A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries 9783110877137, 9783110128697

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A Language Policy for the European Community

Contributions

to the Sociology

61

Editor

Joshua A. Fishman

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

of

Language

A Language Policy for the European Community Prospects and Quandaries

Edited by Florian Coulmas

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1991

Mouton de Gruyter (formely Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication

Data

A Language policy for the European Community : prospects and quandaries / edited by Florian Coulmas. p. cm. — (Contributions to the sociology of language ; 61) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 3-11-012869-1 (acid-free paper) 1. Language policy —Europe. 2. Linguistic minorities— Europe. 3. European federation. I. Coulmas, Florian. II. Series. P119.32.E85L3 1991 306.4'494—dc20 91-32522 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging in Publication

Data

A language policy for the European Community : prospects and quandaries / ed. by Florian Coulmas. — Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1991 (Contributions to the sociology of language ; 61) ISBN 3-11-012869-1 NE: Coulmas, Florian [Hrsg.]; G T

© Copyright 1991 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-1000 Berlin 30. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Typesetting: Satzpunkt, Braunschweig. — Printing: Ratzlow Druck, Berlin. Binding: Dieter Mikolai, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Praefatio Regulae tres de Unguis utendis in conditione varietatis linguarum: communitas universalis, territorium linguae, auctoritas potestatis Communitas universalis Sálvete hospites honorabiles, Europaei! Saluto vos hic in Instituto Reimero et gratias ago invitationem meam secutos esse. In hoc loco iucundo disputandi causa conveniebamus de questionibus linguae, agendas in confoederatione Europaeae. In varietate linguarum divitiae magnae diuturnaque literarum monumenta concluduntur. Tutae variae linguae Europaeae in cursu rerum gestarum contrarias partes egisse constant. Quomodo hae partes in Europa confunda distributatae erunt, quaerimus. Utrum responsum questionis illius quecumque cursum natura dederit permittendum est, an hac in causa acer et libera volúntate civili procedere confoederatio Europaea appellata sit? Lingua universalis, lingua latina pars communis historiae Europae est. Nonne optimi Europae una lingua locoturos esse videbimus, nonne fortasse etiam populos? Ita in memoriam reduxi nunc modo nonullas questiones de quibus disputare in hoc loco litterato occasionem habebimus: Spero, varietas linguarum in hoc circulo nostro animum nostrum non modo non perturbaverit, sed illuxerit! Dixi.

Territorium linguae Sehr geehrte Gäste, Europäer! Ich begrüße Sie hier in der Reimers-Stiftung und bedanke mich dafür, daß Sie meiner Einladung gefolgt sind, in dieser angenehmen Umgebung über die Probleme einer Sprachpolitik für die Europäische Gemeinschaft zu diskutieren. Die sprachliche Vielfalt ist ein großer Reichtum Europas mit einer langen Tradition. Die vielen Sprachen Europas haben in der Geschichte unterschiedliche Rollen gespielt. Wie werden die Rollen in einem vereinten Europa ver-

vi

Praefatio

teilt sein? Soll die Beantwortung dieser Frage dem Lauf der Dinge überlassen bleiben, oder soll die Europäische Gemeinschaft sich dazu aktiv als politisches Subjekt verhalten? An jedem Ort hat eine Sprache Gültigkeit. Werden die Europäer je dazu kommen, die Sprache des Ortes, an dem sie gerade sind, sprechen oder wenigstens verstehen zu können? Dies sind nur einige der Fragen, die wir in dieser unpolitischen Umgebung Gelegenheit haben, zu erörtern. Möge die Vielfalt der unter uns vertretenen Sprachen unseren Geist nicht verwirren, sondern erhellen!

Auctoritas potestatis Ladies and Gentlemen! It gives me great pleasure to welcome you here at the Reimers-Stiftung and I thank you for accepting the invitation to discuss the problems of a language policy for the European Community in these congenial surroundings. Linguistic multiformity ist one of Europe's assets with a long tradition. Throughout history the many languages of Europe have played different roles and fulfilled a variety of functions. How will their parts be cast on the stage of a united Europe? Should this question be left for the course of events to be answered, or schould the European Community take issue with it as an active political agent? Today, the most powerful language, the language of the most powerful, is English. Should the Europeans in future use English to communicate with each other? These are but a few of the questions which this unpolitical environment allows us to discuss sine ira et studio. May the multiplicity of languages amongst us not confuse, but enlighten us. Thus began a conference on a the conditions of a language policy for the European Community held with the generous support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung in Bad Homburg, FRG, from December 11 to 13, 1989. Because of the topic of the conference the question of the conference language inevitably had symbolic significance. It was decided, therefore, to leave the decision which language to use up to the participants. The above three principles for making a choice were suggested, and although it must be admitted that the chairman's attempt to promote the

Praefatio classical language o f European

vii

scholarship did not meet with overwhelming

enthusiasm, a great variety o f languages were heard at the conference which thus

turned

out

to

be

multilingualism. Florianvs Kvlmasis Tokyo, September

1990

a

discussion

of,

as

well

as

an

exercise

in,

Contents Praefatio Florianvs

ν Kvlmasis

European integration and the idea of the national language Florian Coulmas Factors of constraints and freedom in setting a language policy for the European Community: A sociolinguistic approach Andrée Tabouret-Keller Language conflicts in multilingual Europe - prospects for 1993 Peter Hans Neide Linguistic minorities and language conflict in Europe: Learning from the Swiss experience Richard J. Watts Language politics and the new European identity Harald Haarmann

1

45

59

75

103

Society, civilization, mentality: Prolegomena to a language policy for Europe Roland Posner

121

Multilingualism in European Community meetings a pragmatic approach Nick Roche

139

Legal aspects of a language policy for the European Communities: Language risks, equal opportunities, and legislating a language Harald Koch

147

The impact of European Community rules on linguistic policies of the Member States Bruno De Witte

163

χ Reflections about minority languages in the European Community Hartmut Haberland

179

Linguistic "integration" and "identity" - the situation of migrant workers in the EC as a challenge and opportunity Konrad Ehlich

195

Educational language planning in England and Wales: Multicultural rhetoric and assimilationist assumptions Michael Stubbs

215

The status of German and other languages in the European Community Ulrich Ammon

241

National and international dimensions of language policy when the minority language is a national language: The case of Irish in Ireland Pádraig O Riagáin Linguistic nationalism and European unity: The case of Greece Theodossia Pavlidou

255

279

Italian in the European Community: An educational perspective on the national language and new language minorities E. Zuanelli

291

Contributing authors

301

Index of subjects

303

Index of names

309

European integration and the idea of the national language Ideological roots and economic consequences Florian Coulmas Treasure and Achilles heel The stated objective of the European Community is economic, social and political integration. Economic integration has been pursued by means of creating a common market where trade barriers are eliminated, administrative regulations and taxation systems are harmonized and a common monetary policy is adopted by the member states. The Single European Act of February 1986 is the new framework within which the Community will transform itself into a single market of 320 million people. The integrated market is due to be complete by the end of 1992. On February 15 1988 the EC and the Heads of State and Government of its members agreed on the so-called Delors Package, a wide range of reforms designed to create an integrated economic and monetary zone in which citizens, industries and banks are expected to increasingly behave as European rather than as national entities. Although social and political integration are not as far advanced as economic integration, it cannot be denied that during the thirty years of its existence the Community has achieved a remarkable degree of accord in these areas as well. The question which is at the center of this paper ist whether a European Community that transcends national frontiers not only on paper but in the reality of everyday life of its citizens will eventually have to develop a coordinated language policy. To date, the various languages spoken in the EC member states continue to be the most visible mark of their diversity. Tariff boundaries have been successfully abolished, but language still does much more to separate than to unite the peoples of Europe. Both, "federalists" who favor a strong supranational Community and "inter-governmentalists" who resent the idea of transferring parts of national sovereignty to the Community have recognized the divisive potential of the European languages ever since the inception of the idea

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of a European Community that would peacefully unite the peoples of western Europe which in the past so often stood opposed in conflict. But Europe's many highly cultivated languages have also been celebrated as a unique achievement and the Community's greatest asset. As will become clear on the following pages, this assessment is to be understood in a metaphorical as well as in the literal sense. Taking care of this asset in a responsible and reasonable manner is no easy task, which is one of the reasons why Europe's multilingualism was recognized as a problem early on. Opinions as to the depth and magnitude of the language problem, however, vary on a large scale. The late Walter Hallstein, for example, one of the eminent architects of the EC and the first President of the Commission, took it rather lightly: [D]aß die Europäer nicht eine Sprache sprechen, kann uns nicht stören. Die Schweiz liefert uns das klassische Beispiel dafür, daß sprachliche Vielfalt nicht begrenzt, sondern bereichert, und wir wünschen unseren belgischen Freunden, daß sie bald als ein zweites Beispiel angeführt werden können. Die Mehrzahl der Sprachen ist kein Hemmnis, sondern ein Ansporn. Die Erfahrungen mit unseren europäischen Beamten in Brüssel und in den gemeinsamen Forschungszentren von Euratom beweisen es (Hallstein 1974: 12).1 These lines bear close examination. There is certainly some truth in what Hallstein says about the European bureaucracy. That a bureaucratic apparatus which brings together civil servants of many different cultural and linguistic traditions works at all must be seen as a considerable achievement, although this is not often recognized. Christopher Tugendhat, a former Vice-President of the Commission, speaks with the authority of an insider when he points out that "Canadians and others engaged in the difficult task of trying to develop bicultural and bilingual institutions within a single country come to Brussels to see how it is done" (Tugendhat 1987: 139). There is, however, a certain irony here relating to Hallstein's benevolent wish for the Belgians. If indeed the Canadians or others come to Brussels in order to learn something about multilingual institutions, they come to the seat of the European Commission rather than to the capital of Belgium. Today Hallstein's optimism about Belgium's capacity to manage its perennial language problem seems less justified than ever; unless, that is, José Happart is seen as a champion of European unity rather than Walloon parochialism. José Happart is the former mayor of Les Fourons or Voeren, as the Flemish call it, a village of 5000 which belongs to the Flemish province of Limburg. When Happart was elected mayor in 1986 he immediately provoked a national

European integration

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uproar by refusing to perform any administrative business in Dutch which, however, he was required to do by the law of the land. The national Council of State, therefore, had little choice but to counter this act of linguistic insubordination by sacking the mayor. The ensuing controversy brought down the national government forcing Prime Minister Martens to resign in November 1987. This was by no means the first time that Belgian politics was affected by the language dispute. Four of Belgium's seven government crises since 1979 were over language issues. And it can be argued that Belgium has been moving towards a federal system since the early 1980's. 2 But the Happart affair provided the occasion to move forward with the constitutional reform that transforms Belgium from a unified national monarchy into a federation along linguistic lines. This is hardly what Hallstein had in mind when he expressed the hope that Belgium would join Switzerland as an example of how multilingualism can function as an incitement rather than an obstacle. Nevertheless, the Belgian development may eventually prove to be conducive to European integration in an unforeseen manner. Although King Baudouin contends that the new constitution guarantees a solid national state and excludes any form of separatism, many Belgian politicians see it as a weakening of the state. And this is just, some people think, what the Community needs. These observations show that Brussels, an increasingly cosmopolitan city, exemplifies two important aspects of language as a political phenomenon in the European context. (1) On the supranational level of Community administration multilingualism is an obstacle, but a manageable one. (2) On the subnational level languages are associated with loyalties and emotions with an explosive potential. But what about the national level? Belgium is exceptional in that language does not function as a national symbol. Rather its national unity had to be established and to be maintained in the face of linguistic disunity. Although Belgian multilingualism is not yet as unproblematic and free of intercommunal strife as its Swiss counterpart, Belgium like Switzerland is free of the ideological identification of language, nation and state so characteristic of most other European states. It is worth remembering in this connection that some 500 years elapsed from the first three Swiss cantons coming together to shape their own destiny and the last joining the "everlasting league" in 1848. Belgium has not had half as much time for developing the difficult habit of combining shared and divided loyalties. To be sure, languages do command loyalties in Belgium, but these are not identical with national loyalties. More than any-

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thing else it is the connection of language with nation and state which for the European Community makes the language issue such a precarious one. And it is because of this idea that Europe's linguistic diversity is sometimes painted as an almost insurmountable problem which should be avoided rather than tackled head on. For example: Es liegt im Interesse der Zentralorgane und der Regierungen, um des Überlebens willen die Sprachenfrage für diese Generation noch auszuklammern (von Donat 1977: 12).3 Statements like this give expression to the concern that in the field of language most Europeans would rather embrace the Luxembourg national motto, "Mir woelle bleiwe wat mir sin", than the Belgian motto, "L'union fait la force", or that the language question poses a serious obstacle for the delicate act of reconciling these two principles. In spite of such apprehensions it has not been possible to avoid the language question altogether. Language is simply too conspiciuous to be ignored. As a matter of fact, the EC has undertaken various language related initiatives. The question then is whether a review of these initiatives can reveal the principle outlines of what might become a language policy for the EC.

EC language arrangements to date The major domains where the Community has dealt with language are the following: (1) language status; (2) language use by and with EC institutions; (3) translation and terminology formation; (4) language education for citizens of EC member states; (5) minority protection. (1) Status. The point of departure for the Community's language related regulations is Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome which stipulates that the rules governing the use of languages by the institutions of the Community shall be determined by the Council. Accordingly, these rules are laid down in Council

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Regulation No. 1/58. 4 When it was adopted on April 15, 1958, 5 this regulation identified German, French, Italian and Dutch as the official and working languages of the Community. As a result of the subsequent enlargements of the EC, this regulation was changed three times to grant Danish, English, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish the same status. Irish and Luxembourgish are explicitly mentioned in a number of Community documents 6 as national languages which, however, do not enjoy official status. Some institutions have explicit language regulations of their own. The European Court of Justice, for instance, recognizes Irish in addition to the other nine official languages as a language of a case. 7 Although the Irish Government pressed for recognition of Irish when it applied for membership to the EC, it did not insist on the unlimited validity of Council Regulation No. 1 for Irish. As a consequence only legal documents are translated into Irish. For instance, driving licenses are now identified as such in ten languages throughout the Community. Given the declining number of Irish speakers in Ireland 8 , this is an undeniable success in terms of prestige. The status of Irish underscores the actual level of the Community's integration and its nature as an association of sovereign states rather than a federation in that it demonstrates the willingness to accommodate national desires and to accord national languages a privileged status. This is also evidenced by the multiplicity of the official languages which is unparalleled in other international organizations. The 23 members of the Council of Europe, for example, make do with two official languages, English and French. The United Nations Organization has six official languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish; NATO with its sixteen members gets by with English and French; and the European Free Trade Association, EFTA, uses only English, a foreign language for all of its six members. In the EC, by contrast, with its nine official languages Danish and Greek are on an equal footing with French and English, a status they are not even theoretically accorded anywhere else. The equality of all official languages is followed to the letter in a number of symbolic regulations. For example, the presidency of the Council rotates in six-months tenures, each member chairing the Council in turn, in alphabetical order of the names of the member states in their own languages. While prestige considerations and national pride are clearly at work here, there is another, important reason for the abundance of official languages. EC organs take decisions that immediately become law in the member countries and may override national law. It is thus a matter of both accountability and

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precision that regulations and other documents are made available in all official languages of the member states. 9 That, in any event, is the rationale. In modern states the language of law is a highly complex code, and that laws are drafted in the national languages is one important aspect of their privileged status. Although "legalese" is hard to understand for most people without expert help in any event, both for material and linguistic reasons, there is general agreement that it would ill become the Community as a democratic organization to make regulations which some of the citizens cannot understand because they are phrased in a foreign language. Hence a reduction of the official languages of the EC is considered impossible for judiciary reasons, at least for the foreseeable future. (2) Language use by and with EC institutions. Regulation 1 makes explicit reference to official languages and working languages, but it fails to explain the difference. It also in Article 6 stipulates that the institutions of the Community may set their own language rules as long as they conform with the Regulation. None of the institutions, however, seem to make use of the distinction between official and working languages. The European Parliament also uses the term "official languages and working languages" without clarification. And the Court of Justice in its rules of procedure makes provisions for "the language of a case". 1 0 The European Parliament admits all of the nine official languages. Because this forces the deputies to have headphones clamped on their ears most of the time, a tangible manifestation as it were of their inability to communicate with each other, various proposals have been made to change the language rules. For example, in 1974 when the Parliament was not yet a directly elected body, its Members Patijn and Van der Hek posed a seven point written question to the Commission asking whether the Commission agreed that "Latin should be made the European language", that "Latin should be the first foreign language taught in the Community and that it should be the only language used during part-sessions", and whether "the Commission's publications [will] also appear in Latin in future". 11 Interestingly the Commission in its answer declared itself incompetent in this matter, which must be understood as a deliberate decision rather than a legal necessity. The Commission after all has the privilege to propose legislation to the Council. However, in 1974 at a time when the Community was just recovering from the difficult process of Britain's accession, it was not ready to tackle anything as potentially explosive as the language question.

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Yet, a limitation of the number of languages to be used in Parliament has also been considered from time to time, but was never supported by a sufficient number of members to challenge the equality of all official languages. Another proposal which became known as the "asymmetric system" was made by Mrs. van Hoof, the director general of the Commission's Interpretation and Conferences service. It suggests that Members make speeches in their own language, but should be expected in some measure to listen to speeches in the two dominant languages, French and English, without interpretation. 12 This proposal, too, met with hostility. Although in practice the number of languages used at the level of committee meetings of the European Parliament ist occasionally limited, the Parliament remains committed to work in all nine official languages, regardless of the cost. Again this has both decorative and substantial reasons. Most importantly, any language requirement for membership in the European Parliament would be tantamount to a social selection of members in some countries but not in others. Also as a directly elected assembly the European Parliament has a representative function which is to say that every citizen should be able without qualification to stand for the Parliament and to follow its proceedings. The Parliament's committee on rules of procedure, therefore, in 1982 submitted a resolution to the plenum pointing out that "any limitation of the number of languages used by the European Parliament would interfere with the democratic nature of Parliament." The resolution which was adopted on 14 October 1982 "[c]onfirms the rule that there is to be absolute equality between the Community languages, whether used actively or passively, in writing or orally, at all meetings of Parliament and its bodies." 1 3 In his report on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure Mr. K. Nyborg mentions another reason why it is of special importance that all nine official languages are used in the debates of the European Parliament and their documentation: The proceedings of the Parliament are public and the debates thus "represent the only opportunity for public discussion of proposals for new community legislation. Proceedings in both the Commission and the Council are confidential". 14 As for communication between national institutions or individual citizens and the Community, Article 2 of Regulation 1 stipulates that the sender is free to use any one of the nine official languages while the Community is to reply in the language of the sender's choice. The Community is thus obliged to react and cannot limit the number of languages it uses by its own decision.

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(3) Translation and terminology formation. The EC runs the largest translation and interpretation services in the world. Nothing like it has ever existed before. Nine official languages imply 72 language pairs to be dealt with. The total amount of translation work to be handled by Community institutions already in 1979 surpassed one million pages a year. 15 While this may appear to be first and foremost a technical problem, it has political aspects which must not be ignored. The very fact that the Commission has allowed the translation service to become one of the Community's most important agencies testifies to a certain language policy or, as some would have it, the failure to develop one. To be sure, translation and interpretation are indispensible for the work of Community institutions. However, it is a serious question whether ist is really necessary that language interferes in the political process to the extent it does. That meetings must be postponed or policy measures cannot be enacted because certain translations are not available in time is not a rare exception in Brussels. The EC brings together some of the most affluent countries of the world and can hence afford to spend money to get past the language barrier. But in the long run increasing the budget of the translation service can hardly make up for the political deficit. So far, the EC has been used by the member states to defend their languages' privileged position rather than being given the chance to produce a language policy of its own design. Technology is employed for alleviating the translation problem. Considerable resources have been invested into two machine translation systems: Systran for the major language pairs such as English-French; and Eurotra which is designed to handle all language pairs. Some 120 researchers are at present working on this project in twenty centers based in all twelve member states. 16 Machine translations are already used, although they still need careful revising by translators. It is expected that Systran and Eurotra will substantially increase speed and reduce cost, but both measures are designed to enlarge output capacity rather than cut down input necessity. No translator's job is threatened by improved computer translation. Given the nature of the documents the Community produces, terminological precision is one of the crucial requirements on translations. To meet the needs of harmonized terminologies in the nine official languages the Community has its own Terminology Office which collates glossaries of treaty vocabularies 17 and works at the standardization of legal and other subject specific terminologies. The Commission also publishes the annual Terminologie et Traduction.

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(4) Language education. The teaching of foreign languages has probably received more attention than any other language related problem in the Community. The two dominant issues here are (1) improving the language skills of all EC citizens, and (2) dealing with the special language needs of migrant labour. Foreign language learning is seen as an essential element of the construction of greater European unity. Although education was not originally envisaged as a field of Community policy, increasing awareness of the economic aspects of education has led to regular Community cooperation in this field. In 1974 the Commission presented an outline for an action programme, and in 1976 the council and a meeting of Education Ministers agreed on a Community programme. As one of its six points it emphasizes the need for the improvement of foreign language teaching explicitly mentioning the following objectives: - offering all pupils the opportunity of learining at least one other Community language, - the principle that before qualifying as a foreign-language teacher a student should have spent a period in a country or region where the language he is to teach is spoken, - the promotion (e. g., on radio and television) of language teaching outside the traditional school system, in particular to meet the vocational training requirements of adults. In addition the following actions were decided to be undertaken at Community level: - organization of consultation between those responsible for organizing language teaching and specialized researchers in that field, - examination at Community level of the results of research into the methodology of language teaching, particularly that undertaken in the CCC of the Council of Europe. 1 8 The "European Educational Policy Statements" issued by the Council in 1984 call among other things for "one modern language in addition to the mother tongue [...] to be studied in depth", and encourages the learning of other languages. 19 Yet more ambitiously the Council and the Ministers for Education agreed to promote appropriate measures "to enable the maximum

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number of pupils to acquire, before completing their compulsory schooling, a practical knowledge of two languages in addition to their mother tongue." 2 0 On the same occasion the ministers also agreed on a number of practical measures to further the training of language teachers. At meetings of the Council and the Ministers of Education in 1985 and 1988 renewed emphasis was given to the importance of teaching and learning foreign languages. The various initiatives of Council and Commission eventually resulted in establishing the LINGUA programme to promote training of foreign languages in the European Community, the most significant achievement in the field of foreign language education at Community level to date. The Council decision makes reference to Article 128 of the Treaty of Rome which calls for the harmonization of vocational training in the member states. The LINGUA programme is effective as of 1 January 1990 for an initial phase of five years. It provides for a number of actions pertaining to (1) continuing training of foreign language teachers, (2) university cooperation to promote the learning of foreign languages, (3) the development of foreign language teaching and learning in economic life, (4) the development of educational exchanges for young people within the Community, (5) the promotion of innovation for the improvement of the teaching and learning of foreign languages. 21 Although the actual powers of the European Parliament are very limited, it has also been actively involved in promoting foreign language education in the Community by putting pressure on the Commission to implement action programmes which had been adopted and to develop additional programmes to improve foreign language teaching in schools and institutes for adult education. It has repeatedly adopted resolutions to this effect in which special emphasis is put on the importance of foreign language skills for enabling Community citizens to take advantage of the right of freedom of movement. 22 For example, the resolution of 5 April 1982 states that [...] the free movement of labour specifically guaranteed by the EEC Treaty is meaningless if the citizens of the Community are unable, as a result of fundamental differences between their respective educational systems and the failure to recognize educational qualifications, to make positive use of their educational training in the other countries of the Community, [...]

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and that - language education is essential to enable the people of Europe to effectively exercise their right to freedom of movement and to improve mutual understanding [...] 2 3 A resolution of 11 February 1983 reiterates the same point and underscores the importance to workers of freedom of movement in times of high unemployment, and therefore calls on the Commission to submit an additional programme designed to improve foreign language teaching in the Community, in both schools and the adult education sector, taking into account the latest educational methods In a communication on the teaching of foreign languages which the Commission sent to the Council on 21 April 1988, it likewise points out that foreign language teaching is vital for giving effect "to the right of every Community citizen to take up an occupation or to study anywhere in the Community". Since there are some 13 million workers in the Community who have sought jobs in another member state 25 , this aspect of foreign language education is clearly of major importance. Insufficient linguistic skills are a particular problem for unskilled and manual labour, since, because of their lower level of education, these workers are usually most severely affected by high unemployment and thus most likely to be forced to migrate. The Community is well aware of this problem and has taken various measures to deal with it. Since 1976 the Commission has financed some pilot projects on improving reception and teaching methods, the cross-cultural training of teachers, and the integrated teaching of languages of origin of migrant workers. The last point is particularly important for the three million children of migrant workers who often meet with considerable difficulties in integrating in schools. However, the power of the Community to influence educational policy in the member states is extremely restricted, and so are its budgetary means to set up programmes of its own. In particular there is no way the Community can influence the foreign language curricula of the educational institutions in the member states, unless the Council of Ministers unanimously agrees on such measures which is unlikely to happen in view of the considerable variations in both the linguistic circumstances and the educational systems of the member states. 26

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This is evidenced by the Council Directive on the education of the children of migrant workers adopted on 25 July 1977. 27 This directive was important because it officially recognized the urgency of providing mother tongue education. However, at the insistence of the United Kingdom and FR Germany it stopped short of stipulating the individual's actual right to receive such education. Although its Article 3 requires the member states to "promote the teaching of the mother tongue and culture of the children of migrant workers", the force of this directive was watered down by such curtailing phrases as "in accordance with their national circumstances and legal systems". Thus, as a general principle, interference in national policies is avoided. Resolutions by the European Parliament and Communications by the Commission are therefore more impressive than the effective actions taken by the Council. In its Communication 'Teaching of foreign languages' of 1988 the Commission once again accentuated the social aspect of foreign language teaching pointing out that [e]ducation authorities and pupils' parents should realize that adequate teaching of modern languages could considerably improve pupils' opportunities, especially in the case of disadvantaged pupils. The - non widspread absence or decline in the teaching of foreign languages in technical and vocational training establishments is thus inconsistent with an equal opportunities policy; and that [t]he right of every European to take up an occupation anywhere in the Community will remain an illusion until such time as citizens have knowledge of languages other than their mother tongue. To sum up, there is wide awareness in the EC institutions of the need to promote foreign language learning. There is also some commitment to allocate funds to this end. It is agreed that closer integration in a Community that seeks to achieve more commonality than a common market requires citizens who can communicate with each other. However, at present there is not much agreement between member governements as to how such a purpose is to be achieved and what exactly it should encompass. The policy of teaching more foreign languages in order to make the workforce mobile is implemented differently by different member states. 29 In the absence of an accepted perspective of how the Community should develop, national governments are likely

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to pursue their own interests or to yield to the pressure of interest groups on the national level. This is true for many EC policy domains 3 0 and it is true for the domain of education and culture. That everyone should learn more foreign languages is a general maxim which is not hard to agree on - unless its realization implies great expenditures; but it is hardly a blueprint for a language policy. Resolutions and policy statements usually refer to foreign languages in general avoiding any specification as to what languages should be taught with what priorities. In its Communication on the teaching of foreign languages the Commission calls for measures "to diversify language teaching", 31 and in its Communication on education in the European Community it asserts that "Member States should be encouraged to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within their educational system, even if there is an increasing trend towards certain languages ..." (emphasis added). 32 Accordingly, the 1984 Educational Policy Statements by the Council quoted above explicitly mention that the Commission shall lend financial support, within the limits of its resources, to the promotion of "the least widely spoken Community languages", where "Community languages" is to be understood as the nine official languages. Likewise the LINGUA programme is intended to pursue "a strategy of action which involves the diversification of the foreign languages on offer in education and training programmes rather than promoting one or two priority languages". 3 3 However, there is a general tendency to avoid unambiguous reference to the languages under discussion. It is a courtesy to the French that in the above quote from the Communication on Education reference is made to a trend toward "certain languages" rather than singling out English. Likewise, the Council of Ministers' suggestion of 1984 that each student should become fluent in two foreign languages must be seen as a concession to the French, although this is not made explicit. The leading first foreign language in the Community and for many of its citizens the only foreign language is English. In Belgium the Flemings study French and the Walloons study Dutch; and in Luxembourg German and French are studied before English. French is also the first foreign language in Portugal. But this does little to change the general picture of English emerging on top of the pecking order of foreign language in the Community. 34 Whether or not this is a desirable development is, however, quite outside the Community's active interest in foreign language education policy.

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Thus, in as far as an outline of a Community policy in the field of foreign language learning is discernible, it is a reflection of the equal status that the Community's national languages are granted. (5) Minority languages. Europe's many linguistic minorities have found in the EC a new forum for articulating their demands and defending their right to exist. Notwithstanding the conceptual, theoretical and political difficulties involved in properly defining the notion of linguistic minority which are the subject of an extensive literature, 35 the basic frame of reference for determining minority status is the nation state. In a sense it is the creator of minorities. Virtually every European state has linguistic minorities 36 many of which have been marginalized in the past and are felt to be in a precarious position at present. While many of these languages are spoken by tiny minorities if matched against the great national languages, they number in the tens of millions if taken together in the context of the EC. Such figures are more difficult to ignore than, say, a few thousand speakers of Frisian in North Germany. Looking at the EC as a whole and pursuing their objectives collectively the minorities thus have a much better chance in their fight for recognition, protection and support. The ideological backdrop of the high hopes some minority representatives have invested in the EC is that its institutions are seen to be more receptive to their demands than national governments. This is not without reason, for EC institutions have repeatedly expressed "respect for the cultural diversity in the European Community" 3 7 and the conviction that "the multilingualism of Europe is one of the essential features of its culture and civilization". 38 But this is also not without a certain historical irony, since the Community's relatively friendly attitude towards linguistic and cultural plurality is a corollary of the member states' general hostility towards multilingualism, that is, the nation states' tendency to favour cultural and linguistic homogeneity. It is precisely the great importnace the European states attach to their national languages which motivates their backing of linguistic pluralism in the Community context (if only as a means of protecting the national languages). A strong commitment to monolingualism, if multiplied, necessarily results in support for multilingualism. This is not to say, however, that the Community is a haven for the minorities where all of their troubles find a solution. Rather, Community organs have been careful to lend support to an ethos of multilingualism without being too specific as to the policy measures that such an ethos requires if it is to be more

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than lip service. Since there are no provisions in law or in the Community treaties for a Community cultural and educational policy on the basis of which regulations and directives in support of minority concerns could be adopted, the Community has avoided to take any action which would interfere with national laws or policies concerning linguistic minorities. Nevertheless, the lobbying efforts of minority representatives in EC institutions have borne some fruit. The EC insitution which has shown itself most sympathetic to minority concerns is the European Parliament. This is a reflection, on the one hand, of the fact that it is easier to pass resolutions by majority vote than to draft Regulations and Directives which because of their legal consequences for the member states are usually adopted unanimously; and, on the other hand, it indicates that the Parliament is more integrationist than either Council or Commission in that it is more prone to advocate actions which can be interpreted as weakening the nation state. In fact, the European Parliament has reprimanded the Commission on several occasions for failing to take action on the measures it has advocated in its resolutions. 39 The main reason for the Commission's hesitancy to respond to the Parliament's various resolutions is that these often go far beyond stating the general desirability of developing "a Community policy for improving the position of Europe's minority languages", 40 or calling on the Commission to take "initiatives to promote local languages and cultures". 41 Rather, resolutions often refer to particular minorities and particular national governments calling for particular measures. For instance, France was urged "to withdraw its reservation concerning the application of Article 27 of the International Convention on civil and political rights"42 and "to recognize the rights of regional languages". 43 The government of the Netherlands was called upon "to adopt a policy that gives encouragement to the Frisian language and culture" and to respond positively to the request for setting up a Frisian television service. 44 The most important issues addressed by the European Parliament in the general domain of minority problems in the EC are aptly summarized in a report by Mr Willy Kuijpers. 45 Taken together the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament give the impression of a balancing act juggling to defend minority interests, on one hand, and to respect national interests, on the other. The resulting internal contradictions cannot always be concealed. For example, one resolution of 1986 gives expression to the opinion that "the national identities making up Europe should not be sacrificed", 46 while another

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deplores the fact that minority languages "have for centuries suffered oppression" and calls on national governments to promote the use of these languages. 47 The oppression of minority languages thus appears as an agentless happening, an accident of history, as it were, rather than an ideological component which in conjunction with others has shaped the national identities whose continued existence the Parliament does not want to call into question. Lest the impression should arise that the renewed interest in minority languages could in any way disturb the national make-up of Europe, it is pretended that these two issues are logically, if not historically, unrelated. The most promising approach to the minority problem is within a broader regional framework. This relates to a European regional policy designed to strengthen rural areas and suitable to arrest population shifts from outlying regions to the towns. 4 8 A more sensitive issue in this connection is the request for cross-border cooperation of minorities spread over the territory of two or three member states, such as the Catalans and Basques in Spain and France. Again, political wisdom calls for prudence here so as to avoid any suspicion that national sovereignties might be threatened. The demands of linguistic minorities are largely based on the ideals embodied in the human rights to which the EC as well as the member states in principle proudly subscribe. If the minorities have not been able to realize all of their objectives, it is because the member states have differing traditions of understanding the human rights and laws bearing on minority concerns. Except in those areas where the member states have through the signing of treaties transferred their sovereign rights to the EC they do not accept any interference by the Community. For reasons of political prudence the EC must, therefore, avoid giving the impression of attempting to encroach upon the pregrogatives of member states. 49 This is particularly true of the Commission, whereas the Parliament can sometimes be more bold without compromising its credibility. In spite of these limitations and notwithstanding the criticism that the Community's policy towards minorities is insufficient and halfhearted, the minorities have benefited substantially from the very existence of the EC as well as from a variety of specific measures. The most important ones are the following. The Arfé Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 16 October 1981 50 calls for a Community charter for the regional languages and cultures, a request the Parliament reiterated in its resolution of 11 February 1983 51 . As a result of the Arfé Resolution the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages was established in Dublin. In 1983, the European Parliament created a budget item for Community actions for linguistic and cultu-

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ral minorities which enables the Commission to allocate funds for measures in support of linguistic minorities such as publications, research projects 52 , conferences and pilot studies. In 1982 the Commission entrusted the Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana with the task of providing a report on the present situation of linguistic minorities in the EC. 5 3 An investigation of the teaching of regional languages in elementary schools was undertaken by the Fryske Akademy in 1985/1986. In 1987, the MERCATOR network for information and documentation on autochthonous minority languages was set up by the Commission. In sum, within the confines of its powers and financial resources the EC has adopted a position towards linguistic minorities which makes it a more promising addressee of their demands than some national governments. In any event, it has turned out to be a useful additional forum for the promotion of minority interests. It can be expected that in future the main bodies of the Community, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, will continue to be involved in minority problems. From the review of Community involvement in language related problems we can now draw some preliminary conclusions. The most apparent trait of the EC's approach to language which is common to all of the issues identified in the foregoing is a commitment to linguistic pluralism. On various occasions and in many different ways it has expressed its conviction that advances in European integration should not result in the leveling of linguistic and cultural differences. Community Regulations pertaining to the status and use of languages by and with EC organs; the setup and the operation of the translation and interpretation services; the Community's opinions and initiatives on foreign language education; and its attitude towards minority languages all testify to the notion that the Community's cultural and linguistic identity lies in its diversity and that this diversity should be preserved. However, despite repeated proclamations to the effect that linguistic variety is a source of Europe's intellectual fortune, it is not altogether clear just how far this variety should go or what the Community should and can do to guarantee its continued existence. Two delicate questions in particular remain to be answered. One is how or whether the commitment to the equality of the EC's official languages is to be reconciled with their actual inequality; and the other is that of how the relationship between national languages and minority languages is to be defined in the supranational context of the Community. The section that

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follows offers some thoughts as to why it has been and still is difficult to discuss these questions.

Three contradictions In the European tradition national languages are associated with conflicting ideas which have shaped their development. Rooted in Europe's intellectual history these ideas evolved at different times under varying circumstances and sometimes in response to each other. Since, however, one has not necessarily replaced the other, they continue to form part of the ideological cargo of the national languages giving rise to a number of contravening attitudes and tendencies three of which shall be discussed here, however briefly.

Enlightenment and Romanticism In the spirit of enlightenment Leibniz admonished his intellectual compatriots, most of whom at the time prided themselves of speaking French, not to neglect the German language. For history teaches, as he put it, daß gemeiniglich die Nation und die Sprache zugleich geblüht. 54 Condillac expressed a similar idea, stating that les nations ne peuvent avoir des génies supérieures qu'après que les langues ont déjà fait des progrès considérables. 55 To the philosophes of the Age of Reason the nexus between language and nation was part of the discussion of the social contract theory and a lever for challenging if not eliminating the educational privilege of nobility and clergy. The spread of the Enlightenment and the ideal of more education for more people could only be realized if the peoples' mother-tongue was used for the purposes of education, which at the time was still not common practice. The French Revolution and German Romanticism, however, made this rational, instrumental attitude to language rescede into the ideological background as the association of language and nation was exploited for other purposes. Herder interpreted language as a national treasure, the embodiment of the spirit and the deepest traits of a people, 56 the glorification of which as a national idol was to be a general obligation. Language cultivation was thus transformed from a social into a patriotic task. Fichte's Reden an die deutsche Nation which he delivered in Berlin, then occupied by Napoleon's troops, provided its justification as much as its rationalization. Language and literature

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were made the cornerstones of the claim to national self-determination, which meant an independent state. Humboldt followed to anchor the national character in the philosophy of language by formulating the most powerful theory of the common origin of language and nation to date. 57 In the wake of the revolutionary wars language became the key symbol of nationalism throughout Europe. In the Greek struggle to shed off the Ottoman yoke the movement for the purification of the language was a focus of attention, just as the creation of a national language distinct from Danish became an vital component of Norway's independence as a state. The Czechs challenged the dominance of German and the Slovaks the social prestige of Magyar. The Ukrainians resisted Russian efforts to absorb them by emphasizing the importance of learning their language. Nationalists in Finland promoted Finnish among the Swedish speaking upper classes in order to create national coherence. 58 For Italy and Germany, the latecomers on the political scene of nation states, language became an important vehicle of unification. Linguistic nationalism thus became a commonplace of political ideology in Europe which, on one hand, gave rise to purist movements directed against the corruption of foreign language influences, as in Germany, and, on the other hand, provided the rationalization for the oppression of linguistic minorities, as in Spain and France where Catalans and Basques, Bretons and Alsatians were thought to pose a threat to the integrity of the nation state. The "redemption of territories" on which Italian was spoken, but which were not under Italian rule became known as "irredentism". These two spiritual legacies, Enlightenment and Romanticism, which influenced the development of Europe's national languages still shape their political potential, although they are hard to reconcile. They are both constituent elements of nationalism, but the internal contradiction of the demands of nationalism on language are that nationalism requires linguistic independence, that is, a functionally universal language capable of sustaining discourse of every kind and genre which makes reliance on other languages unnecessary; while at the same time demanding a language with a character of its own which can be cited as proof of their speaker's distinction. If a language can be used to carry out any actual and conceivable communicative task, it is in principle interchangeable with any other language similarly empowered; but if it has characteristic features it does not share with others, it is not.

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Humanism and colonialism Europe's great cultivated languages, English, French and Spanish in particular, are world languages which in a typically Eurocentric perspective give expression to a world literature - Nobel prizes of literature awarded to writers of non-European languages can still be counted off on the fingers of one hand. Through mutual contact, translation and use for all conceivable purposes they have been developed into highly flexible and differentiated media of poetry, prose and scientific discourse. Being carried to other parts of the globe several of them have been enriched by contact with other languages thus testifying to Europe's openness to the world. At the same time, they were mystified as national languages and symbolically linked to a transfigured culture of parochialism becoming the means of destroying other languages and cultures. The humanistic emphasis on the instrumental nature of language and the importance of its standardization was and still is intended to reduce social discrimination as it is reflected in and reinforced by language. Accordingly, in that they approach the ideal of tearing down communication barriers between social strata by making everything expressible and understandable to everyone, these languages are intellectual and universalistic. But by replacing the universal language of learning, Latin, they have erected new frontiers in the republic of learning and become a marker of political division. As the voice of the nation state the European languages were turned into a means of social control serving the purpose of creating or reinforcing national loyalties. And under the pretext of their authenticity and superiority their spread to other parts of the world in the wake of colonialism contributed to the detertioration of other languages. From this point of view, the European languages are closed and specific in denying the possibility of communicating with those who do not belong. Humanism like colonialism originated in Europe. Europe's languages have been associated with both, and thus they stand for the universal spread of knowledge, equality and the community of humanity as well as for European superiority, domination, power and the uniqueness of its various peoples. They are associated with a claim to universal applicability as well as with the expectation to serve as a symbol of singularity. Today, the colonial empires are dissolved, the Europeans have withdrawn to their old continent. But they continue to defend their linguistic heritage abroad, still clinging to the idea that these languages are at the same time uni-

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versal and unique. European languages account for the bulk of foreign languages taught anywhere in the world.

Liberation and oppression Europe's languages have coexisted in close proximity for many centuries. Until modern times their distribution was not thought or intended to coincide with political frontiers. Their social differentiation was more pronounced. In one way or another they all developed in conjunction with urbanization, mercantilism, and the rise to power of the bourgeoisie. They were a means of abolishing the feudalist order of society which was marked by linguistic stratification. In France, in particular, the idea of providing all citizens with one uniform, national, and republican set of laws greatly contributed to the spread of French which at the time of the Revolution was spoken only by a minority of the citoyens, so that in 1792 the Assembly ordered the Ministry of Justice to translate directives and laws into German, Italian, Catalan, Basque and Breton. 5 9 But while this indicates a positive attitude towards bilingualism in early republican France, the Jacobins came to view the other languages of France as a remnant of feudalism and a threat to the nation which had produced the revolution or rather which had been produced by it. Thus, the same language which as a deliberate tool of nation-building was celebrated as giving expression to the spirit of liberation became a means of oppression by being granted the privileged status of the national language. Respecting the French language as a crucial part of French identity while denying others the legitimacy of analogous appeals was no contradiction to French nationalists, because French was the language of the educated of all European countries and could, therefore, be promoted with some justification as a universal idiom more desirable to know than other languages. President de Gaulle was still quite convinced of this axiom. Supporting French minorities abroad did not prevent him from upholding the French government's uncompromising stand towards minorities at home. 6 0 France's policies only changed when it could no longer be denied that the international tide had turned against French. Of late, the Francophonie movement has begun to paint a picture of itself as the guarantor of linguistic pluralism. 61 While French language policies provide a particularly clear example of using two different yardsticks, France is hardly alone in applying one set of rules

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to its national language and another to minority languages within its boundaries. Rather this is part of the European tradition without which the maxim of the supposedly natural identity of nation, state and language could never have gained the credibility it for a long time enjoyed in the European context. Since nationalism has exploited language, since the nation state became the model of politicial organization and the major European languages were assigned important functions for sustaining the modern nation state these languages have also become associated with some of the contradictions out of which the nation states were borne: freedom and terror, reason and bigotry, community and distinction, democracy at home and empire abroad. A side effect of this heavy ideological load, common to all national languages and most minority languages of Europe is that language problems are certain to arouse passions which may be hard to control and turn the unlikeliest of rebels like José Happart into a threat to the state. Clearly, this is one of the reasons why language is more difficult to talk about at the European level than butter mountains, wine lakes or the project of a European central bank. However, there are also commonalities with these seemingly trivial, but deeply divisive, economic problems which cannot be overlooked when the political character of Europe's languages is to be staked out.

Economic aspects In the discussion of the 1982 Nyborg resolution on the multilingualism of the European Community quoted above (p. 7) it is pointed out that the 'political' argument of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Petitions in favour of the unconditional equality between the Community's official languages prevailed over economic considerations aimed at reducing costs which were voiced by the Political Affairs Committee, because "any change in the language arrangements posed an altogether basic problem for the Communities, which transcended purely economic considerations." 62 That the EC's plurilingualism is expensive can hardly be denied and has been the subject of many comments and criticisms. 63 Especially the translation and interpretation services have figured high on the list of cost reducing suggestions. Since the latest members (Greece, Portugal and Spain) brought three new languages into the Community which meant a nearly 50 % increase

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of the cost of translation, this discussion has flared up again, although not much progress has been made here. The concern for the language related expenditures of Community institutions is real and justified, but it would be a delusion to think that these expenditures are what is economically important about the EC's many tongues. Languages are not only cost generating items at the Community level but economic determinants which have a bearing on the economic process in various respects. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both the accountable costs of multilingualism at the Community level and the economic aspects of language at the national level. First, let us consider expenditures to be covered out of the Community budget. The EC budget as approved for 1989 foresaw commitments of 46 billion ECU with expenditures of 44.8 billion ECU. 6 4 Of this 4.8 % were allotted to the aministrative budgets of the different Community institutions, that is, some 2.15 billion ECU. Most language related costs are covered by the administrative budget the biggest item being salaries of linguistic staff or other staff involved in the language services. In addition to salaries, expenditures for office space, printing, paper, distribution of documents, etc. have to be taken into account. The share of language costs relative to the total administrative cost varies between EC institutions. According to one estimate about 14 % of the Commission's 11,000 staff members work for the translation and interpretation services. 65 For the Parliament and the Council a higher proportion of the administrative budgets is attributable to language costs. 66 An exact assessment of all language costs is difficult, because tasks are not always so clearly delimited that a sharp line can be drawn between language related work and other work and because not all language costs can be itemized. It is hardly possible to calculate how many working hours are spent throughout the institutions because they produce documents in nine different languages and to some extent conduct their internal business in several languages. Despite these uncertainties it is obvious that the costs entailed by the Community's language arrangements are considerable. That 40 % or more of the EC's administrative budget is spent for its official multilinguism is a realistic estimate. However, it must not been overlooked that the EC's administrative expenses are quite low if compared to national civil services. Every 100,000 European citizens are served by an average of 4,000 national civil servants as compared to only six Eurocrats. Thus, although total expenditures for language which will soon be as high as one billion ECU per year look impressive, it is still true what the European Parliament stated in its resolution on

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the multilingualism of the EC in 1982 (Doc. 1-306/82): These costs represent only about 2 % of the Community's total budget. Therefore, they are not really a matter of great political contention, although smaller sums for language related projects sometimes are. The LINGUA programme is a telling example. Of the 250 million ECU originally requested for a period of five years 50 million ECU were slashed at Prime Minister Thatcher's request who was opposed to the entire programme. From her point of view she was asked to pay for a programme which benefitted her country least. As a result of her opposition the LINGUA programme was cut down to operate on the university level only, whereas it had been planned to cover both schools and higher education institutions. Other language related expenditures are less controversial because there is no sharp hiatus in the perception of national interests. All member states expect to benefit from the Eurotra computer translation programme to which 20.5 million ECU were allocated for a period of seven years. Finally, the financial support of minority programmes - for example, the operational costs of the Bureau for Lesser Used Languages - must be added, at least in part, to the expenditures the EC affords itself for sustaining multilingualism. Prime Minister Thatcher' s opposition to the LINGUA programme brings us to another point. All of the above costs are quantifiable, if not always with great exactitude. This cannot be said, however, of the benefits these costs generate. With the exception of the Eurotra project it can be said that they are not expected to generate any quantifiable benefits at all. Rather, multilingualism is widely regarded as a non-material value in its own right which, if it has any economic implications at all, clashes with the tendencies of economic development. For example, in a resolution on a Community programme in the field of education of 1982 the European Parliament considers that "the main threats to the autonomy and diversity of national cultures at present come [...] from the conformity inevitably imposed by the international economy". 6 7 What is usually left out of consideration is that the same economic forces that pose a threat to linguistic and cultural multiformity also generate huge profits for the language industry. Today English is one of Great Britain's major export products. EFL is a global industry with an annual turnover of some six billion £. 6 8 So far, this economic aspect of the EC's many languages and their obvious inequality in this regard has been ignored in all policy debates on language. There are, of course, also language industries for other languages, notably for French and

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German, both of which are heavily subsidized by the respective governments. The 1987/88 federal budget of the FRG foresaw some 450 million D-Mark for the promotion of German as a foreign language. 69 The expenses for promoting (or "defending") French have been estimated at running as high as 1.5 % of France's GNP. 7 0 Although politicians like to refer to the cultural value of languages and lofty ideals when justifying these budget items, it would be naive to believe that such massive sums are spent in the service of Voltaire and Goethe. What is really at issue was expressed with candour and precision by the head of the division of foreign cultural policy of the FRG's foreign office, Barthold Witte: "Wer Deutsch spricht, kauft auch eher deutsch." 71 In an interview in Français du Monde the former French minister of external trade, Michel Jobert, was just as explicit identifying the "sale" of French as one of his priorities; and the French minister of national education, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, declared that "le monopole linguistique de Γ anglo-américain" was unacceptable and that a policy of diversifying foreign language teaching was a "composante essentielle de notre force de frappe économique". 72 In its Communication of 18 May 1988, the Commission on Education in the EC points out that "lack of capacity to communicate [...] is a handicap to the increasing business and trading connections within the Community". 7 3 Conversely, spreading a language implies competitive advantages for its native speakers because it facilitates access to markets. That the truncated empires by leaving behind their languages in the former colonies have secured lasting economic benefits for themselves is nowhere called into doubt, but it is altogether unclear how such advantages can be grasped in quantifiable terms. Moreover, looking at languages as commodities is often regarded as unduly profane, especially by cultural politicians. Representatives of small language communities in particular tend to consider it undesirable if not dangerous to compare languages in terms of their economic value or to admit that choices of foreign languages are largely determined by economic factors. Thus, the fact that language export, although of considerable economic importance, has so far not been admitted as a topic to the agenda of Community politics has ideological reasons which happen to coincide with the economic interests of the biggest language exporters as well as small speech communities, although for different reasons. It seems questionable, however, that a realistic language policy for the EC can be devised unless the economic properties of languages are taken into account.

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This is not to say that such a policy should be determined by what are perceived to be economic necessities, but that no language policy can succeed if it fails to recognize the economic dimension of language. Learning a foreign language is an investment, both for individuals and for societies. It is an investment in the literal sense of the term in that it involves expenditures which are usually expected to yield a payoff. Like the trade of other goods the export of languages can be profitable to both the seller and the buyer. To date, very little is known about the value of a given language for one side or the other. Accordingly the question of whether it would be appropriate in the Community context to compensate the economic disadvantages of smaller languages in a manner, for example, like the regional fund operates to create more equity between the more backward and the more advanced regions has never even been asked. Another point which cannot sensibly be discussed without taking economic aspects into consideration is the use of the European languages for scientific communication. For example, it is not because they are committed to the universality of science that German publishers increasingly encourage or force their authors to write in English, but because they seek access to a bigger market. Of course, it is quite possible to defend a free trader's point of view with regard to languages, but it is also legitimate to raise the question, as the French so frequently do, 7 4 whether accepting or even advancing the dominance of English is not tantamount to a relapse to monopolistic capitalism which in other domains has been domesticated by deliberate policies.

Conclusions Nobody can deny that the EC has paid ample attention to the many languages of its member states. Its various bodies have taken issue with linguistic matters on many occasions and with regard to a number of political problems. None the less the outlines of a language policy for the EC remain blurred. This is partly because the EC Treaty does not provide a framework for such a policy, but this is not the only reason. On both ideological and economic grounds the linguistic map of the EC is one of an impassable territory full of pitfalls. No policy guidelines shall be presented here. However, from the foregoing four issues emerge which must be addressed if ever a language policy for the EC is to be conceived.

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First, the ideological dead weight of the nineteenth century must be dropped, that is, linguistic nationalism. If there is to be more identification with the European idea and more of a European identity of its citizens, languages cannot continue to play the role of the most important catalysts of social community and thus appear to be an obstacle to creating a supra-national European unity. It will fall upon educators and the media to see to it that the Europeans once again conceive of language as a tool rather than a myth. More specifically, it is necessary to part with the idea of the identity of language, nation and state which had served as the ideological basis of relating language with political loyalty. It should be acknowledged that it never corresponded to reality, since there have always been linguistic minorities. Today, this is more significant than ever. Somewhat ironically, the population influx, on the one hand, from the former colonies and labour migration within the community, on the other, have produced colourful and multilingual societies in the countries whence the idea of the linguistically homogeneous nation state originated. The cultural and linguistic variety of Europe is beginning to be reproduced in the individual states. It is important that this fact should be acknowledged, welcomed and taken as the starting point for creating an ethos of practical multilingualism not only on the supranational level of the EC, but on the national level too. Second, if the Community allows itself to be used for advancing the interests of linguistic minorities or even adopts an actively supportive policy, it will eventually have to deal with the national language privilege. The stronger the community becomes and the more it does for the promotion of minority languages, the less the plausibility of granting national languages a privileged status. In the Community context, there are about five million speakers of Danish and some six million speakers of Catalan. Whether an EC language policy should uphold the national language privilege or work for its abolition is a question which in the long run is bound to become a matter of Community concern. 75 Third, if the EC subscribes to a policy of maintaining linguistic and cultural pluralism, pledges to the importance of Europe's cultural legacy and the equality of all (official) Community languages are not enough. Because when such pledges are translated into the failure to adopt any coordinated language policy measures they will contribute to increasing inequality. This is not to say that "antitrust" laws should be enacted against English. However, rather than letting "nature", that is, the economy run its course, it should be a matter of political decision 7 ^ which language shall be allowed to become the lingua

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franca of the EC citizens. Also, acknowledging the international importance of English does not necessarily entail that the first foreign language in nonEnglish-speaking countries should be English. Other curricula may be more congenial. As Weinrich has pointed out, if the Community's ambitious goal of making every citizen learn two foreign languages is ever to be realized, English should be assigned the position of second foreign language, because the notion that with English one can get by almost everywhere reduces the motivation to learn another foreign language. 77 Finally, language must be recognized and reckoned with as an important factor of the economy. It would befit an organization which was founded as an economic community, but has grown to deal with many political, social and cultural issues, to appraise and politically evaluate the economic benefits and drawbacks of languages for individuals and societies. A realistic and just language policy for the EC can be devised only on the basis of an understanding of language which is more economically determined and ridded of ideological cobwebs.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

That the Europeans do not speak the same language cannot disturb us. Switzerland provides the classical example of the fact that linguistic variety rather than being a limitation is an enrichment, and we hope that our Belgian friends can soon be cited as another example. Multiplicity of languages is no obstacle but an incentive. This is demonstrated by our European officials in Brussels and in the joint research centers of Euratom. See Deprez 1987, Couttenier 1989 for a detailed discussion of the juridical and political aspects of the Fourons issue. As a matter of survival it is in the best interest of the central organs and the governments that the language question should be left out of consideration for the time of this generation. Actually, there were three identical regulations for the European Communities, that is, the European Coal and Steal Community, the European Economic Community and Euratom. See Appendix I. For example, COM (88) 203. The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 1987. O Riagáin (1988: 36) reports that only about 13 % of the Irish population, i. e., some 470,000 people regarded themselves fluent speakers of Irish (in 1983); see also O Riagáin in this volume.

European integration and the idea of the national language 9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

29

As a matter of fact, it has been a point of lasting concern that the enforcement of political measures is often delayed because regulations and other documents become effective only after publication in all languages in the Official Journal of the EC. O J D o c . No C 39/1, 15. 2. 1982. OJ Doc. No C61 /28, 29 May 1974. In a paper presented at the College of Europe, Bruges, 16 March 1978. Proposals of this sort have typically been made by those directly concerned with the practical business of translation and interpretation for Community meetings and documentation. In 1980 the former head of the language service of Bonn's Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a "plea for a pragmatic solution" of the increasingly troublesome language problem which, if turned into EC policy, would shift a great deal of the burden of translation away from the EC to the member states. Under such a scheme full documentation would be provided by the Community in French and English only (Kusterer 1980). Such a proposal which would in effect reduce the status of the author's own national language, German, is unlikely to be made by politicians, because they would fear the risk of being accused of a sellout of national interests. OJ Doc. 1-306/82, p. 5 O J D o c 1-306/82: 12. Nyborg Report (Doc. 1-306/82) p. 36. Cf. also The Economist, 18 July 1987. Cf. Vollmer (1989). Cf., e. g., Vocabulaire des traités européens. OJ Doc. No C 38/1. It may not be superfluous to recall that the Council of Europe is not an EC institution. "CCC" refers to the Council of Cultural Cooperation of the Council of Europe. Since advancing the integration of Europe is one of the objectives of the Council of Europe, it has undertaken various initiatives in the field of foreign language education which are summarized in Trim (1978). The objective of the research on behalf of the Council of Europe is stated as follows: L'objectif fondamental du programme de recherche et de développement mis en route par le group d'experts réuni en 1971 par le Comité de l'Education Extrascolaire et du Développement Culturel du Conseil de la Coopération Culturelle du Conseil de l'Europe est de créer les conditions permettant la création d'un cadre structurel approprié pour le développement, grâce à la coopération internationale, à'une politique européenne cohérente et moderne dans le domaine de l'apprentissage des langues par les adultes [emphasis added] (Trim 1978: 1).

19. 20. 21. 22.

Council of the European Communities General Secretariat (1985). Bulletin of the European Communities 6-1984, p. 45. COM (88) 841. Article 3 (c) of the Treaty of Rome calls for the "abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles for freedom of movement for persons". The Single European Act of 1986 underscores this objective by adding to the Treaty a new Article 8 (a), laying down the principle of the "internal market" as an "area without internal frontiers". The right of free entry and residence is, however, restricted by various provisions of

30

Florian

Coulmas

Community law which are much too intricate to be discussed here. The details of law governing the subject are set out in Séché (1988). 23. 24.

Resolution of 5 April 1982 OJ Doc. No C 87/90. Resolution of 11 February 1983 OJ Doc. No C 68/105.

25. 26.

Cf. European File 3/85. In 1966 the governments of the then six member states agreed to avoid majority decisions, but in 1985 the heads of state and government reestablished the principle of qualified majority decisions for certain purposes. Educational matters, however, are not among them. Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome states that unanimity is required in the case of policies that had not been established by the Treaty itself.

27.

OJ Doc. No. L 199/32f.; see appendix II.

28.

COM (88) 203, pp. If.

29. 30.

Cf. D'Souza 1988. Cf., for example, Tugendhat (1987: 132ff.).

31.

COM (88) 203, p. 5.

32.

COM (88) 280, p. 14.

33. 34.

COM (88) 841, p. 3. A recent survey of foreign language skills in FR Germany gives the following figures: 58 % of all citizens speak English, 22 % French, Italian 7 %, Spanish 5 % and 2 % Latin. The dominance of English is even more pronounced when only the working population is taken into account. DAAD-Mitteilungen 10/1989, p. 2.

35.

Cf., e. g., Haarmann 1973a, b, Héraud 1966, Kloss 1969, Stephens 1976, Straka 1970.

36.

Cf. Linguistic Minorities Project 1985, for the United Kingdom; O Riagáin 1988, for Ireland; Tabouret-Keller 1981, for France; Clyne 1984, for Germany; Vermeulen 1984, for the Netherlands; Verdoot 1978, for Belgium; Hoffman 1979, for Luxembourg; Zuanelli 1989, for Italy; Moon 1984.

37.

Resolution of the European Parliament, Doc. 1-286/81.

38.

Opinion of the Parliament's Political Affairs Committee, Doc. 1-306/82, p. 21.

39.

For example, Motion for a resolution on the establishment of institutes for the study of minority languages, Doc. Β 2-1015/86; Motion for a resolution on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community, Doc. A 2 150/87; and Motion for a resolution on a Community charter of regional languages and cultures and a charter of rights of ethnic minorities, Doc. Β 2-1514/85.

40.

Motion for a resolution on improving the position of minority languages, Doc. Β 2 291/87.

41.

Motion for a resolution on support for institutes and associations for the study of minority languages, Doc. Β 2-1346/86. Motion for a resolution on the protection and promotion of regional languages and cultures in the Community, Doc. Β 2-76/85.

42. 43.

Motion for a resolution on the integration of the bilingual Basque-French schools run by the Seaska association, Doc. Β 2-149/87.

44. 45.

Motion for a resolution on a Frisian television service in Friesland, Doc. Β 2-317/86. European Parliament Session Documents, Doc. A 2-150/87.

European integration and the idea of the national language 46.

47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61.

62. 63.

31

Motion for a resolution on the projected withdrawal of the grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs for the Association for the Promotion of Standard Dutch, Doc. Β 2-890/86. Motion for a resolution on the establishment of institutes for the study of minority languages, Doc. Β 2-1015/86. Motion for a resolution on the languages and cultures of the regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community, Doc. A 2-150/87. For example, the Kuijpers report of 28 September 1987 for a motion for a resolution on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community (Doc. A 2-150/87) calls on the member states to grant constitutional recognition to ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities. In its opinion to the motion the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights takes issue with this "apodictic demand", pointing out that it disagrees with the differing constitutional traditions of member states. The motion should therefore be rephrased to read: "... to grant their linguistic minorities legal recognition". OJ Doc. C 287, 9. 11. 1981 ; see Appendix III. OJ No. C 68, 14. 3. 1983. For example, in the field of bilingual education. Cf. Gorter (1988). Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana (1986). This report does not cover Portugal and Spain because the study on which it is based was undertaken before Portugal and Spain joined the EC. It also excludes Greece for reasons of time and other practical limitations. It is found in all history that usually nation and language bloom together (Leibniz 1916: 19). "... that the nations cannot have a superior spirit unless the languages have already progressed considerably in their development" (Condillac 1970: 330). Herder 1767; cf. also Fishman 1972, Anderson 1983, Coulmas 1985. Humboldt 1823, 1827. For further examples cf. Seton-Watson (1977), Anderson (1983), Scalione (1984). For a comprehensive account of the history of language policy in France cf. Jacob and Gordon (1985). It is interesting to note in this connection that the European Parliament in its resolution on the obstacles to the use of Catalan in the universities and on television of 1986 (Doc. B. 2-1323/86) has pointed out the inconsistency of this attitude. "The European Parliament...expressing concern that languages such as Spanish and French have to be defended against such an unequal competitor [i. e., Catalan, F.C.] and notes that actions of the kind described detract from the moral legitimacy of complaints about discrimination against French in Canada or Spanish in the United States;..." Cf., for instance, Djité (1990). Rosenzweig (1989) succinctly expresses the new spirit of Francophonie: "Niemand denkt daran, Französisch zur Einheitssprache Europas zu machen. ,..[D]ie französische Sprache zu verteidigen heißt zugleich, das Recht anderer Sprachen wie Deutsch, Spanisch und Italienisch zu respektieren." Cf. "Multilingualism", Bulletin of the European Communities, October 1982, p. 59f. Kusterer (1980: 694) speaks of the astronomic costs incurred by granting all national languages equal status. Cf. also von Donant (1977: 13); The Economist 1987.

32

Florian Coulmas

64.

The ECU, a currency unit made up of fixed amounts of the Community currencies, is now used on a large scale by the financial sector and performs many of the functions of ordinary money. Its name, as might have been expected, is a sensitive issue. Although not all EC members can take it as an acronym in their respective languages, it satifies at least the two biggest linguistic rivals: To the French "écu" is the name of an old French coin, while the British read it as the abbreviation of "European currency unit" (Mingasson 1989). To the consolation of the Germans its value is determined by that of the D-Mark more than by any other component currency.

65. 66.

Pfennig 1985. The Opinion of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport on the Motion for a resolution on the multilingualism of the European Community gives the following percentages for the language costs of the various EC institutions' administrative budgets: Parliament 60 %, Council 60 %, Court 50 %, Commission 33 % (Doc. 1-306/82, p. 31). Although somewhat dated these figures are still indicative of the order of magnitude of language costs. A more recent estimate puts the operational expenditures of the various institutions at between 35 % and 65 % (Vollmer (1989: 85).

67. 68.

11 March 1982, Doc. OJ No C 87/93. McCallen (1989) examines the significance of the EFL industry to the UK as well as to the world economy providing a wealth of detailed information on the subject. Auswärtiges Amt Bonn, personal communication. Pons-Ridler, Ridler 1987: 99. Witte (1987: 7). Le Monde 1985. COM (88) 280, 18. 5. 1988, p. 14. It should be noted that in France there are also other voices less opposed to the spread of English. Morin (1987), for example, sees no danger for the future of European culture if English becomes the common language of Europe. When this manuscript was already in press, the European Parliament adopted Resolution A3-0169/90 which, among other things, calls for the publication in Catalan of the Community's treaties and for the use of Catalan in European institutions. I am grateful to Miquel Strubell, Director of the Institut de Sociolingiiistica of the Generalität de Catalunya, for bringing this to my attention. One of the questions by Mr. Patijn and Mr. Van der Hek which in 1974 the Commission refused to answer read: "Does [the Commission] also agree that Latin should be made the European language if American English is not to become generally accepted, thus increasing Europe's dependence?" (OJ Doc. No C 61/28, 29 May 1974). Weinrich 1987.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75.

76.

77.

References Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso Editions.

