A History of Arabia 9780882060361, 0882060368

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YD History of Arabia’ by Chama [ Salibir

Caravarw

Published by Caravan Books Delmar, New York 12054-0344, U.S.A. First Printing 1980 Second Printing 1997 © 1980 Academic Resources Corporation All rights reserved Printed and made in the United States of America The paper used in this publication conforms to the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Publications and Documents In Libraries and Archives ANSI/NISO/Z39.48—1992.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Salibi, Kamal Suleiman, 1929A history of Arabia. 1. Arabia—History. I. Title.

DS223.8235 953 80-11919 ISBN 0-88206-036-8 (alk. paper)

Contents Preface 20... ce ee eee eee ee eee eee Vii Introduction... 0... 0... 0.00. cee cee eee eee ees l 1. The Heritage of Antiquity ........................ O95 2. Changing Masters............. 02... ccc ce evceceee 27

3. Arabia Becomes Arab............................ 50 4. A Day for Medina............... 0.00. e ecw cevee 75

5. Decadence and Revolt ........................... 86 6. Walking the Tightrope ........................... 101 7. An Age of Spice... 2.2.0... 0.020.002.0020... 00000 e ee eee TES

8. The Century of Portugal.......................... 13] 9. Meeting the Powers ............. 0.0000 cee eeeceese 142

10. The Age of Britain. ............................. 160 11. Tightening the Girdle.......................-.2... 181 12. Arabia Redesigned................0..0e eee eeees 205 Epilogue... ........ 0.0... eee eee eee eee eee eee 224 A Selection of Books in English on Arabia. ........... 225

Index... cece ee eee eee ence ee 229

Preface

THIS GENERAL HISTORY of Arabia attempts a synthesis of up-

to-date knowledge on the subject, supplemented with some new research to fill the more obvious gaps, and interpreted in the light of regional and world history. It deals with Arabia as an entity with a pre-Arab as well as a pre-Islamic past; to which developments in the expanding world of the Arabs after Islam were naturally relevant, but normally along with other external factors relating to the world at large. Seen in this perspective, Arabia stands out not only as the timeless home of the Bedouin, the antique land of frankincense and myrrh, the cradle of Islam, or the modern producer of oil, but as a subcontinent located at the crossroads of the world, whose history was never far off the mainstream of world history. This was as true in the days of ancient Sheba, or at the time of the Prophet, as it is clearly true today.

Although many aspects of Arabian history have been well researched, and continue to receive serious attention from scholars, most of the studies done in the field so far have been published as articles in learned journals, or as books addressed more to the specialist than to the general reader. Moreover, the subject has not been generally surveyed as yet, at the scholarly level, except in encyclopaedia articles. Some of those (notably the ones by George Rentz in The Encyclopaedia of Islam under the entry Djazirat al‘Arab, and by R.B. Serjeant and Mahmud Ali Ghul in the fifteenth edition of The Encyclopaedia Britannica under the entry “Arabia, history of”) are remarkably comprehensive, and provide extensive bibliographies of Arab and other sources and referenées which are highly useful. At the end of the present work, a select bibliography of books in English directly relating to Arabia is given. These books can guide the interested reader to other relevant literature.

The given complexity of the Arabian story is not a matter for which a historian of Arabia can be taken to account. In the present survey, I have tried to simplify the narrative as much as possible

viii PREFACE

without sacrificing essentials. Not to cumber the text with numerals, I have dated events of the Islamic period according to the familiar Christian era, without reference to the Hijra year. Here it is useful

to bear in mind that the first year of the Hijra was 622 A.D.; that the lunar Hijra year is eleven days shorter that the solar Christian year; and that there are approximately 103 Hijra years to the Christian century. In the transliteration of personal and place names, I

have only used diacritical marks on first mention, and then in parantheses. Wherever possible, I have used standard English forms for such names, with reference on first mention to the Arabic form.

Naturally, I hold myself responsible for all the interpretations I present, at the level of the general and the particular. I also hold myself answerable for all possible errors of commission or serious omission, pleading only that none were intended. In dealing with points on which I am no specialist, I have generally

deferred to the judgment of scholars who know better. This is es-

pecially true for the pre-Islamic period, where I profited from the still unpublished papers presented in May 1979 at the Second International Symposium on Studies in the History of Arabia (University of Riyad), notably those by A.F.L. Beeston, G.W. Bowersock, W.C. Brice, W. Dostal, Sir Laurence Kirwan, G. Muller, P. Parr, D. Potts, C. Robin, J. Ryckmans, I. Shahid and M. Speece. Where I! have ventured to disagree with specialists on any given matter, | have presented my reasons for doing so, for whatever they may be worth. In explaining Arabic names and terms, my authority was normally Ibn Manzur’s Lisan al-Arab, often checked against

William Gesenius, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (tr. by E. Brown, ed. by F. Brown, S.R. Driver and C.A. Briggs, Oxford, 1977). For my direct knowledge of Arabia, | am greatly indebted to the friendship and assistance of Yusuf Shirawiand thelate James Belgrave

of Bahrain, who organized many of my visits to the peninsula. A number of friends and colleagues in Beirut were generous with their

help in various ways, advising me on particular points, or reading and commenting on early drafts of the text. I make special mention here of Ihsan Abbas, Ramzi Baalbaki, Mahmud Ghul, Abdul-Ahad Hannawi, Wadad Kadi, Abbas Kelidar, Usama Khalidi, Henry MacAdam and William Ward. Abdur-Rahim Abu Husayn read various parts of the book in first draft; Salih Yasin obligingly went through

PREFACE ix

the whole work as a sample non-specialist reader; John Munro edited

the final text before it went to press. The maps were drawn by Sayyed Sayfullah Tora; the index was prepared by James Reilly; the typing was done by Saydeh Nimeh, Mary Bozaian and Huda Jurdak. To all of them I owe thanks, without associating them in any responsibility. Kamal S. Salibi 15 June 1980.

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THE RISE OF HIMYAR 43

with as intermediaries. Nevertheless, Egypt still needed the South Arabian seaports. Before the discovery of the commercial use of the monsoons, the direct crossing of the Indian Ocean was not possible; Egyptian seafarers could only reach India by hugging the South Arabian coast. Here — at least in Hadhramut -—- the Habashat

colonists were their clients and friends. As long as the Habashat remained there, the Egyptians could safely make the needed stops as they sailed the Arabian Sea back and forth, picking up cargoes of Arabian incense along the way. Before long, however, trouble broke out in Hadhramut. A desert people from the interior (possibly Bedouin Arabs of the Kinda confederation, see pp.48,61) began to conduct repeated raids against the

Habashat settlements there. Such was the ferocity of these raids that the Habashat were forced to abandon Hadhramut and return to Abyssinia, their original homeland. A new Hadhrami kingdom replaced the Habashat order in the region. Whether or not the Parthians had a hand in this development cannot be known. No doubt, however, it was they rather than the Ptolemies who profited from the result. Meanwhile, a reaction against the Ptolemaic influence set in to the west of Hadhramut. Here the kingdom of Saba’, in the course of the first century B.C., conquered and absorbed the territory of

Ma‘in. It is not known how the conquest took place, but the circumstances are clear. In an Arabian world which — for understandable reasons — was closing its doors to the Ptolemies, the easy-going Minaeans who apparently kept their own doors open were probably

regarded as offenders. It might well have been in punishment for their continuing collaboration with Egypt that they were robbed of their independence by their stern and concerned neighbours. The overthrow of the Habashat in Hadhramut, and the conquest of Ma‘in by Saba’, took place within a century of the completion of the first Ptolemaic sea journey from Egypt to India. Almost immediately after this journey was completed, a South Arabian community known as the Himyar (see p. 4) organized themselves as a kingdom in about 115 B.C.* By origin, the Himyarites were prob-

bably one of the many tribal peoples living within the territory of Saba’. By the first century A.D., their kings were already established in the stronghold of Raydan (Raydan), outside Zafar (Zafar), in the highlands southwest of Ma’rib. Their official title was ‘“‘Lord of *This year, at least, marks the beginning of the Himyarite era, as known from later inscriptions.

44 CHANGING MASTERS

Raydan” (Dhi Raydan, literally “the one of Raydan’’). More likely than not, the kingdom of Himyar started out, at the time it did, as a Parthian client state —a strategic outpost from which the rulers of Persia could block Ptolemaic access to the Arabian Sea, and also keep regional developments monitored. In any case, the Himyarites, it seems, were to be consistently pro-Persian and anti-Roman later on, as will be seen.

13. The Romans, the Nabat World and Arabia.

The Romans were already well established as the dominant power in the Western Mediterranean basin when they first began to turn their attention eastwards. By 146 B.C., they had come to control the whole of Greece;* they had also acquired large parts of Asia Minor from the Seleucids. Taking the Ptolemies of Egypt under their wings, they encouraged them to regain some footholds in southern Syria, and entered into partnership with them in the spice and incense trade with the East. In the course of the first century B.C., Egypt became for all intents and purposes a Roman dependency. Seleucid Syria was completely taken over by 64 B.C., and the turn of the Nabat buffer principalities to the south came next. Within two decades, the Nabataean kingdom of Petra became virtually a Roman vassal state. At about the same time, the Hasmonaean and Ituraean kingdoms wereabolished. Part of the Ituraean territory was placed under direct Roman government. The rest,

along with the Hasmonaean territory, became another Roman client kingdom, entrusted to the rule of a Jewish king of Idumaean origin, Herod the Great (37-4 B.C.).

In 30 B.C., the Romans finally took over Egypt, and thus fell heirs to the Ptolemaic commerce with the East. Almost right away, they set out to conquer the kingdom of Saba’, in South Arabia. In 26-24 B.C., the Roman prefect (or governor) of Egypt, Aelius Gallus, landed a force of 10,000 men in Leuke Kome and proceeded to move southwards, by an inland route, in the direction of Ma’rib. On the way, he occupied some towns, including Najran (Negrana) and Yathul (Athroula, or Athloula) in the former territory of Ma‘in. Leaving a garrison in Yathul, he advanced to lay siege to Ma’rib (Marsyaba, or Mariaba ). By the time he reached there, however, *The Romans completed their control of Greece in the same year in which

they destroyed their “Phoenician” (or ‘“‘Punic’’) rival Carthage, in North Africa, to become the uncontested masters of the Western Mediterranean basin.

PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH 45

his troops were already worn out and depleted by sickness. The Sabaean capital was not taken, and the whole campaign was forthwith abandoned.* In the long run, the failure of this one and only Roman attempt to conquer Arabia hurt the interests of the Arabians more than it

served them. Soon the Romans, like the Ptolemies before them, fell back on the idea of direct maritime trade with India. To begin with, they followed the old Ptolemaic sea route skirting the South Arabian coast. The journey was long, taking about six months. Moreover, it could be dangerous, because it involved stopping in unfriendly ports. Before long, these problems were resolved. Some-

time before 50 A.D., the periodicity of the monsoon winds in the Indian Ocean was charted. It was then discovered that, at certain times of the year, the direct ocean crossing to India, or back, could be safely undertaken in about forty days, without stopping at the Arabian seaports unless by choice. Another development was to follow in the early second century A.D., when the Roman emperor Trajan (98-117) had the old canal between the Nile and the Red Sea (see p. 29) reopened and enlarged. Arabia, now completely by-passed where the spice trade between the Roman world and India was concerned, lost much of her former commercial importance. Impoverishment and political upheavals were to follow.

14. Problems in the North.

The Romans, after 24 B.C., continued to take an interest in North Arabia which was more strategic than commercial. The area,

it is true, controlled the incense routes from the south and east of the peninsula. More important, it formed part of the buffer zone between the Roman and Parthian empires. This alone made the monitoring of the area necessary. A careful watch, moreover, had to be kept on the Bedouin tribes of the North Arabian desert, to prevent them from obstructing the movement of trade in the region, and from encroaching on the strategic peripheries of Roman Syria.

Until about the middle of the first century A.D., the North Arabian desert remained well controlled from the eastern end by the Parthians. From the western end, it was adequately monitored by *A funerary inscription in Greek and Latin found at Baraqgish (Baraqish), where Yathul once stood, bears the name of a ‘horseman Cornelius” -- probably a participant in the expedition of Aelius Gallus, who died there. So far, no other inscriptions which may relate to this expedition have been found.

46 CHANGING MASTERS

the Nabataean kings from Petra or Bostra; probably also by Herod the Great and his successors, whose kingdom was designed from the beginning to include desert-border territories in Transjordan and in the Hawran (Hawran) region, between Bostra and Damascus. The Herodian kings, like the rulers of Petra, were thoroughly Hel-

lenized, and closely cooperated with the Romans. In Palestine, however, their Jewish subjects were a source of continuous trouble. Zealot Jews in Judaea, Galilee and elsewhere were strongly averse to Hellenism, and considered the Herodain subservience to Rome

an intolerable scandal. Many looked forward to the coming of a messiah — a “Son of David” -- who would vindicate the cause of the Jewish people and redeem them from their plight. Like other Nabat people in Syria who opposed Roman rule, the Jews of Pales-

time hoped for support from Parthia. This may explain why the early Christians — one of the several Jewish messianic sects which appeared at the time -- claimed that three Magi (Zoroastrian priests from Persia or Parthian Arabia*) arrived in Bethlehem towards the

end of the reign of Herod the Great to offer gifts to the newborn Jesus and hail him as “King of the Jews”’.f The persistent unruliness of the Jews was one factor which con-

tributed to the collapse of the Herodian order in Judaea. In 6-41 A.D., and again after 44, the province was taken over by the Romans

and placed under their direct rule. In 92 or 93, Herodian rule was also abolished in the lands east of the Jordan, so that the Nabataean kingdom was left for a while as the only buffer between Roman Syria and the desert. West of the Jordan, successive Jewish revolts brought about the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70, and finally the expulsion of the Jews from the Judaean territory in 135. *Two of the three gifts reportedly carried by the Magi, frankincense and myrth

{the third being gold), were distinctively Arabian products. According to a South Arabian legend which survives to this day, the tomb of the three Magi is to be found in the present territory of South Yemen. tJesus came from Nazareth, in the Ituraean territory of Galilee, where he was probably born. His movement, at one level, seems to have reflected disaffections among the Ituraean Jews, which were directed against the Judaic religious establishment in Jerusalem, as well as against the Hellenistic tone of Herodian rule. It appears, however, that an attempt was later made to give the mission of Jesus a proper Judaic legitimacy. According to the Jewish prophets, the Jewish messiah was expected to be a ‘‘Son of David’’ born in Bethlehem,

which was known as David’s City. Hence the insistence of two of the four Gospels (Matthew and Luke, but nol Mark and John) that Jesus was born in Bethlehem and actually descended from David.

THE DESERT UNLEASHED 47

Meanwhile, the Bedouins of North Arabia, profiting from the decline of Parthian power in the east (see below), had begun to go out of control, and the Nabataean patrol of the area was ceasing to be effective. Hence, in 105, the Roman emperor Trajan sent orders to liquidate the Nabataean kingdom, and the Nabataeans, it seems, put up no resistance. Petra by now was already a dying city, since most of the Arabian trade had long been reaching Syria by an inner route through Wadi Sirhan (Wadi Sirhan), which had its natural terminus at Bostra, the second Nabataean capital. In 106, a Roman province of “Arabia”? was formed out of the northern Nabataean territories, and the capital of this province was ultimately established at Bostra. From their new province, the Romans proceeded to

organize their own patrol of the North Arabian desert, with the Nabataeans serving them as native auxiliaries.

15. The Desert Unleashed.

It was the rapid disintegration of the Parthian kingdom after 51 A.D. which first set the Arabian desert in motion. One factor which brought about the decline of Parthian power was economic. Once

the Romans began to trade directly with India on a regular basis, the flow of commerce through the Parthian territories was considerably reduced. The resulting economic crisis no doubt contributed to the rise of political problems. By the end of the first century, the Parthian empire was already falling apart. There were often more than one Arsacid king ruling in one part of the kingdom or the other at the same time. Meanwhile, local princes (Arsacids and others) made themselves independent in various regions. In the course of the second century, Mesopotamia was invaded and occupied by the Romans no less than three times (under Trajan in 114-117, Lucius Verus in 163-165, and Septimus Severus in 193). On each occasion, the Romans took Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital on the Tigris. As the Parthians turned all their efforts to defend their Mesopotamian territory, the last vestiges of their rule in East Arabia vanished. Consequently, by the end of the century, the whole area from Oman to the borders of the Euphrates was already being invaded and settled by Bedouins from the desert. The new Bedouin settlers in East Arabia arrived, reportedly, as invaders from the southern parts of the peninsula. Here, at some earlier time, Arab tribes of the Azd confederation (see p. 51) had established themselves within the territory of Hadhramut. Starting

in the first century A.D., some of the Azd -- apparently under

48 CHANGING MASTERS

Sabaean or Himyarite pressure -- began to move eastwards, to settle among the Kinda in Hadhramut. Others took advantage of the

collapse of Parthian power in the Gulf basin (possibly after the first Roman occupation of Mesopotamia) to move into the highlands of Oman. According to Arabic tradition, one branch of the Azd pressed northwards from Oman to occupy the Hasa region. Here they merged with various local Bedouin and dislocated Nabat communities to form a new, composite tribal confederation known as the Tanukh (Tanukh). It was these Tanukh Arabs who probably destroyed what remained of the old civilization of Gerrha as they took over the Hasa. By the third century, probably following the third Roman invasion of Mesopotamia, the Tanukh pushed further north to establish their principal settlement at Hira (al-Hira), west of the Euphrates. Here, in time, they established the first truly Arab kingdom. The thrust of the Tanukh in the direction of Iraq (as the Arabs

called Mesopotamia, see p. 6) produced repercussions throughout Arabia. In the northern desert, the Bedouin tribes, under pressure from the Tanukh from the east, began to press westwards. Kept away from Transjordan and Syria by the Roman patrols, they turned further south to concentrate their raids on the Hijaz. Here,

by the end of the second century, the territory of Lihyan (no doubt among others) was already passing under Bedouin control and becoming Arabized. Meanwhile, in South Arabia, the utmost confusion had come to prevail, at least partly as a result of growing pressures from the desert. Apart from the standing kingdoms of Saba’, Himyar and Hadhramut (the last one already Arabized to a great extent), no less than four new kingdoms had emerged in the highlands west of Ma’rib since the previous century (see p. 54). Bedouin tribes from southern Najd now began to infiltrate the territories of these kingdoms to reach the shores of the Red Sea in the west, and those of the Arabian Sea in the south.

Almost everywhere in the peninsula -- in the east, west and south — the old Nabat order, by the turn of the century, was already disappearing, as the Bedouin population in the various Nabat regions swelled. In many of these regions, Nabat speech began rapidly to give way to the Bedouin Arabic. At the same time, old

established Nabat communities began to recall real or imagined tribal origins and identify themselves -- like the Bedouins — as tribes.

The old times, obviously, were coming to an end, and a new era in Arabia was setting in. The peninsula, at long last, was on the point

THE DESERT UNLEASHED 49

of breaking with its old Nabat tradition. Starting with the third century, it was to emerge for the first time as a true “Arabia” -- a land of Arabs, in which the last surviving Nabat peoples were ultimately to “vanish” in the process of becoming Arabized.

Ill Arabia Becomes Arab

1. Arabian Roles Reversed.

By the third century of the Christian era, the Arabization of the Nabat world had already gone a long way. Centres of Nabat civilization still flourished along the peripheries of Roman Syria, where the predominant language was Aramaic; also in the southernmost parts of peninsular Arabia, where the predominant language was

Sabaean (if we may so call it). In the vast territory in between, however, the old Nabat order was rapidly breaking down under the growing impact of the desert Arabs, or Bedouins. In some areas, Bedouin fribes took over old Nabat settlements, became “‘Nabatized”’ (according to the accepted Arabic terminology, see p. 5), and founded new principalities or kingdoms of Nabat type. Where this happened, the old Nabat population of the area became ‘“‘Arabized”’ in language and social organization, as tribal clients to their “‘Nabatized’’ Bedouin masters. In other areas, particularly in the isolated oasis regions of Central Arabia, the process of Arabiza-

tion took a different form. Here, a breakdown of agriculture under the impact of Bedouinism caused many local Nabat communities to abandon cultivation and turn to pastoralism. These communities, it seems, already spoke Arabic; now they reorganized themselves as new Bedouin tribes. Thus the roles were reversed: the old

Bedouins merging with the old Nabat of the peripheral areas -notably in the Hijaz, the Hasa, Oman and Iraq -- and becoming ““Nabatized”’ Arabs, while the old oasis dwellers of Najd, in Central Arabia, became “‘Arabized”’ or ““Bedouinized’”’ Nabat.

