A History of Modern Phylosophy - [2]

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MACMILLAN AND

CO., Limited

LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MELBOURNE •

•

0

the Macmillan company NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAS& •

ATLANTA

•

•

THE MACMILLAN ®

SAN FRANCISCO

CO. OF CANADA*! Ltd. TORONTO

•A *

HISTORY OF

r

#

'

MODERN PHILOSOPHY e

A SKETCH OF THE HISTOR^OF PHILOSOPHY FROM THE CLOSE OF THE RENAISSANCE $

®

TO OUR

OWN DAY //«

S

BAD. ALL# JAN 1923

f L 30 HARALD HOFFD!%

Dr. PROFESSOR

A.T

THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHA®Sjffiis*^

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN EDITION *

#

^

.

By

B.

E.

MEYER « «

AUTHORISED TRANSLATION

• r

VOLUME

M-A CM I Life AN

AND

II

CO.

}

gT,*MARTIN’S STREET, 1

9pS

LIMITED

LONDON

\ J>

CONTENTS \

•

BCfOK VI r

»

*

THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY AND

*

LESSING of Thought Enlightenment tjOTTfioLD Ephraim Lessing Characteristics

1.

^ 2,

in

Age

ti-ie

*

BOOK

.•*

VII

, **

•

IMMANUEL KANT AND THE QRITICAL PHILOSOPHY i.

r*

*ChW^cteris»ics and Biography

.

.

.

#

29

.

*

Philosophical Development

j.

Theory of Knowledge (“Critique of Pure Reason”). (a) Subjective (?>)

Objective Deduction

(c)

Phenomena and Things-in-Themselves

.

.

.

.

,

Psychology

.

.

Cosmology

.

.

(7)

Qritique of Speculative

Theology

Ethics (a) »(/>)

m

.

Critique of Speculative

(e)

w*

.

(f3 ) «a» «»

Natural Philosophy

.

.

.

Critique of Practical Reason”) First Stage

Second Stage

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

*

.

50 50

.

«(«* Critique of Speculative ,

4.

41

Deduction (Psychological Analysis)

(d) Critique of Speculative Philosophy

*

.

2.

.55 58 .62 .

.

62

.63 .65 .

'

.

.

69 71 72

.74

(c)

Thir^ Stage

.

.

.

.

.

.

76

(d)

Applied Ethics

.

.

.

.

.

88

r

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILcfsOPHi£ 5.

of

Philosophy

()

Reason” and “Religion within the Limits

*01

Pure Reason”)

r

Morality and Religion

() The

•

.

^

f

94

”

97

r

6.

Positive Religion

Considerations

(

b

(c)

7.

(“

The two Worlds and

(b) 1

c

( )

and Biological

Critique of Judgment”) Unity

their possible

Reflections on ^Esthetics

.

s

1

o 5^

107 r

.

1

Hamann

Johann Georg

104 104

Reflections on Biology

Opponents of the Critical Philosophy (a)

8.

100

.

'Speculative Ideas ba£e# on ./Esthetic

(a)

94

•

Religious postulates in Relation to Kant’s Episte

ology and to “ Natural Religion (c)

>

Practice

of

(‘Critique

Religion

10

1 1

Johann Gpttfried Herder

1

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

.

.

.

m

14

JJ*

Further Development &f the Critical Philosophy Leonhard Reinhold

(a)

feirl

(b)

Salomon Maimon

(c)

Friedrich Schiller

S

.

f

.... .

BQOK

VIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM A.

The Philosophy of Idealistic

1.

2.

3.

Romanticism regarded Doctrine of Development

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (a)

Biography and Characteristics

.

(b)

Doctrine of Knowledge

.

(c)

Ethics

.

1

(b)

The

.

Religio-Philosophical Problem

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (a)

Biography and Characteristics

(b)

The

162 162 1

Method

60

174 74**

.

1

Dialectical

44

^

.

Period of Natural Philosophy

1

r

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schellin?. (a)

139*’

144

.

i

)

CONTENTS

?$.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich |fEGEL

*

(c).

m

The System

.

.

(d) Philosophy of Rights

Friedrich

4.

(a)

Ernsj.’ 'jSaniel

Characteristics

r

Schle|ermacher

.

and Biography c

and Ethics

(i5)

Dialectic

(c)

Faith and Knowledge

Tef Philosophy of

B.

....

.

(ef Philosophy of Rel%ion

•

—Continued

.

.

.»

.

*

Romanticism

.

