A Hebrew Encyclopedia of the Thirteenth Century. Natural Philosophy in Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. Edition, Translation, Study. Officina Philosophica Hebraica Volume 3 9004518584, 9789004518582, 2022048713, 9789004526433

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A Hebrew Encyclopedia of the Thirteenth Century

Studies in Jewish History and Culture Edited by Giuseppe Veltri

volume 74

Officina Philosophica Hebraica Edited by Reimund Leicht and Giuseppe Veltri

volume 3

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/sjhc

A Hebrew Encyclopedia of the Thirteenth Century Natural Philosophy in Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah Edition, Translation, Study

By

Resianne Fontaine

leiden | boston

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov lc record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2022048713

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. issn 1568-5004 isbn 978-90-04-51858-2 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-52643-3 (e-book) Copyright 2023 by Resianne Fontaine. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface xi Abbreviations

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part 1 Judah ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah: Sources, Critique, Context 1 Introduction: Previous Research and Biographical Details 3 2 Judah ha-Cohen’s Introduction to the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah 19 1 The Sciences: Division, Names, and Titles of Books 20 1.1 The Division of the Sciences 20 1.2 The Names of the Sciences and the Titles of the Books 26 2 The Contents and Structure of the mḥ 29 3 The Hierarchy of the Sciences and the Three Worlds 33 4 Judah’s Motivation 40 5 Criticism and Ambivalence 45 3 Sources and Use of Sources in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah’s Section on Natural Philosophy 47 1 Authors and Sources Mentioned in the mḥ 47 1.1 Greek 47 1.2 Muslim 49 1.3 Jewish 50 2 Sources Actually Used in the mḥ’s Survey of Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy 51 2.1 Sources by Greek Authors 51 2.2 Muslim Authors 52 2.2.1 Avicenna 52 2.2.2 Averroes 53 2.2.2.1 The Middle Commentaries 55 2.2.2.2 The Epitomes 57 2.2.2.3 The mḥ and Different Versions of Averroes’ Commentaries 59 2.3 The mḥ and the Large-Scale Use of Averroes’ Commentaries 61

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3

4 5

Judah ha-Cohen’s Use of Sources 70 3.1 Conciseness 70 3.1.1 Omission of Opinions Held by Philosophers Earlier Than Aristotle 72 3.1.2 Omission of Extensive Argumentation 75 3.1.3 Omission of Averroes’ “Discourse-Structuring Markers” 78 3.1.4 Other Omitted Material 79 3.2 Brevity vs Completeness: Abbreviated Comprehensiveness 83 3.3 Independence vis-à-vis Averroes 84 Brevity vs Clarity: Confusion and Errors 86 The Language of the mḥ 94 5.1 Biblical and Rabbinic Expressions and Quotations 94 5.2 Arabic Words 96 5.3 Influence of Arabic 97 5.4 Terminology 99

4 Judah ha-Cohen’s Critique of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy 104 1 Judah’s Comments on Aristotelian Doctrines in His Survey of Natural Philosophy 105 (i) mḥ/Physics I.2 (the order of learning) 105 (ii) mḥ/Physics V.5 (motion and the categories) 107 (iii) mḥ/Physics VI.4 (the end of motion) 109 (iv) mḥ/Physics VIII.2 (the eternity of motion) 110 (v) mḥ/Heavens I.4 (contraries of rest) 110 (vi) mḥ/Heavens I.9 (the non-generated and incorruptible) 111 (vii) mḥ/Heavens II.4 (privation) 112 (viii) mḥ/Heavens II.7 (motion of the spheres) 112 (ix) mḥ/gc I.4–7 (on growth) 112 (x) mḥ/gc II.15–16 (individual recurrence) 114 (xi) mḥ/Meteorology I.10 (the Milky Way) 115 (xii) mḥ/Meteorology II.2 (the sea as the element of water) 116 (xiii) mḥ/Meteorology II.15 (on thunder) 116 (xiv) mḥ/Meteorology III.4 (the rainbow 1) 117 (xv) mḥ/Meteorology III.7 (the rainbow 2) 117 (xvi) mḥ/Meteorology IV.1 (forms of elements) 118 (xvii) mḥ/ga XVI.5 (the nature of semen) 119 (xviii) mḥ/ga XVI.8 (rennet) 119 (xix) mḥ/ga XVIII.2 (sex-differentiation) 120 (xx) mḥ/ga XVIII.11 (natural time of birth) 120

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(xxi) mḥ/Soul II.17 (the element fire) 121 (xxii) mḥ/Metaphysics I (x comes “from” y) 121 Criticism of Aristotelian Philosophy as a Whole 124 2.1 The First List 124 2.2 The Second List 133

5 The Controversy between Aristotle and Galen 141 1 On the Parts of Animals 141 (i) the seat of the sense of touch 141 (ii) the heart vs the brain 143 (iii) the internal parts 144 (iv) the cavities of the heart 147 (v) the diaphragm 148 2 On the Generation of Animals 149 (vi) the role of the testes 149 (vii) semen 151 (viii) temperature of the white and the yolk of eggs (ix) the female contribution to generation 153

152

6 Judah ha-Cohen’s Explanation of Biblical Verses 161 Introduction 161 1 Thematic Survey of Judah’s Philosophical Explanations of Biblical Verses 162 (i) the three worlds 162 (ii) emanation and the creation of light 164 (iii) the celestial world 167 (iv) the physical world; matter and form; Nature 170 (v) the rational soul and the perfection of man 172 (vi) knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge 176 a. the sciences in relation to the structure of the Book of Proverbs 176 b. the order of learning and the relation between the sciences 178 c. the process of learning 180 d. the limits of study and the limits of knowledge 182 (vii) ethics 185 (viii) providence 188 (ix) resurrection and the world to come 190 2 Comments That Criticize the Aristotelian System of Thought 193 3 Additions to Judah’s Philosophical Survey 202 4 Judah’s Biblical Exegesis in Context 205

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7 Judah ha-Cohen’s Place in the History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy 214 1 The Reception of Averroes 214 2 Maimonides and the Maimonidean Controversy 216 3 Judah’s Attitude towards Aristotle’s Philosophy 220 4 The Three Worlds 238 5 The mḥ as the First Hebrew Encyclopedia of Science and Philosophy 244 6 Reception 247 7 The mḥ within the Context of the Thirteenth Century 250 Appendix A: Examples of Judah’s Manner of Excerpting Averroes’ Commentaries 254 Appendix B: Arabic Words in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah

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part 2 Critical Edition and English Translation of the Introduction and the Section on Natural Philosophy of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah Introduction to the Edition 273 1 The Manuscripts 273 2 The Establishment of the Text: Preliminary Considerations 3 Characteristics of the Selected mss B, C, N, O and V 281 4 The Interrelation between mss B, C, N, O and V 290 5 Conclusions. The Establishment of the Text 300 6 The Apparatus 302 7 The English Translation 303 8 Sigla, Abbreviations and Symbols 305 Appendix: Additional Material in ms O Author’s Introduction to the mḥ Physics

314

344

On the Heavens

392

On Generation and Corruption 416

307

279

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Meteorology

438

On Animals 480 Parts of Animals 480 Generation of Animals 530 On the Soul 592 On Sense and Sensible Objects Hebrew-Arabic Glossary 689 Bibliography 751 Index of Names 776 Index of Passages Cited 779

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Preface This volume studies the sections devoted to Aristotle’s natural philosophy in Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. It presents an edition and annotated English translation of this part of the text and of the author’s Introduction. The Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah is the first of the thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias of science and philosophy. Written originally in Arabic in Toledo, the author translated it himself into Hebrew in Italy (c. 1247). My interest in this text was triggered by M. Steinschneider’s description of the Hebrew encylopedias in the first paragraph of his Hebräische Übersetzungen and C. Sirat’s pioneering articles on Judah ha-Cohen’s work. Over the long years that it took to prepare this book, many persons and institutions have contributed to its completion in one way or another. It is my pleasure to acknowledge their help here. The initial stage of the project was funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (knaw); this support together with the matching hospitality at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam is gratefully acknowledged. In the years that followed I worked on the project intermittently. I have benefited much from the convivial and collegial atmosphere in the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies at the University of Amsterdam, where my colleagues Shlomo Z. Berger z”l, Irene E. Zwiep, Yaniv Hagbi and Bart Wallet enabled me to pursue my research by taking over my teaching from time to time. I am also thankful for the opportunity to participate in research groups at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Jerusalem (2007 and 2012). Although working on different projects there, the scholarly exchanges, personal contacts and rich intellectual environment were very stimulating. The same applies to the Maimonides Center of Advanced Studies (mcas) in Hamburg, where I enjoyed a fellowship in 2020–2021. My mcas project, which had to be carried out in home-office due to the pandemic, helped me to fine-tune some of the sections in this book. I also thank the members of our online reading group, in particular Racheli Haliva and Yoav Meyrav, for their helpful comments during my presentations. The Bodleian Library in Oxford, the Cambridge University Library and the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts at the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem provided photocopies or microfilms of the manuscripts studied for this work. I am most grateful to the Bodleian Library in

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Oxford for granting me permission to use the relevant section of ms Hunt 57 as the basis for my edition. Judah ha-Cohen based his overview of Aristotle’s natural philosophy on Averroes’ commentaries, abridging, summarizing and paraphrasing them. I thank Prof. S. Harvey and Prof. A. Ivry for allowing me to make use of their English translations of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Physics and On the Soul respectively for my own translation of these sections of the Midrash haḤokhmah, which was a big help. Thanks are also due to the Mediaeval Academy of America for the permission to use translations by S. Kurland and H. Blumberg of Averroes’ commentaries on On Generation and Corruption and on Parva Naturalia respectively. A work of an encyclopedic nature typically treats a wide variety of topics in different fields, each with its own specific set of problems. I feel privileged that I could turn to colleagues and friends whenever questions arose. I should mention first and foremost Gad Freudenthal, Ruth Glasner and Steven Harvey. All three generously gave of their time not only by critically reading through large sections of my English translation, but also by patiently answering endless queries about the text. Their support throughout all stages of the project has been invaluable. Special thanks are also due to Paul Lettinck and James T. Robinson for their careful reading of sections of the translation. Many other scholars and friends were kind enough to share their expertise with me, at conferences, in correspondence, or over coffee and meals. I thank, in alphabetical order, Cyril Aslanov, Gerrit Bos, Hans Daiber, Ofer Elior, G. Endress, Amira Eran, Niran Garshtein, Bernard R. Goldstein, Yehuda Halper, Zeev Harvey, Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Y. Tzvi Langermann, Reimund Leicht, Tony Lévy, Charles Manekin, Uri Melammed, Judith Olszowy, Aafke van Oppenraaij, Aviram Ravitzky, Arie Schippers, Yossef Schwartz, Colette Sirat, David Wirmer, Liesbeth Zack, and last but not least, the late Mauro Zonta for their help with specific questions. I offer all of them my deepest thanks. Their knowledge and advice have saved me from many errors. It goes without saying that I alone am responsible for all errors that doubtless remain. I would like to warmly thank Sabine Arndt and Niran Garshtein, who have studied other sections of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, for sending me copies of their dissertations and discussing various aspects of our protagonist’s work. For assistance with technical matters I am much obliged to Gerrit Bos, Lies Meiboom and my daughter Nadia Smidt van Gelder.

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I owe a debt of gratitude to the anonymous referees of this book and to Reimund Leicht for their perceptive reading of the manuscript and their valuable suggestions for improvement. I am much indebted to A.P. Runia (Groningen) for the great care with which he has corrected the English sections of this book. Special thanks go to the editors of the Officina Philosophica Hebraica-series, Giuseppe Veltri and Reimund Leicht, for accepting this book for publication in the series. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the staff and production team of the Brill publishing house, in particular Emma de Looij, and to Paul Gruiters, Bart Nijsten, Kai Eigner and Ivo Geradts of TAT Zetwerk for their efficiency and for the pleasant cooperation during the production process of this volume. An enterprise of this nature inevitably has a heavy impact on the researcher’s family. The loving support and encouragement of my husband Meinard, our children with their partners, Pieter and Yadiri, David and Roos, Mirjam and Omar, and Nadia have been crucial for the advancement of my work, especially in times when I doubted whether it would ever be finished. The happy hours spent with our grandchildren were conducive to mustering new energy for my working hours. I dedicate the book to the memory of two dear colleagues, both great scholars and helpful friends, who sadly passed away when they still had many plans: Shlomo Z. Berger (1953–2015), my neighbour in my office in Amsterdam, and Mauro Zonta (1968–2017), my neighbour at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Jerusalem. Their rich scholarship continues to inspire us.

Abbreviations Sigla B C N O V

ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt. 57 ms Cambridge, University Library Dd. 9.65 ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Poc. 343 ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 551 ms Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, ebr. 338

Abbreviations Anim. b b. Comm. df Ep. ga gc Guide imhm Introd. jsb kjv m mc Metaph. Meteor. mḥ ms(s) pa pn tr. up y

On Animals Talmud bavli ben (son of) Commentary Deʿot ha-Filosofim Epitome On Generation of Animals On Generation and Corruption Guide of the Perplexed Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts Introduction Jewish Study Bible King James Version Mishnah Middle Commentary Metaphysics Meteorology Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah Manuscripts(s) On Parts of Animals Parva Naturalia Translation On the Usefulness of Parts Talmud yerushalmi

part 1 Judah ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah: Sources, Critique, Context

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Introduction: Previous Research and Biographical Details The present volume offers an edition, translation and study of Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s presentation of Aristotelian natural philosophy as contained in his Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. This work, the title of which can be rendered in different ways (such as “The Exposition of Science,” or “The Pursuit of Wisdom”), is a thirteenth-century compilation in Hebrew that presents an overview of philosophy, geometry, astronomy and astrology as studied in the non-Jewish world. It also treats traditional Jewish subjects, such as the explanation of biblical verses. Since it covers several branches of knowledge it is often referred to as an encyclopedic work. The very first of the Hebrew encyclopedias of science and philosophy, it is the subject of the first paragraph of M. Steinschneider’s Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen, in the opening section “Encyklopädien”, which goes on to treat the two later thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias of science and philosophy: Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim and Gershom ben Solomon’s Shaʿar ha-Shamayim.1 In his catalogues of the Hebrew manuscripts in Leiden and Berlin Steinschneider also provided extensive descriptions of Judah ha-Cohen’s compilation.2 For a long time after Steinschneider, however, these encyclopedic texts failed to attract scholarly attention. In part, this neglect had to do with the fact that scholars of medieval Jewish philosophy tended to focus on famous and important thinkers, above all on Maimonides. In line with this approach, the thirteenth century and more specifically the period between Maimonides and Gersonides has long been regarded as philosophically uninteresting and infertile since it did not produce any creative or “original” thinkers. Accordingly, this period was often viewed by scholars as one in which philosophy spread in breadth but not in depth.3 The last decades of the twentieth century, however, witnessed a remarkable shift of emphasis in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy, a development in which C. Sirat’s 1985 History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages 1 Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen, 1–4. 2 Steinschneider, Catalogus codicum hebraeorum, 53–60, and Verzeichniss der hebräischen Handschriften, 121–126. 3 See Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 6.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_002

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was instrumental. Sirat’s book paid ample attention to a large number of less known authors and their writings most of which were (and in many cases still are) in manuscript. More scholars have since started to examine the writings of thirteenth-century authors. The increasing interest in post-Maimonidean “minor thinkers” or epigones has resulted, for example, in a number of important studies on the writings of Shemtov Ibn Falaquera (c. 1225-c. 1295),4 and even though his Deʿot ha-Filosofim has not yet been the object of a comprehensive study, some aspects or sections of this encyclopedia have recently been examined by scholars.5 The Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, too, has begun to be rescued from oblivion. In the twentieth century D. Goldstein was the first to draw attention to this work. In a brief article published in 1975 he pointed out that the thirteenth-century Spanish exegete Baḥya ben Asher made use of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah in his commentary on Genesis.6 A few years later C. Sirat published several pioneering articles on the work and its author that clearly showed the relevance of Judah’s compilation—the first text to present a comprehensive survey of Aristotle’s writings through Averroes’ commentaries—for the history of medieval Jewish philosophy and science.7 Moreover, during the last decade of the past century pre-modern encyclopedic literature in general came to arouse scholarly interest. Ancient and medieval Western and non-Western encyclopedic texts written before Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s L’Encyclopédie, constituted the theme of two conferences held in Groningen in 1994 and 1996,8 and pre-modern Hebrew encyclopedias were intensively studied during a conference held in Ramat-Gan in January 1998.9 S. Harvey’s The Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy (2000) is based on that conference and contains, besides articles on other Hebrew encyclopedias, several studies on diverse sections or aspects of the Midrash haḤokhmah by G. Freudenthal, R. Glasner, Y.T. Langermann, T. Lévy, M. Zonta and

4 See S. Harvey, Falaquera’s Epistle; Jospe, Torah and Sophia; Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico ebraico and Un interprete ebreo. 5 See Zonta, Un interprete ebreo and S. Harvey, “Shem-Tov Ibn Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim.” 6 D. Goldstein, “The Citations of Judah ben Solomon Hakohen ibn Matqa.” These citations are taken from the section of the mḥ which is devoted to the explanation of Scriptural passages. 7 Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen” (1978) and eadem, “La qabbale d’après Juda b. Salomon haCohen” (1980) and “L’explication des lettres selon Judah ben Salomon Ha-Cohen” (1981), cf. also the pages devoted to Judah ha-Cohen in Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, 250–255. 8 The proceedings of this conference were published in Binkley (ed.), Pre-Modern Encyclopaedic Texts. 9 For a survey of thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias see also Zonta, La filosofia antica, 199–221.

introduction: previous research and biographical details

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myself. I published a number of other articles on Judah ha-Cohen’s work, while E. Gutwirth addressed Judah’s self-perception as an author (1998 and 2011). Two recent monographs are M. Benedetto’s Un enciclopedista ebreo alla corte di Federico ii (2010), with special emphasis on Judah’s astrology, and S. Arndt’s PhD (2016) on the mathematical correspondence that Judah ha-Cohen conducted with a scholar at the imperial court of Frederick ii (cf. below).10 Even more recently, N. Garshtein has studied the astronomical and astrological sections of the work, examining the sources used by Judah, his terminology and his method of compilation.11 Despite this increased interest in the mḥ the Hebrew text remains largely unedited, perhaps also because it is quite voluminous.12 Following an introduction, it consists of two parts of which the first is devoted to philosophy (logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics), and the second to the sciences (geometry, astronomy and astrology). Three treatises that bear on Jewish learning are appended to these two parts. The first treatise, devoted to the explanation of biblical verses from Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs, is found after the first part and the two others, treating the letters of the Hebrew alphabet and Talmudic aggadot respectively, are placed after the second part. The astrological section, which circulated independently and seems to have been quite popular, was published by J. Spiro in 1886 under the title Otot ha-Shamayim.13 In an appendix to her first article (1978) on the work C. Sirat presented two longer passages of the Hebrew text in which Judah criticizes Aristotelian philosophy.14 She also translated into French passages from the introduction and from the treatise on the explanation of biblical verses in her second article on Judah ha-Cohen (1980) as well as a portion from the treatise on the meaning of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet (1981). She moreover published and translated into French a polemical discussion, found towards the end of the mḥ that Judah directed at an unnamed Christian scholar (2001).15 D. Goldstein edited the treatise on 10

11 12 13

14 15

Arndt’s as yet unpublished thesis ( Judah ha-Cohen and the Emperor’s Philosopher Dynamics of Transmission at Cultural Crossroads) is available at https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/​ uuid:4a412cd2‑6e98‑480b‑a623‑d24a9cc408f1. N. Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology in the Hebrew Encyclopedias of the Thirteenth Century. I thank Dr Garshtein for sending me a pdf of his Ph D thesis. In ms Vat ebr. 338 (= ms V), the most complete extant manuscript, it contains over 300 fols. For the sigla used here and in what follows, see the Introduction to my Edition. On the circulation of manuscripts, see below, Introduction to the Edition. Garshtein established that the 1886 edition of the section on astrology is defective, and included a new partial edition in his Ph D thesis, 346–358. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 56–61. The first passage is found in Judah’s Introduction, and the second in Treatise 1; cf. Chapter Four. Sirat, “À la cour de Frédéric ii Hohenstaufen.”

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Judah’s biblical explanation in 1981. Goldstein planned an English translation of this section, which does not seem to have been realized. Furthermore, we have Benedetto’s Italian translation of the astrological section and C. Del Valle’s edition and Spanish translation of a part of Judah’s introduction.16 In her recent PhD thesis S. Arndt edited and translated into English the section that contains two problems in the field of geometry and astronomy. For the greater part of the mḥ, in particular of the philosophical part, however, no edition or translation into a modern language is available. The present book seeks to enhance our knowledge of the mḥ by presenting in Part 1 an examination of Judah’s survey of natural philosophy and in Part 2 an edition cum English translation of this section and of the introduction to the mḥ.17 My examination of the mḥ in Part 1 is structured as follows: the rest of the present chapter is devoted to a brief overview of Judah’s biography, summarizing previous research. Chapter Two investigates the main themes of Judah ha-Cohen’s own introduction to the mḥ, discussing inter alia its arrangement and the author’s motivation. Chapter Three explores the sources and use of sources underlying the mḥ as well as the author’s manner of compilation in the section on natural philosophy. Chapter Four surveys the passages contained in that section that criticize Aristotle or call attention to inconsistencies in the philosopher’s thought, while Chapter Five focuses more specifically on passages where Judah contrasts Aristotle’s opinions on biological/zoological issues to those of Galen. Chapter Six treats Judah’s biblical exegesis and the way in which it relates to the philosophers’ views presented in the preceding survey of natural philosophy. On the basis of the findings yielded by these chapters, Chapter Seven, finally, attempts to determine Judah’s place in the history of medieval Jewish philosophy. At this point a methodological observation is in order. We may ask whether it is at all possible to describe Judah ha-Cohen’s position in medieval Jewish thought on the basis of only one part of his encyclopedia, extensive as this part may be. This question seems all the more justified if we bear in mind that the author himself rigorously forbade anyone to copy only a part of his work to the exclusion of other parts: “Nobody who intends to copy this book is permitted to copy only a part of it, omitting other parts. One should instead copy this book as it is, in the same order, from the beginning to the end, letter for letter and word for word.”18 16 17 18

Del Valle, “La Introducción de Judá Cohén,” 62–81. On the extant manuscripts, see the Introduction to the Edition. These lines are found at the end of the section on Metaphysics and form the beginning of D. Goldstein’s edition, “The Commentary” (206.1–3) of Judah’s biblical exegesis.

introduction: previous research and biographical details

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At the risk of incurring the author’s anger I have nevertheless decided to ignore his words and to limit myself to editing here only the part that is devoted to natural philosophy and the introduction. Unfortunately, in the academic constellation of our time it is not very attractive for an individual to embark upon a large-scale project such as editing and studying a bulky text that treats various disciplines. If we were to wait until an all-round scholar had the opportunity to analyze the work in its entirety, Judah’s endeavor would probably remain buried in manuscript for many more years. In the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the work the results presented here have therefore a preliminary character. It is to be expected that the conclusions arrived at here on the basis of a study of only a part of the mḥ will have to be adjusted once other parts of the text have been investigated and edited. Encouraged by the growing interest in medieval Hebrew encyclopedic texts I here express the hope that other portions of the mḥ will receive scholarly attention so that eventually, on the basis of partial studies, a comprehensive insight into Judah’s thought will be gained and a critical edition of the whole text will be available. The recent Ph.D. thesis by N. Garshtein (2021), which discusses the sections on astronomy and astrology of the mḥ, is an important step in this direction.

1

Biographical Details

The only details known about Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s life are those that he himself provides in his mḥ.19 These are the following: at his birth his

19

These data were first assembled by Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 41–43. See also Gutwirth, “Entendudos,” 393–396, idem, “History,” 515–517, and now Arndt, Judah haCohen, 9–14 for a fuller discussion; see also Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 22–24. Sometimes the appellative Ibn Matqa is added to the name Judah ben Solomon haCohen, a practice that originated in the 15th century with Josef ha-Yewani (Steinschneider, Catalogus codicum hebraeorum, 54 n. 1 and Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 40 n. 6). In the mss available to me I have found this appellation only once, namely at the beginning of ms Cambridge Dd. 9.65 (imhm 15922) which, according to S. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts [333] dates from the 16th century. The name Ibn Matqa appears there in the first of the two lines that are written above the beginning of the text. Unless other evidence for the use of this name turns up, I think it is commendable to follow Sirat’s suggestion put forward during a lecture in Erfurt in August 1997 to refrain altogether from referring to Judah as Ibn Matqa; see also Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 40 n. 4 (the designation “Ibn Malka” which appears in Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, 250 is apparently a printing-error). In his letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Maimonides mentions a certain “old man,” named Mitqa, from Granada, see Shailat, Letters and Essays, 530.

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grandfather Ziza b. Shoshan predicted on the basis of the stellar constellation that the infant would have a speech impediment, a prediction that came true as Judah himself asserts;20 he lived in Toledo where he studied with his father and with R. Meir ha-Levi Abulafia (Ramah);21 Maimonides’ Guide instilled in him a “burning fire” to study the sciences;22 at the age of 18 he became engaged in a learned correspondence with someone who was employed at the imperial court of Frederick ii of Hohenstaufen; after ten years of correspondence he departed to Tuscany;23 in 1245 he saw an elephant at the Emperor’s court in Lombardy;24 he composed his mḥ originally in Toledo in Arabic and translated it together with the correspondence into Hebrew at the request of Italian Jews in or around 1247,25 and we also learn that in Italy he longed back to return to his father’s home and his birthplace.26 Although these statements provide some information on Judah’s life and work, they also leave many questions unanswered, such as questions related to his correspondence with the imperial court and his ensuing stay in Italy. We still do not know, for example, with whom Judah ha-Cohen corresponded, nor when he left his native soil for Italy. According to Judah, he received a geometrical query from “the Emperor’s philosopher” when he was only 18 years old and studying in Toledo. He answered the question and went on to address “many questions to the philosopher of the Emperor,” which that “philosopher” answered in Arabic. Judah was not satisfied with these answers, pointing out mistakes which he deemed unworthy of someone who was called “the King’s philosopher.” He also challenged his correspondent to react to a certain objection raised by him.27 He continues: “When these things were related 20 21

22

23 24 25

26 27

The expression used is kevad lashon, as is said of Moses in Ex. 4:10. The passage is found in ms O (= Oxford, Bodl Mich 551), 184r. This piece of information is found in the mḥ’s zoological section, cf. below mḥ/pa xiv.1. On this many-sided Toledan scholar who lived from 1165 to1244, cf. Septimus, HispanoJewish Culture. ms O 145r. The expression “burning (or: raging) fire” derives from Jer. 20:9. Samuel Ibn Tibbon used a similar phrase (“I burned with desire”) in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, see ed. Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary, 553 [36] and cited in Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 274–275. Nachmanides uses the same image in his Introduction to his Torahcommentary. ms V 206v and 210v. This piece of information is found in the mḥ’s zoological section, cf. below mḥ/pa xii.22. ms O 123v–124r: “Originally I composed this book in Arabic and when the matter developed and I descended to Tuscany my friends requested from me that I translate it into Hebrew.” ms V 210v. ms V 209r 9–15. The passages about Judah’s intellectual exchange with the imperial court are analyzed at length in Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, see below.

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before his Majesty the Emperor Frederick ii he was very pleased with the answers I had given to this so-called philosopher. Afterwards there was much exchange between us on many issues and on many questions and answers, but this book is not the place to expand on these things. Hereupon the matter went on for me during some ten years and I descended to the lands of the King.”28 Three scholars have been put forward as possible candidates for the appellation “the King’s philosopher” and hence as Judah’s correspondent, namely Johannes of Palermo, Michael Scot and Theodore of Antioch. The first of these, a mathematician in the Emperor’s service, was, together with Theodore, mentioned as a candidate by Steinschneider.29 However, he seems to have lost his attraction for modern scholarship. The second candidate, Michael Scot, was mentioned as Judah’s correspondent, with some hesitation, by Sirat in her 1985 book on medieval Jewish philosophy,30 but in her later article on intellectual contacts between courtiers and the Emperor she no longer refers to this translator in connection with Judah ha-Cohen.31 Sirat assumed that Judah was born in 1215, and that therefore the correspondence began in 1233.32 In his biography of Frederick ii, D. Abulafia, too, assumed that it was Scot who exchanged letters with Judah and so did Ch. Burnett in an article published in 1994.33 It is not known when exactly Michael Scot arrived at the imperial court. He was there from 1227 onwards, but possibly earlier.34 At any event he remained in the 28 29

30 31 32

33

34

ms V 210v. According to Steinschneider, “Kaiser Friedrich ii,” 63 n. 3 and idem, Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen, 1 n. 1, both Johannes and Theodore are called “the King’s philosopher” (this is repeated in Suter “Beiträge,” 8 n. 3), whence the information provided by the Jewish Encyclopedia vi.537 that Judah corresponded with Johannes and with Theodore of Antioch. Sirat, A History, 250. Sirat, “Les traducteurs juifs,” 175–176. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 40–41; A History, 250; “Les traducteurs juifs,” 175. The year 1215 was posited by Graetz in his Geschichte der Juden (vii, 85) as Judah’s year of birth, but was rejected by Steinschneider (“Kaiser Friedrich ii,” 63 n. 2), who claimed “Die Angabe ‘geb. um 1215’ ist ebenso unbegründet als wertlos.” Abulafia, Frederick ii, 257. Cf. Burnett: “An ambiguous testimony is given by the Jewish scholar Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen. […] either Michael Scott was in Toledo at the time, or (as is more likely), he sent the questions from Sicily” (“Michael Scott,” 102 n. 1). Cf. Van Cleve 1972, 307 and Abulafia (Frederick ii, 261), according to whom Scot arrived at the court some time between 1220 and 1224. Burnett (“Michael Scott,” 116–117) says that “Michael either spent periods of time or made visits to Rome and several cities of North Italy” (ibid., 116), noting that “up to now we have little evidence of what he did in these cities” (ibid., 117). Ackermann notes that both Scot and Frederick were in Bologna in 1220, but that it is not certain whether the two of them met at that time, see Ackermann, Sternstunden am Kaiserhof, 23–25.

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Emperor’s service until he died in 1236, acting, among other capacities, as the royal astrologer, his official title being astrologus Frederici imperatoris romanorum.35 The third scholar to be associated with the title “the King’s philosopher” was Theodore of Antioch, a Jacobite Christian who had studied philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and medicine in Antioch and Mosul and served the Emperor as an astrologer and as his secretary, being entrusted with the royal correspondence with Arabic-speaking rulers. Steinschneider, in his Die arabische Literatur der Juden, assumed that this scholar was Judah’s correspondent, and no longer referred to Johannes of Palermo.36 In an article published in 1995 Burnett assumed that it was “Master Theodore” who exchanged geometrical problems with the youthful Judah on the grounds that the correspondence was in Arabic and that “no one else during that period is consistently called ⟨⟨the Emperor’s philosopher⟩⟩.”37 Unfortunately, it is not known when Theodore entered the Emperor’s services. G. Sarton asserted that this was “sometime before 1236.”38 He dates the beginning of the correspondence in 1237, that is to say, after the death of Michael Scot, and so does C. Van Cleve.39 This would imply that Judah was born c. 1219, provided that the information that he was 18 years old when this exchange of letters started is correct. Burnett refrains from giving exact dates as to the time of Theodore’s arrival at court. While adducing evidence that the Antiochian scholar was with Frederick in 1238, he does not exclude the possibility that Theodore was in Italy as early as 1233, “if he is the philosopher with whom Juda b. Salomon corresponded,”40 which, of course, is based on the assumption that Judah was born in 1215, an assumption that cannot be proven. Judah’s disparaging comment about his correspondent’s intellectual capabilities seems to be at variance with the identification of the Emperor’s philosopher with Theodore who was highly learned, but on the other hand there are more critical reports about Theodore’s accomplishments.41 Moreover, Judah’s negative evaluation may have to do with a wish for self-positioning and a sense of competition. To aggravate the confusion Van Cleve contended that Judah corresponded with the Emperor himself. According to Van Cleve, Frederick addressed a list 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Scot’s exact year and place of death are not certain, see Ackermann, Sternstunden am Kaiserhof, 48–50. Steinschneider, Die arabische Literatur, § 117, 162–163. Burnett, “Master Theodore,” 235. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Sciences, 603–604. Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick ii, 313. Burnett, “Master Theodore,” 234. See Kedar and Kohlberg, “The Intercultural Career,” 171.

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of philosophical and theological questions to Judah ha-Cohen concerning, for example, the nature of the soul and the age of the universe.42 It is unclear on which data Van Cleve bases this statement and the mḥ offers no evidence for an epistolary exchange on these specific questions, but Judah’s statement “much exchange between us on many issues” may mean that at some point Judah corresponded with the Emperor on diverse questions. It is unlikely, however, that the Emperor himself would have been able to correspond in Arabic. The issue has recently been examined anew by S. Arndt in her thesis about Judah’s correspondence. On the basis of a thorough comparison of all the available reports on Frederick’s questions to diverse scholars, in particular of the contents of the mathematical questions, she leans to the conclusion that Judah’s correspondent was Theodore of Antioch, the only of the three candidates who was able to conduct the exchange in Arabic and held the official title “the Emperor’s philosopher” during the period under consideration.43 It cannot be established, however, during which period exactly the correspondence took place. A combination of Judah’s statement that he was in Italy in 1245 with his assertion that ten years elapsed between the beginning of the correspondence and his departure for Italy would imply that the epistolary exchange cannot have started as late as 1237 as Sarton assumed, but in 1235 at the latest. Yet it is of course possible that he had been staying in Italy some time before he saw the elephant. We therefore cannot determine Judah’s birth date in the absence of more information. His statement that he was 18 years old when he received the first queries from Italy may sound like a topos, but since there seems to be little reason to doubt his other biographical statements, it may very well be true.44 Another manuscript has “20 years old” instead of 18.45 In any event, we can safely assume that the first contact between Judah and the imperial court took place when Judah was still quite young and that by then he

42

43

44

45

Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick ii, 309 says that this took place some years after 1240. Such questions are reported to have been sent by the Emperor to Michael Scot, see Abulafia, Frederick ii, 258–263. Abulafia draws on Haskins’s studies without giving specific references. Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, Chapter Three, esp. 119–123. A curious detail is that Theodore, too, is reported to have yearned back for his homeland, see Kedar and Kohlberg, “The Intercultural Career,” 175–176. Judah states twice that he was 18 years old when he started to correspond with the imperial court. Cf. Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 15 and 20. Arndt has examined the extent to which the various accounts about Frederick’s correspondents are fictitious and concludes that in the case of Judah his report about the mathematical correspondence can be considered authentic. ms C 220v. I am grateful to Dr T. Lévy for providing this information.