European integration and the idea of the national language

33

Clyne, Michael 1984 Language and society in the German-speaking countries. London: Cambridge University Press. COM (88) 1988 203. Communication from the Commission "Teaching of Foreign Languages". Documents of the Commission of the European Communities. 18 April 1988. 1988 280. Communication from the Commission "Education in the European Community medium-term perspectives: 1989-92". Documents of the Commission of the European Communities. 15 May 1988. 1989 841. Proposals for Council Decisions - establishing the Lingua programme to promote training in foreign languages in the European Community; - for the promotion of the teaching and learning of foreign languages in the European Community as part of the Lingua programme. Documents of the Commission of the European Communities. 6 January 1989. Condillac, Etienne de 1970 "Essai sur l'origine des connaissance humaines" in Oevres Complètes, Tome 1. Geneve [first 1746]. Coulmas, Florian 1985 Sprache und Staat. Berlin, New York: DeGruyter. Coulmas, Florian (ed.) 1988 With forked tongues. What are national languages good for? Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma. Council of the European Communities General Secretariat. 1985 European educational policy statements 1984. Addendum to European educational policy statements 1974-1983. Brussels. Couttenier, Ivan 1989 "Belgian politics in 1988." Res Publica, 302-328. DAAD Mitteilungen 10/1989. Deprez, Kas and Armel Wynants 1987 Fouron: Insoluble? Manuscript, Universiteit Antwerpen, U. I. A. D'Souza, Henry 1988 "Harmonization of educational policies" in: European Affairs 3/88: 121-27. Djité, Paulin G. 1990 "The place of African languages in the revival of the Francophonie Movement", in: International Journal of the Sociology of Language 86:87-102. European Parliament Session Documents 1987 Doc. A 2-150/87. Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport, on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community. Rapporteur: Mr W. Kuijpers, 28 September 1987. European File 3/85. "The European Community and education." Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-Generale for Information.

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Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 1808 "Reden an die deutsche Nation", in: Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämtliche Werke, J. H. Fichte (ed.), vol. 7. Berlin 1846: Verlag von Veit und Co., 257-516. Fishman, Joshua A. 1972 Language and Nationalism. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House. Français du Monde. 1982, October, 17/9, 13. Gorter, Durk 1988 "Lesser used languages in primary education in the European Community." [Fryske Akademy, ms.] Haarmann, Harald 1973 a Soziologie der kleinen Sprachen Europas. Hamburg. 1973 b Grundfragen der Sprachenregelung in den Staaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Hamburg: Stiftung Europa-Kolleg. Hallstein, Walter 1974 Die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Düsseldorf, Wien: Econ. Héraud, Guy 1966 Peuples et langues d'Europe. Paris. Herder, Johann Gottfried 1767 "Fragmente, erste Sammlung", in: Frühe Schriften 1764-1772, U. Gaier (ed.), Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag (1985). Hoffmann, Fernand 1979 Sprachen in Luxembourg. Wiesbaden/Luxembourg. Humboldt, Wilhelm von 1823 "Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen", Werke in fünf Bänden, III. A. Flintner and K. Geil (eds.) Stuttgart, 1963, 64-81. 1827 "Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaus", in: Werke in fünf Bänden III. Flintner and K. Geil (eds.) Stuttgart, 1963, 144-367. Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana 1986 Linguistic minorities in countries belonging to the European Community. Summary report prepared by the Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome. [Commission of the European Communities Document.] Luxembourg: Office for Publications of the European Communities. Jacob, James, E. and David C. Gordon 1985 "Language Policy in France", in: W. R. Beer and J. E. Jacob (eds.) Language Policy and National Unity. Totowa, N. J., 106-133. Kloss, Heinz 1969 Grundfragen der Ethnopolitik im 20. Jahrhundert. Wien, Stuttgart. Kusterer, Hermann 1980 "Das Sprachenproblem in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Ein Plädoyer für Pragmatik", in: Europa-Archiv, Folge 22, 693-698. Le Monde. 7 February 1985, 31. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1916 "Ermahnung an die Deutschen", in: G. W. Leibniz Deutsche Schriften, W. Schmied-Kowazik (ed.). Leipzig [first 1683].

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Linguistic Minorities Project 1985 The Other Languages of England. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mingasson, J.-P. 1989 "The written form of 'ECU'", in: Terminologie et Traduction 1. Commission des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg, 65-66. Moon, Brian 1984 "Preserving multilingualism in the European Community", in: Report of the Third Annual Conference of the Center for Research and Documentation on World Language Problems. New York, 83-92. Morin, Edgar 1987 Penser VEurope. Paris: Gallimard. Nyborg Report. 1982 Doc. 1-306/82. Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Petitions on the multilingualisms of the European Community. Rapporteur: Mr. K. Nyborg. European Parliament Working Documents 1982-1983, June 21, 1982. Ó Riagáin, Pádraig 1988 "Bilingualism in Ireland 1973-1983: an overview of national sociolinguistic surveys", in: International Journal of the Sociology of Language 70: 29-51. O Riagáin, Pádraig (ed.) 1988 "Language planning in Ireland", in: International Journal of the Sociology of Language 70. OJ = Official Journal of the European Communities. OJ Doc. No C 38/1: Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of Education, Meeting within the Council. 9 February 1976 comprising an action programme in the field of education. Official Journal of the European Communities 19 February 1976. Pfennig, Gero 1985 "Wasserkopf EG-Bürokratie?" in: Europa als Auftrag 4. Pons-Ridler, Suzanne and Neil B. Ridler 1987 "The territorial concept of official bilingualism; A cheaper alternative for Canada", in: Report of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Center for Research and Documentation on World Language Problems. New York, 95-105. Regulation No. 1 adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 15 April 1958, in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 6 October 1958. Rial, James 1985 "Spain: Regional languages in a lingua franca dominant state", in: Beer, W. R. and Jacob, J. (eds.) Language Policy and National Unity. Totowa, N. J., 97-105. Rosenzweig, Luc 1989 "Vive la Francophonie! Frankreich verteidigt mit seiner Sprache auch das Erbe Europas", Die Zeit Nr. 29, 14 July 1989. Scalione, Aldo (ed.) 1984 The emergence of national languages. Ravenna: Longo (Speculum artium). Séché, Jean-Claude 1988 Freedom of movement in the Community. Entry and residence. Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes.

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Seton-Watson, Hugh 1977 Nations and states. An enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism. Boulder, Colorado. Stephens, Meie (ed.) 1976 Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe. Llandysul/Dyfed. Straka, Manfred (ed.) 1970 Handbuch der europäischen Volksgruppen. Wien, Stuttgart: Ethnos, vol 8. Tabouret-Keller, A. (ed.) 1981 "Regional languages in France." International Journal of the Sociology of Language 29. The rules of procedure of the court of justice of the European Communities. Amendment of 8 May 1987. Official Journal of the European Communities No L 165/1,2. The Economist 1987 "Two tongues for Europe. Englisch und Französisch über alles", July 18, 16. Trim, J. L. M 1978 Des voies possibles pour l'élaboration d'une structure générale d'un système européen d'unités capitalisable pour l'apprentissage des languages vivantes par les adultes. Strasbourg: Conseil de l'Europe. Tugendhat, Christopher 1987 Making Sense of Europe. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Van Hoof, Renée 1978 "Une communauté à douze? L'impact du nouvel élargissement sur les communautés européennes." Rapport présenté à La Semaine de Bruges 1978 organisée par le Collège d'Europe, 16 au 18 mars 1978. Verdoot, Albert (ed.) 1978 "Belgium." International Journal of the Sociology of Language 15. Vermeulen, Hans 1984 Etnische groepen en grenzen: Surinamers, Chinezen, Türken. Weesp: Het Wereldvenster. "Verordnung Nr. 1 zur Regelung der Sprachenfrage für die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 385/58, 6. 10. 1958 "Verordnung Nr. 1 zur Regelung der Sprachenfrage für die Europäische Atomgemeinschaft", in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 401/58, 6. 10. 1958. Vocabulaires des traités européens. Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 1985. Vollmer, Jürgen 1989 "Eurotra - goals, organization and framework design", in: Terminologie et Traduction 1, Commission des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg, 85-95. von Donat, Marceli 1977 "Europas Babylon. Das Sprachen-Problem in der EG", in: EG Magazin 10/77: 10-13. Weinrich, Harald 1987 "Mit den Nachbarn in ihrer Sprache reden. Die europäische Wortkultur lebt von ihrer Vielfalt", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 November, 2.

European

integration

and the idea of the national

language

37

Witte, Barthold C. 1987

" W a s ist los mit der deutschen Sprache?" in: Frankfurter

Allgemeine

Zeitung.

8 July,7. Zuanelli Sonino, Elisabetta (ed.) 1989

"Italian Sociolinguistics", in: International 76.

Journal

of the Sociology

of

Language

38

Florian

Coulmas

Appendix I Council Regulation No 1 determining European Community THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously; Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is recognized as an official language in one or more of the Member States of the Community; HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian. Article 2 Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same language.

the languages

to be used by the

Article 3 Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State. Article 4 Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted in the four official languages. Article 5 The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in the four official languages. Article 6 The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases. Article 7 The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be laid down in its rules of procedure.

European Integration and the idea of the national Article 8 If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 April 1958 For the Council The President V. LAROCK

language

40

Florian

Coulmas

Appendix II

Official Journal of the European

Communities

II (Acts whose publication is not obligatory)

COUNCIL COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 25 July 1977 on the education of the children of migrant workers (77/486/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 49 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1), Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (2), Whereas in its resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme (3), the Council included in its priority actions those designed to improve the conditions of freedom of movement for workers relating in particular to reception and to the education of their children; Whereas in order to permit the integration of such children into the educational environment and the school system of the host

State, they should be able to receive suitable tuition including teaching of the language of the host State; Whereas host Member States should also take, in conjunction with the Member States of origin, appropriate measures to promote the teaching of the mother tongue and of the culture of the country of origin of the abovementioned children, with a view principally to facilitating their possible reintegration into the Member State of origin, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 This Directive shall apply to children for whom school attendance is compulsory under the laws of the host State, who are dependants of any worker who is a national of another Member State, where such children are resident in the territory of the Member State in which the national carries on or has carried on an activity as an employed person.

European integration and the idea of the national language Article 2 Member States shall, in accordance with their national circumstances and legal systems, take appropriate measures to ensure that free tuition to facilitate initial reception is offered in their territory to the children referred to in Article 1, including, in particular, the teaching - adapted to the specific needs of such children - of the official language or one of the official languages of the host State. Member States shall take the measures necessary for the training and further training of the teachers who are to provide this tuition. Article 3 Member States shall, in accordance with their national circumstances and legal systems, and in cooperation with States of origin, take appropriate measures to promote, in coordination with normal education, teaching of the mother tongue and culture of the country of origin for the children referred to in Article 1. Article 4 The Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Directive within four years of its notification and shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.

41

The Member States shall inform the Commission of all laws, regulations and administrative or other provisions which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive. Article 5 The Member States shall forward to the Commission within five years of the notification of this Directive and subsequently at regular intervals at the request of the Commission all relevant information to enable the Commission to report to the Council on the application of this Directive. Article 6 This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 25 July 1977. For the Council The President H. SIMONET

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Coulmas

Appendix III No C 287/106

Official Journal of the European

Communities

Friday, 16. October 1981 RESOLUTION on a Community charter of regional languages and cultures and on a charter of rights of ethnic minorities The European Parliament, - having regard to the resurgence of special movements by ethnic and linguistic minorities aimed at bringing about a deeper understanding and recognition of their historical identity,

- considering that autonomy must not be regarded as an alternative to the integration of peoples and different traditions, but as a means of themselves guiding the process necessary for increasing intercommunication,

- recognizing the revival of regional languages and cultures associated with these movements as a source of enrichment for European civilization and an indication of its vitality,

- considering therefore that linguistic and cultural heritages cannot be safeguarded unless the right conditions are created for their cultural and economic development,

- having regard to the declarations of principle made by the most representative and authoritative international organizations, from the UN to the Council of Europe, and to the most recent and widely accepted political, legal and anthropological theories,

- determined to bring about a closer union among the peoples of Europe and to preserve their living languages, drawing on their diversity in order to enrich and diversify their common cultural heritage,

- referring to Resolution No 1 of the Oslo Conference (1976) of the European Ministers responsible for cultural affairs, - considering that all governments in the Community have acknowledged in principle the right of such groups to freely express themselves and their culture and have, in most cases, drawn up legislation in this specific field and begun coordinated programmes of action, - considering that a cultural identity is today one of the most important nonmaterial psychological needs,

- having regard to motions for resolutions Docs. 1-371/79, 1 ^ 3 6 / 7 9 and 1-790/ 79, - having regard to the report of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport and to the opinion of the Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning (Doc. 1-965/80), 1. Requests national governments and regional and local authorities despite the wide differences in their situations and having due regard for the degree of independence which they enjoy, to implement a policy in this field inspired by and designed to achieve the same objectives, and calls on them:

European integration and the idea of the national language (a) in the field of education: - to allow and promote the teaching of regional languages and cultures in official curricula right through from nursery school to university; - to allow and provide for, in response to needs expressed by the population, teaching in schools of all levels and grades to be carried out in regional languages, with particular emphasis being placed on nursery school teaching so as to ensure that the child is able to speak its mother tongue; - to allow teaching of the literature and history of the communities concerned to be included in all curricula; (b) in the field of mass communications: - to allow and take steps to ensure access to local radio and television in a way that guarantees consistent and effective community communication and to encourage the training of specialist regional presenters; - to ensure that minority groups receive organizational and financial assistance for their cultural events equivalent to that received by the majority groups; (c) in the field of public life and social affairs: - to assign, in accordance with the Bordeaux declaration of the Council of Europe Conference of Local Authorities, a direct responsibility to the local authorities in this matter; - to promote as far as possible a correspondence between cultural regions and the geographical boundaries of the local authorities; -

to ensure that individuals are allowed to use their own language in the field of public life and social affairs in their

43

dealings with official bodies and in the courts; 2. Requests the Commission to provide, as soon as possible, recent, accurate and comparable data on the attitudes and behaviour of the public in the Member States towards regional languages and cultures in their various countries; 3. Calls on the Commission to set up pilot projects in the language teaching sector to try out methods of multilingual education capable of ensuring both the survival of the individual cultures and their openness to the outside world; 4. Recommends that the Regional Fund provide financial assistance for projects designed to support regional and folk cultures and calls upon the Commission to include measures in its educational and cultural programmes to promote a European cultural policy which takes account of the aspirations and expections of all of its ethnic and linguistic minorities who are looking towards Europe and its institutions with confidence and hope; 5. Recommends that the Regional Fund should contribute to the financing of regional economic projects since the cultural identity of a region can only exist if the population are able to live and work in their own area; 6. Calls on the Commission to review all Community legislation or practices which discriminate against minority languages; 7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, to the governments and regional authorities of the Member States and to the Council of Europe.

Factors of constraints and freedom in setting a language policy for the European Community: A sociolinguistic approach Andrée

Tabouret-Keller

This paper is divided into three parts inequal in length but equal in the importance of purpose. The longest part is Part I in which I shall be concentrating firstly on the supranational protection of linguistic rights in Europe which can be enforced by law, that is on the protection afforded under EEC law, which is directly applicable in the Member States of the Community, secondly on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (in Strasbourg) which creates an international law obligation for the states concerned, and thirdly on the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages that does not create any international law obligation as it is first of all a matter of principles. In Part II I discuss some of the main problems this state of affairs presents to a sociolinguistic approach, my main question being "What would a language policy for Europe be concerned with?" In Part III I sketch an overview of the European sociolinguistic situation by trying to define the main constraints that operate within the present day situation and to answer the question of what freedom is left to implement a language policy for Europe.

I. Supranational protection of linguistic rights in Europe: an overview of the present state of affairs A language policy for Europe! What could it possibly mean? A directive to the individual state governments? A statute to which individuals or groups could appeal over the heads of state governments? A declaration of human rights? Some answers to these questions are already given within the frameworks of the United Nations Convenants and of the European Institutions.

46

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Such protection as exists in the language area within the United Nations Convenants shall be left aside, since this is principally implemented by means of a reporting obligation by signatory governments to the U.N.; references to the protection of linguistic rights at national level shall also be left out. The significance of the protection afforded by the European Institutions lies in the fact that 1. the standards applied are international and not merely national in accordance with the goal of these institutions to achieve greater unity among their members, 2. this protection overrides domestic law in cases of conflict and at the same time supplements domestic provisions where national law is silent. What kind of linguistic rights do the European Institutions therefore protect? The two institutions concerned here are the EEC and the Council of Europe, and within the later the European Convention on Human Rights and the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. ' The aim of the European Economic Community is to achieve greater integration of its twelve Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) through various economic rights given to EEC nationals in the Treaty of Rome, in particular the free movement of persons and the right of establishment for EEC nationals in any EEC country. Any linguistic rights implied by the Treaty of Rome derive from these two fundamental provisions which are enforced, as well as any other provision of the Treaty, by a legal system (European Community Law) which takes precedence over national law and by a Court of Justice (sitting in Luxembourg) which interprets Community Law. Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome is relevant to linguistic rights insofar as the right to non-discrimination includes non-discrimination on the grounds that one's mother-tongue is not that of the country where one settles (Sabourin 1979). It specifically prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality, and various decisions of the Luxembourg European Court of Justice which are reievant to linguistic rights flow from this article . These decisions make clear that the protection afforded by EEC law against discrimination on ground of language is not concerned with the protection of anyone's mother-tongue as such but merely with facilitating movement by EEC citizens within the twelve countries concerned. Directive 486 (1977) concerns the education of children of migrant workers with respect to the rights 1. to be taught the language of the host country in which one goes to settle as an EEC national, and 2. to maintain and

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practice one's mother tongue in the host country. Its stated aim is principally 'to facilitate the possible reintegration' of these children in their country of origin. It is not, therefore, to protect their linguistic rights as such. It states that Member Countries must provide facilities for these children to be taught the 'mother-tongue of their country of origin' as well as the official language or one of the official languages of the host-state. Gardner-Chloros and Gardner (1986) note that it is the country and not the children which has a mother tongue, a remark I shall come back to later on, they stress also that the group of people at whom the Directive is aimed is extremely specific: the children of EEC nationals who have settled in another EEC country; Turkish migrants and their children would therefore in theory not be affected. The Council of Europe (all Member States of the EEC, plus Austria, Cyprus, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey) also aims to bring about greater unity between its members but, unlike the EEC, not through economic means but through intergovernmental cooperation. Its work is achieved through conventions and other legal instruments which provide an opportunity for states to adopt a common standard in a variety of fields, from environmental protection to equality for men and women; one relevant example is the Charter on minority languages in Europe that I shall discuss later on. Beyond the various conventions which may or may not be ratified by each of the Member States, the principal cornerstone achievement of the Council of Europe is the European Convention of Human Rights, which gives individuals the right to complain about the action of States in its optional, but widely accepted, provision of Article 25. Among the various rights guaranted by the Convention (right to life, to liberty, to family life, private life, home and correspondence, to marry and found a family, to property, to education, e.t.c.) linguistic rights are not mentioned as such but appear in Article 14, within the general framework of rights to nondiscrimination, and in parts of Articles 5 and 6 on the rights of arrested persons. Article 14 states that 'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status'. Gardner-Chloros and Gardner (1986: 50) stress that this provision it potentially the most far-reaching for linguistic rights since it refers back to all the

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other articles guaranteed by the Convention and states that there should be no discrimintaion on grounds of language with respect of any of these. Thus the Convention forbids 'discrimination' with regard of freedom of expression, the right to education, etc. on the basis that one's mother tongue is different from that of the majority. It was due to the threat that a case would be brought on this issue to the Commission and thereafter possibly to the Court that in October 1984 the French Government finally repealed a law published in 1945 regulating the language of publication of the press in Alsace. The original provision, promulgated at the end of the German occupation, provided that at least 25 % of the articles on sport or addressed to youth must all be in French, even in newspapers otherwise in German. Article 5(2) protects everyone arrested by the right to be informed in a language he understands of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him; article 6(3) protects everyone charged with a criminal offence 'to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him' and 'to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court'. Clearly these articles are not concerned necessarily with the mother-tongue of the person arrested or charged, but only with a language, whichever it may be, which that person understands. Like the European Convention on Human rights the Charter on Regional or Minority Languages is a legal instrument which provides an opportunity for states to subscribe to common principles. In March 1988 the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe has taken a resolution on Regional and Minority Languages in Europe (hereafter RML), an amended version has been submitted to the Council in September 1988 and adopted. As I shall briefly show, the terms of the Charter are drawn in such a way that they leave almost entire freedom, if not full freedom, to each state to define and choose the measures to be applied in their territories. A full comment of the text of the Charter is here out of reach (for more details see Tabouret-Keller 1989); I shall limit myself to discuss the question of the definition of RMLs and the notion of 'protection of a language'. The Charter stresses that it pursues a cultural aim, that of protecting RMLs, its aim is not to state political rights. Therefore it is able to refrain from defining the concept of RML: no definition, no lists of RMLs shall be drafted, no reliance put on existing political, social or ethnic definitions. The concept of language as used in the Charter focusses primarily on the cultural functions of

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languages that are regarded first of all as cultural and social facts. However three criteria are central: history, space, language classification. History: RMLs must belong to the European cultural heritage; space: RMLs must have a territorial base; language classification: RMLs must be separate languages, identifiable as such. These terms says the Charter are inevitably vague, they both impose and leave open to each Member State to define the notion of cultural heritage and of territory. The cases of Yiddish and of Gypsy languages are given as an example of languages presenting a European cultural heritage but having no proper territory in the 21 Member States. The question of classification again is not dealt with in any detail, it is up to each state to define what seperate regional or minority languages (if any) are present within its political borders. Therefore the question is left open as to the distinction that ought to be drawn between RMLs as such and other languages on the territory of the state. For the Charter it suffices to distinguish RMLs from official languages in saying that they must clearly differ from one another, but it is clear that the Charter does not concern the presence or the disappearance of local variants within one and the same language. A regional language is supposed to have a fairly large territory and strong cultural attributes, a minority language a small territory, its survival appears as threatened and its developmental potentials as limited. Further the distinction between national languages and RMLs is a complex one, as the national language of one state might be a regional language in a neighbour state (the case of German is given as an illustration). The aim of the Charter is not to stipulate the right of ethnic-cultural minority groups but to protect RMLs as such. Protection of a language is a matter of non-discrimination and of promotion. The definition of non-discrimination is a fairly broad one: it is based on the idea of equality between speakers not between languages. The measures laid down by each state to foster first of all the one language that is the official and/or national language (whatever the constitutional status of this language may be) by means of education or of media, for example, cannot be taken as constituting discrimination against RMLs on the sole ground that measures are being taken for its benefit and not for the benefit of RMLs. Therefore, nondiscrimination is an attitude rather than a precise rule, it corresponds to refraining from any constraints in language matters: no more aggressive attitudes towards RMLs than aggressive policies for the benefit of RMLs. Where-

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as the Charter stresses the right of everyone to speak their own language, each state is left with the responsibility of choosing its own policy. Prohibition of discrimination is not sufficient, the Charter being concerned with languages which are generally on the defensive for their survival, measures for their promotion ought to be taken. Such measures can concern education, public services, media, administration, legal authorities and law, cultural facilities and activities, economic and social activities, and transfrontier exchanges. For each of these domains the kind of provision that can be applied is specified. The most important feature of the Charter is, in my opinion at least, the distinction being made between general principles and adopted measures, that is measures that are going to be legally implemented and therefore applied. The general principles that I have stated above are expected to be adopted with no exception or reservation by all the 21 Member States. But the measures themselves are liable to restriction. Firstly, the Member States are free to name the languages to which they agree the measures being applied, secondly for each of the languages, for which the states accept the Charter shall apply, they can choose the provision to which they subscribe. Therefore, a country may well adopt the principles, but decide that none of them apply to its territory, the consequence being that the application of the Charter will depend for a good deal on the motivation the speakers of RMLs will show to keep their language by using it in everyday life, by being able to agree on a common writing system, by imposing its use in administrative and legal matters, among other signs of their own strength to foster the life of their language.

II. Possible aims for a language policy for Europe and related difficulties A language policy for Europe! What would it be concerned with? Spoken language or written or both? The medium of education? A subject matter within education? The legal status of a language? The form prescribed for a language? Resources made available to achieve a prescribed end? Laisser-faire? As many of the papers in this volume show, 'language policies' in individual states are particularly aimed towards achieving 'national unity'. The notion of 'national unity' is highly controversial because it may imply the preservation of minority rights or their suppression. The same notion is also an easy

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and broad cover term for many measures taken to improve education and to achieve economic ends. Is 'Europe' going to be able to extend such policies on a wider scale? Any language policy has to make decisions at least on the following points: - the version of the language which is going to be fostered, for example in the case of RMLs, vernacular versions or standard versions. If Europe is going to be extended towards the East the question of the script needs also be settled: in pre-Gorbatchovian times the Baltic Republics were compelled to use the cyrillic script. - the medium of education which is going to be adopted. Vernacular education, also often termed 'mother-tongue education', is nowadays, 40 years after the adoption by UNESCO of the principle of the spread of literacy via vernacular languages, a subject of controversy, particularly in 'developing countries' where it seems a non-sensical directive when 'mother-tongue' cannot be defined and when teaching resources and back-up material are not available (Le Page 1964, Tabouret-Keller 1990). In Europe this same directive meets different difficulties to which I shall come back later on: in RML territories 'mother-tongue' education is able to guarantee the knowledge of a language and to increase the number of its competent speakers, but it does not necessarily increase the number of performant speakers, that is of people using the language fluently in everyday life. Yet a further difficulty lies in the choice of a program for RMLs and in the kind of language contact this program provides by the way in which this program integrates a RMLs with other languages. Finally the cost must be questioned in terms of availability of both financial and human resources. - The legal status of a language and the legality of documents in a given language ought to be defined (see in this volume H. Koch's paper which illustrates that supranational harmonization of law does not imply harmonization of languages). In what language can evidence be given in courts and can trials be conducted? (see above in my paper the provisions of the Treaty of Rome that touch upon such problems). At any rate a laissez-faire policy cannot be prescribed. - What kind of control could be installed if a pan-European language policy were to be installed? Given the differences of centralism in the administrative bodies of the different Member States a pan-European control system seems impracticable. In the highly centralised French education system de-

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cisions and their applications need a cascade of controls, from the ministry itself to the regional inspectorate and the local headmaster. All such decisions are far from being mere technicalities. Not only do they involve politicians and governmental institutions but they also raise the question of what other driving forces are needed for them to be adopted and implemented in such a way that the results are supra-national.

III. Overview of constraints inherent in the European sociolinguistic situation Is Europe going to be able to implement such policies on a wider scale? From a sociolinguistic point of view the main constraints which operate within the present-day situation can be analysed under the following headings.

Historical and political constraints In Europe the main dialectal areas have been relatively stable over long periods of time, a thousand years in many cases, like for example the RomanceGermanic border in Alsace (Chambers, Trudgill 1980). In the course of time, these language borders have been overlaid by the establishment of states and their political borders, hence the concomitant forming, in between language borders and political frontier, of so-called language minorities. Most states have in time established official languages first of all for administrative and legal matters but more recently and generally during the 19th century for education and nowadays also for the media and cultural activities. Such language unification contributed to the definition of regions of 'dominated languages', particularly along sea coasts, but sometimes also in the inland. In the long run language unification, promoted by a central state power, may bring with it linguistic assimilation, not only because the official language is a main instrument for united states institutions, but also because this same language is the symbol of a state's unity. Such double function explains why it is so easy to use a 'national' terminology in matters of language policies: the term 'national' is in its turn a unifier for both instrumental and symbolic functions.

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Economic constraints In recent times, labor migration, mainly from the South towards the North, has been followed by the establishment of more or less large groups of a different kind of minority broken up into scattered small immigrant groups. Europe's population is estimated at 320 million of which 32 million are linguistic minorities of one kind or another: historical minorities amount to about 20 million and the global number of immigrants to about the same. To give just one example, there are more than two million Arabic-speaking people in Europe, but they form numerous scattered small groups whereas minority populations form generally relatively larger groups in either one or several large territorial location; neither the EEC not the European Charter takes them into account. It is generally assumed that in Western Europe minority languages are loosing ground and that many of them are in danger of extinction. In his 1976 book Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe, Stephens describes over fifty languages of minorities in sixteen states. His data are mainly from the beginning of the 1970s and it is certain that today a good many of the minority communities he describes, may have kept their identity while having lost the current use of their language. As we have already stressed, official status does not suffice to maintain a language, in this volume several examples illustrate this process, e.g. Ó Riagáin on the case of the Irish, one of the best documented cases, which shows that the Irish language is no more secure now than in the 1920s when the 'national' language policy first took shape. The cases of Catalan and of Basque, different as they are, would also need to be scrutinized, as they are both involved in complex and contradictory dynamics within their relationship to Castillan, as demonstrated by Boix (1990) and Mar-Molinero (1990) for Catalan and by the Demolinguistic Basque Atlas (Eusko Jaurlaritza 1990). As we have shown, sociolinguistic constraints derive largely from the institutionalisation of law and more recently of education and general administration. The language of these bodies is almost universally the country's official language and, therefore, the citizens cannot escape the necessity of learning and using it. When ultimately the labour market, as is the case today, also becomes dependant on the spoken and written use of the official language (or of its standard form), the motivation to use the common vernacular is likely to decrease ever more, particularly by the younger generation. This seems to be true of RML youths as well as of the so-called 'second generation' immigrant children.

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Discussion As opposed to the regression of the use of RMLs and of immigrant languages in the second or third generation born in the host country, the spread of written and spoken use of English is noticeable. The present day strength of the position of English in Western Europe results from multiple factors, the main factor being undoubtedly linked to the dynamics of the economy. In his recent study of 'Attitudes towards English as a possible Lingua Franca in Switzerland' (1990), based on data from 1985, 1986, 1987, Dürmüller shows that in this country English has potential not only for international communication but also for intranational communication. Although this development is generally perceived as unsettling the tradtional linguistic stability of multilingual Switzerland, - the idea of accepting English officially is clearly resented - , it is not possible to ignore the wish of young people to see other Swiss languages in the curriculum replaced by English (for a survey of the Swiss language situation, see Watts' s paper in this volume). It is not unsafe to assume that in most EEC countries too, English is accepted as an additional language, a language for specific purposes, for example business and information, and for international communication. Also used by youths in job related and leisure time domains a kind of English based Lingua Franca is developing. It is presently difficult to describe its spoken and written varieties and the amazing varieties of competence and performance which its use involves. An 'English lexicon coloured' German or Dutch is far from allowing to enjoy English littérature (for example) or to serve as an introduction to the huge domain of cultures expressed in one or another variety of English today. On the other hand it may suffice for international communication and economy to be able to master an 'English based Lingua Franca', within the EEC territories as well as outside. One may wonder if such a state of affairs would not be less harmful to RMLs than assimilatory state language policies have been over the years on the part of highly centralized and bureaucratic state governments (Legendre: 1976). What kind of constraints would an 'English based Lingua Franca' represent? Not only am I unable to answer such a question but I realize that the notion of 'constraint' ought to be discussed within a fundamental framework as it is of general use in varied disciplines. Within the scope of this paper the notion of 'constraint' refers to two different sets of data. The historical and economical situation in Western Europe which it seems difficult, if not impossible, to reverse and within which certain linguistic consequences seem to be inherent,

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like the difficulties of survival of most RMLs; and the law, be it national or supranational, which sets limitations not only to the rights of citizen but also to those of states and their institutions. The protection of linguistic rights, as one can see from the examples analyzed above, open domains of rights only so far as those concerned are aware of the exisiting possibilities of their rights and as they do claim a proper application of the involved rights. The general trend of the evolution inherent in the European historical and economic situation may seem to carry away whatever small scale actions are taken in favour of lesser spoken languages. This however is only true as far as 1. such languages do not seem to be competitive to their speakers, particularly on the labour market, and as speakers do not ensure their transmission (Tabouret-Keller: 1991), 2. the existing rights are not made use of by those concerned, 3. the existing possibilities of amending those rights, where they do not prove to be accurate, are not explored and alternative measures not sought after. It seems, then, that a European language policy, if any, would have to establish itself inside a field of permanent changing tension produced, on the one hand, by dynamics of history and economy and, on the other hand, by complexities of law and linguistic rights. However after 1992 the free movement of labour within the EEC in Western Europe, increased by additional labour migration from Eastern Europe, will result in enormous changes both in the labour market and in the labour language picture, bearing a high rate of social change which might produce unforeseen linguistic consequences, in particular increasing proportions of non-literates among unemployed people, young or old (Mayor 1990).

Notes 1.

The part on the EEC and the European Convention of Human Rights leans on a paper by Gardner-Chloros and Gardner ( 1986) to whom I am indebted for introducing me to those matters and for allowing me to make use of their work.

2.

Examples of such decisions are given in Gardner-Chloros and Gardner 1986.

3.

In the hierachy of EEC instruments a directive is the next most compelling instrument to a regulation, which is directly applicable as it stands in each of the Member States. A directive imposes on the Member States both an aim and a time-limit for its implementation (in this case four years, with regular checks thereafter), leaving only the precise manner of implementation to the choice of each Member Government.

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References Boix, Emili 1990 "Language choice and switching among young people in Barcelona", in: Papers for the workshop on concepts, methodology and data, network on code-switching and language contact (Bàie Jan. 1990), 212-224. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation. Chambers, J. K. and Trudgill, P. 1980 Dialectology, London: Cambridge University Press. Council of Europe 1988 Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. Twenty-third session, 15-17 March 1988, Strasbourg France (mimeo). 1988 Resolution 192 on Regional or Minority Languages in Europe (Prov. Ed.). 1988 "Report on the regional or minority languages in Europe", in: Explanatory Memorandum. Dürmüller, U. 1990 "Attitudes towards as a possible lingua franca in Switzerland", in: York Papers in Linguistics. Special issues in honour of R. B. LePage, 1-18. Eusko Jaurlaritza 1989 Demolinguistic Basque Atlas. Vittoria: Hitzkuntza Politikarako Idazkaritza Nagusia. Gardner-Chloros, Penelope H. and Gardner, James P. 1986 "The legal protection of linguistic rights and of the mother-tongue by the European Institutions", Grazer Linguistische Studien, 27, 45-66. Legendre, Pierre 1985 Jouir du pouvoir. Traité de la bureaucratie patriotique. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. Le Page, Robert B. 1964 The national language question. Linguistic questions of newly independent states. London: Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations. Mayor, F. 1990 Discours d'ouverture à l'occasion de la Conférence Mondiale sur l'éducation pour tous. Jomtien (Thailand, March 1990) [Mimeo]. Mar-Molinero, Clare 1990 "Current language planning and policy in Catalonia", in: York Papers in Linguistics 14, 61-72. Sabourin, P. 1980 "Un nouveau droit culturel linguistique: les implications linguistiques du Traité de Rome", in: Actes du colloque "Langues et coopération européenne" Strasbourg Avril 1970, 201-207. Paris: GREEL. Stephens, Meir 1976 Linguistic minorities in Western Europe, Llandysul: Gomer Press.

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Tabouret-Keller, Andrée 1990 "Are vernaculars a hopeless cause?" in: Abstracts and transcriptions of the discussion York Workshop 1990, edited by Le Page, R.B. International Group for the Study of Language Standardization and the Vernacularization of Literacy, 117-121. York University: Language Department. (in press) "Some major features of the sociolinguistic situation in Europe and the European Charter on regional or minority languages", in: Sociolinguistics today: International Perspectives. London: Routledge for Univ. of Hong-Kong. (in press) "Continuité et discontinuité de la transmission de l'emploi de l'alsacien dans deux familles alliées", in: La communication familiale. Paris: Univ. R. Descartes. United Nations 1983 "The rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities", in: Action in the field of human right, 210-212. United Nations.

Language conflicts in multilingual Europe prospects for 1993 Peter Hans Neide

0. Introduction In this paper, a concept of conflict will first be discussed and then it will be applied to several European multilingual situations. Conflictladen causes for linguistic discord will be illustrated by examples of officially multilingual countries, the minority problem and urban multilingualism. What attempts have been made to avoid or overcome the resulting conflicts are shown by a series of plans which have been used in multilingual countries like Belgium. Since Europe, with its language conflicts often dating from the nineteenth century, has obviously not prepared sufficiently for a multilingual (partial) European Community in the year 1993, a few propositions for the acquisition of several languages should fan anew the discussion of a purposeful multilingualism that corresponds to the market. The paper ends with a polemic look at the future of multilingual Europe.

1. Ethnic conflicts Most contacts between ethnic groups do not occur in peaceful, harmoniously coexisting communities. Rather, they exhibit varying degrees of tension, resentment and differences of opinion, which are characteristic of every competitive social structure. Under certain conditions, such generally accepted competitive tensions can degenerate into intense conflicts, in the worst case ending in violence. The assumption of some sociologists that ethnic contact inevitably leads to conflict situations appears, given the fact that some ethnic groups do live peacefully together, at least exaggerated. The possibility of conflict eruption is, however, always present, since differences between groups create feelings of uncertainty of status, which can, in turn, give rise to conflicts. Sociolo-

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gists who have dealt with contact problems between ethnic groups define conflict as contentions involving real or apparent scares, interests, and values, in which the goals of the opposing group must be fought, or at least neutralized to protect one's own interests (prestige, employment, political power, etc.) (Williams 1947). This type of conflict often appears as a conflict of values, in which differing behavioral norms collide, since usually only one norm can be valid. Conflicts between ethnic groups, however, occur only very rarely as openly waged violent conflicts, and usually consist of a complex system of threats and sanctions, in which threats constitute a key to understanding a conflict, especially if the interests and values of one group are endangered. Conflicts can arise relativeley easily if - as is usually the case - interests and values have an emotional basis. The magnitude and development of a conflict depend on a number of factors which are determined by the number of points of friction between two or more ethnic groups, the presence of equalizing or mitigating elements, and the degree of uncertainty of all participants. Thus, a one-sided (monocausal) conflict explanation or one based on irrational prejudices, will fail. Very different factors which influence each other and can reinforce and "escalate" each other, e.g. feelings of uncertainty and intimidation, scares in areas of values and interests, can cause group conflict. Consequently, such group conflict is part of the social behavior in which different groups compete with each other, and should not be connoted only negatively, since in this way new - possibly more peaceful - forms of coexistence can arise. On the other hand, tensions between ethnic groups brought about by feelings of intimidation can give rise to new conflicts at any time, conflicts which can be caused by a minority as well as by a majority group. As long as society continues to create new scares, because of its competitive orientation, the creation of new conflicts appears unavoidable. Along with sociologists, political scientists also assume that language contact can cause political conflict. Language conflicts can be brought about by changes in the expansion of the social system when there is language contact between different language groups (Inglehart/Woodward 1967). Belgium and French Canada are examples of this. The reasons for this are the following: a dominant language group (French in Belgium, English in Canada) controls power in the areas of administration, politics, and economy, and gives employment preference to those applicants who have command of the dominant language. The disadvantaged language group is then left with the choice of renouncing social ambition, assimilating, or resisting. While numerically weak

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or psychologically weakened language groups tend towards assimilation, in modern societies numerically stronger, more homogeneous language groups having traditional values, such as their own history and culture, prefer political resistance, the usual form of organized language conflict in this century. This type of conflict becomes especially clear when it occurs between population groups of differing socio-economic structures (urban/rural, poor/wealthy, indigenous/immigrant) and the dominant group requires its own language as a condition for the integration of the rest of the population. Although in the case of French Canada, English appeared absolutely necessary as the means of communication in trade and business, nearly 80 % of the francophone population spoke only French and thus was excluded from social elevation in the political/economic sector. The formation of a small French-speaking elite, whose only goal was political opposition to the dominant English, precipitated the latent, socially incited language conflict. Most current language conflicts are the result of language separation accompanied by differing social status and one-sided preferential treatment of the dominant language on the part of the government: in these cases it is religious, social, economic or psychological scares and frustrations of the weaker group that may be responsible for the language conflict. However, a critical factor in the expansion and intensification of such a conflict remains the impediment of social elevation, to the point of blocking any social mobility of a disadvantaged or suppressed ethnic group (cf. the numerous language conflicts in multiethnic Austria-Hungary). The climax of political language conflict is reached when all conflict factors are combined in a single symbol, language, and quarrels and struggles in very different areas (politics, economy, administration, education) appear under the heading language conflict. In such cases, politicians and economic leaders also operate under the assumption of language conflict, disregarding the actual underlying causes, and thus continue to inflame "from above" the conflict arising "from below", with the result that language assumes much more importance than it had at the outset of the conflict. This language-oriented "surface structure" then obscures the more deeply rooted, suppressed "deep structure" (social and economic problems). Furthermore, the multilingual conflicts in Europe, especially in urban societies, show quite clearly that language conflicts are caused primarily by attempts on the part of the dominant group to block social mobility.

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2. Conflicts in multilingual nations Latent and manifest language conflicts can be described from different standpoints. Europe comprises about 70 to 80 languages, of which approximately 35 are spoken in the area of the European Economic Community. In addition to a division into traditionally multilingual countries (ones that are "administratively" multilingual), smaller divisions can be made according to language groups with a high predisposition to conflict because of their mobility or immobility, or according to the degree of heterogeneous population composition in densely populated urban areas which are highly industrialized.

2.1 Officially multilingual countries The language conflicts of multilingual countries that developed historically are more well-known. These countries include Great Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and since the late 1980s also the European part of the Soviet Union. However, the conflict structures are of completely different kinds in these administratively multilingual countries. The Irish language conflict is closely linked to the inherent ideology of Irish which expressly restricts the spread of Irish as a native language. Irish the mother-tongue of a rural Catholic minority in a region (Konamara) with a high rate of unemployment, can only assert itself with great difficulty in urban centers where social advancement is important. In the case of Belgium, whose language conflicts can also be explained as socio-economic, the usual conflict description of a repressed minority is even less true: The oppression of the Flemish, which can be interpreted historically and which the respective literature always portrays as the oppression of a minority, in fact concerns a population majority, so that in the case of conflict the Flemish should actually be regarded as Europe's only repressed majority. In the case of Luxembourg the explanation of the conflict is even more paradoxical than in Belgium. The trilingualism of the country can be regarded in terms of language pedagogy as a model for multilingualism in the Europe of the future, a model in which the dialect-like Luxembourg language of kindergarten is harmoniously supplanted by standard German taught from the first year of primary school on, French not appearing as native tongue until the second year of primary school. But the multilingualism of Luxembourg's schools can also be explained as an accumulation of deficits: Luxembourgish

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plays only a subordinate role as a written language, standard German is supplanted by French after only a few years of school, and French, only in rare cases the mother tongue of the pupil, is taught for reasons of language politics as a native and not as a foreign language from the second school year on, without pupils having the necessary prerequisites (Robert Bruch: "les classes des muets" = "classes of mutes"). For these reasons it can be assumed that most pupils have a triglossic deficit. Conflicts in Switzerland, in contrast to Belgium, often have an indirect character and are frequently dealt with more academically than in other countries, although local newspapers by no means evade conflicts. Here, too, numerous oppositions and confrontations can be explained socio-economically, although a real portrayal of the conflicts would have to be based on much more complex relationships: the "Röstigraben" ("Rösti trench") between French- and German-speaking Swiss, the conflicts in bilingual cities like Freiburg/Fribourg and Biel/Bienne, isolation from Germans because of the increased use of spoken dialect (cf. the so-called "Basel-Lörrach effect"), and also the Germanization of the last Rhaeto-Romance pockets in southeastern Switzerland show that even federated states cannot avoid language conflicts. Finally, Yugoslavia has shown once again how unresolved language conflicts and those that have seemingly quieted down can break out again because of the extreme socio-economic difference between north and south there. A comparison of the official multilingual countries of Europe shows, in spite of a few common denominators, the broad span of characteristic conflicts among ethnolinguistic groups.

2.2 Autochthonous minorities versus allochthonous minorities The forms of multilingualism have become more varied during the decades since World War II, or they have at least come to be evaluated differently. Originally the autochthonous minorities ("ethnic groups", "nationalities") who were residents of most European nations were the center of interest. But since the 1960s new, often socially defined minorities like migrants, guest workers, returning settlers from former colonies, refugees, emigrants, and transmigrants have moved into the foreground of the European context. All these groups have brought about a new awareness among the majority population which has by no means resulted in the native minorities being pushed into the background. Instead, they have been carried along by new currents like the socalled "renaissance of dialects and less common languages." A new regional

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consciousness oriented toward smaller units ("small is beautiful") has increasingly shifted the view of research, politics, culture and the public to minorities, whose significance in a culturally viable Europe, east and west, has been stressed. The pressure from majority groups to standardize language, and the cultural and socio-economic influences of the super-powers which in turn threaten the majority groups themselves with loss of cultural independence, all this puts pressure on the smaller ethnic groups, who have no legal protection at all, to ask themselves whether it is desirable and possible to take measures to ensure the survival of their minority. For most of the smaller ethnic groups of Europe this results in the usually undesirable and difficult choice of either conforming to the often economically stronger majority group and being further assimilated, or facing a conflict the solution and outcome of which is completely unknown. In present-day Europe with its increased tendency toward unification and international involvements, any language or culture contact between different ethnic-cultural groups seems to imply conflict. Since majority groups in their attitude toward linguistic or cultural minorities usually react considerably more negatively to allochthonous than to autochthonous minorities, the conflicts can be described without overlapping. The confrontations between the majority group or dominant groups and the autochthonous or allochthonous minority groups, i.e. the indigenous or the migrant groups, take place on different levels (social, political, economic, cultural), although the forms of discrimination are often similar. Even in sociolinguistics, very few researchers dedicate their efforts to both sorts of minorities at the same time. In the Netherlands, Switzerland and France autochthonous and allochthonous minorities are described and analyzed quite differently for methodological reasons. In Great Britain, however, sociolinguistic contacts are lacking between London linguists examining the so-called "decolonized" languages and the minority researchers in Scotland and Wales because of the completely different conflict situations. No wonder there have been hardly any suggestions for solutions of the conflict which would try to neutralize the language conflicts of the two groups.

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2.3 Urbanization Areas of linguistic concentration like big cities open another conflict perspective. The population explosion and increasing mobility in the 1980s have led to the disappearance of monolingual world cities in the last decade of this century. Much less obvious than in international metropolises is the conflict-laden multilingualism in European, often regional, capitals. Here, too, the causes and occasions of conflict vary considerably, although many have their origin in the insufficient importance placed on minority languages. A few random examples of such conflicts: Dublin/Baile Atha Cliath: Irish as administrative language with a relatively small area of use is spoken almost exclusively as a second language, often learned with great effort; Helsinki/Helsingfors: the economically strong Swedish minority is bilingual, the Finnish majority mainly monolingual; Leeuwarden/Ljouwert: the Frisian minority, which has already weakened in terms of numbers compared to Dutch, is endangered more by a Frisian city dialect ("city Frisian"), which is similar to Dutch, than by outside factors; Bruxelles/Brussel: first, the favoring of, or just the awarding of equal rights to, the numerical Flemish minority (smaller school classes, the same rights as the majority) has led to tensions. In addition, the threat of becoming an even smaller minority because of the presence of migrants provides more fuel for the conflict; Bratislava/Pressburg: in spite of successful Slovakification of a partly Hungarian, partly German population over the course of history, the introduction of the territoriality principle finally slowed down the threatening Czechification in the 1970s. But, conversely, the prestige-laden Czechoslovakian capital Prague is only subject to Slovakian influence in a limited way; Fribourg/Freiburg·. the German minority, most of whom speak a local dialect, by doing so raise the threshold of language acquisition for majority speakers, whose learning motivation could diminish as a result; Bozen/Bolzano: the initial challenge to the Italians to further bilingualism, send more of their children to German schools and thereby emancipate the German minority, has now given way to the fear that too many bilingual Italians could do harm to the labour market of the German minority;

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Pécs/Fünfkirchen: repressive political measures have so menaced the substance of the small German minority that the minority language has largely disappeared form public life. These different situations of conflict, to which numerous other examples could easily be added, show that a single plan for solving such language problems would only meet with failure.

3. Plans for handling conflict 3.1. The territoriality principle and the example of Belgium Originally two principles of multilingualism were in opposition to each other: the individualist principle, mainly supported by the Romance side, by which every speaker is free to use his mother tongue or another language in all official and private domains regardless of his place of residence; and the territoriality principle, defended more by the Germanic side, which obliges the resident of a region, declared administratively to be monolingual, to use the respective territory-bound state language in official domains. Although the individualist principle prevailed up to the 1960s and led to extensive Frenchification of the country, today this principle can only be found in bilingual Brussels. In fact, the famous-notorious "liberté du père (!) de famille" (free choice of one of the two national languages by the head of the family) was only abandoned in Brussels in the 1970s. Instead of a bilingual structure, Brussels today maintains two parallel chiefly monolingual networks in official domains. The two largest sections of the country are either monolingual French or Dutch in accordance with the territoriality principle, except for a few communities on language borders. This application of the territoriality principle met with simultaneous rejection and admiration in the world, since apparently the viability of a small multilingual nation was thereby maintained. No wonder the Belgian language legislation influenced that of Quebec (so-called Law 101) so much. The consequences for the individual speaker are considerable: Whereas the chances of social advancement before introduction of this plan were unavoidably linked to the mastery of two languages (at least in the case of the Flemish and German populations), now life in many spheres can proceed mainly in one language, namely the language of the respective territory.

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3.2. Reducing emotionality With the introduction of the territoriality principle, the Belgian lawmakers acted on the assumption that strict regulation in a few essential areas would leave room for the greatest possible freedom of language use in the unregulated areas. While in most multilingual countries the monolingualism required by the territoriality principle applies to at least two domains (the educational system and public administration), Belgium adds the business domain, monolingualism in companies (language between employees and employers). Social tensions which result from language use according to social class (e.g. when managers use another language than union representatives) are to be reduced thereby. Parallel to language legislation, a plan for federalization and regionalization was developed that would prevent centralized language planning such as that practiced in France. Since such regionalized language planning (called "communalized" in Belgium) was applied to only a few, albeit decisive, realms of life of the different language groups, tolerance is shown in the remaining domains, as compensation, so to speak. Above all in the area of quantitative evaluation of minorities, one of the most disputed and most often abused arguments of the respective opposition, Belgium has gone its own way and not followed the North American or Russian examples. The rights and duties of a majority or minority are thereby no longer dependent solely on the strength of numbers. On the contrary, if the relative size of an ethno-linguistic group is no longer the sole determining factor in language planning, the protection of a language community can proceed from the assumption that a numerical minority needs more help than the majority. The Belgian state has accordingly done away with language counts in the census and thereby surely contributed to reducing the emotional contents of the conflict. Since Belgium differs in this way from most other multilingual nations, some thoughts in connection with the language counts (census) conducted by interviewers will be presented in the following.

3.3. Problems of language census in multilingual areas It is astonishing how readily census data are accepted by contact linguists for the description of linguistic minorities. Census statistics can certainly be of importance in contact zones free of conflict, but in areas where political or so-

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cio-economic conditions are to the disadvantage of the minority, they can often be biased. First, the bilingualism and multilingualism typical of European minority areas defy any strict mother-tongue categorization since most diglossie linguistic behavior is characterized by functional distribution: specific everyday speech situations and conditions continuously require the same linguistic variants, so that the use of a first or second language appears to be institutionalized. There are a few language areas which allow a permanent free alternation between variants for economic reasons. Consequently the results of a poll and the differences identified between foreign and native speakers are less relevant (cf. Neide 1980: 201-209). Second, any given answer to a question regarding day-to-day language use is subject to such a complexity of sociological requirements - especially in conflict zones - that even surveys by trained interviewers can lead to distorted results. In his reply, the informant will certainly not be thinking of the problems of linguistic variety in his use of language as seen by the interviewer. Rather, consciously or unconsciously, he will maintain a certain loyalty to his group and strive to attain his goal of social identity. Neither linguistics nor sociology have the necessary models and methods at their disposal to come to terms with extra-linguistic conditions. Census statistics on individual linguistic behavior indicate more about social consciousness than about the true language use of the informant. The social pressure found in conflict areas, which brands a particular language variant as a prestige language, must therefore always be taken into consideration. Researchers studying prejudices and stereotypes have here an extensive field of inquiry. Census-type investigations can only determine trends, and are often useful if complementary studies are available. In this way the historical as well as the psychological dimension increases in importance.

4. Hypotheses on the acquisition of several languages In spite of many disadvantages, the Belgian model has proved itself in certain aspects. As an outgrowth of a conflict situation which has existed for decades, measures to avoid and neutralize conflict have been developed. The resulting de-emotionalizing of the language dispute has led to individual language behavior that permits the acquisition of two or more languages corresponding to

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a free market economy. In this way the mulitilingualism market, freed from numerous historical and social prejudices, stereotypes and emotions, has been able to adapt to levels of supply and demand. Today the Belgian multilingual situation can be characterized as especially liberal in relation to the three national languages as well as the most important foreign and neighboring languages. To this must be added a purely economic argument: The function of the capital city as an international meeting place has furthered the willingness to learn other languages, insofar as the mastery of languages that meet existing demands obviously pays off. Thus the Belgian example shows that economically motivated language planning according to need is more successful in encouraging the acquisition of several languages than a centralized language policy, which cannot easily adjust to constantly changing language needs in a flexible way. In the interest of avoiding language conflicts in the context of multiple language acquisition, some Western European experiences will now be presented for discussion. 4.1. There is no generally valid model of multilingualism that can be applied to all cultures, countries and circumstances. Situational and contextual elements are decisive for each plan for multiple language acquisition. Proponents of bilingualism are often rash to stress the temporary success of multilingual education in so-called bilingual secondary schools. These are frequently elite schools (the Europa School in Brussels, Kennedy High School in Berlin) at which the children of "privileged guest workers" (diplomats and representatives of multinational corporations) or of the native upper class (affluent minorities) learn several languages. Because of repeated changes of location they recognize the utility of multilingualism more readily than their counterparts in monolingual secondary schools, where the same multilingual curriculum would probably meet with little success. In addition, in most cases there is the considerably higher expense of bilingual education, which not every school system and department of education is willing to finance. This serves as a warning against all forms of elite multilingualism, which becomes questionable if a "Eurocratic upper class" gains control of foreign language acquisition. Academics and the wealthy automatically have easier access to multilingualism for their children.

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4.2. The trend toward artificial (guided) multilingualism corresponds to notions of fashion and prestige for many Europeans and North Americans, that is, language communities of relatively high mobility. But this artificial multilingualism ignores the structural aid to learning provided by the languages of the environment. In secondary schools in eastern France, where many children understand and/or speak a German dialect at home, English since the end of the 1980s has become the first foreign language after the language of instruction. So the dialectal language structures for German that are already present remain unused, with the result that natively acquired proficiency goes to waste and is hardly used didactically in school. Luxembourg with its flexible transition solution ("from kindergarten dialect to standard language in school") provides a better example. As qualification, it should be pointed out that in European countries, with few exceptions (e. g. Hungary), the high prestige value of English endangers all multilingualism planning in schools. As is well-known, learning motivation in adolescents declines significantly in the acquisition of third and fourth languages. In the interest of avoiding conflict: The natural multilingualism that exists in all the countries of Europe except for Iceland and Portugal rules out overly simplistic solutions for the future, such as, multilingualism = mother tongue + English. 4.3. Motivation and support for the acquisition of several languages is inadequate in most European nations. More than half of the world's population is already multilingual, and the trend is a growing one. That is why multilingual education portrays the norm and not the exception. In the spirit of the foregoing, every case of multilingualism should be tailor made for its language community, it should correspond to real economic needs, and its strength should not be diluted with fashionable airs and ambitious but futile language planning.

5. The prospects for 1993 Since all European nations with few exceptions are indeed multilingual in an autochthonous as well as an allochthonous sense, it is regrettable that this enormous reservoir of potential facility for language acquisition has hardly been tapped.

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Language as a secondary characteristic of underlying socio-political and economic conflicts is regarded as a symbol of conflict per se in many multilingual nations. A simple intensification of second language and multilingual instruction in schools in such conflict situations seems to me to be a waste of time and money. This is shown by the examples of the six year minimum of obligatory Russian instruction in most former East Bloc countries and the previously required Dutch instruction that lasted just as long in the Walloon part of Belgium. De-emotionalizing the conflict indicator, language, as well as a kind of "symmetrical-bilingualism" in the numerous language border areas of Europe, a decrease in prejudices and stereotypes effected by immersion in neighboring languages and cultures, and above all increased attention to local and regional peculiarities (ecolinguistic factors) of the languages to be learned: these measures have a better chance of neutralizing conflicts than state-wide educational language planning policies, curriculum regulations, the use of standard teaching textbooks that are distributed world-wide (e. g. Deutsch für alle), and teachers who lack motivation because they are insufficiently trained. Past conflicts and possible new ones should in no case be suppressed or denied. Instead they should be the starting point of a new approach which would ready the linguistically unprepared Europe of 1990 for a conflict-conscious and linguistically more open, i. e. multilingual Europe of 1993. Countries like Switzerland, as a non-EC country, and Belgium, as the probable center of the EC, play a pioneer role that should not be underestimated. If these officially multilingual countries are not able to transform language conflict and multilingual deficits into marketable multilingualism that is tensionand conflict-free, and based on the educational system of the respective country, then who can this responsability be entrusted to? Preferably not to a "Eurocratic" administrative authority of some Western European capital!

References Bayor, Ronald H. 1978 Neighbors in conflict. Baltimore, Londen: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Blalock, Hubert M. 1970 Toward a theory of minority group relations. N e w York: John Wiley and Sons. Boulding, Kenneth 1962 Conflict and defense. New York: Harper and Row. Calvet, L. J. 1974 Linguistique et colonialisme: petit traité de glottophagie. Paris: Klincksieck.

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Clyne, Michael 1975 Forschungsbericht Sprachkontakt. Kronberg: Scriptor. Enninger, Werner and Haynes, Lilith M. (eds.) 1984 Studies in language ecology. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner. Fishman, Joshua A. 1972 The sociology of language. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury 1980 "Prefatory notes", in: Neide, P. H., (ed.) Languages in contact and conflict. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner. von Gleich, Utta 1982 Die soziale und kommunikative Bedeutung des Quechua und Spanischen bei Zweisprachigen in Peru. Hamburg: Selbstverlag. Goebl, Hans 1986 "Mundart, Mass und Meinung", in: Plurilingua VI, Neide, P. H. (ed.) Bonn: F. Dümmler, 9-26. Haarmann, Harald 1980 Multilingualismus I, II. Tübingen: G. Narr. Hartig, Matthias 1980 Soziolinguistik für Anfänger. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. Haugen, Einar 1966 Language conflict and language planning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1980 "Language problems and Language planning: the Scandinavian model", in: Languages in contact and in conflict, Neide, P. H. (ed.) Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 151157. Inglehart, R. F. and Woodward M. 1967 "Language Conflicts and Political Community", in: Language and social context, Giglioli, P. (ed.) New York: Penguin. Kremnitz, Georg 1979 Sprachen im Konflikt. Tübingen: G. Narr. Krysmanski, Hans Jürgen 1971 Soziologie des Konfliktes. Hamburg: Rowohlt. Labov, William 1979 "The Study of Language in its Social Context", in: Language and social context. Giglioli, P. (ed.), New York: Penguin. Mattheier, Klaus A. 1984 "Sprachkonflikte in einsprachigen Ortsgemeinschaften", in: Spracherwerb Sprachkontakt - Sprachkonflikt. Oksaar, E. (ed.) Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter. Neide, Peter H. 1981 "Language 'contact universale' along the Germanic-Romance linguistic border", in: Journal of multilingual and multicultural development 2, 117-126. Neide, Peter H. (ed.) 1980 Langues en contact et en conflit. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner. 1983 Current Trends in Contact Linguistics (Plurilingua I). Bonn: F. Dümmler. 1990 Language attitudes and language conflict (Plurilingua IX) Bonn: F. Dümmler.

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1990 Language conflict and minorities (Plurilingua X). Bonn: F. Dümmler. Neide, Peter H. and Gendron J.-D. (eds.) 1986 Bilinguisme en Europe et au Canada: Perspectives de recherches (Plurilingua VI), Bonn: F. Dümmler. Oksaar, Els 1980 "Mehrsprachigkeit, Sprachkontakt, Sprachkonflikt", in: Langues en contact et en conflit. Neide, Peter H. (ed.) Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 43-52. Oksaar, Els (ed.) 1984 Spracherwerb, Sprachkontakt, Sprachkonflikt. Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter. Strassoldo, Raimondo and Delli Zotti, Giovanni (eds.) 1982 Cooperation and conflict in border areas. Milano: Franco Angeli. Williams, Robin M. 1947 "The reduction of intergroup tension", in: Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57: 40-43. Wölck, Wolfgang 1985 "Beyond community profiles: A three-level approach to sociolinguistic sampling", in: Methods in contact linguistic research. (Plurilingua V), Neide, Peter H. (ed.) Bonn: F. Dümmler.

Linguistic minorities and language conflict in Europe: Learning from the Swiss experience* Richard J. Watts Introduction Mey (1989) considers the formulation and implementation of language policies to be a form of social control which contributes towards regulating access to positions of political and/or socio-economic power within the state. The example that he deals with, present language policies in Catalonia, is instructive in that we see the same processes at work on the regional level of autonomous provinces as we have long been familiar with on the level of the European nation state (cf. Edwards 1985). The fiction upheld by policy makers and language planners is one in which an official standard variety of the language concerned is coextensive with the members of the speech community, this generally being understood as the state (or, in the case of Catalonia, the province). Official efforts to turn this particular fiction into fact have thus aimed, consciously or not, at the total assimilation of minority linguistic and ethnic groups. At the same time, however, the very notion of an official standard variety only makes sense if it can be used as a form of social control. If every member of the speech community/nation state spoke and wrote the standard, the control function of the latter would be lost and alternative definitions of it would need to be developed. However, in a multilingual state - and every state within the EC is multilingual, whether de jure or defacto - the assimilation of minority linguistic groups can only constitute a language policy aim if those minority languages are not granted some form of official protection on the national level, e.g. if speakers of those languages do not have full and equal rights to use them at every level of interaction. In considering future language policies for a united Europe we need to be aware of this fundamental contradiction. I shall deal with some of the points arising from it which bear upon the relationships between majority and minority language groups, and my theme will be one of language contact and conflict. My major point, however, will be that in multilingual, mutlicultural set-

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tings conflict, while unavoidable, can nevertheless be shown to possess positive potential. As Ammon (present volume) shows, one can reasonably argue that languages possess varying degrees of "economic strength", which can be measured along a number of important parameters. For example, irrespective of the state of the British economy, it remains a fact that English "sells" far better than any other official EC language. 1 With regard to the future status of official languages within the EC it would thus appear imperative for language policy makers and sociolinguists to understand the mechanisms of social control through language policies more fully. Addressing the question of who such policies should be formulated for can only be done with a full awareness of their gate-keeping functions. Who is allowed access to the cultural, educational, political and economic resources of a united Europe, and who is denied access? How will access be guaranteed to minority groups in the multilingual community of European states? Catalonia provides evidence of an officially supported reflex action on the part of a linguistic minority on the national level, the probable result of which will be some form of territoriality principle such as that which now holds in Wales, where the minority language (which may or may not have the status of a majority language within its "territory") is official on the regional or provincial level, but not on the national level. If its speakers do constitute a majority within the region or province, the ones who are thereby marginalized are those who speak the national majority language. One of the aims of the present paper is to show that a great deal of unnecessary conflict may be avoided if the territoriality principle is interpreted differently. The example that I shall give is that of Switzerland. At the time of writing the present paper, the speed at which post-WorldWar-Two Europe is being transformed into a new European order leaves me with the uncanny feeling of being overtaken by history. I deliberately used the term "united Europe" above rather than than the European Community in order to suggest that although we might think first and foremost of the 12 member states of the Community and of the magical date 1993, we cannot exclude the possibility that the limits of the EC may be extended by the admission of new member states during the nineties and the first decade of the next millennium. On the other hand, it is difficult to hazard a guess at what the political structure of Europe will look like ten years from now or whether the EC will not have been superceded by some other form of united Europe. Whatever structure emerges, however, any new states admitted to the EC in the future

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are certain to bring with them their own unsolved linguistic minority problems, some of which are particularly virulent. As a result the problems confronting language policy makers in the European Tower of Babel will increase rather than decrease. My purpose in the present paper is connected less with suggesting solutions to the linguistic problems confronting the present bureaucratic machinery of the Community or with the greater efficiency of trade, industry and commerce than with looking at the problems of easier and more extensive movement of a demographic nature across ethnolinguistic boundaries. In order to tackle the nature of minority/majority linguistic conflict, we need to investigate more closely examples of the official coexistence of three or more languages within individual states. We need to consider the extent to which the members of a minority speech community in a multilingual state have access to cultural, educational, political and economic opportunities and the extent to which a minority language can be protected by some form of the territoriality principle. We also need to consider whether demographic movement in an officially multilingual state still allows members of the ethnolinguistic groups to use their languages in public situations, or whether the territoriality principle itself does not in fact create further opportunities for conflict. We also need to consider states which are organized politically as confederations, i.e. from the bottom up rather than from the top down, since this would appear at present to be the only feasible form of political unity for EC states. We need to consider the official language policies of those states, their educational policies with respect to language teaching/learning and cross-cultural contacts, the positive and negative aspects of those policies and examples of where ethnic conflict appears to emerge as linguistic conflict, etc. We also need to assess the extent of individual bi- or multilingualism in those states by examining at a micro-analytical level what goes on in socio-communicative interaction among members of the various linguistic and ethnic groups. Two European states appear at first glance to fit these stringent observational criteria, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Unlike Switzerland, however, Yugoslavia does not have a long history of growth towards multicultural and multilingual unity. In addition, its federal structure appears in many ways to exacerbate rather than neutralize inter-ethnic conflict. Switzerland, on the other hand, offers opportunities for studying all these aspects of language policy and language contact/conflict on a small scale, although ironically it is that state which, in all probability, will resist integration into the EC longer than any other in Western Europe. 3 I will thus concentrate my discussion in this

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paper on the example of Switzerland, drawing parallels, wherever possible, with the political and socio-economic organization of Europe after 1992. In the next section I shall outline the political organization of Switzerland and highlight some aspects which may be of significance to a united Europe of the future. The multicultural, multilingual complexity of Switzerland will then be considered in the third section and parallels drawn with the future united Europe which might be envisaged. The fourth section will concentrate on examples of perceived discrimination and marginalization which are expressed largely by way of linguistic and ethnic differences. My argument will be that the real conflicts lie at a deeper historico-cultural level and are by no means always verbalized as such. The importance of taking statements about linguistic conflict seriously will be stressed. In the final section I shall show how the tensions within Switzerland, which on a greatly magnified scale might reflect the sort of tensions likely to arise in a united Europe, may be evaluated positively and taken as a potential source of great creativity. Throughout the paper it is not my intention to extol the virtues of Switzerland and hold it up as a model to be followed. I should prefer to point out some of the obstacles which are likely to confront a future united Europe and to show how they may be circumvented by focussing on aspects of the Swiss situation which should not be emulated and those which are exclusive to Switzerland. It is my belief that a laissez-faire attitude towards ethnolinguistic minorities in the EC, particularly in the light of the crass differences in economic strength which already exist among the official languages of the community, is likely to lead to the wrong kinds of policy making. Politically and culturally, Switzerland is built on a long tradition of compromise in which direct democracy allows minority opinions to be voiced and often acted upon. Some of the strengths of this tradition might be carried over into the political structure of a united Europe.

