

211

Jeffreys, Elaine. China, Sex and Prostitution. London: Routledge, 2004. Jenco, Leigh. Changing Referents: Learning Across Space and Time in China and the West. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015. ———. “Introduction: On the Possibility of Chinese Thought as Global Theory.” Chinese Thought as Global Theory: Diversifying Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Ed. Leigh Jencon. Albany: Suny Press, 2016. Ji, Yuanfeng. Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao’s China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Jiang Qing 蒋庆. Gongyangxue yinlun: Rujia de zhengzhi zhihui he lishi xinyang 公羊学引论: 儒家的政治智慧和历史信仰 (An Introductory Treatise on Gongyang Scholarship: Confucian Political Wisdom and Historical Faith). Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995. ———. Zhengzhi ruxue: Dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi he fazhan 政治 儒学: 当代儒学的转向, 特质和发展 (Political Confucianism: Contemporary Confucianism’s Transformation, Characteristics and Development). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2003. ———. “Jiang Qing huiying Li Minghui de piping: zhengzhi bushi wutuobang” 蒋庆回应李明辉的批评: 政治不是乌托邦 (Jiang Qing’s Response to Li Minghui’s Critique: Political Confucianism Is Not Utopia). Pengpai 澎湃新 闻 (The Paper) 7 April 2015. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_ 1318656. Accessed 8 April 2020. Jin Yan 金雁. “Zhiyou ziyou deng yu meiyou ziyou” 只有自由等于没有自由 (Only Freedom Means No Freedom). Zhishifenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou de dongdang 知识分子立场: 激进与保守的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Kaske, Elisabeth. Politics of Language in Chinese Education, 1895–1919. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Klöter, Henning and Mårten Söderblom Saarela, eds. Language Diversity in the Sinophone World: Historical Trajectories, Language Planning, and Multilingual Practices. London: Routledge, 2020. Knight, Sabina. The Heart of Time: Moral Agency in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. Kuang Xinian 旷新年. Xiaoshuo de jingshen 小说的精神 (The Spirit of Novel). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. ———. Xiandai zhongguo wenxue lilun piping gainian 现代中国文学理论批 评概念 (Modern Chinese Literary Theoretical Concepts). Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2014.

212

REFERENCES

Larson, Wendy. “Okay, Whatever: Intellectuals, Sex, and Time in Wang Xiaobo’s Golden Age Years.” The China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China 3.1 (2003): 29–56. ———. From Ah Q to Lei Feng: Freud and Revolutionary Spirit in 20th Century China. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Latour, Bruno. “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225–248. ———. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Lee, Haiyan. The Stranger and the Chinese Moral Imagination. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014. Leese, Daniel. Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 2011. Leenhouts, Mark. Leaving the World to Enter the World: Han Shaogong and Chinese Root-Seeking Literature. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005. Lei Qili 雷启立. “Duochong jiaol xia de chanshi: houxiandai yu houzhimin de lunzheng” 多重焦虑下的阐释: 后现代与后殖民文化的论争 (Interpretation under Multiple Anxieties: Debate Concerning Postmodernism and Poststructuralism). Qimeng de ziwo wajie 启蒙的自我瓦解 (Self-Disintegration of the Enlightenment). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2007. Li Dan 李丹. “Zhongguo zuoyi ziyouzhuyi de xianggang gongshi” 中国左翼 自 由主义的香港共识 (The Hong Kong Consensus of Chinese Left-wing Liberalism). Gongshiwang 共识网 (Consensus Net) 8 August 2014. https://www. gongfa.com/html/gongfaxinwen/201408/06-2649.html. Accessed 20 May 2021. Li, He. Political Thought and China’s Transformation: Ideas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Li Jie 李劼. “Lun wenxue xingshi de benti yiwei” 论文学形式的本体意味 (On the Ontological Meanings of Literary Form). Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 3 (1987): 78–88. ———. Wenxue shi renxue xinlun 文学是人学新论 (A New Theory on Literature as a Study of Human Beings). Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1987. Li Jianjun 李建军. “Zhiyi Mo Yan yu nuojiang” 直议莫言与诺奖 (Candid Remarks on Mo Yan and the Nobel Prize in Literature). Wenxuebao 文学 报 (Literary Newspaper) 10 January 2013. Li, Junpeng. “The Making of Liberal Intellectuals in Post-Tiananmen China.” Diss. Columbia U, 2017. Li, Li. Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of Remembering: The Representations of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in English-Speaking Countries. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

REFERENCES

213

Li Shitao 李世涛, ed. Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. ———. Zhishifenzi lichang: Minzuzhuyi yu zhuanxing shiqi zhongguo de mingyun 民族主义与转型时期中国的命运 (Nationalism and China’s Fate in Transitional Period). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. ———. Zhishifenzi lichang: Jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang 激进与保守 之间的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Li Tuo 李陀. “Ding Ling bujian dan: Maotizhixia zhishifenzi huayu shengchanzhong de fuzajiaose” 丁玲不简单: 毛体制下知识分子的复杂角色 (Ding Ling Is Not Simple: Intellectuals’ Intricate Role in Discourse Production in Mao’s Regime). Jintian 今天 (Today) 3 (1993): 3–20. ———. Mantan chunwenxue 漫谈”纯文学” (A Random Talk on Pure Literature). Shanghai wenxue (上海文学) 182:3 (2001): 4–15 ———. Xuebenghechu 雪崩何处 (Where Did the Avalanche Happen). Beijing: Zhongxin, 2015. Li Yang 李杨. “Bailuyuan gushi: cong xiaoshuo dao dianying” 白鹿原故事: 从小 说 到电影 (The Story of White Deer Plain: from Novel to Movie). Wenxue pinglun 文学评论 (Literary Review) 2 (2013): 172–180. Li Yinhe 李银河. “Wang Xiaobo bixia de xing” 王小波笔下的性 (Sex Under Wang Xiaobo’s Pen). Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2002, 273–384. Li Zehou 李泽厚. “Guanyu bashi niandai de jibenshu” 关于八十年代的几本书 (On Several Books in the 1980s), Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 19 November 2018. http://www.aisixiang.com/data/113481-3.html. Accessed 20 June 2021. Liao Suwu 廖述务, ed. Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. Lin, Qingxin. Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999). Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2005. Lin, Yu-Sheng. Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-traditionalism in The May Fourth Era. Wisconsin: U of Wisconsin P, 1978. Liu Junning 刘军宁. ‘Kaifang de chuantong: cong baoshou zhuyi de shijiao kan’ 开 放的传统: 从保守主义的视角看 (Open Tradition Viewed from a Conservative Perspective), Tianya 天涯 (Frontier) 1 (2006): 165–172. Liu, Kang. “Politics, Critical Paradigms: Reflections on Modern Chinese Literature Studies.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 13–40. ———. Aesthetics and Marxism: Chinese Aesthetic Marxists and Their Western Contemporaries. Duke: Duke UP, 2000.