.*

.

a

as

Pessimistic

Conception of Life

Arthur Schopenhauer («)

.

.

.

.

.

.....

(&)

The World

of Knowledge regarded as Appearance

(c)

The World

as Will

(d) Salvation ’

* .

Biography and Characteristics

\e)

Practical’Deliverance

C ‘‘Undercurrent a

(

through /Esthetic Contemplation

of

.

.

.

Romantic, Period

.

.

Jakob Friedrich Fries

.

.

.

.

during the

Phiiasophy

Critical

J

. .

(/;)

Johann Friedrich Herbart

(c)

Friedrich

.

.

4

Eduard Beneke

.

.

D. Transition from Romantic Speculation to Positivism « * or Positive Faith .

ie ,

.

.

.

and Dissolution

(«)

Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy

(b)

David Friedrich Strauss and the Religious Problem

(c)

Ludwig Feuerbach’s Psychology of Religion and Ethics

of the Hegelian School

(d) Philosophy in the

North

.

.

.

POSITIVISM Comte and French Philosophy Phix.osoi’Hy in France during the the Century *

A.

.

i.

first

Decade of

.

*(a) Revival of the Principle of Authority *

»

'((5)

(c)

The psychological School

.

The

.

Socialistic

School

.

.

.

.

.

.

A HISTOR Y OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

2.

Auguste Comte

.

V

.

Biography and Characteristics

(a)

of the Three Stages

(b)

The Law

(c)

Classification of the Sciences

(d) Sociology (e)

'

and Ethics

Theory of Knowledge

Comte

(/)

345 35

r.

as a Mystic

Stuart

.%

T

*

355

Mill and the Revival of English**

Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century 1.

Philosophy in England prior to 1^40 (a)

2.

The Philosophy

of

3^4**

Reform

364

(b)

The Romantic Personality-Philosophy

(c)

Critical

John Stuart Mtll (a)

374

Philosophy

38s

.

394

.

Biography and Characteristics

(b )

Liductive Logic

(c)

Ethical Principles

.

.

.

.

•

406 437

420

(d) Social Ethics * (e)

The

Religious Problem

**

427

V

c

C.

The Philosophy of Evolution

1.

CharleS Darwin (a)

Biography and Course of Development

(b)

Theory and Method

.

440

(c)

Limits of the Theory

.

444

(d) Ethical

2.

43-V

.

and Religious Consequences

Herbert Spencer (a)

(?)

.

and Science

The Concept

458

.

W

Theory of Evolution

467 r

of Evolution within the Sphere of Biology

and Psychology

.

if) The Concept of Development

.

r.

in Sociology

471

and Ethics r

Postscript

(

45-

.

r .

Philosophy as Unified Knowledge)?

(d) Philosophy as a (e)

447,.

453

.

Biography and Characteristics

{b) Religion

43l>

V

4/7

.

CONTENTS

BOOK X PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

1850-1,880

Philosophy in Germany 1850-1880

Mayer and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy

1.

Kiobert

2.

Materialism

3.

Idealistic Construction

.

on a Realistic Basis

Rudolph Hermann Lotze

(a)

(a)

The Mechanical Conception

(J3 )

Metaphysical Idealism

\y) Spiritualistic Psychology

508

516 .

.

r

Psycho-PKysics

Eduard von Hartmann (a)

r

(J3 )

^Pessimism and Ethics

(a) Friedrich Albert

*

(/>)

531 .

Natural Philosophy and Psychology.

tiRiTMwsM anet Positivism

4.

.

Lange

Eugen Diihring

532

533 537 541 54i

55°

(a)

Theory of Knowledge

(/?)

World Conception

,

554 557

560

(y) Ethics

Conclusion

536 528

(7) Natural Philosophy. (c)

520 524

\a) Poetical and Speculative Worla-conception (/3)

508

512

of Nature

Gustav Theodor Fechner

{!>)

493-

499

*

.

561

NOTES

567

^INDEX..

595

t

*

\

.

BOOK

. '

•

VI

*

THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSpPHY AND LESSING •

.

*

#

*

•

.

*

« •

•

I

CHAPTER CHARACTERISTICS

By

I

THOUGHT IN THE AQE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

»0F*

the middle of the eighteenth century the Wolffian philosophy

had established its ascendency in Germany. This philosophy supplanted the neo- Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy Melancthon, and acquired a great influence on fbq^ed intellectual development throughout 'Germany, as, owing to its clearness and sobfiety, it readily lent itself to popularisation. In this respect, indeed, a notable work had already been done, before Wolffs time, by Christian Thomasius, a jurist, who had been zealous in attempts *to break down the lines of demarcation hithe^o so sharply draWn, between learned and lajJf *Ajpongst pther things he lectured and published philosophical works in the German language, a proceeding which indeed thf that can only pause to ' discuss those which are of

psychological problems were handled time.

