A Korean Conflict: The Tensions between Britain and America 9780755618682, 9781350153981

Citation preview

Manchuria (China)

Tumen

Tonghua

R iv e r

Line of greatest UN advance (November 1950)

Kimchaek

lu

Chongju

Korea

Sea of

North

Wonsan

Pyongyang

Nampo

Japan

Hungnam

British-proposed e United Nations Lin (November 1950)

✪

Bay

Soviet Union Chongjin

Shenyang

Ya

R iv e r

Vladivostok Yanbian

Demarkation Line and Demilitarised Zone (from July 1953)

Korea

Kaesong Gangneung

Seoul

Yellow

Ullung-do

South

Taejon

Line of greatest Communist advance (September 1950)

Daegu

Pohang

Korea

Sea

Ulsan

Gwangju Mokpo

0 0

50

rea o K

100 kilometres 50

100 miles

Cheju-do

Korean Conflict.indb 6

Pusan

St ra it

Incheon

✪

Fukuoka

Ja

p

a

n

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER ONE

A halfway house between capitalism and totalitarianism

I

n the years preceding the outbreak of the Korean War, the Americans expressed serious doubts as to the efficacy and the desirability of the special relationship. While it was never explicitly stated by administration officials, the Americans harboured an ineradicable conviction that the British economy and therefore its defence potential were enfeebled by the Labour government’s socialist experiment. However, Britain’s economic problems were due not so much to domestic reform and nationalisation, as to the maintenance of substantial military forces on overseas duties. The Americans were almost temperamentally incapable of judging the British economy as healthy, except in terms of bigger armies and more weapons. At the same time, they considered the special relationship to be essential to their very survival, which left them with no choice but to tolerate their eccentric and wilful cousins. American officials rarely acknowledged the importance to the Labour government and, indeed, to the mass of the British people, of a healthy, decently housed, well-educated and fully employed nation. At the same time, the extent to which American commentators and officials believed that under the Conservatives things would have been little different reveals an implicit awareness of the commitment of the whole of the British people to the enactment and preservation of social principles. After all, the foundations of these principles had been laid before World War I by Asquith’s government – a leading and reforming member of which had been the young Winston Churchill. However, Washington could neither acknowledge nor, perhaps, understand the tenacious legacy of the miserable interwar period. The demand for social justice had grown stronger after the experience of total war between 1939 and 1945, and it was this rising tide 1

Korean Conflict.indb 1

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

which compelled the administration under Clement Attlee, as it would have a Churchill government, to create the welfare state. Expressions of anxiety by the Americans about the condition of the West’s defences came to be, inter alia, stealthy attacks on British socialism. Washington secretly doubted the martial will of a nation which shared elements of the enemy’s ideology. American officials observed that at least Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin had no illusions about the true nature of international communism, unlike their colleagues Richard Crossman, Denis Pritt, Konni Zilliacus and, in the Ministry, Hugh Dalton, Sir Stafford Cripps and Bevan. The fact that the moral and practical demands of domestic socialism shaped trade and economic policies thought to be inimical to American interests was a further source of irritation. So too was the disinclination, felt by Britons across the political spectrum, to join an American-sponsored European political federation. It is little wonder, then, that the Americans should have spoken of strains in the alliance with Britain. As early as August 1947, a Foreign Office intelligence summary reported on the widespread attention that Great Britain’s financial worries were receiving in America. Referring to the United States, the report identified the inevitable recriminations and Schadenfreude regarding the supposed shortcomings of the British ‘socialist experiment’. Even the otherwise friendly New York Herald Tribune asserts that ‘the United States would look upon Britain’s plight a good deal more sympathetically if the Labour Government would subordinate its party program for the needs of production’. It also remarks that ‘the Marshall Plan, upon which Britain so clearly counts, has been designed to help foreign nations to their feet, not to cradle them forever in friendly arms’.

Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador in Washington, took a more sanguine view of American perceptions of Labour’s socialism in 1949, when he looked back on the experiences of the year before. Franks observed that the rapid improvement in Britain’s economic position had largely dispelled ‘the allegation that the nationalisation of basic industries and the expansion 2

Korean Conflict.indb 2

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

of the social services were retarding British recovery and wasting American aid’. Curiously, after Truman’s unexpected victory in November 1948, the ‘reported ill effects of socialism on the freedom, purse and moral fibre of the individual in Britain were cited not so much in criticism of British domestic policy as in an effort to dissuade the American voter from demanding or acquiescing in similar projects here’. The political and military relationship between the two countries continued to be ‘intimate’, which, in Franks’ estimation, was exhibited no more hearteningly than in the Berlin air lift, and in the measures undertaken by Britain ‘to reinforce our military establishment’. Nevertheless, two years later American suspicions remained fundamentally undimmed. A Foreign Office official, in a paper on ‘Co-operation between the UK and the US’, with whose contents Franks expressed agreement, wrote that ‘we must still reckon with the lingering prejudices about Britain, about “entangling alliances” and, now above all, about socialism’. *

*

*

Although these suspicions were framed in terms of concern for Western security, in reality they were largely ideological in origin. Britain under Clement Attlee, with Ernest Bevin as his Foreign Secretary, could hardly have been described as friendly to communism, particularly after the Berlin air lift, but also in the wake of the signing of the NATO Pact and the vigorous anti-insurgency action in Malaya. However, although they were aware of the historical causes of Britain’s economic difficulties, American observers found it easier and more congenial to assert that the economy was weak and therefore the security of the West was endangered, because Britain’s socialist masters were spending too much money on the poor. One such observer was Lewis Douglas. The American ambassador to the United Kingdom, Douglas’ influence was all the weightier owing to his closeness to the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to Ernest Bevin and also to British Conservative leaders. In August 1949 Douglas sent a personal message to Acheson, warning that ‘the present crisis represents probably the most serious international development that has occurred since 1945’. The situation was compounded, in his view, by the sheer difficulty that the British government was experiencing as it tried to explain what Douglas described 3

Korean Conflict.indb 3

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

as ‘the organic and pathological changes that have taken place in the course of the last thirty years in the sterling area’ to the British people. Yet, having adopted this historical perspective, the ambassador was sharply critical of British socialism. At a meeting of Western European and American ambassadors in March 1950, he observed that ‘US/UK relations were at a very low ebb’ and that the British were failing to co-operate in the ‘prosecution of the cold war’. He attributed the problem to ‘the basic conflict between the requirements of a Socialist society and of an international society as we conceived it’. The socialist, he elaborated, ‘was a planner and could not tolerate any external influences … Their principal motivation was their pursuit of a form of society they believed to be good.’ Averell Harriman, also present at the meeting, agreed with Douglas and ‘commented on the ruthlessness of British trade policy on the continent’. Even the liberal Charles (‘Chip’) Bohlen took up the theme: ‘Cripps and the doctrinaire socialist group of the Labour Party are primarily interested in the social experiment,’ he stated. ‘They fear the effect of trade liberalization on their own doctrinaire concept of planning.’ British social policies and trade practices, and a reluctance to participate fully in Europe, were together assumed to represent a possibly fatal weakness in what Bohlen called the prosecution of ‘total cold war’. A long CIA report of December 1949 provided a rather cooler analysis of Britain’s shortcomings. The authors of this report, who remain, unfortunately, anonymous, took as their starting point the following premises: first, that British diplomatic, military and economic support was the sine qua non of the American policy of containing communism throughout the world; and second, that for the foreseeable future Britain ‘must adjust to the role of subordinates in the partnership with the United States’ and ‘can pursue few courses to which the US may have strong objections’. Such a happy state of affairs was, however, threatened by Britain’s economic febrility: ‘Serious economic decline – unchecked by US aid – would result in a reduction of the British will and ability to support not only present defense efforts but important overseas commitments and a vigorous anti-Communist policy abroad.’ Therefore, given the fact that Britain was by a great margin the most valuable and dependable of allies, 4

Korean Conflict.indb 4

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

the cost to the United States of ensuring its internal stability and overseas commitments was ‘considered to be low’. The authors of the report derived comfort from the high standards of the British armed forces, which, though small in relation to the breadth of their obligations, were reported to be ‘qualitatively comparable to those of the USA’. Reassuring, too, was the knowledge that the Labour government did not intend to reduce the size of the military establishment, despite ‘the voices on the left’ calling for defence cuts in favour of social services and food subsidies, and the ‘almost invisible’ reduction in the standard of living that would flow from the faltering economy. Nor to be expected was an ‘appreciable increase of Communist or other subversive influences’, but anti-American feeling – though ‘certainly less strong than anti-British feeling in the United States’ – did oblige the government ‘to avoid appearances of subservience to US influence’. To that extent, the left was not entirely impotent. The existence of the left excited keen interest, if not anxiety, within the CIA. The popular social and industrial programmes in place in Britain were, to the authors of the 1949 CIA report, an ‘experiment in democratic Socialism, which appears to offer a half-way house between the capitalism of the United States and the totalitarianism of Soviet Russia’. It is not surprising that the CIA should have looked askance at political developments in the United Kingdom at this time. After all, a number of Britain’s political leaders would not have been permitted to play a role in public life in the United States, let alone sit in the legislature and occupy positions of executive authority. The Prime Minister Clement Attlee, of the ‘intellectualist, middle-class wing of Laborites’, was considered to be safely moderate. Similarly, his most likely successor, Herbert Morrison, gave no cause for concern. Ernest Bevin, though ‘blunt and occasionally overemotional’, was close to heroic in American eyes for ‘his policies of firm resistance to Soviet expansion and … close collaboration with the United States’. Sir Stafford Cripps, who was ‘probably the most brilliant and able man in British public life’, seems not to have aroused in the CIA the enmity felt towards him by other US agencies and officers, perhaps because of the strict orthodoxy of his economic policies at the Treasury and his ‘almost legendary’ integrity and austerity. A ‘left-winger’, Hugh Dalton was judged 5

Korean Conflict.indb 5

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

to be without much influence in government, but not so Aneurin Bevan. The ‘anti-capitalist warrior of the Cabinet’, Bevan was ‘looked upon by some as a dangerous demagogue’. From an American perspective, when allied with his reputation as ‘a capable administrator and a man of marked political talent’, this was disturbing indeed. Bevan was regarded as a likely candidate for leadership in the event of the party moving towards the left. Outside the Ministry, Richard Crossman attracted the attention of the CIA, because as a former leading ‘dissident on the left’ he was thought, accurately and comfortingly, to have modified his views: In 1946 he led a rather abortive revolt of some hundred members of the House of Commons against the policy of Mr Bevin; they charged the government with subservience to the United States and hostility to the true interests of the workers and intellectuals of Europe. Crossman believed strongly in Britain’s becoming the leader of a European ‘Third Force’, removed from both the Soviet and US camps. Since the end of 1947, however, Crossman and most of his associates have gradually modified their views; although they are now critical of Bevin, they are not hostile, and their opinion of the United States seems to have become more favorable. They are Labor members in good standing.

Other back-benchers further to the left, such as John Platts-Mills, Konni Zilliacus and D.N. Pritt (the latter ‘indistinguishable from a Communist’), were virtually isolated in their extremism and as a consequence were considered to be of little concern. What, then, of Douglas’ fears that domestic socialism was incompatible with a responsible – that is to say, pro-American – foreign, trade and defence policy? The CIA could come to no such conclusion. The constitutional stability of Britain, the sanity and calmness of its people, and the unlikelihood of ‘polarization around extremes of left and right’ would overcome any temporary political disturbance brought on by economic stringency. This judgement was presumably all the more firmly held since a few months earlier Britain had passed peacefully through a period in which, as the CIA then observed, the country was ‘strained as nearly to capacity as any great 6

Korean Conflict.indb 6

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

democratic nation has ever been in peacetime’. The British under either party would ‘remain fundamentally friendly’ and ultimately, the report concluded, ‘[i]f war should come Britain would unquestionably side with us’. The fact remained, however, that in the estimation of the CIA the chief, and certainly the only reliable, ally of the USA was disturbingly ill-prepared and poorly armed for war. Julius Holmes, from the vantage point of the American embassy in London, added his voice to that of the CIA, to agree that the socialism of the Labour government was not inherently destructive of the special relationship. The basic cause of the growing friction between the two countries, he said in a cable to Acheson, was economic in nature: Brit[ish] leaders feel they are now fighting a last-stand battle for survival as a world power. They see themselves confronted by a host of life and death problems. They are trying simultaneously to maintain their Commonwealth and Empire and military commitments, balance their trade, modernize their industry, balance their budget, fight off inflation, and prevent a fall in their standard of living. Since there are no margins, even trivial things such as a battalion dispatched to Eritrea; a million pounds expenditure on this or that item; a million pounds gained or lost in overseas trade; a penny rise in the price of bread or a dime on the price of domestic coal become critical problems of major dimensions that require Cabinet attention.

Although a Labour government ‘committed to planning and nationalization imposes certain additional strains on our mutual relations’, the important thing to remember, Holmes advised, was that ‘it would be a mistake for us to believe that our differences would disappear if [the] Conservatives come to power’. In matters of international concern any British government ‘would adopt much the same policies’. Holmes’ allusion to the forthcoming British elections of February 1950 was designed to placate any fears should Labour be returned to office. In the event, according to a Foreign Office assessment made in March, little alarm was occasioned by their victory. True, the narrowness of the 7

Korean Conflict.indb 7

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

government’s majority gave rise to some wishful thinking that the policies of the welfare state might be repudiated and the nationalisation and control of industry slackened, but it was understood in America ‘that there is little difference of principle between the two parties in the United Kingdom over foreign affairs’. There were, however, some misgivings in official American circles after the election about the appointment of Manny Shinwell to the Defence portfolio and, more particularly, of John Strachey to the War Ministry. These misgivings were no doubt fuelled by the Evening Standard’s charge that Strachey had ‘never repudiated his belief in Communism’. The appointments were announced just as the Fuchs affair was unfolding and the Americans were facing their own spy and loyalty investigations. Shinwell, despite having served as a Minister since 1945, had made little effort to hide his hostility towards American foreign policy. Truman and Acheson had to be very careful indeed in this matter. Touching as it did on the highly sensitive issues of defence and espionage, the issue might well have caused a major breach between the two countries if mishandled. On 9 April, Acheson raised the subject with the President: I mentioned to the President that our Military people appeared to be getting very disturbed about the exchange of military information … in view of the presence of Mr Shinwell as Minister of Defense and Mr Strachey as Minister of War in the Attlee Cabinet. I said that this was a matter which required pretty careful judgment. Nobody wished them [the Pentagon] to run into real dangers on matters of important military secrets. Similarly, we did not wish to get into major trouble with such an important ally by taking a position which might be interpreted as dictation on our part as to who should be in the British Cabinet.

Truman agreed that they should be ‘extremely cautious’, observing delphically that ‘the British might solve the problem for us’. Shinwell and Strachey remained in the government, so whatever Truman had in mind does not appear to have come to pass. When the issue trickled into the American press in April, Sir Oliver Franks felt obliged to warn the Foreign 8

Korean Conflict.indb 8

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Office. An Associated Press story originating in The Hague carried an allegation that the Americans were pressuring the British government to ‘deny certain military information to Mr Strachey’. Franks simply declared in response that ‘no official or semi-official clarification will come from this end’, and nothing more was heard of the matter. Certainly, for Attlee to have ordered that the two men be denied access to security-sensitive documents is scarcely credible. However, the presence in the Labour government of Ministers whose past and, in some cases, as aforementioned, existing political views and associations would have disbarred them from office in the United States, continued to act as an irritant in relations between the allies. In April 1950, a briefing paper was prepared in the State Department for use by officials and Acheson at the tripartite Foreign Ministers’ talks to be held in London in May. Again, the Americans revealed their nervousness about Labour’s domestic social policy and its corrosive effect on the international economy and Western defence. A ‘working relationship’ between the two countries, it was stated, had been ‘a basic, if usually unspoken, premise of US foreign policy’ since, remarkably enough, the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. In the years after World War II the association had become one of the very foundations of US foreign relations. However, in recent months, the paper continued, a ‘number of stresses and strains’ had become apparent which threatened ‘to develop into major cracks in the structure of US–UK relations’ – developments which, in turn, would require a drastic reorientation of American foreign policy. According to the paper, a change in the relationship along these lines would be ‘a major disaster involving the decline and eclipse of the whole Eastern Hemisphere and a policy of isolation for the Western Hemisphere or even perhaps for North America alone’. As financial limitations were, in the view of the State Department, the reason most frequently advanced by the British for their inability to cooperate fully with the United States, these were closely examined in the Department’s briefing paper. Certain difficulties, such as the dollar and sterling position, were almost beyond immediate or even medium-term solution. Other problems, though, were the results of policy decisions, chief 9

Korean Conflict.indb 9

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

among which was Labour’s commitment to ‘dedicating a large part of the budgetary income to domestic welfare and social services’. Clearly the State Department felt something must be done, for it was their conviction that this form of expenditure should be limited in some fashion or other if Britain was to attend to ‘its external responsibilities’. There is more than a faint echo here of Lew Douglas’ strictures. Despite protestations by London to the contrary, Britain’s efforts to maintain a socialist state had undoubtedly led ‘to attempts to insulate the economy from outside competitive forces, thus limiting the ability of the British economy to adapt itself to changing world conditions’. Worse still, ‘the more doctrinaire of the British socialists’, antagonistic as they were to the philosophy of capitalism, distrusted American motives and insisted on ‘insulating British economic planning from any chance of intervention by Americans’. But intervene America must: A failure to keep domestic welfare expenditure in a reasonable relation to total commitment might very well defeat the very objectives which the British seek domestically. They cannot transfer external responsibilities to us without limitation. We cannot quarrel with the objective of becoming independent of US aid nor with the objective of reestablishing sterling as a strong currency … We believe that the urgency of taking the actions necessary to prevent deterioration in the situation of the Western world is greater than the urgency of terminating dependence upon US aid and the reestablishment of sterling. This belief forces us to face the fact that we may well have to do some or all of the following: (a) continue US aid in some form after 1952, (b) take a variety of domestically unattractive actions which will in themselves decrease the necessity for US aid, and (c) contribute to a solution of the sterling balance problem.

In the last resort, especially as there was ‘no future for the British apart from close collaboration with the US’, Washington would have to get tough: While we cannot deny the right of the British, or of any country, to follow whatever social or economic doctrine they choose democratically, 10

Korean Conflict.indb 10

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

we do have a right and duty to see that the large amount of assistance we are giving is used in a way to promote the objectives for which it is given. We have the right and duty to protest if we really believe that the pursuit of dogma is prejudicing the creation of those conditions which are necessary to recovery and peace.

Or, in other words, like Siamese twins, one must be dominant in all things lest the two perish. There were, alas, differences in temperament between the twins. ‘We are apt to be impatient’, it was observed, ‘urging fast action, specific commitments and definite plans. The British are much more cautious and favor the gradual approach which has traditionally been known as “muddling through” … the pressure of events and the tempo of the cold war are not such as to permit leisure.’ While the Americans might plead that their critical attitude towards Britain’s policy priorities was amply justified by the exigencies of the cold war, they seem nevertheless to have felt no great enthusiasm for the prospect of Britain reaching economic independence. Noting that Britain was giving ‘over-riding priority’ to achieving freedom from outside aid and to reestablishing the strength of sterling by mid-1952, the State Department asked whether these goals were ‘seriously prejudicing other more important world objectives’. Presumably, the fight against communism and the prevention of a putative World War III should have been more important to London, assuming the former would not bring on the latter. What the State Department called the ‘economic facts of life’, wedded indissolubly to the survival of the Western powers, might have been to the British a euphemism for a world made safe for American trade. What, then, did his advisers suggest that Acheson say to Ernest Bevin in the May 1950 talks – apart, that is, from the habitual incantation that ‘collaboration and common action between the two countries’ were ‘essential to the security, prosperity and expansion of the free world’? First, the Secretary of State was to point out that the economic health and safety of the free world would be beyond reach if the British continued to insulate themselves from the ‘competition of outside economic forces’. They would therefore have to accept the postponement of self-support until after 1952. Second, ‘suggestions 11

Korean Conflict.indb 11

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

as to their internal problems and actions will have to be accepted’ if the extensive financial aid from the United States was to achieve its ends. Or, to put it another way, if the West was to survive, the British had no choice but to continue receiving American money, and it would be an indispensable condition of these payments that Labour curtail its economic ambitions, and more particularly its social welfare programmes. The Foreign Office anticipated the general line of the State Department, and opposed it. In discussions between officials from the two Departments preliminary to the May meeting, it was pleasingly apparent to the Foreign Office that the United States regarded British strength, prosperity and, not least, advice as essential to the security of America itself. But, the British insisted, in order ‘to maintain our position as a World Power’, the Americans should forbear from interference: We have our own ideas about the basis on which our internal strength can best be developed. The Americans may not always agree with them or like them. We ourselves have serious reservations about some aspects of American internal policy and in particular their unemployment policy and the apparent absence of means to counteract industrial recessions and slumps which may have a grave effect on the Western economy as a whole. But so far as these are purely internal matters, they are for each of us our own affairs.

Whether or not the Foreign Office apprehended the connection between US aid and the claim to have a say in British domestic policy, they emphatically rejected further help: ‘We do not want any further grants or direct aid for ourselves.’ All that was asked was that the Americans ‘should really adopt policies consonant with their creditor position’ by allowing Britain ‘to sell a sufficient amount of goods in the American market’. Further, they should also refrain from weakening ‘the position of sterling and the sterling area, and the position in our Colonies’. Early in May, Bevin presented a progress report to Cabinet on the officials’ talks. He noted that the Americans had questioned Britain’s concentration on ‘attaining viability at all costs in 1952’, since it was 12

Korean Conflict.indb 12

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

‘prejudicing the development of wider European interests and in some cases American policy, owing to the hostility which some … actions arouse in the United States’. The British team, he observed with some satisfaction, had ‘strongly pressed our own point of view on this and the Americans have shown an understanding on the need for changes in their own economic policy’. Clearly, in the Foreign Secretary’s view the Americans had got nowhere and, indeed, were forced onto the back foot during the course of the discussions. Further, he assured his colleagues that he would press for an undertaking on the part of Washington that ‘in the context of collaboration in foreign policy and defence no pressure would be put on us which might impair the strength of our economic and financial position’. Over lunch with Acheson and Attlee on 9 May, Bevin ‘emphasised the great desire of the British people to reach a stage when they were no longer receiving aid, but were fully independent economically and financially’. Acheson could hardly object and asked only that the British should not take their attempt to achieve independence to the point at which ‘it ran counter to the general good of the Western world’. *

*

*

At the core of all the talk about the special relationship and the strains to which it was being subjected lay the question of the Soviet threat. To the United States the threat was real and pressing. To Britain it was a rumbling volcano, disquieting but not about to erupt, and certainly not requiring emergency action which might jeopardise economic recovery and the welfare state. Even those in government who could not share Nye Bevan’s view that the Russians were in no condition to fight a major war believed that the Western powers had a few years’ breathing space yet. The Americans, however, continually insisted that the sky was falling in. When asked to produce evidence they would point to Czechoslovakia, the Berlin crisis and, in 1949, to Russia’s possession of the atomic bomb. Almost everything that was uncongenial to the Americans, including Britain’s economic and welfare policies, was represented as ultimately weakening Western defences and inviting Soviet military aggression. The language employed by American officials, in internal discussions as well as in their 13

Korean Conflict.indb 13

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

public statements, was apocalyptic in tone and rejected as alien the sort of analysis normally to be expected in the examination of such grave matters. In public and private debate on the intentions and strategies of allegedly hostile dictatorships – whether that of Hitler or, later, Khrushchev – attention was given to the personalities of the leaders in question, factional disputes and conflicting aims within the regimes, and a host of other factors. However, as far as Stalin’s Russia was concerned, this seems to have occurred only rarely. In the millions of words produced in this period by the State Department, the CIA, the National Security Council and other agencies, one looks almost in vain for Stalin’s name, let alone those of his subordinates (except, of course, for those with whom American and British officials had direct dealings, such as Vyacheslav Molotov, Andrey Vyshinsky and Andrei Gromyko). The virtually unmentioned Stalin therefore merged in the writings, and doubtless in the imaginations, of American officials with what has latterly been termed ‘the evil empire’. The result was that the USSR became a sort of malicious demon capable of materialising anywhere and everywhere in order to do his damage. The flat-earth philosophy of international relations developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s was founded on an unfalsifiable assertion: Moscow’s overriding desire was ‘to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world’. Nothing could be rejected as proof, and analysis had no place. While panicky and unsubstantiated reports from the cold war front served to nourish the fears of the Americans, these fears began in turn to have a perceptible influence on the views of certain key British officials. In March 1950 Sir David Kelly, the British ambassador in Moscow, reported without qualification the anxieties of his American counterpart, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, who had recently returned from a conference of US ambassadors in Europe: His two chief points were the following. First, he found all his colleagues in an anxious mood about the possibility of a Russian military offensive almost at any time … they asked him whether he could guarantee a static situation for six months. He had answered that he could not guarantee anything owing to the possibility of accidents but that he 14

Korean Conflict.indb 14

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

thought that the general considerations and data as far as known to him were about the same as last year.

In response to a query about who would do the actual fighting if it came to war, Kirk stated unequivocally, ‘[t]he United States and Britain’. Commenting on Kelly’s message, Strang quoted with approval the opinion of one of his officers that ‘the safety both of the United Kingdom and of the United States depends upon the evolution of a special relationship between our two countries’.1 The unfolding of the fearful attitude (which by the middle of 1950 bordered on panic) was also evident in Sir Oliver Franks’ annual reviews of political developments in the United States for 1948 and 1949. By June, it was this attitude of incipient panic that underpinned the Americans’ readiness to blame the Soviet Union for the North Korean aggression. *

*

*

Even though it was a presidential election year, Franks noted that the conduct of foreign affairs ‘dominated’ Congress and public opinion in 1948 to an extent that was unprecedented in the peacetime history of the United States. Thanks to the prestige of George Marshall as Secretary of State and the common sense of Senator Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles, America’s foreign policy was bipartisan in nature, and all in all, Franks seems to have been pleased with the mature way in which the Americans had assumed the ‘leading world role’ so recently thrust upon them. Two events in 1948 shaped and finally hardened attitudes towards the Soviet Union: the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the blockade of Berlin. The coup as such did not come as a surprise to the American people. They regarded it ‘merely as proof that the appetite of the Russian bear had not been sated and that more aggression was in prospect’. However, the death of the dissident Jan Masaryk shortly after the coup was a different matter. Masaryk’s tragic suicide (some called, and many thought, it murder) came as a profound emotional shock, the effect of which on the American public and on Congress was of great consequence. It dispelled, as no less dramatic event could have done so quickly and thoroughly, the persistent 15

Korean Conflict.indb 15

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

illusion of that minority of Americans which had been unwilling to give full credence to the ruthless ambitions of the Kremlin and which therefore continued to believe in the feasibility of reaching a modus vivendi with communism … The death of Masaryk convinced the vast majority of the American public that the chasm between their political ideology and way of life and that of the Communists was virtually unbridgeable. The Berlin blockade confirmed ‘the conclusion derived from the fate of Czechoslovakia’, but ignoring the ‘violent Russiphobes’ who urged the despatch of armed convoys to Berlin, the public was content with the air lift as ‘a more sensible and less explosive retort’. According to Franks, the American public in 1948 tended to regard the cold war as ‘not so much a prelude to a hot one as an accelerated modern version of the game of power politics which the United States, in its new role, is likely to have to play for a long time to come’. Truman too, Franks observed, had acted soberly by repeatedly offering to talk to the Russians and thereby exhibiting a willingness to conclude a rapprochement should the Kremlin display good faith. If Franks was correct in his general assessment, then in 1948 the Americans did not yet regard the USSR with bitter and implacable enmity. By 1949, however, the mood had altered. In that year Americans, both inside and outside government, dwelt on the course of Western relations with the USSR ‘to the virtual exclusion of everything else’. In particular, the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb ‘shattered the belief, which had begun to gain ground as the result of the success of the Berlin air lift and the deviation of Marshal Tito, that the Western democracies were beginning to win the cold war’. Franks attributed the absence of public hysteria in part to the President’s calm public face, but this could not hide the fact that the administration’s ‘political and military strategy had been seriously upset’. A critical change in the general mood was caused by the erosion of the bipartisan approach to foreign affairs. Governor Thomas Dewey’s un­ expected defeat in 1948 discredited the liberal wing of the Republican Party, while the ‘loss of China’ precipitated the first real split between the parties over foreign policy since World War II. In Franks’ judgement, Truman’s post-victory behaviour had not helped the darkening situation: 16

Korean Conflict.indb 16

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

[T]he leadership was cocky and independent. Having snatched victory from the very jaws of defeat Mr Truman and his immediate entourage seemed to feel that they had a popular mandate for whatever they wished to do and they were thus, for some months, in no mood to consult with, or even to take into their confidence, any Republican leader. More importantly so far as Britain was concerned, the air of tension and anxiety in the United States pervaded Anglo–American relations in the realms of economic, foreign and defence policies, and led to widely shared ‘dismay’.

The sense of urgency was unfocused and all-embracing. The State Department declared: ‘Our major antagonist presses us relentlessly in all fields, military, political, economic, cultural, etc., and forces us to the realization that alone we do not have the power or resources necessary to achieve our objectives. We must mobilize our allies and friends, expanding their number and assuring their collaboration and help.’ However, displaying all the phlegm for which the British were infamous in American eyes, Sir Gladwyn Jebb told US officials in April 1950 that, while the Soviets had made a ‘slight gain’ by producing the atomic bomb and helping the Communists to success in China, their provocative behaviour did not betoken a readiness to ‘risk action which might result in hostilities’. In his estimation the critical period was unlikely to come before 1955 or 1956. In this, Jebb was speaking for the Foreign Office and indeed for the British Chiefs of Staff. However, the fact that they were willing to hazard such a prediction suggests that the British also believed the Russians were operating to some sort of timetable for the accomplishment of European, perhaps world, domination. The difference between the two allies lay only in their views on the question of timing, although given the awful nature of the expected ‘hostilities’, the Americans doubtlessly regarded the British estimate as impossibly complacent. Of course, it might have been that the British were merely humouring the Americans by seeming to agree that the Kremlin intended to engage in general war at a more or less predictable time in the future, but in light of the tenor of the discussion of the problem in the Cabinet and Whitehall, 17

Korean Conflict.indb 17

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the view appears to have been sincere. London, as well as Washington, had begun to see the USSR as a doomsday machine, primed and ticking inexorably towards the moment of detonation. Thus, for London too, the Soviet leaders had ceased to be mere mortals whose motives and very ways of thinking could be analysed rationally. This was an extraordinary transformation in the few years since World War II, when the – admittedly ludicrous – creation by British propagandists of the Uncle Joe cult had at least depicted the Russian people and their leaders as human beings. Though committed to a cranky and distasteful ideology, they were depicted as differing from British people in only a few superficial respects. Early in May 1950, Bevin told the Cabinet that he and the Americans were in broad agreement that ‘the trend of power in the last twelve months had been, on balance, unfavourable to the West, and that the present situation is one of danger’. Unlike the Americans, though, the Foreign Secretary thought ‘it was not likely that they [the Soviets] would be prepared to run a serious risk of war for several years’. In this case, he implied, elimination of the ‘weak spots in the Western system’ could proceed at a steady rather than a frantic pace. In reply to questions in Cabinet about Britain being made to appear an obstacle to talks with the Russians, Bevin said that he was ‘entirely clear that … general negotiations are unlikely to succeed until such time as we have built up a “situation of strength” in the West’. The situation-of-strength philosophy was very much the formulation of the American Secretary of State: Acheson was speaking through Bevin. In the middle of 1950 NATO was largely without teeth, and it was with this in mind that Bevin warned his colleagues of the military dangers confronting Western Europe from the East. He urged the replacement of the original idea of the Western Union with ‘the wider conception of the Atlantic community’. During the May talks Bevin developed his thesis concerning the nature of the Russian threat. There was indeed a contest ‘between Soviet philosophy and western civilization’ and, as in the case of Greece, the Soviets might well exploit the technique of fomenting civil war in susceptible areas such as Germany and Southeast Asia. But Bevin went on to discount an immediate threat to Western Europe. While agreeing with Acheson that NATO must be strengthened, he emphasised the necessity for what was to the Americans 18

Korean Conflict.indb 18

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

a dangerous illusion, namely building Europe’s defences without simultaneously jeopardising the ‘standard of living’. As Acheson knew, he meant the welfare state in Britain. As the Americans approached a state of mind indistinguishable from that of a people at war, a further strain in the relationship emerged over the issue of British integration with the rest of Western Europe. In Washington’s view, the military integration of Europe, and indeed of Europe and the United States, rested ultimately on some form of European economic and political federation. While the details of this structure were far from clear, the fulfilment of such a scheme would also carry the advantage to the United States of a reconstructed and open market for US goods. Julius Holmes’ description of American ‘prodding, pressure and criticism’ was no better illustrated than with respect to this issue: The principal source of friction in this connection is our continuing demand that they ‘integrate’ their economy with Europe … they are fearful that American opinion may not be satisfied with such prosaic objectives as multilateral trade and convertible currencies in Europe, and may insist on a more ambitious form of unification that would undermine Brit[ain’s] position in relation to the Commonwealth … Moreover Brit[ain] resents a common American attitude that they are just another European power. They see Brit[ain] as the hub of a vast and complicated political, military and economic mechanism, occupying a position in the world and a relationship with us which is quite different from the other European powers. There is a constant wonder here that we should think it in American interests for them completely to integrate with Europe.

*

*

*

Holmes’ shrewd assessment identified a bundle of twitching British nerves: fear that closer formal ties to Europe would endanger the cohesion of the Commonwealth – and further, that the USA would not be sorry to see this happen; refusal to be regarded as simply another European supplicant; and, of course, the age-old, near-ineradicable conviction that Britain was not and never would be part of Europe. 19

Korean Conflict.indb 19

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Lew Douglas expanded on one of these fears at the meeting of US European ambassadors in March. Although the Commonwealth had changed in charac­ ter profoundly since the war – with the addition of members of ‘different race, religion and philosophic outlook’ – and London could no longer automatically claim leadership, the organisation remained important to her. It seems it was also important to America. It was observed at the same meeting that ‘there was discussion in Washington as to what extent the US could replace the UK in the Commonwealth’, and though ‘there was considerable doubt’ about the proposition, Harriman remarked that at the very least the United States should not allow the British to use the Commonwealth as an exclusive instrument of their foreign policy. Douglas, ever mindful of the political complexion of the British government, added that ‘if Socialism became permanently fastened to the UK the Common­wealth would disintegrate in any event and we would be confronted with the decision as to what role the US should play in such circumstances’. Probably no more than idle speculation, these remarks nonetheless serve to validate the nagging fear felt in London that the Americans had begun to cast covetous glances at the Commonwealth. The assurance given to Strang by Philip Jessup, US ambassador at large, that ‘we do not want to break up the Commonwealth’, certainly betrayed an awareness of British suspicions if it was not a case of protesting too much. In the opinion of the State Department, the Commonwealth was ‘of greater importance, economically, strategically and politically, than any other existing grouping’. To be sure, the body was intimately associated with the sterling system as a whole. This was of paramount importance, according to the State Department, at a time when the ‘internal economy [of the United Kingdom] is kept going … only through detailed manipulation of price and wage controls, subsidies and other forms of government direction’. For Britain, the Commonwealth was of vital concern also for reasons of sentiment and prestige. Moreover, it was intrinsic to the general problem of the Anglo–American relationship: Our principal difficulty has related to the reluctance of the British to indicate, in making defense plans, what forces they would be prepared to commit on the Continent. It is probably an academic matter to discuss 20

Korean Conflict.indb 20

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

whether we do or do not favor real political union between the UK and Europe … There is no reason to believe that a strictly Western European political union is within the realm of practical politics in the foreseeable future. It is also far from clear that, if we faced up to all the implications, we would favor political merger to such a degree as to mean the end of the Commonwealth system and of the special relationship which exists between the British and us.

At the same time, the State Department suspected that the British were making rather too much of the Commonwealth connection. For, although it was in America’s interest to help maintain the strength and cohesiveness of the Commonwealth, its welfare was ‘in the long run dependent upon a strong Western Europe with which the UK is closely associated’. Fundamentally, then, while the British had historically wished to exercise political power on the Continent, they believed that ‘political merger with Continental countries would be fatal to their position as a world power’. It was clear to the State Department that Britain ‘did not have much respect for the political maturity, resoluteness or discipline of the Continental countries’, close association with whom could only damage their ‘stable political system and type of society’. Washington was careful, however, to leave the British guessing about the special relationship, even to the extent of allowing them to think it might not exist at all. As Bevin informed Cabinet with some disappointment, the United States was insistent that ‘so far as European affairs are concerned we must not expect them to regard us as entirely different from the other European Powers’. This was certainly the view of David Bruce, the US ambassador in Paris, who cabled Jessup in early May 1950: If the special relationship in a world-wide basis becomes established US policy, I believe the consequences in regard to our partners in the Atlantic community will be extremely harmful … it would be regarded on the continent as the abandonment by the US of any serious attempt at European or even Atlantic community integration in favor of an Anglo– American world alliance as the cornerstone of US foreign policy. 21

Korean Conflict.indb 21

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

As if in anticipation of President de Gaulle’s misgivings, Bruce added that the British would be certain to use the special relationship in order to act as an intermediary between the United States and the other European powers. Adopting a no-nonsense approach, Lew Douglas responded by saying that in the first instance, no amount of ‘dialectical argument’ could wish away the central importance of Britain and the Commonwealth to the United States. The problem was not whether the special relationship should be denied but rather, how the US should acknowledge it without injuring the North Atlantic community. As to the possibility of Britain introducing herself as a sort of Atlantic go-between, Douglas asked what harm could that do: In fact our major criticism of HM Govt has been that she has not exerted leadership on the Continent and has in fact refused to be an American intermediary. The issue is not whether the UK would attempt to be Mr Bones in a minstrel show but whether the UK would be a good Mr Bones … I do not for a moment imply that the UK’s desire to have a special relationship with the US is as pure as Castile Soap and as clean as Snow White. Her motives are often no worse than ours, and no better, but I do not agree with the view that the primary reason which moves her to attempt to establish a special US–UK relationship is because of her unwillingness to join in molding a more closely knit Western Europe. Her principal motive is to buy insurance.

Coming from a man who had been calling for a tougher policy towards Britain and who had castigated its socialism, this clear-eyed appraisal was surprisingly sympathetic. In the event, the two countries agreed to disagree, at least for the interim. After a conference of officials, a joint paper was issued in which it was rather wearily stated that the problem of the United Kingdom’s ‘full union with the continent … will be a continuing source of irritation, but is an inevitable one’. Bevin, however, felt able to announce to Cabinet, perhaps a touch too confidently, that the Americans ‘have definitely stated that they do not think we should accept any form of organic union with Europe’. 22

Korean Conflict.indb 22

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Douglas’ benign frame of mind was shattered when, on 13 June, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party produced a statement entitled ‘European Unity’. It was drafted by Denis Healey under Hugh Dalton’s supervision, and was meant to set out the party’s policy on Britain’s place in Europe. Unfortunately for its purposes, the statement included some last-minute and less than enthusiastic remarks about the Schuman Plan for the pooling of the coal and steel industries of France and Germany. The plan had been more or less sprung on Bevin and had quickly become the subject of vigorous debate and speculation within the party. The National Executive Committee’s pamphlet seemed to the Americans to confirm the darkest suspicions that they had entertained about the British attitude towards Europe. ‘Every now and then,’ Douglas cabled Acheson, ‘the British drop a brick and when they do it’s a classic.’ The document, something of a patchwork job according to Douglas, had not been seen before publication by Bevin, Cripps, Gaitskell ‘or anyone, in fact, in government who speaks with authority on economic matters’. Presumably Dalton, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, was not regarded by the ambassador as possessing such authority. Although the pamphlet was intended as a discussion and not as a firm policy paper, Douglas claimed to know that ‘parts … are completely unacceptable to certain responsible members of the Government’ and that it had caused ‘grave disquiet in top government circles’. In essence, the statement alarmed the Americans because it seemed to consolidate hitherto fragmentary evidence for British reluctance to fall into line with the United States’ vision of Europe. Moreover, it ‘stood out as a baldly expressed reaffirmation of party belief in a cautious approach to political or economic European unity and opposition to supranational authority. It also goes further than past statements in insistence on necessity for acceptance of socialist doctrine.’ Though not wholly bad – it rejected the notion of Europe as a third force between the USA and the USSR and praised America’s progressive foreign programme – its publication revealed ‘irresponsibility by Party and government leaders’. Since Douglas concluded that the document would not fundamentally alter relations between the two countries nor make the solution of difficulties ‘more prickly’, its chief impact 23

Korean Conflict.indb 23

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

appears to have been symbolic. That is to say, it signified Britain’s unwillingness ‘to enter upon any international commitments which might conceivably restrict their ability to plan their internal economic life and to maintain full employment and fair shares at home’. On 16 June, the day after this message was sent to Washington, Douglas called on Attlee if not to upbraid the Prime Minister then certainly to make it clear that the Americans were not pleased: ‘I … explained to him my very deep worry about the violence of the response of the Senate and the House, and throughout the US generally, to the Labor Party program and wondered what could be done to abate the tidal wave of criticism and the havoc that it might produce.’ The ambassador went on to suggest, no doubt as delicately as possible, that while the British might have good reasons for refusing to participate in discussions shortly to take place in Paris about the Schuman Plan, it might be as well for Attlee to state publicly that London had no wish to say anything which might interfere with the discussions, and would ‘be prepared to make constructive suggestions’. Attlee undertook to explore this suggestion with one or two of his colleagues. ‘At no time, however,’ observed Douglas, did the Prime Minister ‘indicate that there was anything in the Labor party pamphlet with which he disagreed.’ Attlee could hardly have done so since, as Dalton had had to remind him, he had agreed to the draft at a meeting of the National Executive Committee.2 In fact, he defended it ‘quite vigorously’ to Douglas, thus confirming the ambassador’s diagnosis of Britain’s economic and, indeed, moral position: My own interpretation of the pamphlet and my conversation with Attlee is that at last there has been brought out into the open the real inconsistency between socialism as a part of an internationalist order, except as it may be wholely [sic] and completely socialist, and the socialist state as an instrument for internal planning of the economic life of a nation.

The predicted storm of protest in the United States was, to judge by the reports of the Washington embassy, less of a storm than a brief squall. Acheson took refuge in the obvious explanation that the pamphlet was strictly a party statement and did not represent official government policy, 24

Korean Conflict.indb 24

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

while press and radio comment had been ‘one of disappointment and irritation’ rather than of anger. Further, according to the embassy, a statement by Attlee in the House, possibly influenced in part by Douglas’ urgent representations, helped to damp down American hostility. A week later it was reported that comment ‘still ranges from the acerbity of the anglophobes to the restrained amalgam of understanding and disappointment of intelligent and friendly observers [friendly observers were by definition intelligent in the despatches of Franks and his staff], but, on the whole there is now a more rational approach to the matter’. Some commentators had been kind enough to point out that Britain’s caution towards the Schuman Plan was ‘a natural corollary of … foreign policy rather than of socialist theory’ and also that those Congressmen calling for punitive measures ‘would be the most strongly opposed to American participation in any such scheme or to the sacrifice of one jot of national sovereignty’. The Labour government’s defence of British economic interests and of their own domestic achievements signalled neither an unwillingness to contribute a greater proportion of resources to NATO, as Washington feared, nor a rejection of cautious engagement with the Continent at some time in the future. What they did signify was a determination not to be browbeaten by the impatient Americans, lest in attempting to regain the status of a great power Britain should lose the autonomy and freedom of action consonant with greatness. In such circumstances, the special relationship would purchase for the nation little more than power without glory. In one crucial matter – rearmament – the Labour government did succumb to American pressure. The rearmament programme put into abeyance the achievement of economic independence, severely disrupted the structure of the British economy, slowed down progress in welfare reforms, and, with the departure of Nye Bevan from the Cabinet in April 1951, contributed to a split in the Labour Party which lasted until the 1960s. Given the reluctance of Britain right up to the eve of the war in Korea to disturb its economy for the sake of accommodating herself to the Americans, the question is, why did the government make the decision to rearm massively? The answer is inescapable: the British contracted the virus of war hysteria incubated across the Atlantic. This is remarkable, even allowing for the 25

Korean Conflict.indb 25

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

painfulness of memories associated with World War II, concluded only five years earlier, and for the ready manner in which Attlee was willing from the late 1940s to cast Stalin in the role of Hitler. The apprehension created by a small war in faraway Korea greatly exceeded that aroused by the Czech coup or the Berlin blockade, neither of which had been interpreted as proof of Russia’s intention to immediately march westwards towards the Channel. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the drastic prognosis derived from the North Korean attack was not confined to the right and centre of British politics. It is true that there were a few – mostly timorous – voices raised against the prevailing wisdom about Soviet intentions, but those on the left whose views were represented by Bevan and the New Statesman questioned the sheer magnitude of the rearmament programme, not its need. Bevan himself, in asking whether the Soviet Union was capable of launching a war, did not rule out the medium or longer-term possibility. Indeed, his advocacy of resisting communism by means of raising living standards in susceptible areas of the world of necessity implied that the USSR was a foe. What he and others objected to was the damaging effect of placing the British economy on a semi-war footing when no real threat existed. Just how widespread and genuine was the fear in Britain and the United States of a general war, or of a military conflict in Europe which might easily become a general war? There appear to have been two main strands of thinking. First, it was thought that the Korean War was designed to confuse and dissipate the concentration of the West’s forces preparatory to a Soviet attack somewhere in Europe, probably against Germany or Yugoslavia. Second, it was thought that the Far Eastern adventure sought to test the resolution of the non-Communist world, which, if found lacking, would be followed by all-out Soviet aggression. Either or both of these logically entailed a rapid and large increase in defence preparedness. Opinion in official US circles as to Soviet plans varied considerably immediately after the onset of hostilities in Korea, but one thing seemed clear to all: the risk of general war had been sharply enhanced. *

*

*

26

Korean Conflict.indb 26

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

In an assessment noteworthy for its length and for having been produced on the day the war broke out, the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research unequivocally stated that the North Korean government ‘is completely under Kremlin control and … the move against South Korea must therefore be considered a Soviet move’. According to the paper, it followed that though the Soviet leaders were probably discounting the risk of general war, they must have been aware that the United States might involve itself militarily in Korea. The advantages to the Soviet Union of the ‘liquidation’ of South Korea were said to be considerable. The resolve of the United States ‘on ground militarily most favorable’ to Russia would be sorely tested; a blow would be dealt to American prestige in Asia and to the encouragement in the whole region of anti-Communist forces; the USSR would secure its eastern approaches; and finally, Japan’s alignment with the United States would be weakened. In Europe, the success of a Sovietinspired invasion of South Korea might well lead to serious questioning of ‘the might and will of the US’, especially in occupied Germany where it would be feared that the East German paramilitary police might be used as the North Koreans had been used. The one major figure who disagreed with this sort of analysis, though it made no difference to his conduct of the Korean campaign, was General MacArthur. In November 1950 he told James Plimsoll, an Australian diplomat, that if they had ‘really inspired the North Korean aggression, the Soviet Union would not have abandoned the North Koreans so completely, giving them no assistance whatsoever’. This, he added, ‘would have been the greatest betrayal since Judas accepted his 30 pieces of silver’. The only evidence of complicity had been the North Korean use of Russian equipment. Evidence to the contrary, which was far more compelling in MacArthur’s view, was the failure of the UN forces to capture or identify Russian officers and advisers, the meek response by Moscow to the accidental bombing of Soviet territory by an American plane, and the complete absence of protest when his forces cut off one of the Siberian power sources after the capture of a generating plant in north-east Korea. However, this judgement was made five months after the onset of the war. MacArthur certainly didn’t express these opinions in June, and 27

Korean Conflict.indb 27

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Washington, in the mood then prevailing, could only assume the worst. If a crisis were to break out in Europe, the United States would scarcely be in a position to be of much use, according to a National Security Council memorandum for the President dated 6 July – a memorandum which bore all the signs of incipient panic. Even if no more threatening an outbreak than Korea were to occur in the coming months, it warned that ‘we are already being forced to seriously weaken the defenses of the United States’. Were the Russians to reimpose the Berlin blockade, for example, ‘there are not enough airplanes available to handle simultaneously another Berlin air lift, the Korean campaign and the absolute minimum necessary for the military defense of the United States. This is still true even if we commandeered the planes of all our airlines, which action would of course seriously cripple the domestic economy.’ As for defence production, ‘nobody knows what to make, or how much to make, or when, or why’. Indeed, a long-range strategic defence plan – ‘essential to our survival’ – requested by the President in 1945 had not been produced. The resulting chaos in the event of general war, when ‘everybody will want everything yesterday’, would be compounded by the necessity to counter major acts of sabotage and devastating atomic attacks. The memorandum concluded by reminding the President grimly: ‘The British refused to face up squarely to the menace of Nazism until the invasion of Poland.’ However, given Truman’s frame of mind after the North Korean attack, he hardly needed the benefit of this kind of instructive lesson from the past. A memorandum submitted to the President by the CIA drew less alarming conclusions. Of a number of possible developments, the one most to be feared, namely a Soviet instigation of global war, was the least likely to occur. Although the gains to be made by the USSR by actions short of general war, such as that in Korea, might be considerable, general war simply could not be hazarded in view of the potential industrial-military strength of the West and the actual atomic superiority enjoyed by the United States. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that policy should be based on at least the possibility that Korea was a Russian feint meant to disguise a larger purpose, and they warned against ‘excessive commitments of … military forces and resources in those areas of operations which would 28

Korean Conflict.indb 28

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

not be decisive’ in a time of world war. Accordingly, they advised that the United States’ effort in Korea should be minimised, by which they meant abandoned, in the event of major Soviet combat units being encountered there, for this would signal the start of World War III. Truman, choosing to heed the more Cassandra-like of his advisers, proceeded to base his pronouncements and his orders for national mobilisation on the assumption, if not necessarily the conviction, that global war was but a hair’s breadth away. Was Stalin thought to be a madman? Certainly, The Economist believed there was ‘madness in the Kremlin’. In this case, Russia might be expected to go to war even though it was manifestly certain to be defeated and physically destroyed. Such evidence as existed – if not wilfully or fecklessly ignored – would seem to have indicated otherwise. Stalin was known, by Chip Bohlen among others, to be a cautious man, and Russian behaviour since 1945, albeit hostile and suspicious, had been directed at consolidating the essentially defensive territorial gains won at such a terrible price after June 1941. It was the ever-present recollection of the price paid by the Russian people, or so the more thoughtful analysts in the Foreign Office and the State Department argued, that would make the Kremlin draw back from open conflict with the West, as they had done over the Berlin crisis. Intimations of a Soviet strike in the West were not confined to Washington. In conversation with Acheson on 30 June, the Norwegian ambassador expressed a fear commonly held throughout the Continent that ‘the Communist thrust in Korea might be a feint and that there would be another attack somewhere else, perhaps even in Europe’. He was at the same time ‘much heartened … feeling that if the US is capable of meeting the situation in Korea so firmly, it will certainly not falter in its commitments in the NAT [NATO] area’. The unspoken thought was clear. If America was willing to go to the aid of a country of which few had heard and fewer still cared about, then surely it would come to the aid of even a small European nation such as Norway. Therefore the Korean action was thought at the very minimum to have exposed as hollow the taunt implicit in Russia’s Far Eastern aggression, namely the idea that the United States was irresolute and ultimately incapable of enforcing the strategy of containment. In turn, 29

Korean Conflict.indb 29

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

it was believed in the State Department, at least a few days after the onset of the crisis, that ‘our European allies’ would not be deterred by a fear of general war from supporting America in Korea. In this light, it is worth noting that Sir Oliver Franks, in his first weekly report to London after the outbreak of the war, observed that the majority of well-informed commentators in the United States had been taken by surprise when the President announced the military commitment to South Korea. ‘There was,’ he wrote, ‘much emphasis on the fact that this was a civil war, that the US as a “third party” was not directly involved … Indeed, it was suggested that the affair might be a Soviet trap designed to divert American attention and efforts from Europe.’ Apparently, then, Franks’ responsible and well-informed press and radio commentators were not initially at one with their government in thinking that the United States should or would defend South Korea solely to reassure nervous Europeans that Soviet challenges on a scale less than total war would go unmet. The civil war, which the administration chose to call ‘North Korean aggression’, did not in their view constitute a grave threat to the security of the West. However, when told by Truman that they were mistaken and that the event was of critical importance, they fell into line. Similarly, it might be conjectured that if the Europeans, including the British, had been allowed to remain content with the belief that the Korean incident was of minor significance – akin, say, to a civil war or a coup in a Central American republic – they would not have started looking over their shoulders towards Eastern Europe and Russia. However, they believed Truman when he said, in effect, ‘If South Korea falls, it is your turn next.’ Having stimulated fear where none had existed, the United States promised to do something to assuage it. The Europeans might have been better advised to recall Franklin Roosevelt’s aphorism: ‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.’ On 5 July in the House of Commons, with his formidable authority Churchill lent weight to the American assertion that the crisis in the Far East was a crisis for Europe. Of course, no one had forgotten that it was he who had warned of the German danger in the 1930s. Now the great man was calling for a Secret Session in order that the defence of Britain and Western 30

Korean Conflict.indb 30

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Europe could be debated. His words were alarming: ‘It might be asked of us “How can you judge without the fullest information whether the United Nations, the United States and Great Britain are strong enough to resist Communist aggression in the Far East when that resistance may conceivably bring about a major crisis in Europe? Might it not be that the rulers in the Kremlin are drawing us all into the Far East as a preliminary to striking in the West?”’ At the same time, however, Churchill expressed the hope that a victory in Korea against the Communists would, in combination with the American superiority in atomic weapons, bring the Soviet Union to the conference table – a wish he was to carry into his second premiership. A week and a half later at a Conservative Party rally in Portsmouth, the old anti-Bolshevik warrior emerged. ‘Communism is a religion,’ Churchill thundered, ‘with all of its disciples and some of its fervour, a religion not only without a God, but anti-God.’ Stalin was intent on reducing the world ‘to the Soviet-Socialist pattern, just as Hitler wanted it reduced to the Nazi-Socialist pattern’. Surely knowing that he touched on a sensitive nerve, which doubtless provoked a fugitive sense of pleasure as well as of pain, he concluded, ‘My own anxieties about the safety, not only of the free world, but of our own hearths and homes, remind me often of the summer of 1940.’ The Cabinet was not disposed to grant his request for a Secret Session, principally because it might undermine the position of the new French government by stimulating queries about the state of Europe’s defences. It seems more than likely that a secret parliamentary debate would also have been a perfect recipe for creating alarm and despondency. After all, a war had broken out in an obscure corner of the world which, for reasons few could understand, the United States chose to regard as being of critical importance; the Leader of the Opposition had publicly expressed fears about the possibility of a Soviet assault on Western Europe; and there were calls for a Secret Session – unprecedented in peacetime – at which undisclosed grave matters would be debated. Had it taken place, such a session could only have created dispiriting rumours, which would doubtless have flourished prodigiously in the absence of clear and credible official information. In the summer of 1940 the threat had been tangible: after all, the Germans could almost be seen across the Channel. In the summer of 31

Korean Conflict.indb 31

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

1950, in contrast, denied knowledge of matters debated secretly in Parliament, the public would surely have experienced an inexplicable and unfocused sense of menace. Attlee was aware of the danger. In refusing Churchill’s demand, he said that a Secret Session would ‘give rise to serious public alarm, and a crop of irresponsible rumours, which neither the Government nor the Opposition would be able to control’.3 In such an atmosphere it was not long before demands were made for British rearmament – or, more accurately, for a large increase in the whole defence establishment. Early in July The Economist, anticipating ‘a long-drawnout struggle’ in Korea, warned that the West might thereby fritter away its forces in the Far East and invite Communist adventures elsewhere. Unless, therefore, the nations of the free world reconsidered drastically the whole scale of their military resources, it was ‘impossible to see how the Korean intervention can fulfil its real purpose – which is not, heaven knows, primarily to restore an unstable little state below the 38th parallel but to serve notice … that aggression does not pay’. Unpalatable though it was to The Economist (literally, it seems, since ‘the choice of guns involves less butter’), Britain and the United States must rearm and rearm quickly. Korea had shown that defence available ‘within six months, or six days, has far greater value’ than possibly better and more technically efficient forces two years hence. The ‘urgency of near-war’ must be instilled into both government and people. However, Attlee was not unmindful of the ‘feint’ theory of the Korean War, and on 6 July he wrote urgently to President Truman requesting the immediate convening of joint military–political discussions on the question. Across the Atlantic, Averell Harriman was pressing for just such a British rearmament effort. He had clearly come to the conclusion that Korea provided both the occasion and the reason, though it is difficult to tell which of the two was uppermost in his mind. Dining with Sir Oliver Franks early in July, he remarked that Korea gave the chance for a rapid intensification of defence under NATO: ‘It had weakened or destroyed such elements of military isolationism as there were in the Pentagon and it had produced an emotional state in the Congress which would make … quite large scale economic assistance for this purpose not too difficult.’ Such a hint could not be ignored lightly. Harriman was immensely influential. A former 32

Korean Conflict.indb 32

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

ambassador to Britain and to the Soviet Union, he had played a key role in the establishment and administration of the Marshall Plan and had recently been appointed as special adviser to President Truman. There was no issue on which his advice went unheeded. In him, Franks perceptively told London, ‘the threads of political, military and economic considerations affecting foreign policy come together’. Harriman undoubtedly reflected Acheson’s thinking when he told Franks that the Korean incident warranted British and European rearmament. The Secretary of State, after attending a Cabinet meeting on 14 July, recorded a general agreement that there was no evidence to suggest that ‘the Soviet Union will not take any or all of the actions’ open to them, namely military action ranging from local aggression to all-out general war. The situation was, he believed, one of ‘gravest danger’. In view of the poor American showing in Korea, the mood in Europe during the three weeks since the outbreak of the war had changed from ‘one of elation that the United States had come into the Korean crisis to petrified fright’. Acheson found this surprising, which is surprising in itself. The Europeans had been told, after all, that if the Communists were not stopped in Korea, all would be lost. The CIA echoed this assessment: While the early reaction of Western Europe was to give enthusiastic approval to the US intervention in Korea, the Western European nations are unlikely to take resolute action to meet the challenge implicit in the ‘limited war’ phase of world power conflict unless US military power can be mobilized and deployed in strength that is plainly sufficient to constitute at least a substantial deterrent to further Soviet or Sovietsponsored military aggression.

According to the CIA, then, unless there was to be a speedy victory in Korea (which seemed to be unlikely), the only way to put some backbone into the wavering Europeans and persuade them to increase arms production was to significantly increase American armaments. The President agreed. Acheson accordingly assured the French ambassador that the United States intended pushing ahead ‘energetically and rapidly’ with the rearmament of the 33

Korean Conflict.indb 33

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Atlantic Pact nations. On 21 July, the President met with Acheson, Harriman and Louis Johnson, the Secretary for Defence, and decided to send Charles Spofford to Europe ‘to try and get the European members of NAT to make a very greatly increased military effort’. Like Harriman, The Economist believed the Korean War could be turned to the advantage of the West, since it might ‘turn the policy of containment from a diplomatist’s blueprint into cold military reality’. Certainly the American response in Korea, and Truman’s decision to increase defence expenditure by $10 thousand million, had finally removed doubts about ‘whether the United States really would come to the assistance of any victim of aggression’. When all was said and done, Korea was a sideshow: There may be other aggressions on the borders of China – or, indeed, in the Middle East. But the place where the issue will be determined … is in Europe. It is here that the two systems lie close together and where mortal blows can be exchanged. It is here that no space can be sold even for precious time. So long as there is any risk of a rapid Russian occupation of the western continent, western diplomacy is hampered from one end of the world to another.’

If such comments are any guide, then Acheson’s judgement that the American example would inspire or goad Europe was not without foundation. So far as The Economist was concerned, America’s increased spending on defence should serve as a model for the British community and the Commonwealth, even if this meant fewer ‘new cars, refrigerators, television sets and household fittings’. By the third week of July, less than a month after the Korean hostilities had begun, British Ministers were considering an increased defence programme and were already revealing a susceptibility to American pressure. In a minute to Attlee commenting on defence proposals from Shinwell, Bevin said that the political situation demanded a more definite statement ‘without any surrounding vagueness’. Above all, he feared comparisons with the announced US defence programme. The Foreign Secretary could see in the Defence Ministry’s plans no indication of the size and shape of the forces 34

Korean Conflict.indb 34

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

envisaged, little notion of the way in which the scheme was to be coordinated for collective defence, nor any estimation of the date by which Britain was to have achieved preparedness. The Defence Department had obviously been caught unawares by the rush of events. Bevin suggested that for the moment a sum of at least £880 million should be announced as the amount to be spent in the following year ‘in order to avoid the risk of political trouble here and the accusation that we are dragging our feet’. On 25 July, the Cabinet discussed Shinwell’s proposals – an additional £30 million for the current fiscal year and £980 million for 1951–52 – and agreed that a further £100 million should be authorised at once so that the forces might ‘be in a better position to face any emergency that might develop in the near future’. But, as was no doubt expected, the £980 million for 1951–52 encountered resistance. ‘Defence expenditure at that level’, it was pointed out, ‘would … absorb all the benefits of the estimated increase in industrial productivity, and would force the Government to choose between a lower standard of living or longer dependence on United States aid.’ It was almost as if the Americans had commissioned the Korean War, for as we have seen, the ‘guns or butter’ dilemma was precisely what they had hoped would be forced upon the British. However, the moment had not quite arrived in all its fullness. Cabinet decided to postpone a decision on the £980 million sum until the 1951–52 estimates came up for consideration. The government, although refusing Churchill’s request for a Secret Session, brought on a defence debate on 26 July before the House rose for the summer recess. Shinwell left the Chamber in no doubt that he considered the Soviet threat to Europe to be great and immediate. Russia possessed 175 active divisions, one-third of them mechanised, 25,000 tanks, 19,000 military aircraft, and nearly three million men under arms. So far as Britain’s forces were concerned, the Minister admitted they fell ‘a long way short of requirements even on the most conservative basis’, and, as Bevin had informed Attlee, planning for the manner of their participation in a NATO force had a long way to go before completion. The £780 million to be expended in the current financial year, Shinwell further confessed, was a heavy and indeed tragic burden. However, Korea had brought home to the country the dangers to which it was exposed: 35

Korean Conflict.indb 35

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In the present situation it is only deeds that count. The President of the United States, in his recent message to Congress, has told the American people of the scale on which they must take action as part of a combined effort by the free nations of the world … even if it involved diverting additional economic resources to defence purposes. We too, in spite of all the difficulties of the economic position, must be prepared to respond to the needs of the situation. In this and subsequent years we must be prepared to make such sacrifices as are required to enable us to protect the way of life that we have developed, and which we cherish above all else.

Shinwell was not asked to, and did not, explain how the unproven Soviet instigation of the North Korean attack had become the harbinger of World War III. Attlee’s contribution to the debate was confined to underlining the grim message conveyed by the Minister of Defence. With characteristic candour and brevity, the Prime Minister warned that the ‘easier times’ about to be enjoyed by the British people must be postponed, and it was of little use hoping that the increased spending on arms could be absorbed by increased productivity. On the second day of the debate Churchill made a contribution which, in Harold Nicolson’s estimation, reduced the state of public opinion to one of ‘paralysed shock’. Shortly afterwards Hugh Dalton too noted in his diary that the ‘war in Korea has begun to upset people’ and that ‘fear of a Third World War is becoming very real and widespread’. It seems that only the later Cuban missile crisis of 1962 provoked a scare of similar proportions. In fact Churchill produced no new figures, but by placing those given by Shinwell in the context of 1939–45, he further darkened the ominous picture painted by the government. Against the Russians’ 175 divisions (or 80 in immediate battle readiness), NATO possessed a total of 12, including two American divisions; the Soviets outnumbered Britain in aircraft ‘by a far larger number of machines than Hitler ever had’; and, similarly, the Soviet U-boat menace in war ‘would be far more severe than were the German U-boat attacks of 1939 and 1940’. In short, Churchill stated, with perhaps some exaggeration, ‘the preparations of the Western Union to 36

Korean Conflict.indb 36

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

defend itself stand on a far lower level than those of the South Koreans’. Moreover, if Russia could reach the Channel before the arrival of substantial reinforcements from the USA, Britain would be subjected ‘to a bombardment by rocket-propelled and guided missiles … incomparably more severe than anything we have endured or imagined’. Evoking the summer of 1940 again, he concluded by warning that in 1950 and 1951 the nation faced as great a danger as it had ten years earlier. Yet conviction of the danger remained far from universal in official and other quarters. Franks reported from Washington that, despite the ‘uncom­ fortably plausible fears’ of Mr Churchill, most informed American observers did not expect the Soviets to launch a global war. Indeed, only a day or two before the debate Franks and Lord Tedder had reiterated a contention made by British intelligence that ‘1955 onward was the period when the Soviet Union would be most likely to take serious risks of provoking a major war’. The American representatives at the meeting, General Bradley and Jessup, emphatically disagreed, in keeping with the United States’ view. However, information reaching them, or certainly the CIA, suggested that the sanguine British prediction – the one for private consumption – was not without support. From France, for example, came the opinion of the head of political intelligence that the likelihood of Soviet aggression in Europe could be discounted, at least for the time being, since the Kremlin was intent merely on harrying the West through the incitement of colonial insurrection and disturbances. As ever, the New Statesman was willing to say that the emperor had no clothes, particularly if the emperor happened to be American. In a leader of 29 July it was pointed out that no evidence existed for the view that the Soviets intended widening the Korean conflict either in Asia or elsewhere. It was doubly unfortunate that the additional sum to be spent on armaments signalled the cancellation of the hoped-for improvements in living standards and the social services. The Economist, quick to remind its readers of the near parity of US and British defence expenditure (the US at 10 per cent of national income and the UK at a little over 9 per cent), observed that it was wrong to talk of a return to a war economy, for Britain had never fully emerged from the economy of World War II. Alas, the British people had 37

Korean Conflict.indb 37

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

no choice but to ‘devote less to their private consumption or to Government activities of a non-defence character’. At the end of July – ‘out of the blue’, according to Hugh Gaitskell – the Americans asked the government what precisely they were going to do about increasing the defence programme and how much could be achieved without US assistance. Pointing out to Cabinet, not unreasonably, that the government had already committed an additional £30 million for the current year and £70 million for 1951–52, as well as £130 million for civil defence, Cripps proposed asking the Americans for £550 million. This sum was needed to bridge the gap between the £2,850 million that could be raised by the government in the following two years and the £3,400 million thought to be required for adequate rearmament. Cripps also insisted that the aid should be given in free dollars so that purchases could be made in any part of the world. In the course of a discussion on 1 August Nye Bevan immediately expressed his ‘grave misgivings’. In the first place, he argued, the United States – and therefore Britain – seemed to have abandoned the policy of countering Russian imperialism by means of economic aid and social improvement, in favour of an ill-advised policy of military spending. Britain might be able to sustain the additional expenditure, but in France and other European countries the effort could well reduce living standards to such a point that their ability to resist domestic Communist movements would be seriously prejudiced. Closer to home, the effect of rearmament would be to make life difficult for those Ministers responsible for the social services. Indeed, the only course of action open to them would be to decide which of their programmes should suffer first or most. In effect contradicting Attlee’s statement in the House during the defence debate, Bevan asked why the expected increase in productivity could not pay for the additional defence requirements and for the maintenance of capital investment and the social services. He received the dusty reply that improved productivity had already been taken into account in providing for the social services, and that in any event there was no question of a reduction in these services, but rather a proposal for a reduction in the rate of increase. Bevan lost the first round, as he was to lose the succeeding ones. Apparently unwilling to argue on his grounds, the majority of Ministers 38

Korean Conflict.indb 38

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

expressed anxiety lest the defence proposals appeared insufficient ‘on both sides of the Atlantic’ to meet the dangers of the international situation. While insisting that as a percentage of national income Britain’s expenditure would compare favourably with that of the United States, Ministers felt that public opinion demanded that a policy of accelerated arms expenditure should be firmly articulated. In this they were right. A Gallup poll published in August, shortly after the programme was announced, showed a 78 per cent approval rating for the new policy. Cabinet was also persuaded to extend the period of national service from 18 months to two years. The Chiefs of Staff had warned that the experience of scraping together a brigade group for service in Korea had demonstrated the parlous state of the Army, and it was agreed that the defence of Western Europe had reached a ‘critical stage at which decisive action had to be taken’. Applying an arcane formula, the British and American governments were constantly apt to regard the danger to Europe as directly proportional to the degree to which the United Nations was failing to achieve its purpose in Korea. So it was that in late July and August, when the American forces had only a perilous toehold on the peninsula, the British Cabinet made its hasty decisions to increase both the defence budget and the number of conscripted servicemen. While these decisions were being taken, a Foreign Office paper of August 1950 considered the implications of the Korean War and adopted a rather less alarmist interpretation of Soviet intentions. True, it was believed that one of the courses open to Russia, following the unexpectedly stiff US response to the North Korean attack, was the concentration of their resources for a world war now considered inevitable by the Kremlin – though not ‘at the present time’. If anything, the Foreign Office seems to have considered the Americans more likely to start global war, since they ‘would not boggle, in their present mood, at resorting to atomic warfare’ should lesser means not prevail against aggression in areas of the world regarded as strategically vital. In its analysis, the Foreign Office paper drew upon a Joint Intelligence Committee report which had been compiled in the spring of 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean conflict. For the foreseeable future, the report had 39

Korean Conflict.indb 39

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

stated, though cleaving to a belief in the inevitability of world communism, the Soviet Union would not risk a military challenge because of the incalculable damage likely to be sustained in atomic warfare. Two exceptions to this forecast were considered possible: first, should the West, and particularly the United States, suffer an economic crisis or fail to rearm quickly, Russia might become bold enough to ignore Western reactions to extensions of Communist control; and, second, if they became convinced that they were to be attacked, the Soviet leaders might decide to strike first. However, given the unpreparedness of both the Soviet economy and its air forces, the report concluded that the little evidence that did exist suggested that Russia would not contemplate ‘provocative action’ until 1955, at the earliest. To what extent, asked the Foreign Office paper, did the Korean incident warrant modification of the Joint Intelligence Committee’s appreciation? The answer was cautiously optimistic and certainly lacked the doomsday reverberations to be found in other official circles in London and Washington. It was also less than adamant about Russia’s complicity in the origins of the war. ‘On the assumption that the Korean operation was launched with Soviet knowledge and approval,’ the Kremlin most likely made the decision expecting to gain an inexpensive victory in a part of the world apparently written off by the United States as strategically unimportant and militarily untenable. In this case, ‘the North Korean attack was originally launched, not, as some have suggested, with the primary object of diverting American attention from Europe, still less as a prelude to provocative action against our weak spots on the European and Middle Eastern periphery, but as a limited operation within the ambit of an overall offensive to expel Western influence from the Far East’. Nonetheless, the paper continued, the Russians had exhibited a disquieting indifference to the risks of heightening world tension. But it could hardly be said – indeed, the Foreign Office carefully avoided saying – that this was an overture for World War III. It was concluded that the Russian leaders might genuinely believe that ‘some influential Americans are planning to push back the Soviet Union within its pre-war frontiers and hope ultimately to destroy the Soviet regime’, but the American superiority in atomic weapons would stay their hand. 40

Korean Conflict.indb 40

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Even allowing for the danger of assuming too readily the limited intentions, rationality or weakness of a potential foe, and accordingly the necessity to act in matters of defence as if the worst will happen (Murphy’s law of international relations), it does seem that by behaving as if war would break out on the morrow, the British Cabinet had neglected the careful reasoning of their professional advisers. This neglect was the result not of stupidity, but of very strong American pressure to rearm. Making the Ministers’ stance even more curious was the continuation by their officials of the line maintained before the Korean War, that Russia was not intent on general war. At a meeting in Paris on 3 August between representatives of Britain, France and the United States, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Southeast Asia M.E. Dening stated that although Korea was a case of the Soviet ‘technique of aggression by proxy’, he believed they would have no compunction in sacrificing North Korea should the adventure miscarry. The Kremlin had undoubtedly been surprised at the reaction of the West, which, together with an unwillingness to close the door to negotiations, suggested they wished above all to avoid total war. Chip Bohlen, the State Department’s authority on Soviet behaviour, observed in response that by nature Stalin ‘is very prudent, and he is not accustomed to launching wars where the odds are not overwhelmingly in his favour’. Indeed, Bohlen might have added that the war against Finland was the only instance of Stalin directly instigating a conflict in some 25 years of power. America’s atomic arm, Bohlen reminded the meeting, currently existed as a strong deterrent. Nor did the US ambassador in Moscow believe that war was imminent: Despite the Korean conflict, [a] plethora of subsequent rumors and an obvious increase in intensity of the war of nerves, none of the developments since April of this year seems to us to alter the Embassy’s basic opinion that, although they are prepared to assume grave risks in pursuit of their objectives, the Soviet leaders do not desire to engage themselves in global conflict in the near future.

What evidence did Kirk adduce? Though hardly constituting firm evidence, ‘nothing discernible’ in Moscow had come to the ambassador’s attention 41

Korean Conflict.indb 41

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

which revealed a bellicose intention; rather, he had noticed that domestic propaganda continued to stress the defensive character of Soviet armed strength, which seemed to be confirmed by what was known by the Embassy of the dispositions of the country’s forces. Public opinion had not been whipped up into an offensive mood – ‘which even a dictatorship such as this must consider essential’ preparatory to war – while the anger over Korea had been allowed to subside and was channelled into harder work for defence. Interestingly, the ambassador, like the Foreign Office, thought – for ‘good reason’ – that the Korean adventure had its origins in a Soviet conviction, that no military counteraction would be taken by the West, and therefore that little risk attended the enterprise. The fact is, however, that the American administration chose to pay little attention to the views of Bohlen and Kirk, in much the same fashion as the British government disregarded their officials’ advice. Accordingly, Washington gave Britain’s defence proposals a frosty reception. Lew Douglas, still preoccupied by London’s reluctance to get their economic priorities right, told Acheson that the defence programme did not go nearly far enough, permeated as it was with a ‘business as usual’ flavour. Worse still, the programme as presented to the United States was in truth a ‘poisonous’ bargaining ploy. The hazardous assumptions on which the proposals had been drawn up were: first, that major war was improbable for several years (though Douglas appears not to have noticed that this was hardly the tenor of the government’s public statements); second, that defence preparations on the scale envisaged would be sufficient to deter aggression; and third, that an emergency would develop gradually, or at least gradually enough to allow for the necessary transformation of the British forces. The reality was that the existing armed strength of Britain was ‘wholly inadequate to meet domestic and foreign requirements and current NATO commitments’. Douglas, like Nye Bevan, believed the programme could be accomplished by the probable annual increase in production. The amount of aid requested was therefore excessive and should be rejected pending American efforts to persuade the British to adopt a more realistic position. Although perhaps not with Britain specifically in mind, Acheson revealed some sympathy for the governments on whom so much pressure was being 42

Korean Conflict.indb 42

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

exerted, though not for reasons that may have counted for much with them. ‘If by our pressure to bring about the maximum rearming of Europe,’ he told his colleagues, ‘we place an undue strain on the economy of these European nations, we subject them to the grave danger of opening the back door to Communist inroads and expansions that might serve to defeat, through political forces, the military ends we are seeking.’ Of course, this had been one of the arguments marshalled by Bevan against heavy defence expenditure. Gloomier still, in respect of the general European outlook, was the CIA’s mid-August assessment: On the whole, continental Western Europe still appears to be anxiously awaiting the outcome of military operations in Korea, which they fear to be doomed … There are increasing fears that the US cannot prevent and perhaps cannot even substantially delay the use of military force by the USSR despite official efforts to accelerate mutual defense preparations, a sense of defeatism probably will be widespread and will lead to dissatisfaction with the form and amount of US assistance. These attitudes spring from an enforced abandonment of wishful thinking. The nations of Western Europe have been relying largely on a US atomic monopoly … to protect them against Soviet aggression, despite the realization that the USSR’s military preparations were resulting in everincreasing strength. Now, while there is growing awareness of the need for a strong military force-in-being in Western Europe, the accompanying sense of helplessness may undermine NAT efforts.