2. The “Qahtan”’ or “Old Arabs’’.

Before the Nabat order in Arabia began to break down, the “Old Arab” (‘Arab ‘Ariba, see p. 5) tribes tended to be concentrated in two areas: on the one hand, in the North Arabian and Syrian deserts; on the other hand, along the southern edges of the Najd plateau, and in the pastoral highlands south of the Empty

THE ‘QAHTAN’ OR ‘OLD ARABS’ 51

Quarter, within the territories of Saba’ and Hadhramut. Those of the north comprised such confederations as the Judham (Judham, the “Original Ones’’, possibly Bedouinized Edomites, see pp. 21, 40)*; the Lakhm (or “Splitters”, reportedly a splinter group of the Judham); the Quda‘a (Quda‘a, the “Dispersed Ones’’, or “‘Scattered Ones’); and the Salih (Salih, possibly meaning the “Brigands’’, see

p. 17n). Those of the south consisted of such groups as the Azd (the name denotes “Marriage”, or “Intermarriage”); the Ghassan (Ghassan, possibly meaning the ‘‘Virile Young Men’’, or the “Ones with Forelocks’’); the Kinda (possibly meaning the “‘Ingrates’’, or the “Desert People’’); the Madhhij (Madhhij, possibly meaning the

“Foster Group’, “Marriage Group’’, “Outcasts”’, or “‘Rovers’’); the Qahtan (probably meaning the ‘‘Desert Dwellers’, see p. 5); and a host of others. Between the “Old Arabs” of the north and those of the south, there was no demonstrable connection before the third century, when some branches of the “Old Arab” tribes of the south first began to migrate northwards to Iraq or to Syria. Nevertheless, the Arab genealogists of Islamic times thought of them, wrongly, as one people. Taking the name of one southern tribe, Qahtan, they confused it with that of the Biblical Yoktan, who is presented in the Book of Genesis (on which the Arab genealogists set great count) as the ancestor of the old sedentary peoples of South Arabia - the Nabat-type Sabaeans, Hadhramis and others (see pp. 17f). The Arab genealogists then presented Qahtan as the ancestor not

only of the South Arabian Nabat peoples, but also of all “Old Arabs’’, in the south as in the north. Consequently, all these “Old Arabs’’, as Qahtan tribes, were classified as ‘““South Arabs” (‘Arab al-Yaman), even when they had nothing really to do with South Arabia. The confusion on this point, in the traditional Arabic historiography, has continued ever since. Among the South Arabian “Qahtan’”’ (to use the traditionally accepted name), one people, the Azd (as already mentioned), began to migrate eastwards from the Sabaean territory to Oman probably in the second century. From there, they pressed on to regions further north along the Gulf coast, all the way to southern Iraq. Here they merged with various elements (Bedouins and others) to form the new tribal confederation of the Tanukh (the ‘“‘Settlers’’, see p. 48). *The name “Judham’”’, according to Mahmud Ghul of Yarmuk University (Jordan), may be the Arabic equivalent of ‘““Edom’’.

52 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

By the latter half of the third century, the Tanukh of Hira, in southern Iraq, were already in close contact with the “Old Arab”’

tribes of North Arabia and Syria, most of all with the Lakhm. Meanwhile, more “Qahtan”’ tribes began to migrate northwards, through West Arabia, to southern Syria. Among those, the Khuza‘a (Khuza‘a, or “‘Stragglers’’) took over the old caravan station and market town of Mecca, in the Hijaz. Two others, the Aws (““Gift’’?

“Wolf? ) and the Khazraj (or “South Wind’’), settled north of Mecca, in the oasis town of Yathrib (later called Medina, see below,

p. 78). Yet another tribe from the south — the Banu Jafna (Band Jafna), of the confederation of Ghassan -- migrated beyond Yathrib to Syria, to settle next to the Judham, the Lakhm, the Quda‘a

and the Salih, in Transjordan and the Hawran region, south of Damascus.* Of these Ghassanids, as of the Arabs of Hira, more will be said later. While the “‘Qahtan’’ Arabs of South Arabia pressed eastwards to

Oman, then northwards to the Hasa and Iraq, or to the Hijaz and Syria, the old Nabat communities of the central plateau of Najd — now hemmed in by Bedouins from all sides -- began themselves to turn Bedouin. If tradition is to be trusted, the Nabat of Najd were originally called the ‘Adnan, or ‘‘Settled Ones’’** — apparently a generic term synonymous with “Nabat’’, meaning the “‘people of the wells” (see p. 3). Now the name ‘Adnan (never mentioned in

Arabian epigraphy) became the generic name for a Bedouinized people comprising various levels of tribal confederation: first the Ma‘add (or “Great Numbers’’); second the Nizar (Nizar, or “Small Numbers’’); third the two clearly pastoral branches of the Nizar — the Mudar (Mudar, or ‘“‘Soured Milk” tribes) and the Rabi‘a (Rabi‘a, or people of the “Pastures’’, or “‘“Encampments’’){, with their various subdivisions. Folk tradition later explained that all ‘‘Arabized Arabs” (‘Arab Musta ‘riba, see p. 5 ) of ‘Adnan stock were descend-

ed from a common ancestor called ‘Adnan. Ma‘add, it was said, *Henry MacAdam, of the American University of Beirut, has identified for certain no less than 25 names of Arab tribes established in Syria during the Roman period, all mentioned in local inscriptions, and some possibly identifiable with tribal names of the Islamic period. **The Semitic name for the garden of Eden(Arabic ‘Adan) may be derived from the same root, to mean the original human ‘‘Settlement”’. Tit is possible that the Rabi‘a were famed for horse-breeding, which might explain why they were frequently referred to as Rabi‘a al-Faras (Rabi‘a of the Mare).

THE HEGEMONY OF HIMYAR_ 53

was his son; Nizar was his grandson; and Mudar and Rabi‘a were his great-grandsons. Other ‘‘Arabized Arabs’’, in the Hijaz and else-

where, were also — in one way or another -- his descendants. In Islamic times, the Arab genealogists who recorded this folk tradi-

tion (or perhaps invented it) asserted the Nabat origin of the ‘Adnan Arabs, by presuming ‘Adnan to be a direct descendant of Ishmael (Arabic [sma‘il) -- the ancestor of many West Arabian Nabat peoples according to Genesis (see p. 20). The authority of the Koran (Koran 2:127)*, which seems to place the story of Abraham and his firstborn Ishmael in the Hijaz (more particularly, in Mecca) confirmed them in this view.** 3. The South Arabian Hegemony of Himyar.

One factor which kept the territories of Saba’ and Hadhramut from becoming fully Arabized in the third century was the sudden resurgence of Persia at the time, as an imperial power with major stakes in South Arabia. In 226, Ardashir (Ardashir) I of the house of Sasan (Sasan), ruling prince of the Parthian province of Persis (Fars), defeated the last Parthian king in battle and ascended the Persian throne. By 229, he had firmly established himself at Ctesiphon - formerly the Parthian capital on the Tigris — to become also the master of Mesopotamia, or Iraq. During the few decades

that followed, Ardashir I and his Sasanid successors expanded their new empire eastwards to include Central Asia and the Indus valley, along with the coastlands of Oman (then called Mazun) and the whole side of Arabia bordering the Gulf. From the Gulf basin,

they reactivated to old Persian maritime trade with the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. It was in this connection that they set out to reestablish contacts with Hadhramut and Saba’ -- regions

which had often fallen within the Persian zone of influence in Achaemenid and Parthian times. Ever since the first century, when the Parthian empire began to

decline (see p. 47), many parts of South Arabia had fallen under Abyssinian dominance. The Abyssinians, by then, were already organized as an independent kingdom maintaining close relations with Rome Their capital, Aksum, was located in the highlands of *The passage in question says that Abraham and his son Ishmael laid the foun-

dations of the ‘‘house’’, normally interpreted to mean the Ka‘ba temple. **For the connection between Ishmael and the Hijaz, see p. 21n. fFor the earlier contacts of the Abyssinians with South Arabia, see p. 38.

54 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

Tigre; from Adulis and other ports, however, they could easily keep watch over the Arabian coasts of the Red Sea, and even on regions further inland. By the second century, enterprising Abyssinians seem to have taken advantage of the political disintegration of South Arabia (see p. 48) to reestablish colonies in Najran and elsewhere. Their presence in the area, it appears, was deeply resented by some sectors of the native population -- certainly by the native ruling dynasties, many of whom marked out the Abyssinian colonists as political enemies. At the start of the second century, the old territory of Saba’, in

the southwest corner of the peninsula, was still divided between the traditional kingdom of Saba’ (with its capital at Ma’rib), the relatively new kingdom of Himyar (with its capital at Zafar), and the four or more upstart principalities in between (see p. 48), including the two kingdoms of the Gurat and the Hamdan (Hamdan). The political situation in the area at the time seems to have been hopelessly confused. The kings of Himyar claimed the territory of Saba’, and hence styled themselves “Kings of Saba’ ”’ as well as ‘“‘Lords of Raydan’’, the latter being their original title (see pp. 43-4). The kings of Saba’ likewise carried these two titles, thereby setting a claim, in retaliation, to the territory of Himyar. While these two kingdoms remained at loggerheads, the kings of Hadhramut, from their capital Shabwat, east of Ma’rib, annexed the east-

ern parts of Qataban (see p. 32), long ruled by Saba’. In the east, their territories extended to the borders of Oman, to include the incense country of Dhofar. At the same time, the Gurat, the Hamdan, and the other upstart principalities of the Sabaean highlands nibbled at the territories of their older-established neighbours, to add to the confusion. For a while, it appeared as if the Gurat or the Hamdan, among the highland principalities, would reunify the old territory of Saba’ under their rule. In the course of the second century, the Gurat fought successful wars against Himyar, the Abyssinians, and the Kinda Arabs of southwestern Najd (see p. 61), gaining much territory in the process. At one moment, they boasted of having exterminated all their enemies “from the north and from the east, and

from the sea and from the land.” It might have been they who finally put an end to the Sabaean kingdom of Ma’rib, sometime before 200, although the city of Ma’rib itself continued to prosper as a leading South Arabian emporium long after. In the meantime, the Hamdanids were also expanding their realm by conquest. Like

THE KINGDOM OF HIRA 55

the Gurat, they fought the Abyssinians, but apparently without much success. On one known occasion, they subjugated Hadhramut and occupied its capital, Shabwat, but only for a brief while.

In the long run, neither the Gurat nor the Hamdanids managed to achieve their set aims. By the middle of the third century, both kingdoms had ceased to exist; so had all the other South Arabian states except two, Hadhramut and Himyar. This sudden reduction of the multiple political divisions in South Arabia coincided with the reemergence of Persia, under the Sasanids, as a power with vital concerns in the region. By about 280, Himyar was already on its way to achieve an unrivalled South Arabian ascendancy. Sometime after that date, its king Shammar Yuhar‘ish (the second Himyarite ruler to bear this name) set out to conquer Hadhramut and Yamanat (the “South’’, probably the name applied to the Arabian Sea coast). In 294, Shammar Yuhar‘ish was already calling himself “King of Hadhramut and Yamanat”’’, in addition to his former titles.

It was only during the fourth century, however, that the territory of Hadhramut, after repeated conquests by Himyar, was finally subdued.

In the absence of adequate information, it is impossible to tell by what stages the kingdom of Himyar rose from obscurity in the course of the third century, to gain complete dominance over South Arabia in the fourth. This kingdom, as already mentioned (see p. 44),

probably originated as a monitoring station for the Parthians in the region. Once the Parthians were gone, the Himyarites, it seems, readily tranferred their loyalty to the Sasanids, possibly to the extent of recognizing them as their overlords. They certainly had de-

legates representing them in the Sasanid court at Ctesiphon, at least at certain periods. In any case, from beginning to end, the kingdom of Himyar was a friend to Persia and an enemy to Abyssi-

nia and, by extension, to Rome. Its vast territorial extent, after the annexation of Hadhramut, gave it the appearance of an empire. Himyar, however, was never as independent a state as it appeared to be; without Persian support, it might never have stood. 4. The Kingdom of Hira and the Palmyrene Episode. The rise of Himyar to South Arabian dominance took place at a time when the Sasanids of Persia were engaged in their first round of wars with the Romans. These wars began in earnest during the

reign of Shapur (Shapur) I (241-272), the son and successor of

56 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

Ardashir I, and continued until 296 or 297. The hostilities were still at an early stage when Shapur established Sasanid suzerainty over the Arab settlement of Hira (see p. 48), west of the Euphrates. From that time, Hira became and remained an Arab vassal state to Persia.

As already observed, the Tanukh Arabs in Hira were not a homo-

genous group, but a loose confederation of tribal and non-tribal odds and ends brought together by circumstances. Their ranks included tribal elements from the North Arabian and Syrian deserts, among whom the Lakhm Arabs (see p. 51 ) were particularly prominent. Until about 270, the “king” of the Tanukh of Hira was an Azd chief called Jadhima (Jadhima), whose authority appears to have been recognized as far west as Hawran, if not beyond. After his death, the Sasanids seem to have transferred the rule of Hira to a Lakhmid chief, ‘Amr ibn ‘Adi (‘Amr ibn ‘Adi), who was reportedly related to Jadhima by marriage. This ‘Amr became the founder of a Lakhmid kingdom in Hira, which survived as a vassal state to Persia until the late sixth century. Merging the traditions of the

Lakhm Arabs of the north with those of the Tanukh of the east, and the Azd of the south, this Lakhmid kingdom of Hira became the first organized state in the history of Arabia whose character was truly Arab.

Shortly before the Arab tribal kingdom of Hira was placed under the Lakhmids, the Romans, alarmed by the expansion of the Persians west of the Euphrates, recognized a certain Odaenathus (Udhayna) as king of the Nabat community of Palmyra (see p. 41), in the heart of the Syrian desert. When the Persians, assisted by the Arabs of Hira (then under Jadhima) invaded Syria during the region of Shapur I, Odaenathus of Palmyra, acting on behalf of the Romans, fought and repelled the invaders (260-267), pursuing the Sasanid forces all the way to Ctesiphon. The Romans

cumbered him with titles and honours in reward and appointed him corrector totius Orientis (co-regent of all the “‘Orient’’, ie. the areas under Roman rule between Anatolia and Egypt). Odaenathus was at the peak of his success when his ambitious wife Zenobia (Bat Zabbay) arranged to have him murdered in 268, possibly at the instigation of the Persians. Thereupon Zenobia seiz-

ed control of the Palmyrene kingdom. Exploiting the balance of power between Persia and Rome, she moved her capital westwards from Palmyra to Emessa (modern Homs, in the Orontes valley), took over most of Syria, and proceeded to challenge Roman rule

NORTHWARD TRUST OF THE ‘QAHTAN’ 57

in Anatolia and Egypt. Her heedless defiance of Roman authority in the Near East did not take long to provoke a reaction. In 273, Zenobia suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the emperor Aurelian, whereupon she was seized and taken to Rome as a - prisoner, reportedly in golden chains. Palmyra was captured and

destroyed in the following year. With its fall, the last buffer between the Arabian desert and Roman Syria vanished forever. Thereupon Bedouins of ‘Old Arab” stock (the so-called “Qahtan”’ tribes), coming from all directions, began to move into the Syrian highlands and river valleys to settle. Here, as earlier on in most of Arabia, it soon became difficult to tell Nabat and tribal Arabs apart. It was shortly after the fall of Palmyra that the Arab kingdom of Hira -- backed by the Persians - reached the height of its power. Under ‘Amr ibn ‘Adi and his Lakhmid successors, the hegemony

of Hira was recognized by Arab tribes not only throughout Iraq and the Hasa region of East Arabia, but also in North Arabia and southern Syria, including some rural areas in Galilee and the Leba-

non. In Syria, the Bedouin tribes, encouraged no doubt by the Lakhmid kings and their Persian overlords, began to attack Roman outposts and invade Roman-held territories. In 290, one massive Bedouin invasion of the Roman province of ‘‘Arabia’’, south of Damascus (see p. 47), was repelled by the emperor Diocletian. To the Romans, however, such military action against the Bedouins was not enough. Unless they could find allies of their own among the Arabs of the desert, to counterbalance the alliance between Hira and Persia, their position in Syria was bound to remain insecure.

5. Northward Thrust of the “Qahtan’’. As already shown, the fall of the Nabat kingdom of Palmyra in the Syrian desert (274), and the establishment of the Nabat-type Himyarite hegemony over South Arabia (after ca 280), occurred at approximately the same time. As the kingdom of Himyar, in South Arabia, began to expand in all directions, Bedouin tribes from the region were driven northwards in the direction of Syria. Here, fol-

lowing the collapse of the Palmyrene kingdom, Bedouins could move in to settle wherever they pleased, provided they kept a safe distance from the Romans. At times, they even made incursions into Roman-held territory.

It was apparently between the 270s and the 290s that four groups of “Qahtan”’ Arabs — the Khuza‘a, Aws, Khazraj and Ghas-

58 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

san, all reckoned to be branches of the Azd — left the territory of Himyar to begin their northward migration. As already mentioned (see p. 52), the Khuza‘a, Aws and Khazraj stopped along the way to settle in the Hijaz — the Khuza‘a in Mecca, and the Aws and Khazraj in Yathrib. Only the Ghassanids, among the four groups, reached Syria. Here they settled among the Lakhm and other “Old Arabs”’ in the desert areas east of the Jordan valley.

In their new Syrian homeland, the early Ghassanid settlers, of the Banu Jafna tribe (see p. 52), appear to have recognized the authority of the Lakhmid kings of Hira. The wars between the Romans and the Persians, at the time, were still going on. This provided an opportunity for the Ghassanids, as for other local Arabs, to make incursions into the province of “‘Arabia”’ and other Syrian

territories held by Rome, with the backing of the kings of Hira and the Persians. Most likely, the Ghassanids were among the Arab tribes defeated by Diocletian in 290 (see above). In time, however, they did manage to settle within the territory of Roman ‘“‘Arabia”’,

ultimately to become the leading Arab clients to the Roman empire.

6. The Desert Kingdom of Mar’ al-Qays.

Meanwhile, between the second and fourth centuries, a number of ephemeral tribal “kingdoms” sprouted in various parts of penin-

sular Arabia. One such “kingdom” was that of the Azd, with its centre possibly in Oman. Another was that of the South Arabian: Ghassan, probably within the territory of Himyar. A third and a fourth were the “kingdoms” of the Kinda and the Madhhij, in the southwest corner of Najd, close by Najran. A fifth, and the only one which was clearly ‘“‘New Arab” rather than “Old Arab’’, was a

“kingdom” of the Nizar (see p. 52), somewhere in Najd. Of these five ““kingdoms’’, that of Kinda was subdued by the Gurat kings of

South Arabia towards the beginning of the third century. The other four still existed in the early fourth century, when their territories were absorbed by a new Arabian desert kingdom -- that of enigmatic Mar’ al-Qays (or Imru’ al-Qays) ibn ‘Amr.* *There issome confusion regarding the historical identity of this Mar’ al-Qays.

Apparently, he was a contemporary or near-contemporary of another Mar’ al-Qays ibn ‘Amr who was the son and successor of ‘Amr ibn ‘Adi, the founder of the Lakhmid dynasty of Hira (see p. 56). The Arab historians of early Islamic times seem to regard the two as one person -- a king of Hira who became the ruler of the whole Arabian desert. Some modern specialists accept

THE DESERT KINGDOM OF MAR’ AL—QAYS 59

The circumstances of the rise of this Mar’ al-Qays to power de-

serve some attention. By 297, the first round of wars between Rome and Persia had come to an end. The Romans, under Diocletian, had emerged victorious, and the Persians were forced to cede

to them most of their territories west of the Tigris. During the four decades that followed, the Romans in the Near East enjoyed an unchallenged ascendancy. Meanwhile, under Constantine I (the

Great, 306-337), the Roman empire underwent a fundamental transformation. The Roman capital was transferred eastwards from Rome to Byzantium -- the “New Rome” on the Bosphorus, which was now renamed Constantinople. At the same time, the Roman state began to break connections with its pagan past and turn Christian ~ a process which was completed later in the century under Theodosius I (also the Great, 372-395). From their new capital in Byzantium, Constantine I and his successors could

establish direct contacts with Arab chiefs in Syria and Arabia, much as the Sasanids did from Ctesiphon. The first of these chiefs to become their client, during this period, was Mar’ al-Qays. Most probably, this Mar’ al-Qays began his career as an Arab

chief within the territory of the Roman province of ‘Arabia’; it was there, at Namara (al-Namara), that the Arabic inscription marking his tomb was found. His original contact with the Romans might have been made shortly after the final victory of Diocletian over the Persians in 297. It was under Constantine I, however, that

he reached the peak of his power.* Setting out from his North Arabian base, he subdued the Azd and the Nizar, the Ma‘add (see p. 52 ) and the Madhhij — so the Namara inscription about him asthe testimony of the Arab historians on this point, but others do not. As I see it, the clue to the confusion in the traditional Arabic historiography is reveajed by the fact that the Arab historians add the term al-Bad’ (probably al-Badi, a common place name meaning the ‘‘Well”’ or ‘‘Valley’’) to the name of Mar’ al-Qays. This suggests an original distinction between a Mar’ al-Qays of alBadi and another of Hira. The existence of the first Mar’ al-Qays, as will be seen, is testified for by a funerary inscription which relates his exploits. AlBad’ can also be read to mean the “chief” or ‘paramount chief’’. Even if it is taken to mean “of the start’, or “Sof the origin”, it could not reasonably apply to Mar’ al-Qays of Hira, since he was not the “starter” or “originator” of the Lakhmid dynasty there, or of anything else for that matter. *According to the Arabic tradition about him, he became a convert to Christianity, possibly under the influence of Constantine I. Many specialists, however, doubt this tradition, though the reasons they give for their doubt are not entirely convincing.

