A House Divided: Comparing Continental & Analytic Philosophy 2003009412

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COMPARING ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

c.

G.

PRADO

mB Humanity Books An Imprint of Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive Amherst, New York 14228-2119

2 6 JUN 2014

14-6' 4J ,. '

Published by Humanity Books, an imprint of Prometheus Books

A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy Copyright © 2003 edited by C. G. Prado. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, digital,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise or conveyed via the Internet or a Web site without prior written permission of the publishe~ except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

This one is for Maxine Wilson, for all her help with it and several others. Inquiries should be addressed to Humanity Books 59 John Glenn Drive Amherst,NewYork 14n8-u19

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A house divided : comparing analytic and Continental philosophy I edited by C. G. Prado.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-59 102- 105-7 (alk. paper) l. Analysis (Philosophy) 2. Philosophy, European. 3. Philosophy, Modem. I. Prado, C. G.

B808 .5H68 2003 l46'.4-dc2J 2003009412 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTE'NTS

INTRODUCTION ...... . . ... ............ .... .... . ..... . . 9 C. G. Prado Chapter 1. ANALYTIC AND CONVERSATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ... .... . . .. . . . ... . . ..... ..... ... 17 Richard Rorty Chapter 2. CARNAP'S CONTEXTS: Comte, Heidegger, Nietzsche ..... .... . . .. ..... .... .. 33 Barry ALien Chapter 3. ON THE ANALYTIC-CONTINENTAL DIVIDE IN PHILOSOPHY: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy .. .. . ... . . .. .... ... .. ... .... . . ...... 63 Ba/Jette E. Bahich Chapter 4. PHENOMENOLOGY: Straight and Hetero ..... . . ... ...... . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 105 Davi:J R. Cerbone

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HOUSE DIVIDED

Chapter 5. DAVIDSON AND WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWLEDGE, COMMUNICATION, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Sharyn Clough and Jonathan Kaplan .. . ... · ·

INTRODUCTION C. G. Prado

Chapter 6. HEIDEGGER AND QUINE ON THE (IR) RELEVANCE OF LOGIC FOR . PHILOSOPHY. .... .. . . . .. ..... . .. .. ... . .. . . . 155 Rtchard Matthew.J Chapter 7. CORRESPONDENCE, CONSTRUCTION AND REALISM: ' The Case of Searle and Foucault. . . . . . . . . .

,~GP.'} v. . raoo

· ··· · ······

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Chapter 8. ILLUMINATING LANGUAGE: Interpretation and Understanding in Gadamer and . Davidson . . . .. . .. . .. ... ...... .. . ... . ... ....... 213 BpJrn Torgrtm Ramberg Chapter 9. DAVIDSON AND RORTY ON TRUTHReshaping Analytic Philosophy for a . Transcontinental Conversation Mike Sand6othe . .. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 235 Chapter 10. TIME, SYNTHESIS, AND THE END OF METAPHYSICS: Heidegger and Strawson on Kant Barry Stocker . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 259 Chapter 11. MUCH ADO ABOUT THE NOTHING:

~arnap and Heidegger on Logic and Metaphysics 291 Edward WitheNpoon ······ CONTRIBUTORS

T

he aim of this collection is to explore differences and similarities among philosophers in the "analytic" and "Continental" traditions. The aim is to reconsider the often facile characterization of major thinkers as belonging to one or the other tradition, and the problematic conception of the two traditions as incommensurable. Taking Gilbert Ryle 's negative and dismissive review of Heidegger's Sein und Z:it as a somewhat arbitrary historical turning point, we can say that for some seven or eight decades there has been a broad gap between how philosophy is conceived and practiced in the illdefined but well-recognized analytic and Continental traditions. 1 The past three or so decades have seen a widening of the gap by the weighing in of postmodernist thought on the Continental side. But more recently there has been growing interest on the part of some philosophers on both sides of the divide in narrowing the gap. For the most part, this interest has tended to focus on the work of individual philosophers, which certainly is the most productive approach to closing the gap. Generalities about traditions are less useful than better understanding of the work of particular seminal thinkers. The articles

... ... .. . .. . . . .. ...... .. . ... . ..... . . .. 323

INDEX . ... ..... .