The ‘comparatively modest’ rearmament proposal – which the British claimed to be the utmost possible without converting to a wartime economy – stemmed, said the CIA, from the twin conviction that economic recovery was the first priority and that British workers should not continue to endure reduced living standards. Accordingly, Britain preferred that the cost of rearmament should be borne ‘by the vastly superior resources of the United States’. Meanwhile, Franks’ anglophobes, evidently unaware of the United States’ offer of assistance towards the defence programme, had pounced on 43

Korean Conflict.indb 43

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Britain’s request for aid, and, more disturbingly, press reports of impatience in official circles appeared to Franks to have substance. For their part, the British were by no means convinced that their rearmament plans would fully entice the United States into the defence of Europe. This was made explicit late in August when Franks told Acheson that the Prime Minister wished to visit the United States in order to hold discussions with the President. Prompted by Franks, who said, perhaps a touch disloyally, that he ‘didn’t think the suggestion made very much sense’, Acheson’s response was distinctly cool. When he asked the ambassador what Attlee could possibly wish to discuss, Sir Oliver replied that he ‘would be interested in the extent to which the US expected to really play a role in the defense of Europe and the fact that it would be something of a breach of tradition to station large numbers of troops on the Continent’. The Prime Minister would also, suggested Franks, want to be reassured as to the untruthfulness of rumours concerning America’s intention to treat Britain as just another European power, and to break up the Commonwealth. That there existed a certain degree of testiness on both sides was demonstrated by Charles Spofford’s visit to Europe. Designed to ginger up the Europeans and their defence measures, it occasioned sufficient irritation among the British for Acheson to forcefully remind Franks that those in London who thought Spofford’s position did not reflect official US thinking were wrong. ‘The views which Mr Spofford was expressing concerning the American attitude toward the British defense effort,’ he insisted, ‘represented accurately his feeling and the feeling of his Government.’ He added that misunderstanding might have arisen as a result of the President’s public expression of appreciation for Britain’s effort, whereas the truth was that this effort was judged to be inadequate. *

*

*

However, support for the defence programme was to be found in one quarter: the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party. In a remarkable document, drafted by the International Sub-Committee of the NEC for the 1950 party conference, the government’s decision to rearm was elevated almost to the status of an act of selfless universal socialism. With a whiff of 44

Korean Conflict.indb 44

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Churchill’s ‘summer of 1940’, the NEC warned, not without relish, that a quarter of a million men and women would have to change over from civil to defence production, that some goods would disappear from the shops, and that there would be a general tightening of belts. In short, ‘sacrifice now will prevent far greater sacrifice in the future’. Significantly, the NEC made no allusion to the doctrine of equality of sacrifice, which had been central to a wholehearted community effort during World War II. Who was to blame for this state of affairs? The answer was worthy of the simplest-minded cold war propagandist: These new burdens have one cause alone – the policy of the Soviet Government. Even now Russia is spending thirteen per cent of her national income on her armed forces. She has 175 divisions ready to march. Her people are taught to glorify the arts of war. The Kremlin makes no secret of its aim. It wants to enslave the whole world to its machine of tyranny. Since Hitler’s downfall, it has pushed onwards wherever weakness or unrest opened the way. Half of Europe has been sucked into its Empire. It has organised Communist fifth columns all over the world.

Hitler and Nazism, the reader was invited to conclude, had been replaced by Stalin and communism. The invitation was made the more alluring by references to the hard lessons of the 1930s, the ‘suicidal stupidity of appeasement’, and the necessity to ‘teach the dictators that aggression does not pay’. This bogeyman stuff, treating the rank and file of the party and the general public as fools in need of a good fright, was produced by senior Labour members of parliament and party officials, presumably in the full knowledge that at least some members of the government and the Foreign Office were subjecting the problem of the USSR to sophisticated historical and political analysis. The perennial justification for increased arms production – ‘We are strengthening our defences to preserve the peace’ – was succeeded by a peroration which contrived to associate the government’s policy with the ‘great traditions’ of socialism: 45

Korean Conflict.indb 45

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Bullets cannot kill ideas. We must remove the misery and injustice in which ordinary men turn to dictators. We must end the exploitation of man by man, of nation by nation. We must achieve social justice within the state. We must liquidate the remnants of nineteenth-century imperialism. We must raise living standards throughout the world. Such action is no less essential for the defence of freedom than the force of arms.

As a device to garner public support for rearmament, such an appeal to milk-and-water ideals of socialist brotherhood was superfluous. Shortly after Attlee’s announcement of the programme a Gallup poll found that, in addition to widespread approval for increased spending on arms, there was agreement by 61 per cent to 23 per cent with the proposition that the needs of defence warranted cuts in the standard of living. American displeasure at the inadequacy of the programme made itself known not only in the person of Spofford but also in an unwillingness to make good the promise of aid. Bevin confessed to Cabinet on 4 September that he was disturbed about the uncertainty thus created, and was at a loss to know what he should say to Parliament the following week. He had accordingly sent a personal message to Acheson asking for ‘at least a moral commitment’ to supply the £550 million requested. In these circumstances it was decidedly Oliver Twistish that someone in Cabinet should suggest that the government ask for more than this sum, on the grounds that the original intended outlay of £3,400 million for the three-year period had blown out to £3,600 million as the result of a subsequent decision to increase service pay. At the same meeting Bevin touched on the question of West German rearmament – an issue which, for all its fearsomely difficult implications, the Americans were bent on making part and parcel of European defence. Indeed, no issue illustrates more starkly the contortions that the Korean War forced upon settled British policy. As recently as March 1950, during a debate in the Commons, the Foreign Secretary had stated his unequivocal opposition to the arming of Germany. He remarked that even his socialist colleagues in Germany remained ‘a little too nationalist’ for comfort. 46

Korean Conflict.indb 46

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

Responding to a statement made by Churchill, he alluded to the extreme sensitivity of the French to the question: As I understood Mr Churchill, the situation he had in mind was something like this: ‘We should get Germany and France to come together, but we should now begin discussing the arming of Germany’. I can only suggest that if I went to Strasbourg or Paris with that proposal, the bringing of Germany and France together would be set back for a long time. I must say to Mr Churchill that we have set our face – the United States, France, and ourselves – against the rearming of Germany. To that we must adhere … If we want to bring France and Germany together, this attitude of talking about rearming Germany is going to set the clock back for a considerable time.

Now, six months later, Bevin began to cautiously accept the necessity of rearming a people whose character, he had reminded the House in March, was unchanged. Lew Douglas had informed him that the United States favoured a contingent from Western Germany as part of an integrated European defence force. Bevin had replied to the ambassador that, in view of the susceptibilities of the French, such a contingent should be a ‘gendarmerie’ of no more than 100,000 men. Even at this early stage of negotiations bargaining positions were being adopted. Bevin was willing to discuss the matter at the forthcoming tripartite meeting in New York and at the North Atlantic Council ‘on condition that the United States Government had first given some more definite assurance about the extent of financial assistance’ towards defence expenditure. The Americans implicitly made it known that increased US forces in Europe, without which the continent could not be defended, were conditional on acceptance of an armed German presence in NATO. After arriving in New York for the talks, Bevin despatched cables to Attlee stating that in the course of discussions with Acheson and Schuman, the former had made it abundantly plain that the stationing of American troops in Europe was dependent on the creation of a sufficient number of forces to make the whole enterprise successful, and, in turn, success could 47

Korean Conflict.indb 47

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

not be achieved without armed German participation. A hint in the mouth of Lew Douglas had very quickly become firm United States policy. As Franks recalled in 1964: The decision to rearm Germany was obviously taken against the background of uncertainty whether the Soviets intended to let the war in Korea be the prelude to general hostilities … This left no doubt in anyone’s mind that German rearmament was an absolute necessity. German rearmament was one of the few occasions when the United States Government reached a decision and felt that it had to make it prevail.

In the circumstances, the Cabinet thought it wise to ask the Foreign Secretary to play for time and certainly not to commit Britain to accede, even in principle, to any proposal that went beyond the gendarmerie scheme discussed by Ministers on 4 September. In addition to nervousness about the possible Soviet reaction, ‘at a time when Western defence was still very weak’, the Cabinet was by no means sure that German support for rearmament existed. No doubt they had in mind an alarming report from Ivone Kirkpatrick, the British high commissioner, that from Dr Adenauer downwards morale was low and defeatism rampant in Germany. It was Acheson’s belief, as related to the President, that Bevin really agreed with the American position but ‘had been put under wraps’ by the government, which possessed ‘a pathological fear of Churchill and does not say anything for fear it will leak to the American press’ and be used by Churchill in the House. As for Schuman, he also dared not say anything publicly, and took refuge in the obvious ploy that German participation could not be considered until the NATO forces had been fully formed. Acheson grumbled to Truman that the French and the British were prepared to accept everything offered by the United States, including the historically unprecedented placing of troops in peacetime Europe, but would offer nothing in return, flatly refusing to budge on Germany. On a second consecutive day of discussion devoted to German rearmament, the Cabinet produced a classic piece of bureaucratese: ‘Little difficulty was seen in reaching in present circumstances an 48

Korean Conflict.indb 48

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

agreement in principle that at some future time, under conditions which had still to be worked out, German units should be included in a Western European force.’ This, as Ministers must have known, was unlikely to satisfy Washington, in which case aid for the defence programme might not be forthcoming. They complained among themselves that ‘[t]o some extent the United States Government appeared to be endeavouring once more to commit this country to firm commitments without a clear indication of the extent of the commitments which the United States was prepared to undertake. Not only was the financial position still unsettled, but it was not clear to what extent the United States was in fact prepared to participate in the land defence of Western Europe.’ Thus the government, already tired and relentlessly badgered by the United States, as Julius Holmes had pointed out earlier in the year, had to contend with the awful possibility that the Americans might not be willing to come to the defence of Europe after all. By early October this possibility had forced Bevin to modify his obstructiveness, as no doubt Washington had intended by appearing to be ready to return to isolationism. In a Cabinet paper of 6 October, after returning from the tripartite and Atlantic Council talks, the Foreign Secretary told his colleagues that he had reluctantly agreed in principle to the formation of German units to be integrated into the larger NATO force, but not before the latter had reached a position of strength – only thus could Europe be defended without a revival of German militarism. Acheson had been quite open in threatening to withhold an American contribution to the integrated force should his demand for German units fail to be met. The threat had been uttered when, after a week of furious negotiation, Schuman had still refused to give in. These meetings did at least serve to extract from Bevin a rarely proffered, if rather patronising, compliment. The United States in their readiness to consider defending Europe were, he said, ‘acquiring the wisdom as well as the might of a Great Power’. Speaking to his memorandum in Cabinet on 9 October, Bevin gave every sign of having capitulated unconditionally to Washington, and of wishing to blame the French for obstructing progress: it would be a tragedy if the 49

Korean Conflict.indb 49

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Americans were to withdraw their offer to defend Europe because of French reluctance to accept German rearmament. Accordingly, he advised the application of ‘further pressure’ on Paris. *

*

*

The American press might talk of the British as ‘beggars with gold in their purses’, but, as a paper written by the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor towards the end of October showed, the burdens of rearmament were causing genuine agitation to the government. Moreover, the paper hinted that these burdens were not entirely necessary, for they had been imposed on the country by ‘the aggression in Korea and the reaction to it of the United States’. The British, having cried wolf too lustily, were now obliged to discharge the financial consequences. Before the outbreak of the conflict the picture, according to the joint paper, had been almost rosy: The internal position was healthy; we had full employment but suffered from neither inflation nor deflation. There was a steady and rapid increase in production and productivity. The external position was developing satisfactorily. The sterling area as a whole was earning a dollar surplus and the gold reserves were increasing rapidly. The United Kingdom was also in surplus on its current balance of payments … In short, we were, provided the current trends continued, within sight of the objective we had set ourselves at the beginning of the European Recovery Programme – independence of external assistance and a level of reserves at least equal to that which obtained when the European Recovery Programme started.

Less than a month after the outbreak of the Far Eastern hostilities, the paper continued, the situation had altered radically, owing to the necessity for rearmament. The abandonment of the goal of economic independence which this threatened to bring about was not, the authors implied, a matter of mere amour propre. It imperilled the country’s ability to sustain the worldwide commitments of a Great Power, and, more than this, it would lose Britain the position, which it had just regained, as ‘the principal partner 50

Korean Conflict.indb 50

04/09/2015 11:40

A H A L F WAY H O U S E

in world affairs of the United States’. Not only might the country be thrust back into the European queue, with treatment ‘as just another necessitous European nation’, but the task of holding the Commonwealth together would be made much more difficult (it was not stated whether this might be against the depredations of America). It therefore seemed the lesser of two evils to avoid asking the United States for aid. Economic independence was simply too important. In accordance with this imperative, the paper recommended that the government should not pursue the requested £550 million – especially as a derisory £28 million had been offered by Washington in its stead. More ‘tolerable for our economy’ would be co-operation in the so-called Nitze plan, which it was hoped would achieve a fair distribution of the collective burden between the NATO powers. During discussion of this paper in Cabinet on 9 November, someone asked how it was that the country could avoid inflation and drastic reductions in social expenditure now that the £550 million from the United States was not to be pursued. This question appears not to have been answered. Shinwell, having just returned from a NATO Defence Committee meeting in Washington, added to the gloom by revealing the thoroughly unsatisfactory state of European defence arrangements. No agreements had been reached on the appointment of a commander-in-chief for Western Europe, the integration of the Western Union and NATO, nor on the size of America’s military and financial assistance. The ‘real obstacle’, however, was the objection of the French government to German rearmament, which, Shinwell might have added, René Pleven, the French Minister of Defence, had obfuscated with a complicated plan whereby German units, no greater than a battalion in strength, would be merged into the European force and Germany denied effective control of them. However, with the advent of full-scale Chinese intervention in Korea in the last week of November the British government hastily swallowed their misgivings about the cost of rearmament. Public and official opinion, especially in the United States, were persuaded that World War III had all but commenced. By December 1950 the cost of the British programme had mushroomed to a colossal £4,700 million. This is attributable not only to the panic engendered by the dangerous turn of events in Korea; it was also 51

Korean Conflict.indb 51

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

part of the price Attlee paid for allowing himself to believe that during his visit to Washington in December he had returned the hysterical and bellicose Americans to their senses. However, the situation in which the British found themselves was in no small measure of their own doing. The reckless and disastrous crossing of the 38th parallel by UN forces in October, which directly provoked the Chinese intervention, had – against the advice of the Chiefs of Staff – been encouraged, sanctioned and rationalised by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

52

Korean Conflict.indb 52

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER TWO

Recognising Communist China

D

ifferences in expectations of Communist China brought about a profound divergence of policy between Britain and the United States, both before and after the onset of the Korean War, which formed the most severe breach in relations between the two countries since World War II. The benign attitude of the British derived from frankly acknowledged self-interest and a conviction – entertained timidly but never embraced by America – that China would eventually disengage itself from the ideological and strategic embrace of the Kremlin. Exacerbating its irritant value for the Americans was the impression conveyed by the British that the conviction was vouchsafed to them by long diplomatic experience. For their part the United States, led by a beleaguered Acheson and a President fundamentally hostile to Mao’s China, disparaged British policy as a naive and dangerous acceptance of the Communists as agrarian reformers who professed Marxism–Leninism only as a temporary creed. Mao would prove to be an Asian Tito, shortly to lead his people away from a Soviet Union intent on exploiting Chinese. However, it is clear from the evidence that in the period of Mao’s victory and consolidation of power the British entertained no such fond hopes, at least not in the short term. In fact, Mao and his followers were admitted by the British to be convinced Marxists–Leninists, antipathetic to the West and all its works, so, although Chinese xenophobia and traditional suspicion of Russia might eventually prevail, in the foreseeable future there was little possibility of Mao divorcing himself from Moscow. Diplomatic recognition might ‘keep a foot in the door’, as the policy was termed, but such international civilities were not expected to bring immediate gain. Indeed, after recognition Britain steeled itself for taunts 53

Korean Conflict.indb 53

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

and humiliations at the hands of the Chinese, of a kind that would have been utterly unacceptable to the more easily wounded Americans. Aware as they were that for domestic political reasons Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, could not appear to regard the final defeat of Chiang Kai-shek on mainland China as anything but a disaster, the British nonetheless deplored the sheer unpredictability of America’s China and Far Eastern policy generally. Like General MacArthur, they often doubted if Washington had any policy at all. Would the United States support Britain if China attacked Hong Kong? Would the Americans see sense and recognise the Communist government, allowing Britain to extricate its foot from the door? Would they lend support, or at least not oppose the seating of Peking in the United Nations? What of Formosa, long since promised to the legitimate government but now held by the Nationalists? Would the Americans persist in statements and actions whose effect was to drive China still further into the arms of Moscow? With so many questions unanswered, the British could not formulate their own policy with assurance. They could not count on any certainties in the Far East and Southeast Asia, where they had so recently struggled against Japan and were still struggling in Malaya to retain influence and power. The feeble, not to say febrile, nature of American policy would not have mattered so much if it had not been for the sheer wealth, size and strength of the United States – attributes that were obviously to be exploited, but in what manner and for what purposes no one knew. Perfunctory declarations of an intention to bring lasting peace and prosperity in the Pacific region were no guide. Early in 1949 the British government, seeking to clarify its own policies in the Far East and Southeast Asia, sent the newly appointed permanent head of the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, on an extensive two-month journey of the region – or, as he called it, ‘the sea-girt periphery … which skirts the Heartland of Europe and Asia’. His immediate predecessor, Sir Orme Sargent, dismissed this ‘flying trip to the East in order to become an expert in a month … as dangerous in diplomacy’, believing that ‘[t]here is no profession in which a little learning is so dangerous’. For all that, the impressions derived by Strang from his journey reveal the drift of official 54

Korean Conflict.indb 54

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

thinking, particularly concerning China, and were seen as sufficiently important to be worked up into a Cabinet memorandum. Taking as a given that the object of British policy was to maintain control of the periphery, ‘denying it to communism, and, if possible, defending it against military attack’, Strang was at pains to point out that Britain had ‘a part to play in this area which can be played by no other Power’. His reasons for this assertion amount to a pantheon of the post-colonial virtues: [T]he maintenance of our good name, political influence and economic interests thanks to the example set to the world by the British people in their efforts towards recovery; to our act of policy in India; to our policy of non-intervention and watchful waiting in China; to the zeal, demeanour and resource of representatives, whether of the Foreign, Colonial, Commonwealth or Armed Services … and to the integrity, experience, enterprise and flexibility of reactions to new conditions shown by our business communities; the growth of a team spirit among them, and of a confidence between them and the official side.

The sagacity of Britain’s wait-and-see policy towards China had been confirmed in Strang’s mind by conversations with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Governor of Hong Kong, the British ambassador at Shanghai, Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, the Indian ambassador at Peking and General MacArthur. Nehru, whose views about China were to become increasingly important both to Britain and the United States, told Strang that though Marxism had an intellectual attraction for him, its results in Russia ‘must in the long run be evil because the means are evil’. Communism would ‘in whatever country it might appear’ – including, presumably, China – ‘be overlaid and transformed by the national character’. India’s ambassador to Peking, K.M. Panikkar, who came to be of central importance as a go-between during the Korean War, expressed views similar to those of his Prime Minister and commended the British policy of ‘non-intervention and watchful waiting’ as being very wise. China was experiencing a Marxist revolution, but not along Russian lines: 55

Korean Conflict.indb 55

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

First, Russia had a land-locked economy, while China looks to the sea and … has intimate contact with the great Chinese communities overseas. Secondly, the Soviet revolution had been based on the urban proletariat and the leaders had seized the State machine and imposed the regime from above; in China, on the other hand, the revolution was based on peasants’ councils, and would establish itself from below. Thirdly, there had been a State bureaucracy in Czarist Russia, not a very good one, but it did govern the whole country, and the machine was at the disposal of the revolutionaries; there was no such machine in China to facilitate the assumption of power throughout the country.

In Shanghai Sir Roger Stephenson, though unsure how the Communists would behave towards foreign business interests, said that the Kuomintang ‘had behaved scandalously in this respect’, and he seems to have been almost relieved to inform Strang that they were ‘finished’. Stalin was playing an odd game and it was by no means clear ‘that the Soviet Government wanted Mao Tse-tung to sweep the country’. The Governor of Hong Kong was also cautious rather than alarmist in his estimation of the situation: ‘As to the future, he thought a generally held view was that the Communists would, in the initial stages at least, act with moderation … Most people who knew China were reluctant to believe that the Chinese people would be communised on the Russian model.’ Moving on to Tokyo, Strang was granted an audience with General MacArthur. ‘Like most great public men’, he wrote, ‘General MacArthur has a strong sense of the theatre, and he has it in supreme degree. He is also an indefatigable and unsparing talker.’ It seems tolerably plain that MacArthur was simply un-English in bearing and utterance. This, together with the astonishingly free rein granted him by his civilian masters, made his actions during the Korean War, when he seemed to have it in his power to drag Britain into a world conflict, unfathomable and unpredictable. The British, it is true, had their Monty, another soldier of theatrical bent, but he could be categorised as a talented, and boastful eccentric, rather than simply being gazed at in troubled, uncomprehending awe. For the moment, however, MacArthur was one of the few Americans with power who had 56

Korean Conflict.indb 56

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

given considerable thought to the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. From him, Sir William gained only confirmation of the British anxiety that in this region, where great things were stirring, American policies were largely absent. ‘The United States Government’, complained the General, ‘had not framed theirs and were improvising from day to day’, though he did think that ‘developments in China and increasing demands on United States resources, economic and military, throughout the world might now bring the United States Government to take stock and establish priorities on a world-wide scale.’ As Strang’s tour had demonstrated, India was of great importance in the formulation of British policy in the Far East and Asia generally, almost as a filter through which British thinking had to pass before it could be judged morally and practically acceptable. India asserted, and was acknowledged by London as possessing, the moral (one might say spiritual) leadership of Asia – a position, whether or not it was conceded by the other Asian nations, from which it made influential pronouncements on all matters touching on colonialism, independence and the rights of Asians to chart their own destinies free from dictation by the West or by the Kremlin. It also claimed the leadership of the non-aligned movement, and to the extent that this conferred, or was believed by others to confer, an impartial, disinterested but essentially just view of international relations, India was listened to in the councils of nations. Vigorously anti-Communist at home, Nehru nevertheless frequently warned London and Washington not to make the mistake of assuming that Communist leaders of the independence movements of Asia, especially those of China and Indochina, were Marxists first and patriots second. Britain attended to what India had to say because to do so was simultaneously to proclaim the wisdom and magnanimity of the grant of independence in 1947, and implicitly to tell the world that they had created a stable, democratic and praiseworthy state of the second most populous nation on earth. India was therefore regarded as a bridge between East and West, between the technologically advanced and less advanced regions. All of this made India a central, indeed an indispensable, member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. If this organisation was to be a useful body as 57

Korean Conflict.indb 57

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

well as a post-colonial symbol of lasting British influence and power, India was necessary to impart legitimacy to it and must perforce be consulted and wooed. New Delhi had become as important a capital as Moscow and Washington. Of course, it should not be forgotten that for their part Indian leaders such as Nehru and Krishna Menon – English educated and, in many ways, English in outlook – possessed an enormous fund of goodwill towards the British, who in turn felt pride and affection for India and Indians. Thus the predisposition to consult one with the other and to consider each other’s interests and sensitivities was not entirely the result of realpolitik, nor, on the part of Britain, the result of a sense of noblesse oblige. Accordingly, regarding the recognition of Communist China, the single most important issue for the British in Asia before the outbreak of the Korean War, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office felt obliged to consult India at every step on the way towards eventual de jure recognition in January 1950. However, this was not Krishna Menon’s impression. He recalled his time as high commissioner in London: I went day after day, week after week, to see Ernest Bevin. I had long talks with him on the recognition of China. Each time he would say, ‘tomorrow, tomorrow’, meaning soon. He gave me a date in October and then again in November. These didn’t come off. Ultimately I had to tell him, ‘We cannot wait any longer and we are going to recognize China’ … The only reason for the delay was that we thought that as a Commonwealth country with particular relations with the UK, and with a Labour Government there, we should be patient and act together. I knew that everybody except the Foreign Office was in favour of recognition. Mr Ernest Bevin was not able to stand up to his officials … Also his conservative reactions and antiCommunist feelings might have come into it.

However, if the Cabinet’s wish to take account of Indian opinion is any guide, Menon’s recollection is not quite accurate. In March, Bevin told his Cabinet colleagues of his concern that communism would make Britain’s position in Southeast Asia ‘untenable’ were it to spread into the Indian subcontinent. At the same time he warned against any rejection of a possible de 58

Korean Conflict.indb 58

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

facto recognition of the Communist administration in North China, citing India’s views as worthy of consideration: India takes the view that a Communist-controlled regime would be absorbed by internal problems, which they would handle according to Chinese methods without accepting Russian dictation, that their foreign policy would be in line with Russia’s, that Communists in Southeast Asia would be encouraged by events in China, but would receive no direct help from there, and that the correct course would be to help national movements in Southeast Asia and maintain contacts with the new government in China without any commitments.

By the middle of 1949 the progress of Mao’s forces was such that the British government felt it an urgent matter to pay attention to the vulnerability of Hong Kong. Again, India figured prominently in Cabinet discussions. In any declaration designed to deter the Chinese from an attack on Hong Kong, ‘India’s support, in particular’, it was pointed out, ‘would have a powerful effect on public opinion throughout Asia’, in which case any thought of associating the colonial powers – France and the Netherlands – with such a declaration would have to be ruled out. For similar reasons, the wording of a public statement would require great care: ‘The Government of India were convinced that in Asia Communism was most dangerous when it could ally itself with nationalism; and they would regard it as playing into the hands of the Communists to represent Hong Kong as an outpost of western democracy in the Far East.’ As remembered by Menon, the question of de jure recognition of Communist China was becoming acute by October 1949, and despite the impression of dilatoriness conveyed by Bevin, the Foreign Secretary was anxious to recognise as soon as possible after consultations with the United States and Commonwealth countries. It was, he said in Cabinet, ‘important to ensure that the Indian Government took action at the same time’. In the event, it was not possible to ensure this, since by early December the British had not completed their consultations (chiefly because of difficulties with the Americans), and Cabinet accepted the fact that ‘India would probably 59

Korean Conflict.indb 59

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

accord recognition well before the end of the current month’, noting with evident relief that India ‘would understand our reasons for delaying recognition until a slightly later date’. It is true that Bevin did not relish recognition of the Chinese Communists, but he acted promptly in concert with India when recognition became unavoidable. Bevin came quickly to Nehru’s defence at the Colombo Conference in January 1950 when Percy Spender, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, complained that ‘certain Commonwealth countries’, principally India, had rushed to recognise Peking before full Commonwealth consultations had taken place. ‘I pointed out’, Bevin later told Cabinet, ‘there had been full and continuous consultation with the Commonwealth on the subject for several months past’, and he praised Nehru’s ‘lucid exposition’ of the reasons that had led India to recognise the People’s Government before the other Commonwealth nations. Nehru’s further remarks about China at the conference clearly earned Bevin’s approbation, for he felt they warranted a summary for Cabinet: Pandit Nehru … considered that the Communists had succeeded firstly because of the hostility to what was regarded as foreign interference by the Americans and secondly because they gave at any rate an appearance of liberating the country. In Southeast Asia, too, they might be regarded as a liberating and economic rather than as a military force, and we must do something to counter this. He thought that India’s attitude towards the new China should be to show firmness in anything affecting her security, but otherwise to be cautiously friendly.

The deference paid by Britain to India in all matters Asian was to become even more marked after the outbreak of the Korean War, which, owing to the very different response of the Americans to the role arrogated to itself by India, was to cause yet another fissure in Anglo–American relations. The Americans, whose historical links with India were, of course, utterly different to those of the British, never seem to have reconciled themselves with the presence in Asia of an outspoken, independently minded power – and one, moreover, whose interpretation of events had a disturbing, indeed 60

Korean Conflict.indb 60

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

baffling, tendency to differ from that of the State Department. India’s very closeness to Britain deepened the difficulties between New Delhi and Washington, for India could not simply be ignored. Its policy of nonalignment produced quite genuine puzzlement in the United States at a time when the ‘loss’ of China and fear of monolithic world communism was creating an embattled state of mind among even moderate elements of official and public opinion. Americans no longer felt a curious sentimental, near-romantic attachment to China; rather, they were experiencing all the bitterness of a rejected suitor. In the view of the British, the United States was less than well served by the quality of its representation in the Far East and Southeast Asia. One of the conclusions of a conference of British diplomatic, military and colonial officers in November 1949 was that the US representation in the general region ‘was not on the whole of very high calibre’. The American ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, (according to J.K. Galbraith ‘a stern and vigilant warrior against Communists, idealists and the notion of a Jewish homeland’) was thought by Sir William Strang not to have been a wise choice for a post of such sensitivity: Mr Henderson is taking his duties very seriously and is showing a good deal of public activity, not always of the most adroit. He is much incensed by Indian criticism of the American way of life and of United States policy, more so, I should have thought, than he need be. Though he has given his staff strict instructions not to express or countenance antiBritish sentiments, I think he is rather restive at finding that Indian criticism is so often directed against the United States rather than against the United Kingdom (the same is true of China).

Henderson, to the extent that he did exhibit a certain prickliness towards India, was betraying no more than Acheson’s feelings, which were brought most readily to the surface by the China recognition issue. In a memorandum of discussions with Nehru held in Washington in October 1949, Acheson noted calmly enough the differences between the two countries: Nehru’s ‘general attitude seemed to be that since recognition was doubtless inevitable, 61

Korean Conflict.indb 61

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

there was little purpose in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers’. The United States, countered Acheson, did not ‘believe that any advantage could be gained for this country in according early recognition’, adding quickly ‘that our primary concern here was to indicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the welfare of the Chinese people’. Recalling the encounter 20 years later, Acheson painted an entirely different picture. ‘The great man’, as Acheson sourly called Nehru, was not amused by the Secretary’s welcoming after-dinner speech, and further cooled the atmosphere by talking to Acheson as though he ‘were a public meeting’. The Prime Minister ‘went off on recognition of the Communist regime in China’, which aroused Acheson’s interest since Nehru’s views on the matter ‘obviously stimulated Bevin’s’. Although the two men agreed to disagree, the meeting’s consequences, to judge by Acheson’s reflections on it, were to be unfortunate: It made a deep impression on me. I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship. He was important to India and India’s survival so important to all of us, that if he did not exist – as Voltaire said of God – he would have to be invented. Nevertheless, he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal.

The extent to which this antipathy sprang also from profound differences of policy is difficult to determine, although it seems more than coincidental that the relations between leading American officials and Indian diplomats and politicians were marked by coolness, suspicion and, occasionally, open hostility. During her occupancy of the ambassadorship at Washington, Nehru’s sister, Madame Pandit, fared scarcely better than her compatriots, though she no doubt derived some comfort from Acheson’s assurance to her that ‘the Ambassador’s brother, the Prime Minister of India, had emerged as a world figure of great influence and that we looked to him to assume the leadership in the rehabilitation of India’. Madame Pandit was the recipient of a lecture from the Secretary of State on the unwisdom of recognising Communist China only days before India did so. ‘I considered it an illusion,’ he told her, 62

Korean Conflict.indb 62

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

‘to believe that a government which extended early recognition would gain gratitude or other lasting benefits from its actions.’ Detecting strong ‘analogies between the position of the Chinese Communists today and that of the Russian Communists in 1917’, Acheson warned that no nation could expect the new regime to honour any international commitments from the previous government. When speaking to the Indians, Acheson seems to have forgotten his own sympathetic analysis of Asian opinion on the situation in China, set forth in his White Paper earlier in 1949, an analysis that was almost identical to that of India. As interpreted by the CIA: Political leaders in many Asiatic states, particularly Nehru in India, see the advent of the Communist regime to power as the culmination of an indigenous national revolution of many years duration and welcome it as such. Though these Asiatic political leaders may have misgivings about the Communist government, they consider it to have a comparatively broad popular base and therefore to be qualified to replace the Kuomintang, which not only has been thoroughly discredited as an effective government but also was widely identified with Western intervention, dictatorial political procedure, and special privileges for a landed, commercial and financial minority.

The CIA also noted the importance of Indian opinion to the British, since ‘whether or not they agree with it, [the] British are determined to avoid playing the traditional Western role of dictating the kind of government an Asiatic people should have’. No less a commentator than Walter Lippmann, normally at this time a supporter of Acheson against Republican attacks, was concerned at the drift of American policy in Asia. Returning ‘deeply troubled’ from a tour of Asia in February 1950, he told Admiral Forrest Sherman that not only did the United States appear to be aligning itself with ‘discredited or puppet regimes’, it was also in danger of alienating its friends: My greatest fear now is that we shall lose Nehru and the Indian Congress Party. They are the greatest force left which could align themselves on 63

Korean Conflict.indb 63

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

our side. But we are handling them badly, without sufficient understanding, without diplomatic ingenuity and resourcefulness.

In short, the state of Indian–American relations on the eve of a war that would place a primacy on the closest possible co-operation between the two powers was in considerable disrepair. Much of the confusion, acrimony and, ultimately, disaster attending American policy towards China before and after the outbreak of war in Korea is attributable to Dean Acheson. It is now clear that but for a failure of will caused by domestic political pressure, he could have recognised Mao’s regime early in 1950, thus avoiding a worsening of Sino–American relations and the endangering of a common front with America’s allies. As events unfolded, his powers of decision making in matters relating to China were enfeebled to the point of atrophy. Interviewed in 1964, Sir Oliver Franks said: What Acheson wanted was time to allow his own and American policy towards Red China to develop. He had no clear view of where he wanted to go; he only knew he needed time … He was saying in effect: ‘Here’s a subject on which we ought to go thinking about.’ He was not saying we’ve made up our minds. He did not believe the United States had a policy ready made for the new situation in China.

Franks’ memory was accurate. In the British embassy’s annual review of US events for 1948, it was noted of the American response to the civil war in China that ‘there was little or nothing in the way of a positive plan for dealing with a series of events most unwelcome to the United States’. Critics of the State Department ‘could, and did, rightly say, just as they had in 1947, that it still had no China policy worthy of the name’. Interviewed in 1974, Arthur Ringwalt – formerly the Chief of Chinese Affairs in the State Department and later First Secretary in the London embassy – stated frankly that during the Truman period he was not aware of any China policy: ‘I never did learn. I don’t know yet.’ Within the State Department, however, ‘[i]t was generally agreed that sooner or later the Chinese 64

Korean Conflict.indb 64

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

Communists were going to win, and what was the use of opposing a movement which was almost unopposable … Chiang Kai-shek was dumb, and his methods were not very clever.’ By early January 1950, by which time Acheson had been Secretary of State for one year, Franks continued to bemoan ‘the failure of the administration to adopt a unified policy’ towards China. Understandably, then, in the year preceding their recognition of Communist China, the British government were by turns bemused and frustrated in their desire to co-ordinate policy with the United States. Further, some anxiety was felt for fear that ‘the Americans who have smaller commercial interests in China than the UK … may be tempted to cut their losses at an early stage and to proceed at once to a policy of economic warfare against the Communists’. In August 1949 Bevin told his colleagues frankly of his bewilderment at the twists and turns of the Americans. Although they ‘had never given any clear indication of their policy’, they had to that date at least agreed that British nationals should remain in China and that the two countries should jointly adopt ‘a foot in the door’ approach. Now, however, ‘without any prior warning, the United States policy seemed to have taken a sharp turn in the direction of retreat’. Pointing to the inconsistency of the USA, Bevin observed: While on the one hand the State Department issued a White Paper of some 1,100 pages which sought to justify the past policy of the United States in China and liberally castigated the Nationalist Government of China, on the other they appear to have decided that it is no longer desirable that they should keep a foot in the door, and to be desirous of evacuating their nationals from China as soon as possible.

Bevin confessed that it ‘is difficult to understand what the present trend of American policy denotes’, but the portents were not promising: there is understood to be a school of thought which considers that Communist China should be allowed to relapse into complete chaos, which will encourage the Chinese people to overthrow the Communist 65

Korean Conflict.indb 65

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

regime. This is diametrically opposite to our own view … namely, that if we are not to drive Communist China into the arms of Moscow we must do our utmost to maintain Western contacts.

What could the United Kingdom do? ‘We are faced with the dilemma,’ the Foreign Secretary could hardly avoid saying, ‘that unless we can persuade the United States authorities to agree with us we must either agree to differ and pursue our own policy in China of keeping a foot in the door, or abandon the whole of our interests in China in order to follow in the American wake.’ Nonetheless, he did glimpse some light in the gloom. Washington had asked Britain to ‘take charge of their interests’ in China, and in such circumstances he felt able to recommend to Cabinet that they ‘should adhere to the policy of remaining in China’. The matter was made all the more pressing by Acheson’s having asked Bevin to discuss China during the forthcoming conversations in Washington the following month. *

*

*

With the retreat of Chiang’s forces to Formosa, the island became and was to remain the hub of dissension between Britain and the United States. The opening shot was fired in December by the British in a stiff note from the Foreign Office. Having learned that large quantities of arms and aviation spirit were still reaching the Nationalists from the United States, the Foreign Office reminded the Americans that it had been Bevin’s understanding during his September visit to Washington ‘that no practical steps could be taken to prevent Formosa falling into Communist hands, and that such a development was in fact inevitable’. Indeed, the ‘loss’ of Formosa could be prevented only ‘if the United States Government were prepared to assume large scale and long term responsibility for its protection’, and the Foreign Office asked to be kept informed ‘of the views of the United States Government regarding the complicated situation’. The British government simply did not know which way the Americans might jump, and suspected that they would act in a manner inconsistent with their undertakings. Franks followed up the matter on 8 December and extracted a statement from 66

Korean Conflict.indb 66

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

Acheson that only $8 million worth of military equipment remained to be shipped to Formosa under the terms of a congressional grant of aid. This was true, but Chiang was receiving large quantities of arms from private American suppliers, a fact of which Acheson must have been aware. Franks reiterated the Foreign Office query: had the US attitude towards Formosa changed since Bevin’s conversations with Acheson in September? The Secretary of State’s reply hardly squared with the ‘hands-off’ policy so recently announced, but it was evidently enough to satisfy the British ambassador. The President, Acheson said, had approved a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation that ‘Formosa was not of sufficient strategic importance to make it desirable for the US Government to employ force to prevent the Island falling’ to the Communists, ‘though we were seeking’, he added, ‘by political and economic means to do everything feasible to prevent that’. Despite America’s desire for Britain to keep its foot in the Chinese door and to look after US interests there, they regarded recognition of the Communist regime as a ‘stab in the back’ as long as opposition to Mao still existed. So Bevin told the Cabinet on 12 December. However, resistance on the mainland had largely ceased by this date, and it is hard to estimate the intentions of the Americans in making such a dire and provocative statement. Certainly they made the task of the British government no easier in its attempts to decide when and in what form to recognise. As if to deepen British confusion, President Truman announced a month later, in seemingly unequivocal terms: The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights and privileges, nor to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Even after this announcement of 5 January and after the fact of British recognition, Formosa continued to irritate relations between the two countries, as a record of what must have been a terse conversation 67

Korean Conflict.indb 67

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

demonstrates. Franks asked whether the United States was prepared to use its influence with Chiang to ‘terminate the blockade of the Chinese mainland and to cease its bombing attacks on Chinese cities’, and if not, what would be the American attitude if ‘the British themselves undertook to break the blockade’? This was potentially a very serious matter, for if Britain did make such an attempt, it would constitute a de facto state of hostilities between itself and a regime sponsored, supported and supplied by the United States. Franks pointed out that ‘the planes that were now being used to destroy British lives and property in Shanghai had been supplied by the United States’, and added: British merchants, particularly in Shanghai, had about reached the end of their tether. The British Government did not look at this matter narrowly from the point of view of the economic situation, although they had hoped that by hanging on in China they could obtain some economic advantages … apart from economic questions, it was to the advantage of both the British and ourselves for them to stay there as long as they could and to maintain contact with the Chinese.

As a Foreign Office brief for Bevin remarked no less candidly, ‘The Chinese People’s Government has not ignored the fact that Chinese ports are bombed by American aircraft with American bombs, while warships acquired from the Americans lay what are presumably American mines in the Yangtse.’ Although the Truman administration did not try to restrain Chiang, especially with the influential MacArthur on the sidelines urging precisely the opposite course of action, nothing came of Britain’s flirtation with the hazardous idea of breaking the Nationalist blockade. Two British analyses of April 1950, one by Franks and the other by the Foreign Office, written a couple of months before all hope of a conciliatory American policy towards China was engulfed by the Korean War, reveal the extent of the perplexity and anxiety in Whitehall, and the earnest attempt made by the British authorities to understand the causes of their woes. It was not enough to assert, as Sir Orme Sargent had done, that it would be 50 years before the Americans learnt diplomacy; some insight into the 68

Korean Conflict.indb 68

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

sources of American policy – or, rather, the lack of policy – was vital if Britain was to formulate a rational and effective Far Eastern programme. Franks’ analysis, set out in a letter to Bevin and no doubt the more fully informed because of the ambassador’s intimacy with Acheson, was set against the broad and sombre backdrop of US–Soviet relations. These relations, still characterised on the American side by ‘firm but patient containment of the Soviet Union’, had recently been subjected to critical scrutiny even from administration supporters. Why? The collapse of the nationalist regime in China and the presumed success of the Soviet Union in breaking the American monopoly of atomic weapons would by themselves have been sufficient to raise doubts as to whether the Administration’s present policy in the Cold War was adequate to prevent a third world war. The progressive realisation that this war would, in the new era of hydrogen weapons, prove inconceivably destructive has sharpened these doubts. This realisation has helped to create the present atmosphere of uncertainty which Mr Acheson and other Administration spokesmen are attempting to dispel.

In short, ‘the general picture has been one of unhappy confusion’, made worse by the illness of Senator Vandenberg, who had been ‘the chief architect of the bipartisan idea’ in American foreign policy. The confusion, in Franks’ view, was also caused by Acheson’s precarious authority: [T]his weakening stems primarily from the fact that Mr Acheson owes his position, unlike former Secretaries of State, less to political prestige than to outstanding personal qualities. In recent months Mr Acheson has been subjected to increasingly severe and bitter personal attacks. The attack on the Administration’s Far Eastern policy became in effect an attack on Mr Acheson. Senator McCarthy’s campaign against supposed Communists in the State Department has in its turn become progressively concentrated on the same targets. And the facts that, when confronted by these attacks, Mr Acheson has limited reserves of political 69

Korean Conflict.indb 69

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

strength on which to draw and that his rather stiff public personality limits his popularity, have rendered his position peculiarly vulnerable.

Acheson’s position was made more precarious, according to Franks, by the public’s tendency to believe that McCarthy’s accusations had some substance, since, wild as they were, ‘there can hardly be so much smoke without some fire’. Truman’s apparent unwillingness to enter the fray on Acheson’s behalf, Franks opined, also detracted from Acheson’s standing, for ‘the President, with whom the ultimate responsibility must always lie, should play a more active role in the determination of American foreign policy’. Underlying Franks’ concern was the importance of the Secretary of State’s anglophilia at a time when, in Strang’s words, there was an ‘overriding need’ to find ‘a means of survival in the face of the dangers that threaten both of us and the whole of the non-Communist world’. Walter Lippmann, who had been in touch with the British embassy in January to urge that the British continue ‘to expose the folly of the China interventionists’, had similar views to those expressed by Franks. In a letter to Alan Kirk, Lippmann explained: What is happening now is that under the cry of appeasing the Reds and not supporting Chiang Kai-shek and all the rest of it, the isolationists … are seizing control of the Republican Party, taking advantage of Vandenberg’s illness and the discredit of Dewey’s and Dulles’ defeats and they intend to emerge from the whole fracas … as the leaders of the Republican Party.

Beyond the machinations of the isolationists, Lippmann, like Franks, believed Chiang’s political demise was the precipitating cause of the foreign policy crisis: If we take the longer view of it, I think you have to come to the conclusion that the stage was set for it by the fact that the collapse of China constitutes a diplomatic defeat which has shaken the confidence of the whole Truman Administration and its foreign policy. The Administration 70

Korean Conflict.indb 70

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

has been going to Congress and the country for three years, telling them that the Truman Doctrine and the measures which were designed to support it were containing the expansion of communism. Then the public realized that communism had not been contained in China and that it would not be contained easily in southeast Asia. The feeling that something is very wrong inside the Administration stems from this defeat which the Administration has not been able to explain as a defeat or to transcend by offering a clear policy as to what is to happen after the defeat. Nothing succeeds like success in foreign policy, and nothing fails like failure. It has been the failure in Asia which has made possible the whole McCarthy business.

With such forces at work, and, more significantly, with opinion virtually universal in the United States in concluding that China had been ‘lost’, it is little wonder that Britain should have struggled to understand and accommodate itself to American policy. The extent of these difficulties was considerable, and given the United States’ attitude, they were seemingly intractable. Not that the Americans were entirely unhelpful. Truman’s statement about Formosa in January and a major foreign policy speech by Acheson were, according to Franks, deliberately timed to coincide with Britain’s announcement of its recognition of Communist China ‘as a friendly gesture to divert the fire’, an assessment of intention echoed by the Foreign Office in a paper prepared for Bevin in April 1950: ‘At a most opportune moment Mr Acheson and President Truman issued statements which undoubtedly helped greatly to minimise any adverse effects which our act of recognition might have had on American public opinion.’ The Foreign Office could find little comfort otherwise. Roosevelt’s original China policy having proved a failure, in a congressional election year the administration ‘has had to act with extreme caution, the net result of which has been that there is in fact no United States policy towards China at all beyond “waiting for the dust to settle”’. Far from meriting the description ‘benign’, this approach was actively detrimental to the common interest of Britain and the United States: 71

Korean Conflict.indb 71

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

To some extent … several adverse factors in the present situation in China are attributable, not so much to any conscious policy on the part of the United States (since, as has been said, there is no clear policy), but because of United States military aid to the Nationalists on the one hand and the actions of the Administration in antagonising the Chinese People’s Government on the other.

Worse still, there was strong evidence that these actions were stimulating the Soviet Union into providing increasing instalments of military aid, ‘the natural outcome of American assistance to the Nationalists of Formosa’. The Foreign Office came close to accusing Washington of sheer diplomatic ineptitude and thoughtlessness in all this. As early as July 1949, as reported in a Foreign Office brief in April, in his White Paper Acheson had warned the Chinese Communists not to consort with Moscow, and had said that the United States would do all it could to help the Chinese people to avoid entanglement with the Russians. ‘Though for our part,’ the Foreign Office observed, ‘we should concur in these views, their appearance in an official document which received world-wide publicity can hardly have failed to indicate the hostility of the United States to the government then about to assume power in China.’ After the signing of the Sino–Soviet Treaty, the text of which was at pains to emphasise the equality between the two countries, Acheson ‘lectured China on the way in which she should conduct herself ’. The potential impact for British interests was serious: To the extent that the United Kingdom is undeniably associated with the United States in its opposition to Russian imperialism – and we have agreed to take charge of American interests in China – there can hardly fail to be an adverse reaction on our own relations with the Chinese People’s Government. Indeed it is conceivable that this has been one of the main reasons for the delay in consenting to establish relations with the United Kingdom. It must be supposed that the Russians are using all their influence to persuade the Chinese that we are hand-in-glove with the Americans [and] they should have nothing to do with us. 72

Korean Conflict.indb 72

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

Running parallel with statements of American hostility and with open support of China’s ‘enemies’ on Formosa were more perceptive remarks, such as that made by Acheson in July 1949 to the effect that the Nationalists ‘had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people’, and another in March 1950 to the effect that they had collapsed from ‘inherent weakness and the withdrawal of the people’s support’. If the Foreign Office was confused by the evident inconsistency in these utterances with those suggesting that China had been conquered not by a party and an army enjoying the people’s support but by a ruthless, Kremlin-dominated clique, one can only speculate as to the puzzlement in Peking. Inseparable from this inconsistency was the attitude of the United States towards the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai, ‘a main contributory cause’, stated the Foreign Office, ‘of the virtual breakdown of our trading position there’. Manifestly in a position to do something about the blockade and admitting it to be ‘illegal’, the United States has ‘been unwilling to do anything to bring it to an end’. Again, the Soviet threat materialised: It may be that the blockade will before long be broken [by the Russians] … but the appearance of the Russians so far south is something which both we and the United States should have wished to avoid, and the results of this intervention, which is attributable in some degree to the inaction of the United States over the blockade on the one hand and to their action on the other in making military aid available to the Nationalists, may be far-reaching.

As for the problem of Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations, the Foreign Office foresaw little chance of an American change of mind. Although the USA had indicated a willingness not to veto a majority in the Security Council in favour of seating Peking, the four powers in question (France, Egypt, Ecuador and Cuba) – two of whose votes were necessary – were unlikely to act unless the United States came out in favour of Communist China. This, in the view of the Foreign Office, was ‘unsatisfactory, since in essence it is dislike of the ideology of the Chinese 73

Korean Conflict.indb 73

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

People’s Government and not any more substantial reason which governs the attitude of the United States’. Here, then, was the nub of the matter. If the wellspring of American action or inaction in the Far East was ideological, a sort of fundamentalist antipathy for communism, there was nothing that the British could do by way of appeals to rational self-interest, to consideration of the remote consequences of present actions, or even to Wilsonian internationalism. The British, as Bevin never tired of saying, shared a distaste for the ideology of the new China, but unlike their Atlantic cousins their long experience of diplomacy and the ways of the world had taught them to be pragmatic in matters such as the China problem. Or so they believed. On this interpretation, American policy, if it could be so dignified, made absolutely no practical sense. It was confounding Britain’s attempt to establish normal relations with China and thereby to sustain valuable commercial and trading interests, infuriating the Chinese leaders, alienating Asian opinion, and worst of all, driving Mao further into the arms of Stalin. But were the British in their turn being naive by interpreting American actions in this way? Was American policy in fact shaped only by an over-developed fastidiousness in matters ideological, or were the Americans something other than idealistic blunderers in China and in the Far East? A memorandum of November 1948 from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to Acheson, still not Secretary of State, shows clearly that at least one important agency of the Democratic government was not wedded to China by ties of sentiment. Unfortunately the author of the document is not identified, but to judge from the tone of a covering letter he was a friend as well as a colleague of Acheson’s. For 50 years, the paper stated explicitly, US policy towards China had been based on ‘no sentimental attachment to the Chinese people’ but rather on an ‘instinctive feel’ for the importance of China to American security. American efforts over that time were accordingly designed to prevent any one power from dominating the area, ‘whether Russia, Britain or Japan’. Mao’s Communists, loyal to Moscow, were laying the groundwork for the installation of a regime in North China, which, together with Manchuria, was of ‘vital importance’ to the United States. The area boasted heavy industrial capacity and contained 74

Korean Conflict.indb 74

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

the greater part of the exploitable natural resources of China, and moreover it produced large food surpluses. Without such resources ‘there would be literally no hope of achieving a viable economy in Japan’, a development – it was implied – that was of grave economic and strategic import for the United States. Although rarely stated openly, American possession of Japan, overt until the conclusion of a peace treaty and covert thereafter, was the one constant in an otherwise rudderless Far Eastern policy. The three alternatives contemplated in regard to North China and Manchuria – complete withdrawal, unlimited commitment and the current ‘finger-in-the-dyke’ approach – had been unacceptable or ineffective: ‘In effect China is a weak, emaciated and exasperating patient … The treatment is failing, and so is the patient.’ However, it remained vital to forestall Soviet aims in China, and, advised the paper, a completely different tack must be tried. This should entail Chiang’s abandonment, if necessary. If he continued to be both inefficient and uncooperative, America should be prepared to aid non-Kuomintang forces in the north and leave the rest of China to its fate. ‘Very substantial funds’ would be required, but ‘given the potential of North China and Manchuria much of the required investment, except that directly associated with military operations, should bring fairly quick returns’. At least in the view of the ECA, then, the majority of the gallant, long-suffering Chinese people, who had for many years earned American respect and affection, were expendable so long as North China and Manchuria were denied to Mao and Stalin. In January 1949, some months before the defeat of Chiang’s armies, the CIA advised against committing American prestige and material resources to ‘a rump Nationalist regime’ on Formosa, and like the ECA they laid emphasis on ‘maintaining the economic and political stability of European colonial powers’ in Asia. This was deemed to be ‘essential to the protection of long-term US security interests in the Far East’. The hardening of the official American attitude, grounded in fears for economic and political security, did not lack for critics, but they could not prevail against the dominant group in the State Department. After only a short period of service, J.K. Galbraith had only contempt for this faction: 75

Korean Conflict.indb 75

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

The secular priesthood at State abhorred Communism, the Soviet Union and the Jews, and for many the three were roughly identical … But in the years after the war one small group of young officers – Charles E. Bohlen, George F. Kennan and Llewellyan Thompson, Jr – were fascinated students of the Soviet experiment as also of the Russian language, character and culture. And for China there were the China hands – John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies and Edmund O. Clubb. All had concluded that Chiang Kai-shek and his evanescent, predatory and combat-resistant armies were not on the wave of the future. So it would be, or might be, the Communists. For being right the China hands were called severely to account in the fifties by John Foster Dulles and the McCarthyites on Capitol Hill. Their colleagues in the secular priesthood accepted, on the whole gracefully, the need to sacrifice them to the general good.

What were the internal critics saying? Bohlen, unlike most of his colleagues, believed that there had been ‘ample evidence to support the view that Stalin did not anticipate or wish to see the Communists take power in China’, though once it had occurred, ‘Stalin had no course except to help it’. Therefore, Bohlen did not subscribe to the prevailing notion that the Peking–Moscow axis was indissoluble. George Kennan, despite being the originator of the policy of containment, nonetheless argued strongly for the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. Defeated in the department, he recorded angrily in his diary on 17 July 1950, ‘I hope that some day history will record this as an instance of the damage done to the conduct of our foreign policy by the irresponsible and bigoted interference of the China Lobby and its friends in Congress.’ By July 1950, of course, the Korean War had destroyed any chance of America adopting a neutral stance on the issue of Red China’s seat on the Security Council. Kennan was clearly of the opinion that Acheson – supported by Dulles, who for political reasons had been appointed as an adviser to the State Department – had reversed his former position on this question: 76

Korean Conflict.indb 76

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

The position we were taking seemed to me to imply an acceptance of the theory that in the last analysis the UN would not be universal but would be an Article 51 alliance against Russia … that the basis of our policy in the Far East from here on out would be an emotional anticommunism which would ignore the value to ourselves of a possible balance between the existing forces on the Asiatic continent, would force everyone to declare himself either for us (and incidentally Chiang Kai-shek) or against us, that this would break the unity not only of the non-Communist countries in Asia but also of the non-Communist community in general, and would be beyond our military capacity to support.

Unwittingly, Kennan shared the Foreign Office view that American policy seemed to be founded on ideological distaste: With Rusk and some of the others, I think there was a very real sense of moral indignation about the Chinese Communists. These people, after all, are treading now the paths which we old Russian hands were treading over twenty years ago in our first experience with the Soviet dictatorship.

Lippmann was also reminded of the early days of the Soviet Union. Writing to Senator Knowland in September 1949, he stated that, ‘[D]rawing upon the experience of our dealings with the original Russian revolution in 1919, I would not foreclose de facto recognition of a Chinese Communist government, if and when it is set up.’ Using terms closely resembling those later employed by Ernest Bevin, he added, ‘I do not believe in the nonrecognition principle of accomplished facts in international affairs.’ An acquaintance of Acheson’s for many years, and overall a sympathetic observer of the Secretary’s travails, Lippmann grew steadily more critical of the State Department. In December 1949 he identified the weakness of the United States in Asia: I learned many things abroad, which I am only beginning to digest … The political implications … are obvious and they are enormous. For what we are struggling for in Asia, I now realize is not democracy and 77

Korean Conflict.indb 77

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

not free enterprise, and not allies in the cold war against the Soviet Union, but to maintain some contact between Asia and the West. We have very little power in Asia, and we must not think of ourselves as lords of creation who can fix the terms of the bargain on which relations are to be continued. We have to make connections, we have to seek avenues of contact and influence, or we shall gradually find ourselves shut out.

After America’s refusal to recognise the Chinese Communist government Lippmann wrote despairingly to Forrest Sherman in February. ‘I am afraid we made a decisive and irreparable mistake when we failed to recognize,’ he wrote. ‘Our only chance of salvaging anything in China lay either in supporting a far more liberal and enlightened regime as an alternative to the Communists, or of disengaging ourselves three years ago, and observing a policy of correct neutrality in the Chinese civil war.’ Now, he observed, the United States is ‘almost hopelessly committed to the support of those elements in Asia that cannot possibly hope to recover the leadership in Asia. All we have in the Far East now are a few beachheads occupied by discredited puppet regimes.’ Acheson’s account of the US position in China, as recorded in his memoirs, is, inevitably enough, rather more cut and dried than the situation was in reality. Some months before Britain recognised the Communists, Acheson, in conversation with Bevin, summarised the conclusions reached by the administration: In brief, these were that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were no longer an effective force on the mainland, where the Nationalist Government … was about to collapse. No other leaders were apparent for the time being. Nor had friction yet developed between Mao and Stalin, though we believed it would do so. Recognition seemed to us a futile gesture and would doubtless mean as little to the Chinese Communists as to us, while worrying other Asian states. The result indicated was to await a more propitious time for action of any sort that trouble in China or between China and Russia might bring. In the meantime I hoped that the 78

Korean Conflict.indb 78

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

North Atlantic Treaty countries would concert their policies and that we could all impose controls on trade with Communist China.

The thesis that Communist China was and would remain a Soviet client state, all evidence and Chinese history notwithstanding, was enunciated almost as if the United States wished this to be so after Chiang had lost the civil war. This ideological preoccupation, noted by the British, would admit of no subtleties or refinement of interpretation. The Chinese Communists must henceforth be regarded as irrevocably committed to world subversion and revolution as the Soviet Union was alleged to be, especially after National Security Council Report 68 had cemented the thesis into the foundations of American foreign policy. A CIA paper of April 1949 warned that the USSR intended adding China to its orbit in order to aid Communist expansion in the Far East, and predicted that a Communist China would support Soviet policy and propaganda. Acheson, in his Press Club speech of 12 January 1950, had barely allowed the new regime to settle in before he predicted that the ‘righteous anger and wrath and hatred of the Chinese people’ would fix upon Soviet designs on Chinese territory and that their ‘fundamental interest … is to get rid of foreign domination’. A month later, speaking in San Francisco, Acheson expanded on this theme but simultaneously revealed an understanding that the Chinese had little recourse but to turn to the Communists. ‘The Nationalist Government,’ he asserted, ‘was overthrown not by force of arms; it collapsed from its own inherent weakness and the withdrawal of the people’s support.’ However, he denied completely the possibility that Mao had come to power as the head of a genuinely nationalist movement, or the notion that the Chinese could act as an independent nation: The Communists won by default, not by what they offered. They employed the well-known Communist technique of probing for weakness and, on finding it, exploiting it to the full … Their seizure of power has reversed the true purpose of the revolution. For while neighboring people, some of them for the first time in centuries, are at last achieving true national independence, China, with its long, proud history, is being 79

Korean Conflict.indb 79

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

forced into the Soviet orbit as a dependency of the Soviet political system and the Soviet economy.

Not only was this at odds with the CIA’s estimation, made within a week of Acheson’s speech, that the Communist government was widely supported and ‘probably more efficient and less corrupt than any regime within the memory of living Chinese’, it was also dismissive and insulting to the Chinese leaders and their supporters who had embarked on their epic labours in the 1920s. As if to deepen Chinese indignation, Acheson uttered dark warnings about the consequences they might incur as the result of any international action disapproved of by America: As old friends we say to the Chinese people that we fully understand that their present unhappy status within the orbit of the Soviet Union is not the result of any choice on their own part, but has been forced upon them … The American people will remain the future, as in the past, the friends of the Chinese people. But they should understand that, whatever happens within their own country, they can only bring grave trouble on themselves and their friends, both in Asia and beyond, if they are led by their new rulers into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders … I say this so that there may be no mistake about the attitude of the United States: no opportunity to distort or twist it; and, so that all in China may know who would be responsible for all that such adventures might bring to pass.

As an earnest of earlier, private declarations of intention, the Secretary concluded by promising that the United States would not trade with China if the regime continued to ‘declare their hostility to us and all we stand for’. The Korean War, even during the period when China was not directly involved, would soon provide the occasion for the virtual cessation of US–China trade and for American pressure on Britain and other nations to do likewise. Sino–Soviet collusion as a thesis received rather less emphasis in the administration’s internal discussions (the word ‘debate’ would wrongly suggest the existence of a vigorous dispute). Truman possessed strong views 80

Korean Conflict.indb 80

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

about the Chinese Communists, which were decidedly more hostile than those of Acheson. In October 1949, for example, he told James Webb, the Under-Secretary of State, that he felt ‘we should be in no hurry whatever to recognize this regime’, and remarked that ‘we had waited some 12 years to recognize the Russian Communist regime’. So it was something of an achievement in November when Acheson was able to persuade the President to agree with a more sophisticated postulation of America’s options: Broadly speaking, there were two objectives of policy: One might be to oppose the Communist regime, harass it, needle it, and if an opportunity appeared to overthrow it. Another objective of policy would be to attempt to detach it from subservience to Moscow and over a period of time encourage those vigorous influences which might modify it. I pointed out that this second alternative did not mean a policy of appeasement any more than it had in the case of Tito. If the Communists took action detrimental to the United States it should be opposed with vigor, but the decision of many concrete questions would be much clarified by a decision as to whether we believed that we should and could overthrow the regime, or whether we believed that the second course outlined above was wiser. I said that the Consultants were unanimous in their judgment that the second course was the preferable one.

It is worthy of note that even before the Communists had fully assumed office in Peking, the United States was contemplating their overthrow (although by what means was not made clear). Sensibly enough, such a possible course of action was never divulged to the British. However, of greater significance was America’s willingness – not to say daring – to consider shaping policy as if Mao was another Tito. Hints such as these, of a more flexible attitude, were transformed into admittedly tentative policy by National Security Council Report 48/2 of December 1949. The author of that paper recommended that ‘[t]he United States should exploit’ by covert as well as overt methods, ‘through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements 81

Korean Conflict.indb 81

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention’. At the same time, however, the United States should continue to express to friendly governments its own views concerning the dangers of hasty recognition of the Chinese Communist regime but should not take a stand which would engage the prestige of the United States in an attempt to prevent such recognition. In general, however, it should be realized that it would be inappropriate for the United States to adopt a posture more hostile towards a Communist China than towards the USSR itself.

Even the recognition of China – ‘when it is clearly in the United States’ interest to do so’ – was not ruled entirely out of court. Quite what circumstances would need to obtain was not stated, although presumably a palpable and irrevocable break between Peking and Moscow would be required. As Franks pointed out, ‘small scattered groups’ in the USA argued ‘that it is illogical for the United States to refuse to establish relations with the Communist Government in China when it is putting up with repeated indignities in order to preserve its diplomatic contacts with the European satellites’. In conversation with Senators Knowland and Smith on 5 January, Acheson hinted at an attitude a little more flexible than that stated in the National Security Council Report document. Russian control, he informed the Senators, ‘had in no way been consolidated and … I felt the Soviets were going to encounter increasing difficulties by way of their program of subjugation’. Similarly, in January the CIA suggested that the Sino–Soviet link was not necessarily strong enough to preclude an ‘eventual accommodation between Communist China and the Western Powers’, remote in time though that might be: It is true, however, that the USSR has developed to new heights of professional skill the theory and practice of capturing and controlling social institutions. Soviet penetration of key units of the Peiping administration is now in process, and the USSR, capitalizing on the Sino–Soviet alliance and China’s request for assistance, is installing itself 82

Korean Conflict.indb 82

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

solidly in China, thus reducing the chances for Chinese ‘Titoism’ and reducing the impact … of whatever dissident movements develop.

Nonetheless, widespread resentment against the USSR and the new regime was likely to grow over inflation and the famine imminent in China. Ill feeling was ‘already in evidence among non-Communist Party members over Soviet privileges and economic exploitation of Manchuria, rumored Soviet profiteering in trade, and the influx of Soviet political, technical, and military advisers’. As for the longer-term future: In regard to relations with the Western Powers … foreign capital and foreign manufacturers will exercize a greater attraction to economic planners intent on industrialization. A demonstration of independence of Moscow, even though accompanied by continual asseverations of Communist faith, probably would reinforce the Peiping regime’s popular standing. US interests will be advanced by every new strain on the link between Peiping and Moscow. The existing strains on Sino–Soviet relations, however, probably will not become critical in 1950.

It was to be many years before Mao’s break with Moscow in the 1960s and the introduction of Den Xia Ping’s westernising policies of the 1980s, but clearly there were some in the administration of the later 1940s and early 1950s who were not entirely overborne by political enmity and a belief in Russian omnipotence. However, the presence of this enlightened few could do little to hasten the United States’ recognition of the new China. Acheson might talk benevolently, as he did to Nehru, of not rushing recognition because of America’s ‘deep interest and concern for the welfare of the Chinese people’, but in conversation with Senators Knowland and Smith in November 1949 he showed that he was not above resorting to quasi-legalistic hedging. He stated that ‘no thought would be given to recognition until at least three factors had been served’: all or substantially all of China must have been conquered, any new government must demonstrate a fitness to comply with its international obligations, and there should be ‘an evident will on the part 83

Korean Conflict.indb 83

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

of the people to accept the government’. By November 1949 the first of these requirements had been satisfied. However, the other two were subject to almost infinitely malleable interpretation by the Americans. Accordingly, Acheson felt able to reassure the Senators that ‘while he could not say we would never recognize the Communist government he wanted to repeat the assurance that he would exercize every form of caution and considered study before any move in that direction was made’. In an effort to persuade Sir Oliver Franks of his view, the Secretary reiterated his argument that China must show its willingness to honour its international obligations, drawing an analogy with the early Soviet Union: I then brought up the question of possible recognition … In the first place, it seemed desirable to us to act if at all possible in concert with other concerned powers to ascertain whether the Chinese Communists intended to live up to their international obligations. It seemed to us that the inclinations of the Chinese Communists were to follow the Russian example of considering themselves not an evolutionary regime which had sprung from the previous one which, therefore, entailed that they assume both the rights and obligations of the former regime, but a revolutionary one which would seek to assume all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake.

Nevertheless, Franks felt that the administration’s helpful response at the time of Britain’s recognition ‘will at least and at last clear the way for a reassessment and restatement of American objectives which will be followed, it is hoped, by practical action’. Alas for Franks’ hopes, on 14 January the State Department announced that it had recalled all its official personnel from China following the Communists’ seizure of the US Consulate General in Peking. The recall affected 135 US officials and their dependents in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking. Acheson stated that the incident made it obvious that the new regime did not want American diplomatic recognition, adding somewhat wistfully that he hoped for the rise of a third force in China, led by neither Mao nor Chiang, but foresaw little chance of such a development. *

*

*

84

Korean Conflict.indb 84

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

As we have seen, the problem of Formosa became a subject of sharp dissension between Britain and the United States. It was also the source of much heartburn in Washington, and nothing better illustrates the vagaries of policy formulation before the Korean War than the erratic swings between unqualified support for Chiang and implied acknowledgement of the Communist government’s claim to the island. Acheson’s feelings on the question were revealed in a heartfelt lamentation to John Kee, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in January 1950, when he wrote: ‘[T]here seems to be some magic flowing from the use of the term ‘island’ which seems to immediately give everyone the jitters, whereas, if Formosa had happened to be a peninsula we would probably have heard nothing more about it.’ Acheson felt, quite correctly, that had the Nationalists retreated not to an island but to a mainland redoubt, they would long since have been overcome and a problem of grave proportions, which Acheson obviously wished would go away, would not have arisen. The Secretary of State might also have observed that if Mao had taken Formosa – only 81 miles off the Chinese coast – in 1949, it would not have been elevated to the position of importance it later enjoyed. In the hands of Chiang it was undoubtedly of strategic concern to the mainland, but in the hands of Mao the island could hardly have been such a threat to American interests in the Pacific and to America itself, as MacArthur, the Republicans and some members of the military establishment claimed. As for being a bastion of the free world, in fact little had changed since 1946 when the Foreign Office had reported on the aspirations of the native Taiwanese for self-government after the ejection of the Japanese: The reality has been the arrival of General Chen Li from Fukien, with a swarm of military officers and civil officials determined to get rich in the shortest possible time, and a state of affairs verging on anarchy, with wholesale looting and confiscation by the liberators. ‘You dropped the atom bomb on Japan, but you dropped the Chinese army on us’, was the reproach of a Formosan to an American officer in Takao.

85

Korean Conflict.indb 85

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

To his credit, Acheson was determined that America would not become embroiled militarily in Formosa. As he wrote in his memoirs: ‘From October 1948 to the outbreak of the Korean War … this policy – that United States forces would not be used to defend Formosa – never wavered.’ Truman supported him against the Pentagon and the Republican right in this. It was not, however, an easy policy to sustain. The CIA’s warning of January 1949 against a commitment to a rump Nationalist regime on Formosa did not mean that Communist control of the island and subsequent Soviet access would not have ‘seriously unfavorable implications for the US’, as the Agency indicated in a sort of addendum in March. Nor were the native Taiwanese – who were ‘increasingly restive’ because of the Nationalist influx – impervious to Communist influence. Although the Cairo and Potsdam conferences had made it unambiguously clear that Formosa, under Japanese rule since 1895, would be returned to China at the conclusion of the Pacific War, the CIA floated the idea – grasped at eagerly by American officials – that ‘from the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the republic of China’ because pending a Japanese peace treaty, ‘the island remains occupied territory in which the US has proprietary interests’. Facing facts, though, the report concluded that, assuming ‘US inactivity, Taiwan will eventually pass under the control of the Chinese Communists’, especially as they ‘will not secure their prospective victory in China until they control Taiwan’. Having withstood domestic opposition and vilification over China and Formosa, in early December 1949 Acheson assured Franks that the United States remained firm in its ‘hands-off’ Formosan policy, and indeed ‘had recently attempted to disabuse the Generalissimo of any misconception he might have had in this respect and to exhort him to take the necessary action to consolidate the position since all the ingredients for success were available on the Island’. A month later Franks reported to Bevin that the ‘shadow boxing that usually precedes the return of Congress has on this occasion largely concerned China and Formosa and the Army department has done its bit in embarrassing the administration over the defence of the Island’. Nonetheless, as the President’s statement of 5 January had made plain, Truman and Acheson ‘are against military intervention in Formosa and the 86

Korean Conflict.indb 86

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

despatch of military missions’ – but, with remarkable prescience, Franks added that the President might ‘have to bow to Congressional pressure over the measures designed to throw a defensive screen around Formosa or in some way keep the Island out of Communist hands’. Of course, like everyone else the ambassador was unaware of the imminence of the Korean War and the fortuitous way in which at one stroke both the China recognition and Formosa problems would be solved for the American government. Perhaps the fullest and most honest exposition of administration policy was developed by Acheson in his conversation with Senators Knowland and Smith in January 1950. Unlike some of his colleagues, he dismissed the ‘legalistic’ argument that Formosa could not be part of China until the signing of a Japanese peace treaty, and asked what America could do. I replied to my own question by stating that as I view the picture we are confronted with the necessity of making a choice that would ultimately lead us to adopting one of two alternative courses of action: We can take the position either that we will fight, if need be, for the retention of the island under our aegis, or in the absence of such a position we must be prepared to accept what now appears to be the possibility of its collapse.

Not only would a war over Formosa be contrary to the interests of the American people; it would, he implied, be morally wrong and lead to a propaganda defeat: the mere statement of our intention to so hold the island would be completely defeative [sic] of the general line we had been taking and the philosophy we had been preaching of self-determination of all countries in Asia. I emphasized my strong feelings that such a move would play right into the hands of Russian propaganda which could exploit to the fullest point that such actions give the lie to our protestations of an absence of any imperialistic design in our motives.

The nations in Asia with whom the United States had been co-operating would, in that event, be filled ‘with a sense of revulsion and with an attitude 87

Korean Conflict.indb 87

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

that our deeds were belying our words’. As for the alleged significance of Formosa for the security of the United States, Acheson, finding practical grounds for his moral posture, stated emphatically that his view could be adopted only if Formosa and the immediate region were ‘not of vital importance to the security of the United States’. Invoking the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said that this was their opinion, and, while I acknowledge that the highest military authorities would look with considerable concern should a foreign power occupy Formosa, nonetheless the retention of Formosa has been defined to be not of vital importance to our security.

In retrospect, it seems curious that the United States was not prepared to commit forces to save Chiang but did so to save Syngman Rhee, who was no less reprehensible, corrupt and reactionary an Asian leader. Truman’s 5 January statement, welcomed by Franks as ‘leaving the administration’s attitude in no obscurity whatever’, was, he said, also welcomed by the American public: [T]he majority of both pundits and ordinary citizens seem relieved that the United States is not going to embark on an adventure which would be hazardous at best. It is admitted that the hands-off Formosa policy can be interpreted as a surrender of the island to the Communists (no one expects Chiang to be able to hold it), but it is argued that it marks the end of a long road of defeat for the United States in China on which it is now too late to turn back.

The conviction that such a turning back would be a forlorn exercise was amply expounded by the CIA in a report of 18 January. On Formosa the old ‘corrupt inefficiency on the part of the Chinese authorities continues’ and would be likely to ‘undermine the Nationalist position even if the Communists did not assault the island’, added to which was the danger posed by poor morale among Chiang’s troops. ‘Nothing short of outright military occupation and complete administrative control by the US,’ the 88

Korean Conflict.indb 88

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

CIA warned sternly, ‘is likely to save the island’. The Agency agreed with Acheson that this would have unfortunate consequences: Even assuming occupation of Taiwan to be strategically advantageous enough to warrant using the necessary forces, such US action would seriously hamper the achievement of general US aims in Asia. It would give new grounds for Communist and other anti-Western attacks on US ‘imperialism’. Probably it would prevent the newly independent governments of India and Pakistan from cooperating with the US in South Asia. It would diminish US prestige and opportunities for leadership in the UN. Inside China the propaganda theme that US aims were ‘imperialist’ would spread among Chinese of all shades of political belief. Finally, the more doctrinaire Stalinist leaders among the Chinese Communists would advance their positions at the expense of such Communists as may be favorably disposed toward an independent policy in international affairs and an accommodation with the Western Powers.

Many, though not all, of these doleful consequences were to flow from the decision in June to station the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait, an action of lesser magnitude than occupation but still regarded by Peking as tantamount to occupation of the island. On 14 June, General MacArthur delivered himself of a characteristically lengthy message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff protesting against the apparent abandonment of the island and the downgrading of its strategic importance. It was a foretaste of further vigorous objections to the policies of his Commander-in-Chief, made not on military but on political grounds, that were eventually to precipitate him into virtual mutiny and dismissal. In time of war, he argued, America’s possession of Formosa would enable it to exercise military control ‘along the periphery of Eastern Asia’, whereas, in enemy hands, Formosa would pose a direct threat to Okinawa, Japan and the Philippines, and could ‘be compared to a unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy’. He asked it to be remembered that the Japanese had launched attacks from the island during World War II. Apart from strategic considerations, 89

Korean Conflict.indb 89

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Formosa was valuable because of its self-sufficiency in food ‘in a generally food-scarce locality’. Furthermore, ‘from a moral standpoint’ the United States should, MacArthur urged, ignore wartime undertakings to return the island to China, since the promises were ‘given in consonance with a political situation entirely different from that which now exists’; moreover, the native Taiwanese should be allowed to ‘develop their own political future in an atmosphere unfettered by the dictates of a Communist police state’. Of the Nationalists’ oppression and exploitation he said nothing. In view, then, of the necessity to regain ‘a proper United States posture in the Orient’ and to forestall ‘a disaster of utmost importance’, MacArthur agitated for a reconsideration of the Joint Chiefs’ recommendation that he conduct ‘an immediate survey of the need and extent of the military assistance required in Formosa in order to hold Formosa against attack’. *

*

*

An examination of British Far Eastern policy before the outbreak of the Korean War, and in particular the recognition of Communist China, may best be commenced with a considered statement made by Clement Attlee in 1954. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Attlee, freed from the restraints of premiership, commented frankly to his largely American audience on the essential divergence in Anglo–American foreign policies and on the thinking that had led his government to recognise the new China in 1950. His belief that the ‘Communists offered something that appealed to the mass of the Chinese people’ was not poles apart from Acheson’s view; nor indeed was the realisation that by late 1949 ‘the Communists had become the effective government of China’. However, the British, ‘though totally opposed to Communism, recognised this as a fact’, while the failure of the Americans to do likewise ‘affronted the self-respect of the Chinese people’. Attlee, like American officials, was not immune from using the Russian and other historical analogies, but in this case they were employed for taking his allies to task: I think the American attitude unwise. It seems to resemble the shortsighted attitude of the British Government after the First World War when it supported Kolchak and the reactionaries against the Bolsheviks 90

Korean Conflict.indb 90

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

and thus rallied to Lenin the support of Russian nationalist feeling. There are other precedents in history, such as the support of the emigres against the French Revolutionaries at the end of the eighteenth century. One can imagine what the effect would have been in America at the time of the revolution if European Powers had supported a rival government in, say, Bermuda against President Washington.