A federal state or a confederation of states? In a paper entitled "Gestire il mandato Costituzionale delle lingue ufficiali" delivered to a one-day symposium held in Berne in March 1989 for federal civil servants on the state of the national languages of Switzerland in the federal administration, the Federal Vice-Chancellor, Achille Casanova, makes the following interesting point notably in French, as he, quite significantly, shifted languages from Italian to French after about a quarter of the paper:

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La Suisse est une coalition de résistances. Contre le seigneur, le juge étranger, le conquérant ou l'idéologie importée. Mais aussi contre un Etat central trop puissant ou contre tout homme ou tout groupe politique ou social qui tendrait au monopole du pouvoir. (1989: 3) Casanova offers this as support for his position that Switzerland is plagued less by problems of linguistic and ethnic marginalization than other countries because of a "subtil partage du pouvoir". A number of points arise here which I should like to focus on: 1. Casanova implicitly assumes in the phrase "coalition de résistances" that what holds the Swiss Confederation together is the will of individual groups to combine in resisting various forms of threat to the self-constructed identity of those groups. From this we may infer the following: a. that there is something common to those groups despite ethnic and linguistic differences, and b. that they nevertheless retain an individual group identity. If we carry this train of thought further, we may conclude that the groups agree to accept those differences, with all the unsolved intergroup problems they may incur, but to waive them in the common cause of resistance. What, therefore, are the similarities and differences implied by this line of reasoning? 2. Federalism itself does not automatically guarantee that there will be fewer problems of this nature, but rather a subtle sharing of power, which is seen to be peculiarly Swiss. The subtle sharing of power to which Casanova refers is, on the political level, the division of responsibilities between the Confederation and the cantons and the communes on the one hand, and the agreement to share executive power in the Federal Council between representatives of the four political parties most strongly represented in the National Assembly on the other. On the ethnic level it is realized in the unwritten understanding that in parliamentary committees and in the Federal Council the minority ethnolinguistic groups are proportionately well represented. 3. The subtle sharing of power derives historically from the fact that Switzerland is a coalition of resistances against:

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a. foreign domination, in particular and significantly in this order "le seigneur, le juge étranger, le conquérant, l'idéologie importée" b. too powerful a central state c. individuals or groups (political or social) who lay claim to a monopoly of power. Let us first focus on point 3. What Casanova is implicitly referring to here is the historical development of the Swiss Confederation. This began in 1291 with the rebellion of the cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwaiden against Austrian domination. As we all know from the legend of William Tell, the uprising was directed against the tyranny of the Habsburg "Vogt" ("seigneur" or "governor") Gessler. What the legend does not tell us, however, is that the principal motivation behind the uprising was commercial control over the lucrative North-South trade route over the Gotthard (cf. Peyer 1972, Im Hof 1988) and that the alliance of the three Inner Swiss cantons arose more as a matter of convenience, mutual protection against possible counter measures and the guarantee of local interests, than out of a feeling of national solidarity. It was, in other words, truly a "coalition de résistances", above all else against "le seigneur" and "le juge étranger". But lying at the heart of the coalition was a common economic interest. From the rebellion against the Habsburgs till the time of Napoleon the Swiss Confederation grew steadily through the addition of further cities and cantons, which, with the sole exception of Fribourg, were German-speaking (cf. Andres 1990). 4 Members of the confederation, however, maintained independence through their own political and economic infrastructure, imposing their own taxes, exacting customs duties from other members on goods imported into or passing through their territory and with their own individual monetary systems. The true nature of Switzerland, at least the Germanspeaking part, is that of a confederation of states (a "Staatenbund") rather than a federal state (a "Bundesstaat"). The growth of the Europe of the Community, like that of Switzerland before the time of Napoleon, has been towards a "Staatenbund" rather than a "Bundesstaat", and as in the case of Switzerland the major motivation towards this development has been economic. It might even be said to be a coalition of resistances to the threat of foreign domination - that is if one accepts that the Cold War and opposition to economic domination by America and Japan are

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analogous to the kinds of foreign threat which gave rise to a feeling of Swiss national identity. However, one might argue that the comparison is rather tenuous and stops here. Even though the centralized state imposed by Napoleon, the Helvetic Republic, was very short-lived, documenting the opposition against both a foreign conqueror and an imported ideology, resistance to which Casanova also sees as part of the "raison d'être" of the Swiss state, the federal constitution of 1848 effectively created a "Bundesstaat" out of what had been a "Staatenbund". We do not, on the other hand, know whether and how Europe will progress on the road to a federation. Certain member states, notably France and the Federal Republic of Germany, appear to set this as their ultimate goal. 5 Others, above all the United Kingdom, are highly unlikely to want to take the concept of a united Europe further than that of a "Staatenbund", a confederation of independent states. Similarly, despite the fact that Switzerland has made that final move, there are different and opposing conceptions of what "Switzerland" means to its citizens and to the different ethnic groups. 6 In addition, whether it is now a federal state or not, the old mistrust of central authority, of "seigneurs" ("governors") on a federal level, is as strong as it ever was. The resistance is no longer against domination from beyond the borders of Switzerland but rather against domination from central authority, and it is a resistance which reaches from taxation policies through transport policies to education policies, touching, needless to say, language policies. Centralism in Switzerland is thus a very delicate matter and involves Casanova's "subtil partage du pouvoir" (point 2 above). Its only chance of succeeding is by ceding large areas of power and decision making to the cantons, by taking a bottom-up rather than a top-down view of political and administrative structure, such that the local commune is the heart of the system and the first point at which those who wish to succeed in politics must begin their careers. The canton is the next most important unit, and superimposed on this is the federation. Strictly speaking, for example, there are no Swiss citizens. The Swiss are citizens of their commune, by virtue of which they are citizens of their canton and finally citizens of the Swiss Confederation. Federal politics must therefore be carried out within a pluralistic, consensus-oriented frameη

work. Steinberg (1976) has called Switzerland a bottom-heavy democracy, which on the one hand accounts for its political stability, but on the other hand is responsible for a widespread apathy in voting habits, disinterest in political is-

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sues and a consequent complacency and resistance to innovation in everyday matters. I should like to suggest that the only way for a united Europe to develop as a viable political unit will be to take the nation state as the analogue to the commune, or canton, in the Swiss system. By this I mean that Europe must also develop as a bottom-heavy democracy with an emphasis on pluralism and consensus if any development is to be made from a "Staatenbund" to Q

a "Bundesstaat". What one may have to put up with is the kind of apathy and disinterest in federal politics which is evident in Switzerland. The implication inferable from Casanova's first point that there are fewer conflicts of an ethnic and linguistic nature than in other federal states and that they do not constitute a threat to the Confederation, will be picked up and dealt with in more detail in the following section. It is important because it verbalizes the generally complacent feeling in both official and non-official circles that conflict exists but is not disruptive. I should like to represent the point of view that conflict exists and is expressed in terms of language and ethnic groups, rather than in terms of underprivilege, discrimination and disadvantage. One reason why the conflict does not become disruptive is because it can be viewed in this way, i.e. it is cohesive rather than disruptive. Since conflict expressed in terms of language serves political interests, it creates the impression that those who complain about language differences do so because they believe that localistic interests are served by regional (in the German-speaking part of the country, dialectal) language use. This is then taken to be a rejection of national unity (cf. Watts 1988). The non-German-speaking population of Switzerland tend to believe that this can only be rectified by inducing German speakers to use standard German more than they do at present. If conflict were seen to be other than this, it would become truly problematic. There is a need in Switzerland for the minority groups to bring their minority status to the attention of the majority groups precisely in order to stress the desirability of national unity.

Language policies in Switzerland Perhaps I should stress the point that a comparison between Switzerland and a united Europe may be tendentious. Switzerland has four national languages, German, French, Italian and Romansch, three of which, German, French and Italian, are official languages within the federal administration. In the present

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EC there is no such distinction between national language and official language, although one might envisage such a suggestion being made if ever the move from a confederation to a federal state were accomplished. There are, after all, no fewer than nine official languages within the EC at present (English, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Danish). 9 Choosing a restricted set of official languages from amongst this set must inevitably take some account of the status of the language in terms of its use not only throughout Europe, but also throughout the rest of the world. It must also take demographic and economic factors into account (cf. footnote 9). However, any such decision would result in the marginalization of speakers of those languages to which national, but not official status is granted, and this would create grave problems for European unity. Let us nevertheless review official language policies within Switzerland, in particular the Territoriality Principle (which is consistently invoked by local politicians in problematic situations concerning language), and see what kinds of gaps exist between those policies and the use of the four languages in a number of important social domains, in particular politics and federal, cantonal and communal administration, industry and finance, education, and, most importantly, face-to-face social contacts between individuals and groups from the different ethnolinguistic areas. Then let us see whether any analogies can be drawn with the situation within the EC and what suggestions might be made on the basis of the Swiss experience. The four national languages are protected by the Federal Constitution (Article 116), although in reality the degree of protection depends largely on the ways in which Article 116 is interpreted and put into practice in the different language areas. Census data over the past eighty to ninety years show a remarkable amount of stability in the numbers of native speakers of each of the four languages. The share of German speakers has risen marginally over this period, there has been a very slight decrease in the number of French native speakers, and native speakers of Romansch have dropped from 1.5 % of the total population to around 0.8 %. The largest increase has been in the total number of native speakers of Italian. As is always the case with census figures relating to linguistic data, however, these "facts" have to be taken very warily indeed. They do not provide a particularly accurate picture of the linguistic situation within Switzerland, not even in terms of overall numbers of native speakers. The first fact that needs to be mentioned is that of the total population of around 6 and a half million inhabitants almost one million are not Swiss. In

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census takings, however, the one million inhabitants who are not of Swiss nationality (migrant workers with a restricted work permit and those with a longterm residence permit) are included in the figures. A range of other languages spoken in Switzerland therefore emerges, e.g. Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, Serbo-Croat, Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, Greek, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, English, etc., 10 some of which have sizeable numbers of native speakers even exceeding the total number of Romansch speakers, and none of which is "protected" by Article 116. The increase in the number of Italian speakers is due to an increasing influx of guest workers from Italy after the Second World War. The second important fact concerns the status of Romansch. The drop from 1.5% to 0.8% in terms of the total population does not take into account the proportion of Romansch speakers to the overall increase in the non-Swiss population of Switzerland and thus needs to be interpreted with extreme caution. In effect the drop from 1.5% to 0.8% is unlikely to be a true reflection of the number of Romansch speakers (just over 60,000) to Swiss compatriots of another mother tongue. There has clearly been a drop in the total number of Romansch speakers. This fact cannot be denied and/or argued away by means of statistics. But if by way of comparison we examine the demise of, say, Welsh or Breton in the face of English and French, the drop is encouragingly small. We need to consider the efforts to maintain Romansch in this somewhat more positive light and to assess what it may tell us about the status of other minority, non-official languages in the member states of the Community. It should also be pointed out that census figures in Switzerland make no provision for bilingualism. As we shall see, Romansch speakers are bilingual by virtue of their geographic, socio-political and socio-economic situation. Monolingual Romansch speakers are few and far between. Bilinguals may consider either of their two languages as their mother tongue. Thus between 1940 and 1970 no less than 35 Romansch-speaking communes became "Germanspeaking" as a simple consequence of more than 50% of the population giving German as their mother tongue. A third point concerns the type of question asked with respect to census data on language and the consequences that this may have on the linguistic map of Switzerland. In order to explain this we need to raise the problem of the so-called Territoriality Principle, which is felt to be an essential part of Swiss language policies (or perhaps lack of them). Article 116 of the Federal Constitution effectively grants the cantons the right to decide on those languages which will be used in administration, the law courts and the school

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system within their territorial boundaries just as long as that language is one of the national languages and "the protection of significantly large linguistic minorities" is sufficiently taken into consideration (Keller 1990). The obvious problem here is who decides what constitutes a "significantly large linguistic minority". The kind of "protection" that may be offered is a restricted amount of mother tongue teaching, which still does not guarantee the individual the right to use her/his mother tongue in official domains. Thus if a canton is territorially monolingual, it has the right to determine that language and no other as its official language. If it is territorially bilingual, i. e. there is a relatively clear demarcation between those communes whose inhabitants are speakers of the majority language A and those whose inhabitants are speakers of the minority language B, then two official languages may be chosen at the level of the cantonal administration, but each commune may decide what the language of its local public institutions shall be. Above all, this effects the language of instruction in the schools. On the other hand, in order to protect the assumed homogeneity of a language area, communes can remain Α-speaking by cantonal decree, even if there are more than 50 % B-speakers resident in the commune. The only exception here is the canton of Grisons, which again has a negative effect on the status of Romansch. Consider some of the problems raised by the Territoriality Principle. First and foremost is the decision at the communal level on the language of local administration in bi- or trilingual cantons. In general, this has only been a problem on the linguistic boundary between German and French speaking territory. If the decision to count a commune as officially Α-speaking or Bspeaking is taken on the grounds of the majority of speakers of A or Β in accordance with the census figures, demographic shifts in the balance between A and Β may have rather crucial effects on local language policy. To exemplify this, let us imagine a small commune which has been traditionally Α-speaking but whose population is suddenly increased by a large influx of Β speakers. It is highly unlikely in this case that the communal council will be inclined to make a sudden change in its language policy. For a start, such decisions are not generally imposed from above, but in the bottom heavy democracy that Switzerland is can only be decided at the level of local politics. At the same time a Federal Court ruling requires provision to be made for speakers of language Β to have the right to receive their schooling in that language if the commune is on the language boundary. If language Β is the language of instruction in the next commune, then parents have a right to send

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their children to that school and the local commune (in which language A is the official language) must defray the costs. Thus, if there is now a majority of Β speakers in the commune and no provision is made for schooling in Β within that commune, the public costs are likely to be very high and there will be a consequent rise in the level of taxation - one point on which any good Swiss, whatever her/his mother tongue, is very sensitive indeed. Hence, wholesale demographic movements across ethnolinguistic boundaries in Switzerland would constitute a threat to the delicate balance between the ethnic groups, and they occur only very rarely indeed. In one way this may be seen as a positive effect of the Territoriality Principle. On the other hand, it creates a situation in which individual bilingualism is not as widespread a phenomenon as might be imagined. On the language borders it has always existed in varying degrees, and much of it is a form of instrumental bilingualism. Beyond the borders, however, most individuals are essentially monolingual with varying degrees of proficiency in one or another of the national languages. More often, however, the preferred second language of the majority of the Swiss is English (see Dürmüller 1986). In terms of the projected open market for the EC, this type of effect resulting from a territoriality principle would appear to run contrary to the economic aim of free movement of labour and capital across ethnolinguistic boundaries. A further disadvantage of the Territoriality Principle concerns once again the status of Romansch, which was only officially granted national language status in 1938. Since Romansch exists in a number of widely different dialects which are not always mutually comprehensible, it is extremely difficult to use it at an official level. In 1938 the canton of Grisons promised Romansch speakers that official documents pertaining to their interests would appear in the two main types of Romansch spoken in the canton, but this has never really been implemented. Since the cantonal capital of Chur is well within German-speaking territory and since Romansch has not yet achieved official language status, it has not been felt necessary to act upon this well intentioned but somewhat Utopian declaration. Things may change in the near future, however. The first chair of Romansch within Switzerland was instituted in 1984 at the University of Zurich and the Federal Technical University in Zurich. Great efforts are being made to create a Rumantsch Grischun to serve as a written standard for the different Romansch dialects of the Grisons. Finally, a recent government report on the language situation within Switzerland (Zustand und Zukunft der viersprachigen Schweiz), which was commissioned on the occasion of the prospective

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change in Article 116, has clearly stated that Romansch should be granted constitutional recognition as an official language. As we saw above, the negative side of the Territoriality Principle is felt by native speakers of Romansch in that their territory appears more fragmented than it actually is. Census figures which show over fifty percent German speakers in a commune in the Grisons lead to a decision to count that commune as German-speaking (cf. Camartin 1982, Viletta 1985). This has led to a lack of institutionalized support for the language, particularly in the school system. In "German-speaking" communes schooling will be held in German with some provision made for Romansch speakers. In "Romansch-speaking" communes the first four grades of primary school are held in Romansch, but very intensive instruction is carried out in German to equip schoolchildren for secondary education, all of which is in German. Thus one clear effect of language policies within Switzerland is that the Romansch community is heavily marginalized and does not, as do the Frenchand Italian-speaking communities, have the equivalent of a francophone or italophone community on a national level behind it. However, despite this apparent support for the italophone community and despite the greater protection it receives through the official language status of Italian in the Confederation, the Ticinesi are feeling the effects of marginalization quite acutely and are becoming more vociferous in their demands. The situation for the Italian-speaking Swiss can be summarized as follows. Although from a cultural point of view they are oriented towards Italy, historically, economically, politically and educationally they are oriented towards Switzerland beyond the Gotthard. The only other geographical connections with the rest of the country are over the Nufenen pass into the Germanspeaking part of the territorially bilingual canton of Valais and through the San Bernardino road tunnel to the Romansch-speaking area of the canton of Grisons. However, being a major route across the Alps, this road brings one very quickly once again to Chur, which, as we have seen, is German-speaking. In addition, the Ticino has a strong tourist industry and has had to endure the widespread building of holiday houses by German-speaking Swiss and also, until the Lex Furgler restricting the sale of land to non-Swiss, by Germans. One of the justified complaints of the Ticinesi is that during the summer months more German can be heard on the streets of Lugano and Locarno than Italian, and that German speakers automatically assume that any enquiry they make in German will be responded to in that language. One could go even further than this and state with confidence that the German-speaking Swiss even

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expect to be able to make their enquiries in Swiss German and are surprised if they are not understood. One final point may be made here. There is no institute of higher education in the Ticino; as a consequence those going on to receive a university education are obliged to go to one of the French-speaking universities (Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchâtel) or one of the German-speaking universities (Zurich, Basle, Berne), the University of Fribourg being bilingual. Since first degrees from Italian universities have not yet been given recognition at Swiss universities, the young Ticinesi who wishes to go on to university has no alternative than to achieve a fairly high level of individual bilingualism. This, we may feel, is surely advantageous. But looked at from the other side of the fence, which I will do in the following section, the Ticinesi quite rightly conclude, like the Romansch speakers, that, with respect to language policy, there is a great gulf between the democratic principles of the federal constitution and the reality of ethnolinguistic co-existence within the Swiss state. While the Territoriality Principle effectively allows German- and Frenchspeaking Swiss (as long as they do not live on the language border and do not have occasion to communicate with members of the other language group in any of their social activities) to remain monolingual - despite instruction in the other language at school - it obliges the Italian-speaking Swiss to become bilingual, sometimes even trilingual. In the following section I should therefore like to outline ways in which members of the different ethnolinguistic groups perceive themselves to be discriminated against and their ethnic identity to be marginalized.

Marginalization and discrimination expressed through language differences One of the best ways of revealing language attitudes in a multilingual state like Switzerland, or at least the attitudes of those who concern themselves with the issue, is to study statements on language made in the media. Since these statements reflect opinions of politicians, prominent citizens, educators, representatives of the media, and, through letters to the editor, citizens who do not have a vested interest in language policies, a good spread of opinions can be gathered. In addition, use of the four languages on radio and television provide another set of insights into both the present situation and the way it might be developing, especially in respect to the use of German. The only way of as-

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sessing what might be happening "on the ground", as it were, is to carry out wholesale ethnographic studies of face-to-face interaction in a number of social domains and activities between members of the various language groups. A start has been made along these lines in some of the research carried out within the Swiss National Science Foundation's Project 21 (cf. de Pietro et al. 1989/90;Werlen et al. 1989), the overall aim of which was to provide a picture of the cultural diversity of Switzerland. It is obviously not possible to discuss a wide range of points in detail here, so I shall restrict myself to those that may be of relevance to language policies within a united Europe. To begin with, one fact should be emphasized. As was pointed out in a recent debate on German Swiss television, it would be wrong to suggest that there was once a golden age when a majority of the Swiss were bi- or even trilingual and that for some reason things have deteriorated. There is no reason to believe that the state of inter-ethnolinguistic contacts was ever better than it is now. If anything, such contacts were restricted to certain relatively small sections of the population. In effect, this type of attitude represents a multilingual version of the "complaint tradition" (cf. Milroy and Milroy 1985). On the other hand, we cannot afford to ignore the fact that this is the dominant expression of lay opinion with respect to language contacts within Switzerland, nor should we forget that these complaints have increased in frequency over the last five years. What, then, are the main areas in which alarm signals are being triggered off in the media and elsewhere? Four main areas may be identified: 1. French-speaking, and increasingly Italian-speaking, Swiss who complain that the German-speaking Swiss are jeopardizing opportunities for inter-ethnic communication by using their dialects in an increasing number of social domains. 2. Italian-speaking Swiss who complain that there is not enough awareness on the part of their German- and French-speaking compatriots of the increasing marginalization of the Ticino, and that, while they are expected to be bilingual, the opposite with respect to linguistic competence is not the case. 3. German-speaking Swiss who complain that the increased use of dialect is responsible for a marked decrease in the ability of the German-speaking Swiss to communicate adequately in standard German. This is clearly linked to point one, but it also refers to an increasing margianlization of the German-speaking Swiss in a germanophone context.

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4. Educationalists and researchers who claim that individual bilingualism cannot be adequately achieved through instruction in the other languages within the school curriculum as it is organized at present. Let us now take the first three of these areas individually and discuss some of the pros and cons of the argument. The claim made in points 1. and 3. that Swiss German dialects are being increasingly used to the detriment of crosscultural communication within Switzerland and of the ability of the Germanspeaking Swiss to communicate adequately in standard German is an extremely difficult one to evaluate. Statistics can be produced to bolster up both these arguments (cf. Diirmiiller 1990), but there is in effect very little evidence to suppose that the dialects were less frequently and less widely used in the past. There have been periods within recent Swiss history after 1848 in which standard German has enjoyed greater prestige than the dialects, and it is commonly believed that at present German-speaking Switzerland is going through its third "dialect wave". What makes it seem that use of the dialect is currently presenting a threat to the standard is that the platforms of public communication have expanded considerably since the second World War such that there is now more "space" for Swiss German. 11 From the viewpoint of the French-speaking Swiss, it is self-evident that if they have received formal schooling in standard German only to find that they cannot use it in Zurich, Berne, Basle or St. Gallen, they have a right to wonder why they should bother to learn it at all. On the other hand, statistics also show that, despite the fact that the first non-native language learnt at school is one of the national languages and not, for example, English or Spanish, only a small minority of the Romands (French-speaking Swiss) would prefer to learn German or Italian if they had a choice. Throughout Switzerland the preferred choice of first foreign language would be English (cf. Diirmiiller 1986). There is also a general tendency in the Romandie to reject Swiss German culture, which is possibly a consequence of the fact that until the time of the Helvetic Republic the French-speaking cantons were under the political and economic domination of German-speaking cantons (notably Berne). Until the time of Napoleon the only official language throughout Switzerland was German. The canton of Fribourg, for example, actually took measures to suppress its "Frenchness". German was used as an official language, and Frenchspeaking schools on a private basis were declared illegal. Within personal, private domains, however, efforts to suppress French were unsuccessful (cf. Haas 1982).

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I have argued elsewhere, however, that, from a cultural point of view, the Romands feel themselves part of "la francophonie". Thus while they, like the German-speaking Swiss, would subscribe to Casanova's comment that Switzerland is a "coalition de résistances" in which any centralized authority is potentially suspect, they nevertheless share with the French a pride in the French language and what they perceive to be the achievements of francophone culture. The center of their cultural universe is Paris, not Geneva, or Lausanne certainly not Berne. Attitudes towards language tend to be normative and prescriptive, and dialect speakers are at best folklorically quaint and at worst uncouth, uneducated, uncultivated. Is it therefore any wonder that the Romands should feel resentment against having to learn standard German at school? In general, they do not perceive much advantage in having to do so; they do not perceive the learning of German to unlock a valuable culture for them, but rather to be, at best, of immediate practical value within the overall Swiss socio-economic framework. They consider the use of dialects by the Germanspeaking Swiss - and again I am generalizing greatly here - at best to be deliberately obstructive towards the creation of a more multilingual society and at worst to be a sign of their cultural inferiority (cf. Watts 1988 for statements to this effect by Romands). The term "hollandization" is being increasingly used by the Romands to mean a move towards the creation of a Swiss German standard language, and it neatly encapsulates fear of Swiss isolation and domination within Switzerland by the German-speaking majority. The Italian-speaking Swiss feel under pressure from both the Romands and the German-speaking Swiss. As I pointed out in the previous section, their most frequent contacts are with speakers of German, a language with which they feel very little affinity, and although bilingual Ticinesi are more likely to have French as their second language than German, it is German that they will be called upon more frequently to use. On the other hand, although they too, from a cultural point of view, are oriented more towards Italy than the rest of Switzerland, their sympathy for speakers of a dialect are greater than those of the Romands. The dialects of the Ticino are still in common use and are as linguistically distinct from standard Italian as the Alemannic dialects are from standard German. In addition, like the German-speaking Swiss, the Ticinesi have good reason to mistrust the linguistic hegemony of a standard language. The days of the Irredenta, the Italian nationalist movement whose aim was to unite all Italian-speaking peoples within one nation state and which experienced its zenith during Mussolini's fascist régime have not been forgotten.

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The problems faced by the Ticinesi are far more those of a linguistic minority than those of the Romands. Despite the guarantee of linguistic equality in Article 116, they and the Romansch speakers are effectively the only Swiss who need to be bilingual to get on in life. The complaint that not enough compatriots from the other ethnolinguistic groups make an effort to learn Italian is justified and is consistently aired at the level of the federal administration in Berne. Whereas the first foreign language for the German-speaking Swiss at school is French, they are under no obligation to choose Italian as the second foreign language, the overwhelming majority of students opting for English. Thus the long-term goal of Swiss educationalists is to equip as many people as 19 possible with at least a passive knowledge of Italian. The third type of complaint concerns a supposed deterioration in the ability of the German-speaking Swiss to communicate adequately in standard German, both in the oral and written 1 ^ media. Again, there is little concrete evidence that this is really the case. Critics base most of their arguments on the standard of written composition of German-speaking pupils (who, in effect, are virtually always dialect-speaking pupils) and in the oral performance of politicians and other prominent public personalities. No one has as yet suggested ways of measuring degree of competence in standard German, let alone applying these measurements to a representative data sample. Why, then, should this opinion currently receive so much attention? Is it really the case that the German-speaking Swiss are less proficient now in standard German than, say, thirty years ago? There is of course no real way of answering the second question satisfactorily. The first question, however, can be given a variety of answers. The relationship between the Swiss German dialects and standard German has been well-known since Ferguson (1959) described it as a classical case of diglossia. Ferguson's assumptions, however, do not really hold for the Swiss situation (cf. footnote 11). In the first instance, it is no longer true, if indeed it ever was, that standard German is the High variety and a Swiss German dialect the Low variety, and that there is a clear distinction between domains of social activity in which the one rather than the other is chosen as a means of communication. Discussing the complexities of the relationship between standard German and Swiss German dialects is not only beyond the scope of the present paper; it would also entail me criticizing the notion of diglossia itself (cf. Berger 1990). What can be said is that dialect is widely used at all levels of social interaction including radio and television and also, in some cantons, in parlia-

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mentary proceedings. Standard German is reserved for written interaction, although even here letter writing and diary writing in dialect are on the increase. In addition there is a strong tradition of dialect literature, in particular in the canton of Berne. Use of the dialect in the media precludes a non-German-speaking (often a non-dialect speaking) audience. Apart from the complaint from the Ticinesi and the Romands that access to German-speaking programs is effectively barred to non-dialect speakers and that such a development is divisive rather than cohesive, German-speaking critics of the "dialect wave" point to an increasing isolation from the rest of the germanophone world, an inability and an unwillingness to gain access to literature in the standard and the extreme improbability of any dialect being able to form the basis of a standard Swiss German. Swiss German speakers, however, sense an affective barrier towards using standard German, which may very well derive from a long history of asserting political autonomy from other German-speaking countries and stressing local and regional values (cf. Casanova's coalition of resistances). For the Swiss German dialect speaker language is a strong affective marker of national identity which is as strong as, if not stronger than, other markers such as religious confession, economic and political autonomy, rejection of centralism, etc. There is clearly a contradiction inherent in this attitude. In effect, it precludes the development of a multilingual national identity. However, it is a contradiction which particularly the Romands need to understand if the roots of language conflict within Switzerland are to be seen and the problem tackled. The cohesive elements between the ethnolinguistic groups which makes them all feel Swiss are non-linguistic factors such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph. Only in the case of the German-speaking Swiss does language also function in this way. Thus criticism of the third type, however well-meaning and sensible it may be, is likely to meet with opposition. The demand that reasonable proficiency in standard German should be stressed in the school system and elsewhere is likely to lead to the suspicion that those who make the demand are advocating a greater identification with the germanophone world, and this is indeed often the case. This idea, at least to the person on the street, is anathema. In the circumstances, therefore, reasons for demanding more and better standard German are likely to be expressed with a lack of understanding for the importance of the dialects for their speakers. Similarly, the German-speaking Swiss are likely to lack a true appreciation of why the Romands in particular are so vehement in their rejection of the dia-

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lects. Yet precisely this situation of apparent deadlock over language policy can be interpreted positively as a cohesive, rather than a truly divisive sociopolitical factor, an analysis of which could be of inestimable value in interpreting language minority problems and language conflict in Europe. In the next section I shall argue this point of view in more detail.

Positive aspects of language conflict In a multilingual state organized along federal lines in which the ethnolinguistic groups not only have a constitutional guarantee of their ethnic identity through the official recognition and use of their language but also, despite minority or majority status in demographic terms, are located geographically within well defined territorial limits, linguistic conflict is either disruptive, signalling perceived discrimination and possibly leading to localistic secession, or a healthy sign of competition between majority and minority groups. This is not to say that quarrels over language cannot be virulent and politically polarizing at times. Nor do I wish to suggest that the same ideas of linguistic conflict, minorization and marginalization that are frequently expressed by the media, educators and politicians are shared equally throughout the population or to the same intensity on the language borders as in the heartland of a language area. I argue that when a minority language group such as the French- and Italian-speaking Swiss in the type of multilingual society defined above voices discontent at language policies and educational practice, it is not because the existence of those languages is perceived to be threatened, but rather that the minority ethnolinguistic groups see themselves as being discriminated against and put at a disadvantage in other ways. Language is simply the most convenient way of labelling the group which is felt to be disregarding the rights of the minority. In a situation in which an ethnolinguistic group is not protected, or protected insufficiently (cf. Romansch), by constitutional guarantees, it tends to be the case that the language is in real danger of being ousted, and such situations tend to occur more fequently when the minority language is not the official language of some other state. Hence Romansch is in danger of extinction, as are Welsh, Breton and Scots Gaelic. On the other hand, it has been argued that the loss of an ethnic group's language does not necessarily mean total loss of ethnic identity for that group. Religion, oral traditions, folk culture, etc.

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may be just as powerful as markers of group identity as language, in particular when that group has attained the status of an independent nation (cf. Ireland and the demise of Irish Gaelic). In Switzerland an increase in the dissatisfaction expressed by a minority language group with respect to a majority group (which in this case will almost always be the German-speaking Swiss) can be correlated with other types of dissatisfaction which have more to do with economic, political and educational factors. The major concentration of industrial power within Switzerland is located in the German-speaking part of the country, a point about which the Romands and the Ticinesi have always felt somewhat sensitive. The concentration of economic power in the German-speaking area has been more salient for both minority groups through the recession during the seventies and eighties in the major industry of the French-speaking area, the watch and clock-making industry, and the rundown of the Ticino-based steelworks, a sister firm of a larger organization based in German-speaking Switzerland. In addition to this, German-speaking companies have tried to revitalize the economy in the Romandie by opening up branches there. This has generally resulted in the labour force being taken from the local population and the management moving in from German-speaking Switzerland. The financial hub of the country, Zurich, is also located in the German-speaking part of the country as is the administrative capital Berne. Since neither the cantons in the Romandie nor the Ticino would wish to secede from Switzerland, we need to look from their point of view at the German-speaking cantons to see what it is that they consider disruptive or discriminatory. Given the fact that local patriotism is as strong in the Romandie as in German-speaking Switzerland (cf. Pichard 1978), as is the mistrust of central authority and a central concentration of power in the state, it is these factors, in other words Casanova's "coalition de résistances", which are likely to be the common denominators in a feeling of Swiss national identity and not language or religion. And it is precisely a concentration of political, industrial and financial power in the German-speaking part of the country which the French- and Italian-speaking Swiss feel has been taking place over the past twenty years. While everyone profited from the economic boom of the fifties and sixties, this did not seem to worry the minority groups. The recession of the seventies set things in a different light. Potential conflict on this level has not yet been consciously verbalized, or, if so, only haltingly. However, deflecting it onto the level of language differences may help to underscore the

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need to stick together and may lead to some form of overt recognition of these factors. For the minority ethnolinguistic groups within Switzerland the Germanspeaking part of the country is perceived to be endangering national unity. This becomes even more salient if and when it can be shown that there is an increase in the use of dialects in the media and in public life and a concomitant decrease in the willingness and ability to speak standard German. For the French-speaking Swiss at least, regardless of whether they are or are not willing to learn German, this is equivalent to a sell-out of the idea of a multilingual federal Switzerland. On the one hand, the German-speaking Swiss are not properly aware of why linguistic conflict is seen by the Romands to exist. They do not seem, for the moment at least, to be able to relate their use of language with the wider implications of being Swiss. On the other hand, the Romands do not appear to understand the enormous significance that Swiss German has for the German-speaking Swiss, i.e. that use of the dialect documents precisely the same rejection of central authority and the stressing of local patriotism. It can be argued, in other words, that apparent linguistic conflict of the type that has recently surfaced in Switzerland can be related to other factors of conflict and can help the sociologist to spot areas in which an imbalance in the subtle distribution of power endangers the harmony between the ethnic groups and to make concrete suggestions for overcoming these problems. Expressing perceived discrimination and marginalization in terms of language use is not only a useful safety valve, but it is also a useful means of indicating that the true causes of discontent lie elsewhere. As in the EC, English serves as the language of access to international networks of opportunity. This cannot, and should not, be prevented, but we still need to achieve a greater awareness of the significance of language in relationships between different ethnolinguistic groups rather than avoid the problems by choosing what might appear to be a neutral world language. Minorization as a process need not be understood in purely linguistic terms, since there are minorities of many different kinds. But if linguistic minorization coincides with other forms, e.g. in particular socioeconomic and socio-political minorization, the former, perhaps because of its salience, tends to cloud the latter. In the united Europe of the future, it is essential to avoid the further minorization of certain language groups by not making the kind of constitutional distinction between national and official languages that we have in Switzerland. The revision of the language article (Art. 116) in the federal constitution, in

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which the suggestion is made that Romansch be given the status of an official language, documents an increased awareness of this danger. One can only hope that it is not too late to save Romansch. On the other hand, it is vital to the existence of languages threatened by extinction in the individual member states that they be given some kind of constitutional protection. 14 The decentralization of the Spanish state has led to an increased importance for Basque, Catalan and Galician, and Switzerland may serve as an example of how those languages may then also be used on the level of central administration. The defusing of disruptive language conflict can often be achieved by restructuring a centralized state along federal lines (cf. Belgium and Spain), but there is a real danger that those same prescriptive attitudes which lead to the imposition of a standard language as a means of social control such as were evident in the centralized nation states of Western Europe can also be created by linking language too closely with national territory on a more local level (cf. the situation with Catalan discussed by Mey 1989). The Territoriality Principle which is invoked by cantonal governments in Switzerland is one version of this kind of linkage. In some ways it has helped to guarantee a high degree of stability in the relations between the ethnolinguistic groups, but it has also led to inflexibility with respect to bilingual language teaching programs, the need to protect minority speech communities which do not have the advantage of a territorial base and a predominance of individual monolingualism in a bilingual state. All these factors should be considered very seriously in a future united Europe. But above all it is important not to see all language conflict as being socio-politically disruptive. In Switzerland it has always served as an efficient means by which minority groups could air their grievances. Competition between ethnic groups can be positive as long as those groups see a greater value in working and living together. But it should also be taken as a serious indicator of dissatisfaction on other levels, political, cultural, economic, educational, etc. One valuable duty for sociolinguists must be to register the dissatisfactions expressed as language conflict on a number of different levels and in a number of different social domains. A lot can be learned from the micro-level ethnographic study of verbal interaction between members of the various ethnolinguistic groups as long as one does not forget the wider structure in which such interaction takes place. What is said about language, language use and language attitudes is of vital importance in assessing the non-linguistic relationships between language communities, and any set of language policies adopted by the EC in the future must take such factors into account.

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Notes *

My thanks in particular go to Daniel Stotz and Franz Andres for their criticism and insightful comments on the first draft of this paper. As an Englishman living and working in Switzerland, it is more than useful to be able to draw on the competence of native Swiss colleagues. My thanks also to colleagues at the Bad Homburg symposium in December 1989 for their helpful suggestions. Thanks also to my wife AnneMarie for the disturbing anecdote of the Tamil refugee and the Bernese butcher in fn. 13. It is incidents such as these that remind me constantly of the urgency of our task. All failings, omissions, oversights, etc. still remaining in the text are entirely my own responsibility.

1.

Whereas concerted efforts need to be made by the French and German governments to encourage the teaching of French and German as foreign languages and the development of teaching materials and training of foreign language teachers, i.e. large sums of money have to be invested (cf. Ammon, present volume), EFL (English as a Foreign Language) teaching has been big business in Britain for the last thirty years. The annual profits made alone on the publication of course materials runs into several millions of pounds. Looked at on a world-wide scale, the selling power of the English language, with the United States having long overtaken Britain in the EFL/TOEFL market, appears even more formidable.

2.

By "gate-keeping" I understand control over the right of entry to social resources (cf. Mey 1989, Gumperz 1982, Scollon and Scollon 1981). There are many reasons that could be discussed for the Swiss reluctance to join the EC. Some of them, e.g. the particular form of direct democracy in Switzerland which allows individual citizens or groups of citizens to initiate referenda at cantonal and federal level (cf. Andres 1990), are well justified. Others, e.g. the fierce insistence on Swiss military neutrality (an argument which is rapidly losing its force in the face of continued disarmament and the end of the Cold War) and the insistence on (apparent) concensus and compromise at government level which has led to a Federal Council of ministers composed of members from the four strongest political parties proportionate to the number of seats in parliament but which tends to neutralize effective political opposition (cf. Steinberg 1976), are far less convincing. It is also important to note that until the time of the Helvetic Republic the official language of the canton of Fribourg, despite its majority of French speakers, was German. Whether German reunification will have the effect of changing German European policy away from political integration within the EC cannot be foreseen at the time of writing. If this were to happen, then Germany might move closer to the concept of a "Staatenbund" than to that of a "Bundesstaat". John Gumperz makes a distinction between a "community on the ground", i.e. a community that can be assigned to some kind of territorial limits, and a "community in the mind", i.e. one which exists by virtue of the concensus of opinion as to what constitutes membership, regardless of where the members happen to be located territorially. It can be reasonably maintained that Switzerland is more like a community in the mind than one on the ground. Cf. Meier-Dallbach, " 'Schweizerisches': Etikett für Regionales" (1988: 108 ff).

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

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9.

10. 11.

12.

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Whether any provision has been made for political development in this direction must remain an open question here. At all events, the present EC parliament in Strasbourg does not appear to play a major role in the community's political decision making. One could even argue that there are official languages within the EC which are more "official" than others. Of these French and English spring immediately to mind, French because the most important "EC-cities" are either in or on the fringe of the French-speaking area of the Community, and English because it is clearly the most significant language in terms of world trade, international politics and science. German might also be counted within this group, since the sheer size of the population of the Federal Republic and its dominant position in terms of economic power are a warranty for its significance, but also because it has not lost all of its former significance as a language of science to English. I owe these points to Franz Andres. Of course, this will also be the case in a number of EC member states. I owe this point to Daniel Stotz. One might also add here the explanation of the relationship between standard German and the Swiss German dialects which invokes a notion of diglossia (cf. Ferguson 1959) is inadequate to account for the facts. What it does is to present a simplistic and distorted picture in terms of high and low varieties. The EDK (Conference of the Directors of Education) has recently backed a plan suggested by Christoph Flügel from Bellinzona, which he calls "Modell Schweiz", to teach enough Italian to allow members of the different ethnolinguistic groups within Switzerland to enter into polyglot conversation, in which each participant can guarantee an understanding of what others have said whilst being allowed to use her/his native tongue. In effect this type of polyglot verbal interaction already occurs quite frequently, but only if the participants agree specifically to allow use of the mother tongue.

13

My own personal opinion is that there is a great deal of substance to this argument, although more concrete evidence is needed to use it in the debate on language politics. The type of evidence we need is hard to get, since it involves direct observation of everyday situations in which an inability or refusal to use the standard create communication breakdown. Two short anecdotes may be related here, one observed by myself, the second by my wife. In a shoeshop in Berne, two ladies from the North of Germany asked the young salesgirl straightforward information concerning a pair of shoes they had seen in the window. They received an answer in broad Bernese German, which they did not understand. They asked for clarification in standard German only to receive a second answer in Bernese. After some time and a great deal of confusion the salesgirl was forced to ask an older colleague to deal with the customers. The second anecdote also introduces an element of racism into the picture. A Tamil asked at the butcher's in good standard German for 1,200 grammes of chicken. The butcher reacted immediately in Bernese German and maintained he did not understand what the Tamil wanted. There was an awkward silence, after which the butcher replied, again in his broadest Bernese, "Ah, one kilo two hundred grammes of chicken. Why didn't you say so in the first place? You should say what you want next time."

14.

One can always argue, of course, that explicit steps should not be taken to prevent languages from extinction. The costs of such measures may far outweigh any real

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benefits which they may bring. On the other hand, each individual situation needs to be analyzed in detail to decide whether constitutional protection is likely to be of any use at all and what other measures might be more effective.

References Ammon, U. 1991

"The status of German and other languages in the European Community", in the present volume, pp. 241-254. Andres, F. 1990 "Language relations in multilingual Switzerland", in: Multilingua 9, 11—45. Berger, M. 1990 "Diglossia within a general theoretical perspective. Charles Ferguson's concept 30 years later", in: Multilingua 9-3. Camartin, I. 1982 "Beziehungen zwischen den Schweizer Sprachregionen", in: R. Schläpfer. (ed.), 303-351. Casanova, A. 1989 Gestire il mandato costituzionale delle lingue ufficiali. Bern: Bundeskanzlei. [Mimeograph.] Cattani A. and Α. Α. Häsler 1984 Minderheiten in der Schweiz. Toleranz auf dem Prüfstand. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung. De Pietro, J.-F., G. Lüdi and L. Papaloizos 1989/90 "Une communauté francophone en milieu germanophone: identité linguistique et résaux de sociabilité dans la ville de Bâle". Langue et société, 50 f., 93-115. Dürmüller, U. 1986 "The status of English in multilingual Switzerland", in: Bulletin CILA 44, 7-38. 1990 "Attitudes towards English as a possible lingua franca in Switzerland", in: York Papers in Linguistics. Special issue in honour of R.B. LePage. Edwards, J. 1985 Language, society and identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Eidgenössisches Departement des Innern [Federal Department of Internal Affairs] 1989 Zustand und Zukunft der viersprachigen Schweiz. Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei. Ferguson, C.A. 1959 "Diglossia", in: Word 15. Reprinted in Giglioli (ed.) 1972, 232-251. Giglioli, P.P. 1972 Language and Social Context. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gumperz, J. 1982 Discourse Strategies. London: Cambridge University Press 1989 "Interpretive method in the study of urban language." Lecture delivered at the Symposium on "Verbale Kommunikation in der Stadt" at the University of Berne, October, 1989. [Mimeo.]

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Haas, W. 1982 "Sprachgeschichtliche Grundlagen", in: R. Schläpfer (ed.), 21-70. Im Hof, U. 1988 "Die Geschichte der Schweiz. Ein Abriss", in: H. G. Wehling (ed.), 45-78. Keller, P. 1990 "Legal aspects of language choice in schools: possibilities and limits for language immersion programs in Switzerland", in: Multilingua 9, 105-112. Meier-Dallbach, H.P. 1988 "Die Schweiz zwischen Traditionalität und Modernität. Zur politischen Kultur in der Schweiz", in: H.-G. Wehling (ed.). Mey, J.L. 1989 '"Saying it don't make it so': the 'Una Grande Libre' of language politics", in: Multilingua 8, 333-355. Milroy, J. and L. Milroy 1985 Authority in Language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Peyer, H. 1972 "Frühes und hohes Mittelalter. Die Entstehung der Eidgenossenschaft", in: Handbuch der Schweizergeschichte 1, Zürich. Pichard, A. 1978 Land der Schweizer. Eine Beschreibung der Schweiz und schweizerischer Eigenart (und Unart). Huber: Frauenfeld. Schläpfer, R. (ed.) 1982 Die viersprachige Schweiz. Zürich, Köln: Benziger Verlag. Scollon, R. and S. Β. K. Scollon 1981 Narrative, literacy and face in interethnic communication. Norwood, Ν. J.:Ablex. Smith, O. 1984 The politics of language 1791-1819. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Steinberg, J. 1986 Why Switzerland? London: Cambridge University Press. Viletta, R. 1984 "Die Rätoromanen. Geduldetes Relikt oder gleichberechtigter Teil der Eidgenossenschaft", in: Cattani A. and Α. A. Häsler (eds.), 95-134. Watts, R.J. 1988 "Language, dialect and national identity in Switzerland", Multilingua 7, 313-334. Wehling, H.-G. 1988 Die Schweiz. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Werlen, I. and E. Lieverscheidt 1988 "Formulating affiliation to social minority groups," in: Multilingua 8, 37-56.

Language politics and the new European identity Harald Haarmann

1. The problem of traditional language politics as a matter of national concern Following the traditional view, language politics has to do with the regulation of languages, their status, and social functions on a national level. Language politics incorporates the ideas and conceptual framework of the envisaged regulation, while language policies implement such ideas. The effectiveness of the political implementations relating to languages strongly depends on the authority of the institutions which can control language politics. Within the borders of the EC this is only true for the political bodies of individual states. There is no institution to guarantee the implementation of language related measures on a supranational level (see De Witte in this volume). The reason for this lies in the historical development of the Western European movement toward integration. The idea of a transformation of individual states into a European Federation is rather new, and competences of the political bodies in the member states have not yet been shifted to the supranational level. If the term 'European Federation' is not to remain a verbal intention in reverence to a Utopian dream of a would-be integration, then political competences, including federal competences of language politics must be assigned to supranational bodies. The need for supranational authority in political affairs relating to the status and functions of languages in the EC is urgent because the extensive network of the language services in Brussels and Luxembourg calls for a reform of the traditional translating and interpreting system. Except for the Irish language, which was voluntarily dropped by the Irish government before Ireland became a full member of the Community, all the other state languages of the EC countries enjoy the status of official language in EC institutions (i.e. English, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek). The language services in Brussels have had, for many years, the biggest budget of

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all existing EC institutions. At least 40 % of the EC's administrative budget is spent on maintaining the translating and interpreting services on the supranational level. In view of the reality that English is the language of widest communication both inside and outside the EC, and French is the ««officiai working language of the EC bureaucracy, it appears reasonable to think of a reduction in the number of official languages to a few or even one. Another problem which the European Federation has to face and which involves aspects of language politics is the expected migration of workers within the EC. This will require educational measures to deal with a flexible system of languages of instruction in national schools. Educational programs initiated so far on the national level have remained insufficient, since too little attention has been paid to the role of bilingualism {e.g. Arab-Italian bilingualism among children of Moroccan immigrants in Italy) and of the languagerelated identity of the immigrants (e.g. among the descendants of Turkish guest workers in Germany). On the whole, an extensive program of measures would have to be effected in order to safeguard social and linguistic identity among immigrant workers and their offspring (see Ehlich in this volume). A similar problem as regards the languages of instruction arises for the refugees from all over the world, the steady flow of which into the EC is straining the capacities of the authorities in the member states. Traditional language politics was implemented in the individual EC countries as a result of national state politics. A prominent feature of national politics is that its organizational range coincides with the boundaries of a given state, the nationstate (Edwards 1985). Since traditional language politics is still valid in the EC member states, and no supranational body to implement a supranational language politics for the EC exists at present, nobody can be surprised at finding a vacuum in the integration process just where substantial coordination and cooperation would be needed. The basic problem is not that the orientation towards the national languages is still the dominant policy, and that their protection has so far remained the ««official maxim of state politics in the member states, with supranational perspectives being correspondingly neglected. There is the living experience of a multilingualism in countries such as Belgium or Switzerland which favors the idea of the coexistence of the national languages on the supranational level. The crucial point in the debates about monolingualism versus multilingualism, in the EC political organs, among a broader public, or in circles of experts on European affairs, is that the traditional view of language-related identity still prevails.

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2. Traditional identity as a feature of cultural history in Western Europe Even today Europeans are still being educated in the traditional way, with the doctrine of the national language being promoted as the crystallizing focus of national identity. As is well-known, this doctrine originated in the eighteenth century, its most prominent supporter during the Age of Enlightenment having been J.G. Herder (1772). Under the impression of the French occupation of Germany and of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe, the idea of language as the marker of the nationality was further promoted until it became the dominating ideology of German Romanticism. The most outstanding example of this thinking is found in W. v. Humboldt's (1823, 1827) writings. A further step in the evolution of the national language doctrine was the adoption of romanticist ideas into political thought and practice, as can be seen in the works of R. Böckh (1866, 1869). The latter laid the groundwork for the identification of a German in terms of a speaker of the German language, and the ideology which evolved from it dominated the founding of the German Empire in 1871 and continued to prevail at least until 1945. Although the political idea of the nation state and notion of language as the marker of national identity were strongly advocated in Germany, they also took roots in other societies, especially in Italy (Mancini 1851) and France (see Balibar - Laporte 1974 for the evolution of national language ideology since the Revolution of 1789). The tradition of the national language doctrine originated in Western Europe as a means for improving popular education which was intended to have the mother tongue of the people as its framework. In this respect the idea of the national language as the unifying vehicle of a speech community was a philosophical "invention" of the eighteenth century which evolved into a political tool during the course of the nineteenth century. Following the political ideology of the nation state, national identity in Western Europe has been based for more than 150 years on a notion for which Kloss (1969: 21) has coined the term "Sprachnation" (language-nation). This notion of national identity as exclusively related to the mother tongue has persisted in the European nation states as an elementary component of their inhabitants' way of thinking, and it has been transmitted - as a political idea with a still dominant range of influence - into the EC by its member states (see Coulmas in this volume). The traditional notion of language as the marker of a nation which is still a major formative element of the identity of the majority of EC citizens today

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has been an impediment to the creation of a far-reaching system of minority rights. Since the national language doctrine unilaterally favors the language of the majority as representing the nation, it consequently neglects the promotion of minor languages. Thus, the proposals made by the UNO as regards basic human rights, particularly those focusing on the role of the mother tongue (Kloss 1969: 130 ff.), have not found the appropriate channels in national politics to meet the basic needs of regional languages in EC countries. Although in terms of their demographic size, regional speech communities which do not speak a language of wider communication account for only a fraction of the total EC population (320 million people), these groups with their regional political movements nevertheless constitute a factor of considerable concern in the political and social affairs of European integration. 1

3. Markers of ethnic identity: a comparative view Discarding the traditional notion of a language as the exclusive marker of ethnic identity simply because it constitutes an impediment to supranational perspectives in the European integration may not suffice to promote a supranational identity among a broader public. The idea of replacing the traditional notion of identity with a new one may turn out to be inefficient unless it can rely on a promoting force which is nourished by the awareness that language is an elementary but not necessary component in ethnic identity. In its sociocultural evolution ethnicity has produced multifaceted patterns among the communities of the world, and they are all based on three main components (Fishman 1977): paternity (or descent), patrimony (or the adoption of specific cultural patterns), and phenomenology (or the value system). Language is a factor which is relevant for the constitution of patrimony. Here, language takes over the essential role of a vehicle for transferring the patterns of a local culture ino an individual's behavior. However, language is not a necessary criterion regarding paternity and phenomenology. For example, identity among black Americans does not crystallize in the language which they share with white Americans. Crucial for their self-awareness as citizens of that country is their paternity in terms of racial descent. On a world-wide scale it is paternity, not patrimony associated with language, that is the "central experiential concept" (Fishman 1977: 17). The changing role of language as a marker of ethnic identity may be best illustrated by elucidating the historical processes in the formation of modern

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communities in a cross-cultural view. The formation of communities follows basic patterns of ethnic fusion and fission (Haarmann 1986: 41 ff.), and it has been claimed that such patterns are of universal validity. Ethnic fusion is manifested in cases of amalgamation, as in the emergence of a Basque identity resulting from the fusion of people of Iberian and of Cantabrian stock, of incorporation, as in the assimilation of ethnic minorities to the Russians in czarist Russia, of conglomeration, as among Oriental Jews who keep up Jewish cultural traditions although speaking the languages of the co-territorial nonJewish population (e.g. Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Persian, Ladino which originated in Spain and was later transferred to Balkan countries). Ethnic fission refers to phenomena of profilation, as among the Gypsies whose local groups speak Romani strongly influenced by co-territorial languages, of separation, as in the emergence of affiliative patterns of culture among the Slavic, Germanic or Romance populations, of proliferation, a term which I have applied to explain the emergence of a Bosnie nationality in Yugoslavia the members of which belong to the Islamic community and speak variants of Serbo-Croatian. When considering the historical evolution of ethnic identity, a European is surprised to find that language as an exclusive marker of identity is an exceptional phenomenon rather than one representative of a general trend in the world's communities. The modern world, which is becoming more and more cosmopolitan through intercultural relations and intercommunication, requires a new idea of ethnic identity which would be flexible enough to compensate for the shortcomings of the traditional notion of identity through the channel of the national language. Given the historical depth of the traditional notion of identity, any new approach to a revision of the idea is evaluated against it. "Two centuries after the philosopher J.G. Herder who exalted the mother tongue as an essential component in the nature of every people, another German, Harald Haarmann, a scholar of Romance languages and cultures, rejects the notion of Sprachnation as a 19th century fabric and by doing so refutes the weighty heritage of the romanticist nationalism, linguistic and cultural, which is about to die" (Muljacic 1988: 58). What is needed for the interaction among the communities under the auspices of the European integration movement is indeed a new "anti-Herder" concept of identity. The crucial question remains as to whether the new identity has to be conceived as exclusively supranational, with the national element left behind.

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4. An exclusively supranational identity - a utopia To what degree is it possible to establish a new identity to serve as a medium in the process of integration? Would it be enough simply to abandon the notion of national language as obsolete, and to change educational ideals to fit into the mold of a "modernized" (i.e. exclusively supranational) identity? In theory, this might be the most straightforward and reasonable approach to steering the process of European integration onto a secure path for future political management. And yet, there is something to the factor 'identity' which makes it prone to succumb to tradition rather than to new experimental ways of formulating its contents. The main reason for this is the inclusion of evaluations and attitudes (i.e. phenomenology), and also of sentimental and stereotyping values in the formation of identity which makes the concept less accessible to purely rational thinking and manipulation than might be expected. Neglecting traditional identity, or trying to replace it with a notion of a supranational identity, would most likely cause confusion and ultimately lead to a long-term disturbance of interethnic relations among the European communities. Illustrative examples for the presumably negative effect of an educational campaign can be found in European history, specifically in Eastern Europe. A prominent example of failure to break with the past and shape a new identity through education is presented by recent developments in the Soviet Union. For more than six decades, social planners and instructors have been trying to abolish the national language as the exclusive marker of identity by educating Soviet citizens to adopt a supranational socialist identity. In this process of sovietization, the priority of self-identification through the medium of the mother tongue was supposed to change into a general appreciation of Russian as the inter-Union vehicle of socialist internationalization par excellence. An important part in this process was assigned to national languageRussian (e.g. Estonian-Russian, Uzbek-Russian, Armenian-Russian) bilingualism (Haarmann 1985). National language-Russian bilingualism, in its essence, was understood as a transitional stage toward the development of a new socialist identity which would favor Russian as the only language of wider communication in the Soviet Union. A natural consequence of such planning which, according to critics, remained judicious, was a steady spread of Russian in terms of the number of its speakers as well as in terms of its social functions throughout non-Russian territories (Haarmann 1991a). Still nowadays - at least where traditional Soviet

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language politics still prevails - the planners find their solution in "ensuring that the instrument of group culture affiliation, the 'national language' becomes the means of expressing only the 'attractive forms of nationalism' " (Lewis 1972: 293). However, wherever national movements have gained ground during this era of perestroïka and glasnosf, the first step taken by local governments has been the safeguarding of the national language. This was effectively put forward in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia and Georgia (Grusinia) in 1989. Thus, despite many decades of education in the direction of a supranational socialist identity the traditional notion of a national language and its symbolic values has lost nothing of its attraction, among neither non-Russians or the Russians themselves. Russian as the symbol of the Russian people has regained a strong status among the members of the conservative Pamyat' movement, the name of which literally translated into English would be 'memorial movement'. Against the background of the Soviet experiences it cannot be reasonably assumed that replacing traditional identity with a new one in the EC countries would yield the expected results in a long-term educational process. Moreover, there is another factor which impedes any direct implementation of educational reform favoring an exclusively supranational identity. After the foundation of the UNO in 1945 the recognition of the national language as a prominent marker of ethnic identity has gained much publicity, particularly in the countries of the Third World (Kloss 1969: 351 ff.). Measured against the historical tradition in Europe the recognition of the role of the national language favored by the UN only serves to strengthen the inherited notion. Any "anti-Herder" campaign in the field of identity planning therefore has to cope with the ideological background provided by UN documents and verbal practice. The concept of an exclusively supranational identity as thus defined, to be promoted within the boundaries of the EC, would be in conflict with UN standards. In addition to the problem of such a conflict a democratic system such as the European Federation cannot mobilize the necessary political resources for establishing a radical change from a national to a supranational identity. Most likely, no political movement in the European Federation having ideals that fall below UN standards of human rights as its objective would gain majority support by the voters. In other words, no political party or EC authority would take up the issue of renouncing one's national language and of being "superformed" in one's cultural identity by a supranational means of communication, for the simple reason that this would be tantamount to politi-

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cal suicide. The notion of the national language as a marker of ethnic identity is even widespread among those who no longer speak the language of their ancestors. Basques who have assimilated to Spanish or French still hold the national language (i.e. Basque) of their people in great esteem, and even if it is only as a nostalgic element is their phenomenology. I have termed this phenomenon the 'historical dimension' of ethnic identity (Haarmann 1983b: 34 f.). A similar attitude toward the (lost) national language can be found among assimilants in other communities, for instance, among people of Occitan, Breton, or Alsatian paternity in France, of Greek or Sardinian paternity in Italy, or of German paternity in Belgium. Claims have been made by scientists, accompanied by statements given by assimilants, that the latter hold a "broken" identity. This term is ideological in at least two respects. First, the notion of traditional identity, where paternity and patrimony have the same ethnic markers, is taken as the only valid basis for definition. According to the traditional view, a Frenchman is a person who speaks French (patrimony) and has French-speaking ancestors (paternity). An Alsatian of German descent (German paternity) who has been raised in French cultural surroundings (French patrimony) has a "broken" identity only if seen against the exclusive background of the traditional identity. In fact, his/her identity is multiple in nature because it includes differing national components with respect to paternity as opposed to patrimony. Second, a "broken" identity is ideological because it is generally evaluated as something negative. Having been created in an atmosphere of misleading evaluations about the absolute dominance of traditional identity, the term 'broken identity' has influenced self-awareness among assimilants to the extent that many feel like secondclass Europeans. New horizons for breaking out of such a psychological deadlock can only be opened in an emancipatory move toward the promotion of the idea of a multiple identity.

5. Multiple identity and European integration The history of civilizations throughout the world illustrates that wherever new cultural patterns were introduced to break with existing traditions, basic features of the latter have survived, in some way or another. "Pagan" traditions have lived on in Christianity, for example in Latin America where regional Indian-Christian syncretic cultural patterns have emerged. In Islamic countries there is a tradition of magic beliefs inherited from the ancient Oriental civili-

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zations which still flourishes today. Thinking of the time depth of several thousand years, the fragmentary persistence of pre-Indo-European cultural patterns in South-Eastern Europe is amazing. Elementary features of religious symbolism and folk traditions of pre-Indo-European origin can be well traced into classical Greek mythology and even into Byzantine art (Gimbutas 1989), not to speak of writing as one of the oldest cultural heritages before the spread of the alphabet into the Aegean (Haarmann 1989). The most recent case of cultural continuity in Europe has been referred to above, namely the persistence of national cultural patterns in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. It seems that so far nobody has seriously tried to answer the question of why the romanticist idea of a national language could have enjoyed such prominence even though it was supposed to be a new idea in the eighteenth century. Paying tribute to the principle of cultural continuity, we find clear traces of an ethnically-oriented identity before the rise of the ideology of national languages. Ancestry has always been among the elementary experiences of people throughout the ages, and they have always paid attention to the question of a person's parental origin (Müller 1983). The need for the individual to identify himself/herself as a member of the group, and to distinguish his or her own group from other (i.e. foreign) groups is so basic that it must be considered a stable component in man's evolution (Maslow 1981: 66, 125). When language was raised as an issue of identity in the eighteenth century, with the notion of a national language subsequently being promoted, this was not equivalent to the establishment of a "new" idea, but rather actually meant specialization of a formerly diffuse ethnic identity. The specialization lies in the fact that the concept 'ancestry', originally indifferent toward language, was unilaterally linked to the mother tongue as a cultural pattern. A new European identity could have hardly be a mere substitute for the traditional notion in the sense that the latter should be totally abandoned. Ethnic identity focusing on national languages is not necessarily an impediment to supranational integration as long as it is assigned its proper relative role in the process of identification. When thinking of the re-education of Europeans this proper assignment becomes the focus of efforts. Arguably, the most effective way of creating a new feeling of identity among Europeans is to transform unilaterally national identity into something which is multifaceted and incorporates both features of national identity as well as those of the envisaged supranational integration. The specialized traditional notion of a national identity would be broadened to assimilate additional features in a manner allowing for the formation of an idea of balanced identity in which the basic needs of

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national self-recognition would not collide with the assets of a supranational movement toward integration. Such a multiple identity would promote interEuropean cooperation where it is urgently needed. Most likely, a new European identity would support language programs much better than can be observed today. The LINGUA project, which resulted from initiatives made by the European Council and Commission, and which has been effective since the beginning of 1990, exemplifies some of these principles. It aims at the teaching of two foreign languages in each of the member states, whereby the languages in question are "community languages" (= the nine official languages functioning as state-languages). Many obstacles of a practical and subjective nature have emerged which are likely to hamper the implementation of the LINGUA program in the individual EC states. Such obstacles are deeply rooted in the exclusively national identity of those nations the languages of which have assumed the role of languages of wider communication in the world, English and French in particular. A multiple identity - provided it works effectively would most likely skip the traditional conflict of interests by distinguishing more clearly between the subjective value of national civilization and the practical needs of European intercommunication. The fear felt among the linguistic minorities of Western Europe of falling victim to the integration process is well known. In a European Federation social advancement will, more than before, depend on proficiency in one of the official community languages; English will definitely assume the central role in this regard. Against the background of the traditional identity this situation would be interpreted as a growing assimilation pressure on minority communities and their members. As a result of an increasing assimilation, the speakers of minority languages would gradually shift to one of the languages of wider communication and ultimately give up their mother tongue. Such a process is generally viewed as having negative effects on the formation of identity as understood in the traditional way. In the light of the new identity, however, being a member in a linguistic minority and favoring a language of wider communication for social advancement is not an insuperable conflict.

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Promoting multiple identity as a maxim of EC language politics

There can be no misunderstanding about the role of language politics in relation to the new European identity. Since the latter will incorporate both language-related and non-language-related features, language politics only refers to those aspects of this identity which will guarantee the individual's awareness of language as a cultural vehicle. For motivational reasons, the range of language politics covers a specialized section of identity, both national (i.e. referring to the mother tongue) and supranational (i.e. referring to languages of wider communication). Within the EC boundaries only the native speakers of English would find it easy to reconcile the new identity with the traditional one. Among the communities for the members of which English is a second language (e.g. for speakers of Welsh) or an additional language in intercommunication (e.g. for EC citizens outside Britain and Ireland) the evaluation of languages in the light of the new identity poses unprecedented difficulties. Provided that an EC language politics on the federal level is ever be brought into existence, it should aim at easing the crucial reconciliation of national and supranational interests in the formation of identity. It is doubtful, however, that the supranational element will ever assume a superordinate status with respect to the national element in identity and become its dominant part. A multifunctional approach in the devising and implementing of languagerelated measures may have chances of success leading in this direction. Such a language politics would promote the spread of one (English), two (English, French) or three (English, French, German) languages of wider communication on the federal level while, at the same time, strongly favoring the maintenance of local mother tongues among linguistic minorities. Since the function of a language of wider communication is distinct from that of a language serving ethnic intimacy (e.g. language used among family members, relatives or friends) the interactional ranges of the languages concerned will not interfere. By becoming identified with a multifunctional hierarchy of properly delimited ranges of language use for the purpose of daily interaction, the previously insuperable polarity between world language and minority language is transformed into a pattern of functional coexistence. Nevertheless, a crucial problem remains, specifically the reasonable differentiation of the social functions for a given minority language. Who is to define what is "reasonable" in this regard?