214

REFERENCES

———. Globalization and Cultural Trends in China. Honolulu: U of Hawai’i P, 2004. Liu, Lydia. Translingual Practice: Literature, Culture and Translated Modernity—China, 1911–1937 . Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. Liu, Qingfeng. “The Topography of Intellectual Culture in 1990s.” Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry. Ed. Davies, Gloria and Geremie R. Barmé. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 47–70. Liu Yunhong 刘云虹, Xu Jun许钧. “Wenxue fanyi mosih yu zhongguo wenxue duiwai yijie: guanyu Ge Haowen de fanyi” 文学翻译模式与中国文学对外译 介: 关于葛浩文的翻译 (Literary Translation Model and Translation of Chinese Literature: On Howard Goldblatt’s Translation). Waiguoyu 外国语 (Journal of Foreign Languages) 37.3 (2014): 6–17. Liu Zaifu 刘再复. “Lun wenxue de zhutixing” 论文学的主体性 (On Literary Subjectivity). Wenxue pinglun 文学评论 (Literary Review) 6 (1985): 11–26. ———. Wenxue de fansi 文学的反思 (Reflections on Literature). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1986. Liu Zhong 刘忠. Chongxie wenxueshi zhuanlan de huiwang 重写文学史专栏 的回望 (Retrospect on the Rewriting Literary History Column). Zhongzhou daxue xuebao 中州大学学报 (Journal of Zhongzhou University) 32.1 (2015): 1–8. Lu, Jie, and Wang Ban, ed. China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Lu, Jie. “Constructing Agency: Challenges and Possibilities in Chinese New Left Literature.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Lu, Xing. Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Impacts on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2004. Lu Xun 鲁迅. Selected Works. Trans. Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang. Vol. 4. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. ———. Lu Xun quanji 鲁迅全集 (The Complete Works of Lu Xun). Vol. 18. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2005. Luo Gang 罗岗. “Wenxue: shijian yu fansi” 文学: 实践与反思 (Literature: Practice and Reflection). Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 (Shanghai Literature) 7 (2001): 72–78. Lynch, Daniel C. China’s Futures: PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics and Foreign Policy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2020. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. Instructions Paiennes. Paris: Galilee, 1997. Ma, Licheng. Leading Schools of Thought in Contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015. McDonald, Edward. Learning Chinese, Turning Chinese: Challenges to Becoming Sinophone in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2011.

REFERENCES

215

McGrath, Jason. Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Makeham, John. Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008. Marchal, Kai. “Modernity, Tyranny, and Crisis: Leo Strauss in China.” Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Ed. Kai Marchal and Carl K.Y.Shaw. London: Lexington Books, 2017, 173–196. Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. Mittler, Barbara. A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2016. Møller-Olsen, Astrid. “Fictional Dictionaries: Power and Philosophy of Language in Contemporary Chinese Fiction.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 29.2 (2017): 66–108. McGrath, Jason. Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Meng Fanhua 孟繁华. Bailuyuan: Yinmi suiyue de xiaoxian zhilu 白鹿原: 隐秘 岁月的消闲之旅 (White Deer Plain: A Leisured Journey at a Mysterious Age) Wenyi zhengming 文艺争鸣 6 (1993): 66–68. Metzger, Thomas A. Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture. New York: Columbia UP, 1986. Mu, Aili. “The Rise of the Short-Short Genre.” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Murthy, Viren. “Modernity Against Modernity: Wang Hui’s Critical History of Chinese Thought.” Modern Intellectual History 3(1) 2006: 137–165. Nan Fan 南帆. “Kongdong de linian: chunwenxue zhibian” 空洞的理念—纯文 学之辩 (Empty Concept: Debate on Pure Literature). Shanghai wenxue 上海 文学 (Shanghai Literature) 6 (2001): 68–69. ———.“Wenhua de ganga: Chongdu bailuyuan” 文化的尴尬: 重读白鹿原 (Cultural Predicament: Reading White Deer Plain). Wenyi lilun yanjiu 文 艺理论研究 2 (2005): 62–69. North, Joseph. Literary Criticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2017. Pan Lili 潘丽莉 and Zhou Suli 周素丽. “2015 zhongwai shida sichao” 中外十 大思潮 (Top Ten Streams of Thought). Renmin luntan 人民论坛 (People’s Forum) 1 (2016): 14–19. Pang, Laikwan. The Art of Cloning: Creative Production During China’s Cultural Revolution. New York: Verso, 2017. Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, ed. 1983. Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Historical Issues. Beijing: Renmin, 1983.

216

REFERENCES

Peng Xiuyin 彭秀银. “Fanyi meixue shuyu xia de wenhua chuanyi: yi Ge Haowen yingyi fengru feidian weili” 翻译美学视阈下的文化传译: 以葛浩文英译 《丰乳 肥殿》 为例 (Cultural Translation Viewed from Translation Aesthetics: Take Howard Goldblatt’s English Translation of Big Breasts and Wide Hips). Yangzhou daxue xuebao 扬州大学学报 (Journal of Yangzhou University) 21.5 (2017): 122–127. Prado, C.G. Searle and Foucault on Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Qian Liqun 钱理群. “Wode xiandai wenxue yanjiu dagang” 我的现代文学研究大 纲 (My Plan for Modern Chinese Literature Studies). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies) 1 (1997): 61–66. ———, Wen Rumin 温儒敏 and Wu Fuhui 吴福辉. Zhongguo xiandai wenxue sanshinian 中国现代文学三十年 (Modern Chinese Literary of Thirty Years). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1998. ———, Huang Ziping 黄子平 and Chen Pingyuan 陈平原. Ershi shiji zhongguo wenxue sanrentan 二十世纪中国文学三人谈 (Three People’s Talk on 20th Century Chinese Literature). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004. Qian Yongxiang 钱永祥. “Xiandaixing yeyi haojin le pipan yiyi ma” 现代性业 已耗尽了批判意义吗 (Is the Potential of Modernity Exhausted). Houfazhan guoji de xiandaixing wenti 后发展国家的现代性问题 (Modernity Issue in Developing Countries). Ed. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2000. Qin Hui 秦晖 (Bian Wu 汴悟). “Ping zhongguoshi de xinzuopai he houxue” 评 中国式的新左派和后学 (Comment on Chinese the New Left and Postmodernist Studies). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 33. 1 (1996): 4–17. ———. Tianyuanshi yu kuangxiangqu 田园诗与狂想曲 (Pastorals and Rhapsodies: A Research for Peasant Society and Peasant Culture). Beijing: Zhongyangbianyi chubanshe, 1996. ———. “Ping zhongguoshi de xinzuopai he houxue”评中国式的新左派和后学 (Comment on Chinese Neo-Leftists and Postmodernist Studies). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty-First Century) 33.1 (1996): 5–16. ———. “Chuangtong zhongguoshehui de zairenshi” 传统中国社会的再认识 (Re-understanding Traditional Chinese Society). Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与 管理 (Strategy and Management) 20.6 (1999): 62–75 ———. Wenti yu zhuyi: Qin Hui wenxuan 问题与主义: 秦晖文选 (Question and Ism: Selected Works of Qin Hui). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999. ———. “Zhenjia hengtingdun yu dongxi hengtingdun” 真假亨廷顿与东西亨 廷顿 (‘True and False Huntington, Eastern and Western Huntington’). Zhishifenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou de dongdang 知识分子立场: 激进与保守的 动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000.