In short, continued Attlee with just a touch of the patronising tone used by the British in unguarded moments, ‘Americans tend to see things in black and white where we see shades of grey.’ This shortcoming had led the US to give aid ‘to those whom we consider undemocratic, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee and General Franco’. Rubbing salt into the wound, he went so far as to suggest – implausibly – that had ‘China been given her seat in the United Nations the Korean War might never have started’ and, notwithstanding the icy state into which Sino–American relations had sunk by 1954, he continued to insist that China was no obedient Russian puppet: I think it is unlikely that the Chinese people with their ancient civilization are likely to swallow the whole Communist doctrine. Still less do I think that China is likely to become a docile satellite of Russia. But the more China is shut away from the Western World and forced to ally herself with Russia, the more strength will be given to her Communist masters. The greater the contacts with the Western World, the less will be the danger of the integration of the great Asiatic mass in a Communist bloc.

Ernest Bevin had a rather more immediate reason for believing that China would eventually disengage itself from the Soviet Union. According to Franks, ‘Bevin was quite clear that Russia and China were bound to fall out some day … At a meeting which Bevin attended with Bidault and Molotov at the Paris Conference in July 1947, Molotov remarked to Bevin, “When I go to China, my face is white”. That remark stuck with Bevin.’ On more solid ground, added Franks, ‘Bevin thought that there was no point in not recognising something that was there.’ 91

Korean Conflict.indb 91

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Nevertheless, the formulation of British policy was by no means conducted with the calm and fixed assurance conveyed by the recollections of the protagonists. Save for a vague antipathy for communism, ideological considerations were subsumed by what might be called ‘empirical diplomacy’. Debates in Cabinet and the Foreign Office proceeded on firm assumptions and goals in the Far East: a determination to maintain commercial and trading enterprises in China and elsewhere, linked to the retention of Hong Kong; a desire to widen any potential breach between Peking and Moscow; and the intention to act, and persuade others to act, in such a way as to avoid alienating Asian, principally Indian, opinion. In none of these was there a source of controversy between right and left in the Labour Party, and nor indeed between the government and the opposition. Further, there is little to suggest that had he been Prime Minister in Attlee’s place, Churchill would have followed a markedly different policy. In a Cabinet paper of March 1949, Bevin related the fears of the Chiefs of Staff that a Communist-dominated China would pose a considerable threat. ‘Increased unrest’ could be expected to occur throughout Southeast Asia and might even threaten India, while the possible domination of China, including Formosa, by the Soviets would represent a serious potential hazard to British sea communications in time of war. Bevin, however, was encouraged by India’s view that Communists elsewhere in Asia would receive no direct help from China, especially if Britain and other governments helped rather than opposed nationalist movements. Also significant for Bevin was China’s need to depend on the West for assistance in solving the numerous difficulties that would beset the new regime, although he recognised that in the long term the Communists might be expected to nationalise land and industry and to expropriate and ultimately expel foreign interests. At stake was hundreds of millions of pounds’ worth of British commercial property and investment, for which reason ‘it has been decided on political grounds that British interests should be supported in their desire to keep a foot in the door in China as long as possible and on economic grounds it would be regrettable to cut ourselves off from a potentially vast market for British goods’. It was therefore important, concluded Bevin, that while sanctions should be 92

Korean Conflict.indb 92

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

prepared against the contingency of Chinese ‘molestation’ of foreign interests, the USA should be persuaded not to conduct economic warfare so long as the Communists in China behaved themselves. Cabinet could do little other than agree with the Foreign Secretary’s wait-and-see policy and prudently try to avoid creating a public impression that ‘the United Kingdom Government would compensate British merchants for any serious losses’. Hong Kong, however, was a different and pressing matter. A decision on what to do should the Chinese Communists appear determined to take the colony could not long be delayed. As early as March 1949, steps had been taken to prepare Hong Kong for internal unrest, a large-scale influx of refugees from China, and the activities of guerilla bands. Despite these threats and the possibility that Hong Kong might be used as a centre for the direction of regional subversion, the Secretary of State for the Colonies felt that any attempt to root out communism would only increase internal disorder. Far better, he advised Cabinet, ‘to raise the standard of life in Hong Kong by social and economic measures so that it would be apparent that life under British rule was preferable to life in neighbouring countries dominated by communism’. On the other hand, some Ministers were disturbed by suggestions of a quiescent policy: was it, they asked, wise to turn a blind eye to Communist agitation in Hong Kong? Was there not a danger that a short period of tranquillity was being bought at the price of serious disturbances when the colony riddled with communism would fall easy prey to action fomented internally and encouraged from outside? The matter was postponed for further discussion. In the event, the government acted with dispatch. In April the Defence Committee of Cabinet recommended and Cabinet approved an infantry battalion and a brigade headquarters to be sent at once to Hong Kong, with the remainder of a brigade group and ‘certain naval and air reinforcements’ to follow as soon as possible. These reinforcements, advised the Chiefs of Staff, would enable the colony to cope with the dangers envisaged, short of overt action by the Chinese Communists, though some pause for thought must have been provoked by their statement that the sending of reinforcements would ‘reduce the strength of the strategic reserve’ in the 93

Korean Conflict.indb 93

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

UK to one infantry brigade. Such was the extent to which Britain’s armed forces were stretched around the globe. In itself, this decision did not signal the government’s intention to resist a Communist invasion of the colony by force of arms, but Cabinet was moving steadily towards such a position. The next step was taken to contact other Commonwealth countries to discover just what degree of support, if any, they would be willing to lend in the defence of Hong Kong. Some thought was given to consultations with the French and the Dutch as well, but this was taken no further since they ‘were regarded with great suspicion by the Asiatic peoples’, not least in India, and it was thought unwise to represent the cause of British Hong Kong as the ‘rallying point for anti-Communist forces in Asia’. It was also suggested by one nervous soul in Cabinet that ‘in the long run it would prove impossible to preserve Hong Kong as a British colony, and that serious consideration ought now to be given to the possibility of giving it the status of an international port on the analogy of Trieste’. This solution was rejected as not coming at ‘an opportune time’. The Secretary of Defence, Manny Shinwell, made it clear in a paper of 24 May that he at least was prepared to fight for Hong Kong, even in the face of a Chinese attack. On the one hand, in such an event the colony ‘may well become the stage for a trial of strength between Communism and the western Powers’. On the other hand, withdrawal would be a ‘blow to our prestige throughout the world’, while its ‘immediate repercussions in South East Asia would add immeasurably to our defence burdens in that area’. (Prestige, it may be observed in passing, an elusive but seemingly vital quality, was as much prized by the British as by the Americans, and threats to it aroused instincts as belligerent as those aroused by threats to territory or to irreplaceable trading interests.) It had been estimated that not more than around 40,000 Chinese Communist troops could be deployed at any one time in a land offensive against Hong Kong, with 50 or 60 aircraft. The Chiefs of Staff had advised Shinwell that Britain must be ready to deal with a force of this magnitude by early September 1949, although they had expressed the hope that a public announcement of Britain’s intention to defend the colony might mean that British forces ‘may never be put to the test’. 94

Korean Conflict.indb 94

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

Shinwell’s call to arms was met by a certain amount of nervous dithering in Cabinet. Leading a discussion of the paper on 26 May, Attlee declared himself satisfied that a failure to meet a threat to Hong Kong would indeed be damaging to British prestige and would endanger the setting up of a common front against communism in Siam, Burma and Malaya. Again, however, it was suggested that there was little that Britain could do if the Chinese were really intent on taking Hong Kong, and in those circumstances the better course would be to come to an arrangement whereby the ‘Communist Government of China could acquiesce in our remaining’. To make the retention of the colony ‘a point of prestige’ might, in turn, make it ‘a matter of prestige for the Communists to force us to withdraw’. However, it was argued by others in Cabinet that a declaration of intent would: first, deter a direct attack; second, rally wavering elements in the Hong Kong population and reduce international strife; and third, strengthen the anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia. To support this, a quasidomino theory was described: The maintenance of our trading position in Hong Kong was doubtless important; but even more important at the present time was the political question whether we must not somewhere make a stand against Communist encroachment in the Far East. If we fail to make this stand in Hong Kong, should we not find it much harder to make it elsewhere in South East Asia?

A forthright declaration followed by lack of support from ‘friends’ would, however, be embarrassing (if only because Britain would appear to be ‘pursuing a selfish policy’), so it was decided to take up the Prime Minister’s proposal to seek support from the Commonwealth and America, although it was acknowledged that Nehru was unlikely to issue such a statement of support. No public announcement was to be made of policy, nor of the decision to send military reinforcements to Hong Kong. A month was to elapse before the disappointing news was communicated to Cabinet that only New Zealand was prepared to offer wholehearted help in the form of three or four frigates and possibly some aircraft with 95

Korean Conflict.indb 95

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

crews. South Africa had given a ‘firm promise of moral support’, but the other Commonwealth countries approached were unwilling to commit themselves, even Australia, a staunch ally in any and every conflict since the Sudan: ‘It was especially disappointing that the Australian Government should have been unwilling to assume any share of the responsibility … in a part of the world which they professed to regard as being of special concern to them.’ Bevin was nonetheless determined to press ahead with preparations to defend the colony, but was obliged to concede a little ground when some of his weaker brethren snatched once more at the possibility of some sort of ‘internationalization’ of Hong Kong. The United Kingdom, it was urged, should enlist US help in working out a scheme for placing the colony ‘under an international regime’, in which China might have a share, and the sooner the better since it might at any time demand the handing back of the territory. Other members of the Cabinet felt that this would convey an impression of weakness, run the risk of admitting a share of control to the Soviet Union, and, moreover, encounter legal difficulties connected with Britain’s right to surrender a leased territory to an international authority. However, although the Cabinet agreed to invite the Foreign Secretary ‘to give further consideration’ to the proposal, the wording of the invitation hardly constituted a firm instruction and nothing more was heard of the scheme. The United States administration, although evidently unwilling to offer more than moral support, did undertake a study of the problems of Hong Kong through the CIA, which gave five reasons for Britain’s wish to hang on: (a) the hope that a strongly defended Hong Kong will induce the Communists to negotiate a comprehensive settlement involving mutual economic and political concessions; (b) the loss of British prestige in Southeast Asia in the event of a withdrawal; (c) Commonwealth concern over Hong Kong; (d) public opinion in the UK; and (e) Hong Kong’s economic value to the British. 96

Korean Conflict.indb 96

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

Although not dismissing the possibility of a Chinese invasion of the territory, the CIA detected certain considerations which might dissuade them from doing so: the possible exploitation of the colony as a bargaining counter for international recognition and trade, the difficulty of administration, the economic benefits flowing from ‘a stable Hong Kong under British rule’, the military cost of an attack, and ‘possible Soviet opposition to a military assault’. On these grounds, the CIA estimated that an ‘attempted invasion, at least before September 1950, seems improbable’ and noted with satisfaction, ‘In the case of an attack, the British have announced a determination to defend Hong Kong and are preparing for that eventuality.’ As 1949 moved to its close, the question of Hong Kong was caught up in the broader problem of the recognition of Communist China, the offer of which might lessen China’s appetite for the colony. Indeed, the fact that the Chinese desisted from making demands after recognition was extended on 6 January 1950 might suggest that British calculations were correct. Of equal importance, though, as the CIA suggested, may have been the economic convenience of the port in Western hands, and also, as the CIA had not and possibly could not suggest, at least a residual desire not to offend the British – and the West generally – more than was necessary. Curiously, the process leading to Britain’s de jure recognition of Mao’s China, despite the vagaries of American policy, assumed almost an inevitable quality in contrast with the agonising that attended the decision to defend Hong Kong. Not that Bevin ever displayed enthusiasm for the task, a trait detected and assiduously worked upon by Acheson. On one occasion, according to the Secretary of State, Bevin ‘listened restlessly’ while he explained to him, yet again, the reasons for America’s refusal to contemplate recognition: Bevin would have to talk this over at home. Our interests in China, he thought, were divergent; the task was to reconcile our policies so far as possible. The United States Government was withdrawing; the United Kingdom, trying to hold on, to ‘keep a foot in the door and see what happens’. The British were not in a hurry to recognize the Communists (this attitude soon changed), but they did have big commercial and trade 97

Korean Conflict.indb 97

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

interests in China and they intended ‘to hang on in Hong Kong and stay there’. He feared that if the United States was too obdurate we would drive China into the arms of Russia. To which I added that they were there already.

Some six months or more before the Communist victory in China there was little that Britain could do beyond noting the progress of Mao’s forces, withholding de facto recognition for the moment and hoping that a Communist regime’s dependence on British commercial and trading expertise would postpone the evil day of expropriation and expulsion. It was not until August 1949 that the Cabinet had another long discussion about China, the period between March and August having been absorbed by the government’s preoccupation with Hong Kong. In a lengthy paper, occasioned by his forthcoming Washington visit and Acheson’s wish to discuss China, Bevin forecast Mao’s imminent victory and subsequent ‘control of the greater part of China’, but was less sure about the course of events thereafter: The political future is still obscure. In broadcasts and public pronouncements the Chinese Communists reiterate the orthodoxy of the Marxist–Leninist ideology, their support of the Soviet Union and the Cominform and their opposition to British and American ‘imperialism’. In the field of practical politics, little has been done to remedy the ills of China to which the Communists have become heirs, and there is as yet no evidence of a co-ordinated economic policy. It appears probable that a Communist government will be set up in the autumn. A message from a high Communist authority to His Majesty’s Government, received at third hand after some delay, suggests that there is a conflict between those Communists who are fanatical supporters of the Soviet Union and, believing in the imminence of a third world war, consider it not worth while to seek an arrangement with the western Powers; and those who, while 100 per cent Communist, consider that the consolidation of their position must be a slow process and that it is necessary to enter into relations and trade with the West. The extreme faction is said to control 98

Korean Conflict.indb 98

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

the propaganda machine, and this is said to explain why Communist publicity is wholly hostile to western Powers. That there is a conflict within the Chinese Communist Party is believed to be a fact; for the rest it remains to be seen how a Communist Central Government, when it is set up, will behave towards the western Powers.

In spite of the hope of a split in the Communist leadership, Bevin could not be sanguine: the position of British trading communities was cause for ‘serious concern’, with the threat of crippling taxation and the Communists remaining ‘uncooperative and aloof ’, while the absence of a US policy was if anything even more worrying than the muted hostility of the Communists. By quoting his officials’ assessment that there ‘do not seem to be any further grounds for hope that the Communists will fail in their bid for complete power’, Bevin expressed a devout wish that Mao and his followers had never existed. It was only much later that Attlee and other members of the government could talk of Chinese communism as they spoke of other forms of Asian nationalism, such as that which had led to the independence of India. For the moment, not unnaturally, they could see only the problems. The questions of recognition and of Chinese representation in the United Nations, continued the paper, ‘will become acute in the next few months’, and after recognition the Sino–British relationship might well be like that between Britain and the Soviet satellites of eastern Europe – that is to say, unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, it was important not to display an openly antagonistic attitude, since there was always the possibility ‘that the pattern will eventually develop along the lines of our present relationship with Yugoslavia’ – that is to say, not unsatisfactory. Arthur Ringwalt was, according to his own account, one of those at the London embassy responsible for attempting to retard British recognition, and he related in 1974: The British were originally going to recognize Communist China much sooner. In fact, they went ahead – an interesting tale – the British Consul General in Peking on his own initiative recognized Communist China, perhaps without realizing what he was doing. And when the Chinese 99

Korean Conflict.indb 99

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Communists declared themselves the government of China from the 1st October 1949, Graham, the British Consul General, went around to the Communists and congratulated them and said his government was prepared to – on his own initiative, mind you – recognize the competency of the Chinese government in areas under their control. This caused a great deal of stir back in London because the British were taken aback … The British Foreign Office legal adviser … and the legal adviser came out with the opinion, ‘Well, regardless of whether or not he meant to recognize Communist China, he’s done it.’ It was a fait accompli. So, thereafter, it was only a question of when a formal recognition would come from the Foreign Office. And we, at least in Washington, got excited and said, ‘Hold off, hold off, hold off.’ But Nehru on the other hand, who held very strong views on the subject and had a great deal of influence with the then Labour Government, insisted, ‘You must, you must recognize quickly. Quickly, quickly.’ And we said, ‘No, no, never, never, never.’ So the British ended up by delaying Formal recognition for a matter of a few weeks only.

Ringwalt’s memory was not at fault. The British Consul General did tell the Communist authorities on 5 October that his government wished to extend de facto recognition, though the Foreign Office, caught on the hop by his action, explained to the US embassy in London that it was ‘meant merely as [a] device [to] establish [an] informal relationship [with the] Communists’. They further explained that the question of de jure recognition required prior consultation with the Americans, as agreed by Acheson and Bevin, whereas ‘consultation [is] not contemplated in [the] case of de facto recognition’. It was difficult to escape the conclusion, Holmes cabled to Acheson, that the whole thing was deliberate. On 14 October Acheson delivered a rap on the knuckles to Bevin, complaining that, notwithstanding the Foreign Office view that de facto recognition had not been accorded, the strong implication was that it had been and that the Americans were not told about it until six days afterwards. Truman, when told of the affair, commented that ‘the British had not played very squarely with us on this matter’. Lew Douglas, delivering Acheson’s message, secured Bevin’s 100

Korean Conflict.indb 100

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

agreement that consultation with Washington should have occurred. ‘Dening was sent for,’ continued Douglas, ‘and offered apologetic explanation that because of procedural error instructions to British Embassy in Washington had been sent by airgram instead of cable, which accounted for the fact that we were not notified in advance.’ Dening had to repeat the whole humiliating explanation to Ringwalt, who asked him if anyone in the Foreign Office ‘might have pulled a fast one’: He denied emphatically that any skulduggery had been intended anywhere along the line, but admitted that his overworked and undermanned staff had committed two stupid errors: (1) the Foreign Office instruction to the British Embassy at Washington containing the text of the note … had inadvertently been sent ‘Saving’ (by air mail) instead of being telegraphed, (2) the Far Eastern Department had blundered outrageously in not checking with its Legal Adviser who … is of the opinion that the note as delivered amounted to de facto recognition.

Meanwhile the United States’ China policy was not entirely innocuous. The Americans were proposing a species of economic warfare against the Communist regime, a policy complementary with their tacit support of Chiang Kai-shek. This became the subject of a sharp exchange between London and Washington and was to be discussed between Acheson and Bevin during Bevin’s September visit to Washington. The disagreement was symptomatic of the responses of America and Britain towards the new China: the United States treating the Communists – even before Mao announced the establishment of his government – as their enemies, while the British strove mightily to appear to be acting normally towards them. In an aide-mémoire from the American embassy of 3 August, the State Department expressed its ‘disappointment’ with the British reply to a suggestion originally made in July that ‘the western Powers demonstrate their bargaining strength’ by ‘the concerted control of selected exports of key importance to the Chinese economy’. Britain’s unenthusiastic response to the suggestion had, in the view of the State Department, portentous implications: 101

Korean Conflict.indb 101

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Any failure to demonstrate western control over selected imports would represent the abandonment of the most important single instrument available for the defense of mutual vital western interests in China and the Far East generally. Yet the proposed United Kingdom response would appear to imply the desirability of a completely passive role by the western nations in their economic relations with China. Such a role would extend not only to all strategic aspects of the China problem, but would cast serious doubt on the possibility of arriving at an effective joint approach towards the mutually agreed objective of combating the spread of communism throughout Asia.

The United States professed not to understand what ‘political and administrative difficulties’ (a classic British delaying tactic doubtless familiar in Washington) were so great as to outweigh the ‘importance of solidarity in the adoption of a strategy for the maximum protection of United StatesUnited Kingdom mutual, vital long-range interests’. It appears not to have occurred to Washington, or perhaps was not pointed out to them with sufficient emphasis, that the ‘vital long-term interests’ of the British, namely their financial stake in China, would be threatened rather than secured by the American plan. In January 1950 Julius Holmes, of the US embassy in London, cabled Acheson: ‘Economic difficulties explain in part their recognition of China – a long-shot gamble made in the hope that Brit may save something of its trade and investment (four times of US), as well as enable her to hold Hong Kong.’ Bevin wished to reply bluntly to Acheson at their forthcoming meeting. Although Britain agreed with the broad anti-Communist goal in Asia and was already controlling the export of arms and certain petroleum products to China, the wider American programme would not work and indeed would have adverse effects, especially upon ‘the exertion of Western influence on the Chinese Communists’. Not only would China regard the assumption of export controls ‘as a threat to impose sanctions’, but in British eyes it was ‘hard to see why such a step should be any more effective than an announcement designed to remind the Chinese Communists of the economic bargaining position of the West’. Almost in praise of the Communists – for in economic 102

Korean Conflict.indb 102

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

matters, it was implied, they were no less pragmatic than the British – Bevin went on to say that they ‘regard commercial relations as being entirely dissociated from political relations’ and were willing to trade freely with ‘capitalist countries with whom they are in acute political divergence’. By October 1949 the case for recognition had, in Bevin’s opinion, become ‘strong’, since the Communists had set up the People’s Republic and had ‘expressed a desire to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign Powers’. However, he advised Cabinet that before a decision was taken the USA and Commonwealth nations should be consulted and consideration given to the conclusions reached at a forthcoming conference of Colonial Governors of Southeast Asia and the Far East. This conference, held in Singapore early in November under the chairmanship of the Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, was important because its participants might be able to offer an assessment of the effects of recognition upon the peoples of the regions they represented. With the proviso that the new government in China should accept their ‘existing international obligations’, the conference urged early recognition and observed comfortingly that it ‘would in no way affect the attitude of the Chinese communities’ in British territories. Even so, Bevin, if not wavering, was still privately unsure of the wisdom of the course the government had charted. Lew Douglas reported to Acheson on 1 December: Just before Bevin went off to Eastbourne for his two or three weeks retirement and confinement, he talked to me very personally and quite unofficially about China and his Government’s attitude toward recognition. He made it clear that his own mind had not come to rest on the matter, and anything he said was in the nature of a premature preview of his thoughts. Obviously, therefore, anything he might say would not have the sanction of Cabinet. They were becoming increasingly worried about the effects of non-recognition, and although Bevin had not come to any clear decision, he felt that probably during the course of the next month or six weeks they would conclude to extend recognition to the Communist regime. He said he didn’t know whether, should they reach this conclusion, recognition would be de facto or de jure. 103

Korean Conflict.indb 103

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Sir Oliver Franks, though, speaking to Acheson a week after Douglas had written, and responding to yet another lecture from the Secretary of State about the moral unworthiness of the new China, was insistent on the need to make a positive decision swiftly. He ‘wanted it understood that the British Cabinet was not merely going to consider the question in mid-December but … would probably make a decision which might well be to recognize before the year was out’. The Cabinet duly considered the matter in mid-December and accepted Bevin’s recommendation ‘to accord de jure recognition to the Chinese Communist Government at an early date’, the exact timing of which was left in his hands. Despite the US view that British recognition ‘would be a stab in the back’ while any opposition to the Communist regime still existed (an argument, surely, for perpetual non-recognition), the Foreign Secretary’s reasons were plainly compelling and overcame any residual distaste felt in Cabinet for Mao’s government. However, Bevin was at pains to point out that recognition did ‘not signify approval of its ideology or outlook’, but was ‘no more than an acceptance of a fact, which its withholding would not alter’. This clear-eyed understanding of events was enhanced by the fact that failure to recognise would imply a deliberate boycott of the regime, which, in turn, would damage British trading interests, lessen the possibility of modifying China’s hostility, and poison the long-term relationship between the two countries. As to the latter, it is noteworthy that the British obviously envisaged a long life for the Chinese government, unlike the Americans who never abandoned the fond hope that the Communists might suddenly collapse as a result of widespread internal dissatisfaction and revolt. The establishment of diplomatic relations, Bevin continued, ‘may be expected to provide the minimum protection necessary’ to British trading and commercial interests, while ‘arbitrary and vexatious’ regulations would, he implied, have to be borne with fortitude as the price demanded by economic necessity. Similarly, the military disadvantages of recognition were thought to be outweighed by the ‘political and economic advantage’. The corollary of recognition would have to be Britain’s readiness to uphold China’s claim to be represented in all international bodies, including, of course, the Security Council of the United Nations, even though – another 104

Korean Conflict.indb 104

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

penalty of recognition – the Chinese could be expected to cast their vote against Britain on most major issues. In conclusion, Bevin stated: We have now reached the stage when we have consulted with friendly Governments on this question and we have to make up our own minds. There is an obvious danger if recognition is delayed too long, and the time may not be very far distant when, if it is withheld any further, the Chinese Communist Government will begin to put pressure on our interests in China, and even demand the withdrawal of our officials. We shall then be compelled either to accord recognition under duress or to withhold it indefinitely as a gesture against coercion. To adopt the first alternative would be to weaken our whole position in the Far East. To adopt the second would be to sacrifice our interests in China which we have been at pains to maintain.

Recognition was therefore inescapable and was accorded on 6 January 1950, with the Americans, as we have seen, being thoughtful enough to create a loud diversion offstage. The gratitude of the British for the action of the US administration lends strength to the view that they felt the dictates of decency required a certain furtiveness in the accomplishment of the action. It was as if the government agreed with those US commentators who, according to Franks, ‘admitted that we have compelling reasons which make our decision understandable, if not laudable’. Six months later, in his report on US affairs for 1949, he was to comment that ‘dismay over divergence of United States and United Kingdom foreign policy was widely shared’, the China problem being thought to be an example ‘where the centripetal effect of common resistance to the danger of Communism did not exist’. Supported though it was by the Conservatives, including Churchill, the decision to recognise was taken in the face of a largely indifferent or antagonistic public. A Gallup poll of December 1949 showed only 29 per cent in favour of the proposal, while 45 per cent were opposed and a large minority of 26 per cent had no opinion. However, China could hardly have 105

Korean Conflict.indb 105

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

loomed large in the minds of the British public in the winter of 1949–50, so this was a case of a foreign issue on which the government enjoyed considerable freedom to act as it chose. As the Americans predicted, and no doubt observed with a touch of schadenfreude, far from bringing advantages, recognition seemed only to worsen the plight of the British in China, as a lugubrious paper by Bevin pointed out in April 1950. The Foreign Secretary spoke of ‘a profoundly unsatisfactory situation’ and an ‘exceedingly dark’ picture, as if, indeed, the nation were suddenly plunged back into the dark days of 1940. What caused this bleak outlook? The Chinese had refused to establish normal diplomatic relations, leaving British diplomats in China looking distinctly bedraggled and confused after the tidal wave of the Communist victory had passed over them. United Kingdom business interests had ‘greatly deteriorated’, the question of Chinese representation in the UN had not been resolved, Soviet influence and military aid had ‘undoubtedly strengthened’ following the signing of the Sino–Soviet Treaty in February, and the United States continued to act in ways harmful to the interests of the West. While the Chinese appeared to be ready to tolerate British trading and other interests and had refrained from ‘physical molestation’, their indifference to the difficulties caused by heavy taxation and by the Nationalist blockade, as well as their refusal to allow the dismissal of labour even when industries were idle, all pointed to a policy of inaction designed to bring about the liquidation of British enterprises. So grim had things become that Bevin was constrained to warn Cabinet that ‘if there is to be a break in our relations with China, the initiative and responsibility for that break should be left with the Chinese’, especially as opinion in the Far East and Southeast Asia would rally to the side of the British in such circumstances. Keeping a foot in the door was proving to be painful, but in effect Bevin advised a general gritting of teeth and stiffening of sinews so that Britain could remain where it was. The Cabinet, as ever, agreed with the Foreign Secretary. They could offer little comfort to their countrymen in China, who were to be told ‘that they should not expect the United Kingdom Government to give them any financial assistance in order to help them maintain their establishments’. 106

Korean Conflict.indb 106

04/09/2015 11:40

RECOGNISING COMMUNIST CHINA

In what the Americans called ‘scarcely veiled criticism’ of US policy, Sir Esler Dening used the talks between officials in Washington in May to blame the United States for Britain’s Chinese ills. Identifying China as the ‘chief area of difference’ over the whole range of matters of mutual concern to the US and the UK, Dening insisted that American support of Formosa’s blockade and the bombing of Chinese cities had been largely responsible for the extension of ‘Soviet military power as far south as Shanghai’. Livingstone Merchant, his opposite number, unwittingly demonstrating that the twain could never meet, replied that at least the blockade was causing China ‘economic and administrative difficulties’. Dening empha­ tically, and disingenuously, rejected the US notion that British policy been ‘dictated by commercial interests’. Instead, he argued, it had been shaped by the vital necessity of denying the entire field to the Soviet Union, in support of which he rather recklessly cited the presence of the ‘UK mission in Belgrade [as] largely instrumental in [the] growth of Titoism’ (one wonders what Marshal Tito would have made of this). As for Communist Chinese membership of the United Nations, Dening could only repeat the view that ‘one cannot exclude a charter member merely because one does not like his ideologies’. To the Americans at that stage of their relations with China, this was a counsel of perfection. The outcome of these talks was not a happy augury for the conference of Foreign Ministers, for which they had been a preparation. On China, Bevin and Acheson got nowhere; indeed, Bevin subsequently reported to Cabinet that on the question of UN membership of Communist China, there would be ‘no point’ in British representatives at the UN raising the item at all.

107

Korean Conflict.indb 107

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER THREE

‘An unstable little state beneath the 38th parallel’4

I

n all the minutes, memoranda, conference papers and correspondence engendered by the problem of China and the Far East, one searches almost in vain for any mention of Korea by British policy makers before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. There were two reasons for this. First, it seems as if, apart from a few Foreign Office specialists, the British had barely any knowledge of the country’s existence. Churchill spoke for his countrymen when he told Montgomery in July 1953, ‘I’d never heard of the bloody place till I was 75.’ Perhaps complete ignorance was a happier state than some slight acquaintance. As recorded by Bruce Lockhart in his diary, a Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Le Quesne Martel told him that Koreans ‘are a miserable, diseased and syphilitic race who are no good’, an opinion no doubt shared by many thousands of British prisoners of war who had had the misfortune to be guarded by Korean soldiers in the Japanese army during World War II. Second, although commercial considerations had obliged the British to take a keen interest in China, Korea was clearly part of the Far East consigned to the American sphere of interest, a tacit arrangement acknowledged almost casually by Franks and Acheson in December 1949: As he was leaving, the British Ambassador asked whether he could put this memorandum in the context of a remark that the US conceived its interest in that area of the world as an arc which stretched from Japan through to India and that our interest was not merely a line so to speak drawn from California through Japan to China. I said that the concept fitted other discussions we had had …

108

Korean Conflict.indb 108

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

Of course, Japan was known to be virtually an exclusively American bailiwick. As early as January 1946 the Foreign Office Research Department accurately forecast the collapse of formal inter-allied power over MacArthur’s freedom of initiative in Japan, and stated, ‘When Commissions break down, proconsuls prance, and this one may be expected to prance with uncommon vigour.’ However, Bevin could not be accused of abdicating British responsibility for Korea, since that process had begun not long after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Korea in 1883, a process hastened by the Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1910. Such interest as was taken in Korea was expressed in the weekly political intelligence summaries of the Research Department. The tone of these reports was an exasperated pessimism about the future of Korea, with more than a hint of asperity directed at American bungling in the country, although the sheer difficulty – if not impossibility – of attempting to bring democracy to Korea almost overnight was fully recognised. In November 1945, only three months after the conclusion of World War II, the Foreign Office reported that the sharp bisection of the country at the 38th parallel had destroyed ‘the economic unity which it had under Japanese rule’ and sowed confusion among the Koreans as to the intentions of the occupying powers. Addressing a meeting in Seoul, Syngman Rhee told his listeners that he had asked General MacArthur and General Hodge, the US Military Commander in Korea, to explain what the allies’ plans were in Korea. Neither had been able to do so. The report continued: ‘But surely,’ said Rhee with an optimism undimmed by a lifetime of tribulation, ‘somebody somewhere in the world knows the answer.’ Unfortunately for Rhee and his countrymen, no one did know the answer in the atmosphere of uncompromising hostility that had developed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the terms of the Moscow Agreement, the occupying powers were to consult ‘Korean democratic parties and social organisations’ with a view to setting up a provisional government for the whole of the liberated nation, which would remain under a four-power trusteeship (involving Britain, the USA, China and the USSR) for a period of up to five years. From the start the Soviet–US Joint Commission could not agree on who should and should 109

Korean Conflict.indb 109

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

not be consulted among the Korean people, let alone on larger constitutional questions, and the talks collapsed completely in May 1946. This had several unpleasant consequences. The 38th parallel, originally designed by Dean Rusk in the State Department as a line of convenience for the American and Soviet forces’ acceptance of the Japanese surrender, now became an impenetrable barrier to the exchange of goods between the two zones. The Foreign Office observed: Thus Korea continues to remain divided by an artificial barrier between regions which depend upon one another. In the north are the industries, in the south the farms. And with conflicting political systems in each of the two zones, the tendency is to a widening of the gap rather than unity.

The economic disruption brought about by this division worsened food shortages and led to rampant inflation and profiteering, which in turn created political strife in the south. Politicians, of whom there were many of all factions, were ‘busily stirring up a witch’s brew of intrigue, disorder, and murder’. Riots, assassinations and brawls were commonplace, while at the same time the Americans’ insistence on trusteeship turned the hatred of the population towards their supposed guardians and protectors. All of this, not surprisingly but perhaps unfairly, inclined the Foreign Office to regard Koreans as too politically immature to be allowed to manage their own affairs. ‘It is nowhere contended’, observed one report, ‘that the Koreans are yet capable of assuming the responsibilities of self government.’ There were few leaders ‘with any political ability and none experienced in governmental administration’, and those who did ‘inspire respect … do not carry the rank-and-file with them, partly because in the eyes of the Koreans they are old, conservative and out of touch with modern Korea’. Even worse, the right-wing parties, favoured by the Military Government, conducted ‘themselves noisily, to the frequent embarrassment of their American friends’. The Americans too harboured a belief that Koreans were feckless and irresponsible, and yet, because of the exigencies of the cold war, they pushed them hard towards self-government under a leader – Syngman Rhee – for 110

Korean Conflict.indb 110

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

whom Acheson and the State Department had scant respect. A CIA report of October 1948 called Rhee’s behaviour ‘often irrational and literally childish’ and warned that ‘his inflated ego may lead him to action disastrous or at least highly embarrassing to the new Korean government and to the interests of the US’. But Rhee was also staunchly anti-Communist, and, concluded the CIA with exceptional inconsistency, ‘a remarkable astute politician’. This was a combination of qualities sufficiently attractive for the purposes of the Americans in Korea to overlook his shortcomings. To the British the policy of the Americans in Korea was scarcely less obscure than their general Far Eastern policy, but they were convinced at the beginning of 1947 that, at the least, ‘the American people must be prepared for a long and costly occupation’. Subsequent reports showed that the witch’s brew had come to the boil. They spoke of a ‘sad picture of bewilderment and dismay of the Southern Koreans at the results to date of the American occupation’ which was ‘achieving neither political, nor economic, rehabilitation’. To add to the general sense of chaos, the ‘systematic looting’ by the Soviets in the North and the imposition of a oneparty state there had created a flood of refugees, which suggested to the Foreign Office that ‘life in Northern Korea is not all beer and skittles’. Even ‘at the risk of wrecking the Joint Commission’, a report enjoined in August 1947, ‘the United States delegation must take immediate steps to declare and implement a definite policy … if a confused and frustrated people are to be prevented from resorting to desperate measures’. By September the Joint Commission had abandoned any attempt to form a provisional government and Korea seemed likely henceforth to remain divided. As if to demonstrate how hopeless the situation had become, the Americans proposed a scheme to the United Nations in October which was utterly futile in conception. Under its terms the UN would set up a commission to supervise elections in both zones of Korea for a single National Assembly, but – and here was the rub – the new legislative body would comprise representatives in proportion to the population size of the zones – that is to say, two-thirds from the south (20 million) and a third from the north (10 million). Given the degree of ideological rigidity that had formed, such a proposal would never have been acceptable to the Soviet Union. In the north 111

Korean Conflict.indb 111

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the Russians had banned any parties hostile to Moscow. In the south General Hodge had recently approved of a law by which voters must fill in ballot papers unaided. In restrained tones, the Foreign Office pointed to the obvious consequences: ‘This deprives the illiterate section of the population of representation proportionate to their numbers and will not commend itself to those parties who rely on the support of the proletariat.’ From this point on the Foreign Office intelligence summaries expressed mounting concern about the possibility of civil war, both in the South and between the South and the North. Armed raids across the border by both sides were numerous, and were ‘becoming an increasing source of anxiety to the United States occupation authorities’, some of them conducted by southern groups with alarming names such as the Braving Death Society. Intelligent Koreans, it was remarked, ‘appear to be making up their minds to the prospect of eventual civil war’, an attitude doubtless reinforced by tales of imminent invasion told by defectors from the North, as well as ‘the slaughter of all police and prisoners taken, and, ultimately, the setting up of the eighteenth Soviet Republic’. The American authorities must have keenly envied their colleagues in occupied Germany and Japan. By March 1949 puppet regimes had been established in both halves of Korea. The Soviet forces had withdrawn, the Americans were in the process of pulling out, and war was expected by the British as a likelihood rather than as a possibility. A Cabinet paper, ‘Communism in Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit’, noted of Korea: In general, it is clear that despite many grave political and economic weaknesses, which could of themselves injure or destroy the Republic of Korea, the specifically Communist danger lies not with the residents in the southern territories, but with the agents, arms, money or troops which the Russians or the Korean Communist Government may send in from North Korea. These are already producing a simulated ‘fifthcolumn’ which is claimed by the Communists to presage a general revolt.

From his vantage point in Washington in 1949, Sir Oliver Franks was in no doubt that the Americans were abandoning their erstwhile protégé. As a 112

Korean Conflict.indb 112

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

result of the Communists’ success in China, the Korean Peninsula, he observed, was being left as ‘an isolated beach-head on the Asiatic continent highly vulnerable to Soviet attack’. Hence the ‘American willingness to withdraw’ and the ‘ample indications that the military authorities were thinking of an Asiatic theatre in terms of island bases on the continental periphery’. By late 1949 the War Office were also giving some thought to the matter. In reply to a note from E.J.F. Scott of the Foreign Office, Major Ferguson-Innes commented: On the question of aggression by the North, there can be no doubt whatever that their ultimate object is to overrun the South; and I think in the long term there is no doubt that they will do so, in which case, as you so aptly remark, the Americans will have made a rather handsome contribution to the military strength of Asiatic communism … Whilst being in no doubt about future North Korean (or Soviet) plans regarding South Korea, we think an invasion is unlikely in the immediate future; however, if it did take place, I think it improbable that the Americans would become involved. The position of South Korea is not essential for Allied strategic plans, and though it would obviously be desirable to deny it to the enemy, it would not be of sufficient importance to make it the cause of World War III.

If speculation of this sort caused anxiety, it was not deep or immediate enough to prompt any Minister to bring the subject of Korea to the attention of Cabinet in the period between the paper of March 1949 and the outbreak of war on the peninsula in June 1950. The reason is plain. If a conflict was to occur, then, so far as the British were concerned, it would have contributed no more than ‘a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing’. Besides, Korea was the Americans’ affair and they were washing their hands of the tiresome place. It therefore came as a surprise to the British when the Americans declared their intention to aid South Korea militarily against the North after conflict had begun on 25 June 1950. Britain’s prompt support for the lead taken by the United States, including the immediate commitment of the Royal Navy, was 113

Korean Conflict.indb 113

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

a decision of such insouciance as to defy explanation except by reference to the American hold over British foreign policy in what Washington deemed to be an international crisis. Even considering that the Cabinet accepted the near universal view that the Kremlin had ordered the North Koreans to invade, and that no one could have foreseen the widespread and long-lasting consequences of the decision, it nonetheless remains puzzling. As we have seen, the British regarded the Americans, in their Far Eastern policy, as a sort of mentally retarded adolescent son, immensely strong but capricious and wilful in behaviour. Why, then, after defying the US over the China recognition issue, did Britain fully support American policy in Korea with barely a moment’s thought, risking inter alia the delicate and painfully created relationship with Communist China? Moreover, this was a conflict in a country where Britain had no financial or other interests and in defence of a regime for which it had little respect (insofar as anything at all was known of Korea). Only two days after the start of hostilities, when Truman placed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits at Acheson’s behest, the agreement to disagree over China became an agreement to disagree violently over Formosa. George McGovern has helped to identify one of the causes of the precipitate decision: In my view, the most abused and most costly historical analogy since World War II has been the frequent invocation of American policymakers of the ‘lessons of Munich’. By appeasing Hitler at Munich, the lesson goes, we set the stage for World War II under even more dangerous circumstances. The Soviet Union, via Korea, Cuba and Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, or Angola has created another potential ‘Munich’. Let us therefore apply the lessons of Munich and intervene to stop these manifestations of Hitlerism and thus avoid World War III.

These observations apply to Britain in the case of Korea with as much force as they do to the United States. Politicians, ever prone to dangerous – because almost invariably fallacious – conclusions based of the ‘lessons of history’, are no less apt than anyone else to make decisions in a crisis which spring from a fear of repeating shameful past actions. The peculiar 114

Korean Conflict.indb 114

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

tenacity of the memory of Munich lay not only in the shame it prompted but also in the conviction that the shame was caused by an act of policy that had failed. In the House of Commons on 26 June 1950, the day after the outbreak of war, Attlee expressed certainty that ‘there will be no disagreement, after our bitter experience in the past 35 years, that the salvation of all is dependent on prompt and effective measures to arrest aggression wherever it may occur’. In a broadcast on 30 July Attlee reminded the nation of the lessons of the 1930s, which ‘should have taught us that failure to take up disagreeable but necessary duty only postpones the evil day and brings greater troubles upon us … The fire started in distant Korea may burn down your house.’ The Prime Minister’s evocation of Munich was no idle rhetorical device. He and his colleagues believed what they were saying both publicly and privately. Although nervous about too close an identification in Truman’s proposed statement between the Soviet Union and the North Korean invasion, the Cabinet recalled ‘the events preceding the Second World War’ in considering the ‘risks in allowing the Soviet Union to conclude, as Hitler had done, that aggression would succeed if its victim could be over-powered sufficiently quickly’. Similarly apprehensive about some American assumptions, the New Statesman nonetheless felt obliged to point out that ‘an act of aggression has been committed, and that one of the quickest ways to war – as the world knows in 1950 – is unchecked acts of aggression leading to the humiliated state of mind of Munich and, sooner or later, to that of 1939’. A draft statement prepared for the Labour Party conference of 1950 said, ‘There is only one way to meet the military danger. We learnt that lesson the hard way in the Thirties. We know the suicidal stupidity of appeasement. Aggression must be stopped by strength in its early stages. We must teach the dictators that aggression does not pay.’ Sir Alvary Gascoigne, writing from Tokyo, remarked on the similarity between the Russian action in Korea and the ‘Nazi technique of isolating and defeating one state after another’. But Korea was not Czechoslovakia, and Stalin, let alone Kim Il-sung, was not Hitler. Accompanying the belief that a failure of will in Korea would be akin to a resurrection of Munich was a desire to see the failed hoped reposed in the 115

Korean Conflict.indb 115

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

League of Nations redeemed in the police action of the United Nations, making it all the easier for America to represent its unilateral action as being taken on behalf of all right-minded nations. Korea would not only salve the still uneasy liberal conscience related to Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain and Czechoslovakia, but would triumphantly vindicate the idea of the League of Nations. Despite the expression of such sentiments, the initial response of the British Cabinet and officials to the outbreak of war scarcely amounted to a steely resolve to nip Communist aggression in the bud. Gladwyn Jebb, on first hearing the news, thought that either the ‘unpopular and seemingly not very democratic Syngman Rhee’ would be deposed and a deal done with North Korea to unify the country, or else ‘the affair would be patched up without the Americans deploying any armed forces’. He was ‘staggered’ to learn from Sir Pierson Dixon that the Americans had gone in ‘with everything they’ve got’. R.H. Scott, who had doubted that the USA ‘will intervene militarily’, must have been equally staggered, though he did think that His Majesty’s Government shared ‘to a slight extent the American interest in the retention of a non-Communist foothold on the NE Asian mainland’. Sir Oliver Franks, too, before the US responded militarily, seems not to have expected such action in support of South Korea. Significantly, his report to London was more concerned with the worrying possibility of ‘some sudden decision on Formosa’ by the Americans and its potentially adverse effects on the ‘convergence of our respective policies on China’ – a decision, moreover, which would accord with ‘Acheson’s need for political rehabilitation with the public’. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister, was also taken by surprise. Earlier in 1950 he had spoken to General MacArthur, who, responding to Pearson’s query about the exclusion of Korea from the Pacific security zone, had stated, ‘No, it would be very difficult, it would be embarrassing, it would be disappointing, it would be worrying if an enemy took Korea; but it is not vital to our security.’ When the North Korean invasion came, Pearson recalled in his memoirs, ‘I was caught by surprise, not only by the aggression but, what is more to the point, by the United States reaction.’ The fact that three senior Foreign Office officials, one of them – Franks – very close to Acheson, did not expect the 116

Korean Conflict.indb 116

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

action taken by America indicates how little they knew of the Far Eastern policy of their ally, and also how low in their scale of priorities the fate of the South Korean regime was. When shown the American draft of a Security Council resolution on 25 June, Sir Terence Shone, the British representative, was among those who took the general line that this was a fight between Koreans. In its essence, therefore, it was in the nature of a civil war and they objected to the use of the word ‘aggression’ since that implies aggression of one State against another State.

The resolution was stiffly worded and, in calling for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel and for the rendering of every assistance by UN members, clearly attributed blame to North Korea. On the next day, 26 June, Sir Terence urgently requested instructions as to whether it would be appropriate for the Security Council to address an appeal to the Soviet Union to help bring about an end to hostilities. He feared that such an appeal would carry too heavy an implication of Soviet guilt for the Korean aggression. The Americans were already beginning to feel that the British were pussyfooting. So too did the French. David Bruce, the US ambassador in France, reported on 26 June that Massigli, his French counterpart in London, was struck with the British ‘calm over the Korean episode’, while the head of the French Foreign Office, Parodi, was ‘disappointed over what he considers [the] phlegmatic British attitude’. British caution, amounting to at least the appearance of timidity, did not match the actions of those who had learned the lessons of Munich. They hesitated to call the Russians aggressors, because provocative language might antagonise the potential enemy, and in addition the evidence for such an accusation did not exist. In their first discussion of the North Korean invasion the Cabinet agreed that it ‘had not been proved that … the North Koreans had been acting on instructions from Moscow’. On the same day, at a meeting between Kenneth Younger, Strang, R.H. Scott and two members of the American embassy, Julius Holmes and Arthur Ringwalt, it 117

Korean Conflict.indb 117

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

was also ‘agreed that there was no direct evidence of Russian participation or complicity in the attack on South Korea’. The issue of Soviet complicity was raised in Cabinet on 27 June as a result of the necessity to consider the text of a statement to be delivered by Truman that same day. In it he intended to refer to ‘centrally-directed Communist imperialism’ as the fundamental cause of the Korean conflict. It was preferable, thought Cabinet, to isolate the Korean incident and treat it as an act committed on North Korean initiative. Not only was evidence of Soviet instigation lacking, but a more cautious statement would enable ‘the Soviet Government to withdraw, without loss of prestige, any encouragement or support which they might have been giving to the North Koreans’. In addition, a proposed reference to Formosa ‘might embarrass the United Kingdom Government in their relations’ with China, possibly provoking the latter to attack Hong Kong or foment disorder there. The Americans, at least privately, were similarly cautious. George Kennan, explaining to Sir Oliver Franks the reasoning behind the decisions taken by the US, said that the Russians, after realising they would have no part in a Japanese peace treaty, had indeed instructed the North Koreans to attack but had no intention of entering the war, and indeed had left themselves a way out if things went badly for their satellite. It was therefore important that the United States should cope with the incident ‘in such a manner as to restrict it to minor proportions’, especially as the administration ‘did not attach overwhelming importance to [the] strategic position of Southern Korea’. Nor did Acheson believe that the ‘present test of military strength’ was intended by Russia ‘to go beyond [the] boundaries of Korea’. However, on 27 June the British Cabinet did not know of these currents of thought in Washington (in fact, on the same day Kennan apologised to Franks for the lack of consultation in the preceding 36 hours), and the ambassador was instructed to tell Acheson of their concern. In order to prevent world war, advised the Foreign Office, ‘it seems to us essential to give [the] Russians an opportunity of beating a retreat when confronted with this welcome manifestation of American power and determination.’ It was noted that the USSR had made no statement of policy and ‘have 118

Korean Conflict.indb 118

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

most carefully avoided identifying themselves with the North Koreans’. Accordingly the members of His Majesty’s Government most strongly urge that the statement be so worded as to omit any reference to Soviet responsibility for the attack which however obvious is not susceptible of proof … no challenge should be thrown which the Russians might feel bound to take up … the statement should omit any reference to the situation in terms of ‘centrally directed Communist imperialism’.

The Americans heeded the advice and the presidential statement was made without the offending phrase. However, it was scarcely exculpatory of the Soviet Union: ‘The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.’ In the same statement Truman announced his decision to station the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and mainland China, an order which was to severely strain the relations between Britain and the United States. *

*

*

The Security Council resolution of 27 June 1950, which called on UN members to assist in repelling the aggression, amounted to an ex post facto legitimation by the UN of military action taken solely by the United States. The decisions of the British government first to support the resolution and later to lend armed support to the United States were made with a remarkable lack of internal debate or analysis, in sharp contrast to the degree of attention that the British had accorded the question of Soviet complicity in the North Korean incursion. As ‘Rab’ Butler noted, the Americans had ‘rushed UNO’; Britain too had acted with haste. On 26 June Younger and Attlee visited Bevin in hospital, where the three decided on the course of action to be taken by the Cabinet the next day. Few as they were, the brief and scattered analyses that the British did undertake were advanced only after Younger and Attlee had met with Bevin. Apart from an allusion in Cabinet to Hitler and the 1930s, there seems to have been no questioning of Russian nor, indeed, of American 119

Korean Conflict.indb 119

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

motives in the context of these decisions. Rarely can an important determination of foreign policy have been made with such alacrity and with so little knowledge of the circumstances, and yet the nation was proceeding to commit itself to war. In his radio broadcast on 30 July, Attlee simply paraphrased President Truman: Make no mistake about it, the evil forces now attacking Korea are part of a world-wide conspiracy against the way of life of the free democracies. Communists, whether they make war in Korea or cause disruption in Malaya, India or Burma, whether they destroy the liberties of the Czechs and Poles, or try to wreck the economic recovery of Britain, France or Australia, are all engaged in an attempt to mould the whole world to their pattern of tyranny.

As he then went on to castigate the Soviet Union for its destructive tactics and impulses since the end of World War II, Attlee’s listeners could hardly have been in any doubt who to blame for the Korean affair. On 27 June a warning came from GHQ , Far East Land Forces that if no action was taken in Korea the ‘repercussions throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia will be farreaching’. The only possible restorative would be armed American intervention (a decision already taken, of course), which would create the risk of general war. However, ‘if our estimate of Russian policy is correct, namely that the lengths to which it will at present go stop short of war directly involving the Soviet Union’, the risk was not as great as might be feared; as the Berlin air lift had demonstrated, only by bringing matters to the brink of war would the Russians be forced to withdraw. In Washington Lord Tedder, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission, told General Bradley that he was ‘generally in accord with our taking the firm position’ and gave Bradley a full report of the disposition of British forces in the Far East. However, Foreign Office representatives in the Far East were no wiser than their colleagues in Whitehall. G.L. Clutton, writing from Tokyo, confessed:

120

Korean Conflict.indb 120

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

that it came as a complete surprise to, I think, everyone here. We knew, of course, that the Republic of Southern Korea was an artificial and fragile creation and it seemed inevitable, even, from what I have gathered, in the view of the Supreme Commander himself, that sooner or later it would be absorbed by Northern Korea … None of us had expected anything so blatant as this. What we had expected was the usual Soviet technique of infiltration and guerilla activity culminating in the collapse of the legitimate Government.

Sir Alvary Gascoigne, writing to Sir Esler Dening from Tokyo, took the process of explanation somewhat further. The North Koreans, he noted, had for years been trained as ‘a first-class fighting force’, whereas the South had trained their men only as a police force, and the result Gascoigne compared ‘with the position of the French and British armies in northern France in May and June 1940’. Although the attack came as a complete surprise, Gascoigne’s military adviser told him that it had been known in April that some sort of preparations were being made in the North, so, in his view, the Americans should have been ready in the sense of knowing what to do, in the technical way, ‘when the storm broke’. He concluded his analysis with the somewhat premature observation that, ‘The United Nations flag is in the ascendant – thank God for that.’ However, alarums and excursions were commonplace in Korea and, as E.J.F. Scott observed, ‘We knew, as did the world at large, that either side might have decided at any time that its forces were more ready … than those of the other for civil war: we also knew that a successful border affray might at any time have set such a civil war going.’ It was doubtful, he surmised, that the South Koreans had known that an invasion was pending – otherwise they would have uttered loud warnings – and there was good reason to suppose that the USA had no warning of any kind. On 20 July Gascoigne, still puzzled and almost angry, returned to his analysis of the war’s origins. Why did America, knowing that the USSR intended to take over South Korea eventually, fail to adequately plan to deal with the danger?

121

Korean Conflict.indb 121

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

I can only assume that the reason for this was that it was generally understood that Korea had been ‘written off’ and that there had been no intention that the United States or anybody else should fight to preserve democracy in Korea … although why it should not have been foreseen I do not understand – we have experienced similar aggressions in our own time!

On a number of occasions in the past, related Gascoigne, MacArthur had told him that ‘Russia would, in the end, inevitably overrun all Korea’, although Japan, of course, would not be permitted to become a Soviet satellite. Even allowing for this, Gascoigne could not understand why the United States seemed almost to have gone out of its way to render South Korea powerless against attack. He was aware of the argument that the United States had been anxious to prevent the South from becoming strong enough to commit aggression itself, but why build up the nation economically only to make it easy prey for the Communists? In reply, Dening offered a tentative answer: On the assumption that the Americans had decided that South Korea was untenable, it was perhaps logical for them to whitewash their abandonment of that area by ECA and by training of an apparently adequate military force. They could then await the inevitable collapse of South Korea from internal stress and would, in this way, have been able to extricate themselves from the country with relatively little loss of prestige. It is consistent with this assumption that, while awaiting internal trouble in the South, the Americans should have taken no action to counter a military buildup which they might have been expected to fulfil its customary function on the border of a satellite-to-be.

From this Dening drew the conclusion, although it does not necessarily seem to follow, that ‘naked aggression’ had forced the Americans to act as they had. As for the Soviets’ reasons for ordering the invasion of South Korea, beyond Attlee’s implied attribution of a worldwide conspiracy in Moscow 122

Korean Conflict.indb 122

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

(which amounted to a complete and uncritical acceptance of the American line) there was little analysis in Whitehall until late August 1950. A fortnight after the outbreak of war F.S. Tomlinson in the Foreign Office suggested that ‘the eventual domination of the whole Korea Peninsula must remain an objective of Russian foreign policy – as it has in fact been since Czarist days’, but, unlike the Americans, the British were not given to producing thousands of pages of analysis. In August a long Foreign Office paper entitled ‘Implications of the Situation in Korea for British Foreign Policy’ did see the light of day. Consistent with earlier thinking about US policy, the authors blamed the Americans for providing the Russians with an opportunity they could not resist grasping: It is in the Far East that co-ordination of Anglo–American policy is virtually non-existent; it is also in the Far East that American policy has paid least regard to the interest of other Powers with the result that it is in that area that it enjoys least sympathy and support. It is in the Far East that American policy in the last five years has led to a steady decline of prestige and influence (except in Japan where, however, the American policy of drift may eventually produce the same result).

Opportunities for the Soviets were therefore considerable and the North Korean attack ‘was originally launched as a limited operation within the ambit of an overall offensive to expel Western influence from the Far East’. The US response was unexpected and Russia was still taking stock, though, given the ‘commanding’ US nuclear superiority, the Soviets were unprepared to become involved in a world war over Korea. They may, added the paper chillingly, ‘appreciate that the Americans will not boggle, in their present mood, at resorting to atomic warfare failing other effective means of resisting aggression in any area which they regard as being of vital strategic importance’; and the recent talks between Gromyko and Sir David Kelly in Moscow might well indicate a readiness on the Russian side to settle the affair. A comparison between Soviet tactics in Korea and in Eastern Europe was thought to be instructive. In Europe the actual installation of Communist regimes had been carried through by local Communist parties by more or less constitutional 123

Korean Conflict.indb 123

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

methods, including the Czech coup, and there was no evidence of direct Soviet influence except the silent threat of the Red Army across the border. In Berlin the Russians were ‘ready to accept failure of the blockade’ rather than risk military conflict with the West. In the Far East, however, the USSR had shown a readiness ‘to warm up the technique’. They had recognised the Viet Minh regime in Indo–China long before it was clear that Ho Chi Minh could gain control of the whole country, and in Korea a puppet regime had been allowed to launch ‘a civil war across an established demarcation line’. Did this transition from cold war in Europe to ‘hot war by proxy’ in Asia signify that ‘the Soviet leaders considered themselves strong enough to counter any military action by the Western Powers and may press on with their plans to extend their influence and control regardless of Western reactions’? On the assumption that the Korean invasion was initiated with Soviet knowledge and approval (the implied uncertainty is significant), the Foreign Office asked why the issue had been forced by military action when it was quite likely that the Soviets could have gained control of South Korea in a year or two by ‘an orthodox Communist coup de main’. Mao’s victory and the stirrings of liberation movements in Southeast Asia provided the background for an opportunity to damage the American position in Japan and the positions of the British, Dutch and French in the Asian region. Korea offered the opportunity: the South, from which American troops had been withdrawn, had been written off by the USA ‘for some time as being strategically unimportant and untenable’; in view of the country’s ‘remoteness’ there was a good chance of localising any military conflict; and, as Russian troops were not called for, there would be no direct involvement of Soviet prestige or responsibility. In the estimation of the Foreign Office, it was important for the Soviet Union to build up a powerful position in anticipation of the imminent conclusion by Britain and the United States of a peace treaty with Japan. The Foreign Office clearly did not share the apocalyptic interpretation of Russian intentions espoused in other quarters: On the above analysis the North Korean attack was originally launched, not, as some have suggested, with the primary object of diverting 124

Korean Conflict.indb 124

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

American attention from Europe, still less as a prelude to provocative aggression against our weak spots on the European and Middle East periphery.

Although surprised by Truman’s reaction, having expected a ‘walk-over’ in Korea, the Soviets had nonetheless showed themselves ‘disquietingly indifferent to the danger of heightening the already existing tension in the world’. Why were the Soviets displaying such recklessness? It was conceivable, ‘given their training, experience and mode of thought’, that they might genuinely have believed that ‘influential Americans’ were planning to push the USSR back to its pre-war frontiers, hoping ultimately to destroy it, and were willing, even at the risk of armed Western counter-action, to press home a local superiority while they still had time. Such an analysis, far more sophisticated than the simplistic public rhetoric of the British government, was a luxury that could not be afforded in the 48 hours or so after the outbreak of the war. Indeed, nor would it have altered the course of events. With Munich in their minds and the Americans at their heels – and, as we shall see, the expectation of a short war requiring no serious commitment of forces – the British leaders rushed into support of the United States. Sobriety returned when the United States made it uncomfortably clear that much more was required, including the abandonment of Britain’s China policy. To rationalise what the British were beginning to recognise as a decision that had been taken in haste, recourse was taken to the argument that co-operation in the Americans’ Korean adventure was vital if Britain was to re-establish the special relationship and cease to be a merely a member of the European queue. *

*

*

One of the early difficulties arising from the British decision to support the United States in Korea was associated with the questionable – or, at least, questioned – legality of the resolutions of the Security Council. The fortuitous absence of the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, from the Council since January, in protest against the Nationalists’ occupation of the Chinese 125

Korean Conflict.indb 125

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

seat, enabled the passage of the resolutions but gave rise to the airing of doubts and much ransacking of the articles of the United Nations Charter. Sir Gladwyn Jebb at the UN informed the Foreign Office on 29 June: If the Russians challenge validity of the action taken by the Security Council in the absence of the Soviet Delegation … it may be best to maintain that the absence of the Soviet representative must count as abstention. This is the line which has generally been taken by ourselves and other delegations since the Soviet walk out. It also has the advantage that abstention by a permanent member has become a well established practice.

On the same day the Commonwealth Relations Office cabled the govern­ ments of the Commonwealth: If Russians should question competence of Security Council to take decisions in their absence, United Kingdom Ambassador has been instructed to point out that Article 28 provides that Security Council should function continuously. Absence of one member cannot of course be allowed to frustrate object of this Article and cannot therefore be regarded as any more than an abstention on any vote which might be taken. It is now accepted practice of Security Council that an abstention by a permanent member even on a question of substance does not (repeat not) count as a veto. Russians have themselves on occasions subscribed to this practice.

The instruction referred to, prepared by Sir Eric Beckett, contained a somewhat convoluted argument which amounted to a justification for the Americans’ intervention in Korea in advance of the Security Council resolution of 27 June. The right of individual or collective self-defence was not, stated Sir Eric, created by the Charter but was ‘an inherent one’. Furthermore, while ‘the Charter only mentions the case of an armed attack against a member of the United Nations and Southern Korea is not such a member’, it had been accepted by the NATO powers that Article 51 applied 126

Korean Conflict.indb 126

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

in the case of attacks against non-member states; hence, ‘every party to the Atlantic Pact is obliged immediately to come to the aid of Italy and Portugal, neither of which are members of the United Nations’. Sir Eric concluded that, ‘America’s action in intervening before the Security Council’s resolution of June 27th must … be regarded as an exercise of the right of collective self-defence under Article 51.’ With the passage of the resolution America’s action was then justified under Article 39. However, the Lord Chancellor was reported to be ‘not impressed’ with the argument that the US was entitled to come to the aid of South Korea under Article 51, and he raised a number of other tricky legal questions. Were the South Koreans and their allies entitled to invade North Korean territory? Would Britain and the United States be justified in taking action in the territory of a third power which was aiding North Korea? Could Soviet ships bringing supplies to North Korea be intercepted? What, indeed, of British ships chartered by the USSR to perform this task? No ready answers were forthcoming, and it is little wonder that the British government was becoming anxious at the effectiveness of the Soviet charge that ‘the pressure of the US Government on members of the Security Council converted the UN Organisation into a kind of branch of the State Department’. On 4 July Cabinet debated the validity of the 27 June resolution. In the course of the debate it was pointed out that on previous occasions the Security Council had taken decisions despite the abstention of a permanent member. Further, Article 51 provided that nothing in the Charter impaired the right of individual or collective self-defence, and in any event ‘the written constitution of the Council was in the process of modification by practice’. However, the real mood of the Cabinet was perhaps expressed in the declaration that ‘it was the duty of peace-loving nations to make the machinery of the United Nations work effectively, despite legal quibbles, and not allow it to be frustrated by the abstentions of a single member’. At a Cabinet meeting two days later it was noted with evident relief that in the Commons the previous day, ‘there had been no disposition to ventilate legal doubts about the validity of the action taken by the United States and Commonwealth Governments’. 127

Korean Conflict.indb 127

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

‘Legal quibbles’ or not, the British were sufficiently concerned about the implications of the action, taken supposedly under the auspices of the United Nations, to write to the State Department on 13 July seeking clarification of the views of their allies, only to learn that the Americans were supremely indifferent. Admittedly, US forces were at the time fighting desperately to avoid being ejected from Korea. ‘The Department’, the British embassy was told, ‘has not so far found it necessary to make any overall determination as to the legal nature of the Korean conflict, i.e. whether it is a civil war or an international war’, since ‘it is difficult to fit the Korean conflict into traditional concepts of … war and the Department feels that it is unnecessary for present purposes to do so.’ Even allowing for Acheson’s disregard, not to say contempt, for the United Nations, it is surprising that having declared North Korea to be guilty of aggression against another state, the Americans should not have decided whether the conflict was or was not a civil war. Also, while in agreement with the Foreign Office that a UN police action entitled members ‘to exercise all the rights to which a normal belligerent is entitled under international law’, the State Department could not recognise North Korea as ‘a lawful belligerent’ entitled to the rights enjoyed by the UN forces, such as the right to interfere with neutral shipping. The North Koreans, so far as the Americans were concerned, existed in a sort of martial limbo, undeserving of the normal courtesies – such as they were – extended in time of war between nation states. With the ordering of naval forces to Korean waters under the command of the Americans, the British government, confident that the conflict would be short-lived, had no intention of sending ground forces to the war. As Sir Pierson Dixon remarked, the Navy is ‘traditionally expected to operate whenever trouble occurs’, whereas he doubted ‘that there would be popular support for the despatch even of a token contingent of British Land Forces’. The support was lacking among the government as well as among members of the public at large, and it took much prodding and shoving from the Americans before the British decided in principle to send troops to Korea, and then, to the fury of Washington, even more prompting before they were actually sent early in September 1950. 128

Korean Conflict.indb 128

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

Three days after the outbreak of the war George Perkins, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs at the State Department, told Franks that British assistance in Korea was thought ‘not only important from the point of view of stressing the fact that our military operations are in support of a United Nations decision, but would also have a useful psychological effect in this country’. These were to be recurring themes of the United States’ pleas for military help, namely that at all costs the Korean affair must not appear to be a purely American show, and that the British, as America’s chief ally, must not appear lukewarm about the prosecution of the war. From an early date the British were aware of the latter difficulty, and, indeed, of the way in which it had disturbingly wide ramifications. On 30 June Kenneth Younger wrote to Franks, asking him to make much of the UK naval commitment in order ‘to counteract United States criticism of His Majesty’s Government policy in relation to Europe and on the ‘foot-dragging’ issue generally’. He added: ‘There could not be a more useful demonstration of the United Kingdom’s capacity to act as a world power with the support of the Commonwealth, and of its quickness to move when actions rather than words are necessary.’ It would be unfair, in Younger’s view, if the United States, in coupling Britain’s reservations about European integration with an unwillingness to contribute militarily on the ground in Korea, were to reduce its economic aid and thus ‘weaken our position and our ability to play a world part in the defence of freedom’. If Franks’ weekly report for 24–30 June is any guide, however, Younger’s fears were misplaced: Publicity for the promptness and magnitude of our commitment … was greatly enhanced by the fact that at the moment our decision was being announced in London, Senator Wherry, the Republican floor leader, was caustically implying … that we would probably hang back. … The step is welcomed, not only because we will thus share the military burden, but because it confirms our reliability as America’s principal ally and because it underlines the fact … that the operation is not an American act of war but a police action under the aegis of the UN. 129

Korean Conflict.indb 129

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

A week later Franks was happy to report that the British decision to place ‘His Majesty’s ships in Japanese waters … at the total disposal of General MacArthur’ had received ‘banner headlines in most papers and entirely removed any suspicion (which a few newspapers had raised) that Britain was not wholeheartedly behind the US in her stand against aggression’. Expecting a demand for land forces, only five days after the commence­ ment of hostilities Sir Pierson Dixon accurately foresaw that difficulties might flow from Anglo–American military co-operation in which the Americans were by far the more powerful partner. An offer of land forces, he suggested, should be conditional on a British entitlement to the details of the American plan of campaign. ‘I cannot exclude from my mind,’ Dixon remarked ominously, ‘the nasty possibility that the Americans may, if the military situation becomes desperate, contemplate using atomic weapons, and I feel that at the appropriate moment we ought to obtain an assurance from them that these weapons will not be used without prior consultation with us.’ This fear was never far from the forefront of the minds of those ministers and civil servants who had tied Britain militarily to a power whose policy in the Far East they did not entirely trust. The Economist, though, had no such reservations. After declaring that on 27 June Truman had spoken with ‘the voice of Palmerston’ and generally celebrating the heroism and historic nature of the American decision, the editorial of 1 July asked: ‘[W]hat should other governments – in particular the British – do?’ Moral support was not enough: ‘What hope of safety for the British people is there without reliance on American aid in time of danger? And how can we hope that the Americans will help us if we do not help them?’ The editorialist was not to know it, of course, but on the same day the National Security Council, noting that a Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong was unlikely, recommended that if such an attack did occur, the United States should provide as much help as possible, including ‘military assistance’. However, the British government could never be sure of such assistance, and the Americans were not slow in using it as a quid pro quo in their attempts to persuade their allies to commit troops to Korea. At a Cabinet meeting on 4 July it was noted that the government should expect shortly to receive a formal request from the United States for land 130

Korean Conflict.indb 130

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

forces. No such request had been made to date. However, the Chiefs of Staff ‘were not disposed to recommend the despatch of any land forces to Korea’, especially as American action in neutralising Formosa had freed Chinese Communist troops about to attack the island, thus increasing the potential threat to Hong Kong. They reiterated this opinion the next day, warning that ‘it would be militarily unsound to make available any land or air forces for the Korean campaign’. Accordingly, on 6 July Attlee told Cabinet that the Defence Committee was firmly of the view that because of the risks to which Britain was exposed elsewhere in the Far East and Southeast Asia, it was not proposed to send further forces to Korea. At the same time, however, Attlee was suggesting to Truman that Korea might signify a Communist intention to step up trouble making around the world, including an attack on Hong Kong, and that machinery should be set up whereby the two countries could discuss likely Soviet plans and means to counter them. ‘Other Governments,’ he was at pains to point out, ‘in particular the French, may be concerned but it will suffice if they are informed as and when the situation demands.’ The British desire to establish a special relationship was sleepless. Truman readily acceded to Attlee’s request and appointed Philip Jessup and General Bradley as America’s representatives in talks which were to take place with Franks and Lord Tedder. By the middle of July, at least some sections of the British press were beginning to express unease about the absence of United Kingdom troops in Korea. On 15 July The Economist observed: American criticism is, perhaps, not so wide of the mark when it questions the British decision to commit no land forces to Korea. It is impossible for the layman to speak with authority on such an issue, but the existence of a garrison of 40,000 regular soldiers in Hongkong … is bound to raise questions which should be conclusively answered in the interests of Allied understanding.

However, the real pressure came not from the press but from Sir Oliver Franks. Writing directly to the Prime Minister on 15 July, he applauded 131

Korean Conflict.indb 131

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Britain’s decision to support the Korean decision of the United States and observed that the President’s response signalled the acceptance of Britain as a full partner in world affairs: This would have been impossible three or even two years ago: then we were one of the queue of European countries … we are effectively out of the queue, one of the two world Powers outside Russia … I feel that the Americans will to some extent – and I know this to be true of the Defence Department – test the quality of the partnership by our attitude to the notion of a token ground force.

Comment and criticism on this score had spread beyond Washington, warned Franks, and he was worried lest, as in the past, the British government should take a long time to make a decision only to make it appear that it had been forced to do so by ‘massive discussion, criticism and pressure’ in the USA. ‘Washington in emotional drive is a capital at war,’ Franks added, and the mood of the administration ‘is one of the things that have to be taken into account in estimating the effect on Anglo–American relations of what we decide to do or not to do.’ A few days earlier Franks had already alluded to the growing emotionalism and – he implied – irrationality of mood in Washington. He had dined with the ubiquitous and powerful Averell Harriman – in whom ‘the threads of political, military and economic considerations affecting foreign policy come together’ – and was struck with the strength of Harriman’s feelings about Korea. Harriman saw the conflict as a limited case of the war of the free world against Communism. From this point of view there are no shades of difference between Pyongyang, Peking and Moscow – all is one black ’ism. This struggle is therefore one of ultimate dedication and commitment – these were the words he used. He feels that victory in the struggle is likely to prevent the appearance of a third World War.

Shrewdly divining the portents of trouble to come, Franks noted in Harriman a ‘passionate drive’ which ‘will not make it easy for him for the moment to 132

Korean Conflict.indb 132

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

worry very much about the thoughts and feelings of Asiatic peoples and their importance in the long term nor about the importance of not getting the Chinese embroiled and to this extent failing to localise the affair’. A Chiefs of Staff report, considered at a Cabinet meeting of 17 July, stated that the situation in Korea was critical and that the ‘best the Americans could now hope to achieve was to hold a bridgehead around Pusan until they were reinforced’. However, the United States had not yet made a direct request for British reinforcements. This was just as well, as the Chiefs were still of the view that it would be strategically unsound to divert to Korea troops required to meet Communist threats, especially in Hong Kong and Malaya. They were also unsympathetic to the suggestion that a force should be sent from Hong Kong to be replaced by soldiers from America, to which Ministers, nervous about offending China, added reservations about the political disadvantages in associating America with the defence of the colony. As if to counter Franks’ warnings on the issue, the next day a communiqué arrived from Sir Alvary Gascoigne in Tokyo. American officials and officers, at first very complacent about the Korean incident, displayed ‘consternation and disappointment’ when the military situation began to look serious and were complaining, ‘sometimes rather bitterly, that Americans should be fighting the war almost alone and unaided by the ground forces of other democratic Powers’. On the day of this message – 18 July – Acheson, at his daily meeting with his senior officials, ‘asked whether or not we should now deliver the note to the British Ambassador which would request the British to furnish ground forces to Korea’. On the unwarranted grounds that the British might be ‘moving ahead anyway’, it was decided not to send a note. Three days later the Foreign Office was told of this decision by Arthur Ringwalt, who suggested ‘that the political effect of a United Kingdom offer of ground forces would be greater, if that offer was volunteered’. In what amounted to a request, though, Ringwalt said that the United States would wait at least a week or ten days for such an offer, and after that would be satisfied with a period of between five to eight weeks before the troops arrived in Korea. There was, Ringwalt insisted, a genuine military need even for a ‘token’ force, preferably consisting of tanks. 133

Korean Conflict.indb 133

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In Washington, in talks between Jessup, Bradley, Franks and Tedder that began on 20 July, ‘it was quite clear’ to the ambassador ‘that the question of United Nations forces for Korea was foremost in the American mind and I would judge … we shall now be expected to respond with at any rate a token force’. In a reference to the President, Franks added: ‘There was no doubt in our minds that what was said to us had been carefully thought out beforehand and had the highest authority.’ He and Tedder professed to be surprised at this development, since they had been under the impression that British forces would not reach the theatre of war in time to be of any use. By now the ‘American mind’ had become public knowledge. In a novel argument against the despatch of troops, though one already hinted at in Cabinet, the New Statesman reasoned: By hesitating to make the disagreement [over Formosa] public, the British Government has made it difficult to explain to impatient Americans why no Commonwealth ground forces are available for Korea. It is surely time to state bluntly that, if the Americans had kept their hands off Formosa, some troops might have been spared from Hong Kong or Malaya. But the risk of an American-Chinese clash in the present circumstances compels us to man the defences of all South-Eastern Asia.

On 22 July, in a letter to Franks, Bevin began cautiously to move – not, it should be noted, because of the merits of the military case as put by the Americans, but because he wished to curry favour with the United States: From the military point of view we would of course find it extremely hard to provide even a token force. But we realise that the question is at least, in part, if not mainly political. While we would not wish to be stampeded by public opinion in the United States and elsewhere, we should be influenced in our attitude on this problem if it was likely that an offer of British ground forces would strengthen our hand with the United States Administration.