60 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

serts. His realm, as a result, came to extend from the borders of Hira in the northeast, to those of Himyar (at Najran) in the southwest. He died in 328 as “King of All Arabs’’, but his kingdom did not survive him for long. If it did not vanish with him, it certainly ceased to exist after the death of Constantine [ in 337, when the Persians, forty years after their defeat by Diocletian, resumed their offensive against the Romans (see below). 7. The Zenith of Himyar. In South Arabia, the contemporary of Mar’ al-Qays was the great Himyarite king Shammar Yuhar‘ish II]. No doubt, the establishment of a vast desert kingdom by a Bedouin chief such as Mar’ al-Qays must have alarmed Shammar Yuhar'‘ish. It was possibly to prevent

a further expansion of the kingdom of Mar’ al-Qays in the direction of the south that Shammar Yuhar'‘ish turned his full energy to the conquest of Hadhramut (see p. 55), probably with the approval of his Persian allies. Normally, the Persians might have preferred

to keep South Arabia divided between Himyar and Hadhramut, the better to manage the area as a zone of influence. At that par-

ticular moment, however, the Bedouin threat from the north, strongly backed by the Romans, made all the difference. The disintegration of the desert kingdom of Mar’ al-Qays could only have brought relief to Himyar and to the Persians. Meanwhile,

in 337, the second round of wars between the Romans and the Persians broke out, to continue until about 390. In the course of these wars, the Persians managed to regain the lost parts of Iraq; in 363, the Euphrates was reestablished as their western frontier. Consequently, the Roman influence over North and Central Arabia receded. At about the same time, Abyssinian incursions into South Arabia --no doubt prompted by the Romans -— were successfully repelled by the kings of Himyar, certainly to the satisfaction

of the Persians. Meanwhile, in the north, the kingdom of Hira entered into a new period of power as a Persian client state. By the end of the century, the ascendancy of its Lakhmid kings was again being recognized by Bedouin tribes throughout the area between the Euphrates and the Jordan. As the ally of a strong Persia, the kingdom of Himyar, in South

Arabia, reached the height of its power in the early decades of fifth century under Abukarib As‘ad -- perhaps the greatest of the Himyarite rulers. In an attempt to bring the whole of peninsular Arabia under his control, this Abukarib As‘ad conducted several

KINDA AND GHASSAN 61

campaigns against the Ma‘add tribes in Najd. He also invaded the Hijaz, possibly as far north as Yathrib. The only part of the peninsula which he did not try to conquer was the Hasa region in East Arabia, which fell within the realm (or political zone) of Hira. No longer satisfied with being simply ‘King of Saba’ ’’, ‘““Lord of Raydan” and ‘‘King of Hadhramut and Yamanat” (see pp. 54-5), he now

began to call himself also “King of the Arabs in the Highlands (Tawd) and the Coastlands (Tahamat)”’.

8. “Royal Kinda” and the Kingdom of Ghassan. Actually, neither Abukarib As‘ad nor any of his successors ever managed to impose a regular rule over the “Highlands” of Central Arabia. It was the chiefs of the Kinda Arabs, in southwestern Najd, who seem to have undertaken the control of the area on their be-

half. In the latter half of the fifth century, one of these Kinda chiefs — a certain Hujr (Hujr), nicknamed A kil al-Murrar (the MurrarEater)* — was accepted as king not only by his fellow Kinda Arabs,

but also by the Ma‘add (or ‘Adnan) tribes of central and northern Najd. His kingdom, it is true, was little more than a tribal superchieftainship; nevertheless, he was accepted as a peer by the kings of Himyar and Hira. His descendants — called the ‘Royal Kinda’”’ (Kinda al-Mulik) — continued to be recognized as kings in Najd until the early seventh century, long after their rule had ceased to be effective. From their base in Najd, Hujr and his early successors expanded

their desert realm northwards in the direction of Syria. Here they fought the Salih (see pp. 51-2) and other local Bedouins, many of whom recognized the overlordship of the Lakhmid kings of Hira. Consequently, a conflict developed between the kings of Kinda and the Lakhmids. Meanwhile, the kings of Kinda joined the Ghas-

san Arabs of Transjordan in raiding Syrian territories within the Byzantine empire; as they pressed northwards, they drove the Salih and other local tribes before them all the way to the Orontes valley, and to the Aleppo region beyond. The Byzantines at first tried to repel their raids. Later, however, they reversed their poli*Murrar is a species of star thistle (Centaurea pullescens}) whose shoots are edible. Presumably, Hujr was fond of eating them. According to one Arabic tradition, however, he was called Akil al-Murrar because he charged into battle with his mouth wide open, “like a camel which had eaten murrar’’. The explanation is unconvincing, but it projects a vivid picture of a desert warriorking.

62 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

cy, taking the kings of Kinda, along with the Ghassanids, into their service as clients. Starting with the early decades of the sixth century, both Ghassan and Kinda became Byzantine vassal states, pitted against the Sasanid vassal kingdom of Hira. The wars between

the two sides were to dominate the annals of North Arabian history during the period that followed. 9. Religion and Imperial Politics. Kinda and Ghassan, it seems, were first recruited into the Byzantine service by Justinian I (the Great, 518-565). When this remark-

able emperor came to power, the Roman state had been in crisis for well over a century. To start with, the Roman empire had lost its unity. Upon the death of Theodosius the Great in 395, its Western provinces had gone to his son Honorius, who became emperor

in Rome, while its Eastern provinces went to his son Arcadius, who became emperor in Constantinople. Soon the two parts of the empire, under different lines of rulers, began rapidly to drift apart. In the course of the fifth century, the Roman empire in the West

lost one province after another to Germanic invaders from the north; it finally ceased to exist when these ‘‘Barbarians” took Rome in 476. Only the Roman empire in the East remained in existence after that date, with its territory virtually intact. Internally, however, this “Byzantine empire’ was riddled with dissensions - not least, by the Christological controversies which raged at the time. At one level, these controversies were simply quarrels among theologians about the “nature” or “natures” of Christ. At another level, however, they served as cover for a baffling array of political and social tensions and grievances. Perhaps more than anything

else, they expressed the deep resentments felt against the alien Byzantine rule by non-Greeks in general -- most of all by the native populations of Egypt, Syria and Armenia. Considering the historical importance of the Christological con-

troversies, a brief account of them here would be in order. In the days of Constantine the Great, the unity of the Christian Church was threatened by the “‘Arian”’ heresy -- so-called after Arius of Alexandria, who explained that the ‘“‘Son”’ and the “Holy Spirit’, in the Trinity, were not co-eternal with the “Father” from whom they derived. In the interest of Christian unity, Constantine arranged

for a first Oecumenical Council to meet at Nicaea in 325. This

council proceeded to condemn Arianism and lay down the: princi-

RELIGION AND IMPERIAL POLITICS 63

ples of Christian orthodoxy in the so-called Nicene Creed. It was thereupon ruled that all three persons of the Trinity were co-eternal with one another. As for Christ, he was to be considered as one person, begotten but not created, who was fully God and fully Man. In time, as the Arian heresy gradually died out, the Nicene Creed came to be accepted by all Christians as valid.

Meanwhile, as various theologians in Constantinople, Antioch and Alexandria set out to explain the Nicene Creed, the unity of the “two natures” of God and Man in Christ was envisaged in different ways. At one extreme were the “‘Nestorians”’ (so-called after their leader Nestorius, a patriarch of Constantinople) who stressed

the separateness of the “two natures” in Christ by maintaining that he was, so to speak, God in Man. At the other extreme were the “Monophysites” (from monos physis, or “‘single nature’), who stressed the fusion of the “two natures” in Christ to the extent of making them appear as one, by maintaining that Christ was essentially God become Man. In 431, the Council of Ephesus (the third Oecumenical Council), again sponsored by the Roman state, settled the issue in favour of the Monophysites by deposing Nestorius and condemning his teachings as heresy. Next came the turn of the

Monophysites, who were condemned as heretics by the fourth Oecumenical Council, held at Chalcedon in 451. To the official church, in Constantinople as in Rome, the middle-

of-the-way interpretation of the Nicene Creed made at Chalcedon* became the accepted basis for Christian orthodoxy. The Nestorian and Monophysite heresies, however, proved impossible to eradicate. After the Council of Ephesus, the Monophysites joined the orthodox in persecuting Nestorius and his followers, forcing most of them to seek refuge in Iraq and Persia under the protection of the Sasanids (see below). Here the Nestorians continued to

flourish, outside the reach of the Roman state. In the course of the sixth century, the Arab Lakhmid kings of Hira, in Iraq, converted to the Nestorian form of Christianity. Nestorianism also won a base, apparently from an early time, in the island of Socotra, off the South Arabian coast. Unlike the Nestorians, however, the Monophysites successfully resisted persecution after the Council of Chalcedon, and never left the Byzantine territory. The bastion

of the Monophysite community was the Church of Alexandria, *The Council of Chalcedon reaffirmed the Nicene Creed without offering any explanation as to how the Divine and Human “‘natures”’ of Christ were united in his ‘‘person’’,

64 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

whose Egyptian or ‘“‘Coptic”’ diocese extended southwards, up the

Nile valley, to include Nubia and Abyssinia. Outside Egypt, the Gregorian church in Armenia was Monophysite; so were many Christians in Syria, including the Ghassanids and other local Arabs. Faced with the forceful presence of the Monophysites in all these

regions, the Byzantine state had no choice but to tolerate them, although it continued to press for strict ‘“Chalcedonian” orthodoxy.

Meanwhile, as Christianity spread to peninsular Arabia, mainly from Syria in the north and from Abyssinia in the south, the Arabian Christians — probably including the later kings of Kinda — became Monophysites under the Syrian and Abyssinian influence.

10. The Sasanids at their Peak.

While these religious dissensions (along with other conflicts) were rending the body of the Byzantine empire, the Sasanids in Persia and Iraq reached the peak of their power. From about 390 until 518, the rulers of Constantinople, preoccupied with internal problems, left them at peace. Economically, their state prospered as never before. Much of the Indian Ocean trade, if not most of it, passed through their territories. So did the important silk trade of China, which reached the Persian markets by way of the great caravan route across Central Asia.* Militarily, Sasanid Persia had already proved itself a match to Byzantium in the wars of the fourth century. Politically, it could exercise leverage against the Byzantines in such provinces as Syria by exploiting local discontent with Byzantine rule. Until Justinian came on the scene, most of Arabia was claimed by the Sasanids as a zone of influence. The spread of Christianity in the northern and western parts of Arabia, however, starting with the fourth century, left the Persian impact strongest along the eastern and southern peripheries of the peninsula.

Unlike the Byzantine state, which was Christian, the Sasanid state was Zoroastrian. Under its influence, Zoroastrianism had gained some footholds in East Arabia, most of all perhaps in Oman. The Sasanids, however, pursued a policy of religious tolerance. In the tradition of the Achaemenids and the Parthians, they favoured *Chinese silk first began to reach the Roman world in the first century B.C., through the intermediary of Parthia. Significantly, Nestorian Christianity, from its base in the Sasanid realm, was to reach the Far East by way of the caravan route of the silk trade. It was Nestorian monks visiting China, during the sixth century, who smuggled silkworms back to Constantinople.

JUSTINIAN AND ARABIA 65

the Jews who had suffered persecution at the hands of the Roman state even before it became Christian. After 431, as already observed, the Sasanid empire became the main refuge of Nestorian Christians from Byzantine Syria and elsewhere. It was possibly to keep the Monophysites from turning their loyalty to Persia, as the Nestorians before them had done, that Byzantium tried hard to mend her fences with them. Under Justinian, the Monophysites of Syria were permitted to organize themselves formally as the ‘‘Jacobite”’ church — so called after its organizer Jacob Baradaeus (Ya‘qub Burd‘ana), who enjoyed local political backing from the kings of Ghassan. Even then, the loyalty of the Monophysites to Byzantium remained tenuous and brittle. Il. Justinian and Arabia.

As emperor (first in association with his uncle Justin I, then alone after 527), Justinian was determined to reestablish the Roman empire as the dominant power in the world. In the course of his reign, most of the old Roman territories in the western Mediterranean basin (Italy, Spain and North Africa) were reconquered. In the East, Justinian set out to challenge Persia from the very start. Coveting the silk trade of China, which the Persians controlled, he

sought to divert it from the Central Asian caravan route which brought it to the Persian markets, to the maritime route which could carry it directly to Byzantine Egypt by way of the Red Sea. It was at least partly for this purpose that he encouraged his Christian African allies, the kings of Abyssinia, to pursue an aggressive policy towards the South Arabian kingdom of Himyar. Within the territory of Himyar -- principally in the oasis region of Najran, but also elsewhere -- Christian Abyssinian colonists had long been established. Through their influence, local Christian communities had developed, whose loyalty went naturally to Abyssinia and Byzantium. Even before the accession of Justinian, the Abyssinians had been attempting military invasions of the Himyarite territory, in connivance with the local Christians. In retaliation, the Himyarite king Yusuf (Yusuf) As‘ar Yath‘ar, better known as Dhu Nuwas (Dhii Nuwas), defied the Abyssinians (and, by extension, the Byzantines) by proclaiming his Judaism, then proceeded to persecute all Christians in his realm. Towards the end of 518, he besieged and occupied the chief Christian stronghold of Najran, and the Christian community there was massacred. In that same year, Justinian became emperor in Constantinople.

66 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

Incited by Justinian, the Abyssinians set out to avenge the massacre of the Christians of Najran in 525. Byzantium placed a fleet at their disposal for the needed crossing. Dhu Nuwas prepared to repel the invaders, but he was defeated and killed in battle, and

the territory of Himyar was occupied. For a while, the former Himyarite kingdom was placed by the Abyssinians under a native Christian vassal called Simyafa‘ (Simyafa‘). Later, a commander of the Abyssinian army of occupation, called Abraha, seized power there to run the country as a virtually independent Christian kingdom.

In the north, the confrontation between Justinian and the Persians was more direct, involving two rounds of wars: the first from 527 until 532, and the second (with interruptions) from 540 until

562. It was probably in preparation for the first of these rounds that the Byzantine emperor (as it seems) incited the king of Kinda, al-Harith (al-Harith, Greek Aretas) ibn ‘Amr (d. 528), to attack his pro-Persian Arab rivals, the Lakhmids of Hira. The Lakhmid king then was al-Mundhir IIT (505-554) -- an inveterate warrior who was already waging attacks on Byzantine territory in Syria, with assistance from his many Arab followers there. He was probably so engaged when al-Harith of Kinda attacked and wrested most of his possessions in East Arabia, then proceeded to occupy his capital, Hira, in 525. Three years later al-Mundhir recccupied Hira, seized

al-Harith of Kinda and put him to death. He then resumed his campaigns against Byzantine Syria with remarkable success. When the first round of wars between Byzantium and Persia came to an end, Justinian was compelled to treat with al-Mundhir separately, agreeing to pay the Lakhmid king a tribute to make him keep the peace:

After the death of al-Harith of Kinda, his successors remained clients to the Byzantines, and continued to hold out against the dominance of Hira in parts of Central and East Arabia. By now, however, the ‘ruler of Persia was the great Khosraw I Anushirvan (Anushirvan, often called Chosroes the Blessed, 531-579). With this Khosraw backing the Lakhmids of Hira, the kings of Kinda stood

little chance against them in war, and were apparently content to oppose them with tribal intrigues. Meanwhile, in North Arabia and Syria, Justinian found a new ally against the Lakhmids and the Persians in the person of al-Harith (also Aretas) ibn Jabala (529-569) the first historically attested king of Ghassan. In the course of the

second round of wars between Justinian and the Persians, this

THE JAHILIYYA WARS 67

Ghassanid al-Harith took the field against the redoubtable al-Mundhir

of Hira, who was finally defeated and killed in battle in 554. In re-

turn for his services, al-Harith ibn Jabala was rewarded by the Byzantine emperor with the titles of patrikios and phylarch, and with recognition of his kingship over the Arabs of Syria. Under the successors of al-Harith of Ghassan and al-Mundhir of Hira, desultory

wars between the two Arab kingdoms of the north continued, on and off, until the last decade of the century.

12. The Jahiliyya Wars.

With South Arabia under Abyssinian occupation, and North Arabia divided between two Arab kingdoms, one backed by the Byzantines and the other by the Persians, the central parts of the peninsula, between the Red Sea and the Gulf, became an open field for

a power contest which -- because of the lack of adequate documentation - can only be dimly discerned. Meanwhile, the weakened Royal Kinda, still in league with Byzantium, intrigued against the Lakhmids and the Persians in Central and East Arabia. As the Arab tribes of these regions aligned themselves some with the pro-Persian, some with the pro-Byzantine camp, a situation of the utmost complexity developed. This was the setting of the Jahiliyya (see p. 12): the age of the great tribal feuds which ended with the rise of Islam. As already observed, the kingdoms of Hira, Kinda and Ghassan were founded by Nabatized tribal elements of “Old Arab” stock the so-called “‘Qahtan’’. So was the Khuza‘a settlement in Mecca: so also were the Aws and Khazraj settlements in Yathrib, and the

Azd settlement in Oman. Hemmed in from the east, north and west by the now Nabatized ‘‘Qahtan’’, and from the south by the virtually independent Abyssinian kingdom of Abraha (see p. 66), the “New Arab” ‘Adnan Bedouins of the Ma‘add confederation, in the highlands of Najd, began to grow restless. Normally, the tribes of this central desert had moved out in the direction of the peripheries as their numbers increased. Now, however, the tight ring of the

Nabatized ‘‘Qahtan” and the Abyssinians around Najd left hardly an outlet for its excess population to drain. The area, with its scattered pastures often rendered more sparse by successive years of drought, could support so many Bedouins, but not more. Soon it became grossly overpopulated with respect to its limited resources. As a result, the Bedouin tribes of the area turned against one an-

other. Tribal confederations split into their component parts as they quarrelled over meagre pastures and watering rights. Even in-

68 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

dividual tribes divided into splinter groups which decimated one another in vicious and seemingly senseless wars.

According to the traditional reports, the great Jahiliyya wars of the sixth century broke out over trifling issues. The greatest of all — the so-called War of Basus (Harb al-Basiis) -- presumably developed

out of a dispute over a she-camel (Basus was the name of the lady

who was its owner). The tribes of Bakr and Taghlib, originally forming the confederation of Wa’il (Wail), split over this issue and fought one another bitterly for several decades, with untold losses in life on both sides. Another famous war, called the War of Dahis and al-Ghabra’ (Harb Dahis wa’l-Ghabra’), developed from a dispute over a horse race (Dahis and al-Ghabra’ were the horse and mare involved in the race). Again the hostilities lasted for decades -— in this case between the sister tribes of ‘Abs and Dhubyan (Dhubyan), of the Ghatafan (Ghatafan) confederation. While the Jahiliyya wars - of which the two mentioned are the

prime examples -- reflected the tribal tensions inside Najd at the time, they also reflected the contemporary external situation at more than one level. In their contest for Arabian dominance, the kingdoms of Ghassan and Kinda on one side, and the kingdom of Hira on the other -- not to mention the Abyssinians in South Arabia -- appear to have invested considerably in the growing tribal discord among the ‘Adnan Bedouins of Central Arabia. So in all probability did the Byzantines and the Persians. In the early stages

of the Basus war, for example, Kinda, the client of Byzantium, backed the Bakr tribe, while Hira, the client of Persia, backed Taghlib. In this as in the other Jahiliyya wars, the Bedouin contestants set out to destroy one another with little thought of the higher political stakes involved in their conflicts. When outside parties stepped in to take sides, they were seen as friends or enemies rather than as cynical exploiters. Caught in games between greater powers, such has been the predicament of tribal peoples at all times.

13. Rise of the Quraysh.

In the early sixth century, at about the time when the Basus war broke out, some scattered Bedouin clans of the central Hijaz came together to form a new tribe, called Quraysh. Like the ‘Adnan tribes of Najd, the Quraysh clans, by origin, were probably local Nabat communities which had become Bedouinized at some

RISE OF THE QURAYSH 69

earlier time under the influence of “Old Arab” invaders from the north or south. In any case, they were conscious of being “‘New Arabs’’, and came to identify themselves, somewhat unconvincing-

ly, as a branch of the ‘Adnan. The original chief of the Quraysh, who brought their various clans together, was a certain Qusayy (Qusayy), nicknamed al-Mujammi‘ (the Gatherer). Under his leader-

ship, the tribe seized Mecca from the “Old Arab” Khuza‘a, and established there the first coherent ‘‘New Arab” regime in the peninsula.

As masters of Mecca, the Quraysh organized the city as a merchant oligarchy run by a council of notables called Dar al-Nadwa. While other ‘New Arabs” wasted their energies in fratricidal wars, they concentrated on business and kept out of tribal and political conflicts, maintaining friendly relations not only with the diverse warring tribes, but also -- as much as possible — with the Arabian kingdoms and the external powers that stood behind them. Whenever the occasion called, they offered their services as arbiters of Arab tribal disputes, and thereby became masters in the art of conciliation. As a result, Mecca rapidly gained recognition as a neutral meeting-ground for Arabs from every tribe and region. It also became the leading centre for Arabian commercial life. It was probably to emphasize the pan-Arabian character of their

city that the Quraysh set out to present themselves as patrons of the Arab folk culture. Through their efforts, the Meccan market of Suq ‘Ukaz (Siq ‘Ukaz) was transformed into a pan-Arabian forum where periodic folk festivals were held, attracting participants from everywhere. Since the fourth century, the rise of the Arab kingdom of Hira, followed by that of Kinda, had prompted the emergence of a literary form of Arabic which all could understand and use on formal occasions. This classical Arabic appears to have been developed mainly by poets, many of whom enjoyed Arab princely patronage. In Mecca, the festivals of Suq ‘Ukaz featured competitions in the recitation of Arabic poetry, in which the winners were honoured.* By such means, the Quraysh contributed to the enrichment of the literary tongue which transcended the tribal

dialects to become the prime heritage and pride of the Arabs as a people. * A later legend had it that the pre-Islamic Arabic mu ‘allaqat (usually translated

as the “suspended odes’’) were the winning poetical compositions presented at the ‘Ukaz festivals, which were ‘“‘suspended” (Arabic ‘allaqa) from the walls

70 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

Meanwhile, the Quraysh succeeded in turning the old Ka‘ba temple of Mecca, with its sacred Black Stone, into the principal sanctuary for the traditional Arabian folk religion. Despite the spread of Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism in different parts of Arabia since the fourth century, many tribes and communities still followed the old pagan folk cults, honouring a wide assortment of regional and tribal gods. In South Arabia, the later Himyarites, before the dramatic conversion of Dhu Nuwas to Judaism (see p. 65),

had developed their own brand of monotheism which centred around the worship of the “‘Merciful God”? Rahmanan (Rahmanan), who was described as the “‘Lord of Heaven and Earth’’. Elsewhere,

however, the traditional Arabian polytheism still honoured such gods as Hubal (the Lord), al-Lat (al-Lat, the Goddess), Manat (Manat, Death), ‘Uzza (Power?) and a host of others, all of which were represented by idols (asndm,-singular sanam) -- mostly unsculpted monoliths. At a time when Orthodox or Monophysite Christianity in Arabia implied loyalty to Abyssinia or to Byzantium, and when Zoroastrianism, Judaism or Nestorian Christianity implied allegiance to Persia, remaining pagan, or developing one’s own brand of

monotheism, was one way to express political neutrality and a determination or preference to remain non-aligned. Thus the politically neutral Quraysh of Mecca opted to stick to paganism, although most of their sedentary neighbours in the Hijaz were already Christians or Jews. Moreover, by opening the Ka‘ba temple city to all pagan cults, and turning it into a centre of pilgrimage where every Arab tribe could come to worship its own god or gods in its special way, they further advanced the claim of Mecca to be a haven-city for all Arabs. To secure the safe access of the pilgrims to Mecca, the Quraysh persuaded the Arab tribes to observe three

months during the year as a period of truce when alli fighting would cease, and all feuds would be frozen. It was during these “sacred months” (al-ashhur al-hurum) that the annual festive market of Suq ‘Ukaz was held. of the Ka‘ba temple (see below) as a mark of special honour. More likely, the term mu‘allaqat (singular mu‘allaqa) means ‘“‘string odes’’, because the compositions in question consist of the treatment, in the same metre and rhyme, of a set series of themes (the abandoned camp site; the love chase; the poet’s personal or tribal conceit; the desert adventure or hunt; the drinking carouse; the qualities of the poet’s favourite horse or camel; praise of his patron; ob-

servalions on life and death; etc.). The various theme treatments are then “strung” (another meaning of the Arabic ‘allaqu) together to form the complete ode.