REFERENCES

217

———. “Kaiqi xirurongrui de xinlu (shang)” 开启西儒汇融的新路(上) (Opening a New Path for the Fusion of Western Theories and Confucianism: Part 1). Zhanlue yu guanli战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30.4 (2002): 104– 118. ———. “Kaiqi xirurongrui de xinlu (xia)” 开启西儒汇融的新路(下) (Opening a New Path for the Fusion of Western Theories and Confucianism: Part 2). Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30.5 (2002): 86– 102. ———. “Lun Wang Xiaobo yu dangdai pipan xianshizhuyi wenxue de mingyun” 论王小波与当代批判现实主义文学的命运 (On Wang Xiaobo and the Fate of Contemporary Critical Realist Literature). Han Yuanhong 韩袁红, Ed. Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. ———. “Chonglun ‘dawusi’ de zhudiao jiqi heyi bei ‘yadao’’ 重论大五四的主调 及其何 以被压倒 (Reexamining the Big May Fourth Movement’s Leitmotif and Why It Was Overridden). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 150.8 (2015): 19–34. Qiu Feng 秋风. Lixian de jiyi 立宪的技艺 (The Art of Constitutionalism). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005. Qu Wanwen 瞿宛文. “Quanqiuhua he houjin guojia zhi jingji fazhan” 全球化 与后进国家之经济发展 (Globalization and Economic Development in Backward Countries). Houfazhan guoji de xiandaixing wenti 后发展国家的现代性 问题 (Modernity Issue in Developing Countries). Ed. He Zhaotian 贺照田. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2000. Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970. Shen Songqiao 沈松侨. Xuehengpai yu wusishiqi de fanxinwenhua yundong 学 衡派与五四时期的反新文化运动 (Xue Heng School and Anti-New Culture Movement in May Fourth Era). Taipai: Guoli taiwandaxue chubanshe, 1984. Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You.” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ed. Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction. Durham, Durham: Duke UP, 2003, 1–37. Shang, Wei. “Writing and Speech: Rethinking the Issue of Vernaculars in Early Modern China.” Rethinking East Asian Languages, Vernaculars, and Literacies, 1000–1919. Ed. Benjamin Elman. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Shao Lu 邵璐. “Fanyi meixue shuyu xia de wenhua chuanyi: yi Ge Haowen yingyi fengru feidian weili” 莫言英译者葛浩文翻译中的“忠实”与“伪忠实” (English Translator’s Faithfulness and Unfaithfulness). Zhongguo fanyi 中国 翻译 (Chinese Translation) 5 (2013): 62–67.

218

REFERENCES

Shen, Dan, and Xiaoyi Zhou. “Western Literary Theories in China: Reception, Influence and Resistance.” Comparative Critical Studies 3.1–2 (2006): 139– 155. Shih, Shumei. “Theory, Asia and the Sinophone.” Postcolonial Studies 13.4 (2010): 465–484. ———, Chien-Hsin Tsai and Brian Bernards, eds. Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader. New York: Columbia UP, 2013. Smith, Arthur. Chinese Characteristics. Shanghai: North China Herald, 1890. Song Hong 宋宏. ‘Nanyi zhengtuo de kunjing: guanyu jijin yu bao shou de zhenglun’ 难以挣脱的困境: 关于激进与保守的争论 (Inescapable Predicament: Debate on Radicalism and Conservatism). Qimeng de ziwo wajie 启蒙 的自我瓦解 (Self-Disintegration of the Enlightenment). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2007. Steele, Meili. Hiding from History: Politics and Public Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell U P, 2005. ———. Theorizing Textual Subjects: Agency & Oppression. New York: Cambridge UP, 1997. Su Hongbin 苏宏斌. Wenxue bentilun yinlun 文学本体论引论 (An Introduction to Literary Ontology). Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2006. Shu, Yunzhong. “Technologies of the Self as Antidotes to Chaos: A Foucauldian Reading of White Deer Plain.” Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée 40.3 (2013): 257–270. Strafella, Giorgio. Intellectual Discourse in Reform Era China: The Debate on the Spirit of the Humanities in the 1990s. New York: Routledge, 2017. Tackett, Nicolas. The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017. Tang, Xiaobing. “Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman’ and a Chinese Modernism.” PMLA 107.5 (1992): 1222–1234. ———, ed. Zaijiedu: Dazhong wenyi yu yishixingtai 再解读: 大众文艺与意识 形态 (Rereading: Mass Art and Ideology). Beijing: Beijingdaxue chubanshe, 2007. Tao Dongfeng 陶东风. “Dui ‘guominxing lilun zhiyi’ de zhiyi” 对 《国民性理论 质疑》 的质疑 (Questioning ‘the Questioning of National character Theory’). Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 23 November 2006. http://www.aisixi ang.com/data/38654-3.html. Accessed 22 May 2021. Taylor, Charles. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke UP, 2004. Thakkar, Sonali. Rev. of Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as a Postcolonial Experience, by Rey Chow. Critical Inquiry Summer (2017): 912–913. Tong Qingsheng 童庆生. Hanyu de yiyi: yuwenxue, shijie wenxue he xifang hanyuguan 汉语的意义: 语文学, 世界文学和西方汉语观 (The Significance of