Accordingly, Bevin asked Franks to take soundings, without consulting the Americans, on the likely reactions to an offer among both government and 134

Korean Conflict.indb 134

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

public. Simultaneously, Lew Douglas was writing to Acheson, strongly urging that the latter should permit him to talk to Attlee about ground forces: ‘I believe it would be far better if the British were to make an offer on their own initiative instead of as result of aide-mémoire from us.’ With the strength of his known closeness to Acheson behind him, Sir Oliver Franks pulled out all the stops in a reply to Bevin of 23 July, trying to point out the grave consequences of a British reluctance to offer troops. Despite the ‘difficulties and disagreements between us’, he argued, there ‘is a steady and unquestioning assumption that we are the only dependable ally and partner’ – a function of ‘our position in the world over past decades, our partnership with them in two world wars and their judgement of the British character’. The Americans realised that Britain was only just recovering economically, and moreover had heavy commitments all over the world, but ‘in Korea they will be in a tough spot for a long time’ and will ‘look around for a partner’. The American people ‘are not happy if they feel alone’ and would not understand it if this was the case in Korea. Thus a rejection by the British government would provoke a ‘deep and prolonged’ response which would be felt not just in short-term matters such as additional appropriations for European defence and the third appropriation of ERP. The important consideration is the effect our decision will have on the basic relationship of the two countries. I believe that because of the rational and irrational elements in the American mind about this for them unparalleled undertaking to act as a policeman in the world, a negative decision would seriously impair the long term relationship. This is so partly because of the significance our decision would acquire as giving a lead, which they expect to be followed by other countries.

If Franks was to be believed, and he was, then not only was the war in Korea to be of longer duration than the British had expected but it was also taken by the Americans, certainly to the surprise of the Attlee government, to be as important as any campaign fought in the days of their military association during World War II. Any backsliding on the part of Britain 135

Korean Conflict.indb 135

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

threatened to have repercussions for the defence of Europe, the scale of US economic aid, and, most worrying of all, the possibility of Britain establishing a long-lived, if not permanent, special relationship with the United States. ‘Douglas obviously very worried about Korea’, Malcolm Muggeridge noted in his diary on 24 July. ‘He’d been with Attlee that morning trying to persuade him to send troops to Korea.’ He need not have been anxious, however, for the next day – one month after the outbreak of the war – the Cabinet relented under the combined pressure of Sir Oliver Franks and the Americans. The Prime Minister told his colleagues that His Majesty’s ambassador at Washington had represented ‘very strongly’ the view that an early offer of British land forces ‘would make a valuable contribution to Anglo–American solidarity’. The Defence Committee of Cabinet, in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff, had accordingly reviewed the position. Although still believing that it would be ‘unsound’ to divert to Korea troops needed in Hong Kong and Malaya, and that operating a mixed force there with separate supply lines would be a ‘military disadvantage’, these misgivings had been ‘outweighed by the political advantages’, namely, the valuable effects on US public opinion and the lead that Britain would be giving to other members of the United Nations. It was therefore decided to form a brigade group without any reduction of the strength of forces in Hong Kong and Malaya, which would be sent as soon as possible to Korea and placed under American command. Shinwell made an announcement to this effect in the Commons on 26 July. Lew Douglas wrote generously of the British to Acheson: I hope that when the announcement of the British contribution is made there will be a full explanation of the first-rate war the British have been fighting in Malaya against the Communists for some two years, of the position they are in at Hong Kong and the need for forces not only for the defence of the Colony against attack from without but also for the security of the Colony against the widespread subversive elements that there are within … [and] requirements for British troops to guard and defend the lifeline – the Middle East, and, finally, of the need for forces on this island which is so vulnerable to attack and so important in general strategic plan. 136

Korean Conflict.indb 136

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

  I suggest it might be helpful also if it were made very clear that, notwithstanding all these world-wide demands on their military resources, British had contributed in initial stages greater naval forces … than we ourselves had in the Korean affair and that notwithstanding the exposed position of this island to hostile air attacks, she had made available a carrier.

Scarcely had Acheson received this message than he was cabling to Douglas: ‘[W]e are disappointed with length of time which will elapse before forces are despatched. Brit have already consumed month in reaching decision with net result that ground troops will not be available for action until at least three months after aggression started.’ American public opinion, on which the British had pinned so much hope, was also less than magnanimous. From the embassy in early August came a survey of public opinion in the Chicago area, which was said to represent ‘fairly accurately the attitude of the people’. Although ‘cynical comments about America being left alone to do the fighting are mainly confined to the light-weight and lunatic newspapers’ (as if most Americans formed their opinions on the Washington Post and the New York Times), the report was hardly encouraging: Of most importance has been the increasing criticism of other UN nations for not providing ground forces assistance in Korea. Naturally, the brunt of this criticism falls on us as always; regardless of the fact that the Commonwealth countries are the only ones to date providing any appreciable help via sea and air forces. Such help is usually referred to as a few ships or planes, the implication being that it is very much ‘token’ assistance and of little account. In any case critics are only interested in the absence of ground troops, and aided and abetted by newspaper editorials and cynical radio newscasters, the public are increasingly encouraged to think of themselves as deserted by their potential allies, and left to fight this first act of aggression alone … Even our staunchest friends and those having an appreciation of what is at stake on a worldwide basis have emphasised the desirability of our making a contribution in ground troops without delay. 137

Korean Conflict.indb 137

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In reply to Acheson’s message of 1 August, Douglas said that he had already expressed to the British government his surprise at the length of time it would take the troops to reach Korea. ‘The fact is, however,’ he explained, ‘that British do not have forces presently organised … to despatch on a mission of this sort … The significant fact emerging from all this is the lamentable state of ground forces in Britain.’ For all that, some British people – not entirely confined to left-wing groups – felt that no troops should be sent to Korea. A worried official of the Foreign Office, P.L. Carter, noted that there was a ‘danger of laying ourselves open to the charge of being “hired mercenaries” in MacArthur’s war (see tomorrow’s New Statesman front page)’. He observed that there ‘is undoubtedly in this country, and far beyond New Statesman circles, a certain amount of latent anti-Americanism and an uncomfortable feeling that this charge is true’. Towards the middle of August a frantic tone was evident in the urgings of the Americans. Acheson, concerned at the capital being derived in the Security Council by Malik from the charge that the Korean War was a purely American affair, instructed Douglas: ‘Pls see Attlee urgently and express above views as held most seriously by US and urge immediate reexamination of Brit capabilities as to increasing tempo forwarding Brit troops to Korea at once.’ Douglas, who seemed to be able to see the Prime Minister as of right, duly spoke to Attlee and Bevin on 14 August about ‘expediting’ the movement of forces to Korea. Although they realised ‘the importance of refuting Soviet propaganda’, they stated that the transfer of troops from Malaya would be militarily risky (and ‘might even mean the loss of that part of Asia’), while the forces in Hong Kong could not be depleted in view of the threat posed by China. The United States, it was implied, would simply have to wait for the formation and posting of the brigade group. Three days later the government underwent yet another abrupt and reluctant change of mind as a result of direct American pressure. The decision was preceded and almost certainly shaped by a long appreciation of the ground troops issue written for the Prime Minister by Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, the Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence. He recalled that owing to the nature of the American response to Lord Tedder’s query of 25 June about possible military assistance, the British authorities 138

Korean Conflict.indb 138

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

had worked on the assumption that the United States wanted ‘a fully balanced force, trained for battle’ and ready for offensive operations towards the end of 1950. Elliot reminded Attlee that on 25 July the government had decided to form a brigade group for service in Korea, and that this should not lead to a depletion of the Hong Kong garrison. On 10 August Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier in Tokyo reported that MacArthur had asked for British help at the ‘very earliest opportunity’, since there was ‘immediate need for men with rifles to enable the bridgehead to be held’. In view of this apparent difference between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tedder was instructed to see the Joint Chiefs. He was told to inform them that troops could not be withdrawn from Hong Kong and Malaya, but that if they insisted that the arrival of troops was ‘militarily essential’, the British Chiefs ‘would be prepared to recommend to Ministers that forces should be sent to Korea from there’. Elliot informed the Prime Minister that Tedder had now reported that the Joint Chiefs asked that Britain do everything possible to get troops to Korea at the earliest opportunity because ‘they are in desperate need of reinforcements’. According to Bradley ‘A platoon now would be worth more than a company tomorrow’, and furthermore, the presence of British soldiers would be of ‘very real morale value’. The Chiefs of Staff had met that day, Elliot continued, to consider Tedder’s report and General Harding’s analysis of the consequences of sending troops from Malaya and Hong Kong. In the forefront of Harding’s mind was the Briggs Plan, the campaign led by General Sir Harold Briggs to quell Communist insurgents, and he warned that the withdrawal of a commando brigade from Malaya ‘might well wreck the Briggs Plan altogether’. On the other hand, as the threat of an attack on Hong Kong was not regarded as serious at that point, Harding observed that forces could safely be transferred from there to Korea. The Chiefs of Staff had therefore recommended, on military grounds, that the right course was to send two infantry battalions from Hong Kong to Korea immediately. The Minister of Defence agreed ‘emphatically’ with this recommendation. On reading Elliot’s appreciation, Attlee told Bevin that if the Acting Governor of Hong Kong thought the risks of such a plan to the colony were not unreasonable, then he too would favour the recommendation. 139

Korean Conflict.indb 139

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In conversation with Malcolm Muggeridge, Churchill ‘referred scornfully to the fact that Attlee had insisted to him that there was no possibility of taking troops from Hong Kong for Korea and that the Americans were not pressing for the British forces. Both these statements were contradicted the very next day. When I told him that the troops going from Hong Kong were going naked, with no proper equipment and, to all intents and purposes, unarmed except for ammunition, he was even more distressed.’ The response in America was also less than wholly enthusiastic, at least according to Franks: Our decision to send troops to Korea from Hong Kong has been welcomed. Those who feel we have been slow to act (they are, unfortunately, many) are for the most part prepared graciously to overlook this now that we have acted but bitter comments and cartoons about our coming in to share the glory of an American victory are not infrequent in unfriendly quarters.

The Hong Kong battalions arrived in Korea by early September and were followed a few weeks later by the brigade formed in the United Kingdom. However, Churchill was still unhappy about the government’s handling of the matter. In a political broadcast on 26 August he charged the government with procrastination; Attlee replied in his broadcast of 2 September, but the exchange was innocuous compared to their dispute in the Commons on 12 September. Why, Churchill asked, did it take the government a month to decide to send a land force? Why and on what date was it decided suddenly to send the battalions from Hong Kong, after the idea had been resisted during this same period? Attlee could not remember the date and became uncharacteristically nettled by the Leader of the Opposition’s insistence that he recall it accurately, and by the accusation that the ‘Americans are bitterly disappointed’. More to the point, Churchill stated: It is my personal view that the Government and their military advisers, having rejected this project for many weeks, suddenly made a right-about 140

Korean Conflict.indb 140

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

turn and did what they had hitherto declared to be impossible. There was really nothing new in the situation, except perhaps the growing disappointment of the United States that we were so long in sending them anything from anywhere … The tangled story of sending and delaying sending, and changing of plans in the method of sending, what could only be a token force, and rightly could only be a token force, to Korea, is a culminating example of the incapacity to take decisions and of living from day to day, which casts its shadow on all our military affairs at a time when … potentially mortal perils gather their clouds around.

The political hyperbole apart, Churchill’s accusations were well founded. Confusion and cross-purposed action had attended the government’s – and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s – handling of the issue. British public opinion might not have been enthusiastic about the prospect of sending young men off to yet another conflict, but the fundamental cause of the government’s ineptitude may be sought in a lack of conviction. The government had entered the war almost casually, certainly without earnest reflection, and quite rapidly found themselves embroiled in a very serious affair indeed. To their growing consternation, the Americans had associated them with a troubling Far Eastern policy, and they could neither withdraw nor avoid increasing and damaging commitments. In the period between the outbreak of the Korean War and the successful Inchon landing of mid-September, the British government not only had to deal with matters of grave import – land forces for Korea, rearmament, Formosa and China, and much else besides – but, in dealing with them, ministers and officials had to contend with an America whose behaviour they regarded as verging on the irrational. The New Statesman spoke of American imperialists having ‘a cautious and thoughtful Secretary of State’ at their mercy, and as early as 1 July John Allison, the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs at the State Department, was urging a drive ‘right on up to Manchuria and Siberian border’. Sir Pierson Dixon, commenting on a message that Acheson had sent to Bevin in July, noted the implied threat ‘that unless we come into line … the consequences for Anglo– American relations will be very serious’. 141

Korean Conflict.indb 141

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

If the Americans sounded panicky, it was because they were panicky. On 14 July Acheson summarised the views expressed in a Cabinet meeting in Washington that day: There is unanimous agreement … that the present world situation is one of extreme danger and tension which, either by Soviet desire or by the momentum of events arising from the Korean situation … could present the United States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including general hostilities. This is the situation we face, and it is one of the gravest danger. It is becoming apparent to the world that we do not have the capabilities to face the threat, and the feeling in Europe is changing from one of elation that the United States has come into the Korean crisis to petrified fright … In the very early days of next week some action must be announced. Whether that action is the best possible action is less important than that some effective action be taken and announced.

The fright attributed by Acheson to the Europeans was as much his own as others’, and it is little wonder that the British government feared that the USA would make an irrevocable error of judgement and plunge the world into World War III. An impulse towards action for action’s sake, evident in Acheson’s summary, had already been identified by Franks. In a report to Strang on 14 July he observed: The Americans of Washington found relief & release in action last Tuesday fortnight. All sorts of doubts, hesitation & perplexities of thought and planning were resolved in that moment. The temperament of the American people is, when in doubt, to do something. It is far preferable to do something which turns out to be mistaken than to do nothing and to continue the intolerable suspense of thought, doubt and inaction.

The revelation of North Korean strength and leadership, exposing the inadequacy of the initial US response, had ‘bitten deep’ among Americans, the more so, stated Franks presumably with tongue in cheek, as ‘[t]hey have 142

Korean Conflict.indb 142

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

no tradition, as we have, of glorious failure’. Franks characterised members of the administration as, for those reasons, reluctant and impatient when anyone recalls to them a thought not directed to the simple end of winning the war. For example, to ask them whether it is really true that the different measures put in one package by the President on June 27 are of the same nature provokes for the moment hot temper and not reason … Even to say that it is very important to conduct the affair in Korea so that the risk of intervention by Chinese Communists is minimised is apt to be greeted by the statement that they will probably intervene anyway … action is pleasant.

Perhaps it was his friendship with Acheson, but Sir Oliver Franks displayed none of the alarm that these sorts of observations occasioned in London. Indeed, after advising his masters to allow time for the Americans to recover their poise, he concluded his message to Strang with a veritable peroration: I ought perhaps to add that in the last two weeks I consider the American Government and the American people have instinctively followed their high destiny in the world. The people are behind the President & they want to stop open & senseless aggression. They are resolved to act & to do it. All of which is a very great thing for all of us.

It might almost have been Truman speaking to the nation. Sir William Strang attended very closely to the substance of Franks’ observations. ‘I said,’ he noted of a conversation with the French ambassador on 19 July, ‘that the American Government and to some extent the public felt that they were at war … the same atmosphere did not prevail here.’ Britain and France would have to bear this difference in mind: ‘The Americans would give first priority to action and would tend to be impatient with those who offer counsels of prudence.’ By August the temper of the Americans had not improved. The Foreign Office despaired of being able to reach a common Far East policy, since ‘the United States reactions to the Far East situation are at present highly 143

Korean Conflict.indb 143

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

emotional, with the result that reasoned arguments may prove to have little appeal’. Hugh Gaitskell, two months before succeeding Cripps as Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote in his diary on 11 August: I attended a rather angry interview with the PM with the American Ambassador … They are curious people to deal with – nice, well intentioned but, I think, often lacking in judgment. And whereas most high officials here are pretty shrewd judges of the political interest, one has the impression that their counterparts in the American Civil Service are often very much at sea.

In the United States the most tangible symptom of the reverses in the Far East was an enhancement in momentum for McCarthyism. In mid-August Franks informed the Foreign Office that the Korean War had intensified ‘anti-Communist feelings and heightened the fear that Communists within the gates may endanger the national security out of all proportion to their numerical strength’, a fear which had led to extreme measures such as the cancellation of Paul Robeson’s passport. Indeed, this latter was an official action which, according to Franks, amounted to a deliberate ‘stimulation of a general alertness to subversive activities’. A distaste for McCarthyism was often evident in Franks’ reports, especially as the phenomenon touched his friend Dean Acheson, and he quoted with stern disapproval statements such as that made by Senator Wherry, which called for the removal of Acheson and of ‘the alien-minded radicals and perverts in the Democratic Administration’. Not that the British were entirely immune from this phobia; in his broadcast of 30 July the Prime Minister asked ‘all to be on guard against the enemy within’ and against ‘those who would stop at nothing to injure our economy and defence’. ‘The price of liberty’, he reminded the nation, ‘is still eternal vigilance’. In its vagueness and exhortation to snooping, the warning is reminiscent of the ill-conceived and ill-fated Fifth Column Campaign during World War II. A long report, ‘The Prospects of Fascism in the United States’, prepared in the Washington embassy under Franks’ name, included an analysis of American anti-communism as the ‘most obvious concomitant of fascism in 144

Korean Conflict.indb 144

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

the United States’. Although the report was sent to the Foreign Office on 21 July, after the start of the Korean War, it had been commissioned by Strang some months before and so it cannot be regarded as having been occasioned by the war. However, it did examine the roots of attitudes and fears that were magnified by the conflict. Franks’ summary of the report, contained in a covering letter to Strang, was sanguine in tone and merits quotation at length: The general conclusions of the paper are that: first, in normal times there are practically no factors of any importance tending towards the introduction of Fascism in the United States. Secondly, the political system would make it particularly difficult for any such factors to operate to an important degree. Thirdly, in the great depression of the thirties there were certain manifestations which could properly be described as of a Fascist character, but even at that time they were checked and corrected before they had reached national importance. Fourthly, in the stress of war, which might also be expected to bring to light any latent Fascist tendencies, there was certainly an increase in the authority of the Central Government, but this was on the whole restricted to the minimum necessary for the efficient conduct of operations, and there was always strong and effective resistance to centralisation for its own sake. Fifthly, the present tendency is undoubtedly towards the gradual extension of the powers of the central Government, particularly in welfare matters, but this is proceeding far more on the lines of what we have done in Britain than on any totalitarian lines. Finally, there is no doubt that the country would be better prepared, both administratively and psychologically, to cope with a new depression than it was in the thirties. This might be expected to reduce the danger of undesirable political consequences following from economic disequilibrium.

As for anti-communism as a mark of ‘incipient Fascism’, the report stressed that although Marxism–Leninism had ‘for long been regarded as antipathetic to Americanism’, its origins were to be sought in ‘the inevitable American reaction to the fact that this country emerged from the last war as the leading Power economically and militarily, but with its political primacy … 145

Korean Conflict.indb 145

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

challenged by a country using communism as an aggressive political tool’. Hence a tendency to ‘over-value opposition to communism’ in those such as Franco and Chiang Kai-shek, for whom anti-communism ‘is part of the Fascist pattern’. Incidentally, de Gaulle was bracketed with these leaders by the authors of the report: ‘Americans as a whole are certainly not pro-de Gaulle, but they might easily become so if he were the only practical alternative to Thorez, Duclos and the Confederation Generale du Travail.’ More repugnant because clearly visible, as they were to Franks, were the ‘spy and loyalty investigations’. These were attributed in part to ‘the general excitability and emotionalism of Americans’, an explanation often proffered by the British when faced with the otherwise inexplicable behaviour of the Americans. The report condemned the investigations as downright ‘injudicial’: There is no denying that Constitutional guarantees, the principles of Anglo-Saxon law and the rules of ordinary fair play have all been violated in the name of security: in view of the devious ways of the Communists and the difficulty of acquiring information about covert subversive activities some abuses of personal freedom (e.g. telephone wire-tapping) are perhaps inevitable. Nevertheless, the methods employed in the Congressional investigations were disturbing and the atmosphere surrounding them was very unhealthy.

The ‘witch-hunt’, which seemed imminent a year or two before, was receding as a likelihood, and, somewhat prematurely, the report predicted that ‘the danger of an hysterical persecution of suspect liberals and social or political non-conformists will recede still further’. Although Franks was confident in August that McCarthy’s charges were ‘shown to have been warmed-over versions of earlier unsubstantiated allegations’, McCarthy’s heyday was yet to come, in the aftermath of China’s intervention in the Korean War and the humiliating near-defeat of the US forces at the end of 1950. By late August, over two months after the outbreak of the war, the British government was still finding the Americans difficult to deal with. In a broad review of the international situation, Bevin told his colleagues on the thirtieth of the month that ‘the temperature of Far Eastern questions will 146

Korean Conflict.indb 146

04/09/2015 11:40

‘A N U N S TA B L E L I T T L E S TAT E ’

rise rather than fall during the next three months, just at the time when China and Korea will be in the forefront of international debate’ and when party political tension in the United States would be high. Moreover: Added to all this is the fact that American public opinion is in a highly emotional state, which is attributable in part to the Korean situation itself and in part to the sense of frustration induced by the feeling that in fighting the North Koreans, Americans are not coming to grips with the real enemy. In such a state of mind the American public is likely to be irrational in its outlook, and unreasonable towards the United Kingdom where our policy diverges from that of the United States.

A few days later the Foreign Secretary, repeating his warnings, told Prime Minister Nehru that ‘the atmosphere is very highly charged in the United States at this moment, and with the elections coming on in November the Administration is going to find it very difficult to take any step which does not have popular support.’ Mindful of this nervous current of thought in London, Acheson told Franks on 31 August that ‘he could honestly and emphatically assure London that there is a growing soberness on the Hill with respect to Formosa and … understanding of the dangers involved’. Franks duly communicated the message, observing with palpable relief that finally, ‘a new and more sober mood was spreading among Senators’.

147

Korean Conflict.indb 147

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER FOUR

A war by any other name

I

n September 1950 the British Attorney-General, Sir Frank Soskice, quoted Lewis Carroll in a Cabinet paper on the ‘Legal Implications of the Korean Conflict’: When I use a word, said Humpty Dumpty, it means just what I intended it to mean: neither more nor less. But, said Alice, the question is whether you can make a word mean different things. Not so, said Humpty Dumpty, the question is, which is to be master, that is all.

The British government struggled mightily with the difficulties that flowed from engagement in a war which was not a war but a ‘collective police action’. Mere avoidance of the words ‘Korean War’ by the Cabinet in all their memoranda and minutes was not enough to fend off legal, political, and not least semantic entanglements. The chief difficulty for a modern liberal state when engaged in a conflict of a lesser scale than world war is to convincingly characterise the conflict as a just one. The difficulty is made all the more acute when action in which the nation’s soldiers are dying cannot be called a war. If the government fails in this challenge, not only does it run the risk of being accused of committing the nation to an immoral and profitless exercise, but it must face the opprobrium always inherent in suppressing or punishing dissent. Early in August 1950, the Foreign Office Legal Adviser was asked: ‘Is the UK at war with North Korea and if not how are the … operations in which it is engaged to be described?’ The answer he unequivocally gave was that ‘HMG are not at present at war’. His reasoning was as follows:

148

Korean Conflict.indb 148

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

[I]t does not necessarily follow that there is war between the United Kingdom and North Korea because their respective armed forces are fighting together. President Truman has already stated that he does not consider the United States is at war, having no doubt in mind particularly a provision in the US Constitution under which the consent of Congress is necessary for a declaration of war … at present the answer to the above question should be that His Majesty’s Government are not now at war but are engaged in collective police operations under the authority of the Security Council resolution to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in Korea. … There will, therefore, be no war between HMG and North Korea unless HMG chooses to declare it or the North Korean Government chooses to declare it. If the North Korean Government, while continuing to resist, does not declare war, it will be in the position of a Government which is resisting by force the operations of a collective international police force.

The Legal Adviser added that nations involved in this novel enterprise possessed ‘at least the right to conduct any operation which a belligerent engaged in an ordinary war would have the legal right to conduct’, but warned against making any public statements about the rights of neutrals. He noted, giving a chilling example, that it would be ‘a grave question’ whether or not ‘it would be legally correct to bomb … dumps in Vladivostok which are obviously connected with the supply of materials of war to the North Korean forces’. More comforting was his opinion that, domestically, the police action could be regarded as war ‘for the purpose of all proceedings in our courts’. From the question of whether Britain was at war under domestic law flowed the issue of the government’s entitlement to invoke the law of treason. When in combative mood, as it was in the case of Alan Winnington, the Communist journalist, the government was hampered by an obvious disinclination of the public to believe the nation was truly at war. For them, war was what they had experienced only five years earlier, not this Korean affair which seemed scarcely more urgent and threatening than the operations against the so-called ‘bandits’ in Malaya. Although a Gallup poll found in October 1950 that 50 per cent thought that fighting should 149

Korean Conflict.indb 149

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

continue until North Korea’s defeat, and, more significantly, 63 per cent agreed with the despatch of British troops to Korea, only 14 per cent believed that the conflict would lead to a world war. No amount of exhortation and thinly veiled scare-mongering about the intentions of the Kremlin could make them think otherwise. The matter was raised in stark form by the British Attorney-General in September 1950 when he circulated his paper on the legal implications of the Korean conflict. Despite the opinion of the Legal Adviser, the Attorney General judged the situation to be unprecedented, such that the ‘significant political and legal consequences’ of the Cabinet’s assessment of the present status of the Korean conflict and any ‘new law’ they might wish to create were of considerable moment. He agreed with the Lord Chancellor, Viscount William Jowitt, that ‘the law of treason and other English laws apply to the present conflict as if it were a war in the ordinary sense’, defined as a settlement by force of arms of a contention between individual states. At the same time and less precisely, the Attorney General expressed a view that ‘international law does now recognise a kind of twilight condition in which collective enforcement action is taken under the aegis of the United Nations’. Of immediate practical importance, however, were the interactions of the Daily Worker’s correspondent, Alan Winnington, with the North Korean armies. The government had not yet stated publicly whether the law of treason could, or would in specific cases, apply, and procrastination on this point was becoming increasingly untenable. The Winnington reports – unfavourable, of course, to the UN forces – were receiving increasing attention, and a related parliamentary question had been set down for reply by Attlee on 18 September. Discussing the matter on 18 September, the Cabinet agreed that the domestic law applied as if Britain were at war and it was decided to state publicly that a British subject consorting with the North Koreans ‘might lay himself open to the charge of treason’. Neither decision, however, resolved the problem of whether the Korean conflict was a war or a form of police action. The Cabinet simply decided to postpone consideration of the problem, although the Lord Chancellor wanted the adoption of a nononsense attitude: ‘Where organised States were in armed conflict, it was difficult to argue that the operation was not a war.’ 150

Korean Conflict.indb 150

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

With the onset of November and the matter still under consideration by an inter-departmental committee, the Attorney General asked for Cabinet’s advice regarding whether he should prosecute the Daily Worker for the publication of its pamphlet entitled ‘I Saw the Truth in Korea’. The most offensive, and actionable, section was the final paragraph: The last war was made inevitable by Chamberlain’s mad dream of becoming Hitler’s partner in a war against the Soviet Union. Is history going to repeat itself at an atomic level? The key is Britain and the time is now. That is why the moguls of Wall Street have exerted such giant steps to drag our people in the blood-bath they prepared for five years in Korea, and that is why, no sooner had the lackey Attlee promised them their ‘token’, than they sent their aircraft into China to spread the zone of war.   It is America which has invaded Korea. To defend the interests of Morgan and Rockefeller, of DuPont and the steel barons, to restore the land to the feudal landlords, to drive the people back to penury, to maintain a war against the peaceful Soviet Union. Are British lads to be sacrificed to these ignoble aims? Is Britain to become the lackey of an America which aspires to Hitler’s role – joint detonators of a new world war? Britain’s trade unions, Labour Party branches, progressive organisations and people of every sort can and must give the answer quickly: Withdraw All Foreign Soldiers from Korea! hands off china. preserve world peace.

The Attorney General had ‘no doubt that this publication constitutes the offence of treason in giving “aid and comfort to the King’s enemies”’, principally because of the allegation that the aggressor had been America, not North Korea. Strictly speaking Winnington’s pamphlet does not support such an interpretation; certainly its tone was offensive to members of government, to say nothing of the Communist jargon, but nowhere does Winnington state that the United States actually began the hostilities. Rather, he seems to imply only that American entry into Korea after 25 June constituted a species of invasion, though it can hardly be denied that he charged the Americans with aggression. Having called the 151

Korean Conflict.indb 151

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

publication treasonous, the Attorney General nevertheless admitted to a reluctance to see the law take its course: I must say that I am extremely loath to take proceedings for treason … the law of treason accompanied by the inevitable death penalty is far too heavy a weapon with which to attack propaganda of this sort. The trouble is that there is no other weapon. During the war there was emergency legislation which enabled prosecutions to be taken for lesser offences in respect of action which might also have constituted treason. Under the law as it exists at present, however, the offence is treason or nothing and we are now faced with the dilemma of deciding either to prosecute for treason in respect of propaganda which a Jury might well think (as indeed I do) not to merit the death penalty or of saying that the law of treason is not a suitable remedy for such propaganda but that no other remedy is provided by the law … I think I must warn my colleagues that there may well be Parliamentary difficulty if I am forced into conceding that this propaganda is treasonable but at the same time announce that I do not propose to take action.

The Attorney General’s hesitancy to proceed represented a blend of emotion and calculation: a vengeful impulse in conflict with a liberal conscience, the practical doubts of the politician, and an understandable wish not to appear a fool in the House of Commons. The government’s plight was perhaps an inevitable consequence of engaging the nation in a twilight war. The Economist commented on just this dilemma a year later, when Winnington was still troubling the government. ‘Confronted with difficulties of this kind,’ said the editorial, ‘both the British Government and the British public have been considerably perplexed about the right course to follow.’ On the one hand, there was a healthy dislike of limiting free speech and of making martyrs of contemptible people, while on the other ‘there is a feeling that the work of the British Communists on behalf of the enemy in the Korean War has really amounted to treason of a sort for which British subjects were hanged a few years ago’. Echoing the advice that had been given to the government, The Economist noted that even 152

Korean Conflict.indb 152

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

though the Korean conflict ‘has been somehow intermediate between peace and … war’, it could almost certainly be established in the courts that Britain was at war with the North Koreans, but that the law of treason, in these particular circumstances, was unsatisfactory: ‘In the first place it admits of no penalty but death, which means that it cannot in practice be enforced … Secondly, it is extremely vague, which means that it can be stretched according to political expediency.’ Commenting on the Attorney General’s memorandum, Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary of whom Harold Macmillan said, ‘He is always right’, offered the Prime Minister fresh difficulties for contemplation. Not only would Winnington and the editor of the Daily Worker be thought by the public and a jury to be undeserving of the death sentence, but the judges themselves ‘might feel that the Government were putting the courts in an invidious position by bringing proceedings for treason in such cases’. Moreover, it would be ‘improper’ if the prosecution were to state in the course of a trial that the Home Secretary intended to commute a death sentence to one of penal servitude for what might be period of only one or two years. Brook suggested as an escape route the charge of sedition, an offence falling short of high treason but ‘not inappropriate to the present case’, since it was punishable by a maximum of two years’ imprisonment. A catch-all law, sedition covered ‘all those practices, whether by word, deed or writing, which … directly tend to incite discontent or dissatisfaction, to incite ill-will between different classes of the King’s subjects … to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government, the laws or constitution of the realm’. The suggestion was not taken up. In the Cabinet’s discussion it was sensibly pointed out that other newspapers had published material of a character similar to that appearing in the Daily Worker – for example, ‘alleged atrocities by South Koreans’ – and it would be said that Winnington and his newspaper were being prosecuted because of their ‘political bias’. A decision on the thornier aspects of the legal status of the war was brought no closer when an inter-departmental committee reported to Cabinet in December. Beyond expressing agreement with the Attorney General’s earlier opinion that a collective police action would be on the same footing as war for purposes of domestic law, it offered little in the way of 153

Korean Conflict.indb 153

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

guidance for Ministers wrestling with problems such as that posed by the Daily Worker. Sir Norman Brook was not to allow them the luxury of hoping that legal difficulties would disappear. The committee favoured a declaration of the Korean operation to be a police action, which, Brook reminded Attlee, would create ‘the grave danger that the Government may find themselves committed internationally before they have fully explored the domestic repercussions of what is proposed’. Simply to declare in legislative form that ‘where war was referred to in Statute Law, it was deemed to cover collective police action’ might ‘easily land the Government in a position of some absurdity’, trying – as it must – to ‘translate into the black and white’ of domestic law ‘the theoretical conceptions of the international lawyers’. Unwittingly invoking the shade of Neville Chamberlain, Brook pointed out that ‘North Korea is far away and has no substantive links with this country’ and it was therefore relatively easy to avoid the ‘conception of being at war and to rely on the more nebulous conception of collective police action’. But, he asked tellingly, what if United Nations action were taken against East Germany? And what of the situation in law if the police action became real war in the event of Russia or another major power intervening in the Korean hostilities? By early January, when Cabinet inconclusively considered the inter-departmental report, Brook’s hypothetical example had come to pass: The Attorney-General said that this question had become more complicated and more urgent as a result of Chinese intervention … The position of persons in this country who traded with China presented many legal difficulties.

No action was ever brought against either the editor of the Daily Worker or Alan Winnington himself. The Labour government lacked the courage to pursue these dissidents. When the Conservatives came to power in October 1951, however, Winnington’s passport was confiscated and he was obliged to spend the rest of his working life reporting events from Eastern Europe and China. The case of Mrs Monica Felton also produced difficulties that lay at the heart of the relationship between the dissenting citizen and a liberal state 154

Korean Conflict.indb 154

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

engaged in ‘warlike operations’ but not war. Mrs Felton PhD (though never called ‘Doctor’ by her critics) was a member of the Labour Party and had been Chairman of the Stevenage Development Corporation since October 1949. In April 1951 she left for a visit to North Korea sponsored by the Women’s International Democratic Federation, a ‘Communist-controlled’ body, according to The Economist. On her way back she delivered a broadcast from Moscow in which she spoke of ‘American aggression’ in Korea, of atrocities allegedly committed by British, American and South Korean troops, and, in particular, of the Americans burning women and children and burying civilians alive. Mrs Felton repeated these allegations in the press and at public meetings on her return to Britain, declaring on one occasion: The truth about Korea is so appalling that nothing will silence me … The Government dare not let the country know what savagery is being committed in the name of Western civilization … I went to Korea because here was a chance to sort out the facts from the propaganda. The simple fact is that a whole people and the life they have created are being destroyed with a calculated savagery that can only be compared with that of Hitler and the Gestapo against the Jews. The Americans are using the most devilish weapons on the civilian population … A whole people are being crucified.

On 14 June Charles Taylor, a Conservative, raised the matter in the House. Taylor accused Mrs Felton of ‘high treason’ and used the occasion to tarnish the Labour Party: ‘During the past few months we have seen too many Communists posing as loyal members of the Socialist Party, and too many of these full-blooded Communists are holding prominent positions in the land.’ The Attorney General could do little except announce that the papers relating to Mrs Felton’s activities had been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. By so announcing, of course, the government affirmed its belief that she might well have some sort of case to answer, and a grave one at that. Sir Frank faced a problem similar to that which faced him earlier in the case of Winnington. As the Cabinet saw the matter, if he decided not to 155

Korean Conflict.indb 155

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

prosecute Mrs Felton for treason, just what should he do? A charge of treason was thought to be impracticable both politically and at law, but it was clearly his and the Cabinet’s feeling that Mrs Felton should not be allowed to go scot free. What about a change to the existing law which would permit a lesser, but still serious, charge to be brought? The ‘public disquiet at the series of incidents such as Pontecorvo, the Diplomats [Burgess and Maclean], now Mrs Felton, and no doubt further incidents of this kind’ seemed to call for a modification of the law. ‘The Cold War will continue,’ stated Sir Frank, ‘and if I decide not to prosecute Mrs Felton others may take this as carte blanche for them to visit North Korea as much as they like.’ He went on: To the average person it may seem fantastic that when British troops are engaged in all-out hostilities … it should be open to anybody, if the North Koreans will allow them, to go behind the enemy lines and consort with those who are doing their best to kill British soldiers.

Curiously, it appears not to have occurred to the Ministers that it was equally fantastic that British diplomats, businessmen and traders, encouraged by the government, were simultaneously consorting with the Chinese Communist regime. As if conceding the impossibility of framing wartime legislation in time of peace, Sir Frank concluded that it would be ‘very difficult to devise any change which would not unduly infringe freedom of expression and movement and yet would be enforceable’. The New Statesman, though not in sympathy with Mrs Felton, was quick to seize upon the civil libertarian dimension of the issue, particularly because the affair evoked shades of the Campbell case and the Zinoviev letter. In addition, the Tory press had already attempted to link John Strachey, the Minister of War, with Klaus Fuchs. It accordingly defended Mrs Felton’s right to commit her ‘folly’ by reference to the historical right of British citizens to condemn the conduct of their country’s troops in the field on moral grounds: There are some who are so forgetful of British traditions that they even regard it as treachery for an English man or woman to support the cause of those who may be fighting against us. Mr Gladstone was ‘disloyal’: he 156

Korean Conflict.indb 156

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

said that Egyptian rebels against British arms ‘were rightly struggling to be free’. Anyone who, like Emily Hobhouse in the Boer War, gave an unfavourable report of British use of concentration camps would be, on the basis of this argument, a traitor. We are not in this matter comparing Mrs Felton’s report with that of Emily Hobhouse. We are merely asserting that a British subject has the right to criticise the conduct of British and allied troops in the field, and, if given a chance to visit the terrain, report on what he or she sees.

Rather than accuse her of treason, the government should use Mrs Felton as the occasion for an impartial investigation into the conduct of the war on both sides. ‘Nationalism is not enough,’ averred the journal in a paraphrase of Nurse Cavell. Not surprisingly, The Economist had no time at all for the rights of Mrs Felton or Alan Winnington and their like, but nonetheless expressed a train of thought also evident in Cabinet discussions: ‘There is a strong case for legislation to define lesser degrees of treason and to provide a penalty, not of death, but a stiff term of imprisonment for such offences by a British subject as acting as a war correspondent with a force conducting military operations against a British army.’ In response to the Attorney General’s anxious questioning, the Cabinet could only suggest that the matter ‘be examined afresh, possibly by a Cabinet Committee’. One brave soul fruitlessly urged the reintroduction of Defence Regulation 18B, a wartime measure that had enabled the indefinite detention without trial of suspect persons, such as Sir Oswald Mosley. However, after the Attorney General stated that ‘insufficient evidence’ existed against Mrs Felton the affair was allowed to peter out, with the Cabinet resting content with her dismissal from the Chairmanship of the Stevenage Development Corporation. She had, according to Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Local Government and Planning, been guilty of ‘a grave discourtesy’ to the House by failing to appear before the Public Accounts Committee on 7 June. Her trip to North Korea did not constitute an excuse, since her duty was ‘to subordinate all other arrangements, whether public or private, whether at home or abroad, to this summons’. Having sent a telegram to the Minister before 7 June explaining that a breakdown in travel 157

Korean Conflict.indb 157

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

arrangements would cause her to miss the committee hearing, Mrs Felton was convinced that her dismissal was a case of victimisation. However, considering the dire nature of the forms of retribution that had been suggested both within and without government for her utterances about the Korean War, Mrs Felton might have counted herself fortunate to have escaped with the mere loss of her position. Sir John Pratt presented an even more ticklish problem for the government, for his recent status as a senior civil servant in the Foreign Office could hardly allow him to be characterised as a Communist or a wide-eyed fellow traveller. Moreover, Sir John could claim near-peerless experience and knowledge of the Far East, having first served in China as a student interpreter in 1898 before joining the China Consular Service for which he acted in a number of capacities, including Consul General in Shanghai in the 1920s. During World War II he was head of the Far Eastern Section of the Ministry of Information, and he rejoined the Foreign Office in 1945 as Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs. By 1951, as well as having seven books on the Far East and China to his credit, he was a representative on the Universities China Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the School of Oriental and African Studies. His public expostulations about the Korean War were therefore all the more worrying to officials. As one former colleague put it, ‘because he served in the Foreign Office for so long and because he is known to be a great authority on the Far East’, his views ‘are given a degree of credence which would be denied to anyone who had not held his former official position’. Among his other accomplishments Sir John could claim Boris Karloff (William Pratt) as a brother, though he did not exploit the relationship in his pronouncements. What, then, were his views on the Korean War? Declaring his disinterest (‘Anyone who thinks I am a Communist or fellow traveller is either a fool, a liar or both. I have no politics, I am not a Labour man, nor am I a Tory’), Sir John was disturbed at the assertion of North Korean guilt for the origins of the war. It was the South, he believed, led by Syngman Rhee, that had launched an attack on the North as a result of a conspiracy hatched between Rhee, John Foster Dulles and the American military. In this, Pratt’s 158

Korean Conflict.indb 158

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

interpretation of events was very close to that of I.F. Stone. On one occasion he asserted: Fighting began at dawn on Sunday, 25th June 1950 and that same afternoon the Security Council passed a resolution declaring North Korea guilty. Their decision was based on a telegram from the United Nations Commission in Seoul reporting that there was no evidence which side began the fighting. My suspicions were aroused by the haste with which this resolution was passed and by the fact that President Truman, without further reference to the United Nations, used it as a pretext for sending American troops to South Korea and the American navy to Formosa. The text of the United Nations telegram was suppressed even in the Command Paper laid before the House of Commons.

Sir John argued further that at a meeting in Tokyo, held a day or two before hostilities began, Dulles, General Bradley, MacArthur and Louis Johnson, the US Secretary for Defence, decided to precipitate the war in order to save Formosa and South Korea from communism. He concluded, in an unpublished letter to the Daily Telegraph, that ‘No one who studies the evidence … can doubt that the Korean War began with an attack upon North Korea launched by Syngman Rhee with the support of his friends in the American Military Advisory Group.’ The government, nettled by Sir John’s accusation that it knew of but suppressed the UNCOK telegram, maintained, in Morrison’s words, that the ‘text was not included in our first White Paper on Korea … not for any sinister motive but for brevity’s sake’. John McNair, General Secretary of ‘the good old ILP’, as he called it, identified the vulnerability of this argument after securing information from Morrison for an editorial in the ILP’s Socialist Leader. ‘This is very weak,’ he told Morrison. ‘If I were in Sir John’s place, I would say at once that it was inexcusable to leave out of an important White Paper this first vital communication from the UNCOK to the United Nations.’ Certainly, when faced with accusations from a man of Pratt’s eminence of complicity in the ‘lying and cheating’ policy of the Americans, the government could ill afford such maladroit responses, 159

Korean Conflict.indb 159

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

particularly when even leading Conservatives felt uneasy about some aspects of the war. On 28 June, Harold Nicolson noted in his diary that Rab Butler was ‘worried about the Korean situation and feels that the Americans have rather rushed UNO. It certainly looks as if they had acted first and then obtained the consent of the Security Council afterwards’. As one event succeeded another in Korea, Sir John broadened the scope of his attack. The crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces in October 1950 had not, he asserted, been authorised by the United Nations but was purely a decision of MacArthur’s, and the UN was left in his wake, lamely acknowledging the legitimacy of his action retrospectively. Sir John was wrong, in that the United States, and to some extent Britain also, had debated and approved the crossing well in advance of the event, but his misgivings accorded closely with the private sentiments of many British officials. Emulating his brother’s most famous role, Sir John rampaged like Frankenstein’s monster up and down the country, addressing numerous meetings and publishing pamphlets and letters to the press. The Foreign Office received ‘a constant stream of evidence, in the form of letters from MPs, public bodies and members of the public, of the harm that is being done by Sir John Pratt’s writings and speeches’. The Foreign Secretary continued to get reports from McNair. One such was of a meeting of the Woolwich Peace Council, addressed by Pratt, whose audience consisted mostly of ‘dear old Quakers and religious folk, with a sprinkling … of a dozen of the usual hard-faced Communists’. McNair saw this meeting as part of an attempt by the Communist Party ‘to capture the Quaker Movement’ and to infiltrate his own ILP. A speech in Bradford prompted three members of the audience to write to Morrison’s successor, Anthony Eden: After attending a meeting in Bradford organised by the British Peace Committee, at which Sir John Pratt was the speaker, we feel it is essential that you should be made aware of our feelings concerning the … manner in which the present government, as well as the previous Labour government, have deliberately concealed the truth in presenting the situation to the British public concerning the Korean War and the 160

Korean Conflict.indb 160

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

intervention of the Chinese People’s Republic. When a man in Sir John Pratt’s position confirms that the policy of the West is built on a tissue of lies, then it is obviously time for people of this country to demand that our policy be changed before we find ourselves drawn into another war.

Sir John had again expressed the innermost doubts of officialdom when he laid the blame for Chinese intervention in the war squarely on MacArthur, ‘whose avowed object was to carry the war into China’. If the Chinese were branded by the UN as aggressors, he asked, was that ‘because aggression is not aggression when committed against a Communist but becomes aggression when the Communist hits back?’ This argument bore kinship with a question in an internal Foreign Office memorandum: how would the United States respond if Mexico had been invaded by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces in support of a socialist government? Although such fragments hardly warrant the conclusion that the Foreign Office was staffed by Communists, Malcolm Muggeridge was ‘concerned’ to learn from an informant that ‘young men in Foreign Office [are] all anti-American and against Korean intervention’ – concerned enough, anyway, to commit this information to his diary. The level of ire aroused by Pratt was directly proportionate to the closeness of his accusations to thinking in the Foreign Office which dare not speak its name. The British government, charged Sir John, had quite simply ‘deliberately deceived the people over the Korean War’, knowing the whole adventure to be based on ‘a gigantic lie’, which was to be contrasted with the Communists who were ‘telling the truth’. The sin had been worsened by the government’s ruinous rearmament programme – part of the Americans’ endeavour ‘to surround the world with atom bases’ – and by its association, however unwittingly, with the ‘slaughter’ of 1 million North Koreans. This was strong stuff. If the Cabinet had toyed with the idea of charging Winnington and Mrs Felton with treason, then surely Sir John Pratt merited such consideration as well, especially as the Daily Worker had taken up his accusations with a will. The government’s unwillingness to employ the criminal law against Sir John amounted to a grant of immunity, and gave the paper freedom to publish material of a sort which might normally be 161

Korean Conflict.indb 161

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

printable only under parliamentary privilege. Why, therefore, did neither the Labour nor the Conservative cabinet so much as mention Sir John’s delinquencies in their minutes and papers? Quite possibly, it was felt that discreet private overtures by the Foreign Office would do the trick. After all, Pratt had until recently been one of them (so, of course, had Burgess and Maclean). Indeed, according to an official, in December 1951, ‘Efforts by the Chief Clerk and Mr Scott to persuade him to desist from his foolish behaviour have had no effect.’ Sterner measures were also of little use. The Foreign Office relieved him of his post as its representative on the Universities China Committee ‘on the ostensible ground that he lacked recent experience of China, but actually because of these undesirable activities’ – in other words, for conduct unbecoming. However, little could be done by way of relieving him of the Chairmanship of the School of Oriental and African Studies. Nor, according to the Chief Clerk, could a case be made for ‘stopping’ Sir John’s pension. The only remaining action was to arm the News Department with ‘the necessary material to enable them to rebut in detail any allegations’ made by Pratt, and, if possible, to plant inspired questions in the House. In truth there was nothing that the government could do to silence a critic with such impeccable credentials. Becoming more frenzied in his accusations, he was uttering sentiments obscurely and darkly entertained by members of the government and the higher civil service. These amounted to the suspicion that the origins of the Korean War were by no means as clear-cut as the Americans would have them; that MacArthur seemed bent on dragging his government and the United Nations into a general war with China and, possibly, the Soviet Union; that the British government had been panicked into adopting an economically disruptive rearmament programme; and that the British might not after all be engaged in a just war. Sir John Pratt lived on until 1970, continuing to enjoy an annual entry in Who’s Who and no doubt reflecting wryly on the pass to which the Americans had brought themselves in Vietnam as a result of a Far Eastern policy he had so vociferously condemned in the early 1950s. *

*

*

162

Korean Conflict.indb 162

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

The brutality of the Syngman Rhee regime, aside from its doubtful claim to being one of the ‘free world’s democracies’, caused embarrassment to the British government and acute shame and confusion among the more thoughtful and sensitive of the journalists covering the war. However much the authorities might have emphasised the notion that the war was a UN police action whose purpose was to punish aggression, and not a defence of the South Korean government as such, the unpalatable fact remained that this government was a police state of singular unpleasantness, scarcely to be distinguished from the North Korean state in repressiveness. By contrast with Sir John Pratt’s and Mrs Felton’s strictures about the causes and morality of the war, strictly factual accounts of mass, barely legal executions in South Korea could hardly be portrayed as bordering on the treacherous. Measures to counter them were correspondingly feeble, relying as they did on unconvincing interpretations of the atrocities as a series of unconnected incidents, and as small in scale when compared to those for which the Communists were responsible. A few weeks after the outbreak of the war the Foreign Office was already confronted with the problem and attempting to play it down: The press in London is showing great interest in reports of shooting by Korean Government police of a number of Communist prisoners. News Department is under pressure as to whether we have any information which confirms or denies these reports. It is realised that it will probably be impossible to obtain any satisfactory reply from SCAP [MacArthur’s headquarters] or the republican Government. If, however, an enquiry was made and the result was as anticipated, it would at any rate enable the News Department to say they had looked into the matter but had been unable to obtain sufficient information to allow them to form an opinion. This would be useful in damping down press interest.

Such reports, both from journalists and Foreign Office representatives in Korea and Japan, continued unabated. In July a ‘reliable Australian source’ told H.R. Sawbridge, the British chargé d’affaires in Korea, that he had seen ‘a truck loaded with 20 people’ who ‘were kneeling and being beaten 163

Korean Conflict.indb 163

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

by guards on least movement’. On enquiry Sawbridge’s informant was told by the guards, ‘Guerillas, bang, bang!’ and, ‘feeling powerless to intervene’, the Australian ‘continued on his way’. Four days later, the summary shooting of 20 North Korean prisoners-ofwar was witnessed by a Picture Post photographer. It was noted, with evident relief, by the UK Liaison Mission in Japan that there was ‘some doubt as to whether even Picture Post would publish the photographs he had taken of this incident’. However, the Daily Worker had no such qualms. On 9 August it carried a story from Winnington about the massacre of 7,000 political prisoners at a village near Taejon, allegedly conducted by ‘South Korean puppet police’ acting ‘under the supervision of American officers’. Enquiries in Korea initially suggested ‘that something along the lines of the Daily Worker’s report may have occurred’, but the American authorities later informed the British that ‘if any such incident as charged … did take place (or if any such incident even remotely similar to that charged took place) it was entirely without the consent and without the knowledge of the Americans’. In September 1950 it was reported to the Foreign Office that the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs had complained that the brutal beating of a prisoner-of-war by a South Korean policeman had been witnessed and photographed by two Picture Post journalists. While the American authorities had insisted that their correspondents would ‘not be permitted to make use of any such material’, the two journalists could not be found because they were constantly on the move, and London was asked to take action ‘appropriate in the circumstances’. Accordingly, A.G.R. Rouse got in touch with Tom Hopkinson, the editor of Picture Post, to exercise a bit of subtle censorship: The subject was of course broached in a tactful manner and it was pointed out to the editor that we did not wish to intervene officially in a matter of this sort. At the same time it was pointed out that whilst such unfortunate occurrences might occur in South Korea, we had every reason to believe that incidents of this nature were more frequent and more violent in North Korea. In any event we thought that two blacks did not make a white and pictures of this sort could not be taken in territory held by the North Koreans, and publicity about South Korea treatment only told part of the story. 164

Korean Conflict.indb 164

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

Hopkinson undertook to contact the Foreign Office ‘if there was any question of publishing the picture when it was received’. Unfortunately for those in government attempting to ‘damp down’ reports of this nature, incidents of atrocious behaviour (or ‘excesses’, to use the curious euphemism then employed) occurred against the background of a war waged by the United States in what was seen as an unprecedently savage manner. Reports of brutality therefore seemed all the more plausible. Time magazine ran a piece on 21 August 1950 in which its correspondent, John Osborne, began by saying, ‘This is a story that no American should ever have to write. It is the ugly story of an ugly war.’ Waging war against communism ‘by military means alone’, Osborne wrote, was forcing upon the American army, operating in a foreign and largely hostile country, ‘acts and attitudes of the utmost savagery … not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field, but savagery in detail – the blotting out of villages where the enemy may be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans’. He continued: And there is savagery by proxy … The South Korean police and the South Korean marines whom I observed in front line areas are brutal. They murder to save themselves the trouble of escorting prisoners to the rear; they murder civilians simply to get them out of the way or to avoid the trouble of searching and cross-examining them. And they extort information – information our forces need and require of the South Korean interrogators – by means so brutal that they cannot be described.

When The Times published accounts of what was being done in the name of the United Nations’, and therefore Britain’s, police action, the British government could no longer supinely hope that the stories would go away or be blamed on Communist propaganda. A story by Louis Heren of 25 October 1950 described events in a village police station a few miles distant from Seoul that were typical of what was occurring throughout the country wherever the writ of the government ran, and which represented ‘the accepted methods of the South Korean police sent from Pusan to 165

Korean Conflict.indb 165

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

eradicate Communism’. On the day of his visit, the correspondent noted that ‘290 men and women and 7 babies’ were crowded into six small cells, which had been home to most of the prisoners for 20 days. Interrogation consisted of repeated bashings with rifle butts and ‘the insertion of splinters under finger-nails’. The policemen appeared to work harder ‘to prove their diligence’ while being observed, though it was obviously impossible for the journalist ‘to decide fairly whether they [the prisoners] were Communists or victims of malice or revenge’. The report concluded: The scene described has been, and is still being, repeated throughout Korea. An officer of a United Nations investigation team said that reprisals are as numerous as reports of Communist atrocities. Most nonKorean members of the United Nations forces are aware of this, but feel either too helpless to intervene or believe attention drawn to the reprisals would be excellent material for Communist propaganda. Others are of the opinion that their suppression is the responsibility of the South Korean Government, and that as foreigners they cannot interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

Perhaps because of its appearance in such an august publication, this article attracted immediate and widespread attention in Britain. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, received large quantities of protesting mail, one such letter coming from an official of his old union, the Transport and General Workers: ‘is it for this, that British soldiers are dying, to perpetuate a tyrannical regime, whose past history has been deplorable and whose present conduct we are helping to uphold by force of arms?’ Bevin’s standard reply to such protests, presumably as drafted by his officials, managed to combine the unconvincing assurance that the South Korean government ‘will do all that they can to prevent such abuses’ with an attempt to sheet home the ultimate blame to the North Koreans: We are, of course, anxious to do all that is possible to prevent such deplorable situations as that in Korea from arising, and it is for this that 166

Korean Conflict.indb 166

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

we are fighting. Our soldiers are not in Korea to perpetuate any regime but to resist unprovoked aggression; and there certainly would have been far less bitterness in all parts of Korea had the aggressor not obstinately resisted the continuous efforts of the United Nations to bring to birth an independent and united state in that country.

In a similar manner, the House of Commons, whose attention had been attracted to the problem by The Times, had to be content with an undertaking from Ernest Davies, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the government would ‘do all they can to prevent any further atrocities and to try to bring an end to vindictiveness’. The twin pillars of the government’s apology-cum-defence of the South Korean regime were unveiled in a Foreign Office brief prepared for the use of the Lord Chancellor on 2 November. First, little better could be expected of Koreans, and more especially of Korean police, in view of their long Japanese tutelage: ‘The Koreans are not by nature phlegmatic or pacific.’ Those among them ‘who were trained by the Japanese will already have been accustomed to this [callous] point of view, and since none of them has been brought up in democratic traditions it cannot but be expected that the prisons should be over-full … and the methods of interrogation should often be brutal’. Second, ‘It seems probable that if ever a balance sheet of atrocities can be drawn between North and South the Communists will be found … to have acted with more ruthless brutality and with infinitely less excuse than the Southerners.’ That is to say, we are fighting with allies who are less morally reprehensible than the enemy. Despite some months of such analyses and excuses, by the end of 1950 reports were still arriving at the Foreign Office from Korea stating that ‘elements of Korea’s forces and police are out of control’. However, it took a journalist of James Cameron’s quality and passion – aided by his proprietor’s bungled attempt at censorship – to make the issue of the Korean atrocities a thoroughgoing public controversy. Finding himself in Korea almost by accident, since he had replaced an earlier Picture Post correspondent killed in an all-too-common US transport plane crash, Cameron was struck immediately by the squalor of the country and the 167

Korean Conflict.indb 167

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

nastiness of the war – ‘a blundering war, a wasteful war, a war in which everyone was on the wrong side’. But he was only truly appalled when he and his photographer, Bert Hardy, happened upon a scene at the railway station compound at Pusan: [W]e came upon the sight that, more than anything else in that unlovely country, made us realise that the corrupting hand of Korea had reached out for us at last. A month before we would have been aghast; it was shocking now only to feel it commonplace … [but] this was the first time that a lull in our front-line work had given us an opportunity to enquire, and examine, and photograph. It was in the second week in September; it could, as I found out later, have been almost any week.

What he had seen was a crowd of some 700 South Korean political prisoners, crouching ‘in the classic Oriental attitude of subjection, the squatting foetal position’ in pools of garbage: Any deviation from this attitude – I watched for an hour and a half on this occasion, and repeated the observation later – brought a gun-butt on their skulls. Finally they were herded – still roped together and manacled, as they had been throughout, the lowest common denominator of human degradation – into trucks, with the numb air of men going to their deaths. I was assured, by a willing attendant anxious to make a good impression, that many of them were.

Knowing these men, or most of them, to have been only suspected of Communist sympathies, Cameron immediately took his ‘protests to the [UN] Commission, who received me kindly, and said, in effect: “Yes, we know; it is all very disturbing; nevertheless you must remember that these are Asiatic people and congenitally different; their standards of savagery are different from ours. Clearly it is undesirable, but the situation is especially difficult.”’ Quoting The Times’ article of 25 October in support of his sense of outrage that this should be happening under the flag of the United Nations, Cameron concluded: 168

Korean Conflict.indb 168

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

We have the opportunity here, it seems to me – it may well be the final one – to strike out the beam from our own eyes before it blinds us. The United Nations Organisation is, after all, a very young thing, an awkward and uncertain five-year-old; nevertheless it is something that most of us cleave to rather desperately, having no other. Here, as with many fiveyear-olds, an ugly rash has appeared, requiring urgent treatment. If cured, it might confer a valuable immunity for the future; if ignored, the disease that follows may well be mortal. In Korea the rash has appeared abruptly, in a virulent form, largely through our five-year-old having been compelled by circumstances to consort with some very undesirable and infectious company. The end was accepted, only the means are in question. We went into Korea to fight our conception of oppression, but if, in the waging of that war, we slacken our grip on our standards, if we assault well-intentioned diagnosticians of the evil as saboteurs and fellow-travellers – if, in the end, the difference between the thing we are fighting for and the thing we are fighting against becomes academic to the point of invisibility, then the game is up.

The episode etched itself deeply on Cameron’s memory, for he wrote of it at length in his memoirs which were published in 1967; he spoke of it in a BBC broadcast in 1981, and wrote of it again in the Guardian in late 1982, going so far as to state, ‘I have seen Belsen, but this was worse’. In writing up the piece for publication in Picture Post, Cameron – aware that his anger might easily spill over into mere ranting – carefully drained it of emotion until the piece ‘became almost bleak in its austerity’. Tom Hopkinson questioned both Cameron and Hardy closely about the authenticity of the story and the photographs, and even though he was satisfied, nevertheless he ‘searched all the East European magazines’ he could obtain ‘to get hold of some picture giving the opposite side of the case – ill-treatment by the North Koreans of prisoners from the South’. He found one in a Czech magazine: ‘[I]t showed an American soldier dressed up by his captors in a false nose and swastika, forced to march in procession trailing the Stars and Stripes in the dust.’ The completed feature was captioned ‘An Appeal to the United Nations’ and sent to Kenneth Younger, 169

Korean Conflict.indb 169

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the Minister of State then leading the British delegation to the UN in New York. No comment was forthcoming, so the article was sent to the presses, only to be stopped on the orders of the proprietor, Edward Hulton. As The Times and the Daily Telegraph had recently published stories on Korea ‘a good deal more outspoken’ than Cameron’s, Hopkinson was naturally puzzled. An appeal to the board of directors not only resulted in the editor being sacked and Cameron’s resignation, but evinced no explanation for Hulton’s behaviour. The affair might have ended quietly there, the stuff of ephemeral Fleet Street gossip, had it not been for the Daily Worker’s getting hold of a proof of the article and publishing extracts under the banner headline korea exposure suppressed – picture post editor sacked. A major row followed, with newspapers and journals taking sides, questions asked in the House, and the article receiving more attention than it would have if Hulton had permitted it to be published. Cameron’s original purpose was not lost on C.W. Judd of the United Nations Association. He wrote to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Britain’s permanent representative at the United Nations: You may have heard that Cameron of ‘Picture Post’ wrote a series of articles for them on Korea and that in the last he tried, as a good UN supporter, to draw attention to atrocities which he witnessed himself. Having failed to get anyone to pay attention in Korea, he felt a sort of mission to rouse public opinion in order that these atrocities could be brought to an end and the good name of the UN cleared up in the Far East. Hulton suppressed the article and dismissed the Editor, which caused quite a stir in this country, and the proofs of the article unfortunately leaked out from the printing works to the ‘Daily Worker’ which splashed extracts from the story out of their context, using them as a stick with which to belabour the UN’s actions in Korea – the very thing that Cameron had hoped to avoid.

‘When the dust finally settled,’ Cameron recalled many years later, ‘Tom Hopkinson and I were out of a job, and shortly Picture Post withered away, as it deserved.’ 170

Korean Conflict.indb 170

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

By early December 1950, Washington was sufficiently embarrassed by ‘widespread criticisms of … alleged ill treatment of collaborators appre­ hended by Republic of Korea authorities’ for Acheson, the Secretary of State, to distribute a note on the matter to American embassies and consulates around the world. Perhaps with Cameron and like-minded journalists in mind, Acheson observed that unfavourable newspaper articles had been written ‘by inexperienced, biased or apparently emotional reporters’ and drew attention to South Korea’s relatively liberal and humane treatment of suspected collaborators, a fact ‘attested by International Red Cross representatives’ in Korea. In terms reminiscent of the Foreign Office brief prepared for the Lord Chancellor, the State Department hastened to point to the behaviour of the enemy: The steps taken by the Republic of Korea in regard to Communist collaboration should be contrasted with the activities of the Communist invaders and their wanton disregard of every civilized standard of behavior. It should be borne in mind that many of Korea’s principal cities have been largely destroyed by departing Communist arsonists. Moreover, more than ten thousand civilians disappeared from Seoul after the occupation and countless more were murdered.

Scarcely had Acheson’s letter of guidance been sent out than James Webb, Acting Secretary of State, was anxiously telegraphing the embassy in Korea, ‘Weekend press reports on ROK mass executions of Commie collaborators and Rhee statement ordering speedup red trials and executions … creating exceedingly bad reaction here and abroad … Continuation present course will give Commie propaganda most effective weapons in further splitting already divided views in UN re acceptability ROK.’ Or, as William Sebald, the State Department representative in Japan, wired to Acheson on 19 December, ‘it is feared these excesses may serve to cast discredit on entire UN Korean effort’. However, it was the direct physical intervention of the British army between a group of intended victims and their executioners that stirred the Foreign Office into action, and even then on the curious ground that the 171

Korean Conflict.indb 171

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

morale of the soldiers would suffer if they continued to see mass executions of civilians. The incident was news in the United States as well as in Britain, for on 16 December the New York Times reported that executions taking place in the Seoul area – ‘going on almost daily since the liberation of Seoul in September’ – had caused ‘a wave of disgust and anger’ among British troops stationed in the vicinity. As related to BBC correspondent Rene Cutforth by a Captain of the Northumberland Fusiliers: What’s happened is that these police bastards have been shooting a lot of people and I think they may try it on again this morning, in which case we’re going to put a stop to their little games. Yesterday morning, about this time or a little later … some of my chaps saw some trucks arrive about a quarter of a mile away over there to the north. They walked over to see who they were, and when they got there, they saw … a freshly dug trench about three feet deep and the policemen were dragging about a dozen people – men and women with their hands tied behind their backs with electric flex – out of a truck they had parked nearby. They made these poor sods kneel down in the trench and then they shot them with automatic weapons through the backs of their heads. Very poor shots they were, by all accounts.

On 21 December the worried US ambassador, John Muccio, reported to Washington the events of the preceding day: ‘Yesterday afternoon ROK Army … officer attempted conduct execution undetermined number persons convicted … is same general area of encampment UK 29th Brigade where other executions had resulted in adverse publicity.’ After seventeen had been shot, ‘British officers then stopped executions … Commanding Officer UK 29th Brigade has issued orders prohibiting further executions this area. British troops will stop them and will bring responsible person before him “by force if necessary to be dealt with”’, by which was meant, according to Muccio, that the Korean guards would be shot if necessary to prevent further executions. The officer, Brigadier Brodie, then ordered his men to encircle Execution Hill, as it had become known, to prevent fresh waves of killing. All this had occurred the day after the British chargé, 172

Korean Conflict.indb 172

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

A.C.S. Adams, had made urgent representations to Muccio and to the South Korean Home Minister lest there be ‘an incident if British troops were again subjected to the spectacle of mass executions’. After the incident, Syngman Rhee made his by-now habitual assurances and excuses, namely that the matter would be investigated and that greater leniency would be shown in future, but that, in any event, ‘he could not understand resentment aroused by executions since if those concerned were released they would have continued helping the Communists’. It was scant comfort for the British authorities to be told, as they were by the American adviser to the Korean Army Judge-Advocate, that, ‘This is a sovereign republic … and nobody can interfere. Every one of those executed has been given an impartial trial with full evidence.’ This defence carried little weight. In the first place, South Korea was only nominally sovereign. The Americans had virtually run the country since 1945 and were now even more firmly in charge, as the regime depended for its very survival on its powerful protector. In the second place, the impartiality of the Korean judicial system was known to be an utter sham, a host of instances having been cited by investigators of the UN Commission on Korea. Rhee used the judicial system to cower and coerce even members of the National Assembly and was not averse to having them roughed up by his police and gaoled after transparently rigged trials. However, the affair involving British troops was not without salutary, if temporary, effects. As Adams told John Shattock, his friend and colleague at the Foreign Office, a fortnight later, ‘It is just too bad that a lot of folk were brutally executed, but a number of lives have been saved as a result of adverse publicity, UN action, perhaps also our own representations, and the resultant review of procedure and the amnesty.’ In fact, however, the executions continued. In February 1951 R.H. Scott upbraided the Korean Minister accredited to Britain and reminded him ‘that the British public and press were always very sensitive to what appeared to be atrocity stories’. This was the strongest action that the British government was to take. It had predictably little effect. In April the South Korean Minister of the Interior and two other Ministers were dismissed as the result of an investigation conducted by the National Assembly into the summary execution of 187 villagers near Taegu. 173

Korean Conflict.indb 173

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In February 1951 the results of investigations pursued in late 1950 by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) were published. The investigation report stated that although the exact number of people executed in South Korea since the beginning of the war could not be determined, ‘it certainly amounts to many hundreds’ and it related the facts in the incident that so angered the Northumberland Fusiliers: The unfortunate people concerned were compelled to dig a ditch to serve as a common grave, were then lined up in batches of six or eight, and were shot rather clumsily and inexpertly before the eyes of the others who were waiting their turn to be shot. Often a person was not killed in the first round, and several more shots were required to finish him off.

As a result of representations made by the chairman of UNCURK to President Rhee, provision was made for the next of kin to collect the corpses of the executed and methods of execution were to be improved. The sentences of the many political prisoners (estimated variously between 5,000 and 7,000) were reviewed, so that by the end of 1950 1,228 had been completely pardoned, 697 released on probation, and charges pending against another 708 dropped. ‘This is very satisfactory,’ commented James Plimsoll, the Australian representative on UNCURK, but he added, ‘Unfortunately, during their imprisonment many of these persons had suffered greatly from malnutrition, beatings, and even torture, and after release some of them died as a result of maltreatment.’ Searching for causes of the general deplorable situation, Plimsoll singled out ‘Far Eastern customs and Korean history’, which embraced a Japanese-trained ‘police of a particularly vicious sort’, the vengeful feelings of those Koreans who had been persecuted during the occupation by the invading North Koreans, and the inability of the United Nations to intervene ‘in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of a … legally constituted government’. Plimsoll concluded, ‘The picture is not a pretty one, even when due weight is given to the special conditions of war and of a relatively primitive country’ 174

Korean Conflict.indb 174

04/09/2015 11:40

A WA R B Y A N Y OT H E R N A M E

and he advised, rather forlornly, that the United Nations should strive to secure ‘reforms in the police system’. The British government was properly obliged to bear the opprobrium of association – tenuous but undeniable – with an undemocratic, vicious regime dominated by a handful of wealthy landowners. One looks in vain in the Cabinet and Foreign Office records for traces of even a single strenuous effort to bring pressure upon the American and South Korean governments to put an end to what amounted to state murder. Instead, the government sought refuge from clear moral responsibility in fatuous statements about the immaturity of the Rhee regime and the greater evils of the North Koreans. To the critic of official policy, this latter distinction was so fine as to be almost casuistical, and overlooked Cameron’s charge that the means had tarnished the ends. A war undertaken for high principle had been corroded to a nullity by the actions of the South Korean government. Verified atrocity stories could not help but create doubts in the minds of those who had hitherto swallowed their misgivings about the casus belli in a desire to support the government and the idea of the United Nations. The plain fact is that in its eagerness to curry favour with the Americans, and, perhaps more creditably, to atone for Abyssinia, Manchuria and Munich (however mistakenly these analogies were drawn), the British government had leaped into a war, giving every appearance of acting in defence of a gallant little Belgium in the Far East.

175

Korean Conflict.indb 175

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER FIVE

Indian–British Overtures to the Soviet Union

F

or all the uncertainty and suspicion of Soviet motives and intentions, the fact remained that in both the British and American governments there existed a feeling, perhaps no more than a hope, that the Soviets were looking for a way out. The logic of the situation early in July 1950 and for two-and-a-half months thereafter suggested otherwise, unless the Russians really had been shocked by the response of the West in Korea. After all, the North Koreans were driving all before them and until mid-September seemed close to victory. Moscow had merely to sit back and chuckle at the discomfiture of the Americans. If things went awry they could point to the West as capitalist–imperialist warmongers, and yet here they were, scarcely a week after the outbreak of the war, putting out peace feelers to the British ambassador in Moscow. According to the British way of thinking, the Russians might have been serious, but if they were intent only on doing a profitable deal, nothing would be lost by a bit of diplomatic bargaining – especially as general war might be the ultimate price for the failure to stop or contain the conflict in Korea. In the upshot, the Kremlin wanted Communist China seated at the United Nations and Formosa returned to Peking, knowing full well that the British and India wanted, at least in principle, the same things. Britain, even though suspecting that the Russian intention was to drive a wedge between the allies, and with little hope of persuading Washington to accept such demands, nonetheless aspired to wrest something from the negotiations. Labour Ministers were anticipating Harold Macmillan’s dictum, ‘Jaw-jaw is better than war-war.’ For their part, the Americans possessed, in the words of a 1956 report from the UK embassy in Washington (but equally relevant to 1950), ‘a deep-seated mistrust of negotiation’, caused in part ‘by a distaste 176

Korean Conflict.indb 176

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

for dealing with Communists’ and in the main by ‘doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with unscrupulous regimes; the illusion of the plain, blunt American being outwitted at the conference table by dishonest foreigners is still cherished in some quarters’. On 30 June 1950 Sir David Kelly, the British ambassador in Moscow, reported his belief that the Soviet Union had connived in the North Korean attack, at least to the extent of being fully aware of its imminence, but had been taken by surprise at the ‘unexpected speed’ of the Security Council’s response and the ‘prompt United States reaction’. He concluded that the Soviets had ‘intended to exploit a favourable local situation, not to provoke a general conflict’. On 6 July Kelly reported to the Foreign Office that Gromyko, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, had asked if he had any specific propositions for a peaceful settlement, to which, of course, Kelly could only respond by suggesting that the Russians use their influence with North Korea to restore the status quo ante. ‘He nodded assent,’ noted the ambassador, and repeated the Soviets’ desire for a peaceful settlement. It was a slender foundation for large hopes on the one hand, but on the other hand, Russian leaders were not given to idle chit-chat on such grave matters. Kelly, clearly trying to suppress any nascent excitement he might have felt, warned Bevin that the Russians might be engaging in a ‘heads I win – tails you lose’ exercise – that is, an attempt to elicit a proposal amounting to a North Korean victory (for example, a ceasefire on the existing front, with the UN holding only the Pusan bridgehead), or to arrive at a position which would enable them to accuse Britain of not really wishing for a settlement. However, Kelly observed, it is ‘not impossible (repeat not) that Soviet Government … are genuinely seeking a means of escape perhaps including a compensatory concession about the admission of Communist China to … Security Council’. Ernest Bevin wasted no time. On the same day, 6 July, he instructed Franks to show Kelly’s report to Acheson at once, and to inform the Secretary: Have in mind that the public here in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognise that they have over-stepped the mark in Korea. 177

Korean Conflict.indb 177

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace, and the Government … are bound to be careful not to act in any way which might lose them the unanimous support of the country which was demonstrated most lately in yesterday’s debate in Parliament.

Late on the 6th Franks duly spoke to Acheson, who said that Gromyko’s approach should be ‘taken seriously’. While Franks reported on the exchange on the following day his account did not indicate that Acheson had been unhappy about Bevin urging concessions for a ceasefire, although in his memoirs Acheson reported expressing unhappiness over the point. Indeed, Bevin had made no proposals for concessions of any description, merely wishing at this stage to tell the Americans of the developments in Moscow. Perhaps, recollecting the event many years later, Acheson was reliving the misgivings he voiced to Lew Douglas, the US ambassador in London, in a cable on 7 July. The Soviet approach might well be a trick, he warned the ambassador, but his inclination was to treat it seriously as a device of the Soviets to end the Korean affair without undue loss of prestige. If Kelly could play the matter out without involving the United States or other governments, well and good, but it was of the greatest importance that Gromyko should not get the impression that a settlement could be concluded outside the terms of the UN resolutions of 25 and 27 June, or by haggling over Formosa and a seat for Communist China on the Security Council. With this in mind, Kelly should see Gromyko again with a view to discussing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. Just what was in this for the Russians, by way of a quid pro quo, it is difficult to see. Certainly, Bevin saw the necessity for at least the contemplation of compromises, even if Acheson thought them to resemble ‘surrenders’. Before Douglas had relayed the Secretary’s reactions to the Foreign Office, on 7 July Bevin wrote to Franks a message he might well not have sent had he known of the Americans’ state of mind. The only proposal which Britain could properly make (and, indeed, the only one made by Kelly thus far), Bevin noted, was that the Soviet Union should persuade the North Koreans to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th parallel. The Russians might be prepared 178

Korean Conflict.indb 178

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

to do this, though they would have to use their ‘ingenuity’ to find a face-saving formula in doing so. It was more likely, however, that they would raise the question of Formosa, ‘having regard to the situation which the President’s declaration of 27th June creates’, and possibly the seating of China in the United Nations. At this point, Bevin stumbled fully into the lion’s den: I think that Mr Acheson and the United States Government should appreciate, and I put it to them very frankly, the way I see the situation … Whereas the United States have the whole-hearted backing of world opinion … in Korea, I do not believe they could rely on the same support for their declared policy in connexion with Formosa. Not only would many Powers, particularly Asian Powers, dislike the prospect of an extension of the dispute which might follow if the Central People’s Government were to attempt an attack on Formosa, but undoubtedly feel that … it would not be justifiable, in view of the pledge under the Cairo Declaration, to take steps which might prejudice the ultimate handing over of the territory to China. India … is very sensitive on this aspect of United States policy.