THE YEAR OF THE ELEPHANT 71

12. The Year of the Elephant.

One factor which enabled the Quraysh to stay out of the imperial conflict between Byzantium and Persia, in the days of Justinian and Khosraw Anushirvan, was the emergence of Abraha’s runaway Abyssinian regime in South Arabia. Under the last kings of Himyar, of the seemingly Arab or Arabized dynasty of Dhu Yazan (Dhu Yazan), the Himyarite realm had disintegrated into a number

of feudal principalities, some run by native princes, others by Abyssinians. Tensions between the native population and the Abyssinian colonists, the Bedouins and the sedentary communities, pre-

vailed everywhere, and continued to do so after the Abyssinian conquest of the country in 525. In their time, the kings of the house of Dhu Yazan had moved their capital to San‘a (San‘a’), within the Arabized parts of their realm, leaving their old capital, Zafar,

to be occupied and run for a while by Abyssinian colonists. It was from San‘a that the last Himyarite king, Dhu Nuwas, tried to unify his kingdom by fighting the local Abyssinians, and persecuting their native Christian followers, only to provoke the Abyssinian retaliation which finally destroyed his regime. Following the Abyssinian conquest of South Arabia, the political confusion there continued until Abraha finally seized power.

Like Dhu Nuwas earlier on, Abraha set out to bring the former Himyarite territory under a strong centralized rule. Until 542, he was still governing the country as a sort of viceroy for the king of Abyssinia, against whom he had originally revolted. By 553, however, he was already calling himself king, dealing with the Abyssinian ruler as a peer, and entering into independent political relations with Byzantium and Persia, the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids. No doubt, it was the balance of imperial power at the time between Byzantium under Justinian, and Persia under Anushirvan, which made his independence possible. Like the Himyarite kings before him, Abraha was not content

with South Arabia, but sought to expand his rule northwards presumably to enhance the strategic security of his kingdom and gain contro! over vital trade routes. On at least one occasion, he led a campaign to suppress a rebellion among the Ma‘add tribes of Central Arabia. As long as Justinian lived, however, he made no ventures in the direction of Mecca, which dominated the trade route between his own kingdom and Byzantine Syria. Any such venture then was bound to bring him into a direct confrontation with Byzantium, which he was apparently careful to avoid. Mean-

72 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

while, Byzantium left Mecca alone, and so did the Persians. As a result, the Quraysh there felt secure from all directions, and traded freely with all.

It was only after the death of Justinian that Abraha turned against Mecca. According to traditions reported by later Arab historians, the conflict between the two sides began over the question of religion. Abraha had established Monophysite Christianity as the official religion of his kingdom, though many of his subjects were

pagans or Jews. In San‘a, where he fixed his capital, he built a great church which was called Bayt al-Qullis (Bayt al-Quilis, obviously an Arabic rendering of the Greek ekklesia, or church). This he turned into a centre for Arabian Christian pilgrimage, to rival Mecca as centre for Arabian pagan pilgrimage. Meanwhile, he took measures to suppress paganism (along with Judaism) in his realm, to the grave annoyance of the Meccans. Before long, incidents of hostility began to occur between Mecca and San‘a. On one occasion, some pagan Arabs entered the church of Bayt al-Quilis in San‘a and defiled it. Abraha held the Meccans to be responsible for this offence, and decided to teach them a lesson. In 570, he left San‘a with an Abyssinian army, complete with African elephants, and advanced against them. He was almost within sight of their city, however, when his forces were mysteriously destroyed, apparently by a fallout of rocks from the sudden eruption of a local volcano.* The Meccans proclaimed the event a miracle, and its date was long remembered as the Year of the Elephant.

Shortly after the failure of his one attempt to conquer Mecca, Abraha died, and his kingdom after him fell again into confusion under his successors. Meanwhile, the death of Justinian had left Byzantium ina weakend position for some decades. In Persia, Khosraw Anushirvan continued to reign until 579, and the Sasanid monarchy remained at the peak of its strength under the rulers who im-

mediately followed him to the throne. In Mecca, the Quraysh regime survived. Under the changed circumstances, however, it was apparently forced to lean more and more towards Persia. Further-

more, as South Arabia reverted to confusion, the regional trade *The Koran (105.3-4) speaks of the destruction of the Abyssinian forces at the time by fayr ababil (probably meaning ‘“‘missiles of fire) and hija@ra min sij-

jil (stones of baked clay), which indicate a volcanic fallout. Violent volcanic eruptions in the Hijaz are reported by historians as late as 1200. Acknowledgement is due to unpublished research done by a friend and colleague, Usama Khalidi, on this point.

THE LAST DECADES OF THE JAHILIYYA 73

was diverted away from the Arabian mainland, to Abyssinia and the Red Sea. Consequently, the Meccan commerce, as it seems, was badly hit. Thus Mecca escaped conquest by Abraha to find her neutrality compromised, and her economy in relative stagnation. Political crisis and social tensions naturally followed. 13. The Last Decades of the Jahiliyya.

Between 565 and 610, all but the northwestern parts of Arabia fell, to varying degrees, within the Sasanid zone of influence. Never

before did the Persians wield such power over the peninsula. In 575, five years after the failure of Abraha to capture Mecca, a Persian force landed in Aden (‘Adan), drove the Abyssinians out of South Arabia, and restored the kingdom of Himyar under the semilegendary Sayf ibn Dhu Yazan -- a member of the last Himyarite ruling house. Sayf, it seems, was unable to restore unity and order to the country. Hence, under the Sasanid ruler Khosraw II (590628), the kingdom of Himyar was finally transformed into a satrapy

of the Sasanid empire, under a Persian governor. At about the same time, Oman was brought under direct Persian rule. Somewhat earlier, the wavering loyalty of the Lakhmids of Hira, in the course of the wars which raged between Byzantium and Persia from 572 until 590, had provoked the anger of the Persians. This prompted Khosraw II to destroy the kingdom of Hira and place its territories, along with those of Oman and Himyar, under direct Persian government.

By the turn of the century, the Persians held control over the whole extent of East and South Arabia, from the borderlands of Iraq to the mouth of the Red Sea. Only the kingdom of Ghassan, which was strictly speaking within Syria rather than Arabia, remained part of the Byzantine zone of influence. After 584, however, it became fragmented into a number of principalities, and lost its former importance. In Central Arabia, the kingdom of Kinda also fell apart and vanished, to be replaced by the smaller kingdom of Yamama which was possibly a Persian vassal state. Only

Mecca, in the Hijaz, managed to maintain a precarious independence, trying hard to remain on good terms with the Byzantines in Syria despite its increasing dependence on Persia. Here, if anywhere,

was the last tottering stronghold of politically non-committed Arabism in the peninsula. Mecca might well have lost its independence before long — probbably to Persia, or possibly to Byzantium -- had it not been for the

74 ARABIA BECOMES ARAB

final round of wars which broke out between the two powers, shortly after the onset of the seventh century. As these wars went on, the Quraysh became divided between those who thought the

Persians would win, and those who expected the Byzantines to gain the final victory. While the two great powers fought one another in the north, Arabia for the moment was forgotten and, apart

from Mecca, fell into complete anarchy. The Arabian caravan routes everywhere became so harrassed by the now masterless Bedouin tribes, that the Quraysh of Mecca haa to exert all their efforts to save what remained of their trade with Syria and the diverse parts of the peninsula. The imperial wars which secured their con-

tinued independence threatened them, paradoxically, with utter economic ruin. What was needed to save Mecca now - as in the Year of the Elephant -- was nothing short of a miracle. By 610, such a miracle, to some Meccans, seemed to be at hand. It was the birth of a new religion.

IV A Day for Medina

1. The Rise of Islam.

The period 610-622 A.D. was a time of crisis in the Byzantine world. The last round of wars against Persia had broken out in 603,

and Byzantium, under the incompetent tyrant Phocas (602-610), was not faring well in the field. Meanwhile, two Barbarian peoples, the Avars and Slavs, were ravaging the Balkan region and pressing in the direction of Constantinople. In 610, Phocas was overthrown and put to death by the energetic Heraclius, who succeeded him as Byzantine emperor (610-641). The Persians, under the able Khos-

raw II, did not wait for Heraclius to renew the offensive against them. In 611 they invaded Syria and captured Antioch. Damascus fell to them shortly after, and in 614 they captured Jerusalem, thereby completing their conquest of Syria. Before long Persian forces were overrunning Asia Minor, conquering Chalcedon on the Sea of Marmara, and encamping near Chrysopolis (present Uskidar), facing Constantinople across the Bosphorus. Meanwhile another Persian army had set out to conquer Egypt, capturing Alexandria by 614. These years, so critical to Byzantium, saw in Mecca the beginnings of the career of the Prophet Muhammad (Muhammad). As the Persians overran the lands to the north, bringing plunder and devastation to the countries with which Mecca traded, and throw-

ing the Bedouin order in the desert into complete disarray, the Meccans were dismayed. Muhammad, however, was convinced that the Persian triumph could not last long. ‘‘The Romans”, he recited, “have been defeated in the lands closest by, and it would be they,

after their defeat, who will triumph in a few years; ... on that day the faithful shall rejoice in the victory of God!’’ (Koran 30:2-4). The Prophet Muhammad was about forty years old when he began preaching Islam (literally, “submission” to the One God) in Mecca, in 610 A.D. - the same year in which Heraclius became emperor in Constantinople. According to tradition, Muhammad

76 ADAY FOR MEDINA

was born in 570, the Year of the Elephant; he belonged to the clan of Hashim (Hashim), one of the less prominent clans of the Quraysh. Like other Meccans, he started life as a merchant, travelling with the caravans to Syria and perhaps also to various parts of Arabia, which may explain the vast knowledge he had of Arabian matters.

When he was about twenty-five, he came into a great fortune through marriage to the rich Khadija (Khadija) — a twice-widowed lady several years his senior, who had earlier employed him to manage her commercial affairs. Mecca at the time must have been enjoying a brief commercial revival, profiting from a short-lived peace in the north between Byzantium and Persia ($9 1-603).* When the

Persian-Byzantine hostilities were renewed in 603, the Meccans were again faced with crisis. The economy of Mecca now went into a catastrophic decline; the established social order in the city began to show signs of breaking down; and the Quraysh leaders in power, unable to discover a swift remedy for the emerging problems, apparently fell into some discredit. The crisis had probably assumed serious proportions when Muhammad, in 610, announced the start of his Prophetic mission, and proceeded by 613 to launch virulent attacks on the pagan cults — the very cults on which the religious prestige of Mecca rested. The Quraysh oligarchy of Mecca was quick to notice the political and social implications of Muhammad’s preaching, and readily mustered its forces to oppose him. 2. The Impact of Islam on Mecca.

The essence of the new religion of Islam was simple: belief in the One Omnipotent and Omniscient God and in the Day of Judgment, when the dead would be raised to account for their actions in life and face acquittal or condemnation. All earlier valid religions

(including Judaism and Christianity) were Islam, and all earlier valid scriptures (notably the Jewish Torah and the Christian Gospels) were revelations of the Koran, had their texts not been corrupted.f Muhammad, the Messenger of God (Rasitl Allah), was the *For ine general deterioration of the economy of Mecca after 570, see pp. 72-3. +The Koranic charge regarding the corruption of the Torah and the Gospels may have a historical explanation. At the time of the Prophet, the Masoretes in Tiberias were editing and vowelling the Jewish scriptures, a fact which may well have come to his attention through contact with the Jews of the Hijaz. The Prophet, likewise, was possibly aware of on-going disputes over the choice of Gospels and other Christian texts to be canonized -- disputes which were not finally settled until the seventh century.

THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON MECCA 77

last of a series of prophets (including Abraham, Moses and Jesus) who were charged with transmitting Islam to the world, and there were to be no prophets after him. The faithful were enjoined to

profess the true Islam of the Koran, to do good, and to abstain from evil. They were to perform ritual prayer five times a day, pay a tithe in alms, and fast one set month in the year. The Ka‘aba temple of Mecca, though defiled by idol worship, was considered to have been the religious edifice built by Abraham for his eldest-born Ishmael (see pp. 20-1), and originally dedicated to the worship of the One God. Islam was later to call upon the faithful to perform pilgrimage to Mecca if it was within their ability, at least once in life. Believers were also to pray facing Mecca (they were enjoined, at an earlier stage, to face Jerusalem in prayer). In Mecca they were to pray facing the Ka‘ba, and within the Ka‘ba the sacred Black Stone, Originally set there by Abraham as a symbol! of his dedication to Islam.

The Quraysh oligarchy may have been willing to tolerate Islam, as they had already tolerated Judaism and Christianity, assuming that it involved no more than a profession of faith. The new religion, however, brought with it a social message: it condemned the oppression of the weak by the strong, and the poor by the rich who “love wealth with a passion” (Koran 89:20). Commercial malpractice and other forms of corruption were roundly denounced. In several passages of the Koran, the established rich were singled out as being unifit to rule: “When we intend to destroy a city, we place those of inordinate wealth in power so they corrupt it” (Koran 17:16). In the face of such taunts, the Quraysh in power could not remain silent for long. It was about 615, shortly after the occupation of Syria by the Persians, that Muhammad finally fell out with the Quraysh. While Muhammad and his followers (judging by the evidence of the Koran)

sympathized with the Byzantines and looked forward to their ulti-

mate victory, the great merchants of Mecca, prompted by their pressing business interests, apparently came to terms with the Persians, which made it possible for them to continue their caravan trade with Syria, though on a somewhat reduced scale. Muham-

mad’s opposition to the Quraysh on this point could only have added to the intensity of the conflict between them. Relations between the two sides were probably worsened when some followers of the Prophet left Mecca in 615 to establish themselves in Christian Abyssinia, where they were well received. The emigrants to

78 ADAY FOR MEDINA

Abyssinia, which was still a vassal state to Byzantium, may well have gone there to flee the wrath of the Meccan oligarchy; their flight there, in any case, indicates that the young community of Islam was determined to differ from the Quraysh not only in religion and in social outlook, but also in external policy. 3. The Prophet in Medina.

The emerging friendship between Muhammad and the Abyssinians, which implied a defiance of Persia, must have especially embarrassed the Meccans. In any case, the continued presence of Muhammad in Mecca had ceased to be possible. Faced with mounting

opposition, he left the city in 622 and moved northwards with his followers to establish himself in the oasis-town of Yathrib, in the relatively fertile valley of Wadi Hamd (Wadi Hamd). Yathrib now became the Medina (al-Madina, or ‘“‘City’’) of the Prophet — a ‘“New

Mecca’”’ which could better serve as a centre for-the spread of Islam. Members of the Quraysh and others who left Mecca to establish themselves in Medina with the Prophet were called the Muhajirun (al-Muhajiriin, or ‘those who migrated” for the cause of Islam). The old residents of Medina, who belonged to the rival “‘Old Arab” tribes of the Aws and the Khazraj (see pp. 52, 58), were enjoined to lay aside their old feuds as they accepted Islam, and came to be known as the Ansar(al-A nsar, or ‘‘champions”’ of the Prophet’scause).

Sixteen years later, under the second of the Prophet’s successors, the year of the f/ijra (Migration) was recognized as the first year of the Era of Islam. Once established in Medina, Muhammad gained complete free-

dom of action and became head of the Umma -- his own “‘Community’’. His career from now on was one of almost uninterrupted success. To create a civic order among the peasant and Bedouin tribes of Wadi Hamd and its desert neighbourhood was no easy matter, but Muhammad, as the Prophet of Islam, had the authori-

ty to do it. In urban Mecca, he had condemned the corruption,

haughtiness and cynicism of a decadent oligarchy set in its effete ways. In rural Medina, which he was bent on transforming into a model city to rival Mecca, he condemned the Jahiliyya (see p. 67), or blood feuds, which kept the local Arab tribes warring with one another, and urged these tribes to unite under his‘leadership in the brotherhood of the faith. Loyalty to the “Faith” and the ‘“Community”, he insisted, must transcend loyalty to the tribe; and the law of Islam, as set now by the Koran and the fiat of the Prophet,

MEDINA AND MECCA AT WAR 79

must replace tribal law. In Islam, all believers were to be equal, but deference was due in a particular way to the Quraysh Muhajirun, who had proved their loyalty to the cause of the new religion by abandoning Mecca and staying with the Prophet in his exile. In Medina, these Muhajirun became the chief assistants to the Prophet in the management of the new “Community” -- apparently to the barely concealed distaste of some ambitious local Ansar. 4, Medina and Mecca at War.

While he proceeded with his efforts to weld his followers in Medina into an orderly civic community, Muhammad made war on Mecca and began to raid its caravans as they passed nearby on their way to and from Syria. His initial raiding successes were crowned

in 624 by a victory at Badr, where a Meccan caravan with a military escort, returning from Syria by way of the coast, was surprised by a Medinese force led by the Prophet in person and badly beaten. In the following year a Meccan force attacked the neighbourhood of Medina to defeat the Prophet’s forces at Uhud (Uhud). The Meccans, however, did not follow up this success. Avoiding the now dangerous Hijaz routes, they began to send their caravans

to Syria by roundabout ways which crossed or skirted the Najd plateau. Herealso the Meccan caravans were intercepted and plunder-

ed by the Prophet and his followers. A last attack by the Meccans on Medina was repulsed in 627. Meanwhile, the Prophet went to war against the Jews of Khaybar, a rich oasis settlement connecting with Wadi Hamd. By 627, the Jews there had been defeated and expelled, and the territory of Khaybar was taken over by the Umma, along with other villages and tribal regions of the neighbourhood. All this time, the Prophet had maintained good relations with Abyssinia, where some of his followers stayed until about 628. He also established good relations with Egypt following its reconquest by the Byzantines. Both the king of Abyssinia and the prefect of Byzantine Egypt (and reportedly others as well, including the emperor Heraclius) were invited to accept Islam. The response of the prefect of Egypt was particularly friendly. While he declined to accept Islam, he sent Muhammad a present of a eunuch, Mabur (Ma bir), and at least two Coptic slave-girls. One of these slave girls, Mariya (Mariya), was taken by the Prophet as a wife ~ one of the

many whom the Prophet married after the death of Khadija in

Mecca in 619.