REFERENCES

219

Chinese Mandarin: Philology, World Literature and Western Views on Chinese Mandarin). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2019a. ———. “Tong Qingsheng tan xifang hanyu guan” 童庆生谈西方汉语观 (Tong Qingsheng on Western Views on Chinese Language). Pengpai xinwen 澎湃 新闻 (The Paper) 7 July. 2019b. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forw ard_3743968. Accessed 10 February 2021. Tsu, Jing, and David Der-wei Wang. “Introduction: Global Chinese Literature.” Global Chinese Literature: Critical Essays. Ed. Jing Tsu and David Der-wei Wang. Leiden: Brill, 2010. 1–13. Veg, Sebastian. “Utopian Fiction and Critical Examination: The Cultural Revolution in Wang Xiaobo’s The Golden Age.” China Perspective 4 (2007): 75–87. ———. “The Rise of China’s Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and “Repoliticization”.” The China Journal 82.1 (2019a): 23–45. ———. Minjian: The Rise of China’s Grassroots intellectuals. New York: Columbia UP, 2019b. Vukovich, Daniel. China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC. New York: Routledge, 2013. Wang, Ban, and Jie Lu, ed. China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Wang Binbin 王彬彬. “Yiweiluanzhen he huaweiweizhen: liuhe yuji shuxie, kuayuji shijian de wenti yishi” 以伪乱真和化伪为真: 刘禾 《语际书写》 《 , 跨语际 实践》 的问题意识 (Distort Truth with Falsehood and Turn Truth into Falsehood: Problematics in Liu He’s and Discursive Writing and Translingual Practice). Wenyi yanjiu 文艺研究 (Literature and Art Studies) 4 (2007): 150–157. Wang, Chaohua, ed. One China, Many Paths. New York: Verso, 2003. Wang, David Der-wei. Fictional Realism in Twentieth-Century China: Mao Dun, Lao She, Shen Congwen. New York: Columbia UP, 1992. ———. Fin-de-siecle Splendor: Repressed Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849— 1911. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. ———. 王德威. 海外中国现代文学研究的历史, 现状与未来 (The Past, Present and Future of Oversea Modern Chinese Literary Studies). Dangdai zuojia pinglun 当代作家评论 (Contemporary Writer Review) 4 (2006): 132–136. ———. Why Fiction Matters in Contemporary China. Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2020. Wang Dingding 汪丁丁. “Qimeng sile, qimeng wansui—Ping Wang Hui guanyu zhongguo wenti de xushuo” 启蒙死了, 启蒙万岁—评汪晖关于中国问题的 叙说 (Enlightenment Dies, Enlightenment Survives—Wang Hui’s Narrative About China Problem). Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of

220

REFERENCES

Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. ———. “Wang Xiaobo de shuo yu si” 王小波的说与思 (Wang Xiaobo’s Speaking and Thinking). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Wang Hui 汪晖. Wanghui zixuanji 汪晖自选集 (Self-Selected Works of Wang Hui). Guiling: Guangxi shifandaxue chubanshe, 1997. ———. Sihuo chongwen 死火重温 (Dead Fire Revisited). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2000. ———. 2000. “Dangdai zhongguo de sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing wenti” 当代中国思想状况与现代性问题 (Contemporary Chinese thought and the question of modernity). Zhishifenzi lichang: ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场: 自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi, 2000. 83–123. ———. China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition. Ed.Theodore Huters. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. ———. Xiandai zhongguo sixiang de xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起 (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004. ———. Quzhengzhi de zhengzhi: Duan ershi shiji de zhongjie he jiushi niandai 去政治的政治: 短二十世纪的终结与90年代 (The Politics of Depoliticization: The End of Short Twentieth Century and the 1990s). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2008. ———. “The Liberation of the Object and the Interrogation of Modernity: Rethink ‘The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought’”. Modern China 34.1 (2008): 114–140. Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996. Wang Mingming 王铭铭. Xifang zuowei tazhe: lun zhongguo xifangxue de puxi yu yiyi 西方作为他者: 论中国西方学的谱系与意义 (The West as the Other: On the Genealogy and Meaning of China’s Western Studies). Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi, 2007. Wang, Shaoguang. “Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan.” Diss. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990. ———. The Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan. Hong Kong: Oxford UP, 1995. Wang Xiaobo 王小波. Siwei de lequ 思维的乐趣 (Pleasure of Thinking). Beijing: Beiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1996. ———. Wode jingshen jiayuan 我的精神家园 (My Spiritual Home). Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 1998.

REFERENCES

221

———. 2007. Wang in Love and Bondage: Three Novellas by Wang Xiaobo. Trans. Hongling Zhang and Jason Sommer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. ———. Huangjin shidai 黄金时代 (The Golden Age). Xi’an: Shanxi shifan daxue, 2009a. ———. Baiyin shidai 白银时代 (The Silver Age). Xi’an: Shanxi shifan daxue, 2009b. ———.Qingtong shidai 青铜时代 (The Bronze Age). Xi’an: Shanxi shifan daxue, 2009c. ———. “Weilai shijie zixu” 未来世界自序 (Preface to the Future World). Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009d. 37–38. ———. “Huaiyi sanbuqu xu” 怀疑三部曲序 (Preface to Trilogy of Doubt). Wang Xiaobo yanjiu ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 2009e. 43–47. Wang Xiaoming 王晓明. Wang Xiaoming zixuanji 王晓明自选集 (Wang Xiaoming’s Selected Works). Nanning: Guangxi shifandaxue chubanshe, 1997. ———. “Cong wanshousi dao jingpo hu: guan yu ershi shiji zhongguo wenxue yanjiu” 从万寿寺到镜泊湖: 关于二十世纪中国文学研究 (From Longevity Temple to Jingpo Lake: On Twentieth Century Chinese Literature Studies). Wenyi yanjiu 文艺研究 (Art and Literature Studies) 3 (1989): 35–41. ———. “Zai pipai de zitai beihou” 在批判的姿态背后 (Behind the Critical Posture). Ershiyi shiji 二十一世纪 (Twenty First Century) 22.4 (1994): 137–142. Wang Xuedian 王学典. “Bashi niandai shi zenyang bei chonggou de?” 八十年代 是怎样被重构的? (How is the 1980s reconstructed?). Kaifang shidai 开放时 代 (Open Times ) 6 (2009): 44-58. Wang Yi 王毅, ed. Bu zai chenmo—Renwen xuezhe lun Wang Xiaobo 不再沉 默—人文学者论王小波 (Not Silent Any More: Humanities Scholars on Wang Xiaobo). Shanghai: Guangming ribao, 1998. Williams, Jeffrey J. “New Modesty in Literary Criticism”. Chronicle of Higher Education. 5 January 2015. Wu, Guanjun 吴冠军. Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Thought. Singapore: World Scientific, 2014. Wu, Shufang. “The Revival of Confucianism and the CCP’s Struggle for Cultural Leadership: A Content Analysis of the People’s Daily, 2000–2009.” Journal of Contemporary China 23.89 (2014): 971–991. Wu, Yiching. The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014. Wu Yiqin 吴义勤, ed. Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Jinan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe, 2006.