.. . ..... .. . .. . . . .. ... . .. .. . . ..... . . . . 327

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A HOUSE DIVIDED ·~~~~~~

Prado: Introduction -~~-

that follow compare individual philosophers who have had major influ~nce in the analytic and Continental traditions with a view to clarifying JUSt how and where they differ in the conception of the issues they address, but also where and how they complement each other's work. The differences marked by the labels "analytic" and "Continental" philosophy for the most part are real enough. Though the labels tend to conjure up simplistic stereotypes, as well as obscure important similarities among philosophers, they undeniably do mark significant differences. The best account I have seen of these differences is Giovanna Borradori's "The Atlantic Wall." 2

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The heart of the analytic/Continental opposition is most evident in is, in a focus on analysis or on synthesis. Analytic philosophers typically try to solve fairly delineated philosophical problems by "reducing them to their ... parts and to the relations in which these. part~ stand." Continental philosophers typically address large questions m a synthetic or integrative way, and consider particular philosophical issues to be "parts of larger unities" and as properly understood and dealt with only when fitted into those unities.4

taking them apart and seeing how they work."5 Michel Foucault exemplifies the Continental integrative predisposition, saying that philosophy "from Hegel to Sartre has essentially been a totalizing enterprise."6 But methodology is not the sole basis for the analytic/Continental distinction. Many, perhaps most analytic philosophers consider the work of Continental philosophers to be too "literary." Bertrand Russell expressed a trend-setting assessment in saying that Nietzsche "was a literary rather than academic philosopher. He invented no new technical theories in ontology or epistemology. "7 Analytic philosophers also consider recent Continental thought to be burdened with political baggage because of European intellectuals' efforts to come to terms with the implications of two world wars fought mainly on European soil. Finally, many analytic philosophers consider Continental and especially contemporary French thought to be tainted by Nietzschean nihilism and the radical relativism of deconstruction. Some analytic philosophers go to the extreme of dismissing specific influential Continental figures, especially postmodemists, as simply not worth bothering about. Richard Rorty notes that "a distinguished analytic philosopher" -who I have good reason to believe was D. M. Armstrong"urged that 'intellectual hygiene' requires one not to read ... Foucault."8 Likely referring to Jacques Derrida in particular, Searle remarks that the attitude of analytic philosophers toward postmodernism is that "most of this stuff just passes them by. They wonder, why should I waste my time attacking it?"9 The Continental perception of analytic philosophy is more difficult to describe briefly because of major differences among European philosophers. Existentialists, hermeneuts, phenomenologists, structuralists, poststructuralists, postmoderns, and deconstructivists all vary in their assessment of and interest in analytic philosophy. One general point that can be made is that, on the whole, European philosophers see analytic philosophy as having ceased to be a "socially engaged interdisciplinary enterprise, becoming instead a highly specialized occupation."10

John Searle illustrates the analytic methodological predisposition in describing his own method as trying "to fmd the constitutive elements of consciousness, intentionality, speech acts, and social institutions by

This disengagement is seen by some as decisive. Responding to Searle's above-quoted comment, Rorty remarks that while it is true that analytic philosophers simply ignore postmodern thought, "[o]n the other

"':"hat emerges in Borradori's account is that analytic philosophers are thmkers whose canon was shaped by philosophers like Frege, Rus~ell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and the emigre logical positivists. These mfluences .gave a decidedly logico-linguistic cast to analytic philosophy as well as imparting to it a special interest in epistemology that tended to center on issues in the philosophy of science. One consequence was that from the mid-1930s on, a fairly high order of technical expertise became characteristic of analytic philosophy. Additionally, the shapers of the analytic canon were united by nothing if not by rejection of the metaphysical speculation so integral to the. wo~k o.f thinkers like Bradley, Bosanquet, Bergson, and Heidegger. This reJection resonated with most Dewey-influenced North American philosophers and Moore-influenced British philosophers, and largely is why "the definition of analytic philosophy has always been posed in opposition to European thought."3

m~thodology, th~t

12 hand,

- - - -A HOUSE DMDED

1

~nal~ic philoso~ ~y is no~ taken very seriously anywhere except by

an~lyt1c.ph1losophers. Certamly many European thinkers regard analytic philos~phers as having isolated their philosophizing from history an~ culture m the process of professionalizing it, and in the process made their work too arcane to be of interest to anyone but themselves. The disengageme~t in question is amply illustrated by comparing J?ewey and lat:r leadmg North American philosophers. Dewey publish.ed as mu~h m popular as in learned journals, while philosophers like ~ume,. Davidson, and Putnam contributed little to public debate on ISsues like education, political reform, and capital punishment. In this, Rorty's ongoing criticism of analytic philosophy as overly professional seems to accurately represent the European view.12 However, as noted above, my goal in compiling the articles that follow was not to add to the generalities we so often hear and read regarding analytic and Continental philosophy. Things have changed in recent years, and previous mutual indifference is being replaced, if not yet by genuine interest, then at least by curiosity. Oddly enough, I think that one reason for the change may be that what both analytic and Continental philosophers see as the excesses of postmodernists and deconstructivists ha.s prompted some of them to look a bit more closely at their counterparts m the other tradition. This is a familiar enough phenomenon; two opposed parties seem to appreciate one another more when they find .themsel~es j~intly opposed to a third party. The way this has worked, m my view, is that analytic philosophers in particular have looked again at Continental figures of the last philosophical generation_ Husserl, M~rleau-:onty-in an attempt to understand how figures of the present philosophical generation-Foucault, Derrida-can claim the thi~gs they claim. At the same time, Continental figures familiar with their own predecessors' work have been critical of some of their contemporaries. Most notably, Habermas's criticism of Foucault has been as hard as, say, that of Charles Taylor. The t~ouble with the partisan standoff between analytic and Continental ph'.losophers is that it precludes productive engagement among a. lot of bright people. But the standoff has complex causes; it is not due simply to disagreements on particular points. The standoff is at least in large part the result of how historical developments consigned analytic