80 A DAY FOR MEDINA

5. Final Triumph of the Prophet.

It was apparently the Byzantine reconquest of Syria and the final defeat of the Persians by Heraclius in 628 which set the stage for the complete triumph of Muhammad over the Meccans. In the course of the Byzantine-Persian wars the Meccans, as already said,

had apparently counted on a Persian victory. Once the Persians were defeated, they naturally lost heart. Muhammad, by now, was openly declaring his determination to take over Mecca. In 629 he was permitted to enter the city in peace, on pilgrimage to the Ka‘ba. In 630, he entered Mecca as a conqueror, meeting with no resistance. The idols in the Ka‘ba were forthwith destroyed. In that same year, a coalition of Bedouin tribes still opposed to the Prophet was routed in battle at Hunayn (Hunayn). The Arab tribes now hasten-

ed to make their peace with the Prophet and accept Islam, and even the Persian satrap of South Arabia publicly proclaimed his conversion. Defeated Persia had meanwhile lost control over all her outposts in the peninsula. For all intents and purposes, Muham-

mad - who maintained his capital in Medina -- had become the master of all Arabia. 6. Islam Completes the Arabization of Arabia. In a way, this final triumph of Islam did not only unify the Ara-

bian world for the first time, but also completed its Arabization, which had been proceeding gradually for several centuries. Muham-

mad himself was eminently conscious of his ethnic identity as an Arab. While he regarded [slam as universally valid, he also maintain-

ed that it was a religion preached in Arabic, by an Arab Prophet, to Arabs — facts which are emphasized in the text of-the Koran. With a religion of their own which unified the ranks, the Arabs as a people could at last stand out as a nation, all on their own: as Moslems, ‘“‘the best nation (umma) to emerge before the world”’ (Koran 3:110). Henceforth, by implication, it was no longer neces-

sary for them to be dependent on external powers, as they had been before. The stand of Muhammad on this point was no different from the traditional position of the Quraysh, who upheld the traditional Arabian paganism in the face of alien universalist religions such as Christianity, Zoroastrianism or Judaism, which were

sponsored or protected by imperial powers from outside. While the Old Meccans opposed these alien religions with archaic folk cults of no more than parochial appeal, Muhammad opposed them with Islam - a vigorous Arab religion which could not only com-

THE SUCCCESSION OF MUHAMMAD 81

pete with the alien faiths on home ground, but also have, like them, a universalist appeal. Hence, what the Old Meccans fried hard to gain through paganism but failed, Muhammad in his ‘“‘New Mecca” readily achieved through Islam. 7. The Quarrel with Byzantium. According to tradition, Muhammad invited the emperor Herac-

lius to accept Islam in 628 -- the very year in which Byzantium won its final victory over the Persians. Heraclius, it is said, paid no

heed to the invitation. Whatever the historicity of the report, it certainly indicates a change of policy in Medina at the time with respect to the Byzantines, who were now once again the masters of Syria. By 628, Muhammad was calling upon Arabs everywhere

to accept Islam, and some tribes from as far north as the Syrian borderlands responded to his call. These tribeslived on the peripheries

of the Christian Arab kingdom of Ghassan which, though now in decline, was still in existence as a Byzantine vassal state. In 629, when Moslem Arab tribesmen raiding the desert outpost of Mu’ta, east of the Dead Sea, were defeated and repelled by the local Byzan-

time garrison with the assistance of the Christian Arabs of the neighbourhood, Muhammad sent a force from Medina to revenge the defeat, but without success. The Medinese force was cut down by the Mu’ta garrison, and one of the Prophet’s own cousins was among the slain. Muhammad was planning another attack on Mu’ta when he died in 632. By now, Byzantium was clearly marked out by Medina as an enemy power. It is not clear to what extent the Byzantines, by 632, were appreciative of the significance of the new developments in Arabia. To them, the Islamic Umma which had emerged in Medina while they were preoccupied with their Persian wars, must have seemed

little more than a new Arabian border principality which they could ultimately bring under their control. The Moslem attacks on

Mu’ta could not have unduly disheartened them. The fact that Muhammad, in Medina, was no ordinary prince of the desert, but the founder of a new faith and potentially of a new empire, must have utterly escaped their notice. 8. The Succession of Muhammad and the Ridda Wars.

For a brief while, the Byzantines, engrossed in their efforts to

reconsolidate their power in Syria and Egypt, could afford to

82 ADAY FOR MEDINA

forget about Arabia. Following the death of the Prophet, the Umma of Medina faced a crisis. To begin with, there was a thorny problem of succession.* While the Quraysh in Medina insisted that one of their own ranks should succeed, the local Ansar argued that

all Moslems were equal in the brotherhood of the faith, and that the successor (khalifa, or “‘caliph’’) to the Prophet should be freely chosen from among the ranks of the believers to be their leader (imam), or commander of the faithful (amir al-mu’minin). While the Ansar, supported by a large body of tribal Arabs in different regions, opposed the Quraysh, the latter were divided among themselves into rival factions. To begin with, there were the Muhajirun — the old believers who had been with the Prophet in Medina since he first arrived there. Among their leaders were the pious Abu Bakr (Abu Bakr), the energetic and frugal ‘Umar, the rich and influential Talha (Talha) and Zubayr, and above all the Prophet’s vivacious eighteen-year-old widow ‘Aisha (‘A’isha), formerly his favourite wife, and the daughter of Abu Bakr. After the success of Muhammad had become established, members of the old Meccan oligarchy had accepted Islam and entered the service of the Prophet in Medina. These included the talented Yazid (Yazid) and Mu‘awiya(Mu‘awiya), the sons of Abu Sufyan (Abu Sufyan), who had once bitterly opposed the Prophet. These two, along with their cousins, formed the clan of Umayya (hence the Umayyads), and they harboured political ambitions of their own which they suppressed for the moment. Among the Muhajirun, they were represented by the

competent yet modest ‘Uthman (‘Uthman), whose early conversion to Islam did not detract from his devotion to his kinsfolk. For the moment, the Umayyad clan made common cause with the Muhajirun to oppose the political claims of ‘Ali (‘Ali) — the first cou-

sin of the Prophet who was the husband of his daughter Fatima (Fatima) and the father of his only two grandsons, Hasan (al-Hassan) and Husayn (al-Husayn). ‘Ali claimed the caliphate by virtue of being the Prophet’s next of kin. Far in the background was the family of the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas (al-‘Abbas), to whom he had never been particularly close. These were to emerge much later as the clan of the ‘Abbasids. Making common cause with all the Quraysh but ‘Ali, the Muhajirun, led by ‘Umar, managed to secure the succession of Abu Bakr as Commander of the Faithful by acclamation, and the Ansar had *Muhammad is said to have had two sons who died in infancy, and he only had grandchildren (two grandsons) by a daughter, Fatima (see below).

THE EARLY CONQUESTS 83

no choice but to concede. ‘Ali for the moment retired from the scene, although his faithful followers — called Shi‘at ‘Ali (the Shi‘a, or Shi‘ites) — insisted that he alone was the rightful Imam. Meanwhile, trouble was breaking out in various regions of Arabia, where

many tribes declared their secession from Islam. While this tribal break with Medina was regarded as nothing short of apostacy (the so-called Ridda), some of the tribes may have been merely rising in rebellion to express opposition to the manner in which the problem of the succession had been settled. Whatever the reason, the rulers of Medina turned at once to deal with the Ridda rebellions. Armies were organized under competent Quraysh generals and sent in various directions to deal with the rebels, who were finally subdued in 634. One thing was certain: the successors of Muhammad were determined not to allow his newly formed Arabian Umzma to fall apart. 9. The Early Conquests and Related Problems.

It was while the last pockets of the Ridda were being subdued in Arabia that the Moslem Arab tribes in the north began to launch fresh raids, not only on the borderlands of Byzantine Syria, but also on the fringes of Sasanid Iraq. The rulers of Medina were quick to send reinforcements to assist in these raids, and freshly subdued

rebel tribes were encouraged to move northwards and help their brother raiders. In southern Syria (possibly Palestine), a first resounding victory was won by the invading Arab forces at Ajnadayn (Ajnadayn), in 634. In that same year, an Arab assault in Iraq was

repelled by the Sasanids at the Battle of the Bridge. The Arab invaders there, however, remained undeterred, and their operations against the Sasanids across the Euphrates were soon resumed with a new vigour.

Abu Bakr did not live to see the final success of these invasions in the north. He died in 634 and was succeeded as Commander of the Faithful by his close associate ‘Umar (634-644). The years that followed saw the beginnings of the phenomenal transformation of the Arabian Umma of Islam into a world empire. In Syria, a decisive victory was won by the Arabs over the Byzantines near present-

day Deraa (Dar‘a), at the battle of the Yarmuk (al-Yarmuk) — an eastern tributary of the Jordan — in 636. By 640 or 641, the whole of Syria had passed under Moslem rule, with the Umayyad Mu‘awiya serving as governor in Damascus. Meanwhile, another member of the Umayyad clan - ‘Amr ibn al-‘As (al-‘As) — had con-

84 ADAY FOR MEDINA

quered Egypt. In Iraq, the Arab invaders had earlier defeated the Sasanid forces at Qadisiyya (al-Qadisiyya) in 637 and occupied Ctesiphon. Shortly after the conquest of Syria and Egypt was completed in the west, the Sasanid army was destroyed at Nihavend in Persia. Meanwhile, the whole of Iraq had been taken over, and the occupation of Persia followed right away. To manage such rapid conquests, the young Umma of Islam had little experience to go by. While ‘Umar proved a leader of admirable capacity, personal. jealousies among his generals and administrative

agents, and tribal jealousies among the forces he sent out to complete the conquests, created problems with which the ruling establishment in Medina was still poorly equipped to deal. The worst problems involved the distribution of the war spoils and the new tax revenues from the freshly conquered lands. These, in principle, went to the central treasury of the community (the Bayt al-Mal), which arranged for their equitable distribution among the faithful;

but there were always those who were not satisfied with their shares, claiming that the distribution was unjust. The lurking opposition to the Muhajirun establishment in power no doubt encouraged such claims. In 644, ‘Umar was murdered by a disgruntled

warrior who felt unjustly treated. The Muhajirun and Umayyad factions immediately joined forces to acclaim the Umayyad ‘Uthman -- who was also one of the leading Muhajirun — as caliph and

Commander of the Faithful. Though ‘Uthman (644-656) tried hard to be fair, the tribesmen supporting the political opposition in Medina remained unconvinced of his good intentions. 10. The Caliphate Leaves Medina.

The reign of ‘Uthman saw the completion of the conquest of Persia (651) and the beginning of the Moslem expansion in North Africa (648). In Syria, his competent cousin Mu‘awiya managed well, administratively and also militarily in his continued campaigns against the Byzantines in the north. In Egypt, ‘Amr ibn al-‘As was also militarily successful, but the massive tribal reinforcements ar-

riving there to help in extending the conquests southwards and westwards created for him serious problems. Even more troublesome was the situation in Iraq, where the Arab garrison town of Kufa (al-Kufa), on the Euphrates, was already emerging as a leading centre of political sedition.

Meanwhile, in Medina, ‘Ali reappeared on the political scene

THE CALIPHATE LEAVES MEDINA 85

and joined forces with the Ansar leaders to oppose ‘Uthman. The ageing caliph was accused of favouring his Umayyad kinsmen at the

expense of the community, and was declared unfit to rule. In 656, riots involving forces returning home from the war fronts broke out in Medina. An angry mob attacked the house of ‘Uthman, and the caliph was murdered. The insurgents forthwith acclaimed ‘Ali as caliph and Commander of the Faithful. Neither the Muhajirun party in Medina, nor the Umayyads in Syria and Egypt, were willing, however, to recognize the new caliph, who was actually denounced by Mu‘awiya of Damascus as the man chiefly responsible for the murder of ‘Uthman. ‘Ali promptly left Medina to establish himself in Iraq, where his chief support lay, and he set up his new capital in Kufa. In Damascus, his Umayyad rival, Mu‘awiya, claimed the caliphate for himself. Only twenty-four years after the death of

the Prophet, Islam was already moving out of Arabia, its original homeland. The abandonment of Medina as the seat of the caliphs, at first thought to be no more than a temporary matter, proved to be permanent. Henceforth, the course of Islamic history (as distinct from the parochial Arabian history) was to be directed from elsewhere.

V} Decadence and Revolt

1. Islam at the Parting of Ways.

Sooner or later, the capital of the rapidly expanding empire of Islam was bound to move out of Arabia. By 656 the conquered territories had already reached the borders of India and Central Asia in the east and the vicinity of Carthage in the west. Such territories could not be controlled effectively from Medina; cities such as Kufa in Iraq, or Damascus in Syria, were clearly better located for that purpose. For a while there was a contest for dominance between Kufa under ‘Ali, and Damascus under Mu‘awiya. Kufa was oriented

towards the east, where the conquests for the moment had come toa halt. Damascus was oriented towards the north, where the conflict with Byzantium continued; also to the west, where the armies of Islam pressed in the direction of the Atlantic. The prevailing circumstances thus favoured Damascus in its bid to become the imperial capital. Here Mu‘awiya had established a firm administration, while his rival ‘Ali, in Kufa, faced mounting trouble. In the course of his wars with Mu‘awiya, ‘Ali agreed at one moment to have the question of the caliphate put to arbitration. This divided his followers between his own Shi‘a faction, who maintained that the caliphate was his by personal right to dispose of as he pleased, and others who maintained that the caliph was the choice

of the community of the faithful and held office in trust for the Umma, which alone could decide who would be its leader. The lat-

ter represented a political view which was originally that of the Ansar — the tribesmen of Medina, whose leaders had made common

cause with ‘Ali to oppose the Muhajirun and the Umayyads. They now denounced ‘Ali for betraying the trust of the community by accepting arbitration, and “‘rebelled” (kharaju) against him, whereupon they came to be known as the Kharijites (Kharijites, Arabic Khawarij). These Kharijites continued to denounce ‘Ali, even after he himself had rejected the verdict of the arbitration which favoured his rival Mu‘awiya. In 661, a Kharijite stabbed ‘Ali to death.

ARABIA IN ECLIPSE 87

With ‘Ali dead, Mu‘awiya readily secured recognition for himself

as Commander of the Faithful and caliph of Islam, among all but the Kharijites. ‘Ali’s eldest son, Hasan, was prevailed upon to aban-

don his claim to the office, although the Shi‘ites continued to revere him as the rightful Imam (as distinct from the actual caliph, whom they regarded as a usurper). Hasan retired to Medina and was rewarded by Mu‘awiya with a pension and an estate in the Hijaz. Upon his death, the Shi‘ites recognized his younger brother Husayn as his successor, and hence as the third rightful Imam. When

Mu‘awiya died in Damascus in 680 and was succeeded as caliph there by his son Yazid, Husayn led a small force from Medina to Iraq, with the intent of establishing himself as rival caliph in Kufa,

with the support of the local Shi‘ites. Yazid, swift to act, sent forces from Damascus which fought and defeated Husayn at Karbala (Karbala’), outside Kufa. Husayn himself and several members of his immediate family were killed in battle, and others were tak-

en prisoner. To the Shi‘ites, Husayn became the first martyr of their cause. Meanwhile, Yazid secured the rule of the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus, where it continued until 750. 2. Arabia in Eclipse. After the capital of the caliphate had been removed first to Iraq, then to Syria, Arabia was relegated to a position of secondary consequence in the growing Islamic empire. In the Hijaz, Mecca, since

its Conquest by the Prophet in 630, had only retained a position of honorific importance as a place of pilgrimage. Now Medina, the capital of the Prophet and his immediate successors became, like Mecca, a relic of the past. In 656, following the murder of the caliph ‘Uthman, the Muhajirun, who formed what was apparently the strongest single front in Medina, refused to accept the succession of ‘Ali, and actually fought him under the leadership of ‘Aisha, Tatha and Zubayr (see p. 82). ‘Ali was even pursued into Iraq, but the effort to prevent him from establishing himself there was unsuccessful. After ‘Ali had established his capital in Kufa, and Mu‘awiya had risen to challenge his-rule from Damascus, the main events of the Islamic world no longer took place in the Hijaz, or in Arabia. By 661, when ‘Ali was killed, Medina had become a city for the retired, mostly of the rich Quraysh, who profited from the continuing Islamic conquests and accumulated huge fortunes. It also became a city where deep political resentments were nursed -by the Muhajirun, whose political counsels were no longer sought;

88 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

by the Ansar leaders, who were neglected; and by the family of ‘Ali

(mainly Husayn and his descendants after him), whose claims to the caliphate were given cavalier treatment by the Umayyads. Apart from being a place for the politically retired, and for futile gossip about matters which were already far beyond the city’s control, Medina after 661 became a leading centre for Islamic scholarship on the one hand, and on the other for leisurely life. While the pious of the city set themselves to preserve the tradition (Sunna or Athar) of the Prophet, mainly by gathering and compiling his personal pronouncements (the Hadith) which were later to complement the Koran as a source for the Moslem Law (Shari‘a), the less pious set themselves out to live pleasantly, enjoy their wealth, and cultivate the more frivolous arts. The oases of Wadi al-‘Aqiq (Wadi al-‘Aqiq) — a tributary of Wadi Hamd, outside Medina ~ became their favoured haunts. Here the most renowned singers of the day sang for their entertainment. Soon, the rich of Medina were vying with one another to possess slave girls talented in song and dance. Among the younger generation, who had little taste for the austerity of Islam, a real or affected nostalgia for the desert and for the imagined ways of pre-Islamic times became fashionable. Playboy poets like the famed ‘Umar ibn Abi Rabi‘a (Abi Rabi‘a) liked to picture themselves as ribald Bedouins in pursuit of dangerous love adventure, roaming the desert by day, and waiting for nightfall to steal into desert encampments, to court the damsels in their tents. Such was the fancy of the new decadence. 3. The First Arabian Revolts.

In the midst of this carefree life, political ambition was not forgotten — neither among the sons of the more prominent Muhajirun, nor among the descendants of ‘Ali, who equally resented the established success of the Umayyads outside Arabia. In 680, when Yazid succeeded his father Mu‘awiya as caliph in Damascus, a son of

Zubayr, ‘Abdallah (‘Abdallah), proclaimed himself caliph in the Hijaz, fixing his capital in Mecca. In that same year, as already mentioned, the younger son of ‘Ali, Husayn, left Medina to stage a revolt against Yazid in Iraq. While the revolt of Husayn failed and ended with his death, ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca was more successful. He was soon acknowledged as caliph not only in most of Arabia, but in Iraq and parts of Syria as well. When Yazid died in Damascus in 683, and was followed to the grave within the same year by his incompetent son Mu‘awiya IL,

THE FIRST ARABIAN REVOLTS 89

‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr almost became the universally acknowledged caliph of Islam. Promptly, however, an ageing but determined cousin of the first Mu‘awiya, Marwan ibn al-Hakam (Marwan ibn al-Hakam), left the Hijaz to reestablish Umayyad authority in Damascus and reign there as caliph. Marwan’s energetic son and successor, ‘Abd al-Malik (685-705), managed so well to consolidate the restored Umayyad hegemony that he was able, finally, to turn against his adversary in the Hijaz. In 692, he sent his ruthless general al-Hajjaj (al-Hajjaj) to besiege Mecca. The city was taken, and ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr was killed. The first revolt of Arabia against the caliphate which had left it was thus subdued. It was while ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr was still caliph in Mecca that a certain Mukhtar (Mukhtar) staged an unsuccessful revolt in Iraq, in 686, in the name of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya (al-Hanafiyya) -- a son of the caliph ‘Ali by a wife other than Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. Following the death of Husayn at Karbala in 680, Mukhtar organized a faction of the Shi‘a -- later called the Kaysaniyya (al-Kaysaniyya) -- who recognized Muhammad, his half-brother, as the next rightful Imam, although Muhammad himself was reluctant to accept the honour. Because ‘Abdallah ibn alZubayr had already established himself in power in the Hijaz, Mukh-

tar staged his revolt outside Arabia, in the Shi‘ite stronghold of Kufa. ‘Abdallah sent against him his brother Mus‘ab (Mus‘ab), who governed Iraq from Basra in his name. Mukhtar was defeated and killed. His Kaysaniyya Shi‘ite followers, however, continued to revere Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, in Medina, as their Imam. After the downfall and death of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya made his peace with the Umayyads.who paid him a handsome pension. When he died in 700, however, the Kaysaniyya insisted that he had a son, Ahmad (Ahmad), who became the rightful Imam after him. This Ahmad, they claimed, had vanished inside a mountain in Najd, from which he would reappear one day as the Mahdi (the divinely “Guided One”, equivalent to the Jewish and Christian Messiah). In Iraq and East Arabia, the Kaysaniyya movement survived as an expression of rural and tribal disaffection for the established order, merging in time with a more formidable movement of revolt in these regions -- that of the Qaramita (al-Qaramita; see the following chapter). Meanwhile, the Kharijites - who were as opposed to the Umayyads as they were to the house of ‘Ali -- were getting themselves entrenched in various corners of the expanding Islamic world. In

90 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

Arabia, their main stronghold was among the Azd tribesmen of Oman, whose leaders in ca 680 were Sa‘id ibn ‘Abbad (Sa‘id ibn ‘Abbad) and his brother Sulayman (Sulayman), of the so-called Julanda (Julanda) dynasty. The two brothers, according to tradition,

sponsored an early colonization of East Africa by people from Oman who hunted there for black slaves; the demand for such slaves, by this time, was probably being enhanced by the phenomenal growth of the Islamic empire. As a people engaged in trade,

the Azd of Oman favoured the most moderate form of Khariite doctrine -- that of the liberal I[badis (al-Ibadiyya), so-called after the Kharijite leader ‘Abdallah ibn Ibad (Ibad). The Umayyads, however, did not tolerate their independence for long. Once the revolt of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca had been crushed, the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik sent two expeditions to subdue Oman. The first expedition, in 694, was effectively resisted. The second, shortly after, was more successful. The Ibadis of Oman were defeated; large numbers of them were slaughtered; and their leaders fled by sea to East Africa. For a short while at least, the Umayyads could rightly claim to be the rulers of all Arabia. 4. The Rise of the ‘Abbasids. Umayyad power in the world of Islam reached its apogee under ‘Abd al-Malik and his immediate successors. Once the first wave of Arabian revolts had been successfully dealt with, the various parts of the peninsula were committed to the care of governors and virtually forgotten, while the caliphs of Damascus turned their atten-

tion to the further expansion of their empire eastwards and westwards. By the end of the reign of the caliph Hisham (Hisham, 724743), however, Umayyad power was already in decline. In the west, the armies of Islam, in central France, had reached the point (Tours-Poitiers, in 732) beyond which they could no longer expand,

and from which they would soon begin rapidly to retreat. Meanwhile, the massive conversion of the Persians to Islam contributed to turn the populous provinces of the former Sasanid empire into a centre of Moslem mafipower overshadowing Syria in importance.

The traditional Umayyad policy of discrimination between Arab Moslems and Persian converts to Islam alienated the Persian. Moslems from Damascus. The disaffection was worst among the warlike tribesmen of Khurasan (Khurasan), in northeast Persia, who now stood ready to make common cause with anyone willing and able to challenge Umayyad rule.