We

interest for thq, history of

philosophy

general.

1

based on two notions borrowed from Leibniz i.e. that the difference between darkness and clearness is the fundamental difference in psychical life, and that ideas are the constituent elements of The dqpper-lying motives and presages contained in this life. This was the Jiey-da^ of his psychology were unregarded.

The psychology

of the Enlightenment

is

chiefly

;

“Enlightenfnent of the understanding ” was the catchword^ and everything within the lif® *of the soul which was hot immediately transparent was conceived as a chaos of

rationalism.

The practical consequence of this inteilectualist dark ideas. psychology was an ‘unbounded confidence in the future only ;

would be tvell! A turning-point w§,s reached, however, when it was perceived that the li|e of light,

then

all

of other elements •besides the intellectual. English^ psychology (since Shaftesbury and Hutcheson) had already perceived this. Rousseau, whose influence on the German Enlightenment was extraordinarily great, had enthusiastically consists

championed the cause of feeling and protested against the overestimate of the intelligence. Last of all pietism, too, had**"

Thus the period of rationalism gave place to a period of sentimentality. The word “ sefTCimental ” tended in this direction. dates from the

eighteenth century it seems to have been coined by Sterne, the English novelist, and was, «op Lessing*?? ;

suggestion, rendered in

German by empfivdsdm.

The

peculiarity

of feeling as an independent side of the life of consciousness was first established in the course of efforts to develop an

During

aesthetic theory.

-

of the Berlin

their investigation of aesthetic feeling

SULZER (see his treatises in fee papers Academy 175 1-52) and of HOSE'S M*ENDELSSO|p

the attention of

J.

G.

,

CH.

I,

*

•

FUELING AND ITS PLACE IN PSYCHOLOGY

«

7

2

%

•

(Briefe iiber die Empfindungm 1755) was drawn to the fact thalt they |iad here before them af Pure Reason” to Lambert*. but the latter died before it ap- T Lambert stiil adhered to the confident dogmatism* peared. of the Enlightenment philosophy, since he did not see—-what had dawned very early on Kant that the transition from the analytical to the constructive method presupposes conditions which involve as a principle the limitation of knowledge (cf. Kant’s letter to Lambert, December 31, 176$). JOHANN Nicolaus Tetens, of South Schleswig, who, after discharging the duties of professor of philosophy and mathematics in Butzow and Kiel, filled a series of £igh administrative posts

—

Copenhagen, where he died in *[807, approached still to Kant’s fundamental thought but he had been put on the scent by that work of Kant in which the fundamental thoughts of the critical philosophy first saw the

in

nearer

light, le. „

'‘

;

the Dissertation of 1770,

menschliche

Natur

;

is,

Tetens’ Versucke ilber die both in respect of psychology as Veil

r ^

* %

*

%

•

CH.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGH^

1*

17

most important philosophical work in the period immediately preWe have already pointed out ceding Kant’s great work. as, of epistemology, the

which appeared

Germany

in

In his theory Tetens proceeds from a thought the assertion of which might, perhaps, have served to introduce greater into Kant’s philosophy^ i.e. that all conscious clearness perception is the perception of a relation. In every act of atte nt ion we single out that to “which we attend from its

significance in connection with psychology.

of knowledge

•

its •

surroundings.

“

The word

much, that the object which

I

‘

see

expresses at

’

perceive

is

least

a separate

this

thing.

”

is a distinguishing, an Auskennm "(I. p. 273). step is conscious comparison. Here, too, through thought itself, a relation (of similarity or difference) the act of between things is established. We have in space and time a special , class of relations ; as Kant had already taught

Perception

The next

Dissertation, they are

his

in

forms in which *our knowledge

arrajpggs the ^material furnished

Kant has reminded

us,

by the

we cannot

time from presentations of

felt

sensations.

“

As Herr

the conpept of the acts of feeling

abstract

objects

;

it is

which are continually going on within us which have succession and duration, even when no perceptible object 4s felt which could afford material for the abstraction of time” (I. p. 398, cf. 277).