Prado: Introduction

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and Continental philosophers' different insights to supposedly irreconcilable philosophical traditions. As a result, their respective positions on central philosophical issues have tended to be seen, not as divergent positions within philosophy, but rather as positions that define incommensurable conceptions of philosophy- or, for many, of philosophy and pseudophilosophy. The standoff between analytic and Continental philosophers is not a matter of arguments about key issues being evenly matched on both sides; it is more a matter of entrenched opposition without much bilateral discussion. The little that passes for bilateral discussion often is either indulgent harangue or facetious sniping. The upshot is that in practice, analytic philosophers ignore Continental philosophers and vice versa, so few undertake the hard work of trying to reconcile worthwhile ideas from opposite sides of the divide. Despite the very real differences between the analytic and Continental traditions, and especially those dividing analytic and postmodern thinkers, there is a compelling reason for critically comparing exponents of each of these traditions on pressing philosophical topics. The reason is that if we accept the present standoff, if we do consign philosophers to supposedly incommensurable traditions, we in effect adopt an unacknowledged and unexamined relativism. We do so because the consigning entails acceptance that there can be, and are, incompatible conceptions of fundamental philosophical matters, and of philosophy itself, and that these incompatible conceptions are contextually separable and separately viable. The only alternative to this tacit relativism, one that is intellectually repugnant, is for adherents of each set of conceptions to write off the others as just wrong and, what is more, as somehow unable to see that they are wrong. This is a repugnant alternative because there are serious, able thinkers on both sides of the divide whose views cannot be simply dismissed. Serious thinkers cannot avoid engagement with contrary-minded serious thinkers on pivotal matters. There must be continuing effort at resolving differences. It is not good enough for each side to tolerate the other as right only from their own point of view, or worse, to dismiss the other as confused or perverse and as unwilling or incapable of

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A HOUSE DIVIDED

understanding their alleged confusions. Though rarely acknowledged, or perhaps even clear to many, this is precisely why there is so much facile mockery of each other by analytic and Continental philosophers. The point precisely is to disallow that those on the other side of the divide are serious thinkers.

In any case, the time has come to examine more carefully and in a focused manner just what is most at issue between analytic and Continental philosophers, and where they share insights and approaches. This is best done by considering the work of particular pivotal members of the two traditions. By considering the similarities and dissimilarities among individual philosophers with respect to key philosophical questions, I think that we can achieve a more productive understanding of the analytic/Continental divide. We may even discover that the divide is not quite as wide as we tend to think it is. In the articles that follow, contributors familiar with both the analytic and Continental traditions focus on the similarities and dissimilarities between particular thinkers in each tradition. The contributors to this anthology represent a good sampling of philosophers working in different countries and contexts, of philosophers with diverse interests, and of philosophers at various stages in their careers. What is common to all is insightful appreciation of just how porous is the border usually drawn between "analytic" and "Continental" philosophy. I should mention that rather than impose my own order on the papers, I have, with one exception due to specific content, simply arranged the articles that follow in alphabetical order by author's name.

In "Analytic and Conversational Philosophy," Richard Rorty characterizes the analytic/Continental division in terms of ahistoricist and historicist loyalties and commitments, stressing how analytic philosophers understand philosophical problems as perennial while Continental philosophers see them as emerging from "the friction between old cultural inheritances and new developments." Barry Allen, in his "Carnap's Contexts," explores the dimensions of Carnap's influence-unquestionably the most significant influence-on how the boundaries were drawn between the analytic and Continental ways of ph~osophizing. Babette E. Babich, in her "On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy,"

Prado: lntroductwn

15

argues that analytic and Continental styles of philosophizing should be understood in light of Nietzsche's philosophy. David Cerbone's "Phenomenology: Straight and Hetero" offers a comparison of Edmund Husserl and Daniel Dennett on the possibility of phenomenology as a serious methodology. Sharyn Clough and Jonathan Kaplan, in their "Davidson and Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Communication, and Social Justice," explore how Davidson and Wittgenstein use the strengths of both analytic and Continental approaches to avoid the paradox of making social justice claims while abandoning foundationalism. In his "Heidegger and Quine on the (Ir)relevance of Logic for Philosophy," Richard Matthews considers some surprising similarities on the place of logic between these two paradigmatic Continental and analytic philosophers. My own "Correspondence, Construction, and Realism: The Case of Searle and Foucault" is an attempt to show that Foucault is closer to philosophers like Davidson on truth than Searle is to either Foucault or Davidson. Bj(