THE IBADI INSURRECTION 91

It was the descendants of ‘Abbas, an uncle of the Prophet’s (see p. 82 ), who finally set out to plot the overthrow of the Umayyads. From a base in southern Syria (in Humayma, Arabic al-Humayma,

south of the Dead Sea), the ‘Abbasids deftly exploited popular grievances against the caliphs of Damascus, attracted the Shi‘a sup-

port for the ‘Alids (who were their kinsmen) to their side, and established regular contact with the tribal chiefs of Khurasan in Persia. It was actually in Khurasan that the ‘Abbasid revolt against

the Umayyads finally broke out in 747. In 750, the Umayyad forces were routed in open battle in northern Iraq, near Mosul, and the last Umayyad caliph was killed. The ‘Abbasids forthwith occupied Syria and Egypt, conducted a general slaughter of the Umayyads, and took over the caliphate, transferring its centre from

Syria to Iraq. For twelve years, their capital was Kufa. In 762, however, they moved to Baghdad -- the new capital they built on the Tigris, near the ruins of the old Sasanid capital at Ctesiphon. 5. The [badi Insurrection and the Zaydis in the Yemen. In Arabia, the Umayyad control established under ‘Abd al-Malik was already crumbling long before the outbreak of the ‘Abbasid revolt in Khurasan. From their old base in Oman, the Ibadi Kharijites had established a new base for themselves in the Yemen. There, in 747, they rose in revolt and pressed northwards to capture Mecca and Medina, where they carried out a massacre of the Quraysh. The Ibadis held the two cities for three months before the Umayyads finally managed to drive them out. The rebels were then pursued to the Yemen and routed outside San‘a. An Ibadi principality established in about 745 in Hadhramut seems to have vanished in

consequence. Meanwhile, another Kharijite revolt was quelled in raq. The Hijaz had hardly recovered from the ibadi invasion when the first “Abbasid caliph, Abu al-‘Abbas al-Saffah (al-Saffah, 750754), formally assumed power in Kufa. He was barely in power One year when the Ibadis of Oman proclaimed their independence by electing a certain Julanda ibn Mas‘ud (Mas‘iid) as their first

Imam — a formal defiance of central authority which they had never attempted before. Al-Saffah immediately sent forces to occupy Oman and put the newly elected Ibadi Imam to death. For a while, no Imam was chosen to succeed him, and Oman fell into a state of tribal confusion. It was probably the short-lived Ibadi occupation of Mecca and

92 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

Medina which put an end to the carefree days of the Hijaz, already interrupted once before by the revolt of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr. Life in the two cities was henceforth to become more sombre. The

decimation of the Quraysh aristocracy in Medina in particular seems to have destroyed whatever remained of the old prominence of the Zubayrids, paving the way for their replacement in the Hijaz leadership by the house of ‘All. Until 740, the ‘Alids still had their main support in Iraq rather than the Hijaz. In that year, Zayd, a grandson of Husayn, had left Medina for Kufa -- as his grandfather before him had done -- and staged a revoit there against the Umayyad caliph Hisham. The revolt failed, and Zayd was killed. To his followers, the Zaydi Shi ‘ites, he became a model of the ‘Alid Imam who fought for his rights. Any ‘Alid, according to these Zaydis, could be recognized as Imam if he was able and willing to vindicate his claim to the Imamate by force. In the Hijaz, however, the Zaydis never won much ground, though they were successful in gaining followers elsewhere. After

the rout of the Ibadis at San‘a in 747, they managed to establish their main Arabian stronghold in the Yemen. 6. The Last Revolt of Medina. To the ‘Abbasids, control of the Hiyjaz, in Arabia, was far more

important than the control of either Qman or the Yemen. Unless their authority was fully recognized in Mecca and Medina, they could not rightly claim to be the true caliphs of Islam. Here, the house of ‘Ali, as already mentioned, had lately been gaining power.

At the time when the ‘Abbasids were still plotting to overthrow the Umayyads, they had approached their ‘Alid cousins in the Hijaz, promising to associate them in the caliphate once it was taken over. These promises were naturally forgotten when Abu al-‘Abbas

al-Saffah became caliph, being succeeded after his death by his brother al-Mansur (al-Manstr, 754-775). In Medina, the ‘Alids were disappointed. After the accession of al-Mansur in Kufa, they rallied around a great-grandson of Hasan called Muhammad al-Nafs

al-Zakiyya (Muhammad of the Pure Soul),* and rose in revolt. When al-Mansur called Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya to obedience,

the latter retorted that it was to him -- as the direct descendant of *After the death of Husayn in 680, it became customary among Shi‘ites to add pious sobriquets such as this to their ‘Alid leaders, thus distinguishing those who carried the same given name from one another.

MEDINA, THE ‘ALIDS AND THE ‘ABBASIDS 93

the Prophet — that obedience was rightly due. In further defiance, the ‘Alid leader sent his brother Ibrahim (lbrahim) to Iraq to occupy Basra.

Ai-Mansur was not the man to tolerate such insubordination, least of all froma ‘Alid kinsman. In 762, shortly before moving his capi-

tal to Baghdad, he sent an army to besiege and capture Medina, and Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya was killed. Soon after, Muham-

mad’s brother Ibrahim was defeated and killed in Iraq. Having secured control over the Hijaz, al-Mansur began to appoint governors to Mecca, which now replaced Medina as the principal city of the region. The ‘Abbasids, however, lavished money on both cities as part of their religious policy to enhance their prestige. The precincts of Mecca and Medina, for the first time, were forbidden to non-Moslems, in keeping with a tradition attributed to the Prophet.

The birthplace of Islam and the first capital of the Umma were henceforth to be considered sacred ground where only Moslems could tread.

In a way, the revolt of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya may be seen as a last bid on the part of the Hijaz to recover its lost dominance over the world of Islam. The tragedy was that the Hijaz lead-

ers, after 656, never fully realized to what extent the success of Islam on the world stage had dwarfed the importance of its old parochial grounds in Arabia. In this respect, the revolts of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr under the Umayyads, and of Muhammad al-Nafs al-

Zakiyya under the ‘Abbasids, were much alike, although each of the two leaders represented the interests of a different faction. Both wished the Hijaz to be more than a holy land, and both lost. After 762, the lesson was finally learnt, and political dissent in the Hijaz to the extent that it continued — became little more than disgruntled murmur. 7. Medina, the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbasids. Medina, after 762, retained for a while its position as a centre of religious learning. The leading jurist in the city at the time was Ma-

lik (Malik, d. 795), the descendant of a prominent companion of the Prophet. Malik was the most renowned compiler of Hadith in his day, and he became the founder of one of the four surviving orthodox schools of jurisprudence in Islam, giving his name to the Malikite school, the other three schools being the Hanafite (Hana-

1.‘ALI d. 661

2. AL-HASAN 3. AL-HUSAYN

d. 669 d. 680

| | MUHAMMAD aut IBN AL-HANAFIYYA HASAN 4. ‘ALI ZAYN 4. 700

| d, 713 | AL-‘ABIDIN .

‘ABDALLAH

AHMAD

(existence

5. MUHAMMAD alleged by

AL-BAQIR ZAYD seit) d. 731 i‘ites MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM d. 740 AL-NAFS d. 763

AL-ZAKIYYA

a782 6. JA'FAR AL-SADIQ

d. 765

ISMAIL 7. MUSA AL-KAZIM First Hidden Imam d. 799 of the Isma‘ ilis |

CALIPHS |

8. ‘ALI AL-RIDA

FATIMID

d. 818

9, MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD

d. 835 10. ‘ALI AL-HADI

d. 868

THE HOUSE OF ‘ALI 11. HASAN AL-‘ASKARI d. 874 |

12. MUHAMMAD AL-MAHDI AL-MUNTAZAR

vanished 874

MEDINA, THE ‘ALIDS AND THE ‘ABBASIDS 95

fite), the Shafi‘ite (Shafi‘ite) and the Hanbalite (Hanbalite)*. Malik’s

decisions on legal matters were sought from near and far, so that the ‘Abbasids feared his influence. In 764, the ‘Abbasid authorities had him arrested and flogged to deter him from making legal pronouncements which ran contrary to their political interests. The ‘Alids in Medina, and also in Mecca, were permitted to retain

their local political prominence under the ‘Abbasids. After the failure of the revolt of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya in 762, no descendant of Hasan rose to challenge the ‘Abbasid authority in the Hijaz. The local Hasanids, while accepting the deference paid to them by the Shi‘ites, did not show on the whole much attachment to the Shi‘ite cause, whose leaders were the Imams of the line of Husayn. Under the Umayyads, Husayn’s son ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin (Zayn al-‘Abidin), his grandson Muhammad al-Bagir (al-Baqir) and his great-grandson Ja‘far al-Sadiq (al-Sadiq) were recognized by most Shi‘ites in the world of Islam as the fourth, fifth and sixth Imams respectively. All three lived in Medina; the fourth Imam, Muhammad al-Baqir, however, died in Humayma, where he had apparently gone to assist his ‘Abbasid cousins in planning the overthrow of the Umayyads. Muhammad’s son Ja‘far, the sixth Imam, outlived ‘the Umayyad period and died in 765, during the reign of al-Mansur. He carefully avoided conflict with the formidable caliph of Baghdad and, like his contemporary Malik, devoted his time in Medina to juristic study. When Ja‘far died in Medina, most Shi‘ites recognized his son Musa al-Kazim (Misa al-Kazim) as the seventh Imam. Some insist-

ed, however, that the rightful seventh Imam was Musa’s elder brother Isma‘il, who, to all but his followers, was already dead. Like his father Ja‘far, Musa was politically circumspect and careful not to arouse ‘Abbasid suspicions against him. His brother Isma‘il, on the other hand, seems to have been more rash. The followers of Isma‘il — who were the political activists among the Shi‘ites

~ insisted that he had gone into satr (hiding) during his father’s life-

time, which now made him the “hidden” seventh Imam. His successors were to remain hidden Imams until the way was prepared for their reemergence from hiding, whereupon they would overthrow the usurping ‘Abbasids and publicly assume the caliphate. *The Hanafite school was founded by Abii Hanifa (d. 767), in Iraq; the Shafi‘ite school by al-Shafi‘i (d. 820), in Egypt; the Hanbalite school by Ibn Han‘bal (d. 855), in Iraq. These three, along with the Malikite school, came to be recognized as the four valid bases of Moslem orthodoxy by the late ninth century A.D.

96 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

The Isma‘ilis, as the followers of Isma‘il were called, organized themselves as a secret da‘wa (mission) bent ultimately on revolution, and one of their principal centres was established in the highlands of the Yemen. In Medina, however, it was Musa who remained the head of what came to be known as Imami Shi‘ism. When he died, he was succeeded as eighth Imam in Medina by his son ‘Ali al-Rida (al-Rida). Meanwhile, in Baghdad, al-Mansur was succeeded in the caliphate by his son al-Mahdi (775-785), who was in turn succeeded by his two sons al-Hadi (al-Hadi, 785-786) and al-Rashid — better known by his full name as Harun al-Rashid (Harun al-Rashid, 786-809).* When al-Rashid died, the caliphate was disputed between his two sons al-Amin (al-Amin, 809-813) and al-Ma’mun (al-Ma’mun, 813-

833). In the course of the war between the two brothers, al-Ma’mun courted the support of the Shi‘ites for his cause; when he was proclaimed caliph in Khurasan upon the murder of his brother alAmin in Baghdad, he solemnly promised that ‘Ali al-Rida of Medina, the eighth Imam of the Shi‘ites, would be his successor to the caliphate. ‘Ali al-Rida was invited to join al-Ma’mun in Khurasan, and he died there in 817 before al-Ma’mun was able to enter Baghdad and formally assume the caliphal office. In Medina, ‘Ali al-Rida was succeeded as the ninth Imam of the Shi‘ites by his son Muhammad al-Jawad (al-Jawad). The promise of succession made by al-Ma’mun to ‘Ali al-Rida whetted the political appetite of the Imami Shi‘ites, but ultimately spelt serious trouble for ‘Ali al-Rida’s successors. In Baghdad, alMa’mun was succeeded as caliph by his younger brother al-Mu‘tasim

(al-Mu‘tasim, 833-842), who organized for himself a powerful standing army (‘askar) of Turkish mamluks (Arabic mamlik, plural mamalik, meaning “owned persons”’, or slaves), and soon established for himself a new capital north of Baghdad, at Samarra (Sdmar-

ra). Shortly before leaving Baghdad, the new caliph summoned the ninth Imam, Muhammad al-Jawad, to leave Medina and present himself at court. Muhammad al-Jawad, by virtue of being ‘Ali alRida’s son, had a claim to the caliphate based on the promise of alMa’mun to his father; it was therefore necessary to keep him under careful watch. It was actually in Baghdad that Muhammad al-Jawad died in 835, while his son ‘Ali al-Hadi succeeded him as the tenth Imam in Medina. *The names of the ‘Abbasid caliphs, as ordinarily cited, are their official reigning titles (alqdb, singular laqgab) rather than their given names.

POLITICAL RESURGENCE OF THE YEMEN 97

‘Ali al-Hadi himself was not left in peace for Jong. Hardly had the caliph al-Mutawakkil (847-861) assumed power in Samarra after the

death of his father al-Mu‘tasim, and the brief reign of his brother al-Wathiq (al-Wathiq, 842-847), than the Imam was brought over from Medina to be kept virtual prisoner in the ‘Abbasid capital. ‘Ali al-Hadi died in Samarra in 868, and his son, Hasan al-‘Askari (al“Askari)* ,succeeded him there as the eleventh Imam, and the second in ‘Abbasid-captivity. Medina, by now, had long ceased to be the seat of the Imams. Even in Samarra, there were not to be Shi‘ite Imams for long. Shortly after the death of Hasan al-‘Askari in 874, the twelfth Imam -- his minor son Muhammad -— vanished into what his Shi‘ite followers called a ghayba (absence). The world, defiled by evil usurpers, was no longer — in Shi‘ite eyes -- a fit place for the pure Imam. In time, the twelfth Imam Muhammad was to return from the mystic ghayba as al-Mahdi al-Muntazar (the Awaited Messiah), to establish the millenium. Until he did so, no rule in the world was to be considered truly legitimate. 8. The Establishment of Sunnism. To oppose the Shi‘ite claims, and also the still rampant Kharijite forms of heterodoxy, the ‘Abbasids, starting with the caliph al-Mu-

tawakkil, became the spansors of a strict order of Moslem orthodoxy, as formulated by the classical jurists. The followers of this State Islam were called AAhl al-Sunna wa’l Jama‘a (Followers of the Prophet’s Tradition and the Community) -- in short, the Sunnites. Once the Shi‘ite Imams had finally left Medina, the Hijaz be-

came a stronghold of the new orthodoxy, Sunnism. Meanwhile, other parts of Arabia persisted in their different doctrinal ways. 9. The Political Resurgence of the Yemen.

Distracted by the business of empire, the ‘Abbasids took little notice of the early spread of Zaydi and Isma‘ili Shi‘ism in the Yemen. This country, as the land of Saba’ (or Sheba), had once been the most important region of Arabia, with a tradition of civilization and independence dating back to the tenth century B.C., if not earlier. Its location at the maritime juncture between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and at the southern terminus of the Arabian caravan route to Syria, had given it a special commercial im*So called because he spent his life as Imam entirely in Samarra, the city of the ‘askar.

98 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

portance in the ancient world, and brought it great wealth. The prosperity of the country, as already seen (pp. 72-3), had begun to decline before the coming of Islam, when the Sasanids diverted a

substantial part of the Indian Ocean trade to their own lands by way of the Gulf, while the Abyssinians diverted most of what remained to their own ports on the African side of the Red Sea. Hence, when Islam appeared, the Yemen was already an impoverished land. Shortly after, its population was depleted by the Islamic conquests, as large numbers of its youth left the country as soldiers, or as emigrants, to seek their fortunes in distant lands. By the time of the ‘Abbasids, the Yemen had sunk to the level of a neglected province on the margins of the Islamic empire. The Yemenis, no doubt, deeply resented this fact. Moreover, the success Of the Islamic conquests had completed the economic ruin of their country by opening up direct routes for the East-West trade which ran across the conquered territories in the north, by-passing peninsular Arabia, and turning the Red Sea for the time being into a stagnant backwater. It was probably to express their frustrations under the new order that the people of the Yemen -— particularly in the rugged highland regions — turned to rebellion and protest. In San‘a and the highlands to the south, the glories of the Himyarite period were still vividly remembered, and movements of Himyarite political revival seem to have wielded a strong popular appeal. In

some areas there, the Isma‘ili da‘wa, by the last decades of the eighth century, had become well entrenched. Meanwhile, in the Sa‘da (Sa‘da) region, north of San‘a, Zaydi Shi‘ism won a large fol-

lowing among the local tribes. How and when this happened are questions which remain unclear.

The Zaydis and Isma‘ilis were already well established in the highlands of the Yemen when the economy of the country - mainly in the coastal areas - began somewhat to revive. By the early ninth century, a trickle of commerce was finding its way back to the Red Sea. By now, the major Arab conquests had been completed, and the lands of the Mediterranean basin were enjoying relative peace. Syria and Egypt were firmly in the ‘Abbasid grip; the Byzantine empire had found a way to co-exist politically and economically with the caliphate of Baghdad, despite continuing border clashes; Spain was thriving under a branch of the Umayyad dynasty which had escaped massacre by the ‘Abbasids in 750; the rise of the Carolingian empire, in the Christian parts of Western Europe, had introduced a new stability there, which reopened the area somewhat to

POLITICAL RESURGENCE OF THE YEMEN 99

world commerce. All these factors combined to reactivate the East-

West maritime trade, between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, by way of the Red Sea. Once it was resumed, this trade grew

rapidly in volume, bringing the Yemen once again into the world picture.

The caliph al-Ma‘mun, it seems, was the first ‘Abbasid ruler to notice the reviving importance of the Yemen. Since the time of the Prophet, governors had been appointed to San‘a first from Medina, then from Kufa, Damascus and Baghdad. In about 820, al-Ma‘mun sent one of his generals — an Arab claiming Umayyad descent, called

Muhammad ibn Ziyad (Ziyad) -- to subdue a revolt in the Yemen and remain as governor there. The new governor immediately set out to found a new capital city, Zabid (Zabid), a little way inland to the north of the Red Sea port of Mocha (al-Mukha).* For the next two centuries, the Ziyadids (Banu Ziyad) — as the descendants and successors of Muhammad ibn Ziyad were called — were virtually the independent rulers of at least the coastal parts of the Yemen, which were directly involved in the new maritime trade.

To secure their position in Zabid, the Ziyadids tried at first to extend their control inland, into the highlands. Here, however, they

met with strong resistance. By 861, a certain Ya‘fur ibn ‘Abd alRahman (‘Abd al-Rahman), who claimed descent from the old kings of Himyar, had established an independent principality for himself in San‘a. From his mountain capital, Ya‘fur extended his control southwards to include Janad -- today a suburb (and also the airport) of neighbouring Ta‘izz. The Ya‘furid dynasty lasted in San‘a and Janad for nearly a hundred years.

Meanwhile, starting towards the end of the ninth century, the ‘Zaydis in the Sa‘da region, north of San‘a, became politically organized under-a dynasty of Imams known as the Rassids. The ancestor of these Imams was a certain al-Qasim al-Rassi (al-Qasim al-

Rassi), who-claimed to be a member of the house of ‘Ali, of the line of Hasan. Originally from the Hijaz, this al-Qasim became involved at one time in a Zaydi revolt in Iraq. It was his grandson Yahya (Yahya) -— self-styled al-Hadi ila al-Haqq (the Guide to the Truth) — who first arrived to establish himself in the Yemen. Here Yahya deftly exploited the local Zaydi support for the ‘Alid cause, which gave him the authority to settle old feuds among the Zaydi tribes of the Sa‘da region by arbitration. In about 893, he was for-. *For the later importance of Mocha, see pp. 146, 151-2.

100 DECADENCE AND REVOLT

mally accepted by these tribes as Imam, and thus became the founder of the first Zaydi state in the Yemen highlands. With the help of his tribal followers, he captured San‘a from its Ya‘furid rulers at one moment, only to lose it back to them soon after. 10. The Second [badi Imamate in Oman. About three decades before Muhammad ibn Ziyad established his Yemeni State in Zabid, the Ibadis of Oman had resumed the assertion of their independence from the ‘Abbasids by electing Imams of their own, in defiance of the caliphs of Baghdad. The ‘Abbasids were not prepared to tolerate this, first because of the religious (and therefore political) implications involved, and second, no doubt, because of the strategic location of Oman at the maritime juncture between the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Apart from anything else, Oman was the Arabian centre of the African slave trade, and negro

slaves were in high demand in the ‘Abbasid empire, now at thé height of its political power and economic prosperity. Late in his reign, the caliph Harun al-Rashid sent a large force to attempt the reduction of the Ibadi rebels in Oman. The ‘Abbasid force was defeated at the port of Sohar (Suhar) by the Imam Warith (Warith) ibn Ka‘b. Prudently, however, Warith released the commanding officer of the expedition after he had taken him prisoner. For nearly a hundred years Oman, under the elected successors of Warith, retained its independence. The focal Ibadis, however, like

all tribal peoples, were given to factionalism, and this ultimately weakened their position. Before the end of the century, another invasion of Oman was undertaken by the ‘Abbasids, and this time the invasion was successful. Nazwa (Nazwa), the mountain capital of the Ibadis, was captured. Their Imam, ‘Azzan ibn Tamim (‘Azzan ibn Tamim) was put to death, and his head was sent to the ‘Abbasid caliph as a trophy. Large numbers of the Ibadis were massacred

and their towns and villages devastated. Oman had barely time to recover from the effects of this expedition when it suffered another, more terrible invasion by the notorious Qaramita. With the appearance of these Qaramita on the Islamic scene, a new era began not only for Oman, but for the whole of Arabia.