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Against the background of the new European identity, language politics is likely to promote the assignment of specific functions to individual languages in order to create the emergence of a network of European intercommunication. Stressing the multifunctional role of EC languages does not mean unilaterally giving preference to the monopoly role of languages of wider communication while neglecting the functions of minor languages. Instead, it means encouraging the establishment of a multifaceted hierarchy of language use. At an earlier stage of European integration, I made proposals relating to an integral language politics which incorporate the assignment of each EC language to a specific functional level (Haarmann 1975: 130 ff.). In the sketch of an integral system of language regulations four levels were distinguished: 1) the supranational level of official language use (e.g. French in the organs of EC administration), 2) the national level of language use involving external official languages (e.g. Dutch in the Netherlands and in the Flemish part of Belgium), 3) the national level of language use involving internal official languages (e.g. Welsh in Wales), 4) the level of language use in the education sector (including interregional and regional languages of instruction). Another aspect in the educational sector is obviously of more urgent concern in the EC member states. Projects and programs have been propagated which address the role of foreign languages as subjects on different educational levels in the national curriculum. The range of languages is no longer restricted to the indigenous means of communication among the EC communities but also includes "exotic" languages, the importance of which has risen with the constant increase of the number of immigrants and refugees from countries outside the EC. The British Ministry of Education has recently put forward a program of modern foreign languages (i.e. order 1989) with two schedules, one offering EC languages (i.e. Danish, Dutch, French, German, Modern Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish), the other incorporating external languages (i.e. Arabic, Modern Hebrew, Japanese, Russian, Bengali, Gujerati, Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu, Cantonese or Mandarin Chinese, Turkish); (see Stubbs in this volume). Whether such programs will ever be exploited to the full is doubtful, since there are not even enough teachers for each of the languages mentioned. Seemingly, the basic implications of my earlier sketch for the safeguarding of both mother tongues and official languages has lost little of its topicality, although the boundaries of the European Community have been extended since 1983. The system needs refinement so that it would also include further functions such as language use in the economic sector, in the business world,

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and others. The problems of the 1970s which were addressed have not been solved, but rather have even become more acute in the 1980s. The impact of the language of widest communication in the EC countries, English, is noticeable on various functional levels (e.g. in economic affairs), and its consolidation on the supranational level is feasible. However, efforts to consolidate official language use should not be motivated by neglect of the other functional levels or of acknowledgement of the fact that languages serve as vehicles for and symbols of local cultures. The new European identity must stress the functional differentiation and diversity of languages but it must not yield to chauvinistic tendencies resulting from traditional nationalism. For example, finding the focus of one's ethnic identity as a Frenchman in the national language 'French' does not hamper the integration process as long as national identity is not used as a "tool" to oppose the role of English on the supranational level or to deny the regional languages in France (i.e. Occitan, Catalan, Basque, Corsican, Breton, Flemish, the Alsatian variety of German) to serve as symbols of the national identity of their speakers. In the new European identity the traditional patois mentality which is said to be typical of the people in Northern France (Fourquet 1968) would become intolerable. Awareness of being an EC citizen is not opposed to self-recognition as a Frenchman, it is rather an additional element in the new European identity. The infrastructure of the new identity must allow for the balancing of prestige values which up to now have found a place exclusively in languages of wider communication. In the traditional patois mentality among French people there is still little room for the recognition of regional languages as cultural vehicles in their own right.

7. Prestige planning and the new identity At an advanced stage of democratic cooperation among the EC member states language politics can no longer function by maintaining a level of regulation which might still have been acceptable in the 1970s. In the past two decades self-awareness within the speech communities has created standards which exhibit a growing tendency to be less tolerant of interference from state authorities in regulating national language use. Language politics, therefore, can be expected to reduce the degree of bureaucratic interference and to create an ever-increasing amount of tolerance and private responsibility in languagerelated matters. Future language politics in the European Federation should as-

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sume a task which has not been appreciated thus far, and that is the development of prestige planning as an independent function. With respect to planning activities, this means a differentiation into corpus, status, and prestige planning (Haarmann 1990). Whatever political implementations may be devised, they will have to account for the prestige involved in language use. Prestige planning may become a field of activity for those who assume the social or political responsibility in the future European Federation. In the light of the new European identity the concept 'prestige' is likely to assume multifunctional connotations. English is prestigious because its command raises the chances of social advancement which is commonly associated with standards of living. French is prestigious because it makes access to the world of EC bureaucracy easier. At the same time, minor languages would be acknowledged as prestigious for differing reasons. Catalan enjoys prestige because it is the familiar in-group vehicle of interaction on the official and private level in Catalonia and, thus, serves as a means of strengthening in-group solidarity among the Catalan people. The principle of social advancement is also valid in the Catalan community, since the access to the language within the framework of Catalan society is associated with its use in business affairs among Catalans. For the smaller languages in the EC member states having a sociocultural potential which appears too weak to suggest a promotion on the level of official language use, the new European identity would provide the prestige of languages of ethnic intimacy which is a factor as important as recognition of the function of wider communication. The revival movement of regional cultures in the 1970s was initiated by or on behalf of languages belonging to this category (Petrella 1978). The balance of prestige which has to be achieved by prestige planning in the future is a corner-stone in the construction of a general language politics for the European Federation capable of coping with national as well as supranational affairs. To many politicians and scientists it may still seem futile to carry along the burden of protecting the minority languages in view of the integration movement which favors the use of one major language. And yet, according to everything that is known about the process of ethnic identification, whether more strongly oriented toward paternity, patrimony, or phenomenology, it is too strong a force to be eradicated. Consequently, the national language issue will always remain one of permanent topicality. Language-related identity is not only an everyday experience among the speakers of EC languages, but also a pertinent scientific subject to which more

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research effort should be devoted than has been the case so far. Only those who have been unaware of the basic nature of this force can be surprised by a recent statement according to which "the theory of identity has to be regarded as the basic theory of all the humanities, on which the more specialized ethnological and other anthropological disciplines (...) would have to be based and elaborated" (Müller 1987: 391). An approach to establish ethnic identity as the very basis of sociolinguistic theory-making is presented in Haarmann (1991b, chapter 2). Following this priority, any theoretical groundwork for language planning and politics would have to rely on the findings provided by identity research. Against the background of the new European identity scientific analysis would not only concentrate on providing a diagnostic taxonomy for the traditional notion of national identity, but would also strive for the elaboration of a prospective taxonomy for the structures of the new identity. The supranational element in the formation of the new identity will, however, always remain fragile unless it is firmly linked to the national markers of the existing identity.

Note 1.

The most comprehensive survey of these ethnolinguistic groups in the European context available so far is Haarmann (1983a: 104 ff.).

References Ammon, U. and Kleineidam, H. (eds.) 1991

"Language spread policy", in: International guage (special issue).

Balibar, R. and Laporte, D. 1974 Le français national volution. Paris.

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Böckh, R. 1866

"Die statistische Bedeutung der Volkssprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität", in: Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 4, 2 5 9 - 4 0 2 [reprint in: Haarmann 1 9 7 8 , 4 1 - 1 8 6 ] .

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Bromley, YuV. 1980 "Hierarchy of historio-cultural communities (historico-phasic aspect)", in: Ikola 1980, 1-23. Coulmas, F. 1991 "European integration and the idea of the national language", in this volume, pp. 1-37. Edwards, J.R. 1985 Language, Society and Identity. Oxford Fishman, J.A. 1977 "Language and Ethnicity", in: Giles 1977, 15-56. Fourquet, J. 1968 "Langue - dialecte - patois", in Martinet 1968, 571-596. Giles, H. (ed.) 1977 Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations. London. Gimbutas, M. 1989 The Language of the Goddess. San Francisco. Haarmann, H. 1975 Soziologie und Politik der Sprachen Europas. München. 1983a Elemente einer Soziologie der kleinen Sprachen Europas, Bd. 1: "Materialien zur Sprachökologie. Hamburg" (3rd edition, completely revised and with a new text). 1983b "Kriterien der ethnischen Identität", in: Language problems & language planning 7, 21-42. 1985 "The impact of group bilingualism in the Soviet Union", in Kreindler 1985, 313344. 1986 Language in ethnicity. A view of basic ecological relations. Berlin - New York Amsterdam. 1989 "Writing from Old Europe to ancient Crete - a case of cultural continuity", in: Journal of Indo-European Studies, 17, 251-275. 1990 "Language planning in the light of a general theory of language - a methodological framework", in: F. Coulmas (ed.) Perspectives on Language Contact and Language Policy. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 86, 103 -126. 1991a "Measures to increase the importance of Russian within and outside the Soviet Union - a case of covert language spread policy, in: Ammon-Kleineidam 1991. 1991b Basic aspects of language in human relations. Toward a general theoretical framework. Berlin - New York. Haarmann, H. (ed.) 1978 Sprachenstatistik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Hamburg. Herder, J.G. 1772 Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache. Berlin. Humboldt, W. v. 1823 "Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen" (fragment), in: Werke III, 64—81. 1827 "Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues", in: Werke III, 144-367.

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Ikola, O. (ed.) 1980 Congressus Quintus Internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum, Turku 20-27.VIII. 1980, pars I. Turku. Kloss, H. 1969 Grundfragen der Ethnopolitik im 20. Jahrhundert. Die Sprachgemeinschaften zwischen Recht und Gewalt. Wien - Stuttgart. Kreindler, I. T. (ed.) 1985 Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages. Berlin, New York, Amsterdam. Lewis, E.G. 1972 Multilingualism in the Soviet Union. Aspects of language policy and its implementation. The Hague - Paris. Mancini, P.S. 1851 "Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti", in: Diritto internazionale, Naples 1873, 1-64. Martinet, A. (ed.) 1968 Le langage. Paris. Maslow, A. H. 1981 Motivation und Persönlichkeit. Hamburg Muljacic, Ζ. 1988 "Review of Haarmann 1986", in: Archivio Glottologico Italiano LXXIII, 58-61. Müller, K.E. 1987 Das magische Universum der Identität. Elementarformen sozialen Verhaltens. Ein ethnologischer Grundriss. Frankfurt - New York. Müller, K.E. (ed.) 1983 Menschenbilder früher Gesellschaften. Ethnologische Studien zum Verhältnis von Mensch und Natur. Gedächtnisschrift für Hermann Baumann. Frankfurt - New York. Petrella, R. 1978 La renaissance des cultures regionales en Europe. Paris.

Society, civilization, mentality: Prolegomena to a language policy for Europe

Roland Posner Riccaut: ( . . . ) Mademoiselle parle français? Mais sans doute; telle q u e j e la vois! - La demande était bien impolie; Vous me pardonnerez, Mademoiselle. Das Fräulein: Mein Herr Riccaut: Nit? Sie sprek nit Französisch, Ihro Gnad? Das Fräulein: Mein Herr, in Frankreich würde ich es zu sprechen suchen. Aber warum hier? Ich höre ja, daß Sie mich verstehen, mein Herr. Und ich, mein Herr, werde Sie gewiß auch verstehen; sprechen Sie, wie es Ihnen beliebt! (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: "Minna von Barnhelm", 1763: IV, 2)

I. Culture as society, civilization, and mentality 1. Historians, sociologists, and anthropologists throughout the world agree that Europe has played a central role in the evolution of human civilization in the last two and a half millennia. As to the time between the Renaissance and the beginning of the 20th century there is even agreement that the rate of civilizational innovation was greater in Europe than anywhere else on the planet. These facts require an explanation. 1 The explanation given most frequently is based on the observation that since the fall of the Roman Empire Europe has become a rather stable system of diverse cultures that continued to develop relatively independently but in close contact with one another.

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2. A culture can be characterized a. as a society, i.e., a set of individuals whose mutual relations are organized in specific social institutions, b. as a civilization, i.e., a set of artifacts which are produced and used by the members of this society, and c. as a mentality (a system of values and ideas, morals and customs), i.e., a set of conventions that control the social institutions and determine the funetions and meanings of the artifacts. The emancipation of the various European cultures from the Latin superstratum of Antiquity and the early Middle Ages took place in similar ways, but at different speeds. Each culture created its own political institutions, systems of artifacts, and conventions which were regarded as typical of that culture when seen from outside and as unifying when seen from the point of view of an inside observer. 3. A system of institutions that organizes the society of a culture as a whole is called a national state·, a system of artifacts that constitutes the civilization of a culture as a whole can be called a national civilization·, and a system of conventions that determines the values and ideas and the morals and customs of a culture as a whole will be called a national mentality. At the level of institutions, the process of emancipation of the European cultures led to national states which established themselves in particular territories with fixed boundaries; at the level of artifacts it led to national forms of production in agriculture and industry; and at the level of conventions it led to national sign systems such as national languages, national literatures, arts, music, architecture etc. 4. A culture that differs from others by having a specific national state, a national civilization, and a national mentality is called a national culture. The trend towards national cultures first succeeded in Spain, England, France, and the Netherlands. Based on their model, the thesis that each culture should have its own territorial state, its own industry, and its own mentality became one of the prime motives for political development in the rest of Europe. In addition to Italy, Germany, Poland, and Russia, a great number of smaller national states emerged in Scandinavia and Southeast Europe.

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5. The political development towards national states contrasted, however, with the economic development, which required more and more complex production centers for more and more specialized artifacts and correspondingly expanded markets. The contradiction between the optimal forms of organization at the various levels of culture confronted most national cultures with two alternatives: either preservation of national structures combined with economic backwardness or economic expansion facilitated by the abandonment of national particularities. Nearly every national culture tried to combine the positive ideas of the two alternatives by forcing other cultures to accept its own forms of society and civilization. This is what is known as imperialism. It ended in the catastrophe of the two world wars, which devastated the entire cultural life of the European states in the 20th century.

II. The structural crisis of European cultures 6. In the post-war period, the constraints of industrial development and of global competition with non-European cultures forced the Europeans to create supranational structures. European industry was increasingly organized in multinational trusts or systems of collective combines that provided products beyond the borders of the existing cultures. The European states transferred part of their regulatory competence to supranational institutions that also became active beyond the borders of the existing cultures. These development deprived the people of the existing national cultures of part of the bases of identification4 which they needed in order to form their self concepts. In pre-war times, the people of the national cultures had their state institutions available as means of identification at the social level; at the civilizational level, they had their systems of artifacts, and at the mental level, their sign systems. In post-war Europe the potential for identification diminished dramatically at the social and civilizational levels. Only the conventions of the national sign systems and traditional morals and customs - in short, the national mentalities - seemed for some time unaffected. But in the late fifties even this potential for identification began to be relativized as the industrialists of these states invited immigrant workers to live there temporarily. The immigrants stayed and brought with them their own sign systems, morals and customs. Thus, a system of multicultural states emerged in Europe. The majority of the citizens in the former national cultures found themselves at the mercy of these transformations, unable or unwilling to cope with

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them intellectually. The new civilizational developments were perceived more as a threat to the old cultural identity than as an opportunity to develop a new, more comprehensive one. Since the seventies this can be seen in reactions such as the increased interest in history, the rise of nostalgic rituals and the formation of new political parties with unreasonably nationalistic programs. 7. If one examines the existing economic and social conditions, one can predict that the present structural crisis of European cultures will not last long. In an age of increasingly rapid communication, quick assimilation will affect both the old multiplicity of separate national cultures and the new coexistence of different national mentalities in the same territory. For reasons of efficiency, the multinational industrial trusts as well as the supranational institutions of the European Community tend to use existing codes across the borders of the old cultures or to introduce new international codes which then impede and eventually replace the old culture-specific ones. Either development will take away from the people of the old national states an essential part of the mental basis of their identity. This involves not only obviously regu-lated codes such as the system of traffic signs and of public pictograms, but also sign systems which are less easily manipulated such as the gestures of nonverbal communication, the secondary codes of literature, film, music, the fine arts, and architecture as well as the national languages. If this trend towards assimilation is successful then the last differences between the old European cultures will also disappear, and, in the long run, the result will be only one comprehensive European culture. And even this need not be the last stage of the process: Why should it be worthwhile to retain sign systems that are specific to Europe? Today more than ever it seems possible that a comprehensive transatlantic Western culture will emerge that might well function as the core of a more or less homogeneous world culture: No longer "Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer", but "One world, one culture". 8. As Europeans confront these perspectives, they must ask themselves: Should we yield to this seemingly necessary course of history? Should we perhaps even try to accelerate it? A strong argument can be made that Europeans should intervene in the course of history and entirely redirect it. Cultural anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and biologists agree that a comprehensive polycentric culture consisting of many relatively independent member cultures which are in close

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contact with one another is in many respects superior to a homogeneous unified culture which is oriented only towards one center. 5 It was this consensus that provided the basis of explanation for the unusual rate of development in Europe during the last 500 years: (1) In a compound of relatively independent cultures, the social, civilizational, and mental structures of each participating culture enjoy a certain protection against the constant threat of assimilation from the competing cultures. The communication barriers erected by differences in the sign systems of the participating cultures allow each culture to develop new structures that may have inferior components but excel relative to the others in their superior organization. (2) In this way a compound of cultures is able to create a greater diversity of approaches to the solution of potential problems than a homogeneous unified culture. (3) A compound of cultures facilitates greater differentiation. It can allow each participating culture to find local solutions for its local problems without negatively affecting the other cultures. (4) A compound of cultures reacts with more flexibility to problems newly arising in one of its many centers. Each participating culture can have developed problem solving methods that may be adopted by the affected center as long as it has not developed a more efficient solution of its own. By comparison, in a unified homogeneous culture the fate of the whole is connected for better or worse with the fate of its only center. (5) A compound of cultures is therefore more robust in situations of crisis than a homogeneous unified culture. If the social, civilizational, and mental structures of a unified culture collapse, the entire culture perishes. In a compound of cultures, however, only one participating culture is affected while the others continue to thrive; and even the affected culture can be saved in most such cases, if it adopts suitable problem solving methods from other cultures of the compound. 9. There exists currently a broad consensus among experts about such system-theoretic considerations. What remains controversial, however, is the optimal size of a compound of cultures and of the cultures participating in it. As has already been pointed out, the answer to this question has depended historically on the state of development of the economy. It seems evident that present-day Europe can only survive in global competition if it creates supranational structures at the levels of both society and civilization. But what is

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the best solution at the level of values and ideas, morals and customs, codes and conventions, i.e. at the level of mentality? If one compares Europe with other cultures of similar size and productivity, such as those of the USA and Japan, one finds that in the USA subcultures of the various "ethnic groups" are more divergent and coexist in smaller areas than in Europe (see note 3). Nevertheless, the dominant American "white Anglo-Saxon protestant" culture is homogeneous enough for one to be able to speak of a unified culture in the USA. Labeled "the American way of life", it has attained a high level of prestige in the rest of the world. The Japanese culture is regionally and ethnically even more homogeneous. Its differentiations are mostly due to the peculiarities of local economy. Against this background, it seems reasonable that a culture such as Europe take neither the American nor the Japanese direction but pursue its own traditions and endeavor to maintain the relatively independent mentalities of its old component cultures at the same time as mutual integration is occurring at the social and civilizational levels. Such a course would also be of value for the global system of cultures since it would enable differently structured cultures to compete and would, in cases of local crises, facilitate the adoption of alternative problem solving methods from the other cultures instead of letting identically structured economies compete with one another. 10. This response to the problem of Europe's future cultural structure leaves open the question of whether the mentalities of all former national cultures can and should be preserved. In some cases (Spain, Great Britain, France, Germany) it might be advisable to let the present national mentalities become differentiated into regional mentalities (such as those of the Catalans and the Basques in the case of Spain and of the Irish, the Scottish, and the Welsh in the case of Great Britain). In other cases mutual integration of related national mentalities could be a reasonable option (in the case of the Dutch and the Flemish?; the Serbs and the Croatians?). This question is of secondary importance in the present context and will remain unanswered here. Far more important is the more general problem: How to guarantee that Europe will keep its multicultural character at the level of mentalities despite its increasing integration at the social and civilizational levels? While this problem concerns all kinds of values and ideas, morals and customs, codes and conventions, our discussion here will be limited to the sign systems used in Europe and, in particular, the European languages.

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III. Linguistically homogeneous individuals, territories, and communication processes: are they needed? 11. Current language practice in Europe is characterized by two contradictory tendencies. On one hand, by reason of schooling and professional mobility, many Europeans have learned more than one language (multilingualism); on the other hand, the free performance of this multilingualism is systematically hindered by a number of deeply entrenched assumptions originating from a wide-spread common-sense language theory: (a) Each individual is assigned one and only one "mother tongue" that turns him or her into a life-long member of a language community. In areas where several languages are spoken, each language community jealously sees to it that everyone remains loyal to one and only one language community. Examples are Belgium, Switzerland, as well as South Tyrol, where official questionnaires impose a forced decision on citizens for either the German or the Italian language community. Joining another language community or simultaneous loyalty to two different language communities is considered treason {Postulate of linguistically homogeneous individuals). (b) Each territory is claimed to have its own regional language·, and this is reinforced with a rigidity comparable to the adoption of the regional religion after the Reformation. Official bilingualism, found in certain parts of Finland and Switzerland, is a rare phenomenon. Where it exists, each language community is eager to make its own language the primary and eventually the only tongue used in the region. (Postulate of linguistically homogeneous territories) (c) When Europeans of different languages join in a dialogue, they tend to restrict themselves to speaking only one language, even if each can presuppose that the others understand his or her mother tongue. This makes the restaurant customers at each table appear as a linguistically homogeneous group even though they in fact often have different mother tongues. Nearly every international meeting announces ahead of time an official language of communication, which has to be used by participants who wish their contributions to be taken seriously into consideration. If several languages are permitted as official languages, rivalries arise, since each language community strives to make its language the dominant one and to give formulations in that language official status for the subject matter in question. (Postulate of linguistically homogeneous communication processes)

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12. The custom of assigning to each individual, each territory, and each communication process "its proper language", is grounded in the premise that linguistic homogeneity is the optimal basis for a thriving individual, a prospering territory, and a well functioning process of communication. However, this premise is scientifically untenable 6 and should be taken seriously only as a political maxim. As such, it has brought great harm to mankind. The attempts at transforming the existing social reality to make each individual, each territory, and each communication process linguistically homogeneous lead again and again to confrontations between people in which they experience life in the midst of "people of a different tongue" as unbearable, residence in a "territory of a different tongue" as uncomfortable, and participation in a "conversation of a different tongue" as difficult. As long as we are constrained to profess loyalty to one and only one mother tongue, regional language, and language of communication to the exclusion of other languages, we continue to create new friction between one another that diverts our attention from more substantial issues. What emerges is a kind of European language league, in which the language communities enter contests, with home and away games, with winners and losers on points, with fan clubs and language strategists, with allies and adversaries, with pressure groups and loyalty conflicts. The rank of a language becomes dependent on the number of its native speakers, the size of its territory, the set of topics it can deal with, the frequency of its use, and the prestige of the occasions of its use. Thus, language strategists mark it as a gain in points when the speakers of a language have many children, when the territory of a language expands, when the set of topics covered by a language increases, and when the number of international meetings that adopt a language as official grows. In the 1970s and 1980s, the excesses of such linguistic chauvinism made many Europeans tend towards the position that Europe should adopt one Europe-wide language so as to lay to rest this linguistic ghost once and for all. As a candidate language that would neither privilege nor handicap anyone, a synthethic tongue such as Esperanto was increasingly suggested. 13. However, it must be emphasized that language synthesizers proceed from incorrect premises, just as do language chauvinists. There is no need to press individuals, territories, and communication processes into a system of linguistic monocultures. There is no need to restrict each individual, each territory, and each communication process to only one language. On the contrary, poly-

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glot individuals, polyglot territories, and polyglot dialogues are culturally most fruitful: (1) There are - and there always have been - families in which the mother speaks language L j , the father language L 2 , and their colleagues language L 3 with the consequence that the children learn to master all three languages equally well. Examples are families of displaced persons, refugees and immigrant workers, as well as families of merchants and diplomats. Wherever one looks, such families have generated disproportionally many extraordinary persons who have substantially contributed to the culture of their country. This is true as much of the families of the French Huguenots and of the Polish Jews in the 18th and 19th Century Germany as it is of the German immigrants in the United States in the 20th Century. It is also evident in the cases of GermanCzech literature in Prague and Austrian-Hungarian music in Budapest at the beginning of the 20th Century as it is in the cases of Turkish-German literature and music in Berlin at the end of this Century. Whoever forces a child from such a milieu to profess loyalty to the language of either his mother or his father or his country, creates unnecessary problems and impedes cultural exchange which is as essential for the individual as it is for his society. (2) There are - and there always have been - territories in which one village speaks L j , another village L 2 , and a third village L 3 without there being clear geographical boundaries with respect to which one could specify them as "linguistic islands" on a "linguistic mainland". In Eastern Europe an undisturbed cultural symbiosis of people with different mother tongues existed for many centuries. Other cases in point are present-day urban agglomerations in which the language spoken often changes from block to block, house to house, apartment to apartment without complications. All European metropolitan areas have drawn a considerable part of their innovative potential from the division of labor among people who came there from various other parts of Europe and the world without discarding their own linguistic and cultural identity. Whoever forces such people to give up their language and to alter their mentality in order to create a linguistically homogeneous territory, paralyzes their innovative potential and diminishes their contribution to the culture as a whole. (3) There are - and there always have been - gatherings of people with different mother tongues who do not hesitate to speak to one another in their native languages because they can count on the others understanding them. Examples are conversations among people of related languages as in Scandinavia, where it is not uncommon for one person to speak Danish, another

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Imperial Norwegian, a third Swedish, with no need for anyone to apologize or feel uneasy. Similar situations can be found in the Mediterranean, where anyone from the Romania can assume that his partner in conversation will understand him even if he himself has a different tongue, since the various tongues are all derived from the same Latin roots. Anyone who has experienced how lively and spirited such conversations can be when they deliberately force a confrontation of linguistically conditioned differences in speakers' experiential horizons, will refrain from any attempt to level these differences in favor of linguistically homogeneous communication. The positive experiences gathered from polyglott individuals, territories and communication processes 7 might suggest that it would be good advice to abandon all attempts at regulating European language customs and to allow them to develop on their own. 14. However, much experience, both in Europe and in other parts of the world, counterindicates such advice. Where a dynamic economy provides a continent with a homogeneous set of products and imposes unified political institutions, even the most distinct national mentalities will lose their moorings. The most impressive case in point is the United States of America which has functioned for most ethnic groups as a "melting pot" that diminishes the peculiar mentalities until they are absorbed, after a few generations, into the general "American way of life". Such developments have also occurred in Europe, as is shown in the absorption of Welsh, Scottish, and Irish in Great Britain, of Breton in France, of Frisian in the Netherlands, and of Sorbic in EastElbian Germany. All these tongues are more or less well-elaborated written languages today, nevertheless their decay seems inevitable. In a Europe whose societies and civilizations are dynamically growing into a comprehensive Western culture, such processes could also occur in languages which, as national languages, have thus far seemed unassailable. English, the language of the Western world, could become more than just the most frequent language of communication; it may increasingly take over the roles of mother tongue and vernacular language. This would deprive Europe of all the advantages that its multilingualism and the corresponding cultural diversity have afforded it for millennia.

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IV. How to combine regulation and deregulation of languages for individuals, territories, and genres of communication 15. If one regards the options of cultural development described here as dangerous, one must seriously consider the conditions that encourage polyglot individuals, territories, and communication processes and try to foster them: (1) Multilingualism in a child does not arise simply from contact with several languages. Polyglot children need a milieu in which they can assign each of several spoken languages to either specific persons or regions or at least to some typical communicative setting. Where this is not the case, children lack the clear instance of identification needed to keep the several languages distinct. The result is language mixing (creolization), the opposite of an orderly acquisition of competence in separate languages. If there are no individuals and no territories to which a language is peculiar, then there must be at least some genre of communication which is generally performed in it. So-called dead languages such as Hebrew, Ancient Greek, and Latin, which for centuries were neither anyone's mother tongue nor any state's vernacular language survived only because certain types of communication were reserved to them: religious services in the Jewish temples and in the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches, the academic discourse of medieval universities, and, far into modern times, the legal discourse of state administration. Therefore, individual multilingualism always requires the existence, for each language, of other individuals or of territories or of genres of communication that are identified with that language. (2) Multilingualism in a territory does not arise independently of surrounding territories. In most cases, there exists for each language involved at least one other territory whose vernacular language it is. An example is bilingual Brussels, whose inhabitants orient themselves either towards monolingual Flanders or towards monolingual Wallonia. Another example are the bilingual areas of Silesia, whose inhabitants have both Poland and Germany as reference countries. If a language spoken in a multilingual territory does not have the status of the vernacular anywhere else, it serves as mother tongue for at least part of the inhabitants or as the language of communication in certain communication genres. This situation is exemplified by Yiddish, which was spoken for centuries although its speakers could never claim a state or an occupied territory as their own. Nowhere did it function as a vernacular language, but it served many as their mother tongue and was used in a number of communication genres: in table talk, in folk songs, and in many literary gen-

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res. Thus multilingual territories always require the existence of individuals or of other territories or of communication genres that are identified with the languages involved. (3) Multilingualism in conversations is not a type of communication that can be exclusively and permanently used in a given territory. In all historically known cases it occurs in individuals who profess loyalty to only one mother tongue and in territories bound to a certain vernacular language. This is true for Scandinavia as well as for the Mediterranean and for Latin America. Were conversational participants not to assume that their partner has a different mother tongue or vernacular language, and were they not to attempt to learn their mutual languages at least passively, there would be no polyglott dialogues. Instead of the systematic transition from one language to the other along with speaker change, there would be mutual imitation eventually leading to increasing assimilation of the languages used. The original system of independent languages spoken in accompaniment with one another would dissolve into one more or less homogeneous creole language. The result would not be mutual stimulation, but the leveling out of both the original language differences and, at the same time, differences between other cultural codes. A case in point is the multilingualism of ritual communication. Without the original selection of one language and the fixation of the communication process therein even the contemporary change from Latin to the vernacular and back that can be observed in Catholic liturgy would long have disappeared. Thus multilingual communication always requires the existence of individuals or of territories or of communication genres that are identified with the languages involved. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that no culture can consist exclusively of polyglot individuals, a polyglot territory, or polyglot communication: no multilingualism without the existence of monolingual individuals, territories, or communication genres! Whoever wants to promote multilingualism must assure, for each language involved, that it be the only mother tongue for certain individuals, the only territorial language for a certain territory, or the only language permitted for certain genres of communication. A fruitful interaction of speakers of different languages requires that each language be relatively stable and recognizable as such. This depends in turn on the existence - at the level of speakers or territories or communication genres - of centers of identification at which the language users can orient themselves. At the level of territories such centers of identification are frequently different from the political metropolis, which is often characterized by multi-

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lingualism. Thus in Germany it is not the dialect of Berliners that is acknowledged as linguistic model for the rest of the population but the language spoken around Hanover; in England it is not the dialect of Londoners but Oxford English; in Italy it is not the dialect of the Romans but the language spoken in Florence.

V. Maxims of a language policy for the future Europe 16. The above considerations have direct consequences regarding a language and culture policy for the future Europe, which can be summarized as follows: (1) It is advisable to maintain the existing multiplicity of mentalities even at a time when the societies and civilizations of Europe are becoming more unified. (2) Since each specific mentality is strongly supported by the use of a specific natural language, the existing multiplicity of languages in Europe should also be preserved. (3) The best way of maintaining a culture is to live it, the best way of preserving a language is to use it. It must become a concern of every speaker of English to foster wherever possible the use of Dutch and Danish, Polish and Czech, Italian and Spanish, German and French, etc. and vice versa. (4) The linguistic and cultural richness of Europe should not be allowed to become fossilized in its present state. The individual languages and cultures should not be isolated and conserved for the future, but should interact with each other and stimulate one another to further development. (4.1) It would be unwise to divide Europe into fatherlands organized as linguistic monocultures. What is needed is rather an appropriate set of regions with only one official vernacular language, along with regions with two or more such languages. The area of Brussels would be a prime candidate for the introduction of a multilingualism that would provide for the use of all the languages of the surrounding regions: Dutch, French, German, and English. (4.2) It would be unwise to assign to each European one and only one language. What is needed is rather a balanced relationship of Europeans who profess loyalty to only one language and Europeans who feel equally at home in two or more languages. Polyglot families and polyglot schools should be promoted by appropriate means. (4.3) It would be unwise to continue considering monolingual communication as the standard mode of communication. What is needed is rather a fruit-

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ful mixture of monolingual and multilingual communication. Polyglot dialogue should become the rule among Europeans of different mother tongues. (5) In order to achieve all this, changes have to be introduced in the language-related maxims of politeness as well as in the principles of language instruction in schools: (5.1) No longer is it to be regarded as impolite to continue speaking one's own language when one's communication partner is speaking a different language - as long as each may suppose that the other possesses an adequate passive understanding. In such a context, everyone should be allowed to speak the language most familiar to him without having to apologize. (5.2) Language instruction in schools must no longer educate children exclusively for monolingual communication in a foreign language, but must prepare them to carry on polyglot dialogues in which change of speaker systematically coincides with change of language used. (5.2.1) Isolated instruction in separate foreign languages should be replaced by instruction for multilingual communication. This requires training in the ability to quickly shift actively or passively from one language to another. (5.2.2) In order to make accessible as many European languages as possible, each European school should teach the following languages: a. the student's mother tongue, b. the world language (English), c. a language from a language family that does not include the student's mother tongue (i.e., a Romance or Slavic language for Germans, a Germanic or Slavic language for French, a Germanic or Romance language for Poles etc.) (5.2.3) School instruction in the student's mother tongue should emphasize systematic comparisons with other languages belonging to the same language family (i.e., for native speakers of German comparisons with Dutch and Danish, for native speakers of French comparisons with Italian and Spanish, for native speakers of Polish comparisons with Czech and Russian etc.). Students should be taught rules that enable them to acquire passive linguistic competence in related languages on their own. (6) Independently of both the problems and the outcome of the present study, and independently of the content of maxims (1) through (5), the following overriding principle must always be honored: Everyone has the freedom to decide which language he wants to use in a given situation. This principle should be included among the basic human rights.

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Notes 1.

The present study is based on the conception of culture developed in the treatise "What is Culture?" (Posner 1989), which carries further the considerations that were made in the dialogue of the European Humanists Erasmus of Rotterdam, Ulrich von Hutten, and Philipp Melanchthon and published in 1987 under the title "Good-bye, Lingua Teutonica? Language, Culture, and Science on the threshold of the 21st Century" (Posner 1987). The paper was written in response to the current discussions concerning the unification of Europe and of Germany. See also the book "Warnings to the Distant Future" (Posner 1990).

2.

This definition of the concept of culture is to be found in Posner 1989. It makes use of the work of Clarke 1978 and presupposes that not only the concepts of society and civilization but also that of mentality can be given a semiotic explication. When Lazarus and Steinthal (1860) and Wilhelm Wundt (1900 and 1901; see also 1911: 20f) advocated the concept of a national soul ("Volksseele") for social psychology, they were rightly accused by Paul (1880: 9, 11, 13) and Delbrück (1901) of disregarding specific empirical methods of analysis for the cultural phenomena and of metaphorically reducing the conditions of a society to those of an individual. The conception of a mentality avoids this double pitfall. It takes up the tradition of the French journal Annales E.S.C, (founded by L. Febvre and M. Bloch in 1929), according to which a collective mentality consists of the categories of cognition and emotion that are used by a group of persons and thus determine their dispositions for action. In this sense, the history of mentalities is a "historical phenomenology of what is possible for men" as members of a given society (Raulff 1987: 11; see also Geiger 1932, Febvre 1941, Duby 1961, Le Goff 1974, Teilenbach 1974, Hutton 1981, Sellin 1985). The mentality of a society can be explicated semiotically as its set of conventions, i.e. preferred responses for problems of coordination in cooperative action and communication (see Lewis 1969). In general cooperative action, sets of conventions that associate signifiers with signifieds are called codes.

3.

As will be shown presently, it is by no means always the case that the borders of a society coincide with those of a civilization and those of a mentality. A case in point is North America where individuals belonging to different systems of institutions (the USA and Canada) and having different mentalities (native Americans and immigrants from Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, East Asia and Latin America) are connected through one and the same system of artifacts (the North American civilization). Other cases are Belgium and Switzerland, where a comprehensive system of institutions administrates groups of individuals whose mentalities have less in common with each other than with those of the populations of neighboring states. Yet another case can be found in the two states that developed on German territory after World War II: Their people, who have more or less the same mentality, were increasingly separated by opposing political institutions and diverging systems of artifacts. - The possible overlap of society, civilization, and mentality is discussed in Clarke 1978: 363 ff; the overlap of mentality and language was earlier described by Saussure 1916: V, iv, 4; see also Posner 1989: 252f.

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4.

The need of a group of persons for a group identity as a factor of social, civilizational, and mental development is studied by Haarman 1986 and Müller 1987. A society can use its institutions as well as its artifact types and its conventions as sources of identity (see Posner 1983). When either institutions or artifact types or conventions disappear, the society loses its source of identity and the culture disappears.

5. 6.

See Weizsäcker 1986: 13. This is shown by the replacement of the code-theoretic approach to semiotics with the pragmatic approach; see Sperber and Wilson 1986 and Posner 1988. See Europäische Mehrsprachigkeit. Festschrift for Mario Wandruszka, ed. Pöckl 1981.

7.

References Clarke, David L. 1978 Analytical Archeology. London: Methuen. Delbrück, Berthold 1901 Grundfragen der Sprachforschung mit Rücksicht auf W. Wundts Sprachpsychologie. Straßburg: Trübner. Duby, George 1961 "Histoire des mentalités", in: L'histoire et ses méthodes. Paris: Gallimard. Febvre, Lucien 1941 "La sensibilité et l'histoire. Comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?" in: Annales d'histoire sociale 3: 5-20. Geiger, Theodor 1932 Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes. Stuttgart: Enke. Haarman, Harald 1986 Language in ethnicity: A view of basic ecological relations. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hutton, Patrick H. 1981 "The history of mentalities: The new map of cultural history". History and Theory 20. Le Goff, Jacques 1974 "Les mentalités. Une histoire ambigue", in: J. le Goff and P. Nora (eds.), Faire de l'histoire, Vol. 3. Paris: Gallimard: 76 ff. Lazarus, Moritz and Heimann Steinthal 1860 "Volksgeist und Volksseele", in: Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 1: 1-73. Lessing, Gotthold E. 1763 "Minna von Barnhelm", in: G. E. Lessing, Werke, Vol. 4 (ed. H. G. Göpfert) München: Hanser 1979. Lewis, David

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1969 Convention. A philosophical study. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Müller, Klaus E. 1987 Das magische Universum der Identität. Elementarformen sozialen Verhaltens. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Paul, Hermann 1880 Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. Halle: Niemeyer. 4th edition 1909. Pöckl, Wolfgang (ed.) 1981 Europäische Mehrsprachigkeit. Festschrift für Mario Wandruszka zum 70. Geburtstag. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Posner, Roland 1983 "Kodes als Zeichen", in: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 5: 401 ff. 1987 "Good-bye, lingua teutonica? Sprache, Kultur und Wissenschaft an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert", in: T. Buddensieg, K. Düwell and K.-J. Sembach (eds.), Wissenschaften in Berlin, Vol. 3. Berlin: Mann: 195 ff. 1988 "What is pragmatics?" Arbeitspapiere zur Linguistik 26. Technische Universität Berlin: Institut für Linguistik. 1989 "What is culture? Toward a semiotic explication of anthropological concepts", in: W. A. Koch (ed.), The Nature of Culture. Bochum: Brockmeyer: 240 ff. 1990 Warnungen an die ferne Zukunft: Atommüll als Kommunikationsproblem. München: Raben. Raulff, Ulrich (ed.) 1987 Mentalitäten-Geschichte. Zur historischen Rekonstruktion geistiger Prozesse. Berlin: Wagenbach. Saussure, Ferdinand de 1916 Cours de linguistique générale. Paris and Genève: Payot. Sellin, Volker 1985 "Mentalität und Mentalitätsgeschichte", in: Historische Zeitschrift 241: 555 ff. Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson 1986 Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Teilenbach, Gerd 1974 "Mentalität", in: Geschichte, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Clemens Bauer zum 75. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot. Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von 1986 "Einleitung", in: K.M. Meyer-Abich and B. Schefold (eds.), Die Grenzen der Atomwirtschaft. München: Beck: 9 ff. Wundt, Wilhelm 1900 Die Sprache. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1901 Sprachgeschichte und Sprachpsychologie mit Rücksicht auf B. Delbrücks Grundfragen der Sprachforschung. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1911 Probleme der Völkerpsychologie. Leipzig: Wiegandt. 2nd edition Stuttgart: Kröner 1921.

Multilingualism in European Community meetings - a pragmatic approach Nick Roche

The title of this symposium - "Wanted: a language policy for the European Community" - calls to mind the wall poster without which no Hollywood western could call itself complete - Wanted dead or alive: the legend which accompanies an artist's impression, or perhaps, in view of what follows, an identikit picture of some unsavoury-looking individual who has been terrorising the local citizenry. A juxtaposition of the serious academic proposition and the tinseltown cliché then occurs: Wanted: a European Community policy for languages, dead or alive. For who is to say that the net effect of a policy designed to safeguard the linguistic diversity which we currently enjoy would not be to hasten the demise of some of the weaker brethren in our vernacular midst? The motorway to hell is paved with just such good intentions. As evidence for this sceptical outlook one need only see the journey towards extinction of the rhinoceros which has really only picked up speed since the launching of a worldwide campaign for its preservation. There are grounds, too, for fearing that the fortunes of the elephant may take a turn for the worse now that the professional animal lovers have turned their attentions in its direction. So, since I have a fatalistic conviction that the most wellmeant schemes will "gang aglay" and because I should hate to see a genuine love of Europe's linguistic coat of many colours blind us to the dangers of it being transformed into a straitjacket, my instinctive reaction to the slogan "Wanted: - a language policy for the European Community" is to ask "why?". What's wrong with the way things are at present and, if the answer is, as I think it is, "Not a lot", well then, if it ain't bust, why fix it? In the course of this paper I shall endeavour to provide some sort of broad justification for the dissident tone of my introduction before moving on to explain how an absence of explicit policy, beyond working within a scheme of priorities dictated by the fact that we live in a world of finite resources, both human and financial, enables us to cope with the demands which are made of

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us in the interpreting service which caters for the requirements of most EC institutions. Any policy worthy of the name would, one must suppose, consist, at the very least, of a set of recommendations that the relevant authorities should follow in particular areas; more ambitious schemes would entail binding rules, the breaking of which would lead to sanctions of some sort. We are presumably talking about measures which will involve some limitations on people's freedom to continue to do as they are doing at present - otherwise why go to all the trouble of devising a policy, if it doesn't change anything? Quite apart from the fact that a policy which requires some loss of individual or collective freedom will not sit easily with the general liberalising dynamics of the EC in the run-up to 1992 and beyond, one can ask if the present state of affairs is one we need to become exercised about in the first place. To go to the lengths of producing a policy in pursuit of a particular objective, one should be clear both about the definition of that objective and about the likelihood of its being achieved. The root of the problem lies, I believe, in regarding it as such. One hears constantly about the handicap suffered by Europe as a result of the language barriers that have to be negotiated within its borders. Envious comparisons are drawn with the situation enjoyed by the Americans and the Japanese. This envy, mainly expressed by people who view the world from a narrow perspective located on the bottomline, in turn engenders fears on the part of those who cherish our linguistic diversity that, in an attempt to offset the undoubted economic disadvantage this constitutes, Europe will be tempted to adopt an "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em" attitude and place some kind of restrictions on people's freedom to use the language of their choice and thereby engineer a de facto shift towards the use of a reduced number of languages in an everincreasing number of contexts. One cannot discount this possibility - indeed it is a process which is already under way to some extent, but not as a result of some governmental fiat. No Brussels edict has or will be issued decreeing any such development. It is an evolution which is consistent with the workings of the market - note, I do not say "dictates" of the market, implying that markets are somehow malign forces divorced from the human beings that people them - and whilst I do not subscribe to the view that it is always impossible to buck the market, one does so at one's peril and should therefore have worked out the odds beforehand. One hears rather less, if indeed at all, about the advantages conferred upon Europe by its rich linguistic inheritance. Perhaps this is because these are less

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easily quantifiable in terms that a corporate finance executive can understand, in that they don't show up on a balance sheet, but they are real for all that and bring definite economic benefits, which will increase as we exploit the unique privilege of belonging to a multilingual community. Here there is a Community programme (not a policy) which is playing its part and that is LINGUA which seeks to promote the learning of EC languages in all schools throughout the EC. It is not a richly-endowed programme but nevertheless will make a contribution to ensuring that future generations will move freely and confidently across the existing national frontiers, equipped with the wherewithal to play an active and constructive rôle in societies with different cultural backgrounds, which they will come to understand and appreciate in a much more meaningful way than would have been possible in the past. The skills that one acquires in this process - linguistic, social, cultural - are an economic asset, too, particularly if they are extended to include the acquisition of similar knowledge in relation to other parts of the world, Japan, for example. The more automatic becomes the assumption that our schoolchildren will pick up 2 or 3 European languages, the easier it is to contemplate grafting on more exotic language skills. Someone from a predominantly monolingual economic space, to use the current jargon, e.g U.S.A., is at a definite disadvantage in this respect. From the above it is clear that I take a fairly relaxed attitude to Europe's socalled linguistic problems, viewing them as a challenge which brings rewards rather than a handicap which imposes penalties. How is this reflected in the way in which the Joint Service Interpretation-Conferences goes about its work? I shall begin with a look back to the beginnings of the European adventure, when there was a possibility that not all the existing national languages would be used at an E.C. level. There were, of course, four at the time: - French, German, Italian and Dutch. French is the official national language in Luxembourg, even if the inhabitants of the country talk to one another in their local Luxembourg language, which is far from being under threat. For politicial reasons, it soon became apparent that all four would be official languages, since the E.C., unlike the U.N. where only a limited range of languages, in relation to the total membership of the organization, is in use, adopts legislation which has immediate effect in its member states. Clearly documents relating to that legislation in addition to the proceedings leading to its adoption must reflect the linguistic reality of those in whose name it is being adopted. Thus, when the U.K., Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973, two new languages, English

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and Danish, were added. With the subsequent accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal our language tally has risen to nine. The consequences of this growth in terms of interpretation requirements have been exponential and, as such, phenomenal. If we are to contain the use of the relay system, whereby the meeting delegate dependent on interpretation receives, instead of a secondhand message, a third-hand message, with all that implies in terms of dilution of and, sometimes, departure from the original version, we must man each language booth with three people. This means that, for a meeting where all nine languages are being spoken and interpretation is being provided into all nine languages, a total of 27 interpreters is required. This compares with the situation before 1973 when, with four languages, only 2 people were needed per booth and a total complement of 8 interpreters catered for a meeting with full language cover. The cost of an interpreter's services has not diminished in the interim, so the budgetary consequences of the growth in the size of the Community have been considerable. Aside from that, there are a number of other drawbacks to the present state of affairs: - interpreters find it less easy to sustain their concentration on the proceedings when their average working (broadcast) time cannot, by definition, exceed 33 % - delegates have to adjust to hearing a greater variety of voices, styles, mannerisms over their headphones - the disproportionately large size of the interpreting team to the number of delegates can cause awkwardness. In order to justify the willing acceptance of so many inherently unwelcome factors, one needs to be convinced that it is all really necessary. This is not always the case, however. There are undoubtedly meetings where certain languages are provided (passively and actively) solely to satisfy a political requirement to that effect, when those speaking and listening to that language could perfectly well function using another language, and in many instances do, opting to listen to interpretation, let us say, from Portuguese into English rather than their native Dutch because they prefer to be hearing what a majority of their fellow participants are hearing. Needless to say, the interpreters who become aware of their rôle as a piece of linguistic/nationalistic windowdressing find it hard to motivate themselves to do the kind of job of which they would be capable if they were conscious of fulfilling a vital function in the proceedings. That is why the governing principle underlying our staff de-

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ployment arrangements is that of "real needs". For now, and for the foreseeable future, Councils of Ministers (with the ministers themselves present) are sacrosanct, i.e. 9 - 9 cover is automatically provided. At other meetings, the extent of language cover varies in accordance with the actual requirements of participants. We are moving towards a situation where our programming staff will liaise with the Permanent Representations of the Member States to ascertain in which Council working groups their representatives will absolutely have to be able to speak and/or listen to their language. The Permanent Representations will perhaps have a quota of meetings where their languages can be catered for, so they have to make the decisions as to which of their people are going to have to operate with a language other than their own. Leaving the decision up to them, which is effectively what this means, will pay a double dividend: - it makes the member states aware that interpretation is not a tap which can be turned on and off at will - it instills a concern for practical efficiency ahead of linguistic prestigeseeking. Within the Commission itself, the people who organise meetings are obliged to take account of what the genuine needs of the participants are. Otherwise scarce resources will be allocated to places where they are not needed. Failure to impose such restrictions would place impossible demands upon our service in terms of recruitment of staff and free-lance interpreters, the inevitable consequences of which would be a lowering of professional standards which will be in nobody's interest at all. Substandard interpretation is worse than useless and must be avoided at all costs. As things stand, the system works, even where full language cover is provided, although one may question the desirability, the legitimacy even, of an arrangement which effectively stifles debate in the chamber set aside for that purpose and encourages behind the scenes deals to be cobbled together out of earshot of the interpreters and, more to the point, out of earshot of the other meeting participants. Too often the formal ministerial proceedings, with 27 interpreters in attendance, are just that - a formality with the real business taking place in the wings. Perhaps if ministers felt freer to talk to one another direct, in a common language, in the meeting proper, rather than being constrained for reasons of national policy to speak their national language, more genuine debate would ensue and the true democratic purpose of the insti-

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tution would be served. An interesting precedent was set during the Danish presidency in 1987 when some Danish ministers took advantage of their occupation of the chair to speak English whilst the minister speaking on behalf of the Danish delegation spoke Danish, as custom dictates. It is only custom, as, although the treaties clearly state the right of each country's representative to use his own language, he is under no obligation so to do. What will happen if, as now seems increasingly likely, new members join the Community, bringing with them new languages? It will not simply be a matter of coping as we coped with the arrival of Danish in 1973 or Greek in 1981 or Portuguese in 1986, each of them a language not traditionally spoken at international gatherings. The geometric progression inherent in the expansion in the number of languages suggests that we are almost at breaking point and any further addition would make the system well-nigh unworkable. What then? Do we appoint one or two pivot languages which will serve as relay languages for all the more exotic community tongues? On what basis would these pivot languages be selected? Would this be compatible with the status of a Community composed of member states equal in importance, with languages to match? Everything argues in favour of a pragmatic, whatever-works-best-in-practice approach, everything, that is, except the demands of national pride which is indissolubly associated with language. Dr. Samuel Johnson said: languages are the pedigree of nations. Should that be changed now to read: languages are the pedigree of nation states? It will clearly not be for the E.C. as such to decree that only certain languages and not others will be used at particular meetings. Instead a campaign aimed at persuading people of the advantages of a pragmatic approach, free of national sentiment, will need to be waged. To those who argue that the requirement to defend their language within Europe dictates that it be used at every available opportunity, I would ask, what kind of language is it that sees the creation of avoidable inconvenience when it is spoken as part of a strategy to defend itself? It would be more likely, in my view, to undermine the standing of the language and, in the process, to bring the proceedings in the course of which it is so used, or abused, into disrepute. I refer, of course, to circumstances where a language is being used solely for the purposes of national prestige and not because it is indispensable to the smooth conduct of the business at hand. The same argument applies when it comes to the upgrading of the status of minority languages within member states. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which now, quite properly, prevails in E.C. affairs whereby responsibility for decisions lies at the lowest appropriate level in the

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local, regional, national, supranational hierarchy - such a matter would be entirely for the member state concerned to decide upon. However, in an E.C. context, practical convenience should be the major priority and, as such, would normally preclude the addition of such minority languages to our service's client list. Such artificial means of support are surely not needed for languages which are generally considered to be thriving and doing so because they fulfil a need on the part of their practitioners. Since they are clearly not in need of a life-support machine at an E.C. level, there is no point clogging up the arteries of the E.C. body politic unnecessarily through their inclusion. With the advent of new technologies bringing with it greater access to means of communication at lesser expense, there is no shortage of outlets to cater for an increased use of minority languages. Two minority languages within the British Isles, Irish and Welsh, are currently flourishing because there is a spontaneous demand and provision for their use which has no coercive associations. Where attempts at coercion do occur, these invariably provoke a backlash which harms the status of the language in question. From my vantage point, therefore, people should always be free to speak and listen to their language insofar as, taking into account the feasibility of providing interpretation facilities, this makes a positive contribution to the conduct of affairs. Where this is not the case, in high-tech meetings, for example, and people are able to function in a foreign language which is understood by a large proportion of participants, they should do so. One cannot deny that this puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis those who are operating with their mother tongue, but in return they gain a psychological edge as a result of making the concession to work in somebody else's language. The old business adage that if you are buying, you do so in your own language, but if you are selling you do it in the customer's, holds true here too. The onward march of English as a global language, which, I suppose, serves as the backdrop to consideration of the need for a European language policy, is not without its drawbacks, not just for non-native speakers increasingly obliged to use it, but for the language itself. Luckily, it is a robust creature, able to absorb most of the punishment meted out to it, but there is the danger that, by dint of overuse as a vehicular language, it may become colourless, odourless and flavourless. Mrs. Thatcher's fears of an identikit Europe are groundless but the threat of identikit English is real. This matters less to those for whom it is a second language than to those whose sole means of expression it is. The pressure to confine oneself to a standard format English in order to be understood by those who claim to understand English, with a vo-

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cabulary not quite as limited as that of American soap-operas but veering that way, may render us ultimately incapable of expressing ourselves any other way. This would be a matter for regret. So the might of English in international affairs is not an unmixed blessing for those of us who learnt it at our mother's knee. I would conclude by saying that, whilst we have every reason to celebrate our linguistic diversity, we should beware lest we end up consecrating it with some sort of divine right to remain unaltered by events. It is, after all, events which have produced this diversity in the first place. Just as in industry we have learnt the folly of feather-bedding lame duck operations, so with languages we should not try to erect a ring-fence around them and hope that, by so doing, we shall guarantee their survival. Whilst it is true to say that languages can be seen as natural resources, which can be either squandered or protected like endangered species, we should not neglect the possibility that, by seeking to protect, we in fact squander. The best guarantee of survival is the ability to adapt to the world in which we, and our languages, live.

Legal aspects of a language policy for the European Communities: Language risks, equal opportunities, and legislating a language Harald Koch

If language policy means: determining the means of communication, then the legal implications of a language policy can be twofold. First the process of determination is a legal question (who decides?), and second the problems of misunderstanding that come up more often (though not only) in using a foreign language has a legal dimension in as far as laws or legal agreements are conceived in different ways by the communicators. So it is not only the well-known tendency of lawyers to legalize every question of life that leads me to find a number of legal problems in the discussion on a language policy in Europe. Rather, the need for rules and decisions is obvious, and although lawyers are not by themselves the policy-makers they can draw the attention of those who are looking for a language policy to a number of situations and questions in which open legal problems have to be solved. In spite of the all-embracing pretension of lawyers I cannot possibly venture to deal with all the questions one might think of under the above heading. Rather, I would like to pick up three different legal aspects of a language policy. But I do not propose common solutions. Instead I shall try to show that every effort to agree on, or to prescribe, the use of one language at the same time has to keep in mind and allocate the risks attached to a language policy even in the field of private law contracts. The three fields I want to deal with are (I) the language risk in contract negotiations, (II) the language risk in procedure, and (III) the legal protection of the native language.

I. The language risk in contracts Who is to pay for misunderstandings in contracts that are due to different language backgrounds of the negotiators? W e will have to distinguish two different situations that call for different solutions: One is the situation of pure in-

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land contracts with participation of foreigners, as opposed to the transborder situation. Let me give some examples that have caused legal disputes again and again. -

A Greek restaurant owner, living since some time in Germany, buys a video camera. After the first enthusiasm has settled, he notices an electronic problem that spoils the results. When he wants to return the camera to the dealer, he has to learn with surprise that there was a provision in the standard contract terms - which he did not know - considerably reducing the buyer's right to cancel the deal or to ask for relief. Can we exspect a foreigner to read and to understand complicated German legal clauses in a standard set of small printed papers containing important exclusions o f liability and the like?

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A similar question arises when a foreign employee is dismissed, and upon receipt of his documents is asked to sign a paper, entitled neutrally " C o m pensation receipt", saying that after having received the rest o f his regular salary, he once and for all declares to have no more claims against his employer. Later the employee discovers that there are payments under a pension plan he was entitled to, or extra payments for good results that could not have been calculated earlier etc. Can the employer refuse these payments, referring to the note signed by the employee?

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In a sales contract between Signor I from Bologna and Herr D from Düsseldorf the correspondence is in English. The terms o f the contract provide for a 'lump-sum'-payment in case o f delay. Herr D understands the term as the minimum of damages that he can claim, but with the possibility o f higher amounts if proved. But Signor I takes the term at face value, i.e. as a flat rate without the possibility of proving actual damages higher than that.

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An international contract is drawn up in 2 versions, in Italian and in German, that are expressly termed as equivalent. But then there are translations that have a different meaning in the respective languages: 'Pauschale' in German means something different than 'somma globale' in Italian. This is a well-known problem in EC-law-making, too, since all legislative, administrative, and judicial acts are issued in 9 languages that are equally authoritative.

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Now I shall try to offer some solutions to these problems, and here I shall mainly draw on the German legal position although similar solutions are practised in other EC-states, too.

1. Inland contracts First I shall consider the situation of inland contracts to which one foreigner is a party. How can we allocate the burden of possible language-caused misunderstandings in the situation of a foreigner exposing himself to legal terminology in another country? (a) First of all, we have to analyze the legal background of using a language in contract negotiations and drafting. For the questions of authority of a language it obviously makes a difference wether or not the parties expressly have agreed on a language beforehand. If so, then the language agreed upon must be prevailing for purposes of construction of contract clauses. But if the parties only inadvertantly used a language - without having in mind the abovementioned consequences for validation - , then there is a tendency with the courts to hold the inland language operative in the first place. The crude argument for this practice is this. If a party from country A goes to country Β and there enters into negotiations for a contract, then she has to prepared for the foreign language's risks.1 Of course this argument does not convince in special cases where you simply cannot expect the visitor to know the host's language or its specialities. This is true where it is quite apparent to the host that the visitor does not have enough command of the host's language to understand every detail of the discussion or the contract he signs. In those situations an obligation to make sure that the partner understands, and to translate in cases of doubt, can be inferred from the circumstances. There is another generally accepted special rule among merchants in international trade, and that is the common use of English in many branches of trade, sometimes also of other languages in special areas. Where such a convention exists, those who enter the field have to be prepared for the "usual" language and cannot expect the other actors to make sure that they understand when they speak English (or another conventional language). b) Under German law in cases of misunderstandings general rules of contract can be applied. 4 I can only briefly sketch some of them, especially those that are operative in the language area.

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Contracts consist at least of two legal elements (declarations), offer and acceptance. In order to find out wether they are congruent, wether there is real agreement between the parties, we have to interprete them. Legal interpretation or construction of contract provisions has to find out what the parties really wanted, and how the respective declarations can be fairly understood by the addressee. So the interpreter (the judge, the lawyer) cannot only examine the literal or the semantic sense of the words used. He has to take into consideration all the circumstances relevant to the contractual setting, too. And here again the nationality of the parties, their respective command of the language, their level of education, special duties of a superior party to inform or explain, or the general customs in this line of business can be of importance in the process of interpretation. 5 Once we have thus ascertained the meaning of a declaration then it is possible to state the agreement or disagreement. So the Greek restaurant owner's video camera order cannot be interpreted as to include his consent to a contract clause unknown to him and containing unusual and disadvantageous provisions. Since there is no agreement on this clause it is not part of the contract. The same is true for the foreign employee who could not anticipate the effects of the waiver clause in the receipt he signed. These are examples of German contract law rules.

2. International contracts a) The problems are different with cross-frontier contracts. In these cases it does not go without saying that the same (German) rules are applicable because the contract was not necessarily concluded under the regime of German law. Rather, we have to decide at the outset whose law is to answer the question of allocation of language risks. If the parties have agreed on the application of a certain law, this is simple. In international contracts you can often find clauses like that: "The contract is governed by and shall be construed under English law". If the parties did not stipulate the applicable law, then this depends on the closest connection the contract has to a certain law, which in the case of sales and exports generally is the law of the seller (the party that performs the 'distinguishing' contract duty other than the payment of money). This rule is conclusive for a number of EC-countries which agreed on common rules of the law applicable to contracts some years ago. 6 b) In the case of bilingual contracts - that is, when both versions are declared to be equivalent - the problem of contradictions in the translation has to

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be solved. It seems to be reasonable to cancel the inconsistent parts and fill the gap with the law determined by the contract's closest connection. Or, if essentials of the contract are affected by the contradictions, the contract lacks its ba-7 sis altogether and cannot be regarded as valid. c) In international trade there is a special phenomenon that is supposed to give a simple answer to all these questions. That is the increasing harmonization of different national laws. This harmonization is initiated either by private organizations of international trade, like the International Chamber of ComQ merce, or the IATA. They recommend the use of contract terms in international business that are defined without reference to any national concept. The other source of harmonization is by public international organizations like the UN or the EC. The techniques of harmonizing different national laws can be similar in that they recommend the ratification of unified laws to their member states. 9 On the EC-level we have different techniques which are much more efficient: that is either direct law making by Brussels (so-called 'regulations') or at least the obligation of the member-states to implement harmonized model laws into their national systems (by 'directives'). 10 The reason why I mention these efforts in this context is that harmonization of law does not necessarily mean harmonization of languages. There are quite a number of new construction problems concerned with harmonized laws as long as the states or the contract partners do not agree on the authority of one version of the respective provisions. Here are some examples: - On the reverse side of many airline tickets there is a clause saying that in case of an accident the liability of the carrier is limited to a certain sum. Now: What is an accident? Is it only a crash, the physical destruction of the aircraft or parts of it, or is the sudden drop in air-pressure in the cabin that causes severe ear problems an accident, too? - Different courts in different countries have taken different positions in this regard. 11 - The same is true for the interpretation of International terms of commerce ιη (Incoterms) in different countries. - Another example is to be found in the EC-wide laws on product liability. The EC-directive - that is the basis for national product liability statutes says that the producer shall be liable for damages caused by a defect in his product "with a lower threshold of 500 ECU". This gave rise to the interpretation that in case of damages higher than 500 the total amount can be

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recovered - only the small claims should not fall under the rule. The French version translates the same directive as "le dommage - . . . sous déduction d'une franchise de 5 0 0 E c u s " , and in German it says something about "Selbstbeteiligung von 5 0 0 E C U " . 1 3 -

T h e UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is applicable, if ratified, to the sale o f goods ("la vente des marchandises", "Kaufverträge über Waren"). There are quite different conceptions behind this notion o f 'goods', and it is not clear, for example, wether the Convention covers soft-ware contracts, too: Are they goods? It seems that the English terminology is broader than the German one, which traditionally means "movable and tangible things" only with " W a r e n " . 1 4 T o be sure, not all of these problems of interpretation are caused by linguis-

tic differences between two versions o f a document on the same topic. S o m e o f them are simply questions o f different understandings of the same word by different people even of the same language. On the transnational level such problems simply come up more often and in a more explicit form, as there are different national concepts behind every notion. T h e legal solution to such problems is, for some cases, provided by private international law. In a given case where we have a conflict o f senses of a provision o f unified law we have to pay attention to that nation's understanding o f the provisions that have the closest connection to the contract. 1 5 (And again: in sales contracts this usually is the seller's perspective). This does not guarantee international uniformity, indeed. But it secures at least the conformity o f the national origins o f general contract rules and the definitions o f specific terms. Where international courts do exist - like the European Court o f Justice in Luxembourg - another solution o f the disharmony problem can be applied. T h e Courts can be asked to decide the dispute not under national perspectives but under a truely independent, autonomous concept o f interpretation that has to be prepared by comparative and functional analysis, a difficult task indeed.16 Such an autonomous interpretation could even be practised by national courts, and there are already some rules advising national courts to take into consideration the supra-national origin o f statutory provisions. 1 7

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II. Language risks in procedure Coming to the next point, the language risk in procedure, I must first of all define the problem. Which language is admissible before courts and administrative authorities? Is there an 'official language'? What are the consequences of not using it? This is quite another structure of argument. In the contract situation the risk allocation is a matter of balancing the interests between partners on the same level of communication, whereas in the procedure situation we do not have equal partners: here is the citizen - who is confronted with a superior/public authority that can refer to the public interest in using and admitting a certain language.