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was already well-versed in the sciences. This raises the intriguing question of how the Emperor would have known about the mathematical skills of a young man in Toledo. There must have been an intermediary who helped establish this first contact. Abulafia asserts that it was Michael Scot, the Toledan translator, who “provided the main link between this youthful mystic and scientist and the Hohenstaufen court,” unfortunately without presenting any supporting evidence for this statement.46 Yet although there is no definitive proof for this assumption, it is indeed possible or even likely that it was the Arabic-to-Latin translator who was instrumental here.47 In spite of the many studies on Scot there are still considerable gaps in our knowledge about him.48 It is known that Scot was in Italy between 1220 and 1224, but we have no precise information on his whereabouts in later years, except that he traveled a lot. Hence it is conceivable that he went back to Toledo from time to time or otherwise heard about Judah, especially since, as modern research has suggested, he was much indebted to Jews who helped him with the Arabic in his translations, without Scot giving them the credit that modern academic standards would require.49 With regard to a possible connection between Scot and Judah there is a noteworthy observation by Judah in the section on astronomy that contains an abstract of al-Biṭrūǧī’s Kitāb al-Hayʾa. Judah states that this work “is very close, about 30 years before our time which is 1247.”50 Al-Biṭrūǧī died in 1204, and hence C. Sirat may well be right in assuming that it was in fact Michael Scot’s 1217 Latin translation of this work (De motibus celorum) that Judah refers to.51 If so, this would mean that Judah knew about Scot’s Latin translation of al-Biṭrūǧī’s work, carried out in Toledo. It must also be born in mind that Judah belonged to the well-known Ibn Shoshan family and studied with the renowned scholar and communal leader Ramah who had many contacts and connections. Again, we have no data about any contacts between these two figures and Scot, but if Scot remained in touch with learned circles in Toledo after his departure from the city he may have heard about the skills of the young Judah. Interestingly in this regard, Scot is known to have prompted the Emperor to send out the various queries that 46 47 48 49 50 51

Abulafia, Frederick ii, 257. This is also suggested by Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 119. Burnett, “Michael Scott,” 101 and 121 (see above n. 33). See also Ackermann, Sternstunden am Kaiserhof. Van Oppenraaij, “Quelques particularités,” 123; Burnett, “Michael Scott,” 109; cf. Ackermann, Sternstunden am Kaiserhof, 38. ms V 256r, cf. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 42. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 42 n. 11. The Arabic version dates from after 1185, but the exact date of composition is uncertain.

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occupied Frederick to “the doctors of all the branches of science,” and preferably, to meet and have discussions with them.52 Concerning Judah’s stay in Italy, uncertainty prevails as to Judah’s function at the imperial court and the place in Italy where he resided. Given that he hailed from a family of astrologists, we may suppose that he served Frederick in the capacity of astrologer, for the Emperor was as given to astrology as was Judah, and the same applies to Scot. However, the mḥ contains no information whatsoever about the nature of Judah’s employment. As for his place of residence, Judah relates that he descended to Tuscany and that he saw an elephant in Lombardy. Seeing that the mḥ makes no reference at all to Naples or Sicily, it is not sure that he resided in Naples, as did Jacob Anatoli, who was recruited to the Emperor’s court in Southern Italy in 1230–1231.53 As a result of his endless struggle with the pope and with the revolting Lombard cities, Frederick spent long periods of time in Tuscany and Lombardy during the 1230s and 1240s54 and it thus likely that Judah formed part of the Emperor’s itinerant court. In one passage Judah provides a brief description of his observations at the court: “I saw how his deeds and affairs were arranged, his scholars (ḥakhamaw), his scribes, his elders, his judges, his guards, the food of his table and the seating (or: “dwellings”) of his servants.”55 Unfortunately these words are too general to admit of any precise location. The description suggests a court life that was extensive and luxurious, but Frederick is known to have built many impressive vast palaces to consolidate his power, and he often brought his staff when he resided in these palaces, so that Judah’s brief description need not necessarily apply to Naples or Sicily.56 The elephant, which apparently made a

52 53

54 55

56

Morpurgo, “Philosophia naturalis,” 242. On his activities at the court and on his relation to Michael Scot, cf. Sirat, “Les traducteurs juifs,” 169 ff. On Frederick’s scientific interests in general see also Haskins 1960, 242–271 and Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick ii, 283–346. More literature is cited in Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 41 n. 9. Abulafia believes that earlier historians have tended to overemphasize Frederick’s cultural achievements (Frederick ii, 251ff.). Abulafia, Frederick ii, 253. Abulafia writes that Frederick led a “ceaselessly itinerant life” (p. 255), “a gypsy life” (p. 257). The description is concluded by the wish to return to his homeland, cf. above. The passage was translated into French in Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 42 and “Les traducteurs juifs,”, 175. For an English translation see Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 22, and her Hebrew ed., ibidem, 60–61 (sections 48–49). It is not clear exactly which functions are indicated by the words “wise men, scribes, elders, judges, guards.” One might think of jurists, notaries or chancellors. In the vast literature on Frederick and life at the imperial court it is often not specified which court is being referred to. On Frederick’s building activity and the luxury and his way of life in his palaces and fortifications see Radke, “The Palaces of Frederick ii.” See

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great impression on Judah, is attested in Christian sources as well. According to Haskins, in 1245 the monks of Santo Zeno at Verona saw themselves obliged to extend their hospitality to the imperial menagerie, including an elephant.57 In view of this date this may well have been the same elephant that Judah reports to have seen in Lombardy.58 Judah refers to Tuscany and “the land of Rome,” another indication that suggests northern or central Italy rather than the south as Judah’s place of residence.59 For the composition of the Hebrew version of the mḥ we have the date of 1247, which Judah mentions in his reference to al-Biṭrūǧī’s Kitāb al-Hayʾa, mentioned above. More details, however, are not known. Did he start or finish the Hebrew translation in that year, and did he translate the whole work in one piece or in stages? The original Arabic version, which he claims to have written in Toledo, is no longer extant. If the title Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah is a literal rendering of the Arabic, one may assume that the Arabic title was Ṭalab al-ḥikma, like the title of Saadya’s commentary on Proverbs.60 Given the lack of precise information on Judah’s year of birth and the year in which the correspondence began we do not know when he wrote the original Arabic. As noted, however, Judah was in Italy in 1245 and if the correspondence indeed lasted ten years, we may posit the first half of the 1230s as the period in which he drafted his work. This fits well with Judah’s declaration that Maimonides’ Guide inspired him to study the sciences, and more specifically with his statement that Maimonides should not be accused of the things his contemporaries have imputed to him.61 The passage seems to relate to the Maimonidean controversy, and as we shall see in more detail below the issue of the validity of Aristotle’s philosophy greatly engaged Judah’s attention (Chapters Two and Four). The question concerning the permissibility of the study of philosophy was hotly debated during this controversy, and therefore this period suggests itself as the time in which the Arabic original was composed. Steinschneider assumed that Judah

57 58

59 60 61

also Rader’s description of Frederick’s palaces Friedrich ii, 203–224; p. 204 shows a map with all the imperial palaces; on p. 215 the author provides information on how many times the Emperor visited some of these places. Haskins, The Renaissance, 328. There is also a palace by the name of Lombardia in Sicily, but in view of the date and the parallel information on the elephant in Christian sources it is more likely that Judah is referring to Lombardy in northern Italy. Colophon of ms Parma 3023/7 (imhm 13752): “we-yaradti le-tosqana we-ereṣ romi.” Gutwirth (“History,” 515) also refers to “the court in Tuscany.” On the Hebrew title, see Chapter Seven, section 5. ms O 145r and V 166r; see the Hebrew text and French translation in Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 44, English translation in Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 98.

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supplemented the original version during his stay in Italy, leaving unspecified, however, what exactly was added in the Hebrew version.62 After 1247 nothing is known about Judah ha-Cohen. The mḥ contains a computation of the coming of the Messiah for the year 1260. Another Jewish courtier of Frederick, Jacob Anatoli, expressed the wish that the coming of the Messiah take place in the Emperor’s lifetime,63 and Judah may have been of like mind. If so, it is likely that Judah made this computation at a time when his patron was still alive, that is, before 1250 when the Emperor died. No further details about Judah’s stay in Italy are known. However, in what appears to be the oldest extant manuscript there is an intriguing marginal annotation to his remark on the speech impediment, reading: ‫הודיע על עצמו‬ ‫המחבר ולא הרגיש‬ ‫ר׳ הילל עם היותו‬ ?]‫מדבר צחות בקלו]ת‬ […]‫יחשוב לו זה ל‬ ?]‫עם היותו משכי]ל‬ 64‫בכללות‬

The interpretation of the annotation presents some difficulties. A few characters in the left margin are not entirely legible, and the ‫ ח‬of ‫ יחשוב‬is a correction.65 The last word of the fifth line could be [‫ לכלו]ם‬or [‫לא כלו]ם‬, with ‫זה‬ referring to the speech-impediment. If this is correct, the annotation seems to convey that a certain R. Hillel had a meeting with our author and did not notice a speech-impediment, and that he found him knowledgeable in “general things.” The last word, ‫בכללות‬, could also denote that Judah was a polymath, or perhaps it refers to Judah’s knowledge of Averroes’ commentaries.

62

63 64 65

Steinschneider, Arabische Literatur, 162. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Sciences, 502 follows Steinschneider. On the question of the relation of the Hebrew version to the Arabic original, see also below Chapter Three, section 4. In the postscript to his translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Organon, see Gordon, The Rationalism of Jakob Anatoli, 218. ms O 184r, left margin. C. Sirat dates the manuscript to c. 1300 (and perhaps before 1288), cf. below, Introduction to the Edition. Unfortunately, a late manuscript from the eighteenth century (ms Berlin, Or Qu. 837) that is a faithful copy of the Oxford manuscript including most of the marginal annotations of O omits this annotation. I wish to thank Prof. Y. Schwartz and Drs N. Garshtein and R. Leicht for discussing this passage with me, and Dr R. Fronda of the Bodleian Library for sending a scan of the annotation.

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One wonders whether this R. Hillel could be the famous Hillel ben Samuel of Verona (ca 1225–ca. 1295). Chronologically this is possible, and Hillel of Verona seems to have been acquainted with the mḥ.66 In the absence of more information about a meeting between the two scholars, however, this must remain an open question. S. Arndt considers it likely that Judah had contacts with Jacob Anatoli and Moses Ibn Tibbon in Italy.67 This assumption is intriguing. The three authors shared an interest in Averroes’ commentaries, and both Anatoli and Judah worked on Averroes’ logical commentaries as well as on Ptolemy’s Almagest around the same time. Both were engaged in the Emperor’s service, and there are indications that Judah’s astronomical vocabulary was influenced by Anatoli’s.68 Moses Ibn Tibbon was related to Anatoli and is known to have visited him in Naples. According to O. Fraisse, this was in 1245 or 1246 when Judah was already in Italy.69 One also wonders if it is sheer coincidence that Judah’s Hebrew translation of his own work more or less coincides with Anatoli’s death and with Moses Ibn Tibbon’s translations of Averroes’ Epitomes. It is tempting to speculate on possible scenarios regarding contact and cooperation (or conflict and competition?) between these authors, but at present nothing can be said with any certainty. Some scholars have attempted to identify “our” Judah with Judah b. Moses ha-Cohen ben Mosca, translator of astronomical works and the astronomer of Alfonso al-Sabio, the King of Castille, Leon and Galicia from 1252 to1284.70 On this theory, Moses, or Mosca, is a corruption of the name Matqa.71 Moreover, this Judah b. Moses has been assumed to be identical with the poet of the same name mentioned in the Diwan of Todros Abulafia.72 According to others, however, Judah ben Moses ha-Cohen, is a younger relative of “our” Judah.73

66

67 68 69 70

71 72 73

Rosenberg, Review of G. Sermoneta, 439–441. In an e-mail (9 June 2019) Y. Schwartz kindly informed me that authors such as Abulafia and Kalonymus refer to Hillel of Verona simply as “R. Hillel,” which may suggest that there was no need no identify him any further. Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 132. See Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 212–215 and Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 50–51. Fraisse, Moses Ibn Tibbons Kommentar, 36. On this author, see Gutwirth, “History,” 517–518. For the identification, see Chapira, “Contribution,” 17–19. I wish to thank J.H. Laenen (Leiden) for drawing my attention to this theory and for sending me the relevant literature. On this name, cf. above note 19. In the literature there is considerable confusion regarding the question whether this Judah ben Mosca is identical to “Yehuda fi de Mose fi de Mosca.” Chapira, “Contribution,” 17–19. According to Saenz-Badillos and Taragona, Dicionario, 136 and 139, this theory is not entirely convincing. Roth, “Jewish Collaborators,” 61; cf. also Baer, Die Juden im christlichen Spanien, Vol. ii, 60 n. 1.

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Although it is of course feasible that Judah ben Solomon would have offered his services to another patron after the death of Frederick and that he indeed went back to Spain,—for after all, we know that he longed to return to his homeland—the theory is speculative, and leaves unexplained how the name Solomon in Judah’s name has disappeared. Another as yet unclarified question is whether the mḥ is the only work to have been written by Judah ha-Cohen. In his article “Plotin chez les Arabes,” P. Kraus called attention to an Arabic manuscript in the Library of Aḥmad Taymūr Pasha in the Egyptian Library, which contains, inter alia, a fragment of a treatise (Risālah) by the “eminent Jew Yahūda ibn Sulaymān.”74 Dealing as it does with logic, or to be more precise, with the different kinds of proofs, this text does bear a certain resemblance to the sections of the mḥ that cover Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, without, however, being an Arabic equivalent of it. The attribution to Judah ben Solomon seems to be corroborated by the fact that the treatise seeks to explain the weakness of the proofs adduced by Aristotle in support of the eternity of the world. As will be seen below, this doctrine of Aristotle was severely criticized in the mḥ (Chapters Four and Six). However, the contents and authorship of this treatise as well as the precise way in which it is related to the mḥ remain to be investigated. No other writings by Judah have come to light thus far.75 As noted, it has become customary to refer to Judah’s compilation as an encyclopedia since it encompasses different fields of knowledge. Whether or not it is a fitting label for this work depends on how one defines an encyclopedia, and how one answers the question whether or not this anachronistic term can be used for a medieval composition. There does not seem to be general agreement on what criteria regarding size, scope, contents, intended audience and arrangement a given text, be it a modern book or a pre-modern one, must meet to be considered an encyclopedia or to belong to the genre of encyclopedic writing.76 On the first page of his classic study Encyclopaedias: Their History Throughout the Ages, R.L. Collison recalls a definition of unknown attribution: “a book that is never read,” a definition that is not particularly helpful, and in any case does not apply to the mḥ, for as we shall see, the work was read, copied

74 75 76

Kraus, “Plotin chez les Arabes,” 279–280, n. 2, (ms ḥikma 117, f. 256–261). My thanks to Prof. P. Fenton for directing my attention to this text and for providing me with a copy of it. Langermann “Some Remarks,” 388 has pointed to some manuscript material that may be related to the mḥ. This material has not yet been further investigated. On the problem of defining a (medieval) encyclopedia, see Fowler, “Encyclopaedias,” Ribémont, “On the Definition” and Harvey, The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias, 4–9.

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and studied.77 For our period, F. Bodenheimer defined an encyclopedia as “any mediaeval book, which contains in any form discussions from many fields of knowledge,” a definition that leaves unspecified how many fields of knowledge an encyclopedia should comprise.78 Covering most of Aristotelian logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, Euclid’s geometry and Ptolemy’s astronomy and astrology, the work certainly does not contain omne scibile, which some would posit as the hallmark of an encyclopedia, but it does comprise a wide range of Aristotelian writings, which, according to others, qualifies as a requirement for a pre-modern encyclopedia.79 S. Harvey’s description of the medieval Hebrew encyclopedia as a “well-ordered, easy-to-use, comprehensive account of already existing information”80 does for the most part fit the mḥ, although one may question its reader-friendliness, as we shall see in Chapter Three (section 4). In view of the fact that Judah’s work seeks to spread existing knowledge from various disciplines in an orderly fashion, features that may be considered encyclopedic, and given that the thirteenth century is often considered to be an “age of encyclopedism”81 I shall continue to use the term “encyclopedia” to refer to the mḥ. In scholarly literature Judah’s encyclopedia is referred to as a survey, an extract, a digest, a summary, a précis, an outline, an overview, or an adaptation of contemporary scientific knowledge. These terms are all fitting because the work is a compilation drawn from various sources. Judah’s procedure in putting together the mḥ will be detailed in Chapter Three. In Chapter Two I will discuss how Judah himself presents his work in his Introduction to the mḥ. 77 78 79 80 81

Collison, Encyclopaedias, 1. For the reception and fortuna of the mḥ, see Chapter Seven, section 6 and Introd. to the Edition. Bodenheimer, “On Some Hebrew Encyclopedias,” [3]. See S. Harvey, The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias, 7 and Glasner, “The Hebrew Geometrical Compendium,” 204–207. S. Harvey, The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias, 9. Le Goff, “Pourquoi le xiiie siècle.”

chapter 2

Judah ha-Cohen’s Introduction to the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah The mḥ’s introduction comprises a number of topics or items that are typically treated in the prologue literature of the Alexandrinian-Arabic tradition familiar to Jewish authors working in a Muslim environment.1 These topics include: the title of the book, the name of its author, the structure and contents of the work, the aim and utility of the work, the intended audience, and the books on which it is based. Furthermore, as usual in this type of literature, the introduction to the mḥ starts with a praise of God (the basmalah) and ends with a captatio benevolentiae of sorts by appealing to the reader’s benevolence for any errors.2 Apart from these topics that are frequently found in medieval Hebrew and Arabic prologues, Judah discusses some other themes in his introduction, such as the tripartite structure of all that is; the division of the sciences, and his evaluation of contemporary scientific non-Jewish learning in relation to traditional Jewish learning. These themes are most relevant to Judah ha-Cohen’s enterprise, which is why it is apposite to start our discussion of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah with a study of the Introduction. In this chapter I shall examine Judah’s presentation of the division of the sciences and its relation to the structure of the mḥ; the hierarchy of the sciences and his introduction of the theme of the “three worlds”; Judah’s motivation, and the author’s critical attitude towards his sources.3 The question of the 1 For the emergence and development of the genre of introduction literature, see Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie. For introductions by medieval Jewish philosophical authors, see S. Harvey, “The Author’s Introduction” (on Introductions in Muslim philosophy) and “Maimonides and the Art of Writing Introductions.” 2 The Introduction starts as follows: “With the help of Him who brings to light hidden things [Job 28:11], I shall begin to write the book Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah.” The verse from Job is followed by two Biblical verses, namely Ps. 16:1 and Prov. 15:24, see my edition below, mḥ/Introd. 1. The end of the Introduction (mḥ/Introd. 27) reads: “Everyone who will judge me according to the scale of merit without blaming me because of errors will be blessed by God, Amen,” which is followed by a quotation from Ps. 19:13 and 15. The translations of biblical passages generally follow the English Bible translation as given in the Jewish Study Bible (henceforth: jsb) of the Jewish Publication Society. I have, however, followed the Authorized King James Version (henceforth: kjv; see the online version at http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org) in passages where this translation is more consonant with Judah’s interpretation of a biblical verse than jsb. 3 The theme of the three worlds and Judah’s critical attitude towards his sources also surface

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_003

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sources on which he actually drew and the manner in which he used them will be addressed in Chapter Three.

1

The Sciences: Division, Names, and Titles of Books

1.1 The Division of the Sciences The first part of Judah’s Introduction consists of a description of the books through which, according to the author, science and philosophy are studied (mḥ/Introd. 1–13). The author presents a threefold division of the sciences, which, he says, follows the tripartite division of all existence. Immediately after the basmalah the opening sentence of the Introduction states that the tripartite division of the sciences as adopted by “the philosophers” corresponds to the division of all creation into three worlds: natural science studies the world of generation and corruption; mathematical science that of the spheres, and “divine science” that of the superior or immaterial world. For these three sciences Judah lists the following books: i. Natural science (ḥokhmat ha-ṭevaʿ) is studied through the books of Aristotle: Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, On Animals, On the Soul, On Sense (or: the Sentient) and Sensible Objects (= Parva Naturalia).4 ii. Mathematical science (ḥokhmat ha-limmudim) comprises arithmetic, geometry, music, mechanics, optics, statics (lit.: the science of weights), and astronomy and astrology. Geometry is to be studied through Euclid and the books of Menelaos and Theodosius.5 The theoretical part of astronomy is studied through Ptolemy’s Almagest, and the practical part, that is, astrology, through the same author’s Quadripartitum.6 iii. Divine science (ḥokhmah elohit) contains the thirteen books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.7 To this Judah adds that logic (higgayon) is a tool for the study of these sciences, like an axe for the carpenter; it is studied through Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, Topics, Rhetoric, Poetics.8

4 5 6 7 8

in other sections of his work. Therefore, I will return to these issues later on (in particular in Chapters Four, Six and Seven). mḥ/Introd. 1–8. Judah does not provide titles of works here. mḥ/Introd. 9–11. mḥ/Introd. 12. mḥ/Introd. 13. For Judah’s titles of the Aristotelian books, see section 1.2.

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For all these books Judah provides a fairly detailed description of their subject matter, following the order of the sources, and specifying which subjects are treated in each book or treatise. For example, he describes Treatise i of Aristotle’s Physics as explaining that “there are three principles, namely, form, privation, and matter, and that form or matter are truly principles, whereas privation, which is the opposite of form, is a principle [only] accidentally.”9 The length of Judah’s description of the contents of the scientific writings may vary from one book or treatise to the other, but in general it can be said that he makes a genuine effort to provide his reader with an adequate account of what is to be found in these non-Jewish books. In his classic study on the classification of the sciences in medieval Jewish philosophy H.A. Wolfson already observed that the thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias adopted the Aristotelian division of the sciences.10 Although Wolfson’s knowledge of the encyclopedias was indirect (he relied on Steinschneider’s Hebräische Übersetzungen) his assessment is correct: the Aristotelian tripartite division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics and metaphysics is immediately apparent in Judah’s scheme.11 Nonetheless, the division of sciences in the mḥ differs in several respects from that found in other medieval Hebrew texts that treat the topic. The subject of the division of the sciences enjoyed considerable popularity among Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars alike, as is evidenced by the large number of texts on it.12 Who are “the philosophers” Judah refers to? As M. Zonta has shown, the two treatises on the subject that circulated among Jewish scholars are al-Farabi’s “Enumeration of the Sciences” (Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm) and Avicenna’s “Epistle on the 9 10 11

12

mḥ/Introd. 2. Judah subdivides the books (sefarim) of the philosophers into treatises (maʾamarim), see my translation of the Introduction, n. 4. Wolfson, “The Classification of the Sciences,” 512–513. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1025b2–1026a20, 1064b1, cf. also Physics 198a30–32. Judah does not mention that the theoretical sciences constitute in fact one of the three groups in Aristotle’s more general division of sciences, the other two being the practical and productive sciences. According to Wolfson, this is not at all unusual among medieval Jewish philosophers, cf. Wolfson, “The Classification of the Sciences,” 497. Weisheipl (“The Nature, Scope and Classification of the Sciences,” 474) observes that in the Latin world “the period between 1170 and 1270 was the high watermark for treatises on the nature and division of the sciences.” For the interest in the subject among medieval authors, see Benedetto, Un enciclopedista ebreo, 77–98, where much further literature is indicated. For Muslim authors treating the subject, see also Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie; Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam and Forcada, “Ibn Bajja and the Classification.”

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Division of the Intellectual Sciences” (Risālah fi-ʾaqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya), which expands upon al-Farabi’s treatise. As Zonta notes, al-Farabi’s “Enumeration” “enjoyed a noteworthy success among Jewish medieval philosophers, in Spain and in the Maghreb in particular, either in Arabic or in Hebrew translation.”13 It is therefore possible that Judah was familiar with al-Farabi’s treatise in its Arabic version, but if this was the case, it does not seem to have inspired his classification because the mḥ does not refer to politics and religious sciences, which are parts five and six respectively in al-Farabi’s canon of sciences. Nor does Judah mention the disciplines of mineralogy and botany under natural science, two subjects that constitute parts six and seven respectively of al-Farabi’s eight parts of natural philosophy. The Muslim philosopher moreover split the subject matter of the discipline of meteorology into two parts (covering Books i–iii and Book iv of Aristotle’s Meteorology respectively), so that in his scheme natural philosophy totals eight disciplines, and not seven as in the mḥ. What the two schemes have in common are the eight sections of logic and the seven parts of mathematical science. Avicenna’s Division expands on al-Farabi’s treatise and exhibits the same division into intellectual sciences and traditional (Muslim) sciences.14 A common feature of the Division and the mḥ is the division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics and metaphysics (which is likewise the division underlying the Muslim philosopher’s encyclopedic Shifāʾ) and the view that logic is the instrument of philosophy, but unlike the mḥ, Avicenna’s treatise also features a tripartite division of practical philosophy into ethics, economics and politics.15 Furthermore, the mḥ does not follow the subdivision of the natural and mathematical sciences into “fundaments” and “branches,” which is typical of Avicenna’s classification. Nor does it enumerate the many branches that Avicenna subsumed under physics, such as medicine, alchemy, oneiromancy etc.16 Also, like al-Farabi, but unlike the mḥ, Avicenna mentions eight “fundaments” of physical science by treating Meteorology iv as miner-

13 14 15 16

Zonta, “The Reception of Al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Classifications,” 361–362. Cf. Zonta “The Reception of Al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Classifications.” Cf. Zonta, La filosofia antica, 201. From a later passage we learn that Judah had a low opinion of alchemy, cf. ms O 196v, cf. Sirat, A History, 253–254 and Patai, The Jewish Alchemists, 150–151. Judah asserts here that non-Jews use their science, among other things, to make gold, a procedure which they call “the great work,” but which is futile, because it is impossible. According to Sirat, Judah implicitly criticizes Anatoli here, Sirat, “À la cour de Frédéric ii Hohenstaufen,” 63–64, an assumption that was challenged by Freudenthal, “Alchemy in Medieval Jewish Cultures,” 354 n. 62. If we assume that Judah knew about Michael Scot’s interest in alchemy, the Arabic-to-Latin translator might also be Judah’s target in this passage.

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alogy and moreover inserting On Plants before On Animals. It would seem, therefore, that Avicenna’s treatise has not served as Judah’s model either. The disciplines of mineralogy and botany are also listed as disciplines falling under natural science in three Jewish texts, the composition of which antedates that of the mḥ. The first is Millot ha-Higgayon xiv, where it is said that natural science looks into natural bodies that are not [generated] by human will, such as, minerals, plants and animals. Like the mḥ, the passage under consideration assumes a tripartite division of “theoretical philosophy” although adopting a different order (mathematics, physics and “elohit,” which is the same order as in Guide i.34), and like the mḥ, it classifies logic as an instrument, not as a science. It also describes the extent to which the subject matter of these three philosophies is abstracted from matter, a topic that Judah does not mention in this passage, but is found in other passages of his work.17 The passage in Millot ha-Higgayon, however, does not list the names of books through which knowledge of these disciplines can be attained. The second work to refer to mineralogy and botany is Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Perush ha-Millot ha-Zarot, composed in 1213 or a bit later. Here the two disciplines are the fifth and sixth of the nine branches of natural philosophy. Ibn Tibbon mentions Aristotle’s books on natural philosophy and provides a very concise description of their subject matter.18 The third Jewish text is Chapter xvii of “The Cure of the Souls” (Ṭibb alnufūs) by Josef Ibn Aqnin (written in Spain or Morocco after 1198, precise date uncertain), which is based on Al-Farabi’s “Enumeration of the Sciences.” Encompassing Jewish and non-Jewish sciences it is in fact a detailed program of study that is more comprehensive than Judah’s scheme.19 As for “philosophical disciplines”—to be studied after religious studies—the following order of instruction is to be observed: logic, mathematics, arithmetic, geometry, optics, astronomy, mechanics, medicine. Then comes natural science which includes the subject matter of Physics, On the Heavens and the Earth, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology i–iii, Meteorology iv, Minerals, On Plants, On Living Beings, and On the Soul, while metaphysics is the last discipline to be studied. Like Judah, Josef Ibn Aqnin mentions the titles of Aristotelian books. He provides a much more extensive description of their subject matter (at least for some of them) than Judah’s, but unlike Judah, he does not point out in which

17 18 19

Cf. the next section and text to n. 38. Ed. Even Shmuel 1987, 50–51 s.v. ḥokhmat ha-ṭevaʿ. On this work, see Robinson, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Peruš ha-Milot ha-Zarot.” Ed. Güdemann 1968 (reprint of 1873). For the passage on mineralogy and botany, see Hebrew text p. 41 (German tr. 108–109).

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particular treatise of an Aristotelian book a particular topic can be found. For the mathematical sciences Ibn Aqnin refers to Abraham bar Ḥiyya and Abraham Ibn Ezra alongside Arabic sources. The two later thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias, Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim and Gershom ben Solomon’s Shaʿar ha-Shamayim, do not make an attempt to draw up a classification of sorts. Nonetheless their introductions provide some relevant information on their conception of the division of the sciences.20 In his introduction to Deʿot ha-Filosofim Falaquera provides a brief survey of the subjects he intends to discuss in the first part (“on natural things”), together with some of the titles of the relevant Aristotelian treatises. The study of “natural things” consists of seven parts: (i) general characteristics of physical things (Physics); (ii) the elements, their generation and corruption and meteorological phenomena (On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology); (iii) minerals; (iv) plants; (v) the nature of the bodies of living beings (On the Soul and On Sense and Sensible Objects); (vi) the nature of the faculties of living beings; (vii) the spheres.21 This last section comprises cosmology and astronomy. The second part of the Deʿot is devoted to metaphysics, or to be more specific, it contains the opinions of the philosophers on the active intellect, on secondary principles and on God.22 A significant difference between this division and that of the mḥ is that Falaquera does not mention logic and mathematics and thus does not present the complete Aristotelian scheme. Furthermore, in his enumeration Falaquera provides less detailed information on the subjects dealt with in the various disciplines than does Judah.23

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The introduction of Abraham bar Ḥiyya’s incomplete 12th-century encyclopedia Yesodei ha-Tevunah u-Migdal ha-Emunah (“The Foundations of Intelligence and the Tower of Belief”) contains a “Table of contents” that may be taken to represent a classification of the sciences. This Table lists: 1. Propedeutic science (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy); 2. Natural science, comprising the eight topics enumerated in al-Farabi’s Enumeration; 3. Human or political science (corresponding to the three parts of Aristotle’s practical philosophy); 4. Metaphysics. Of the entire work only the section on the quadrivium is extant, see Millás Vallicrosa, La obra enciclopédica, 9–10. On this encyclopedia see Rubio, “The First Hebrew Encyclopedia of Science,” 140–153. Curiously, Wolfson did not include this passage in his survey on the classification of the sciences. df, ms Leiden Or. 4758, f. 108r. Cf. the detailed outline of the contents of the df provided in Jospe, Torah and Sophia, pp. 53–61, reprinted in S. Harvey (ed.), The Hebrew Encyclopedias, 238–247. On the df, see Harvey’s article in that volume, 211–237. A different division is found in Falaquera’s Reshit Hokhmah, presumably written c. 1250. In this work, which incorporates al-Farabi’s Iḥṣāʾ, supplemented with other sources, such

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The Shaʿar ha-Shamayim adopts the same tripartite division of the theoretical sciences into natural science, mathematical science and divine science, for Gershom ben Solomon states in his Introduction that the first part of his work will treat “the wisdom of nature,” the second “the wisdom of astronomy,” and the third “the wisdom of God.”24 Whether or not this statement constitutes a classification, it should be noted that Gershom’s division differs from that of the mḥ in that Gershom’s section on natural science does not include a discussion of the contents of the Physics and On the Heavens. The first part is limited to an account of the nature of the elements, meteorological phenomena, minerals, plants, animals and man. The omission of the subject matter of On the Heavens can probably be explained by the fact that the second part of the work, which is devoted to astronomy, contains not only adaptations of the Almagest and of al-Farghani’s astronomy, but also quotations from pseudo-Avicenna’s De Caelo et Mundo and other sources.25 A more fundamental difference is that logic is not referred to in the introduction, nor included in the encyclopedia. The material covered in the Shaʿar is thus different in terms of emphasis than the mḥ, even though both authors base themselves on the tripartite division of the sciences.26 We notice that the absence of mineralogy and botany in the field of natural science sets Judah’s division apart from the schemes of al-Farabi and Avicenna, as well as from other Jewish texts. How can this deviation be explained? One explanation may be that Judah simply did not know treatises on these subjects. Yet it is also possible that the omission has to do with the fact that he knew that there were no authentic writings on these subjects by Aristotle. Aristotle announced a book on mineralogy at the end of Meteorology iv, but apparently never wrote one. The subject is not mentioned at the beginning of the Meteorology, where he says that he will also give an account of plants and animals. His work on botany is lost. What survives is a summary by Nicolaus

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as Avicenna’s Risālah and al-Ghazali’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, the subdivision of physical science includes alchemy, medicine and the study of talismans, subjects that are absent from Judah’s list; cf. Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 38–41 and Zonta, “The Reception of Al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Classifications,” 368–370. On this encyclopedia, cf. Robinson, “Gershom ben Solomon of Arles’ Shaʿar ha-Shamayim,” 248–274, and see also the next two notes. Gershom’s astronomical sources have now been studied in detail in Garshtein 2021, Chapter 5. For the different emphases in the Shaʿar and the reason for the deviating structure, see Freudenthal, “The Aim and Structure.”