Discussing Acheson’s message on 8 July with Douglas and Kenneth Younger – while Bevin was in hospital – Attlee stated his intention of instructing Kelly, in effect, to play for time and to draw the Russians out without appearing over-anxious. This did little to assuage Douglas’ fears. Off the record, he told the Prime Minister that the Soviets were likely to demand the seating of Red China in the United Nations and such would be the pressure of ‘world opinion’ on the United States that the Chinese claim to Formosa might prove irresistible. ‘In other words,’ he lamented, ‘the United States might be faced by a horse-trade involving the surrender of Formosa to the Communists in return for the cessation of the fighting in Korea.’ In Washington Chip Bohlen, then the Deputy Under Secretary of State, offered additional grounds for caution in a memorandum, the perceptiveness of which revealed clearly why, together with George Kennan, he was regarded as the State Department’s resident Soviet expert. He agreed with Acheson that ‘the Soviets are serious in this matter and wish to find some 179

Korean Conflict.indb 179

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

means of terminating a situation which obviously has taken a turn unanticipated by them’. Stalin, he reasoned, foreseeing the introduction of sufficient US power into Korea to ‘bring about victory on the spot’, will expect to be faced with an uncomfortable choice: (1) To do nothing and permit American power to come up to the Soviet frontier right next door to Vladivostok and within easy bombing distance of their chief military headquarters in the Far East, Khabarovsk, a situation which he might well find intolerable; or (2) Prior to our reaching the 38th Parallel, to re-occupy Northern Korea with Soviet forces.

The latter eventuality would be scarcely less inviting to Stalin than the former, Bohlen reasoned, since it ‘would immeasurably increase the risk of an open conflict between US and Soviet forces’. Unwilling to accept a complete Soviet surrender, Stalin would be likely to offer restoration of the status quo ante in exchange for the withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. Which, in turn, stated Bohlen pointing to the obvious, would be unacceptable to the United States. Were they not to do so, however, they could be accused of failing to agree to a reasonable peace proposal, and the longer the United States took to build up ‘massive’ forces in Korea, the tougher the Soviets would become in their attitude towards a peaceful settlement. Bohlen could only advise his government to develop a convincing justification for insisting that, come what may, American troops must remain in Korea. In a telegram to Douglas on 9 July, Acheson was of precisely the same mind and wished Kelly to be advised not to permit his discussions with Gromyko to ‘carry any implication’ that United Nations forces would be withdrawn from South Korea. In sending a long reply to Bevin’s message of 7 July, Acheson, who, according to Franks, had ‘been under very heavy strain the last two weeks’, instructed Douglas to let the Foreign Secretary know of the seriousness with which he viewed ‘the implications of his message and their possible effect on our whole future relationship’. This was a dark warning calculated to strike a chill fear in the hearts of those who, like Bevin, had striven so mightily to cement the special relationship. Even more gravity was imparted 180

Korean Conflict.indb 180

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

to the message when, a day or two later, Franks informed Sir William Strang, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, that it had been ‘gone over in detail outside the State Department … after a Cabinet meeting with the President in the Chair’. The apocalyptic terms in which Acheson couched his reply, reflecting the mood of panic that had swept through Washington, gave little reason to suppose that the threat – its vagueness notwithstanding – was an idle one. The United States, he insisted, was ‘acting for the protection of the entire free world’, whose peace ‘hangs directly upon the success we expect to achieve in defeating this first overt act of aggression since the end of the war’. Munich was evoked yet again: ‘the tragic history of the 30s demonstrates beyond any doubt that the sole hope of preserving the peace of the world is to halt before they spread initial acts of aggression of this character.’ Getting this cold war bombast out of his system (much of which, in a less rhetorical form, Bevin would have agreed with), Acheson reached the nub of the matter. It was simply stated. In the existing circumstances, the United States would never consider agreeing to Chinese representation in the United Nations, nor to the reversion of Formosa to the mainland regime. Clearly, in Acheson’s eyes China had become an international leper. And yet the reasons adduced – apart from the unsubstantiated charge that China was directly associated with the North Korean aggression – were no different from those given earlier when the United States regretted rather than bitterly opposed Britain’s recognition of the Central People’s Government and of its right to take a seat in the United Nations. What were the sins of the Chinese now recapitulated by Acheson in his message in reply to Bevin? Peking had singled out Americans and American interests in China for especially hostile treatment; the regime made no pretence of accepting and discharging its international obligations; Ho Chi Minh had been recognised and the Chinese were actively interfering in Indo-China as well as lending support to Communist insurgents elsewhere in Asia; Mao was co-operating in the Soviet penetration of China and in defiance of the United Nations in Korea; and, all this apart, the Communists’ control over and support in China was incomplete. It seems to have flowed inexorably for Acheson that the question of China’s seat in the UN could never be 181

Korean Conflict.indb 181

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

considered while the Korean War lasted, and certainly not as part of ‘horse-trading’ with the Kremlin. According to Acheson’s reply, Formosa was a straightforward matter. The President’s decision to station the Seventh Fleet in the Straits had been a ‘simple matter of military prudence’ to prevent hostilities between the mainland and Chiang’s forces. In truth, however, the matter was somewhat more complicated than Acheson asserted. He gave the lie to the American position by stating that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations had been made when the conditions of mid-1950 did not exist. At that time, Formosa did not then belong to a China dominated by a Communist regime, especially not a regime lending at least moral support to the aggressors in Korea. In their hour of travail the Americans could not or would not distinguish between China and North Korea. So far as Acheson was concerned, the Korean War at one stroke relieved the administration of the domestic political opprobrium of an open and honestly debated consideration of recognition of Communist China, her claims to Formosa and a seat in the United Nations. Acheson viewed Bevin’s tentatively put propositions as acceptance of blackmail. It must be observed that during the Korean War the Americans were often wont to label proposals for negotiations as unwelcome, and until the Chinese entered the war late in 1950, all suggestions of negotiation were rejected. Douglas, delivering the message to Bevin in hospital on 11 July, found him ‘somewhat surprised and taken aback’ at the vigour of Acheson’s response. The Foreign Secretary insisted that he had merely wished to test the American attitude in the event of ‘honest and inviting’ proposals from the Russians, and in any event Kelly had already been instructed not to entangle Formosa and other questions with the discussions about the Korea problem. Bevin further remarked that he ‘fully understood Mr Acheson’s difficulties, and had not pressed him when he was here in May, but the fact remained that we had not yet been able to get any agreement of Far Eastern policy’. The ambassador (whom the Foreign Secretary did not entirely trust) thought Bevin defensive and reluctant to give a direct answer to Acheson’s query about the advantages to be derived from the seating of China in the United Nations and the return of the Soviet Union 182

Korean Conflict.indb 182

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

to the Security Council. ‘It has the marks of Strang’s spoor’, Douglas remarked of Bevin’s attitude, which no doubt prompted Acheson’s conviction, as expressed in his memoirs, that ‘a group in the Foreign Office … eager to get the Communist Chinese into the United Nations as soon as possible’ had been at work. Two days later, having lunched with Julius Holmes, the Minister at the US embassy, Strang and Sir Esler Dening (the latter also regarded with suspicion by the Americans), Douglas reported that Bevin had been ‘hurt if not offended by the seriousness with which you [Acheson] view the implications of his message and their possible effect on the future relationship between the two countries’. At this lunch Strang had defended Bevin against ‘the inference that His Majesty’s Government was at least flirting’ with the idea of a deal involving the return of Formosa to China in exchange for peace in Korea. Bevin asserted the Permanent Under Secretary was merely exploring the situation. Candour being the order of the day, not only between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary but also between officials, it was made abundantly plain to Douglas over lunch that ‘all British present were extremely worried and anxious’ about Formosa and America’s treatment of China: Any efforts undertaken by this lawful government to exercise its sovereignty over an area, in this case Formosa to which it was legitimately entitled, would not be an act of aggression but merely a normal, natural and legal measure. They could not therefore understand why the US should intervene by stationing its fleet in a certain position to prevent a lawfully established and recognised government from performing its normal functions over the island of Formosa.

Nor could Douglas’ luncheon companions understand why a greater flexibility on the part of the United States in matters Chinese would be ‘an extorted blackmail price’ for a Korean settlement. American policy was regarded by ‘free Asians’ – and implicitly by the British themselves, though Douglas did not make this inference explicit – as attributable first to purely strategic considerations, second to a dislike of the new China, and third to 183

Korean Conflict.indb 183

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

a desire to maintain in Formosa yet another Western outpost for the domination of the Orient. Douglas fell back on the argument that since Formosa was still Japanese, pending a peace treaty with Japan, the status of the island must of necessity remain unresolved – an argument which, he erroneously observed, had not occurred to the British and which he thought should be amplified by Acheson. The Foreign Office’s analysis of the behaviour of the Americans was testily relayed by Sir Pierson Dixon in an internal minute: The first which strikes one about Mr Acheson’s message and Mr Douglas’s additional remarks is their tone, which is characteristic of the Americans when under the stress of emotion. It reflects the mood when Americans feel that they have shouldered the burden of the world and are being criticised by others whose burden they are carrying.

A good deal of ‘muddled and wishful thinking, particularly in relation to Chinese representation’ in the UN, was evident; and all the reasons given for not recognising the Central People’s Government, except possibly for the question of the regime’s complete authority in the country, ‘are reasons for not liking Peking’s face’. Dixon observed accurately enough that Acheson’s message was saying, in effect, ‘that unless we come into line … the consequences for Anglo–American relations will be very serious’. His conclusion – ‘the American attitude may precipitate a general war in the Far East and thus a World War’ – demonstrates the correctness of Douglas’s impression that the British were extremely worried and anxious. No more so, however, than the Americans. On 14 July Acheson attended a Cabinet meeting at which ‘unanimous agreement’ was given to the proposition ‘that the present world situation is one of extreme danger and tension’ which might ‘present the United States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including general hostilities’. Acheson spoke of ‘petrified fright’ in Europe, but if true, it is scarcely to be wondered at with waves of panic rolling eastwards across the Atlantic. However, so far as the Communist Chinese were concerned, the British Minister in Peking, J.C. Hutchison, reported on 14 July: 184

Korean Conflict.indb 184

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

Chou’s declaration was primarily concerned to re-affirm China’s right to Formosa and unalterable determination to recover it, but he did not repeat the previous official assertion that it would be recovered this year … Terms of Chou En-lai’s declaration and distinctive playing down of Korean news for about a week thereafter suggest strongly that the Chinese Government had no desire to be embroiled in any war (which apart from other consequences would inevitably shatter the economy they are trying to build up, and may even endanger their own position). There is no (repeat no) reason to suppose that their views have since changed.’5

Bevin, still in ill-health and shaken by Acheson’s onslaught, uncharacteris­ tically took some days to send a reply. In it, he was at pains to point out that in asking ‘what the US view would be in the event of the Soviet Union asking a price for using their influence with the North Koreans’, he had never had it in mind ‘to suggest that a bargain was desirable’. The British government were, he insisted, ‘just as determined not to submit to Soviet blackmail’ as the Americans and would not discuss, nor ever had any intention of discussing, the question of Chinese representation in the UN as part of the Korean problem. Having disavowed the tendency towards appeasement attributed to him by Acheson, he could not, however, resist the impulse to deliver himself of a lecture. He reminded the Secretary of State of the ever-present danger of driving Peking irrevocably into the arms of Moscow and of the unwisdom of regarding Mao’s declared goal of liberating Formosa as empty ‘bravado’. In view of this, Bevin suggested delicately, ‘Maybe the President in his own inimitable way could say something to remove any misapprehension by making it clear that the final disposition of Formosa is an open question which should be settled on its merits when the time comes.’ This the President did in a public statement on 19 July, four days later, and, as Acheson made clear to Franks, in response to Bevin’s request. Closing his message, Bevin gave it as his opinion that China was no more anxious than Russia to become involved in the Korean War, and he quite sensibly, though uselessly, advised Acheson ‘not to accuse China of what she has not yet done, or to give her the impression that she 185

Korean Conflict.indb 185

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

is already so much beyond the pale that she has no hope of re-establishing her position with the West’. On receiving this message, Acheson judged that the ‘correspondence had no future, so we dropped it’,6 though it did at least inspire Truman’s statement of 19 July and demonstrated that the British were not as biddable as Acheson implied. For, clearly aware as they were since 11 July of the intractable attitude in Washington, they pressed ahead with the Kelly– Gromyko conversations, albeit in an increasingly desultory fashion. Having been instructed not to be drawn into discussion of Formosa and China’s seat at the UN, Kelly saw Gromyko on 11 July and stated that the USSR, as a member of the United Nations, should use its influence with North Korea to secure peace. Gromyko, as expected, was most unhelpful. He disputed the assertion that North Korea had initiated hostilities, queried Britain’s reluctance to ‘run ahead’ of the United Nations’ (in reality, America’s) opinion on Formosa and the seating of China, and asked disingenuously why it was thought that the Soviets could exercise any influence over the North Koreans. Despite Gromyko’s obduracy, Kelly was inclined to believe that the Soviets ‘have not in fact made up their own minds. This latter possibility is quite likely in view of the fact that they are now for the first time working with a partner namely the Chinese whom they cannot treat as they would a European satellite’.7 Six days later they met again. At this time Kelly was told that in the view of the Soviet government the best means for a peaceful settlement was the convening of the Security Council with the ‘indispensable participation of the Chinese People’s Government’, to which Kelly could only reiterate his government’s insistence, despite their wish to see Communist China seated on the Security Council, that this and the Korean problem were separate issues. And there was an end to it. As Sir David Kelly told the Foreign Office on 18 July, ‘Soviets cannot now be talked into calling off North Koreans without quid pro quo … We cannot offer any quid pro quo.’ The USSR, Attlee told Cabinet on the same day, had conceded nothing. As the Russians had published a version of the Gromyko-Kelly exchanges, the Prime Minister gave the British version in the House of Commons on 20 July. 186

Korean Conflict.indb 186

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

Doggedly, the British did not entirely abandon hope. The Cabinet reminded themselves that the ‘protracted negotiations which had led to the raising of the Berlin blockade might be analogous … the Soviet Government had eventually taken up the position which had afforded a real basis for a solution’. The flickering hope was sustained by Kelly’s report of ‘faint signs of disappointment’ displayed by Gromyko when informed that Britain could offer nothing, and of the ambassador’s inclination to believe ‘that they hoped we would come forward with a compromise … or at least that we would keep the door open’. Alas, the only conceivable chance of a non-military solution, according to Kelly in a telegram to Bevin, was for Britain ‘at a propitious moment’ to let it be known that it would vote for Chinese admission to the UN as soon as the Soviets resumed their seat on the Security Council, and as soon as the North Koreans ceased fighting and withdrew to the 38th parallel. On reading this telegram, Bevin commented that ‘he had given a lot of thought to the possibility of an arrangement on the lines suggested by Sir D. Kelly’, but – hardly understating the matter – that ‘given the American attitude … did not think it was a practical proposition at the moment’. Evidently, Bevin’s consideration of a quid pro quo was more than a passing thought. As late as August, Sir Elser Dening was still holding out the hope to American and French officials that the Russians ‘have not closed the door to negotiations’ and, courageously, he stated that ‘he could not honestly assert that in the view of the United Kingdom settlement of the Korean problem must necessarily precede the admission of Communist China to the United Nations’. However, before Inchon the Americans were unwilling to concede or negotiate anything, and after Inchon they were single-mindedly intent on the total defeat of North Korea and the occupation of the whole country. It was not until they were facing defeat a second time, when the Chinese entered the war, that the Americans retreated from their death-orglory conduct of hostilities. If British attempts at mediation irritated Acheson, similar and simul­ taneous endeavours by the Indians drove him to distraction – or, at the very least, left him at a loss for words to describe their actions.8 Not that India was intending to do more than Britain. Certainly their diplomacy was clumsy, but they were more open, and more persistent, and they wanted China in the UN 187

Korean Conflict.indb 187

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

just as London did, in the belief that this would entice the USSR into engineering a Korean settlement. The conclusion is inescapable. Washington resented displays of Indian initiative, the more so as India was pursuing a general foreign policy of non-alignment. Yet the Americans were yoked to them by virtue of Britain’s insistence on India as the leader of Asian opinion and by virtue of their role as go-between, especially between the West and Communist China. In Washington, however, India was thought to be, if not excessively sympathetic, at least insufficiently hostile towards Asian communism and its role in nationalist movements. One also suspects that Nehru’s constant emphasis on the primacy of international morality – or ‘spiritual exhortation’, in Acheson’s words9 – and on American shortcomings, amounting to a holier-than-thou posture, grated on a nation which for so long had believed that it was the keeper of the international conscience. Acheson’s contemptuous description of Sir Girja Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, as ‘a pleasant little man’10 was less than generous to a highly influential, pro-American official who, it seems, the American ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, had occasion to see at least once a day during the Korean War. Indeed, the volume of correspondence between New Delhi and Washington relating to Korea and China was exceeded only by that between London and Washington. The Americans adopted a tone towards Nehru and Indian officials that was at one and the same time hectoring, pleading and patronising, and no better exemplified than in Henderson’s frequent conversations with Bajpai. On 28 June 1950, for example, when the Indians were wrestling mightily with the crucial decision whether to support the USA’s call to render assistance to South Korea, Henderson treated Bajpai to a veritable homily. Announcing that ‘I was never more proud of being a servant of [the] Government of the United States than I was today’, Henderson expressed the hope that India ‘would display moral courage’ and asked, ‘Would Indians in years to come be proud of [the] stand taken by their government’ if they failed to vote ‘for a resolution which was the logical consequence to one already supported by it branding North Korea as an aggressor’? Leaving Bajpai ‘visibly somewhat shaken’ by this, the ambassador ‘went on to point out that hesitation and wavering at this historic moment might encourage aggressors to go on with 188

Korean Conflict.indb 188

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

aggression program [sic] which would inevitably result in world war’. It was more than flattery when Henderson stated, ‘Positive and speedy action by GOI would have tremendous influence among all peoples of Asia’, for despite their irritation at having to truckle to India, the Americans knew that its foreign policy was influential in the formation of Afro–Asian opinion. In all this, Henderson ignored Bajpai’s careful explanation of the difficulties entailed in the Indian decision: while wishing to give moral support to the United Nations in opposing aggression, India had to take account of the effect of its actions on other, less powerful Asian nations, such as Burma, and of the apparent support by the USA of forces in Formosa and IndoChina which ‘many millions of Asians including many Indians considered to be imperialistic, colonial or reactionary’. In the event, India did support the United States’ resolution in the Security Council. Bajpai revealed to Henderson on 30 June ‘in utmost confidence that he felt compensated for staying on in [the Ministry of External Affairs] under extremely trying conditions by his contributions during this single day’. He also proffered a hint of his friendliness by saying that for ‘policies of positive neutrality’ and ‘nonalignment’ he hoped gradually to substitute ‘an independent policy … determined solely by India’s ideas and objectives’. Henderson cautioned Acheson against assuming that the decision would lessen Nehru’s dislike of America’s ‘Formosa and Indo-China policies’. A week later Nehru publicly announced India’s stance towards the Korean affair, and sought to justify it. Although India ‘did not approve of much that happened in North and South Korea’ and had recognised neither government, the invasion of the South by the North was ‘large-scale and well-planned’, and lest the United Nations collapse and general war ensue, this aggression could not be allowed to succeed. This was the basis for India’s support of the resolutions of 25 and 27 June. Nehru was careful to add, however, that the policy did not signify ‘any change in the basic foreign policy of India, which is one of non-alignment with any group of nations against another group’. He also argued strongly for the admission of Communist China and the return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council, explaining that their absence was one of the principal reasons for ‘the progressive deterioration of the international situation’. 189

Korean Conflict.indb 189

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Nehru was indeed anxious. He wrote to Attlee on 8 July, warning that a ‘head-on collision between America and China’ could not be avoided for long if the United States persisted in its Formosa policy. Two days later, having seen Sir David Kelly’s account of the conversation with Gromyko, Nehru wrote again to the Prime Minister. ‘Since entry of the New China into the Security Council,’ he argued, ‘and return of the USSR can be secured without … America either recognising Peking Government or voting for its admission to the Council, no surrender by America would be involved in removal of obstacle to seven votes being cast for Peking’s admission.’ He urged strongly that Britain argue this case with the Americans, seeming to imply that the initiative rested with London but failing to mention that the Indians had themselves initiated diplomatic action. Admiral Kirk reported to Washington on 10 July that he had been approached by Radhakrishnan, the Indian ambassador in Moscow, with a peace plan, namely that the United States should support the admission of Communist China into the Security Council, in exchange for which China and the Soviet Union, after the latter’s return to the Council, would call for an immediate ceasefire in Korea, the withdrawal of North Korean troops, and mediation by the UN for the creation of a united, independent Korea. The same proposal had been put forward to the Soviet government, but it was unclear to Kirk whether the Indians were aware of the Kelly–Gromyko discussions, and also whether the inspiration was New Delhi’s or Radhakrishnan’s alone. For reasons best known to themselves the Indians asked Kirk ‘that nothing be said’ to the British about their mediation effort. This was a source of anxiety and suspicion to the American ambassador: In the circumstances, we believe it essential some means be found to get British and Indians together before things go any further. Delicacy of matter is that Indians have specifically requested British not be informed and, as British apparently have not informed Indians, it is difficult to see how it can be accomplished without betraying confidences. On the other hand, we note that Indians talked with British before first, and so far as we can ascertain, the only Indian conversation with Soviets on July 1 and 190

Korean Conflict.indb 190

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

possibility cannot be excluded that British and Indians are cognizant each other’s negotiations which are being presented to us here as independent. In any event, considering all aspects of matter we feel British should be consulted in strictest confidence and their agreement obtained that … Indians be (1) informed of prior Soviet overture to British and (2) strongly urged to postpone further action along their line until possibilities of British conversations are further developed.

Sir Sarvepelli Radhakrishnan was in large measure to blame for the confusion; he was a man who was a puzzle to his fellow diplomats. Kelly wrote of his ‘vague and rather mystical approach’ to the craft, while a Foreign Office official thought him ‘a curious other-worldly character who is very difficult to deal with since he appears not to hold himself bound by the ordinary conventions of diplomatic intercourse’. If these were the impressions that the British had formed, one can only guess what the Americans thought of Radhakrishnan. However, his other-worldliness had not proved a disqualification to his becoming the foundation Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford in 1936, nor, after the conclusion of his diplomatic career, Vice-President and later President of the Indian Republic. Indeed, Kirk was told by the Counsellor at the Indian embassy that behind the facade of Radhkrishnan’s ‘naivete and vagueness’ was a ‘very observant and realistic mind’.11 Wishing ‘to avoid muddying the waters [of the] Kelly–Gromyko conversations’, Acheson immediately agreed that Kirk should attempt to persuade the Indians to take the British into their confidence and to inform Radhakrishnan that the United States would have nothing to do with any scheme which ‘meant payment or reward’ to the aggressor. The Indian government was already well aware of the American attitude, as Nehru made clear to Attlee, but the important news – conveyed by Panikkar after talks with the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister – that China had agreed that the question of their UN admission should be kept separate from the Korean problem, strengthened New Delhi’s determination to seek a settlement by negotiation. Accordingly, Bajpai returned to the rather forlorn task of trying to persuade Loy Henderson of the sense in the Indian position. 191

Korean Conflict.indb 191

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Far from favouring a deal between the United States and the USSR, Bajpai insisted that the ‘atmosphere for achieving a solution … would be much better if Communist China could be admitted immediately and unconditionally’ to the United Nations. However, America could hardly be expected to overlook the probability that the unconditional admission of China followed by a settlement in Korea would be widely interpreted as constituting a deal. Meanwhile, in London Krishna Menon, then Indian high commissioner, was putting the same argument to Attlee with at least some greater hope of success, although the British Prime Minister was soon to backpedal with considerable alacrity when presented with America’s hostility to any suggestion of compromise. Radhakrishnan also responded with alacrity when Kirk told him of the Americans’ disapproval of his mediation efforts, advising that: ‘(a) his endeavours would now cease as they were his own idea although approved by Nehru; (b) his sole approach to Foreign Minister has been on 1 July when he saw Zorin; (c) he responded favorably to my suggestion that British be informed of his efforts and without hesitation said he would undertake to advise British Ambassador promptly.’ The plot, though, was much thicker than Kirk realised. According to Henderson, Nehru was ‘carrying on secret correspondence with Radhakrishnan unknown to Bajpai’. With some justification, Henderson informed Acheson, ‘It seems to me that British and Indian diplomacy is becoming entangled and that resulting confusion cannot be too unpleasant to the Russians.’ It was no doubt a measure of the desperation felt by India and Britain, both in the general situation brought about by the Korean War and by American intransigence, that their representatives should have been reduced to acting in an almost comically clandestine fashion. Matters had clarified themselves, at least for Henderson, by 14 July when he reported to Washington his firm conviction that New Delhi had not sanctioned Radhakrishnan’s approach to the Soviet government but was ignorant of it: ‘I gained impression that Radhakrishnan had been authorized to send out certain feelers but … had gone much further than his government had expected him to go and had not reported in detail his activities to New Delhi.’ Moreover, Henderson was convinced that Nehru has ‘not been 192

Korean Conflict.indb 192

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

supporting a quid pro quo arrangement’, and, indeed, Bajpai was ‘rather disturbed’ at suggestions that India had supported such a scheme. However, the United States could hardly be blamed for identifying the actions of the Indian ambassador at Moscow with the policy of his government, especially when Acheson received a message from Nehru on 13 July that amounted to a direct appeal to agree to a quid pro quo arrangement for which Bajpai was denying Indian paternity. It might almost have been Acheson writing rather than the British Prime Minister when Attlee replied to Nehru on 14 July. America’s questionable stationing of the Seventh Fleet in the Straits had been, according to Attlee, ‘dictated by the military means of the moment’ and not by any desire to interfere in Formosa’s eventual future, which could not, in any event, be decided until the war in Korea had ended and the North Korean forces returned to the 38th parallel. Nor could the Chinese Communists expect to get majority support for UN entry until the war had ended. Attlee, like Acheson, wanted it both ways. While telling the Russians that the Korean problem could not be tied to the problems of Formosa and China’s seat, he was also telling Nehru that these latter questions could not be settled until the Korean War had been resolved on terms satisfactory to Britain and the United States. This was a less than honest tactic to employ; at best, it shows that Attlee had capitulated to American policy. In the circumstances, it must have been galling to Nehru for Attlee to insist that ‘[i]t therefore all rests with Mao Tse-tung and with the Russians’, and to be told sanctimoniously that ‘the motives of the United States in all this is to resist aggression so that the world can have peace’. Although, as we have seen, the Indians were not fully aware that the British had approached the Kremlin only a matter of days earlier with a proposal similar to their own, they felt that this reply represented a distressing change of tack. Bajpai told Henderson the following day that the government, meaning Nehru, was ‘deeply disappointed’ and had immediately sent another letter to Attlee, adding that the: UK apparently has gone backward rather than forward. Only recently it was prepared to vote admittance Communist China [sic]. It seemed 193

Korean Conflict.indb 193

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

now, however, to be laying down conditions, some of which were not pertinent to merits of the case.

Stalin, meanwhile, had killed the Indian and British approaches stone dead by responding to their ‘peace initiatives’, as he called them, suggesting that the Security Council handle the matter but only after the Communist Chinese government had been admitted (an ‘indispensable’ condition) and ‘representatives of the Korean people’ permitted to be heard. Attlee’s further reply to Nehru, of 18 July, had therefore to be framed in the light of the Soviets’ response. While agreeing with Nehru’s contention that it was difficult to believe that Russia had engineered the North Korean invasion to compel the West to admit the New China into the UN, he observed that Stalin was nonetheless making precisely this a condition for settlement of the Korean War. Nothing in Stalin’s reply, Attlee reasoned, was likely to lead to a settlement acceptable to the vast majority of UN members. However, the British Prime Minister was rather more forthcoming, not to say honest, than he had been in the earlier letter. He all but confessed that the views of the United States were paramount in the matter of Chinese representation in the UN, stating that American public opinion would not swallow a change in administration policy, and that were India and Britain to press the issue ‘we shall put ourselves in a very difficult position’. There were, in short, ‘the gravest dangers’ in linking the two questions. Nehru replied on 21 July, ‘[G]reatly distressed at the turn events are taking’, but declaring that he would abandon the Indian démarche. The greater part of his reply comprised an implicit denunciation of the inability of the West, including Britain, to understand Asian thinking and Asian aspirations. It was this, he seemed to be saying in his explication, that had brought the world to such a perilous pass. North Korea, he declared again, had been guilty of aggression, ‘probably with the connivance of the Soviet Government’, and the action taken by the United Nations was unavoidable, but ‘there has been a consistent record of failure in the policies adopted in the Far East and in parts of Southeast Asia’ by the West, ‘due, I think, to a complete lack of understanding of these vast dynamic forces that are at work in Asia’. Not only did talk of the dangers of communism fail to frighten 194

Korean Conflict.indb 194

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

Asians; it also served to remind them that they would ‘prefer Communism to colonial control’. Moreover, the West appeared to be supporting the forces of reaction in the region, whereas the Soviet Union and its allies ‘generally appear to support what might be called the progressive forces’. ‘The continued exclusion of the New China from the UN,’ Nehru cited as an example, ‘helps to increase sympathy for the People’s Government … among vast numbers of Asian peoples and distrust of the policies of Western Powers.’ Like the Americans, Nehru had no doubt that the North Koreans would eventually be driven out of the South, but, unlike the Americans, he asked, ‘What then?’ The bleak alternatives seemed to be armies of occupation and control along colonial lines or else an evacuation, leaving the field to communism. Indeed, the same dilemma faced the West in Japan. The only answer he could suggest to Attlee, however, was the adoption by the West of a ‘positive policy’, which took account of the fact that ‘millions of people in Asia have strong feelings and cannot be suppressed for any length of time’. This heartfelt message, though rather confused and even contradictory, was commended by Strang to Franks: ‘We feel here that Pandit Nehru’s reply is both moderate and sensible, and that there is a good deal in what he says.’ Franks was asked to convey its substance to Acheson, but its effect could only have been to strengthen the Secretary of State’s conviction that Strang was a cuckoo in the nest of the Western alliance and that Nehru was fundamentally, even dangerously, out of sympathy with American policies. The Indian Prime Minister also continued his correspondence with Acheson, the latter sustaining it only after occasional prompting and pleading from Henderson. After being reminded that the Indians were becoming anxious for a reply to Nehru’s letters of 13 and 17 July, Acheson responded on the 18th. In it, he rehearsed the by-now standard American line that the question of a Chinese seat in the United Nations could not be linked to a settlement of the Korean War, lest unlawful aggression be seen to be rewarded. On being shown this reply in Washington before its despatch, Mme Pandit ‘in some agitation’ expressed disappointment and asked how the drift to a new world war could be stopped. Her brother was undeterred, returning to the fray the following day with a message to Acheson: 195

Korean Conflict.indb 195

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

My suggestion for breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People’s Government of China and the USSR can return to it, was designed to fulfill this policy, not weaken it. In voting for the resolutions on Korea … on the 25th and 27th June, it was our purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. Since the Government of India recognized the People’s Government of China on 30th December, 1949, it has been our endeavour to bring about the admission of its representatives to the various organs and agencies of the United Nations. Our present proposal was a renewal of this effort. It was made on its merits and also in the hope that it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. I do not think that the admission of China now would be an encouragement of aggression … Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

Diplomatic civilities did little to disguise official Indian displeasure at the turn of events. On 19 July Rajagopalachari, the new Minister without Portfolio, told Henderson that Nehru believed ‘aggression in Korea would not have taken place’ if the United States had allowed Communist China to take its seat in the UN. If Nehru’s views had been reported correctly, then Henderson could not be blamed for being ‘frankly astonished’, since it was neither plausible nor demonstrable that North Korea had attacked South Korea because of Chinese frustration at being denied a place in the United Nations. A few days later Henderson reported worrying signs of hostility in New Delhi. Bajpai, normally so forthcoming and friendly with the American ambassador, had taken Acheson’s message of 18 July as a ‘personal affront’ and had been making a ‘number of sarcastically critical remarks to other chiefs of mission’, including an observation to the British chargé d’affaires that the ‘US has made its decision and the worse for the US’. Henderson was not above loosing a few arrows himself, noting that Bajpai was displaying ‘personal pique’ and possessed a ‘supersensitive mind’. It was also an ill omen that the ambassador should identify Krishna Menon, who was to play a prominent role in Indian–American relations, as the ‘most effective foe of [the] US among Nehru’s trusted inner circle’ and, indeed, as the instigator of the Indian peace proposals. In order to prevent Indian resentment from 196

Korean Conflict.indb 196

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

getting out of hand, Henderson suggested to Acheson that he write another note to Nehru, this time emphasising the importance placed by the United States on Indian co-operation and friendliness. This Acheson did, on 22 July. Its ‘personal and confidential’ nature and Acheson’s request that India continue to act a go-between in Peking was not, however, accompanied by any softening of American policy (Nehru could hardly have expected otherwise), and the message failed in its conciliatory purpose. Early in August the British acting high commissioner in New Delhi, F.K. Roberts, spoke to the Foreign Office of the ‘considerable underlying bitterness’ evident in Bajpai’s statements to him about the United States. Arguing, in Roberts’ view, with ‘considerable justification that he was one of the best friends America had in this country’, Bajpai asserted that the United States’ ‘conduct and propaganda had done very little’ to demonstrate to Asian opinion that there was no danger from US imperialism. He observed, quite accurately, that the Americans had exhibited scant understanding of India’s difficulty, emerging as it had from dependent status and yet suddenly called upon to play an important part in Asia and in the United Nations. ‘America would be well advised’, Bajpai continued, ‘to pay more attention to Indian feelings’, especially to the fact that India and other Asian nations did not take the same view of communism as was taken in Europe. In China, for example, the Communists’ success had not been brought about by an invading army, but rather was the latest phase in a revolutionary process begun in 1911. The Soviet Union did not therefore appear in Asia as a direct menace to nationalist and economic aspirations. Roberts, like Henderson, noted that Bajpai had become very sensitive and was irritated at the United States’ failure to afford him due recognition for his personal part in rallying Indian support for the UN resolutions on Korea; certainly, support of this nature would have been difficult to maintain in view of the extent to which American policy had alienated Indian opinion in the intervening weeks. Roberts concluded that Bajpai had not exaggerated the depth of Indian susceptibilities. Horace Alexander, a Quaker and formerly an intimate friend of Gandhi and now of Nehru, had told Roberts that even ‘balanced and responsible Indians’ were 197

Korean Conflict.indb 197

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

beginning to make excuses for the USSR, so inept had been the American handling of the Korean issue and of Asian affairs generally. Washington, and to a lesser extent London, showed ‘no signs of any constructive thinking’ about the future of Korea after the defeat of the North Koreans and it was important the Indians be assured that ‘we were not simply using the Korean issue as a test case to warn the Russians not to repeat aggression in other parts of the world’. Nehru did not allow any of the bitterness detected by Roberts to intrude into his reply to Acheson at the end of July. Instead, he simply reiterated the compelling reasons which had led New Delhi to recognise Communist China. He emphasised his conviction that world peace would not be enhanced by excluding ‘a nation of 450 million people’ from the UN organisation, and expressed his belief that China had nothing to gain from turning ‘social reconstruction’ to ‘the hazards of war’. It was clear from Nehru’s letter that India had dropped any aspirations to the role of peace-maker. In mid-August, however, Bajpai – ‘merely thinking aloud’ – ventured the tentative suggestion that the Americans might consider negotiating directly with the North Koreans. After all, they were the enemy, but the catspaw role of the North Koreans had developed such a strong grip on the American consciousness that it was thought in Washington that China and the USSR, especially the latter, were the real villains. It had not occurred to the Americans to begin negotiations with the actual enemy they were fighting. Acheson was left with the impression, enduring enough to find a place in his memoirs, of the possible truth of ‘a childhood illusion that, if the world is round, the Indians must be standing on their heads – or, perhaps, vice versa’.12 At the time, and less obscurely, he told Robert Menzies that the Indian actions had caused considerable damage.13 The British, too, having largely abandoned their own efforts after the Bevin–Acheson exchanges, became anxious and even censorious about the Indian overtures. It was a case of the poacher turned gamekeeper. On 18 July Sir David Kelly complained to the Foreign Office that Radhakrishnan’s accounts of Indian activities in Moscow were ‘unreliable’ and ‘might well prove dangerously misleading when the matters at issue are important and delicate’. Also, on 18 July, while a cautionary letter from Attlee was on its 198

Korean Conflict.indb 198

04/09/2015 11:40

I N DIAN–B RITI S H OVE RTU RE S

way to Nehru, the Foreign Secretary cabled Franks in Washington: ‘There can I am afraid be no doubt that Nehru’s intervention in Moscow has placed all of us in an extremely difficult position.’ In Bevin’s view, the principal danger was of a cleavage between Asia and the West over the issue of Chinese representation in the UN, for ‘it is quite clear that India does not consider the admission of China as representing any bargain with the Soviet Union, and in view of the stand she has taken there is of course no reason why she should’. Franks was asked to persuade Acheson to take India’s position into account if at all possible, especially as there was a risk of a ‘head on collision between the United States and India in the Security Council’. ‘Perhaps the best thing that could happen is that nothing should come of Nehru’s proposal’, Bevin concluded. ‘But if it becomes a live issue I think very close consultation will be necessary if we are to get out of the predicament in which we shall find ourselves.’ As we have seen, the result of the to-ing and fro-ing between Acheson and Nehru was that nothing came of the Indian proposal – or, at least, nothing that could be called a step in the direction of peace in Korea. The CIA summed up the affair thus: Although India has backed the UN effort to repel the North Korean invaders, Indian efforts to mediate the Korean question and willingness to support Soviet maneuvers to seat Communist China in the UN indicate that Indian thinking is still dominated by the desire to remain ‘neutral’ and [by] a preoccupation with India’s position in Asia. The ambivalent attitude thus displayed is epitomized by its offer of a detachment of medical troops for use in Korea.

Henderson, ever suspicious of the British, offered the opinion in December that it was they who had been behind India’s less than enthusiastic support of American policy. Together, Britain and India had contrived to hide ‘the extent to which they have gone in order to placate the Chinese Communists’, the former exhibiting considerable cunning by giving as their reason for an inability fully to support America the need to ‘take into consideration the views of their Asian allies and friends’. At the same time they had been 199

Korean Conflict.indb 199

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

‘making great effort to prevail upon their Asian friends to adopt policies with regard to the Far East’ opposed to those of the USA. Citing as his informant Sardar Patel, then the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, Henderson asserted that Britain had rushed India into recognition of Communist China by falsely insisting that America would recognise ‘as soon as a suitable set of circumstances could be brought about’. During a visit to New Delhi in November Sir Esler Dening, never one to pull his punches, told Henderson that Washington’s policy towards Formosa and the Far East generally was wrong, dominated as it was by ‘internal political exigencies’ whereby an ‘unfortunate hysteria in the United States’ ensured ‘that emotion rather than reason’ ruled foreign policy. Reverting to the clandestine methods favoured by British officials, Dening – according to the American ambassador – fed the press with stories critical of General MacArthur, and, he surmised, undoubtedly ‘found a sympathetic listener’ in his conversations with Nehru. All in all, Henderson concluded, the British exploited ‘the special position which we help them to hold in South Asia in criticizing our policies and belittling our efforts’. Such was the residue, in Washington as well as in New Delhi, of the attempts by two leading members of the Commonwealth to find a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the Korean War.

200

Korean Conflict.indb 200

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER SIX

Crossing the parallel

T

he crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations forces in October 1950 was one of the most critical decisions taken in international affairs since 1945. Causing the Chinese to intervene militarily in Korea, it deeply soured Sino–American relations for over 20 years, extended the period of Peking’s dependence on Moscow, probably kept in existence the harsh regime which yet presides over China, and contributed to the postcolonial turmoil of the Far East and Southeast Asia. After the victory of Inchon in mid-September, at a time when the UN forces under MacArthur had virtually destroyed North Korean resistance and the Russians were exhibiting signs of willingness to negotiate an end to the war, the invasion of the North prolonged the conflict for a further two-and-a-half years and led to many thousands of civilian and military deaths. The Americans, wishing to make of Inchon prodigiously more than had been envisaged in the original UN resolution to aid South Korea, suddenly found themselves at war with China and facing, or so they believed, the real possibility of global war. Britain’s tendency to say ‘here’s another fine mess you’ve gotten us into’ overlooked its support for America’s plan to unify Korea by force and to impose a friendly government on the whole of the peninsula. More importantly for Britain, perhaps, here was a chance to dish the Russians in the Far East, strategically insignificant though Korea was. Britain’s complicity in the decision to cross the parallel was augmented by the formulation and sponsorship of a UN resolution which was at best disingenuously, and at worst dishonestly, used to authorise an action already taken. After Chinese intervention the British were dragged along in the wake of the Americans and obliged, ruinously, to add to their already burdensome arms programme. This was the quid pro quo for 201

Korean Conflict.indb 201

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Washington’s assurances that the atomic bomb would not be employed against China, and that the war would be contained. Although they did not insist upon it as a condition of their support, the British, especially the Chiefs of Staff, were anxious from the outset to establish that the forces of the United Nations were not intended to cross the parallel. Their interpretation of the Security Council resolution of 27 June laid heavy stress on the restoration of the status quo ante bellum and insisted that the resolution admitted of no more than that. For example, it was with some relief that Sir Oliver Franks reported on 27 June that George Kennan, briefing the ambassadors of the NATO powers in Washington, made ‘it clear that MacArthur would not allow United States action to be pressed north of the 38th Parallel. The operation was restorative, not aggressive’. Kennan was one of the few to hold staunchly to a belief in the wisdom of a restrained policy. Nevertheless, at the end of June, questions of a hypothetical nature were raised in the Foreign Office about the legal justification for an invasion of North Korean territory by ‘the South Korean armies and their allies’. The department’s Legal Adviser gave a clear affirmative to the question of whether the 27 June resolution of the Security Council sanctioned a crossing of the parallel, an opinion which was to become Ernest Bevin’s favoured inter­ pretation after Inchon. According to the Legal Adviser, because the resolution recommended the restoration of ‘international peace and security in the area’ and not in South Korea alone, any ‘reasonably necessary’ measure in North Korea was justifiable in pursuit of this end. Moreover, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter bestowed the right of collective self defence on members of the United Nations, and did not state that powers exercising the right must confine their operations exclusively to their own territory. The British press were at pains to note the limited aims of the police action. Early in July, The Economist observed, ‘The purpose is to stifle the explosion, to restore and keep the peace, not to widen the area of conflict’, and applauded the Americans’ stated intention to stop at the parallel. Not that the government was entirely satisfied with these assurances. On 4 July a member of Franks’ staff was despatched to the State Department ‘under urgent instructions’ to enquire about the United States’ attitude towards the 202

Korean Conflict.indb 202

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

unification of Korea as opposed to ‘mere restoration of the status quo ante’. Later that day Franks spoke to Dean Rusk, who was far from unequivocal or, for that matter, clear about United States’ intentions. The UnderSecretary, perhaps unwittingly giving voice to his expansionist tendencies, remarked that ‘the arrival of a United Nations force at the 38th Parallel would not of itself provide a military solution. Nor would the United States Government wish that its forces should be pinned to a garrisoning job in South Korea. The question of unification of the country would certainly come to the fore and the means of securing this would require much study.’ Far from clarifying the situation, Rusk’s answers were distinctly at odds with Kennan’s assurances of a few days earlier and pointed to the existence of some division of opinion, not to say confusion, within the administration. That Foreign Office officials were disturbed at the possibility of the United States’ appetite waxing in some dangerously unforeseen manner was demonstrated by a long and worried memorandum by F.S. Tomlinson on 9 July. Noting that a crossing had already been mooted (whether by Rusk or someone else he did not say), Tomlinson took the view that its ‘superficial attractions’ failed to take into account certain grave objections. Taking issue with the Legal Adviser, he saw considerable legal impediments in the way of a crossing. First, transgression of the border would exceed the terms of the 27 June Security Council resolution. Second, it would exceed the terms of the General Assembly’s resolution of 12 December 1948, which declared the Republic of Korea to have ‘control and jurisdiction over Korea south of the 38th Parallel’. A crossing of the border, Tomlinson seems to have suggested, could be represented as an illegal attempt to extend South Korean control and jurisdiction over the territory of a neighbouring sovereign state. Otherwise, since North Korea was unrecognised as such by the Western powers, it would be an act in violation of the principles laid down by the United Nations for the unification of the country. The legal question apart, Tomlinson added that a crossing might well invite violent measures by a Soviet Union unwilling to witness the extinguishing of a satellite, which in turn ‘might lead to a major war’. Even a lesser conflict, ‘a Spanish civil war situation’ as he termed it, with the major powers conducting the conflict by proxy, carried the danger of world 203

Korean Conflict.indb 203

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

war. Given the Russian desire for domination of the whole peninsula – an objective of its foreign policy since Czarist times – no international agreement was likely to be reached and there was accordingly ‘no alternative to the continued unnatural division of the Korean Peninsula’. Tomlinson’s conclusions were prescient (and infused with the low esteem in which the Foreign Office held Koreans generally): In all the circumstances, it is hard to see any practicable alternative to the eventual restoration of the government of Syngman Rhee in the territory south of the 38th Parallel. It is unfortunately true that many of the harsh things that have been said about Syngman Rhee’s regime are well-founded. The last annual report on Korea presents a depressing but convincing picture of black reaction, brutality and extreme incompetence … after the hostilities the Americans will have to stay in Korea … The continued presence of American troops in South Korea will not only be attacked by Communist propaganda, but doubtless, since the Koreans are feckless and irresponsible to a degree, by the South Koreans themselves. The leaders in the Government will be only too happy that the Americans are staying.

Somewhat less charitably, Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Le Quesne Martel, an acquaintance of Bruce Lockhart, commented that the ‘South Koreans are a miserable, diseased and syphilitic race who are no good. We shall therefore have to keep troops there indefinitely.’ With the war barely a fortnight old, news arrived from Franks that scarcely pointed to the presence in Washington of the restraint necessary to achieve the sort of goals envisaged by the Foreign Office. In conversation with Harriman, the ambassador noted that the latter was not in his present mood inclined to worry about ‘the Asiatic peoples and … the importance of not getting the Chinese Communists embroiled and to this extent failing to localise the affair’. Nehru, who as we have seen was one of the Asiatic peoples to whom the Americans were irritably obliged to listen, was anxious about the question of long-term United States policy in Korea. Writing to Attlee in late July, he expressed ‘little doubt’ that the North Koreans would 204

Korean Conflict.indb 204

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

be driven out of South Korea in the end. But, he asked pertinently, ‘What will happen then? The moment foreign troops are withdrawn, the same position would arise again or perhaps a worse one. The alternatives will be: armies of occupation and full control on colonial lines’, or to leave the Koreans ‘to shift for themselves and drift inevitably to Communism. If this analysis is correct, then the policy adopted by the Western Powers does not and cannot lead to any solution, which is satisfactory to them, or what is no less important, conducive to world peace.’ Meanwhile, Bradley and Jessup informed Tedder and Franks at their Washington meeting in July that the problem of what should be done once the parallel was reached ought to be carefully studied, but that it was a matter ultimately for consideration by the United Nations. No mention was made of the keen debate which had begun over the matter within the administration. In any event, the British representatives appeared more interested in the Americans’ undertaking that should Russia intervene openly in Korea, the United States would get out and prepare for global war. Another straw in what for the British was becoming an enervating wind came from Sir David Kelly in Moscow. The American ambassador, Admiral Kirk, earnestly enquired of Kelly and his French and Dutch colleagues about the political objectives for which they were fighting in Korea, and whether the forces of the UN should stop if and when they reached the border. Kelly replied that the defence of South Korea had been undertaken as a ‘token of will’, not ‘on account of [the] strategic or political importance of Korea’, and warned that an ‘American invasion of North Korea would overpass’ the limits within which the Russians restrained themselves from war. In short, Kelly told Kirk, ‘it would be madness to incur any risk of general war for the sake of Korea itself or the welfare of its population’. In this respect, Kelly was at one with the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, who thought ‘it somewhat bizarre that, to liberate a country about which no one cares very much (except on the point of principle) and restore a regime which was a pretty rotten one, the United Nations should have to undertake a major effort which cannot fail to weaken their ability to meet other ‘Koreas’ elsewhere – to say nothing of a major Soviet attack’. Despite Kirk’s insistence that his questions were 205

Korean Conflict.indb 205

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

purely hypothetical, the British ambassador found them ‘disquieting’, since they suggested that the United States ‘have not thought them out yet and may drift into [a] position in which they would feel justified in invading North Korea which I feel we must assume would bring [the] Russian armies in’. Kelly added that Admiral Kirk ‘is very familiar with [the] mentality of [the] American Chiefs of Staff for whom he is “one of us”’. Accordingly, Sir David asked the Foreign Office to seek a clear and public agreement that the aim of the Korean War was the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, fearing as he did a ‘progressive hardening and exasperation of American public opinion under stress of war’. It was no coincidence that the day after he received Kelly’s communiqué, the American ambassador cabled Washington to argue strongly against any premature move committing the use of UN forces north of the parallel. Indeed, the ‘key’ question was whether the United States should attempt to eliminate Soviet influence and power from the peninsula, as an essential step in the unification and democratisation of Korea. He doubted that Russia wanted to push the Korean issue to the point of full-scale war, a line Kirk was to continue stoutly to maintain, and thought it a matter of ‘elementary prudence’ that American strength, so sorely needed elsewhere in the world and especially in Europe, ought not be committed to the extent that the effort should be disproportionate to the political and strategic importance of Korea. The general thesis, and even in part the phraseology of his message, was such that it might almost have been drafted by Kelly. Washington was to ignore his warnings, as it did his repeated assertion that the Soviet Union might be willing to participate in negotiations to end the war. From the start of their commitment to the Korean adventure, the British seem to have been uneasily aware that American aims in Korea were dependent in a dangerous fashion on domestic and international pressures on the administration. Ministers and officials alike were beginning to feel like passengers in a car being driven too fast around a long and increasingly sharp curve. This is apparent from the way in which they couched the aims of the Korean action in terms of what should be avoided rather than what must be achieved. Thus, in a Foreign Office paper of August the objectives (apart from a vague injunction that Britain should assist the United States 206

Korean Conflict.indb 206

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

‘in bringing their operations against aggression in Korea to a successful conclusion’) were stated in purely negative terms, in keeping with Kelly’s frank admission that Korea and the Korean people did not ultimately matter: the conflict should be handled in such a manner as ‘not to increase our own difficulties and commitments’, to ‘prevent it from developing into a world war’ and to ‘obviate an open breach between China and the Western Powers’. As for the future and welfare of Korea, the rest was silence. While there might have been misgivings about the Americans’ evident lack of forethought, little systematic consideration was devoted in the Foreign Office to the problem of the parallel. A minute by Sir Pierson Dixon raised the matter on 21 July: Although we have considered the question incidentally from time to time, I do not think that we have seriously gone into the position which will arise if the American forces drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel. What is to happen then? Do the Americans (or the United Nations) summon the North Koreans to lay down their arms and then proceed to arrange for the United Nations Commission to settle the future of the territory? Or, if the North Koreans refuse to lay down their arms, do the American (United Nations) forces attempt to drive them right out of Korea, i.e. northward of the Northern boundary of North Korea? And when that has been done, what happens next? … I think that we ought to clear our own minds about it.

When Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State, raised the matter with Strang in August, the Permanent Under Secretary also said that he had given no thought to it, and in conference with American officials in Paris during the same month, Sir Esler Dening remarked, almost as an afterthought, that when the parallel was reached, ‘Doubtless the United Nations will then seek to unify all Korea. Unification, however, will be impossible without United Nations forces to support it.’ Nevertheless, Dening judged discussion of such matters to be ‘premature’. This was perhaps an understandable attitude, with the UN forces hemmed in by the Pusan perimeter, but such was the triviality of Korea in the British scheme of things that they simply procrastinated. It 207

Korean Conflict.indb 207

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

was as if the question of whether to invade Germany had been put off until the Rhine was reached late in World War II. The Americans quite naturally concluded that the ‘British and French apparently adopt’ the view that ‘questions of ultimate solution should not be decided until the military position has cleared up’. Certainly Cabinet had not considered the matter, and so Britain drifted towards a position in which tacit agreement would be assumed to have been given for the invasion of North Korea. By late August, when UN forces no longer appeared to be in danger of being ejected from the peninsula, the press at least faced the problem squarely. As The Economist asked: Are the UNO forces to stop at the 38th parallel or is it a necessary part of their task that they should liberate North Korea from the regime that started the war? … But it is difficult to imagine the Soviet and Chinese Governments agreeing – either in the Security Council or in negotiations outside – to allow forces that are predominantly American to come up to their frontiers with northern Korea. On the other hand, if the UNO operations stopped at the 38th parallel everybody would be back where they started … The Korean situation would become almost identical with that in Germany: the country would be divided with the Communists left as the champions of unity and nationalism.

The Economist, experiencing the dilemma shortly to face politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, was torn between the advantages to be secured by ignoring the limited aim of the 27 June resolution and the grim consequences that might flow from such action: war with China and the Soviet Union. A shift in British thinking became evident in a brief prepared by the Foreign Office in August for the forthcoming New York meeting of the US, French and British Foreign Ministers. The paper also appeared in Cabinet under Bevin’s name at the end of the month. The influence of Tomlinson’s pessimism, the low regard in which the Koreans were held (especially their ‘extreme immaturity and irresponsibility’), and knowledge of Russia’s longstanding determination to dominate the peninsula disposed the Foreign Office and Bevin, privately at least, to dismiss as foolish any hope that the 208

Korean Conflict.indb 208

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

nation could be made free, democratic and independent. It was nonetheless thought important that an early statement should be made as to the broad aims of the United Nations in Korea. Moving into the open at last, the Foreign Office declared: ‘A statement of objectives would be unlikely to achieve its purpose unless it envisaged more than the mere restoration of the authority of the present government … and a return to the previous precarious status quo. A limited objective of this kind would satisfy neither world opinion nor the Korean people.’ Accordingly, the best course of action was thought to be a General Assembly resolution calling for UN-sponsored elections leading to ‘a unified, independent and democratic Korean government’. In view of the acknowledged obduracy of the North Koreans and the support lent them by the Russians, how could elections be held and their results implemented, as the paper recommended, without committing the United Nations to the view that ‘forces should eventually pass beyond the 38th parallel and occupy the whole of North Korea’? The truth was that the British, though unconvinced that the Koreans could ever create a unified, democratic state on Western lines, devised the proposed Assembly resolution, first, to embarrass the Soviets should they obstruct the realisation of the United Nations objective, and second, to serve as the occasion, not to say pretext, for a crossing of the border. No doubt mindful of the impetuosity of the Americans, officials cautioned that ‘if there is to be any question of United Nations forces operating on any extensive or semi-permanent basis beyond the 38th Parallel, it is considered essential that such action only be taken after some statement of general objectives has been made’. In other words, the resolution must not bless an invasion of North Korea after it had been launched. As for the thorny question of the legality of a crossing, the Legal Adviser’s line was adopted, that is to say, the Security Council resolution of 27 June sanctioned military action over the parallel if it furthered the purpose of ‘repelling the armed attack on the Republic of Korea’. No one appears to have asked whether an advance to the Yalu and perhaps beyond would be a logical consequence. How better to repel the North Koreans than to occupy all their territory? The diplomatic strategy set forth by the Foreign Office was a shrewd one, but events were soon to show that its authors had been too clever by half. 209

Korean Conflict.indb 209

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

The Cabinet were not left in any doubt by the Foreign Office about the dangers that lay ahead. Although Russia was believed to be unwilling to provoke (or, it could have been added, to be provoked into) war over Korea, a situation ‘full of explosive possibilities’ akin to the Spanish Civil War might well develop if the parallel were crossed. Irrespective of any UN intention to make the crossing, the Soviet Union might decide to reoccupy North Korea. Since it would be unthinkable for the UN to conduct hostilities across the border in that event, Korea would remain unhappily divided. That this would be regarded by the Foreign Office as unfortunate shows the extent to which the purpose of the Security Council resolution, passed only two months earlier, had been forgotten or overlooked. The original symbolic importance of the Korean action had clearly been swiftly smothered by what was, at root, a desire to dish the Russians in the Far East, for there is no evidence to suggest that the British had with equal swiftness come to nurture philanthropic impulses towards the Korean people and nation. The Foreign Office paper was thorough, suggesting that a crossing of the border was considered to be more than one option among a number of possibilities. The paper canvassed details such as the composition of a new UN Commission for Korea, and the means by which Rhee’s claim to sovereignty over the whole country might be thwarted. Did Bevin and his officials know of the planned amphibious landing at Inchon, which was to make invasion of the North a certainty? All their talk of a crossing and occupation was otherwise so much profitless speculation. It is likely that they did know; the projected landing was termed ‘Operation Common Knowledge’ by journalists in Korea. On 2 September Hugh Dalton noted in his diary that Bevin ‘hopes there will be a landing soon, in force, on the East Coast of Korea, opposite Seoul, to cut the lines of the North Koreans’ – and indeed, this was precisely what took place on 15 September. Not wishing to give hostages to fortune, British officials exercised caution and followed the Foreign Office brief during their preliminary discussions with the Americans for the New York tripartite meeting. The Americans, while determined to cross the parallel if at all possible, displayed almost equal caution. As UN forces approached the border, continuous consultation would be held with members of the United Nations; if Soviet forces 210

Korean Conflict.indb 210

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

occupied North Korea, no crossing would be made unless ordered by the United Nations (which, of course, meant never); and if major Soviet or Chinese combat units engaged in hostilities or threatened to do so in Korea, further action would be referred to the Security Council, although the United States had already decided to pull out if the Soviets intervened. Expressing broad agreement with the principle of unification as put to them at the meeting, the British officials nonetheless drew back from committing their government to a crossing. They were doubtful about whether the 27 June resolution would justify it, since the resolution ‘was aimed [only] at repelling attack’, knowing – as they must have done – that the Foreign Office and Bevin had taken this phrase to mean that pursuit of the North Korean forces over the border and some form of territorial occupation was sanctioned by it. However, they did concede that an extension of hostilities into North Korea would be a matter for decision in the United Nations, and that future military circumstances would necessarily have to be taken into account. This minute was concluded by the statement that, although it need not oblige a crossing, the General Assembly should call for the holding of free elections for the whole of the country at the earliest date. As we have seen, London knew that nationwide elections could not be held without resort to force of arms. Henceforward, the Americans were in little doubt that their principal ally would fall in with their expansionist schemes in Korea. The only disagreement of substance revolved around the future extent of Rhee’s power. The British and French representatives, fearing that the United States’ insistence on the recognition of Rhee’s regime ‘as the only lawful Government’ implied sovereignty over the whole country, continued to express their dissatisfaction with the Rhee government. Their misgivings might have deepened had they known of reports which had reached the State Department of ‘some kind of agreement made between General MacArthur and President Rhee as to the action to be taken by the Korean Government at the time of reaching the 38th Parallel’. Acheson was sufficiently concerned to order one of his senior officers to ‘get the dope on it’. *

*

*

211

Korean Conflict.indb 211

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

By mid-September, both before and after the Inchon landing, the British Chiefs of Staff were distinctly uneasy, since they neither knew nor had been consulted about American intentions. Indeed, they did not seem too sure even of their own government’s plans. On 6 September, Bouchier in Tokyo reported that the ‘feeling’ there was that the UN forces would cross the parallel and press on to the Manchurian border. ‘This might be done either after obtaining United Nations authority or else by unilateral military action for reasons of military security and relying on subsequent endorsement of the United Nations for this action.’ The Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, saw in Bouchier’s message evidence of America’s, if not of MacArthur’s, indecision about ‘the object of the exercise in Korea’. Furthermore, after looking for a second time at the Cabinet paper concerned, he was not confident ‘that we ourselves have really thought this out carefully enough’. Seeing through the subterfuges of the paper, he observed in his bluff manner that ‘we can keep our tongues in our cheeks as to the extent to which any Korean regime would in fact ever be democratic or, for that matter, independent with Communist China and Russia just across the Yalu’. With equal brusqueness, he dismissed Korea’s strategic value to the West – ‘I think the Americans would agree with us’ – and asked whether it was wise, in view of the urgent requirements of the European theatre, to retain any but the smallest force in Korea. Such a force should be numerous enough to deter a Russian or Chinese intervention, and to ensure, as Slessor put it, ‘that we are no worse off than before the North Korean invasion’ by running the risk of ‘the form of attack which the Russians would have adopted this time if they had had any sense, the political conquest on the CzechoSlovak model’. What, then, was the point of sending any forces north of the parallel? None, wrote Slessor, in response to his own question. On the assumption that the North Korean army was destroyed south of their own territory, and with ‘all her industries knocked flat’, he would not expect them – even with Russian assistance – to become a menace again for a long time to come. More importantly, the Chief of the Air Staff foresaw grave dangers in a crossing: the questionable legality of an invasion would alienate Asian, and especially Indian, opinion; the Western powers would be ‘in for an enormously increased commitment in the shape of forces for internal law 212

Korean Conflict.indb 212

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

and order throughout’ Korea; and they would run ‘a pretty serious risk of clashes with Russia and Communist China’. ‘I’d have thought,’ he added, ‘from that point of view there was a lot to be said for having a couple of hundred miles between American/British troops and the Yalu.’ What alternative did Slessor have to offer? His solution was simple, though opposed to what was rapidly becoming orthodoxy in London and Washington. After the reconquest of South Korea, the North Korean government – if it should be still functioning – should be invited to participate in UN-sponsored elections to be held with the object of creating an independent, unified and democratic state. If they refused, he suggested with a freedom from ideological compulsion not available to politicians, ‘we should make it clear that we are not interested in forcing upon them’ this scheme, and ‘if they prefer to remain a Russian satellite, that is their own affair’. Meanwhile, the United Nations should set about improving South Korea politically and economically, in particular ensuring that ‘Syngman Rhee and co. must not have a free hand to misgovern the place as they did before’. Slessor the pragmatist saw no sense in the West making any exertions to change the situation as it had been before 25 June 1950. However, he realised that it would ‘be difficult to induce the Americans’ to accept such a modest and pragmatic solution, since it would mean a return to the status quo ante, which for him was a perfectly satisfactory outcome to the UN police action. Meeting on 20 September, that is to say, when UN forces were already advancing speedily towards the parallel after the success of Inchon, Slessor’s colleagues found nothing with which to disagree in his paper, although the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Slim, was careful to point out that the problem was ‘mainly a political one’. After all, Slessor had strayed far from purely military considerations. In fact, they largely paraphrased him in discussion. Slim favoured pulling out as many allied troops as they could as early as possible, declaring that in the event of a world war it was ‘our intention to abandon Korea’ anyway. Sir John Slessor added to this that just enough forces should remain for there to be ‘a sufficient deterrent so that any attack by Russia would only be undertaken at the risk of provoking a major war’. It was, in short, generally agreed that no UN forces should cross the parallel. Indeed, such was their anxiety that 213

Korean Conflict.indb 213

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

they wanted instructions issued to MacArthur lest UN forces were to be ‘moved forward into North Korea without the implications of such action having been fully studied’, chief among these implications being the danger of provoking the Russians or Chinese to intervene. Clearly, at the back of their minds was a fear that MacArthur was capable of launching attacks across the border without permission from the United Nations or even, perhaps, from his superiors in Washington. In the light of the Chiefs’ views, it is remarkable that on the day they collectively expressed them Attlee should have sent a message to Bevin in New York virtually sanctioning – indeed, in effect urging an invasion of North Korea. Commenting on the imminence of an enemy collapse, the Prime Minister observed: It is, I think, important that the United Nations Organisation should be considered the deliverer, not the destroyer, of Korea. There is much to be said for some kind of declaration that the United Nations … will take the responsibility for the rehabilitation of the whole country. Otherwise the USSR might step in with a view to appearing as the benevolent restorer of what the United Nations has destroyed. I should imagine that China would not be sorry if Russian influence were eliminated from Korea provided that the new regime was a real United Nations Organisation trusteeship for the eventual freeing of the Koreans.

Attlee must have known that rehabilitation of the whole country, like elections, could not be effected without the invasion and occupation of North Korea. The Prime Minister, preoccupied with the chance to secure a political and propaganda victory over the Soviet Union, seems naively not to have considered that the Chinese, far from welcoming a United Nations – in effect American – trusteeship over North Korea, might take alarm and intervene in the war. In reply, Bevin rejected the idea of a trusteeship – ‘tried at Moscow in 1943 and it failed’ – and transmitted the terms of a draft resolution on Korea which he proposed putting up to the General Assembly. ‘The really tricky thing’, he told Attlee somewhat needlessly, ‘is whether the 214

Korean Conflict.indb 214

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

United Nations forces are to go north of the 38th Parallel’, though ‘they must do so if the unification of Korea is to be achieved’. The resolution sought ‘to cover this contingency, though admittedly in veiled terms’. In fact, a British team in New York with Bevin had presented the Americans with what Rusk regarded as a masterly piece of drafting, which was to give legal warrant for a crossing of the parallel and for an extension of the war. Three days later, on 25 September, Bevin cabled London and set out his reasons for trusting the United States to act responsibly and for the best of motives: It has been very clear throughout our conversations with the Americans that they have given careful consideration to the potential risks involved in any move across the 38th Parallel … They are clearly anxious to avoid provocation and have told us that they do not wish American forces to operate in the Northern border provinces. They appear to wish to remain approximately south of the 40th Parallel. They do not wish to deploy large United Nations forces in North Korea … forces which enter North Korea should be mainly South Korean with elements of United Nations forces (presumably American) to ensure that they do not resort to acts of retaliation and victimisation … In spite of the above the Americans appreciate that a certain amount of risk is unavoidable and they consider that the dangers inherent in the situation must be borne in mind and accepted. They say that up to the present there is no evidence of a move by Chinese or Russian forces.

On the day on which this message was sent, in what amounted to a clear endorsement of unification and scarcely concealed support for a border crossing, Bevin told the General Assembly, ‘There must no longer be South Koreans and North Koreans but just Koreans.’ *

*

*

With the ground thus publicly prepared for a reversal of British policy, it then became, in Tomlinson’s words, a matter of ‘the highest urgency that the General Assembly should approve proposals for a general political 215

Korean Conflict.indb 215

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

settlement in Korea, which would at the same time give authority for operations north of the 38th Parallel’. While he stuck to the view that the 27 June resolution gave only ‘doubtful’ warrant for a crossing, he was nonetheless obliged to draft a way around the problem and then to discuss it with the Americans, who ‘had given little thought to the terms of such a resolution’. In fact the Americans had given a great deal of thought to the question, but, disguising the extent and fury of the debate they had conducted among themselves, they preferred that someone else should be seen to be changing the rules of the game. Although Attlee and Bevin had decided between themselves that Britain should be a party to extending the war, no dissent was raised at a Cabinet meeting of 26 September. Indeed, there was ‘general agreement that military operations could not be stopped at the 38th Parallel’. No mention was made of the Chiefs of Staff, but, perhaps as a tacit concession to their misgivings, it was suggested that as small a British contingent as possible should cross the border in the process of pacification. As ever, India had to be wooed, or at least placated. If Nehru could be persuaded to support the resolution, any residual doubts about the legality – and, for that matter, the morality – of exceeding the original goal of action in Korea might be swept aside. Up to the eve of the Assembly’s adoption of the British measure on 7 October, by which time a crossing by South Korean forces had already taken place, strenuous efforts were made to bring Nehru round. These were efforts rendered doubly forlorn by Nehru’s growing conviction that the Chinese would come in if Western – though not South Korean – troops set foot in North Korea. On 26 September, in a message to the Indian Prime Minister, Bevin argued that the unification of Korea, long supported by the United Nations, would be impossible with the mere restoration of the status quo ante, and that the parallel must perforce be regarded as ‘an imaginary line on a map which has neither political nor military significance on the ground’. On reading this statement Nehru might have been forgiven for reflecting that the parallel had borne enormous political and military significance on 25 June, when North Korea embarked on an attempt to unify the peninsula. Some crossings, it appears, were more aggressive than others. As for the ever216

Korean Conflict.indb 216

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

present Indian fear of the Korean War widening into world conflict, in a curious piece of reasoning Bevin commented that ‘if Russia wants war she does not need Korea as an excuse’, and concluded lamely that ‘we have so worded our draft resolution that the non-provocative nature of the entry of any United Nations forces into North Korea is clearly demonstrated’. Nehru was not persuaded. Rather than create a situation in which ‘world catastrophe is more than probable’, he told Bevin, the UN should repeat the call for Korean unification and offer to talk to the North Koreans about ways and means. When presenting Bevin’s message to Girja Bajpai, permanent head of the Ministry of External Affairs, the British High Commissioner was told that news had reached New Delhi from Peking of ‘a complete change of outlook in China’ during the preceding fortnight. In fact this was the first of an increasingly portentous series of reports: the regime could no longer tolerate frequent violations of their territory by US aircraft and the presence of a hostile force on their flank, and, in sum, had no alternative but to take military action. Bajpai conceded that Panikkar was ‘a somewhat volatile person’, but the Indian government had to accept the views of the man on the spot and thought they should be considered before the tabling of the British resolution went ahead at the United Nations. On 27 September, H.A. Graves of the British embassy in Washington informed the State Department that Panikkar had spoken to General Nieh Yen-jung, Acting Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, who warned of China’s willingness to go to war with the United States if sufficiently provoked by incidents arising from the Korean conflict. Graves stated that the British did ‘not take too seriously Pannikar’s [sic] fears, believing him [to be a] volatile and unreliable reporter’, but had nevertheless thought it a matter of urgency to convey the information to the State Department. As recalled by Panikkar in his memoirs, Nieh’s remarks – arising from the possibility of an American approach to the Manchurian border – were indeed alarming if they were seriously meant: We know what we are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped. The Americans can bomb us, they can destroy our industries, 217

Korean Conflict.indb 217

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

but they cannot defeat us on land … They may even drop atomic bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million people … After all, China lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there? Yes, our economic development will be put back. We may have to wait for it.

It is little wonder, when faced by this cosmic resignation to the consequences of war with the West, that the Americans and British were simply uncomprehending and chose to regard such talk as bluff. As a result of his conversation with General Nieh, Panikkar, who had hitherto doubted that China would intervene in Korea, now reinterpreted more pessimistically the remark made to him by the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on 21 September, to the effect that ‘since the United Nations had no obligation to China, China had no obligation to the United Nations’. Bevin, unimpressed by these reports but anxious to allay Nehru’s forebodings, wasted no time in putting to him the British thesis that China might prefer to see a United Nations presence, rather than a continued Russian presence, in North Korea. Moreover, he observed, I must confess that I have wondered whether the statements of the Chinese Chief of Staff have not been deliberately directed towards weakening the front which is opposed to North Korean aggression. The fact that we are thinking of putting forward a resolution in the General Assembly has now leaked everywhere. The contents of the resolution are still a matter of speculation and rumour is rife. May it not be that the Chinese, at Russian instigation, are trying to minimise the results of the North Korean defeat?