VI Walking the Tightrope

1, An Age of Two Caliphates.

In theory, all Arabia until the tenth century A.D. remained part of the empire of the ‘Abbasids, who claimed sovereignty as caliphs over the whole world of Islam. In the extreme west, the sovereignty of the ‘Abbasids was effectively rejected by the Umayyads of Spain (756-1031); also by the Idrisid (Idrisid) rulers of Morocco (788985) who were accepted there as ‘Alids and descendants of Hasan. Elsewhere, only secluded groups of organized Kharijites (as in Oman) or Zaydi Shi‘ites (as in the Yemen) refused to accord the ‘Abbasid caliphs formal recognition. In 909, however, a rival caliphate emerged in North Africa, in the region which its today Tunisia, and the legitimacy of ‘Abbasid rule,

in the Moslem world at large, was openly challenged for the first time. The founder of the new caliphate was a certain ‘Ubaydallah (‘Ubaydallah) who claimed to be a descendant of Isma‘il, the seventh Imam (and first “Shidden” Imam) of the Isma‘ili Shi‘ites(see pp. 95-6).

Before he emerged from “hiding” to proclaim himself caliph and Mahdi among the Berber tribes of North Africa, the ground had been prepared for him there, religiously and politically, by Isma‘ili

missionaries from the Yemen. Once he had proclaimed himself “Fatimid” caliph (after Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and the ancestress of the Shi'ite Imams), Isma‘ilis all over the Moslem world hastened to recognize his rule. Having formally styled himself al-Mahdi, he founded for himself a new capital, al-Mahdiyya, near the site of ancient Carthage. Between the new Fatimid cali-

phate in Mahdiyya, and the old ‘Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, there could be in principle no peace, but only war. 2. The Economics of the Situation. The political disintegration of the ‘Abbasid empire, which had set in shortly after the death of the caliph al-Mutawakkil (see p. 97) in 861, was no doubt one factor which encouraged the isma‘ili Shi-

102 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

‘ite activists to establish an independent caliphate for themselves by 909. Another, more subtle factor, however, also pertained. The Fatimid caliphate, it must be remembered, was founded in the part of North Africanearest to Italy, by the action of Isma‘ili missionaries

operating from distant Yemen. Why it should have been so is a matter that bears examination. Since the early ninth century, as already observed, a steadily growing commerce from the East had been reaching the Mediter-

ranean world again by way of the Red Sea. Among the factors which contributed to the continuing development of this commerce, in the Mediterranean basin, was the political stabilityof the Byzantine empire under the Macedonian dynasty (867-1056): also the rise of the new feudal monarchies in Western Europe starting with the tenth century. In Italy, the growth of the new Mediterranean commerce had meanwhile prompted the emergence of a number of cities

specializing in sea trade, such as Amalfi and Venice. In Egypt, which controlled the vital overland passage between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, the ‘Abbasids, at about the same time, con-

doned the establishment of two virtually independent regimes founded by Turkish military governors sent from Baghdad -- that of the Tulunids (Tulunids, 868-905), followed by that of fhe Ikhshidids (Ikshidids, 935-969). Acting on behalf of the ‘Abbasids, each of these two Egyptian regimes, in its time, came to control at least the southern parts of Syria, along with the Hijaz and the adjoining

coast of the Red Sea. Further south along this same coast, the Ziyadids (see p. 99), who were also political clients to the ‘Abbasids, had earlier established a control over the southern entrance to the Red Sea from Zabid. It is against this background that the emergence of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa, between Egypt and Italy, must be seen. In a way, it was a political product of the general revival of Mediterranean commerce at the time. This same commercial revival was already bringing increased prosperity to Moslem Spain, where the Sun-

nite Umayyad rulers, encouraged by the Fatimid example, began to call themselves caliphs in defiance of the ‘Abbasids in 929. Mean-

while, from their capital at Mahdiyya, the Fatimids began eying Fgypt covetously, no doubt with full appreciation of its unique position at the crossroads of the new commerce. Their Isma‘ili fol-

lowers in the Yemen, at the other end of the Red Sea, provided them with ready means for political leverage there. All they had to do was seize Egypt, and the whole Moslem sector of the Mediter-

THE QARAMITA ON THE LOOSE 103

ranean trade — barring only the marginal share of Umayyad Spain -would be theirs.

3. The Qaramita on the Loose. It was shortly before ‘Ubaydallah al-Mahdi proclaimed the emer-

gence of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa that the revolt of the Qaramita (see p. 100) broke out in southern Iraq, spreading from there to East Arabia and Syria. By any Moslem standard -- Sunnite, Shi‘ite or Kharijite — these Qaramita were pernicious heretics. While their movement is commonly considered as an undisciplined branch of Isma‘ili Shi‘ism, some of its tenets -- if the historical reports of them are correct -- would classify it rather as revival of the Kaysaniyya, whose followers believed that the ‘Alid Imamate, after Hu-

sayn, went to his half-brother Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya (see p. 89). The Kaysantyya, as already mentioned, expected the return of this Muhammad’s alleged son, Ahmad, as the rightful Mahdi. According to at least one report, the Qaramita held similar tenets.

As it happened, the Qaramita did not wait for the return of their Mahdi -- whoever they believed he was -- to announce their millenium. Operating from their original base in the Kufa region, they proclaimed the suspension of the Shari‘a (the sacred law of Islam), mustered around them the peasants of southern Iraq and the tribes of the nearby desert, and by 899 had expanded southwards to the Hasa region in East Arabia. Here they established the main centre for their movement under their leader Abu Sa‘id (Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi, 899-914). Their insolent defiance of the established order in distant Baghdad appealed to the local Arabian peasants and tribes-

men, who joined their ranks in great numbers.” From their new base in the Hasa, the Qaramita conducted repeated raids on Iraq and Syria, and in 904 invaded the Yemen and plundered Zabid. Between 911 and 915, a short-lived Qarmati regime was established at San‘a under a certain ‘Ali ibn al-Fadl (al-Fadl), and Qarmati raids on the inland peripheries of the Yemen continued long after. Shortly before the Qarmati leader Abu Sa‘id established himself in the Hasa, the nearby region of Yamama, in Central Arabia, had *] personally interpret the Qarmati movement, and its frank antinomianism, as an anarchy expressing theendemic hostility of the tribes of the Arabian desert

and its rural borderlands to orderly state control. Other interpretations, however, tend to present it as an egalilarian movement of considered social protest, and describe the Qarmati regime of Abu Sa‘id and his successors in the Hasa as a sort of communist-type republic.

104 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

fallen under the control of the Ukhaydirids (Banu al-Ukhaydir) -one of the many dynasties of ‘Alid pretenders which appeared in the islamic world at the time, claiming descent from Hasan. The founder of this dynasty, Muhammad ibn al-Ukhaydir, had established himself in the Yamama during the reign of the ‘Abbasid caliph

al-Musta‘in (al-Musta‘in, 862-866). He then began to impose tolls on pilgrims passing through his territory on their way from Iraq to Mecca, and his successors continued to do so after him. Under the leadership of Abu Tahir (Abu Tahir, 914-944), the son and successor of Abu Sa‘id, the Qaramita attacked the Ukhaydirids

and seized the Yamama from them. Like the Ukhaydirids, they proceeded to intercept communications between Iraq and the Hijaz. Meanwhile, their forces, joined by tribesmen from Iraq, pressed westwards in the direction of Transjordan and Damascus. Here

their continuous raids threatened to disrupt access to the Hijaz through Syria. The Qaramita, as a religious community, had discarded pilgrimage

in principle, as they had also discarded other accepted norms of. Moslem worship. In 930, Abu Tahir and his followers swept across

Najd to attack and plunder Mecca, and succeeded in seizing the sacred Black Stone of the Ka‘ba which they carried away as a trophy. Thousands of pilgrims were reportedly massacred in the city on the occasion. Already under Abu Sa‘id, a first Qarmati invasion of Oman had apparently been attempted. Now, under Abu Tahir, the Qaramita invaded Oman again and devastated the country, bringing about a thorough disruption of the Ibadi order there. 4, Collapse of the Gulf Commerce.

The anarchy of the Qaramita in the Hasa, and the collapse of the Ibadi Imamate under Qarmati pressure in Oman, were no more than symptoms of an underlying change in the situation of the Gulf

basin in the ninth and tenth centuries. As the main commercial routes became once again diverted to the Red Sea, to bring prosperity and increased stability to the Yemen and Egypt, the Gulf lost most of its trade, and the lands on either side of it were impoverished. The decline of ‘Abbasid power in Iraq did not improve matters either; on the contrary, it made them worse. During the reign of the caliph al-Mu‘tamid (870-892), the overland access from the Gulf to Baghdad was seriously disrupted by a

revolt of the negro slaves working the salt marshes of southern Iraq, a revolt which took years to suppress. It was only after this

THE SHARIFATE OF MECCA 105

revolt was brought under control that the ‘Abbasids sent their last expedition to Oman towards the end of that century (see p.100), under the caliph al-Mu‘tadid (al-Mu‘tadid, 892-902). By now, however, the economic decay of the Gulf had gone too far to be remedied. Oman was shortly after abandoned and left in the hands of its weakened Ibadi Imams, ultimately to fall prey to the Qaramita, as already shown. 5. The Sharifate of Mecca. While the ‘Abbasids were not able to crush the Qaramita in East

Arabia, the Ikhshidids who governed Egypt on their behalf did their best to keep these heretical invaders away from Syria and the

Hijaz. The black eunuch Kafur (Kaftir, 946-968), who was the actual ruler of Egypt and southern Syria under the later [khshidids,

apparently managed to come to terms with them before long. In return for an annual tribute, the Qaramita returned the Black Stone to Mecca in 950, and for some time their raids in the direction of the Hijaz and Syria ceased. It was possibly in an attempt to reorganize the Hijaz, the Qaramita now being restricted to the Hasa, that a local ‘Alid notable -a descendant of Hasan called Ja‘far al-Musawi (al-Musawi) -- was installed at that time as Sharif of Mecca, his duty being to watch over the sanctuaries of the Hijaz and facilitate pilgrimage. The title

sharif (equivalent to the English ‘nobleman’’) had long been in common use throughout the world of Islam to denote persons descended either from the Prophet or from his more prominent Quraysh “‘Companions’’. In time, its use came to be restricted to the ‘Alids, who were descended from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima, and more particularly to ‘Alids who were descended from Hasan (those claiming descent from Husayn were later distinguished by the title sayyid) While many claims of ‘Alid descent

were dubious,* those of the descendants of Hasan in the Hijaz, who actually held his estates there through legal inheritance, could hardly be doubted.

The institution of the Sharifate of Mecca was established and placed in the charge of Ja‘far al-Musawi shortly after the year *At the time, most ‘Alid pretenders claimed descent from Hasan rather than from his brother Husayn, probably because claims of Hasanid descent were less likely to be disputed by the Imami and Isma‘ili Shi‘ites, whose Imams were of the Husaynid line. Spurious claims of descent from Husayn only became common in later Islamic times.

106 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

950, when the Qaramita of Hasa were prevailed upon by Kafur of Egypt to return the Black Stone to the Ka‘ba mosque. As Sharif of Mecca, Ja‘far was by no means formally recognized as ruler of the Hijaz. In reality, however, he seems to have exercised the powers of alocal ruler, albeit under the supervision of the masters of Egypt. His descendants and successors of the Musawi dynasty were still the Sharifs of Mecca when the Fatimids of North Africa, taking

advantage of the death of Kafur in 968, invaded and occupied Egypt in the following year. When the Musawi line died out in 1061, other Hasanid families succeeded them in the office. Barring some

brief interruptions, the institution of the Sharifate was to continue in Mecca until 1925 (see p. 214), many centuries after the circumstances which had led to its establishment had been forgotten. 6. The Fatimids, the Qaramita and the Sharifs.

With the Fatimid conquest of Egypt in 969, developments in the eastern lands of Islam took a new turn. By 973, the Fatimid caliph al-Mu‘izz (952-975) had moved to Egypt and established his capital in Cairo -- a new city specially built for the purpose. Meanwhile, in 968, the Qaramita had returned to Syria, where they join-

ed forces with local Arab tribes - most of all the Tayy (Tayy) in Palestine and North Arabia -- in preparation for war against the Fatimid newcomers. In 971, and again in 974, the Qaramita and the Tayy Arabs appeared outside Cairo, in both instances to be defeated by the Fatimids. Under the caliph al-‘Aziz (al-‘Aziz, 975-996),

the Fatimids invaded Syria and routed the Qaramita and their Tayy allies at Ramla, in Palestine, in 977. The Qaramita forthwith withdrew from Syria, never to return. To make certain that they stayed in the Hasa, the Fatimids, as the [khshidids before them, promised to pay them an annual tribute. Left behind in Syria by the Qaramita, the Tayy Arabs staged a revolt in Palestine against the Fatimids during the reign of the next caliph, al-Hakim (al-Hakim, 996-1021). The rebels seized Ramla and invited the Musawi Sharif of Mecca, Abu al-Futuh (Abii al-Futih),

to come over and be installed in the town as a rival caliph, with

the regnant name of al-Rashid (al-Rashid). Promptly, Abu al-Futuh arrived in Palestine to assume the caliphal title there in 1012. Before long, however, the Tayy rebels in Palestine were pacified. Abu al-Futuh was shortly after prevailed upon to abandon his claim to

the caliphate, and he returned to Mecca as a Sharif, presumably recognizing the overlordship of the caliph of Cairo.

THE FATIMIDS, THE HIJAZ AND THE YEMEN 107

7. The Buwayhids and East Arabia.

Less than three, decades before the arrival of the Fatimids in Cairo, a dynasty of Shi‘ite princes from Persia called the Buwayhids

(sometimes written Buyids) had gained control over Baghdad, where they ruled from 945 until 1055 on behalf of the ‘Abbasid caliphs. These Buwayhids were Imami or possibly Zaydi Shi‘ites; while they cynically deferred to the Sunnism of the ‘Abbasids for political convenience, they viewed the Isma‘ilism of the Fatimids with repugnance, and also considered them dangerous political rivals. Once the Fatimids had established themselves in Egypt, Arabia became — along with Syria — an open field for the FatimidBuwayhid power contest. The resulting situation was strongly reminiscent of the imperial struggles over the same area in Hellenistic and

Roman times (see chapters II and III). Now, as then, rival powers snatched at the Arabian regions from opposite directions, dividing the peninsula into zones of influence between them. As masters of Iraq and Persia, the Buwayhids took advantage of the confusion prevailing in Oman since the second Qarmati inva-

sion to seize that country, or at least parts of it, in 974. For the rest of the century, no [badi Imams were elected in Oman, while three Buwayhid princes succeeded one another as rulers there. In

the Hasa region, the Qaramita, for the moment, were still too strong to be subdued. The early Buwayhids apparently came to terms with them, exploited their hostility to the Fatimids, and provided them with financial and military assistance when they resumed their invasions of Syria in 968. Before long, however, the power of the Qaramita began to decline. Still unable to reduce them by sheer force, the Buwayhids apparently began to incite some of the stronger Hasa tribes against them. The Qaramita in East Arabia, though weakened, managed for a short time to outlast Buwayhid

rule in Baghdad. It was only in 1077 or 1078 that their political presence in the area was finally liquidated. 8. The Fatimids, the Hijaz and the Yemen. Meanwhile, from Egypt, the Fatimid caliphs consolidated their position in Syria. They also gained control over the Hijaz, and began to extend their influence over the Yemen. Here the contest be-

tween the Fatimids and the Buwayhids -- the latter acting as the custodians of the ‘Abbasid interests in the area -- was reflected for some time by internal troubles. In the Yemen highlands, the Ya‘fu-

108 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

rids of San‘a accepted the Fatimid suzerainty, probably to strengthen their position against the Zaydi Imams of Sa‘da who threatened them from the north (see p. 100).* At Zabid, however, the Ziyadid rulers -- or rather the ministers who wielded power in their name after 971 — continued to defer, at least in theory, to the ‘Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad. Meanwhile, a number of local chiefs usurped power in the Aden region and Hadhramut, where they established themselves in virtual independence.

In 1018, the last Ziyadid ruler of Zabid was murdered and replaced by his minister. Shortly after, in 1022, an Abyssinian slave called Najah (Najali) seized power in the city, was recognized by the ‘Abbasid caliph and the Buwayhids in Baghdad, and so became the founder of a new local dynasty -- that of the pro-‘Abbasid (and hence pro-Buwayhid) Najahids (1022-1158). These Najahids, however, like the later Ziyadids, controlled no more than a coastal strip

of the Yemen bordering the Red Sea. Elsewhere in the country, the political situation remained fluid. In the Yemen highlands, Ya‘furid rule in San‘a ceased after 997, although Ya‘furid princes continued to hold the nearby strongholdtown of Kawkaban (Kawkaban) until 1286. Determined to persist in opposing the pro-‘Abbasid Najahids of Zabid, the Fatimids in 1037 sponsored the establishment of an Isma‘ili dynasty, the Sulayhids (AI al-Sulayhi), to replace the Ya‘furids in the San‘a region. The founder of this new dynasty, ‘Ali al-Sulayhi (1037-1080), was

the leading representative (dai, or “missionary”, plural du‘at) of the Isma‘ili movement in the Yemen. In 1062, he occupied Zabid, killed its ruler Najah, and ruled in his place. In the following year, he advanced into the Hijaz and occupied Mecca, installing there a new dynasty of Hasanid Sharifs to replace the Musawis, whose line had became extinct two years earlier. In 1080, a son of Najah’s, called Sa‘id, killed ‘Ali al-Sulayhi and

recaptured Zabid. Later that same year, however, ‘Ali’s son and successor al-Mukarram Ahmad (1080-1091) reoccupied the Najahid capital and ruled it until 1082. He again seized the city in 10861087, and once more in 1088, before the Najahids finally managed

*The tenth century in the history of the Yemen highlands is notable, at the intellectual level, for the career of a brilliant scholar, al-Hasan ibn Ahmad alHamdani (d. ca 945), whose works include a classic description of Arabia (Sifat Jazirat al-‘Arab) and an encyclopaedic account of the antiquities of the Yemen (al-Tklii), In his time, al-Hamdani was also a poet of renown. His patron was a chieftain of the Hamdanid tribal territory, between San‘a and Sa‘da.

REPERCUSSIONS IN THE YEMEN 109

to restore their rule there. Meanwhile, in 1083, al-Mukarram Ahmad

had secured the control of his Fatimid suzerains over the entrance to the Red Sea by capturing Aden. Here he installed a vassal Isma‘ili dynasty — that of the Zuray‘ids — which continued to rule the Aden region until 1173. This political fragmentation of the Yemen, within the framework of the Fatimid-‘Abbasid power struggle, is a good tndicator of what

probably happened in the country in the days of Saba’ and Himyar, under the impact of the power contests between the Ptolemies and the Romans from one direction, and the Parthians and the Sa-

sanids from the other. The same phenomenon was to recur time and again in later centuries, as will be seen, whenever similar circumstances pertained. 9. The Coming of the Seljuks. It was shortly before ‘Ali al-Sulayhi dislodged the Najahids from

Zabid for the first time that the Buwayhids were expelled from Baghdad by the Turkish dynasty of the Seljuks. These Seljuks, originally from Central Asia, had conquered Persia in 1040 and established their capital at Isfahan. As staunch Sunnite Moslems, they deemed it scandalous that the Sunnite ‘Abbasid caliph in Baghdad should be controlled by a dynasty of Shi‘ite princes. Responding to an appeal by the ‘Abbasid caliph, they entered Baghdad and

put an end to the Buwayhid rule there in 1055. Three years later, the grateful caliph vested the Seljuk chief-king Toghrul Beg (d. 1063) with full temporal authority over his realm, proclaiming him sultan (sultan, literally ‘sovereign authority’’), in theory over the whole Moslem world. Succeeding where the Buwayhids had failed, the Seljuks took over Syria from the Fatimids by 1078. At about the same time, they destroyed what remained of the power of the Qaramita in East Arabia. 10. Repercussions in the Yemen.

It was probably to block Seljuk intervention in the Yemen that the pro-Fatimid Sulayhids of San‘a undertook their repeated efforts to occupy Zabid, the seat of the pro-‘Abbasid (and now proSeljuk) Najahids. The Sulayhid al-Mukarram Ahmad, who seized Zabid no less than three times (as already mentioned), was actually the contemporary of the Seljuk sultan Malikshah (Malikshah, 1072-1092), in whose time Seljuk power was at its zenith. It might

110 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

have been increased Seljuk political activity among the tribesmen of the San‘a region at the time which forced al-Mukarram Ahmad to move his capital southwards in 1087 from San‘a to Jibla, where he was closer to his faithful Zuray‘id vassals. When al-Mukarram Ahmad died in 1091, he was formally succeeded in San‘a by a distant cousin, al-Mansur Saba’; real power, however, was taken over by his widow (and also a distant cousin) Arwa (Sayyida Arwa), a highly gifted lady, who continued to rule in Jibla until her death in 1138.* With the death of Arwa, Sulayhid rule in the Yemen came to an end. In San‘a, al-Mansur Saba’ had already died in 1099. Here power passed into the hands of a succession of families belonging to the tribal confederation of Hamdan, and known to historians collectively as the Hamdanids. On the whole, these Hamdanid rulers succeeded in holding their ground against the Zaydi Imams who still pressed against San‘a from the north. Their rule, like that of the Isma‘ili Zuray‘ids of Aden, lasted until 1073. Il. The Crusaders and Arabia. In the interest of their flourishing commerce, which depended so much on their control of the Red Sea, the Fatimids maintained good relations with the Italian merchant cities (Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa and Venice) which were their principal customers in the Mediterranean basin. These Italian cities, however, starting after 1096, seized the opportunity of the Crusades to bring a good part of the Eastern trade under their direct control. In a way, the whole Crusader movement may be seen as a first bid on the part of Western Christendom (of which Italy was a vital part) to gain dominance over the full extent of the Mediterranean world. The First Crusade reach-

ed Syria in 1097; by 1110, nearly the whole of the Syrian coast had been conquered. Among the Italian cities, Genoa and Pisa in particular had provided ships and men to help in the conquest, and they were rewarded with considerable trading privileges in the Syri* After 1094, the Sulayhids in the Yemen continued to recognize the Fatimid caliphs of Cairo as legitimate Isma‘ili Imams, unlike other Isma‘ilis who broke away fo form the Isma‘ili revivalist sect of the so-called Assassins. The tomb of Arwa, at Jibla, is still venerated as a shrine by the so-called Bohra Isma‘ilis of India. The Makramid du‘at who established the Isma‘ili community of Najran (see pp. 173,178-9) in the seventeenth century, and provided it with leadership until the region was finally subdued by the Sa‘udis in the twentieth, belonged to a branch of the same sect.