222

REFERENCES

Xie Tianzhen 谢天振. “Zhongguowenxue wenhua zouchuqu: lilun yu shijian” 中 国文学文化走出去: 理论与实践 (Chinese Literature and Culture Go Global: Theory and Practice). Dongwu xueshu (东吴学术) 2 (2013): 44–54. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. “Cong teshu zuoxiang pubian” 从特殊走向普遍 (From the Specific to the Universal). Gonggongxing yu gonggong zhishifenzi 公共性与公 共知识分子 (Publicity and Public Intellectuals). Ed. Xu Jilin 许纪霖. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2003a. ———. Zhishifenzi shilun知识分子十论 (Ten Essays on Intellectuals). Shanghai: Fudan Daxue chubanshe, 2003b. ———, ed. Qimeng de ziwowajie: 1990 niandai yilai zhongguo sixiangwenhuajie zhongdalunzheng yanjiu 启蒙的自我瓦解: 1990 年代以来中国思想文 化界重大论争研究 (The Disintegration of Enlightenment: A Study of Seminal Debates in Chinese Intellectual and Cultural Circle Since 1990s). Changchun: Jilin chubanjituan, 2007. ———. “Ta si gu ta zai” 他思故他在 (He Thinks, Therefore He Is). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. ———. “Rujia xianzheng de xianshi yu lishi” 儒家宪政的现实与历史 (The History and Reality of Confucian Constitutionalism). Kaifang shidai 开放 时代 (Open Times) 1 (2012): 44–59. ———. “Rujia wenhua zhongguo wenhua yu zhonghua wenhua you qubie ma?” 儒家文化, 中国文 化与中华文化有区别吗? “Is There Any Difference Between Confucian Culture, Chinese Culture and Greater Chinese Culture?” Aisixiang 爱思想 (Love Thinking) 12 June 2018. https://www.aisixiang.com/ data/110423.html. Accessed 10 February 2020. Xu Youyu 徐友渔. Gebainishi de gemming: Zhexue zhong de yuyanxue zhuanxiang 哥白尼式的革命: 哲学中的语言学转向 (Copernican Revolution: Linguistic Turn in Philosophy). Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1994. ———. “Ershi shiji zhexue zhong de yuyan zhuanxiang” 二十世纪哲学中的 语言转向 (Linguistic Turn in Twentieth Century Philosophy). Dushu 读书 (Reading) 12 (1996): 100–106. ———. Xingxingsese de zaofan: Hongweibing jingshen suzhi de xingcheng ji yanbian 形形色色的造反: 红卫兵精神素质的形成及演 (Various Rebellions: Red Guards’ Spiritual Formation and Transformation). Hong Kong: The Chinese U of Hong Kong, 1999. ———. “Ping jiushinian de xinzuopai” 评九十年代的新左派 (On the New Left in the 1990s). Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 (Contemporary Chinese Studies) 4 (2000). https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/ past-issues/71-mcs-2000-issue-4/549-2012-01-03-12-11-40.html. Accessed 20 May 2020. ———. “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo” 自由主义与当代中国 (Liberalism and Contemporary China). Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu

REFERENCES

223

zhongguo sixiangjie de fenghua 知识分子立场:自由主义之争与中国思想界的 分化 (Intellectuals’ Positions: Controversy over Liberalism and the Division of Chinese Intellectual Circle). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2002. ———. “Jinru ershiyi shiji de ziyouzhuyi he xinzuopai” 进入二十一世纪 的自由主义和新左派 (Liberalism and New Left in the 21st century). Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 (Contemporary China Studies) 2 (2007). https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/96mcs-2007-issue-2/1006-21.html. Accessed 27 March 2021. Xu Zhangrun 许章润. “Ziyou zhuyi ruhe zai zhongguo luodi” 自由主义如何在 在中 国落地 (How Does Liberalism Achieve Landing in China). Dongfang lishi pinglun 东方历史评论 (Oriental Historical Review) 6 (2014): 114–121. Xu Zidong 许子东. Dangdai xiaoshuo yuedu biji 当代小说阅读笔记 (Reading Notes on Contemporary Novels). Shanghai: Huadong shifandaxue chubanshe, 1997. ———. Weile wangque de jiti jiyi: jiedu wushipian wenge xiaoshuo 为了忘却的集 体记忆: 解读50篇文革小说 (For the Forgotten Collective Memory: Reading 50 Novels About the Cultural Revolution). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2000. Xue Yong 薛涌. “Cong zhongguo wenhua de shibai kan kongzi de jiazhi” 从中 国文化的失败看孔子的价值 (The Value of Confucius Seen from the Failure of Traditional Culture). Nanfang zhoumo 南方周末 (Southern Weekly) 1 January 2008. Yang Jiangang 杨建刚. “Xinshiqi wenxue shixing bentilun de yanjin lunzheng yu fansi” 新时期文学形式本体论的演进, 论争与反思 (The Evolution, Debate and Reflection on Literary Formalist Ontology in New Era). Renwen zazhi 人文杂志 (Journal of Humanities) 6 (2016): 60–67. Yang Kaidao 杨开道. Zhongguo xiangyue zhidu 中国乡约制度 (Chinese Village Code Institution). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2015. Yang Qingxiang 杨庆祥. Chongxie de xiandu: chongxie wenxueshi de xiangxiang he shijian 重写的限度: 重写文学史的想象和实践 (The Limit of Rewriting: The Imagination and Practice of Literary History Rewriting). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011. Ying, Kong. “A Dictionary of Maqiao: Metafiction of Collective Biography.” Frontiers of Literary Studies in China 5.4 (2011): 633–649. Yu Jie 余杰. Pintie de yinxiang pibei de zhongnian 拼贴的印象 疲惫的中年 (Collage Impression and Exhausted Middle-Age). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. Yu Yingshi 余英时. “The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century.” Daedalus 122.2 (1993): 125–150. ———. Xiandai ruxue lu 现代儒学论 (On Modern Confucianism). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010.