Among the * latter plass of relations belongs the relation of dependence (causal relation), and Tetens has here tried, not •iery clearly, to mediate

experience, (!•

P«

draw

should

Hume

certainly not

3 20)j after it another given

to say

my

between

and Wolff. “ Without have “supposed,” he says “that the occurrence of one phenomenon would

I

—

“ I

—

phenomenon but ” he goes on express this supposition through a judgment that ;

reason

is necessarily compelled to pass, and which, theresomething other than habit or association of ideas i.e. a true thought, although preceding experience.” This is, of course, no answer to HumVs problem Tetens nowhere proves that* the judgments whicl? our reason passes with logical jiecessit^ can be valid of actual events. When Kant read Tetens’ Versmche which he prized very highly and which (as

fore, is

:

;

'

,

Hamann

relates in

writing-table,

he

a fetter) was always to be found on his had already hit on the idea which was

• requisite, at this .point,

VOL.

II

to carry the theory of

knowledge

further.

C

i

CHAPTER

•

_

II

*

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING ®*

*

It

appear from what

will

we have

already said that the so-

Enlightenment led out beyond itself at several It had, it is true, a certain tendency to consider itself points, perfect, and to look back with a pharisaical air on the darkness of preceding ages but, at the same time, it was an age rich in possibilities, while for Germany it was a time o& transition 'to The a magnificent period of*poetical and philosophical flower. feeling that he lived in an age of transition was particularly Although LESSING strong in the leading spirit of this period. was on terms of# 'personal friendship with Mendelssohn and a friendship in which the latter were by no means Nicolai mere recipients yet he was not so satisfied with the Enlightenment as they were. He felt himself a stranger to hff^age. called period of

;

—

Unsatisfied

—

by the

givefi

forms of intellectual

life

he,

Socrates before him,'emphasised the subjective, personal the striving after truth. prey.

The

chase,

he

says, is better

like*

side^,

of

than the

In virtue of this accentuation of the personal feeling of

and endeavouring he is the child of his age while same feeling enabled him to enter into other times ancl other standpoints more than was possible to .the men of the Enlightenment and the Sentimentalists. The difference between different ages and standpoints comes out, of course, most clearly when we consider the results «tq which they while in the inner strivings, the subjective forces which led

striving

;

this

>

;

r

produce the results greater kinship is to be found. £essing’s sense is connected with his favourite idea of the

historical

eternal striving. And that his eyes were turned so .eagerly towards the future in the hope of what it held in* store is stiff * * more closely connected with this idea.

^

r

CH?

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING

II

This

„

19

not the place to discuss Lessing’s significance as a

is

poet and aesthetic inquirer, although, no doubt, it would be interesting to trace the fundamental character of this great inquirer yi

all

Norman we it

the different spheres in which he busied himself.

enter her© into the derails of his biography, since

contains no dat£ which could help us to understand

He was^orn

a philosopher of religion. in

at

Kamenz

iii

him as Lauwitz

1729, studied at Leipzig, afterwards lived in Breslau, Berlin, in writing poetry and works on

and^Hamburg, occupied

1770, he became librarian at Wolfenbiittel youth up he had been addicted to philosophical It was studies, and had sket'chdd* out philosophical treatises. during the Wolfenbiittel period, however, that this side of his interests first became predominant, and, more especially, in the course of the controversy in which he became involved through his publication of the fragments of Reimarus’ “ Apology ” (“ The Wolfenbiittel Fragments ”). He here carried on a literary fw ^with Mie narrow-minded orthodoxy of his day, now remembered only on account of the skill in exposition, learning, and fulness of idejfs it occasioned Lessing to display. He aesthetics until, in

From

his

died in 1781.

He

Lessing was well aware that £is' chief pcvwer lay in criticism. lacked the creative faculty. Nevertheless he possessed

two valuable

fresh spiritual

He had

life,

And

aesthetics.

which distinguish him from most of his an unquenchable thirst after true and religion as* well as in philosophy and he possessed the historic sense and a great

qualities

contemporaries.•-

—

in

capacity for appreciating the original intellectual contributions of earlier times. It

is

perhaps

his

historic

sense

which places

sharpest contrast to his contemporaries. pietism, nor nationalism contented

him

in

If neither orthodoxy,

—and

none of these directions appeared to him to be the one in which the religious life of the future could develop, this was a consequence of the clearness* with .which he kept before him the historical him,

—

# character of

all

positive religions.