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Damascenus, which was translated into Arabic and Hebrew. It is uncertain if Averroes ever wrote any commentary on these sciences or considered them to be Aristotelian.27 In his df Falaquera provides noteworthy information about the (un)availability of Aristotelian texts on these subjects. As for mineralogy he notes that a treatise on minerals by Aristotle was not available to him and that some people say that it was never written. Likewise, he did not have an Arabic translation of On Plants, only excerpts. For this reason, he states, the sections in his encyclopedia treating these disciplines are less extensive than other sections.28 Averroes’ name is not mentioned in Judah’s introduction, but as will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three, Judah’s survey of Aristotle’s physical writings and of his metaphysics consists almost exclusively of summaries and paraphrases from Averroes’ commentaries. Put differently, Judah’s basis for his survey of philosophy is the Aristotelian corpus as defined by Averroes’ commentaries. Therefore, the reason for the absence of mineralogy and botany might be that Judah wished to present a canon that included only treatises that were genuinely Aristotelian according to Averroes, the authoritative Aristotle interpreter of his day. In any event, Judah’s description of the division of the sciences is the most detailed among the thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedists in that it not only mentions the titles of the works to be studied but also specifies the contents in much detail. In all likelihood, it reflects the textual corpus that was available to him and that he had studied himself. 1.2 The Names of the Sciences and the Titles of the Books Judah’s designations for the three parts of theoretical science (ḥokhmat haṭevaʿ, ḥokhmat ha-limmudim, ḥokhmah elohit) are common in medieval Hebrew philosophical literature. However, some of the names that he assigns to individual disciplines or books are less standard. His nomenclature consists of transliterations from Greek (via Arabic), and Arabic terms alongside Hebrew ones. In the field of logic non-Hebrew terms are given for the fifth and sixth books of the Organon, namely s-f-s-ṭ-ʾ (probably to be read as Safsaṭaʾ) for Sophistics, and Ṭobiqa (Topics; here he also supplies the Arabic term ǧadal).29 For On Interpretation Judah uses the name Sefer ha-Mivṭaʾ, which renders the Arabic al-ʿibārah. The term mivṭaʾ is used by Abraham Ibn Ezra for logic (Yesod

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On this question, see Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus Damascenus De Plantis, 349; 363–367 and Zonta, La filosofia antica, 264–265, 271, 293–296. Falaquera, df, ms Leiden Or 4758, f. 128v. mḥ/Introd. 13.

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Moraʾ Ch. 1),30 and can also be used for grammar. Prior Analytics is called Sefer ha-Sevara instead of the more usual Sefer ha-Heqqesh.31 Another somewhat unusual title is Sefer ha-Divra for Rhetoric.32 As for the books studied in the mathematical sciences, only Ptolemy’s writings on astronomy and astrology are mentioned by name.33 For astronomy Judah mentions the Arabic title Al-Maǧisṭī, explaining that it consists of thirteen treatises, and for astrology, which he considers to be the practical part of astronomy, “the composition that is called The Decrees of the Stars, the Four Treatises” (= Quadripartitum/Tetrabiblos). The books by Euclid, Theodosius and Menelaos are not specified, but apparently the works that he had in mind are Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Theodosius’ Spherica and Menelaos’ treatise, which usually goes under the title Shakl al-qaṭṭāʿ (The Cutting Figure).34 Several of the names for the seven disciplines that fall under mathematics reflect Arabic terms, such as that for arithmetic (ha-mispar = al-ʿadad); for the science of statics (or: weights, ḥokhmat ha-kevedim = ʿilm al-aṯqāl),35 and optics (habaṭot = manāẓir). His taḥbulot seems to render ḥiyal (artifices, or mechanics). Geometry and music are given as gemaṭria and musiqa respectively. In several passages Judah subsumes the mathematical sciences under the name binah (cf. below); a term that Abraham bar Ḥiyya used for physical science. Turning now to the titles for Aristotle’s physical writings, the only somewhat unusual one is that for the Meteorology, called by Judah The Book on Air (or: The Air Book, Sefer ha-Awiri) instead of more common titles that literally translate the Arabic, which in English translation would be “The Upper Ways,” or “The Upper Signs.”36 In treating Aristotle’s zoological writings, he observes that the first eleven of the nineteen treatises are more concerned with higgayon (mḥ/Introd. 5), the term that he also uses for logic. These treatises contain Aristotle’s History of Animals which was considered to be more descriptive than the Parts of Animals and the Generation of Animals. The title “On Sense” (or: “On the Sentient”) refers to the first six sections of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia. 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Ed. Simon 2002, i, 9, line 86. On this term, see Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 128, n. 84. On the use of the term sevara, see below, section 3. For the names of logical books and other logical terms in medieval Hebrew texts, see Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology. The Introduction of the mḥ is the only occurrence for this term listed in Klatzkin’s Thesaurus. mḥ/Introd. 10–11. See Lévy, “Mathematics in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah,” 300–301, n. 1. In Ibn Falaquera’s Reshit Ḥokhmah this term denotes mechanics. By the time Judah wrote his encyclopedia Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Meteorology entitled Otot ha-Shamayim (“The Signs of Heaven”) was already available. For the use of the title Sefer ha-Awiri, see also Chapter Seven, section 6.

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More remarkable, however, is Judah’s assertion that the branch of physics is called musar in Scripture. This is claimed not in the introduction but in the treatise appended to Pt 1 of the mḥ. The term ḥokhmat ha-musar is sometimes used to denote mathematics in medieval Hebrew literature, rendering the Arabic al-riyāḍa, but to my knowledge not for physics.37 Commenting on Prov. 1:2, “to know wisdom and instruction; to perceive the words of understanding,” Judah asserts that in the Bible “wisdom” (ḥokhmah) without further qualification stands for “divine science”; “instruction” (musar) for physics, and “understanding” (binah) for mathematics.38 Elaborating on this he explains: Scripture calls physics “instruction” (musar), since it studies beings that are in motion and not permanent by themselves, that is, bodies which are made up of matter and form. They are susceptible to kinds of motion such as generation, corruption, growth and diminution, alteration and locomotion, and as they are mutable (sarim) and changeable from one thing into another, Scripture calls the science dealing with these bodies musar. […] Mathematics is called “things of understanding” (imrei binah), as these beings are [the objects] of the study into the form that can be separated from matter, at least in thought, not in reality, and also because this science requires “understanding of the heart” (havanat ha-lev) it is called imrei binah.39 This piece of exegesis clearly reflects Aristotle’s description of the three classes of beings which form the objects of the “three theoretical philosophies.”40 Taking as his point of departure the degree to which beings are separable from matter, Aristotle distinguished between three genera of being: things that are inseparable from matter but not immovable (dealt with in natural science);

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The term musar for mathematics is found, for example in Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation of Baḥya Ibn Paquda’s introduction to his Ḥovot. For Judah’s somewhat idiosyncratic terminology, see also Chapter Three, section 5. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 509–511. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 511–516. Cf. preceding section, text to n. 16. In Physics 198a29–30 the three genera of being are associated with the three branches of study. Cf. also Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie, 163ff. Judah probably knew the passage through Averroes’ mc Physics ii.3.1, cf. ed. Harvey 225.1–4 (tr. 302–303). A similar passage on the objects studied in “the three theoretical philosophies” is found in Arist., Metaphysics 1026a13–16 (and see also 1052b2– 1026a18). Zonta (“The Reception of Al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Classifications,” 376–377) has called attention to a related pseudo-Avicennian passage that was known in the medieval Hebrew tradition, but it is uncertain whether Judah had access to this source.

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things which are probably not separable but immovable (dealt with in mathematics), and things which are both separable and immovable (dealt with in “first science”).41

2

The Contents and Structure of the mḥ

Contrary to what one might expect, the presentation of the division of the sciences in the opening pages of the mḥ does not constitute a “Table of Contents” of the book. In his enumeration of the seven parts of the science of mathematics, Judah immediately informs his readers that he will treat only two of them, that is, geometry and astronomy.42 What is more, he refrains from providing a complete survey of geometry. Judah presents only a selection that corresponds to Euclid’s Elements i–vi and xi–xiii, because he does not consider the rest relevant to the study of astronomy. Moreover, he omits a discussion of Theodosius’ and Menelaos’ treatises referred to in the Introduction.43 The astronomical/astrological section, in contrast, comprises not only Ptolemy’s Almagest and Quadripartitum, but also a brief survey of al-Biṭrūǧī’s Kitāb al-Hayʾa, which was not mentioned at all in the Introduction.44 Moreover, Judah inserts in this part the mathematical correspondence that he conducted in his youth with a scholar at the imperial court of Frederick ii (cf. Chapter One). The survey of the mathematical sciences is thus both more restricted and more expansive than one might expect on the basis of the introduction. 41

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For the notion that musar is to be equated with physics and its relation to ethical behavior, see also Chapter Six. Apparently, Judah takes the word musar to derive from the root s-w-r. Of the remaining ones, only that of music is referred to briefly in a passage in his explanation of biblical verses which connects musical instruments to the spheres, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 493–504. Commenting on Ps. 150:3–5, Judah observes that the musical instruments enumerated in this passage correspond to the nine spheres. To this he adds “if we were more knowledgeable in the science of music we could assign each of them to its own proper sphere.” His alleged lack of proficiency in the science of music notwithstanding, he does assign each of the instruments mentioned to one of the spheres in the lines that follow. He makes use of optical theories in the section on meteorology, and in that on astronomy (see Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen,” 377), but the science of optics does not receive a separate treatment, see Meiron, Gersonides’ Supercommentary, vol. 1, 13–14. Dealing with spherical geometry these treatises formed part of the so-called “intermediate books,” which should be studied between Euclid’s Elements and Ptolemy’s astronomy, see Lévy, “Mathematics in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah,” 300–301, n. 1. For the astronomical section of the mḥ see Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen” and, in more detail, Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, Chapter 2.

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Similarly, in his précis of logic Judah excludes some of the logical works that he mentioned in the introduction, confining himself to the treatment of Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, and Posterior Analytics. Judah winds up his survey of the Posterior Analytics with the remark that what he has presented so far is sufficient for the purpose of his book, which deals more with the sciences. In his opinion the remaining books (that is, On Sophistical Refutations, Topics, Rhetoric and Poetics) “are only for those who wish to delve deeply into the subject of logic. Such a one may be likened to a person who whiles away all his days in the study of grammar so that he may be considered an expert in this field. Now this is not a place of understanding.”45 It should be noted, though, that the last part of the section on logic (chs 26–30) provides a summary of topical inferences. Thus Aristotle’s logical works and the mathematical sciences are only partially covered in the mḥ, although one cannot rule out the possibility that the original Arabic version contained more material than the Hebrew one. In contrast, the section devoted to natural philosophy faithfully covers the subject matter as given in the Introduction. However, the most striking difference between the philosophers’ classification and the actual arrangement of the mḥ concerns the place of metaphysics. Judah outlines the structure of his encyclopedia at the very end of the introduction: he divides his book into two parts (ḥalaqim) and three so-called treatises (maʾamarim). The first treatise is appended to the first, philosophical part, and the remaining two to the second, scientific part. The structure of the mḥ, then, after the Introduction, is as follows: Part 1: logic, physics and metaphysics Treatise 1: explanation of selected biblical verses (mostly from Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs) Part 2: mathematics, confined to geometry, astronomy and astrology Treatise 2: explanation of the hidden meaning of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet Treatise 3: Talmudic aggadot dealing with the unification of the Name.46

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ms O 45v. Tr. Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 281. The last phrase is somewhat cryptical. For “understanding” he uses the word binah. Seeing that Judah equates binah with mathematics (cf. above) he perhaps intends to convey that one does not need the four latter books of the Organon for mathematics (the sciences). As Manekin notes, the treatises covered in the mḥ are those of which Anatoli translated Averroes’ Epitomes into Hebrew, a translation that was dedicated to Frederick ii. mḥ/Introd. 25.

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The section on metaphysics consists of a summary of Aristotle’s Metaphysics books i–xiii and largely corresponds with Judah’s outline in the Introduction.47 Its place of insertion, however, is surprising. Judah treats the Aristotelian work directly after having completed his survey of natural science and before proceeding to deal with the mathematical sciences. In his Introduction, however, he subsumed the thirteen books of the Metaphysics under the heading “divine science” (mḥ/Introd. 12), mentioning its contents after his list of books on mathematical science (mḥ/Introd. 1–11), and before logic (mḥ/Introd. 13), in congruence with his tripartite division of the sciences. On the basis of the Introduction, therefore, one would expect the order of treatment to be: (logic), natural science, mathematics, (Aristotelian) Metaphysics. By moving the survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics before mathematical science Judah thus deviates from the order of sciences that he presented in his Introduction. What is more, there is no Part 3 that deals with divine science, as might be expected on the basis of his tripartite division of the sciences. Instead, the last sections of Part 2 consist of the two treatises that bear on religious topics: the letters of the Hebrew alphabet (Treatise Two) and Talmudic aggadot (Treatise Three). The difference between the description of the division of the sciences in the Introduction and the actual arrangement can be visualized as follows:

Division of the sciences according to the philosophers (mḥ, introduction)

Contents of the mḥ (after the Introduction)

Logic: Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, Topics, Rhetoric, Poetics

Part One Logic: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics

i. (world of generation and corruption) Natural Science: Aristotle’s Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On Air, On Animals, On the Soul, On Sense.

Natural Science: Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On Air, On Animals, On the Soul, On Sense.

47

Judah’s survey omits Aristotle’s Book A, whereas his Book 1 renders alpha elatton. The numbering of books B to N runs from ii–xiv. For the mḥ’s treatment of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Zonta, “The Place of Aristotelian Metaphysics,” 420–422 and Fontaine, “The First Survey of the Metaphysics in Hebrew.”

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(cont.)

Division of the sciences according to the philosophers (mḥ, introduction)

Contents of the mḥ (after the Introduction)

Metaphysics (= Aristotle’s Metaphysics i–xiii) Treatise 1: Explanation of Biblical Verses ii. (world of spheres) Mathematical science: arithmetic, geometry (Euclid, Menelaos, Theodosius), music, mechanics, statics, theoretical astronomy (Ptolemy’s Almagest), practical astronomy (= astrology, Ptolemy’s Quadripartitum)

Part Two: Mathematical science: geometry (Euclid, Elements i–vi, xi–xiii) correspondence with imperial court on geometry and astronomy astronomy (Ptolemy, Almagest; al-Biṭrūğī, Principles of Astronomy) astrology (Ptolemy, Quadripartitum)

iii. (immaterial world) Divine Science (Aristotle’s Metaphysics i–xiii)

Treatise 2: Explanation of the Letters of the Hebrew Alphabet. Treatise 3: On Talmudic aggadot.

Moreover, at the very end of the work we find some seemingly unrelated material, such as the computation of the year of redemption, and a refutation of an unnamed non-Jewish scholar who held that the Jews were not “the chosen people,” two subjects that were not mentioned in the Introduction. The religious topics discussed in the three treatises had no place in the philosophers’ classification as presented by Judah, and the author leaves the reader in the dark as to whether or how these treatises relate to the other parts of his book, and whether or not they fall under what he calls “divine science.”48 These questions will be addressed later on in the present study (Chapter Seven). For the moment it is sufficient to note that the combination

48

In listing the contents of the mḥ Arndt counts 24 items ( Judah ha-Cohen, 22–24). This numbering is somewhat arbitrary in that Judah’s survey of the three Books of Aristotle’s On Sense and Sensible Objects are counted as three separate items (On Sense, On Memory, On Length of Life) and his treatment of On Animals as two (Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals), whereas Judah numbers the treatises of the two books consecutively in his presentation. Moreover, the calculation of the coming of the Messiah is not included in Arndt’s list.

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of scientific and Jewish religious learning sets the mḥ apart from the two later thirteenth-century encyclopedias, for Falaquera’s Deʿot and Gershom’s Shaʿar do not include religious topics although the latter adopts a biblical framework.49 Somewhat paradoxically, then, the actual contents of the mḥ are more reminiscent of the classifications of both al-Farabi and Avicenna, which comprised traditional (Islamic) and scientific (non-Islamic) subjects, than Judah’s “classification” in the Introduction, even though, as noted, the division of the sciences presented there deviates from the Islamic ones. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the philosophers’ classification and the actual contents of the work suggests that the mḥ was not merely intended to provide information on the canon of science and philosophy of his day.

3

The Hierarchy of the Sciences and the Three Worlds

Hardly having finished his account of the scientific curriculum of his day, Judah hastens to point out that the net result of the study of all the books of Aristotle is very limited indeed: the study of the physical and mathematical writings will yield knowledge “of very few things only,” whereas from the study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics one will learn no more than that “there exists a Prime Mover, who is the Rock, one, living, and who is neither body, nor force in a body, and that there is for each sphere a separate intellect.”50 After his careful exposition of the structure and contents of the books from which science can be learned this assertion comes like an anti-climax. If the above enumeration of the sciences had whetted the appetite of the prospected reader to embark upon the study of these sciences, he would now probably feel demotivated, or at least surprised by Judah’s rather blunt statement. It now becomes clear that the scientific curriculum outlined in the first part of the introduction is not only not meant as a Table of Contents for the mḥ, it is also not intended as a program of study that provides complete and true knowledge. If this is the case, what is the reader to make of Judah’s list? Judah’s critical appreciation of the knowledge comprised in the books of the non-Jews is intrinsically bound up with his understanding of the notion of the tripartite structure of all that exists that he ascribes to “the philosophers”. As I argued elsewhere,51 the theme of the three worlds plays a major role in the mḥ, 49 50 51

See Freudenthal, “The Aim and Structure.” mḥ/Introd. 14. For a full translation of this passage, see Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 48–49 (in French), and 1985, 253 (in English). Fontaine, “The Theme of the Three Worlds.”

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and we will come back to it later on in this study (Chapters Six and Seven). In this chapter the focus will be primarily on Judah’s treatment of it in his Introduction, in particular on the hierarchy between these three worlds and their corresponding sciences. Judah’s first step after his detailed description of the various sciences is to point out that Scripture makes mention of the three worlds that underlie the philosophers’ tripartite division of the sciences: Deut. 10:14, “Behold, the heaven, and the heaven of the heavens is the Lord’s, thy God, the earth also, with all that therein is,” alludes to these three worlds.52 The expression “heaven” (shamayim) refers to the immaterial world; “heaven of the heavens” (shemei-shamayim) to the world of the spheres, and “earth” (ha-areṣ) to the world of generation and corruption. Other proof texts are Neh. 9:6 and Ps. 148:1– 7, which, in Judah’s view, likewise enumerate these worlds and in the same order.53 In the following passages of the Introduction the hierarchy between the three worlds comes into clearer focus. Unsurprisingly, the upper world ranks highest in hierarchy. Judah describes it as the cause of the two lower worlds; knowledge of it is the cause, root and principle of the sciences that are associated with these two worlds. It precedes the two other worlds in various ways of priority.54 Therefore, the relation between these three worlds and the corresponding sciences is that the person who has knowledge of the immaterial world immediately and easily knows the two lower worlds, for knowledge of them is comprised in knowledge of the immaterial world. The reverse, however, does not obtain: someone who knows only the two lower sciences does not yet know the higher world.55 The crucial distinction between this upper world and the two lower worlds is that the latter two are accessible to the senses, whereas the former is not.56 Sense-perception, which forms the foundation of philosophical knowledge, is therefore to no avail for someone who aspires to gain knowledge of the superior world, which, as becomes apparent in what follows, is the ultimate goal. According to Judah, precisely here lies the big mistake made by the philosophers: the Philosopher (that is, Aristotle) went the other way around by endeavoring to know the upper world on the basis of knowledge of the two lower

52 53 54 55 56

kjv translation. mḥ/Introd. 15. mḥ/Introd. 17. mḥ/Introd. 17. mḥ/Introd. 16, 17, 18; see also Introd. 14 and Biblical exegesis, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 988– 1007.

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worlds.57 As Judah puts it, “they endeavored to know the three worlds solely on the basis of sevara.”58 The term sevara turns out to be a key term for Judah’s evaluation of nonJewish science. Before examining Judah’s understanding of the term sevara, however, we should briefly look into its usage in some other medieval Hebrew philosophical texts. Falaquera has an interesting observation on the term sevara. In his Reshit Ḥokhmah he notes that it is used in various ways: it may denote heqqesh (analogy) “in the language of our ḥakhamim in the expression ‘gemara or sevara’,” but also “thinking that may not be true” (maḥshavah sheefshar she-einah amitit).59 Falaquera rightly observes that the term has a wide range of meanings. As can be seen in the peshat database, in medieval Hebrew translations from Arabic texts it may render various Arabic terms that denote “opinion”, such as ẓann, raʾy, or “guessing”/ “conjecturing”, such as wahm and taḫmīn, or it may stand for qiyās (analogy, reasoning). The term thus denotes different sorts or modes of knowledge or reasoning that yield different degrees of certainty.60 To mention a few examples in Jewish philosophical texts preceding Falaquera and Judah ha-Cohen: in Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation of the beginning of Saadya’s introduction to his “Book of Opinions and Beliefs” (Emunot wedeʿot), sevara renders the Arabic ẓann, in combination with maḥshavah, which renders wahm. In this passage it is clearly distinguished from “truth”: some people affirm their own opinion as the truth. In Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation of Halevi’s Kuzari it stands for reason, rendering Arabic qiyās (i.5), and this is also the case in ii.49. In passages where Halevi polemicizes against the Karaites (iii.38, iii.49) sevara has the connotation of individual reasoning as opposed to received tradition (Ar. naql, Hebr. qabbalah). The term is also found in Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s translation of the famous passage in Guide ii.22, where Maimonides says that everything that Aristotle says 57 58 59

60

mḥ/Introd. 16 and 25. mḥ/Introd. 16. Reshit Ḥokhmah 27. The expression “gemara or sevara” is found in bBaba Batra 77a and means: do you say that by analogy or something received by tradition? In rabbinical literature sevara stands for speculation, logical argument, logical deduction, as opposed to “verbal tradition” (gemara), see Jastrow, Dictionary, s.v. sevara. See also Bacher, Die exegetische Terminologie, vol. 1, 129–130 (for the verb savar in Tannaitic literature) and idem, vol. 2, 131–132 (for sevara as used by the Amoraim). The peshat database (https://peshat.gwiss.uni‑hamburg.de) s.v. sevara provides the following English equivalents: 1. belief as opposed to certain knowledge; 2. estimation/appraisal; 3. reason; 4. view/opinion. Klatzkin’s Thesaurus lists many synonyms, and offers various German translations: Spekulation, Denken, Meinung, Vermutung, Erkenntnis, and also: Syllogismus.

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about “the sphere of the moon and that which is above it is […], something analogous to guessing (maḥshavah, Ar. ḥads) and conjecturing (sevara, Ar. taḫmīn).”61 In a passage on the limits of the intellect in Guide i.31, towards the end, the term sevara stands in opposition to hassagah amitit (true knowledge or apprehension).62 What can we say about Judah’s use of the term in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah? As S. Rosenberg has observed, Judah uses the term sevara frequently, but what exactly does Judah mean by it?63 In the passage under discussion he explains sevara as “yediʿat ha-kares (lit.: knowledge of the belly), the basis of which is sense-perception.” This description conveys that sevara is unfounded knowledge, knowledge that has no sure basis. Interestingly, to support the claim that sevara has its root in sense-perception Judah appeals to Aristotle himself, referring the reader to the philosopher’s Posterior Analytics and On the Soul.64 Presumably, what he has in mind are passages like Soul 432a7, where Aristotle states that the objects of thought reside in the sensible forms,65 and the discussion in Posterior Analytics 87b28ff. about the inadequacy of sense-perception in acquiring scientific knowledge. A bit later in the same passage in the Introduction Judah uses sevara in combination with sekhel in the expression sevara me-ha-sekhel, by which he seems to denote reasoning by the intellect. In his survey of natural philosophy we encounter sevara as a translation of the Arabic qiyās (analogy, deduction by analogy, reason) in mḥ/Meteor ii.9 and mḥ/Sense ii[3].5, and in mḥ/pa xiii.8 bi-sevara el means “in relation to.” The expression savar ba-lev occurs furthermore in mḥ/Soul iii.16, where it renders the Arabic iʿtaqada (to believe) of Averroes’ mc Soul. In his list of Aristotelian logical works, however, Sefer ha-Sevara is the title for Prior Analytics, whereas in his coverage of Prior Analytics in the section on logic, and also in his description of its contents in the Introduction, it denotes syllogism,66 syllogistic reasoning or conclusive inference.67 In Treatise 1 (on the 61 62

63 64 65 66 67

Tr. Pines, 320. Al-Ḥarizi renders sevara by qeruv. Sevara we-daʿat in Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s translation renders the Arabic raʾy wa-maḏhab; al-Ḥarizi has shemirat dat u-sevara. Pines translates: “a particular doctrine or opinion,” as opposed to something that is “truly grasped” (tr. 67). Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, 132. mḥ/Introd. 16. Cf. mḥ/Soul iii.26: The beginning of apprehension is sense-perception. See mḥ/Introd. 13, and, for example ms O 19r, where we read that the syllogism (sevara) is more universal than demonstration (mofet), cf. Arist., Prior Analytics 25b29. ms O 35v20–21, and 36r20.

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explanation of biblical verses) the term surfaces in a long passage criticizing Aristotelian philosophy. Here Judah says: “but even if we agreed with his [= Aristotle’s] proofs that are true according to human reasoning (sevarat ha-enosh) the basis of which is sense-perception as we have said […],”68 and a few lines later it is used for syllogism.69 We thus see that Judah uses the term in different senses, but in his Introduction the meaning conveyed by sevara clearly is: human knowledge based on sense-perception, which, contrary to what the philosophers claim, cannot provide knowledge of the upper incorporeal world. Indeed, Judah continues: “Given that this world is incorporeal, how could it possibly occur to them [= the philosophers] that sense-perception can lead to knowledge of it?” It follows that the philosophers cannot attain certain knowledge of the superior world, since only this knowledge can be called “certain wisdom” (ḥokhmah waddaʾit).70 Judah supports this last claim by again invoking Aristotle, who “in Treatise iii of his book [= Metaphysics]” contended that only the person who possesses wisdom of the immaterial world is called “wise” (ḥakham).71 Judah’s reliance on Aristotle’s Metaphysics here is somewhat surprising for it seems to be at variance with his negative evaluation of the usefulness of studying Aristotle’s Metaphysics and with his conviction that the philosophers cannot apprehend this superior world. Apparently, Judah’s intention here is to emphasize the true meaning of the words “wise” and “wisdom”: Judah agrees with Aristotle that the appellation “wise” applies only to someone who has wisdom of the superior world, even though he disagrees with him on the method by which this wisdom can be attained. This is why Judah adds that the word “wise” (ḥakham) in Job 17:10, “I shall not find a wise man among you” applies to someone who occupies himself only with the two lower worlds. In sum, it is clear from Judah’s conception of sevara that Aristotle’s divine science, as laid down in his Metaphysics, falls short of providing certain knowledge, for even though it has as its object the divine, its methods are not sufficient for studying it. Sevara is thus Judah’s designation for rational knowledge as acquired by syllogistic discursive reasoning on the basis of sense-perception; 68 69 70 71

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 673–674. Ibid., line 688. mḥ/Introd. 17. Ibid. The reference is to Metaph. iv 1004b17–26 where Aristotle discusses the difference between philosophy on the one hand and dialectic and sophistry on the other. This reference has a parallel in Judah’s survey of the Metaphysics where he writes, “and it is fitting to call this science ‘wisdom’, and the person who knows it ‘wise’” (ms O 102v). Here he adds that Prov. 31:29, “But you surpass them all” refers to this “highest wisdom.” A similar statement is found in his explanation of biblical verses, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 531–533.

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it cannot provide certain knowledge. Judah does not say explicitly that sevara is knowledge that may not be true as Falaquera does, but rather that it does not yield certain knowledge of the immaterial world.72 Having dismissed sevara as a means to attain true knowledge of the upper world, Judah goes on to emphasize that there is instead another source that can provide such knowledge. Judah first characterizes this source as “the tradition (qabbalah) that is transmitted from man to man from the mouth of the Force (mi-pi ha-gevurah = divine command).”73 A bit further on he describes qabbalah as knowledge that was revealed only to the prophets “and those who fear Him,” thus equating it with revelational prophecy or religious tradition. Furthermore, the knowledge that the prophets attained was not the result of their possessing an additional intellectual faculty, but, instead, of God’s granting them the revelation of his secrets. In other words, knowledge of the upper world is not acquired by man’s own efforts; God grants it to whom he wishes. Qabbalah thus denotes a superior type of knowledge, and unlike sevara, it does provide certain knowledge. Here, however, an incongruity should be noted. Whereas in the preceding passages in the introduction the upper immaterial world was set apart from the two lower worlds, in the present passage Judah groups the immaterial world and the world of the spheres together on the basis of Ps. 115:16, and maintains that one needs qabbalah to acquire knowledge of these two worlds. To be more precise, with the help of sense-perception and intellect man can master only the particulars of the nether world.74 This discrepancy regarding the rank of the world of the spheres does not seem to bother Judah. What troubles him instead is the rabbinic dictum “A wise man (ḥakham) is superior to a prophet” (bBabaBatra 12a), which, at first sight, seems to contradict the claim that knowledge received by the prophets ranks higher than rational knowledge. Consequently, he feels called upon to explain the seeming contradiction. The dictum on the wise man, he contends, applies only to things that can be apprehended by sevara, but in regard of things that transcend the domain of sevara the person who receives knowledge of them by emanation, that is, the prophet, is superior. As a proof text he adduces

72

73 74

For a similar use of the term sevara by other thirteenth-century authors who likewise entertained doubts on the validity of philosophical knowledge, see Chapter Seven, section 3. mḥ/Introd. 18 and cf. ed. D. Goldstein, lines 616–621. In Chapter Six (section 1.vi c) we will see that this incongruity is also found in Judah’s explanation of biblical verses.

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Prov. 30:3, which verse conveys that “wisdom” (ḥokhmah) cannot be acquired by learning; put differently, that it is a gift. The term ḥokhmah, he adds, refers here to “divine wisdom” as in other biblical passages where the term ḥokhmah tout court is used. Judah pictures the relation of this divine science to other branches of sciences in dualistic terms, as that of true light to fire that is in fact darkness.75 At this point, we should briefly consider Judah’s use of the term “divine wisdom,” the science that is related to the immaterial world. As we will see also later on it is not always clear what Judah means by it.76 The term ḥokhmah elohit first occurs in the Introduction when he describes the tripartite division of the sciences as adopted by “the philosophers.” Divine wisdom, or divine science, is related to the immaterial world. It is this term that he uses when detailing the contents of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In these passages, ḥokhmah elohit clearly stands for Aristotle’s Metaphysics. As we have just seen, however, after his enumeration of the books from which the sciences are to be studied, he avers that not much can be learned about the immaterial world from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (mḥ/Introd. 14), and that one needs qabbalah, not sevara to gain knowledge of it (mḥ/Introd. 16–17). It is given only to the prophets to know the essences of the upper world, that is to say, the immaterial world that is alluded to in Scripture by the term “heavens” (mḥ/Introd. 15). It follows therefore that there are two sets or kinds of divine wisdom: that contained in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and that contained in Scripture. Both have the heavenly divine world as their object, but they are not equivalent. When Judah asserts that the expression ḥokhmah as used in Scripture refers to divine wisdom that relates to other sciences as bright light to darkness, he does not have the divine wisdom of the Metaphysics in mind. This is clear from the continuation of the passage where he maintains that “that which the Holy One blessed be He revealed from it [namely, from divine science], he revealed only to Israel” (mḥ/Introd. 20). However, Judah does not specify the contents of this revelational divine knowledge, but describes the relation of the books of the nations to Israel’s certain wisdom as that of the light of the candle to that of the sun at day (mḥ/Introd. 20). Thus, it is obvious that the two types of divine knowledge are not of the same order of magnitude: revelational divine wisdom is valued higher than Aristotle’s divine science. This twofold understanding of “divine science”, then, explains why in his encyclopedia the section on Metaphysics is placed after that of physical science, and not after that on mathematical science, as one would expect from the

75 76

mḥ/Introd. 19. See Chapter Seven, section 3.

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order as outlined in the enumeration of the sciences (cf. above). While Judah clearly deems it appropriate to provide his readers with a survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he wishes to demonstrate at the same time that that science does not have the same epistemological status as revelational divine science. This brings us to Judah’s aim underlying his encyclopedia, a subject to which we will also come back later (Chapter Three, section 4).

4

Judah’s Motivation

Before addressing Judah’s motivation, let us first recapitulate Judah’s exposition thus far. After his outline of the sciences of the non-Jewish philosophers and the relation of these sciences to the three worlds he has made the following points: when all is said and done these sciences yield very little knowledge; knowledge of the immaterial divine world cannot be attained by the senses and the intellect; therefore another source of knowledge is needed, namely revelation/tradition, which Judah refers to as qabbalah; this is given only to the prophets of Israel. At this point the reader may wonder why Judah should invest so much effort in composing a survey of sciences that do not provide certain knowledge. It is at about two thirds of the Introduction that Judah unfolds his purposes, stating that his motivation in compiling the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah was twofold.77 His first aim was to inform readers who intended to turn to the study of non-Jewish sciences about the benefit to be gained from the books dealing with these sciences and also to provide this reader with hints about “our divine science.” The second aim was to redirect to the Torah those readers who had already exercised their thought and wasted their time by studying scientific books. Later on, at the end of the section on logic, he refers to the passage under consideration, now phrasing his motivation somewhat differently. For after having explained that he does not think it necessary to present the last four books of Aristotle’s Organon in his book because they are not relevant to his survey of the sciences, he says: “We have already laid down in the introduction to this book that our sole intention is to make known the limit/end (takhlit) of the usefulness of the books of the nations, so that the Jews will not be devoid of them and that they (= the nations) will not pride themselves against them with their sciences. Accordingly, this book will enable the Jews to acquire knowledge and to answer an Epiqoros on the basis of his own wisdom.

77

mḥ/Introd. 21.