224

REFERENCES

Yuan Weishi 袁伟时. “Jiujing zenyang duidai chuantong wenhua” 究竟怎样对 待传统文化 (How to Treat Traditional Culture). Nanfang zhoumo南方周末 (Southern Weekly). 2 December 2010. Zhang Huiyu 张慧瑜. “Chunwenxue fansi yu zhengzhi de huigui” 纯文学反思与 政治的回归 (Reflection on Pure Literature and Return of the Political). Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论与批评 (Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art) 2 (2006): 69–76. Zhang, Longxi. “Western Theory and Chinese Reality.” Critical Inquiry 19.1 (1992): 105–130. ———. “Out of the Cultural Ghetto: Theory, Politics, and the Study of Chinese Literature.” Modern China 19.1 (1993): 71–101. ———. “Re-conceptualizing China in Our Time: From a Chinese Perspective.” European Review 23.2 (2015): 193–209. Zhang Qianfan 张千帆. Weile ren de zunyan: zhongguo gudian zhengzhi zhexue pipan 为了人的尊严: 中国古典政治哲学批判 (For Human Dignity: Critique of Classical Chinese Political Philosophy). Beijing: Minzu yu fazhi chubanshe, 2012. Zhang Xu 张旭. “Dalu xinrujia yu Kang Youwei zhuyi de qingqi” 大陆新儒 家与康有为主义的兴起 (The Rise of Mainland New Confucians and New Kangyouwei-ism). Wenhua zongheng 文化纵横 (Cultural Warp and Weft) 3 (2017): 98–107. Zhang Yiwu 张颐武. “Bailuyuan: Duanlie de zhengzha” 白鹿原: 断裂的挣扎 (White Deer Plain: Struggle in Rupture). Wenyi zhengming 文艺争鸣 6 (1993): 60–62. ———. “Ershi shiji hanyu wenxue de yuyan wenti” 二十世纪汉语文学的语言问 题 (Language Issue in 20th Century Chinese Literature). Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 (Strategy and Management) 30.5 (2002): 86–102. ———. Chunwenxue taolun yu xinwenxue de zhongjie 纯文学讨论与新文学的 终结 (Pure Literature Discussion and the End of New Literature). Nanfang wentn 南方文坛 (Southern Literary Forum) 3 (2004): 17–20. ———.“Jingshen de kuifa” 精神的匮乏 (Lack of Spirit). Han Shaogong Yanjiu Ziliao 韩少功研究资料 (Research Materials on Han Shaogong). Ed. Liao Suwu 廖述务. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2008. ———. “Shinian hou zaisi Wang Xiaobo de jiazhi” 十年以后再思王小波的价 值 (Rethinking on Wang Xiaobo’s Value After a Decade). Wang Xiaobo Yanjiu Ziliao 王小波研究资料 (Research Materials on Wang Xiaobo). Ed. Han Yuanhong 韩袁红. Tianjing: Tianjing renmin chubanshe, 2009. Zhang Ying 张英进. “Cong wenxue zhenglun kan haiwai zhongguo xiandai wenxue yanjiu de fanshi bianqian” 从文学争论看海外中国现代文学研究的范 式变迁 (See the Paradigm Changes of Oversea Modern Chinese Literary Studies from the Literary Debates). Wenyi lilun yanj 文艺理论研究 (Literary and Art Theory Studies) 33.1 (2013): 28–38.

REFERENCES

225

Zhao, Suisheng. “Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China.” Journal of Contemporary China 24.96 (2015): 961–982. Zhao Yuan 赵园. “Xiandai wenxue yanjiu suixiang” 现代文学研究随想 (Random Thought on Modern Literature Studies). Xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan 现 代文学研究丛刊 (Modern Chinese Literature Studies). 1 (1997): 4–6. Zheng Min 郑敏. “Shiji mo de huigu: hanyu yuyan biange yu zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo” 世纪末的回顾: 汉语语言变革与中国新诗创作 (Retrospect at the Centurial End: Chinese Linguistic Change and Chinese New Poetry Creation). Zhishifenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou de dongdang 知识分子立场: 激进与保守的动荡 (Intellectual Positions: Turmoil Between Radicalism and Conservatism). Ed. Li Shitao 李世涛. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000. Zhong Shuhe 钟叔河. Zouxiang shijie: jindai zhongguo zhishifenzi kaocha xifang de lishi 走向世界: 近代中国知识分子考察西方的历史 (A History of Early Modern Chinese Intellectuals’ Investigation of the West). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985. Zhong Xueping. “International as Specter: Na’er, ‘Subaltern Literature,’ and Contemporary China’s ‘Left Bank.’” China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Jie Lu and Ban Wang. New York: Lexington Books, 2012. Zhong, Yurou. Chinese Grammatology: Script Revolution and Literary Modernity, 1916–1958. New York: Columbia UP, 2019. Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤. Shuzhai li de geming 书斋里的革命: 朱学勤文选 (Revolution in the Study: Selected Works of Zhu Xueqin). Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999.

Index

A Academic public intellectuals, 1, 2, 12 Actor-network theory, xxiv Aestheticism/aestheticist, 19, 23, 33 Alternative modernity, 146, 155–158, 161 Althusser, Louis Pierre, 35 Anderson, Marston, xiv Anker, Elizabeth, 48 Anthropocentrism, 100 Anti-Confucianism, 143, 144 Aporia, 22 “The Awakening of Asia”, 30 B Baihua Movement, 63, 73, 83 Bai Tongdong, 148 Ba Jin, 121 Bakhtin, Mikhail, xx Bao Zunxin, 144 Beijing Literature (Beijing wenxue), 23 Beng-Lan, Goh, xiii Best, Stephen, 53

Bible, 80 Book of Day and Night (Riyeshu), 86 Bourdieu, Pierre, 35 Bourgeois liberalizations, 144 “Bravo, my country (China)”, xxv Buddhism, 2 Button, Peter, xiv C Cai Xiang, 34, 35, 38–41, 49 Capitalist production of knowledge, 199, 200 Cassirer, Ernst, 70 CCP (The Chinese Communist Party), 28, 29, 32–34 20th century Chinese literature (Ershi shiji zhongguo wenxue), 29, 30, 32 Certeau, Michel de, 129, 130 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 160, 173 Chang, Eileen, 29 Cheek, Timothy, 8 Chen Duxiu, 80 Cheng Hao, 159

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Gao, A Novel Approach to China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6518-9