Scriptures,* over the

interpretation

Instead of regarding the of which

men

can never

most important form under which Christianity had appeared, Lessing harked back to the national life and to the whoje religions development and tradition of which they were thfr outcome, and which explain to us how they arose. His agree, as the

*

*

*

s

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING

'

20

'bkCvi

assertion (in his defence of the publication of the Wolfenbiittel

fragments) that Christianity (foes not stand or fall, with the Ho maintains the view Bible was ifo mere stroke of diplomacy. is older than the f Bible, and that Jits future depends neither on book-learning nor op. descriptions of®* the spirit and the power,” but on the continued fife and presence of this “spirit and power” (j^ber den Beweis des Geistes und der He here appears as the opponent of the over-estimaKraft). tion of book-learning and of the theological leading- wi ngs which had become general in the Protestant Churches in consequence of Luther’s eager appeal to the Bible as the rule of doctrine. He pointed out that if Glfrisfianity is to endure it^ must have other proofs than those to which orthodoxy had He welcomed the appearance in his own hitherto clung. time of the Herrnhiiters, since he recognisecf in this movement a departure from the externality of orthodoxy -an inwardness which places theriife higher than the letter. # Against Gdze, his orthodox opponent, he maintained that Christianity is esseqJi^Uy a matter^ of the heart, of feeling, and that no criticism of

that Christianity

—

historical t.nd philosophical proofs touches ’simple believers.

Lessing, however, has stated with sufficient clearness in his letters, as

the

well as jn his works, that

view here

indicated

of

the

highest truth historically revealed.

Nathan der Weise

he himself goes beyond

Christian

religion

His Qaplik,

as

the

his Antigeze,

Erziehung des Menschengescklech ts, cfn d Freimaurer afforded him an opportunity y of developing a cornpfete religio-philosophical theory, a theory which was not only very remarkable in its own time but which may well, even at the present day, afford food for reflection. It was an idiosyncrasy of Lessing’s to provide opponents as well as friends with new arguments. Owing to*’ Gesprdchi

iiber

,

die

—

and his clear insight he .was often able opponents which they themselves could never have discovered. On this account he was sometimes claimed by Christians as a brothef in the faith, while, bn

his great love of truth

to find

weapons

for his

other

occasions, 'they accused him of dishonesty. So is the world (even the so-called Christian $art 'of it) accustomed to see a man helping his energies His endeavour

little

!

to include everything which could serve to throw light oo the problem did not, however, prevent Lessing from ^eVbloping his- - « * own ideas to their fullest extent.

THE SEARCH AFTER TRUTH

'

cj*ir

*

21

5

a

The best starting-point for #n exposition of these * “ Not the truth which famous .passage in the Duplik

ideas

disposal of every gaan, but the honest pains he has

taken to

.

is

is

at the

come

For not behind the truth jtnake the worth of a man. through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth, do his powers

increase, a*id

God

this alone consists his ever-increasing

in

Possession

perfection.

makes us

Auiet, indolent, proud. ...

If

and in His left the single, unceasing, striving after truth, even ’though coupled with the condition that I should ever and always err, came to me and I would in all humility clasp His left hand and said, Choose with

all

truth in His right hand,

!

*

say,

*

’

Father, give

me this*

’

!

is

These words were aimed

at

”

not pure truth for Thee alone? the orthodox as well as the

philosophers of the Enlightenment, and both schools stood in

need of the reprobf. It may indeed appear as though there were something tantalising in this eternal search, especially as Lessing is prepared to accept along with it thewcondition that he *^ould always err. But we must remember that Lessing was speaking hypothetically. He is conceiving a choice between eternal seeking and* erring on the one side, and on tfye other the mere possession of truth. It is clear that he is contemplating a case which can never actually take place. "That this is so is evident not only from the form in wfiich it is stated, but also from his

man consists not in the possession truth bu.t in the “ honest pains ” he takes to acquire it. This value, that is to say, is conditioned by the fact that the assertion that the value of a

oWie

powers of men become extended by inquity.* But such extension would be impossible if no result other than continual error were to ensue. The consequences would then be disablement and In and for

contraction, not extension.

But

a self-contradiction. result to whicji

we

attain

is

starting- pbint for further endeavours.

which, as meaning. # • this

will

itself eternal striving is

another thing to say that every only provisional and becomes the

it is

be* seen

And

it

was precisely

from the sequel, was

Lessing’s

®

Lessing

definitely expressed his attitude towards positive religion i% his treatise Uber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft and in his later works he often returns to it. Were the histojical foundation of Christianity beyond question yet as ,

already ejaplained

%w

—

—

historical

truths could prove nothing here.

can the knowledge of the

eternal

interconnection

of

f

c

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING

f

22

bk.