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Moreover, [it is the purpose of the book] to revert to our sacred Torah him who has lost his way (shagag) in their books.”78 Taken together, these passages reveal in fact more than two aims: besides the purpose to inform his fellow Jews about (the limits of) contemporary science and to revert them to the Torah, both of which are stated in the two passages, according to the first passage the encyclopedia seeks to provide hints about Jewish divine science (as opposed to Aristotle’s divine science), while the second provides a polemical motive: to prevent the non-Jews from looking down on Jews. Elaborating on the different wording in the two passages, S. Arndt has argued that the sections containing the correspondence with a scholar in the entourage of Frederick ii and the disputation with the non-Jewish scholar serve this last purpose, that is, to show to non-Jews that Jews are also knowledgeable in non-Jewish sciences.79 This interpretation is certainly possible, but the aim added in the second passage may also be viewed as a corollary of the stated aim to inform Jews about the benefit of the study of non-Jewish books: once Jews have studied non-Jewish books, they can show to the nations that they are well-versed also in these sciences. Before elaborating on Judah’s motivation it will be useful, for the sake of comparison, to briefly review the motives that prompted the two later thirteenth-century encyclopedists to embark upon their compositions. As for the Deʿot ha-Filosofim, written several decades after Judah’s compilation, Shemtov Ibn Falaquera writes in his introduction that he endeavored to assemble all the philosophers’ opinions on physics and metaphysics in one volume in order to save his coreligionists the trouble of gathering knowledge from a large number of books or to turn to books in which these views were inadequately translated. What Falaquera sought to achieve with his enterprise was to enable his fellow Jews who wished to know the opinions of the philosophers to know them with a true knowledge, so as to enable them to tell truth from falsehood and the impossible from the possible. Furthermore, he maintains that everything he writes is necessary for the perfection of a person who uses the scientific method. To this he adds that originally his intention was to compose a book that would serve him as a memory aid in his old age.80

78

79 80

ms O 45v, translation based on Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 98. Septimus translates the phrase about the nations: that they will not “grow haughty toward” the Jews. Jacob Anatoli has a similar expression regarding “the nations,” cf. below, n. 87. Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 33–34. A translation of Falaquera’s Introduction is found in Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 50–51. For a survey of motivations expressed by Arabic-into-Hebrew translators, see Rothschild, “Motivations et méthodes.”

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Gershom ben Solomon gives no other motivation than the desire to collect everything that was worth knowing (“omne scibile”) in condensed form in a single volume. Quoting Eccl. 1:13, “I set my mind to study and to probe with wisdom all that happens under the sun,” Gershom ben Solomon begins his Shaʿar ha-Shamayim by stating that he sought wisdom concerning all things under heaven. To achieve this, he consulted the books of the philosophers that had been translated into Hebrew up to his day, but also included oral information deriving from Jewish as well as non-Jewish sources.81 He does not specify which audience he had in mind. The three thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedists thus seem to share the wish to facilitate the study of non-Jewish science for their contemporaries and to disseminate these sciences to a larger public. However, the motivation given in the mḥ differs from that of both Deʿot ha-Filosofim and Shaʿar haShamayim in that its author explicitly connects it with polemical purposes. This is more explicit in the second of the aforementioned passages, but the polemical motive is also present in the Introduction, for here Judah’s declaration of intent immediately follows a passage in which he compares the wisdom of non-Jews to that of Jews.82 In this passage he first points out that the wise men of the nations possess only the (lower) sciences, whereas the people of which Scripture says, “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people,” (Deut. 4:6) possess the root and the branch, that is, knowledge of the upper world, which was revealed to them by God. However, as Judah goes on to explain, referring to Isa. 29:14, “the wisdom of our wise men has perished and the understanding of our prudent men is hidden,” this wisdom has disappeared from Israel. As a result, of these sciences only “two berries or three on the topmost branch” (Isa. 17:6) have been preserved, so that in this era the Jewish sage can glory only in his knowledge of the non-Jewish books mentioned. Only the Greeks, Judah goes on to relate, wrote books on the sciences and these were translated in other languages. Due to this situation the Gentiles claim that “there is no wisdom in Israel,” and that “my people is foolish” (Jer. 4:22). Here we come across the theme of the “lost wisdom,” a theme that became particularly popular and urgent in thirteenth-century Jewish philosophical writings.83 Various authors, including Nachmanides and Falaquera, held that in

81 82 83

Shaʿar, introductory passage. mḥ/Introd. 20. See Roth, “The ‘Theft of Philosophy’ ” and the literature indicated in S. Harvey, Falaquera’s Epistle of the Debate, 41–42, n. 77. Twersky (“Aspects of the Social and Cultural History of Provençal Jewry,” 204–205) notes that the desire to show that Jews are still worthy

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former times Israel possessed philosophical knowledge and/or wrote books on them, which, however, in the course of time disappeared because of the Exile resulting from Israel’s sins.84 A related notion was that wisdom or philosophy originated with the Jews and that the Greeks either stole or learned this wisdom from them. Maimonides, too, intimates that in former times Jews possessed philosophical knowledge but that it was lost during the Exile.85 In Guide ii.11 he says that “the wicked from among the ignorant communities […] destroyed our words of wisdom and our compilations,” and in this context he also invokes Deut. 4:6 and Isa. 29:14.86 Far from claiming that the Greeks owed their wisdom to the Jews, let alone that they stole it from Israel, Judah contents himself with saying rather vaguely that the root of wisdom was once with the Jews, thus presenting an attenuated version of the theory of “lost wisdom.” Indeed, by explicitly stating that “only” the Greeks wrote scientific books, he seems to reject the claim that in the days of old the Jews, too, composed scientific books, which were then lost. Neither does he provide any details as to how and why this wisdom departed from Israel, saying merely that this was due to the “absence of Providence from Israel.” Instead, he focuses on the sad results of this state of affairs, namely that “only two or three berries in the top” have been preserved, so that in his day Jews can attain wisdom from non-Jewish books only. Judah found this circumstance particularly embarrassing and distressing, as is apparent from his observation that, as a result, the nations of the world consider Israel to be devoid of wis-

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of the designation “a wise and understanding people” was a prominent component in the defense of the study of philosophy by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Provençal authors. Nachmanides, Introd. to his Torah commentary; Falaquera, Introd. to df, ms Leiden 106ra: “if the sages composed books on science they got lost in exile or because of the oppression of the nations.” The subject is treated extensively in Melamed, The myth of the Jewish Origins. (Non vidi). Guide ii.11, cf. also i.71 (beginning). On Maimonides’ perception of the degenerate nature of his day, see Kellner, Maimonides on the ‘Decline of the Generations’, 37ff. (Chapter 3). On the “forgotten knowledge” in Maimonides’ Guide, see also Michaelis, “ ‘For the Wisdom of Their Wise Men Shall Perish’.” Michaelis describes how in early Karaite literature the future sense of the verbal form avedah of the biblical phrase (“the wisdom of our wise man shall perish”) was, for ideological reasons, interpreted as something that already had taken place—“has perished.” Maimonides adduces Isa. 29:14 also towards the end of his Introduction to the Mishneh Torah to justify his halakhic enterprise. For Maimonides’ use of this verse, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 36. The same verse is found in Ramah’s Introduction to his Massoret Seyag la-Torah, cf. Septimus, ibidem, and in Gikatilla’s Introduction to Shloshah sifrei diqduq le-R. Yehuda Hajjuj. Here the context is the deplorable status of the Hebrew language.

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dom. According to him, the first part of Isa. 29:14, “Truly I shall further baffle that people with bafflement upon bafflement (hafleʾ wa-feleʾ),” refers to the paradoxical situation that the people called “a wise and understanding people” have to take resort to the writings of the nations because their own original wisdom has departed from them, “as the waters of the sea fail” (Job 14:11). It is this lamentable situation that Judah sets out to remedy.87 Like Maimonides in his Introduction to Mishneh Torah, Judah quotes Neh. 5:13, “I shook out the bosom of my garment,” to underscore his motivation.88 Judah ha-Cohen was certainly not the only thirteenth-century Jewish scholar to express concern about the low scientific level of contemporary Jewry as compared to its non-Jewish environment and the resulting mocking attitude of the Gentiles. A few decades earlier Samuel Ibn Tibbon observed in his Maʾamar Yiqqawu ha-Mayim that non-Jews were deriding Jews for not knowing the true sciences that were hidden and hinted at in the Bible, sciences that were widespread among the non-Jews.89 Samuel Ibn Tibbon used this argument to legitimize his divulging of Maimonides’ esoteric teaching.90 Falaquera, too, sought to raise the cultural level of his fellow Jews. The wish to disseminate scientific learning was one of the driving forces behind the compilation of both Judah’s and Falaquera’s encyclopedias. However, what sets Judah apart from Ibn Tibbon, but also from Falaquera and Gershom ben Solomon, is that along with this aim he pursued another goal while assembling the teachings of the philosophers, that is, to redirect to the Torah students who had “wasted their time” on studying the sciences. The two later encyclopedists did not express such explicit reservations about the sciences they set out to include in their works, nor did they contrast Aristotle’s divine science to traditional divine science. In this regard, the addition “our” in “our divine science” in Judah’s moti87

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For Jacob Anatoli it was likewise derision by the non-Jews that played a part in composing his Malmad ha-Talmidim, and he quotes the same verse Isa. 29:14, Introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim (p. 393 in ed. L. Pepi), and see Elior, Euclid’s Elements, 13. In the Introduction to his translation of the Organon Anatoli refers to “evil boasters who glorify themselves against us,” see Halper, Jewish Socratic Questions, 183. See Maimonides’ Introduction to the Mishneh Torah (end) and also Berechya ha-Naqdan’s introduction to Mishlei-Shuʿalim, ed. Schwarzbaum 1979, xxv. The context in Nehemiah is Nehemiah’s actions in restoring seized property to the returnees. Quoted by Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 236. For Anatoli, who followed Samuel Ibn Tibbon in this regard, see Gordon, The Rationalism, 115 ff. and 232–233. For other thirteenth-century authors who invoked the perceived philosophic inferiority of the Jews vis-à-vis the non-Jews to legitimize the dissemination of the sciences, see Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 238 n. 113. Ravitzky’s list includes Judah ha-Cohen. It seems that the argument was particularly pertinent to thirteenth-century Jewish philosophers working in Italy.

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vation as phrased in the Introduction is highly significant: it emphasizes that Aristotle’s divine science is not the equivalent of Jewish divine science.

5

Criticism and Ambivalence

Right after having laid down his twofold motivation in the Introduction, Judah sets out to ventilate detailed criticism of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. To this end he draws up a long list of Aristotelian doctrines about the natural world the truth of which in his view has not been proven. As we will see in more detail below, this list consists of doctrines taken from Aristotle’s Physics, On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption.91 According to the author, only very few of these doctrines can be considered proved, that is to say proved by means of a physical proof (reʾayah, demonstratio quia), which in the hierarchy of proofs ranks lower than the demonstrations (mofetim) used in the mathematical sciences. What is more, for the majority of these teachings, Judah claims, Aristotle did not even provide reʾayot. This entails that not only does Aristotelian metaphysics not lead up to true knowledge about the higher world, his physics, too, falls short of providing reliable knowledge about the sublunar realm. In this context Judah announces that later on in his book he will collect some fifty premisses that underlie these Aristotelian doctrines. This list is found in the first treatise of the mḥ, within the framework of his comment on Prov. 2:6, “For the Lord grants wisdom …” Therefore, I will defer a discussion of Judah’s criticism, as expressed in these two passages, to Chapters Four and Six below. Towards the end of the Introduction he once again finds an occasion to contrast non-Jewish wisdom to Jewish wisdom. Here he compares “the occupation of the nations with the sciences” to a writer who embellishes an inkstand, furnishing it with golden straps, but forgets to make a place for the ink, which, after all, is what the inkstand is for.92 The analogy describes the procedure of non-Jews who believe that they can know the higher world by studying the two lower ones. Yet, in spite of Judah’s criticism and his skeptical attitude regarding the reliability of Aristotelian philosophy, at the same time a more positive evaluation of non-Jewish science emerges from his introduction. It may be taken as sarcastic that he characterizes the list of unproven Aristotelian doctrines as “the choicest of his pearls” (mivḥar peninav), an expression which brings to mind

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mḥ/Introd. 22–24. mḥ/Introd. 26.

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the collection of epigrams usually attributed to Solomon Ibn Gabirol, but it may also manifest some genuine admiration. In another passage Judah says that even though the little knowledge that the philosophers have attained is “like a drop in the ocean, it is certainly not small for someone who has reached it on the basis of sevara,” that is, unaided by revelation, a statement that testifies to a more positive evaluation of their accomplishments.93 As we have seen (Chapter One), he acknowledges that Maimonides inspired in him a “burning fire” (Jer. 20:9) to study the sciences, and as is clear from the list of unproven doctrines Judah displays a thorough knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy. We have also noted that he invokes Aristotle’s authority in passages where he seeks to undermine the reliability of his mode of thought (section 3 above). In other words, Judah displays a certain ambivalence towards non-Jewish science. This ambivalence is also noticeable in his motivation, for he warns his potential readership against the very corpus of knowledge that it seeks to spread. At first sight, his two goals, spreading knowledge and reverting the student of non-Jewish science to the Torah, may even be seen as contradictory. In short, the Introduction of the mḥ raises a number of questions. How are the two purposes he describes related to each other? What can the student of the mḥ expect to learn from it? And to what extent does the reserved and critical attitude that Judah displays towards Aristotle’s philosophy come to fruition in his work? To address these questions, I shall examine Judah’s use of sources and manner of compilation (Chapter Three); his criticism of his sources (Chapters Four-Five), and his biblical exegesis (Chapter Six). At this point, however, it is possible to answer the question of the status of Judah’s “division of the sciences” with which he begins his Introduction. Put briefly it can be said that it presents the canon of the sciences as studied in the contemporary non-Jewish world, a corpus that provides some knowledge, but which is not sufficient for Jews. It forms the point of departure for Judah’s musings about the three worlds and his views about the relation of non-Jewish science to traditional Jewish science. In other words, in the Introduction the author unfolds both the rationale and the program of his undertaking. 93

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Sources and Use of Sources in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah’s Section on Natural Philosophy In Chapter Two we have seen that the survey of philosophy and science offered in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah differs from the outline of the sciences described in the Introduction. The present chapter lists the Greek, Muslim and Jewish authors or sources that are mentioned by Judah in his encyclopedia (section 1), and describes the sources on which the work’s section on natural philosophy is actually based (section 2). Moreover, it examines the way in which Judah used these sources in that part of his compilation (sections 3 and 4).1 The last section of the chapter is devoted to the language of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah (section 5).

1

Authors and Sources Mentioned in the mḥ

1.1 Greek Besides Aristotle, Euclid, Menelaos and Theodosius who already appear in the mḥ’s introduction, other Greek authors are referred to in different sections of the mḥ. Unsurprisingly, of all the authorities mentioned by Judah Aristotle’s name occupies center stage. Judah mentions or quotes him not only in the philosophical-scientific part of his work, but also in the three Treatises appended to this part. Of Aristotle’s predecessors, only the names of Plato and Socrates occur. Judah refers to Plato briefly in his survey of the Metaphysics, where he records Plato’s theory of the existence of separate universal forms in connection with Aristotle’s refutation of it.2 Furthermore, in the first Treatise, devoted to the explanation of biblical verses, he states that, according to Plato, form is masculine and matter feminine,3 while in the second Treatise, on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, he notes that in Plato’s view the entire universe

1 Occasionally I will also refer to Judah’s survey of the Metaphysics although my edition does not include this part of the mḥ. 2 ms O 112r. For the sigla of the mss of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, see below, Introduction to the Edition. 3 Ed. D. Goldstein, ll. 170–172; cf. Plato, Timaeus 50d–51a.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_004

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possesses the vital soul.4 Socrates is quoted only once, in mḥ/Sense, where he is reported to have said to his fellow-citizens that the wisdom he possessed was human wisdom.5 Of Aristotle’s Greek commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias is mentioned a few times: once in mḥ/gc i, where Judah discusses the question of whether growth takes place in the matter or in the form of a growing body.6 In mḥ/ Meteor. the name of this commentator surfaces three times, namely in the discussion of celestial fire;7 in the section on the Milky Way,8 and at the very end where Alexander is said to believe that no animal species can be produced in the stomach.9 In his survey of On the Soul Judah records Alexander’s opinion on the material intellect.10 In the same book he also refers to Themistius’ view of the active intellect,11 while in mḥ/Metaph. xi (which corresponds to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda) Themistius’ view of the role of the separate substances in the generation of animals is recorded.12 The second Greek authority whose name is found regularly in the mḥ is Galen. The physician’s zoological-biological views are cited primarily in the survey of mḥ/pa and mḥ/ga, where Judah contrasts them to those of Aristotle.13 Galen’s view of mixture is quoted in mḥ/gc ii.9, and Galen’s description of the anatomy of the eye is given as a supplement to Aristotle’s theory of sight.14 Galen’s precursor Hippocrates figures only once, namely in the discussion of the formation of the embryo, where Judah relates an experiment conducted by the physician to find out whether semen is a physical constituent of the embryo.15 It is important to emphasize, however, that in general the author had no direct knowledge of Greek philosophical authorities. Instead, his knowledge derives from his perusal of Averroes’ commentaries. As we shall see below (section 2.1), there is only one case where Judah appears to have drawn directly on an Arabic translation of a classical Greek text. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

ms O 193r; cf. Plato, Timaeus 30b. mḥ/Sense iii.2.3; cf. Plato, Apology 20d–e. On this statement, see Halper, Jewish Socratic Questions, 69–72; 84–85. mḥ/gc i.6,7. mḥ/Meteor. i.3. mḥ/Meteor. i.10. mḥ/Meteor. iv, last line. mḥ/Soul iii.13. mḥ/Soul iii.21. ms O 112r–v. These passages are discussed in Chapter Five. mḥ/Soul ii.23. mḥ/ga xvi.10.

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Another frequently mentioned classical author is Ptolemy, whose Almagest and Tetrabiblos are excerpted in the mḥ.16 Moreover, in the section On the Heavens (ii.10) he mentions some of Ptolemy’s views on the motions of the planets, while Ptolemy’s discussion of the inhabited zones of the earth, which is taken from the Almagest, is recorded in the section on meteorology.17 Hipparchos, too, appears on some occasions in the astronomical section of the mḥ. Euclid, whose Elements was listed in the introduction, does not figure prominently in other sections than the mathematical part where Judah summarizes this work. The names of Menelaos and Theodosius, likewise listed in the introduction, also appear in the astronomical part,18 while the latter is moreover mentioned in passing in On the Soul i.19 1.2 Muslim The Muslim philosophers referred to by name are Ibn Bājja, Avicenna, and Averroes. Here, too, Averroes’ commentaries are mostly Judah’s source for the references to the earlier Muslim philosophers.20 In his précis of the Meteorology Judah includes Avicenna’s view that the equatorial zone is more balanced than other zones, adding that Averroes held the opposite.21 The views held by Ibn Bājja and Avicenna on the eternity of the celestial body (also quoted via Averroes) are recorded in the survey of Metaphysics.22 Moreover, Avicenna is also cited in the astronomical part in connection with theories on the positions of the planets with regard to each other.23 References to Averroes will be dealt with in the next section (cf. below 2.2.2). Here it suffices to note that Judah does not mention any writings by Averroes other than his commentaries on Aristotle’s writings.

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

For Greek authors mentioned in the mḥ’s sections on astronomy and astrology, see Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen,” 371–389. mḥ/Meteor. ii.11. Cf. Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen,” 385 ff. For Judah’s use of these three authors, see Lévy, “Mathematics in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah,” 300–312. mḥ/Soul i.4. The reference concerns the question of how a straight surface can “touch” a sphere. For Judah’s use of al-Farabi’s commentaries on logic, see Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 283–284. Cf. also Sirat “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 43. mḥ/Meteor. ii.12. ms O 122v, 123v, see Fontaine, “The First Survey,” 281–282. ms O 160r. Here Avicenna’s view is cited via “R. David” (= David ben Naḥmias, cf. next section, Jewish sources).

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In the field of astronomy, the major Islamic scholar to be quoted appears to be al-Biṭrūğī. In his section on astronomy Judah ha-Cohen incorporates a summary of al-Biṭrūğī’s Kitāb al-Hayʾa, (Principles of Astronomy) observing that this Muslim sage refuted Ptolemy and all the astronomers before him. Judah held al-Biṭrūğī in high regard, as is evident from his words, “if he had been a Jew, he would have been worthy of divine wisdom.”24 Judah’s endorsement of alBiṭrūğī is presumably the reason for including the Muslim astronomer’s views in mḥ/Heavens ii.10 as correcting those held by Ptolemy, as he does as well in mḥ/Metaph. xi.25 Ibn al-Haytham’s Book of Optics is also mentioned to in the astronomical part.26 1.3 Jewish Compared to Greek and Muslim authors, names of medieval Jewish scholars are relatively scarce in the mḥ. In his overview of the Physics Judah quotes Abraham Ibn Daud when discussing the question in which categories motion can be found.27 In his treatise on biblical exegesis Judah quotes Abraham Ibn Ezra’s explanation of Ps. 19:6–7.28 In the same treatise we come across a reference to ha-Ammasoni (or: ha-Imsoni), who wished to explain all the occurrences of the nota objecti et in the Torah.29 Unfortunately, Judah ha-Cohen provides almost no details about his Spanish teachers and predecessors. An otherwise unknown Jewish astronomer, David b. Naḥmias of Toledo, emerges in the section on astronomy.30 Furthermore, as noted, Judah acknowledges Maimonides’

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In his article (“Some Remarks”) Langermann discussed Judah’s references to Muslim astronomers, such as al-Zarqāllu, Ǧābir Ibn Aflaḥ, al-Biṭrūğī. The subject is now studied in great detail in Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, Chapter 2. ms O 116v. The Hebrew title is Sefer ha-habaṭot. See Langermann, “Some Remarks,” 377 and Meiron, Gersonides’ Supercommentary, Pt. 1, 13–14. Cf. mḥ/Physics v.5, n. 124. Judah testifies to the fact that Ibn Daud died a martyr’s death (ha-neherag al-yiḥḥud ha-Shem) in Toledo. C. Sirat (“Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 43) was the first to call attention to the mention of Ibn Daud by Judah ha-Cohen. It may be added that the same formulation ha-neherag al-yiḥḥud ha-Shem occurs in one of the letters written during the Maimonidean controversy in the 1230s, namely in the letter that R. Josef bar Todros Halevi of Burgos sent to the scholars of Provence (in the context of a reference to Ibn Daud’s Sefer [here: Seder] ha-Qabbalah), see Ginzei Nistarot iv.169.6–7. Ed. D. Goldstein, line 392, cf. b Pes 22b. Leicht, “Toward a History,” 275 calls attention to the fact that the astrological works of Abraham Ibn Ezra “left no imprint” on Judah’s compilation. Judah adopted, however, some of Ibn Ezra’s vocabulary, cf. below, section 5. Ed. D. Goldstein, line 133. On him, see Langermann, “Some Remarks,” 375–377. Langermann notes that Judah haCohen is our only source for this scholar, who defended Ptolemy’s position concerning

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Guide as his principal source of inspiration,31 without, however, referring to particular passages, nor to any other writings of Maimonides. He once names his teacher Ramah, R. Meir Abulafia (d. 1244), who is reported to have taught him that the dove should be added to Aristotle’s list of animals that have no gall bladder, a piece of information that Ramah apparently found in the Palestinian Talmud.32 References to or quotations from the Bible and rabbinical sources occur more frequently than those to medieval Jewish authors.33 A passage of the Babylonian Talmud from Bekhorot on reproduction in various animals and trees is quoted at some length in mḥ/ga xviii.34 An interpretative translation by Targum Onkelos of Deut. 34:7 is found in the treatise on the letters of the alphabet,35 while references to passages from the Mishnah, the Babylonian Talmud and, occasionally, from Midrashim appear at regular intervals in Judah’s explanation of biblical verses.36 Moreover, he incorporates rabbinic sayings in his survey of Ptolemy’s Quadripartitum.37 Finally, it should be recalled that Treatise 3 of the mḥ consists almost entirely of passages from various treatises of the Babylonian Talmud.38 In this treatise he also mentions Bereshit Rabba, “the Heikhalot-books,” Pirqei deRabbi Eliezer, and the Bahir.39

2

Sources Actually Used in the mḥ’s Survey of Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy

2.1 Sources by Greek Authors Turning now to the philosophical sources on which Judah actually drew in his survey of natural philosophy we should recall that Judah’s knowledge of Greek sources was indirect. This applies also to Aristotle: the mḥ does not display

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

the question of the order of planets. See now Garshtein who concludes (Astronomy and Astrology, 37) that David b. Naḥmias lived in Toledo and explained or taught at least the first parts of the Almagest. ms O 145r, cf. above Chapter One. For two more statements on Maimonides, see Chapter Seven, section 2. mḥ/pa xiv.1. Septimus (Hispano-Jewish Culture, 129 n. 144) notes that he did not succeed in locating the passage in the Palestinian Talmud, and that it may be a misnomer. For the actual quotations used in the mḥ’s survey of natural philosophy, see below (section 5). mḥ/ga xviii. The passage quotes bBekhorot 7b–8b. ms O 194 v. These can be easily located in the notes to D. Goldstein’s edition of this Treatise, p. 247 ff. Ed. J. Spiro, 1886 and now Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, Chapter Two. See Chapter Seven, section 3. ms O 206v.

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any direct knowledge of Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy in Arabic translation. Of course the possibility that he knew such translations through oral instruction cannot be ruled out, but the section on natural philosophy of his encyclopedia reveals no trace of it.40 Judah relied instead on Averroes, as becomes immediately evident from the large number of more or less literal quotations from Averroes’ commentaries in the mḥ. As will be explained in more detail in the next section (below 2.2.2), Judah’s presentation of the contents of Aristotelian natural philosophy is often patterned after these commentaries, in particular the Middle Commentaries. In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that virtually all of Aristotle’s teachings as presented by Judah in his survey of natural philosophy derive from Averroes’ commentaries. The same is true of Judah’s knowledge of Galen’s teachings. The mḥ’s statements on Galenic views appear to be a more or less literal, albeit abridged quotation of what is found in Averroes’ commentaries in parallel passages. This also applies to the few passages that record the interpretations of Aristotle’s words by Alexander of Aphrodisias or Themistius. There is, however, one notable exception: in his treatment of the question of whether growth takes place in the form or in the matter of the growing subject Judah states that he consulted Alexander’s treatise on growth (in Arabic translation), from which he quotes directly.41 2.2 Muslim Authors 2.2.1 Avicenna Avicenna appears to be quoted both directly and indirectly. His aforementioned view that the equatorial zone is more moderate than the other climata is taken from Averroes’ commentaries.42 In the section on thunder and lightning Avicenna appears anonymously as “a certain scholar” who had found an extremely hard object in a place where a thunderbolt had struck, a passage reflecting Averroes’ Epitome of the Meteorology where we read that this scholar was Avicenna.43 Yet mḥ/Meteor. also contains a few details that reveal a direct knowledge of Avicenna’s Shifāʾ, a source which Judah leaves unmentioned. For 40

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It should be noted, though, that C. Manekin wonders whether Judah knew Aristotle’s Prior Analytics in Arabic translation, cf. Manekin, “The Logic,” 287 n. 27. Y. Halper “Easy in One Sense,” 143 suggests that Judah ha-Cohen may have had access to Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation of the Metaphysics. mḥ/gc i.7. The Arabic translation is ascribed to Abu Uthmān al-Dimashqī, cf. ed. Ruland 1981. According to H. Eichner, it is improbable that Averroes knew this treatise, cf. Eichner’s edition of Averroes’ mc on the gc 2005, 87 n. 14. mḥ/Meteor. ii.12. mḥ/Meteor. ii.17, n. 100.

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example, in the section on earthquakes Judah draws a comparison between the raging of the wind inside the earth and the pains of a woman in labor. This comparison is not found in any of the two commentaries by Averroes on the Meteorology, but occurs instead in the Shifāʾ.44 Moreover, his treatment of the question of why the rainbow appears as a semi-circle is derived from the same source,45 and so is Judah’s description of the colors of the rainbow.46 Few in number as these statements may be, the fact that the mḥ contains information that is found literally in the Shifāʾ adds to our knowledge of Avicenna’s reception among Jews.47 2.2.2 Averroes Averroes’ commentaries are Judah’s principal sources, as will be explained in more detail in what follows. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the name of the commentator does not occur very frequently. For example, it does not appear in the first two sections of the mḥ’s survey of natural philosophy, which treat the Physics and On the Heaven. It is only in the section on De Generatione that Averroes is referred to by name. This occurs in passages where Judah records Averroes’ position regarding a view of Alexander of Aphrodisias, or when he compares the Commentator’s view to that of Avicenna.48 Likewise, in the section on Meteorology Judah briefly comments on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Averroes’ views on the Milky Way.49 The next occurrence of the Commentator’s name is in the zoological sections, where divergent views held by Aristotle and Galen on topics such as the primacy of the heart or the so-called “female semen” are noted.50 In mḥ/Soul iii.13 Judah enumerates different opinions about the nature of the material intellect, mentioning Averroes’ position of the Middle Commentary, according to which the material intellect is something that is composed of the disposition found in us and of an intellect that is conjoined to that disposition. Here again his name is mentioned in relation to the view held by

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mḥ/Meteor. ii.13, n. 81. mḥ/Meteor. iii.6, n. 122. mḥ/Meteor. iii.4. On accounts of the colors of the rainbow in medieval Hebrew and Arabic texts, cf. Fontaine 1998, vii–xxv. On this topic see Freudenthal/ Zonta, “Avicenna among Medieval Jews” and cf. Zonta, “The Reception of Al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Classifications,” 358 n. 3. For Judah’s possible use of the Shifāʾ in the section on mathematics, see Lévy, “Mathematics in the Midrash haḤokhmah,” 202. See mḥ/gc i.3, i.10 and ii.12. mḥ/Meteor. i.10. mḥ/pa xiii.7 and mḥ/ga xv.11; xviii.4,5.

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Alexander. Yet later on in mḥ/Soul iii we also find explicit quotations from Averroes (for example, on the agent intellect), and the same happens more often and more extensively in his presentation of On Sense. Here we find some passages that are translated literally or almost literally from the commentaries and are introduced by the words: nusaḥ Ibn Rushd (“the precise words of Averroes”).51 In sum, at the beginning of his overview on natural philosophy Judah does not mention Averroes at all; later on he refers to him within the context of a debate or controversy, and in the last sections he inserts explicit quotations from Averroes in his text with due acknowledgment. Remarkably, Averroes’ name does not appear in the introduction, where Judah, as we have seen, draws up a list of Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy including a detailed description of their contents (cf. Chapter Two). The unprepared reader would thus be under the impression that what he was going to read in the philosophical part of the mḥ—if the introduction had indeed whetted his appetite to read on—, was a presentation of Aristotle’s own writings. This impression would have been affirmed when he found at the beginning of the part on logic: “the philosopher said.”52 Likewise, at the very end of that part Judah notes: “we will now start to record the general teachings of Aristotle’s natural science, the beginning of which is the Physics,” after which his extract of Physics starts with: amar (“he said”).53 This reflects of course Averroes’ usage in referring to Aristotle’s text in the Middle Commentaries, but since Judah does not inform the reader about the identity of his spokesman, the expression might be taken to refer to Aristotle himself. In all probability, this impression would be further reinforced by the aforementioned passages where Judah writes “according to Ibn Rushd,” or nusaḥ Ibn Rushd, expressions that give rise to the assumption that other passages do not reflect Averroes’ words.54 In mḥ/gc i.5, for example, Judah treats the question of whether growth takes place on account of the form or the matter of the growing thing, and adds: “Ibn Rushd explained this issue,” after which the Commentator’s explanation follows. The reader might thus be under the impression that the preceding section was not from Averroes, whereas in fact the whole discussion is taken from Aver-

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52 53 54

See mḥ/Sense ii [1].5 ff. In his survey of the Metaphysics, book Lambda, we also find extensive quotations from Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, see Fontaine, “The First Survey,” 278–279 and Zonta, “The Place of Aristotelian Metaphysics,” 421 n. 17. ms O 10v. ms O 45v. I refer to the Commentator by his Latin name, but when quoting from Judah’s text, I use “Ibn Rushd”.

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roes’ commentary. Likewise, in his survey of the Metaphysics Judah introduces a quotation from Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics as follows: “These are the words of Ibn Rushd,” but concludes it by saying: “We will return to Aristotle’s words.”55 Put differently: a reader who was not familiar with Averroes’ commentaries will not have been aware that the sections on natural philosophy and on metaphysics are in fact excerpts from Averroes’ commentaries, all the more so since Judah refers at regular intervals to Aristotle.56 It is well known that Averroes came to supplant Aristotle for Provençal Jews in the fourteenth century, and as J.T. Robinson has observed “a citation of ‘Aristotle’ in Hebrew is more often than not a citation from Averroes.”57 Yet the fact that in the thirteenth century it was already self-evident for Judah in Toledo that Averroes was the authoritative gateway for studying Aristotle calls for an explanation.58 Before addressing this issue (section 2.3), however, I will first examine which type of Averroes’ commentaries underlies Judah’s presentation. 2.2.2.1 The Middle Commentaries To begin with, I have not found any indication that Judah used the Long Commentaries.59 For almost every bit of information a parallel can be found either in the Middle Commentaries or in the Epitomes, or in both. In his précis of natural philosophy on Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology and On the Soul Judah appears to have drawn on both types of Averroes’ commentaries on these Aristotelian treatises. The sections On Animals and On Sense, treatises on each of which Averroes wrote only one commentary are likewise based on Averroes.60 Even a cursory reading reveals that the Middle Commentaries have served Judah ha-Cohen as his most important sources.61 This becomes immediately evident from the order of treatment of the material as adopted in the mḥ, which in most cases parallels that of the Middle Commentaries. Another indication for Judah’s reliance on this type of commentaries is the regular occur-

55 56 57 58 59

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ms O 115v. For example in mḥ/Soul ii.6 and ii.29. Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2007), 99. See section 2.3 below. As was pointed out by Mauro Zonta, Jews, unlike their Latin colleagues, turned to the Long Commentaries only after having studied and translated the Epitomes and the Middle Commentaries, see Zonta, La filosofia antica, 151. Opinions differ as to whether these two commentaries should be regarded as Epitomes or Middle Commentaries. For a recent, systematic discussion of the issue, see now Harvey, “Unfounded Assumptions” (forthcoming). This applies also to his survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

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rence of the expression amar to introduce a statement by Aristotle, which reflects Averroes’ qāla of the Middle Commentaries. Moreover, there are a large number of phrases that are taken literally or almost literally from these commentaries. In addition, the numerous instances where the mḥ includes statements that have a parallel in the relevant Middle Commentary, without their having a parallel in the corresponding Epitome clearly indicate that Judah modeled his exposition of natural philosophy primarily after the Middle Commentaries. To mention but a few examples: in the section on On Generation and Corruption Judah presents the divergent opinions of Galen and the philosophers on mixture, a discussion which appears in the mc on this treatise, but not in the Epitome (mḥ/gc ii.9). The same applies to Judah’s observation on “three” as the principle of number (mḥ/Heavens i.1). Likewise, in enumerating the premises which should precede the discussion of what “place” is (mḥ/Physics iv.2) Judah follows the Middle Commentary, for such an enumeration is lacking in the Epitome. Moreover, in cases where a certain topic is discussed both in the Middle Commentary and in the Epitome, Judah can often be shown to have followed the treatment of the Middle Commentaries. An example of this is provided by mḥ/Physics iv.1, where Judah lists nine ways in which a thing can be said to be “in” another thing. This enumeration is taken (albeit in abridged form) from the Middle Commentary. The Epitome refers to only four ways in which a thing is “in” another thing.62 A little later when discussing the question of the place of the world, Judah notes that the world is in a place accidentally, since its parts are in a place (mḥ/Physics iv.3). In similar vein, he adds, it is said that “man sees, since he sees with a part, namely the eye.” The same explanation of the world being in a thing accidentally is found in the mc, whereas it is lacking from the Epitome.63 Some more examples can be adduced: (i) Judah reproduces Averroes’ discussion of the several ways in which the words “ungenerated,” “generated,” “corruptible,” and “incorruptible” can be used.64 This discussion is found in both of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, but the text of the mḥ appears to be modeled on the account in the mc, for it enumerates three senses of the word “ungenerated” as does the mc.65 62 63 64 65

Ep. Physics, ed. Puig 49.13 ff. mc Physics iv.1. 9. mḥ/Heavens i.6. mc Heavens 151.2–3; Ep. Heavens, ed. Haiderabad, 31.