1. Official language In Germany the legislative solution has been very simple since long ago. Section 184 of the Courts' Constitution Act reads: "The official language is German" (so does sec. 23 of the Administrative Procedure Act). This general rule has consequences that have to be examined more closely. a) Decisions of courts and public authorities, declarations, statements, that are made in the official language, are deemed valid regardless of the comprehensibility to the addressee. And, vice versa, any petition, application, presentation to a court or official body other than in the official language can be disregarded. - In Germany this principle has a long tradition that is not confined to the language question only. Rather, it seems to be a general matter of the underlying concept of what the state is. According to the idea of a "Hoheitsstaat" sovereign authority (as a matter of principle) ranks above the citizen's position. If these rules would be applied without qualification, we would arrive at the following results: - An expulsion order to a refugee has to contain an instruction on the possibilities of challenging it - which is necessary to start the time limit. This instruction would take effect even if the refugee does not understand a word. - Or: A statutory 3-days-deadline for objections against the default judgement would expire and bar later protests even if the judgement debtor did not understand the details of the judgement.

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- And finally: An application for an administrative action or a court order could go unnoticed - even though it was brought in time - if it was not submitted in the official language or accompanied by a translation. b) This indeed, was the traditional approach of the German courts under the statutory provisions mentioned above: The risks of using a foreign language vis-à-vis state authorities and not understanding what they say thus fully charges the foreigner. He/she has to provide (and to pay!) for necessary translations and run the risk of not understanding, of expiration of time, and the like. 18

2. Constitutional critique This strict position, however, does not in every case meet human rights' and constitutional requirements. a) First of all, in criminal procedures the European Convention of Human Rights requires the authorities to inform an arrested or accused suspect about the charges in a language he/she can understand. Also, the accused is entitled to interpreter support in every stage of the proceeding. The European Court of Human Rights, for instance, 10 years ago blamed the Federal Republic of Germany for not providing for interpretation free of charge, so that the state meanwhile assumes the costs by statute. 19 b) Furthermore, there is a number of civil rights in the national constitutions that obviously have a bearing on the practise of the courts and agencies vis-à9Π vis foreigners, not only in criminal cases, but also in other proceedings. - The right to be heard (due process, rechtliches Gehör) is due to everyone, not only to the state's own nationals, and this demands protection against language isolation in state proceedings. - The principle of a fair trial requires communication support for those unable to communicate in the official language. - The constitutional guarantee of effective judicial protection against infringements by the state or by others cannot do without considering language handicaps. - And finally: the necessity of equal treatment before the law for those in court and administrative proceedings mandates compensation of linguistic disadvantages.

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c) These are very general constitutional principles, indeed, but they are valid in one form or another in most European countries. 21 Their consequences can be summarized as influencing the application of provisions on an official language in different aspects. First, we cannot simply allocate the language risk to foreigners without any qualification. There is obviously a difference between an expulsion procedure of a political refugee and a civil proceeding on a small claim of 150 DM. The relative importance of the affected interests and their constitutional weight have to be considered when one language is to be enforced against another. Second, principles of procedural economy and responsibility of the parties require active efforts of a foreigner who is confronted with another official language: He cannot simply wait for translations and compensation for all his language deficiencies. Rather, he is expected to provide for translation etc. as far as he can recognize the problems and has a realistic possibility to deal with them. In any event, the least the host state can be charged with is the necessary information and warnings on the risks of using a foreign language or of not understanding the native language.

3. International organizations: The example of the European Court of Justice Until now I have been dealing with language problems in national courts and agencies. The situation is quite different in international institutions. Here the national restriction to one language is impossible from the outset. Rather than describing the Babylonian problems in the United Nations or in Brussels, I shall briefly turn to one example: the European Court of Justice 99

(ECJ) in Luxembourg. The rules of procedure provide for 3 different language levels: First of all there is the rule that any of the 9 official languages or Irish (which is not an official language) can and have to be used as the language of procedure. That means that even a non-EC-party - for instance a Swedish or a Japanese applicant for an import quota - has to use one of the 9 + 1 official languages. It is usually up to the appellant to choose one of the languages which will be the language of this proceeding - unless the appellant is an organ of the Community itself: in this case the defendant's language is the language of proceedings. But in practice this language is very often supplemented by the so-called working language. This is the language the judges use for their internal communication, for the reports of the proceedings, for questions in the session, for

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the final argument. 24 From the very beginning of the European Court of Justice it was the French language that was usually adopted by the judges as the common medium of deliberation, and, interestingly enough, it seems to have retained this position even after the accession of the English speaking countries. 25 - And finally there is the level of publication: The decisions of the court are eventually translated and published in the 9 official languages, among which in case of later doubts only one is authentic, and that is the language of procedure (as mentioned above). 26 - By the way: to master the task of translation, Luxembourg has some 120 lawyers/translaters, usually double qualified, who translate some 80.000 pages per year (i.e. 7 pages per day for 77 each translator).

III. Defending the native language by law? Is it possible and does it make sense to prescribe the use not only of a certain language at home but also of a certain usage and even of specific terms in the native language? These questions have a completely different importance when posed in a multilingual country (like Belgium, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Finland, Canada) - as compared to a unilingual country. As other colleagues in this context are dealing with minority protection already, I shall confine myself to a rough sketch of legal efforts - some say fascinating, some say eccentric - to defend a language against foreign influences, and that is the French legislation of recent years concerning the use of the French language. Every foreign visitor to France - even if he/she is not a linguist - knows that the French have a special relationship to their language. Without probing too deep into the history of French fears and complaints about "Frantalien, Fragñol, Franglais" - the crossbreeds/bastards of French and Italian, Spanish, and English - I shall start only in 1976 with the enactment of a law, the "loi relative à l'emploi de la langue française". 28 It bears the signature of someone who is said to be particularly language-conscious: then-president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. What the law says is this. First it imposes an obligation on everyone offering goods or services in France to frame such offers, advertisements, labels, using instructions, guarantees and so on in French. Also, it bans the use of any foreign term in such communications (by the way: also on TV and radio) as far as a French equivalent exists which is prescribed in detail in various lists issued from time to

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time by government ministries. The breach of those duties is punished by criminal sanctions (fines and even imprisonment). Second, the law imposes the duty to write contracts of employment in French without said foreign terms. If the employee is a foreigner he is only entitled to a translation. Third, public notices, displays in public places - that means highways, airports, public transport, bus shelters - have to be in purified French (although they may be accompanied by a translation for foreign visitors). And finally the law makes similar provisions for the drafting of all contracts concluded by public bodies. This law is supplemented by a number of regulations and decrees establishing boards and committees in different fields who compile and publish the said lists, outlawing foreign terminology (above all Anglicisms of course), and recommending French replacements. The main fields of application so far have been data processing, other fields of industry, health, defense, telecommunication and advertising, tourism and transport (some examples: data banc = banque de donées, package tour = contrat à forfait, jumbo jet = le gros porteur). - In the first ten years of the law's operation more than 200 companies and individuals have been successfully prosecuted and convicted for failing to employ French in their advertising materials. Although the fines tended to be very small, the publicity attached to the cases - some of them went up until the Cour de cassation - no doubt had its effect. Official commentators try to argue that these laws were enacted for the protection of French consumers. They should be informed in a way they can understand. I do not think that this is a sufficient justification for such a legislation. Rather it seems to me, it is a matter of cultural identity and of national pride that motivates the French legislation. Whether laws are really an instrument to cope with those questions I do not want to judge on (although for a self-confident lawyer this might be too modest an assumption).

IV. Theses for a language policy in Europe 1. The allocation of legal language risks in international commercial contracts can be left to the parties. They can either agree on the respective burden, or, in case of lack of agreement, the general rules of contract interpretation have to be applied.

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2. In the case of consumer or labour contracts, where an economic superiority of one party is typical, the foreign consumer or employee needs protection. Thus in such situations every language policy has to make sure that sufficient information is provided, as well as instruction on risks of a foreign language, and translation. Thus, in the contract setting there is no need for prescribing one or more official languages. Language policy here means: Indirect influence by providing a framework of rules for information and interpretation. 3. In procedures in national courts and administrations only as a matter of principle the native language can be used. If foreign parties are affected, though, safeguards are necessary that they be efficiently informed on language risks. 4. All this is different in the case of international institutions (courts, agencies, parliaments). Here a language policy has to put nationalisms into practical, economic, and, last but not least, into political perspective. And that means that those who have to do with international institutions must be prepared to use a common working language - which does not necessarily have to be prescribed once and for all.

Notes 1.

Reithmann and Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht (4. Aufl. 1988), no. 758; Schlechtriem, "Das Sprachrisiko - ein neues Problem?" in: Festgabe für Weitnauer (1981), 129.

2.

Jayme, "Sprachrisiko und internationales Privatrecht beim Bankverkehr mit ausländischen Kunden", in: Festschrift für Bärmann (1975), 509, 517/8; Spellenberg, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Bd. 7 (Internationales Privatrecht), 2. Aufl. München 1990, Vor Art. 11 EGBGB, No. 142.

3.

E.g. in maritime charter contracts, c.f. Reithmann and Martiny (op. cit. note 1), no. 645. See generally Medicus, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB (3. Aufl. Heidelberg 1988), § 24. For an analysis of an illustrating example see Reinhart, Zum Sprachenproblem im grenzüberschreitenden Handelsverkehr, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 1982, 226.

4.

5.

Medicus, op. cit. § 24; Zweigert and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtvergleichung Bd. 2 (2. Aufl. Tübingen 1984, English translation by T. Weir, Amsterdam 1989) § 7.

6.

Art. 4 of the EEC-Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980). See North (ed.), Contract Conflicts (Amsterdam, N e w York, Oxford 1982).

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7.

Reithmann and Martiny, op. cit. (note 1), no. 146; Reinhart, Verwendung fremder Sprachen als Hindernis beim Zustandekommen von Kaufverträgen? Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1977, 16.

8.

The ICC already in 1936 proposed the use of "International terms of commerce" (Incoterms) to which the contract partners could agree by using one out of 14 short forms (like cif, fob, fas...) for certain distributions of charges and risks. The International Air-Transport Association (IATA) not only organizes a tariff system among the member airlines, but also promulgates standard contract terms for the flight passage. For an example see the Vienna UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 1980, UN-doc. A/CONF. 9/19 (1981). For these sources of law see Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972) or von Ganshof van der Meersch (ed.), Droit des Communautés Européennes (1969). For examples see Giesen, Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 82 (1983), 31, 36; Ruhwedel, Der Luftbeförderungsvertrag (Frankfurt 1986), 90. Eisemann, Die Incoterms in Handel und Verkehr (Wien 1963). Cf. H. Koch, "Internationale Produkthaftung und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung durch die EG-Richtlinie", in: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988), 537, 542. See Czerwenka, Rechtsanwendungsprobleme im internationalen Kauf recht (Berlin 1988), 146. Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht (Tübingen 1975), 204. Kropholler, op. cit., 265. Cf. Art. 36 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch; Protocol 2 on the uniform Interpretation of the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, International Legal Materials 28 (1989), 620, 641. For a detailed analysis of the case law see Ingerì, Sprachrisiko im Verfahren (München 1988). Luedicke v. Federal Republic of Germany, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1979, 34. For an analysis see Duffy, Human Rights Review vol. IV no. 2 (1979), 98. The cost rule was changed by Statute of 18.8.1980, BGBl I 1503 (Nr. 1904 Kostenverzeichnis zum GKG). See Ingerì, op. cit. For an account of the situation in the U.S. see Arjona "Language Planning in the Judicial System", in: Language Planning Newsletter 9 No. 1 (1983), 1 and Levi, "Rights of Language Minorities in the United States: An Introductory Bibliography", in: Language Planning Newsletter 11 No. 3 (1985), 2. Cf. Berteloot, "Babylone à Luxembourg - Jurilinguistique à la Cour de Justice", in: Vorträge, Reden, Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut der Universität des Saarlandes Nr. 136, 1988. European Court of Justice, Order of procedure of 1974/1982, O.J. 1982 no. C 39, Art. 29-31. Art. 29 § 5 ECJ Order of procedure. Berteloot, op. cit. 11. Berteloot, op. cit. 13.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

160 27. 28.

Harald Koch Berteloot, op. cit. 11. Loi no. 75-1349 du 31. Décembre 1975, J. O. 4.1.1976, p. 189. Cf. Delaporte, "La loi relative à l'emploi de la langue française", in: Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 1976, 447; Munday, "Legislating in Defence of the French Language", in: Cambridge Law Journal 44 (1985), 218; Carbonneau, "Linguistic Legislation and Transnational Commercial Activity: France and Belgium", in: American Journal of Comparative Law 29 (1981), 393.

References Arjona, Etilvia 1983 "Language planning in the judicial system", in: Language Planning News Letter 9 No. 1, 1. Berteloot, Pascale 1988 "Babylone à Luxembourg - Jurilinguistique à la Cour de Justice", in: Vorträge, Reden, Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut der Universität des Saarlandes, Nr. 136. Carbonneau, Jacques 1981 "Linguistic legislation and transnational commercial activity: France and Belgium", in: American Journal of Comparative Law 29, 393. Czerwenka, G. Beate 1988 Rechtsanwendungsprobleme im internationalen Kaufrecht. Berlin. Delaporte, Vincent 1976 "La loi relative à l'emploi de la langue française", in: Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 447. Duffy, P.J., Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc 1979 "A discussion of the case and of certain questions raised by it", in: The Human Rights Review, Vol. IV no. 2, 98. Eisemann, H. and Melis, D. 1982 Incoterms. (Ausgabe 1980.) Wien. Von Ganshof van der Meersch, E. (ed.) 1969 Droit des Communautés Européennes. Ingerì, Reinhard E. 1988 Sprachrisiko im Verfahren - Zur Verwirklichung der Grundrechte deutschunkundiger Beteiligter in Gerichts- und Verwaltungsverfahren. München. Ipsen, Hans-Peter 1972 Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht. Jayme, Erik 1975 "Sprachrisiko und Internationales Privatrecht beim Bankverkehr mit ausländischen Kunden", in: Festschrift für Bärmann, 509. Koch, Harald 1988 "Internationale Produkthaftung und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung durch die EG-Richtlinie", in: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 152,537.

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Kropholler, Jan 1975 Internationales Einheitsrecht. Tübingen. Levi, Judith N. 1985 "Rights of language minorities in the United States: An introductory bibliography", in: Language Planning News Letter 11 No. 3, 2. Medicus, Dieter 1988 Allgemeiner Teil des BGB, (3. Aufl.) Heidelberg. 1990 Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Bd. 7 (Internationales Privatrecht). (2. Aufl.) München. Munday, Roderick 1985 "Legislating in defence of the French Language", in: Cambridge Law Journal 44, 218. North, J. (ed.) 1982 Contract Conflicts. Amsterdam, New York: Oxford. Reinhart, Gert 1977 "Verwendung fremder Sprachen als Hindernis beim Zustandekommen von Kaufverträgen?" in: RIW (Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft) 16. 1982 "Zum Sprachenproblem im grenzüberschreitenden Handelsverkehr", in: IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts), 226. Reithmann, Christoph and Martiny, Dieter 1988 Internationales Vertragsrecht, (4. Aufl.). Schlechtriem, Peter 1981 "Das Sprachrisiko - ein neues Problem?" in: Festgabe für Weitnauer, 129. Zweigert, Konrad and Kötz, Hein 1984 Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. (2. Aufl.) Tübingen, English translation by Tony Weir, Amsterdam 1989.

The impact of European Community rules on linguistic policies of the Member States Bruno De Witte

Introduction European unification, until now, has largely consisted in a change of the scale of production and trade which merges various national markets into "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured". 1 This internal market can only function in an optimal way if the transaction costs between the market participants are minimal, and, more specifically, if they are able to communicate effectively with each other. This creates the need, for instance, for a standardisation of the technical specifications of certain products, or the need for telecommunication networks in the various countries to be compatible with one another. One could say that, in a metaphorical sense, Europe should speak a common language. But the question may also be raised in the literal sense: does successful economic integration require the use of a common language? The same question has been the object of historical analysis in relation to the development of the European nation-states. In his influential sociohistorical work Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner, for one, argues that the cultural and linguistic nationalism of the 19th century ("one state, one nation, one language") has to be explained in terms of the social and economic evolution of that time. The structural change taking place in the economies of all European countries from the late 18th century onwards, more particularly the shift to an industrial economy, led to a new division of labour and hitherto unknown occupational mobility. Now, the capacity "to move between diverse jobs, and incidentally to communicate and cooperate with numerous individuals in other social positions" requires "that members of such a society be able to communicate in speech and writing, in a formal, precise, context-free manner - in other words they must be educated, literate and capable of orderly, standardised presentation of messages. (...) Men cooperating on complex

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tasks involving high technology must be able to read the same idiom" (Gellner 1987: 15). This, of course, is an analysis of the historical evolution which took place during an earlier century. As such, it has met with both support and criticism among historians. But what is interesting for our present purposes is the light this theory may throw on the new enlargement of economic scale taking place in the second half of this century, which is known as European integration. One may wonder whether this new operation will, in the long run, produce the same effect on cultural and linguistic diversity as the earlier one arguably did. Do we witness a similar process of linguistic standardisation, by which some of the smaller "national" languages (such as Dutch or Danish) will be reduced to the status of quasi-dialects and one or a few "national" European languages will emerge? However, the institutional conditions now are very different from what they were in the nineteenth century. Unlike then, the creation of a larger economic space has not been accompanied by the transfer of cultural and linguistic policy decision-making to the higher level of government. Indeed, on a first legal view, the European Community would seem to have no reason or means to interfere with the linguistic policies of its Member States.

The EEC treaty and linguistic policy The fundamental legal starting point is that the European Community was created by an international treaty containing specific rules binding the contracting States and attributing specific powers to the Community institutions. All the remainder was left within the jurisdiction of the Member States. And as the EEC Treaty does not contain any rules relating to language use (except for the functioning of the European institutions themselves, but this aspect will be left aside here), nor provides the Community institutions with competences to adopt such rules, the logical conclusion would seem to be that EEC rules cannot affect the linguistic policies of the Member States. More generally, one could say that even if the process of economic integration may affect informal patterns of linguistic communication, the formal political decision was to separate the economic and the cultural spheres, and to launch a process of economic unification leaving unaffected national competences in culture and education.

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policies

According to one interpretation, this was above all a matter of strategic choice. The choice for economic integration may be explained in terms of the functionalist theory of integration: economic interdependence would gradually but irresistibly lead to the ultimate goal of the political union of Europe. Cultural activities were therefore not so much excluded as postponed; they might be added as a further stage of integration, or also as a parallel strategy at times •j

when the economic vehicle of integration seemed to be grinding to a halt. The non-inclusion of culture may, however, also be seen as a substantive choice. In this view, the European founding fathers had decided that peaceful coexistence and growth required economic unification but need not affect the political independence or cultural identity of the Member-States. In other words, Europe should by no means become a new nation-state according to the 19th century model but rather a (con)federation respecting existing cultural patterns. The legal starting point, as sketched above, needs however considerable rectification. Since the coming into force of the EEC Treaty, Community law has developed in a strong and often unpredictable way. Starting from the purely economical and trade-oriented concepts of the Treaty, the Community has gradually extended its influence over a number of non-primarily economic policy areas, among which such apparently remote areas like education, culture or language, none of which are mentioned in the EEC Treaty. 4 The fundamental legal justification for this expansion is the fact that the powers attributed to the Community are only partially defined in sectoral terms (examples are agriculture or transport) but more largely in functional terms, that is, they are defined in terms of an objective to achieve rather than in terms of a substantive policy to develop. The overall functional objective indicated in the Treaty is, of course, the establishment of a common (or internal) market. In implementing this objective, the Community institutions necessarily have to cut across the boundaries between substantive policy areas which the States are used to trace for their own internal purposes. In this way, many public policies which were not transferred as such to the Community have nevertheless been limited by Community rules and Community action. In the following pages, I will try to show that the linguistic policies of the Member-States (and their regions) are also, be it rather modestly, affected by this mechanism.

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Linguistic barriers and the internal market The general consequence of the creation of a common market for the linguistic policies of the Member States is, briefly speaking, as follows. The EEC treaty aims at guaranteeing free and unhindered economic activity across the intra-Community borders. As language is the medium of all economic activity, the rules of the EEC treaty also, implicitly, establish the principle of free language use in transnational economic activity. As this linguistic freedom is often limited by national rules on language use, a conflict may arise, which, due to the principle of supremacy of Community law, is to be decided in favour of the EEC rules. This basic statement will be illustrated by a short analysis of the chief components of the common market: the free movement of goods, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of persons. The free movement of goods implies a prohibition of all national laws and regulations that, directly or indirectly, hinder intra-Community trade in goods. It is not required that those regulations should discriminate against imported or exported goods. Measures applying indistinctly to "national" and to "foreign" goods may also be contrary to the free movement of goods if their effect is to restrict the trade of the "foreign" goods. Rules on language use may constitute barriers to trade of this type. One very common example is that of requirements concerning the language to be used in the labelling of goods or in documentation accompanying those goods. If those requirements are different from one country to another (and they are bound to be), there are extra costs for those producers who want to market their goods in several countries and have to comply with the (different) linguistic requirements of each of those. Therefore, such linguistic rules may be analysed as a potential restriction on trade (cf. Mattera 1988: 417). On the other hand, those rules may be justified by the need to provide adequate information to the consumer of the product. The Community has recognised the need to balance free movement and consumer protection and has enacted a Directive harmonising the national rules relating to the labelling of foodstuffs. 5 The Directive holds that the Member States may (and must) prescribe that labelling should be in a language easily understandable by the consumer unless the consumer is sufficiently informed otherwise about the nature of the product. National regulations that prescribe the use of the national language in all cases and for all products would therefore seem to be excessive (cf. Van Bunnen 1988).

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Some national provisions go even further than that. The most far-reaching piece of legislation is certainly the French "Loi sur l'emploi de la langue française" of 1975, which in practice imposes the use of the French language in all commercial transactions taking place on French territory, even if one or all of the participants are foreigners. 6 In addition to the free movement of goods, the EEC Treaty also guarantees the freedom to provide services from one Member-State into another, which covers such diverse commercial "products" as the financial services offered by banks and insurance companies, the legal services offered by lawyers or accountants, the information services provided by a telecommunication firm. Linguistic requirements may hamper the international trade in those goods as much as the trade in goods, by regulating the language to be used in promotional offers and contracts, or in the provision of the services themselves. The linguistic dimension is particularly important for transfrontier broadcasting which, according to the European Court of Justice, has to be considered as a "service" in the sense of the EEC Treaty, at least when the channel or the η

single programmes have a commercial character. Can the Member States justifiably impose requirements as to the linguistic origin of programmes, or as to the language in which the programmes should be transmitted? What is certainly not allowed is a discriminatory treatment; in the fairly recent case of the Bond van Nederlandse Adverteerders ν the Netherlands\ a Dutch regulation which prohibited advertisements on foreign channels using o the Dutch language were found to be incompatible with the EEC Treaty. The reverse of this, namely the imposition on national broadcasters of a duty to use the national language or (more commonly) to broadcast a certain amount of programmes produced in that language, has also restrictive effects on the trade in broadcasting services. But this restriction was, after some discussion, accepted in the recently adopted EEC Directive on transfrontier television. 9

Free movement of persons More important consequences for national linguistic policies derive from the rules concerning the free movement of persons. This freedom implies that persons who are economically active may freely move to other Community countries and are entitled there to equal treatment with the State's own nationals. This principle of equal treatment was worked out in more detail by Regulation

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1612/68. 10 Article 3 of this Regulation also prohibits indirect discrimination in the following words: "provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action or administrative practices of a Member State shall not apply: (...) where, though applicable irrespective of nationality, their exclusive or principal aim or effect is to keep nationals of other Member States away from the employment offered. "This provision shall not apply to conditions relating to linguistic knowledge required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled". In other words, when a Member State makes access to employment dependent on linguistic proficiency, there is a presumption of an indirect discrimination against foreign workers, unless it can be shown that such proficiency is needed for that particular job. This is theoretically a far-reaching limit on the Member State's linguistic policies, but its practical scope may have seemed very limited at the time of adoption, in 1968. Indeed, it only relates to the public regulation of private employment relations, and language rules of this kind hardly existed at that time. 11 Outside the scope of the Regulation remained linguistic requirements imposed by the employer on his own initiative, and also, or at least it seemed so, linguistic requirements in public employment. Indeed, the EEC Treaty has a provision, article 48 (4) stating that the free movement of workers does not apply to "employment in the public service", for which nationality conditions, and a fortiori linguistic conditions seemed perfectly legitimate. On this last point, a major change has taken place since 1968, through a series of judgements of the European Court of Justice limiting drastically the exception clause of article 48 (4). Henceforth, workers from other Community countries can only be excluded from public sector jobs that are concerned with the exercise of state authority (justice, police, central ministerial departments) but not from the (more numerous) jobs in other public service sectors such as 19 health care, education or transport. In the latter category of services, the principle of free movement fully applies, including the language provision of Regulation 1612/68. The role of this provision becomes then much more important, because linguistic requirements are very often made upon access to public sector jobs. One can even say that, as a rule, all plurilingual countries or regions have more or less formal rules of this kind. The question of whether those rules are compatible with EEC law was squarely raised in the Groener case recently decided by the European Court of Justice. 13

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The facts of this case were the following. Anita Groener is a Dutch national who was a part-time teacher of painting at the College of Marketing and Design in Dublin. In order to be appointed on a permanent basis, she had to show, like Irish nationals, that she had an adequate knowledge of the Irish language. She failed in the examination which she took for that purpose and then claimed that this requirement was invalid because it constituted an indirect discrimination causing the exclusion of foreign applicants. Knowledge of the Irish language was, she claimed, not necessary at all for this particular function, as her experience during those years had shown. It would seem, indeed, that there was no functional need to know Irish for teaching the art of painting in Dublin. But before the European Court, the Irish and French government, supported herein by the Advocate General, used a different sort of argument and pointed to the cultural and political need that all teachers in Ireland should be able to understand and speak a certain amount of Irish. The Irish Constitution proclaims that Irish is the first national language, and that Irish and English are both official languages of the country. This means that all Irish citizens have a general right to use that language and that the government may lawfully impose a corresponding duty to know that language on teachers in the public education system. The Court of Justice accepted this point of view to a large extent and held: The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national language and the first official language. (...) The importance of education for the implementation of such a policy must be recognized. Teachers have an essential role to play, not only through the teaching which they provide but also by their participation in the daily life of the school and the privileged relationship which they have with their pupils. In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable to require them to have some knowledge of the first national language. 14 Yet, the reasoning of the Court also indicates that there are limits to the autonomy of national linguistic policy decisions: "(T)he implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free movement of workers. Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures intended to implement such a policy must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against nationals of other Member States." The court rejects the view of the French government that lin-

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guistic policy is entirely beyond the scope of Community law and confirms the "functional" doctrine described earlier on, namely that any national policy standing in the way of one of the Common market freedoms is to be carefully scrutinised. The consequences of Groener appear rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the Irish regulation (and, indirectly, similar regulations elsewhere in the Community) is allowed to stand, and the court corrects somewhat the impression that, from the point of view of market integration, linguistic diversity is not so much a cultural asset as an obstacle to efficient communication. 15 On the other hand, the Court has established its jurisdiction to check whether language regulations do not impinge on the exercise of Community rights. Moreover, its holding is limited to official languages. Rules prescribing the use or knowledge of minority languages would not necessarily be viewed with favour. However, the role of European Community Law has not simply been the negative one of eliminating linguistic barriers to trade and movement of persons, it has also sought, be it rather timidly, to take positive steps in order to increase the linguistic skills of the participants in the common market.

Improving linguistic skills of market participants Generally speaking, the duties imposed by the EEC Treaty are negative in nature. Member States should refrain from imposing certain linguistic obligations on persons participating in transfrontier economic activities. But they should also allow Community workers and their families to avail themselves of the same linguistic rights as the State's own citizens. An example of incompatibility with European Community law is a Belgian statute which gave the right to persons living in the German-speaking part of the country to use the German language in criminal appeal proceedings, but only if they were Belgian citizens. Mr Mutsch, a Luxembourg citizen living in the area was therefore denied that right. This, the Court of Justice held, was an unlawful discrimination against Community workers. The option to use one's own language at court was to be considered as a social advantage for which, according to EEC Regulation 1612/68, Community workers should receive equal treatment. 16 The consequences of this judgement are the following: States may still decide whether or not to grant linguistic rights to their own minorities. But if they grant such rights, Community workers speaking that same minority language should also be entitled to those rights.

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On the other hand, Community law generally does not impose on the States a duty to recognise special language rights to citizens of other Community countries. In a Resolution of the European Parliament on "Special Rights for Community Citizens" adopted in 1977, it was proposed to recognise "the right of Community citizens to use their mother tongue (...) in court actions". But this proposal was never implemented. There are, however, more limited special rights for Community workers. One of the earliest Council regulations implementing free movement deals with the social security rights of Community workers and holds in this respect that "authorities, institutions and tribunals of one Member State may not reject claims or other documents submitted to them on the grounds that they are written in an official language of another Member State." 17 Another Regulation complements this provision by guaranteeing to the same workers the right 18 to have certain administrative decisions notified in their own language. The impact of those provisions of Community law are, practically speaking, very modest but they may have some symbolic importance. Thus, Belgium may well impose the exclusive use of Dutch in official life in the north of the country, and French in the south, but this policy of strict territorial unilingualism has to allow for exceptions provided in favour of Community workers. A potentially more important source of "positive" language rights for EEC citizens is the EEC Directive of 1977 on the education of children of migrant workers. 1 9 On the basis of this binding legal instrument, Member States have a duty to organise special language education for the children of migrant workers from the Community. In order to promote the mobility of Community workers, it was felt that "appropriate measures" had to be taken in order to facilitate the integration of those children by teaching the official language (or one of the official languages) of the host State. Article 3 of the same Directive adds that the States also should promote teaching of the (official) language and culture of the country of origin. This would seem like a recognition of the idea that movement of people should not go to the detriment of linguistic diversity. In fact, the underlying view may be slightly different; as the preamble of the Directive candidly admits, this was included "with a view principally to facilitating their possible reintegration into the Member States of origin". Therefore, both the provision on the teaching of the language of the host State as the one on the teaching of the mother tongue, seem to be inspired by the same goal: improving the linguistic skills of migrant children in order to facilitate the intra-Community mobility of their parents.

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The recent LINGUA programme can be understood along the same lines. This is a multiannual scheme of Community grants to promote training in foreign languages; an ERASMUS-type of construction which is limited to one particular area, that of foreign language education. 20 The link between this initiative and the basic Community objective of market integration is clearly indicated in the preamble of the Decision: "the establishment of the Internal Market would be facilitated by the quantitative improvement of foreign language training within the Community to enable the Community's citizens to communicate with each other and to overcome linguistic difficulties which impede the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital".

Maintaining competition on the market for languages The removal of linguistic barriers to transfrontier activities leads to what could be called a 'market' for languages in which they compete with each other in analogy to what happens on the markets for goods or services. Such an open border situation enhances the value of language skills in the major European languages and correspondingly reduces the incentive to invest time and resources into smaller languages. The question is then whether it is legitimate, under Community law, to correct this market mechanism by preferential policies (e.g. public subsidies) in favour of specific, national or regional, languages. This is still a rather doubtful question. The EEC treaty contains a special chapter whose essential purpose is to ensure that the common market, during and after its emergence, should function according to the rules of economic competition, so as to maximise economic welfare. The Treaty contains two sets of rules, directed on the one hand at the market behaviour of private (or public) enterprises, and on the other hand at state financial intervention affecting the position of (private or public) enterprises. A common condition for the application of those rules is therefore that "enterprises" should be acting or receiving a benefit, but this concept has been given a very wide scope and certainly does not a priori exclude organisations in the cultural sector. Although the competition rules applicable to the activity of private enterprises (articles 85 and following) do have some indirect relevance for governmental policies in the linguistic field, I will deal here mainly with the rules of article 92 and ff. of the EEC Treaty, instituting a Community control of state aids to enterprises. In order to protect competition in the common market, all

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forms of state aid (both direct subsidies and indirect advantages such as fiscal deductions) are subject to the preventive control of the Commission and will be accepted by it only under certain conditions. There is no explicit rule in the Treaty which legitimates subsidies based on linguistic criteria and/or inspired by reasons of linguistic policy. Yet, in reality, subsidies of this kind are very frequent all over Europe, so frequent even that one could not provide a full inventory of them. Suffice it to give a few examples. France has an active policy of favouring the use of the national language which takes not only the form of restrictions against the use of other languages (see above) but also that of positive incentives to French language expression. The government subsidises the translation of French publications into foreign languages; it subsidises French libraries abroad and French publications for distribution abroad; it offers special aid to theater or film productions using the French language; French language "world" radio and the French language song also receive official financial support. It should be added that this policy is not fundamentally different from that pursued by most other European states, only perhaps more systematic. The Autonomous Community of Catalonia and the Basque Country have instituted ambitious policies of "language normalisation" which attempt to re91 store the current and normal use of the Catalan and Basque language. In order to promote the use of those languages in all areas of social life, both regional governments have instituted selective subsidy schemes for cultural activities in which the Catalan language is used in speech or writing: publishing (both books and periodicals), theatre, film production. The compatibilty of these, and many similar, schemes with the EEC Treaty is an uncertain matter. Until now, the Commission has not taken action against any one of them. But, on the other hand, it has resolved itself, in the framework of its internal market programme, to take stronger action against all forms of State aid distorting competition and, until now, there is no provision in the Treaty or judgment by the Court of Justice which would exempt from review subsidies based on linguistic policy considerations. Articles 92 and following are thus hanging as a sword of Damocles over all those regulations; the EEC Treaty does not even distinguish between whether they were granted by national or by regional or local governments. The Member-States of the Community are responsible for the action of all public authorities in the country, even if in some cases the central government is not entitled to control the activities of the regions.

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There is, however, one criterion for the application of the EEC rules which seems reassuring, especially for the schemes favouring regional or minority languages. In order to be caught by the Treaty, state aids should "affect trade between Member States" (art. 92). It may be argued that governmental subsidies to, say, the Catalan language book, will hardly improve the European market share of books produced in Spain or prejudice the import of books from other EEC countries into Spain. Beyond this formal argument, a substantive case can also be made for public support of minority languages which runs parallel to the arguments usually made, and accepted, about less-developed regions within the Community. The Community institutions have long accepted the view that open borders and free competition are not sufficient to ensure the development of peripheral or declining regions, and that they can be made valid participants in the European market only on the basis of a deliberate policy for developing their economic structure. This attitude of the Community has two sides: the negative side is the non-application of the usual strict standards for the control of national subsidies if those form part of a regional development programme. The positive side is the regional development policy of the Community itself, which essentially takes the form of grants from the EC budget to regional development plans proposed by Member States or regional and local authorities. The European Regional Development Fund instituted for that purpose is the second largest item of Community expenditure, after agricultural policy. The argument in favour of positive incentives to less-developed regions may be extended to minority languages, and to smaller European languages in general. Incentives are needed to give those languages a fair chance on the "cultural market" and to preserve linguistic diversity effectively. Such a policy could also take two forms: accepting national systems of subsidy to smaller (national or regional) languages as legitimate under article 92, and offering some support from the Community budget to those same languages.

Community support for languages There is a further strong argument why public subsidies for the use of regional and minority languages should be declared compatible with the EEC Treaty, and that is that the European Community itself is providing some financial help of this nature, mainly through the "European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages" established in Dublin in 1982.

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This is perhaps the most widely known element of European Community linguistic policy, but its importance should not be overrated. First of all, the legal basis for this expenditure is a resolution of the European Parliament based on the so-called Arfé-report which, like the later resolution based on the Kuijpers-report, has no binding force. This subsidy is therefore the precarious result of a political agreement between the various budgetary authorities of the EC (Council, Parliament and Commission) which can be revoked at each yearly occasion. Moreover, the size of this financial support for minority languages is quite modest, and will be more than offset by the money which the EC will start distributing through the LINGUA programme mentioned earlier, which is reserved to the so-called Community languages (that is, the official languages of the Member States) and from which most "lesser-used" languages are therefore excluded. Probably around 10 % of all EEC citizens speak a regional or minority language. Those persons receive comparably less financial support from the Community budget than the 90 % who happen to speak an official language of the Community. Formally speaking, the Community has expressed a general commitment to protect linguistic pluralism and to enhance multilingualism. 22 But a true policy of linguistic pluralism would imply a reversal of its present tendency to neglect the traditional regional and minority languages.

Notes 1.

This is the definition of the "internal market" given by article 8A of the EEC Treaty.

2.

Gellner (1983). A later and briefer presentation of those views can be found in Gellner (1987).

3.

The latter happened during the late 1970s and early 1980s, during which one finds a number of European "cultural" initiatives inspired by the need to reinforce the feeling of loyalty to the Community at a time when economic integration did no longer seem to provide tangible benefits. See De Witte (1987).

4.

On education, see various contributions in De Witte (1989); on culture, see generally Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen (1988); and Rasmussen and De Witte in J. Schwarze & H.G. Schermers (1988).

5. 6.

Directive 79/112 of 18 December 1978, Official Journal 1979, L 33/1. Loi N° 7 5 - 1 3 4 9 du 31 décembre 1975 relative à l'emploi de la langue française, Journal officiel 4 - 1 - 1 9 7 6 , p. 189. See the following commentaries: Delaporte (1976), Carbonneau (1981).

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7.

The European Court's approach has been developed in four cases which all dealt with commercial television programmes transmitted by cable in another country than the country in which the programme originated: case 155/73, Sacchi, [1974] European Court Reports 490; case 52/79, Procureur du Roi ν Debauve, [1980] European Court Reports 833; case 62/79, .S'A Coditel et al. ν SA Ciné Vog Films et al., [1980] European Court Reports 881; case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders et al. ν the Netherlands, judgement of 26 April 1988, [1988] European Court Reports 2085.

8.

The facts of this case may seem curious, as one would expect a government to impose rather than prohibit the use of the national language, but the prohibition in this case was intended to shield the Dutch advertising market from foreign commercials specially directed at the Dutch public. EEC Directive of 3 October 1989 "on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities", Official Journal 1989, L 298/23, article 8. Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968, Official Journal 1968, L 257. Since then, Belgium has seen the adoption of (regional) legislation on language use in private employment, but this imposes the use of a particular language during employment rather than the knowledge of that language at the time of access (Decree of the Flemish Community of 19 July 1973; Decree of the French Community of 29 June 1982). According to the French "loi sur l'emploi de la langue française" mentioned above, labour contracts must be made in French, but knowledge of the French language is not required from the employee (article 4 of the "loi" even entitles the foreign worker to ask for a translation of the contract in his own language). For an analysis of the case-law of the Court on this question, see Handoll (1988). See also the Communication of the Commission published in Official Journal 1988, C 72/2. Case 371/87, Anita Groener ν Minister for Education and City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee, judgement of 28 November 1989 (not yet published in the official European Court Reports). Groener case, cit., paragraphs 19 and 20. Cf. the statement by Lord Cockfield in the European Parliament, when he was vicepresident of the Commission with the main responsibility for the internal market programme: "linguistic diversity is one of the richest elements in our common European heritage but (...) it should not act as an obstacle to competition, innovation and growth." (Debates of the European Parliament, No. 2-370/242, 28 October 1988). Case 137/84, Ministère Public v. Mutsch, [ 1985] European Court Reports 2681. Regulation n. 3 on social security for migrant workers, now Regulation 1408/71, article 84 (4). Regulation 574/72, article 48 (1). EEC Directive 77/486 of 26 July 1977, Official Journal 1977, L 199/32. Decision nr 89/489 of 28 July 1989, Official Journal L 239 of 16 August 1989. For the concept of "language normalization" and a short description of the Catalan and Basque policies, see Cobarrubias(1989).

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

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See, for instance, the "Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers for Education meeting within the Council", of 6 October 1989 on cooperation and Community action in the field of education, Official Journal of the European Communities 1989, C 277/5.

References Carbonneau, Thomas E. 1981 "Linguistic legislation and transnational commercial activity: France and Belgium", in: American Journal of Comparative Law, 393—412. Cobarrubias, Juan 1989 "The protection of linguistic minorities in the autonomous communities of Spain", in: P. Pupier and J. Woehrling (eds.) Language and Law. Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 3 9 9 ^ 3 4 . Delaporte, Vincent 1976 "La loi relative à l'emploi de la langue française", in: Revue critique de droit international privé, 447-476. De Witte, Bruno 1987 "Building Europe's image and identity", in: A. Rijksbaron, W.H. Roobol, M. Weisglas (eds.) Europe from a Cultural Perspective. Amsterdam: Nijgh en Van Ditmar, 132-139. De Witte, Bruno (ed.) 1989 European Community Law of Education. Baden Baden: Nomos. Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen 1988 Reports of the 13th Congress "Legal Aspects of Community Action in the Field of Culture". Thessaloniki. Gellner, Ernest 1983 Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 1987 "Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion in complex societies", in: E. Gellner (ed.) Culture, Identity and Politics. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 6-28. Handoll, John 1988 "Article 48 (4) EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment", in: European Law Review, 223-241. Mattera, Alfonso 1988 Le marché unique européen - ses règles, son fonctionnement. Paris: Jupiter. Officiai Journal of the European Communities. Schwarze, J. and Schermers, H.G. (eds.) 1988 Structure and Dimensions of European Community Policy. Baden Baden: Nomos. Van Bunnen, Louis 1988 "L'emploi des langues dans l'étiquetage et le droit communautaire", in: Journal des Tribunaux, 41.

Reflections about minority languages in the European Community* Hartmut Haberland

1. Introduction Any language policy - be it a policy of language spread or promotion (Amnion 1989), or just the attempt to regulate the ways people interact in a given community - should have as its prerequisite a survey of the language situation. Thus the Ford Foundation supported early sociolinguistic research in the form of language surveys which were to form the basis of language promotion programmes supported by the Foundation. It is surprising - at least to linguists - that such surveys are rarely carried out before a policy is implemented. Politicians seem to shy away from the acquisition of detailed knowledge before taking action. Perhaps this attitude is related to the fear of more harm being done by legislation than by laissez-faire. At the Bad Homburg conference, Nick Roche told the story about the sad fate of the rhinoceros. In 1973 a conference decided to launch a program to rescue the animal from extinction. Ten years later the total number of rhinoceroses in the world had decreased by 90%. A survey of the languages of Europe would have to deal with minority languages in at least two senses. On the one hand there is the vision that in a future united Europe, national cultures would have to be preserved in exactly the same way as minority cultures are being kept alive in today's nation states. This would imply the maintenance of minority languages. Given the overall poor record for minority rights in Europe, the prospects for the proud national languages of today's Europe would be somewhat bleak. But in spite of this, it is exactly the above mentioned vision that is called up in a leading article in the Danish daily Information of July 16, 1990.1 This is remarkable, since Denmark, 'a small' EC country, has until now always been very wary of giving up its own national identity in favour of a European common identity. Fears of the melting-pot have prevailed until quite recently. The other sense is that Europe, this fringe of promontories on the Western edge of the Asian continent,

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is not only the home of many of the world's 'big' languages; it also is home to a great number of small and very small languages most of which are minority languages in some sense. The concept of minority and minority language is one of those concepts which are used widely and with relative ease, but which seem to defy easy definition. In a document on minority languages commissioned by the European Community and prepared by the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana in 1986 (Simone et al. 1986), the problem is summarized in the following way: The first problem which arises in describing linguistic minorities in EC countries is that of the semantic definition of the expression 'linguistic minority' [...]. It is fairly clear that in a complex area which is full of understandable tensions, such as the area of minorities and their protection, an illchosen term may evoke unforeseen associations of meaning, and may lead to confusions rather than clarity. But the question is not only one of terminology; it is also a question of giving a conceptual definition of the notion of a minority, and this operation turns out to be extremely important even in a practical sense; in fact, if one adopts one meaning of the term rather than another, one may be led to exclude from one's enquiry facts and phenomena which would otherwise be included, or vice versa. (Simone et al. 1986: 8) The careful wording of these preliminary remarks to a discussion of different attempts to define 'minority' and 'linguistic minority' is not surprising given the fact that this is a document prepared for the use of the Commission of the European Communities. While not an official document by the Commission (rather than for the Commission), it could easily be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as speaking for the Community as a whole. I have suggested elsewhere that the goals and objectives of sociolinguistic research can be determined by three agents - the keepers of social order, the involved 'subjects', i.e. social and sociolinguistic groups, and researchers (Haberland 1988:1822f.). Researchers may be impartial to the extent that their research pursues the researcher's own interests, e.g. the acquisition of some position which provides prestige or a livelihood in a reputational system (Whitley 1982). Very often their research is commissioned, but then usually by those in power, as minority groups themselves rarely have the possibility of commissioning research into their own situations. One's position in this triangle is likely to influence one's use of the terms. Minority members are rarely in doubt that they belong to a minority; it is part of their human condition and if somebody proves to them that they really are not a minority (Kurds

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being 'redefined' as 'Mountain Turks' is not the only example) they will at best laugh and scornfully accuse the speaker of what some people call 'semantics'.

2. Minority languages vs. language minorities If one attempts a conceptual clarification of the complex web in which language and minorities are interwoven, the first thing to make clear is the difference between linguistic minorities and minority languages. In her contribution to the Bad Homburg conference, Elisabetta Zuanelli (Zuanelli this volume ) pointed out the difference between language rights (of an individual or a group) and the rights of the language. A statement issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of October 1988, regarding Resolution 192 (1988) of the Council concerning regional languages and minority languages in Europe states clearly that the assembly - I quote from the German version - "betont, daß der Entwurf dieser Charta Sprachen und nicht sprachliche Minderheiten betrifft". This tendency to grant privileges and protection to languages rather than minorities is quite common, for reasons that are not far to seek. But if this tendency exists it requires that we keep minority languages and linguistic minorities apart conceptually. There are even cases where these two do not match: cases of a language minority without a minority language, and cases of a minority language without a language minority. The latter is exemplified by the case of Sanskrit in India or of Irish in Ireland. These languages are spoken by definite demographic units in the respective countries, but these units are rather social categories than social groups according to commonly used criteria. I am not talking about the Gaeltacht population here: I suggest that the reason for the relatively successful maintenance of the Irish language is not so much to be found in the existence of Gaeltacht areas and Gaeilge speakers in the Gaeltacht (most of whom, if not all, are of course bilingual), but the fact that Irish is the First national language of Ireland with speakers outside the Gaeltacht. But I would not consider the Gaeilge speakers outside the Gaeltacht a linguistic minority. An example of the former - a linguistic minority without a minority language - is the German minority in Southern Jutland, North of the DanishGerman border. 2 There we have a perfectly well-established group with extensive linguistic rights, schools - both primary schools and a gymnasium in Abenrâ, the largest town in the area - , etc., but the members of this minority

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largely speak s0nderjysk, the local Danish dialect, as their mother tongue and home language. There are native speakers of German in the area, typically children of German parents who have been 'imported' from Germany to cater for the cultural needs of the minority. These 'German speakers' (Byram 1986: 40 et passim) are to a large degree identical with what the locals refer to as teachers' children (Lehrerkinder) and form a minority within the minority.

3. What is a minority? Many but not all European minority languages are 'small' languages in the sense of Haarmann, 4 notable exceptions being Catalan and Occitan. Obviously we must take the relational character of the minority concept seriously which means asking for its relatum. If minority is related to minor, we have to ask 'smaller than what'? The following definition by Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson gives an important hint: If you live in a country with speakers of many different languages, you have to share at least one language with the others in order for a democratic process to be possible. And if the language most widely spoken by your fellow citizens (either because it is the mother tongue of the majority, or because the power elite has decided that that will be the lingua franca) is not your mother tongue, you belong to a linguistic minority in your country. (1989: 470) It is perhaps slightly problematic that this is the definition of linguistic minority is logically dependent on the definition of mother tongue. But this definition introduces two other important concepts: majority and power elite. As Srivastava has pointed out, the meaning of minor cannot be 'smaller than the majority of the population of a country'. India attests the existence of at least twelve major languages, but none of them is spoken by more than half of the 600 million of total population. (1984: 99) He suggests instead to use a two-dimensional criterion, taking into account both number ("quantum") and power:

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Power

(A)

(B)

Majority

Janta

(C)

(D)

Elite

Minority

Quantum

(Srivastava 1983, 101)

Table 1

Although a minority group really often is a dominated group (as Haugen (1978: 11) has pointed out), a minority in Srivastava's sense is only a group to which both features [-Power, -Quantum] apply. The janta or 'general mass' may well be a dominated group but not a numerical minority - it is [-Power, +Quantum]. Finally, we have the case of 'minorities' with [+Power, —Quantum], groups that should appropriately rather be called 'elites'. The only feasible relatum of minor seems to me to be the national language. Accordingly, a minority language (of a country) is a language existing in a country which is not the national language of this country. It is exactly its mode of existence which is at issue here. Ideally this minority language should exist in a country because some minority group present in this country is related to it. If we accept this, the task of identifying minority languages and linguistic minorities can be broken down into three steps: we have to identify a language, we have to identify a group, and to state what relates this language to this group. Identification of languages (e.g. vis-à-vis dialects) is not an easy task, especially not for linguists; but normal people have no big problems in identifying them and as working concepts they are even used by linguists. Identification of groups is the task of the sociologist. Sociologists usually refer to some common property, to interaction between group members - this is important in order to distinguish a social group from a mere social category

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and sometimes to other-identification of this group. But we have to be careful about the 'real existence' of a group. Gellner makes this point (in his discussion of nations, a form of groups), when he quotes Renan, 'L'oubli et, je dirais même, l'erreur historique sont un facteur essentiel de la création d ' u n e nation . . . ' (Renan 1882), and expands, ... his view that a shared amnesia, a collective forgetfulness, is at least as essential for the emergence of what we now consider to be a nation. ... [Renan] correctly singled out one, perhaps the, crucial trait of a nation: the anonymity of membership. A nation is a large collection of men [!] such that its members identify with the collectivity without being acquainted with its other members, and without identifying in any important way with subgroups of that collectivity. (Gellner 1987: 6) According to Gellner, it is 'will, not fact' that is the basis of nations, or, as he paraphrases it, 'consent, coercion and inertia'. And he goes on to say that this is not the case for nations only, but applies to other social groups as well. Minorities, as we may add. But notice Anderson, who comments on Gellner's dictum that nations are invented by nationalism: Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that 'true' communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. (Anderson, 1983: 15) Once more, the latter applies to minorities too. There is great diversity in the relationship between minority languages and minority groups. The simplest, but not necessarily most common case is that the common property referred to in the demarcation of the group is the use of a distinctive language, in which case the relationship between minority language and language minority already is stated when the group is defined. Alternatively, the relationship between group and language can be some pattern of bilingualism or diglossia. In this case the statement of the relationship between the two (language and group) becomes more complicated. But the rela-

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tionship between group members and languages does not have to involve the group members actually speaking the language in question. In order to identify with a language (to take one obvious example of such a relationship), one does not even have to speak this language (Eastman 1984, Khubchandani 1986). In India, minorities are often defined by religion, or by the use of a specific script rather than a language. In some case, ethnic, religious and linguistic definitions of a minority can compete. This may not affect the self-perception of the minority, but it can have consequences for the rights granted to it. In Northern Greece the minority officially called 'Muslim minority' until 1952, was later referred to as 'Turkish minority'. Today the official term is 'Muslim minority' since one wants to avoid giving the impression that this minority has any connection with the Turkish state. But Turkish is also the name of a language: consider the joint implications of this Sprachregelung and the Council of Europe statement referred to above about the rights in the Minority Language Charter that are granted to languages but not to minorities as such (hence, not to non-linguistic minorities like religious ones).

4. Dimensions relevant for the discussion of minorities There are some dimensions by which we can classify linguistic minorities and minority languages and which seem useful and - in part - correlated. The following seem to me to be dimensions particularly relevant for European minorities.

1st dimension autochthonous

M

•

recent immigration (imports)

'Recency' is of course a relative concept and the question of whether English in Ireland (or even England) or French in France are autochthonous could lead to heated debate. 5 But the distinction seems to grasp a relevant difference - which probably has to do with the fact that it is strongly correlated with another dimension, viz. the following:

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2nd dimension territorially compact

•

territorially scattered

This is simply the question of whether the territoriality principle applies in any meaningful sense. A typical language area with a high density of languages per given area is New Guinea; according to some, New Guinea is home to one fourth to one third of the world's languages. But apart from a few exceptions (notably, languages of regional wider communication like Tok Pisin, Hiri Motu or even Tolai), these languages spread themselves over the country in a nice patchwork with minimal overlap, like languages on any good language map should. This is a far cry from a realistic map of Europe. In Europe, there are minority languages which are spoken by small monolingual populations in homogeneous pockets. But the more common picture is that of scattered languages, either across larger areas like Arvanitika in Greece (cf. Sasse 1985), or, when it comes to languages spoken in big cities, not even locatable on a map: in some high-rise apartment building in Berlin, Turkish may be spoken on the ground, third and fourth floors, while German is the language of the first, second and fifth floors. Similar situations have been described for North American inner cities. I have been toying with the term 'vertical minority' for a linguistic minority involved in such a pattern. The reason for this state of affairs that in New Guinea we have a high degree of diversification of languages. Communication areas are small, and there has been little need to form larger linguistic units until recently for the purpose of identification or in order to ease inter-communication. 6 In Europe, on the other hand, the Entmischung process started after the French revolution and with the advent of the nation state has never been completed, and while some more recent movements (notably the exchange of populations after the two world wars) have reduced linguistic complexity, others (like the migration of workers which started already before the first world war) have added to it significantly.

5. Why minority languages? I have been intrigued by the apparent contradiction between two ideas expressed or referred to in abstracts or preliminary versions of papers distributed before this conference.

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On the one hand, there is the very plausible notion that the formulation and implementation of language policies is a form of social control, regulating access to positions of power within the state (Mey 1989). As Allan Luke put it, ...linguistic structures are but media for the transmission of sociocultural messages. (Luke 1989: 58) In this case the sociocultural message can easily be "Stay off!". Language choice (especially if the language is chosen for somebody else) can easily have a gatekeeper function whether one thinks of gatekeepers either as watchdogs like in Hans Chr. Andersen's fairy tale of the Tinder Box with fiery eyes as big as the Round Tower in Copenhagen, or more prosaically as bouncers in front of some more obscure dancing outfit. But on the other hand we have the notion that the emergence of nation states and with them of national languages has to do with the transition from advanced agrarian civilisations to growth-oriented industrial societies (cf. Gellner 1983, 1987, and De Witte, this volume). Industrial societies (as exemplified by the European states in the 19th century) have a strong tendency towards cultural homogeneity, and are marked by the overt use of culture as a symbol of persisting political units, and the use of its homogeneity to create a sense (part illusory, part justified) of solidarity, mobility, continuity, lack of deep barriers, within the political units in question. (Gellner 1987: 18) To the extent that this sense of the lack of deep barriers is justified, it has firm economical roots: industrialized societies need to create a barrier-free interior national market. To function, this inner market is dependent on minimal transaction costs and the existence of linguistic barriers is simply dysfunctional to it. Also, it requires that its members can cooperate on a large scale. Men cooperating on complex tasks involving high technology must be able to read the same idiom. (Gellner 1983: 15) But how can the existence of a national language vis-à-vis minority languages both be a unifying and a divisive factor? How can it both exclude people and join them together? The answer is that it does both. Both tendencies exist and are at work sometimes successively and sometimes even simultaneously.

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6. The subjective factor weil in Deutschland, da fühle ich mich noch so ein bißchen Dänisch, und in Dänemark da fühle ich mich wieder ganz klar Deutsch und das ist einfach die einzige Stelle wo man wirklich hingehört Member of the German minority in Southern Jutland (quoted in Byram (1986: 100)) Even if it is true that linguistic minorities are not necessarily defined as groups by virtue of the language they speak, but rather exist as groups with a special relationship towards one or several languages (non of which need be exclusive to this group), this does not diminish the importance of objective features in the definition of this relationship between language and group. But it might put more emphasis on the subjective factor as far as the constitution of the group is concerned, since the group is not necessarily constituted by virtue of the relationship to its language or languages. What defines a language minority as a group if not necessarily the language it relates to? Groups do not come into existence through formulating their identity. They have to define their identity once they do exist. If a group is under pressure (in the sense of § 5) from contradictory forces, it may choose to formulate its own identity under this pressure. Khubchandani has suggested the terms language for identity and language for communication (Khubchandani 1986). A group will normally not identify itself exclusively on the basis of its stigmatization by majority language speakers or majority group members ("Your language is not good enough"). Neither will minority members define their group through their communication problems alone. This does not mean that questions like "Can I file a complaint in my mother tongue or do I need a translator?", or "Can I sell my fish to the frozen food people myself at a good price or do I have to pay for an agent who has to negotiate for me?" are not important. They can turn out to be essential for survival, both individual and collective. But it is usually a combination of both factors, identity and communication, which shapes the minority condition. That majority members will have difficulties in understanding the complex issue of minority identity, is shown by a news item in the Süddeutsche Zeitung of October 21/22, 1989 (reproduced as Figure 1.) The Social Democratic Mayor of Flensburg, a German border town with a sizeable Danish minority, had

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suggested that Danish should be introduced in local administration as a second official language. Most of the Danes in the border area speak German (a situation which in a way is the mirror image of the situation in Southern Jutland referred to above). Rather than considering this an argument against the promotion of Danish, the Mayor suggested that majority members should make an effort to learn the minority language. Both the newspaper and the government officials in Kiel quoted in it reveal a certain lack of understanding of the importance of such bilingual action. But the point is not, "Do Danes in Flensburg need a sign Socialforvaltningen alongside with Sozialamt to find their way?". Maybe Danes are much better at home in German than in Danish. Although for a majority member a Dane who speaks mostly German is likely to have forfeited his or her minority birthright, this is not the point at all. The point is whether the minority group - and this group exists independently of any individual language choice, for which there is ample evidence - is recognized by the majority independently of how it defines itself. This recognition of minorities in the present nation states might be a test case of things to come. Already now there are people who cannot understand why Danish members of the European Parliament need simultaneous interpretation from English if they all understand English very well (cf. Haberland and Henriksen 1991). But the point is actually not only the communication problems of Danish speakers. (In fact, providing Danish interpretations and translations might make communication more difficult for them, for instance in the case of relay interpretation which necessarily results in delays and poorer quality.) The point is their right to assert themselves as a group which is recognized by the other groups. The ease with which the European nations will travel into a more integrated Europe is also dependent on the confidence they can have with regard to the right to assert themselves as being exactly this: themselves.

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Figure 1. "Südtiroler Verhältnisse im hohen Norden." Süddeutsche Zeitung October 21, 1989.

Südtiroler Verhältnisse im hohen Norden Flensburger Oberbürgermeister will Dänisch im Grenzland zur zweiten A m t s s p r a c h e m a c h e n

Flensburg (ddp) - Wenn es nach dem Flensburger Oberbürgermeister Olaf Cord Dielewicz (SPD) geht, herrschen diesseits und jenseits der deutsch-dänischen Grenze bald Südtiroler Verhältnisse. Denn nach seinem Willen soll Dänisch zur zweiten Amtssprache werden. Die Zukunft könnte dann so aussehen: Schilder in den Rathäusern von Flensburg, Husum oder Niebüll weisen dem Besucher nicht nur den Weg zum „Sozialamt", sondern auch zur „Socialforvaltningen"; in den Amtsstuben sitzen Beamte, die auch in dänischer Sprache Auskunft geben können, und in Stadt- und Gemeindevertretungen sowie in den Gerichten bekommen Simultanübersetzer reichlich Arbeit. Dielewicz stört sich daran, daß zwar die „Dänen südlich der Grenze ausnahmslos und nördlich der Grenze weitgehend deutsch sprechen", während die Deutschen mit Dänischkenntnissen eine klare Minderheit seien. Und weil sich eine Fremdsprache besser in der Jugend als im Alter lernen Iäßt, wartet der Flensburger OB gleich mit einem weiteren Vorschlag auf. In allen Schulen soll im nördlichen Schleswig-Holstein bereits ab dem dritten Schuljahr Dänisch, im südlichen Jütland Deutsch als freiwilliges Unterrichtsfach eingeführt werden. Über den Zeitpunkt der Umstellung und zu den Kosten, die zum großen Teil auch das Land tragen müßte, mag der Sozialdemokrat noch nichts sagen. Er wolle, nachdem er bereits vor fünf Jahren einen entsprechenden Vorschlag gemacht hatte, einmal mehr „eine Anregung zur öffentlichen Diskussion" stellen. Voller Stolz verweist man aber bei der Stadt Flensburg darauf, daß die Bemühungen um Zweisprachigkeit nicht nur Zukunftsmusik sind. Vielmehr sei bereits einiges getan

worden. So wurde das Schiffahrtsmuseum auch mit dänischen Beschriftungen versehen; das Städtische Museum soll folgen. Und bereits seit 1986 bietet die Stadt kostenlose Dänisch-Kurse für ihre rund 2000 Mitarbeiter an, immerhin 253 Beamte und Angestellte haben seither noch einmal die Schulbank gedrückt Kräftigen Beifall erhält die Idee aus Flensburg von Karl Otto Meyer vom Südschleswigschen Wählerverband (SSW), dem einzigen Abgeordneten der dänischen Minderheit im Kieler Landtag. Er möchte am liebsten gleich noch die friesische Volksgruppe mitberücksichtigt wissen. Daß die immerhin 50 000 Angehörigen der dänischen Minderheit und die rund 3000. dänischen Staatsbürger im nördlichen Schleswig-Holstein ohnehin alle deutsch sprechen, ist für Meyer kein Gegenargum e n t Wie Dielewicz verweist der SSWPolitiker darauf, daß die Sprache ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der eigenen Kultur sei. „Jeder soll in seiner Muttersprache reden können und niemand dazu gezwungen werden, eine fremde Sprache zu sprechen", argumentiert Meyer. Doch in Kiel rufen die Vorschläge aus dem Grenzland noch keine Begeisterungsstürme hervor. So gibt sich denn auch der Sprecher der SPD-Landesregierung, Herbert Wessels, zurückhaltend. Er sieht momentan mit Blick auf die leeren Landeskassen und „das gut ausgebaute Bildungswesen" im nördlichen Schleswig-Holstein „keinen Handlungsbedarf'. Die dänische Minderheit verfüge über mehr als 50 Privatschulen, die von der Kieler Regierung mit 100 Prozent gefördert würden. So werden Dielewicz und Meyer erst einmal abwarten müssen, was aus der' Europäischen Charta der Minderheitensprachen wird, an der derzeit eine Kommission des Europarates arbeitet. Wenn die Bundesrepublik der Charta beitrete, sagt Wessels, sei Bonn auch bei den Kosten gefordert

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Notes *

I want to thank the participants of the Bad Homburg conference for their comments on this paper in its first, tentative version, especially Elisabetta Zuanelli who contested my claim that 'group' in any way could be a correlate of 'language' - a linguistic minority is not necessarily a group, since its members do not necessarily communicate with each other - , and to Pádraig O Riagáin who did not buy my analysis of Irish as a minority language without a linguistic minority. I also would like to thank Thomas W. Webb and Alison Woodward for sociological advice, Jacob L. Mey for a close reading of an intermediate draft, and Lachman M. Khubchandani for a stimulating discussion on minorities on an overcast day at the Danish seaside.

1.

Some of the main points in the article are: "Is Denmark as a nation about to be wiped out? This question is being asked by more and more Danes while the EC's single market becomes more and more visible in everday life ... Obviously a great deal of this fear of the future is due to an equation of nation state, national feeling and national identity. Weakening the nation state is perceived as weakening being Danish. This does not have to be the case, on the contrary. Both past and present are full of examples as to how national, ethnic identity can thrive without a nation state or within the framework of another state. ... Denmark is one of the few states where nation and state can be equated, and even in our harmonious cosy little corner we have three minorities: Germans, Faroese and Greenlanders. ... Nothing in the present plans for union suggests that all national (ethnic) diversity is about to be done away with. The distinctive features of the different regions are to be kept and strengthened, and the newest catchword in Brussels is subsidiarity. This means, problems should be solved as locally as possibly." It is important to note that Information is anything but a fiercely pro-EC newspaper.

2

Even Bahr, publishing in Nazi Germany (in 1935), points out that the German minority in Jutland is not defined by its language. This would of course allow for arguments like the one that many of the French speakers in the Eupen-Malmédy area ceded to Belgium after World War I actually were ethnic Germans with French as their mother tongue (members of the preußische Wallonie). On the other hand he cannot argue (and consistently, he doesn't) that the population of Alsace is German just because it speaks German. Bahr's book contains a chapter about just about every German minority from the Baltic states to Transsylvania, but nothing about AlsaceLorraine.

3

Interestingly enough, Bahr does not endorse the concept of the nation state at all as he clearly sees that it would be impossible to unite all the German minorities of Europe within a German nation state. On the other hand, he is scornful about Prussia which always put the notion of state (almost in the sense of the French revolution) above the notion of people (in the sense of Herder's Volk) and which, therefore, never showed any real interest in German minorities outside her own domain. The declarations by the Danish and West German Governments of 1955 regarding the status of minorities on both sides of the border expressly state that people should not be asked about their minority loyalty by majority officials. This makes it difficult to obtain statistical data of language use within the minority, but the following figures

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about the home language of pupils from the German school in Tinglev/Tingleff, quoted by Byram (1986, 41), give some indication:

4. 5.

6.

German 14.8 % s0nderjysk 62.2 % Standard Danish 1.6 % both s0nderjysk and German 17.5% other (Inuit) 4.4 % Harald Haarmann (1983) defines the small languages of Europe as those with less than 4,500,000 speakers Remember the discussion about the replacement of the term 'American Indians' by 'Native Americans' - a Sprachregelung which made many Black and White Americans ask themselves whether they were non-natives in the country they were born in. Remember that this situation has existed until quite recently in some parts of Europe, too. Caratzas, when wondering how the Greek linguistic islets in Southern Italy could exist until only 50 years ago with a mostly monolingual population within an Italianspeaking environment, reports, "On m'a dit à Sternatia qu'il y a trente ans toute la population du village parlait grec. A ma question: «Comment se faisait-on comprendre quand on allait à Lecce?», on m ' a simplement répondu, en s'étonnant d'une si naïve question, qu' «on n'y allait pas!»."(Caratzas 1958, 250f.)