THE RISE OF THE AYYUBIDS 111

an seaports they helped to cccupy. As Crusader rule in Syria expanded further, the Genoese and the Pisans gained even better control over the eastern end of the Mediterranean trade, to the detri-

ment of Egypt. Here the Fatimid state soon began to decline, gradually at first, but catastrophically after 1121. It was this decline of the Fatimids, starting in the late eleventh century, which was reflected by the retrenchment of the power of their Sulayhid agents in the Yemen.

That the Crusaders entertained plans to gain direct control over the Arabian coast of the Red Sea is certain. During the reign of King Baldwin I of Jerusalem (1100-1118), Crusader rule reached ‘Aqaba; the hillsides of Karak, to the east of the Dead Sea, were then organized as a Frankish border seigneurie, including ‘Aqaba, and controlling the main highway from Syria to West Arabia. In 1181, Renaud de Chatillon, the intrepid seigneur of Karak, raided the northern reaches of the Hijaz, but without much success. In the following year he had galleys carried by camels from the Palestinian coast to ‘Aqaba, and then sent them out from there to terrorize the Red Sea. The port of ‘Aydhab (‘Aydhab), on the African coast opposite Jidda, was attacked and plundered. By 1183, the Egyptian fleet in the Red Sea finally managed to destroy the Crusader galleys. About 300 men of the Crusader force were able to land in the Hijaz, and they began an inland march to Medina, but were immediately pursued by the Moslems who cut them down to a man. The Crusaders were destined never to secure a foothold in Arabia. 12. The Rise of the Ayyubids in Egypt and Syria. By now, however, it was no longer the Fatimid caliphs who ruled Egypt. In Syria, a recession of Seljuk power, beginning shortly before the arrival of the First Crusade, had left behind it two successor states, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Neither of

these two states was conquered by the Crusaders, and both fell under the rule of successive Sunnite Turkish dynasties. In 1154, a certain Nur al-Din (Nir al-Din Mahmid), a Turkish prince of the

house of Zengi, managed to unite the kingdoms of Aleppo and Damascus under his rule, then set out to compete with the Crusader kings of Jerusalem for the control of Egypt. Here the last Fatimid caliph, al-‘Adid (al-‘Adid, 1160-1171), was having trouble with his

ministers, and Nur al-Din sent three successive expeditions from Damascus to help him against them. These expeditions were led by a Kurdish commander called Shirkuh (Shirktthh), who was assisted

112 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

by his nephew Salah al-Din (Salah al-Din Yusuf), or Saladin, the son of his brother Ayyub (Ayyub). Following the success of his third expedition in 1168, Shirkuh remained in Egypt as minister to the Fatimid caliph, although he was a Sunnite whose first loyalty went to the Sunnite Zengid state in Syria, and ultimately to the now powerless ‘Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. When he died in the following year, he was succeeded in the same office, in Cairo, by his nephew Saladin. By 1171, Saladin had become for all intents and purposes full master of Egypt. In that same year, he abolished the Fatimid caliphate in Cairo, reclaiming its territories for Sunnite Islam. In theory, he continued to recognize Nur al-Din of Damascus as his master and suzerain; on the other hand, he did everything possible to enhance his own position in Egypt as a virtually independent ruler. When Nur al-Din finally died in 1174, Saladin advanced into Syria and occupied Damascus. By 1183 he had also occupied Aleppo, whereupon he was generally recognized as sultan of Islam. The death of the last legitimate sultan of the Seljuk line in Persia, in 1157, had left that position vacant, and Saladin was generally regarded as the right man to claim it. 13. The Ayyubid Conquest of the Yemen. It wasin 1173, shortly before the death of Nur al-Din in Damascus,

that Saladin sent his brother Turanshah (Tiranshah) from Egypt to conquer the Yemen. It was rumoured at the time that Saladin and his brothers (known after their father as the Ayyubids) sought to secure the Yemen as a safe retreat from the wrath of Nur al-Din, who was displeased with the emergence of what seemed to be an in-

dependent Ayyubid kingdom in Egypt. Actually, however, any ruler of Egypt was bound to be interested in the Yemen (and likewise in the Hijaz) to secure, if nothing else, the Egyptian economic prosperity. Having fallen heir to the Fatimid state in Egypt, Saladin

was bound to pursue the traditional Egyptian policy in the Red Sea basin, which imposed itself on any ruler of Egypt as an imperative. The Yemen, by now hopelessly divided, presented itself as a ready target. By the latter half of the twelfth century, the situation in the Yemen had become more confused than ever before. In the highlands, the Zaydi Imams controlled Sa‘da, and Hamdanid rulers maintained themselves in San‘a. What prevailed elsewhere, however, was little better than anarchy, with feudal princes (such as the Ya‘furids

DEVELOPMENTS IN OMAN 113

of Kawkaban, see p. 108) holding sway over bits of the countryside

here and there from their mountain strongholds. In Aden, the Isma‘ili Zuray‘ids were still in control. In Zabid, the last Najahids had been overthrown in 1159 by the Kharijite ‘Ali ibn Mahdi, a religious zealot who proceeded to establish a strict puritan regime which continued in the region under his Mahdid successors.

The Ayyubid conquest of the Yemen in 1173 made a clean sweep of the political confusion that prevailed. The whole country was rapidly subdued, and all the existing local regimes, including for a time the Zaydi Imamate at Sa‘da, were abolished. The Yemen, like Egypt before it, was formally reclaimed for Sunnite Islam according to the Shafi‘ite rite (see p. 95n), which was the rite favoured by the Ayyubids. A new age in the history of the region had begun. 14, Developments in Oman.

One effect which the Ayyubid conquest of the Yemen had was to consecrate the rift between East and West Arabia which had been

growing since the tenth century. The Ayyubids, it is true, were Sunnite Moslems who ruled, theoretically, in the name of the ‘Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. However, the empire they established included Egypt, Syria and West Arabia, but not Iraq and Persia, which were becoming more and more part of a separate eastern Moslem world. The healing of the religious rift, which followed the liquida-

tion of the Isma‘ili Fatimid regime in Cairo, did not involve the more fundamental geographic and political rift in the far-flung world of Islam. Until 1157, East Arabia, in theory, formed part of the realm of the Seljuk sultans whose sovereignty was restricted mainly to the eastern Moslem territories. After 1157, it remained within the sphere of influence of Persian successor states to the Seljuk sultanate, none of which seems ever to have secured an actual foothold in Arabia. On the whole, the Seljuks and their successors in Persia and Iraq appear to have favoured the Central Asian caravan trade at the expense of the maritime Gulf trade. Thus East Arabia, for the time being, remained in a state of economic stagnation.

In Oman, four Ibadi Imams were elected to succeed one another

between 1009 and 1053, after the withdrawal of the Buwayhids from the country. By 1053, the Seljuks were already well established in Persia, and they probably also controlled Oman, which may explain why no Ibadi Imams were elected there during the hun-

114 WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

dred years that followed (at least, there are no records of such Imams being then elected). It was only towards the middle of the twelfth century that the Ibadi Imamate in the country was briefly revived, only to be extinguished again in 1154. By then, a dynasty of feudal princes known as the Nabhanids (Banii Nabhan) had assumed power. Various branches of this dynasty held sway over different parts of Oman until 1406, but only the names of four ruling Nabhanid princes, including the first and the last, are known. In the local tradition, the Nabhanid rulers were called kings (mulitk, singular malik).* They were apparently active in the Indian Ocean trade, at least off and on; this is suggested by the fact that the cultivation of mangoes was introduced into Oman in their time. 15. Dhofar under the Manjawa. One area in South Arabia which was involved in trade with both

Oman and the Yemen was Dhofar, which fell in the twelfth century under the rule of a family called the Manjawa (Manjawa). Dhofar at this time was considered a dependency of Oman, but its Manjawa rulers seem to have maintained trading relations of their own with various countries of the Indian Ocean basin. Towards the end of the century, the Ayyubids in the Yemen began to take a keen interest in Dhofar, obviously with a view of controlling its thriving trade and directing it to the Red Sea. As a dependency of the Yemen, Dhofar was to reach the height of its prosperity during the two centuries that followed.

*The first of them is referred to in one source by the title ‘‘sultan’’, obviously not in the pan-lslamic sense of the term.

Vil An Age of Spice

I. The Ascendancy of Venice. The Crusades had two different effects on the world of Islam. At one level, they provoked a new surge of Moslem hostility towards Christendom -- in particular against the ‘‘Franks” of Western Eu-

rope who arrived in the Moslem East as conquerors. At another level, the Crusades consecrated the growing economic dependence of the Moslem East on commerce with the Christian West, mainly through the intermediary of the Italian merchant cities. Thus, while Moslems in Syria and Egypt fought the Crusaders throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with the determined intention of putting an ultimate end to the Frankish political and military presence among them, they were careful at the same time to maintain and even strengthen established commercial relations with the Italian cities -- mainly Genoa, Pisa and Venice. This was as much the case

under the Ayyubids as it was under the Fatimids before them. It was to remain so later on under the so-called Mamluks. Those were the commanders of the Turkish slave forces of the later Ayyubids, who succeeded their masters as rulers of Egypt in 1250, and of Syria along with Egypt in 1260.* As already observed, the active role played by Genoa and Pisa in the Crusader conquest of coastal Syria secured for these two cities

commercial privileges in the Syrian seaports, giving them a considerable advantage over Venice for most of the twelfth century. In the long run, however, the close association of these two cities with Frankish rule in Syria was to turn to their disadvantage. Commercial relations between Venice and the Ayyubids of Cairo were already developing when the Fourth Crusade was organized, aiming at the conquest of Egypt. The Venetians joined this Crusade (1202-1204) and diverted it to Constantinople. This must certainly have earned them the gratitude of the Ayyubids. Starting with the thirteenth century, the rulers of Egypt began to cultivate the *For the term mamliik, see p. 96.

116 AN AGE OF SPICE

friendship of Venice in a special way, to the detriment of the business interests of Genoa and Pisa. Meanwhile, the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204 gave the Venetians an ideal base for their commercial operations in the eastern Mediterranean. When the Byzantines reconquered Constantinople in 1261, Venice managed to retain many of her trading outposts in the reconstituted Byzantine empire. Thirty years later, in 1291, the last Crusaders were expelled from Syria by the Mamluks. Consequently, the Genoese and the Pisans lost their privileges in the Syrian seaports, and these were now taken over by the Venetians whom the Mamluks favoured, much as the Ayyubids before them had done. In the history of the East-West commerce, the two centuries that followed are marked by the dominance of Venice. 2. The Mongols in the Moslem East. As the leading commercial power in the Mediterranean, Venice

maintained excellent relations with Egypt, but at the same time tried to secure other channels for her trade with the East by establishing contact with the Mongol world. Under Chengiz Khan (d. 1227), the Mongols of Central Asia had established a vast empire extending from the coast of China in the east to the borderlands of Europe, north of the Black Sea, in the west. After his death, various branches of his family established themselves more or less independently in different parts of his empire, while the main line of Mongol Khans succeeded him in Peking. In 1256, one of these Khans, called Mongke, sent his brother, Hulagu, to conquer Persia. Eventually, Hulagu founded a separate Mongol state there, and was recognized by his brother in Peking as an Ilkhan (//-Khan, or Khan of a Province).

In 1258, Hulagu invaded Iraq, captured Baghdad, and put an end to the ‘Abbasid caliphate there. By the end of the century, his successors had made themselves completely independent of Peking by converting to Islam, and they continued to rule Persia and Iraq as a Moslem dynasty until 1335. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, as will be seen, a revival of Mongol power in the eastern world of Islam was effected by the great conqueror Timur Lang of Samarkand (d. 1405). This revival, however, was short-lived, although descendants of Timur (the so-called ‘“Moguls’’) later became

emperors of India, where they retained the imperial title until the nineteenth century.

THE SPICE TRADE 117

For most of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and again in the early fifteenth, the Mongol ascendancy in the Asian lands secured an overland caravan route for the East-West trade which was much used, providing, as in Sasanid times (see p. 64), a ready alternative to the maritime route reaching Egypt by way of the Red Sea. The Genoese (as will be shown in more detail later in this

chapter) tried for a time to exploit the Mongol presence in Persia and Iraq to their advantage. Meanwhile the Venetians, anxious to keep their options open, sought direct contact with the Mongols in China — which explains the voyage of the Venetian Marco Polo there in 1285. For Venice, however, it was always easier to trade with the East through Egypt. Hence, until the end of the fifteenth century, the Red Sea remained the principal commercial channel between East and West, particularly for the spice trade which ranked first in world importance at the time. 3. The Spice Trade.

From the great spice emporium in Calicut, in southern India, cargoes of ginger, cinnamon, cloves, mace, nutmegs, cardamons, cassia, and most of all pepper, were carried by sea to the island of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Gulf. From there, the better part of these cargoes was dispatched to the seaport of Dhofar (which also traded directly with India), then to Aden. Next, the cargoes were transshipped by way of the Red Sea to Egypt and Syria. Venetian merchants picked them up from Alexandria or Beirut in excnange for gold, silver, and various commodities and goods of West European origin, notably amber, furs, and woollen cloth. The Venetians then marketed the spices in Western Europe, where they were at the time in high demand, not only as luxury items for cooking and the flavouring of wines and other drinks, but also as necessary food preservatives. In the cold European countries of the north, the scar-

city of winter feeding stuffs for livestock made it necessary to butcher large numbers of animals each autumn; the meat of these animals had to be heavily salted and spiced to keep it edible for the long winter months. Not only spices, but other products of the East (including the cotton textiles of India and the native aromatics or ‘“‘perfumes”’ of South Arabia) were carried by the galleys of Venice from Egypt and Syria to Western Europe. As an item of trade, however, the spices reigned supreme. South Arabian traders bought them from the Indian merchants in exchange for gold and silver; also in ex-

118 AN AGE OF SPICE

change for the products of Western Europe, or for local Arabian products, such as the famed horses bred by the Arab tribes of the desert. The great profits in this business brought wealth to all involved. In Arabia, they brought special prosperity to the Yemen and two other regions, Dhofar and the Hijaz. 4. Dhofar under the Habudis.

The Yemen was already prospering from the spice trade, as the leading enterpot between India and Egypt, when the Ayyubids took over the country in 1173. To enhance their control over the spice

imports to South Arabia, the Ayyubids extended their rule eastwards to include Hadhramut. In 1200, they even attempted a siege of Dhofar, without success.

Shortly after, in 1203 or 1204, a shipowner from Hadhramut seized power in Dhofar. Some sources give his name as Mahmud (Mahmud) ibn Muhammad al-Himyari (al-Himyari); others refer to him as Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Habudi (al-Habtidi).* This man

became the founder of the Habudi dynasty ‘which managed to maintain the independence of Dhofar until 1278, and which at one time also held the important inland town of Shibam (Shibam), in Hadhramut. In about 1222, the Habudis destroyed the old seaport of Dhofar and set up a new one nearby, with improved fortifications. Little else is known about Habudi rule in the Dhofar region, beyond the fact that the founder of the dynasty was reputed to be a lover of literature and a generous patron to poets. ). Sharif Qatada in the Hijaz. While the Ayyubids, from their base in the Yemen, were still trying to extend their dominions eastwards to Dhofar, they also tried to strengthen their control over the whole length of West Arabia. The Ayyubid sultans, operating mainly from Cairo but also from Damascus, were particularly interested in establishing their sovereignty over Mecca, which would enhance their claim to universal Moslem leadership. In Mecca, however, a certain Qatada ibn Idris

(Qatada ibn Idris) managed to seize power and establish a new *Possibly there were two brothers in question, Mahmud and Ahmad, both sons of a Muhammad. The surname Habudi refers to a town in South Arabia, and Himyari to the ancient Himyarite dynasty from which many South Arabian notables liked to claim descent (see e.g. p. 99).

AYYUBID RULE IN THE YEMEN 119

dynasty of local Sharifs in 1200 or 1201. Descendants of this Qatada were to keep the Sharifate of Mecca until the twentieth century.

The new Sharif of Mecca came originally from the seaport of Yanbu‘, which was then the chief port of the Hijaz. Here the Hasanid branch of the house of ‘Ali had held a considerable estate since Umayyad times. Having taken over Mecca, Sharif Qatada proceeded to subdue most-of the Hijaz. This he did apparently in defiance of Saladin’s brother al-Malik al-‘Adil (al-‘Adil, 1200-1218), who had only recently managed to settle the question of Saladin’s succession and establish himself as undisputed sultan in Cairo. It was possibly to secure his power in the Hijaz against the Ayyubid ambitions that Qatada garrisoned a fortress by the sea at Yanbu‘. With this important seaport under his control, the new Sharif was in a position to exact a share of the coveted profits of the Red Sea trade. Two years after Qatada died, the Ayyubids of the Yemen sent

one of their leading officers, ‘Ali ibn Rasul (Rasiil), to capture

Mecca in 1222 and govern it on their behalf, along with the rest of the Hijaz. In the following year, however, the house of Qatada recovered the Sharifate of the city, and shortly after made war against the Ayyubids of Egypt under the Sharif Rajih (Rajih), one of Qatada’s many sons. After 1241, quarrels over the Sharifate among Qatada’s descendants facilitated the renewed control of the Hijaz by the descendants of ‘Ali ibn Rasul, who had meanwhile succeeded the Ayyubids as rulers of the Yemen (see p. 121). Later on, control over Mecca and the Hijaz was to be disputed between the Rasulids of the Yemen and the Mamluks of Egypt. 6. Ayyubid Rule in the Yemen. Under the first Ayyubids, the Yemen was run as a dependency of Egypt rather than as an independent kingdom. Turanshah, who

undertook the conquest of the country for his brother Saladin in 1173, did not stay there long. As a result, actual power was usurp-

ed by a succession of ambitious mamluk officers, or ‘‘emirs’’,* while Turanshah -- who continued to be ruler of the Yemen in name -- retired to his hometown Baalbek, in Syria (today in Lebanon), where he spent the remaining years of his life (1 176-1180). In 1181, Saladin -- now in Damascus — Sent another brother, Tughte*From the Arabic amir (commander), plural umara’.

120 AN AGE OF SPICE

kin, to rule the Yemen. When this Tughtekin died in 1196, he was succeeded in Zabid by his son al-‘Aziz Isma‘il (1196-1201). Meanwhile, Saladin had died in 1193, and the Yemen, like other parts of his empire, became virtually independent under its local Ayyubid rulers. In 1201, al-‘Aziz Isma‘il was murdered as a result of a conspiracy among his emirs, and replaced on the throne by his

younger brother al-Nasir Ayyub (al-Nasir Ayytib, 1201-1214), who was still a minor. Power now fell into the hands of an emir, Sunqur, who ruled as regent for the boy-king. When this Sunqur died in 1205, another emir called Ghazi ibn Jibril (Ghazi ibn Jibril)

married al-Nasir Ayyub’s mother and took over the regency for him. By 1214, however, al-Nasir Ayyub was dead, and soon after Ghazi ibn Jibril was murdered. Al-Nasir Ayyub’s mother thereupon

seized the reins of government in Zabid; to secure her power, she married an Ayyubid prince, al-Muzaffar (al-Muzaffar) Sulayman, who had recently arrived in the Yemen to seek his fortune there. For a short while (1214-1215), al-Muzaffar Sulayman was officially the ruler of the Yemen, but he proved incompetent. Another Ayyubid prince, al-Mas‘ud Yusuf (al-Mas‘ud Yusuf, 1215-1228), was sent from Egypt to overthrow and replace him. With the death of this al-Mas‘ud in 1228, the Ayyubid regime in the Yemen came to an end, as will shortly be seen. In the Yemen, as in Egypt, the Ayyubids relied for their power on mamluk forces. These mamluks were mainly Turks, and their officers, or emirs, were compensated for their services with the tax revenues Of assigned areas called igta‘ — a payment system frequent-

ly confused with the European notion of feudalism, for which there is no formal equivalent in Islamic political practice. Actually, the emirs wielded no power over their ig{d‘ grants; they merely receiv-

ed the fiscal revenues, which were normally collected for them from the assigned areas by agents of the central government which

ruled supreme. What made the emirs strong under the Ayyubids was not the iq{a‘ system (as it is sometimes wrongly believed)*, but the fact that they commanded the army. There were cases when emirs were sent out from Zabid to subdue and govern outly*Some modern scholars have spoken of a ‘feudal system’’ introduced into the Yemen by the Ayyubids, by misunderstanding the nature of the iqta‘ system. Local potentates did wield power over diverse parts of the Yemen, in Ayyubid as in earlier and later times, by taking advantage of the weakness of central government at particular periods; this, however, had nothing to do with iqgta‘

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