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(ii) In his discussion of growth Judah refers to a water skin that expands and contracts all the while retaining its original shape (mḥ/gc i.4). This water skin appears in the mc, but not in the Epitome. (iii) In mḥ/Meteor. i.12 Judah explains how phenomena that are due to moisture such as rain and snow are formed, describing water and earth as their material cause and the movement of sun and stars as the efficient cause, exactly as Averroes puts it in the mc. The Epitome explains these phenomena without using the terms “material cause” and “efficient cause.” 2.2.2.2 The Epitomes Notwithstanding the sustained and predominant use of the Middle Commentaries in the mḥ, the influence of the Epitomes should not be ignored. To begin with, the mḥ displays a basic characteristic of the Epitomes in that it omits views that were put forward by Aristotle’s predecessors.66 In his Epitome of the Physics Averroes states explicitly that he will disregard “the arguments of the ancients which are other than his [= Aristotle’s] own.”67 In his Middle Commentaries, by contrast, he reproduces at length views held by the early philosophers and Aristotle’s refutation of them. In order to achieve conciseness, of which we will hear more below (section 3), Judah invariably leaves out all these passages and the lengthy discussions that evolve from them, even though he bases his expositions on the Middle Commentaries. More importantly, there is ample evidence that Judah also had the Epitomes before him when composing his work, since one also finds instances of direct quotations from them. In some cases such quotations have no parallel in the Middle Commentaries, although these cases are much fewer than those where the quotations from the Middle Commentaries have no equivalent in the Epitomes. A case in point is the account on waters in the section on meteorology. As in the Epitome, Judah begins his description by making a division into running and stagnant waters. He then quotes this commentary more or less verbatim in

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Yet, in his explanation of biblical verses he informs us that some of Aristotle’s predecessors were of the opinion that the stars were composed of fire, in line with the rabbinical dictum that “the heavens (shamayim) are fire (esh) and water (mayim),” cf. Chapter Six, section 1 (iii). Tr. S. Harvey 1977, 401, ed. Puig 7.8–9. Cf. also Kurland who describes Averroes’ method in the Epitomes as “culling from the work of Aristotle only the positive, scientific portions to the exclusion of all those argumentative portions in which Aristotle summarizes and refutes the views of his predecessors and to the exclusion of all those places where Aristotle either reviews or summarizes arguments he had already adduced elsewhere.” (Kurland, Averroes on Aristotle’s De Generatione, Introd., xv–xvi).

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explaining how stationary waters, e.g. the water in cisterns, are formed, and he even borrows some Arabic words from his source.68 Other issues where Judah adduced the Epitomes concern, for example, a passage on mixture (end of mḥ/gc i.14); on the contraries in composite bodies (mḥ/gc ii.2); on active and passive qualities (mḥ/gc ii.4–5); on the common causes (mḥ/gc ii.11); the inhabited world (mḥ/Meteor. ii.12), and the thunderbolt (mḥ/Meteor. iii.17). In most of these cases Judah combines the accounts of the mc and the Epitome on the subject under consideration.69 This procedure is especially clear in Books vi and vii of mḥ/Physics. At times, however, the Epitome seems to be the primary source rather than the Middle Commentary. This happens notably in mḥ/Soul ii.15–18 in the sections discussing the faculty of sense-perception and sensible objects.70 A special case of the use of the Epitome is mḥ/Soul iii.18 where Judah switches back and forth between the mc and the Epitome in his account of the active intellect.71 In sum, Judah’s usage of the Epitomes varies throughout the treatises on natural philosophy in the mḥ. It is not easy to determine a general rule for his use (or non-use) of the Epitomes. The most plausible explanation is that Judah turned to them to supplement the information he found in the Middle Commentaries, or to present examples that are not found in the Middle Commentaries. Supplementary information with a view to comprehensiveness is presumably a motive in his account of the rational faculty towards the end of On the Soul iii.72 Here, the importance of the subject may also have played a part, something that can hardly be assumed to have been the case in the paragraph about running and stagnant waters. In other cases the reason why Judah should adduce the Epitomes is even less clear. One might argue that he incorporated them because they are much shorter, for example in the passages on the external senses, a strategy that would be in line with his declared goal to strive for brevity (cf. below, section 3). But if this is what prompted him to base his account in the aforementioned

68 69

70 71 72

mḥ/Meteor. i.15, notes 44 and 45. For a list of Arabic words in the mḥ, see Appendix B. Such cases are indicated in the notes to my translation. In mḥ/Heavens there is only one instance where the Epitome seems to have been used as an additional source, see mḥ/Heavens i.5, n. 24. In mḥ/Soul ii.19 Judah moreover draws on the Epitome of Parva Naturalia, see ed. mḥ/Soul n. 105. mḥ/Soul iii.18–19, notes 250 and 258. mḥ/Soul iii.26, n. 287.

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and other cases on the Epitomes rather than on the much longer Middle Commentaries, the question arises why he did not do so in other passages as well. Similarly, the supposition that Judah incorporated material from the Epitomes with a view to greater clarity regarding problematic issues, as, for example, Falaquera can be shown to have aspired in his Deʿot ha-Filosofim raises the same question.73 The same applies to the assumption that Judah started his study of the Commentaries with the Epitomes and then at some point turned to the Middle Commentaries, realizing that they were closer to Aristotle’s own writings, but nonetheless kept an eye on the Epitomes, for this would still not explain why his usage of the Epitomes varies from one treatise to another or even from one passage to another. Since the author does not provide us with any clue, one cannot help thinking that a certain arbitrariness also played a part here. After all, it might very well be the case that for reasons that are not immediately clear to us, Judah found some issues more interesting than others. It should be noted that in his section on logic Judah also combined the Epitome and the Middle Commentary.74 Regardless, it seems justified to infer that in general Judah ha-Cohen considered Averroes’ Middle Commentaries the best means of offering a reliable account of Aristotelian philosophy, apparently because they provide a more extensive, orderly, and therefore more authoritative coverage of Aristotle’s philosophy than the Epitomes with their rather free rearrangement of material. Seeing that one of Judah’s aims was to provide his coreligionists with an adequate overview of contemporary knowledge of science and philosophy, the choice of the Middle Commentaries as the most reliable philosophical sources is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that we already find such an extensive and sustained usage of Averroes’ commentaries in a work produced in Toledo in the first half of the thirteenth century. I will turn to this highly interesting phenomenon below (section 2.3). 2.2.2.3 The mḥ and Different Versions of Averroes’ Commentaries As is well known, Averroes revised some of his commentaries in the course of time, notably those on Aristotle’s Physics viii and Soul iii. Interestingly, in some cases it can be determined which version of Averroes’ commentaries underlies the mḥ. As R. Glasner has established, at the beginning of his account of Physics viii when explaining that every motion must be preceded by another

73 74

See S. Harvey, “Shem-Tov Ibn Falaquera’s,” 221–237 and Fontaine, “Between scorching heat,” 118–126. See Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 283.

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motion Judah relied on the first, unrevised version of Averroes’ Middle Commentary that is known to us in the Hebrew translation by Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel, whereas otherwise his summary of the Physics is based on the version represented in Kalonymus’ translation.75 As for the commentary on On the Soul, in the second version of his Epitome Averroes changed his view on the nature of the material intellect, abandoning Alexander’s view that he had adopted in the first version of the Epitome. On this issue Judah follows the Middle Commentary, in which Averroes adopts a theory that combines the views of Alexander and Themistius. Judah explicitly mentions the different views and describes Averroes’ position as a combination of them.76 This gives rise to the assumption that Judah did not know Averroes’ reworking and only had the first redaction at his disposal.77 Another instance of revision by Averroes concerns the question of the generation of the forms of living beings. In the first redaction of his commentary On Animals Averroes held that an external mover, namely, the active intellect generates these forms, but he later abandoned this position. Judah’s treatment of the issue seems to be based on the first redaction.78 Also, in the section on the acquired intellect the Hebrew text contains a passage that can be shown to be based on the longer version of Averroes’ Epitome found in the majority of the Arabic mss, but not in ms Cairo.79 Moreover, mḥ/Soul iii.24 contains a sentence on the intellect’s judgment of things that forms part of a longer passage that has no parallel in Averroes’ mc Soul, but is found in two Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts of the mc as well as in Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of the mc.80 Finally, in mḥ/Sense there are a few cases where the Hebrew text is in congruence with the Latin translation of Averroes’ commentary on pn, against the Arabic and its Hebrew translation by Moses Ibn Tibbon, which suggests that a common model underlies the Latin version and Judah’s presentation. Examples are: (i) yashqifu (‘behold’; Lat. videntur), where the Arabic has taṭlaʿu (‘ascend’; Moses Ibn Tibbon yaʿalu);81 (ii) yitpazzer (‘is dispersed’; Lat. fuerit sparsum), which presupposes a form of the Arabic root b-d-d, whereas the

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

Glasner, Averroes’ Physics, 30–32, mḥ/Physics viii.1, n. 200. Cf. mḥ/Soul iii.13, n. 230. For the section on Metaphysics in the mḥ M. Zonta (Il Commento medio, 56–58) has noted that Judah combined the first and the second redaction of Averroes’ Middle Commentary. Cf. mḥ/ga xvi.6, n. 65. mḥ/Soul iii.18, notes 250 and 252. mḥ/Soul iii.24, n. 277; cf. mc Soul, ed. Ivry 205, n. 46. mḥ/Sense ii[1].10, n. 53.

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Arabic has tabarrada (‘is cooled’, of the root b-r-d), which is the reading found in Moses Ibn Tibbon (titqarrer),82 and (iii) shimmush (‘use’), in accordance with the Latin usum.83 Furthermore, one reading in Judah’s coverage of Alexander’s treatise on growth (cf. above section 2.1) may point to the use of a specific manuscript.84 2.3 The mḥ and the Large-Scale Use of Averroes’ Commentaries* At this point it is apposite to address the remarkable phenomenon of the extensive and sustained usage of Averroes’ commentaries in the mḥ. It is well known that E. Renan claimed that Averroes’ name “became almost instantaneously the foremost philosophic authority among the Jews.”85 This claim fails, however, to elucidate what exactly is meant by “almost instantaneously.” In a recent article S. Harvey has investigated when Jews started to consider Averroes to be the Commentator par excellence. He suggests that Averroes earned his reputation as the Commentator of the Philosopher (Aristotle) only in the early fourteenth century when Hebrew translations of the Arabic commentaries became more readily available in the Provence.86 It is in the fourteenth century that Averroes became “a household name,” as Twersky put it, among Jewish scholars in Provence.87 What is most important for our discussion here is Harvey’s conclusion that the spread of Averroes’ fame as a commentator was made possible by a few Jewish scholars who worked in the thirteenth century, that is in the first 100 years after Averroes’ death. For the second half of that century we can indeed point to a number of Jewish scholars who display their familiarity with and interest in Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle. These scholars furthered the study of the commentaries either through translations or through encyclopedic writings. As for the 82 83 84

* 85 86 87

mḥ/Sense ii[2].6, notes 89 and 93. mḥ/Sense ii[2].3, n. 66. Moses Ibn Tibbon has peʿulat. For the readings in Falaquera’s df, see notes 67–69 to my translation of mḥ/Sense. In the passage that derives from the treatise on growth by Alexander in Arabic translation (mḥ/gc i, cf. above section 2.1.), the reading ḥilluqa follows the reading of the Arabic mss Escorial and Teheran inqisāmihā (ed. Ruland, p. 60). The printed edition has tabadullihā. There is one Hebrew ms (ms Leipzig) that reads ḥillufa, but qof and peh can easily be confused in manuscripts, and ḥilluf in mḥ usually renders Arabic iḥtilāf. In all probability, therefore, Judah had before him the reading inqisāmihā of the two aforementioned manuscripts. Some paragraphs of this section overlap with my article “Averroism in Judah ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Hokhmah?” which treats the same question in condensed form. Renan, Averroès, 180. S. Harvey, “When did Jews Begin,” 293–297. Twersky, “Aspects,” 202.

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translators, we should first mention Moses Ibn Tibbon who translated Averroes’ Epitomes of Aristotle’s On the Soul in 1245 or a bit earlier88 and of other treatises on natural philosophy as well as of the Metaphysics around 1250 in Provence. A little later (1261), and after Judah composed the Hebrew version of the mḥ, Moses Ibn Tibbon also translated the Middle Commentary on On the Soul, which Shemtov ben Isaac of Tortosa had translated a year or so earlier. In 1284 Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel Ḥen translated the Middle Commentaries on the Physics, On Generation and Corruption and on the Metaphysics in Italy.89 Averroes figures of course prominently in the two Hebrew encyclopedias of the second half of the thirteenth century, Gershom ben Solomon’s Shaʿar haShamayim and Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim. The former, written in the Provence, should be dated c. 1300 and is therefore less relevant to our discussion here. The Deʿot ha-Filosofim was composed earlier, ca. 1270 either in the Provence or northern Spain. Large sections of his encyclopedia consist in fact of translations of Averroes’ Epitomes and Middle Commentaries, which Falaquera, like Judah, read in Arabic. Falaquera states himself that everything that he is writing are the words of Aristotle, as explained in the commentaries of Averroes.90 Although it should be noted that these commentaries are not Falaquera’s exclusive sources, it is safe to say that this book is one of the major testimonies to an increasing appreciation of Averroes’ commentaries in Jewish thought in the second half of the thirteenth century. The first half of the thirteenth century, however, reveals a different picture. S. Harvey has suggested that the influence of Averroes’ commentaries in Jewish thought begins with Maimonides, who recommended their study in his letters to his pupil Josef Ibn Shamʿun and his translator Samuel Ibn Tibbon.91 It is a matter of debate whether Maimonides himself made use of them when writing the Guide; he may have seen some of them.92 The first Jewish author to actually quote one of Averroes’ commentaries is Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who inserts

88 89 90 91

92

In a conference lecture in Hamburg (13 Febr 2019) D. Wirmer adduced evidence that this translation dates from 1240. For more data on these translations see Zonta’s list in his “Medieval Hebrew Translations,” 17–73. S. Harvey, “Shem-Tov Ibn Falaquera’s,” 211–237. S. Harvey, “Did Maimonides’ Letter.” On this theory, see Freudenthal and Zonta, “Avicenna Among Medieval Jews,” 277–279; Forte, “Back to the Sources” and most recently S. Harvey, “Did Maimonides Recommend.” On this issue see, for example, Kraemer, “Maimonides and the Spanish Aristotelian School,” 54–58; Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2007), 99. S. Harvey summarizes much of the literature pertaining to this question in his “Did Maimonides Recommend” 159–165.

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some ten quotes from Averroes’ Epitome of the Meteorology in his own translation of the Arabic version of Aristotle’s Meteorology (1210), twelve years after Averroes’ death in 1198.93 Ibn Tibbon’s Arabic model of the Aristotelian text was defective, which is why he attempted to reconstruct the text with the help of commentaries on it, one of them being Averroes’ Epitome. Yet it is Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the Meteorology that serves him as his major source, not Averroes. Samuel Ibn Tibbon also translated two treatises by Averroes on conjunction with the Active Intellect and one by Averroes’ son on the intellect. Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon worked in the Provence. Around the time of Samuel’s death, his son-in-law (or brother in-law), Jacob Anatoli, completed the first translation of a commentary by Averroes, namely the Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s first four logical books, supplemented by the Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge in 1232 in Naples under the patronage of the Emperor Frederick ii. Another 13th-century compilation of Provençal and/or Napolitan origin to be mentioned in this regard is Ruaḥ Ḥen, a summary on scientific questions of unknown authorship and date, but as has been established recently by O. Elior, it reveals no traces of familiarity with notions entertained by Averroes.94 Apart from Shemtov ben Isaac of Tortosa’s translation of the Middle Commentary on On the Soul none of the hitherto mentioned works that testify to Averroes’ impact on Jewish thinkers was written in Spain, the heartland of Averroes’ philosophic activity, with the possible exception of the Deʿot. In a recent article, R. Glasner has called attention to the remarkable phenomenon that she describes as “the suspension of Aristotelianism [among Spanish Jews] in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and its revival in the fifteenth century.”95 As she explains, unlike the situation in the Provence, for Jews in Christian Spain Aristotelianism was not a distinct trend during this period although Aristotelian material was imported from Provence, especially in northern Spain. Spanish Jews returned to the study of Aristotle only from the late fifteenth century onward when they started to engage with Latin scholastic texts. In this regard Glasner refers to Judah ha-Cohen and Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel Ḥen as Jewish intellectuals who “left Spain and continued their scientific and philosophical activity in Italy.”96

93 94 95 96

See Otot ha-Shamayim, ed. Fontaine 1995, lxii–lxxi. Elior, A Spirit of Grace, 51–52. Glasner, “The Peculiar History,” 369. Ibid., 370–371.

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B. Septimus, by contrast, claims in his study on Judah’s teacher, R. Meir Abulafia, that the mḥ “gives some sense of where the philosophical curriculum in Toledo was going.”97 By this he means the study of the Aristotelian corpus with “its commentators down to Averroes.”98 He also asserts that Averroes, after his works had become available in Toledo by the turn of the thirteenth century “quickly assumed a central role as a powerful and authoritative interpreter of the Aristotelian corpus.”99 But is this really the case? One may wonder whether the philosophical curriculum in Toledo among Jews was going anywhere at all. There seems to be no other evidence for it than Judah’s book. The Shaʿar ha-Shamayim by Judah’s contemporary Isaac Ibn Latif, who also lived in Toledo, does not reveal traces of familiarity with Averroes’ commentaries.100 The Andalusian philosopher Moses ben Josef ha-Levi certainly knew Averroes, for he wrote a treatise in which he defends Avicenna against Averroes, but we do not know exactly when and where he lived, nor with which of Averroes’ commentaries he was acquainted.101 Judah ben Samuel Ibn Abbas, who drew up a program of study in his Yair Nativ, presumably around 1250, recommends the use of Averroes’ commentaries in studying Aristotelian logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics.102 Yet he does not provide details as to which type of commentary he regards as the most fruitful, using the word perush to refer to them, and it cannot be established how much of them he had read himself. Moreover, it is not certain where Ibn Abbas wrote his work, in Spain or in NorthAfrica.103 Hillel of Verona asserts in his Tagmulei ha-Nefesh that in his youth he studied natural philosophy in Spain.104 This testimony has been subject to debate, but if it is trustworthy, it refers to Barcelona at a time that Judah was already in Italy, and not to Toledo in 1230s.105 In sum, the indications pointing to

97 98 99 100 101 102

103 104 105

Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 19. Burnett writes more prudently that there may have been an “Averroes-project” before 1215 in Toledo, see Burnett, “Michael Scott,” 105–106. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 18. Zimran’s Ph D thesis (Philosophy, Tradition, and Esoterica) on Isaac Ibn Latif’s Shaʿar hashamayim does not list Averroes as one of the sources of Ibn Latif. Research on Moses ha-Levi’s Metaphysical Treatise and the question when he lived is currently being carried out by Yoav Meyrav. Judah ben Samuel Abbas, Yair Nativ; ed. Guedemann, Das jüdische Unterrichtswesen, 62. According to D. Schwartz, “Meharsim,” 589 Ibn Abbas refers to Averroes’ Commentary on On Sense. According to Talmage, David Kimhi, 10 it was in North-Africa. See ed. Y. Schwartz, Hillel von Verona, 260 (Hebrew) and 261 (German trans.), and Introd., 10, 17. On this issue, see Leicht, “Miracles” and Y. Schwartz, “Imagined Classrooms?” and “Cultural Identity,” 189–190. See also Z. Harvey, Review of J. Sermoneta, Hillel ben Shemuel, 535.

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the study of Averroes among Jews in Toledo or more widely in Spain, let alone to his authority, other than Judah’s encyclopedia, are very scanty. To this it may be added that M. Zonta’s list of medieval Hebrew translations includes only very few Arabic-to-Hebrew translations that were made in Spain during the period under consideration, and they concern al-Farabi’s works on logic (of which it is not certain whether they were translated in Spain or in the Provence); medical writings; Abraham Ibn Ḥasdai’s translation of pseudo-Aristotle’s Book of the Apple, and works by Isaac Israeli and al-Ghazali.106 This certainly does not testify to a widespread Jewish interest in Averroes in Spain during the first half of the thirteenth century, a conclusion that is in line with R. Glasner’s observations mentioned above. All in all, then, the emergence of a rather large text that leans heavily on Averroes’ commentaries appears to be something like an anomaly, for in its comprehensiveness it seems to be the only text to testify to the impact of Averroes among Jews in Spain in the first half of the thirteenth century. The omnipresence of Averroes in the mḥ is all the more intriguing in view of the fact that the first traces of the use of Averroes’ commentaries among Christians are not to be found in Spain but instead in Paris, Oxford and Italy. The early use of the commentaries (that is, the Long Commentaries) in Latin texts can be dated to the late twenties and thirties of the thirteenth century. Christian authors reacted primarily to the commentaries on the Physics, on On the Soul, and the Metaphysics, so one cannot speak of a wide interest in Averroes’ commentaries on the part of Christian scholars in the period under consideration.107 Moreover, from the way these authors introduce Averroes it is obvious that at the time Averroes was not yet well known.108 As for Muslim scholars in Spain, J. Puig has argued that after Averroes’ death, none of Averroes’ pupils or scholars belonging to his intellectual environment engaged in the study of philosophy, “at least not openly.”109 Put differently, it would seem that the mḥ is not only the first text by a Jewish author to display an extensive use of Averroes’ commentaries; it is the first text whatsoever to provide a comprehensive survey of them. There seems to be no earlier Arabic, Hebrew or Latin work that testifies to the impact of Averroes’ commentaries to the same extent. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Judah’s enterprise precedes the massive Arabic-into-Hebrew translation106 107 108 109

Cf. Zonta, “Medieval Hebrew Translations,” 25–28. See Gauthier, “Notes sur les débuts” and S. Harvey, “When did Jews Begin,” 279–281. Ibid., 280. Puig, “Materials,” 256.

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movement that started in the thirteenth century. By the time Judah composed his book in Arabic none of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy had been translated into Hebrew, and the same obtains for the mid-1240s when he wrote the Hebrew version of the mḥ, with the exception of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Epitome On the Soul. In fact, in a certain sense the mḥ may be viewed as forming part of this translation movement, at least as far as the literal quotations in it are concerned. In any event, for a few decades the mḥ would be the only Hebrew text from which Jews who had no access to Arabic could learn about all treatises of Aristotle’s philosophy as interpreted by Averroes. How then are we to explain the emergence of the mḥ with a distinct Averroian character in thirteenth-century Toledo? Modern scholarship has emphasized the importance of Toledo as a center of intellectual exchange and transmission of Arabic and Latin manuscripts.110 This is also borne out by what we know about the availability of Arabic manuscripts of Averroes’ commentaries and Aristotle’s works in Toledo: Michael Scot translated al-Biṭrūğī’s astronomy and Aristotle’s On Animals in Toledo in Judah’s day, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon found a copy of the Arabic version of Aristotle’s Meteorology in Toledo before or in 1210.111 The relevant studies by S. van Koningsveld and C. Burnett reveal that besides medical texts, Arabic manuscripts on the sciences and philosophy also circulated among Jews in Christian Spain or were owned by them, including those of the Epitomes and Middle Commentaries.112 Toledo thus emerges as a suitable environment for the study of Aristotle with the help of Averroes’ commentaries. Few Jews seem to have actually devoted themselves to the study of Aristotle, but we may point to a notable exception. As mentioned above (section 1.3), Judah reports that he heard from his teacher R. Meir Abulafia (Ramah) that “Aristotle forgot to include the dove among the species of animals that have no gall-bladder as is mentioned in the Jerushalmi.” This cannot but mean that Ramah knew either through oral communication or through his own reading which animals without a gall-bladder were listed

110

111 112

See Burnett, “The Coherence” and Gutwirth, “Entendudos,” 392–393, for the image of Toledo as the place where otherwise inaccessible books could be found. Cf. also the story in Immanuel of Rome’s Maḥbarot about books stolen from boxes that had arrived from Toledo, Brener, “Stealing Wisdom.” Whether historical or not, the story testifies to the reputation of Toledo as a place where books could be found that were otherwise difficult to obtain. Otot ha-shamayim, ed. Fontaine, Introd., lines 26–27. Burnett, “Sons of Averroes,” 260; van Koningsveld, “Andalusian-Arabic Manuscripts,” 100ff.

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by Aristotle. As noted by Septimus, Nachmanides viewed the Talmudist Ramah as mastering “the rich and varied Andalusian tradition of Hebrew and Arabic learning.”113 Judah was moreover linked to Ramah in another way, for Ramah was married to a woman from the wealthy, influential and aristocratic Ibn Shoshan family, to which Judah’s mother belonged.114 It seems therefore quite natural that Judah studied with Ramah. To Ramah’s circle belonged also Judah ben Josef al-Fakhar, who after 1225 shared the leadership of the Jewish community in Toledo with Ramah, and whose family was likewise connected by marriage with the Ibn Shoshan family. As Septimus has pointed out, these three men, Ramah, Judah ha-Cohen and Judah al-Fakhar shared the same intellectual attitude: philosophically knowledgeable and familiar with the ArabicAndalusian heritage, and at the same time entertaining reservations about the study of Aristotelian philosophy.115 Both Ramah and Judah al-Fakhar were involved in the Maimonidean controversy of the 1230s.116 In light of all this I submit that the Averroes-reception in the Midrash haḤokhmah should be viewed as the product of the particular intellectual constellation in Toledo at that time in combination with Judah’s personal interest. The parameters of this constellation are: 1) the position of Toledo as a translation-centre with its international contacts and the availability of the relevant texts; 2) the presence of a small circle of like-minded scholars, and 3) the contemporary debate on the permissibility and desirability of the study of non-Jewish sciences that raged during the first half of the 1230s, arguably the period of Judah’s formative years. His study of philosophy and science, which, as he acknowledges himself, was inspired by Maimonides, together with his eagerness to challenge Aristotle’s doctrines should be viewed against the background of this debate.117 In other words, he simply seems to have been the right person in the right place and the right time. He clearly appreciated the importance of Averroes’ commentaries, and in this he seems to have followed the direction suggested by Maimonides, but he represented only a very small cir-

113 114 115 116

117

Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 15. For the position of the Ibn Shoshan family in Toledo, see Gutwirth, “Entendudos,” 393–394 and Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 11 and the literature indicated there. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 62, cf. also pp. 68–69. On Judah al-Fakhar, cf. Talmage, David Kimhi, 35–39 and Berger, “Judaism,” 88–101. Cf. also below, Chapter Seven, section 3. On the extent of their involvement and their role in the controversy, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, Chapter iv (The Maimonidean Controversy). See also below, Chapter Seven, section 2. For Judah’s double motivation, see Chapter Two, section 4; for his criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy, see Chapters Four, Five and Six (section 2), and for his position in the controversy, Chapter Seven, sections 2 and 3.

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cle of Spanish Jews. The new orientation had no follow-up in Spain, at least not immediately. The new trend was to be continued outside the Iberian Peninsula, in Italy, and Judah himself may have played a part in it, in Italy.118 To these three factors we may perhaps add a fourth one. In Chapter One I suggested that Michael Scot may have been helpful in establishing contact between Judah and the imperial court of Frederick ii. As mentioned above, Judah’s compilation of the Arabic version of the mḥ coincides with Jacob Anatoli’s Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on the first four books of Aristotle’s Organon together with that on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Anatoli, too, thus seems to have realized the importance of Averroes’ commentaries for the study of Aristotle. Anatoli was acquainted with Scot, who was certainly aware of the importance of Averroes’ commentaries for the study of Aristotle. As Dag Hasse has shown, several anonymous translations of Averroes’ commentaries must be ascribed to the Arabic-to-Latin translator.119 Hence, it may not be too far-fetched to surmise that Scot was influential here, too, and thus, that Scot’s role in the emergence of Averroes’ commentaries in Jewish philosophy may have been more instrumental than has hitherto been assumed.120 In this respect it is worth noting that, as J.T. Robinson has pointed out, there is also a certain symmetry of interests between Michael Scot and Samuel Ibn Tibbon, which would imply that the Latin scholar is a key-figure in the parallel development of the study of Aristotle in the Latin and Jewish world.121 This highly interesting theory requires further study. In any case it is important to note that as a result of the presence of Averroes, the reception of Aristotle in the mḥ differs markedly from that in earlier compositions on Aristotelian philosophy by Jewish authors. Twelfth-century Jewish thinkers such as Ibn Daud and Maimonides incorporated in their works Aristotelian teachings through the writings of al-Farabi, Avicenna and al-Ghazali that constituted their major sources. The mḥ ushers in a new phase in the history of medieval Jewish thought in that it is a textbook that presents the very phrasing/wording of Aristotle’s doctrines as articulated by Averroes. As we have

118 119 120

121

Cf. below, Chapter Seven, section 6. Hasse, Latin Averroes Translations. It seems no coincidence that around the same time William of Luna translated the very same logical commentaries by Averroes from Arabic into Latin, cf. S. Harvey, “When did Jews Begin,” 285–287. It is noteworthy that the two Latin scholars, Anatoli and Judah haCohen all worked under the patronage of Frederick ii. As yet, however, nothing is known about any contacts between Anatoli and Judah ha-Cohen, cf. above Chapter One. Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2007), 106–111.

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seen in Chapter Two, the outline of the sciences also reflects Averroes’ division more than Avicenna’s. In sum, in the mḥ the paradigm for the study of Aristotle by Jewish philosophers has definitely changed.122 Here we should note that Judah’s extensive use of Averroes’ commentaries can be of some help for the establishment of the Arabic text of these commentaries, for in some cases the correct reading of the Arabic can be derived with the help of the mḥ. After all, the mḥ is one of the earliest Hebrew documents that relies on these commentaries and is thus closer in time to Averroes’ original texts than their Hebrew translations. I have come across the following instances:123 – mḥ/Heavens iv.2 n. 114, “Their proper place”: The Hebr. nifraṭ presupposes muḫtaṣ instead of the conjectural reading muḥīṭ in al-Alaoui’s edition of the mc On the Heavens. – Ibid., n. 115, “the like”: The Hebr. domeh presupposes miṯl instead of mayl. – mḥ/Meteor. iii.1, n. 104, “vision”: The Hebrew shows that the correct reading in the Arabic edition of mc Meteorology should be al-baṣr instead of al-baḥr. – mḥ/Meteor. iv.9 features the Arabic word al-ġirāʾ (glue), which makes better sense than al-ġiḏāʾ (food) of the edition of the Arabic mc. – mḥ/Meteor. iv.12, n. 175, “evaporation”: The Hebrew shows that the correct reading in the Arabic should be tahbīh instead of taṯbīt of the edition of the mc. The correct term is given in Hebrew characters in Judah’s text. – mḥ/Soul ii.18, n. 104: Arabic mā is not rendered as a negation (as in ed. Ivry), but as an indefinite pronoun, in conformity with Moses Ibn Tibbon’s translation of Averroes’ Epitome of On the Soul. – mḥ/Soul iii.18, n. 251: The reading we-ein corroborates the Arabic lā anna (adopted in editions Wirmer and Haiderabad) against the reading li-anna (in editions Gomez Nogalez and Ahwani). – mḥ/Soul iii.20, n. 262: The reading mah she-hayyinu yodeʿim (what we knew) reflects the better reading Arabic ʿalimnāhu (as in Ivry 117.5) against the reading ʿamilnāhu (what we did), as in Falaquera’s df, which is a mistake, as already observed by Ivry (2000, 423 n. 69). – mḥ/pa xiii.22 presents a case where the Hebrew helps finding a mistake in another Hebrew text. ms Paris héb 956, containing the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary On Animals of which the Arabic is lost, has the reading ha-meʿi ha-ṣar in a passage on the jejunum. The mḥ has the correct

122 123

Cf. Fontaine, “The Early Reception.” For parallel places in the Arabic texts, see the footnotes to my English translation below.

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reading ha-meʿi ha-ṣam, with ṣam corresponding to ṣaʿimah of the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Parts of Animals.124 Caution, however, is required in using the mḥ for establishing the Arabic of Averroes’ commentaries, since Judah alternates direct quotations from his sources with paraphrased passages, as will be seen in the next section, and, of course, the Hebrew text also contains mistakes.