With this in mind, Bevin asked, could not Nehru now see his way clear to supporting the resolution? After all, the Foreign Secretary concluded, overlooking yet again the original purpose of the United Nations action, ‘[I]f the United Nations are to have no access to North Korea, all the efforts of those who have fought the battle – and it has been a hard battle – will have been in vain.’ Told of the news from Panikkar, the Cabinet nonetheless agreed that British policy should not be altered. However, it was suggested that the 218

Korean Conflict.indb 218

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

Americans should be persuaded to invite a Peking representative to discuss ‘outstanding’ questions, such as Formosa, at the United Nations, and that attempts should be made to assuage Chinese anger at overflights of their territory by US aircraft. Meanwhile, a Reuters report from New Delhi showed that it was common knowledge that not only would India refuse to support the resolution, but that the measure implicitly presupposed a military crossing of the parallel: ‘On no other terms could the reunion of Korea through elections supervised by the United Nations be foreseen.’ Nehru, for his part, must have begun to wonder if the British had taken leave of their senses, the more so as only a couple of months earlier India and Britain had been at one in wanting to limit the area of hostilities and had, admittedly in their confused ways, both approached the Russians to this end. In replying to Bevin’s message of 28 September and refusing to lend support, Nehru could scarcely have hoped to dissuade the British government from tabling the resolution. However, the Indian Prime Minister was nothing if not persistent. The Chinese utterances, he said, did not in his view amount to ‘an empty threat’, while a call to the North Koreans to lay down their arms ‘would not be realistic nor could an expectation that they would co-operate in implementation of the United Nations objective be regarded as appeasement’. The British high commissioner had ‘done his utmost’ to convince Nehru that American intentions in North Korea were of a benign character; but that was not the point. Bajpai, no doubt speaking for the Prime Minister, remained insistent that a crossing would provoke Chinese intervention and ‘would almost certainly lead to a third world war’. Indeed, less than two months later, after the Chinese had given effect to their warnings, Washington too came to believe global war was almost upon them. The pressure on India to support the British resolution was unrelenting, even though the Americans had already decided that a crossing would take place before there was any possibility of the measure passing the General Assembly. Loy Henderson in New Delhi was informed on 28 September that ‘military necessity may require ground action across the thirty eighth parallel before [the] Assembly can express its final opinion’ (MacArthur had, in fact, already been told that ROK troops could be sent north of the 219

Korean Conflict.indb 219

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

38th parallel), but Henderson was nonetheless instructed to press ahead with his representations to the Indian government. In a bid to ‘reassure India and Peking’, Henderson was further informed, Bevin had been ‘authorised’ by Washington to tell Nehru that the United States was willing to have unintentional bombing damage in China assessed independently and compensated. As for Nehru’s distaste for the government of Rhee, Henderson was asked to say that its installation as the government of a unified Korea would be no bad thing: after all, the Seoul regime was an ‘unquestionably freely chosen’ administration, and a victory for it in a truly national election held under UN auspices should be accepted. Nehru’s support for the resolution would be of ‘tremendous significance’, to which end Washington was considering a postponement of its introduction in the Assembly in order to allow India time to reconsider. As a piece of cynicism, the lobbying of Nehru over this matter is in a class of its own – on the very day after Henderson had been given these instructions, Marshall told MacArthur to feel unhampered tactically and strategically in his operations north of the parallel. Bevin continued to lend aid and comfort to the Americans’ diplomatic stratagems. Although he had begun privately to fear Chinese intervention as ‘a real danger’ should North Korea not survive as a buffer state, he persisted in cajoling Nehru. In a message sent just before he left New York after the conclusion of the tripartite talks, the Foreign Secretary insisted that London’s scepticism about the possibility of China entering the war was based not on a presumption of Peking bluffing but on his ‘estimate of Chou En-lai’s statesmanship which must surely appreciate the consequences of an attack upon United Nations forces’. As well as ignoring General Nieh’s expression of China’s stoic willingness to endure the consequences of war with the West, Bevin failed to ask himself whether the results for China of attempting to block the US forces in North Korea would be worse than allowing them to reach the Yalu and cross into Chinese territory. Had Bevin forgotten the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s? Had he, indeed, forgotten that only ten years earlier the British government, of which he had been an important member since May 1940, had preferred to fight the Germans on the Continent rather than wait for them to reach the Channel? 220

Korean Conflict.indb 220

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

These are not entirely hypothetical questions, since the fact that Bevin appears not to have asked them is a measure of his inability or reluctance to enter sympathetically into the minds of those leaders whose government he had recognised in January and whose difficulties he had then tried to understand. The likely explanation resides in his anxiety, itself the child of the hysteria fostered by the Korean War, to do nothing to offend the United States. However, in case he should appear too keen in his protestations to Nehru that America would exercise the ‘greatest care’ – whatever that meant – were they to cross the parallel, Bevin hastened to add unconvincingly that concessions had been made to the Indian viewpoint: the draft resolution had been modified to excise any mention of the parallel and to emphasise the determination of the UN to withdraw its forces from Korea promptly after unification had been achieved. This, he affected to believe, ‘should convince China of the absence of any aggressive intention’. The American press, however, gave the game away by trumpeting the widely leaked ‘United Kingdom plan’ as potentially ‘the most severe diplomatic and geopolitical defeat’ inflicted on the Communist powers since the end of World War II. In transmitting this information to London, the British embassy added, ‘Unfortunately, the tendency of most Americans to judge events abroad against the framework of their own institutions has led them to imagine that free elections in Korea will automatically produce a stable democratic government.’ The British embassy was not so sanguine. Nor, presumably, could the Chinese have been persuaded by American press comment that Bevin’s estimation of United Nations aims in North Korea reflected the truth. By late September, Anglo–American nagging began to have an effect in New Delhi. Bajpai told the American ambassador that following receipt of the amended resolution, India – while preferring that the North Koreans should be invited to lay down their arms and co-operate with the UN – might not actually vote against it in the General Assembly. Henderson correctly interpreted this as a significant shift of the Indian position. Bajpai conceded that the forces of the UN had a right to enter North Korea under the terms of the June resolution, and indeed, in further conversation said that India might even vote for the British 221

Korean Conflict.indb 221

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

measure if international developments so warranted. However, this softening of attitude was of necessity short-lived. On 3 October Henderson relayed to Washington information received from Panikkar that Chou had stated China’s definite intention to intervene if American forces entered North Korea. From Holland there came confirmation of this alarming intelligence. The Dutch chargé in Peking, although suspecting Panikkar to be a ‘fellow traveller’ to the Chinese regime, believed the Indian’s version of his conversation with Chou to have been accurate. There was, thought the chargé, a real danger that in a moment of panic the Chinese would commit the one million troops known to be stationed in Manchuria; certainly they were still ‘intensely bitter’ about US support of Chiang during and after the Chinese civil war. MacArthur’s rapidly expanding hubris, a characteristic not unique to the General in the weeks following Inchon, would not permit him to regard the reported statements of the Chinese as other than ‘pure bluff’. Having granted an audience to Sir Alvary Gascoigne on 3 October, MacArthur argued (overlooking the desire of the Chinese to prevent a situation in which they would be compelled to intervene) that ‘If Chou had meant business … he would not have broadcast his intentions beforehand in this manner’, and, in the confident tone he was to employ at the Wake Island meeting with Truman some days later, he ‘claimed he had plenty of troops adequately to deal with the Chinese, and even with the Russians, if they should prove so foolish as to enter the arena at this stage’. If the Chinese intervened, he ‘would immediately unleash his air force against towns in Manchuria and North China including Peking – he knew that Chou must know that … Chou’s statement to Panikkar was just blackmail’. These were hardly the statements of a man who intended to tiptoe into North Korea, unfussily pave the way for elections, and quietly withdraw. Nor were they easy to reconcile with his assurances to Gascoigne that only South Korean troops would be directed to go as far as the Yalu. More significantly, if MacArthur did have forces more than adequate to deal with the Chinese and the Russians on the North Korean battlefield, why contemplate the bombing of Chinese cities? Chou was perhaps right to fear that the Americans’ subjugation of North Korea would not satisfy them. 222

Korean Conflict.indb 222

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

MacArthur’s immediate tactical plans, also disclosed to Gascoigne at this meeting, came as a surprise to London. They had not known of them, and nor did they know whether any forces had crossed the parallel. It was a remarkable state of affairs, given the oft-repeated American declaration that the British were by far their closest allies, who, moreover, were at that point trying to push through a resolution in the United Nations fostering and to some extent protecting American interests and face in Korea. Acting on urgent instructions from London to discover what was going on, on the night of 3 October Franks asked Dean Rusk to call on him at the embassy, preferring not to visit the State Department himself at such a late hour and thus arouse press speculation. Had South Korean forces proceeded north of the parallel, and if so, had they been directed to do so by Unified Command? Yes, replied Rusk, they had crossed the border, but he did not know how far and nor at whose direction, although he ‘supposed’ they were pursuing a Unified Command order. To the best of his knowledge, no nonKorean troops had accompanied them. It was a measure of the confusion surrounding the whole issue that Franks should have then asked if operations in North Korea were covered by the Security Council resolution of 27 June. After all, this had been discussed and debated in Washington and London since the beginning of the war, and the British resolution shortly to be introduced in the Assembly had been designed expressly for this contingency. In reply, Rusk could only reiterate the American line that military necessity obliged MacArthur to cross the parallel if the purposes of the Security Council were to be fulfilled, but the ‘broad political-military objectives’ remained a matter for further United Nations consideration. Scarcely able to cloak his disquiet, Franks asked finally whether in fact MacArthur had been ordered to proceed as he had done, since it was London’s understanding that ‘he was under strict instructions not to operate north of the 38th parallel without a specific directive from the President’. Rusk confessed ‘ignorance’ of the precise details, but was able to say that MacArthur had received ‘an operational policy directive’ to cross the border, the mechanisms of which were to be submitted to Washington for approval. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Rusk, as the senior Far Eastern official in the State Department and a strong advocate of crossing, would by 3 October have 223

Korean Conflict.indb 223

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

been unaware of Marshall’s instructions of a few days earlier freeing MacArthur of restraint. The British government might have expected to have been kept in closer touch than this. The crossing was full of portentous implications, yet it was not known until after the event whether the action had been taken, who had crossed and where they were, the nature of the instructions – if any – issued to MacArthur, and finally, whether he was to be allowed to act virtually as a free agent. It was therefore odd that in his transmission of his findings or lack thereof to London, Franks seemed to derive comfort from the fact that no ‘major military operation’ across the parallel was contemplated before a week’s time. The disclosure of his plans by MacArthur to Gascoigne caught Washington on the hop. Certainly Rusk was caught out. Having received the promised copy of the background directive given to MacArthur, Franks informed London, ‘Contrary to the impression we had received from Rusk yesterday, it did not contain any clear indication of what MacArthur was authorised to do without further United Nations action or further instruc­ tions from the President.’ Moreover, the directive contained a programme for the occupation and administration of North Korea of which the British had been unaware, but which had been in existence for some time, as a Foreign Office official observed on reading Franks’ message. ‘It is remarkable,’ he noted, ‘that Gen MacArthur should have been given so free a hand in military operations … Evidently the instructions, of which we have heard from Sir A. Gascoigne, were given to Gen MacArthur by the President near the time of the Inchon landing, possibly before the Presidential statement regarding the need for UN decision to cross the Parallel.’ It was obviously a worrying conjunction of events. Not only had it become apparent that the United States was failing to consult the British on vital matters that might ultimately concern world peace, but also MacArthur had been given even more latitude than had been feared in London. Furthermore, if his utterances to Gascoigne about what he would do in the event of Chinese intervention were to be taken seriously, the General proposed to take even more latitude than that. What was happening to the special relationship? By early October the British Chiefs of Staff, no better apprised of events in Korea than their political masters, had passed from a state of unease 224

Korean Conflict.indb 224

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

about a crossing of the parallel to one of palpable anxiety. Not fully sure whether South Korean troops were already engaged in the North, they approached Sir Roger Makins on 5 October seeming, in his words, ‘to have convinced themselves that the Chinese will intervene; that we will become involved in hostilities with them; and that this would make it impossible to localise the conflict’. The Chiefs therefore wanted ‘to see MacArthur halted at the 39th parallel for about two weeks in which further efforts should be made to get the North Koreans to surrender and to associate the Peking Government with the negotiations for a settlement’. Makins told them realistically that the only way of holding up action was to make a major political intervention in Washington and thereby unfortunately incur the responsibility of robbing the United Nations ‘of the fruits of victory’ – to which, with equal if gloomy realism, Slim replied that he thought the Americans ‘were now determined to go on whatever we did’. Attlee and Shinwell, when they were shown the Chiefs’ conclusions after Makins had journeyed urgently down to the Labour Party conference at Margate, professed to share their anxiety ‘lest the manner in which General MacArthur was taking the bit between his teeth in Korea should lead to a general conflagration in the Far East’. This was unfair, though understandable in view of the ignorance in which the British leaders were being kept by the United States. MacArthur, it is true, was to cross the parallel in force on 9 October, but under specific instructions to do so and, as we have seen, with the implicit approval of the British government. As events were to show, he pursued his instructions to destroy the North Korean army with disturbing zeal, and wilfully ignored the ban on sending non-Korean soldiers right up to the Yalu, but – having disregarded the earlier warnings of both the Chiefs of Staff and the Chinese – MacArthur could not be ultimately blamed by Attlee, and nor could the course of events be reversed. Showing scarcely less restraint than the Supreme Commander, the British government had taken the bit between their teeth, so entrancing was the prospect of total victory in Korea. *

*

*

No member of the government desired the goal of total victory more avidly than the Foreign Secretary. On 6 October Bevin circulated a note to Cabinet 225

Korean Conflict.indb 225

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

setting out the results of his recent conversations in the United States. It betrayed none of the anxieties then beginning to swirl through Whitehall, instead exhibiting an almost amused view of Nehru’s fears about the consequences of extending the war into North Korea. Finding, on his arrival in New York, that the ‘spectacular change’ wrought by Inchon had caught the Americans unprepared as to the next step (in fact the Americans knew very well what the next step would be), Bevin took the initiative by getting his advisers to prepare a draft resolution which, after general approval by the State Department, was shown to potential UN sponsors. The Indian delegation had been favourably disposed but were overruled by Nehru, who ‘had become somewhat unduly alarmed’ by Panikkar’s reports from Peking. Indeed, observed Bevin, the 38th parallel had ‘assumed nightmare proportions’ in the Indian Prime Minister’s mind. However, since the boundary was no more than an imaginary line and had never been internationally recognised, the Foreign Secretary had been at pains to ignore it both in the drafting of the resolution and in his speech to the General Assembly. The imaginary line, it must be stressed again, had seemed to possess the utmost importance for him in June 1950. Bevin simply disregarded the fact that the 1948 UN resolution on Korean unification, which he now invoked, had formed no part of the Security Council measure of 27 June. Bevin could not afford to appear less than bold, because otherwise he might have weakened the effectiveness of his negotiations at the UN on behalf of the American government. Nevertheless, in a message to Franks he did betray some anxiety. The two immediate objectives in Korea were to restrain Peking and localise the fighting, he told the ambassador, and he did not wish to disguise from the Americans the fact that the Chiefs of Staff were ‘very disturbed’. At the same time, though, he would not press for the abandonment of ‘any operations which may be contemplated North of the Parallel’, but they must, as a matter of the first importance, be confined within Korea. Failure to do this would have far-reaching consequences: direct action against the Chinese (for example, in Manchuria) would certainly lead to general hostilities between the United States and China. 226

Korean Conflict.indb 226

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

This in turn would have two consequences. In the first place, it would involve the Americans in a conflict of indefinite duration which would be a running sore draining away the strength of the Western Powers and reducing their ability to deal with other crises elsewhere. In the second place, on the political front it might split the United Nations. Moreover, this split would occur not between Russia and her satellites and the rest, but in the ranks of the democratic Powers on the Asiatic-European line. It might even affect the present overwhelming support in the United Nations for action in Korea itself.

No doubt with MacArthur in mind, Bevin therefore wanted specific assurances that attacks on ‘Chinese communications in Manchuria or other targets outside Korea’ should not be undertaken by UN forces without express sanction. Although the intended implications of these warnings could scarcely have been more sombre, the Foreign Secretary was almost as concerned that the launching of a major campaign over the 38th parallel would occur ‘too soon after the passage of the Assembly resolution’. He told Franks that this might be construed as casting doubt on the good faith and sincerity of the supporters of the measures, principally – though he did not say so – Britain, and himself as author of the plan. In discussion with Jessup and Rusk the following day, the British ambassador was assured that America would adhere to its policy of restricting the war to Korea, that MacArthur had clear instructions not to attack targets in Manchuria or Siberia, and that there would be ‘some gap’ between the passage of the resolution and the move across the parallel. Alas, such a seemly interval of time was denied to Bevin. The resolution was adopted ‘as soon as possible’, as he wished, on the day following his cable to Franks, but two days later MacArthur unleashed all his forces across the parallel. In the general excitement, no one – at least, no one making sufficient noise to gain public attention – charged the British government with having dressed up a fait accompli in the tawdry finery of their resolution. Those who knew this sequence of events for what it was were probably too embarrassed to state the truth. 227

Korean Conflict.indb 227

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Like a man trying to take out insurance after his house has started to burn, the West continued to use an increasingly anxious India as a gobetween, bearing implausible placatory messages to Peking. The necessity to do this must have been galling to Acheson and to Henderson, particularly as the ambassador’s relations with Bajpai were strained as a result of what the former called ‘a little exchange’ that took place on 4 October. A ‘hottempered’ Bajpai rebuked Henderson for reflecting sourly on some remarks the Prime Minister had made about Syngman Rhee, which provided the ambassador with an opportunity to catalogue Nehru’s sins. It seemed to Henderson that Nehru had been publicly more critical of America’s Far Eastern activities and policies than of those of ‘the aggressor’; for example, he had expressed sympathy for North Korean prisoners of war while ignoring the murder of Americans in enemy hands, and the victory of the Communists in China had been described as ‘expressive of the will of the Chinese people’ while MacArthur’s recent successes had been represented as a victory for American ‘militarism’ and the ‘military mind’. Bajpai evidently had time only to murmur that the Indian Prime Minister was a kind-hearted man who hated to see human suffering before Henderson delivered an attack on the spinelessness and poor calibre of the diplomatic corps in New Delhi. No other chief of mission, he lamented, dared ‘take exception to anything Nehru says or does’. Nye, the British high commissioner, followed a policy of ‘flattery, cajolery and apology somewhat similar to that employed by Nehru in dealing with Chou En-lai’. The Canadian representative was ‘even more supine’ and engaged in antiAmerican statements in order to strengthen his position in New Delhi. Sadly, the only diplomats loyal to the United States were the Italian ambassador and the Australian high commissioner. This intemperate outburst could only have come from a man acutely conscious of representing a Great Power in a country whose leader had the temerity to castigate American behaviour. Like the Secretary of State, Henderson undoubtedly found what he regarded as Nehru’s preaching and holier-than-thou moralising exasperating, but his good offices had at the same time to be courted lest the one slender thread to Peking be broken. Scarcely had tempers cooled when Henderson was obliged to act 228

Korean Conflict.indb 228

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

on the futile instruction to speak directly to the Chinese ambassador in India and reassure him that American intentions in Korea were fundamentally peaceful. The Chinese would have nothing to do with the overture. In New Delhi they had steadfastly refused to treat with any diplomats whose countries, including Britain, did not maintain an ambassador in Peking; moreover, they presumably saw what was plain to everyone else, namely that MacArthur was poised for a full-scale invasion of North Korea. Acheson, still persuaded that China would not intervene, allowed a doubt that did exist in the back of his mind to prompt this small-scale démarche. However, as US troops were about to cross the parallel, nothing he might say could assuage Peking’s fears of American designs in the region, including the nightmare of a military effort to overturn the Communist Party’s sovereignty in China. In the circumstances, Nehru’s personal message to Chou at the beginning of October was also foredoomed. Pleading for restraint, and holding out the hope that ‘influential sections’ in America favoured China’s admission to the United Nations, Nehru alluded to the devastating consequences of any rash action for the Chinese people. Information reached India on 4 October to the effect that the ‘entry of South Korean forces into North Korea would not necessitate Chinese intervention’, but that the entry of ‘forces other than South Korea … would be met, however, by Chinese intervention’. It was argued by Chou, reasonably enough, that a crossing by Korean forces would be part of the continuing civil war and would not call for Chinese interference, but a crossing by United Nations – that is to say, American – troops would constitute aggression against a ‘friendly neigh­ bouring state’. Chou had thus made it clear that China would intervene with the greatest reluctance, although predictably the State Department chose to interpret this as a ploy further to engage the sympathy of India and of uncommitted nations. With George Kennan safely out of the way at Princeton, a single, timorous voice within the State Department raised the proposition that the Chinese might not be bluffing. Edmund Clubb, the head of the Chinese Affairs desk, warned that the USSR and China might be prepared to ‘risk 229

Korean Conflict.indb 229

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the danger of World War III’ over Korea, in the light of which attention should be given to the Indian proposal, namely that the North Koreans should be given ten to fifteen days in which to reconsider MacArthur’s order to surrender, during which time firm suggestions should be made for the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea. Clubb argued somewhat belatedly that a full-scale crossing and occupation of the North might be unwise, since ‘we can evidently expect only (1) a costly military campaign, complicated by guerrilla warfare … during a time when our military forces perhaps had better be disposed elsewhere; (2) a likewise costly process of rehabilitation…; and (3) a possible further exacerbation of relations with hypersensitive and already embittered, xenophobic Orientals’. Clubb’s argument sank without trace. It contended unequally with the administration’s, and especially Acheson’s, sheer political inability to appear less than wholehearted in grasping the so-called fruits of the Inchon victory, and also, at a deeper level, with the American desire for the unconditional surrender and humiliation of the aggressor. Bevin also joined in the sotto voce lobbying of Chinese leaders, with as little chance of success. After securing Acheson’s approval of the contents of a message to be transmitted to Peking through Panikkar, the Foreign Secretary stated that progress could not be made towards a unified, independent and democratic Korea – whatever that meant to Mao and Chou – until the North Koreans laid down their arms. If they refused to do so, the UN Command would have no alternative but to continue the campaign. However, no action would be taken which could be construed as a threat to China’s security, and as soon as elections were held the UN forces would withdraw from Korea leaving behind ‘a new democratic government’. In a final assurance, which was to be rendered hollow within a month, Bevin promised that no troops other than Koreans would be stationed near the Chinese frontier. For the Chinese leaders, there was nothing in this. Consequently, neither was there anything that might have stayed their hand. *

*

*

The Russians had become distinctly jittery. Meanwhile a curious episode was unfolding in New York early in October, which suggested the terms on which 230

Korean Conflict.indb 230

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

the Soviet Union might be prepared to settle matters in Korea. Admiral Kirk’s opinion, which had previously been ignored, was confirmed: the Soviets were far from happy about the turn of events. If Moscow for its part were to encourage participation in UN-sponsored elections, and, on the other hand, so long as the North Korean Communists were to be tolerated for the sake of Moscow, it appeared that the Soviets were open to ‘Asiatic’ – possibly Indian – forces becoming the occupying power in North Korea. How did this come about? Hans Engen of the UN Norwegian delegation, a former editor of an Oslo daily newspaper and close friend of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange, approached the State Department on 5 October with an account of a conversation he had had with Vassili Kassaniev. Kassaniev had been Consul General in New York, and though he did not occupy a prominent post with the Russian Secretariat at the UN, he seemed to have direct access to Andrei Vyshinsky, the Foreign Minister, who was then in New York and who was a member of the Soviet delegation. In the first of their ostensibly casual talks over lunch and dinner Kassaniev reacted oddly, indeed he ‘paled visibly’, when Engen told him that the Americans wanted to vacate Korea as soon as the North Koreans were defeated and might be prepared to leave occupation duties in North Korea to Asian troops. The Russian asked if he might relay this information to Vyshinsky. Amid much secrecy and with the highly circumspect support of the State Department, Engen met Kassaniev on a number of occasions up to 9 October, when the conversations were terminated as a result, the Norwegian believed, of the crossing of the parallel. Regardless of the motives of the Russians, it seems clear that Vyshinsky, doubtless aware that Engen was acting as an intermediary, was at one stage prepared to see Engen in order to take the matter further. Engen and his American contact at the UN, John C. Ross, surmised that the Russians – disturbed at the miscarriage of their Korean adventure, and anxious about the prospect of American forces close to Vladivostok – might be willing to accept a non-American, namely Indian, occupation force in North Korea, and the holding of elections under United Nations auspices. The price was to have been an American agreement not to send their own troops across the parallel as part of the UN Command armies. 231

Korean Conflict.indb 231

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Though not mentioned by Ross or Engen as a possibility, Moscow might have got wind of an Indian plan as put to Peking, namely the occupation of North Korea by the forces of UN countries not involved in the war and the holding of a plebiscite by a UN Commission. The Chinese were not entirely hostile to some such scheme either, which they seem to have contemplated at least implicitly as part of their price for refraining from intervention. As we have seen, they had undertaken not to concern themselves militarily with North Korean affairs as long as American soldiers remained south of the parallel. Indeed, in his two-volume work entitled How Wars End, Sydney Bailey has argued14 that the Russians were anxious to come to some arrangement with the West before the Chinese intervened and supplanted Soviet influence in North Korea. However, if the Kremlin did give serious thought to such a stratagem, which would have stopped a MacArthurdriven occupation, they could surely not have hoped that an electorate dominated by South Koreans by a factor of two to one would fail to return, if not the Rhee regime, then a government heavily influenced by the United States. As Russia stood to lose in either event, it is entirely possible that there was a greater fear behind its flirtation with the idea of a compromise peace: the fear of a general conflagration in the Far East and the inevitability of war between herself and the United States. It is a moot point whether the Americans would have responded positively if the Engen–Kassaniev talks had flourished. Rusk was the official to whom Ross was relaying Engen’s intelligence, and it was Rusk who was busying himself at this time with killing Dutch and Canadian proposals for a UN motion calling for a temporary ceasefire in Korea. In any case, it is likely that nothing short of an actual Soviet or Chinese military intervention would have stopped the United States from invading North Korea in October 1950. Nor, it seems, would anything have stopped the farce of Bevin’s resolution from proceeding at the General Assembly, even though Britain’s own permanent representative on the Security Council, Gladwyn Jebb, was himself ‘very apprehensive’ about the extension of the war, and presumably embarrassed by the manner in which his country was leading its retrospective sanctioning. 232

Korean Conflict.indb 232

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

Lester Pearson, Canada’s respected Foreign Minister and a close friend of Acheson, was disturbed by the very same considerations, and attempted a last-minute diversion of the resolution. The Canadians believed that the United Nations had discharged its obligations when the parallel had been reached, and opposed, in Pearson’s words, ‘a march into northern territory’. When it became obvious to him that the Americans did not intend to halt at the border, Pearson put forward ‘the inevitable Canadian compromise’, namely allowing the North Koreans a three- or four-day period of grace in which to reconsider a ceasefire. He also suggested to the Americans that if a crossing had to be made, a halt should be called at the 39th or 40th parallel so that the Chinese should have no cause to feel threatened. To Pearson’s relief, on 6 October the Americans agreed that the proposal was not unreasonable – indeed that it was a wise – course. As I understand it, after a meeting in the Waldorf Towers, this course had been agreed upon and proposals to this end would be put forward at a meeting of the Assembly the following morning.

On the same day, however, Rusk reported to his colleagues in the State Department that he had talked the Canadians out of proposing a motion in these terms. Whatever Pearson might have been told in New York, in Washington Rusk clearly spoke for the intention of the Americans to cross the parallel come what may. On the following day, to Pearson’s ‘amazement and disgust, the United States representative got up and, in effect, asked support for an immediate pursuit … for a follow through to the Chinese boundary, if necessary to destroy the aggressor’. He cabled Ottawa expressing his profound misgivings: The whole episode is a disheartening one, both as an indication of the confusion and division in United States counsels at the Assembly, and, more important, of their impatience with any line of policy than that which seems to be dictated by General MacArthur and the immediate military situation in Korea … Apparently in Washington they feel that it is more important not to interfere with the military timetable than to 233

Korean Conflict.indb 233

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

make every possible move to bring fighting to an end in a way which would command the approval of Asian members of the United Nations.

Acheson hastened to apologise to Pearson, who was then satisfied that the Secretary of State and his senior officers had not been responsible for the ‘mix-up’. However, Acheson’s explanation is most unconvincing. He told Pearson that after the discussions of 6 October, arrangements had been made for a presidential statement to be issued along lines which ‘might do some good and of which he [Acheson] approved’. No search of the compendious 1950 FRUS15 volume on Korea, nor of the Truman papers, nor those of the State Department, reveals any such statement having been planned or even discussed. Certainly a proposed announcement by the President calling for a ceasefire and possibly stating America’s intention to stop at the waist of Korea would have been discussed in the administration – and furiously at that, in view of the speed with which events were moving both militarily and diplomatically. According to Acheson, ‘someone else in Washington’ got wind of the development and contacted Senator Austin, who then dissuaded Truman from making the statement. Was this ‘someone’ Dean Rusk? Possibly, since Rusk, as we have seen, informed his colleagues that he had effectively killed the Canadian proposal, and moreover it was he among the high officials of the State Department who favoured an uninhibited crossing and occupation of North Korea the most enthusiastically. The evidence suggests strongly that Acheson also had a hand in the killing of the plan. He knew of and must have approved the rejection of a Dutch approach for a ceasefire made on 5 October, which was couched in terms almost identical to Pearson’s proposal. On the same day, he reported to the State Department from New York that the Netherlands representative at the UN, Von Balluseck, had on instruction from his government proposed that the crossing be suspended for a fortnight in order to facilitate negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Von Balluseck, himself doubtful about the usefulness of the plan, was given the now standard response: fears of a Chinese intervention were groundless, any postponement of a crossing might eventually ‘cost many American lives’, and accordingly the eight-power resolution sponsored by the British 234

Korean Conflict.indb 234

04/09/2015 11:40

C RO S S I N G TH E PAR ALLE L

was the best possible course of action. On the same day, certainly with Acheson’s approval and probably at his direction, these and other American objections were communicated to the Dutch ambassador in Washington, who complied with a request to send an urgent cable to The Hague to this effect. How, then, could Acheson have been truthful in telling Pearson that the Canadian plan, so similar to the Dutch proposal, had been received sympathetically and might be cast in the form of a presidential statement? Obviously, the truth was not told. Indeed, his apology to Pearson contained more than mere avoidance of the truth; it contained a lie, so anxious was the Secretary of State to forestall anything that might impede MacArthur’s advance into North Korea. Pearson therefore probably got close to the nub of the matter in observing that whoever was responsible for the death of his plan ‘was inspired by the desire to prevent anybody minimising the effect of General MacArthur’s pronouncement to the North Koreans’ to surrender unconditionally and immediately. The resolution passed through the General Assembly with what Panikkar called ‘historical insouciance’. There were 8 abstentions, 47 votes in favour and 5 against. The resolution stipulated that ‘All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea’ so that a unified, independent and democratic government could be established. ‘All sections and representative bodies’ of the population, South and North, were invited to co-operate with the United Nations in the holding of elections and in the setting-up of a unified government, after which, the resolution avowed, UN forces would be withdrawn from the country. The economic reconstruction of Korea would be assisted by a newly created body, UNCURK, whose members were nominated as Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan and the Philippines. As well as placing a gloss of legitimacy on a process already in train, the Assembly’s action amounted to little more than a deliberately vague carte blanche for the United States to impose its own notion of stability and an appropriate government on a country whose unification was to be achieved by force of arms. Assuredly, there was no reason to suppose that the North Koreans would respond to a call for co-operation in ensuring conditions of stability in their territory, since in their view such conditions had existed 235

Korean Conflict.indb 235

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

since the defeat of the Japanese. Indeed, given the opportunity, they might have argued that the United Nations intended to invade North Korea in order to make it unstable, which condition it then became the task of the United Nations to eradicate. The resolution could have done little to assuage Chinese forebodings, either. As a Canadian historian, quoted by Stairs, observes, ‘China proved to be as unwilling to admit such a plan for Korea as the United States might have been if United Nations forces, mostly Chinese, had been about to arrange for a people’s democracy in Mexico’16 – or for that matter, it might be added, anywhere else in Central and South America, the Caribbean, or Canada itself. Just as percipiently, Panikkar noted in his diary: So, America has knowingly elected for war, with Britain following. It is indeed a tragic decision, for the Americans and the British are well aware that a military settlement of the Korean issue will be resisted by the Chinese and that the armies now concentrated on the Yalu border will intervene decisively in the fight. Probably that is what the Americans, at least some of them, want. They probably feel that this is the opportunity to have a showdown with China. In any case MacArthur’s dream has come true. I only hope it does not turn out to be a nightmare.

To George Kennan also, the invocation of a UN resolution to justify military operations extending beyond the parallel represented an abuse of the organisation’s mandate. Bevin, however, maintained his equanimity. He told Cabinet on 9 October that a further appeal should be made to the North Koreans to cease active resistance, and in the course of regretting India’s lack of support for the resolution he insisted that fears of Chinese or Russian intervention were groundless. However, the spectre of Chinese military action could not be wished away.

236

Korean Conflict.indb 236

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Chinese intervention

L

ike men who did not believe in ghosts but were nonetheless scared of them, Western policy makers and their advisers whispered nervously among themselves as MacArthur drove triumphantly northwards into enemy territory. For James Wilkinson, the American Consul-General in the listening post of Hong Kong, such nervousness was misplaced. Wilkinson had read the portents in the Chinese mainland press and sounded out his numerous contacts in the region. On 7 October, by which time a UN crossing by American troops had become a certainty, he came to the conclusion that the Chinese would not take action. He believed that the Chinese would be most reluctant to risk the dangers of a war with the Western powers without the full support of the Soviet Army, and that support was not forthcoming. Peking’s propaganda seemed to be merely preparing the population for the support of North Korea in a lengthy guerrilla war of resistance. In Washington, though, there were glimmerings of doubt. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told the President that Chinese intervention was possible and received his permission to instruct MacArthur, in the vague terms by now customary in their directives to the Commander-in-Chief, that ‘in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere’ of major Chinese forces in Korea, he should continue his operations if they offered ‘a reasonable chance of success’. This was a measure of the recklessness that had infected even the normally cautious Joint Chiefs of Staff. The instruction – invitation would be a better word – contradicted the earlier policy to pull out of Korea if major Chinese or Soviet forces intervened. The Joint Chiefs added the extraordinary injunction, surely unnecessary in the case of any military leader other than MacArthur, that before taking military action against objectives in Chinese territory, MacArthur should obtain authorisation from Washington. 237

Korean Conflict.indb 237

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Truman’s proposed meeting with MacArthur, scheduled for 15 October on Wake Island, served to add to anxiety about the Chinese. On 9 October Philip Jessup wrote to Acheson, who needed no convincing that the notion of a meeting was a foolish one. Nevertheless, Jessup explained that news of the meeting might heighten fears entertained in Peking and Moscow that a plan was being hatched ‘to invade Manchuria or to engage Chinese armies there while Chiang Kai-shek makes a landing on the mainland to the south’. On the same day, following receipt of Jessup’s message, Acheson accordingly advised the President not to allow MacArthur to disturb American policy towards Formosa, so ‘critical in our relations with China’. The British were also unhappy about what might or might not occur at the Wake Island meeting – an unhappiness that arose in part from the quite deplorable latitude which they believed the American civil power was prepared to grant its pre-eminent military officer. Bevin, notwithstanding his sang-froid in Cabinet two days earlier, wrote to Acheson on 11 October exhibiting signs of uneasiness about the possibility of Chinese action and MacArthur’s unfettered response. Having at last divined from statements issued by Kim Il-sung and Chou that Chinese intervention could not be discounted entirely, the Foreign Secretary expressed the view that in light of the impending Wake Island meeting it was ‘of the highest importance’ that the United States should be made aware of the consequences of China joining the war. If they did so act, Bevin considered ‘it vital that General MacArthur should not take reprisals against them outside Korean territory without express sanction from President Truman’. Almost as an after­ thought, Bevin suggested that prior consultation should take place with Britain before MacArthur was allowed to act outside Korean territory. ‘We have,’ he concluded, ‘complete trust in the President and rely on him to make General MacArthur aware of the great issues that hang on our conduct in Korea.’ Within the constraints of diplomatic language, this is as close as Bevin would permit himself to venture, short of saying that he did not trust the General. Bevin was preaching to the converted. A briefing prepared by the State Department for the President two days before the meeting shows plainly enough that the administration, though without much idea of what should 238

Korean Conflict.indb 238

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

be done in Korea, knew what should not be done. It stated that the conflict must not be allowed to spread beyond Korea, to which end ‘extreme measures’ must be taken to prevent incidents involving Chinese or Soviet forces or territory, and only Korean troops should be deployed in the far north of the peninsula. In the event, the unstated purpose of the Wake meeting – in the words of the British embassy in Washington, ‘to bring the General into line’ – was not fulfilled. The verbatim record discloses only one question asked of MacArthur by Truman which remotely touched on the anxieties voiced by Bevin and by Jessup and others within the American government, namely, ‘What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?’ The General replied that ‘there would be the greatest slaughter’ of the Chinese, and, although they were more formidable, he seemed to suggest that the Russians would present scarcely more of a problem. Evidently satisfied with this ineffable statement (it was certainly not an answer to the question), the President moved on to participate in a desultory and rambling discussion of the Philippines, the Japanese peace treaty, Indochina, and the rehabilitation of Korea. MacArthur could have been forgiven had he formed the impression after the meeting that he had just engaged in an idle conversation with a colleague rather in than a briefing of his commander-in-chief. Flying back to Tokyo irritated by the time wasted on Wake Island, the General must also have surmised that little stood in between his intentions in Korea, and perhaps elsewhere, and their accomplishment. It is tempting therefore to agree with the accusations levelled at Truman at the time – and since – that he conceived the idea of the meeting in order to associate himself in the public mind with the prodigiously successful General, and, again in the words of the British embassy, ‘to serve the purposes of pre-election party strategy rather than those of constructive statesmanship’. In a speech made in San Francisco on his return to the United States the President duly associated himself with MacArthur – ‘a very great soldier’ – and with the expected total victory in Korea. However, he was careful to emphasise that America had no aggressive designs there; indeed, it would evacuate the country as soon as peace and independence had been secured. The British embassy, 239

Korean Conflict.indb 239

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

though detecting nothing in the speech which added to what little was known about the Wake Island meeting, did regard it as an important statement of US policy. Among other things, it was framed to mollify critics who suspected the administration of favouring the defence of Western Europe at the expense of the Far East, and simultaneously to exempt China from Truman’s strictures against aggressive international communism. The two-week period between the crossing of the parallel and the first appearance of Chinese troops was a curious, almost poignant amalgam of two irreconcilable emotions: a nagging fear of Chinese or Soviet intervention, and the pleasure derived from MacArthur’s home-by-Christmas prediction. However, the latter was overshadowed by the former. After analysing recently received fragments of evidence, on 12 October the CIA ruled out the probability of Soviet military action in Korea. Despite the severe blow to the USSR which the defeat of North Korea would occasion, the risk of global war with the West was, said the CIA in effect, not worth the candle: ‘[T]he Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war.’ Only if the Kremlin decided on world war would they intrude directly into Korea. In this event, the CIA understandably neglected to say, Korea would be reduced to a sideshow of almost infinitesimal importance. After a less perceptive reading of other fragments of evidence – statements by Chou, Chinese troop movements and Peking’s charges of UN atrocities and border violations – the CIA, in the same report, concluded that Chinese ‘intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans’. A ‘diplomatic round-up’ conducted by the State Department in midOctober, although inconclusive, tended to confirm what American officials wanted to believe, that is to say that the Chinese had no intention of becoming embroiled in conflict with United Nations forces. Thirteen American missions abroad – Taipei, Hong Kong, Bern, Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels, Oslo, Stockholm, New Delhi, The Hague, Moscow and London – were asked to relay to Washington any information they might have received about Chinese intentions. With the exception of intelligence for which the ultimate source was Panikkar, and which was therefore dismissed, 240

Korean Conflict.indb 240

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

none of the missions conveyed worrisome messages; indeed, the gist of the responses was that the warnings of the Chinese, in the words of a Belgian source, ‘should be taken with a heavy grain of salt’. Thus, on 18 October the CIA was able with some confidence to reaffirm the appreciation made six days earlier: There have been a number of reports that the Chinese would openly intervene after UN troops (as distinguishable from Republic of Korea troops) crossed the 38th Parallel. There are certainly enough Chinese Communist forces readily available in Manchuria to permit military intervention on a scale sufficient to alter the course of events in Korea … It is becoming less and less likely, however, that Chinese Communist troop units will openly enter the battle under the flag of the Peiping regime. The time has passed when Chinese intervention would have turned the military tide toward a complete Communist victory … The Chinese Communists cannot fail to be unaware that war with the US, at least in the absence of a general East-West war, would be disastrous not only to China’s interests in general but also to the domestic program and stability of the Peiping regime.

Clearly, the stoic view of the Chinese towards the consequences of war with the United States was simply incomprehensible to the Americans and therefore easily disregarded. This tendency gained strength from the readiness with which Panikkar, the chief medium of Peking’s warnings, was discredited as a reliable source. On 19 October, six days before the warnings were given effect, Under-Secretary Webb observed, ‘There has been some question regarding the political sympathies and biases of the Indian Ambassador in Peiping … his accuracy and objectivity as a reporter are subject to question.’ Was this observation meant to suggest that Panikkar had fabricated the statements apparently made to him by Chinese political and military leaders? Either the warnings had been uttered or they had not. Stripped of any gloss Panikkar had put upon them, there could be no doubt about their authenticity, as indicated by their dismissal as ‘bluff’ by the Americans. The earnestness of the Chinese was discounted 241

Korean Conflict.indb 241

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

because the Americans, and to a slightly lesser extent the British, did not want to believe that anything could cheat them of a thoroughgoing triumph. Hence, too, their failure to ask why, if Mao was prepared to risk war in order to regain Formosa, would he not risk war to protect the Manchurian border? Sloppy and wishful analysis of Chinese motives, when married to the complacency induced by MacArthur’s ‘terrific slaughter’ thesis, prepared the ground for catastrophe. A certain measure of complacency, though less culpable, was also to be found among the public in the United States and Britain. ‘The Korean War’, observed the British embassy in the last week of October, ‘is no longer the dominant topic of public interest’, the more so as the President had stated at a press conference that he understood the Manchurian border area would be held by South Korean forces alone. For those in the know, however, it must have been disturbing to hear Truman state that the tactical disposition of troops was ‘of course a matter for the Military Commander’. What had become of the instruction that American forces were not to be sent to the Manchurian and Soviet borders? In Britain, a Gallup poll conducted in October (before China intervened) showed that 50 per cent favoured a continuation of the war until the defeat of the North Koreans, as opposed to 41 per cent who preferred a negotiated settlement. More significant, since it strongly implies that Chinese or Soviet intervention was not expected, only 14 per cent believed that the fighting in Korea would lead to general war, while 57 per cent were of a directly contrary opinion. In addition, the fact that 67 per cent approved the despatch of British soldiers to Korea, as opposed to 31 per cent who did not, suggests it was commonly thought that the troops would be engaged only in a mopping-up operation. Bevin, evidently suppressing his fears about the Chinese and regarding victory as imminent, shifted his attention to occupation matters towards the end of October. The claim of the heartily disliked Rhee to sovereignty over the whole of Korea aroused deep misgivings in London, and the Foreign Secretary gave vent to them in a message to Franks. Speaking expansively for public opinion in ‘Europe and Asia’, Bevin insisted strenuously that the administration of the liberated territory lay with the Unified Command, and Rhee’s despatch of ‘governors’ to the North represented a usurpation 242

Korean Conflict.indb 242

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

of this power. Moreover, reports of South Korean atrocities, which Bevin rather curiously placed in the category of ‘mishandling the political settlement’, provided the Russians with marvellous fuel for their propaganda. Above all, he did not want all that he had intended to achieve in promoting the UN resolution to be brushed aside by Rhee, who, he might have been tempted to add, was being aided in his designs by MacArthur. Why should the South Korean regime not have been regarded by Britain as the rightful government of the whole of Korea? After all, in June the United Nations had come to the assistance of an internationally recognised state under attack and, having repelled the attack, was on the point of destroying its authors. Therefore, why not allow the South Korean authorities to govern the North pending the national elections? The simple fact was that Rhee was loathed by the British, and they had no wish to see the brutality and corruption of his regime extended to the whole peninsula – at least not until after the elections, which might be a long time in coming. If the elections were preceded by an interregnum in which the United Nations was seen to administer North Korea, then a victory for Rhee would not appear to be a hollow formalisation of power already grasped. Having tolerated the lesser evil of military support of a repugnant regime since June, in order to fend off the greater evil – the loss of United States commitment to Europe and of the special relationship – Bevin now choked on what was apparently asked of him. That Washington expected, and possibly desired, Rhee to hold sway over the whole country was more or less confirmed to London at the end of October. Rusk told Franks, rather airily, that it was unrealistic ‘to expect the Korean government to be an ideal western democracy under present circumstances’. With equal and probably intentional vagueness, he warned that Rhee would not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction in North Korea ‘until it was properly demonstrated that he had authority to do so … at any rate during the initial phases of liberation’.17 If the Americans were not in fact promoting Rhee, they were certainly practising a policy of benign indifference scarcely to be distinguished from fostering his cause. However, with the brief appearance of Chinese troops in the last week of October, Anglo–American differences over the political settlement of Korea 243

Korean Conflict.indb 243

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

increasingly took on the proportions of a schoolyard squabble. The Chinese had not yet materialised in overwhelming force, but they did enough damage, especially to South Korean units, to warrant the sorts of analyses in the West that might more profitably have been conducted before the decision was taken to cross the parallel. On 1 November Edmund Clubb, possessed of an inexhaustible capacity for memoranda, warned Rusk that Peking had intervened not with the intention of ‘being promptly bloodied and thrown out’ of Korea, but rather with a real measure of victory in mind. Moscow, he believed, was behind the move and might well be contemplating action elsewhere, in the light of which the presence of four Soviet armies near Berlin should not be disregarded. On the awesomely sweeping grounds that in Communist ideology political factors are given precedence over economic ones, Clubb dismissed the possibility that the Chinese had intervened principally to protect the Yalu power installations. Alarm in Washington became palpable. W.W. Stuart, a colleague of Clubb’s in the Office of Chinese Affairs, pleaded that the American government should do everything possible to reassure the world that it had no intention of enlarging the conflict, lest hostility with China led to global war. One of Rusk’s assistants, at the self-confessed risk of ‘seeming really alarmist’, warned that Peking was, at a minimum, planning to keep the United States bogged down in Korea for many months, and at the most, was preparing the employment of hundreds of thousands of troops in expectation of general war in the region. Certainly, he concluded, ‘they are not planning to limit their participation to anything like as small a force as the presently reported 18,000 “volunteers”.’ Bedell Smith, for the CIA, advised the President that the ‘Chinese Communists genuinely fear an invasion of Manchuria’ and were therefore intent on establishing a cordon sanitaire south of the Yalu. While not entirely ruling out the possibility of a Russian instruction to Peking to mount fullscale military action, Bedell Smith lent strength to his argument by examining the importance to the Chinese of the hydroelectric plants for whose security they had become concerned after South Korea had threatened to destroy them. Thus, for reasons which in all likelihood had 244

Korean Conflict.indb 244

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

more to do with a desire for total victory than with an acceptance of Bedell Smith’s analysis of Chinese motives, the administration chose to believe that Peking’s aims were limited. A halt was not called to MacArthur’s planned final offensive. In this, judged the British embassy, the American public were at one with the government. It was understood that the Chinese should want to protect the power plants – some press observers even sympathised with this desire – but there was ‘no slackening in the determination to proceed with the campaign even though Chinese participation should be on a larger scale than is yet apparent’. On balance, the British government also wanted to press ahead with the campaign. In a message to Franks on 3 November, while he was opposed to Washington’s plan to upbraid the Chinese in the Security Council since this might make it difficult for Peking ‘to climb down’, Bevin said that he favoured a continuation of the offensive. Meanwhile the British, he added, were working on a draft resolution – ‘stern but objective, moderate and reasoned’ – which would reaffirm the terms of the 7 October resolution, especially the limited character of the UN’s aims in Korea, and recognise Peking’s ‘legitimate interest in the future of their neighbour Korea’ by proposing consultation with the Chinese at the appropriate time. Although welcoming the general terms of the resolution foreshadowed by the Foreign Secretary, and agreeing with Bevin’s desire to avoid provoking the Chinese and to recognise their legitimate interest in a neighbouring state, Acheson would not concede that Peking had any right to concern itself with the internal affairs of Korea or with any plans the UN might have for the country. This was chutzpah of the highest order, but at least Acheson had been drawn by Bevin to promise that for the moment America would refrain from pressing for the imposition of United Nations sanctions against China. The British Cabinet regretted the misfortunes that had flowed from Washington’s refusal to admit Communist China to the UN, since admission might have made them ‘more reluctant to intervene in Korea’, but little more could be expected from a Secretary of State under siege in his own country from critics on the right. If, a month earlier, the British Chiefs of Staff had been uneasy about the crossing of the parallel, by early November they were in a state of agitation 245

Korean Conflict.indb 245

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

about the consequences. Was MacArthur, they cabled to Lord Tedder in Washington, deciding his own policy with respect to an advance to the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers? Were non-Korean forces, including the British brigade, moving beyond the line which the Chiefs had been given to understand was the limit of their advance, that is to say, no closer than 30 miles from the Yalu? Again, they insisted plaintively that they were entitled to know under what instructions the UN Commander was operating. More than mere professional pique was involved. The situation, they argued, looks like getting us in for what we have feared since [the] Inchon landing, namely, at best prolonged containment of large UN forces in Korea at [the] expense of really important commitments elsewhere; and at worst continuation of large scale warfare with [the] Chinese with consequent risks of spreading the conflagration in the Far East.

The Canadians, staunch supporters like the British of the original UN action in Korea, were also becoming nervous. In discussion with Dean Rusk on 6 November the Canadian ambassador, Hume Wrong, ‘implied a Canadian criticism that General MacArthur might be overstepping his role’. Rusk replied emphatically that no important step would be taken in the absence of consultation ‘specifically with the British’. Doubtless the British Chiefs would have dearly liked to have overheard this assurance. The fact was that London continued to be kept in a state of ignorance, which might just have been endurable since they were very much the junior military partners in Korea. However, Lord Tedder’s reply to the Chiefs on 8 November must have created the truly frightening impression that neither the White House nor the Pentagon knew what MacArthur was going to do next. Tedder reported comfortingly enough that a discussion with General Bradley had elucidated the American intention to avoid direct conflict with China, and, more than that, in Bradley’s words, ‘to get together with these people and talk things over – if it is the power station and dam on the Yalu they are worried about we could come to an arrangement’. At the same time, he admitted that MacArthur had been allowed to bomb the Yalu 246

Korean Conflict.indb 246

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

bridges, albeit on the Korean side only. He also reported that ‘the original endeavour to differentiate between the South Korean forces and the UNO forces is no longer possible and the idea of the South Korean forces alone dealing with the final stages has become academic’. Bradley gave no reason for this change in policy. Thus, it was only sixteen days after MacArthur had decided for himself to send all his forces – non-Korean and Korean alike – to the Yalu that the British learned of the fact. This apart, MacArthur’s determination, as understood by Bradley, to destroy the forces of the enemy in North Korea, which presumably now included Chinese units, sat strangely with the American Chiefs’ wish to avoid antagonising the Chinese further. Tedder’s conclusion that the ‘US Chiefs are as concerned about the dangers of the present situation as we are’ could, in the circumstances, have meant little else than that MacArthur was running the show. Certainly, Acheson was a worried man. In a letter to Harry Truman in 1955, he recalled of the period, ‘We in State were almost wild by this time because in our meetings at the Pentagon no one could explain what MacArthur was thinking of.’ Bradley’s allusion to the Yalu bridges related to an episode which had occurred two days earlier, which amply illustrates the curious relationship that existed between MacArthur and his superiors. On 6 November it became known in Washington that orders had been given for the bombing of two of the main bridges spanning the Yalu, and with less than four hours remaining before the event, Lovett, Rusk and Acheson met hastily to discuss the matter. For a number of compelling reasons, including an undertaking to London ‘not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the River’ without prior consultation, the proposed operation was thought extremely unwise. Acheson telephoned the President, then in Kansas City, who agreed that the attack should be called off unless required for the security of UN troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then flashed a message to Tokyo, one-and-a-quarter hours before the mission was to be launched, forbidding MacArthur to bomb targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. The General, dissuaded by one of his officers from immediate resignation over the issue, fired back a cable. In it he prophesied destruction of the UN forces if the flow of Chinese men and material across the bridges was not stemmed, and, all in all, characterised the Chiefs’ 247

Korean Conflict.indb 247

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

instruction as one of the most disastrous in military history. Thoroughly browbeaten and clearly in awe of the victor of Inchon, the Chiefs secured Truman’s agreement to reverse their earlier directive, and just before midnight on the same day they told MacArthur that he could bomb the ‘Korean end of the Yalu bridges’. Even with what were called ‘radiocontrolled bombs’, the operation ran a very real risk of violation of Manchurian territory, especially as hundreds of aircraft were involved. However, as things were shaping up, a few stray bombs dropped across the river would not materially have altered the course of events. MacArthur had made it abundantly plain to the Chinese that their warning incursion, if that is what it was, into Korea in late October would not alter his resolve to push all the way to the Yalu. One question on which there could be no consultation with the British was any use of the atomic bomb against the Chinese. Astonishingly, this was discussed at a senior level in the State Department at a time when attempts were being made to restrain MacArthur from taking provocative action in Korea. It seems therefore probable that Truman’s famous statement at the end of the month, which so alarmed the world, was not a mere brainstorm for which he alone he was responsible. Though rejected on the grounds of impracticability, employment of the weapon in Korea and in China was contemplated at least to the extent of being debated on paper in the State Department. On 4 November Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as head of the Policy Planning Staff, took soundings of the Defence Department as to the tactical and strategic effectiveness of the bomb in the Far Eastern conflict. He concluded that in the existing circumstances it would not be militarily decisive in Korea, that many civilians would die, and moreover, its use would probably bring the Soviet Union into the war. In any event, agreement of the United Nations might have to be obtained before the weapon could be used in Korea, and although Nitze did not say so, such an agreement would almost certainly not be forthcoming. Edmund Clubb, worried about a split in the ranks of the countries supporting the Korean action, believed that it would be practically impossible to get agreement for nuclear attacks on ‘certain selected targets in Manchuria’, however desirable this might be 248

Korean Conflict.indb 248

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

in ‘indubitably’ shaking the Chinese aggressor. John Emmerson, Planning Adviser to Dean Rusk, seems to have thought that the effect of the bomb on the position of the United States might be even more catastrophic than on its victims. He argued that, regardless of the fact that military results achieved by atomic bombardment may be identical to those attained by conventional weapons, the effect on world opinion will be vastly different. The A-bomb has the status of a peculiar monster conceived by American cunning and its use by us, in whatever situation, would be exploited to our serious detriment. The five principal disadvantages cited by Emmerson were the damage to America’s moral position in the world, especially if the bomb were used against China, destruction of the unity achieved in the UN over Korea, an immense boost to Soviet propaganda, alienation of the peoples of Asia, and the danger of engagement in atomic warfare on a wider scale in Asia if decisive results were to be obtained.

That these discussions led to nothing is hardly remarkable. What is remarkable is that they should have taken place at all. They had been provoked, it should not be forgotten, by a relatively slight and short-lived Chinese foray into Korea which, though disturbing, was not generally expected to be repeated, or certainly not in a greatly augmented form. This – admittedly tepid – flirtation with the idea of using the ultimate weapon shows the extent to which the Americans had begun to lose their grip on the realities of their own interests. The possibility of failure in Korea, in truth a failure to achieve a purpose which had greatly inflated since June, was beginning to be thought of as a prospective Pearl Harbor. In such a mood, the Americans might be inclined to act perilously as if in defence of hearth and home. However, prudence was not entirely lacking in Washington. In the view of the CIA, so little was known of the temper and intentions of the Chinese that it would be as well to avoid even chance incursions into Manchuria: ‘If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they would probably enter Korea in full force.’ This same report of 6 November amplified Bedell Smith’s 249

Korean Conflict.indb 249

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

argument of a few days earlier that Peking had come in essentially to protect the frontier: The establishment of a Western-oriented and US-supported regime on the south bank of the Yalu River is probably viewed by Peiping as a threat to the security of the Communist regime in China. The USSR would likewise be sensitive to the advance of UN forces to the northeastern tip of Korea. The Chinese Communists apparently regard the US as a hostile power, determined to bring about their eventual overthrow.

John Paton Davies, an expert on China in the State Department’s Policy and Planning division, shared the CIA’s interpretation. He warned against the view that China was making a token show of force in order to bring the UN to the negotiating table, and argued that Peking regarded the UN forces as deeply hostile: The fact that the United States is the moving spirit in the UN operation in Korea is of major importance … Quite aside from their ideological antipathy to us, the Chinese Communists view us with morbid distrust and hatred. This is the product of five years of intensely bitter civil war in which they regarded us as allies of their enemies, culminating in the galling frustration of our action with regard to Formosa.

As for the Soviets’ hand in the latest turn of events, Davies, like Bedell Smith, detected nothing to suggest that Moscow had done more than ‘egging China on’ to prevent the destruction of the North Korean regime. The nub of his advice was to hang on in Korea, continue to keep the conflict localised, and prepare for World War III. Clubb also advised a militarily conservative policy, though continuing to interpret Moscow’s role in a much more sinister light than either Davies or Bedell Smith. Summoning up a hellish vision, he warned that ‘while we were slowly sinking in the quagmire of that vast waste over which no victory could be anything but pyrrhic, we might see Japan, Germany, and all of Europe be lost before our eyes – and the United States placed in a danger such as it had never known before’. 250

Korean Conflict.indb 250

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

Such, he believed, were the consequences of falling into a Soviet trap of full-scale war with China. Acheson, leaning towards the views of Clubb, edged closer and closer to the grand conspiracy theory, namely that Moscow and Peking were developing plans to culminate in an as-yet unknown devastating blow or series of blows against the West. In doing so he continued to ignore the gist of Kirk’s despatches from Moscow to the effect that Russia was uncertain, nervous and dithering in its policy towards Korea. On 7 November, for example, he cabled the view ‘that we should expect and accept as natural that Soviet Government and Peking Government would be concerned over hostilities nearing their common frontier with Korea’, and further, that their interests ‘such as power plants on boundary rivers’ should be taken into account. ‘I cannot imagine,’ he concluded, ‘that were Mexico in so deplorable situation as Korea that US Government would not be considerably concerned over boundary and other questions.’ As on earlier occasions, however, the ambassador’s insistence that the ‘Kremlin still wants to keep open a way out’ of the Korean mess evaporated into the ether. Admiral Kirk had to contend with a shift in the analyses of the CIA, which probably had an effect on Acheson’s thinking. In its third report in as many days, on 9 November the agency amended the earlier attribution of Chinese action to Peking’s understandable if mistaken fear for the frontier. The Soviets were now held responsible. In turn, this suggested that the USSR considered ‘the Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of general war’. However, having no doubt thoroughly alarmed its readers, the report went on to discount any such threat in the immediate future and to predict that attacks across the Yalu on Chinese troop concentrations would not constitute a casus belli for the Soviets. The British government was, of course, powerless to act or to influence events. At a Cabinet meeting on 9 November Bevin bemoaned the jeopardy in which Chinese intervention had placed Peking’s entry into the United Nations and the localisation of the war. ‘The situation was an ugly one,’ he commented, and though he did not believe China or Russia wanted to spread the conflict, he was fearful that the Congressional elections might unfavourably affect the US government’s handling of affairs. This was not 251

Korean Conflict.indb 251

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

to be the last occasion on which the British thought their friends more dangerous than their enemies. This desultory Cabinet meeting, imbued as it was with a sense of impotence, was, however, succeeded on the following day by the distribution of a paper under Bevin’s signature which did at least represent a systematic analysis of Chinese intervention and an attempt to understand the thinking of the Chinese leaders. The Foreign Secretary, while still hoping for victory and the subsequent imposition of a UN peace in Korea, pointed to the possibility of a general war between China and the United States. Even worse, Peking might invoke the Sino–Soviet Pact and bring in the Russians. That Bevin did not include Britain as one of the combatants was perhaps a Freudian slip rather than a tacit declaration that Britain would not participate in such a conflict. As he had done in the discussions preceding the recognition of Communist China in January, the Foreign Secretary essayed an analysis of ‘Chinese psychology’ in trying to fathom their motives for intervention. He all but admitted that Chinese suspicion of the West was the fault of the United States: In the first place – and this to my mind is of cardinal importance – they achieved success in their revolution despite the very great assistance given to the Nationalist Government by the United States of America, who, after the war, therefore supplanted the Japanese as Public Enemy No. 1 to the Chinese Communist Party. The continuing hostility of the American press and public to the new China and the continuing sympathy shown to the Nationalist Government have confirmed the Chinese in their impression of the implacable hostility of America.

A tendency towards a defensive and isolationist state of mind, thus fostered by the USA, in fact had its roots deep in the past: ‘Consciously or unconsciously, the Chinese may be seeking to reproduce the old system of a Chinese Empire and a ring of vassal states.’ Bevin discounted the theory that the behaviour of the Chinese could be put down to inexperience, especially as many observers, including General Marshall, had ‘been impressed by the shrewd and realistic outlook of men like Chou En-lai’. 252

Korean Conflict.indb 252

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

Also dismissed was the notion then being put about publicly by Acheson, among others, that Chinese intervention was the culmination of a deep-laid plan made in concert with the Soviet Union. The Russians were certainly ‘conniving at Chinese actions in Korea’, since they thought it in their interests to keep Sino–American hostility alive, but Moscow had no wish to see this hostility develop by stages into world war. In Bevin’s view the Chinese were feeling their way, having foregone an earlier, more easily accomplished opportunity to create a buffer state because they simply did not expect the UN to cross the parallel, much less advance to ‘the extreme northern limits of Korea’. At the same time, the Chinese were not averse to the use of force – witness their action in Tibet and the aid given to the Viet Minh – but for the moment, Bevin concluded tentatively, they were intent on securing a ‘safety belt’ along their frontiers. It is tolerably clear, then, that Bevin was not disposed to blame the Chinese for their intervention, at least not in the sense in which the Americans, including General MacArthur, were characterising the action as the deepest-dyed moral perfidy. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary’s paper comes close to saying that, given the recent history of Sino–American relations and the consequent outlook of Peking upon the outside world, the Chinese were compelled to undertake defensive measures across the Yalu River. But what, if anything, could be done? Bevin’s enunciation – or, rather, reiteration – of British policy was logically almost at odds with his general analysis of the factors that had brought about such an ‘ugly’ situation. The policy was simplicity itself: maximum support for United Nations action in Korea, prevention of an extension of the conflict, and restraint of the Chinese. Now, since an important part of United Nations policy was the military pacification and occupation of the whole of North Korea, and since Bevin had just concluded that this was what had provoked an all-but-justifiable intervention by the Chinese, how could he have expected to restrain them? If the Chinese were intent on creating a safety belt south of the Yalu, even at the risk, according to Bevin, of exposing their cities and communications to attack, how could a continuation of MacArthur’s advance have served to prevent a worsening of the war? Obviously it could not have done so. 253

Korean Conflict.indb 253

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Far from recognising the disparity in logic between analysis and policy, Bevin repeated his conviction that the ‘successful conclusion of the military campaign is the first necessity’, and, even more breathtakingly, concluded that it would be difficult to justify instructions to MacArthur to refrain from attacks on Chinese bases and communications in Manchuria. Bevin did warn his colleagues that if United Nations forces were to face a serious military threat, the policy would have to be reconsidered. But the time for reconsideration was surely then and there, if only in the form of a call for a ceasefire pending negotiations. He would allow himself only the faint and fading hope that Nehru might have a ‘calming influence on the Chinese Government’ – although, he observed lugubriously, the Chinese had traditionally never held Indians in high esteem. Few more unintentionally revealing papers could have come before Cabinet. It reflected the sense of powerlessness and confusion which permeated the Cabinet’s discussion of the previous day, and at a deeper level, the shaming fact that Great Britain could no longer influence the course of great events. Yet again, it was left to the Chiefs of Staff to identify the military and other realities of the situation. During a Cabinet discussion on 13 November of the Foreign Secretary’s paper, Sir John Slessor pointed out that it was ‘no longer practicable, without risking a major war, to attain the original objective of occupying the whole of North Korea and placing it under a United Nations regime’. In order to reach the border it would be necessary to mount air attacks against targets in Manchuria, and, having reached it, the task of holding a line about 450 miles long in mountainous country would be very difficult indeed. ‘Korea,’ Slessor stated baldly, ‘was of no strategic importance to the democratic Powers; and further operations should be conducted with a view to preventing any extension of the conflict and avoiding any lasting commitment in this area.’ Accordingly, the Chiefs advised withdrawal to a line across the neck of Korea, roughly along the 40th parallel, which would enable air attacks against the enemy without the grave risk of bombing Manchuria. Even better, the territory north of the line could be declared a demilitarised zone and a cease-fire arranged pending discussions in the United Nations.

254

Korean Conflict.indb 254

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

Bevin, presented at last with an encouraging proposal, leapt at the idea, seeing in it a number of advantages. It might prevent the American leaders from being led by their military into further provoking the Chinese, while the Chinese themselves would perhaps cease to believe that the West intended to ‘occupy large areas of Asian territory under a plea of military necessity’. Asian, by which he meant Indian, opinion might also come to see that the United Nations forces were offering no threat to China. The Foreign Secretary saw such merit in the proposal that he asked immediately for Cabinet’s approval to put it to the Security Council as part of a comprehensive solution of the Korean problem. This approval was just as promptly forthcoming, though it was thought wise to consult the United States and the Commonwealth first. Meanwhile, however, British women and children resident in China were to be advised to unobtrusively leave the country lest ‘the situation deteriorate further’. MacArthur, having heard of the plan or one very similar to it a few days earlier, bitterly attacked the notion in a message to Washington on 9 November. In the course of rejecting any re-examination of his mission, since he had been told in October to continue the campaign as long as it offered a reasonable chance of success, the General correctly divined that the rumoured British plan would abort his drive to the Yalu and the seizure of the whole of North Korea. Like his political masters at the time of the original North Korean attack, he fastened on Munich as one of ‘the lessons of history’, and, ever the pedant, quoted at the Joint Chiefs of Staff a State Department document published after September 1938 which had deplored weakness in the face of determined aggression. The British, he said in effect, had not learnt their lesson: To give up any portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia … We would follow clearly in the footsteps of the British who by the appeasement of recognition [of Communist China] lost the respect of the rest of Asia.

255

Korean Conflict.indb 255

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

As a postscript, MacArthur called for a UN resolution condemning the Chinese government for ‘invading Korea’. Increasingly, though, the Joint Chiefs were coming to share MacArthur’s bellicose instincts less and less. On the same day as his anglophobe message the Chiefs advised the Secretary of Defence, George Marshall, that the problem of Chinese intervention should be settled by political means as a matter of urgency, and Peking should be reassured through all available avenues that no threat existed to China. In this they were in unknowing accord with their British counterparts. At the same time they believed that the United States should make ‘its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased’. Everyone except MacArthur, it seems, wanted to ‘reassure’ the Chinese. Though doubting its efficacy himself, the American consul in Hong Kong urged such action on Washington, since nonCommunist Chinese in contact with his staff and the local New York Times correspondent were strongly of the view that the Chinese Communists ‘actually fear [that the] US intends [to] invade Manchuria and that this is [an] important reason for their intervention in Korea’. In the State Department there was especial concern lest ‘any sabre rattling statement’ be issued from US government sources, and the word went out prohibiting statements likely to be provocative to the Chinese. Unfortunately the prohibition was unlikely to be effective when it came to the unrelenting stream of pronouncements and leaks issuing from MacArthur’s head­ quarters in Tokyo. Thus, while the Chinese were being publicly branded as lawless aggressors for venturing across their frontier into North Korea, a friendly state withal, Washington and London separately began to initiate indirect overtures to Peking. In substance, their message was: ‘We mean you no harm, so please do not intervene in Korea again – but if you do, we cannot be responsible for the consequences.’ On 13 November Dean Rusk asked the Swedish ambassador in Washington, Erik Boheman, if his government might be prepared to sound out the Chinese as to their intentions and their fears. A ‘discreet direct contact’ with Peking, presumably that which Loy Henderson had attempted in New Delhi, had failed and Rusk thought it might be useful for the Swedish 256

Korean Conflict.indb 256

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

to try. The Chinese should be assured, it was stated in a note given to Boheman, that the United States had no hostile intentions towards China, nor did they wish to harm legitimate Chinese interests in frontier matters, including the hydro-electric installations. Indeed, China’s interests were ‘wholly reconcilable with the United Nations policy’, the note added with some audacity, but if Peking did not act peaceably, the result would be a disaster for China and a comfort only to the Soviet Union. The substance of what was transparently a message from the United States was made known to the Chinese Foreign Ministry by the Swedish ambassador, who was told that an answer might be forthcoming ‘in a few days’. On 4 December, by which time the Chinese had entered Korea in massive force and were doing too well to entertain thoughts of negotiation, Boheman informed Rusk that the Swedish ambassador had been unable to establish any further contact with the top Chinese Communist officials. Ten days later, however, Boheman informed the State Department of a message given to the Swedish ambassador in Peking. The Chinese, while hoping for a peaceful and early solution to the conflict, noted that the Americans had mentioned nothing ‘about a truce’, and neither had the sixpower resolution in the United Nations – criticising China’s actions as it did – contributed anything to a peaceful solution. Remarkably in the circumstances, Philip Jessup was undeterred. He suggested to Rusk that the Swedish, still maintaining the pretence that they were speaking for themselves, might approach the Peking authorities once more, this time holding out the possibility of quite far-reaching concessions in return for a ceasefire. The proposed message, though not specifying the nature of the concessions, spoke of discussions with the Chinese on ‘other problems in the Far East’ and envisaged the exclusion of no subject ‘from the agenda of such talks’. Jessup could only have intended this to mean that, as well as bringing about a Korean settlement, the United States would be willing to consider the future of Formosa and the seating of Peking in the United Nations. Rusk immediately asked the Swedes to use Jessup’s memorandum in another approach to the Chinese. Yet a mere two weeks earlier the British, in the course of the Truman–Attlee talks, had been virtually accused of appeasement by Acheson for trying to persuade the American government to give some 257

Korean Conflict.indb 257

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

ground to the Chinese on these issues. The Chinese reply to these overtures, as might have been expected when they were sweeping all before them in Korea, was not encouraging and the Swedish ambassador in Peking was ‘coldly received’ when he approached Vice-Foreign Minister Chang. The American démarche might have been no more than an attempt to buy time with a ceasefire in order to consolidate a crumbling military situation, although it should be noted that Rusk took the initiative on 13 November, some twelve days before the Chinese intervened in earnest and when MacArthur, and to a lesser extent the Joint Chiefs and the State Department, thought victory was close at hand. The episode is another tantalising view of what might have been. If the Chinese had not been so distrustful of the United States and had agreed to a ceasefire before committing themselves to the full-scale assault, or afterwards for that matter, would Washington have actually been prepared to negotiate the future of Formosa and a seat in the United Nations? Given the awesome domestic pressure on the Truman administration, this must be doubted. It was far too late for Acheson to have revived the more rational Chinese policy towards which he had been moving cautiously in the months before June 1950. One thing is clear: Rusk and Jessup, in their Swedish-aided efforts, implicitly acknowledged the sanity of the British position. Denying both Formosa and a UN seat to Peking was a potent source of trouble, and quite possibly unjust. A parallel approach made by the British government to Peking, disclosed to but independent of the Americans, was just as fruitless. In the third week of November Bevin instructed Hutchison in Peking to approach Chou or the highest accessible figure and emphasise the limited goals of the United Nations in Korea. He was also to warn the Chinese of the gravity of the situation, and of their ultimate responsibility for any extension of the conflict. Bevin could hardly have hoped that this message, simultaneously placatory and threatening, would be effective, especially as the Chinese had received numerous such communications since MacArthur had crossed the parallel in October. However, evidently he did place some hope in Hutchison’s enquiring, as if on his own initiative, ‘whether they had ever given any thought to the idea of a demilitarised area in North Korea, and if so whether they would like … to convey any suggestions regarding this’ to 258

Korean Conflict.indb 258

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

London. Bevin enlisted the support of India by asking Nehru to instruct Panikkar to make a similar approach to the Peking leaders. The hapless diplomat made the representation with scant chance of success, as Panikkar records in his memoirs. The Indian ambassador, who had been duly asked by Nehru to support the approach, clearly put little zest into the task, for he told Hutchison that it was useless in the absence of a direct offer of negotiation, and was, to boot, patronising in tone. No mention had been made by Bevin of the crucial question of Formosa, while the ‘strange British idea of a neutralized zone, meaning thereby the annexation of the rest of Korea by Syngman Rhee, was naturally brushed aside as irrelevant by the Chinese’. In other words, Panikkar seems accurately to suggest, the Chinese thought they were being asked to withdraw on British assurances and leave America a free hand in unifying Korea under cover of United Nations auspices. London’s approach also suffered, Panikkar recalls with more than a hint of fellow feeling, from having conveyed the impression that they could not quite accept the idea that China was entitled to at least as big a say in Far Eastern matters as themselves and the Americans. On 22 November, virtually on the eve of MacArthur’s final assault and China’s crushing response, Bevin made a last endeavour to placate the Chinese. It was very much a case of more of the same, although I was slightly more conciliatory in tone than earlier messages. Bevin expressed disappoint­ ment in the two countries’ inability to exchange ambassadors and in Britain’s failure to secure membership of the United Nations for the Central People’s Government. He emphasised again that the sole task of the United Nations was to restore peace and order in Korea preparatory to the creation of an independent, unified and democratic state, as reaffirmed in the 7 October resolution. The British buffer zone proposal, as put up to Cabinet by the Chiefs of Staff, also came to nothing. Owing to the attitude of the Americans, the plan was dead even before it was placed before the Chinese by Hutchison a day or two before the explosive expansion of the war on 25 November. On 13 November, the day on which the matter had been raised by the Chiefs in Cabinet, Bevin wasted no time in cabling Franks with an outline resolution. 259

Korean Conflict.indb 259

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

As well as reiterating earlier UN resolutions and optimistically suggesting an immediate start on the economic and political rehabilitation of Korea, the measure proposed ‘the establishment of a demilitarised area’ to ‘extend from a United Nations line (running roughly from Hungnam in the East to Chongju in the West) to the existing Manchurian–Siberian–Korean frontier’. The political virtues of the plan in Bevin’s mind resided chiefly in the opportunity it gave for ‘terminating the whole Korean campaign earlier and thus liquidating a costly military commitment’, as well as for satisfying the Chinese that the UN had no aggressive designs against Manchuria. He added that the latter object would certainly not be achieved if an American proposal to include Manchurian territory in a buffer zone was pressed. Militarily, a demilitarised zone would provide a much shorter line to defend – 150 miles compared to 400 miles along the frontier – and, if necessary, air power could be used against the enemy without risking violations of Chinese territory. At the same time Bevin had to fend off a request for British agreement from the hard-pressed Acheson that UN fighter planes should be permitted to engage in ‘hot pursuit’ of enemy aircraft across the Manchurian border. Clearly such a transgression of agreed policy would have endangered the plan for a buffer zone, and on 16 November the Foreign Secretary hastened to instruct Franks to convey his veto to Acheson. In Moscow Admiral Kirk, though still insisting that the Kremlin was essentially a nervous bystander wishing only to see America become bogged down in Korea, warned against the British resolution. The Russians, he believed, would quickly see that it had the potential for causing a divergence of policy between America and Britain and they would exploit the opening, as they had done in the previous July when the British independently approached Moscow seeking support for negotiations in Korea. The South Koreans were, of course, utterly opposed to the idea of a buffer zone on Korean soil. In conversation with the Korean ambassador on 20 November, Rusk, who must have known that the plan had been put directly to Acheson by Bevin, answered an angry query from Dr Chang about the source of the proposal by speaking vaguely of it having ‘been broached, at least in the press, in England’. Rusk received a warning from one of his officers, John Emmerson, that the United Nations’ acceptance of the scheme might well 260

Korean Conflict.indb 260

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

lead to pressure on Washington to make further concessions, such as deserting the Nationalist regime and allowing Peking a seat in the UN. The auguries were not propitious for Bevin’s attempt at a peaceful settlement. Philip Jessup, ever the voice of restraint in the State Department, argued tacitly for something like the Bevin plan in a memorandum to Acheson on 20 November. His premise was that achievement of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea did not demand military occupation and the pacification of the whole country up to the Yalu, especially since it was vital to avoid action which entailed major military involvement with China and a risk of general war. Accepting the CIA estimate of 8 November that the Chinese genuinely feared invasion and wished to establish a cordon sanitaire along their border, Jessup urged that MacArthur must be told that his mission was not based on the principle of territorial occupation. This being the case, the United States could establish either a defensive line south of the Yalu or a demilitarised zone north of the Chongju–Hangnum line, as proposed by Britain. The conflict would thus, Jessup implied, be localised and the ground – both literally and figuratively – prepared for negotiation. In the course of a rambling discussion at the Pentagon on 21 November, at which Jessup was present, it became clear that neither the British plan, nor anything resembling it, could compete with MacArthur’s promise of total victory. Indeed, Acheson said that he had ‘discouraged the UK from pressing its proposals’, rendering the proposal for a buffer zone lost before it was presented. The military leaders argued for an advance right up to the Yalu, the destruction of the remnants of the North Korean forces, and then a withdrawal to the more easily defended high ground overlooking the river. Only then, it was agreed, could negotiations with the Chinese be considered. However, the influence of the British had not utterly vanished. Towards the conclusion of the meeting Lovett suggested that Chiang’s troops might be used. Jessup at once warned that this would almost certainly lead to fullscale war with China, to which Rusk added that ‘it was most likely that the British would refuse to have their troops fight along side of Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese Communists and suggested that 10,000 British troops were of more value than 30,000 Chinese in Korea’. 261

Korean Conflict.indb 261

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

At a meeting later the same day in the State Department, Acheson stated that he opposed a demilitarised zone because it was ‘merely another way of saying that the Chinese will occupy that territory’. The Americans and the Chinese thus offered the same reason for their rejection of the scheme, deeply suspicious as they were of each other, and sceptical about the possibility of negotiations following the declaration of a neutral zone. Acheson did concede, however, if only to himself and a few colleagues, that such a scheme might ‘permit a cooling down of the situation’. He had also to admit that everything was dangerously confused: on the one hand, MacArthur’s military instructions were to destroy the North Korean forces if the Chinese did not prevent him from doing so; on the other hand, MacArthur’s civil directive did not take any account of a Chinese intervention. The General, Acheson said in effect, could not be blamed for puzzlement as to the nature of his broad mission. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State, wilfully accepting what he must have known was a euphemism, then proceeded to conclude that MacArthur should be allowed to ‘probe’ the situation. In other words, Acheson, one suspects against his better judgement, was willing to gamble on the success of the final drive to the Yalu, and it was this that decided him against the British plan. Yet virtually in the same breath, he expressed agreement with an observation made to him by Franks the day before, namely that the Russians, the Japanese and the British themselves had always seen Korea as ‘a main highway’ to the invasion of Manchuria, and for that reason the Chinese and the Russians might possess a greater sensitivity about UN action in Korea than American intelligence had allowed. Acheson was palpably no less confused than he believed MacArthur to be. His mind juggled and struggled with a number of not entirely compatible ideas: the Chinese, and to some extent the Soviets, had an understandable fear of an advance by UN forces to the northern border of Korea; this in turn gave doleful promise of all-out war with Peking and even of global war; nevertheless, MacArthur should press on to the Yalu, and only after this had been accomplished could negotiations be considered; Bevin’s scheme would therefore hinder the success of what Acheson knew to be a hazardous enterprise. ‘If the Chinese were badly licked’, he mused, ‘it might reduce the chance of a general war.’ 18 If they were not, Acheson might have 262

Korean Conflict.indb 262

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

added had he been candid with himself, general war became possible, perhaps probable. However, he could see clearly enough to realise that a home-by-Christmas withdrawal of American soldiers was out of the question, and at the very least that ‘the maintenance of stability and peace requires that we be in the Far East longer with more forces than we had expected’. In the early 1950s, of course, he could not know for how much longer and with what terrible consequences the next Democratic administration would commit American forces to the Asian region. Such Hamlet-like meanderings gave Acheson no warrant to confidently assure Bevin, on the very day of these important State and Pentagon discussions, that the United States was giving the highest consideration to ‘the winding up’ of the Korean War. The occasion for this message was Acheson’s alarm at Bevin’s having instructed Gladwyn Jebb to introduce the buffer zone proposal in the United Nations. There had, in Acheson’s view, been no agreement as to the nature and extent of the zone, nor to the ‘method or timing or presentation or negotiation’. The United States would therefore vote against the motion if it went ahead in its existing form. Kirk had been right: the scheme promised to cause an open breach between America and Britain, and at a crucial phase of the war. Why was Acheson so adamant? With the UN offensive about to begin – in three days time, unknown to the British – the airing of the plan would be most ‘confusing’ to General MacArthur; the Chinese delegation, shortly to arrive in New York, would regard it as the starting point of negotiation ‘for something more’; it would pose grave unexplored military problems; and it would be premature to carry the resolution through the UN before the results of the forthcoming offensive were known. Acheson’s reasoning was at best disingenuous. He knew that the whole point of the British plan was to halt MacArthur’s final assault on the Yalu before it had begun. His gambler’s throw, he further knew, would be frustrated if acceptance of the buffer zone proposal in the UN prevented MacArthur’s sweep to the frontier – only then, if at all, would the Americans consider negotiating with the Chinese. For their part, the British had recoiled from the probable consequences of acceding to, indeed helping to bring about, the crossing of the parallel. As in July, a major British attempt to end 263

Korean Conflict.indb 263

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the war was foredoomed by Washington’s opposition to negotiation except in extremity (a position soon to be reached) and to any solution short of military victory. The whole episode was doubtless another illustration to the British of the American predilection to do something, anything, rather than endure inaction or irresolution. If Jebb’s statements are an accurate guide, the urgency with which Acheson had tried to kill the British plan was not called for. Sir Gladwyn told Senator Austin on 23 November that he had not received instructions to proceed formally with the motion in the Security Council, and, moreover, he implied strongly that because of its ‘vague and formless nature’ there would have been no point in discussing it publicly. Jebb had certainly objected to the Foreign Office’s flirtation with the idea of amending or postponing the six-power resolution in order to give precedence to their own plan. He promised Austin that in no circumstances would he raise the question in the Security Council without first consulting the Americans. All that he had in view, and he was sure Bevin was of the same mind, ‘was to keep an eye open to see whether at some appropriate stage [the] question of [a] demilitarized zone might be interjected into the SC proceedings in some appropriate manner’. As MacArthur was poised to resume the offensive on the following day, the appropriate stage – whenever that might have been – would hang forever in abeyance. Bevin, however, allowed himself to be gulled into believing that Washington would at some time in the near future give serious consideration to his plan. After talking to Julius Holmes, he wrote to Acheson and said he was glad to learn that the Secretary of State had not changed his ‘general attitude to the proposals and that what you had in mind was that I should instruct Sir Gladwyn Jebb as a matter of tactics to delay making them public at the moment’. He felt nonetheless that the proposals offered the best chance for peace and should be pursued with the utmost vigour even if they could not, for the moment, be made public. It is clear that Bevin had no inkling of just how close was the final American throw of the dice. On 24 November, after the commencement of MacArthur’s offensive which rendered the British plan stone dead, Acheson adumbrated his objections at considerable length in a message to Bevin. The UN forces, he 264

Korean Conflict.indb 264

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

pointed out, were already north of the suggested Hungnam–Chongju line as they drove towards the Yalu. and to propose abandonment of the territory gained, and to be gained, would be to inflict a disastrous blow on the morale of the troops, the Korean people and the American public. What then, Bevin might have asked himself, of the prospects of ever creating a demilitarised zone? Acheson had all but admitted that once the Yalu had been reached and the enemy destroyed, there was no chance at all of a buffer zone. He made this even clearer by observing that such a zone offered no guarantee against a recrudescence of North Korean or Chinese aggression; indeed, any implementation of the plan ‘would be to remove the frontier considerably to the south and hamper operations without resulting benefit’. This objection, of course, proceeded on the unstated assumption that fruitful negotiations were impossible. Adopting the rather transparent fiction that the latest UN military operation was intended to test the intentions and strength of the Chinese Communists, Acheson expressed the hope that schemes such as Bevin’s might be explored ‘from a position of strength’ after the operation had been successfully completed. However, a position of strength signified to Acheson nothing less than total victory in Korea, in which case negotiations involving the possible surrender of territory would surely have been out of the question. The British did not lack supporters in their enthusiasm, not to say desperation, for a demilitarised zone in Korea. On 24 November Vincent Broustra, a member of the French delegation at the UN, told one of his American counterparts at a dinner party that the French, knowing ‘the ways of successful generals’, were considerably worried about what MacArthur might do. At this, several of Broustra’s colleagues chimed in voicing their desire for the creation of a buffer zone. Distrust of MacArthur, always latent, had by the final week of November intensified in Britain and in the rest of Europe, and lay at the heart of Bevin’s persistence in urging his scheme on Acheson even after the latter’s dismissal of it on 24 November. Distrust of the General and a widespread feeling of being kept in the dark about developments in Korea were not confined to the Labour government and party. In a blunt message to Acheson on 22 November, 265

Korean Conflict.indb 265

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

delivered through Franks, the Foreign Secretary spoke of anxiety on all sides of the House of Commons lest MacArthur commit UN forces to large-scale hostilities with the Chinese. He also confessed anxiety for himself about having to handle the matter in a forthcoming foreign affairs debate, especially as the information that had been disclosed to him by Washington was for his eyes only. This difficulty provoked from Bevin a lengthy remonstrance: This has placed me in a most difficult and embarrassing position. There is a campaign going on in Korea in which British forces are engaged; the command of the forces is ultimately subject to the United Nations through the agency of the United States Government … and the objectives of the Commander must be those set out in United Nations Resolutions. Despite this the United Nations has no real say in the instructions issued to the Commander, and I am not at liberty to disclose such information as I have. Parliament and the British public are entitled to expect that the objectives of the United Nations Commander in the field are no more and no less than the stated objectives of the United Nations … They are, moreover, entitled to feel confident that whereas in this case one member government (the United States Government) is acting as agent for the United Nations for the purpose of issuing instructions to the United Nations Commander, such instructions are confined strictly to the attainment of the declared United Nations objectives. I am aware that under the American military system, it is customary to leave more latitude to the commander in the field than under the British system. But the same principles apply whether the commander is acting on his own initiative or under instructions. I can reasonably claim that it is not in the public interest to disclose the precise nature of the instructions issued to him. I must, however, be careful not to leave the impression that the reasons why the instructions are not made public is either because these give General MacArthur more latitude than a strict fulfilment of the United Nations Resolutions would justify or that quite simply we have no knowledge of their contents. 266

Korean Conflict.indb 266

04/09/2015 11:40

TH E C H I N E S E I NTE RVE NTI O N

Bevin concluded by demanding that members of the Security Council with forces in Korea should be consulted on instructions to MacArthur that had political implications, and that such instructions should not be issued unless the agreement of those states had been secured. It was rather too late in the day for Bevin to complain about the consequences, which he might have expected anyway, of having an American government directing an American commander who was known to be headstrong. He was in fact complaining impotently about the lack of British influence in what was an American war and recognised as such, despite the persiflage about a United Nations police action. Having suspended their earlier and profound disbelief in the wisdom of US Far Eastern policy since the outbreak of the Korean War, the British were beginning to revive it in the form of implied criticisms of MacArthur’s judgement. However, it was American policy in Korea as a whole that was called into question. Acheson’s reply could hardly have been other than what it was. While giving Bevin what he wanted for parliamentary purposes, namely an assurance that MacArthur was doing no more and no less than pursuing UN objectives, Acheson refused to give an undertaking of consultation and agreement with allied governments before instructions were given to the UN Commander. On 24 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned MacArthur of some sentiment in the United Nations favouring ‘unwelcome restrictions on your advance to the north’. Almost diffidently, they asked for his comments of the feasibility of halting on the high ground overlooking the Yalu – the compromise plan which had been decided in the State–Defence discussions. A halt just short of the frontier might, he was told, enable the Chinese to withdraw from Korea without loss of face, lessen the concern of Russia about the security of Vladivostok, and lay the foundations for elections and the eventual unification of the country. The tenor of the message – which was certainly not an instruction – could only have left MacArthur with the impression that his superiors, military and civil, were vacillating between wanting him at one and the same time to achieve complete military victory and avoid the almost inevitable concomitant of success: large-scale conflict 267

Korean Conflict.indb 267

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

with China. They had virtually invited his contempt. The General, as we have seen, had already condemned the British plan and would have no truck with this diluted version of the same scheme. In the manner of a head of state, befitting the way in which he was treated by Washington, MacArthur rejected the Chiefs’ suggestion that he might consider halting on the high ground and lectured them about the political realities of the region. Indeed, his military objections constituted only a small portion of the message. Having conducted a personal reconnaissance of the front the day before, he had concluded that it would be ‘utterly impossible’ to hold a defensive line on the high ground, while failure to secure UN control right up to the river, he added somewhat lamely, would encourage lawless incidents such as bandit raids and smuggling. MacArthur seems to have clung to the belief that neither the Chinese nor the Russians would intervene, since he developed the argument at some length that the protection of the hydro-electric installations was of no real concern to them. Indeed, he had expounded this thesis with great conviction a few days earlier to James Plimsoll, the Australian representative on UNCURK. In addition, the Communists had been repeatedly assured that the UN had no aggressive designs on their territory. Adoption of the plan would be politically ‘disastrous’. The Koreans would regard it as a betrayal, and the Chinese and Soviets would take it as a sign of weakness. He therefore declared his intention to complete his mission, return the American forces to Japan and leave the political unification of the country to the United Nations authorities. In any event, it was much too late for any major change in plan, for on the day this reply was sent to Washington the UN forces were launched upon their final assault. Two days later these same forces were retreating pell-mell in the face of an overwhelming Chinese counter-attack. What MacArthur on 28 November was to call an ‘entirely new war’ had begun.