References Ammon, Ulrich 1989 "Zur Geschichte der Sprachverbreitungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von den Anfangen bis 1985", in: Deutsche Sprache 17:229-263. Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Bahr, Richard 1935 Volk jenseits der Grenzen, Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. (2nd edition.) Byram, Michael S. 1986 Minority Education and ethnic survival. Case study of a German school in Denmark. Clevedon, Avon: Multilingual Matters. Caratzas, Stam. C. 1958 L'origine des dialects néo-grecs de l'Italie méridionale. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. [Collection de l'Institut d'Études Byzantines et Néo-Helléniques de l'Université de Paris, 18] De Witte, Bruno 1991 The impact of European Community rules on linguistic policies of the Member States. In this volume, pp. 163-178.

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Eastman, Carol M. 1984 "Language, ethnic identity and change", in: Linguistic minorities, policies and pluralism. Edwards (ed.) London: Academic Press, 259-276. Simone, Raffaele et al. (eds.) 1986 Linguistic minorities in countries belonging to the European Community. Summary report prepared by the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. Commission of the European Communities Document. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Gellner, Ernest 1983 Nations and nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987 "Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion in complex societies", in: Culture, identity and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6-28. Haarmann, Harald 1983 Elemente einer Soziologie der kleinen Sprachen Europas. Hamburg: Buske. Haberland, Hartmut 1988 "Research policy", in: Sociolinguistics/Soziolinguistik, Second Volume, Amraon/ Dittmar/Mattheier (eds.) Berlin: de Gruyter, 1814-1826. Haberland, Hartmut and Carol Henriksen 1991 "Dänisch - eine kleine Sprache in der EG" in: Sociolinguistica 5. Haugen, Einar 1978 "Bilingualism, language contact and immigrant languages in the United States: a research report", in: Advances in the study of societal multilingualism, Fishman (ed.) The Hague: Mouton, 1-111. Khubchandani, Lachman M. 1986 "Multilingual societies: issues of identity and communication", in: Sociolinguistics 1 6 ( l ) : 2 0 - 3 4 . Luke, Allan 1989 "Open and closed texts. The semantic/ideological analysis of curricular narratives", in: Journal of Pragmatics 13: 53 - 8 0 . Mey, Jacob L. 1989 "Saying it don't make it so: the 'Una Grande Libre' of language politics", in: Multilingua 8 (4): 333-355. Renan, Ernest 1882 Qu 'est-ce qu 'une nation ? Paris: Calman Lévy. Sasse, Hans-Jürgen 1985 "Sprachkontakt und Sprachwandel: die Gräzisierung der albanischen Mundarten Griechenlands", in: Papiere zur Linguistik 32: 37-95. Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove and Robert Phillipson 1989 '"Mother tongue': the theoretical and sociopolitical construction of a concept", in: Status and function of languages and language varieties, Ammon (ed). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 450-477. Srivastava, R.N. 1983 "Linguistic minorities and national languages", in: Linguistic minorities and national languages. Language policy issues in developing countries, Coulmas (ed.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 99-114.

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Whitley, Richard 1982 "The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations", in: Scientific establishments and hierarchies, Elias/Martins/Whitley (eds.) Dordrecht: Reidel, 313-357. Zuanelli, Elisabetta 1991 Italian in the European Community: An educational perspective on the national language and new language minorities. In this volume, pp. 291-299.

Linguistic "integration" and "identity" - the situation of migrant workers in the EC as a challenge and opportunity* Konrad Ehlich

1. Linguistic qualification in a European 1 perspective - "one Europe, one language"? The post-war situation in Eurrope is characterized by massive expansions of the labour market across the borders of nation states. Different members of the (West) European Community have experienced this expansion in different ways. The demand for labour has varied according to structures of the economic statuses and their formal organization, the degree of the historical development of national economies, the international integration and involvement of national economies, and the different pathways of development. Crossing national borders for the recruitment and/or repulsion of labour-power reflects its demand and results in longterm migration and remigration processes, as will be discussed systematically below. Demands on the linguistic qualification of workers differ on a large scale. There are two main trends, one resulting in a general increase of formal education, including education with regard to language (mother tongue education and foreign language education), the other in a dequalification of human labour and its replacement by machinery. The employment of labour-power from outside a given language territory has been organized largely in such a way that a minimum of linguistic ability in the employing economy's language seems to suffice, the FRG being a case in point. For a long period of time, trans-economic aspects of the problems for these labourers and their families were not even taken into consideration, and the treatment of linguistic deficiencies on the part of these persons is still, by and large, treated as their individual problem. To the degree that the importance of transnational labour-power for the national economies has increased, the distribution of national versus trans-

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national labour-power tends to become less and less sufficient even from an economic point of view. There are other aspects which have led to a change of language policies for migrant workers even in national economies such as the F R G where, for a long time, the complexity o f this issue was not realized. The important role which language plays for human identity has direct consequences and repercussions on what is termed "qualification o f labour power". T h e process o f transnational integration which runs under the heading "from a common market to a European Community" reflects the various aspects o f economic development, growing complexity and international integration. An increasing complexity of labour-power making possible its employment at different places o f the new, extended economic unit, is one o f its basic aspects. The simple dichotomy "emigration/immigration" does not seem to be sufficient any more. Instead, migration capability seems to become one important feature o f large scale labour qualification in general. This type o f qualification demands a large increase o f linguistic training for economic reasons which clashes with, if not contradicts, many aspects o f the traditional education systems. In most member states of the Community, the curricula, as far as langauge is concerned, are still characterized by ideological and political aims which were derived from the overall aim of achieving national linguistic unity. T h e achievement o f linguistic unity was part of the establishment of large economic units, the nation states. These processes o f linguistic unification took centuries in France and in what later was to become Germany or Italy. T h e transnational development towards Europe as an economic unit faces a fundamentally different situation than the national language unification processes mentioned above. It makes the command o f more than one language necessary for large parts of the working population. Whereas the human ability to cope with these demands stands beyond doubt, as can be easiliy seen in border areas within Europe and in many multilingual regions in other parts of the world, the restriction o f multilingual education equipment to small "elite" parts o f the populations in Europe for centuries makes it very difficult to find new solutions to the problematic linguistic situation o f Europe in the near future. Migrating workers have developed a large variety o f problem solutions to cope with the demands o f their multilingual situation. They did so without much support from government or other official institutions. For the further linguistic development in Europe these workers and their families have fulfilled and still fulfill a pilot function in outlining new linguistic profiles. Their

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biographical experiences and the diversification of problem solutions they have worked out are a very important resource for large scale changes regarding language in the European countries. These experiences are thus of major importance for language politics in and for the EC. They cannot be captured by simplistic oppositions such as "integration" versus "segregation". Modification and maintenance of "identity" in the context of a multilingual society seem to be major aspects of the future development in Europe. The situation of migrant workers offers to the EC the chance of well-grounded research for the development of new problem solutions for European "internationalism" and "inter-lingualism" - a challenge which has not yet been accepted seriously.

2. European labour migration in socio-historical perspective long-term processes and strategies The processes and changes in the composition of national populations in Europe which have taken place during the last four decades apparently affect some basic presuppositions of ethnic identity in Europe. These processes can be observed primarily in the towns and cities. However, they are no longer limited to them. The populations of many European towns are losing the homogeneous appearance which seemed to characterize them for a long time. The citizenry becomes increasingly internationalized. Novel as this process seems to be, it has its historical precedents. The qualification of the composition of the populations of European states as "novel" is based on a notion of homogeneity which is a historical construct rather than a simple account of the demographic facts of Europe before World War II. "Homogeneity" in this sense is the result of the honiogenization of historical facts in retrospect according to an underlying notion of what a "nation" is and should be. This notion in turn reflects complex processes of the transformation of regional populations into units of trans-local and trans-regional identity, viz. "nations", which in most parts of Europe, have been evolving for centuries. They are similar in structure to present-day shifts, though not with regard to the ingredients which make up these processes. It was not least the rapid demographic development with its well-known "demographic scissors" which contributed to this process in the 19th century. Predominantly, however, it was caused by the development of general eco-

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nomic structures which made necessary the inclusion if not integration of societal "peripheries" as defined from the economic centres. With respect to present-day demographic developments, four, or maybe, five groups of European countries can be distinguished. The differentiation is roughly determined by differences in relation to the colonial history in each case. (1) Many European countries have a colonial past (especially the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium). (2) A few countries took part in the colonization of the extra-European world for a short time only (German and Italy). (3) A third group of countries were themselves colonies or quasi-colonies, like Greece and Ireland, achieving independence only in the last or present century. (Switzerland could be regarded as an early predeccessor. It achieved independence in the course of four centuries, beginning with the 14th century, and coming to an end with the de jure acknowledgement of its state of independence in 1648.) (4) A special form of colonization is expansion into adjacent regions, as, for instance, Denmark's expansion into other parts of Scandinavia. Similar policies were pursued by other countries as well, especially France, Italy and Germany. (5) A special situation is that of Austria. The double-monarchy, its two centres (Austria and Hungary), and many dependent regions gave it some special characteristics both with respect to language and nationalities. These characteristics still live on today, witness the difficulties of applying the concept of nation state to present-day Austria (cf. Wodak, Menz 1990). With regard to the countries of group (1), the process of decolonization took place at different times, in different ways and with different speed and intensity. Granting the populations of the colonies, or parts of them, citizenship was part of the attempt on the part of the European powers to maintain and protect their influence. As a result, parts of the population of the colonies immigrated to the mother countries. Those who took advantage of this opportunity were "compradores" at first and then ever more members of the colonial population. This influx of non-European people and cultures into European environments has turned out to be a favorable condition for increasing migration from the former colonies to Europe. It has been this aspect of decolonization more than anything else which determines the selection of immigrant groups, and

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the more so the closer the process of colonizing and decolonizing is to the present. This is the case, for example, in the Netherlands (Indonesia, Surinam), Belgium (Congo/Zaire), the United Kingdom (Indian Subcontinent, West Indies, East and West Africa), and especially France (Mahgreb, "Communauté Française"). However, it would be inadequate to look at the demographic changes in Europe only from the point of view of decolonization. Similar processes to those in the countries of group (1) can be observed concerning the countries of group (2) which had no or only a marginal colonial history. Some countries which were colonial powers in the past, like Spain and Portugal, are "emigration" countries now. The FRG, by contrast, is one of the major immigrant countries. Thus decolonizing can by no means be regarded as a sufficient cause for migration. The complexities of the present-day situation indicate clearly that migration processes are determined by other, namely economic demands of developing capitalistic production and the ensuing needs of the expansive labour market. The expansion of production and circulation has necessitated more and more parts of the peripheries' populations to participate in the labour market to satisfy its growing demand. Three phases can be distinguished in the development of the conditions of production in Europe: A. Urbanization of production, regionalization of distribution, and transregionalization of trading capital; to label phase A, one could speak of a phase of "economic regionalization". B. Expansion of industrial production, reduction of the importance of agricultural production in relation to industrial production, transnationalization of distribution and international fight for markets. Financial capital is organized on a national basis, but it operates internationally. These processes took place between the late 18th and the early 20th centuries. Phase Β can be termed a phase of "economic nationalization". C. Establishment of multinational companies for distribution and production, complete internationalization of capital; international applications of financial capital, partly tending to develop a life of their own, sometimes at odds with the overall economic process; marginalization of agriculture with regard to its claims on the labour-market as combined with considerable increases of its productivity. Phase C is a phase of "economic internationalization". There are political and societal developments which correspond to these three phases of economic development. The political and societal develop-

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ments influence, and are influenced by, the economic development. Concerning the first phase (A), this means politically the development of relatively independent regional units. To illustrate these processes with Germany as an example, Phase A can be seen in the early bourgeois revolution, called the "Reformation". The second phase (B) is the elaboration and realization of the concept of a "nation" which took place in two variants, a late-feudalistic and a bourgeois one. The third phase (C) brings with it the coming into existence of "mega-nations" such as the United States, and of transnational units such as the European Community. Phase A is characterized by general homesteadiness of the rural population, combined with little internal migration into the towns. Phase Β showed a considerable demand for labour-power for the steadily growing industrial production which was met by the formation of expansive administrative and political units on the one hand (cf. Prussia as one outstanding example), and by international migration on the other hand. The latter was strongly "encouraged" by political measures such as the peasant liberation in the first sub-phase of Phase B. Migration from rural to urban areas became a common practice for the following sub-phase. The political realization of national unity set aside further administrative impediments to mobility. In this second sub-phase the periphery became increasingly affected by the overall integration process. Since the larger polities were ethnically and linguistically herterogeneous (cf. e.g. Prussia/Poland or France/Britanny), manpower of different ethnic groups and different languages became involved in this process. Another type of large scale migration processes in Europe needs mentioning: Between Phase A and Phase Β migration processes were caused by an expulsion of parts of the population of different regions for the sake of establishing religious homogeneity. Salient examples are the expulsion of the Huguenots (1685) from France and the expulsion of the Salzburg protestants (1732). The expulsion of parts of the population and their immigration to other countries often entailed the introduction of modem techniques of production to the immigrant countries. Immigration, then, meant a push of technology for the domestic, regionally organized, largely rural structures, as was the case in Prussia, Hesse and other areas into which Huguenots immigrated. As a consequence, social frictions emerged between the domestic population and the immigrants. These problems were aggravated by certain fiscal privileges the immigrants were granted. These migration processes seem to have had considerable impact on the conceptualization of immigration and of its consequences among the domestic populations of the immigration countries and on

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the mental images which have been used to understand it. The demand for labour continued to grow in Phase C. It did so, however, only under very specific circumstances. On the one hand, the cycle of crises determined the structural demands on the labour market. On the other hand, the overall development was subjected to specific conditions when the crises showed their most drastic form, viz. during World War I and II. Already in the final stages of the second phase (Phase B), in the period of national orientation, the administrative units which had been established so far became insufficient for the demands on the labour market. As a consequence of the integration of the marginal regions into larger labour markets, the working class became increasingly internationalized, just as the process of nationalizing it and thereby depriving it of its regional linguistic variety had taken place before in Phase B. The question of language has been a permanent source of problems in this context. The methods of solving them partly foreshadow solutions in the present. Thus, the history of this period of labour-migration is of special interest for the present situation. 3

3. Integration vs. repulsion of migrant labour-power: costs, benefits, and linguistic demands The integration of manpower from abroad into the collective labourer involves a number of specific difficulties regarding the labour market while at the same time it provids the capitalists who buy labour a number of advantages. This ambivalence deserves systematic attention when considering the language problem. One of the difficulties is that of additional costs which are caused by language. This problem has sometimes been met by enforced naturalization. The Polish immigration into the Ruhr area from 1870 to 1933 is a case in point. Today, the Polish language has all but disappeared in the Ruhr area, being reduced to a folkloristic decorum. One of the advantages of the integration of foreign workers into the collective labourer is a gain of flexibility with regard to its extension. Foreign populations are made part of the "industrial reserve army" of a country. Depending on the actual demand, these workers may be part of the labour market, or they may be removed from it - and at the same time thrown out of the country. Expulsion minimizes the subsequent social costs. Furthermore, the "foreign group" is usually willing to undercut standard wages. The domestic bourgeoisie can realize the reproduction of labour at a lower cost, since the costs of ed-

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ucation (which in the case of the marginal areas tend to be comparatively low anyway) is partly transferred to other countries. This advantage, however, soon reaches a limit, constituting a contradiction concerning the necessary qualification of labour-power as a whole. On the one hand, this leads to a further breakdown of work and, consequently, of the working class; on the other hand, it also leads to increasing demands on the qualification of "imported" labour. The systematic, economic division of the working class has direct consequences for the overall societal conflicts, one main tendency being the transformation of the struggles between workers and capitalists into conflicts between nations. This became very pronounced and obvious, for example, in the case of Germany by forced labour recruitment during World War II (cf. Roth 1974). After the war certain patterns of integrating "foreign workers" ("Fremdarbeiter") before and during the war were re-established. Again different periods can clearly be distinguished. First, there was some sort of naive recruitment. As long as economy prospered the social problems inherent in the recruitment of foreign workers did not become manifest. They became obvious only with the first substantial post-war crisis in 1966/67 when foreign workers were set under intense public pressure to return to their countries of origin. In 1973 the Government of the FRG reacted with a ban to recruit foreign labour from countries outside the EC. Nevertheless, the demographic structure of labour immigration did not change much, the majority of migrants coming from Turkey, a non-EC country. The conflict between the domestic and the foreign population has smouldered as a potential cause of societal conflicts ever since. The measures by the administration have been similar to those adopted in the late "Weimar"-period and that part of the NS-time regulations that referred to the recruitment of labor power from "allied" countries. In the 1970s and 1980s foreign labour came under increasing pressure by high levels of unemployment. Ever since there have been attempts to reform immigration and foreign labour laws. At the same time a policy was adopted of offering material incentives to leave Germany (so-called "Rückkehrprämien"). Restrictive measures do not find unanimous support from part of the economy, since the future developments and demands on the labour market are uncertain. The present political development is characterized by a process in which the social conflict potential becomes reactualized which lies in the fact that the "industrial reserve army" is composed of labour-power from beyond the na-

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tional borders. This conflict potential is a structural one as I hope to have shown before. The political developments in East Germany since November 1989 make the situation even more complicated. Because of the uncertainties of further structural demands on the labour market other strategies are developed than those which the present conservative government of the FRG pursues. This is the case with some fractions of capital as well as with some "Länder" which have a Social Democratic government. Instead of immediate repulsion of foreign labour beyond the borders as soon as possible, after the employment demands have changed, there is the strategy of integrating the imported labour-power into the national, domestic labour resources as one way of increasing the overall work force. Such efforts partly meet economic interests depending on the anticipated demands on the labour market. However, neither the concrete crisis cycle can be calculated precisely nor the time it will take to introduce innovative techniques which have revolutionizing impacts on the qualification structure of labour (cf. the "information revolution") ( - let alone political processes like the unification of the FRG and GDR). Consequently, the structure of demands regarding labour-power remains systematically contradictory. It is difficult, therefore, to develop a coherent labour policy. The unclear situation for immigrant workers who are confronted with contradictory requirements and demands thus is a structural one. A simple and satisfying solution is not very likely. This constellation is at odds with a deep-going structural change of the qualification structure of the collective labourer, a change which has been mentioned above. The level of training necessary for more and more complex processes of production can the longer the less be achieved in an "ad-hoc"manner. There is a demand for longterm training starting from a high level of general knowledge. Long-time training includes life-long learning, because innovation procedes at a rapid pace in most areas of production, so that many workers will have to re-qualify several times in the course of their workinglife. Resources in general being scarce, it makes sense to involve parts of imported labour into these training processes and to make them participate in the basic knowledge and learning equipment which is necessary to do so successfully. For this, however, a high level of linguistic proficiency is necessary which presupposes longterm investments. The notion of "integration" is the theoretical cornerstone of this strategy. It is of interest to capital. Nevertheless, integration is only one of several options. The uncertainties and calculatory risks

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involved in all anticipated scenarios for further development make other options equally plausible. The various German "Länder" have adopted different strategies concerning integration, limitation or repatriation of foreign labour. One example is Bavaria with its concept of "segregating" foreign children in homogeneous mother tongue education classes. This approach lays the ground-work for making repatriation possible. Another example is North-Rhine Westfalia with its concept of "integration" by means of which children of foreign workers may become, as early and as intensely as possible, part of future domestic labour power. This policy treats German as the dominant language. It has been favoured by the trade unions for a long time. Much research needs to be done on how the above described structural aspects of labour migration affect the different European countries. In order to analyze and to understand which concrete and specific economic, historical and politic circumstances are of importance for the language situation of migrant workers, an interdisciplinary approach could be of great use.

4. Language, integration and identity In the following I am going to discuss the overall structural situation from the point of view of the migrants, which is, of course, a much more practical one. The diffuse opposition of "integration" vs. "segregation" offers completely different lifeworld perspectives for the migrants' conceptualization of their status as migrants. Many of them maintain the belief that they can return to their home countries any time they want, even if they have been living in another country for decades. They thus maintain a fictitious biographical plan which obviously is of great importance for the mental organization of their lifeworld. Such plans are encouraged or frustrated by the political options of migrant policy. The ups and downs of remigration figures show that this belief is occasionally realized. In many cases return migration has resulted in failure for economic reasons. The material rewards from working abroad often prove to be insufficient for setting up a small enterprise "at home" - as had been the plan during the stay abroad. Obviously such failures do not affect the option in general which continues to be treated as a possible life-plan by others. It is resistant against falsification, though, obviously, there are very few positive examples of realization, if any.

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Biographical plans are an important aspect of the migrants' lifeworld. Language is another. Let us now take a look at its role for migrant labour. From the more general perspective of sect. 3., language differences proved to be a possible obstacle to accelerated qualification of labour in the context of quickly changing qualification profiles. Language skills in the national language, being the language of the curriculum and of professional training, were shown to be an essential prerequisite for foreign labour to function in the recipient nation's economy for a longer period of time. This perspective differs much from that of the migrants themselves. Language, for the individual workers and their families, is important in many more respects than that of labour qualification. It is a crucial means of maintaining their biographical identity and their identity as members of a specific group. Identity and group membership are essential features of the individual biographies of the workers. The position of language, as it is seen from an economic point of view, and its importance for the individuals, as it is experienced by the speakers themselves, differs a lot. The migrant worker's language situation thus is an important example of an experience which is expressed in an ironic slogan coined to criticize the politics of migration in Germany: "Manpower was called, but human beings came". This seems to be cynical, but, in fact, it uncovers the structural cynicism of importing and repelling workers from other countries in developed economies. At this point, then, the distinction between "language as a means of communication" and "language as a means of identity-formation" is indispensable. Language as a means of communication has its systematic place in the productive and receptive processes of life. From that perspective, language as a means of identity formation it at best a burden. In the recipient countries the general view on these problems is largely determined by a set of concepts which are influenced by, and the expression of, the ideology of the nation state which originated in Phase (B) (cf. sect. 2 above). Concerning language this means: language is a national language, which is homogeneous in principle ( - notwithstanding all sorts of variety), and there is one official language only within one nation. 4 Similar conceptions regarding language are also found in the countries of origin of immigrants, and immigrants share them as far as their notions on language are concerned. Take, for example, the situation of the Greeks in the FRG and other recipient countries, in contrast to that of the Italians, and the consequences in policy which are effected by the migrants themselves.

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For the Greek population the role of language has been of permanent importance for ethnic and individual identity. For the Italian migrants the role of language is quite different, because their language situation is diverse and split-up, and in many parts of the country a national language ethos is absent or hardly developed. As a consequence, different attitudes and policies concerning language are adopted by migrant groups. The Greeks favour mother tongue education for their children. They have even taken steps to establish their own school-system in addition to the public one. However, these schools have a very difficult status in the state's overall education system because of the school monopoly of the state. This monopoly in itself is an expression of the policy of the nation state. In the Italian population no comparable language consciousness can be found, and there is a lack of corresponding initiatives. Initiatives to install mother tongue classes are very powerful among Greek and also among Turkish - parents, and relatively weak with Italian or Spanish parents (cf. BAGIV 1985). Thus some sort of "import", which reflects the respective linguistic situation in the countries of origin, seems to play an important role concerning the options of language policy that can be found among the representatives of the minorities in the recipient countries of which the situation, again, is determined by the notion of a national language. Accordingly, the question of membership of the individual migration groups will have different answers. The Italians have a membership concept characteristic of Phase A. This means that membership is oriented towards the region which is in virtual conflict with the status of the national language. The Greeks, by contrast, identify with and by means of their national language. 5 The importance of these predeterminations for a life with several languages in an officially monolingual situation stands beyond doubt. Nevertheless, the handling of these problems by the migrant workers and their families is a major resource for the development of strategies for coping with what might be called a post-national language situation. There is a large amount of experience which, however, has hardly been analyzed so far. Consequently this resource is still unavailable for more general purposes. One issue seems to be of specific interest and importance here: Biographies of migrants do not take their course without suffering from language problems, from lack of linguistic competence and from threats to identity maintenance. Many of them are examples, however, of practical ways of overcoming these problems and for developing individual strategies and solutions. Migrants do not, in general, sever all contacts with that part of their life which

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took place in their country of origin, and they stay open for a variety of further biographical plans which can make different language choices necessary. They thus need to keep different languages at their disposal. I think it would be an illusion to hope to develop a language policy which could generally eliminate suffering with regard to, and caused by, language and the diversity of languages characteristic for the future, post-national society. But I think the development of a language policy is possible which at least minimizes parts of this hardship.

5. Some consequences for language and linguistics in Europe 1. Different lines of development are conceivable for the situation of languages in Europe. There is a strong tendency towards a new monolingualism on a European level, taking English as the European language - and depriving the vast majority of Europeans of their own languages turning them down to the status of dialects. A similar tendency is to be seen with regard to the migrants' languages in those recipient countries which do not accept other languages than their own national language. The losses which are entailed by such an option are enormous, not only with regard to the linguistic situation, but also with regard to active and/or passive resistance which probably will arise in what might turn out to become a large scale language struggle. There are other options which, perhaps, are less obvious but much more worthwhile to think about. A helpful theoretical construct could be the concept of "opposition" as it was developed in phonology. In this construct the differences of units (phonemes in the case of phonology) are conceptualized in such a way that their co-existence ("opposition") and the partial suspension of their differences ("neutralization") are taken into account. Neutralization is not elimination. It would be worthwhile to look for possibilities of neutralization of the opposition of languages of origin and language of the recipient country. One such form of neutralization could be socially created by what I would like to term an encouragement of multilingualism. In the European nation states, multilingualism is rarely considered a serious choice. On the contrary, the idea of multilingualism is burdened with verdicts from politicians and linguists. For example, Leo Weisgerber, one of the most influential German linguists from the late 1920's to the mid 1960's, wrote about the "unhealthiness" and mental damage resulting from multilingualism (Weisgerber 1933). This clearly was a

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transposition of the idea of the one language nation state into linguistic evaluation. This view is still widely accepted today, especially in the field of politics which has been affected by popularized parts of the scientific discussion - if there is any awareness of these problems at all. Present linguistic research has a much more positive attitude towards bilingualism (cf. e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1981). I think there are good arguments for multilingualism, and encouragement of multilingualism is an important task, left primarily to linguistics. The arguments in favour of multilingualism are not only and primarily moral ones (as many of the arguments which have been used in the context of migration research during the last decades have been of a mainly moral nature, appealing to humanitarian values, "human rights" etc.). Basically, they can refer to specific resources which are of importance for further development. Multilingualism is not an "ideal", but it offers a chance of self-realization and of societal development beyond the borders and barriers that were built up in the national era of Phase B. 2. Identity maintenance has often been reduced to folklore (in the negative sense of the term). This way of maintaining identity is highly problematic because it presupposes and leaves unchallenged the concept of so-called "highculture", which in its turn is an integrative part of the concept of national culture. In contrast to that, there is the people's culture, "folklore". (The same holds true of cultural relics from Phase A). Whereas this conceptualization of "identity" is part of the dominant culture of the recipient countries, there is a second set of concepts which is part of the world view in some of the countries of origin and which is partly accepted and made use of by representatives of the migrants. This set of concepts can be labelled with the term "nativism" (cf. Mühlmann 1964). This term refers to a specific form of social, groupspecific regression into an earlier period of a group's history. Nativism is one of the big dangers and constitutes some of the major problems with which European countries are confronted today and will be confronted in the near future. Nativistic movements are not only of importance in the countries of origin, but also in the recipient countries where the "New Right" exploits nativistic hopes and fears. Whenever nativisms in the context of Europe clash with each other the result is a repetition of structures which were typical of the big conflicts of nation states, both in the last and in the present century. In contrast to these two ways of functionalizing the need for identity maintenance, folklorizing and nativism, a concept would be desirable which offers the chance to develop a sophisticated multilingualism.

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Much work has been invested into the analysis of multilingual settings during the last four decades (cf., e.g., Haarmann (1980), (1986), Extra (1989)). These analyses reflect the general aims of linguistics, especially those of sociolinguistics (cf. Ammon, Dittmar, Mattheier 1987f.) and of foreign language teaching research (cf. Bausch et al. (1989)). Only in recent years, the lifeworld of the migrants and the importance of language for it becomes of interest for linguistic analysis. Relatively few microstudies of the interrelations of linguistic activities, knowledge systems, identitiy formation and maintenance in the broader context of the migrants' social life have been carried out so far (cf. e.g. Rehbein 1985). It is this broader perspective which could contribute to lay foundations for a comprehensive conceptualization which would take into account the pioneering problem solutions of the migrant-workers. Some of them are a primary resource for the neutralization of linguistic conflicts which arise from nation-based language oppositions. Linguistics, in its concepts and in its methods, is still largely dependent upon and inclined to the pre-national and the national phases of political and linguistic development. The question of a post-national group identity is yet to be investigated. 3. It will become important to calculate the costs and benefits of language learning. This calculation is important for the individuals involved; it is also important with regard to the budgets of education, and with regard to the total budgets of national and transnational political units. The calculation of costs and benefits is not only a financial issue, but financial resources are of major importance, of course: Demands for linguistic training of the individuals, of families and school children, are dependent upon the group members' acceptance of and insight into language capacity needs and upon their willingness to "pay" the costs, in terms of time and learning investment. These costs, then, are basically "ideal" factors. They are not independent, however, from "material" costs, budgets which supply the money for teachers, tutors, teaching material, etc. In such a calculation categories like "cultural pluralism" as a societal resource should be adequately transformed into curricular values, and the corresponding budgets should be provided. The benefits of multilingualism and cultural pluralism surpass, as has been argued above, the individuals' enrichment and offer resources for social development as a whole. These factors up to now have been considered as marginally important at best, in a context in which budgets are organized primarily on the level and in the context of the nation state.

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A new type of calculation of costs and benefits could be useful above all with respect to the efficiency of foreign language education. In my opinion, the main ways of how foreign languages are taught, namely in the context of the school system, are doomed to failure, notwithstanding the enormous amount of techical and methodological innovations and improvements. Completely different solutions should be sought, and some have been tested in large scale experiments (cf. the various "immersion" projects, following the promising pilot project of the "St. Lambert Experiment" (Lambert & Tucker (1972),)). It would demand much political courage to realize such a language learning policy, since it would mean to part with nation-based linguistic concepts which have presuppositional value for many European citizens, and since it would have major consequences with regard to the structure of schools and of schooling. 4. The question of "language acceptance" plays an important role here. Public attitudes towards languages are still determined by national schemes. This situation should be transformed - not in the sense of a new opposition to what has been reached so far, but to introduce a potential of neutralizing the opposition (as it has been described at the beginning of this section). This is important, among other things, for the sake of continuity of social life, since the remaining potential of conflicts, including nativistic simplifications, is about to play its pernicious role. 5. How could linguists contribute to the promotion of multilingualism in Europe? Five aspects should be mentioned. (a) Linguists should try harder to develop and operationalize in detail categories like that of "language proximity" (cf. Kloss (1987), Coulmas (1985)). (b) Linguistic research in the context of labour migration should change from empathetic approaches towards "research into resources", thus turning away from a type of research which, despite good will and empathy, is often doomed to societal failure. (c) Linguists should serve actual needs, options and choices of the speakers who live under circumstances which make choices necessary, instead of trying to take the decisions in their place by establishing "programs" etc. (d) The categorial systems and the methods of analysis of linguistic pragmatics need elaboration. (e) Last but not least, research is needed about the strategies of migrant groups who seek solutions for their social, linguistic, and individual lives un-

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der the c o n d i t i o n s o f e m e r g i n g m u l t i l i n g u a l i s m and inter-culturalism. For linguistics, this c o u l d m e a n to e n c o u r a g e a c o m b i n a t i o n o f grass-root analysis with categorial r e f l e x i o n to a stronger d e g r e e than the rich e x i s t i n g literature o n b i l i n g u a l i s m and foreign l a n g u a g e teaching d o e s , in order to e v e n better learn by the linguistic e x p e r i e n c e s o f migrant workers w h o , as it w e r e , are "post-native speakers".

Notes *

1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

I would like to thank Bill Elmer (Basle), Stephan Schlickau (Dortmund), Stephen Speight (Dortmund) and the editor for their considerable help with the English version of the present paper, and Ortrun Hanna (Dortmund) for assistance in bibliographical matters. When speaking about Europe in the following text, I primariliy relate to the West and Middle of Europe, thus fundamentally the area of the present Council of Europe. The situation in Eastern Europe is different in many respects, but it also shares some basic features with the West. This process has its precedent in antiquity, in Roman history. Emigration proper, with subsequent immigration into one of the "new countries", differs structurally from the migration processes from the peripheries to the centres. The USA are of major importance here because they have a characteristic of their own which is not - or not quite - determined by the developmental trends inherent in the transformation of pre-national into national structures. The situation in countries like Belgium and Switzerland, which might be quoted as counter-examples, is relatively untypical for the language situation in Phase B, and even here, a number of language conflicts (obvious in Belgium and, more covertly, also present in Switzerland) have their origin precisely in the continous importance of the "national language"-paradigm which is part of the idea of the nation state. Clearly, the question concerning the Turkish population involves very special problems, and the same holds true of the Arab migration, of which a considerable part meanwhile has reached the Federal Republic via France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

References Ammon, Ulrich, Dittmar, Norbert, Mattheier, Klaus J. (eds.) 1987f Sociolinguistics/Soziolinguistik. An international handbook of the science of language and society/Ein internationales Handbuch zur Wissenschaft von Sprache und Gesellschaft. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter (2 vol.)

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BAGIV (ed.) 1985 Muttersprachlicher Unterricht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hamburg: Rissen. Bausch, Karl-Richard, Christ, Herbert, Hüllen, Werner, Krumm, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) 1989 Handbuch zum Fremdsprachenunterricht. Tübingen: UTB. Burger, Hannelore 1990 Über das Problem der Staatssprache, in: R. Wodak and F. Menz (eds.) 1990, 1319 Castles, Stephen 1987 Migration und Rassismus in Westeuropa. Unter Mitarbeit von Heather Book und Tina Wallace. Berlin: EXpress Edition. Cinanni, Paolo no year Emigration und Imperialismus. Zur Problematik der Arbeitsemigration. München: trikont. Coulmas, Florian 1985 Sprache und Staat. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Dohse, Knuth 1981 Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat. Genese und Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Königstein/Ts.: Anton Hain. Eischenbroich, Donata 1986 Eine Nation von Einwanderern. Ethnisches Bewußtsein und Integrationspolitik in den USA. Frankfurt, New York: Campus. Extra, Gus 1989 "Meertaligheid in een multi-etnische samenleving", in: P. Stijnen et al. (eds.) Etnische minderheden. Deel 3: Kernthema's in de multietnische samenleving. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, 31—49. Geck, Hinrich-Matthias 1979 Die griechische Arbeitsmigration. Eine Analyse ihrer Ursachen und Wirkungen. Königstein/Ts.: Hanstein, (Materialien zur Arbeitsmigration und Ausländerbeschäftigung (Bd. 3)) Haarmann, Harald 1980 Multilingualismus. Tübingen: Narr. 2 vol. 1986 Language in Ethnicity. A View of Basic Ecological Relations. Berlin etc.: Mouton de Gruyter. Jaritz, Gerhard and Müller, Albert (eds.) 1988 Migration in der Feudalgesellschaft. Frankfurt, New York: Campus. Just, Wolf-Dieter and Groth, Annette (eds.) 1985 Wanderarbeiter in der EG: ein Vergleich ihrer rechtlichen und sozialen Situation in den wichtigsten Aufnahmeländern. Mainz: Grünewald. Kloss, Heinz 1987 "Abstandsprache und Ausbausprache", in: U. Ammon et al. (eds.), Vol. I, 302308.

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Körner, Heiko and Mehrländer, Ursula (eds.) 1986 Die "neue" Ausländerpolitik in Europa. Erfahrungen in den Aufnahme- und Entsendeländern. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. Körte, Herrmann and Schmidt, Alfred 1983 Migration und ihre sozialen Folgen. Förderung der Gastarbeiterforschung durch die Stiftung Volks wagenwerk 1974-1981. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Lambert, W. E. and Tucker, R. G. 1972 Bilingual Education of Children. The St. Lambert Experiment. Rowley, Newbury House. Mühlmann, Wilhelm E. 2 1964 Chiliasmus and Nativismus. Studien zur Psychologie, Soziologie und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen. Berlin. Murphy, Richard 1982 Gastarbeiter im Deutschen Reich: Polen in Bottrop 1891-1933. Wuppertal: Hammer. Raphael, Lutz (ed.) 1988 Arbeitsmigration und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Eine Literaturstudie zur Lebens· und Bildungssituation von Migranten und zu den gesellschaftlichen, politischen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Ausländerpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Rehbein, Jochen (ed.) 1985 Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Rosch, Marita (ed.) 1985 Ausländische Arbeitnehmer und Immigranten. Sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Diskussion eines aktuellen Problems. Weinheim: Beltz. Roth, Karl Heinz 1974 Die "andere" Arbeiterbewegung. München: trikont. Schrettenbrunner, Helmut 1971 Gastarbeiter. Ein europäisches Problem aus der Sicht der Herkunftsländer und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Frankfurt, Berlin, München: Diesterweg. Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1981 Bilingualism or not. The education of minorities. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Weisgerber, Leo 1933 "Zweisprachigkeit", in: Schaffen und Schauen 9. Wodak, Ruth and Menz, Florian (eds.) 1990 Sprache der Politik - Politik der Sprache. Klagenfurt/Celovec: Drava

Educational language planning in England and Wales: Multicultural rhetoric and assimilationist assumptions Michael Stubbs

Britain is often recognised as a country with profoundly monolingual assumptions and a widespread apathy towards learning other languages. This paper is a case study of some major changes which are currently taking place in the British education system. These changes involve a great deal of discussion of language issues, both in official documents and in the press, and they do have some bright spots, notably: - for the first time, learning a modern foreign language will be compulsory for all secondary school pupils - an element of language studies (language awareness) will be a compulsory component within the English curriculum. However, despite much government rhetoric about increased opportunities for linguistic diversity, I will conclude pessimistically, that basic attitudes are unchanged, and that there are major attempts to further strengthen the dominant position of Standard English in Britain, rather than to attempt a more balanced relationship between English and other languages. The essential theme of the article is expressed by Williams (1965: 145) in his discussion of the selective tradition in British education: ... the way in which education is organized can be seen to express, consciously and unconsciously, the wider organization of a society, so that what has been thought of as simple distribution is in fact an active shaping to particular social ends. His comment about distribution is intended to apply to selections of content in the curriculum, and therefore applies equally to the way in which languages are chosen for the education system.

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The essential structure of the argument is provided by a very pointed and aggressive attack in current government language policy, formulated by Rosen (quoted in the Times Education Supplement, 24 June 1988): 'liberal words (which are used) to disguise sinister messages of state coercion.' In this paper, I discuss to what extent such judgements are true, and conclude that they are, to a large extent, justified. There is much talk in government statements about ethnic diversity, and about opportunities for children to study a wider range of languages. But much of this looks like empty rhetoric when seen against the background of - other statements - the lack of resources to implement such policies - the complete absence of any overall language planning. (For other articles with the same basic argument that there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality, between appealing formulations which give only an illusion of change and social facts, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1989, and several papers in Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins eds. 1988, especially Tosi 1988, who discusses the 'depressingly vague and ambiguous notion' of multicultural education in the UK.)

The Education Reform Act (ERA) and the 'National' Curriculum This paper discusses only England and Wales: Scotland and Northern Ireland have different education systems, and the Secretary of State for Education and Science (i.e. the Minister of Education) has responsibility only for England and Wales. He cedes this responsibility to the Secretary of State for Wales in Welsh matters, including the Welsh language in schools. I will comment further below on this geographical definition of language matters in Britain. The organization of education in England and Wales has changed very sharply since 1988, when the ERA came into force: this is the largest piece of educational legislation (hundreds of pages in length) since the Education Act of 1944, and makes very large scale changes to the organization of primary, secondary and tertiary education. One of the main planks of current British conservative government policy is the National Curriculum. This is a misnomer, since it applies only to state schools in England and Wales. (Private

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schools may follow it if they wish.) However, it is within the so-called National Curriculum that a great deal of language planning is taking place, not explicitly and overtly, but in a fragmented and uncoordinated way, so that its effects are more difficult to monitor and predict. What mainly concerns us here is that previously there was no National Curriculum in schools. Pre-1988, in the years BNC (before the National Curriculum): - many educational responsibilities were delegated to around 110 Local Education Authorities (LEAs) - the curriculum in schools was the responsibility of individual schools, departments and teachers (with examination boards effectively controlling the content of the curriculum for upper secondary age pupils). Whereas now: - there is enormous centralization of control over the content and assessment of the curriculum: the Act gives the Secretary of State about 400 new powers with which to manage the whole system. These changes have taken place very fast indeed, with only minimum consultation with teachers and others. Amongst very many other provisions, the ERA established a National Curriculum comprising English, mathematics, science, technology, history, geography, one modern foreign language, music, art and physical education, and, in Wales, Welsh. I will discuss here the work of various government committees (only some of which were overtly concerned with language), whose work amounts to de facto language planning. My main references will be to the following Reports and Orders: 1975 1985 1988 1989 1989 1990

Bullock (DES 1975) Swann (DES 1975) Kingman (HMSO 1988) Cox (DES 1989a) Orders for Modern Foreign Languages (DES 1989b) Harris (DES 1990).

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There is no national language planning commission (as there has been, for example, in Australia: Clyne 1988). CDE (1982) is a very clear Australian statement on the inadequacy of uncoordinated, ad hoc responses to language diversity, and on the need for an explicit national language policy, with clear discussion of the different roles of languages in the country, local, national and international. It has not been customary for the British government to do any language planning at all. For example, it has collected no statistics of languages spoken in the UK in the 10-yearly censuses (except for Welsh, Scottish Gaelic and Irish). Figures, where they have been collected at all, have been collected at Local Education Authority level (e.g. LMP 1985; Bourne 1989a, b; and see Printon ed 1986, who gives some basic statistics from various sources.) However, language planning has suddenly simply started to be done, on a very large scale. But it is not generally presented as such: it is seen merely as a natural concomitant of the National Curriculum, an inevitable effect of the work of various government committees concerned with English and foreign language teaching. Language planning is introduced by the back door. The approach is uncoordinated, perhaps deliberately so: it could be denied that this is language planning at all. 1 It is either a muddle or a conspiracy, depending on your wider view of British history. But certainly, when there is no explicit policy, it is more difficult to monitor the language rights of different groups. Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1989:8) point out that countries differ significantly in the degrees of explicitness with which language rights are formulated. Britain is far at the implicit end. (See Figure 1.) The British government has always avoided any basic policy commitments on languages (except for Welsh). It is, I think, a widespread and justifiable view of the Thatcher government, but also more widely of British politics, that there is a lack of underlying theory: things are done in an ad hoc, pragmatic, piecemeal fashion. But an absence of a policy is a policy, whether intended or not. And an indifference to languages is likely to lead to an endorsement of the status quo. It is doubtful, in fact, if the term language planning would mean anything at all to most people (including most politicians and educationalists) in Britain. It might mean 'teaching English to immigrants' or 'choosing which foreign languages to teach in schools'. The majority could probably not conceive what else it might mean, because of the profoundly monolingual assumptions which are regarded as natural in Britain. Language planning of a far-reaching kind has, then, suddenly started to be done, via different committees which are isolated from each other. One effect

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of the lack of explicit planning is that advice and decision making are all split. The S wann Report (1985) was about the education of minority group children. The Kingman Report (1988) was about English language in the mother tongue curriculum. The Cox Report (1989) was about teaching English as a mother tongue in the National Curriculum. 3 The Harris Report is about modern foreign languages in the National Curriculum. But no committee has had a national language policy per se as part of its terms of reference. And there are large areas, obviously relevant to general policy, which are not covered at all in the present reforms: e.g. adult literacy; the education of the deaf; language disabilities; translation and interpretation services, in the courts or social services. Consultation is also muddled and split. Therefore groups of subject teachers or bilingual speakers have to make the same points over and over again to different committees. They have no participation rights, and the process of divide and rule leads to exhaustion and demoralization.

The Swann Report (DES 1985) The Swann Committee was set up to advise not on language planning, but on the role of education in race relations and equal opportunities. The concern was with social cohesion, in a situation where the government was deeply worried about possible race riots in an ethnically divided country. The Committee recommended a policy of mainstreaming: i.e. of giving bilingual children better access to the curriculum, by having them taught, with support, alongside their peers, rather than being withdrawn to separate remedial language classes or special language centres (as had been the strategy to deal with large waves of immigrant children into Britain from the 1960s). The policy of mainstreaming is now widely accepted. But this change is, by definition, limited to schools with multilingual populations. Swann's general recommendations about the need for all children, in whatever area, to learn about the multilingual nature of Britain, have hardly been put into effect, and have had little effect on the dominant culture (Verma ed 1989). The Cox Report (DES 1989a: 2.8) recommends that the curriculum for all pupils should include informed discussion of the multi-cultural nature of British society, whether or not the individual school is culturally mixed. This may be a pious hope. It may also be phrased too vaguely in terms of 'multilingualism', with no specific demands about languages.

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The Kingman Report (DES 1988) In the immediate run up to the National Curriculum, the Kingman Committee was set up to recommend on English language teaching. This was widely perceived as having to do with grammar teaching, though the Kingman Report itself interprets the issue more widely, as indeed its terms of reference required it to do. The Report proposes a model of language comprising: the forms of the English language (essentially phonology, graphology, syntax and discourse), communication and comprehension, acquisition and development, and variation. This is a standard type of model, very familiar to linguists. Much of it is, however, almost incomprehensible to many English teachers, who have received little or no training in English language or linguistics. In addition, the model has come under heavy attack. It provides and extraordinary description of language variation, which is seen as historical and geographical, but not social. No social class or ethnic divisions are mentioned, although social class is obviously a major concomitant of language diversity in Britain. (The Cox Report also avoids the term 'social class', and talks coyly of 'social groups'.) The implicit denial of social class differences in the Kingman Report is clearly politically loaded; is is also simply false. The language of a particular class is passed off as the language of the nation. But there is considerable confusion in the Kingman Report over whether the Committee are talking of the English language or of language in general. For example, consider these paragraphs (p. 33, paras 1 and 2): It is the purpose of this chapter to illustrate the relevance of the language model to English teaching... Children arrive at their first school able to use at least their own spoken language. For many children in Britain, this will be a language other than or in addition to English, but there is no unambiguous statement that English can be better understood in relation to other languages. (Contrast Cox, 2. 7-12.) Since the educational recommendations are not clearly focussed on language learning needs in general, the effect is to give more weight, yet again, to English. On the surface, the Kingman Report appears moderate and liberal, though many analyses (e.g. Cameron & Bourne 1989: 12-13) see it as authoritarian. It recommends social cohesion around one variety of English. It uses a rhetoric of language entitlement and language rights, and of freedom and democracy

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(e.g. pp. 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11), which gives the Report its superficially liberal pluralist tone. (In other areas of education, the government stresses parents' rights.) Talk of individual language rights makes the correct moral noises, but it has no legislative basis, and is therefore empty. There is talk of entitlement, but not of the discrimination which many children face; and talk of equality of opportunity, but not equality of outcome. (Cf. Rampton 1989 on the 'entitlement' rhetoric; and Skutnabb-Kangas - Phillipson 1989 on the myth that language rights are a reality in many countries.)

Language and nationality In the debate over language and nation, the Kingman Report is a key ideological text (Cameron - Bourne 1989). The focus was on a claimed crisis of falling standards. 'Grammar' carried an enormous symbolic weight of authority, hierarchy, order, tradition, and elitism. The Report has been widely interpreted as taking an authoritarian, national unity position, ethnocentric and nostalgic, with the covert function of strengthening and protecting English. A characteristic of the current debate in Britain about language, especially English in the National Curriculum, is the enormous press coverage which the Kingman and Cox Reports have had, and essential to an understanding of the debate is the nature of the rhetoric which is used. For example, The Times leading article (30 April 1988), when Kingman was published, wrote: English ought to be the queen of the curriculum for any British child. It is one of the things that define his or her nationality. This claimed relationship between language and nationality, which has very little basis in British law, occurs very frequently. Marenbon (1987) is published by the Centre for Policy Studies, a right-wing think tank set up by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph in 1974. Marenbon ends his attack on current trends in English teaching in this way: ... in the future of its language there lies the future of a nation. The Kingman Report itself uses a general formulation (p. 43, para 32): ... language above all else is the defining characteristic of an individual, a community, a nation.

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There are certainly many cases in the world where language has been the focus of separatist, nationalist demands. But the Kingman Report is presenting as the only, obvious, 'natural' view, what is, in fact, a particular 19th century European Romantic view (Leith 1989), that a language expresses individual, creative, poetic genius (there is a lot of literary criticism in the Report on biblical translations, Shakespeare and Dickens), and the Volksgeist, the genius of a people.

The Cox Report (DES 1989a) The main job of the Cox Committee was to recommend programmes of study and attainment targets for English mother tongue teaching from 5 to 16. Its recommendations have been amended, after limited consultation, by the National Curriculum Council, and turned into law. The Report also contains other chapters on Standard English, linguistic terminology, knowledge about language, equal opportunities, bilingual children, and Wales: these chapters have no statutory force. There is no space here for a detailed account of the very substantial debates around teaching English as a mother tongue. (For more detailed analysis of the Cox Report see Stubbs 1989.) The Report is discussed elsewhere in this article for its relevance to the other languages of England. The essential general point is that the ERA defines separate subjects on the school curriculum: 'English' is different from 'Modern Foreign Languages'. Different Committees are responsible for the curriculum, with only poorly defined requirements of 'cross curricular themes' between subjects. It has been pointed out that the list of subjects in the National Curriculum is almost identical to the list of subjects for grammar schools proposed in the early 1900s.

Modern foreign languages in the National Curriculum: statutory orders In connection with the ERA, the government has published Statutory Orders (DES 1989b), which came into effect in August 1989, specifying which languages may be taught in the National Curriculum. Nineteen languages are listed as possible foundation subjects, to be taught between 11 and 16 years (probably for 4 periods per week).

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The positive aspect is that, for the first time, a modern foreign language will be compulsory for all secondary age pupils, whereas previously a foreign language has been seen as a subject for the academic elite. This new 'languages for all' policy is a major step forward, in the context of facilitating communication between citizens of EC countries. However, there are several aspects of the policy which are disappointing. The permitted languages are in two schedules. Schedule 1 contains the working languages of the EC (minus English). These are unconditionally specified as foundation subjects, and schools must offer at least one: Danish, Dutch, French, German, Modern Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish. Schedule 2 contains 11 languages, which are a mixture of international languages and languages of major linguistic minorities in Britain. As long as they offer an EC language, schools may in addition offer one or more of: Arabic, Bengali, Chinese (Cantonese or Mandarin), Gujerati, Modern Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese, Panjabi, Russian, Turkish, Urdu. The schedules do explicitly give legal status to a relatively wide range of languages, and one must welcome the formal recognition of non-European languages. This enhancement of their status may look very progressive in a European context, where non-European languages are often totally unrecognised except in low status 'migrant worker programmes'. But it has been quickly pointed out that the schedules also establish a caste system of grade 1 and grade 2 languages. (See also below on some of the implications of territorial descriptions such as 'non-European'.) Again, we have a proposal which appears superficially to encourage language diversity. However, there are problems: - Children are obliged to study only one language in the National Curriculum: they may study second and subsequent languages, but outside the National Curriculum, and very little time is available outside the compulsory subjects. In practice, the opportunity to study a second language will seldom be available. - The publication of such lists creates the expectation of adequate resourcing, but, in fact, no resourcing is available for the wider range of languages proposed. There are no teachers of Danish or Dutch, for example. Nor are there

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any incentives to offer schedule 2 languages. French will therefore continue to be taught because there are teachers of French. The government has published schedules of languages, to which it can rhetorically refer in talking of opportunities for pupils, but is has shown no commitment to turning the schedules into reality. - In practice, there are few resources to teach much apart from French. But there is actually a current shortage even of French teachers, and this is when over 60 per cent of pupils now drop French at age 14. Under the National Curriculum, they will be obliged to continue with a language until 16, and the teacher shortage will therefore be more acute. - Although 19 languages are listed, others are thereby excluded: schools need special permission to teach them. The central specification of particular languages is inevitably a partial and arbitrary estimation of future needs, but no mechanisms are proposed whereby the schedules might be changed. In general, the Orders fossilize provision. The schedules embody a superficial and mechanical definition of Europe: simply 1992 as visualized in 1989. If Turkey or Sweden join the EC, for example, does the government have to change the law? After the events of summer and autumn 1989, this view of Europe looks very dated indeed. The Orders are accompanied by a non-statutory Circular (DES 9/89) which contains a brief discussion of which languages are of relevance to Britain. There is a weak classification into: working languages of the EC, major trading languages, and languages used by ethnic communities in Britain. But there is no real theory of such language types or functions. (Again, contrast CDE 1982.) Watertight categories are clearly useless, and any theory would have to allow multiple categorization (Clyne, 1988). Starting categories might be: -

traditional foreign languages, i.e. languages for which teachers are available community/heritage languages languages of neighboring countries and/or trading partners EC languages world/international languages, e.g. languages used for scientific communication - classical languages (which are completely omitted from the National Curriculum - 'easy' versus 'difficult' languages, e.g. languages with a non-Roman writing system (though such a description may be very ethno- or Eurocentric).

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It would not be possible to define such categories in more than a common sense way. In fact, it is evident that the categories above are not neutral, since they signal the status of languages: international language sounds important, community language less so. But planners and decision makers need such categories because they imply policies and actions. The Circular attempts no basic justifications for language education (Clyne 1988: 278), in terms, for example, of social justice, enrichment for all British citizens, or the maintenance of languages already spoken in Britain. Even on cost-benefit grounds, the economic arguments look very shortsighted: there is likely to be an enormous waste, allowing languages already spoken in the home and community to be eroded, whilst starting from scratch to teach other languages in schools and colleges. Only a narrow version of economic strategies in relation to Britain's external relations is clearly spelled out. This will need careful analysis of the implications of some very simple facts. For example, in Europe, German is the first language in terms of numbers of speakers, and of the number of different countries in which it is the main language (Germany, Austria and Switzerland, with sizeable numbers of speakers in other countries. In the world, in terms of numbers of speakers, German ranks below English, Spanish and Portuguese (and many other languages) (Ammon, this volume). The Circular gives only a very sketchy rationale, based on personal motivations (practical skills, understanding of other cultures), and national motivations (economic and cultural, trade, tourism and international relations). This needs to be substantially developed by an analysis of increased personal mobility, of increased opportunities to meet migrants and tourists, of the increasing importance of languages in international life, including increased access to radio, televison and films in other languages, etc. Nor is there anything but the vaguest discussion of the internationalization of business and commercial life in which an adult is very likely to have to use a foreign language, but probably not the one s/he learned at school (Trim 1989). The implications of the global village are hardly recognised. In a word, there is still great confusion over what modern foreign languages are for in British schools. The range of political, social and historical factors which lead to lists of languages such as those in the schedules must be publicly debated and justified. Language planning depends on a problem being defined, alternative solutions being formulated, so that they can be evaluated, and so that one can then be chosen and implemented, and its implementation in turn evaluated (O Riagáin, this volume).

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In addition, the rationale for teaching heritage/community languages is very different from teaching traditional modern foreign languages (in practice, French and German), and very different programmes of study are needed. Expectations of linguistic competence could be much higher than with ab initio teaching of a foreign language. The main motivations may be cultural and or religious, and the maintenance of a language spoken in the local community. In summary, the overt ideology has changed in favour of widening the available languages. But when this rhetoric is translated into concrete actions in institutions, little will change. If anything, the present status quo could be even more rigid than at present, because some aspects of it are now enshrined in law. English exists in a web of institutions, woven even tighter in England and Wales by the National Curriculum. In a review of language planning in the USA from the 1960s to the 1980s, Fishman (1981: 516, 522) reaches pessimistic conclusions, very similar to this article: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. On the surface a great deal has changed ... but basically ours is not a society whose peculiar genius is along the lines of linguistic sophistication, sensitivity or concern. ... the exasperated know-nothingism of "this is, after all, an English-speaking country" ... Language maintenance ... is not part of public policy because it is rarely recognised as being in the public interest.

Modern foreign languages in the National Curriculum: the Harris Committee The National Curriculum Modern Foreign Languages Working Group was set up in September 1989, to design the programmes of study and attainment targets which will come into force from autumn 1992. The press statement, from the Education Minister at the DES who introduced the Committee, emphasised, in a narrow way, the 'challenge of 1992' and the need for languages in 'today's increasingly competitive world'. The Committee's terms of reference were, however, wider than many people had predicted: the group was asked both to reconsider the two schedules of languages and also whether only one language in secondary education is appropriate. At the time of writing (March 1990), the Committee has produced an interim report, which does not significantly change the terms of the debate.

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Welsh The Welsh Act of 1967 asserted the 'equal validity' of English and Welsh, and gave both languages equal status in legal proceedings. However, when the effects of the Act were reviewed 10 years later, it was concluded that such legislation had not strengthened Welsh. This required active promotion in all domains. The National Curriculum Welsh Working Group envisages a variety of different kinds of provision: Welsh medium education, Welsh mother tongue teaching, and Welsh as a second language within English medium education. In 1988, only 13 per cent of young primary age Welsh children were fluent in Welsh. The proportion of bilinguals does not therefore look very different in Wales and in England. But the legal situation of Welsh in Wales is very different from the situation of other languages in England or Wales. A particular form of territoriality principle, with unfortunate consequences, is used for Welsh in Wales (Cameron & Bourne 1989; Bourne 1989a, b). Geography is used to define provision and rights. Welsh has legal status only in Wales, so that as soon as a Welsh speaker crosses the border into England those rights vanish for that individual. This territorial conception of language rights is not only enshrined in law: it is the conception which has been acceptable to Welsh language activists themselves. (The territorial view is, of course, found widely elsewhere under very different political circumstances: many separatist political demands are based on a language-territory claim; even in Switzerland, despite the notion of a multilingual federation, languages are linked to territory. Neide and Watts, this volume.) The Welsh Act is the only explicit legislation in the UK concerning language rights, and is therefore significant for its covert implications for other languages. And this discourse of national boundaries has dangerous implications. The territorial conception may well have benefited Welsh itself, but have created unfortunate precedents for other languages. If Welsh is the natural language of Wales, then it seems to follow that English is the natural language of England, and that languages in general belong to territories not to speakers. Since the languages of England (e.g. Asian languages, Chinese, etc.) have geographical homes elsewhere, then they have no natural home in Britain. Their speakers belong elsewhere, and should presumably forget their languages or return to where they came from. They certainly cannot expect any language rights in Britain. This seems to be the unacceptable logic of this way of thinking.

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It is such assumptions which have to be extracted from covert statements. The Kingman Report (e.g. p. 30) also sees languages as things which spread over territories: As populations are dispersed and separated, they typically develop regular regional changes in their language forms. These changes may mark different dialects (or eventually different languages). This expresses a strange model of populations 'dispersing', independently of other populations who might be making them disperse: agency is strangely missing. Further, there is no notion that, having dispersed, the populations might come into contact with other populations who speak different languages. Language contact often leads to language convergence.

The other languages of England and Wales Bhatt and Martin-Jones (1989) summarize the changing policies concerning minority languages in Britain. The major waves of immigration into Britain in the 1960s were accompanied by firmly assimilationist assumptions: Britain should respect, but could not be expected to perpetuate, different cultural values. Groups were seen as a problem needing compensatory English teaching: bilingualism was seen as bewildering for the individuals involved (DES 1971 : 9). The Bullock Report (1975) took a liberal pluralist view that minority languages are a resource and a right: in a famous statement (quoted by Cox, DES 1989a: 2.7.), they asserted that children should not be expected to cast off the language and culture of the home as they cross the school threshold. The EC Directive (EC 1977) on the education of the children of migrant workers was interpreted by the DES (1981) as requiring an exploration of how minority languages might be taught inside or outside school, but not as the right of children to have such tuition. In the 1980s, there was discussion of the possibility of minority languages in three places in the curriculum: as examination subjects in secondary schooling; as bilingual support in the classroom, especially for young children in reception classes; and as a resource in language awareness courses. (Tosi 1988 provides a comparable analysis, of a rhetoric which shifts from 'assimilation' to 'integration', with little changing but the words.)

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Surveys of minority languages spoken in Britain tend to stress their diversity. For example, the Cox Report (10.3) emphasises that: The 1987 Language Survey conducted by ILEA (Inner London Education Authority) found 23 per cent of the Authority's school population using a language other than or in addition to English at home, with 170 different languages spoken by its pupils. This argument is probably a strategic blunder, because it makes planned provision seem impossible (Bourne 1989a, b). In fact, of the 170 languages spoken by London school children, 37 languages were spoken only by one child, and the overall distribution of the languages was very uneven. For example, Bengali accounted for over 20 per cent of bilingual children (some 12,600 pupils), who were concentrated in certain areas. There were large numbers of speakers of Bengali, Gujerati, Panjabi and Urdu, and substantial numbers of Turkish, Greek and Chinese speaking children. In England some 5 per cent of children are bilingual, but in many schools over 60 per cent of the children speak the same language other than English, and in some schools it is over 90 per cent. Such a presentation of the figures makes planned provision seem much more realistic. It is important, in a wider European context, to stress that such children are not from migrant worker or immigrant families. They are not Gastarbeiter or Wanderarbeiter. They are second or third generation British citizens. Pupils who have recently arrived in the UK may be exempted for only 6 months from the National Curriculum, but the DES (Circular 15/89) expects such exemptions to be very rare. Even if exempted, they are still entitled to a 'broad and balanced' curriculum: i.e. there are no explicit language recommendations even here (that they should receive special English language teaching help, for example.) Otherwise, bilingual children are subject to the same programmes of study and attainment targets as any other pupils. This might seem, on the face of it, like equality of treatment. But again, the point is that there are no general principles for language education, only specific programmes of study which pupils have to follow. The ad hoc language planning is hidden. Furthermore, bilingual children do not anywhere get credit for their knowledge of two (or more) languages. The Kingman Report (p. 58, para 17) dismisses bilingual children in a single paragraph, saying simply that the Report is concerned with English as LI, and that English as L2 is outside their terms of reference. This is an extremely weak argument, and arguably quite false. The Committee's terms of

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reference asked them to advise on a model of the English languages which could inform 'all aspects of English teaching', but the committee narrowed its own terms of reference quite sharply. The Cox Committee, in contrast, was given much more sharply defined guidance by the Secretary of State, and contested it by trying to find a better formulation. However, the formulations which it did find stand only as an assertion of principle, with no financial backing or legislative force. They amount only to recommendations that other languages should be valued and respected. In a statement (in the Notes of further guidance to the Chair of the Committee) the Secretary of State said this, in an extraordinary paragraph on equal opportunities: The group should take account of the ethnic diversity of the school population and society at large, bearing in mind the cardinal point that English should be the first language and medium of instruction for all pupils in England. In this unprecedentedly explicit statement, English is given priority, and the assumption appears to be that bilingual education is ruled out in Britain: only English-medium education is assumed (except for bilingual schools in Wales). Furthermore, the assumption appears to be that English should become (?) the 'first language' of children themselves: the monolingual assumptions underlying this statement are quite extraordinary. Language loss appears to be recommended. Given that the paragraph is about 'equal opportunities', it is just double speak. The statement is contested in the Cox Report itself, but only weakly. The Report points out that English is not the first language of all children. But it admits that English is the 'first language' of the education system. Overall, the rhetoric is one of rights and entitlements. It appears tolerance- and promotionoriented: and some of the minority languages are explicitly listed in the schedules. But there is no actual promotion or financial support. Such languages may be a subject on the curriculum, but not a language of instruction. There is no explicit right even to use such languages in education (or any other institution). There is only weakly supported co-existence in very narrow domains.

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Assimilationist assumptions Researchers (e.g. LMP 1985) have struggled to have linguistic diversity accepted as the norm, on a continuum from dialects of English to languages other than English. And some of these ways of talking have been picked up in government reports. The overt rhetoric is often of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism, but always held in check by ethnocentric and assimilationist assumptions. Schools have always been the most powerful mechanism in assimilating minority children into mainstream cultures. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson (1989) discuss the symbolic violence involved in a shift from physical to psychological control over groups of people. This is a new and more sophisticated control, which recognises ethnic diversity, but confines it to the home, which pays lip service to multilingualism, but is empty liberal rhetoric. They argue that declarations of language rights must be explicit. Even overt permission does not protect languages: compare the lack of effect of the Welsh Language Act cited above. Languages are oppressed, not by active opposition, but by lack of resources (also Phillipson 1989). There are no social justice arguments used in favour of minority languages. There is no thought of whose interests are served, or of what policy for language provision would be formulated by a speaker of one of the minority languages, from the point of view of the bilingual him or herself. (See Rawls 1972). There is an unstated premise: that the situation of the monolingual majority should be altered as little as possible. Language planning (such as it is) avoids any challenge to the practice of the currently privileged. The policies operate systematically and consistently to the advantage of speakers of Standard English. But this is nowhere stated: this is the advantage of not having a language policy. Implicit ideologies are used to legitimate unequal resources. The discourse of multiculturalism excludes questions of social, economic and political power. In a swingeing attack on such situations in different countries, SkutnabbKangas and Phillipson (1989) talk of the implicit paranoia ideology of a country which is monolingual in an international language. Multilingualism is thought to be inevitably negative, and one widely held, but seldom explicitly expressed, myth or assumption, is that 'many languages divide a nation' (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1989:55). There is an implicit assumption

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that societal monolingualism is the norm and that language diversity means conflict. Behind the rhetoric, bilingual is often a euphemism for 'Black' and 'poor'. Educational statements often refer to societal multilingualism as a fact. For example, the Secretary of State's notes of guidance to the Cox Committee refer to: the ethnic diversity of the school population and society at large. But they tend not to refer to individual bilingualism as a goal. In the present context, this goal is formulated only with reference to Welsh in Wales.