3

Judah ha-Cohen’s Use of Sources

I will now proceed to discuss the way in which Judah ha-Cohen uses his sources. In the present section I will focus on Judah’s manner of compilation and on the way in which he arranges and presents his material in the section on natural philosophy, leaving one specific aspect of his use of sources, to wit his criticism of Aristotelian natural philosophy, for the next chapter. 3.1 Conciseness A salient feature of the mḥ is its conciseness. At the end of his survey of Almagest vii the author explicitly says: “Our intention in this book is conciseness (or: brevity, qiṣṣur).”125 Although the specific context of this statement is the necessity of observation instead of books for knowledge of the stars, Judah expresses his concern for brevity a few times in the section on natural philosophy too. In mḥ/Physics vi.4 he notes a contradiction regarding Aristotle’s view on the divisibility of the beginning and end of motion, but refrains from discussing it, saying “we should not go to lengths.” At the end of mḥ/Soul i we read: “Hereafter [Aristotle] mentioned the opinions of the ancients on the essence of the soul and refuted them, until the end of Treatise One. There is no need to lengthen our book with these matters.”126 Elsewhere, when briefly discussing the phenomenon of the Milky Way, he records Alexander of Aphrodisias’ explanation of its cause and then limits himself to noting that Averroes “has a lot to say about it, but this is not the place to discuss that.”127 124 125

126 127

Cf. mḥ/pa xiii.22, n. 177. ms O 160r: “we-kawwanatenu be-zeh ha-sefer huʾ ha-qiṣṣur.” With this statement Judah justifies the omission of certain portions from the Almagest, cf. Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 48. Cf. ibid. 41 ff. for the way in which Judah presents the Almagest to his readers. As in his survey of natural philosophy, here too, one finds literal translations alongside paraphrases and additions. mḥ/Soul i.5. mḥ/Meteor. i.10.

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Unlike Maimonides, who, as I. Twersky put it, “never tired of writing in praise of brevity,” in his presentation of natural science Judah is silent about the reason why conciseness is so important.128 Nor do we hear what exactly he means by qiṣṣur. Judging by the contents of the book it comprises both omission and abbreviation of his source-material. As noted above (Chapter Two, section 2) he justified the omission of certain portions of Aristotle’s logical works and of Euclid’s Elements by saying that they are not necessary for the purpose of his book. Yet other topics, also in his presentation of natural philosophy, such as Aristotle’s account of chance and necessity in Physics ii are passed over without any explanation. The survey of natural philosophy reads as a series of succinct statements that render Aristotle’s major teachings as explained by Averroes. However, various degrees of brevity can be discerned, for Judah presents these teachings in different forms. Some passages can be shown to have been taken over more or less literally from his source in abridged form, whereas others are of a more paraphrasing nature, and yet others (notably in On the Soul and On Sense) consist of translations of selected longer passages of Averroes’ commentaries. Sometimes a particular doctrine is presented as a brief statement without any elucidation or discussion, but such a statement is sometimes also followed by a brief explanation. A typical example of how Judah implements his concern for brevity is found at the beginning of mḥ/Physics i.3, a passage that covers Arist., Physics 184b15– 191b13:129 The principles are finite in quantity and in quality. The principles ought to consist of two contraries and the substrate of the two contraries. [Aristotle] determined that they are three: form, matter and privation. Form is the opposite of privation, and matter is the substrate of both. We ought to know in which way privation is a principle. Although these three are [all] principles, only two of them are principles in truth, that is to say, matter and form. Privation, however, cannot be called a principle except accidentally. It can be called a principle only because it precedes form and when this form comes to be, its privation is removed and what persists is the being that is composed of matter and form. Every being which is composed of matter and form is generated only from a specific thing, not 128

129

See Twersky, Introduction to the Code, 337. Robinson (“The Ibn Tibbon Family,” 215 n. 79) called attention to the fact that Samuel Ibn Tibbon deliberately “rebels against the rule of brevity of Andalusian literature.” It roughly corresponds to Averroes’ mc Physics, ed. Harvey 1977, 183–196.

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from any chance thing, let alone from privation. Generation can be only from what exists, not from privation. In general, the portions from his sources that Judah omits concern:130 (1) opinions held by philosophers earlier than Aristotle. (2) details of extensive argumentation. (3) Averroes’ “discourse-structuring markers” and other organizational devices. (4) text portions omitted as the result of other abbreviation techniques. Some of these categories may overlap, but it goes without saying that Judah’s abbreviation techniques make for considerable economy.131 Examples of these techniques are given in what follows. 3.1.1 Omission of Opinions Held by Philosophers Earlier Than Aristotle As noted above (section 2.2.2) Judah does not adopt Averroes’ procedure in the Middle Commentaries of reviewing the opinions of Aristotle’s predecessors. He clearly deemed it superfluous to inform his readers explicitly about theories held by Greek natural philosophers before Aristotle. We do not know whether this reflects any awareness on Judah’s part of Maimonides’ “warning” in his letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon to the effect that there is no need to consult the books of Aristotle’s predecessors.132 Oftentimes Judah limits himself to recording the answers or conclusions that Averroes, following Aristotle, reached through his examination of earlier views, without presenting these discussions themselves. An example of utmost brevity is found in mḥ/Heavens i.5, where we read: “The world is finite in magnitude: it is one in number and not more.” The extensive discussions from the Middle Commentary that take up some 25 pages in the printed edition of this commentary by Al-Alaoui have been reduced to this single statement in the mḥ. A more succinct summary of Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens i.8–9 can hardly be imagined. Judah omits the entire investigation, dealing as it does for a large part with earlier opinions.133

130 131 132 133

In the notes to my English translation of my edition of the mḥ’s sections on natural philosophy I have generally indicated where Judah skips over long sections from his source. For the disadvantages of this procedure, see section 4 below. Cf. S. Harvey, “Did Maimonides’ Letter.” mḥ/Heavens i.5 notes 22 and 23. The quoted sentence from the mḥ renders the beginning and end of mc Heavens i.7. The beginning (mc 94.10–11) reads: “And after having completed this he [= Aristotle] set out to investigate here firstly whether the world is finite

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Likewise, the mḥ’s rendering of the account of the earth at the end of On the Heavens ii consists of only one sentence: “[Aristotle] said that the earth is at rest and does not move; that its place is the centre of all, that its shape is spherical and that its centre is the centre of all.” With this brief statement Judah ha-Cohen summarizes Averroes’ reflections on Aristotle’s inquiry of On the Heavens ii.13–14, the beginning of which reads: “It remains to speak of the earth, where it is, whether it should be classed among things at rest or things in motion, and of its shape.”134 In other cases Judah’s starting-point of a given topic is in fact the conclusion reached by Averroes through an examination of the views of Aristotle’s predecessors, as one can see at the beginning of mḥ/gc. The corresponding account in the Aristotelian text starts with a discussion of earlier theories, such as that absolute unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away take place by way of aggregation and segregation.135 Judah rigorously omits all of this, starting his exposition with the statement that absolute generation takes place out of something which exists in potentiality, not in actuality. In the Aristotelian text, as in Averroes’ rendering of the discussion, this statement concludes the rejection of previous theories and constitutes the basis of Aristotle’s own investigation of the question in which way anything like absolute coming-to-be can be.136 In Judah’s account, by contrast, the question of whether generation can occur at all is not an issue: Aristotle’s conclusion that it occurs forms the point of departure, and the mḥ is solely interested in the question how it occurs. Yet it should not be overlooked that there are statements in Judah’s survey that do reflect opinions held by Aristotle’s predecessors, albeit in disguised form. This is often the case when Judah asserts that such-and-such is not the case, as in mḥ/Heavens ii.9 where we read that the stars do not produce sound. Only a reader who was familiar with Judah’s source or with Aristotelian philosophy will have noticed that this statement reflects Aristotle’s

134 135 136

or infinite, and if it is finite, whether it is one or more,” and its end (mc 119.15–16): “It has become evident from this discourse that we have arranged that the body of the whole is finite and that it is impossible for it to be infinite.” The next chapter, mc Heavens i.8, starts as follows (mc 120.3–4): “Now we ought to investigate whether it is possible that there are many worlds or one world,” and ends (mc 139.4): “It has become clear why there is only one world and not more.” Tr. Guthrie 293a15. mḥ/Heavens ii.11, n. 99. In the mc this investigation is found in ed. AlAlaoui, pp. 251–276. Arist., gc 314a7–317a32. Arist., gc 317b15–17.

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rejection of Pythagoras’ theory of the harmony of the spheres.137 Another hidden Pythagorean tenet is the sentence: “three is a perfect number, for it is the first number that has a beginning, a middle and an end.”138 Likewise, Judah’s account of the imagination in mḥ/Soul iii.7 presents a “negative assertion” behind which views of Aristotle’s predecessors are hiding: “Imagination is neither sensation, nor knowledge, nor opinion, nor intelligence, nor anything composed of these.” This sentence summarizes Aristotle’s exposition on earlier views about the faculty of imagination as well as Averroes’ detailed exploration of the way in which imagination is different from other cognitive processes.139 Another example is found at the beginning of mḥ/Heavens ii: “This celestial body is not subject to any fatigue or effort.” Comparison with Aristotle shows that these words reflect views on this topic that were held by Plato and Empedocles.140 Other phrasings as well may indicate the omission of Aristotle’s rejection of positions held by earlier thinkers, as is the case at the beginning of mḥ/Physics, in the discussion of how many principles there are. Judah briefly states: “[Aristotle] determined that they are three.”141 In the corresponding passage in the mc Averroes treats Aristotle’s discussion of the views held by “the ancients” on the number of the ultimate constituents of existing things, that is the principles. After having established, following Aristotle, that the principles must be more than one, the Commentator then proceeds to describe at great length Aristotle’s investigation whether they are two or three or more. It may even be the case that seemingly casual statements reflect criticism of an opposite view in Judah’s source that was held by an earlier thinker. For example, from the assertion “The term ‘nature’ is applied in a truer sense to form than to matter” (mḥ/Physics ii.2) the reader would not immediately have gathered that apparently some people believed that the opposite was the case. In the parallel passage Averroes says: “There is some speculation as to whether matter or form is worthier to be called nature.”142 Similarly, it will have escaped a reader with no previous knowledge of natural philosophy that some of Judah’s statements in fact reflect a refutation by Averroes of a view that was held not by one of Aristotle’s predecessors, but by

137 138 139 140 141 142

Cf. mc Heavens 238.17–18. In Guide ii.8 Pythagoras is mentioned explicitly in connection with this view. mḥ/Heavens i.1, see also mḥ/Heavens ii.3, and note 63 there. Cf. Arist., Soul 428a4–5 and Averroes, mc Soul 105–106. Arist., Heavens 284a14–27. mḥ/Physics i.3, n. 11. mc Physics 215.7–8, tr. p. 289; cf. Arist., Physics 193a10–b22.

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one of his Greek commentators. This is the case, for example, at the end of mḥ/Heavens in the account of the heavy and light in the primary bodies, where Averroes refutes Themistius’ views on the subject under consideration.143 This implies that besides the sources mentioned by Judah explicitly there are also some “hidden” or implicit sources in his survey of philosophy. Only on rare occasions does Judah deviate from his procedure to omit preAristotelian views. A case in point is his discussion of the origin of semen, for here he records the opinion of otherwise unspecified “ancient thinkers” according to which semen is formed from all the parts of the body (that is, the socalled pan-genesis theory), adding to this that Aristotle refuted this theory.144 In mḥ/Metaph. xi he records Plato’s view of the ideal forms and Aristotle’s refutation of it. However, even in such cases brevity is the rule, for Judah refrains from going into any detail. In this regard we should also note that on several occasions in his survey of the Physics Judah refrains from mentioning interpretations of Aristotelian views by al-Farabi and Ibn Bājja found in Averroes’ commentaries.145 Likewise, in treating the question of whether or not the forms of living beings are generated by a mover from without, Judah ignores Averroes’ discussion of the view of Ibn Bājja.146 Thus, it would seem that in general he adopted the same attitude vis-à-vis Averroes’ predecessors as he did vis-à-vis Aristotle’s predecessors, although occasionally he does refer to Ibn Bājja and Avicenna (cf. above, sections 1.2 and 2.2.1). 3.1.2 Omission of Extensive Argumentation Judah generally abbreviates or omits altogether passages that contain lengthy argumentations in support of a given proposition whether or not these concern the refutation of views held by Aristotle’s predecessors. Throughout his précis Judah usually confines himself to noting down the outcome of a long and involved inquiry, ignoring the pros and cons involved in the process of accept-

143 144 145

146

Cf. mḥ/Heavens iv.3. mḥ/ga xv.6. For examples, see mḥ/Physics iv.3: Judah omits from the mc the passages in which Averroes mentions the interpretations by al-Farabi and Ibn Bājja of the view that the universe is in a place accidentally, not essentially (n. 94). Similarly, in mḥ/Physics vi.3 (n. 150) on ‘instantaneous change’: Averroes reviews the solutions suggested by the commentators, in particular that of Ibn Bājja; all of which the mḥ omits. Cf. also vii.3 “this series must stop at a first mover that is not moved by anything else” (n. 174). Judah does not present the proof that Averroes provides for this doctrine nor the Commentator’s discussion of Ibn Bājja’s views. mḥ/ga xvi.6, n. 329.

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ing or rejecting a certain doctrine. Here, too, we often find Judah limiting himself to copying statements from Averroes with which the Commentator either concluded a preceding discussion or introduced a new topic of inquiry. Put differently, Judah’s statements can often be shown to reflect the last or first line(s) of a given discussion in Averroes.147 Consider, for example, the beginning of mḥ/Heavens i.2. Judah states that “there exists a spherical body which moves with a circular motion, and its nature differs from that of the four simple bodies.” This sentence has a parallel in Averroes’ mc Heavens, where it introduces the subject matter of the relevant section and at the same time constitutes the conclusion of the discussion in that section.148 None of the five proofs and arguments that Averroes advances in support of his thesis in the discussion itself is reproduced by Judah.149 Three more examples of omission of extensive argumentation by Judah must suffice here: (i) About the void Judah notes: “Because of certain reasons the void is a separate dimension and it cannot exist at all. The light and the rare exist because of other reasons.” He does not go into detail as to what these “certain reasons” and “other reasons” are.150 (ii) At the end of mḥ/Physics i Judah writes that prime matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, without advancing Averroes’ arguments in support of it. Averroes, following Aristotle, sought to prove this thesis by showing that absurd conclusions would result from the assumption that prime matter was generated and corruptible.151 (iii) At the end of mḥ/gc i.12 we read that “Mixture is neither generation and corruption, nor alteration, nor growth.” Judah omits the detailed argumentation that underlies this doctrine. At other times Judah makes selective use of his source’s arguments in support of a given proposition, recording what, in all probability, he considered the most important. A case in point is the aforementioned passage in mḥ/Physics ii.2, where Judah states that form can be more properly called nature than matter. Averroes offers three arguments for this doctrine, of which Judah notes only the last.152 Similarly, when treating the question why there is no sixth sense other

147 148 149 150 151 152

Cf. above p. 73. Ed. Al-Alaoui 77.4–5 and 83.1–2. Ibid. 77.5–82 ult. mḥ/Physics iv.5. mḥ/Physics i.4, cf. mc Physics 209.13–14. This third argument claims that “the motion in the generation of a subject is toward the form, and the motion is called ‘nature’ insofar as the motion is toward it.” Judah ha-

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than the five known senses, he lists only the third of Averroes’ three demonstrations, presumably because Averroes says that the third one is the strongest (mḥ/Soul iii.1).153 Only in very rare cases does Judah go so far as to mention all the arguments provided by his source. This happens in a passage from On the Heavens where we read: “The shape of the heavens is spherical, and this is necessary for many reasons,” followed by all of Averroes’ four arguments in favor of this doctrine, again in abridged form.154 To be sure, Judah’s omissions do not always concern extensive argumentation. Shorter passages from Averroes are often also rendered in summary fashion. Compare, for example, Judah’s assertion in mḥ/Physics iii.1: “Motion is composed of what is in potentiality and what is in actuality” to the corresponding section in the Middle Commentary. In the corresponding passage Averroes writes: We maintain that it is manifest from the nature of motion that it cannot fall under the species of things that are in actuality, for these things are at rest. Nor can it fall under the things that are in absolute potentiality, since these are privations as long as they remain in potentiality. Since it is impossible that motion falls under either of these species, it cannot but remain that it is composed of what is in potentiality and what is in actuality.155 We see that Judah omits the options that were rejected and limits himself to recording the conclusion of the argumentation even though the passage in Averroes is not very long. Similarly, in cases where Averroes provides only a succinct explanation of a given proposition or phenomenon Judah often refrains from copying Averroes’ explanation. To give two examples: (i) In mḥ/Meteor. ii.8 Judah notes that the eastern wind is hotter than the western wind, but unlike Averroes he does not explain why this is so.

153

154 155

Cohen limits himself to noting that motion is “called by the name of that to which it proceeds,” without, however, bothering to point out the connection with the preceding sentence. Also, it is often not recognizable that a certain statement is in fact a proof offered by Averroes for a given doctrine, cf. mḥ/Heavens i.5, n. 30; i.6 n. 31; i.9 n. 52ff.; and mḥ/gc i.8, n. 22. Cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.6, n. 72. mc Physics, ms Hamburg, Staats-und Universitätsbibliothek, hebr 264, 24v1–5.

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(ii) In mḥ/pa Judah notes that viviparous animals have stronger bones than other animals and that men have stronger bones than women, but fails to provide the cause of it as given by Averroes, to wit, that the strength of the bones is dependent on the size of the animals and the functions the bones have to perform.156 Yet we also come across numerous instances where a somewhat less rigid form of succinctness is pursued, that is, where Judah does record a certain doctrine while adding to it some kind of demonstration or explanation, albeit in a more concise way than what is found in his source. In these cases the explanation is usually introduced by lefi-she e.g.: “Mountains are the most appropriate place for the formation of rivers, for (lefi-she) in mountains dew, moisture and cold are collected, because of their height and vicinity to the cold place etc.”157 Besides the lefi-she formula, Judah also employs the Question-and-Answer pattern to briefly indicate the cause of a certain tenet: “Why is the motion of the upper sphere from east to west? Because of its nobility, since we observe in animals that the more noble motions are from the right, and the right side in the heavens is the east.”158 3.1.3 Omission of Averroes’ “Discourse-Structuring Markers” Judah moreover refrains from reproducing Averroes’ attempts at systematizing Aristotle’s text. He omits all those passages where the Commentator in his Middle Commentaries provides what may be called a “Table of Contents” of a given book or chapter, or his (sub)divisions into kelalim and peraqim. Instead, Judah ha-Cohen proceeds straight away to excerpting the contents of his source without elaborating on the organization of the subject matter.159 A good example is Averroes’ mc to gc ii. The Commentator opens his discussion of the elements by explaining that Aristotle investigates five questions with respect to these bodies, and he then goes on to specify them.160 These five questions are not formulated as such by Aristotle himself; they reflect instead Averroes’ organization of the material and his endeavor to present its contents in a lucid and systematic way. Judah ha-Cohen does not spell out these five

156 157 158 159 160

mḥ/pa xii.15; cf. Averr., Comm. Animals 427r; Arist., pa 655a5. mḥ/Meteor. i.15. mḥ/Heavens ii.7. The exception to the rule is Judah’s discussion at the beginning of mḥ/Soul where Judah enumerates the subjects that will be addressed in that treatise, mḥ/Soul i.1–2. mc gc ii.1, ed. Eichner, 86.9–14; cf. translation Kurland, 68. See mḥ/gc ii.1, n. 47. Judah adopts a similar procedure at the beginning of mḥ/gc i.

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questions, but it is obvious from his treatment of the subject that he let himself be guided by Averroes’ scheme, for his presentation reproduces the main lines of Averroes’ discussion. Likewise, Judah as a rule omits the “markers of discourse” with which Averroes frequently winds up the discussion of a certain issue, rehearsing his conclusions or introducing a new topic. In Judah’s compilation we look in vain for sentences like “after having shown that x is the case, we will now proceed to examine y.” In fact, Judah often lists a given doctrine by simply copying Averroes’ formulation of it in the “Table of Contents” with which Averroes often starts his investigations. In mḥ/Physics ii.3, for example, we read: “The natural philosopher ought to study form and matter together, not one of them without the other. He has to study the form inasmuch as [form] is the perfection of matter, and matter inasmuch as it is the subject of form.” These assertions are quoted almost literally from the beginning of Book ii.2 of Averroes’ mc Physics, where the Commentator describes the contents of the three chapters covered in that section.161 To be sure, similar statements appear in the course of the discussion that follows, but their wording differs and they are interwoven in a discussion of the apprehensions of the ancients on the study of natural science, which is probably why Judah found it easier to copy the abridged passage at the beginning of Averroes’ account. Towards the end of mḥ/Physics ii.9, Judah writes: “Nature acts only for the sake of an end; it does not do anything in vain. The final cause in generation is the form.” These sentences reproduce verbatim Averroes’ conclusion of a long exposition on chance things and the final cause in generation, whereas the exposition itself is absent from the mḥ.162 Moreover, one gains the impression that methodological discussions are less relevant to Judah. In Book xi of mḥ/pa for example, Judah does not record Averroes’ enquiry of the procedure to be followed in studying zoology, nor does he devote any attention to Averroes’ treatment of the three questions that, according to Averroes, Aristotle sought to elucidate in this book, or to the difficulties underlying a classification of the animal world. 3.1.4 Other Omitted Material Besides applying the aforementioned abbreviation techniques, Judah also reduces the size of his encyclopedia by avoiding repetitions; by omitting exam-

161 162

mc Physics ii.2, ed. Harvey, 217.20–218.2. The sentences quoted announce the subjectmatter of the third chapter of ii.2. mc Physics ii.3.3, ed. Harvey, 237.5–6.

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ples or details of his source, and by omitting cross-references found in Averroes’ commentaries. The following representative examples may serve as illustrations. (i) When discussing motion Judah explains that motion can occur only in three categories (namely, those that have contraries). His source goes on to investigate why no contraries are to be found in the other categories, an investigation which Judah summarizes by saying: “The other seven categories do not have contraries as will be evident to those who will investigate them one by one.”163 Apparently, Judah considered it superfluous to detail this for the other categories. (ii) In mḥ/pa xiii.11 Judah notes about the lung: “Some animals have a large lung with much blood and in others it is the opposite.” This renders his source’s: “Some animals have a large lung with much blood, whereas in other animals it has little blood and it is small, for example, in birds.” Here Judah summarizes the second part of the statement simply by observing that the opposite of the first obtains for other animals, an abbreviation technique that he employs frequently. Moreover, he omits Averroes’ example. (iii) Likewise, in his account of things that are due to chance he makes a distinction between things that come to be always; things that come to be in most instances, and things that come to be in rare instances. As an example of the second category he mentions “the heat in the summer,” whereas his source has “heat in the summer and cold in the winter.”164 (iv) mḥ/Physics iii.1 presents two definitions of motion as given by Aristotle. Contrary to his source, Judah does not explain the difference between them.165 (v) In mḥ/Sense ii[3.]4 Judah omits Averroes’ note on the fact that individuals of animals and plants are determinate in existence “as has been explained in the Book of Animals and the Book of Plants.” (vi) In the section on memory and recollection (mḥ/Sense ii[1.]3) Judah follows almost verbatim Averroes’ description of the difference between the memorative and the imaginative faculty.166 However, after having reproduced his source’s explanation of why the faculty that reinstates the

163 164 165 166

mḥ/Physics v.4. mḥ/Physics ii.8 cf. mc Physics ii.3.2, ed. Harvey 229.5, tr. 309. Cf. mc Physics iii.2.3, ms Hamburg, Staats-und Universitätsbibliothek, hebr 264, 24r; cf. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 523 ff. Cf. Averroes’ commentary on Parva Naturalia (ed. Blumberg 38.13–39.12, tr. 23–24).

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image after it has disappeared must be different from the faculty that perceives that object, he omits a few lines from his source. In these lines Averroes explains that the memorative faculty has two aspects, namely retentive and memorative. Apparently, Judah omits this piece of information because he already recorded it at the beginning of the section on memory and recollection. (vii) An example of a case where Judah deems it superfluous to inform his reader that a certain proposition had been subject to debate is found in mḥ/Heavens i.7. Here he presents the theory that powers are defined with reference to the maximum of their capacity, in conformity with mc Heavens 155.6–13, a passage that is based on Aristotle, Heavens 281a7–18. He then goes on to state: “Just as someone who can lift a certain weight can [also] lift something that weighs less, someone who is capable of perceiving a certain magnitude at a certain distance can all the more so perceive another magnitude that is larger than it within the bounds of that distance.” In Judah’s source the statement about perceiving magnitudes appears as an objection that is raised against the theory that forces are defined by their maximum capacity. Averroes says: “if this is the case, then someone who can perceive a given magnitude at a certain distance must necessarily perceive a smaller magnitude within that distance.” (mc Heavens 156.3–4) (and this is not true, cf. Arist., Heavens 281a21–22). Averroes then goes on to remove this objection by pointing out that in sight things are the other way around, namely that in sight the capacity of its action is defined by the minimum/smallest amount it can perceive and that therefore someone who can perceive smaller objects will necessarily perceive larger objects (156.6–11, cf. Arist., Heavens 281a22–24: “On the contrary, it is the man who can see a dot or hear a slight sound who will have perception also of the larger objects”).167 Judah, for his part does not specify that the aforementioned statement is, in fact, an objection, nor does he go into any detail as to the way Averroes solves it. Many of the above examples show that Judah also strives for economy in passages that reproduce his source more or less literally. It is moreover worth mentioning that Judah skips over Averroes’ observations on the transmission of the Aristotelian text he was commenting on. Both in the Epitome and in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology Averroes complains about the

167

Tr. Guthrie, 109–111.

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inaccuracy of the version he had in front of him. Since Judah employed both commentaries, he may well have been aware of the faulty transmission of Averroes’ source-text, but apparently he prefers not to bother his readers with this information. While these techniques as well as the examples mentioned in the previous sections offer some insight in Judah’s procedure in excerpting his sources, it should also be noted that there are a large number of omissions in Judah’s covering that cannot be explained in like manner. Judah left out considerable portions from his sources and substantial material at that, for reasons that are not so easily discernible. One wonders, for example why at the end of mḥ/Physics ii.9 the discussion stops in the middle of the account of chance, which means that we look in vain for a treatment of good and bad fortune, the automatic and necessity. In other words, there is no coverage of Aristotle, Physics ii.4–9. Moreover, one wonders why Judah’s rendering of Aristotle’s and Averroes’ account of the earth at the end of mḥ/Heavens ii is so extremely succinct, or why he does not display much interest in the generation of bees in mḥ/ga, a topic that Aristotle discusses at great length. The same question may be raised with respect to various other topics in the field of natural philosophy. It is difficult to account for such omissions, especially if one bears in mind that one of Judah’s aims was to disseminate knowledge of philosophy among his fellow Jews. As was the case with regard to the question of the author’s combined use of the Epitomes and the Middle Commentaries one gains the impression that some arbitrariness is involved in Judah’s manner of excerption of sources. For if he wished his readers to know that the hair of horses, like that of man, can turn white, why would he refrain from mentioning that horses, like man, can go bald?168 Or, why would he select only one of Averroes’ two questions at the end of the section on memory: (i) why does he who recollects experience pain or pleasure when the object of the pleasure is not existent in actuality?, and (ii) why are some people are good at recalling things and poor in retaining them, while others are both good at recalling and retaining? Of these Judah reproduces only Averroes’ treatment of the second, which he presents partially in an abridged translation and partially in an (almost) literal translation.169 It is difficult to see why Judah should attach more importance to the second question than to the first.

168 169

mḥ/ga xix.6. mḥ/Sense ii[1].11.

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In some cases one might assume that Judah omitted issues or problems discussed in his sources out of a certain reservation to record doctrines that are at variance with Jewish traditional beliefs. For example, in mḥ/Heavens ii.9 Judah repeats Averroes’ statement according to which “the existence of contrary powers in the same thing for an infinite time is absurd.” He omits the context in which this statement occurs, and one might surmise that this is because the discussion in Averroes and Aristotle leads up to the conclusion that the world is ungenerated and incorruptible.170 This explanation seems untenable, however, since Judah has no inhibitions about loudly criticizing and refuting the doctrine of the eternity of the world in other sections of his work (see Chapter Six). Moreover, there are numerous cases of omitted passages where this explanation would not apply. 3.2 Brevity vs Completeness: Abbreviated Comprehensiveness Despite Judah’s concern for brevity it should also be noted that the mḥ at the same time displays a tendency to what C. Manekin has aptly called “abbreviated expansiveness” or “expanded abridgment.”171 There are several instances where Judah is more extensive than his source. In the section above on Judah’s sources (section 2) some such instances were mentioned already: in his account of growth in mḥ/gc i.7 Judah amplifies the discussion by inserting a part of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s Treatise on Growth; in mḥ/Physics v.5 he elaborates on the question of why there are no contraries in the category of quantity, referring to Abraham Ibn Daud, and in mḥ/pa xiv.1 he adds his teacher Ramah’s comment on the gall-bladder of pigeons. In mḥ/Soul i.4 he adds a reference to Theodosius that is likewise not found in his source. As mentioned above in Chapter One, Judah includes a personal observation in his account on animals, namely that he saw an elephant at the court of Frederick ii. Other instances where Judah supplies extra material are found in mḥ/Soul ii.32 (in the paragraph on smell), where he observes that Aristotle forgot to mention things that have smell even though they are cold, and mḥ/ga xvii.2, where he lists the peach-tree as an example of trees that wither away quickly because they bear much fruit, an example that is not found in the corresponding passage in Averroes’ Commentary. In his account of the heavens, too, Judah adds some information to his source, namely that Aristotle did not explain why the upper sphere moves from

170 171

mḥ/Heavens ii.9, notes 52 and 54. Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 284.

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east to west and the spheres below it from west to east, an observation that he may have found in Maimonides’ Guide.172 Judah’s addition on the length of the gestation period in diverse animals at the end of mḥ/ga xviii, which is copied from tractate Bekhorot of the Babylonian Talmud constitutes another example of expansion on his source. Moreover, his combined use of Averroes’ commentaries discussed above (section 2.2.2) also testifies to a certain tendency to comprehensiveness. A particular case of “expansiveness” is constituted by the critical comments that Judah from time to time inserts in his survey.173 Mention must also be made of his excursus on the role of the female semen in mḥ/ga xviii, an excursus in which Judah takes issue with a philosophical view on the female semen that is at variance with a Talmudic statement.174 3.3 Independence Vis-à-Vis Averroes Some of Judah’s procedures described in the foregoing reveal a certain independence vis-à-vis his source. To this it may be added that he feels free to rearrange his source-material if this suits him: in his survey of the five senses in mḥ/Soul ii we find large sections taken from On Sense (Parva Naturalia) Treatise i, because in Judah’s view it was more logical to treat them in connection with the account on the senses as found in On the Soul.175 Likewise, within the section On Sense he moves a section on prophecy to a later passage.176 In his survey of meteorology Judah deviates from his source by moving a section on the thunderbolt and on colors of a cloud.177 His strategy to present Aristotle’s teachings in the “Question and Answer” format departs from Averroes’ manner of presentation. At the end of the mḥ’s section On Memory and Recollection we read: “Why does a person remember much of what he has perceived in his youth? During his youth he has a strong desire for the forms that he sees and he marvels at them a great deal. Therefore, they are retained for a long time, and he comes to know them accurately, so that

172 173 174 175 176 177

mḥ/Heavens ii.7 and n. 80. See Chapter Four. See Chapter Five, section 2 (ix). mḥ/Soul ii.19–29. mḥ/Sense ii[3.]3, n. 108. Judah discusses this in his coverage of Meteor. ii instead of in Meteor. iii. Interestingly, in his translation of Aristotle’s Meteorology (1210) Samuel Ibn Tibbon had expressed his amazement about the order in Aristotle, saying that it would have been more appropriate to discuss these topics in the second book. Judah does not show any familiarity with Ibn Tibbon’s translation, nor did he adopt his terminology, so it would seem that his rearrangement of the material here is not inspired by Samuel Ibn Tibbon.

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they are hard to forget.”178 This literally reproduces a passage from Averroes’ commentary, but the Q&A format does not appear in this source. Besides serving as memo-technical aids such formulations somewhat vivify his otherwise rather arid enumeration of scientific facts. Also, a statement is often followed by the question “How so?” (keiṣad), or “an example of this is” (mashal zeh). We need not assume, however, that Judah had the intention to entertain his audience; this manner of presentation simply reflects the method of inquiry that characterizes traditional Jewish learning. Furthermore, he often deviates from his source by providing different examples. Usually they are not of importance, for example when explaining how things pass from potentiality into actuality he substitutes Averroes’ example of a bronze statue by a wooden box.179 Or in mḥ/gc i.9 on how qualities act upon one another Judah substitutes Averroes’ “whiteness” and “a line” by “redness” and “a plane.” Of course, such changes are not very significant. At times, however, deviating examples serve a specific purpose. mḥ/Physics ii.4 presents some examples illustrating the kind of questions that can be answered with the help of the four causes. While following Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Aristotelian passage, Judah ha-Cohen offers different examples for questions concerning the efficient and final cause. As for the efficient cause, Averroes’ question was “why are the camelriders rushing against us?”180 but the mḥ reads “Why does man go upright?”—“Because his efficient cause (his Maker) wanted him to do so.” Evidently, Judah wished to strip this example of its Muslim character. This is all the more clear in the case of the question with the final cause, where Averroes has: “Why are we fighting with such-and-such a nation?” “In order to bring them over to the belief which is obligatory upon them.”181 Judah substitutes this example with the following: “Why has man been created rational? In order to gain knowledge of his Creator.”182 Again, in the section on memory and recollection he substitutes Averroes’ interjection “Praise be the Wise and the Knowing” by “Praised be the name of the King of Kings and exalted be He above everything,” even though Averroes’ formulation cannot be regarded as particularly objectionable from a Jewish point of view. The same obtains for a passage in mḥ/pa where Judah substitutes Averroes’ “Praised be the Wise who knows” by “Praised be the Creator

178 179 180 181 182

mḥ/Sense ii[1.]11. mḥ/Physics iii.2, n. 69. Ed. S. Harvey 223.19–20, tr. 301. In the mc the answer is: “Because of the murder of ʿUthmān.” Ibid., 223.21–22, tr. 301. mḥ/Physics ii.4.

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for ever and ever,”183 but here it may be surmised that the change proceeds from the wish to emphasize the creation of the world, a topic that is important to Judah. In this regard we may also note an example of what may be a deliberate “free” rendering of his source: in the account on dreams Averroes writes that the interpreter of dreams “must not be inclined towards the habits of the animal soul.” In Judah’s rendering this person should be “holy” (qadosh).184 Regarding Judah’s attitude to his sources we can point to two other characteristics of Judah’s presentation to which I shall return later: his use of biblical and rabbinical quotations (section 5 below), and his critical comments on certain Aristotelian doctrines (Chapter Four).