268

Korean Conflict.indb 268

04/09/2015 11:40

CHAPTER EIGHT

MacArthur

M

alcolm Muggeridge’s impressions of General MacArthur, formed during an interview in November 1947, are, one suspects, those of most Englishmen when confronted by extremes of American bombast: Received by General MacArthur – large seeming (though actually short) rather shoddy man who talked at me for nearly an hour. His theme was that the US army had brought democracy and Christianity to Japan, and had thereby wrought a revolution unique in history. He spoke of the Sermon on the Mount, producing exceptionally large number of clichés (‘Freedom is heady wine’, etc.). I was bored and embarrassed. He seemed to me like broken-down actor of type one meets in railway trains or boarding houses in England who complains that his recent production of Hamlet at Pontypool Repertory Theatre was badly attended whereas the circus was crowded. Occasionally I made feeble efforts to check the flow of words, but with no avail.

The same unremitting cascade of words flowed over Robert Murphy, shortly to assume the post of US ambassador to Japan, when he visited MacArthur in New York a year after the general’s dismissal. As Murphy noted in a letter to Lucius Battle, MacArthur ‘spent the seventy five minutes of our interview in releasing a steady and powerful stream of apparently well-rehearsed comments with overtones of bitterness and resentment’. Most of the Asian mainland had been all but lost by the United States, the effects of which would be felt by ‘our children’s children’ (he had lost none of his fondness for clichés); General Marshall and the Pentagon ‘clique’ were ‘blind to anything but the small portion of the globe comprising western and central Europe’ 269

Korean Conflict.indb 269

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

and he ‘was always considered an outsider by this faction who had monopolized power and who bore the onus of the misfortunes which had occurred’; indeed, Marshall had entirely misunderstood China, failing to see that the ‘Chinese Communist movement could have been nipped in the bud at insignificant cost’, with the result that shortly America would find that Soviet and Chinese power ‘has pushed back our frontier to the Pacific coast of the United States’; as for Korea, MacArthur considered the case ‘fairly hopeless’, a mere prelude to the loss of all of the Asiatic mainland to communism – ‘If we had acted in time, as he had recommended, all of this could have easily been avoided’, but he had been ‘dismissed by the President ignominiously and to this day he had never been told why. He had never disobeyed orders.’ With colossal effrontery he accused the British of ‘heavy-handedness in the Far East’, and it is MacArthur’s conviction that they ‘were largely instrumental … in his elimination’ that interests us. Layer by layer, the picture was built up of a conspiracy between the cunning British, intent on appeasing Communist China, and a compliant White House, formed to remove from the scene the one man who possessed the foresight and courage to win in Korea and rid the Far East of communism. The belief that the British were in large measure responsible for the fall of MacArthur, in Franks’ estimation, was so widespread that it was ‘likely to become a permanent part of American folklore’. How much truth is there in the charge? The edginess induced by MacArthur’s pronouncements, particularly after the intervention of the Chinese, is shown by a telegram sent to Bevin from Dening in Korea on 2 December 1950. Dening considered that the ‘sabreratling [sic] which has gone on in Tokyo for some months past has given encouragement to the Chinese to believe that they are the next objective of attack’. Any chance now of casting blame on the Chinese would ‘be seriously jeopardised if General MacArthur is able to do and say what he likes’. He concluded, ‘You may think I put the matter too strongly but my visit to Japan and Korea has filled me with considerable misgiving.’ Bevin was no less apprehensive. To Franks he pointed out that the British Chiefs were not convinced that the Chinese offensive had been long in the planning, but rather that their intention had been ‘essentially defensive’. This view was based partly 270

Korean Conflict.indb 270

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

on Chou’s statement to Panikkar early in October, ‘which was clearly aimed at restraining the United Nations moving north of the 38th Parallel’. Moreover, the Chiefs did not believe that the ‘Chinese planned a drive right down Korea nor that would have started their offensive if General MacArthur had not launched his’. They agreed, however, that a really serious threat existed and could only hope that the UN air superiority could prevent a sustained Chinese offensive. The Foreign Secretary considered that MacArthur ‘should now be ordered to withdraw to whatever line he believes he can hold with his present forces, and not (repeat not) bomb or cross Manchurian frontier’. The time had come, Bevin concluded, ‘to press for coordinated system of higher direction of operations in Korea and on closer control of General MacArthur’. The Chiefs of Staff, angered by MacArthur’s half-dozen press statements between 30 November and 5 December, sent a telegram to Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), in Washington in which they complained that ‘we are slipping into a position of being made the whipping boy for Allied disasters in Korea’. ‘What worries us about this,’ they continued, ‘is not its folly or the unfairness to us, but the serious threat to Anglo–American solidarity that it implies.’ So far as the American public was concerned, however, the victor of Inchon had a lot of credit in the bank. ‘Curiously General MacArthur has fared rather well’, Franks noted in his weekly report to the Foreign Office: His alleged shortcomings and the mistakes which he appears to have made have been examined by a number of commentators, but the General’s defenders have been both louder and more diligent. There is criticism of him within the Pentagon and his intelligence staff have been generally attacked. There have also been reports that the GIs in Korea are bitter, and there is a back-log of strong dislike for MacArthur amongst the many men who served under him during the late war. Nevertheless, there is a general reluctance to say anything openly against him and he has so far weathered the storm with, on the surface at any rate, less damage to his reputation than might have been expected.

The New Statesman, on 16 December, derived some pleasure in the discomfiture of the supreme commander: ‘The first sign of the needed 271

Korean Conflict.indb 271

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

debunking has come with the defeat of General MacArthur, who, until last week, was almost deified throughout America. To-day, radio commentators, columnists and newspaper editorials are beginning to tell the truth about this over-rated political general.’ With some prescience it was suggested that ‘Mr Truman would do well to replace him. If not, the alternative is, as Mr Attlee has hinted, to lay down precise forms of directives which the general would have to follow.’ Part of the mistrust felt by the British for MacArthur’s leadership lay in his over-estimation of the numbers opposed to the UN forces. ‘One has now come so completely to distrust GHQ’s assessment of enemy strength and intentions’, said The Economist in mid-December, ‘that no really valid figures of enemy strength exist. It would seem that the forces are not so fantastically disparate as was usually accepted, when Tokyo talked in terms of astronomical divisions.’ A British journalist, Reginald Thompson, in a bitterly anti-MacArthur work published in 1952, noted the despatch of a waggish colleague – ‘Chinese hordes in company strength attacked our position’ – and went on to remark: From my own observations and from many discussions with senior staff officers I had not the slightest doubt that the United Nations could hold in Korea if they were prepared to fight. The North Koreans and Chinese could not possibly maintain the strength of their punch in the south, and their long lines of communication must render the United Nations air offensive more effective. But whether the United Nations Army was prepared to fight or not it was impossible to say. Morale had fallen to a terrible low …   … Towards the end of December detailed figures of Chinese strength and positions were produced, and on 28th December they became astounding. The communiqué read: ‘The character of the major military effort by the Chinese Communist government, though initially masked under the treacherous ruse of volunteer participation, is only too apparent in the deployment of all or elements of the Third and Fourth Field Armies which represent two out of five field armies constituting the entire military structure of China’ … It was also estimated by headquarters that six armies could launch a co-ordinated attack against the Eighth Army 272

Korean Conflict.indb 272

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

positions after 1st January. On this day also the United Nations ‘Home by Christmas’ offensive late in November was written down to ‘a reconnaissance in force’ undertaken in order to determine the extent of Chinese Communist participation. Despite all this demoralising rubbish, I had continued to state my conviction that the United Nations, with their immensely superior fire power and complete domination of the air, could hold in Korea. For a day or two after the attack came in it looked like military disaster, but there had been one vital change in Korea which was to have the effect of transforming the whole situation, and which few of us were in a position to assess. Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway had replaced the dead Lieutenant-General Walton-Walker.

But the Joint Chiefs tended to believe MacArthur. On 29 December they sent him a directive based on the implicit assumption that evacuation of the peninsula was a real possibility – to which, on the following day, he replied in part that ‘the entire military resources of the Chinese Nation, with logistic support from the Soviet, is committed to a maximum effort against the United Nations Command’. At the end of December G.L. Clutton, Counsellor at the UK Liaison Mission in Japan, expressed ‘serious misgivings regarding motives of the United Nations Supreme Command in continuously and actively publicis­ ing their views of CCF formations in vast and increasingly numerical superiority poised for an attack against United Nations lines’. No doubt, he added, the Americans hoped that such publicity would be useful in justifying any further withdrawals, but the troops were being told ‘in almost as many words that they cannot be expected to make a serious stand in the face of the Chinese hordes’. Whether these hordes were ‘mythical’ was hardly a factor, since the UN forces had become so jittery in the face of propaganda from their own side that as soon as any large-scale enemy offensive began they would be ready to retreat without waiting to find out the strength and character of the attack. ‘I feel,’ concluded Clutton, the line which has been taken is particularly regrettable because even if the American estimates of enemy … are correct disparity in numbers 273

Korean Conflict.indb 273

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

between the opposing forces is really nothing very remarkable. The figures published for assigned strength of all ground forces under the command of the United States Eighth Army in Korea as at 26th December total about 360,000 (amply supplied with the best arms and equipment) and when one considers on top of this our complete air and naval supremacy it would seem unnecessary to prepare in advance an ‘alibi’ for defeat.

When he was told by MacArthur on 3 January that there were at least 450,000 Chinese troops in Korea, and another half million in Manchuria, Sir Alvary Gascoigne informed the Foreign Office, ‘My military adviser does not agree with these figures, which he considers to be grossly exaggerated.’ Clutton’s suspicions soon grew to fact in the British mind. On 4 January Franks drew Acheson’s ‘attention to the voluminous news and radio comment in this country emanating from Tokyo. The general tone of this comment is gloomy and seems almost to be preparing the public mind for the evacuation of Korea. It speaks of overwhelming Chinese forces. It wonders how long the United States can hold out.’ Speaking candidly, no doubt under instructions, he said, ‘I thought their general effect here and abroad must be deplorable and must throw doubt on what the intention of the United States Administration were.’ Acheson admitted that Franks had correctly described the general character of comment from Tokyo, but insisted that MacArthur had been instructed to fight it out unless his forces were threatened with annihilation. ‘On the other hand,’ added Franks in his telegram to Bevin, ‘I could not help noticing that he was disturbed by what I had said. I think he hopes that the comment is advance preparation by General MacArthur for the worst should it happen and as a relief against which good news will appear even better if the United Nations Command holds a line.’ Reporting from New York on 3 January, Jebb noted that ‘some people here and notably Pearson and myself, are beginning to wonder whether despite all professions to the contrary, the policy of the Unified Command is not to withdraw United Nations forces from Korea as soon as they suitably can’; to which Air Marshal Sir William Elliot minuted at the 274

Korean Conflict.indb 274

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

bottom of this telegram, ‘I am sure that nothing would please the Pentagon more than they should be quit of Korea.’ Meanwhile the news from the Far East was increasingly bleak. On 4 January Bouchier was convinced that it was ‘clearly the policy of MacArthur not to stand and fight anywhere but to maintain the integrity of the United Nations Forces and above all not to suffer heavy casualties … Thus we shall continue progressively to withdraw down the length of the South Korean peninsula until finally we end up in another Pusan bridgehead … It is a dismal picture.’ On 6 January Adams, writing from Pusan, announced Seoul’s fall for the second time, and speculated that ‘it is a matter of time, perhaps a very short time, before this place is threatened too’. He added: I do not think it is unduly pessimistic to say that the conduct of the war gives rise to doubts about the will of the Unified Command to stand and fight seriously in Korea. Besides being crowded to bursting point with refugees from further north, Pusan seems to be full of troops and military equipment for which one would have thought there was urgent need at the front. It is difficult in the circumstances, and having regard to the tendency of the Americans to appear to act from conflicting motives, to guess what the outcome will be. I sometimes feel however that the commanding general is under instructions to get the United Nations forces out of Korea with as few casualties as possible whilst at the same time putting up a semblance of fighting for the country.

At the Foreign Office it was noted on this cable that, despite the possible inaccuracy of the last sentence, ‘It does, however, seem increasingly likely that the American Military in Korea, in Japan and in Washington all desire the complete evacuation of Korea in order to avoid further casualties and the continuation of commitments which in their eyes appear not to serve any major strategic purpose.’ MacArthur, he said, ‘should receive clear directives from Washington’. On 9 January Bouchier’s ‘purely personal impression’ was that MacArthur would withdraw to Pusan ‘with the inevitable object of final evacuation of all UN forces from 275

Korean Conflict.indb 275

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

the mainland of Korea at an early date’. Furthermore, on 13 January, writing from Korea to John Shattock at the Foreign Office, Adams remarked, ‘I cannot escape the impression that the Unified Command has been and is doing everything to inflate the numbers and efficiency of the enemy in order to save face and prepare the world for a complete withdrawal from this country.’ Observing that the US ambassador was always optimistic, he continued, I sometimes wonder if he, the State Department, War Department or MacArthur is out of step. The picture has consistently been one of contradictory aims – a kind of official schizo-phrenia which makes it exceedingly difficult for one to guess who knows really what is going on. Another element that has to be considered is the will-to-fight of the US troops which sometimes seems totally absent … A truly extraordinary war – much of it grim and horrid, and as phoney as it can be in some respects.

Such reports from Tokyo and Korea were drawn together in a long and forthright message on 5 January to Bradley from the Chiefs of Staff, who were scarcely able to contain their frustration: We are becoming increasingly concerned at our almost complete lack of any idea of what General MacArthur’s plans are for future operations in Korea, or of any appreciation by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the probable course of events, and in particular the ability of the UN Forces to hold any sort of line or bridgehead in Korea. While everyone recognises that the US have by far the largest forces engaged, there are two Brigades of British troops involved for whom HMG is responsible to Parliament, and there is increasing disquiet in this country as to the conduct of the campaign. This feeling is bound to find expression in Parliament and any Government would be placed in an impossible position if it transpired that (as in fact is the case) they had virtually no idea of the United Nations Commander’s strategic intentions or of how the situation may be expected to develop. 276

Korean Conflict.indb 276

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

The Chiefs took it that there had been no change in the military intentions of the American government, as affirmed in the Attlee–Truman talks, to resist and fight it out in Korea. This was essential if there was to be any chance of settlement by negotiation. The effect of being kicked out would be calamitous in Asia and in Europe, where Eisenhower had just taken command, and it would encourage the Communist powers everywhere. ‘In fact our relative security could – at least for some years – rest solely on the somewhat uncertain foundations of the Atom bomb.’ They then moved to the nub of the matter: Frankly we find it difficult to believe that, with the backing of overwhelming air and sea power, the United Nations forces could not maintain a substantial hold on the Korean peninsula. In this connection we feel that the essential cause of Anglo–American solidarity would not be served by lack of frankness, and must convey to you first our impression that General MacArthur’s intelligence is not serving him and the United Nations well. We have no evidence that the Chinese forces in Korea are in fact anything like as strong as his repeated communiqués make out – which frankly we find it difficult to believe. We cannot but feel that, whatever the reason may be for what we regard as greatly exaggerated estimates of Chinese strength, it cannot be sound to alarm the troops by constant harping on the overwhelming strength of their enemies … All we hear from our own people in the battle shows that they at least are convinced that they are not up against anything like the numbers stated, and that they by no means regard themselves as beaten.

As for the poor morale of some American units in Korea, the Chiefs conceded that there ‘have been many instances in the history of war when good troops including our own have failed in determination’, but ‘this is a question of leadership and inspiration of confidence from the top, and in this connection we welcome the assumption of Command by General Ridgway’. Though they had had grave doubts about the advance north to the Manchurian frontier, the Chiefs reminded Bradley that they had not in the past pressed for a say in events; however, the time had now come ‘when we 277

Korean Conflict.indb 277

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

as your major ally must be taken into your confidence and, indeed, into consultation, in a situation in which not only the fate of some thousands of British troops is at stake, but still more which contains such enormously farreaching implications for us in Asia and the West’. What was to be done? The situation was reminiscent of Burma in 1943, when, not coincidentally, the CIGS had been in command of the 14th Army: We then found that the only effective military course was to select the main defensive position on which we intended to stand, and then disengage and fall back on it, instead of remaining at the mercy of events and continuing piece-meal withdrawals under pressure, which is not only dangerous and costly, but is bound still further to lower the morale of the troops engaged. Once back on our main defence line we must resist with the utmost determination, and our defence should be characterized by seizing every opportunity [to] counter-attack and kill Chinese, as well as by the utmost exploitation of air and sea power.

They regarded the situation as so ‘critical’ that the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that one of them immediately visit Washington or, preferably, that one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) visit London for discussions. Bevin expressed his ‘complete agreement’ with the Chiefs’ telegram and asked Franks that Acheson and the President be informed of ‘our worries’, adding, for Franks’ information only, that ‘people here fear that MacArthur’s tactics are being determined not by purely military considerations, but by his political sympathies’. On 13 January Sir John Slessor went to Washington for consultations with JCS. British strong suspicions about MacArthur’s grossly inflated estimation of Chinese numbers led to the fear of a needless UN evacuation of Korea, which led in turn to anxiety about a US attack, perhaps directly or through Chiang’s troops, on China itself. Such anxiety was already present owing to the American drift of thinking that had been apparent at Attlee–Truman talks in early December. Franks spoke to Acheson on 7 January (‘I do not think Acheson was much surprised by what I had to say to him. I rather suspect that the State 278

Korean Conflict.indb 278

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

Department has been saying much the same thing to the American military’), and the next day the Secretary of State wrote to Bevin. Disturbingly he left open the question of what the United States would do if China was named as an aggressor by the United Nations. This in part prompted the Prime Minister to inform Truman on 8 January it was his impression that ‘the United States Government may wish to substitute for a policy of localising the conflict in Korea a policy aimed at developing limited action against China’, which would be contrary to the ‘understanding of the common position which we reached together in Washington in December’. If America were to be successful in pushing through an aggressor motion in the United Nations, there would, for example, ‘be little doubt that … a campaign of subversion or guerrilla warfare against China involving the use of Chiang Kai-shek’s men would certainly’ provoke Peking to extend hostilities. ‘I do not know whether such a project is intended by the United States Government, and,’ asked Attlee, ‘I should like to know whether they would intend to recommend such action by the United Nations after China had been declared an aggressor.’ He requested an answer by the following day, since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were due to discuss Korea. In his reply the President reaffirmed the agreement reached in December, namely ‘that resistance to aggression in Korea should continue unless and until superior force requires the evacuation of our troops’, and categorically denied any intention to use Nationalist troops in subversion or guerrilla warfare against mainland China. The tactical situation was forced on the United States ‘to cover the increased jeopardy to UN troops resulting from a recent marked decrease in the effectiveness of the sorely tried South Korean divisions’. Should the Chinese extend hostilities by ‘an attack on Hong Kong or Indo China or Japan or by massive air attacks from Chinese territory on UN forces’, Truman asked, would the Prime Minister not agree that the war could not be confined to Korea? However, this was not what Attlee had said: if the UN could fight and hold on in Korea, avoiding any provocative action which he suspected the USA of contemplating, then there was a chance of negotiations. Of course, if the Chinese did any of these things, the situation would be completely different and would have to be faced afresh. It was almost like asking what if Moscow gave Peking the 279

Korean Conflict.indb 279

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

A-bomb to use against the UN in Korea – a classic non-sequitur. Truman, in support of the principle of collective security, then went on to quote himself from the speech delivered to Congress the previous day: ‘If the democracies had stood up against aggression in Manchuria in 1931, or the attack on Ethiopia in 1935, or the seizure of Austria in 1938, if they had stood together against aggression on these occasions as the UN has done, the whole history of our time would have been different’. Even apart from the question of whether in fact the Chinese had committed ‘aggression’ in Korea, this was the familiar and doubtful Munich argument. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister was grateful for the character of the President’s reply: ‘It is of the greatest importance that we should maintain a stand there if it is militarily possible, and I think that our best means of bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese to abstain from further adventures is to show that their present adventure in Korea does not pay and it is on the contrary a constant drain on their resources. It was for this reason that I was so glad to have your reassurances on this point which helped dispel the doubt in my mind caused by some press communiqués issued in Tokyo and by our analysis of the course of the campaign.’ Nevertheless, British misgivings about the intentions of their ally persisted. Their fears of America becoming bogged down in the Far East, Gifford told Acheson on 20 January, ‘are intensified by reports highly excited state of American public opinion and exaggerated idea of power and influence of General MacArthur’. A later report, on 29 January, pointed out that ‘British feel US political and military leadership in Asia as personified by SCAP has not inspired confidence. There is general belief government has little or no control over his actions and there is even some fear SCAP may be developing calculated long-term world war against communism through aggressive action in China as the weaker of the two major Communist nations.’ In spite of Truman’s disavowal to the contrary, Bevin said in Cabinet on 22 January that the ‘United States Government might prefer to withdraw their troops from Korea, and direct their attack upon the mainland of China. They might even wish to use Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in hostilities on the mainland, and to foment a new civil war in China in which they would be supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communist forces.’ On the following day the 280

Korean Conflict.indb 280

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

Foreign Office sent a message to Franks asking ‘whether the United States really desire a settlement, or whether they are not rather spoiling for a chance to hit back on China by any means at their disposal, reckless of the consequences to others, prompted mainly by mortification over the failure of their policy towards China’. The consequences might be an open split in the UN, but it ‘seems that they are even prepared to risk the loss of the United Nations cover rather than diverge from the course on which they have apparently set themselves’. Three unfortunate remarks had not helped matters: Acheson’s hasty branding of China’s rejection of the Cease-Fire Committee’s five principles as unacceptable, for all practical purposes committing the UN to the same view; MacArthur’s description of Chinese intervention in Korea as ‘a sneak attack far more infamous than Japan’s Pearl Harbor’, made at a time when discussion of Chinese intervention was at a delicate stage in the UN; and a statement by the American representative at the UN, Ernest Gross, to the effect that ‘the question of Formosa will be handled in a way completely consistent with our national interests and security’, virtually closing the door to negotiation with Peking. Sir John Slessor, who had returned from Washington, said at a meeting on 22 January at the Foreign Office that he ‘had gained a definite impression … that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff at heart had no wish to remain in Korea, and that in this way they were supported by public opinion which was strongly in favour of an early withdrawal’; indeed, the best the Joint Chiefs could hope for was a small bridgehead of about 50 miles around Pusan. Slessor qualified this pessimistic assessment by saying that he had heard since leaving Washington that the United States ‘now intended to remain in Korea since the situation there had apparently considerably improved’. This latest impression had been confirmed by a telegram from Franks. However, given the fluctuations of confidence (and British reports of them) in Tokyo and Washington, it could hardly be wondered at that the British did not know what to think. An assessment of allied morale, with which Dening was in agreement, was conducted in Korea in January, and naturally enough, part of it had to do with the Supreme Commander: ‘Expecting to find General MacArthur a hero to all Americans, it was a shock to hear officers and men shouting 281

Korean Conflict.indb 281

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

ribaldries which conveyed in picturesque but unmistakeable terms their opinion that he was either a dangerous dotard, or an egomaniac determined Commander-in-Chief on a world crusade against Communism.’ Officers and men – ‘including those US personnel who frankly proclaim that their only interest in Korea is to get out of it’ – put the enemy strength at about 200,000, while one UN military observer actually said that with trained men in the field as well as South Korean reserves ‘the numerical advantage lies with the United Nations, plus an overwhelming superiority in equipment, supply and support from both sea and air’. There appeared, therefore, to be at least ‘some prima facie evidence’ that the strategy of the previous two or three months had been designed to ‘trail a coat’ for the Chinese, so that a ‘pretext for a retreat’ would be provided ‘which would make possible a demand for authority to bomb Manchurian heavy industry with United Nations approval’. How else, it was implied, could one explain the ‘colossal blunder’ of the ‘virtually unprotected gap between Eighth Army and Tenth Corps’? ‘The line is one which might well be suspected of originating from fellow-travellers’, stated the report. ‘If so, its sponsors have operated with unusual skill, for most of those who propagate it appear to be drawn from the minority in favour of more vigorous and offensive action in Korea.’ If one inclines to this interpretation of MacArthur’s strategy and subscribes to the theory of deliberately exaggerated enemy figures, then it is tempting to read into the exchanges between the JCS and the general confirmation of the fear which so haunted the British. On 29 December the JCS agreed with MacArthur that the Chinese had the capacity to force the UN forces out of Korea if they wanted to. The US could resist this by sending substantial additional troops, but only by jeopardising other commitments, including the protection of Japan, and in the face of the increased threat of general war these forces would be needed elsewhere. ‘We believe’, declared the Joint Chiefs, ‘that Korea is not the place to fight a major war.’ However, a successful resistance at some position on the peninsula would deflate the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists and would be of great importance to American national interests, ‘if this could be accomplished without serious losses’. They directed the General to defend in successive positions, inflicting damage to 282

Korean Conflict.indb 282

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

the enemy ‘subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops’. If the Chinese massed a sufficient force in the vicinity of the Kum river that might be able to force the UN out of Korea, ‘it then would be necessary, under these conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan’. In his reply MacArthur in effect presented his (nominal) superiors with the choice of abandoning Korea, endangering Japan and indeed threatening the ‘engulfment’ of Asia, or making war against the Chinese mainland. The USA should blockade the coast of China; destroy its capacity to wage war by air and naval bombardment; strengthen the UN position on Korea by using Nationalist troops; and allow Chiang’s forces to engage in guerrilla action, ‘possibly leading to counter-invasion’, against vulnerable areas of the mainland, which ‘we are now preventing … by our own Naval forces’. There was not the ‘slightest doubt but that this action would at once release the pressure upon our forces in Korea’. He expressed full awareness that such action had been ruled out for fear of provoking Peking into major war, but nothing the US could do ‘would further aggravate the situation as far as China is concerned’. The threat from Russia should America attack China was ‘a matter for speculation’ – a matter, one would have thought, for furious and frantic speculation, but the Supreme Commander conjectured no further than that ‘a Soviet decision to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviets’ own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities, with little regard for other factors’. European security would not be harmed by the implementation of MacArthur’s recommendations; in truth, he fully concurred ‘in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else – an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself ’. The sting was reserved for the tail of MacArthur’s message. Under the conditions laid down by the JCS – no reinforcements, continued restrictions on Nationalist action, no measures against China’s continental military potential, and acceptance of the concentration of its forces solely on Korea – then their assessment of the tactical situation was sound. Accordingly, the plan of successively contracting defence lines south to Pusan was ‘the only possible way in which an evacuation could be accomplished’. In other words, be it on your own heads! 283

Korean Conflict.indb 283

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

The Joint Chiefs, in keeping with their treatment of MacArthur, were restrained in their reply to this message. The recommended actions against China, he was assured, ‘have been and continue to be given careful consideration here’. But they then went on to deny nearly all of them. There was to be no strengthening of the UN forces in Korea; a naval blockade of the Chinese coast ‘would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hong Kong’, which in fact meant never; naval and air attacks on China could be authorised only in the event of attacks on UN troops from outside Korea; Nationalist troops, ‘in view of the improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable usefulness elsewhere’, could not be used; and if the Korean front could be stabilised with the existing forces, two partly trained National Guard divisions could be sent to increase the security of Japan – or the same purpose would, in the event of a forced evacuation, be served by part of the US forces. MacArthur was given two faint hopes. His request for the arming of Japanese security forces would be ‘expedited’ and he was promised that an effort was ‘being made to intensify the economic blockade of trade with China’. The directives, however, remained the same: withdrawal in successive positions while inflicting the maximum damage of the enemy, ‘subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan’. Should he consider evacuation essential ‘to avoid severe losses of men and materials’, he was then to withdraw from Korea to Japan. On the following day, 10 January, MacArthur shot back to Washington a response in which he clearly overstepped the line between the political and the military. Demurely adopting the guise of a theatre commander whose task was dictated in ‘a very limited field of action’, the General declared that the question of evacuation was a ‘decision of highest national and international importance’ far beyond his competence to judge. Was it the intention of US policy ‘to maintain a military position in Korea – indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?’ Under ‘the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea [a political statement in itself] its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction, if overriding political considerations so dictate’. This 284

Korean Conflict.indb 284

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

was blackmail pure and simple, in the service of MacArthur’s grand plan of attacking China. The JCS and their political masters had obviously decided that Korea was not strategically worthwhile, and certainly not worth the lives of 100,000 men. Such intimidation turned on MacArthur’s Jesuitical quibble as to the meaning of ‘severe’ in the Joint Chiefs’ directive. ‘Whether such losses’ in maintaining a beachhead ‘were regarded as ‘severe’ or not would to a certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term’. He further declared of his command: It was not the intent that it engage the armies of the Chinese Nation and doubtless it would not have been committed at all had there been foreseeable prospect that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense. The troops are tired from a long and difficult campaign, embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their courage and fighting qualities in misunderstood retrograde maneuver, and their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are cheerfully accepted.

Rusk suggested to Acheson, on reading this telegram, that means for continuing resistance ‘without unacceptable losses’ should be found, for example, on the islands off Korea, including Cheju-do. The US could then declare that Korea had not been abandoned. This was taken up at a meeting between Truman, Acheson, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs on 12 January, at which General Collins stated that ‘the question was not a decision to evacuate or not to evacuate but of the timing of the issuance of orders to begin the evacuation’. It was decided that Collins and General Vandenberg should, in any event, leave that afternoon for Korea ‘to ascertain at first hand the state of the morale’ of the forces. Truman ‘repeated the view which he had expressed to Mr Attlee that he was unwilling to abandon the South Koreans to be murdered’, and Acheson suggested to the President that it would be desirable to give MacArthur ‘more information on the political bases of American policy’. 285

Korean Conflict.indb 285

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

In spite of a press conference statement that MacArthur was ‘taking orders’, on 13 January President Truman sent a message to the general as if from one head of a sovereign state to another. It was in fact a considered response to the political views of MacArthur, trying to win him over to the standpoint of the administration. ‘This present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive’, Truman was careful to remark. ‘Its purpose is to give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.’ A successful resistance in Korea would, in effect, save the world from communism, and would, Truman seemed to imply, achieve all the goals of National Security Council Report 68 in one go. It would inspire the free world – in Asia, Europe and the Middle East – to resist the lure and the armed force of communism, prove the ‘inestimable value in time of adversity’ of the United States, bring the UN through its first great effort in collective security, secure the rapid build-up of defences throughout the free world, and alert the peoples behind the iron curtain that their masters were bent upon wars of aggression. This list of potential achievements must have greatly inflated MacArthur’s already formidable sense of importance. The President counselled MacArthur against widening the war for two reasons: first, the United Nations must not be alienated, the majority of whom ‘we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us’; and second, attacks on targets outside Korea ‘would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities’, especially before the USA had built up its military strength. Evidently accepting MacArthur’s estimates of the strength of the opposing armies, the President conceded that withdrawal from the peninsula might be necessary, but if he considered it ‘practicable, and advisable’, MacArthur might think of continuing resistance from the offshore Korean islands, possibly Che ju-Do. In any case, it was important that ‘if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified’. There had of late been ‘a certain amount of confusion and wishful thinking’ in the United Nations, 286

Korean Conflict.indb 286

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

chiefly because most members wanted to be sure that all avenues to a peaceful settlement had been fully explored, but now the great majority were ‘rapidly consolidating’ behind the defence of freedom. ‘The entire nation,’ Truman conceded gracefully, ‘is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances.’ By mid-January the effect of Ridgway’s taking command of the armies in Korea was beginning to become apparent to British observers. According to Bouchier on 15 January, he had ‘shown and is showing a much more aggressive spirit than formerly prevailed in the command’. Five days later the air vice-marshal could report that the much ‘more optimistic atmosphere which now prevails both here in Tokyo and in Korea suggests that it is now necessary for me to amend my previously stated forecast’; the prospect, he declared almost exultantly, ‘of an early evacuation of our forces from Korea in my opinion no longer exists’. This sentiment accorded with Slessor’s impression brought back from Washington, where Collins and Vandenberg had been able to paint a much brighter picture on their return from Korea. Indeed, by the end of the month, at Rusk’s prompting Acheson urged the JCS to tell MacArthur not to re-cross the 38th parallel. The UK acting military attaché in Korea commented on the greatly improved morale of the US troops under their new leadership, though he still had ‘the impression sometimes, especially at Eighth Army HQ , that a major Chinese assault which will throw us out of Korea would not be unwelcome’. He did ‘not believe in the large number of Chinese troops and still maintain that if there are hordes of them they are very small hordes’. It is tempting to conclude that the numbers facing each other remained the same, for there had been no reinforcements from the USA, and yet under Ridgway’s leadership the UN forces had not only stood and fought but were being restrained from crossing the parallel. It was from this point on that MacArthur ceased to have any real influence on events in Korea, but he was to continue to cause anxiety to both the American and UK governments. The problem for the British, as the New Statesman pointed out in December 1950, was that the United Nations had not set up its own agency for directing the war in Korea. The American government was the chief agent of the 287

Korean Conflict.indb 287

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

UN and hence direct communications passed between the Defence Department and MacArthur, who possessed both the usual discretion granted to an American commander in the theatre of war and the cover of special authority conferred upon him by resolutions of the United Nations. It was therefore the American government’s interpretation of these resolutions that was binding, on the general, in theory at any rate. However, MacArthur did what he liked, subject only to the proviso that he not provoke the President and the JCS beyond endurance. For Britain to have had an influence on the general’s actions it was necessary to inform the State Department through the UK ambassador in Washington – for example, that it was thought unwise to provoke the Chinese into war. The State Department would then pass such a message on to the JCS, who might, if they thought fit, relay it to Tokyo, where it would be filed for the general’s information. Already irritated by MacArthur’s comparison of Chinese intervention with Pearl Harbor, on 29 January Cabinet discussed his further statement referring to the UN action in Korea as a campaign for freeing Asia, and decided that Jebb should make clear in the UN ‘that it had been made without the knowledge or approval’ of HMG. Lester Pearson also thought it ‘a most deplorable speech by a man holding the position of United Nations Commander … Coming at this time, on the eve of the vote on the US resolution before the Political Committee, it is particularly unfortunate.’ Richard Stokes, the Minister of Works, wrote to the Prime Minister complaining, among other things, about MacArthur’s statement: ‘The Chinese will put but the worst interpretation on it. It adds to their suspicion that a cease fire will only be used to strengthen UN forces’. The FO commented: Here the Foreign Office would agree, but the difficulty is how to exercise control over him or how to circumscribe his influence. He has so far proved to be a problem beyond the powers of the United States Administration, and it may be that direct representations from us might have the opposite effect as making it very difficult for the Administration to yield to foreign pressure to get rid of one of their most distinguished 288

Korean Conflict.indb 288

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

generals. There is, however, undoubtedly a large body of opinion in the States which is critical of General MacArthur and other countries (e.g. Australia) are also critical of him. It is fully realised by the United States Government that General MacArthur has forfeited the confidence of many other Governments.

H.A. Graves, of the British Embassy, asked Rusk what significance was attached to MacArthur’s statement. Rusk said that the policy of the US government had not changed ‘one iota’ and that MacArthur’s remark was ‘a mere form of words’, to which Graves replied that it was ‘the general feeling in London that broad political statements with political overtones seemed somewhat improper for emanation from the UN Commander’. Further perturbation was caused when Truman said at a press conference on 15 February that MacArthur had full discretion to cross the 38th parallel as necessity might dictate, which, although he added that discussion with the allies would continue, seemed to contradict Attlee’s statement in the Commons that there should be no new invasion of North Korea unless other UN countries approved it with the ‘fullest comprehension of the political implications’. The British had absolutely no intention of reinvading the North. Apart from the military hazards, it would destroy all hope of a negotiated peace. ‘Unfortunately’, reported Franks, Truman had jumped into the fray and the State Department and the White House (as with the A-bomb statement of December 1950) ‘have since been at pains to emphasise that the President was thinking in military terms only and that his remarks must not be put in the context of the political aspect of the question’. So disturbed was Paul Nitze at the ‘immeasurable damage’ caused by Truman’s remarks that he suggested to Acheson that ‘questions to the President should be submitted in writing and prepared answers given to the press’. At a later State Department meeting: Mr Rusk said he wanted the Secretary to know that he had been assuring the local ambassadors with troops in Korea that there would be consultation before any mass crossing of the 38th parallel. The Secretary and Mr Harriman agreed that it was essential that there should be 289

Korean Conflict.indb 289

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

consultation. Mr Nitze said the JCS were opposed to any crossing but were not sure quite how to handle the matter with MacArthur.

At a meeting on 1 March Kenneth Younger, deputising for Bevin who was ill, reminded Cabinet that on 12 February they had approved a recommendation that the US should consult closely with governments contributing forces before a crossing of the 38th parallel was made. Rusk had since confirmed this in a letter handed to Franks, which stated, inter alia, that the US ‘would provide every opportunity for consultations and would make every effort to achieve as much agreement as possible’. In Younger’s view this was ‘satisfactory’, and together with a statement made by MacArthur on the 19th to the effect that he would not cross the parallel ‘if there were cogent political reasons against doing so’, appeared to ‘meet our requirements’. Yet MacArthur, like a restive stallion, still champed at the bit. On 7 March he said that the Korean War could not fail to reach a ‘theoretical military stalemate’ – devoutly wished for by the British and American governments, and now more realistic – if the United Nations continued to fight a half-way war against the Chinese and was denied the opportunity to attack Manchuria. He pleaded for a lifting of the ‘obscurities which now becloud’ UN objectives in Korea. Visiting the general on 8 March, Clutton and Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Russell, Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Station, were told by MacArthur that the morale of his troops was suffering because of the stalemate, and pointed out: how ‘repugnant’ it was to white troops if their only objective in war was to kill the enemy. Such an objective, indeed, was alien to the whole Western conception of warfare, which was to achieve a political objective with the minimum loss of life … The troops under his command were educated men who wanted to know why they were fighting and for what cause they were being called upon to lay down their lives. It was not sufficient to tell them that they were relieving pressure on the French forces in Indo–China, or to say that by fighting in Korea they were holding off an attack in the West. In the absence of any other objective for the present military operations in Korea, all he could give his troops 290

Korean Conflict.indb 290

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

as the purpose of their fighting was to kill as many of the enemy as possible. The General obviously did not think that the morale of his troops could be long sustained by this means alone.

Just what means he believed could sustain the morale of his troops MacArthur made clear at a press conference on 15 March. The maintenance of a conventional defence system along the 38th parallel ‘would require such a sizeable force that if we had it, and could logistically maintain it, we would be able to drive the Chinese Communists back across the Yalu, hold that river as our future main line of defence, and proceed to the accomplishment of our mission in the unification of Korea’. In fact, towards the end of March 1951 the goal of unification had been abandoned – indeed, it had been tacitly abandoned since the Chinese entry into the war – and, with no prospect or desire to break the stalemate that had developed roughly on the 38th parallel and no estimated likelihood of the Chinese, suffering heavy losses, breaking it either, the US decided that it was time to make a peace offer. The State Department, the JCS and the Defence Department worked on a Presidential statement to be made in the last week of March, drafts of which had been circulated for comment to all the governments contributing forces to the war. Vague in outline, the statement was nonetheless worded to enable the Chinese (and the Russians) to read between the lines and conclude that a peace could be secured on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, namely along the 38th parallel. Unification remained declared UN policy, but clearly a distant goal – as it is today. In any event, the USA was saying in effect that this was a goal not to be attained by force of arms. Moreover, a ‘prompt settlement of the Korean problem would greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and would open the way for the consideration of other problems in that area by the processes of peaceful settlement’. This could only have meant Formosa. On 20 March MacArthur had been informed of the imminence of a presidential statement and was asked by the JCS ‘what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for the next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy’. Beyond his customary complaint about the restrictions placed on his command, the 291

Korean Conflict.indb 291

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

general replied that his present directives were ‘adequate’. However, over the next few days he prepared yet another headache for his political masters, and on this occasion he caused the President to withdraw the proposed offer of peace. On 24 March MacArthur released a statement which asked the Chinese to concede that they had lost the war and to enter into an armistice ‘whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea … might be accomplished’. Heavy destruction by massive air and sea bombardment was being ‘brilliantly exploited by our ground forces’, and the soldiers of Red China were ‘showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain and battle’. The new enemy ‘lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.’ Even with the restrictions placed on the UN forces, the result of the technical superiority of the West had been China’s ‘complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea’. Then came the threat: The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

There should therefore, declared MacArthur, be no insuperable difficulty in settling the Korean problem so long as ‘extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China’s seat in the United Nations’ were not introduced. The reference to the implications in Truman’s statement was unmistakeable. The response to this latest declaration was one of confusion in Washington – anger on the one hand, and a residual fear of MacArthur on the other. On the morning of the 24th Lovett told Acheson of a meeting he had just had with the JCS. They divided the problem into three parts: first, the embarrassment caused at a time when the government was 292

Korean Conflict.indb 292

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

negotiating with the 13 countries about the presidential statement; second, the effect of MacArthur’s remarks ‘complicating any US proposals looking toward a settlement’; and third, the question of military discipline, to which the Chiefs would confine themselves. They had to consider the directive of 6 December which had been sent to MacArthur (which he cheerfully ignored) specifically requiring ‘the Commander in the field to clear any statements, speeches, or anything else relating to political matters’. It ‘would be perfectly obvious if it were anybody else who had made the statement which MacArthur made yesterday, he would be relieved of his command at once’. Nevertheless the consequences of relieving him were ‘startling’: it would have an immediate effect in the field, would probably prejudice the success of the Japanese peace negotiations, and, Lovett added, would cause great ‘logistical difficulties’ because of the four separate commands held by the general – SCAP, Commander-in-Chief of UN forces, Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, and Commanding General of the Army Forces in the Far East. Such difficulties, it might be observed in passing, were not insuperable when MacArthur was relieved of all his commands in April. In short, the JCS would try to ‘work out a reprimand rather than a relief ’. Lovett went on: He said everything he had read in the press this morning, and he had read all the press, indicated that this was probably the most popular statement anyone had ever made. It is very clever, it is an encouraging statement (Mr Lovett thought unjustifiably encouraging), it offers peace and holds out the hope of getting out of Korea. If the President challenged it, he would be in the position at once of being on the side of sin. MacArthur had gotten us in Washington in a tight box from which there seems to be no escape. Mr Lovett thought that probably the best thing would be to have as much silence as possible about it. He therefore agreed that there should be some sort of reprimand, that generally questions about it should be met with ‘no comment’, and the State Department would have to take the position with the other Governments of trying to persuade them that this does not represent Government policy, that this was another statement made by the 293

Korean Conflict.indb 293

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

field commander and that it is really not very important. Mr Lovett said he recognized the very great difficulties of such a program.

Acheson replied that the disciplinary problem, naturally enough, was not for the State Department to deal with, but he added prophetically, ‘If this statement can be straightened out that will not do much good if the same thing is apt to happen next week.’ On the same day the State Department issued a press release which said that the ‘political issues which General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibilities as a field commander are being dealt with in the United Nations and by inter-governmental consultations’; and the JCS sent him a message reminding him of the strictures of the 6 December presidential order and telling him to report to Washington any Communist request for an armistice in the field. It was the opinion of C.E. Steel of the British Embassy that while the United States ‘expect reproaches I do not think that ours will be any more severe than those which will descend on their heads from their own people’. He had seen Rusk, who ‘made a completely clean breast of the whole incident’ and who said, ‘On the one hand MacArthur had made a statement entirely at variance with their policy. On the other the political situation at home was such that, were they explicitly to disown him, the whole of their foreign policy might be jeopardised including troops for Europe.’ Steel’s softly-softly approach, demonstrating a reluctance to remonstrate with the administration, earned Gladwyn Jebb’s disapproval: ‘That is all very well, but my personal view is unless we can use this incident to force a show-down of some kind over the mad satrap, we may well be pushed into full-scale war in the Far East involving (inter alia) the disruption of the United Nations. It is indeed a classic instance of the tail wagging the dog.’ In London Pierson Dixon was strongly of the opinion that in view of the fact that the UN did not require the re-conquest of North Korea, the President should direct MacArthur that, his task was to hold a line in the general vicinity of the 38th parallel. Further, it was the policy of the UN not to become involved in a wider war with China and MacArthur should make no public statements implying that the opposite 294

Korean Conflict.indb 294

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

was the case. That is to say, the general should be given clear political guidance limiting his military activities: ‘In fact, in the popular phraseology, he should hold his tongue.’ The more ‘responsible’ American commentators, reported Franks from Washington, criticised MacArthur’s statement on the grounds ‘that its derisive language about a clear threat to China made it well-nigh impossible for the Chinese to respond to the truce suggestion’. This was the view of Herbert Morrison, who had taken over as Foreign Secretary on 12 March. Suggesting to Franks a new approach for a negotiated settlement, he remarked that MacArthur’s latest pronouncement ‘is indeed an additional reason for considering some entirely new procedure as it is now unlikely that any further statement by the Unified Command alone would be taken seriously by the Chinese’. On 2 April Cabinet approved Morrison’s suggestion that the American government be requested to give MacArthur ‘some fresh directive concerning his public utterances’. This was conveyed by Franks to Dean Rusk on 5 April, who noted that the ambassador thought that it ‘reflected the “MacArthuritis” in London’. Franks also raised a matter which was exercising minds considerably in the Foreign Office, namely the Seventh Fleet’s intention to conduct an operation along the China coast in the general vicinity of Formosa about 7 April: The UK referred to this operation as ‘dragging coat tails’ (which was a World War II expression applied to operations which challenged the enemy to come out and fight …). The telegram stated that such an operation had, of course, nothing to do with UN purposes in Korea nor with UN operations there. It stated that the UK took the gravest view of this operation and must insist that the United States will take sole responsibility for any consequences which might come from it.19

Rusk replied that he had heard of the planned operation only in the last day or two, but that it was his understanding, innocuously enough, that it was merely for ‘reconnaissance purposes’. The mission was carried out on 11 and 13 April, involving 20 warships and 140 aircraft, but, though no doubt disturbing to Peking, it did not provoke a military response. 295

Korean Conflict.indb 295

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

On 5 April the Daily Telegraph carried a report from its military correspondent in Tokyo, which told of a meeting with MacArthur at which the general’s old frustrations were apparent: For the first time in his military career he found himself in a war without a definite objective.   Apparently referring to recent pronouncements about the 38th Parallel, he said that it was not the soldier who had encroached on the realm of the politician, the politician had encroached on that of the soldier. The true object of a commander in war was to destroy the forces opposed to him. But this was not the case in Korea.   The situation would be ludicrous if men’s lives were not involved. South Korean casualties, however, already amounted to 230,000 and American casualties to 60,000 … These and still heavier losses would be accepted readily if only they were being incurred for a definite purpose. ‘It was time the politicians faced up to realities’, said Gen MacArthur. If they would ‘take the wraps off’ the United Nations could defeat the Chinese Communists easily enough. The Chinese had no industrial potential, no rubber, almost no oil and insufficient food. They were faced by a widespread and growing guerrilla movement. The United States had only to blockade their coasts and smash their tenuous railway system to reduce them quickly to impotence. In such circumstances Russian intervention would be improbable. The Chinese would be unable to maintain at the front all the sixty divisions they had massed …   He spoke warmly of the part played by British and Commonwealth forces in Korea and particularly by the Royal Navy.

This drew a devastating indictment of MacArthur from an anonymous source in the Foreign Office, in an internal note to Strang, damning him for his duplicity, vanity, recklessness and failed military record in Korea. To say that the destruction of the enemy’s forces was the object of the commander ‘is a misleading simplification’; rather, in the context of Korea, it should be the imposition of the UN’s will upon the enemy to the extent that a negotiated settlement is made possible. MacArthur could not blame the 296

Korean Conflict.indb 296

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

politicians for the deaths involved in the Korean War: ‘His own decisions based on inadequate or false intelligence have resulted in many unnecessary casualties and the policy which he is apparently advocating (an extension of the conflict) will lead to heavy casualties which may be numbered not in the tens of thousands but in millions.’ The general’s ‘airy optimism’ that China could easily be defeated ‘is an expression of opinion incapable of proof except by putting it to the test’, which, in view of his ‘disastrous miscalculations’ in the past, does ‘not inspire confidence’. Further, the deduction which he draws from the weakness of China is in my view entirely wrong – his deductions that blockade and bombing would ‘quickly reduce them to impotence’. This by no means follows. The Chinese are accustomed to a decentralised type of administration and have an almost unlimited capacity for pulling in their belts and surviving under the most adverse circumstances. There is no vital point or (in military jargon) no vital target system whose destruction would bring China to her knees. Unless blockade and bombing were accompanied by widespread popular uprising in China against the Chinese Government, they would not achieve the object. The evidence at present is that there is no such general support for a counter revolution as would enable the Government to be overthrown, however much damage was inflicted by blockade and air raids.

Moreover, the deduction that Russian intervention would be improbable ‘is entirely unwarranted and in fact I cannot believe that he himself thinks so’. The Sino-Soviet Treaty and the important Soviet interests at stake in a war between China and the Western powers ‘make it in my view certain that Russia would intervene on the side of China’. General MacArthur’s expectation of a massive attack by overwhelmingly strong Chinese forces ‘is nothing more than a smoke-screen designed to glorify himself, to justify his past failures and to secure for himself more freedom of action’. Far from MacArthur’s estimate of 60 Chinese divisions, ‘our people put this at sixteen’. His praise of the British and Commonwealth forces, while well deserved, was forthcoming because he lost no opportunity 297

Korean Conflict.indb 297

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

to praise Britain in the military and damn it in the political field. ‘He is under the delusion that the views of HM Government in regard to Korea are the views of politicians and that our policy decisions have been taken without or against the advice of our military advisers. This of course is not true.’ No mention was made in this note of the desirability of replacing MacArthur, but a British commander with such a lamentable record of misjudgement, let alone of public disagreement with his government’s policies, would long since have been relieved of his duties. John Strachey, the Minister for War, felt under no such restraint. He called unambiguously for MacArthur’s dismissal in a letter to Shinwell on 6 April. The actions and declarations of the general, said Strachey, ‘are exactly calculated to make, and are in fact making a general war with China, with all its consequences, inevitable’. Referring to the proposed sweep of the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and China, Strachey quoted a report from Bouchier which said that the presumable object of the reconnaissance exercise is to ‘give Chinese Communists food for thought that perhaps this peaceful naval operation is a prelude to a landing on the South China coast by Chinese Nationalist forces’. Strachey could conceive of no more provocative action: American war vessels are to go in shore and to take photographs, presumably of likely landing places. What can be more probable than that the Chinese Government will attack these American war vessels from the air or with coastal artillery? And is it not obvious that it is precisely General MacArthur’s intention that such an incident shall occur in order to enable him to say that the Chinese themselves had spread the war outside Korea?

In support of his argument, Strachey referred to the Daily Telegraph article, and in particular to MacArthur’s statement about the ease of defeating China if only the politicians would ‘take the wraps off’. Further, in that morning’s edition of The Times appeared a report in which the Republican Leader in the House of Representatives had received a letter from MacArthur which stated, among other things, that he was in favour of using the Nationalist forces in an attack on the Chinese mainland: 298

Korean Conflict.indb 298

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

This is a clear and logical policy of war with China. Have we not come to the point at which we must either accept it or have the Commander in the field who is not only advocating it, but also carrying it out, despite his orders, replaced? Our own Chiefs of Staff have made an estimate of China’s vulnerability … exactly contrary to General MacArthur’s. Are we to accept the advice of our own highly competent military advisers, or tacitly to accept a policy which flouts it, and which our military advisers tell us must lead to disaster?

To add to the Minister’s anxiety, he received a report from Franks to the effect that Rusk had told him of the possible necessity to meet a heavy air attack by the Chinese ‘in every possible way’, by which Strachey understood him to be hinting at the American bombing of the Chinese mainland ‘for which, of course, General MacArthur has long been pressing’. Having spoken to the CIGS, Strachey gleaned from Slim the estimation that the Chinese were building their strength in Korea to 300,000, not 500,000 as MacArthur had stated, which meant a parity between the two sides – ‘with, of course, a great superiority of arms on our side’. Slim also advanced the opinion that the ‘probing’ operations by the UN across the 38th parallel might be converted by MacArthur into a general advance into North Korea. Strachey continued: All these actions and statements of General MacArthur are unmistakably aimed at provoking Chinese action which will enable him to make general war on China. It may well be, of course, that even the most strict restraint on our part would not prevent a renewed Chinese offensive … in Korea. But even if such an offensive is launched surely our correct policy is to beat it off, as we beat off the last Chinese offensive; and to do so without attacking the Chinese mainland either by sea or air. After all, we have all the Chinese air bases in North Korea to bomb. I understand from CIGS that the advantage of bombing Manchurian air fields is by no means a decisive one, since the 38th Parallel is at the extreme fighter range from Manchuria. Thus the Chinese could not effectively escort their bombers so long as we rendered the North Korean air fields 299

Korean Conflict.indb 299

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

unusable. No doubt such a measure of restraint is some military disadvantage: but how small a factor that is when compared to the enormous liability which we must incur if we allow ourselves to be drawn into a general war on China. It may be that in the last resort it might become unavoidable to bomb Chinese air fields over the Manchurian border: nor would that necessarily produce general war with China. But so long as General MacArthur is in command should we have any assurance that the next night the United States aircraft would not be despatched to one of the major cities of China?

Strachey therefore considered it a matter of urgency that, as ‘they appear unwilling or unable either to secure the reversal of General MacArthur’s policies or to replace him’, the US government must be told that British forces, including the navy and air force, would be withdrawn immediately. This letter was judged to be ‘very timely and useful’ by Morrison, as he was engaged in negotiations with Washington on the subject of MacArthur when it reached him. News of MacArthur’s dismissal came when he was about to reply to Strachey. As the Foreign Secretary remarked to Shinwell, ‘I also have shared many of the fears expressed by John and hope that we have now entered a new phase in regard to Korea.’ The negotiations between Britain and the United States related to the question of authorising MacArthur to take retaliatory action against air bases in Manchuria in the event of air attacks on UN forces from aeroplanes based outside Korea. It was very much driven by the fear expressed by Strachey, namely that it wasn’t so much the principle as the man that was the problem. ‘In view of unreliability of some previous reports from MacArthur,’ read a Foreign Office telegram to Franks, ‘we do not … take the threat as seriously as is apparently suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff … At the moment we are inclined to think that the major danger is MacArthur’s rashness and political irresponsibility rather than massive air attacks from outside Korea.’ At a meeting in the Pentagon on 6 April with Bradley, Sherman, Rusk and Nitze, Franks, accompanied by Lord Tedder, was told that the JCS proposed giving MacArthur authorisation to take retaliatory action against bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. However, 300

Korean Conflict.indb 300

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

they were at pains to point out that ‘the instruction to General MacArthur would be kept on ice in Washington and the decision to send it … would be taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and not by Tokyo’. Franks said that his reply would touch ‘on delicate ground’: First of all it was a fact that there was in England considerable apprehension about General MacArthur. This fact existed irrespective of whether or not the apprehension was justified. This being so His Majesty’s Government would, I thought, attach great importance first to the question whether the calculations of enemy strength was exaggerated; in the light of some experiences in the past it might be feared in the United Kingdom that the build-up of enemy aircraft was exaggerated in order to prepare the ground in advance for a reverse of United Nations troops in the event of a Chinese offensive. If, on the other hand, we could be satisfied that the build-up had reached such a size that a major attack could be made, we would have to take account of this fact …   … Secondly I said that in considering the proposal His Majesty’s Government would clearly attach the greatest importance to the decision whether a major attack had taken place being made in Washington rather than in Tokyo. This appeared to be taken care of in the United States proposal.

Franks was struck by the friendly and reasonable tone of the discussion, as well as by the way in which ‘the Americans had most carefully weighed the very serious political and military implications of their proposals … It was also abundantly clear that they wished to keep the final decision in Washington.’ It is noteworthy that the ‘delicate ground’ walked upon by Franks, which would have touched off an explosion of the type seen in the Attlee–Truman talks in December, was accepted by the Americans as reasonable in April. They had almost come round to the British view of MacArthur. The British were not satisfied with American assurances. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on 9 April, Morrison said ‘that he shared the anxiety of the Chiefs of Staff about General MacArthur’s judgement and his apparent desire to provoke a war with China. The real solution might be a change of 301

Korean Conflict.indb 301

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

United Nations Commander but, short of that, it was necessary to make the United Kingdom position clear.’ Later that day Morrison informed Franks: We sympathise with the desire of the United States to plan for the eventuality of massive air attacks on Korea though we do not rate the likelihood of such attacks as seriously as they do … Our principal difficulty, however, is General MacArthur. His policy is different from the policy of the United Nations. He seems to want a war with China. We do not. Knowing of the existence of authorisation to bomb outside Korea, he might claim that massive air attacks had taken place and it would be difficult to dispute his reports even though we might feel that they were exaggerated or misleading … this is a matter of governmental responsibility.

If authorisation was sought from the President, it should not be given in advance of the event. A decision to act upon it must not be taken without the British government’s agreement, which might be withheld if there were doubts about the reliability of reports of Chinese air attacks. Morrison concluded his telegram: I would like you to draw the attention of the United States Government to the wider implications of General MacArthur’s behaviour. It is not an exaggeration to say that by his public utterances he has weakened public confidence in this country and in the Western Hemisphere in the quality of American political judgment and leadership. Here we seem to have a case of a commander publicly suggesting that his policy is not the stated policy of his government, nor subject to the control of his own government, and whom his own government is, nevertheless, unwilling or unable to discipline.

Although not calling for MacArthur’s dismissal, in this message Morrison came very close to it. The ambiguous phrasing of ‘American political judgment and leadership’ – meaning MacArthur or Truman, or both – may or may not have been intended. Certainly he used stronger language than Bevin ever did in asserting Britain’s right to be consulted. 302

Korean Conflict.indb 302

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

Pierson Dixon brought a measure of calm to the ‘MacArthuritis’ afflicting London. ‘Much as we may criticise General MacArthur,’ he minuted on 9 April, ‘it must be admitted that there is an underlying ambiguity as to the political objectives governing the military conduct of the campaign in Korea and this ambiguity, I think, partly justifies the Supreme Commander’s attitude though not his indiscretions.’ On the one hand, the UN could ‘get out’ only by negotiating with China; on the other, it could only ‘get on’, that is to say, hold the whole of Korea up to the Yalu, if Chinese bases, supply centres and communications were attacked in China itself; hence MacArthur’s insistence on widening the war, despite the risks of bringing in the Russians and of general war. Were the UN to continue to insist on a free and independent Korea and the Chinese to refuse to negotiate, ‘General MacArthur will have some justification in saying that in order to attain the political objective he must attack China’. The real solution to the dilemma would mean abandoning the concept of a free and independent Korea and accepting the concept of a divided Korea. This objective could be translated into action in two ways; first, by accepting a military stalemate along the general line of the 38th parallel and, secondly, by publicly stating this change of objective as a means of inducing a more reasonable frame of mind on the part of the Chinese towards a negotiated settlement.

This was far-sighted of Dixon, though the logic of the situation dictated such a solution. The dismissal of General MacArthur on 11 April solved the problem of retaliatory air attacks for the British, though it should be noted that Cabinet’s agreement in principle came after Ridgway, who had replaced MacArthur, had been authorised to take retaliatory action if necessary. On 28 April the JCS informed Ridgway, ‘In the event of a major enemy air attack from outside Korea against forces in the Korean area … you are hereby authorized at your discretion without further reference to the JCS or higher authority, to attack enemy air bases in Manchuria and in the Shantung peninsula … authority to attack should only be used in the event 303

Korean Conflict.indb 303

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

that in your judgment time and circumstance do not permit reference to the JCS.’ In fact this gave Ridgway latitude to act autonomously in a way which was denied to MacArthur, since the President had held up authorisation until it was foreclosed by the latter’s dismissal. Ridgway was further advised that the consequences of retaliatory action outside Korea were potentially so momentous that it was of the ‘utmost importance’ to have the support of the other countries involved in Korea, but again he was given considerable latitude: ‘This support may depend upon consulting or at least informing them of the action prior to its occurrence, if at all possible you should seek JCS advice before taking action and in any case you should inform the JCS immediately and withhold publicity until notification of allies has taken place.’ On 30 April Acheson sent Morrison a message which stated that if air attacks were made on the UN forces from bases in China, a decision to strike back must be taken by the US government, as there would be no time for consultation with the other governments concerned. The Cabinet, meeting on 3 May, considerably softened its line in response to Acheson, the principal reason being that since ‘the dismissal of General MacArthur there was less danger of a precipitate decision founded on insufficient evidence’. It was therefore agreed ‘in principle that, if a major air attack was launched from bases in Chinese territory against the United Nations forces in Korea, retaliatory action should be taken against those bases’ and ‘that we would wish to be consulted before such … action was authorised’. Not to put too fine a point on it, the USA was given carte blanche, and it in turn had already given discretionary power to the American commander in the Far East to bomb China or not. Yet Bradley was quoted in The Economist on 17 April as saying, ‘Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our air force.’ MacArthur’s dismissal raised an enormous fuss in the USA and equal relief in Britain. The British were not unaccustomed to the firing of generals; Churchill replaced Wavell and then Auchinleck in the Middle East at the height of the war. They had failed to stop Rommel, but MacArthur’s sin was not one of military failure; it was one of disobedience. 304

Korean Conflict.indb 304

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

On 5 April the Republican Leader in the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, read to the House a letter he had received from General MacArthur in reply to a letter he had sent about the situation in the Far East. The reply said in part: My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally, these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces in Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.   It seems strangely difficult for some to realize here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms, while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war with Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it, and Europe would most probably avoid war, yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitution for victory.

Truman was furious. He recorded in his diary, ‘This looks like the last straw.’ After meeting with Marshall, Acheson, Harriman and Bradley, the President further confided to his diary, ‘I’ve come to the conclusion that our Big General in the Far East must be recalled. I don’t express any opinion or make known my decision.’ He had made up his mind to fire MacArthur, yet it was widely believed that he would not have the courage to dismiss the General. As Franks told the Foreign Office on 6 April, ‘Mr Truman is no coward, but it is unlikely that he will be able to take any drastic action … His own somewhat precarious position, the strong Republican support enjoyed by the General and considerations of American prestige in Japan will make this very difficult.’ In Tokyo Bouchier clearly did not believe that MacArthur’s hold on power was slipping as a result of the latest outburst. He was surrounded by a sycophantic staff, 305

Korean Conflict.indb 305

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

‘The result being that latter is encouraged in his erroneous belief that a satisfactory settlement of Korean conflict can only come from military collapse and defeat of the Chinese with all accompanying real risks that such broader action would entail.’ After further consultation with his advisers, the President issued a statement from the White House on 11 April announcing that General MacArthur had been relieved of all his Commands in the Far East. These comprised the posts of Supreme Allied Commander in Japan; Commanderin-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander-in-Chief, Far East; and Commanding General of the US Army in the Far East. At the same time Truman announced that Ridgway, Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, would succeed MacArthur in all these posts, and that LieutenantGeneral James Van Fleet would succeed General Ridgway in Korea. Part of the President’s statement read: With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the US Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East …   Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them … In time of crisis this consideration is particularly compelling.

Despite a protest from Nitze that it would demean the Presidency to enter publicly into the controversy, Truman followed up the White House statement with a broadcast justifying the government’s restrained policy towards the Korean War and his firing of MacArthur. He also was able to make the guarded offer of peace which he had intended to deliver before the general’s statement of 24 March torpedoed it. 306

Korean Conflict.indb 306

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

‘Acheson remarked to me on a purely personal basis that the less said by all of us the better’, Franks cabled to Morrison on 11 April. ‘Inevitably he had Britain especially in mind because of what has been written here recently and because the sensation in Washington will be considerable.’ Later that day Morrison made a speech in the Commons in which he summarised the directives issued to MacArthur over the previous few months and which accorded with the UK’s policy. The general, Morrison implied but did not state, had disagreed with this policy: I do not desire to say more that to draw the attention of the House to the traditional British interpretation of the relationship between a military commander in the field and the Government to whom he is responsible. On this matter successive British Governments have always consistently stood for the subordination of the military to the political. It is clear from the statement issued by the President … that under the American Constitution the same interpretation is placed on this relationship, as indeed it must be in any democratic country where the views of the people, expressed by their freely elected governments, must be paramount.

Although he doubted whether the military was, in fact, subordinate to the political (at least until the President’s dismissal of MacArthur), Morrison adopted a sober and restrained response to Truman’s action, as indeed did the British press. The Times remarked that ‘it is General MacArthur’s repeated statements in favour of wider war with China that have precipitated his downfall … It was a public challenge to the Administration that could be answered in only one way if the President and his Cabinet were to remain in manifest control of policy.’ While paying high praise to the general’s military record, the Daily Telegraph said that it seemed ‘hard to believe that the main grounds for his removal can be controverted, namely, that from August last year up till the present month he has consistently and repeatedly defied the instructions transmitted to him regarding the political issues which the campaign involves’. The President has acted with ‘remarkable courage’, declared the Manchester Guardian. ‘One could hardly have a clearer case of an attempt to subordinate the civil to the military power … The 307

Korean Conflict.indb 307

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

splendid service of General MacArthur in the past … could not be allowed to outweigh so gross a breach with a principle indispensable to the proper conduct of public affairs.’ The New Statesman, naturally enough, applauded Truman’s dismissal of ‘the grandiose and arrogant pro-consul in the Far East’, while The Economist more soberly interpreted his shortcomings as ‘intolerable in a general operating under the orders of a democratic government … but they were also the virtues of a great fighting commander, which stood the free world in good stead through the desperate rearguard action of last summer and autumn’. The Economist also counselled against any gloating in Britain, the more so as the charge was already being made in the United States that ‘MacArthur is the victim of British agitation and the Government’s policy towards China’. Acheson employed exactly the same argument in a cable to the American ambassador in London. Some ‘adjustment’ to their policy in the Far East – namely, support of the US proposal for economic sanctions against China and abandonment of the position that China should be represented in the Japanese peace negotiations – would help the British insofar as she would otherwise be brought unfavourably into congressional debates about MacArthur’s dismissal. Acheson predicted that Britain would be charged with appeasement in the Far East. Shown this telegram by Ringwalt, Dening remarked that, speaking personally, it perhaps would be unwise to discuss points of difference while the accusations were ‘flying around’ that ‘the British were responsible for the dismissal of General MacArthur, and that the State Department was in the pocket of the Foreign Office’. Franks reported, ‘The impression that we are the real niggers in the wood-pile has … been fostered by the current reports in the press here regarding our insistence on the inclusion of the Peking regime in the Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations.’ Outside government, Harold Nicolson also feared that the Republicans would exploit MacArthur’s dismissal by saying that it had occurred as a result of representations from Britain. ‘This will make us all the more suspicious of American leadership,’ he wrote in his diary, ‘when the fortunes of the world may be at the mercy of some senatorial lobby or some press stunt.’ In a personal letter to Morrison on 14 April, Gladwyn Jebb offered a slightly more encouraging assessment: 308

Korean Conflict.indb 308

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

I happened to be dining at Los Angeles with Mr and Mrs Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., when President Truman’s announcement that he had dismissed General MacArthur came through on the radio. There was quite a distinguished company, including the American equivalent of the Astronomer Royal and the ‘Queen’ of the American stage, Miss Ethel Barrymore. The general effect on them all was as if a bomb had exploded, but after a few minutes they became very markedly divided on whether Truman was right or wrong. I had the general impression that the initial reaction was unfavourable to the President but that, after a pause for reflection, reason tended to prevail.