227

228

INDEX

Cheng Yi, 159 Chen, Jianguo, 12 Chen Pingyuan, 29, 35 Chen Sihe, 30, 32, 34 Chen Xiaoming, 35, 47 Chen Zhongshi, 14, 15 Chinese Characteristics , xv Chineseness, ix, x Chinese realist literature/Chinese realism, xiv Chinese vernacular (baihua), 62 Chow, Rey, viii, ix, xi, xii, xiv Chun, Allen, ix, xi, xxv The City of Flower (Huacheng ), 59 Classical Chinese (wenyan), 61, 62, 81, 86, 100 Classic of Poetry (shijing), x Combination of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism (rushidaoheyi), 152 Conflicting interpretations of the Cultural Revolution, 115, 119–122, 124, 129, 131, 134, 136 Confucian Constitutionalism, 149 “Confucianism in appearance and Legalism in essence” (rubiaofali), 152 Confucianism (rujia), 2, 3 Course in General Linguistics , 69 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 5 “Cultivate your self, look after your family, manage the country and put all under heaven in order” (xiushen qijia zhiguo pingtianxia), 170, 184 Cultural anthropology, 28, 33 The Cultural Revolution, 2 D Dai Jinhua, 114 Daoism (dajiao), 2

Daoist Confucianism (daoru), 153 Davies, Gloria, ix, xii Democratic socialists, 3 Dengist era, 47 Deng Xiaojun, 148 Deng Xiaoping, 1 Denton, Kirk, 19–21 Derrida, 45, 47 Detail-oriented novel, 39, 49 Dialect, 67, 68, 72, 75, 76, 81, 83, 93 A Dictionary of Maqiao(Maqiao cidian), 15 Dictionary of the Khazars , 86, 87 Ding Ling, 30 Discussion on Pure Literature, 21–23, 34 Discussion on the Humanistic Spirit, 5 Duanmu Hongliang, 29 Ducks and Butterflies fictions, xiv Duke, Michael, 194 Du Shuying, 28 E Eagleton, Terry, 35, 40, 49 Engels, Friedrich, 32 Equal-field system (junxian), 157 Esherick, Joseph W., 195 An Essay on Man, 70 Existentialism, 33 F Felski, Rita, 48, 53 Fogel, Joshua, 8 Formalism/formalist, 23–30, 32, 33, 35, 36 Foucault, Michel, 5 Freud, Sigmund, 48 Frontier ((Tianya)), 59 “Fuck Chineseness”, xxv Fu Sinian, 80

INDEX

Fusion of pure Confucianism with western liberalism (xiruhuirong ), 153 G Gan Chunsong, 165 Gang of Four, 116, 121 Gan Yang, 70 Gao Ruiquan, 34 Ge Jianxiong, 195 Genette, Gérard, xx Ge Zhaoguang, x Global capitalism, 46, 49 Goldblatt, Howard, vi, vii The Golden Age (Huangjin shidai), 15 Guanxue (a local Confucianism of Song Dynasty), 175, 176 Gu, Mingdong, 193 Guo Songtao, xvi H Habermas, Jurgen, 67, 84 Han Dynasty, 148, 162 Han Shaogong, 14, 15 Han Yuhai, 61, 73, 74 Hao Yuanbao, 34 Hayek, 145 Heavenly principle (tianli), 157–159 He Guimei, 35, 40, 41, 49, 53 Heidegger, 28 Hermeneutics of suspicion, 36, 48, 49, 51–53 Hermeneutics of trust, 48, 49, 53 Heshang , 145 Historical linguistics, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 92 Historicist-contextualist paradigm, 50, 51 Holistic ontology, 20, 48 Hong Renxuan, xvi Hong Zicheng, 24, 44

229

Hooligan literature, 34 House of Confucians (tongruyuan), 164 House of Nation (guotiyuan), 164 House of People (shumingyuan), 164 Hsia, C.T., v, vi Huang, Philip, 195 Huang Ziping, 29 Huang Zongxi, 69 Hu Shi, 80

I Intimations (Anshi), 86 Iovene, Paola, 12

J Jameson, Fredric, 35, 38–40, 49 Jenco, Leigh, 8 Jiang Guangci, 30 Jiang Qing, 150, 162–165 Jia Pingwa, 83 Jin Guantao, 144 Jin Yan, 148

K Kang Youwei, 158, 165 Kant, Immanuel, 23, 25 KMT (Kuomintang), 43 Knight, Sabina, 11 Kuang Xinnian, 23 Kubin, Wolfgang, vi

L Lacan, Jacques Marie Émile, 5 Laclau, Ernesto, 43, 44 Larson, Wendy, 10–12 Latour, Bruno, xxiv, 52 Lee, Haiyan, 12 Left-wing liberalism, 3, 4

230

INDEX

Legalism and Daoism complement each other (fadaohubu), 152 Legalism (fajia), 2 Legalist Confucianism (faru), 153 Legitimacy of the heaven (tiandao), 163 Lei Yi, 148 Lenin, 30 Liao Qichao, 158 Liberals, 3, 4, 9, 14 Liberal use of Confucianism, 165 Li Jie, 26–28 Li Jiefei, 26 Linguistic certitude, 6, 7 Linguistic turn, 61, 64, 65, 81, 84, 99 Link, Perry, xiv Li Rui, 83 Literary autonomy, 20, 23, 29, 45, 46 Literary Newspaper (Wenxuebao), vi Literary subjectivity (wenxue zhutixing), 26, 27 Li Tuo, 23–25, 35, 36, 38, 42, 44–46 Liu Kang, 32, 33 Liu Qing, 31 Liu Xiaobo, 144 Liu Xiaofeng, 144 Liu Zaifu, 25, 29 Li Zehou, 25 Longevity Temple, 132 Love in the Age of Revolution, 131, 132 Luo Gang, 35, 41, 42, 49 Lu Xinhua, 121 Lu Xun, vi, xiv–xvi, xviii, xix, xxi–xxiii Lyotard, Jean-François, 5

M A Madman’s Diary, xxii Mainland new Confucians, 146, 161, 162, 165 Mao Dun, vi, 30, 31

Maoist, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31–33, 40 Maoists, 3 Mao Style (Mao wenti), 118 Mao Zedong, 33 Marcus, Sharon, 53 Mass Language Movement, 63 The May Fourth Movement, 73 McGrath, Jason, 9 Meili, Steele, 11 Mencius, 69 Mencius (Mengzi), x Modern Chinese Literature of Thirty Years (Zhongguo xiandai wenxue sanshinian), 30 Modernization ideology, 40 Modern standard Chinese, 61, 62, 68, 71, 83, 87, 88, 93, 95, 100 Mouffe, Chantal, 43, 44 Murphy, Viren, 156