4

Brevity vs Clarity: Confusion and Errors

Judah’s method of excerpting his sources has some clear advantages. Thanks to his selectiveness and brevity, his survey offered the interested reader who was eager for knowledge the relevant basic information on the major points of Aristotelian philosophy and provided him with easy and rapid access to this discipline, as may be expected from an encyclopedic work. Nonetheless it cannot be denied that conciseness also has its disadvantages. Judah’s predilection for brevity not only results in incompleteness of coverage at times, it is also often at the cost of clarity. There are, for example, numerous cases where Judah presents Aristotelian teachings in the form of brief statements without paying any attention to the context in which they appear in his source. The following examples will bear this out: (i) After the introductory section in mḥ/Physics i.3 Judah starts his exposition of natural science with the assertion that “the principles are finite in quantity and quality.” (cf. above, sections 3.1 and 3.1.1). To the unprepared reader, this statement comes as a surprise. Not only does he not know what kind of “principles” are being referred to, he also does not learn what the entire discussion is about. (ii) mḥ/Heavens iii begins with the following statement: “Bodies are not composed of surfaces, nor surfaces of lines, nor lines of points.” In Averroes’ commentary this assertion is to be found within the framework of an

183 184

mḥ/pa xiv.6. mḥ/Sense ii.[3].12.

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investigation into the generation of natural bodies.185 It forms part of Aristotle’s argumentation that natural bodies are endowed with weight or lightness: the assumption that bodies are composed of surfaces would lead to the absurd conclusion that bodies have no weight, since points have no weight. In the mḥ, however, the sentence stands in complete isolation, so that it is left to the reader’s own imagination to figure out what the context or implication of this statement may be. (iii) mḥ/gc i comprises a treatment of contact, action and passion (or: acting upon and undergoing action), and mixture. In the mc Averroes explains that, according to Aristotle, this discussion necessarily precedes the investigation into generation and corruption. In the mḥ, the context remains undisclosed to the reader.186 (iv) In mḥ/pa xii.16 Judah starts his discussion of the composite parts with some short observations on the brain. The brain was already treated at some length in the foregoing section (xii.11–12), and hence at first sight it is not clear why the subject should be dealt with again. If we compare this short passage to its direct source (mc Anim. 427v) and to its indirect source (Arist., pa 656a8–23) the context becomes clear: Aristotle starts his discussion of the non-uniform parts with the most important ones, the sense-organs. He explains that in the hierarchical ordering of creatures animals are more perfect than plants because they possess not only life but also the power of sensation, and that man is the only animal that has something of the divine in him. Because of this special position in the hierarchy of being man ought to be discussed first, which requires a treatment of the head and the brain and the arrangement of the senses. The mḥ does mention the special position of man, but fails to specify that this is why a separate discussion of the head and the brain is required. (v) mḥ/ga xvii treats among other topics the generation of fish, bees and testacea. Surprisingly, Judah notes here: “The fire that is at the concave side of the sphere is extremely simple and therefore it is not visible in itself,” a statement that one would rather expect in a discussion of the heavens.187 The reader cannot have gathered why this piece of information should be included here, unless he knew that Averroes in the parallel passage explains how various classes of animals are related to the elements, in which context he discusses the nature of fire.

185 186 187

mc Heavens 284.8 ff., cf. Arist., Heavens 299a5 ff. mḥ/gc i.8 n. 22. mḥ/ga xvii.8, n. 423.

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(vi) In his commentary on Parva Naturalia Averroes discusses at some length the three causes of accidental individuals. In the corresponding passage Judah reproduces only tidbits of this discussion, which makes the text virtually incomprehensible (see mḥ/Sense ii.[3].5, n. 115). These examples can easily be multiplied.188 What is more, some statements provide inaccurate information as a result of Judah’s abbreviation-techniques. We mention the following: In mḥ/gc i.8 Judah refers to the definition of bodies that are “touching” (or “in contact”) as articulated in mḥ/Physics v.6, adding that this applies to things that act upon one another and undergo action from one another. Here he follows his source, without, however, including Averroes’ remark that this description reflects the strict sense in which the word “contact” is used and that the word can be used also in a broader sense.189 Judah then lists two kinds of “bodies acting upon one another and undergoing action from one another,” namely the action of the heavenly bodies on the elements, and the action of the elements upon one another. Averroes mentions the touching of the heavenly bodies on “the things around us” as an example of “contact” in the broad sense, since only one of the two bodies involved in the process acts. Therefore, this instance cannot be taken as referring to “contact” in the true sense. Judah is thus not rendering his source accurately. At mḥ/pa xiii.6 Judah writes that the epiglottis is found only in man, whereas according to Averroes’ commentary it is found in man and in most animals that have a soft skin.190 This piece of information is inaccurate because it is incomplete, but other passages clearly contain an error. The most curious piece of information is found in mḥ/pa xii.23 where we read that insects smell through the tunic of their eyebrows. Comparison with Aristotle’s text and Averroes’ commentary On Animals shows that Judah probably misread his source: Averroes says instead that this happens through the diaphragm, which presupposes the Arabic term ḥiğāb, whereas Judah’s “eyebrows” is evidently based on a reading ḥāğib.191 The mistake is found in all the relevant mss of the mḥ and can therefore hardly be due to scribal transmission, and Falaquera, too, has the correct reading in his df.192 Even if the Arabic manuscript used by 188 189 190 191 192

For some more examples, cf. mḥ/Heavens i.6, n. 30; mḥ/Soul ii.8. n. 53; mḥ/Sense ii[3.]4, n. 110 and mḥ/Sense ii[3.]5, n. 115. mḥ/gc i.8, n. 25; cf. ed. Eichner, Ch. iv. Averroes, Comm. Anim. 432r. Averroes, Comm. Anim. 429v; cf. the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s pa at 659b16, ed. Kruk, 53. Falaquera, df 218v.

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Judah carried this error, it must be observed that Judah clearly did not pay attention here to what he was writing. Another mistake, likewise in the section on zoology, occurs in mḥ/ga xvii.2: the Hebrew text states: “Partridges have something that is peculiar to them, for when the males perceive the smell of females their bellies will fill with eggs, for they have a strong desire and the mere smell is sufficient for them.” In the source-text (and also in the parallel-passage in the df) it is of course the females whose bellies are filled with eggs when they perceive the smell of males.193 One might surmise that Judah attached less importance to the zoological portions of Aristotle’s natural philosophy and hence was less careful in this section. On the other hand we also find mistakes in other sections of the work, for instance in his survey of On the Soul. Here Judah maintains that “the soul is potentially one and actually many.”194 His source has the correct reading “one in actuality, many in potentiality,” and so has the Hebrew translation of Averroes by Moses Ibn Tibbon.195 In the same treatise he misreads ġāyah (end) as ġāḏiyah (nourishing).196 Another reading mistake seems to underlie the statement that dreams “occur because of the perfect providence for man.”197 His source has “because of the perfect purpose for man,” and so has Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Averroes. Perhaps Judah misread ġāyah (purpose, end) for ʿināyah (providence), or alternatively, the manuscript that he used contained this error. It should be emphasized however, that such outright errors or “slips of the pen” are few in comparison to the passages that lack clarity as a result of incompleteness of coverage. The overall “redaction” (if this term is at all adequate here) of the mḥ reveals a similar picture. At times we see Judah excerpting his source very carefully. In mḥ/Heavens ii.6, for example, Judah explains that the stars heat by motion and by friction, which corresponds to mc Heavens 229.9, but he omits Averroes’ elaboration on the role of air as an intermediary in this process. Consequently, when he goes on to say that the heating force of the stars is commensurate

193

194 195 196 197

Averroes, Comm. Anim. 469v15–20, df 252va2, and cf. Arist., ga 751a15. Contrary to his source, Judah refrains from recording that sound may also produce this effect. From Judah’s account it is moreover not clear that the phenomenon under consideration concerns wind-eggs. mḥ/Soul ii.6, n. 47. mc Soul 50.3–4; Moses Ibn Tibbon, ed. Ivry 44.122–123. mḥ/Soul ii.10, n. 61. mḥ/Sense ii[3].11, n. 139.

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with their size (copying mc Heavens 230.4–5), he omits the mc’s addition “and in accordance with their nearness to the air.” At other times, however, he appears to work less carefully, for one finds crossreferences that do not have a match, as is the case with a reference to Physics vii in mḥ/gc i.2. Again, in mḥ/gc ii.9 Judah refers to the definition of mixture in gc i, whereas in fact no such definition is found there. Of course it may be the case that Judah is referring to passages in his sources and not in his own work, but even then such references are likely to have sown confusion. What is more, there are also a few cross-references to other sections of his own encyclopedia where no match is found. This happens twice in mḥ/Meteor.: in iii.1 we find a reference to “the section on optics,” a section that does not exist, and in ii.18 he refers to the explanation of a certain term for hailstones in Treatise 2 of his compilation, in which treatise one looks in vain for the announced explanation.198 Furthermore, there are instances where different passages provide contradictory information on a given subject: in his survey of logic, in his account of the category of “quantity,” Judah makes mention of two divergent views of “place”, one by Aristotle, and one by unspecified “others,” whereas in his account of Physics iv he records only Aristotle’s definition, which moreover deviates from what he wrote in the section on logic. Similarly, in the passage on Physics he does not refer to his statement in the passage on “quantity”, according to which the view held by the “others” allowed for the existence of the void. In his account of Physics iv he maintains that the void does not exist.199 Such inconsistencies can be explained by assuming that the version of the mḥ that is in our possession today was produced in stages, but if so, it obviously did not undergo a “final revision” in which the information provided in the various sections was made consistent. In any event it must be concluded that, also as a result of Judah’s succinctness, the mḥ’s survey of natural philosophy does not make for easy reading. In general, it can be said that a reader who sought to be informed about Aristotelian teachings could find most of them in Judah’s excerpt. However, if this reader had no previous philosophical knowledge he will have found it difficult to learn what Aristotle’s most important teachings are, since these are buried between many other statements, often without any clue as to the structure of the argumentation or context.

198

199

Theoretically it is possible that some of the missing portions did exist in the Arabic original of the mḥ, but if so it is difficult to see why Judah should have left them out in the Hebrew version. Cf. also below. See mḥ/Physics iv.2–5. For the views on “place” in the survey of logic, see ms O 11r.

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Scholars who have studied other parts of the mḥ have come to similar conclusions. C. Manekin evaluates the section on logic as “a skillful abridgment,” but also maintains that “Judah manages to touch on most of the major points of the modal syllogistic in a remarkably concise—perhaps overly concise— fashion.”200 T. Lévy asserts that the organization of the Euclidean text in the section on geometry “manifests a real mastery of the deductive structure of the Elements,” “even if one can find certain incoherencies.”201 According to Lévy, a beginning reader who was “really interested in geometrical issues” could find the basic tools in it, but for more advanced study he would need to consult other treatises.202 Here too, Judah “abridges the [complex mathematical] demonstrations, although at times to the point of reducing them to mere indications.”203 Y.T. Langermann, on the other hand, considers Judah’s paraphrases of Ptolemy’s Almagest and al-Biṭrūğī’s Principles of Astronomy in the section on astronomy “clearly and carefully worded.”204 A. Ivry, who has studied a section belonging to natural philosophy, is less convinced of the adequacy of the coverage of On the Soul in the Hebrew encyclopedias in general, and that in the mḥ in particular. In his view, Judah is less successful than Falaquera in conveying the sources adequately.205 Ivry underlines Judah’s conciseness in summarizing his sources and moreover views the accounts of the soul in the encyclopedias as “introductions that would have left the reader puzzled more often than not.”206 He suggests therefore that these texts were not only read, but also taught, that is that they were studied together with a teacher. In the case of the mḥ we have indications that the text was indeed studied,207 and despite all its shortcomings it was copied many more times than Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim of which we have only two manuscripts, in both of which parts are missing. How are we to explain that a scholar who apparently was well versed in various disciplines and at a young age became engaged in intellectual exchange with the savants of his time compiled a survey of philosophy and science that must have made heavy demands on his readers? This question would have been eas200 201 202 203 204

205 206 207

Manekin, “The Logic of the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 282 and 287. Lévy, “Mathematics in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah,” 302 and 304. Ibid., 312. Ibid. Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen,” 374. Garshtein (Astronomy and Astrology, 27–31) is of the opinion that Judah’s translation of the portions from al-Biṭrūğī’s astronomy is accurate. Ivry, “The Soul of the Hebrew Encyclopedists,” 393. Ibid., 395. For traces of study in the manuscripts, see below, Introduction to the Edition.

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ier to answer if we knew how the Hebrew version produced in Italy relates to Judah’s own Arabic original composed in Toledo. Did the two versions cover the same material in the section on natural philosophy, or did the author-translator either add to the original contents or omit parts of them? In the absence of the Arabic original we inevitably enter the domain of speculation. If we suppose that the Arabic version was more extensive, and included, for example, more excerpts from Averroes’ commentaries, including the text-portions that are absent in the Hebrew version, the question arises why Judah should have left these passages out when translating his work. Seeing that his coreligionists in Italy requested him to provide them with a survey of contemporary science, why should he have withheld from them certain portions of his book? As noted, there is no clear pattern or strategy that can account for Judah’s omissions other than the abbreviation techniques mentioned above, in combination with a certain arbitrariness on the part of the author. On the other hand, if we assume that Judah made additions to or corrected things during the translation-process, which is theoretically possible, the question arises to which additional sources Judah had access in Italy. As we have seen (Chapter One) Judah seems to have sojourned in mid-Italy, and we have little to no information on the availability of Averroes’ Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises there in his day. Michael Scot is known to have translated Avicenna’s commentary on Aristotle’s On Animals in 1220–1221. It is possible that he did so in Bologna, but we have no reports about the presence of Averroes’ commentaries there. Unfortunately, not much is known about where exactly Michael Scot translated Averroes’ commentaries into Latin, but it seems unlikely that the full range of them was circulating at that time in Central Italy.208 This would imply that when his Italian coreligionists asked Judah to provide them with a survey of the sciences in Hebrew he was left to his own devices. It would also mean that he could not consult his original sources, unless we sup-

208

D.N. Hasse writes that it is uncertain “where we have to locate his [Scot’s] main activity as translator and author: in Spain, Bologna, the papal court, or the Hohenstaufen court” (Latin Averroes Translations, 6 n. 4). Following an observation by A. van Oppenraay on the difference in quality between Scot’s translation of Aristotle’s On Animals, made in Toledo, and that of Avicenna’s On Animals, made in Italy, Hasse suggests that it “seems to have been more difficult for him to get expert advice by Arabic speakers in Italy than in Toledo,” ibid., 11–12, cf. van Oppenraay, “Michael Scot’s Arabic-Latin Translation,” 34. The story in Immanuel’s Maḥbarot on the theft of books from book-crates recently arrived from Toledo in Perugia also illustrates the perceived paucity of scientific books in mid-Italy, cf. Brener, “Stealing Wisdom.”

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pose that he carried a knapsack filled with manuscripts of all of Averroes’ commentaries, Middle Commentaries and Epitomes, when traveling from Spain to Italy.209 It is not too far-fetched to assume, however, that he brought his own Arabic compilation based on his study of the sciences in his youth in Toledo. If these reasonings are correct, the conclusion is that this own text is all he had at his disposal when translating his work into Hebrew. Therefore, I tend to believe that the Hebrew version was not very dissimilar to the Arabic one and hence, that the perceived unevenness and lack of clarity were present already in Judah’s original compilation.210 In my view, the most likely explanation for these features (or if one wishes, deficiencies), is that the part on natural philosophy of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah is, in fact, the fruit of Judah’s own study in his young years, that is, that it is his personal note-book. Following this line of thought, the following picture emerges: inspired by the debate over the study of philosophy in Toledo in his day, Judah set out to peruse Averroes’ commentaries, the gateway to Aristotle’s writings, taking notes and writing comments where he deemed this necessary, skipping over things that he considered less important and not recording exactly how Averroes went from one subject to another. Perhaps he did not do so because this was clear to him and he intended to focus on the doctrines and statements themselves, so as to have a text-book or vademecum of Aristotelian philosophy. Later, when in Italy he was asked to provide his coreligionists with a survey of non-Jewish knowledge he simply translated his own text-book in order to comply with their request, for better or for worse. This explanation ties in with his double motivation: Jews should acquire knowledge of the sciences but should not waste too much time on them. The Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah fulfilled these requirements: Jews could learn the basics of Aristotelian natural philosophy from it through the most authoritative sources of his day, Averroes’

209

210

According to M. Zonta (“A Case of “Author’s Variant Reading”,” 479–480 and Il Commento medio, 56), it is possible that Judah brought a manuscript of Averroes’ (Middle) commentary on the Metaphysics to Italy. It is of course possible that in Italy he added some material that was not related to Averroes’ commentaries to the Hebrew version. This may be the case with the brief exposition on the Chosen People at the end of the work in which he polemicizes with a nonJewish scholar, see Sirat, “À la cour de Frédéric ii Hohenstaufen” and Fontaine, “Religious polemics.” The argumentation seems to be directed against an otherwise unidentified Christian scholar, whom Judah may have encountered in Frederick’s entourage. The Messianic computation for the year 1260 may also have originated in Italy seeing that Joachim of Fiore postulated the same year for the ushering in of a period of redemption, see Chapter Seven, section 4. The observation on the elephant that he saw in Lombardy was of course added during his sojourn in Italy.

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commentaries, but would not need to bother about all its complexities and subtleties. One may wonder, however, whether this knowledge would have been sufficient when it came to polemical discussions.

5

The Language of the mḥ

The language of the mḥ can be characterized as an idiosyncratic specimen of Arabic-into-Hebrew medieval philosophical translation literature. The main component is Rabbinic Hebrew influenced by Arabic grammar and vocabulary. Moreover, the sections studied in this volume contain a number of Arabic words and also a few Aramaic ones, and Judah also weaves quotations from Biblical Hebrew and rabbinic literature into his text. 5.1 Biblical and Rabbinic Expressions and Quotations The following biblical locutions or rabbinic expressions are found in Judah’s survey of natural philosophy. – mḥ/Physics v.2: the transition from non-being to non-being is called “a vain thing” (Deut. 32:47), that is, it is impossible. The same expression occurs in Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s translation of Maimonides, Guide iii.26 and iii.50 (end). The context in iii.26 is the reasons for the commandments: Maimonides explains that if you think that legislation is “a vain thing,” “it is because of you,” which means “the deficiency resides in your apprehension.”211 In Guide iii.50 the expression is applied to narratives in general: the reason for a story may not always be clear, but that does not imply that there is no reason. Maimonides brings the narrative of the stations of the Children of Israel in the desert (Num. 33:2) as an example. – mḥ/gc i.6: Judah mocks Averroes’ refutation of a view by Alexander of Aphrodisias, saying that the Commentator re-establishes Aristotle’s opinion as is his habit with everyone who says anything against Aristotle “as if his soul were bound to that of [Aristotle]” (1Sam. 18:1 about David and Jonathan, and Gen. 44:30 about Jacob and Benjamin). – mḥ/Meteor. iii.3: The biblical term qeshet Noaḥ (Noah’s bow) renders the Arabic technical term qaws quzaḥa for rainbow. – mḥ/Meteor. ii.18 (n. 101): The term avnei el-gabish, found in Ezek. 13:11,13 and 38:22 as a term for hailstones is used here for the thunderbolt.

211

Trans. Pines 507; cf. also a bit further on, trans. Pines 508. Maimonides refers here to jPeʾah i and jKet viii.

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– mḥ/pa xii.25, in a passage on the tongue describing the requirements for speech it says: “someone who possesses them to a greater degree will have ‘a mouth speaking great things’” (Dan. 7:8). – mḥ/ga xviii.9, in a passage on resemblance: “Why is it that bastards resemble the fathers more than legal children? It is written: ‘The eyes of the adulterer watch for twilight (Job 24:15): owing to the love of the lover for his beloved.’ Consequently, the [male] semen prevails in respect of genus, individual form and resemblance.” – mḥ/ga xviii.18: The Hebrew words for youth (baḥur), manhood ( yeshisim) and old age (ziqnah) are those that occur in 2 Chron. 36:1. – mḥ/Soul ii.5: Judah quotes 1Sam. 25:6 (the episode of Nabal) “and say as follows to the animal (ḥayy)” to explain why he uses the Hebrew ḥayy to render the Arabic ḥayawān, see mḥ/Soul ii.5, n. 43. – mḥ/Soul iii.10: When describing the utility of the faculty of the imagination, Judah casts the well-known example used by the philosophers of an animal fleeing from what is harmful and seeking what is helpful for it in terms that are reminiscent of Gen. 2:20 ʿezer ke-negdo, mḥ/Soul iii.10 n. 221. – mḥ/Sense ii.[3]6: The enigmatic term baʿalei ha-mahatalot (“the jesters”) is apparently based on the biblical hapax that appears in Isa. 30:10, see mḥ/Sense ii.[3]6 n. 121. Moreover, the zoological section contains a number of animal names that are taken from the Bible or rabbinic literature, such as: – mḥ/pa xii.25: the biblical word tinshemet, which probably stands for chameleon in Lev. 11:30 and for a kind of owl in Lev. 11:18 and Deut. 14:16 is used for the lizard. – mḥ/pa xiii.5: zemer (Deut. 14:5) is used for giraffe. – mḥ/pa xiii.23 (n. 180): The name for “hare,” ‘the small-feeted’ (ṣaʿir haraglayim) is that used in yMeg i.71d. – mḥ/ga xv.2 (n. 267) ḥuldat ha-senaʾit (for porcupine) is apparently based on the Mishnaic term ḥuldat ha-senaʾim (mKil viii.5). – mḥ/ga xvi.10 (n. 348): The biblical word taḥmas (Lev. 11:16 and Deut. 14:15, “nighthawk”) is used for “swallow”; with the Arabic word ḥuṭṭāf added. – mḥ/ga xix.2 (n. 513): The Mishnaic term kelev kufri (mKil i.6) is used for “wild dogs.” Expressions/quotations from rabbinic literature appear in the following passages: – mḥ/pa xii.4: “one should not answer the lion after his death, but only in his face” (bGittin 83b). Judah uses this expression when treating the question

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whether the common sense is in the flesh, as Aristotle maintains, or in the nerve as Galen believes, and he advances it to defend Galen’s position, cf. Chapter Five, section 1. – mḥ/Soul ii.1, when explaining the difference between the first and the final perfection of form, Judah adds: “And this is like what is said: It is not study which is most important but action” (mAvot 1:17). – mḥ/Soul iii.8: in a passage on opinion and assent Judah translates the Arabic qāniʿun (persuaded) by sameaḥ, adding to it: “that is to say ‘rejoicing in his portion’” (mAvot 4:1). Likewise, Judah occasionally uses Aramaic vocabulary, such as lizbez (rim) in mḥ/Heavens iv.6, and aṭmaʾ (thigh, flank) in mḥ/pa xiv.12,13. In mḥ/pa xii.4 we find the Aramaic expression bukhana we-asita for “rib and rib-joint.” In his treatise devoted to biblical exegesis Judah sometimes also inserts an Aramaic expression.212 Here we should also mention his frequent use of a term that is very common in Halakhic reasoning, namely hi-lekhakh (therefore), and one of the terms that he uses for “cause,” namely gerama.213 The references and allusions to Jewish traditional literature vivify the terse style of Judah’s expositions somewhat. Besides forming part and parcel of his own mental make-up, they may have been intended to make the philosophical information more palatable to Hebrew readers. In any event, they certainly lend a Jewish flavor to his work. 5.2 Arabic Words The over hundred Arabic words that appear throughout the mḥ in Hebrew transliteration are for the most part technical terms.214 The Arabic words were probably found in Judah’s Arabic original, and if so, they constitute the only remainder of this version. At the same time, they point to Judah’s sources, for in most cases they can be traced back to Averroes’ commentaries. Sometimes he indicates that a certain term is Arabic, by adding “in Arabic,” but at other times he just writes the Arabic term without further explanation or Hebrew equivalent. This occurs in particular in the zoological sections. Here one gains the impression that at times Judah was at a loss as to how render specific animalnames in Hebrew, for example for crocodile or insects. Arabic terms for the four

212 213 214

For instance beram ṣerikh at le-meidaʿ, ed. D. Goldstein, line 263. See also Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 134–135. The Arabic terms that appear in the section on natural philosophy as well as some others are listed in Appendix B.

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classes of bloodless animals (insects, testacea, crustacea, cephalopods) are rendered inconsistently. For “snake” he uses ḥayah.215 At times Judah uses Arabic and Hebrew terms interchangeably: for the sutures of the skull he writes both the Arabic durūz, and Hebrew neqavim and tefirot; for testicles beiṣim and ashakhim, but once Arabic unṯayān, and for the bladder kis ha-sheten and keli ha-sheten alongside Arabic maṯānah.216 Something similar is the case in the exposition on “the transparent” (mḥ/Soul ii.17ff.), for which Judah uses derivations of the Arabic verb shaffa, but once he writes m-s-p-g. The Arabic words in his text may take a Hebrew plural or a Hebrew ending or they appear with the Hebrew article, which results in “hybrids” like zarqut (bluishness), minqarot (beaks), or combinations like ṣarār ha-layla (mḥ/Soul ii.30 n. 157) or ha-koaḥ ha-nuzuʿit (the appetitive faculty). The term ha-gavni (“cheesy”) in mḥ/Meteor. iv.8 may be an Arabic loanword, but it may also be a neologism. Likewise, it is not certain whether the word ‫מח‬ in mḥ/Meteor. iii.5 which denotes a color that appears in the rainbow, should be read as Arabic muḫḫ or as Hebrew moaḥ. 5.3 Influence of Arabic Besides specific terms, Judah’s language also displays grammatical features that testify to the influence of the Arabic sources he is rendering. Some examples: – Following Arabic grammar, the Hebrew hiʾ (singular) can refer to a plural subject, rendering the Arabic hiya. – A plural subject (murgashot) is the subject of a verb in the singular, 3 fem. (tenaʿneʿa) (mḥ/Sense 672.5–6). – The direct object is frequently introduced by the preposition le-, often after the verb le-qabbel, but also after other verbs: mḥ/pa 514.10 ha-meqabbelet le-yitron; mḥ/ga 550.2 we-qabbalat ha-reḥem lahen; mḥ/Meteor. 470.6 tofes la-reṭivut; mḥ/Soul 604.11 menaʿnaʿat lo. This feature may also be influenced by Aramaic. – Occasionally, a grammatical error can be traced back to the Arabic sourcetext: in hayah ha-sekhel we-ha-muskal mimennah (mḥ/Soul 648.13) the ungrammatical mimennah renders Arabic minha.

215

216

S. Sela (“Al-Farghānī,” 331) notes that Abraham bar Ḥiyya, Abraham Ibn Ezra and Anatoli all use this term for the stellar constellation “snake” because of the homophonous Arabic ḥayya. In Garshtein’s list of terms used in the astronomical and astrological sections of the mḥ yet another term for “bladder” occurs: kis mei-raglayim (Astronomy and Astrology, 83).

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– The use of calques, such as ḥazar for Ar. ʿāda (mḥ/Sense 672.8), and nitqan tiqqun (“most perfectly made,” mḥ/Heavens 404.13) for ʾutqinat ʾitqānan. A peculiar calque is lakhen, which in Hebrew means “therefore,” but in the mḥ often renders the almost homophonous Arabic lakinna (“but, however”). This idiosyncratic usage results in Hebrew sentences that are confusing at first sight (mḥ/Physics 358.7; mḥ/gc 416.11; mḥ/Meteor. 474.5; mḥ/Soul 610.6; 612.1; 618.4; 626.13; 642.1).217 Other features of Judah’s translation-technique include the following:218 – The Arabic fa- is usually not translated, but is sometimes rendered by we(mḥ/Soul 598.14 we-einah or mḥ/Sense 672.9 we-yiqreh) or it is simply omitted. Judah mentions the use of Arabic fa- in the section on logic (ms O 15r). – The often used Heb. lefi-khakh may render Ar. li-ḏālika; li-hāḏā; min ʾağli, and min al-bayyin. – Heb. baʿavur translates various Arabic expressions: ʿan; min; ʿalā; li-makān; li-mawḍiʿ; li-hāḏā. – Heb. keiṣad occasionally renders Ar. maṯal (but the Arabic word is also translated as mashal). – One Arabic term is rendered by two Hebrew terms. Examples: muḥākāt -> ha-dimyonot we-ha-meshalim (mḥ/Sense 680.9); ʾawwal -> reshit we-hatḥalah (mḥ/gc 430.9); muḫtalifun -> meshuneh muvdal (mḥ/Sense 660.10). – Two Arabic words are rendered by one Hebrew term. Examples: ḥazirah renders ʾinʿikās wa-ruǧuʿ (mḥ/Meteor. 442.17); ṣevaʿim = ʾalwān wa-ʾl-ʾasbāġ (mḥ/ Soul 620.11); sheqer = maḥāl wa-shaniʿu (mḥ/Soul 628.20); nitpaʿʿel = tanfaʿilu wa-tataʾṯṯaru (mḥ/Soul 638.12); ʿasīr ṣaʿb -> qasheh (mḥ/Sense 664.5); ḥinam = ʿabaṯan wa-bāṭilan (mḥ/Sense 682.8).219 – Two different Arabic terms are rendered by the same Hebrew term, as is the case with the term for the faculty of imagination: ha-koaḥ ha-dimyonit renders both al-quwwah al-mutaḵayyilah and al-quwwah al-muṣawwirah (mḥ/

217 218

219

Arndt ( Judah ha-Cohen, 134) observes that this usage is found also in other sections of the mḥ, cf. ibid. 165 and 212. As mentioned above, the sections of the mḥ studied here consist of a combination of different approaches: some passages are literally translated whereas others paraphrase or summarize the contents of Judah’s Arabic sources. It is not always easy to distinguish between these approaches, so that it is sometimes impossible to tell whether we are dealing with a translation or adaptation. The features listed here are taken from passages where Judah renders his source more or less literally. Again, the examples are not exhaustive. In mḥ/Soul 652.5 ḥinam renders ʿabaṯan.

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Sense ii[1]4 and mḥ/Sense ii[1.]7). In mḥ/Soul Judah uses maṭʿemet (instead of the more common ṭaʿam) both for Arabic ṭaʿam and ḏawq (the sense of taste). – Heb. bi-levad does not only mean “only,” but is also used in the sense of “in particular”/“especially,” often translating bi-ḫāṣatin. In other Hebrew translation texts, such as the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Commentary on Animals or Falaquera’s Deʿot we find the more common u-vi-feraṭ (mḥ/ga 578.12) or kol she-ken (df 262ra32) in parallel passages. In mḥ/Soul i.3 bilevad appears two times: the first time it renders the Arabic iḏan and the second time wa-ḏalika mattā ḥaṣala. 5.4 Terminology The most salient feature of Judah’s language is his unusual philosophical vocabulary. As several scholars have noted, it often differs from what we find in translations of the Tibbonids.220 Some examples:

mḥ

Tibbonid

‫חילול‬ ‫חלל‬ ‫מעורה‬ ‫הכח המפרה‬ ‫פריה‬ ‫הבל‬ ‫סדן‬ ‫חסדים‬ ‫מתנענע‬ ‫ עלה‬,‫גרמא‬ ‫בגמרא‬ ‫שיש לו חקר‬

‫שנוי‬ ‫ריקות‬ ‫ ריק‬,‫ערום‬ ‫כח מגדל‬ ‫צמיחה‬ ‫אד‬ ‫קוטב‬ ‫מדות‬ ‫מתנעע‬ ‫סיבה‬ ‫בשלוח‬ ‫בעל תכלית‬

220

alteration void devoid (of qualities) faculty of growth growth exhalation pole virtues to be moved cause absolutely finite

The designation “Tibbonid” in the table below is not meant to suggest that these terms were used consistently or invariably in all translations by members of the Tibbon-family. On Judah’s vocabulary, see Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology and idem, Review of G. Sermoneta, Un glossario filosofico, also Zonta, La filosofia antica, 121–122 and Fontaine, “Arabic Terms.” As Rosenberg (Review of G. Sermoneta, Un glossario filosofico) has noted, some of the terms mentioned in the list below are also used by Hillel of Verona and in Aaron ben Eliya’s Eṣ Ḥayyim, such as ‫ פריה‬and ‫חילול‬.

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In an earlier article i suggested that Judah’s use of non-Tibbonid terminology was inspired by his critical attitude towards philosophy.221 This assumption, however, may be incorrect. Judah employed Arabic sources, and since we do not know whether or to what extent Judah was familiar with the Hebrew Tibbonid translations that were available in his day, his use of non-Tibbonid terms may have been (partly) unconscious. S. Arndt has found that Judah derived much of his technical mathematical/astronomical vocabulary from Abraham bar Ḥiyya and also from Abraham Ibn Ezra. However, she found that he also deviates from their terminology and is not always consistent in his own choices.222 She notes: “Characteristic is the use of different terms carrying the same meaning side by side.”223 Drawing and expanding on Arndt’s findings, N. Garshtein established that Judah’s astronomical and astrological vocabulary contains terms employed by earlier authors (Abraham Ibn Ezra, and—to a lesser extent, Abraham bar Ḥiyya and Jacob Anatoli) as well as new terms coined by Judah.224 Arndt rightly observes that in the absence of the Arabic it is difficult to determine how faithul Judah was in translating the original.225 Yet, in the philosophical part, in sections where we can compare his terminology to his Arabic sources inconsistency in the use of technical terms is also noticeable: – Besides gerama Judah uses also ʿillah for “cause.” This is also the case in the section on logic (cf. ms O 14r, 35r, 44r; see also Introd. to Edition, section “Variant readings”). In the section on logic we find both gevul and gader for “definition.” – Arabic hayūlā (matter) is translated both as golem and as hiyuli (mḥ/Physics ii.2 and mḥ/gc i.5). – In mḥ/Sense ii[1].8 rasm is translated both as ḥaqiqah and as ḥoq in the same passage. – In mḥ/gc i. 5 Arabic yaǧrī occurs twice in one sentence; once it is translated as yehe, and once more literally as yaruṣ. – Arabic shakl is rendered both as temunah and as ṣurah (mḥ/Soul ii.7).

221 222

223 224 225

Fontaine, “Arabic Terms.” See Chapter iv of Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, which is devoted to Judah’s terminology in the sections on geometry, astronomy and his correspondence with the imperial court. Lévy (“Mathematics,” 302) notes that Judah’s mathematical terminology “hardly seems to have been borrowed from […] Abraham bar Ḥiyya and Abraham ibn Ezra.” Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 143. Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 76–81. Garshtein adds a most useful lexicon of Judah’s astronomical and astrological vocabulary, 81–87. Ibid., 140, 149.