Knowledge about language One bright spot on the horizon is the explicit requirement that language study itself, or language awareness, become an explicit part of English teaching. A prerequisite of successful foreign language learning is a positive attitude towards multilingualism. The monolingual ideology must be contested if the aim is to be a more linguistically aware nation. Widdowson (1989) discusses Britain as a profoundly monolingual nation which has no concept of multilingualism as an asset. The pervasive attitude is of cultural and linguistic self-sufficiency, and of a contempt of anything foreign which does not contribute to material well-being. As an example of ethnocentric complacency and prejudice, he quotes an article in The Sun with the headline Di foxed by Frog Lingo. The article reported Princess Diana sympathising with children at the British school in Paris because of their difficulties in learning French: i.e. the language of the country they were living in .... This was reported with indulgent tolerance and approval. Widdowson makes the point that simply putting an obligatory language in the National Curriculum will not magically improve the image of modern languages: it might just provoke mass disaffection. (Esarte-Sarries 1989 reports research on primary age children's stereotypes of France and the French: onion sellers in stripy shirts. At the end of a depressing article, she makes the point that 'the continuation of negative attitudes amongst secondary boys was disquieting'.) Along with supporting chapters on Standard English and Linguistic Terminology, the Cox Report has a complete chapter on knowledge about language.

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This will become an obligatory part of programmes of study in Speaking and Listening, Writing and Reading from ages 11 to 16, covering forms of language, language variation and language in social institutions. A major problem, however, will be teachers' own lack of knowledge and confidence in this area. The Bullock, Kingman and Cox Reports all point out that almost 30 per cent of teachers of English as a mother tongue have no qualifications in English past their own schooling, and that such teachers are responsible for about 15 per cent of all English teaching. Bourne (1989b) points out that many teachers of English as a second language have come from other subjects, and are not much better qualified. And Kingman and Cox both point to the huge teacher training programme which is necessary if teachers themselves are to know enough about language to teach about it coherently. A £15 million training programme is now underway: possibly a drop in the ocean of prejudice and stereotypes, but at least a start. Even this programme is being developed by and for English teachers themselves. Modern language and community language teachers are certainly not systematically involved. Again, there is monolingual vision.

Conclusions Language planning is, by definition, interventionist, goal-oriented, and institutional. It ought to be explicit and, ideally, systematic (Christian 1988: 197). The British government now has a highly interventionist policy in the state education system: but the nature of their intervention in language planning is not explicit, even if it is conscious and deliberate. It is goal-oriented, but its goals are often unclear. It is pervasive, but it is neither systematic nor rational. It is not based on any careful analysis of the range of relevant factors and of the desired outcomes. The alternatives are not clearly laid out: there are, for example, no genuine consultations between central government, local authorities and smaller groups with different language interests. And I see little possibility of the present British government, in the current political climate, setting up the national language commission which would be necessary to move beyond the ad hoc, uncoordinated and disguised language planning which is taking place. Nevertheless, ideologies are never static. Hegemonies are constantly adjusted and renegotiated. Although little is likely to change in the profoundly

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monolingual assumptions in Britain, the ways in which the linguistic domination is maintained have changed rapidly and significantly. These mechanisms therefore require analysis, to discover where they might be challenged. Rational argument is clearly not enough on its own. Linguists have been exposing linguistic myths for years, with some genuine effects, but only in restricted domains, such as initial teacher training. What is required may include a range of small-scale strategies and publicity campaigns aimed at changing people's attitudes. Over time, modest changes in the image of other languages might affect people's assumptions about languages and their speakers. For .example, British television is gradually using more sub-titles in place of voiceovers when speakers of languages other than English are broadcast. In this small way, other languages gain a higher profile in a natural way, people get used to hearing them, and sometimes understanding them, if only a little. Such initiatives should be encouraged. In addition, languages need institutional support: for example, university chairs in minority languages are a concrete sign that they are valued in British society. British academics, as a whole, have done little to encourage such developments, or even to prevent cuts in the few such chairs which have existed. Concessions have been made, in British law, to Welsh in Wales, and this could support movements for change elsewhere, if alliances could be forged. The ideology of multilingualism is strong at local levels, where approaches to language diversity are unavoidable, but it is hampered by lack of central resourcing. Relations with the European Community have had some effect: witness the schedules of languages in the National Curriculum. The British government has previously used the decentralized education system as an excuse for not acting (e.g. on the EC Directive on the education of the children of migrant workers), but with a highly centralized system, it no longer has this excuse. When the possibilities for rational and systematic planning are so restricted, then perhaps small, ad hoc strategies are the best hope. In general, more linguists should be encouraged to get involved with the policy making and to influence decisions where they are made.

Summary This article has discussed the failure of current British government policies to address the dilemma of pluralism: how can a country both sustain cultural dif-

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ferences and also promote national unity? (Widdowson 1989). The symbolic functions of language as both a separatist and a unifying force are evident from the media hype and hysteria which accompanied the publication of the Kingman and Cox Reports (Stubbs 1989). But there is no planning for the possible co-existence of the lower order bonds of community and of the higher order bonds of national unity: no discussion of pluralist Gemeinschaft and national Gesellschaft (Fishman 1981). A great deal of language policy is currently being formulated in England and Wales, but, due to a lack of an explicit general statement, and the (deliberate?) fragmentation of the consultation process, it is difficult to see its implications. The present article is a very partial study of some of the mechanisms which legitimate the dominance of one language over others. The partial nature of the analysis is partly due to the very speed at which the legislative changes are taking place in the British education system. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson (1989) have provided a way of charting the positions on language rights adopted in different countries. For example, Phillipson (1988) points out that discrimination against languages may be overt (e.g. a language may be prohibited in schools), or covert (e.g. certain languages are simply not used in schools or teacher training), or conscious (e.g. teachers tell their pupils not to use their home languages in case this interferes with their learning of another language), or unconscious (e.g. English is just assumed to be the 'natural' language for education or whatever). They also provide a way of mapping the positions adopted by different countries in their language planning provisions: Figure 1 provides a brief summary of my argument.

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Figure 1. After Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1989. ASSIMILATION ORIENTED

MAINTENANCE ORIENTED OVERT Welsh in Wales

PROHIBITION TOLERATION NON-DISCRIMINATION PERMISSION PROMOTION

other languages in England and Wales COVERT

Acknowledgements I have learned a great deal about the topics discussed here from Jill Bourne, both from her published work and from her detailed critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I have also drawn on papers by Ben Rampton and Ros Mitchell submitted as evidence to the DES on language issues. I am grateful to Gabi Keck, Robert Phillipson and Tove SkutnabbKangas for critical comments on an earlier draft. Many points made in discussions at the conference in Bad Homburg have also been integrated into the argument.

Notes 1 2

3

The term language planning is used explicitly by Peter Gannon HMI, Secretary of the Kingman Committee (Gannon 1988). I will use the term English mother tongue in places in this article. But the term is misleading, since many English teachers teach children who have mother tongues other than English. I was a member of the Cox Committee.

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References Bhatt, Α. & Martin-Jones, M. 1989 "Bilingualism, inequality and the language curriculum." Paper read at British Association for Applied Linguistics Annual Meeting, University of Lancaster, September 1989. Bourne, J. 1989a "The teaching of languages in the English school system." Paper read to European Colloquium on Language Planning Policies in a Context of Cultural Pluralism, Brussels, May 1989. 1989b Moving into the mainstream: LEA provision for bilingual pupils. London: NFERNelson. Bourne, J. & Bloor, T. (eds.) 1989 Kingman and the linguists. Committee for Linguistics in Education [Mimeo]. Cameron, D. & Bourne, J. 1989 "Grammar, nation and citizenship: Kingman in linguistic and historical perspective", in: Language and Education, 2, 3: 147-60. CDE [Commonwealth Dept of Education] 1982 Towards a national language policy. Canberra. Christian, D. 1988 "Language planning: the view from linguistics", in: F. J. Newmeyer, (ed.) Language: the Socio-Cultural Context. Cambridge: University Press. Clyne, M. 1988 "Australia's national policy on languages and its implications", in: Journal of Educational Policy, 3, 3: 273-80. DES [Dept of Education and Science] 1971 The education of immigrants. Education Survey 13. London: HMSO. 1975 A language for life (Bullock Report.) London: HMSO. 1981 Directive of the Council of the European Community on the education of the children of migrant workers. Circular 5/18. London: DES. 1985 Education for all. (Swann Report.) London: HMSO. 1988 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the teaching of English language. (Kingman Report.) London: HMSO. 1989 English for ages 5 to 16. (Cox Report.) London: DES and Welsh Office. 1989b The Education (National Curriculum) (Modern Foreign Languages) Order 1989. Statutory Instruments, 825. London: HMSO. 1990 National Curriculum modern foreign languages working group. Initial advice. London: DES & Welsh Office. European Community 1977 Council directive on the education of the children of migrant workers. 77/486/ EEC. Brussels: EC. Esarte-Sarries, V. 1989 " O n i o n s and stripey tee-shirts' or how do primary pupils learn about France?" in: British Journal of Language Teaching, 27, 2: 65-71.

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Fishman, J. 1981 "Language policy: past, present and future", in: C.A. Ferguson & S. Brice Heath (eds.) Language in the USA. Cambridge: University Press. Gannon, P. 1988 "Kingman: Setting the scene", in: E. Ashworth & L. Masterman (eds.) Responding to Kingman. University of Nottingham. [Mimeo]. Lawlor, S. 1988 Correct core. London: Centre for Policy Studies. Leith, D. 1989 "Three criticisms", in: Bourne & Bloor (eds.) Letwin, O. 1988 Aims of schooling. London: Centre for Policy Studies. LMP [Linguistic Minorities Project] 1985 The other languages of England. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Marenbon, J. 1987 English our English. London: Centre for Policy Studies. Phillipson, R. 1988 "Linguicism: structures and ideologies in linguistic imperialism", in: SkutnabbKangas & Cummins (eds.) 1989 "Human rights and the delegitimation of dominant languages." Paper presented at Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages, Ljouwert/Lccuwarden, June 1989. Printon, V. (ed.) 1986 Facts and Figures: Languages in Education. London: Centre for Information on Language Teaching and Research. Rampton, B. 1989 "Almost passionate in its advocacy: Kingman on entitlement", in: Bourne & Bloor (eds.) Rawls, J. 1972 A Theory of Justice. Oxford: University Press. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. 1989 "Legitimating or delegitimating new forms of racism: the role of researchers." Paper presented at Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages, Ljouwert/Leeuwarden, June 1989. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. & Cummins, J. (eds.) 1988 Minority Education: from Shame to Struggle. Avon: Multilingual Matters. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. & Phillipson, R. 1989 "Wanted! Linguistic Human Rights." Rolig-Papir, 44, University of Roskilde [Mimeo]. Stubbs, M. 1989 "The state of English in the English state: reflections on the Cox Report", in: Language and Education, 3, 4: 235-250. Tosi, A. 1988 "The jewel in the crown of the modern prince", in: Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins (eds.)

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Trim, J.L.M. 1989 "Language teaching in the perspective of the predictable requirements of the twenty-first century." Prepared for AILA for submission to UNESCO. Verma, G. (ed.) 1989 Education for All: a Landmark in Pluralism. London: Falmer. Widdowson, H. G. 1989 "Language in the National Curriculum." (Unpublished lecture.) Institute of Education: University of London. Williams, R. 1965 The Long Revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

The status of German and other languages in the European Community Ulrich Ammon

1. Methodological preliminaries The 'status' or, synonymously, the 'position' which a language has within a multilingual society or community, is a highly complex concept (cf. Ammon 1989). It seems essential that this concept is relative to a certain society or community in which the language in question has a certain status. Thus German, for instance, has a different status in the FRG, in Belgium, in France and in the entire EC. The concept 'status' also calls for comparisons between languages or rank orders, if not even orders on the basis of interval scales. It will, however, soon become clear that comparisons or rank orders of languages with respect to a comprehensive status concept are a difficult task. The concept 'status of a language' is independent of the concept 'structure of a language', being a basic (not necessarily a primitive) concept of the sociology of language. 'Structure of a language' is a basic concept of linguistics proper. Though the concepts 'status' and 'structure of a language' are logically or definitionally independent of one another, they have to be related to one another in an explanatory theory of sociolinguistic states (Zustände) of a language in a society, at least in a somewhat comprehensive theory. I shall, however, not deal with this question here. As I said, the concept 'status' is highly complex, as is the concept 'structure' . It can be analysed into at least the following large components as a first step towards a more rigorous explication. Each of these components can be further analysed and delimited in various ways. These components may, however, serve for a preliminary overall orientation. (1) Numerical strength of the language: the number of speakers, who should be distinguished into at least native and non-native speakers and perhaps also into mono-linguals and bi-linguals. (2) Social character of the language - an unusual term, for which I do not know a better alternative: the specification of the speakers of the language in

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sociological terms, for instance their social class affiliation, wealth, sex and the like. The economic strength of a language with which I shall deal later on, is part of the social character. (3) Functions: the use of the language in the domains (for instance use as a school subject, use in the domain of science, etc.). (4) Geographic distribution: the regions where the speakers live, and also where they travel in sufficiently great numbers using the language. (5) Legal status: this component is closely related to functions, but does not conincide with them. Examples are the declared status as the national language of a country or as an official language of a larger community like the EC. (6) Estimation: these are the attitudes which important groups hold towards the language or towards its use in the domains. Such important groups are, for instance, its speakers and also the non-speakers. It hardly seems necessary to point out that each of these components is highly complex. This is why status studies have been so divergent. It is, however, of little help to deplore the innumerable difficulties, and it also seems to be dissatisfactory in the long run to escape from the difficulties by discarding the possibility of a systematic approach and to escape into mere subjective understanding. The difficulties are aggravated by the fact that the societies in which a language has a certain status, however described, are embedded in larger communities, in which the status of the respective language will, as a rule, be different. The status which the language has within the larger community (e.g. the EC) seems at least in part to sum up from the status of the language in the embedded (incorporated) smaller units (e.g. the member countries of the EC). In addition however, it consists of specific components on the level of that larger community. Thus that a language is an official language on the level of the EC cannot simply be summed up from the lower level of the individual member countries; some official languages of the individual countries like Irish or Letzebuergesh are not official on the level of the EC. Other status components like numerical strength can, however, entirely be summed up from the member countries. I shall henceforth distinguish the following three levels or units of which the smaller ones are embedded in the larger ones:

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Single Country (level of...)

EC (-level)

Globe (global level)

It seems that not only the status of a language within the embedded units has an impact on its status within the embedding unit, but also vice versa. Thus, for instance, the legal status of an offcial language of the UN, i.e. on the global level, may well have an effect on its status within a single country, such as to facilitate its becoming an official language of that country. The latter is, however, an effect of the former, not a component of it at which we could arrive by division in analogy to the summation which we used with some status components in the opposite direction, from bottom to top. The concept 'status of a language within a community' would certainly be justified scientifically if it could be developed into a theoretical construct with explanative or predictive power (Hempel 1967; cf. also Altmann/Lehfeldt 1973). Though we are presently far from the realization of this goal, it seems plausible that we may eventually get there. The idea is that from the knowledge of some component (for instance the numerical strength of the language) one can predict, with a certain probability, other components (for instance its legal status). More specifically the following predictions or explanations should be possible:

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(a) Within a single unit (society), for instance a country: the prediction of certain status components of the language from others (for instance its legal status from its numerical strength). (b) For an embedding unit and one of its embedded units: the prediction of status components of the embedding unit from status components of the embedded units, or vice versa (e.g. the status of an official language on the national level of a member country from the status of an official language on the EC-level). Such predictions will only be possible if there are significant regular relations (law relations of a probabilistic, or even categorical nature) between these components. We presently have, as it seems, only very fragmentary knowledge of such relations. It may be assumed that such a status approach will always only grasp part of the truth. Its main shortcoming is perhaps that it is basically ahistoric and does not in particular account for traditions of language status, or language use as part of language status, for instance such traditions as that of French being a preferred language of diplomacy. It should, however, account for the forces which break traditions. Thus the fact that English replaced French as the dominant language of diplomacy on a global level can perhaps be accounted for by certain status components of English and French like the numerical or the economic strength of both languages, the number and the power of the countries in which they are official, and the like. Knowledge about regular relations between status components could also be helpful in selecting important status components for such limited studies as this one. My selection has instead only been guided by vague intuition of what might be important status components. My range of selection is additionally limited by the lack of data for numerous status components.

2. Some status components and their relations within the EC 2.1. Numerical strength - official status - official function Is there any regular relationship between the numerical strength of the languages in the EC and their legal status on the EC-level? In order to answer this question, let us compare the numerical strength of the official languages of the EC with the numerical strength of the other non-official languages within the EC. May it suffice here that we take our data simply from the Fischer Weltal-

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manach '88 (1987). The numerical strength then includes native speakers and second language speakers, but not foreign language speakers. Second language speakers seem to be defined in the Weltalmanach as either living in the country in which the respective language is clearly dominant, or having learned the language as a medium of instruction (not only a subject) in school. As a consequence of bilingualism, the sets of speakers of different languages are not disjunctive. Thus migrant Italians living in the FRG seem to count as speakers of German (second language speakers), but at the same time as speakers of Italian, being citizens of Italy. And Luxemburgers seem to count as speakers of French, of German and of Letzebuergesh. Some data are missing in the Weltalmanach, e.g. the numerical strength of Occitan. These inaccuracies do not, however, impede our argument.

Table 1. Numerical strength of the languages of the EC within the EC (in Millions). 1

Official languages

Non-official languages

German

63.072

Catalan

English

60.170

Basque

1.071

French

59.961

0.700

Italian

57.330 38.820

Irish Breton

Spanish Dutch Portuguese Greek Danish

21.388 10.290 9.930 5.150

9.617

Frisian Welsh

0.900 0.500 0.482

Letzebuergesh

0.367

Gaelic Ladin

0.079 0.030

Slovenian

0.053

Albanian

0.090

It is quite obvious that, as a rule, the official languages of the EC are at the same time the numerically stronger languages. The only exception is Catalan which is numerically stronger than Danish. This strong correlation between the official status on the EC-level with the numerical strength is the result of two selective processes: (1) On the national level, the languages with the greater numerical strength have become national official languages, e.g. French in France, English in Great Britain or Dutch and French in Belgium.

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(2) On the EC-level, those languages were chosen as EC-official which have the greater numerical strength in the case of several national official languages, i.e. the respective countries are represented on the EC-level only with these languages: English, not Irish for Ireland; French or German, not Letzebuergesh for Luxemburg. We may assume that the numerical strength which a language has in the entire world, i.e. on the global level, would also have some bearing on its legal status within the EC. In fact none of the non-official languages of the EC has any considerable numerical strength outside of the EC or in the entire world. It seems not entirely unreasonable to speculate that if languages like Letzebuergesh or Irish had some hundred Million speakers elsewhere in the world, they may well have become official languages in the EC, too. They would then most likely also have a higher status in their own countries. Is there any noticable correlation between the numerical strength of the languages and their official function on the EC-level, i.e. the actual official use? Unfortunately, I do not yet have any sound data on the extent of actual use of the official languages of the EC. A research project into that question is presently being planned at Duisburg. As far as I can gather from various bits and pieces of information, English and French are clearly the preferred languages of proceedings, particularly outside of plenary sessions, where not every word is interpreted, but also for written materials. These are followed by German, Italian and Spanish; the other languages are rarely used. English and French in particular are sometimes used asymmetrically, i.e. between native and nonnative speakers, or as a lingua franca, which rarely happens with German and hardly at all with Italian and Spanish, let alone any of the other official EC languages. If this rank order of preference was true, we would again have a positive correlation between official function (extent of use) and numerical strength. The preferred languages are, broadly speaking, at the same the numerically strong ones. There is clearly, however, no complete correlation. Otherwise German should be used more often than French or English. If we stick to status components for an explanation of why this is not so, and neglect tradition, it is not hard to find sound reasons for this irregularity, if we extend our view from the EC to the global level. There the status of French, and more so of English, is higher than that of German in at least two respects: (a) Both languages are official languages of considerably more countries than German (confer Table 2).

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Table 2. Number of countries with official status of languages

Banks English French Spanish Arabic German Portuguese

(1987)

63 34 23

22

8 7

Fischer Weltalmanach

'88

59 27 21 23 9 7

(National and regional official status are not distinguished consistently in both sources, which is why both are fully included here.)

(b) Both languages are official and working languages in the global political body of the UN, where German has only the subordinate status of a language of documentation. Both status components (a and b) are not independent frome one another. English and French on the one hand have their privileged status in the UN b e c a u s e they are the official languages of so many countries, or at least their status in the UN could be fully based on these grounds if there were not still other reasons for it; German on the other hand does not have such a prominent status in the UN because it is the official language of only relatively few countries. The number of countries in which the respective language has an official status has at least been used as an argument for granting Spanish the status of a working language of the UN in 1948, and Arabic the status of an official language in 1973. (Cf. Ostrower 1965: 4 1 1 ^ 2 1 for Spanish and Tabory 1980: 40 for Arabic. This argument does not preclude that there are other historical reasons why German is not an official language of the UN. Russian for instance is not the official language of numerous countries but is nevertheless an official and working language of the UN. One of the reasons for that is certainly that the Sovietunion was among the victorious powers in 1945.) Why should these status components on the global level have any bearing on the official function of the languages within the EC? The answer is that the official contacts of the EC with all of the countries in which English or French or, respectively, Spanish have an official status can take place immediately in these languages, not, however, in German or Italian; and the same can be said about the contacts of the EC with the UN and its various bodies. Facing the great number of countries, in which these languages are official today, one

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could be inclined to confirm sarcastically, with a glance back into history, that successful colonialism and conquest finally pays linguistically, but also in other ways.

2.2. Scientific function - economic strength - teaching as a foreign language I have presented some ideas, admittedly very rough, on possible correlations between the numerical strength of a language and its official status and function on the EC-level, and also about the relations of these status components with status components on the levels of the single nation and the entire world. Let me now just touch on two more status components: (1) Scientific function, i.e. the extent to which a language is used in the domain of science; (2) teaching as a foreign language, i.e., roughly speaking, the extent to which a language is taught outside of the region where it is the dominant native tongue. The latter (2), could either be treated as a part of the status component of function (use in the domain of school or teaching) or as part of the status component of numerical strength, with a view on its numbers of speakers, in this case foreign language speakers. Both aspects do not necessarily coincide, since a language may for instance be studied extensively, i.e. by a great number of students (functional aspect), but the outcome may be only a small number of actual speakers of the language, namely if the teaching efforts are largely in vain (aspect of numerical strength). I shall only deal here with the functional aspect, since I have no data on the language skills which are actually achieved by teaching. The extent to which a language is used in science is itself a highly complex status component or subcomponent. Some of its own subcomponents are for instance: (a) The extent to which scientists publish original research results in the language; (b) the extent to which the language is actually used in scientific conferences (functions as a conference language), which is quite different from only having the formal status of a conference language; (c) the extent to which the language is used for teaching science, particularly at the higher levels of education (in lectures or in the form of teaching materials).

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I shall provide here only some data on the first of these subcomponents, namely scientific publication. There is no question that all of the larger EC-languages have dramatically lost ground to English in the domain of science in the course of this century, particularly in the period after World War II, which is largely due to the outstanding research capacity of the United States. Even within the FRG the status of German is now, in a certain sense, lower as a language of science than the status of English. In the natural sciences at least, FRG scientists publish more original research results in English than in German - if one can generalize Skudlik's (1990) findings. The percentage of university mathematicians, physicists, chemists and biologists who have published in English is higher than that of those who have published in German (between 93 % and 100 % as opposed to between 71 % and 90 %; Skudlik 1990: 269). The most prominent German scientific journals, i.e. those published in the FRG, have largely shifted from German to English (Kalverkämper/Weinrich (eds.) 1986; Michels 1989), and the most prominent publishers in the FRG produce more titles in English than in German. The Springer-Verlag, for instance, which is the FRG's largest science publisher, now publishes 80 % in English as opposed to 80 % in German before World War II (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24 October, 1989). These data relate to the scientific function of German and English within the FRG. I do not have any data of scientific publications limited to the frame of the EC, but I know various findings on the share of languages in scientific publications on the global level. The findings of Tsunoda (1983) for 1980 or of Baldauf and Jernudd (1983) for 1981 show that in the natural sciences English accounts for between 70 % and 80 %, German for around 4 % and French 3 % of the publications in the world (4,2 % or, respectively, 2.96 % are the unweighted arithmetic means of the figures of Baldauf/ Jernudd for five science disciplines. Cf. also Ammon 1988). Any of the other EC-languages can safely be assumed to range below 1 %. In the social sciences the rank order of German and French is reversed with both languages having a somewhat higher share, and English a somewhat lower share, in the total publications (Thogmartin 1980). It may be assumed that at least the rank order of the languages as to their share in scientific publications is about the same within the EC: English > French/German > Italian > Spanish/Dutch ... The function of a language in the domain of science is one of the motives for teaching and also for studying this language - but certainly not the only motive. Another important set of motives among others are more immediately economic: one wants to do business with the respective language community,

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to work there (which is a special way of doing business with it) and the like. These motives therefore relate to the economic strength of a language, as it could be called. Let me just insert a few data on economic strength, before I proceed to the question of to what extent the languages of the EC are taught or studied as foreign languages. Table 3 shows the economic strength of the official languages of the EC and of Catalan in terms of the gross national product of the respective countries, i.e. the GNP according to percentages of native speakers in the population (in 1985 - following Fischer Weltalmanach '88). The GNP of the main country of the respective language is added in brackets.

Table 3. Economic strength of languages (language communities) within the EC (GNP of native speakers). German

686 916

(FRG

667 970)

French English

568 4 9 2

(France

Italian Dutch

491 440 372 959 190 797

(Great Britain (Italy (The Netherlands

526 630) 474 190) 371 050) 132 920)

Spanish

168 820

Danish

57 657

Greek

35 250

Portuguese Catalan

20 140 44 686

(Denmark

57 330)

(within Spain

41 822)

Obviously economic strength correlates quite closely with numerical strength (cf. Table 1), with only a few changes of rank order: French above English, Dutch above Spanish, and Danish above Greek and Portuguese. If we extend our perspective across the entire globe the most dramatic change occurs with English (944) which now clearly occupies rank 1 with a great interval vis-à-vis German (204: less than a fourth of the value for English). German, however, retains rank 2 among the EC languages, French (141) follows, and Spanish (88) now ranks above Italian (78) and Dutch (37). These are at least the figures, at which Mackey arrived in 1976 with a similar kind of calculation (cf. also Ammon 1990: 139). His absolute figures are not comparable to those in Table 3, but the proportions of the figures are to a certain degree. It may be assumed that the proportions of Mackey's figures are still roughly accurate today, though Japanese should at least be included among the economically strongest languages on a global level.

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What finally is the extent to which the official languages of the EC are studied as foreign languages, first of all within the EC and second worldwide? Again I have to rely on quite incomprehensive and somewhat outmoded data which van Deth (1979: 93) collected for the years 1973/74. He presents a rank order of the extent to which various languages are studied as foreing languages within the then still smaller EC, which did not yet contain Spain, Portugal or Greece. It is bewildering that van Deth gives the final condensation of his data in the form of the unweighted arithmetic means (not to speak of his additional miscalculation for English where he arrives at 79,5 % instead of 76,6 %), i.e. he simply averages the percentages of learners of all the countries without taking into account the enormous difference in population between the countries. I weighted his percentages for each country towards the population of each country (figures for 1986 from Fischer Weltalmanach '88), which is only a rough approximation, since the figures should have been weighted towards the numbers of students in 1973/74. These, however, were not available to me. More precisely, the weighting was done according to the following formula for each language (C = country): 1/100 (% learners of C ( χ population of Cj) +...+ 1/100 (% learners of C ] 2 χ population of Cj) Σ (population of C ( + . . . + population of C ) 2 )

Needless to say that only those countries were included in the calculation for each language, in which the respective language was not the native tongue of the majority (but France, Belgium, Italy and Luxemburg were for instance included for German), and also only those countries for which data were available. (Data were missing for Spanish and for Italian in Denmark, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.) According to this rough approximation, the various languages are studied as foreign languages by the following percentages of students within the EC which is given in Table 4. Van Deth's unweighted figures are added in brackets. Table 4. Approximate extent to which the EC-languages are studied as foreign languages in the EC (percentage of students in 1973/74). English French German Spanish Italian

83,8 % 46.3 % 20.8 % 5.8% 1.4%

(76.6 %/79.5 %) (54.8 %) (34.6 %) (4.1%) (0.8%)

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We may safely assume that at least the rank order is the same today, if the proportions are not roughly the same. Van Deth predicts on the basis of his calculation, the reliability of which is, however, debatable, that: "Le français et l'italien perdent du terrain alors que l'allemand et surtout l'anglais en gagnent." (p. 94). He assumes that as early as 1980 the percentage of students studying German (38,1 %) would exceed the percentage of students studying French (32,1 %), while English would touch the 100 % mark. While the latter assumption seems to have come true, the former most likely has not. The expansion of the EC with Spain, Portugal and Greece has strengthened French as the foreign language ranking second in the EC, though there may be a tendency of a decreasing interval vis-à-vis German and also vis-à-vis Spanish. I have already pointed out that I assume that the extent to which a language is taught or studied as a foreign language (which is itself a component of the language's status), is dependent on other status components, not only on tradition. With respect to English, these other components would have to be those of its status on the global level, not within the EC alone: economic and numerical strength, number of countries in which it is official, status of a working language in the UN and also scientific function (though here English has perhaps a superior status even within the EC alone). The figures of foreign language students show clearly enough, by the way, that English, and no other language, is deemed to be the general lingua franca of Europe if any; while French, German and other languages can at best serve as linguae francae or be used asymmetrically in some situations. French and Spanish, too, are strengthened from the global level by status components like the number of countries in which they are official, status of working language in the UN and, in the case of Spanish, numerical strength. German and also Italian can, however, draw only to a very limited extent on status components on the global level. Within the EC alone German exceeds all the other languages in a number of status components, and Italian exceeds Spanish. In addition, German may have a higher status in Eastern Europe than any of the other languages of the EC, even English. It presumably ranks below all the other languages in esteem, as a consequence of German atrocities in the course of this century. We are not yet in a position to predict which of these status components, which are so divergent on different levels, will prove weightier in the end. Obviously these hints at the status of the various EC-languages have been quite fragmentary and preliminary indeed. My intention was, however, not so much to present reliable findings than to point out a direction of studies, namely status studies (cf. Ammon [ed.] 1989), which I consider important, if

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one finally wants to base a language policy for Europe on more than wishful thinking.

Note This article was written before the unification of the two German states. The present figures for German are higher. 1.

The numbers in Table 1 are composed of the following numbers of the various countries. German: FRG with West Berlin 61,140, France 1,200, Italy 0,280, Belgium 0,065, Luxemburg 0,367, Denmark 0,020; English: Great Britain 56,620, Ireland 3,550; French: France 55,170, Belgium with Brussels 4,224, Luxemburg 0,367, Italy 0,200; Italian: Italy 57,130, France 0,200; Spanish: Spain 38,820; Dutch: The Netherlands 14,560, Belgium with Brussels 6,629, France 0,200; Portuguese: Portugal 10,290; Greek: Greece 9,930; Danish: Denmark 5,120, FRG 0,030; Catalan: Spain 9,317, France 0,300; Basque: Spain 0,971, France 0,100; Irish: Ireland 0,700; Breton: France 0,900; Frisian: The Netherlands 0,500; Welsh: Great Britain 0,482; Letzebuergesh: Luxemburg 0,367; Galic: Great Britain 0,079; Ladin: Italy 0,030; Slovénie: Italy 0,053; Albanian: Italy 0,090.

References Altmann, Gabriel and Lehfeldt, Werner 1973 Allgemeine Sprachtypologie: Prinzipien und Meßverfahren. München: Fink. Ammon, Ulrich 1988 "Deutsch als Publikationssprache der Wissenschaft: Zum Umfang seiner Verwendung im Vergleich mit anderen Sprachen", in: Germanistische Mitteilungen 28: 75-86. 1989 "Towards a descriptive framework for the status function (social position) of a language within a country", in: Ammon, U. (ed.) Status and Function of Languages and Language Varieties. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 21-106. 1990 "German as an International Language", in: International Journal of the Sociology of Language: 135-170. Ammon, Ulrich (ed.) 1989 Status and Function of Languages and Language Varieties. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Baldauf, Richard Β. and Jernudd, Björn Η. 1983 "Language of publications as a variable in scientific communication", in: Australian Review of Applied Linguistics 6 (1): 97-108. Banks, Arthur S. et al. (eds.) 1987 Political Handbook of the World: 1987. Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations as of March 15, 1987. Binghamton, Ν. Y.: CSA Publications.

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Der Fischer Weltalmanach '88 1987 Haefs, H. (ed.) Frankfurt a. M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. Hempel, Carl G. 1967 "Typologische Methoden in den Sozialwissenschaften", in: Topitsch, E. (ed.) Logik der Sozialwissenschaften. Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 85-103. Kalverkämper, Hartwig and Weinrich Harald (eds.) 1986 Deutsch als Wissenschaftssprache. 25. Konstanzer Literaturgespräch. (Forum für Fremdsprachenforschung 3). Tübingen: Narr. Mackey, William F. 1976 Bilingualism et contact des langues. Paris: Klincksieck. Michels, Stefan 1989 Status und Funktion des Deutschen als Fachsprache der Chemie. [Germanistische Magisterarbeit Universität Gesamthochschule Duisburg.] Ostrower, Alexander 1965 Language, law and diplomacy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Skudlik, Sabine 1990 Sprachen in den Wissenschaften. Deutsch und Englisch in der internationalen Kommunikation. Deutsch und Englisch in der internationalen Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Tabory, Mala 1980 Multilingualism in international law and institutions. Alphen aan den Rijn/Rockville, MA: Sijthoff & Noordhoff. Thogmartin, Clyde 1980 "Which language for students in social sciences? A survey to help academic advisors", in: Anthropological Newsletter 21 (2): 6. Tsunoda, Minora 1983 "Les langues internationales dans les publications scientifiques et techniques", in: Sophia Linguistica: 144-155. [Tokio: Sophia University Linguistic Institute for International Communication.] Van Deth, Jean-Pierre 1979 L'enseignement scolaire des langues vivantes dans les pays membres de la Communauté Européenne. Bilan, réflexions et propositions. Brussels: Aimar/Didier.

National and international dimensions of language policy when the minority language is a national language: the case of Irish in Ireland Pádraig O Riagáin

Introduction In this paper I wish to consider some aspects of the current and proposed policies of the European Community as they relate to the maintenance of one of the less widely spoken languages in Europe. The EC policies in question include those that have explicitly language objectives as well as those whose influence on language matters are less obvious. While it appears to many, including the present author, that the present language policies of the EC are so weakly developed that they can be almost totally discounted in any analysis of the changing sociolinguistic face of Europe, it can also be argued that many of the Community's policies which relate to economic, social and political integration, and whose intent is not at all language oriented, hold the potential to greatly affect patterns of language maintenance and shift. Policies in these sectors are rarely assessed for their impact on language patterns, yet it is probable that, in total, their consequences for language maintenance objectives are extensive and of more importance than current or projected language policies per se. This issue will be approached by way of a discussion of the Irish state's attempt to formulate and implement a language policy on behalf of its minority, but national, language. While an individual case-study is necessarily of limited relevance, the experience of Ireland does help to illuminate at least some of the issues involved. Although English is clearly the majority language in Ireland, with only 30 per cent of the population at most claiming even moderate competance in Irish and the proportion actually using it in social contexts under 10 per cent, nonetheless a majority of the population regard the Irish language as an important, if not essential, part of their sense of peoplehood. Attitudinal statements like "Ireland would not be Ireland without the Irish lan-

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guage" evoke agreement from 60-70 per cent of adult samples in national surveys (O Riagáin - O Gliasáin 1984). The discrepancy between these levels of attitudinal support for Irish and the limited degree to which it is used in society have led some commentators to dispute either the ethnic centrality of the Irish language or, even more fundamentally, the significance of ethnicity itself in contemporary Irish society (Peillon 1982; Edwards 1985; McDonagh 1984; Lee 1989). However this rather complex sociological issue is eventually resolved, the current political implications of these public attitudes cannot be ignored. There is impressive survey evidence to suggest that "the Irish public is willing to accept a considerable commitment of state resources to ensuring [the Irish language's] continuance even if not particularly optimistic about the outcome, and even to support a considerable imposition of legal requirements to know or use Irish on certain groups within the society, such as teachers and civil servants" (PAC 1988). These attitudes, which have been stable over the last twenty years or more, currently condition the response of the Irish public to the language policy of its own government and can be expected to also colour its reaction to European policy as it takes clearer shape in the future. But the Irish experience, which is now of some seventy years standing, has a wider relevance. Almost from the moment political independence was achieved in 1922, a broadly based strategy was constructed to enhance the social and legal status of Irish, to maintain its use in areas where it was still spoken and to promote and revive its use elsewhere. The achievements of this experience in language planning are sobering. At best the results of the strategy, which still continues to operate, have been mixed. At the risk of simplifying a somewhat complex picture it may be said that although there has indeed been some measure of revival and that the pattern of bilingualism has consequently shifted, the long-term future of the Irish language is not any more secure now than it was seventy years ago. Many of the policies incorporated in this strategy were ineffective either because they did not fully recognise the realities of the socio-economic system within which they operated or because they ran counter to state policies in other domains. It is only in recent years that there has been an attempt to develop a more comprehensive approach to language planning, but while the need for such a policy is widely supported, the shape of such a new initiative is still unclear. While there are obvious differences in the operation of international institutions like the EC and national governments, the processes of socio-cultural change within which both operate show many similarities and have a degree of mutual relevance for each other.

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To develop an analysis of Irish language policy along these lines it will be necessary to first briefly review the evolution and current pattern of bilingualism in Ireland. The relationship between the operation of language policies and socio-economic processes will then be examined. Finally, the implications of the analysis for the assessment of the implications of European integration will be considered.

The historical background Historically, the contemporary pattern of bilingualism is the outcome of a complex interplay of social, economic and political processes which include those factors which everywhere have worked to the detriment of minority languages. Although as late as the sixteenth century the English language had established only a tentative foothold in eastern Ireland, it was only a matter of time before the territorial ambitions of the English state would stimulate an expansion from this modest base. Political changes began in Tudor times which had profound long-term consequences for the spatial and social distribution of the two languages. By the early part of the seventeenth century the English system of land tenure had been successfully established and a series of plantations beginning at this time dispossessed many of the old Irish aristocratic families and introduced relatively large numbers of native-born English to form a new landlord class. As O Cuív (1976) points out "It was the upheaval among the landholders rather than any official measures against the Irish language that gained for English a foothold in the Irish countryside." While these developments started the process of change, especially among the upper classes, legislation introduced in the eighteenth century slowed the assimilation process by preventing Catholics, and therefore Irish-speakers, from participating in economic and political life. Again it is noteworthy that language laws as such played very little part in this process. With the gradual dismantling of this apartheid-syle legislation the Catholic Church and the upwardly mobile among the middle-classes and especially the lower middleclasses were particularly vulnerable to the social and economic pressures favouring language shift. Also, as O Murchú (1971) points out, "within a generation, the anglicization process was reinforced by the establishment in 1831 of the National School system.... These schools undermined Irish in the still very extensive Irish-speaking communities by insidiously implying the superiority

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of English through strengthening its association with education and high culture generally, while simultaneously making bilingualism almost universal." Damaging as these developments were, they were overshadowed in the mid-nineteenth century by the effects of the Great Famine which reduced the population of Ireland by two millions and a half within the space of five years. Because the Famine was relatively more severe in western and poorer regions, most of those who died or emigrated were Irish-speakers (Wall 1969). This not merely altered the demographic balance between the two language communities but the subsequent rise of large-scale emigration added a powerful new weight to the incentive to learn English. However, as this linguistic shift gathered momentum through the nineteenth century, a movement for the preservation of Irish began to emerge. The most influential organization of this type - the Gaelic League (established 1893), however, was to take the offensive, to aim at the restoration of the vernacular language rather than just simply trying to preserve it. Although the movement started very slowly, within fifteen years after its foundation some 950 branches had been established throughout Ireland. Its influence was very considerable, in the words of one historian, "the Gaelic League had caught the imagination of the county by the early years of the twentieth century." (MacCartney, 1985) (Space does not allow for an analysis of the ideological character of the movement, but the following sources may be consulted: Lee 1989; MacDonagh 1984; Tovey et al 1989). In the political circumstances of the time it was inevitable that the League would become involved with politics and radical republicans became to a considerable degree Gaelicised (MacDonagh 1984). While the Anglo-Irish War was still in progress, the Provisional Government had in 1919 established a Department of the National Language. The prospects for the language were by then not promising. Like many of the indigenous minority language communities in Europe, the speakers of Irish in the early twentieth century were situated mostly in the peripheral regions of the state. Yet despite this well established dynamic of decline and the unpromising contemporary pattern of bilingualism, the newly independent state in 1922 launched a broad threepronged strategy that in essence remains the framework of language policy to the present. "There could be no clearer evidence that a new orthodoxy, identifying political and national self-regard with the restoration of the Irish language had been fully established." (MacDonagh 1984) One element of this strategy was to maintain Irish as the spoken language in those areas where is was still the community language. As these areas (collec-

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tively referred to as the Gaeltacht) were among the most impoverished and remote areas in the state, this dimension of the strategy quickly took on the character of a regional economic development programme. However, in 1926 the Irish-speaking areas contained only 16 per cent of the national population. Elsewhere the objective was revival, for Irish-speakers were only a tiny scattered proportion of an almost entirely English-speaking population. Accordingly, the state looked to the educational system for an increase in the numbers of Irish-speakers in society. Overriding both these dimensions of the strategy a third was concerned with the provision of the necessary infrastructure or context for maintenance and revival dimensions alike (e.g., constitutional and legal status of Irish; standardize and modernize the language, etc.). The range of policies incorporated within the broad strategy was very wide, ambitious and demanding when viewed against the resources of a small state coping with the problems of independence. To reverse the process of decline, the state had to try to create pressures of sufficient persuasiveness in advance of society itself generating such pressures. As will be shown later some of the more significant of these policies sought directly and indirectly to influence aspects of the operation of educational and labour market mechanisms. This proved not merely difficult but highly controversial. One can, therefore, view the history of the Irish language over the last century and a half as a struggle between two conflicting socioeconomic processes. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century the economic and political incorporation of Ireland into the wider British system intensified. While much historical work still needs to be done before a full understanding of this process becomes available, it is clear that the language shift occurred in circumstances that created very unfavourable views of the utility of Irish among the public and that the all too clearly visible evidence of decline itself added to the strength with which these views were held. These beliefs and opinions have persisted from way back, but since the early part of this century the counter-process of state intervention has been cutting across this process of decline, generating its own very different mixture of positive and negative attitudes. In the post-colonial period two ideological and status systems have been competing for dominance, one deriving from the pre-independence British connection and the second arising from an attempt to establish an alternative based upon "Irish" ethnic identity (Tovey - Hannan - Abramson 1989). As might be expected each of these two systems accord different significance to the minority but indigenous language. The current pattern of bilingualism contains elements that are explainable only within this historical context.

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However, the manner in which this sociocultural tension developed was conditioned by the wider process of economic and social change in postindependence Ireland. Before that issue is addressed some attention needs to be given to the actual pattern of bilingualism in Ireland.

The current pattern of bilingualism in Ireland Only a small minority of Irish citizens use Irish extensively in their homes, neighbourhood or at work. Recent surveys would suggest the proportion who use Irish as their first or main language to be something around 5 per cent. A further 10 per cent or so of the population use Irish regularly but less intensively in conversation or reading. As opposed to these relatively low ratios of spoken or active use of Irish, the ratios of passive use, primarily listening/ watching Irish language radio and television programmes, are considerably higher. About 25 per cent of the population watch some Irish language programme weekly and up to 70 per cent watch such programmes at least occasionally. The social, spatial and temporal variation in the incidence of bilingualism provides significant clues to the way in which the overall pattern is changing. Geographical variations point up the contrast between the mainly Irish language communities along the western coast and the rest of the state. In these districts, known collectively as the Gaeltacht, the use of Irish is very much higher than the national average. For example, in 1973, which is the last year for which we have reliable data, frequent and extensive home use of Irish was reported by about 60 per cent of respondents in these areas (as compared to 5 per cent nationally) and differences in work and social contexts are of the same order. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that these communities account for less than 2 per cent of the national population, that they are very scattered and fragmented and that a large proportion of the residents in these areas do not use Irish frequently. In fact, a sizeable minority appear to use it very infrequently or not at all. While the socio-economic status of the residents of the Gaeltacht areas reflects small farm and village occupations, in the urban areas Irish is more likely to be used among higher socio-economic groups, particularly, but not solely in the public sector. However, the most significant attribute of Irish-speakers in the English language areas is not so much their social class, but their educational attainments. In survey data, there is a marked association between those

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with high levels of ability in Irish and those reporting intensive use of Irish. But in turn, high levels of competence are associated with level of education and not with the home. Therefore, bilingualism is more prevalent among the more highly educated groups, who, of course, comprise important fractions of the middle-classes. Finally we may note some variations between age-groups. All children in the first and second level education systems are obliged to follow courses in Irish. As education is compulsory to the age of fifteen and participation rates for the 16-17 ages-groups are high, most children study prescribed courses in Irish from the age of four until they are about eighteen. This inevitably brings the younger age-groups into practically daily classroom contact with Irish over a fourteen year period of their lives. Added to this, some 20 per cent of the young adults surveyed recalled that they used Irish in conversation outside classroom contexts during their school years. A comparison between the ratios of language use suggests a widespread discontinuity in use-patterns over the life-cycle of bilingual persons. Use of the language appears to be most intensive during school-years after which it is discontinued in the case of many individuals. These discontinuities are indicative of the weak position of bilingualism in Irish society generally. Except in Gaeltacht areas bilingualism in Ireland is based rather loosely on a thin distribution of family and social networks which have a degree of underpinning from a variety of state policies in education, work-place and mediainstitutions. But these networks are dispersed and weakly established and are very vulnerable to the loss of members over time as they are not sufficiently large or vibrant enough to easily attract and retain replacements.

Attitudes towards Irish The contrast between levels of use of Irish and levels of public support for the language is striking. The Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research (CLAR) observed in 1975 that "the average person would seem to place considerable value on the symbolic role of the Irish language in ethnic identification and as a cultural value in and of itself. But while this would appear to be the central attitudinal element (and its strength is sufficient to support a desire to guarantee the transmission of Irish) it seems to be qualified by a generally pessimistic view of the language's future and a feeling of its inappropriateness in modern life" (p.229). More recent surveys confirm the stability of this atti-

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tudinal pattern. If anything, the role of the Irish language in ethnic identification has strengthened slightly, but without any corresponding abatement in public pessimism about the language's future. With regard to specific policy areas, there is majority support for policies to maintain Irish in the Gaeltacht, to provide Irish language services on the national television channels, to use Irish on public notices etc., to provide state services in Irish and officials who could speak Irish, to have one standard dialect in Irish and to support the voluntary Irish language organisations. In all of these matters, there was an increase in public support between 1973 and 1983. For most people, it is within the educational system that they have the most direct contact with Irish language policy. In 1973, while just 70 per cent of the sample felt that Irish should be taught to all children in the schools, other questions revealed a large degree of dissatisfaction with the policies being used to achieve this objective. The compulsory character of the policies at the time was a particular cause of concern. However, following changes in this regard, the 1983 survey ten years later revealed a much more favourable attitude towards Irish in the schools. As one recent report put the matter, "Public support for Irish appears to rest on two key ideological positions: the value that is placed on the language for its contribution to national cultural distinctiveness, and the reluctance to see it disappear from public domains of Irish life and from the experience of future generation of Irish people. Most Irish people, however, are not themselves strongly committed to using Irish, perhaps because of its perceived lack of appropriateness to most of the social situations that they routinely encounter." (PAC 1988)

Processes of bilingual reproduction As already noted, the capacity of Irish-speaking networks to maintain themselves over time is severely constrained by their size, thin distribution and transitory character. While there appears to be some continuity across the generations of Irish-speaking homes, the rate of loss outweighs the rate of retention. Census and survey evidence shows clearly that Irish is not being maintained in its traditional core-area. Decline has occurred in two separate but related ways. First, as they are located in marginal regions, they have been losing population until recently. Secondly, within the residual population a progressive language shift to English has continued. Outside of the Gaeltacht only

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about one quarter of those who grew up in Irish language homes use Irish with the same intensity in their current homes. The maintenance of more or less stable rates of bilingualism over recent decades largely derives therefore from the capacity of the educational system to produce, within each new generation, a sufficiently large number of competent bilinguals to replace those who, for one reason or another, are not retained within Irish-speaking networks. However, more recently the pattern appears to have been changing. Most Irish children learn Irish in both primary and post-primary school as a subject, but despite some thirteen years experience in the case of the average child, these programmes do not generally produce highly competent active users of Irish. When they do, it is usually among those who attend all-Irish schools or who stay in the system the longest and take the academically most demanding syllabus. The provision of all-Irish education has been in decline since the 1950s and since 1980 only 10-15 per cent of a cohort opt for the higher level courses in Irish in post-primary schools and even after thirteen years' study of the subject the speaking ability of the majority of the cohort is only moderate or, in the case of a growing minority, negligible (PAC 1986). Finally, it would appear that a significant proportion of current users of Irish began to use the language in their adult years. This group did not have an Irish language home background, and did not appear to have had any strong association with Irish during their school years. How and why this group began to use Irish is not entirely clear from the research, but in the past it appears that Irish began to be used "on marriage or on the establishment of their own households" (CLAR 1975: 212). This group includes many of the small but growing minority of parents who have chosen Irish medium education for their children, and there is evidence to suggest that these schools help to establish some form of home bilingualism and to introduce parents to Irish-speaking networks (Ó Riagáin - Ó Gliasáin 1979). The existence of this last group of Irish-speakers, despite their small size, is evidence that Irish-speaking networks do possess some capacity to recruit new members. This must be set against their apparent inability to secure a permanent character, to ensure efficient reproduction of bilinguals and to absorb the bilingual output of homes and schools. The rather complex mixture of success and failure, of growth and decline to be found in the bilingual pattern indicates that while falling far short of the original restoration objective, some modest element of revival and maintenance has been accomplished. Quite clearly, Irish is not a dead language but neither do the current number and distribution

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of its speakers suggest that a viable future has been secured. (For a fuller account see Ó Riagáin 1988; PAC 1988.) In order to begin to understand why the language maintenance strategy had such disappointing results, two important dimensions of that strategy will be examined in somewhat more detail.

The operation of selected language policies (a) Gaeltacht policies The preceding discussion has referred at several points to the "Gaeltacht" and associated state policies. These districts, which contain the remnants of the historic Irish-speaking communities are scattered along the west coast. In total, the population of the districts in 1981 was 79,500. As the eastern and south-eastern regions are the more urbanized, industrialized and contain the larger towns, the Gaeltacht districts are, therefore, situated within regions that are themselves under-developed in economic and social terms. It was thus not surprising that this dimension of the language strategy was shaped by regional economic development considerations. Historically the state's role in the Gaeltacht has not been concerned with language policy per se but with population maintenance. In turn population maintenance was to be achieved through industrial development by state-sponsored agencies. However, over the past two decades the scope of state action has expanded in other directions and the range of public agencies operating in the Gaeltacht, together with the number of public functionaries, has increased. In strictly economic terms, state-sponsored socioeconomic development in the Gaeltacht in recent years has had an appreciable measure of success. Population numbers have increased and nonagricultural employment has grown. However the underlying problems remain. Employment growth has not been sufficient to absorb all those seeking jobs, and out-migration continues among the young adult age groups. More importantly, within the residual population the progressive language shift to English continues. It would appear that only about half of Gaeltacht children learn Irish in the home and a decline in the proportion of Irishspeakers in other age-groups is also occurring. This is related to the high level of in-migration and return migration which has accompanied the economic restructuring of the Gaeltacht in recent decades. While these demographic pro-

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cesses have slowed down of late, it would seem that the linguistic distinctions between the Gaeltacht and the rest of the country are disappearing. The process of language shift is progressing to the point where Irish is ceasing to be a community language and becoming instead the language of particular social networks. This has been the dominant characteristic of bilingualism outside the Gaeltacht this century, the only difference being that the distribution of networks is thinner and more diffuse. The Irish Gaeltacht exemplifies the dilemmas of state management of both economic development and linguistic processes in a disadvantaged rural region. The case for state intervention rests both on the economically marginal status of the Gaeltacht and on the state's own aim of maintaining Irish as a community language. Economic change, however, brings with it new contexts and social roles together with greater population mobility and heterogenity. The traditional agrarian economy is further marginalised from commercial agricultural progress. Established social networks are progressively incorporated into wider economic and social systems. Cultural autonomy and linguistic distinctiveness are substantially eroded. (See Commins 1988, and PAC 1988 for further details.)

(b) Language policy in the schools The objective of the policies adopted in the remaining part of the state was revival, for Irish-speakers were only a tiny scattered proportion of an almost entirely English-speaking population. Accordingly, the state looked to the educational system for an increase in the numbers of Irish-speakers in society and language policy became largely, although not solely, identified with language teaching policies. Because participation rates in post-primary schools were then very low, the primary schools carried the main weight of the policy until recent decades. While the teaching of Irish was made compulsory throughout the educational system the ultimate objective was to have all educational programmes taught through Irish. The policy for Irish in the schools was increasingly effective from the 1920s up to the 1950s at which point just over half the state's primary schools were offering an immersion programme of a full or partial type. Subsequently, however, this pattern slowly yielded to the type of programme in which Irish was generally taught as a subject only and other subjects were taught through English. Furthermore, although the proportions of children receiving post-primary education increased enormously in the period since 1960, the effect of this on

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acquisition of proficiency in Irish was countered by the decision to discontinue the policy of making Irish a compulsory subject for state examinations in 1973. (However, it must also be noted that since 1970 there has been a revived interest in "all-Irish" or immersion-type programmes and some 50 schools have been established in English-speaking areas in this period in response to pressure from parents.) Learning Irish "as a subject only" is, in the context of contemporary participation rates in education, still a substantial learning experience - some thirteen years in the case of the average child. Nonetheless, this exposure to Irish in the school does not generally produce highly competent active users of Irish. Research findings show clearly that long-term ability levels and commitment to use Irish are related to the duration and intensity of Irish language programmes in the school (CLAR 1975, PAC 1986). Thus, those who received immersion-type teaching in their school years were ten times more likely to be now using Irish intensively than those who had studied Irish as a subject only. Apart from those who were exposed to immersion type courses, it is usually amongst those who stay in the system the longest and who take the academically most demanding syllabus that become proficient in Irish. In 1983, nearly three quarters of current users of Irish had post-primary schooling and nearly half had taken the higher level course in Irish. In the light of contemporary analyses of the effectiveness of language teaching programmes, the broad thrust of these findings is not exceptional. However, viewed from the perspective of language planning objectives, a range of rather critical questions arise which have very little to do with the design of teaching programmes per se. Why, for example, did the provision of immersion type programmes recede since the 1950s? Why do such small proportions of the cohort take the higher level course in Irish in post-primary schools? Since 1980 only 10-15 per cent of a cohort opt for the higher-level courses in Irish in post-primary schools (this includes a small percentage, less than 5 per cent, who still receive immersion type teaching at some stage in primary or post-primary level) and even after thirteen years study of the subject the speaking ability of the majority of the cohort is only moderate or, in the case of a growing minority, negligible (O Riagáin 1982; PAC 1986). To answer these questions, we need to look in the first instance at the characteristics of persons who do in fact select either immersion type courses or higher level courses in post primary education. As noted earlier, bilingual competence is a feature of higher socio-economic groups. Furthermore, it is

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those fractions dependent on state employment that contain the largest proportions of competent and committed bilinguals. In fact some 60 % of persons with a fluent competence in Irish are found in the middle and working class fractions dependent on state employment. By comparison, the percentages of such persons in other middle, working and farming fractions are much lower. However, among the public sector fractions themselves there are differences, with the upper middle and the working class fractions having the largest and the smallest proportion of competent bilinguals respectively (O Riagáin 1987). The reasons for these interclass and class fraction variations can only partly be explained with reference to the operation of language programmes within the schools as variations also appear if this variable is held constant. Two further policies, none of which had anything to do with language teaching as such were very influential. These were (a) the requirement of competence in Irish for entry to the national University of Ireland and teacher training colleges and (b) the requirement that entrants to state employment should have a demonstrable competence in Irish. It would appear that these policies, particularly in the period 1922-1960, to some extent changed the "rules" of the social mobility process. They were not, however, comprehensive enough to affect all sectors of the economy, and therefore the impact of policy was patchy. As the acquired ability to speak Irish was highest among those with high levels of education and the state sector, until the early seventies, offered preference to those with a good competence in Irish, the state attracted particularly those whose levels of cultural capital were high but whose inherited economic capital was low. The private sector, however, until recent decades required greater access to economic rather than cultural capital and this left it to that extent untouched by state language policy. However, the acceleration of economic development since 1960 which occurred as a consequence of a series of development programmes greatly modified the impact of the language policies. The growth of the private sector in this period made it possible, because of the expansion of white-collar occupations, for much larger numbers to advance socially without the necessity of acquiring or maintaining a competence in Irish. Furthermore, as educational qualifications became essential for advancement, even more critical than inherited economic capital in some cases, the language policy within the schools and within the state sector came under enormous pressure and the state re-

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sponded by relaxing the Irish language requirements in both areas. (See Ó Gliasáin 1988, and PAC 1986 for fuller accounts of these relationships.)

Irish and social change The foregoing examples present only a partial picture of the processes involved. Nonetheless, it is clear that the language policy operated in the context of a rapidly modernising economy. Sometimes these wider processes, which included state interventions, produced negative impacts on language variables, and sometimes there were positive consequences. The point being made here, however, is simply that these consequences, whether positive or negative, arose outside the operation of language policies per se. To understand more fully the problems and possibilities inherent in these patterns and trends it is necessary to situate them in the larger social context of which they are a part. Over the past few decades there have been some very major changes in the social and economic organisation of Irish society. Changes in the distribution of different types of occupation, are evident in the growth of skilled manual, service and professional employment, and in the decline of public as against private sector employment. Public sector employment has in the past been of great importance to the survival of Irish, ensuring that some institutional settings existed in the world of work in which the use of Irish was approved or at least considered legitimate. As a consequence of these socio-economic shifts, there have been changes in the position of Irish within the education system. Within some of the most rapidly expanding employment sectors in Ireland (technologically advanced, or professional or semiprofessional commercial occupations) there are trends towards a concentration of personnel who will have "bypassed" Irish in their educational career. Equally, there has been a general increase in the levels of educational certification needed for access to jobs. While this is broadly associated with higher levels of exam-certified ability in Irish among younger job entrants in both public and private sectors, the link between school ability and actual use of Irish appears to be weaker among the younger generations. As the Planning Advisory Committee's report puts it: It seems to us that the new status ideologies that are emerging among some dominant and highly visible groups particularly those in higher commercial occupations, carry rather negative assumptions about most of the features of Irish life which traditionally symbolised our cultural identity. The speed with which social change has occurred in Ireland, and the ambiguous feelings, in-

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herited from colonial times, about older Irish status models, have, we suggest, encouraged such new status groups to adopt status models from outside Irish society, particularly from an Anglo-American stratification system within which Irish identity has historically been accorded little esteem. Such status models cannot provide any bases of conviction for supporting or using Irish. Socioeconomic trends have made it possible for more and more Irish people to lead their everyday lives in an environment from which Irish is virtually absent. As routine contact with spoken Irish declines, perception of it as a "strange" intrusion into everyday life increases, apparently provoking more negative normative assessments of the motives of the user. Such normative responses operate at a sub- or semi-conscious level in most face-to-face social contacts, and this allows them to be all the more easily mobilised in support of the type of new status claims described above (PAC 1988). Thus decline in the use of Irish is both a symptom and a consequence of large-scale economic and social changes that relate to the modernisation of Irish society and which accompany broader economic shifts away from a more agriculturally-based economy, and towards increasing integration into international systems of production and commerce. To a considerable extent, the changes envisaged in the Single European Act are likely to simply continue and intensify the process of economic and social incorporation already well established. As a small open economy, Ireland has been, and will be greatly affected by its wider international relationships.

The implications of the Single European Act From the viewpoint of Irish language policy it is necessary to distinguish between the likely consequences of EC policies explicitly addressed to language issues and the implicit effects arising from EC policies that have no explicit language content. This paper cannot consider all aspects of the issue but will discuss, in a preliminary way, three related questions. The first compares Ireland with other EC countries as regards languages taught in schools and language competence among the population; the second examines the views and role of the EC on these matters; and the third examines Ireland's particular language needs in the context of its economic and social links with European countries.

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(a) The present pattern of language teaching in Europe One of the basic considerations in assessing this issue is to determine the extent to which Ireland's language policy has caused it to depart from the European norm in the teaching of languages. However, due to the diverse education systems in EC member states and the way in which language statistics are collected, it is not easy to compare the relative positions of languages in the various populations and education systems. For this reason, I will rely here mainly on a survey conducted by the Commission of the European Communities in 1987 among a sample of about 7,000 15-24 year olds in all twelve countries of the Community (EC, 1989). This wide-ranging survey included a number of questions on the languages spoken and learned by the respondents. There are some technical problems with this data, but the general picture it presents would appear to accord with other sources (EC 1988a, Eurydice 1989). The main languages that are being studied by these young Europeans (when mother-tongue languages are excluded) are English (60 per cent) and French (42 per cent). The third most frequently studied language, German (19 per cent), falls some way behind. Apart from being the mother-tongue of two member states, English is now the main foreign language studied in seven of the remaining ten states. French is generally the next most popular language after English, although German assumes this position in some northern countries. However, the question of the number of languages studied by young Europeans is rather more difficult to establish from the data. The report appears to show that the percentage of Irish 15-24 year olds who had studied one "foreign" language was only marginally below the European average, while the percentage who had studied more than one "foreign" language was somewhat above average. However, even in this official EC report, there is an unresolved inconsistency in the way "foreign" languages are defined. In places, "foreign" appears to imply any EC language other than the home language. This criterion would, of course, include Irish as a "foreign" language for most Irish people. Elsewhere in the report, however, there is a clear implication that "foreign" language means one of the nine working languages of the EC other than the home language. This criterion would exclude Irish. The report did not resolve this difficulty with the result that data on Irish, and other languages not classified as EC working languages, were inconsistently and inadequately collected and analysed. On the other hand, the report may also overstate the

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extent to which non-national languages are taught. This stress on the definition of "foreign language" is not, therefore, a mere academic quibble. In general, however, it is clear that Ireland is broadly in line with the average for EC member states (cf. Ireland, 1986; EC, 1988a: 97; Eurydice, 1989). Thus, for example, most knowledge of foreign languages is acquired at school and the teaching of foreign languages does not normally begin until postprimary level. Furthermore, the languages taught in Irish schools include all of the three most widely taught languages in Europe - English, French and German. English is the mother-tongue of most Irish children; the proportions studying French are considerably above the European average (67 per cent compared to 42 per cent), while the proportions studying German are somewhat lower (11 per cent compared to 19 per cent, although this proportion has been rising in recent years). Finally, like the EC as a whole, French is a marked "female" subject to a much greater extent than other second languages.

(b) The proposed LINGUA programme Although the European Community has detailed policies to integrate the economies of member states into one internal market, it has not sought so far to develop a comprehensive and fully articulated policy to deal with the linguistic dimenstion of integration. The general thrust of the EC to eliminate barriers to mobility and communication has inevitably pushed it into some explicit and implicit rules relating to language, the underlying principle of which appears to be that language should not constitute an obstacle to transfrontier mobility. It is of particular interest that the basic Community objective of market integration is clearly indicated in the preamble of the LINGUA Decision: "the establishment of the internal market should be facilitated by the quantitive and qualitative improvement of foreign language teaching and learning within the Community to enable the Community's citizens to communicate with each other and to overcome linguistic difficulties which impede the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital." Although the LINGUA programme is clearly linked to the integration issue, it is also committed to "preserving the linguistic diversity and cultural wealth of Europe" and thereby seeks to promote "the diversification of the teaching and learning of languages" (Official Journal, 1989: 24). This articulates the rhetoric of another EC tendency - best expressed, perhaps, in its Regional Policy - which seeks to compensate against the inevitable centripetal processes of the common market itself. How-

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ever, these tendencies hardly add up to a genuine policy on behalf of either the so-called "lesser-used languages" or even of the smaller Community working languages (Danish, Greek, Portuguese, Dutch). The LINGUA programme does not indicate how these conflicting policies are to be reconciled, in fact the accompaning operational directives suggest a laissez-faire approach to the issue. But at a time when English is gaining ground as the standard second language taught in European schools and appears to be increasingly used in the media (Collins, 1989) and commercial life generally (Berns, 1988), the most likely consequence of this approach will be the eventual alignment of LINGUA with the trends favouring English.