N Nan Fan, 35–38, 41 Narratology, 25 “National character”, xvii, xix National Language Movement, 63 Neo-authoritarians, 3 Neomarxist, 21, 22, 35–37, 40, 41, 47, 49–51 New Confucians, 3, 4, 14 New Criticism, v, vi, xxiii, xxiv The New Culture Movement, 143, 144 New Democratic Revolution (xinminzhuzhuyi geming ), 28 New Left, 3, 4, 9, 14 New Qing History, 195 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 48 Non-separation of literature, history and philosophy (wenshizhe bufenjia), 86 Nonhuman actor/agency, 100

INDEX

Non-ideological/non-factional interpretation of literature, 9–12, 15 North, Joseph, 50, 51 O Obsession with China (Hsia, C.T.), v, vi Old Democratic Revolution (Jiuminzhuzhuyi geming), 28 Ontology of form (xingshi bentilun), 26–28 Ordinary social actors’ self-understanding, 165, 169, 170 The Oriental (Dongfang ), 59 Orientalism, 80 Ownby, David, 8 P Pavi´c, Milorad, 86 Peking University, 29, 40 Periodization of modern Chinese literary history, 28 Phonocentrism, 70, 71, 75, 80 Pinyin, 64 Political Confucianism, 111 Positive role of pop literature, 46 Postcritical reading, 53 Postsocialist Chinese literary thought, 20–22, 24, 25, 33, 36, 47–49, 51 Poststructuralist/poststructuralism, viii–xv, xxi–xxiv Post-truth Politics, 135, 137, 138 Problematization of referentiality, 62 Professionalization of Chinese academia, 67 Pure Confucianism(chunru), 153, 155 Pure literature (chunwenxue), 13 Q Qian Liqun, 29, 35

231

Qian Xuantong, 80 Qing Dynasty, xvi Qin Hui, 61, 68–70, 72 Qiu Feng, 148 Quine, W.V.O, 65, 66 Qu Qiubai, 43 R Random Thoughts (Suixianglu), 121 Rationalization, 74 Rawski, Evelyn S., 195 Reading (Dushu), 59 Realist/realism, 23, 26, 30, 32, 33, 39, 43, 52 Red Guards, 117, 118 Regean-Thatcher conservatism, 40 Reparative reading, 52 “The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Historical Issues”, 116 Revising Process (Xiugai guocheng ), 86 Revival of Confucianism, 143, 144 Rewriting Literary History (chongxie wenxueshi), 30, 31 Ricoeur, Paul, 48 The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought , 156 Rituals and music (liyue), 157 Root-Seeking Literature (Xungen wenxue), 59 Russell, Bertrand, 64 S Said, Edward, xvi Saussure, Ferdinand de, 27 Scar fiction, 120, 121 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich, 23 Script reform, 63

232

INDEX

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 52 Self-orientalizing, 79 Semantic ascent, 65, 66 Sent-down youth (zhiqing), 86, 89 Shi Tuo, 29 Shumei Shih, ix, 82 Sinified Marxism, 44 Sinocentric, 7 Sinologism, 193, 194 Sinophone Studies, ix, xi Smith, Arthur, xv, xviii “Social imaginary”, xxiv, 92, 154, 159, 167, 168, 198 Socialist realism, 33 Socialist Revolution (shehuizhuyi geming ), 28 Song Dynasty, x The Soviet Union, 145 Specific intellectuals, 67 Spiritual Confucianism, 111 Spring and Autumn Period, 90 Statists, 3 Strafella, Giorgio, 5 Structuralist linguistics, 27, 28 Sun Ge, 26 Surface reading, 53 Symptomatic reading, 53

T Takeuchi, Yoshimi, 42 Tales of Liaozhai, 97 Tales of the Supernatural , 97 Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art, 33 Tang Wenming, 165 Tang, Xiaobing, xiv Tan Sitong, 69 Taylor, Charles, xxiv, 167, 168 Three bonds and five norms (sangang wuchang ), 151 Three Dynasties (Sandai), xvi, xvii

Tiananmen, 1–4, 7, 9, 14 Tong Qingsheng, 78 The True Story of Ah Q , xv

U Universal intellectuals, 67

V Veg, Sebastian, 108, 109 Vukovich, Daniel, 199

W Wang, Ban, 9 Wang, David Der-wei, xiv Wang Dingding, 61, 77 Wang Fuzhi, 69 Wang Gan, 34 Wang Hui, 61, 74–78, 81, 92, 94 Wang Mingming, 192, 196 Wang Shaoguang, 119 Wang Shuo, 34 Wang Tao, xvi Wang Xiaobo, 14, 15 Wang Xiaoming, 20, 26, 30, 32–34 Wang Yuanxiang, 28 Wang Yueyuan, 28 Weber, Max, 74, 75 Well-field system (jingtian), 157 West-centrism/west-centric, 5, 8 The White Deer Plain (Bailuyuan), 15 Williams, Raymond, 35 Wittgenstein, 84 “The world under heaven is for the public” (tian xia wei gong), 69 Worrying about China, 23 Writing Conveys Dao (Wenyizaidao), 23 Wu, Guanjun, 5, 7 Wu Jun, 26 Wu Liang, 44, 45

INDEX

X Xiao Hong, 30 Xi Jinping, 147 Xu Dai, 28 Xue Fucheng, xvi Xue Yi, 35 Xue Yong, 148 Xu Jilin, 34 Xu Youyu, 61, 64–66, 68 Xu Zhangrun, 147 Xu Zidong, 121

Y Yan Fu, xvi Years Lapse like Waters , 131 Yuan Weishi, 148

Z Zeng Yi, 165 Zhang Chengzhi, 34

233

Zhang Huiyu, 42 Zhang Longxi, xi Zhang Qianfan, 148 Zhang Rulun, 34 Zhang Taiyan, 78 Zhang Tianyi, 30 Zhang Wei, 34 Zhang Yimou, 34 Zhang Yiwu, 45, 46 Zhao Shuli, 30 Zhao Yuan, 35 Zhao Yuanren, 80 Zheng Guanying, xvi Zheng Min, 61, 70–73 Zhuangzi, 97 Zhu Liyuan, 28 Zhu Xi, 159 Zhu Xueqin, 34 Žižek, Slavoj, 5 Zuo’s Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annuals (Zuo Zhuan), x