Jebb added prophetically, ‘And I suggest – though this of course is not my province – that, broadly speaking, this may well be the reaction of the nation.’ Unfortunately, MacArthur’s address to Congress was, according to Franks, from every point of view excellently contrived. The speech was ably constructed and was delivered in a dramatic style which greatly enhanced its effect. Perhaps no one would agree with Representative Dewey Short (R, Missouri) who fervently said when it was over ‘We heard God speak here today’, but there must have been few who were not impressed with it – even amongst those who disagreed with its thesis from the outset. The melodramatic ending in which MacArthur, in a tone of quiet resignation, pictured himself as the old soldier who just fades away and with a catch in his voice bade his hearers ‘good-bye’ may have sickened the sophisticates, but it undoubtedly produced a sympathetic tightening of the throats in millions of his countrymen.

This quiet repugnance for the sentimentality of MacArthur’s speech – and its hypocrisy, for he was shortly to try for the presidential nomination – reflected the view of many ‘sophisticates’, but the sheer skill of the address, alluded to by Franks, spelled danger for the British. As The Economist pointed out: [F]or those who had temporarily suppressed their old, deep-seated and probably irremovable resentment of the British, the dismissal of General 309

Korean Conflict.indb 309

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

MacArthur was an act almost of liberation. President Truman had acted at British direction. ‘The State Department is nothing more than a branch office of 10 Downing Street’, cried Senator Dirkson of Illinois. A bountiful providence, at this point, allowed to leak out of (apparently) the State Department the substance of a ten-day-old Foreign Office aide memoire on the draft Japanese Treaty, which could easily be made to show that Britain was intent on appeasing the Chinese Communists by inviting them to the treaty and promising them Formosa. What could be plainer than that General MacArthur, the historic enemy of such appeasement, had been sacrificed to save British investments in Hongkong and British trade with China?

The fear that Britain would be made a scapegoat quickly manifested itself. Franks reported on 27 April that substantial subsidiary themes of the MacArthur affair were ‘(a) that we are in large measure responsible for his fall and (b) that we are giving aid and comfort to the enemy, are bent on appeasing Communist China and are influencing the Administration accordingly’. He added that the ‘first point is so widely believed that it seems likely to become a permanent part of American folklore’. In a speech to the Primrose League at the Albert Hall, Churchill remarked: A wave of irritation is passing across the United States and the isolationist forces there are glad to turn it upon Great Britain. The reproaches against General MacArthur – that great soldier and great statesman as his settlement of difficulties with Japan after the war have proved – in which Mr Shinwell and even so staid a Minister as Mr Chuter Ede have indulged, enable those who do not like us in the United States to suggest that His Majesty’s Government have had something to do with General MacArthur’s dismissal. I cannot believe there is the slightest truth in this.

Commenting on MacArthur’s testimony before the Senate committees, Franks noted that the General, ‘with typical modesty’, had said that ‘the manner of his dismissal had ‘jeopardised’ the national security’, and added: 310

Korean Conflict.indb 310

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

There is little doubt that MacArthur is anti-British. Egged on by Senator Hickenlooper … he elaborated in his testimony on the volume of strategic materials supplied to China through Hong Kong (quoting from a report by the American Consul-General there). We are also reliably informed that in private conversations he has made venomous remarks about the United Kingdom.

Simultaneously, Franks reported, criticism of British trade with China had grown, ‘set off by the revelation that rubber exports to China have been substantially larger since the Korean War began than they were before’. He said, with some relief, ‘The Prime Minister’s subsequent reminder that controls had already been imposed on rubber shipments from Malaya has helped to produce a better atmosphere and was favourably noted by the Washington Post.’ MacArthur’s accusations concerning British trade with China drew a speedy response from Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Minister of Trade, in the House of Commons on 7 May. Exports from the UK to China in the first quarter of 1951 were valued at £1,300,000, and it ‘was nonsense to suppose that they have been a factor of any significance in the Korean campaign’. Indeed, small exports of goods (which include no arms, explosives, or other items of direct war value) have, to the best of our knowledge, been absorbed in the Chinese civilian economy, and, indeed, fall far short of her normal civilian needs, aggravated as these have been by years of internal warfare.

Total exports from Hong Kong to China in the same period, amounting to £43 million, were less than half of exports in the first quarter of 1950. They included no petroleum products or anything of strategic importance whatsoever. The amount of rubber exported from Malaya and Singapore through Hong Kong to China had been restricted to what was estimated to be required for civilian use, and since 30 March no tyres had been licensed for export to China. As Spanier points out, even before the 311

Korean Conflict.indb 311

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

Korean War Britain had prohibited the shipment of arms and ammunition to China and had restricted anything that might be of strategic value. Among the items that MacArthur read out at the hearings, he selected cameras. Shawcross observed that one camera was exported to China in the first quarter of 1951. However, MacArthur’s testimony at the hearings continued to give trouble. One piece of evidence led to the direct public intervention of the British government. On 6 May Franks told the Foreign Office that the day before MacArthur had said that it was the UK’s policy to give ‘the complete support of giving Formosa into the hands of a potential Red enemy’, which, when interpreted by public opinion, would be ‘universally understood as meaning that His Majesty’s Government would favour transferring Formosa to the Central People’s Government without delay’. This constituted a dilemma for the British government: ‘[E]ither the matter is left to run its course, in which case this version of His Majesty’s Government’s policy will become American legend (like the fictitious version of Sir John Simon’s Manchurian policy in 1932) or His Majesty’s Government will have to say something definite quickly before the legend crystallises.’ Franks favoured the latter course of action and suggested a statement that could be made in the House of Commons. Its wording stated that, though the government adhered to the 1943 Cairo Declaration by which Formosa should be returned to China, the attitudes and actions of the Central People’s Government in the Korean conflict made a solution difficult. Accordingly, Britain was ‘content to reaffirm the Cairo declaration but to leave any action under it to a date when agreement can be reached among the states concerned’. Cabinet considered Franks’ telegram on 7 May and it was agreed that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should work out the terms of an early statement. Morrison made the statement to the House on 11 May: His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that the objectives of the Declaration can be achieved only in the context of a genuine and satisfactory Far Eastern settlement, the first step towards which must be a settlement in Korea … in our view it would be premature to discuss the future of Formosa so long as the operations continue in Korea. 312

Korean Conflict.indb 312

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

  The question of Formosa will, however, come up in the context of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Our aim here is to secure an early Peace Treaty without allowing the difficult issue of Formosa to delay its negotiation and without attempting in the Treaty to find a final solution to an issue which must be given careful consideration later in the general context of the Far Eastern situation.

Regarding MacArthur’s dismissal, Gifford in London cabled Acheson on 11 May stating that Britain had ‘derived much quiet satisfaction from their unjustified belief that they had played a part in securing his removal’, but the government was ‘wisely observing a discreet silence’ in the matter. However, it seemed nothing could quell the rising tide of criticism in America set off by the hearings. On 11 May the weekly political summary from Washington reported: America’s partners are at the moment in very ill repute. The MacArthur controversy has brought to the surface and exacerbated all the grievances about the other United Nations members … which have been accumulating since the Korean War began … references to ‘the United Nations forces in Korea’ grate on many people who seem to be more irritated with those countries which sent what they regard as insufficient forces (and to most people this means the United Kingdom) than with those which have sent none.   The really disturbing factor, however, has been the flood of condemnation from virtually all quarters which has descended round our heads on the subject of trade with China. No explanations have made – or seem to have a hope of making – any impression.

Sir John Slessor, the Chief of the Air Staff, on his return to Britain from the USA wrote to the Secretary of the Cabinet with a long heartfelt complaint about this condemnation of Britain: No one who knows the United States at all well can fail to be struck by the fact that at this moment, May 1951, misunderstanding, suspicion and 313

Korean Conflict.indb 313

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

dislike of the British is more deep and wide that at any time in the last ten years …   … Throughout the country as a whole the Hearst and McCormick papers, as well as widely heard radio commentators like Walter Winchell, carry on a ceaseless and virulently anti-British campaign. And their poison falls upon a vast field of prejudiced ignorance which has to be experienced to be believed. Even intelligent, civilised people in Washington and New York, who are personally charming and hospitable to individual Englishmen whom they know, talk nonsense about British policy which leaves one gasping …   … These things must be taken seriously today when it is very dangerous indeed to assume that isolationism is dead and buried. The American people are impulsive and a people of extremes and, though they are fundamentally peace-loving, let’s face it, they are capable through ignorance and prejudice of forcing their government to precipitate a war. Isolationism and anti-British sentiment and the ‘hell, let’s get this thing over’ feeling thrives on ignorance, and the ignorance of the British point of view throughout America is appalling … The majority of them believe such poppycock as that ‘the British have had their way as usual and forced Truman to fire MacArthur’ or ‘the British Socialist government is pro-Russian and as near Communist as makes no difference’. They will tell you that sort of thing with a perfectly straight face and patiently refill your cocktail glass when you tell them they are talking nonsense …   Take an example. About the end of April every American paper carried headlines … declaring that Britain had exported – and was still exporting – rubber to the Communist countries. For the next two weeks this was the common talk of dinner parties and cocktail parties in Washington and, no doubt all over the States, and, of course, provided excellent ammunition for Mr Hearst and the egregious Colonel McCormick. With the obvious exceptions of people like the Ambassador, Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Sir William Elliot, the writer never found a single British man or woman who had the faintest idea of the facts or who was in any way qualified to put across the other side of the story. In fact, far 314

Korean Conflict.indb 314

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

too commonly, one found that British people were sharing the indignation of their American friends.

The British government’s policy of waiting for the storm to blow over was the right one. Harriman told Sir Edwin Plowden and Sir Roger Makins on 15 May that he was ‘calm and confident about the outcome’. The hearings would continue ‘for four or five weeks and … in the end the Administration’s case would prevail’. If the administration’s case could improve, so would the British government’s. On 18 May Franks was able to report that ‘though the denunciations in xenophobe quarters can hardly be said to have let up, criticisms by the normally friendly is now less sharp’. But the improvement was less than spectacular, for the following week Franks reported: The real victim of the row seems to be the Allies – especially the United Kingdom – who have been accused of engineering MacArthur’s dismissal (nothing seems to shake that belief); of giving no more than token assistance, and sometimes not even that, in Korea; of hampering strategic decisions (some of General Marshall’s testimony seems to many to bear this out); and of meanwhile defying all moral precepts by aiding the enemy through trading with it.

By 8 June, however, he announced that the effect of the MacArthur enquiry seemed to confirm Truman’s prediction that it would swing public opinion to his side: ‘The latest poll shows that 15 per cent of those who only three or four weeks ago disapproved of General MacArthur’s removal had changed their minds.’ Even more encouraging (despite the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean on 25 May) was his impression that there has been a noticeable let up in criticism of the United Kingdom role in and attitude towards the Far East. The storm over our trade with China seems to have blown itself out, except for the occasional gusts. The heroic stand of the Gloucestershire Battalion had a deep and sobering effect and is still being mentioned in public comment … In general, Anglo-American relations are no longer under the heavy clouds which 315

Korean Conflict.indb 315

04/09/2015 11:40

A KOREAN CONFLICT

darkened them a few weeks ago, and whilst it would be unrealistic to pretend that we will soon be basking in the sunshine of good will and understanding the weather does seem to be improving.

Harriman and Jebb had been correct after all. While it would be wrong to maintain that the British were directly responsible for MacArthur’s dismissal in the sense that their attitude towards him might have influenced Truman’s decision (even if the British had no attitude towards him, Truman would still have had to dismiss him), it would be true to say they made it quite plain – without actually suggesting his removal – that his going would be a blessing. After his final offensive of November 1950 had failed there was scarcely a British voice raised in his defence – from the Prime Minister down, Ministers were critical, particularly Shinwell, the Minister for Defence, and Strachey, the Minister for War, who went so far as to suggest MacArthur’s dismissal if Britain was to continue as part of the UN effort in Korea. The government’s protests to the US about the naval sweep in the Formosan Straits and the proposed air action in Manchuria were thinly veiled arguments against giving MacArthur any further power that would serve his aim of making war against China. The Americans must have known this. The Chiefs of Staff had grave misgivings about his leadership and intentions even before Inchon, and they too made these abundantly clear to the JCS. In their various ways a host of officials – Franks and Gladwyn Jebb in America, Bouchier, Gascoigne and Clutton in Tokyo, Dening and Dixon at the Foreign Office, Adams in Korea – condemned MacArthur’s political pronouncements, strategy and inflated estimates of enemy strength. A Gallup poll of May 1951 suggested that the British public had doubts about his leadership: 72 per cent were against extending the war to China, and more importantly, 55 per cent approved Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur, as opposed to 19 per cent who disapproved. MacArthur’s conviction that the British were ‘largely instrumental’ in his elimination might be attributed to his awareness of their hostility towards his China policy and their leadership of Europe, which in his estimation was absorbing far too much of Washington’s attention and far too many 316

Korean Conflict.indb 316

04/09/2015 11:40

M

a c

ARTH U R

resources. However, although ultimately unprovable, his charge carries more than a grain of truth. Although Shinwell, Franks, Kenneth Younger and Esler Dening later denied any responsibility for MacArthur’s firing, they were keeping up the fiction that the government had strictly refrained from interference. Morrison all but admitted that he was about to broach with Washington the desirability of MacArthur’s dismissal, raised in Strachey’s letter of 6 April, when the news came through of Truman’s courageous action. As it was, the Foreign Secretary had already made it plain to the Americans that the General’s behaviour was intolerable. It must also have occurred to Washington that another folie de grandeur by MacArthur would cause some serious thinking in London about the wisdom of keeping troops in Korea. With America’s most important ally gone, others might follow, and hence the whole United Nations police action would be seen for what it was – an American show.

317

Korean Conflict.indb 317

04/09/2015 11:40

Notes

I

n the time between his death and the publication of this monograph, Dr Ian McLaine’s footnotes cardfile was lost. The notes below are either the results of archival crosschecks by a posthumous editor or marginal notes that could be confirmed. 

 1 Emphasis added.   2 Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan (1988) p.101.   3 Martin Gilbert, ‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill, Vol VIII, 1945–1965 (1988) p.531.   4 The Economist, 8 July 1950.   5 Documents on British Policies Overseas, Series II, Vol IV, p.43.   6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (1970) p.418.   7 Sir David Kelly to Foreign Office, 13 July 1950, Documents on British Policies Overseas, Series II, Vol IV, p.46.   8 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (1970) p.416.   9 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (1970) p.420. 10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (1970) p.420. 11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol VII, p.303. 12 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (1970) p.420. 13 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (1972) p.195. 14 Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflicts, 1946–1964 (1982) Vol II, p.410. 15 US State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 16 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint (1974) p.125, quoting W.E.C. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs 1949–1950 (1957) p.293. 17 Emphasis added. 18 Emphasis added. 19 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol VII, p.297. 318

Korean Conflict.indb 318

04/09/2015 11:40

Bibliography

Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970) –––, Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known (London: Greenwood, 1961) Aldrich, Richard J. (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1992) Alexander, Bevin, Korea: The First War we Lost (London: Hippocrene, 1986) Allison, John M., Ambassador from the Prairie; or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973) Allman, Timothy D., Unmanifest Destiny: Mayhem and Illusion in American Foreign Policy – From the Monroe Doctrine to Reagan’s War in El Salvador (New York: Dial Press, 1984) Ambrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (London: Penguin, 1984) –––, Eisenhower, the President, Volume 2: 1952–1969 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984) Attlee, Clement R., As It Happened (London: Viking, 1954) Bailey, Sydney, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982) Baldwin, Frank (ed.), Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1974) Baldwin, Hanson W., ‘China as a Military Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 30, No 1, October 1951 Barclay, Roderick, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office, 1932–1969 (London: Latimer, 1975) Barker, Elisabeth, The British between the Superpowers, 1945–50 (London: MacMillan, 1983) Barnet, Richard J., The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983) Bartlett, C.J., ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992) 319

Korean Conflict.indb 319

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

–––, The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers, 1880–1970 (London: Longman, 1984) Baylis, John, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1984 (London: Palgrave, 1984) Beloff, Max, ‘The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth’, in Martin Gilbert (ed.), A Century of Conflict, 1850–1950: Essays for A.J.P. Taylor (London: Atheneum, 1966) Benn, Tony, Years of Hope: Diaries, Papers and Letters, 1940–1962 (London: Arrow, 1995) Berrington, Hugh B., Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945–55 (London: Elsevier, 1973) Boardman, Robert, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, 1949–74 (London: MacMillan, 1976) Bohlen, Charles E., Witness to History, 1929–1969 (New York: Norton, 1973) Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) Bull, Hedley & Louis, William R. (eds), The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) Bullen, Roger & Pelly, M.E. (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol III: German Rearmament, September–December 1950 (London: HMSO, 1989) Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Norton, 1984) Burchett, Wilfred, At the Barricades (London: Quartet, 1981) Burridge, Trevor, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) Cameron, James, Guardian article, 7 November 1982 –––, BBC radio broadcast, 15 April 1981 –––, Point of Departure (London: Granta, 1967) –––, Picture Post article enclosed in letter from Judd to Jebb, 10 November, 1950 Carlton, David, Anthony Eden: A Biography (London: Viking, 1981) Cecil, Robert, A Divided Life: A Biography of Donald MacLean (London: The Bodley Head, 1988) Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) CIA Report on UK, 7 December 1949 Clark, Mark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954) Clayton James, D., The Years of MacArthur, Vol III: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985) Cumings, Bruce, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton: Cornell University Press, 1990) –––(ed.), Child of Conflict: The Korean–American Relationship, 1943–1953 (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1983) Cutforth, René, Order to View (London: Faber & Faber, 1969) 320

Korean Conflict.indb 320

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

–––, Korean Reporter (London: Wingate, 1952) Danchev, Alex, Oliver Franks: Founding Father (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) Dingman, Roger, ‘Truman, Attlee and the Korean War Crisis’, in Ian Nish (ed.) The East Asian Crisis, 1945–1951, International Studies Papers, Vol. 49 (London: LSE, 1982) Divine, Robert A., Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) Dobbs, Charles M., The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War and Korea, 1945–1950 (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981) Donovan, Robert J., Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984) –––, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982) Douglas, Paul H., ‘United to Enforce Peace’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 30, No 1, October 1951 Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960) Edmonds, Robin, Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1945–1950 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) Eisenhower, Dwight D., The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (London: Doubleday, 1963) Farrar-Hockley, Anthony, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol I: A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990) Farrer, Peter N., ‘Britain’s Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 18, No 2, April 1983 Felton, Monica, That’s Why I Went (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1953) Foot, Michael, Aneurin Bevan: A Biography, Vol II, 1945–1960 (London: Atheneum, 1973) Foot, Rosemary, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985) Franks, Oliver S., Britain and the Tide of World Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) FRUS, 1949: Vol VII, The Far East and Australasia (Washington, 1976) Gaddis, John L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) Galbraith, John Kenneth, A Life in Our Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981) Gilbert, Martin, ‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill, Vol VIII, 1945–1965 (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1988) Goncharov, Sergei N. et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) Gopal, Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol II, 1947–1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) 321

Korean Conflict.indb 321

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gordon, Michael R., Conflicts and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1914–1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) Goulden, Joseph C., Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982) Guttmann, Allen (ed.), Korea: Cold War and Limited War (New York: Heath, 1972) Halliday, Jon, ‘The Unknown War’, The Listener, 23 June 1988 Halliday, Jon & Cumings, Bruce, Korea: The Unknown War (London: Penguin, 1988) Halperin, Morton H., Limited War in the Nuclear Age (Westport, CT: Wiley, 1978) Hastings, Max, The Korean War (New York: Pan, 1987) Heller, Francis H. (ed.), The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1977) Heren, Louis, Memories of Times Past (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988) Hopkinson, Tom, Of This Our Time: A Journalist’s Story, 1905–50 (London: Hutchinson, 1982) Index of Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda Isaacson, Walter & Thomas, Evan, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) James, Robert R., Anthony Eden (London: McGraw-Hill, 1986) Jay, Douglas, Change and Fortune: A Political Record (London: Ebury, 1980) Jebb, H.M.G., The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weybright & Talley, 1972) Jenkins, Roy, Truman (London: Collins, 1986) Jong Yil Ra, ‘Britain and the Korean War, 1950–1954’, PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1971 Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) Kaplan, Lawrence S., A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948–1951 (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1980) Kaufman, Burton I., The Korean War: The Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command (Philadelphia: McGraw-Hill, 1986) Kennan, George F., Memoirs, 1925–1950 (New York: Little, Brown, 1967) Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) Knox, Donald, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory (New York: Harcourt, 1988) Leckie, Robert, The Korean War (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1963) Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) Long, Gavin, MacArthur as Military Commander (Sydney: US Military Academy, 1969) Lowe, Peter, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Addison Wesley, 1986) Luard, Evan, A History of the United Nations, Vol I: The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955 (London: MacMillan, 1982) 322

Korean Conflict.indb 322

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

–––, Britain and China (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962) MacDonald, Callum A., Korea: The War before Vietnam (London: Free Press, 1987) McDonald, Iverach, The History of The Times, Vol V: Struggles in War and Peace, 1939– 1966 (London: MacMillan, 1984) McLellan, David S., Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976) McLellan, David S. & Acheson, David C. (eds), Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980) MacMillan, Harold, Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955 (London: Harper & Row, 1969) Middlemas, Keith, Power, Competition and the State, Vol I: Britain in Search of Balance, 1940–1961 (London: Hoover, 1986) Mikardo, Ian, Back-Bencher (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988) Morgan, Kenneth O., Labour in Power, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) Mosley, Leonard, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (New York: Hearst, 1982) National Security Council Paper NSC–68 ‘United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’ Nicholas, H.G., The United States and Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) Nitze, Paul H., From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (London: Grove, 1990) O’Neil, Robert, Australia in the Korean War, 1950–53, Vol I: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981) Ovendale, Ritchie (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984) Ovendale, Ritchie J., ‘Britain, the United States and the Recognition of Communist China’, Historical Journal, Vol 26, No 1, 1983 Paige, Glenn D., The Korean Decision, June 24–30, 1950 (New York: Free Press, 1968) Panikkar, Kavalam M., In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955) Pearson, Lester B., Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt Hon Lester B. Pearson, Vol 2, 1948–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) Pelling, Henry, Britain and the Marshall Plan (London: MacMillan, 1988) –––, The Labour Governments, 1945–51 (London: MacMillan, 1984) Porter, Bernard, Britain, Europe and the World, 1850–1982: Delusions of Grandeur (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983) Purifoy, Lewis McCarroll, Harry Truman’s China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947–1951 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976) Quigley, John, The Ruses for War: American Intervention since World War II (New York: Prometheus, 1992) 323

Korean Conflict.indb 323

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rees, David (ed.), The Korean War: History and Tactics (London: Crescent, 1984) –––, Korea: The Limited War (London: St Martin’s Press, 1964) Ridgway, Matthew B., Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974) Rose, Lisle A., Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945–1953 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976) Schaller, Michael, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) –––, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) Schnabel, James F. & Watson, Robert J., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III, the Korean War (Washington: Glazier, 1978) Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988) Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung (London: Pelican, 1971) Sebald, William J., With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (New York: Norton, 1965) Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Report of the Korean War and Related Matters (1955) Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995) Smith, Gaddis, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1972) Smith, Robert, MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor (New York: Book Sales, 1983) Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) Spanier, John W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: Norton, 1965) Sperber, Ann M., Murrow: His Life and Times (London: Fordham University Press, 1986) Stairs, Denis, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) Steel, Ronald, Walter Lippman and the American Century (London: Little, Brown, 1980) Stoessinger, John G., Why Nations Go to War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982) Stokesbury, James L., A Short History of the Korean War (New York: Harper Collins, 1988) Stueck, William, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) –––, ‘An Exchange of Opinion: Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol 42, No 4, 1973 324

Korean Conflict.indb 324

04/09/2015 11:40

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Thompson, Kenneth W., Cold War Theories, Vol I: World Polarization, 1943–1953 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981) Thompson, Reginald, Cry Korea (London: Macdonald, 1952) Thomson, James C. et al., Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New York: HarperCollins, 1981) Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Da Capo Press, 1965) Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) Vaizey, John, The Squandered Peace: The World, 1945–1975 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983) Warner, Geoffrey, ‘The Korean War’, International Affairs, January, 1980 Williams, Philip M. (ed.), The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell, 1945–1956 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983) –––, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) Winnington, Alan, Breakfast with Mao: Memoirs of a Foreign Correspondent (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986) Wolf, David C., ‘“To Secure a Convenience”: Britain Recognizes China – 1950’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 18, No 2, April, 1983 Yasamee, H.J. & Hamilton, K.A. (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol IV: Korea, June 1950–April 1951 (London: HMSO, 1991)

325

Korean Conflict.indb 325

04/09/2015 11:40

Index

38th Parallel 32, 52, 160, 178, 201–36; and Chinese intervention 240–1, 244–5, 253, 258, 263; and diplomatic bargaining 180, 187, 193; and MacArthur’s role 271, 287, 289–91, 294, 296, 299, 303 abstentions 126–7, 235, 280 Abyssinia 116, 175 Acheson, D. 3, 7–8, 11, 13, 18–19; and British governmental views 171; and British rearmament 23–4, 29, 33–4, 42, 44, 46–9; and Chinese Communist role 53–4, 61–7, 69–74, 76–81, 83–90, 97–8, 100–4, 107; and Chinese intervention 238, 245, 247, 251, 253, 257–8, 260–5, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 177–89, 191–3, 195–9; and Korean policy implementation 108, 111, 114, 116, 118, 128, 133, 135–8, 141–4, 147; and MacArthur’s role 274, 278, 280–1, 285, 287, 289, 292, 294, 304–5, 307–8, 313; and UN invasion forces 211, 228–30, 233–5 Adams, A.C.S. 173, 275–6, 316 Adenauer, K. 48 Afghanistan 114 Africa 189 aid 3–4, 10–13, 35, 38, 42; and British rearmament 44, 46, 51; and Chinese

Communist role 67, 72–3, 75, 91, 106; and Chinese intervention 253; and Korean policy implementation 127, 129, 136 Alexander, H. 197 allies 4, 9, 17, 30, 64, 78, 90, 109, 113, 117 Allison, J. 141 ambassadors 2–4, 14, 20–1, 23–4, 29; and British governmental views 172; and British rearmament 33, 41–2, 44, 47; and Chinese Communist role 55, 61–2, 67, 69, 87; and Chinese intervention 241, 246, 251, 256–60; and diplomatic bargaining 176–8, 182, 187–8, 190, 192–3, 196, 200; and Korean policy implementation 108, 117–18, 126, 133–4, 136, 143–4; and MacArthur’s role 269, 276, 288–9, 295, 308, 314; and UN invasion forces 202, 204–6, 221, 226–9, 235 American Military Advisory Group 159 American Revolution 91 Americans 1–4, 6, 8–20, 22–5, 27; and British governmental views 155, 158–9, 161–2, 164–5, 169, 171, 173, 175; and British rearmament 30, 35–40, 42, 44, 46–50, 52; and Chinese Communist role 53–107;

326

Korean Conflict.indb 326

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

and Chinese intervention 237–8, 240–7, 249, 252–3, 255–60, 262–8; and diplomatic bargaining 176–8, 180–5, 187–92, 194–9; and Korean policy implementation 108–14, 116–26, 128–38, 140, 142–7; and MacArthur’s role 269, 271, 273, 275, 277–82, 285, 287–8, 290, 295–6, 298–9, 301–2, 304–5, 308–13, 315–17; and UN invasion forces 201–2, 204–23, 225–36 anglophiles 70 anglophobes 25, 43, 256 Angola 114 appeasement 45, 81, 115, 185, 219, 255, 257, 308, 310 Article 51  77, 126–7, 202 Asia 27, 37, 54, 57–8; and British governmental views 168; and Chinese Communist role 60, 63, 74–5, 77–8, 80, 87–9, 91–2, 94, 99, 102, 113; and Chinese intervention 242, 249, 255, 263; and diplomatic bargaining 179, 181, 183, 188–9, 194–5, 197–200; and Korean policy implementation 116, 124, 133, 138; and MacArthur’s role 269–70, 277–8, 280, 283, 286, 288, 305; and UN invasion forces 204, 212, 227, 231, 234 Asquith, H.H. 1 Associated Press 9 Atlantic community 18, 21–2, 25, 39, 184, 208 Atlantic Council see North Atlantic Council Atlantic Pact 34 atomic weapons 13, 16–17, 28, 31, 39–41; and British governmental views 151, 161; and British rearmament 43; and Chinese

Communist role 69, 85; and Chinese intervention 248–9; and Korean policy implementation 123, 130; and MacArthur’s role 277, 280, 289; and UN invasion forces 202, 218 atrocities 153, 155, 163, 166–7, 170, 173, 175, 240, 243 Attlee, C. 2–3, 5, 8–9, 13, 24–6; and British rearmament 32, 35–6, 38, 44, 46–7, 52; and Chinese Communist role 90–2, 95, 99; and Chinese intervention 257; and diplomatic bargaining 179, 186, 190–5, 198; and governmental views on conflict 150–1, 154; and Korean policy implementation 115, 119–20, 122, 131, 135–6, 138–40; and MacArthur’s role 272, 277–9, 285, 289, 301; and UN invasion forces 204, 214, 216, 225 Attorney General 148, 150–5, 157 Austin, W. 234, 264 Australia 60, 96, 120, 228, 235, 268, 289 Australians 163–4, 168, 174 Austria 280 Bailey, S. 232 Bajpai, G. 188–9, 191–3, 196–8, 217, 219, 221, 228 balance of payments 50 Balluseck, D.J. von 234 Barrymore, E. 309 Battle, L. 269 BBC 169, 172 Beckett, E. 126–7 Belgium 175 Berlin air lift 3, 16, 28, 120 Berlin blockade 13, 15–16, 26, 28–9, 124, 187 Bermuda 91

327

Korean Conflict.indb 327

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Bevan, A. 6, 13, 25–6, 38, 42–3 Bevin, E. 2–3, 5, 11–13, 18, 21–3; and British rearmament 34–5, 46–9; and Chinese Communist role 58–60, 62, 65–9, 71, 74, 77–8, 86, 91–2, 96–101, 103–7; and Chinese intervention 238–9, 242–3, 245, 251–5, 258–67; and diplomatic bargaining 177–83, 185, 187, 198–9; and governmental views on conflict 166; and Korean policy implementation 109, 119, 134, 138–9, 141, 146; and MacArthur’s role 270, 274, 278–80, 290, 302; and UN invasion forces 202, 208, 210–11, 214–21, 225–7, 230, 232, 236 Bidault, G. 91 blackmail 182–3, 185, 222, 285 blockades 15–16, 26, 28, 68, 73, 106–7, 124, 187, 283–4, 296–7 Boer War 157 Boheman, E. 256–7 Bohlen, C. 4, 29, 41–2, 76, 179–80 Bolsheviks 31, 90 Bouchier, C. 139, 212, 275, 287, 298, 305, 316 Bradley, General 37, 120, 131, 134, 139, 159, 205, 246–7, 276–7, 300, 305 Braving Death Society 112 Brazil 235 Briggs, H. 139 Briggs Plan 139 Britain see Great Britain British 1–5, 7–9, 11–14, 17, 19; and Chinese Communist role 53–107; and Chinese intervention 238–9, 242, 245–8, 251–3, 255–61, 263–8; and diplomatic bargaining 176–200; and governmental views on conflict 148–9, 151–2, 155–7, 160–1, 163–6, 170–3, 175; and Korean policy

implementation 108, 111–12, 114, 116–21, 123–5, 127–31, 133, 135–42, 144, 146; and MacArthur’s role 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280–2, 284, 287, 289–90, 294, 296–8, 300–4, 307–12, 314–17; and rearmament 22–3, 25–6, 28, 30, 32–7, 39, 41–4, 48, 50–2, 134; and UN invasion forces 202, 205–6, 208, 210–13, 215–21, 223–4, 227, 234, 236 British Army 39, 171–2 British Empire 7 British Joint Services Mission 120 British Peace Committee 160 Brodie, T. 172 Brook, N. 153–4 Broustra, V. 265 Bruce, D. 21–2, 117 buffer zones 259–61, 263, 265 bureaucracy 48, 56 Burgess, G. 156, 162, 316 Burma 95, 120, 189, 278 Butler, R.A.B. 119, 160 Cabinet 6–8, 12, 17–18, 21–2, 25; and British rearmament 31, 33, 35, 38–9, 41, 46, 48–9, 51; and Chinese Communist role 55, 58–60, 66–7, 92–6, 98, 103–4, 106; and Chinese intervention 238, 245, 251–2, 254–5, 259; and diplomatic bargaining 181, 184, 186–7; and governmental views on conflict 148, 150–1, 153–7, 161–2, 175; and Korean policy implementation 112–19, 127, 130–1, 133–4, 136, 142; and MacArthur’s role 280, 288, 290, 295, 303–4, 312–13; and UN invasion forces 208, 210, 212, 216, 218, 225, 236 Cairo Conference 86 Cairo Declaration 179, 182, 312

328

Korean Conflict.indb 328

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Cameron, J. 167, 169–71, 175 Campbell, J.R. 156 Canada 116, 232–6, 246 capitalism 1–52, 103 Caribbean 236 Carroll, L. 148 Carter, P.L. 138 Cavell, E. 157 ceasefires 177–8, 190, 232–4, 254, 257–8, 281, 288 censorship 164, 167 Central America 30, 236 Central Europe 269 Chamberlain, N. 151, 154 Chang Myon 258, 260 Cheju-do 285–6 Chiang Kai-shek 54, 65, 67–8, 70, 75–9; and Chinese Communist role 84–5, 88, 91, 101; and Chinese intervention 238, 261; and diplomatic bargaining 182; and Korean policy implementation 146; and MacArthur’s role 278–80, 283; and UN invasion forces 222 Chiefs of Staff 17, 28, 39, 52, 67; and Chinese Communist role 88–90, 92–3; and Chinese intervention 237, 245–8, 254–6, 258–9, 267–8; and Korean policy implementation 131, 133, 136, 139; and MacArthur’s role 270–1, 273, 276–8, 281–5, 287–8, 290–4, 299–301, 303–4, 313, 316; and UN invasion forces 202, 205–6, 212–14, 216–18, 224–6 China 16–17, 34, 51–2, 108–9, 270; and British governmental views 151, 154, 158, 161–2; and Communist role 53–107; and diplomatic bargaining 176–9, 181–200; intervention of 237–68; and Korean policy implementation 113–14, 118–19, 125,

133, 138, 141, 143, 146–7; and MacArthur’s role 278–81, 283–5, 288, 292, 294–5, 297–305, 307–8, 310–13, 316; and UN invasion forces 201–2, 207–8, 212–14, 217–18, 220–2, 228–9, 236 China Consular Service 158 Chinese 125, 130–1, 133–4, 201, 270–4; and British governmental views 156; and diplomatic bargaining 181–4, 187; intervention of 237–68; and MacArthur’s role 277–83, 287–8, 290–2, 295–9, 301–3, 305–6, 310; and Nationalist role 54, 65–6, 68–9, 72–3, 75, 78–9, 85–6, 88, 90, 106, 125, 197, 252, 261, 279, 283–4, 298; and UN invasion forces 204, 208, 211, 214–16, 219–22, 224–7, 229–30, 232–4, 236 Chinese Empire 252 Chongju 260–1, 265 Chou En-lai 185, 218, 220, 222, 228–30, 238, 240, 252, 258, 271 Christianity 269 Churchill, W. 1–2, 30–2, 35–7, 45, 47–8; and Chinese Communist role 92, 105; and Korean policy implementation 108, 140–1; and MacArthur’s role 304, 310 CIA 4–7, 14, 28, 33, 37; and British rearmament 43; and Chinese Communist role 63, 75, 79–80, 82, 86, 88–9, 96–7; and Chinese intervention 240–1, 244, 249–51, 261; and diplomatic bargaining 199; and Korean policy implementation 111 civil service 130, 144, 158, 162 civil wars 18, 30, 64, 67, 78–9; and Chinese intervention 250; and

329

Korean Conflict.indb 329

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Korean policy implementation 112, 117, 121, 124, 128; and MacArthur’s role 280; and UN invasion forces 203, 210, 222, 229 Clubb, E. 76, 229–30, 244, 248, 250 Clutton, G.L. 120, 273–4, 290, 316 Cold War 4, 11, 14, 16, 69, 78, 110, 124, 156, 181 collective security principle 280, 286 Collins, General 285, 287 Colombo Conference 60 colonies 12, 37, 55, 57, 59; and Chinese Communist role 61, 75, 93–7; and diplomatic bargaining 189, 295; and Korean policy implementation 133, 136, 139; and UN invasion forces 205 Cominform 98 Commonwealth 7, 19–22, 34, 44, 51; and Chinese Communist role 55, 57–8, 60, 94–6, 103; and Chinese intervention 255; and diplomatic bargaining 200; and Korean policy implementation 127, 129, 134, 137; and MacArthur’s role 279, 296–7 Commonwealth Relations Office 126 communism 2–4, 6, 8, 11, 16–17; and British governmental views 149, 151–2, 155–6, 158–61, 163, 165–8, 171, 173; and British rearmament 26–7, 29, 31–3, 38, 40, 43, 45; and Chinese intervention 240–1, 244, 250, 252, 255–7, 261, 265, 268; and Chinese state role 53–107; and diplomatic bargaining 176–9, 181–4, 186–90, 192–200; and Korean policy implementation 111–14, 116, 118–20, 122–4, 130–3, 136, 139, 143–6; and MacArthur’s role 270,

273, 277, 280, 282, 286, 291, 294, 296, 298, 304–5, 310, 315; and UN invasion forces 204–5, 208, 212–13, 221, 228–9, 231 concentration camps 157 Confédération Générale du Travail 146 Congress 15, 25, 32, 36, 71; and British governmental views 149; and Chinese Communist role 76, 86–7; and Chinese intervention 251; and Korean policy implementation 146; and MacArthur’s role 280, 308–9 Congress Party 63 conscription 39 Conservative Party 1, 3, 7, 31, 105, 154–5, 160, 162 conspiracies 120, 122, 158, 251, 270, 305 containment policy 34, 76 covert methods 75, 81, 146, 237, 240 Cripps, S. 2, 4–5, 23, 38, 144 Crossman, R. 2, 6 Cuba 36, 73, 114, 235 currencies 10, 19 Cutforth, R. 172 Czars 56, 123, 204 Czechoslovakia 13, 15–16, 26, 115–16, 120, 124, 169, 212 Daily Telegraph 159, 170, 296, 298, 307 Daily Worker 150–1, 153–4, 161, 164, 170 Dalton, H. 2, 5, 23–4, 36, 157, 210 Davies, E. 167 Davies, J. 76, 250 death penalty 152–3, 157 Defence Department 35, 132, 248, 288, 291 deflation 50 demilitarised zone 254, 260–2, 265 330

Korean Conflict.indb 330

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

democracy 5, 7, 10, 16, 57; and British governmental views 163, 167; and Chinese Communist role 59, 77, 91; and Chinese intervention 243, 254, 259; and Korean policy implementation 109, 116, 120, 122, 133; and MacArthur’s role 269, 280, 306–8; and UN invasion forces 206, 209, 212–13, 221, 227, 230, 235 Democratic Party 74, 144, 263 Den Xia Ping 83 Dening, M.E. 41, 101, 107, 121–2, 183; and diplomatic bargaining 187, 200; and MacArthur’s role 270, 281, 308, 316–17; and UN invasion forces 207 detention without trial 157 Dewey, T. 16, 70 dictatorships 14, 42, 45–6, 63, 77, 115 diplomacy 176, 187, 190–2, 196, 200; and British governmental views 156; and British rearmament 4, 27, 34; and Chinese Communist role 53–4, 61–4, 68, 70, 72, 74, 82, 84, 92, 103–4, 106; and Chinese intervention 238, 240, 259; and Korean policy implementation 109; and MacArthur’s role 305; and UN invasion forces 209, 220–1, 228–9, 234 Director of Public Prosecutions 155 Dirksen, E. 310 Dixon, P. 116, 128, 130, 141, 184, 207, 294, 303, 316 dollar 9, 38, 50 domino theory 95 Douglas, L. 3, 10, 20, 22–5, 42, 47–8, 100–4, 135–8, 178–84 Duclos, J. 146 Dulles, J.F. 15, 70, 76, 158–9 DuPont, C. 151

East Germany 27, 154 Eastern Asia 89 Eastern Europe 30, 99, 123, 169 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 74–5 The Economist 29, 32, 34, 37, 130–1; and British governmental views 152, 155, 157; and MacArthur’s role 272, 304, 308–9; and UN invasion forces 202, 208 economy 1–6, 9–13, 17, 19–20, 23–6; and British governmental views 162; and British rearmament 28, 33, 36–7, 40, 42–3, 50–1; and Chinese Communist role 55–6, 65, 67–8, 75, 80–1, 83, 93, 96–8, 101–2, 104, 107; and Chinese intervention 244, 260; and diplomatic bargaining 185, 197; and Korean policy implementation 109–12, 120, 122, 129, 132, 135–6, 144–5; and MacArthur’s role 284, 308, 311; and UN invasion forces 213, 218, 235 Ecuador 73 Ede, C. 310 Eden, A. 160 Egypt 73 Egyptians 157 Eighth Army 272, 274, 282, 287, 306 Eisenhower, D.D. 277 elections 7–8, 15, 71, 111, 147; and Chinese intervention 239, 243, 251, 267; and MacArthur’s role 307; and UN invasion forces 209, 211, 213–14, 219–22, 230–2, 235 Elliot, W. 138–9, 274, 315 Emmerson, J. 249, 260 Engen, H. 231–2 England 150, 269, 301 English Channel 26, 31, 37, 220 Eritrea 7

331

Korean Conflict.indb 331

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

espionage 8, 146; see also spies Ethiopia 280 Europe 2, 4, 6, 13–14, 17; and British rearmament 19–23, 26–31, 33–5, 37–40, 43–51; and Chinese Communist role 54, 75, 82, 91; and Chinese intervention 242–3, 250, 265; and diplomatic bargaining 184, 186, 197; and Korean policy implementation 123–5, 129, 132, 135–6, 142; and MacArthur’s role 269, 277, 283, 286, 294, 305, 316; and UN invasion forces 206, 212, 227 European Recovery Programme 50 ‘excesses’ 165, 171 Execution Hill 172 Fairbanks, D. Jr. 309 famine 83 Far East 26, 29–32, 40–1, 50, 54; and British governmental view 158, 162, 170, 174–5; and Chinese Communist role 57, 59, 61, 69, 74–5, 77–9, 90, 92, 95, 101–3, 105–6; and Chinese intervention 240, 246, 248, 257, 259, 263, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 180, 182, 184, 194, 200; and Korean policy implementation 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123–4, 130–1, 141, 143–4, 146; Land Forces 120; and MacArthur’s role 270, 275, 280, 291, 293–4, 304–6, 308, 312–13, 316; and UN invasion forces 201, 210, 223, 225, 228, 232 Far Eastern Station 290 fascism 144–6 feint theory 28–9, 32 fellow travellers 158, 169, 222, 282 Felton, M. 154–8, 161, 163 fifth columnists 45, 112, 144 Finland 41

Fleet Street 170 foot-in-the-door policy 53, 65–7, 92, 97, 106 Foreign Office 2–3, 7–9, 12, 17, 29; and British rearmament 39–40, 42, 45; and Chinese Communist role 54, 58, 66–8, 71–3, 77, 85, 92, 100–1; and Chinese intervention 264; and diplomatic bargaining 181, 183–4, 186, 191, 197–8; and governmental views on conflict 148, 158, 160–5, 167, 171, 173, 175; and Korean policy implementation 108–13, 116, 118, 120, 123–4, 126, 128, 133, 138, 143–5; and MacArthur’s role 271, 275–6, 281, 288, 295–6, 300, 305, 308, 310, 312, 316; and UN invasion forces 202–4, 206–11, 224 Foreign Office Legal Adviser 148–50, 202–3, 209 Formosa 114, 159, 238, 242, 250; and Chinese Communist role 54, 66–7, 71–3, 75, 85–90, 92, 107; and Chinese intervention 257–9; and diplomatic bargaining 176, 178–9, 181–6, 189–90, 193, 200; and Korean policy implementation 114, 116, 118–19, 131, 134, 141, 147; and MacArthur’s role 281, 291–2, 295, 298, 305, 310, 312–13; and UN invasion forces 219 Formosa Straits 89, 182, 193, 317 France 23, 31, 33, 37–8, 41; and British rearmament 47–51; and Chinese Communist role 59, 73, 94; and Chinese intervention 265; and diplomatic bargaining 187; and Korean policy implementation 117, 120–1, 124, 131, 143; and MacArthur’s role 290; and UN invasion forces 205, 208, 211

332

Korean Conflict.indb 332

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Franco, F. 91, 146 Franks, O. 2–3, 8–9, 15–16, 25, 30; and British rearmament 32–3, 37, 43–4, 48; and Chinese Communist role 64–6, 68–70, 82, 84, 86–8, 91, 104–5; and Chinese intervention 242–3, 245, 259–60, 262, 266; and diplomatic bargaining 177–8, 180–1, 185, 195, 199; and Korean policy implementation 108, 112, 116, 118, 129–36, 140, 142–7; and MacArthur’s role 270–1, 274, 278, 281, 289–90, 295, 299–302, 305, 307–12, 316–17; and UN invasion forces 202–5, 223–4, 226–7 French Revolution 91 Fuchs, K. 8, 156 Gaitskell, H. 23, 38, 144 Galbraith, J.K. 61, 75–6 Gallup polls 39, 46, 105, 149, 242, 316 Gandhi, M.K. 197 Gascoigne, A. 115, 121–2, 133, 222–4, 274, 316 Gaulle, C. de 22, 146 gendarmerie scheme 47–8 General Assembly 203, 209, 211, 214–16, 218–21, 223, 226–7, 232–3, 235 Germany 18, 23, 26, 30–1, 36, 46–51, 112, 208, 220, 250 Gestapo 155 Gifford, W.S. 280, 313 Gladstone, W. 156 Gloucestershire Battalion 316 Graves, H.A. 217, 289 Great Britain 2–4, 6–7, 10, 12–13, 15; and Chinese Communist role 53–107; and Chinese intervention 242–3, 252, 254, 261, 265; and diplomatic bargaining 177–8, 181,

186–8, 190, 192, 194, 200; and governmental views on conflict 149–51, 153, 160, 165–6, 170, 172; and Korean policy implementation 109, 114, 119–20, 130, 132, 135–6, 138, 143, 145; and MacArthur’s role 288, 298, 300, 304, 307–8, 310, 312–13, 315, 317; and rearmament 17, 19–20, 22–6, 31–3, 35, 38–9, 41–2, 44, 48, 50; and UN invasion forces 201, 208, 216, 219, 227, 229, 232, 236 Great Depression 145 Great Powers 49–50, 123, 145, 228 Greece 18 Gromyko, A. 14, 123, 177–8, 180, 186–7, 190–1 Gross, E. 281 Guardian 169 guerrillas 93, 121, 164, 230, 237, 279, 283, 296 ‘guns or butter’ 35 halfway house 1–52 Hangnum 261 Harding, General 139 Hardy, B. 168–9 Harriman, A. 4, 20, 32–4, 132, 204, 289, 305, 316–17 Healey, D. 23 Hearst, W.R. 315 Henderson, L. 61, 188–9, 191–3, 195–7, 199–200, 219–22, 228, 256 Heren, L. 165 Hickenlooper, B. 311 Hitler, A. 14, 26, 31, 36, 45, 114–15, 119, 151, 155 Ho Chi Minh 124, 181 Hobhouse, E. 157 Hodge, General 109, 112 Holland see Netherlands, the 333

Korean Conflict.indb 333

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Holmes, J. 7, 19, 49, 100, 102, 117, 183, 264 Hong Kong 54–6, 59, 92–8, 102, 118; and Chinese intervention 237, 240, 256; and Korean policy implementation 130–1, 133–4, 136, 138–40; and MacArthur’s role 279, 284, 310–11 Hopkinson, T. 164–5, 169–70 House of Commons 6, 25, 30, 35, 38, 46–8, 140; and Chinese intervention 266; and diplomatic bargaining 186; and governmental views on conflict 152, 155, 157, 159, 162, 167, 170; and Korean policy implementation 115, 127, 136; and MacArthur’s role 289, 307, 311–12 House Foreign Affairs Committee 85 House of Representatives 298, 305 Hulton, E. 170 Hungnam 260, 265 Hutchison, J.C. 184, 258–9 hysteria 16, 25, 52, 146, 200, 221 ideology 2–3, 16, 18, 53, 73–4; and Chinese Communist role 77, 79, 92, 98, 104, 107; and Chinese intervention 244, 250; and Korean policy implementation 111; and UN invasion forces 213 ILP 159–60 imperialism 38, 46, 72, 87, 89, 98, 118–19, 176, 189, 197 Inchon 141, 187, 201–2, 210, 212–13; and Chinese intervention 246, 248; and MacArthur’s role 271, 316; and UN invasion forces 222, 224, 226, 230 independence movements 57, 99 India 55, 57–64, 89, 92, 94; and Chinese Communist role 99; and Chinese intervention 241, 254–5,

259; and diplomatic bargaining 176, 187–200; and Korean policy implementation 108, 120; and UN invasion forces 212, 216–17, 219–22, 226, 228–32, 236 Indochina 57, 124, 181, 189, 239, 279, 290 industrialisation 83 inflation 7, 50–1, 83, 110 intelligence reports 2, 37, 39–40, 240, 262, 271, 277, 297 international law 128, 150, 154 international relations 14, 41, 57 isolationism 49, 70, 252, 310, 315 Italy 127, 228 Japan 27, 54, 74–5, 85, 89; and British governmental views 163–4, 171; and Chinese intervention 239, 250, 262, 268; and diplomatic bargaining 184, 195; and Korean policy implementation 108–9, 112, 122–4, 130; and MacArthur’s role 269–70, 273, 275, 279, 281–4, 286, 293, 305–6, 308, 310, 313 Japanese 85–7, 89, 108–10, 118, 167, 174, 220, 236, 252 Jebb, G. 17, 116, 126, 170, 232; and Chinese intervention 263–4; and MacArthur’s role 274, 288, 294, 308–9, 315–17 Jessup, P. 20–1, 37, 131, 134, 205, 227, 238–9, 257–8, 261 Jews 61, 76, 155 Johnson, C. 34 Johnson, L. 159 Joint Chiefs of Staff see Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee 39–40 journalists 149, 163–4, 166–7, 171, 210, 272 Jowitt, W. 150

334

Korean Conflict.indb 334

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Judd, C.W. 170 just war 162 Kassaniev, V. 231–2 Kee, J. 85 Kelly, D. 14–15, 123, 177–80, 182, 186–7, 190–1, 198, 205–7 Kennan, G. 76–7, 118, 179, 202–3, 229, 236, 248 Khabarovsk 180 Khrushchev, N. 14 Kim Il-sung 115, 238 Kirk, A.G. 14–15, 41–2, 70, 190–2, 205–6, 231, 251, 260, 263 Kirkpatrick, I. 48 Knowland, W.F. 77, 82–3, 87 Korea 108–9, 113–16, 118–26, 130–40, 147; and British governmental views 151, 154–5, 166–71; and Chinese intervention 237–42, 244–5, 247–51, 253–8, 260–2, 265–7; and diplomatic bargaining 176–80, 182–3, 185, 187–92, 194, 196–9; and MacArthur’s role 270–93, 295–6, 298–300, 302–6, 311–13, 316–17; and UN invasion forces 201, 203–7, 209–18, 221, 223–7, 229–31, 233–4, 236 Korean Army 173 Korean War 1, 25–8, 30–2, 34–7, 39–43; and British governmental views 148–53, 158–60, 162–3, 175; and British rearmament 46, 48, 50–1; and Chinese Communist role 53, 55–6, 58, 60, 64, 68, 76, 80, 85–7, 90–1; and Chinese intervention 242, 263, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 182, 185, 188, 192–5; and governmental views on conflict 160–1; and MacArthur’s role 290, 297, 306, 311–13; and policy implementation 108, 113, 118, 120,

125, 128–9, 131, 135, 137–8, 141, 143–6; and UN invasion forces 201–2, 206, 217, 221 Koreans 108–12, 117, 204–8, 215, 247–8, 265, 268 Kremlin 16–17, 27, 29, 31, 37; and British rearmament 39–41, 45, 53; and Chinese Communist role 57, 73; and Chinese intervention 240, 251, 260; and diplomatic bargaining 176, 182, 193; and Korean policy implementation 114; and UN invasion forces 232 Kuomintang 56, 63, 75, 78 Labour Party 1–2, 4–7, 9–10, 12, 23–5; and British rearmament 44–5; and Chinese Communist role 58, 92, 100; and Chinese intervention 265; and diplomatic bargaining 176; and governmental views on conflict 151, 154–5, 160, 162; and Korean policy implementation 115; and UN invasion forces 225 League of Nations 116 Lenin, V.I. 91 Liaison Mission in Japan 273 Lippmann, W. 63, 70, 77–8 living standards 5, 7, 19, 26, 35, 37–8, 43, 46, 93 Lockhart, B. 108, 204 Lovett, R. 247, 261, 292–4 MacArthur, General D. 27, 54–7, 68, 85, 89–90; and British governmental views 159–62; and Chinese intervention 237–40, 242–3, 245–8, 253–6, 258–9, 261–8; and diplomatic bargaining 200; fall of 269–317; and Korean policy implementation 109, 116, 122,

335

Korean Conflict.indb 335

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

130, 138–9; and UN invasion forces 201–2, 211–14, 219, 222–5, 227–30, 232–3, 235–6 ‘MacArthuritis’ 295, 303 McCarthy, J. 69–71, 76, 144, 146 McCormick, R. 315 MacDonald, M. 55, 103 McGovern, G. 114 Maclean, D. 156, 162, 316 Macmillan, H. 153, 176 McNair, J. 159–60 Makins, R. 225, 316 Malaya 3, 54, 95, 120, 133–4, 136, 138–9, 149, 311 Malik, J. 125, 138 malnutrition 174 maltreatment 174 Manchester Guardian 307 Manchuria 74–5, 83, 116, 141, 175; and Chinese intervention 238, 241–2, 244, 246–9, 254, 256, 260, 262; and MacArthur’s role 271, 274, 277, 280, 282, 290, 299–300, 303, 312, 316; and UN invasion forces 212, 217, 222, 226–7 Mao Tse-tung 53, 181, 185, 193, 242; and diplomatic bargaining 181, 185, 193; policy of 56, 59, 64, 67, 74–5, 78–9, 81, 83–5, 97–9, 101, 104; and UN invasion forces 230 Marshall, G. 15, 220, 224, 252, 256, 270, 285, 305, 316 Marshall Plan 2 Martel, G. 108, 204 Martin, J.W. 305 Marxism 55, 57 Marxism–Leninism 53, 98, 145 Masaryk, J. 15–16 mass executions 171–4 massacres 164 Massigli, R. 117

mediation 187, 190, 192, 199 Menon, K. 58–9, 192, 196 Menzies, R. 198 mercenaries 138 Merchant, L. 107 Mexico 161, 236, 251 Middle East 34, 40, 125, 136, 286, 304 military 1, 3–5, 7–9, 13–14, 16–19; and British governmental views 157–8, 165; and British rearmament 26–8, 30, 32–4, 38, 40, 42–3, 51; and Chinese Communist role 55, 57, 60–1, 67, 72–3, 75, 77, 83, 85–90, 95, 97, 104, 106–7; and Chinese intervention 237–8, 240–4, 246, 248–50, 253–5, 258, 260–4, 266–8; and diplomatic bargaining 180, 182, 187, 193, 200; and Korean policy implementation 109–10, 113, 115–16, 118, 121–2, 124, 129–34, 136–41, 145; and MacArthur’s role 272–5, 277–80, 282–3, 286–7, 289–90, 292–3, 295–301, 303–4, 306–7; and UN invasion forces 201, 203, 208–9, 211–13, 216–17, 219, 223–4, 228–30, 232–4, 236 Molotov, V. 14, 91 Monroe Doctrine 9 Montgomery, B. 56, 108 morale 48, 88, 139, 172, 265, 272, 277–8, 281, 285, 287, 290–1 Morgan, J.P. 151 Morrison, H. 5, 159–60, 295, 300–2, 304, 307–8, 312, 317 Moscow Agreement 109 Mosley, O. 157 Muccio, J. 172–3 Muggeridge, M. 136, 140, 161, 269 Munich Agreement 114–15, 117, 125, 175, 181, 255, 280 Murphy, R. 269 336

Korean Conflict.indb 336

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

National Assembly 173 National Executive Committee (NEC) 23–4, 44–5 National Guard 284 National Security Council 14, 28, 79, 81–2, 130, 286 nationalisation 1–2, 7–8, 92 NATO 18, 25, 29, 32, 34–6; and British rearmament 42–3, 47–9, 51; and Chinese Communist role 79; and Korea policy implementation 126; Pact 3, 127; and UN invasion forces 202 Nazism 28, 31, 45, 115 negotiations 1, 18, 41, 47, 49; and Chinese Communist role 96; and Chinese intervention 242, 250, 254, 257–65; and diplomatic bargaining 176–7, 182, 187, 191, 198; and MacArthur’s role 277, 279, 281, 284, 289, 293, 295–6, 300, 303, 308, 313; and UN invasion forces 201, 206, 208, 225–6, 234 Nehru, J. 55, 57, 60–3, 83, 95; and Chinese Communist role 100; and Chinese intervention 254, 259; and diplomatic bargaining 188–200; and Korea policy implementation 147; and UN invasion forces 204, 216–21, 226, 228–9 Netherlands, the 59, 94, 124, 205, 222, 232, 234–5 neutral states 149, 189, 199 New Statesman 26, 37, 115, 134, 138, 141, 156, 271, 287, 308 New York Times 137, 172, 256 New Zealand 95 News Department 162–3 Nicaragua 114 Nicolson, H. 36, 160, 308 Nieh Yen-jung 217–18, 220

Nitze, P. 51, 248, 289–90, 300, 306 non-aligned movement 57, 61, 188–9 North America 9 North Atlantic Council 47, 49 North Korea 15, 26–8, 30, 36, 39–41; and British governmental views 148–51, 153–5, 157–9, 163–4; and Chinese intervention 237, 240, 242–3, 247, 250, 253–6, 258, 265; and diplomatic bargaining 182, 186–90, 194–6; and MacArthur’s role 289, 294, 299; and policy implementation 111–13, 115–18, 121, 123–4, 127–8, 142; and UN invasion forces 202–3, 205–6, 208–11, 213–15, 217–18, 220–6, 229–30, 232, 234–6 North Koreans 114, 117–19, 121, 128, 147; and British governmental views 161, 164–7, 169, 174; and Chinese intervention 240–2, 261–2; and diplomatic bargaining 176–8, 180–1, 185, 187, 193–5, 198–9; and MacArthur’s role 272; and UN invasion forces 201, 204, 207, 209–12, 217, 219, 221, 228, 230–1, 233, 235–6 Northumberland Fusiliers 172, 174 Norway 29, 231, 235 Nye, A. 228 Office of Chinese Affairs 244 Office of Intelligence Research 27 Office of Northeast Asian Affairs 141 Okinawa 89 opinion polls 39, 46, 105, 149, 242, 316 Osborne, J. 165 Oxford, University of 191 Pacific 54, 57, 85–6, 116, 270 Pakistan 89, 235 Palmerston, Lord 130

337

Korean Conflict.indb 337

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Panikkar, K.M. 55, 191, 217–18, 222, 226, 230, 235–6, 240–1, 259, 271 Paris Conference 91, 207 Parliament 32, 45–6, 150, 152, 162, 178, 266–7, 276 Parodi, A. 117 Patel, S. 200 Pearl Harbor 249, 281, 288 Pearson, L. 116, 233–5, 274, 288 Pentagon 8, 32, 86, 246–7, 261, 263, 269, 271, 275, 300 Perkins, G. 129 Philippines 89, 235, 239 phlegmatism 17, 117, 167 Picture Post 164, 167, 169–70 Platts-Mills, J. 6 plebiscites 232 Pleven, R. 51 Plimsoll, J. 27, 164, 168, 174, 268 Plowden, E. 316 Poland 28, 120 police action 116, 128–9, 135, 148–50, 153–4, 163–5, 202, 213, 267, 317 Policy Planning Staff 248 political prisoners 164, 168, 174 Portugal 127 post-colonialism 55, 58, 201 Potsdam Conference/Declaration 86, 182 Pratt, J. 158–63 Pratt, W. 158 Press Club 79 prestige 15, 20, 27, 69, 75; and Chinese Communist role 82, 89, 94–6; and diplomatic bargaining 178; and Korea policy implementation 118, 122–4; and MacArthur’s role 282, 305 prisoners of war 108, 164–5, 228 Pritt, D. 2, 6 profiteering 83, 110

proletariat 56 propaganda 18, 42, 45, 79, 87; and British governmental views 152, 155, 165–6, 171; and Chinese Communist role 89, 99; and Chinese intervention 237, 243, 249; and diplomatic bargaining 197; and Korea policy implementation 138; and MacArthur’s role 273, 285; and UN invasion forces 204, 214 Public Accounts Committee 157 public opinion 15, 36, 39, 42, 46; and British governmental views 149–50, 170; and British rearmament 51; and Chinese Communist role 61, 71, 96, 105; and Chinese intervention 249; and diplomatic bargaining 194; and Korea policy implementation 134, 136–7, 141, 147; and MacArthur’s role 280–1, 312, 316; and UN invasion forces 206 Pusan 133, 165, 168, 177, 207, 275, 281, 283 Quaker Movement 160, 197 Radhakrishnan, S. 190–2, 198 Rajagopalachari, C. 196 recession 12 Red Army 124 Red Cross 171 refugees 93, 111, 165, 275 Republican Party 16–17, 63, 70, 86, 129, 298, 305, 308 resolutions 117, 119, 125–7, 149, 159; and Chinese intervention 243, 245, 256–7, 259–60, 263–4, 266; and diplomatic bargaining 178, 188–9, 196–7; and MacArthur’s role 288; and UN invasion forces 201–3, 208–11, 214–21, 223, 226–7, 232–6 338

Korean Conflict.indb 338

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

revolutionaries 56, 79, 84, 90–1, 197, 252, 269, 297 Rhee, S. 88, 91, 109–11, 116, 158–9; and British governmental views 163, 171, 173–5; and Chinese intervention 242–3, 259; and UN invasion forces 204, 210–11, 213, 220, 228, 232 Ridgway, M. 273, 277, 287, 303–4, 306 Ringwalt, A. 64, 99–101, 117, 133, 308 Roberts, F.K. 197–8 Robeson, P. 144 Rockefeller, J. 151 Rommel, E. 304 Roosevelt, F.D. 30, 71 Ross, J.C. 231–2 Rouse, A.G.R. 164 Royal Navy 113, 128–9, 137, 296, 300 Rusk, D. 203, 223–4, 227, 232–4, 243–4; and Chinese intervention 246–7, 249, 256–8, 260–1; and MacArthur’s role 285, 287, 289–90, 294–5, 299–300 Russell, G. 290 Russia 5, 14, 27–9, 34–5, 37–8; and British governmental views 154; and British rearmament 40–1, 45; and Chinese Communist role 53, 55–6, 59, 74, 77–8, 81–2, 84, 87, 90–1, 98; and Chinese intervention 244, 251, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 185, 194; and Korean policy implementation 118, 122–3, 132; and MacArthur’s role 283, 297; and UN invasion forces 205–6, 208, 210, 212–13, 217, 227, 232 Russian Revolution 77 Russians 13–18, 28–9, 36, 40, 72–3; and Chinese Communist role 76; and Chinese intervention 239, 243, 252–3, 260, 262, 268; and

diplomatic bargaining 176–9, 193; and Korean policy implementation 112, 115, 117–20, 123–4, 126; and MacArthur’s role 291, 296–7, 303, 315; and UN invasion forces 201, 204–6, 209–10, 212, 214–15, 218–19, 222, 230–2, 236 Russiphobes 16 sanctions 92, 102, 245, 308 Sargent, O. 54, 68 Sattock, J. 173 Sawbridge, H.R. 163–4 School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 158, 162 Schuman, R. 47–9 Schuman Plan 23–5 Scott, E.J.F. 113, 121 Scott, R.H. 116–17, 173 Sebald, W. 171 Secret Sessions 30–2, 35 sedition 153 Senate 24, 147, 308, 310 Seoul 109, 159, 165, 171–2, 210, 220, 275 Sermon on the Mount 269 Service, J. 76 Seventh Fleet 89, 114, 119, 182–3, 193 Shanghai 55–6, 68, 73, 84, 107, 158 Shattock, J. 276 Shawcross, H. 311–12 Sherman, F. 63, 78, 300 Shinwell, M. 8, 34–6, 51, 94–5, 136, 225, 298, 300, 310, 317 Shone, T. 117 Short, D. 309 Siam 95 Siberia 27, 141, 227, 260 Simon, J. 312 Singapore 103, 311 Sino–Soviet Treaty 72, 106, 252, 297 situation-of-strength philosophy 18

339

Korean Conflict.indb 339

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Slessor, J. 205, 212–13, 254, 278, 281, 287, 313 Slim, W. 213, 225, 271, 299 Smith, B. 244–5, 249–50 Smith, H.A. 82–3, 87 socialism 1–4, 6–7, 10, 20, 22–5, 31, 44–6, 155, 161, 315 Socialist Leader 159 Soskice, F. 148, 155–6; see also Attorney General South Africa 96 South America 236 South Asia 89, 200 South Korea 27, 30, 37, 112–13, 116–18; and British governmental views 158–9, 163–4, 174; and Chinese intervention 244; and diplomatic bargaining 180, 188–9, 195–6; and MacArthur’s role 275; and policy implementation 121–2, 124, 126–7; and UN invasion forces 201–5, 213, 229, 235 South Koreans 111, 121, 127, 153, 155; and British governmental views 164–9, 171, 173, 175; and Chinese intervention 242–4, 247, 260; and MacArthur’s role 279, 282, 296; and UN invasion forces 202, 204, 215, 222–3, 225, 229, 232 Southeast Asia 18, 41, 54–5, 58–61, 94; and Chinese Communist role 71, 92, 95–6, 103, 106; and diplomatic bargaining 194; and Korean policy implementation 120, 124, 131, 134; and UN invasion forces 201 sovereignty 25, 166, 173, 183, 211, 229, 242, 286 Soviet Union 5–6, 13, 15–18, 23, 26–31; and British governmental views 151, 161–2; and British rearmament 33, 35–7, 39–43, 45, 48; and Chinese

Communist role 53, 56, 69, 72, 75–84, 86, 89, 91–2, 96–9, 106–7; and Chinese intervention 237, 239–40, 242, 244, 246, 248–51, 253, 257, 262, 268; and diplomatic bargaining 176–200; and Korean policy implementation 109–11, 113–15, 117–27, 131, 138, 142; and MacArthur’s role 270, 273, 283, 286; and UN invasion forces 203, 206, 208–11, 214, 229, 231–2 Soviet–US Joint Commission 109, 111 Spain 116 Spanier, J.W. 311 Spanish Civil War 203, 210 special relationship 1, 7, 13, 21–2, 25; and Chinese intervention 243; and diplomatic bargaining 180; and Korea policy implementation 125, 131–2, 135–6; and UN invasion forces 224 Spender, P. 60 spies 8, 146 see also espionage Spofford, C. 34, 44, 46 Stairs, D. 236 Stalin, J. 14, 18, 26, 29, 31; and British rearmament 41, 45; and Chinese Communist role 56, 74–6, 78, 81; and diplomatic bargaining 180, 194; and Korea policy implementation 115 Stalinism 81, 89 State Department 9–12, 14, 17, 20–1, 27; and British governmental views 171; and British rearmament 29–30, 41; and Chinese Communist role 61, 64–5, 69, 75–7, 84, 101; and Chinese intervention 238, 240, 247–8, 250, 255–8, 261–3, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 179, 181; and Korean policy implementation

340

Korean Conflict.indb 340

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

110–11, 127–9, 141; and MacArthur’s role 276, 278–9, 288–9, 291, 293–4, 308, 310; and UN invasion forces 202, 211, 217, 223, 226, 229, 231, 233–4 Steel, C.E. 294 Stephenson, R. 56 sterling 4, 9–12, 20, 50 Stevenage Development Corporation 155, 157 Stokes, R. 288 Stone, I.F. 159 Strachey, J. 8–9, 298–300, 317 Strang, W. 15, 20, 117, 142–3, 145; and Chinese Communist role 54–7, 61, 70; and diplomatic bargaining 181, 183, 195; and MacArthur’s role 296; and UN invasion forces 207 Stuart, W.W. 244 Sudan 96 Susk, D. 110 Sweden 256–8 Taegu 173 Taejon 164 Taiwan 85–6, 89–90, 114 tanks 133, 292 taxation 99, 106 Taylor, C. 155 Tedder, Lord 37, 120, 131, 134, 138–9, 205, 246–7, 300 third force 6, 23, 84 Thompson, L. Jr. 76 Thompson, R. 272 Thorez, M. 146 Tibet 253 Time 165 The Times 165, 167–8, 170, 298, 307 Tito, J.B. 16, 53, 81, 83, 107 Tomlinson, F.S. 123, 203–4, 208, 215

torture 174 totalitarianism 1–52, 145 trade 2, 4, 6–7, 11, 19; and British governmental views 154; and Chinese Communist role 73–4, 79–80, 83, 92, 94–5, 97–9, 102–4, 106; and MacArthur’s role 284, 310–11, 313, 316 trade unions 151, 166 Transport and General Workers Union 166 treason 150–3, 156–7, 161, 163 Treasury 5 Truman Doctrine 71 Truman, H. 3, 8, 16–17, 28–30, 32–4; and British governmental views 149, 159; and British rearmament 36, 44, 48; and Chinese Communist role 64, 67–8, 70–1, 80–1, 86, 100; and Chinese intervention 238–40, 242, 247–8, 257–8; and diplomatic bargaining 186; and Korean policy implementation 114–15, 118–20, 125, 130–1, 143; and MacArthur’s role 272, 277–80, 285–7, 289, 292, 301–2, 305–6, 308–10, 315–17; and UN invasion forces 222, 234 trusteeship 109–10, 214 unemployment 12 unification 19, 174, 203, 206–7, 209; and Chinese intervention 259, 267–8; and MacArthur’s role 291; and UN invasion forces 211, 213, 215–17, 220–1, 226, 230, 235 Unified Command 223, 242, 275–6, 295 Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) see Soviet Union United Kingdom (UK) 3–5, 8–9, 20–2, 50, 58; and Chinese intervention 341

Korean Conflict.indb 341

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

261; and diplomatic bargaining 176, 187, 193; and governmental views on conflict 149, 164, 172; and Korean policy implementation 118, 126, 129, 131, 133, 140, 147; and MacArthur’s role 287–8, 295, 301–2, 307, 311–12, 316; and UN invasion forces 221 UK Liaison Mission in Japan 273 United Nations (UN) 27, 31, 39, 52, 54; and British governmental views 150, 154, 159–63, 165–70, 173–5; Charter 126–7, 202; and Chinese Communist role 76–7, 91, 99, 104, 106–7; and Chinese intervention 237, 240, 243, 245–50, 252–5, 257–62, 264–8; and diplomatic bargaining 176–81, 184–7, 189–99; invading North Korea 201–3, 205–21, 223–7, 229–36; and Korean policy implementation 111, 116–17, 119, 121, 128–9, 134, 136–7; and MacArthur’s role 271–84, 286–92, 294–6, 299–304, 306, 313, 317; resolutions of 117, 119, 125–7, 149, 159, 178, 188–9, 196–7, 201–3, 208–11, 214–21, 223, 226–7, 232–6, 243, 245, 256–7, 259–60, 263–4, 266, 288 United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) 174, 210, 235, 268 United Nations Security Council 73, 76, 104, 117, 119; and British governmental views 149, 159–60; and Chinese intervention 245, 255, 264, 267; and diplomatic bargaining 177–8, 183, 186–7, 189–90, 194, 196, 199; and Korea policy implementation 127, 138; and

Korean policy implementation 125–7; and UN invasion forces 202–3, 208–11, 223, 226 United States (US) 2–10, 12–17, 19–22, 24, 26–44; and British governmental views 149, 151, 159–60, 165, 167, 172; and British rearmament 47–51; and Chinese Communist role 53–107; and Chinese intervention 238–42, 244, 247, 249–52, 255–7, 259, 261, 263, 266–7; Constitution 149, 306–7; and diplomatic bargaining 177–81, 183–6, 188, 190–4, 196–7, 199–200; and Korean policy implementation 108–12, 114, 116–19, 121–3, 125, 127–30, 132–4, 136, 138–47; and MacArthur’s role 269–70, 272, 274, 276, 278–91, 293–6, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 313, 315–17; and UN invasion forces 201–6, 208, 211–12, 215, 217, 220–2, 224–9, 232–6 Universities China Committee 158, 162 Van Fleet, J. 306 Vandenberg, A. 15, 69–70 Vandenberg, H. 285, 287 Viet Minh 124, 253 Vietnam 114, 162 Vincent, J. 76 Vladivostok 149, 180, 231, 267 Vyshinsky, A. 14, 231 wait-and-see policy 55 Wake Island 222, 238–40 Walker, W.H. 273 Wall Street 151 War Department 276 War Ministry 8 War Office 113

342

Korean Conflict.indb 342

04/09/2015 11:40

INDEX

Washington, G. 91 Washington Post 137, 311 Webb, J. 81, 171, 241 welfare state 8, 13, 19, 25 West 2–3, 9–13, 16, 18, 26; and British governmental views 155, 161; and British rearmament 28–9, 31, 34, 36–7, 40–2, 48; and Chinese Communist role 53, 57, 59, 63, 66, 78, 82–3, 89, 91–2, 94, 97–9, 101–2, 106; and Chinese intervention 237, 240–1, 243–4, 250–2, 255; and diplomatic bargaining 176, 184, 186, 188, 194–5, 199; and Korean policy implementation 123–5; and MacArthur’s role 278, 290, 292, 297, 302; and UN invasion forces 203, 205, 207, 209, 212–13, 216, 218, 220, 227–8, 232 West Germany 46–7 Western Europe 4, 18–19, 21–2, 30–1, 33; and British rearmament 39, 43, 49, 51; and Chinese intervention 240; and MacArthur’s role 269, 286 Western Union 51 Western world see West Wherry, K. 129, 144 White House 246, 270, 289, 306 Whitehall 17, 68, 120, 123, 226 Wilkinson, J. 237 Winchell, W. 315 Winnington, A. 149–55, 157, 161, 164 witch-hunts 146 Women’s International Democratic Federation 155 Woolwich Peace Council 160

world powers 12, 21, 129, 132–3 World War I 1, 90 World War II 9, 16, 18, 20, 26; an UN invasion forces 208, 221; and British governmental view 158; and British rearmament 37, 45; and Chinese Communist role 53, 89; and Korea policy implementation 108–9, 144; and Korean policy implementation 114–15, 120, 135; and MacArthur’s role 271, 295 World War III 11, 29, 36, 39–40, 51; and British governmental views 150; and Chinese Communist role 69, 98; and Chinese intervention 240, 250; and diplomatic bargaining 184, 189; and Korea policy implementation 113–14, 118, 123, 132, 142; and MacArthur’s role 280, 283, 303; and UN invasion forces 203–4, 207, 213, 219, 230 Wrong, H. 246 xenophobia 53, 230, 315 Yalu River 209, 212–13, 220, 222, 225; and Chinese intervention 244, 246–8, 250–1, 253, 255, 261–3, 265, 267; and MacArthur’s role 291, 303; and UN invasion forces 236 Younger, K. 117, 119, 129, 169, 179, 207, 290, 317 Yugoslavia 26, 99 Zilliacus, K. 2, 6 Zinoviev, G. 156 Zorin, V. 192

343

Korean Conflict.indb 343

04/09/2015 11:40

Korean Conflict.indb 344

04/09/2015 11:40

Korean Conflict.indb 345

04/09/2015 11:40

Korean Conflict.indb 346

04/09/2015 11:40