(c) Ireland's economic and social links with Europe After nearly two decades of EC membership, about half (47 per cent) of Ireland's exports to EC countries still go to the UK. No other EC country accounts for more than 15 per cent and most account for less than 10 per cent. However, Ireland has a trading surplus with every EC country except the UK (and, to a minimal extent, Portugal). In fact, Ireland's major trading deficits are with English-speaking Britain and the USA - and like most other countries, with Japan. This suggests that mastery of the trading partner's language do not automatically produce trading surpluses for small economies such as Ireland. On the contrary, the fact that Ireland hàs a substantial trading surplus with the smaller English speaking economies of Northern Ireland, Canada and Australia suggests that other facts besides language are involved. (Data on Ireland's external trade are based on CSO, 1988, Tables 6.2 and 6.3.) With regard to "invisible trade", Britain and North America contribute about three quarters of our tourist revenue (Bord Fáilte, 1988; CSO, 1988). Overall, the limited data available from the European Commission suggest that over 95 per cent of all Irish emigrants go to English-speaking countries and over 80 per cent of Irish higher education award recipients emigrate to Britain and North America (HEA, 1988; CSO, 1988). Two thirds of the small number who go to mainland EC countries go to Germany (47 per cent) and The Netherlands (17 per cent). Only 12 per cent go to France although, as noted earlier, French is by far the most widely taught foreign language in Ireland. In other words, there would appear to be very little relationship between the patterns of foreign language learning and subsequent patterns of migration. Predicting changes in these patterns over the coming decade is not easy, and despite all the publicity surrounding the forthcoming changes within the

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EC, the Community appears to be very reluctant to project likely shifts in patterns of capital and labour mobility (EC, 1988b). The report of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC, 1989) is likewise uninformative on these issues, although it is clearly apprehensive about the possibility that the post-1992 changes in the EC will further marginalise the Irish economy. Recent events in eastern Europe may shift the economic centre of gravity further eastwards and further away from Ireland. While these are matters for the future to determine, it is unlikely that long established patterns will change quickly.

Conclusion In this paper I have attempted to briefly describe the historical development of Irish/English bilingualism in Ireland. In particular I have sought to explain how political and cultural circumstances combined to establish Irish as a national language at a point when it was no longer the spoken language of the majority of the population. This constitutional affirmation was backed up with a major state-led intervention to counter, if not reverse, the long process of language shift. Irish has not been successfully maintained in the Irish-speaking areas, although there are still residual districts where Irish is habitually used. Elsewhere only some 5-10 per cent of the population frequently use Irish in daily social intercourse, but this widely-dispersed minority does not command any domain of language use nor is it, in itself, a very efficient source of bilingual reproduction. In fact, were it not for the fact that the schools continue to produce a small but committed percentage of bilinguals, the maintenance of this small minority of Irish-speakers would long since have failed. By comparison with the 1926 pattern of bilingualism, this minority does represent a measure of revival but of a scale that is continuously vulnerable to final submersion in the mainly English-speaking population. Nonetheless, there is as yet no indication that either the Irish Government or the public wish to "officially" abandon the task of trying to maintain their minority language. All the evidence suggests that for the immediate future the effort to refashion policy will continue although the form this revamped policy will take is as yet unclear. Whether success or failure consequently follow this reorientation of policy, the Irish experience in language planning already offers some salutary lessons. I do not believe that the deficiencies in policy formulation and implementation

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are unique to the Irish situation, but are rather a feature of language planning generally. Any perusal of the literature will show that we do not yet have a full understanding of language distributions as a system; consequently it is unlikely that we can devise, either in Ireland or in Europe, strategies which will be fully or even largely effective. Language patterns are but aspects of highly complex social systems. They are the outcome of slow, long-term processes. If language policies are to have any significant impact, they will require large resources on a scale which has not been hitherto realised. Effective language policies will and must affect all aspects of national and international life and will have to be sustained for decades, if not forever. It is clear that when set in this context, the European Community, given the shape and scope of its present policy, appears unlikely to become a significant influence on language policies and practices of Ireland. The small resources devoted or planned for EC language policy, and some basic ambiguities in the formulation of that policy, do not augur well for the establishment of a viable and influential Community intervention. In fact, one is entitled to some scepticism about even the long-term possibilities. Research to date has not identified any strong relationship between international language patterns and socioeconomic variables (see Fishman, 1989 for a fuller discussion of this issue). While in Europe it would appear that long-term adjustments are taking place, it has not been possible to examine all aspects of this question here because the relevant information is not yet available. In particular, the implicit consequences of EC economic policies for language maintenance programmes are difficult to establish because of the confounding of national and European policies. There is a clear need for more reliable information on patterns of language learning and language use across Europe and on the way these patterns link in to processes of labour and capital mobility. Pending fuller study of the issue, the desireable scope and character of an EC policy for languages will have to be left an open question. However, from an Irish viewpoint the following tentative conclusions can be offered. The well documented tendencies in European education systems to adopt English as the almost universal second language have to be noted. From an Irish perspective the long-term implications of this trend are not as much a cause for concern as they might be for other EC states. Ironically, such a development could indirectly lift some of the pressure off Irish language policies, as all Irish are fluent speakers of English. Furthermore, the marginal impact of EC policies on Irish migration patterns to date do not suggest that any major impetus for change will arise from that source in the foreseeable future.

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If the tenor o f these c o n c l u s i o n s , whether with regard to l a n g u a g e planning in Ireland or in Europe, appear discouraging, c o n s o l a t i o n m a y be taken f r o m the fact that m a n y o f our counterparts in other social p o l i c y areas h a v e experie n c e d similar d i f f i c u l t i e s - and h a v e learned to l i v e with t h e m in constructive w a y s . I will, therefore, l e a v e the last w o r d with W i l l i a m A l o n s o ( 1 9 7 5 ) , w h o s e perceptive c o m m e n t s o n regional planning p o l i c y h a v e an equally valid relev a n c e to l a n g u a g e planning: "What is n e e d e d is not a f a c i l e master plan but the d e s i g n o f an evolutionary p r o c e s s o f social learning, i n v o l v i n g f u n d a m e n tal and applied research, citizen particitation, and institutional approaches that favour experimentation without e x c e s s i v e c o m m i t m e n t and learning f r o m m i s takes as w e l l as s u c c e s s e s . "

References Alonso, W. 1975 "Problems, purposes and implicit policies for a national strategy of urbainzation", in: J. Friedmann and W. Alonso (eds.): Regional Policy: Reading in theory and applications, 636-647. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Berns, M. 1988 "The cultural and linguistic context of English in West Germany", World Englishes-1, 1, 37-50. Bord Fáilte 1988 Tourism facts 1987. Dublin: Bord Fáilte Research and Marketing Planning Department. CLAR Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research 1975 Report. Dublin: The Stationery Office. Collins, R. 1989 "The language of advantage: satellite television in Western Europe", Media, Culture and Society 11, 351-371. Commins, P. 1988 "Socio-economic development and language maintenance in the Gaeltacht", International Journal of the Sociology of Language 11-28. CSO Central Statistics Office. 1985 Census of population of Ireland 1981. Volume 6: Irish Language. Dublin: The Stationery Office. CSO Central Statistics Office. 1988 Statistical abstract 1988. Dublin: The Stationery Office. EC 1987 Public opinion in the European Community. Eurobarometer, No. 28. Commission of the European Communities: Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Culture.

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EC 1988a

EC 1988b

EC 1989 Edwards, 1984 Eurydice 1989

The social dimension of the internal market: Interim report of the interdepartmental working party. Social Europe (Special edition). Commission of the European Communities: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Education. The Economics of 1992: An assessment of the potential economic effects of completing the internal market of the European Community. European Economy No. 35. Commission of the European Communities: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Young Europeans in 1987. Commission of the European Communities. J. (ed.) Linguistic Minorities, policies and pluralism. London: Academic Press.

Languages in the Education systems of the 12 EC member states. Unpublished survey undertaken on behalf of Institiúid Teangeolaíochta Eireann by Eurydice (The Education Information Network in the European Community). Fishman, J. Α., F.R. Solano 1989 "Cross-polity linguistic homogeneity/heterogeneity and per-capita Gross National Product: An empirical exploration", Language Problems and Language Planning 13,2, 103-118. HEA 1988 First destination of award recipients in higher education (1987): a composite report of the initial employment, further study and training patterns of certificants, diplomates and graduates. Advisory Group on Labour Market Trends. Dublin: Higher Education Authority. Ireland 1986 An Roinn Oideachais: Tuarascáil Staitistiúil 1985-86. Lee, J.J. 1989 Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCartney, D. 1986 "The founding of the Gaelic League", in: L. de Paor (ed.), Milestones in Irish History, xx Cork: The Mercier Press. MacDonagh, O. 1984 States of mind: A study of Anglo-Irish conflict 1780-1980. London: Allen and Unwin. NESC 1989 Ireland in the European Community: Performance, prospects and strategy. Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. Ó Cuív, Β. 1976 "The Irish Language in the early modern period", in: T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F. J. Byrne (eds.), A new history of Ireland: Vol. 3, Early modern Ireland 1534-1691. xx Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 239, 16.8.1989: 24—32. Ó Gliasáin, M. 1988 "Bilingual secondary schools in Dublin 1960-1980", International Journal of the Sociology of Language: 89-108. Ó Murchú, M. 1971 Language and community, Comhairle na Gaeilge, Occasional Paper No. 1. Dublin: Government Publications Office. Ó Riagáin, P. 1982 "The influence of social factors on the teaching and learning of Irish", in: W.F. Mackey, J. Harris, J.A. van Ek, P. O Riagáin, Contemporary perspectives on the teaching of Irish. Dublin: Bord na Gaeilge. 1987 "Social class, education and Irish", Teangeolas No. 23: 6 - 9 1988 "Bilingualism in Ireland 1973-1983", International Journal of the Sociology of Language: xx Ó Riagáin, P., Ó Gliasáin, M. 1979 All-Irish primary schools in the Dublin area: A sociological and spatial analysis of the impact of all-Irish schools on home and social use of Irish. Dublin: Institiúid Teangeolaíochta Éireann. 1984 The Irish language in the Republic of Ireland 1983: Preliminary report of a national survey. Dublin: Institiúid Teangeolaíochta Éireann. PAC Planning Advisory Committee. 1986 Irish and the education system: An analysis of examination results. Dublin: Bord na Gaeilge. 1988 The Irish language in a changing society: Shaping the future. Dublin, Bord na Gaeilge. Peilion, M. 1982 Contemporary Irish society: An introduction. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Tovey H., D. Hannan, H. Abramson 1989 Why Irish? Irish identity and the Irish language. Dublin: Bord na Gaeilge. Wall, M. 1969 "The decline of the Irish language", in: B. Ó Cuív (ed.), A view of the Irish language, 81-90. Dublin: The Stationery Office.

Linguistic nationalism and European unity: The case of Greece Theodossia

Pavlidou

1 .Introduction Greece is an EC-country which has experienced various language related initiatives in the last fifteen years. By far the most important one was the government directive that put a formal end to the era of diglossia. A second governmental measure was the simplification of the orthography concerning the marking of stress. However, all these initiatives relate to the internal linguistic policy of Greece and cannot be brought in any connection to the question of European unity. This is certainly not very surprising, since in the same time interval the EC itself has not developed any explicit language policy (cf. e.g. Coulmas this volume, De Witte this volume). I would like to argue, however, that there is more to it; that is, even if the EC had confronted its members with some binding regulations with respect to language, Greece would not have been able to pay much attention to them. The reasons are to be sought in the growing sentiments with regard to the Greek language, on the one hand, and to the official attitude of the Greek government to Greece's membership in the EC, on the other.

2. Historical background Although it is not possible here to give even a brief overview of the linguistic history of Greece, the present language situation can only be illuminated, if two facts pertaining to the history of the modern Greek state are taken into account (for more details see e.g. Mackridge 1987). (a) Greece as a modern state has been plagued with diglossia ever since its establishment in 1830. Demotic Greek, the language spoken by the people, has served merely as an L-Variety and has been banned from education, law, and every other official and prestigious field for decades. These areas have

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been exclusively reserved to Katharevousa ("the purified language"), an artificial variety using as its prototype Ancient Greek. In the course of one and a half centuries, Demotic Greek became a symbol of progress, mainly connected with left-wing thinking, whereas Katharevousa, the Η-Variety, stood for conservativism, political or other. However, this is a rather simplified picture, since the actual situation has been too complicated to be captured in polarizations either between linguistic varieties or between their symbolic functions. As a matter of fact, even if one could give a full description of Demotic Greek and Katharevousa synchronically, there could be (and have been) all sorts of in-between varieties. On the other hand, diachronically, the differences between the L- and the Η-variety have not remained constant; at times, the two extremes have come closer to each other, as for example has happened since the 1950's. Moreover, the differentiation between the two extremes has mirrored political polarizations of all kinds (e.g. the national resistance against the German occupation 1941—44 or the Greek civil war 1947—49). For a thorough discussion of these problems see Manavi (1989). Inspite of these difficulties, in what follows I will keep the term "Demotic Greek"; however, I will use it in a specific sense, i.e., in order to refer to non-Katharevousa varieties after 1976, that is after the formal end of diglossia. 1 (b) The military dictatorship in Greece from 1967 to 1974 enhanced the use of Katharevousa in every possible way. At the same time, the colonels themselves practiced such absurd Katharevousa idiolects that the whole issue was driven to ridicule. Less amusing, however, was the comeback of Katharevousa in high-school, as well as in the last two grades of elementary school. A further, rather tragic, historical detail is the following: it was only in 1964 that Demotic Greek had replaced the H-Variety in this sector of the Greek educational system.

3. Recent linguistic policy measures In the light of the above facts, it is only natural that after the fall of the military junta in 1974 the language problem was put on the agenda. In 1976, most interestingly, under a conservative government, Modern (Demotic) Greek was institutionalized by law as the language of education and administration. Moreover, the teaching of Ancient Greek was confind to the second (noncompulsory) part of secondary education, called Lyceum (for pupils between

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16 and 18 years of age). Two consequences of this measure are relevant for our topic. (1) Since Demotic Greek was now both the language of instruction at all of the educational system levels, as well as the language to be taught, the school books had to be rewritten; some of them, e.g., language textbooks, had to be written for the first time. In elementary education the new language textbooks were first introduced in the school year 1982/83. In the compulsory part of the secondary education (for pupils between 13 and 15 years of age), language textbooks (rather than grammar books) were introduced in 1984/85 for the first time. Finally, it was only in 1989/90 that language textbooks were used in the first two Lyceum classes. In other words, the process of renewing the old school books is not even completed yet. As a result, it is as yet impossible to evaluate the effects of using Demotic Greek or learning about it in elementary and secondary education. (2) After decades of exclusion from all institutional areas, Demotic Greek was now confronted with new tasks with which it could not yet cope in a satisfactory way. Civil servants, journalists, politicians, etc. had to replace the standardized Katharevousa phraseology with Demotic elements; sometimes the results were more than unusual. The whole situation enhanced the linguistic uncertainty that the Greeks were well acquainted with since the diglossia time. In 1982 a second measure followed. The various accent marks, a remnant of the Alexandrian times with no synchronic significance at all, were replaced by the so-called monotonie (single-accent) system: only one accent was retained in order to indicate the stressed syllable in a word. By this time, complaints regarding the "impoverishment", the "vulgarization" or even the "loss of our language" increased. Prominent people (artists, politicians, critics and so on), with more or less knowledge of the subject, felt urged to explain their position on this matter and to influence public opinion. They had the opportunity to do so, not only by the usual means, i.e. newspapers , journals, radio and television, but also through public events organized by political parties, ministries etc. For example, one of the Greek communist parties organized in 1985 a public conference about the Greek language in a stadium in Athens with an audience of 3500. During this conference the well-known and, epecially among intellectualls, very popular, song-writer and singer, D. Savvopoulos maintained that "the abolition of the polytonic system and the imposition of the monotonie one will bring about the disappearance of the inherent harmony of the Greek language and lessen its ability to be spoken and experienced as rhythm" (see the newspaper Avgi, 22.1.85). This view is quite remarkable,

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since the various accents were either totally superfluous or they shared the same function, namely, to indicate the position of lexical stress; but it is exactly this function which is realized by the monotonie system! Other people were more cautious; they worried mainly about the so-called dehellenization that threatened the Greek language because of its contact with other languages and the incorporation of foreign words. In 1982, that is, in the same year the monotonie system was introduced, the "Greek Language Society" was founded. Among the founders were the Nobelprize winner O. Elytis and the linguist G. Babiniotis. One of its declared purposes was to "express certain general principles and views for the use of the Greek language and the contemporary scientific terminology and to propose solutions for the protection of the Greek language from the massive, thoughtless and unwarranted invasion of foreign words, which soil the language and adulterate its physiognomy" (Ellinikos Glossikos Omilos 1984: 13). The worries about the deterioration of the Greek language paved the way for a third measure, the comeback of Ancient Greek in the 'Gymnasium' curriculum. The reasoning went as follows: The current state of the Greek language is poor (young people make bad use of it, its vocabulary shrinks, foreign languages threaten it, etc.); this is due to the fact that the knowledge of Ancient Greek diminishes; so let us, once again, teach (and as early as possible, even in the elementary school) Ancient Greek. What lurks behind such and argument is an indirect blow against the teaching of and in Demotic Greek. The absurdity of the argument is quite evident, but is becomes more striking if one takes into account the fact that there had been at the time no high-school graduates who started and completed their secondary education with the new language textbooks. Fortunately, these plans never came true, because one of the most vehement supporters, the Minister of Education at the time (under a social democratic government) resigned in 1988. However, the proponents of this position were successful in convincing public opinion of the necessity of curing Modern Greek with injections from Ancient Greek. This is partly due to the fact that the claim was presented to the public as scientifically justified, since various professors (of philology and even of linguistics) did not hesitate to state that it is impossible to learn correct Modem Greek without having elementary knowledge of our old language. Another reason for the people's eagerness to adopt the above view is Greek nationalism, which has always sought its justification in the glorious past of Greece.

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The above viewpoints did not remain unchallenged. Refuting arguments came mainly from two sides: First, from the Faculty of Arts at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which has been traditionally a pro-Demotic institution (as opposed to the corresponding faculty at the University of Athens); second, from the Secondary Education Teacher's Society (OLME) which certainly has the greatest experience with regard to the instruction of and use of language by adolescents. Of course Greece does not stand alone with its fears about the future of the national language or with linguistic nationalism. For example, in France the Law for the protection of the French language serves similar purposes. The Germans have also been worried in the eighties about e.g. the shrinking of the youth's vocabulary or the decline of the German language (see for example Der Spiegel Nr. 28, 1984). The difference from Greece is, however, that countries like France or the FRG did not have to carry the burden of diglossia in their recent past nor did they have to correlate to such a degree their educational policy with the language itself. Let me mention three more aspects of the development in Greece over the last fifteen years, which are quite interesting from a sociolinguistic point of view: (a) The varieties that have emerged in Greece during the last fifteen years cannot be identified with either Demotic Greek or Katharevousa. Moreover, the symbolic function of the two diglossia varieties fades gradually away. The equations of former times, i.e. preference for Demotic elements equals left wing thinking and, by contrast, preference for Katharevousa elements equals right-wing thinking do not hold any longer. "Right" and "left" can both be found on the same side, as far as language is concerned. (b) Quite often it is impossible to label in a straightforward way a standpoint in the language question as simply right or wrong. For example, scientifically correct positions can go hand in hand with scientifically erroneous standpoints within the same person in such an intricate and complex manner that it would take many pages to refute this person's opinion. (c) There is a strong eagerness in Greece to interfere with the natural language process in a normative way. However, this eagerness is scarcely accompanied by a corresponding willingness for some descriptive steps, let alone a proper justification based on a description of the state of the language. For example, claims concerning the abuse of the Greek language by the younger τ

generation have never undergone any empirical sociolinguistic investigation . Instead there have always been initiatives for language committees. Since last

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fall there exists a standing committee at the Ministry of Education whose aim is to maintain the face of the Greek language and to avoid hasty solutions for linguistic questions (cf. e.g. the newspaper I Kathimerini 6.10.1989).

4. The official attitude to the EC-membership One of the first indications of Greece's official involvement in EC activities with respect to language is the Machine-Translation project of the EC (EUROTRA). The official discussions about Greece's participation in this project go back to 1981. However, this was never a subject of broader interest. The fact that public opinion was wholly devoted to the state and fate of the Greek language may partly explain why the Greeks have paid so little attention to the co-existence of Greek with the other EC-languages. A further reason is certainly the official attitude of Greece to its membership in the EC. As is well-known, Greece became a full member of the EC only in 1981. What is probably less known is the fact that the victorious party of the general elections of 1981, the PASOK, had called in one of its campaign slogans for Greece's withdrawal from the EC. Actually, this demand not only faded out after two ruling periods of the PASOK-government, but as a matter of fact it was altogether dropped (in the elections of June 1989). Nevertheless, the original attitude of this governing party contributed to regarding Greece's membership in the EC as only temporary. As a result, there emerged no necessity of looking into a linguistic policy within the EC. Although there seem to be no documents with respect to an official linguistic policy of Greece within the EC, one can draw certain indirect conclusions about Greece's attitude to the coexistence of Greek with the other EC-languages. In the words of the last Minister of Education during the PASOK era, G. Papandreou, an EC-citizen certainly wants to maintain his/her specific culture and at the same time s/he wants to (and should) feel as an equal participant in the European culture. In addition, an EC-citizen wants (and should want) to speak and communicate with the languages and cultures of the other nations of Europe 4 . This type of attitude is documented in the LINGUA-program for the promotion of the EC-languages, which recently came into force. From the fact that Greece, too, participates in this program, it can be inferred that the Greek government would rather have a multilingual Europe than promote the use of a single language within the EC.

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5. Other EC-languages within Greece The concern about one's own language in Greece implies the rejection of other languages only in so far as the latter have a "bad influence" on Greek. This holds mainly for English, the main source of lexical borrowing for Modern Greek in recent years. But it is English, followed only at a distance by French and German, which is considered to be of great importance for a successful career. The reasons are quite obvious for a country whose national language is shared only by a small fraction of the earth's population. Another reason is probably to be sought in relation to the following, typically Greek, feature. A large number of high-school graduates go abroad for studying because they are afraid of not getting into a Greek university due to the enormous competetion 5 . According to information that was recently presented to the Greek parliament, in 1988 40,000 young people wanted to take up their university studies abroad (12,000 in Italy, 6,500 in England, 7,500 in France, Germany, etc. and 15,000 in East-European countries.) If one takes into account that the number of students studying at Greek universities is about 90,000, then the extent of the so-called student hemorrhage (Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia 10.9.1989) becomes evident. In this context the necessity of foreign languages is more than obvious: Nobody can start studying in a foreign country without having at least an elementary knowledge of its language. The curriculum of secondary education includes the teaching of one foreign language 6 . The languages to be taught are English and French; German is taught in a few high schools on an experimental basis. Although it is generally known that English is the language mostly taught on the secondary level, there is not statistical data as to the percentage of schools offering English as a foreign language. Nor is it clear according to what criteria a certain language is chosen to be taught at a school. However, what seems to be rather unambiguous is the parents' pressure in favour of English. This preference for English holds on the university level, too, as most students chose English as their foreign language. At the same time, it is common knowledge in Greece that a foreign language is to be learned appropriately not at school, but at one of the hundreds of foreign language schools in Greece or with private lessons. Teaching foreign languages in either way is a wide-spread, and apparantely flourishing, business in Greece. This is after all the main occupational goal of the university graduates of foreign language departments at Greek universities.

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6. Future perspectives within the EC-context Nationalism, even language nationalism, tends not to be looked upon with sympathy. It appears even more annoying within the context of a united Europe. However, are there any realistic alternatives for small national languages such as Greek? Although the EC guarantees equal rights to the national languages of its members, it is common knowledge that these languages enjoy equal status only on a judiciary level: Real life within the EC favors the languages spoken by most people, i.e. English and French. Moreover, there are almost no economic advantages for an EC-citizen to learn Greek as a foreign language; pleasure as a motive for learning Greek is rather restricted to philologists and, η

maybe, tourists. On the other hand, Greece is not in the financial position to promote its national language; while France spends 1 % of its GNP and the FRG earmarks 450 million D-Marks for the promotion of their languages (Coulmas this volume), Greece has to face deficits in the order of 300 billions drachmas. Furthermore, a linguistic policy of the EC that lets small languages disappear is for some people not a far fetched alternative, since the costs for keeping all EC-languages on an equal footing rise unreasonably. If the EC adopts such an attitude, then this would imply that languages like Danish, Portuguese, Greek, etc. would not be promoted any longer, while English, French and maybe German become dominant in the EC-institutions. It is quite evident, though, that Greek cannot be put on a par with, say, Danish or Portuguese, since such languages do not have to worry about their survival. Danish does not stand linguistically alone, but within a larger language group including Norwegian and Swedish. And Portuguese is spoken by such numbers of people in South America that the question of language death is rather irrelevant. The situation is different with Greek. It is spoken mainly in Greece, by approximately 10 million people, and there are no linguistic sister languages. Thus, there is no reason to be very optimistic about the future of the Greek language. Sooner or later, on the basis of economic or other practical factors, Q it is doomed to death . Seen from this angle, linguistic nationalism, or even chauvinism, may be the only way to secure the survival of a language within the EC and the only hope for a linguistically balanced Europe. What sort of linguistic policy, then, would Greece want or tolerate within the EC? Well, the only acceptable policy seems to be the maintenance of the

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current situation. That is, in the light of the above discussion, Greece could only favor the coexistence of all EC-languages on an equal basis, since: (a) It can not claim any sort of power (numerical, economic, etc.) for its own language, thus never having the possibility of becoming the only official language within the EC-institutions, as English would have. (b) It could never accept the official hegemony of some other language in the EC, since the Greek language has amply contributed to the cultural heritage of Europe. Although I am in no way suggesting that the EC should adopt such a policy, I think that anybody working in this direction will have to take into account the idiosyncratic features of the linguistic situation in the member states. And as things stand, we know more about the powerful languages of the EC and less about what is happening at the periphery, say in Portugal, Denmark or Greece. Why not, then, encourage knowledge about and knowledge of lesser used national languages within the EC? In this respect, there is a lot that the EC could do, but let me mention two areas in which the EC can become active: (a) Promotion of lesser used (official) national languages as foreign languages, for example: Working out learning materials for these languages, summer programs for learning Greek, Danish, Portuguese, etc. 9 (b) Promotion of research projects for the description of the linguistic situation in marginal EC countries. Such projects, should not be confined to a single member state, but run in cooperation among several states. This could embrace research on minority languages within each state. 10 The above proposals can make up the content of a linguistic policy for the EC, a policy that takes us out of the dilemma "monolingual versus multilingual EC" and promises, in a different way, to make true the present, alleged, equality of the EC languages.

Notes

1.

For other terminological choices, see e.g. Mackridge (1987: 11-14).

2.

Some newspapers had for years a forum, where anybody could express his/her opinions about "our language".

3.

It was only in June 1989, just before the PASOK government lost the parliament elections, that the Ministry of Education decided to sponsor an empirical project on the language of high-school children. The project started formally at the end of 1989. The author of this paper is one of the researchers participating in it.

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8.

9.

10.

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In an article (To Vima 2.4.89), following the inofficial conference of the Ministers of Education in Segovia in the spring of 1989. There are about 10 candidates for one place at Greek universities. Since 1989, foreign languages are taught in certain elementary schools, too, on an experimental basis. As a matter of fact, tourism in Greece rather enhances the motivation of Greeks to learn some foreign language, because they make greater profits with foreign tourists; for example, waiters and waitresses can expect more generous tips if they speak English or German. As a matter of fact this would drive the EC to a logical contradiction, since the EC would on the one hand try to protect the lesser spoken languages in the EC, but on the other it would let official (and national) languages die out. The EC could take the initiative of organizing summer schools or supporting already existing ones. For example, at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki the School of Modern Greek has been offering summer schools on Modern Greek by trained staff for about fifteen years; the EC could, among others, provide scholarships for participation in this program. As far as Greece is concerned, I already mentioned that there are scarcely sociolinguistic investigations with respect to the present linguistic situation. But there are plenty of interesting sociolinguistic problems to work on; one of them is the field of minority languages. Although one can assume the existence of several non-Greek varieties (e.g. Arvanit, Aromunian, Slavonic, Turkish), most of them have not been adequately studied. The last official data with respect to such populations comes from the census of 1951 (cf. Angelopoulos 1979), but the situation has definitely changed since then. Moreover, it is well known that questions of bilingualism, national identity, functional diversification of linguistic varieties etc. require methods of investigation that go beyond the use of a questionnaire and guarantee a minimum of familiarity between researchers and researched. The situation in Greece becomes more complicated because of the aggressive propaganda of Skopje (Yugoslavia) and Turkey; this, in turn, partly explains the reserved attitude of Greece towards matters of linguistic minorities.

References Angelopoulos A. 1979

"Population distribution of Greece according to language national consciousness and religion", in: Balkan Studies 20: 123-132. Coulmas F. "European integration and the idea of the national language. Ideological roots and economic consequences", in this volume pp. 1—4-3. De Witte, Β. "The impact of European Community rules on linguistic policies of the Member States", in this volume pp. 163-177.

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Ellinikos, Glossikos, Omilos (eds.) 1984 "Declaration", in: Greek Language. Athens, 1984: 11-13. Mackridge, P. 1987 The Modern Greek language. Oxford. Manavi, D. 1989 Post-diglossic language varieties and language attitudes in Greece [Research in progress.]

Italian in the European Community: An educational perspective on the national language and new language minorities Elisabetta Zuanelli

1. The sociolinguistic pattern At present Italian is representative of a set of common, although sometimes conflicting values. The process of the people's identification with the national language began with Italy's political unification in 1861. At the time, as is well known, Italian was spoken only by approximately 2 % of all Italians. The rest spoke various dialects with differing degrees of intercomprehensibility, even among varieties of the same regional area (cf. Zuanelli Sonino 1989). Nowadays the maintenance of dialects and alloglot language varieties (German, Slovene, Albanian, Greek, Serbian, Catalan, etc.) is very heterogeneous with high peaks of maintenance for older people, in the countryside, for specific areas: the Triveneto, Sardinia, the South. Two trends are evident: - a tendency towards assimilation of most dialects within regional varieties of Italian, deeply marked by dialect variation (Italian-dialect, dialectized Italian, dialect-Italian, etc. (cf. Zuanelli Sonino 1986); - the maintenance of certain dialects in certain areas paralleled by the presence of Italian in all domains and a reduced pressure to assimilate to standard Italian: the Veneto area, the South. Maintenance of local varieties is often connencted there with the presence of regionalist political movements, such as the Liga Veneta, Partito Sardo d'Azione, Union Valdotâin. These movements, which at the European level join to form the federalist party, follow the trend of linguistic and economic regionalization which is tolerated in different ways in certain alloglot situations: the German speaking population of Alto Adige and the speakers of Slovene of Friuli Venezia Giulia. Because of historical reasons and as a result of the policy of economic autonomy pursued by the minorities, these regions have retained a high level of autonomy, both in perception and fact.

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At present up to one million foreigners are estimated to live in Italy. However, this figure comprises fundamentally different social and cultural groups: (a) workers with different statuses: - professionals of various national origins ranking high in the social hierarchy; - dependent workers performing low status jobs; they come from Third World countries as well as from European countries and are integrated socially and economically to various degrees; - unskilled day-labourers from Africa, Asia and South America who are not well-integrated and create serious social problems which are likely to increase in the near future; (b) refugees who are seeking, or have been granted, the right to live in Italy; (c) students. These various groups of foreigners and immigrants in Italy make the sociolinguistic situation even more complicated than it is already with its many dialects, alloglot languages (German, Slovene, Franco-Provençal, Serbian, Greek, Catalan, Albanian) and regional varieties of Italian mentioned above. The languages of two groups of gypsies are to be added, the Roma and the Sinti. Given such a complex situation, an overall linguistic policy suitable to achieve some measure of integration is no easy matter, involving, as it does, legal, economic, social and functional aspects of language.

2. Internal and external policies For this reason the role of Italian in the EC can be analyzed only in a double perspective, at the intersection of internal and external socioloinguistic factors. In the internal perspective Italian can be considered a "minor" language within the EC context, that is, a language with minor international communicative prestige, as compared with "major" international languages such as English, French, German and Spanish. Its role and policy, therefore, can also be compared with those of other minor languages in the EC, such as Dutch. The relationship between minor and major languages raises the problem of linguistic and cultural "minorization" in Europe which is a result of the uncontrolled spread of major international languages. The external perspective on the role of Italian in the EC can be completed with an analysis of the conditioning internal factors as summarized in Figure 1.

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"strong" alloglot languages (German, Slovene, etc.)

•

A

Τ major international

D

•

Italian

languages (English,

C •

French, German)

minorit y immigrant

languages

• Β minority native regional/ local languages, minor alloglot languages Fig. 1. Italian in relation to other languages.

The scheme represents the twofold flux of linguistic and ethnic revival coinciding with, respectively, the maintenance or assimilation of the diverse linguistic and cultural realities with which Italian is in contact. Flux A represents alloglot groups on Italian territory (the German speaking groups of Alto Adige and the Slovene speaking groups) pursuing a policy of language maintenance and non-assimilation. For these groups a balanced integration with the Italian speaking community appears unlikely. In the case of Alto Adige there even seems to be a tendency to "minorize" the Italian groups living amongst the dominant German speaking community. However, it is difficult to foresee the future development of this situation which at present is marked by an uncompromising policy of non-integration of the different ethnic groups at the educational level. Flux Β represents a steady tendency of assimilation to Italian by other minority alloglot languages and regional/local dialects. With few exceptions these are varieties enjoying a special legal, political, or cultural status (the Sardinian, the Veneto, the Neapolitan, etc.). Flux C represents a novel and yet unpredictable trend. Maintenance or assimilation of immigrant languages and cultures can be foreseen in different degrees and different ways according to cultural distance, social expectations and economic integration. So far, the wide socio-cultural and linguistic range of the phenomenon would suggest development towards assimilation to the Italian language and culture. However, the maintenance of the original ident-

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ity of these groups, as provided for by recent legal measures both at the national and regional levels; their social organization in communities; the reconstruction of family nuclei are some of the factors which may eventually lead to cultural and linguisitc consolidation and pressure on Italian. Finally, as we have already seen, Flux D represents a steady tendency of international languages towards growing communicative dominance. The perspective of a unified Europe, especially on account of economic and professional linguistic needs, poses the risk of cultural-linguistic assimilation. From this general point of view, educational policy concerning the role of minor and minority languages as mother tongues, second and foreign languages becomes crucial.

3. Minor and minority languages in mother tongue teaching Let us first consider mother tongue teaching and the related issue of second language teaching focussing on minority languages. By standard definition, mother tongue teaching consists in the school's fostering in the child the acquisition of his/her primary dominant communicative instrument. Such a process is generally extended and reinforced by the teaching of written language skills. A crucial element in language education is the juridical, socio-economic and cultural status of the language which, for the purpose of teaching, is considered the pupil's mother tongue. Optimal conditions for mother tongue teaching appear to exist when the child's mother tongue coincides with the national language of the state where it performs all of the functions assigned to the standard language (public-administrative, media, education, culture, etc.). This is so because the communicative and sociocultural motivations of the family then coincide largely with those of the wider national community, and because the emotional and cultural values attached to the language agree with the socio-economic values and expectations related to it. When this is not the case and the communicative range of the child's mother tongue is only local or regional, it is likely that the relationship between this language/variety and the language of the nation state will be a problematic one. In such a case the local language may be taught as the pupil's mother tongue, whereas the national language may have its place in the curriculum as the second language.

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This is an obvious simplification which omits reference to situations existing in a number of communities where the language repertoire is often more diverse. In such cases it is extremely difficult to determine which of the languages should be functionally and psychologically dominant as the medium of communicating and processing educational contents. An important factor regarding the choice concerns the legal status the minority language has in the country. When the minority language enjoys a clearly defined legal status, whether at the national or at a regional level, the problem is to translate this status into a set of socio-economic and cultural behaviors by the members of the community and into their desire to identify with the values represented by the minority language. Even more complex is the situation where the minority language is afforded no legal status; language maintenance is then made much more difficult by the more or less marked absence of the prerequisites of standardization. In such a case no educational planning or decision can arrest the tendency of language shift. A third situation obtains in plurilingual countries where two or more languages are officially recognized as the communicative medium of a given part of the national population. Socio-economic and demographic imbalance may be responsible, then, for the social "minorization" of one or more of the national and/or official language(s), even when they are endowed with all basic requirements for their institutional maintenance. A special case of "minorization" in this perspective is a situation where a national/official language is dominated by a minority language which is socio-culturally and economically dominant in a certain area. On the other hand, major and minor languages can be found in a minority position in non-assimilating immigrating communities. In all of these cases the teaching of minority or "minorized" languages, either as mother tongue or second language, depends on the degree of conflict and integration between the minor language community, on one side, and the major or dominant language community, on the other. Such conflicts are determined by three main factors already mentioned, the legal, the territorial, and the functional; that is, it depends on the legal status of the language involved, on the geographic distribution of their speakers in the country, and on the communicative functions which can be, and are habitually carried out with them. Before turning to these factors and possible means of overcoming existing obstacles, let us first deal, briefly, with the role of minor and minority languages in foreign language teaching.

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4. Minor and minority languages in foreign language teaching The role of minor and minority languages in foreign language teaching is determined and defined by international trends of foreign language education policy. The question is whether there is a future for minor and minority language teaching, in addition to, or as a subsidiary of, major international languages. In the course of this century, the economic and cultural prestige and diffusion of English, French, German, and Russian has allowed these languages to increase their primacy and areas of influence. Some of the questions arising from this situation are the following. - Is it possible and desirable to halt or modify present trends such as, for instance, the growing spread of English as an international language of communication? - Is it possible and desirable to foster languages of wider communication such as Spanish, in spite of the fact that they are put in a minor position in the European context? - How can an international language policy be implemented for national languages of varying degrees of diffusion, like, for instance, Italian or Hungarian which in international perspective are minor languages? - How is it possible to promote the cultural role of minor and minority languages and their presence in educational curricula outside the national borders? Answers to these questions must be sought in the coordination of a foreign language education policy on an international level which should not only be aware of the economic and cultural issues underlying the present situation, but also be realistic with respect to the means to be adopted.

5. An international language policy for minor and minority languages First of all, it must be pointed out that success in the teaching of a minority language does not at all guarantee the maintenance of the language and its social success or prestige. Second, failure in the teaching of minority languages is often connected with the fact that in the national or local community there is no desire to learn these languages, since they are often related to a system of values which are

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perceived as negative and not desirable, and are therefore unconsciously stigmatized. Third, positive experiences in bilingual or plurilingual education are often the reult of strong support by the community and are accompanied by a number of other cultural and communicative incentives and initiatives. Fourth, the maintenance or revival of minority languages may sometimes require the definition of educational goals which are complementary or partially different from those pursued by dominant languages. If these general assumptions are correct, three main factors must be considered decisive for the future of minor and minority languages. The legal status of languages all over the world is no minor issue in their defense and promotion in as much as it provides the fundamental prerequisite for educational, social and cultural implementation. The following observations may shed some light on some of the major issues. - Legal status differs from one language to another. - The legal status may be different for the same language/variety in different countries. - The legal status of a language variety may differ from one region to another within one and the same country. - Many languages/varieties have no legal status at any institutional level. These facts invite the following considerations. First, it is necessary to distinguish between the "rights of languages" and "language rights." The rights of languages should be defined regardless of the number of speakers and assessed as a part of the cultural patrimony to be defended and implemented in general. From this point of view, educational and cultural provisions should be guaranteed. Quite different from this perspective is the much debated notion of language rights which concerns primarily the rights of individuals and communities to use their language for certain purposes and in certain circumstances. Here the means of implementation and the overall language policy of a country are brought directly into question. In light of this distinction, legal provisions for the maintenance, protection or promotion of languages should concern both the rights of languages, just as they would concern any other part of the cultural patrimony, and language rights. Interventions at the international level should define a threshold for these rights to be freely fostered and implemented by each country in accordance with its language policy. Educational choices concerning the rights of

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languages and language rights should be pursued at the community level by means of regular consultations about the language policy to be adopted. Such an approach may have two diverging consequences. On one hand, it may spread the awareness among people of language problems and possible remedies and create a positive attitude, which is essential for an effective implementation of any language policy; on the other hand, however, it may force minority languages into an even weaker position within the community. This risk may be reduced by requiring that the language policy for languages of minority groups and the economic and human issues connected with them be defined in the same terms as the language policy concerning dominant language groups. Such an approach is particularly relevant where language repertoires are plurilingual and language choices are, therefore, particularly difficult. It is obvious that functional-communicative considerations favor language rights, whereas cultural-affective motivations favor rights of languages. Language education schemes should combine both aspects so as to reflect the relative weight assigned to them by the community. A final consideration concerns the international language balance among major, minor and minority languages. One possible way of conceiving of such a balance is a proposal for trilingual educational syllabuses for various situations comprising (1) the national language of the country; (2) another language of the country which is widespread enough at the local level to be considered the language of the local community; and (3) a foreign international language. In order to promote minor and minority languages in the international context, provisions should be made for trilingual syllabuses in those countries where the national language is a major international language. In such a case the educational programme should provide for the teaching of (1) the national language of the country, i.e., a major international language; (2) another language present as a minor or minority language in the country; and (3) a foreign minor language. Of course, any attempt to coordinate language education policy along these lines internationally requires multilateral agreements about exchanges of teachers, teaching materials and syllabuses, among other things. Eventually, minor and minority languages can only be promoted through respect for the individual and the communities and for the cultural values represented by these languages. However, such respect cannot be practiced in the abstract, it must be turned into conscious decisions by communities and governments.

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Acknowledgement I wish to thank Unesco for permitting me to use sections 3, 4, and 5 for publication which were originally prepared as a contribution for the development of new language education planning.

References Zuanelli Sonino, E. 1986

"The standardization and vernacularization of Italian, in: R. B. Le Page (ed.) Proceedings of the International Workshop on Language Standardization and Vernacularization of Literacy. University of York, 29-31. Zuanelli Sonino, E. (ed.) 1989 Sociolinguistics in Italy. International Journal of the Sociology of Language #76.

Contributing authors

Ulrich Ammon Fachbereich 3, Germanistik Universität-GHS-Duisburg D-4100 Duisburg, Germany Florian Coulmas Faculty of Letters Chuo University Tokyo 192-03, Japan Bruno De Witte Faculteit Rechten Rijksuniversiteit Limburg NL-6200 Maastricht, Netherlands Konrad Ehlich Abteilung 15, Germanistik Universität Dortmund D-4600 Dortmund 50, Germany Harald Haarmann Unioninkatu 6 A 1 SF-00130 Helsinki, Finland Hartmut Haberland Roskilde Universitetscenter DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark Harald Koch Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaften Universität Hannover D-3000 Hannover 91, Germany

Peter Hans Neide Onderzoekscentrum voor Meertaligheid Vriheidslaan 17 B-1080 Brüssel, Belgium Pádraig Ó Riagáin The Linguistic Institute of Ireland 31 Fitzwilliam Place Dublin 2, Ireland Roland Posner Arbeitsstelle für Semiotik Technische Universität Berlin D-1000 Berlin 10, Germany Theodossia Pavlidou Department of Linguistics Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Thessaloniki 54006, Greece Nick Roche Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (SCIC) Rue de la Loi 200 B-1049 Brussels, Belgium Michael Stubbs Fachbereich II, Anglistik Universität Trier D-550 Trier, Germany

302

Contributing

authors

Andrée Tabouret-Keller LADISIS URA CNRS 668 Université Louis Pasteur F-67000 Strasbourg, France Richard J. Watts Englisches Seminar Universität Bern CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland

Elisabetta Zuanelli Seminario di linguistica e di didattica delle Lingue Università degli Studi di Venezia 1-30124 Venezia, Italy

Index of subjects

adult education 10 Albanian 84, 245, 291 Alsatian 115 Ancient Greek 131,281 f. Ancient Hebrew 131 Arabic 5, 223, 247 Arfé Resolution 16, 175 assimilation 61, 75, 112, 124, 228, 257, 293 attitudes, see language attitude authority of a language 149 Basque 21, 53, 110, 115,245 Bengali 223, 229 bilingual children 229 bilingual contracts 150 bilingual education 69, 263 bilingual institutions 2 bilingualism 184 - in Ireland 256 - in the Soviet Union 108 bilingual reproduction 262 Breton 21, 84, 115, 130, 245 broadcasting, transfrontier 167, 176 n. 7 Brussels 2 f., 66, 131, 133 Castillan 53 (see also Spanish) Catalan 21, 27, 31 n. 60, 32 n. 75, 53, 97, 115 f., 173 f., 182,245,291 Chinese 5, 223, 227, 229 classical languages 224 f. colonialism 20, 198,248 Commission of the European Communities 6, 10, 23, 173, 270, 272 communication barriers 20, 124, 166, 170, 172, 187 community language 265 contract law 150 contract negotiations 147 f. contracts 147-152, 167

Council of Europe 9, 47, 181, 185 Council of Ministers of the European Communities 6, 11-13, 23, 143 Council Regulation No. 1 5, 39 creolization 131 cultural capital 267 cultural exchange 129 cultural identity 109, 165, 268 cultural pluralism 27, 209 culture American - 126 European - 123 Japanese - 126 national - 122 Czech 84 Danish 5, 27, 83, 103, 142, 144, 164, 189, 223, 245, 272 decolonization 199 definitions of terms 152 Delors-Package 1 diglossia 92, 184, 279 discrimination 46, 49, 167-169 indirect - 168 - of goods 166 - of languages 235 due process 154 Dutch 3, 5, 13, 66, 71, 103, 141, 164, 167, 171, 176 n. 8, 2 2 3 , 2 4 5 , 2 9 2 EC directives 15, 151, 171 EC regulations 4, 7, 151, 168 economic integration 1 economic development 123, 267 economic dimension of language 25 f. economic strength of a language 250, 252 elite 182 f., 223 elite multilingualism 69 English 5, 7, 13, 24, 27, 70, 83, 103, 144, 148, 220, 229, 245,257, 272

304

Index of subjects

- as export product 24 - as foreign language 54, 90, 270 f., 285 - as international language 292, 296 - as language of wider communication 113 - as language of diplomacy 244 - as second language 233, 274 - as vehicular language 145 - in international affairs 146 - influence on Greek 285 Standard-215 status o f - 2 4 6 , 249 strength of - in Western Europe 54 Enlightenment 18 equal opportunity 147, 230 equal status of languages 286 equal treatment 154 Esperanto 128 ethnic conflicts 59 ethnic diversity 216, 231 ethnic identity 95, 106, 109 f., 197, 259 ethnic identification 262 ethnicity 256 European Bureau for Lesser-Used languages 16, 24, 174 European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages 45, 47 f., 50, 185 European Convention of Human Rights 154 European Court of Justice 6, 46, 152, 155, 168, 170 rules of procedure of - 6, 155 European cultures 123 European integration 106, 108, 164, 257 European Parliament 6, 10,23, 171, 175 European regional policy 16 expenditures for language of EC institutions 23 fair trial 154 foreign language 114, 154, 222, 248 - education 9 f., 11, 172, 219, 270, 272, 285 - policy 296, 298 diversification of - 13

efficiency of - 210 skills of - in Germany 30 n. 34 foreign language's risk 149, 158 foreign terms 157 Francophonie 21,91 free movement of persons 10, 167, 169 French 5, 7, 13, 21, 31 n. 59, 66, 83,103, 110, 115, 141, 156, 171, 223 f., 226, 245 -

as foreign language 270-272 as international language 292, 296 as language of diplomacy 244 as language of wider communication 113 - as medium of deliberation at the European Court of Justice 156 - in Canada 61 protection of - 156, 283 status of - 246 French publications, government subsidies for 173 Frisian 130, 245 Gaelic League 258 Gaeltacht 260-262 gate-keeping functions 76 German 5, 13,21,49, 83, 103, 113, 131, 141, 148, 189, 204, 223, 225 f., 245 - as foreign language 270 - as international language 292, 296 - as language of wider communication 113 - as minority language 49, 181 f., 291 f. - in Switzerland 82 status o f - 2 4 1 - 2 5 3 decline of - 283 government subsidies for language 25, 173 f. Greek 5, 83, 103, 144, 223, 229, 245, 272, 279-287 - as a foreign language 286 - as a minority language 291 Gujerati 223, 229 harmonization of laws 51, 151 Hindi 223

Index of subjects

305

Hin Motu 186 human rights 16,45 f., 109, 134, 154, 208 Humanism 20, 135 η. 1 Hungarian 19, 84

Irish language organizations 262 irredentism 19, 91 Italian 5, 21, 83, 103, 141, 148, 223, 245, 291-298

identification 111, 123, 131, 262 identity 124, 129, 136 η. 4, 188, 195-210, 294 Basque - 107 broken - 110 European - 103, 111 French - 21 Irish - 269 language related - 104 f. social 68 supranational - 108 f. identity maintenance 206, 208 f. immersion 71,210, 265 f. immigrant languages 54 immigration 129, 185, 200, 228 imperialism 123 industrial development 264 Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana 17,

Japanese 223 Joint Service Interpretation-Conferences 103 f., 141 f.

31 η. 53, 180 integration 46, 106, 108, 195-210, 228, 293 linguistic dimension of - 271 international codes 124 international communication 54 international contracts 148, 150 international language 224 f., 231, 292, 294, 296 international organizations 151, 155 International Terms of Commerce 151 international trade 151 internationalization of business 225 interpretation 7, 103, 151 f., 219 professional standards of - 143 interpreter support 154 Irish 5, 53, 62, 65, 95, 103, 130, 169, 218, 242, 245 f., 256-275 legal status o f - 2 5 6 , 259 maintenance of - 181, 255 ff. teaching of - 265 utility o f - 2 5 9

Katharevousa 280 labor migration 27, 53, 55, 104 language attitudes 88, 91, 97, 234, 255 f., 261 f. language awareness 206, 215, 228, 232 language border 52, 71 language census data 67, - , Swiss 83, 87 language choice 189, 207, 298 language community 127 language conflicts 59-71, 75, 77 f., 94-96, 207, 209,211 η. 4, 295 language contact 51, 60, 65, 75, 77, 228, 282 language costs 23-25, 201, 209 language death 286 language decay 130 language education 9, 114, 134, 215 - for children of migrant workers 171 language export 25 language laws 156 f., 257 language loss 230 language loyalty 129, 133 language maintenance 181, 255, 264, 291, policy of - 293 language minorities 181 (see minority languages) language needs 9, 220, 224, 269 language normalization 173 language of wider communication 106, 112 f., 186, 296 language planning 67, 225 f., 229, 256, 266 - objectives 266 economically motivated - 69 educational-71, 217 f., 231

306

Index of subjects

language policy 103 - in Europe 157 - f o r Europe 121, 133 - for migrant workers 196 - in Switzerland 82-84 - of European Community 6-18, 157, 274 - o f Greece 279 - of Soviet Union 109 - within the Irish school 267 British-216 language politics 103, 115 language problems 206 language promotion 173, 179 language provisions of Regulation 1612/68 168 language rights 181, 218, 220 f., 227, 231, 235, 297 f. (see also linguistic rights) language risk in procedure 147, 153 - , allocation of 150, 157 language rules of EC institutions 6 language services of EC 103 f. (see also Joint Service InterpretationConferences) cost o f - 2 3 , 32 n. 66, 142 language shift 257 f., 273, 295 language status 4, 103, 241f. language strategists 128 language teaching in Europe 270 language variation 220, 233, 280 f. Latin ν, 6, 20, 131 f. legal discourse 131 legal interpretation 150, 157 legal measures for the defense of French 156 f. legal protection of languages 147 (see also protection of a language) legal status of a language 50 f., 223, 242 f., 246, 256, 259, 293, 297 legal terminology 149 lesser-used languages 55, 272, 287 lingua franca 54, 246, 252 - of EC citizens 28 LINGUA 10, 13, 24, 112, 141, 172, 271 f., 284

linguistic linguistic linguistic linguistic linguistic linguistic

chauvinism 128, 286 diversity 3, 140, 170, 231 homogeneity 127, 196 minorities 14, 27, 53, 94, 112 f. nationalism 279, 282, 286 policies of EC states 164 f. (see

language policy) linguistic prestige 143 linguistic proficiency 203 linguistic rights 46, 47, 55, 170 f., 181 (see also language rights) linguistic rules as a restriction on trade 166 literacy 51, 55, 219 loi sur l'emploi de la langue française 156, 167 Luxembourgish 5, 62, 141, 242, 245 f. machine translation 8, 24, 284 mentality, national 122 MERCATOR 17 migrant workers 11 f., 63, 65, 84, 171, 195, 204, 228 f. children of - 228 reintegration of - 171 migration 272 minority, concept of 180 minority languages 22, 144, 170, 174, 179, 228-230, 255, 273, 287 - as foreign languages 296 - i n Greece 288 n. 10 - in Italy 291 f. financial support of - 175 maintenance of - 297 mother tongue teaching of - 294 oppression of - 16 minority identity 188 minority rights 179 minority status 14 minorization 96, 292, 295 mobility 70, 163, 171,225,265 Modern Hebrew 223 monolingualism 14, 67, 104, 207, 215, 232 mother tongue 182 - assignment 127

índex of subjects - education 12, 47, 51, 204, 206, 219, 222 - teaching of minority languages 294 multilingual education 196 multilingualism 3, 14, 24, 27, 59, 69, 104, 127, 130 f., 207 f., 219, 231 - in conversations 132 economic benefits of - 141 ethos of - 27 multinational trusts 123 f. nation 197 concept of - 200 nation-building 21 nation state 14, 19, 104 f., 122 f., 144, 184, 189, 196, 294 national coherence 19 national culture 122 National Curriculum (of Britain) 216-221 national identity 93, 111, 179 S w i s s - 8 1 , 95 national language 5, 17, 19 f., 22, 49, 105, 109, 122, 130, 143, 164, 167, 169, 183, 187, 205,242, 255, 294 - ethos 206 - policy 218 idea of - 111 identification with - in Italy 291 national languages of Switzerland 78 f., 83 national mentality 122, 126 national pride 5, 144, 157 national unity 50, 82, 96, 221, 235 nationalism 22, 115, 158, 163, 184, 279, 282 nationality 221 native speaker 128, 245 nativism 208 Occitan 182 official language(s) 52 f., 85, 90, 153, 155, 158, 171,205, 242 f., 246 - of EC 5, 47, 83, 103, 114, 156, 245 equality of - 17, 287 - o f UN 247

307

Panjabi 223, 229 patois 115 Polish 131,201 polyglot dialogues 129, 132 Portuguese 5, 83 f., 103, 144, 223, 245, 247, 272 prestige planning 115 f. principle of subsidiary 144 procedure 147, 153 protection of a language 48 f., 147, 156, 283 race relations 219 Reformation 200 regional language policy 274 regional policy 271 regional development 264 regional languages in EC 106, 115, 174, 181 regionalization 291 reintegration 171 Rhaeto-Romance 63, 83, 87, 94, 97 - , status of 84 right of freedom of movement 10,46, 163, 166 Romanticism 18, 105, 222 Russian 5, 223, 247, 296 - as a foreign language 71 Sanskrit 181 scientific communication 26, 248 scientific publication 249 Scottish 130,218 segregation 204 Serbian 291 Serbo-Croat 84, 107 Single European Act 1, 269 Slovenian 84, 245, 291 social change 268 social class 67, 220, 267 social control 75, 97, 187 social groups 183 f. Sorbic 130 Spanish 5, 31 n. 60, 83, 103, 110, 223, 245, 247

308

Index of subjects

- as an international language 292, 296 status of languages 4, 103, 223, 241 f. supranational institutions 123 f. Swiss German dialects 90-92 symbolic function of language 205, 235, 261 f., 280, 283 terminology 4, 149, 282 - formation 8, 282 Terminology Office 8 territoriality principle 66 f., 76 f., 83-85, 97, 171, 186, 227 f. TokPisin 186 Tolai 186 tourism 225 trade, international 149 f., 167, 272 translation 8, 103, 148, 154 f., 158, 219 cost of - 23 translation and interpretation services 22 f., 141 Treaty of Rome 4, 10, 29 n. 22, 164 f., 168 trilingualism of Luxembourg 62 f. Turkish 84, 223, 229

urbanization 199 Urdu 223, 229 vocational training 12 Volksgeist 222 Welsh 84, 130, 145, 216f., 227, 245 - as medium of education 227 - mother tongue teaching 227 - as a second language 277 legal situation of - 227 Welsh Act of 1967 227 working language(s) 155 - o f the EC 5 f., 223 f., 270 - o f UN 247, 252 Yiddish 49, 131

Index of names

Abramson, H. 259 Alonso, W. 275 Altmann, G. 243 Ammon, U. 209, 241, 249 f. Andersen, H. C. 187 Anderson, Β. 31 η. 56, η. 58, 184 Andres, F. 80, 98 η. 3 Angelopoulos, Α. 288 η. 10

De Witte, Β. 103, 175 η. 4, 187, 279 Dickens, C. 222 Dittmar, N. 209 Djité, P. 31 n. 61 D'Souza, H. 30 n. 29 Duby, G. 135 n. 2 Duffy, P. J. 159 n. 19 Dürmüller, U. 54, 86

Babiniotis, G. 282 Bahr, R. 191 Balibar, R. 105 Baudouin, King of Belgium 3 Bausch, K.-R. 209 Berger, M. 92 Bhatt, Α. 228 Böckh, R. 105 Boix, E. 53 Bourne, J. 218, 221,227, 236 Byram, M. S. 192 η. 3 Byram, R. 182

Eastman, C. 185 Edwards, J. 256 Ehlich, K. 104 Elytis, O. 282 Erasmus of Rotterdam 135 n. 1 Esarte-Sarries, V. 232 Extra, G. 209

Cameron, D. 227 Caratzas, S. C. 192 n. 6 Carbonneau, T. E. 175 n. 6 Casanova, A. 78 f., 81 f., 93 Chevènement, J.-P. 25 Christian, D. 233 Clarke, D. L. 135 nn. 2, 3 Clyne, M. 30 n. 36,218. 225 Cobarrubias, J. 176 n. 21 Condillac, E. de 18

Gardner, J. P. 47, 55 n. 1 Gardner-Chloros, P. 47, 55 n. 1 Geiger, T. 135 n. 2 Gellner, E. 164, 175 n. 2, 184 Gimbutas, M. 111 Gumperz, J. 98 n. 2, 98 n. 6

Coulmas, F. 31 n. 56, 105, 210, 279, 286 Couttenier, I. 28 n. 2 De Gaulle, C. 21 Delaponte, V. 175 n. 6 Delbrück, B. 135 n. 2 de Pietro, J. F. 89 Deprez, K. 28 n. 2

Febvre, L. 135 n. 2 Ferguson, C. A. 92 Fichte, J. G. 18 Fishman, J. A. 31 n. 56, 106, 226, 235

Haarmann, H. 30 n. 35, 107, 110 f., 116, 136 n. 4, 182 Haberland, H. 180 Hallstein, W. 2 Handoll, J. 176 n. 12 Hannan, D. 259 Happart, J. 2 f., 22 Haugen, E. 183 Hempel, C. G. 243 Héraud, G. 30 n. 35

310

Index of names

Herder, J. G. 18, 31 η. 56, 105, 107, 191 η. 2 Hoffman, F. 30 η. 36 Humboldt, W. von 19, 105 Hutten, U. von 135 η. 1 Hutton, P. H. 135 n. 2 Ingerì, R. E, 159 n. 18 Inglehart, R. F. 60 Ipsen, H.-P. 159 n. 10 Jayme, E. 158 n. 2 Jobert, M. 25 Johnson, S. 144 Joseph, K. 221 Khubchandani, L. 185, 191 Kloss, H. 30 n. 35, 105 f., 109, 210 Koch, H. 51, 159 n. 13 Kötz, H. 158 n. 5 Kropholler, J. 159 n. 15 Kuijpers, W. 15, 175 Kusterer, H. 29 n. 12, 31 n. 63 Lambert, W. E. 210 Laporte, D. 105 Le Goff, J. 135 η. 2 Lee, J. J. 256, 258 Legendre, P. 54 Lehfeldt, W. 243 Leibniz, G. W. 18 Leith, D. 222 Lessing, G. E. 121 Luedicke, B. 159 n. 19 Luke, A. 187 MacCartney, D. 258 Mackey, W. F. 250 Mackridge, P. 279, 287 η. 1 Manavi, D. 280 Mancini, P. S. 105 Mar-Molinero, C. 53 Marenbon, J. 221 Martin-Jones, M. 228 Martiny, D. 158 n. 1, 159 n. 7

Maslow, A. H. 111 Mattheier, Κ. 209 Matttera, A. 166 Mayor, F. 55 McCallen, B. 32 n. 68 McDonagh, O. 256, 258 Meier, Dallach, H. P. 98 n. 7 Melanchton, P. 135 η. 1 Mey, J. L. 75,97 f., 187, 191 Milroy, J. 89 Milroy, L. 89 Mingasson, J. P. 32 n. 64 Moon, B. 30 n. 36 Morin; E. 32 n. 74 Mühlmann, W. S. 208 Muljacic, Z. 107 Müller, Κ. E. I l l , 117, 136η. 4 Mussolini, Β. 91 Neide, P. Η. 227 North, J. 158 η. 6 Nyborg, Κ. 7 Ó Ó Ó Ó

Cuiv, Β. 257 Gliasáin, M. 263, 268 Murchu, M. 257 Riagáin, P. 28 n. 8, 30 n. 36, 53, 191, 225, 263 f., 266 f.

Papandreou, G. 284 Paul, H. 135 η. 2 Peillon, M. 256 Petrella, R. 116 Peyer, H. 80 Phillipson, R. 182, 218, 221, 231, 235 Pöckl, W. 136 n. 7 Posner, R. 135 η. 1 Printon, V. 218 Rampton, B. 221 Raulff, U. 135 n. 2 Rawls, J. 231 Rehbein, J. 209 Reithmann, C. 158 n. 1, 159 n. 7

Index of names Rosenzweig, L. 31 η. 61

Tucker, R. G. 210

Roth, Κ. Η. 202

Tugendhat, C. 2, 30 η. 30

Savvopoulos, D. 281 Scalione, A. 31 n. 58 Schermers, H. G. 175 n. 4 Schlechtriem, P. 158 η. 1 Schwarze, J. 175 n. 4 Scollon, R. 98 n. 2 Scollon, S. Β . K. 98 n. 2 Séché, J.-C. 30 n. 22 Sellin, V. 135 n. 2 Seton-Watson, H. 31 n. 58 Shakespeare, W. 222 Skudlik, S. 249

Van Bunnen, L. 166 Verdoot, A. 30 n. 36 Verma, G. 219 Vermeulen, H. 30 n. 36 Vollmer, J. 29 n. 16 von Donat, M. 32 n. 63 Von Ganshof van der Meesch, E. 159 n. 10

Skutnabb-Kangas, T. 182, 218, 221, 235 Sperber, D. 136 n. 6 Srivastava, R. N. 182 f. Steinberg, J. 8 1 , 9 8 n. 3 Steinthal, H. 135 n. 2 Stephens, M. 30 n. 35 Stotz, D. 99 η. 11 Straka, M. 30 n. 35 Strubeil, M. 32 n. 75 Stubbs, M. 114, 235 Tabouret-Keller, Α. 30 η. 36, 55 Teilenbach, G. 135 η. 2 Thatcher, M. 24, 145, 221 Tovey, H. 258 f.

Wall, M. 258 Watts, R. 54, 82, 227 Weinrich, H. 28, 32 n. 77 Weisgerber, L. 207 Weizsäcker, C. F. von 136 n. 5 Werlen, I. 89 Whitely, R. 180 Widdowson, H. 235 Williams, R. M. 60 Wilson, D. 136 n. 6 Witte, B. 25, 32 n. 71 Wodak, R. 198 Woodward, A. 191 Woodward, M. 60 Wundt, W. 135 n. 2 Zuanelli, E. S. 30 n. 36, 181,291 Zweigert, Κ. 158 η. 5

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Karen L. Adams · Daniel T. Brink (Editors)

Perspectives on Official English The Campaign for English as the Official Language of the USA 1990.15.5 χ 23 cm. X, 366 pages. With 1 illustration. Cloth. ISBN 311012325 8 (Contributions to the Sociology of Language 57)

This collection of papers focusses on the language policy issues underlying the movement to make English the official language of the United States. In recent years, the movement has had success among voters, while at the same time giving rise to accusations of racism from many ethnic minorities. The scholars contributing to this volume represent a variety of fields as well as a variety of perspectives on the history and possible effects of such legislation. In this work, the issue of legislating an official language is put into the broader perspective of general language planning issues and multilingualism. By the very nature of the issues involved, a simple solution cannot be offered. The goal of this book is to show the true complexity of the issues involved despite the simplistic terms often used to characterize them.

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mouton de gruyter Berlin • New York

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Robert L. Cooper and Bernard J. Spolsky

(Editors)

m The Influence of Language on Culture and Thought m Essay in Honor of Joshua A. Fishman's m m m m m m m m m m m

65th Birthday

1991.15,5 χ 23 cm. VI, 290 pages. Cloth DM 158,ISBN 311012806 3

This Festschrift is devoted to the issue of the influence of language on culture and thought, interesting because of the tension it generates between universalism and particularism. On the one hand, our common humanity implies universals in the relationships among language, society, and thought. On the other hand, if language structure and language use have universal properties, there are nonetheless particular languages, each spoken in particular communities, each marked by its peculiar structural properties, and each the carrier of its own cultural and emotional freight. Thus, the central issue is addressed from several perspectives, and the contributions are arranged in sections on the Whorfian hypothesis, the sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic implications of languages in contact, the pragmatic context of language use, and the sociolinguistics of writing systems. Contributors include I. M. Schlesinger, J. Macnamara, V. JohnSteiner, E. Haugen, L.H. Glinert, C.A. Ferguson, S.B. Heath, R. L. Cooper, and F. Coulmas.

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mouton de gruyter Berlin · New York