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– Judah uses forms both of le-hasig and le-haskil for the Arabic taṣawwara; le-hasig also renders Arabic ʾadraka, whereas ʾadraka is also rendered by lehargish (see mḥ/Soul notes 196 and 239). – In mḥ/Soul 20 the Hebrew bi-gemara is given as an equivalent of Arabic ʿala ʾl -ʾiṭlāq, whereas in the section on logic two different Hebrew terms appear for the Arabic term: bi-khlal (ms O 29v) and gemara (ms O 29v). – In his explanation of the phenomenon of the rainbow in mḥ/Meteor. Judah uses nizzur for reflection, but in the section on logic he writes ḥizzur for the same phenomenon (with the Arabic equivalent ʿakās, ms O 45r). – In a few places Judah mentions the Arabic term malakah: in mḥ/Heavens ii.4 and mḥ/Soul iii.25 he translates it by Hebrew yesh, but in the section on logic (when discussing the category of quality) he renders it by qinyan (in the expression: al-malakah waʾl-ḥāl = Hebr. ha-qinyan we-ha-ʿinyan, ms O 11v).226 Arndt explains the divergent use of technical terms in Part 2 by assuming that Judah translated his work in stages.227 Since we do not know exactly when he rendered the philosophical part into Hebrew this scenario could apply her also. As noted, the only certain data are that he saw an elephant in Italy 1245 and that he wrote his survey of al-Biṭrūğī’s astronomy in 1247. Moreover, there are some cases where his philosophical terminology in the Introduction is divergent from that in the actual survey, which may support Arndt’s assumption.228 However, if he translated the sections on natural philosophy in different stages it is hard to see why he should shift from one term to another within the same section or even in the same sentence, as can be seen in some of the above examples.229 Moreover, one can also point to inconsistency with respect to non-technical terms. To mention but one example: in the section on On Sense we find three different translations (ish, adam and enosh) for Arabic marʾ (man), and two (adam and enosh) for Arabic ʾinsān (man, human being). In the absence of more secure data on the history of the Hebrew version, all one can

226 227

228

229

On this term cf. Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico, 77, see also below Appendix B. Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen, 159; 164; 214–217. This theory is endorsed by Garshtein, who also raises the possibility that the divergent terminology was perhaps already found in the Arabic original, Astronomy and Astrology, 79–80. We note the following: In the list of unproven Aristotelian doctrines in the Introduction Judah writes meʿoreh for “bare of forms,” but in the corresponding section on the Physics yitroqen (mḥ/Physics i.4); kaddur instead of shamayim (in mḥ/Physics iv.3), and kolelet instead of sovevet (mḥ/Heavens i.1). For the specific case of diverging terminology in ms O, see below, Introduction to the Edition.

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say is that consistency or standardization in the rendering of Arabic terms was not Judah’s priority. Some unusual terms in Judah’s philosophical vocabulary deserve special attention:230 – einut (‫אינות‬, absence, privation) in the plural, for example in mḥ/Physics 346.13, where the corresponding passage in Kalonymus’ translation of Averroes’ mc Physics has ha-heʿderim. Some scribes have misread the term as eikhut or eikhuyot, which does not make sense (cf. n. 20 ad loc.). Einut also appears in mḥ/Physics vi.2 in the combination einut ha-ḥeqer (the impossibility of infinity), where it parallels Kalonymus’ i-efshar. In mḥ/Heavens 402.12 “blindness is the einut of sight,” einut renders Arabic ʿadam. The term is not frequent in medieval Jewish philosophical texts (it is not listed in Klatzkin’s Thesaurus), but also occurs in Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim, ms Leiden Or 4758, fol. 157r right col., line 2 from below in the phrase: we-hahefsed be-eikhut we-hu niqraʾ einut. Later on in the mḥ the term is found in mḥ/Meteor. 478.2 and mḥ/Soul 652.17. In mḥ/Soul 638.6 two terms (peqidah and einut) render the Arabic ʿadam.231 (in mḥ/Metaph we read the plural einim, ms O 117v). – kammut (quantity) in the plural (mḥ/Physics 356.13), which seems to denote “magnitudes” since this term is also found further on in mḥ/Physics in ms O (f. 48r) in a marginal gloss to the word “magnitude” (godel). The gloss, written by the copyist himself, reads: “in the vernacular manyitudin, and gedalim is manyitutidini and these are the kammutim like a line and a surface …” (cf. Introduction to the Edition, Appendix). – demut. For “color” different terms are used: marʾeh (mḥ/Physics 384.10); ʿayn (mḥ/ga 554.14); ṣevaʿ (mḥ/ga 552.18, mḥ/Soul ii.16,17,18 ff.), but more often the term demut denotes “color” (mḥ/Physics 382.4; mḥ/gc 426.4; mḥ/Soul 592.9, 606.12). The plural is sometimes demutim (mḥ/ga 558.1, mss NB), but also demuyot (mḥ/Meteor. 464.17, mḥ/ga 588.1, mḥ/ga 558.1, mss OCV). In mḥ/Meteor. i.6 the Arabic word for colors (alwān) is rendered both as demutim and as demuyot. The term demut also denotes resemblance (mḥ/ga 570.5).

230 231

Cf. also the remark on the use of bi-levad (above 5.3). On the Arabic term and its Hebrew equivalents, see Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico, 75–77, and peshat in Context—A Thesaurus of Pre-Modern Philosophic and Scientific Hebrew Terminology, ed. Reimund Leicht/Giuseppe Veltri, accessed Tue Mar 22 17:13:34 cet 2022, https://peshat.org/display/peshat_lemmas_00030551 s.v. einut.

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– ha-sekhel ha-mefaʿʿel for the active intellect. In some manuscripts the term is vocalized, apparently to distinguish it from mifʿal, which renders Ar. fiʿl (mḥ/Heavens 398.5; mḥ/Soul 594.13) and infiʿāl (mḥ/gc 424.6; mḥ/Soul 608.1). In this last instance Moses Ibn Tibbon renders the Arabic by hipaʿalut. In mḥ/Soul 638.4 the term m-f-ʿ-l (rendering infiʿāl, but vocalization uncertain) stands for “passivity” or “receptivity.” In mḥ/pa 482.14 ha-tifʿelet is used in the sense of “the being acted upon.” – In his survey of the Metaphysics the term kiyya appears a few times as an equivalent of the Arabic anniya (“that-ness”), also used with a suffix (“its that-ness”). This neologism seems to be unique to the mḥ.232 Judah obviously found it difficult to write in Hebrew. It should be recalled that when he compiled his Hebrew version there were not many Hebrew philosophical texts available on which he could draw and that in fact his own Hebrew text forms part of the Arabic-into-Hebrew translation movement. In the passage on the reason for his auto-translation Judah invokes the well-known theme of the “constraints of the Hebrew language,” asking the reader to judge him favorably.233 While this in part may account for some of his translation-techniques, it hardly explains other linguistic features of his text, such as the avoidance of metathesis in hitpaʿʿel-forms of roots of which the first letter is a sibilant, for example yitṣayyer (mḥ/gc 418.14; mḥ/Soul 648.10) and yitshalshel (mḥ/pa 530.5) instead of the more common yiṣṭayyer and yishtalshel. 232 233

See Fontaine, “The First Survey,” 276. ms O 123v–124r. On the topos of the constraints of the Hebrew language, see Ivry, “Philosophical Translations,” 178 and Zwiep, Mother of Reason and Revelation, 63 and n. 152. A few decades later Zeraḥya uttered the same complaint, see Zonta, Il Commento medio, 65.

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Judah ha-Cohen’s Critique of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy In Chapter Two we have already seen that in his Introduction Judah ha-Cohen expressed serious misgivings about the usefulness and reliability of philosophical knowledge. Indeed one of the motives underlying the composition of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah was his skepticism about the possibility of attaining certain knowledge through (Aristotelian) philosophy. The bottom line of his argument was that sevara (logical deduction or syllogistic reasoning) based on sense-perception cannot lead to knowledge of the higher, immaterial world. Aristotelian philosophy thus has severe limitations. What is more, according to Judah, it even falls short of providing true knowledge about many phenomena in the lower world, the world of generation and corruption. His critical attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy comes to the fore on several occasions throughout the mḥ and takes on various forms. The work contains two extensive passages, in the Introduction and in Treatise 1, in which Judah launches a methodological attack on Aristotle’s thought as a whole. These two passages consist of lists of Aristotelian doctrines or premises that, in Judah’s view, are not proven. Moreover, in his survey of natural philosophy Judah interrupts his presentation at regular intervals by inserting comments on the doctrines he found in his sources. The term “criticism” does not correctly apply to these comments in all instances. Most of them can indeed be called “critical” in that they point to inconsistencies in Aristotle’s thought or raise doubt about specific tenets. Yet there are also comments that do not express objections to the philosopher’s views but rather evince a genuine interest in them. The present chapter aims to examine the extent of Judah’s “criticism” by first surveying Judah’s interventions in his coverage of the treatises on natural philosophy (section 1), and then considering them in relation to the lists in the two longer passages (section 2). His attitude towards Aristotelian philosophy will be further assessed in Chapter Five, which treats the controversy between Aristotle and Galen regarding biological issues, and Chapter Six, which examines Judah’s interpretation of biblical verses.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_005

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Judah’s Comments on Aristotelian Doctrines in His Survey of Natural Philosophy

Most of Judah ha-Cohen’s comments are found in his exposition of the first four treatises of Aristotelian natural science.1 Whereas, as we have seen in the preceding Chapter, his survey of philosophy reproduces Averroes’ commentaries, which he abridges, paraphrases or summarizes, in these interventions we hear his own authorial voice. Often these passages are introduced by the words “there is a safeq here.” The term safeq (doubt, problem, objection) is the equivalent of the Arabic shakk, which renders the Greek problema, or aporia.2 Judah uses it to indicate that he has something to say about the doctrine at hand. I will consider Judah’s remarks in the order in which they appear in his survey,3 disregarding, however, passages that refer to a “doubt” or “problem” that Judah simply reproduces from his sources without adding any comments of his own on the issue.4 (i) mḥ/Physics i.2 (the order of learning) Judah ha-Cohen’s first critical comment is found in the first treatise of his exposition of Aristotle’s Physics. Following Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Physics, he treats the different kinds of proofs in physical and mathematical science, as well as the order of learning. The end of the passage reads: “Therefore, this book [= Aristotle’s Physics] contains the general principles (kelalot) of physical science, whereas the books that follow it deal with each of the beings (maṣuy maṣuy me-ha-meṣuʾim), for general things (kelaliyim) are more known to us than particular things (peraṭiyim).” Then follows a comment that is not found in his source: “This contradicts what was said in the Posterior Analytics,

1 It should be recalled here that Judah’s knowledge of Aristotle’s doctrines was indirect; his account is based on Averroes’ commentaries, see Chapter Three. Judah often writes “he said,” which reflects Averroes’ qāla when the Commentator quotes or refers to Aristotle. 2 On the Arabic term, see Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 285. In the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on On Generation and Corruption the term safeq renders shakk in passages where Aristotle’s Greek has aporia and zetezis, see ed. Kurland 1958, index. See Glasner, “The Evolution of the Genre,” for a discussion of the way in which the genre of “doubts” or questions developed in medieval Jewish philosophy. 3 For references to the relevant passages in Averroes, see the notes to my English translation of the passages discussed. 4 A case in point is his account of veridical dreams in pn ii[3.]3. Here he mentions a “doubt” as to how an immaterial intellect can be the purveyor of material individual objects. Judah reproduces the exposition as found in Averroes’ discussion of the issue without adding anything of his own.

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namely that the general things (kelaliyim) are further from sense-perception while the particulars (peraṭiyim) are nearer to us.” The problem referred to by Judah is a well-known and knotty problem, which has occupied ancient and modern commentators alike. However, we should note immediately that Judah ha-Cohen does not show any concern with the question what the correct interpretation of Aristotle may be. He contents himself with pointing out the contradiction, without going into detail as to the various interpretations given by the commentators. Nonetheless, it seems justified to elaborate a little on this comment since it has to do with the distinction between the proofs adduced in physical science (reʾayot) and the demonstrations used in mathematical science (mofetim). This distinction is crucial to Judah’s thought because it is bound up with his view on the hierarchy of the sciences and their relation to the three worlds, as articulated in his Introduction (see Chapter Two). Furthermore, he brings up the issue again in his First Treatise when rebutting Aristotle’s doctrine of the eternity of the world (see Chapter Six, section 2). In the passage under discussion Judah first explains, following Averroes, that mathematical demonstrations rank higher in the hierarchy of proofs than the proofs employed in physical science, since they proceed from what is prior by nature to the posterior, whereas the proofs used in physics proceed from the posterior (or composite)—the things that are more known to us—to the prior (or simple), which are more known by nature. In physical science the path of instruction is from the general (ha-kelalit) to the particular (ha-peraṭit), and the proofs (mofetim) employed in it proceed from composite (murkavin) to simple things (peshuṭot). This exposition, which is a slightly abridged rendering of a parallel passage in Averroes’ mc, is followed by the aforementioned statement on the contradiction with the Posterior Analytics. The passage in the mḥ is not very clear, which is due to Judah’s concise rendering of his source, and to the fact that he uses the term mofetim both as a designation for mathematical demonstrations and as a generic term for proofs, which is why at first sight he seems to contradict himself. However, there is indeed an ambiguity in Aristotle, as Judah notes. The two Aristotelian statements can be found in Physics 184a24 and Post. Anal. 72a1–5 respectively. In the Physics we read that one should advance from the universal to the particular which it embraces for it is the universal that is the more readily cognizable to the senses, whereas the passage in the Post. Anal. claims that the universal is furthest from the senses. There Aristotle says that what is nearer to senseperception is prior and more familiar to us (cf. also Post. Anal. 100a15–100b4). The confusion in Aristotle lies in his use of the term katholou in the Physics passage. According to some modern scholars, the term should not be taken in

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the sense of “universal,” but rather as something “general” in the sense of undetermined or undifferentiated, that is, something that is not yet analyzed, in the sense of “a kind of the whole” as opposed to “parts of the whole.”5 In Hebrew the term is rendered by forms of the root k-l-l, which can mean “to be general,” “to be universal,” and “to be common.” When taken in the sense of “to be general,” there is no contradiction between the two passages. That there is no contradiction is also the interpretation advanced by Philoponos.6 Moreover, modern scholars are divided on the question of whether Aristotle discusses two different subjects in Physics 184a16–26, namely the method of investigation in natural science (in a16–23) and the order of treatment in his books (a23–26), or whether the whole passage discusses only the first one.7 Philoponos who also addressed this problem, was of the opinion that Aristotle treated two different issues here.8 According to P. Lettinck, both Avicenna and Averroes took this approach although they do not discern clearly between the two issues.9 Furthermore, we should note that the term “composite” (murkav), which occurs in the mḥ as well as in the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary, does not appear in the passage of Aristotle’s Physics under consideration. Aristotle refers to “mingled things,” which Averroes seems to have equated with “composite things.”10 (ii) mḥ/Physics v.5 (motion and the categories) In mḥ/Physics v.5 the question is raised in which categories motion can take place. After recording the Aristotelian position that motion requires two contraries and that therefore the only three categories that admit of motion are the category of place (locomotion), the category of quality (alteration) and that of quantity (increase and decrease),11 Judah interrupts his exposition of Aristotle’s doctrines by remarking that doubts may be raised regarding the category of quantity. As he goes on to specify: in his Categories Aristotle had asserted that there are no contraries in quantity, for something cannot be said to be great or small in an absolute sense, but only in relation to something else. There-

5

6 7 8 9 10 11

See S. Harvey, Averroes on the Principles of Nature, 330 and Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 112– 113. See also the note in the translation of the Aristotelian text by Wicksteed and Cornford, 10. Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 36–37. Ibid. 112–113. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 106–107 and 113. S. Harvey, Averroes on the Principles of Nature, 329. Arist., Physics 226a24–25.

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fore, great and small cannot be real contraries. He then immediately counters this objection by adding that Abraham Ibn Daud of Toledo, “the Spaniard” had already provided a solution to this apparent contradiction. For this philosopher, Judah explains, had assumed that Aristotle’s statement in the Categories to the effect that the category of quantity has no contraries refers to what may be called “absolute quantity,” for example “number” (which has no matter), whereas the passage in the Physics refers to a special kind of quantity, namely the quantity which is peculiar to natural bodies. This second kind of quantity indeed has contraries, since every natural body has a certain limit with respect to its quantity and this limit has two extremes (smallness and greatness). Since diminution and growth can be seen as a process in one of two directions that are contraries, it can be said that there is movement in the category of quantity. Finally, at the end of the passage Judah ha-Cohen adds as his personal opinion that of the seven species of quantity it is only “body” which admits of movement. Curiously, this solution, which Judah ha-Cohen attributes to Ibn Daud, is not found in so many words in any of the two extant Hebrew versions of Ibn Daud’s philosophical treatise.12 Unless we are dealing with an error on Judah’s part, this leaves us with three possibilities: (i) Judah ha-Cohen quotes a passage from the Arabic original of Ibn Daud’s work which has not been preserved in the Hebrew translations; (ii) he quotes from a work by Ibn Daud that is no longer extant, or (iii) this solution is the result of Judah ha-Cohen’s own interpretation of various statements by Ibn Daud. It should be observed, however, that Ibn Daud states emphatically that there are five kinds of quantities “and he who made them more, erred.”13 In this passage Judah ha-Cohen is considerably more elaborate than his sources. Although Averroes had reiterated Aristotle’s position that in the category of relation no movement exists as there are no contraries in this category, he did not use a similar argument to cast doubt on the existence of movement in the category of quantity. On the contrary, he stated unambiguously that the existence of contraries in the categories quality and quantity is evident and manifest.14 This means that Judah ha-Cohen was not following Averroes or

12

13 14

Ibn Daud discusses the category of quantity in his Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah i.1 (ed. A. Eran 122–126), and motion in quantity in er i.3 (ed. Eran 178) and i.5 (ed. Eran 208), and repeats that motion in quantity is that which is specific to a nourishing body in er ii.6.1 (ed. Eran 582). For a book on Physics composed by Ibn Daud, see the articles by Szilágyi and Langermann in Aleph 16.1 (2016): 10–60. Only a fragment of this composition is extant today. er i.1 (ed. Eran 124). Cf. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 420. Cf. mḥ/Physics V.5, n. 124.

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any other commentator of Aristotle here, but that it was his own perceptiveness to problems in Aristotle’s philosophy that made him point to this issue, although apparently his attention was drawn to it by Ibn Daud. However, he is not necessarily criticizing Aristotle in this particular passage. One rather gains the impression that his discussion stems from a genuine interest in the subject and that he subscribes to the solution allegedly proposed by Ibn Daud. Had it been his sole intention to detect contradictions in Aristotle’s thought he would not have hastened to harmonize the two passages. So in this case Judah’s comment should be seen rather as a supplement than as a critique. (iii) mḥ/Physics vi.4 (the end of motion) In mḥ/Physics vi Judah points to the following contradiction: according to one statement, the beginning and end of change are indivisible, whereas according to another, the end of motion does exist and can be indicated (murmaz).15 Judah adds: “Objections have been raised regarding his words here, because they seem to contradict each other, but we need not expand on it now.” The objections to which he refers concern problems resulting from Aristotle’s account of the divisibility of motion (Physics vi.iv–vi), in particular the interpretation of the notion of divisibility and the question of the (im)possibility of instantaneous change. These issues were addressed by Aristotle’s commentators, Alexander, Themistius, and Theophrastus, and were discussed in detail by Ibn Bājja and also by Averroes in all three of his commentaries on the Physics.16 The contradiction pointed out by Judah is not found in as many words in Averroes’ mc, Judah’s major source for his presentation of Physics, but in the Epitome we find it in a different formulation: “How can Aristotle say that the end of motion exists and is concrete, when he says that its beginning does not exist and is not concrete?”17 As might be expected, the Commentator tries to harmonize the two statements. Unfortunately, as a result of Judah’s decision “we need not expand on it now” we cannot know whether he entertained any thoughts of his own on the problem. For our goal it is sufficient to observe that he pointed out the contradiction without offering a solution. One wonders, though, why he chose to comment only on the issue of the end of motion, leaving aside

15 16

17

Cf. Physics 235b32–33 and 236a10–15; 27–28. For the discussion in Aristotle, the Greek commentators, Ibn Bājja and Averroes, see Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 456ff.; 481 ff. and 493; 499; 504–509. For Averroes’ solution and its importance, see Glasner, Averroes’ Physics, Ch. 7 “The Turning Point of Physics vi: The Breakdown of Motion.” For Gersonides’ treatment of this issue, see Eisenmann, “Gersonides’ Criticism of the Aristotelian System,” 100–105. Ed. Puig, 102.17–103.1.

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Aristotle’s position that there is no absolute beginning of motion, given the theological implications of this position. (iv) mḥ/Physics viii.2 (the eternity of motion) At the end of his survey of Physics, in Treatise viii Judah presents Aristotle’s theory of eternal motion as articulated in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Physics (mc Physics viii.2), which he knew in its first redaction.18 It is clear that he does not accept Aristotle’s view that there cannot exist a first motion that is not preceded by another motion (the infinite succession argument), but in the passage under consideration he does not criticize this view philosophically.19 Instead he interrupts his exposition four times to adduce biblical verses (Job 21:16, Job 38:4, Num. 24:16 and Job 5:13). What these verses show is that the human mind cannot comprehend such things and “that such a view belongs to the wicked.” Obviously, his opposition to Aristotle’s thesis has to do with the fact that it implies the world’s eternity, although Judah does not refer to that doctrine here. Its philosophical refutation is found instead in Treatise 1 on the explanation of biblical verses.20 On the Heavens (v) mḥ/Heavens i.4 (contraries of rest) Regarding the statement that to each contrary there can be no more than one contrary, Judah claims that this is subject to doubt, since Aristotle had asserted in Physics v that rest has two contraries, namely motion, and rest in the startingpoint of motion. In mḥ/Physics it is not stated in as many words that rest has two contraries, but perhaps Judah had in mind the following two statements in mḥ/Physics v.9, “The state of rest that is the contrary of motion is rest in the starting-point,” and, “Rest that is contrary to rest is the state of rest in the starting-point that is contrary to the state of rest in the goal.” Since Judah does not go into further detail it is hard to gather what exactly he meant.21 One gains the impression that his sole intention here is to point to an inconsistency in Aristotle’s thought.

18 19

20 21

See above, Chapter Three 2.2.2.3. For a different reading of this passage, see Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 53–54. According to Sirat, Judah employs here an argument that goes back to Philoponos’ refutation of the doctrine of the eternity of the world. In my view, Judah does not offer a counter-argument here; he merely presents Aristotle’s succession argument and argues against it by adducing biblical verses. See below Chapter Six, section 2. The reference seems to be to the problem that Aristotle unfolds in Physics 229b23–27.

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(vi) mḥ/Heavens i.9 (the non-generated and incorruptible) At the end of the first book of mḥ/Heavens it is argued that the terms “not generated” and “incorruptible” imply each other: what is not generated is incorruptible and what is incorruptible is not generated, just as what is corruptible is generated and vice versa. Here Judah follows the exposition in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on On the Heavens, where it is said that the eternal (al-ʾazalī) cannot be generated, except that Judah identifies Averroes’ “the eternal” with “the spherical body” and with “the Rock,” adding “about it is written, I will put you in a cleft of the Rock,” a quotation from Ex. 33:22. The identification of the ungenerated and the incorruptible with God entails an interpretative change: whereas Averroes in the parallel passage seeks to show along Aristotelian lines that the heavens are eternal (Arist., Heavens 282a21–283b22), Judah’s account suggests that the issue at stake is a proof of God’s eternity and emphasizes the incomparability between the divine and corruptible beings. Furthermore, the passage under consideration presents a problem in that it seems to contradict the earlier passage in mḥ/Heavens i.5 on the nature of the things that are beyond the outermost heaven. In that passage Judah reproduced Averroes’ assertion that these things are immaterial and not subject to change. However, whereas the Commentator examined the question whether this description refers to the First Cause and the separate principles or to the heavenly body, Judah omits the phrase “or to the heavenly body.” The omission may result either from his abbreviation techniques, or it may be deliberate. If it was deliberate, this would mean that, in his view, the description applied only to the first alternative, namely, the First Cause and the separate principles. Yet from mḥ/Heavens i.9 it appears that the circular body is neither generated nor corruptible, and indeed after the words “the circular body” mss B and N add, “that is to say, the sphere.” It is possible that Judah was confused by the question what, in Averroes’ rendering of Aristotle constitutes the supreme deity: the outermost heaven or a separate being.22 Regardless, the deviation from Averroes in mḥ/Heavens i.9 is important, for it implies a significant shift of emphasis: the eternal is unequivocally identified with God, and in this way Judah establishes a link with his coverage of Physics viii where he equated the unmoved mover with “the Rock,” who moves eternally and of whom it is written, “for I am the Lord, I change not” (Mal. 3:6).23 Moreover, the reference to Ex. 33:22 implies that “the Rock,” the eternal, is not knowable, for this was God’s answer to Moses’ request to show him His face. 22 23

On the problems surrounding Aristotle’s text and on Averroes’ interpretation, see Endress, “Averroes’ De Caelo,” esp. pp. 12–24. mḥ/Physics viii.4.

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(vii) mḥ/Heavens ii.4 (privation) In mḥ/Heavens ii Judah again points to a contradiction in Aristotle’s words: “When privation exists, the habitus (or: the positive, Hebr. yesh) necessarily also exists, since the habitus is prior to privation. This contradicts what was said at the beginning of the Physics, namely that privation is one of the principles.”24 However, Judah hastens to clarify that when referring to privation in the Physics, Aristotle had in mind “privation which is the opposite of form,” whereas in the present connection Aristotle is referring to something else, namely privation which is the opposite of a certain habitus (or: possession), for which Judah uses the Arabic word malakah. In other words, we are not dealing here with a real contradiction. Judah’s explanation is taken from Averroes, who also says that Aristotle uses the term “privation” here and that it refers to malakah, but Averroes does not claim that there is a seeming contradiction with the Physics. (viii) mḥ/Heavens ii.7 (motion of the spheres) After having stated the reason why the upper sphere moves from east to west, Judah raises the question, “Why does the upper sphere move from east to west and the spheres below it from west to east?” and adds “Aristotle does not say anything about it.” This observation is not found in Averroes’ mc Heavens; Judah’s source is probably Guide ii.19, where Maimonides likewise says that Aristotle failed to give the cause of this. Judah does not provide an answer, but a bit later on (mḥ/Heavens ii.10) he writes that mathematical science, which in this context denotes astronomy, was not yet complete in Aristotle’s day, an observation that is also found in Guide ii.19, as well as in Guide ii.24. In this context he adduces views of Ptolemy and al-Biṭrūğī.25 On Generation and Corruption (ix) mḥ/gc i.4–7 (on growth) In his survey of gc i Judah devotes considerable attention to the issue of growth. He first explains, following Averroes’ account in the mc, how growth and diminution take place in a body, stating that the growing thing grows only in its form and not in its matter, since that which persists in the growing thing is the form, whereas the matter dissolves and does not persist (mḥ/gc i.4). Next he refers to an analogy employed by Averroes to illustrate the persistence of form and the dissolution of matter: it is similar to a water-skin that at times 24 25

Cf. Arist., Heavens 286a22–26. See Langermann, “Some Remarks on Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen,” 371–377 for Judah’s preference of al-Biṭrūğī’s planetary astronomy over Ptolemy’s.

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expands by what is put into it and contracts at others, all the while retaining its shape (mḥ/gc i.5). Judah then records a different view held by Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to which the growing thing also grows in its matter on the grounds that the matter of this thing contains something which persists throughout the process. He then goes on to observe somewhat sarcastically: “Ibn Rushd refutes him and re-establishes Aristotle’s opinion as is his habit with everyone who makes claims against him, as if his soul were bound to that of Aristotle.”26 Then follows Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle, according to which the philosopher’s view was not that growth takes places in the form to the exclusion of matter, or in the matter to the exclusion of form, but that growth takes place in every particle of the growing thing by virtue of its form, not by virtue of its matter (mḥ/gc i.6). The last section of Judah’s treatment of growth consists of quotations from “a treatise by Alexander,” which he saw “later.” Here Alexander asserts that “growth takes place only in the form of a thing” (mḥ/gc i.7). As usual Judah summarizes his source, limiting himself to recording the most salient points of Averroes’ discussion. As a result it is not easy to see whether or not he himself entertained any particular view on the issue. To begin with, Judah does not pay any attention to Averroes’ explanation in his mc why Aristotle is so concerned to establish that the growing thing does not grow in every particle of its matter: if this were the case then the corollary would be that bodies can interpenetrate and that a void can exist in the growing body.27 Furthermore, Judah does not at all refer to the Commentator’s account of Alexander’s claim that Aristotle only used persuasive or rhetorical proofs in support of his view without supplying a demonstrative proof.28 Averroes emphatically rejected this claim, arguing that it is impossible that Aristotle would have been content with rhetorical proofs. In all likelihood it is this defense of Aristotle by Averroes that has elicited to Judah’s sarcastic comment. Judah also refrains from reproducing Averroes’ extensive treatment of Alexander’s view, so that it escapes the reader of the mḥ that Averroes, in presenting his own solution of the problem, in fact took Alexander’s objections into account.29 The Commentator’s interpretation of Aristotle’s view is therefore not a mere re-establishment of Aristotle’s position, and hence, Judah’s rendering of it does not do full justice to his source.

26 27 28 29

The last clause is a biblical expression, cf. Gen. 44:30 and 1Sam. 18:1. Tr. Kurland 1958, 34. Tr. Kurland 1958, 35. For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Ch. iii of Eichner, Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar, 83–110, especially p. 92 and p. 109.

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Finally, it is not clear what Judah intended to elucidate by adding the quotations from Alexander’s treatise, since he does not explain how it relates to Averroes’ criticism of Alexander. The quoted portions render the Arabic translation of Alexander’s tractate on growth, entitled “That growth takes place in the form, not in the matter” (Fī ʾan al-nushūʾ wa-ʾl-namāʾ yakunāni fī ʾl-ṣūrati lā fī ʾl-hayūla.)30 This treatise is not referred to in Averroes’ mc on On Generation and Corruption, and it is not certain that Averroes knew it.31 The quoted passage conveys that growth takes place only in the form of a thing. In other words, one gains the impression here that Alexander adopts Aristotle’s view after all, but Judah leaves the reader in the dark whether this is what he intended to explain. For our purposes, however, it is important to note that Judah is not explicitly leveling criticism at Aristotle here. His account merely reveals that there was an obscurity in Aristotle’s exposition, which gave rise to different interpretations among Aristotle’s commentators. The person under attack is rather Averroes, who is portrayed as blindly following Aristotle. (x) mḥ/gc ii.15–16 (individual recurrence) At the end of Book Two of On Generation and Corruption we find a most surprising departure from Aristotle’s teaching. After having explained—again following Averroes’ account in his Middle Commentary—that the motion of things that undergo change must be circular since they are set in motion by something that moves in a circle, Judah raises the question why individual human beings or animals do not recur upon themselves circularly.32 After all, the existents in the world of generation and corruption are moved by the cyclical motion of the sun along the ecliptic. According to Aristotle, he continues, perishable individual substances can recur only in species, not individually. However, he hastens to add that someone who carefully studies astrology will find that an individual will necessarily recur and live after having died. What is more, in the next sentence he maintains that this doctrine is “a principle (ʿiqqar) of our holy religion.” The conclusion with which he ends this passage probably provides a clue to the question of why Judah adopted the doctrine of transmigration, for 30

31 32

Ed. Ruland 1981. The section he quotes corresponds to lines 15–25 and 35–39 of Ruland’s edition of the Arabic text. As noted in Chapter Three, section 2.1, this is the only Greekto-Arabic text among Judah’s philosophical sources. The translation is ascribed to Abū Uthmān al-Dimashqī, the reliability of which is questioned by Ruland, cf. his ed., 61. The Greek text is Quaestio i.5, in Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Scripta Minora, ed. Bruns 1894, 13. See also trans. Kurland 1958, 164 n. 9. Eichner, Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar, 87 n. 14. See notes 88–89 of my translation of mḥ/gc ii.15–16. For Averroes’ discussion of this topic, see Eichner, Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar, 269–276.

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this last sentence expresses a Messianic expectation: “And since things return cyclically, therefore our kingdom will return, may it be His wish soon in our days.”33 The underlying theory is that the same constellation of the celestial bodies can recur at different periods of time and can thus cause the return of the same individuals. Hence Judah’s rejection of Aristotle’s doctrine has to do not so much with philosophical considerations but rather with his belief in astrology in combination with religious belief. One wonders whether the doctrine of a cyclical return of time also forms the background of a passage that is found at the very beginning of his account of On Generation. Here he writes: “When bread is corrupted, blood is generated. When blood is corrupted, semen is generated; and when semen is corrupted, a man is generated. When man passes away, dust is generated; and when dust is corrupted, a plant is generated. When this plant is corrupted, blood is generated, and so on and so forth.” Unlike the rest of his survey of gc this passage has no clear parallel in Averroes’ commentaries. To be sure, Judah does not bring in astrology here, but the context is a process of cyclical generation, so that the passage can perhaps be read as pointing to the cyclical return of perishable beings, albeit not specifically to individual recurrence. Meteorology (xi) mḥ/Meteorology i.10 (the Milky Way) Judah deals with the Milky Way only briefly. He notes that the light of the large number of stars in that part of the sphere is the cause of its catching fire, which Alexander held to be Aristotle’s cause of the Milky Way, and that Averroes has much to remark on this issue. Judah concludes that “this is not the place to discuss it.” Judah’s reluctance to go into detail may have to do with his stated aim to be concise. However, if we look at Judah’s source, it appears that Averroes did not express himself unambiguously with respect to the Milky Way. The discussion in the mc (and also in the Epitome) centers around the question of whether the Milky Way is due to reflection (that is, a visual effect) or to inflammable exhalation ignited by the stars. According to Averroes, Alexander adhered to the second opinion (which Alexander believed to be Aristotle’s), whereas Aristotle himself seemed to have adhered to the first, although some of his words, so Averroes remarks, are similar to what Alexander says. Moreover, Averroes suggests that the differences between Aristotle and Alexander might be caused by

33

For a possible connection with Josef Ibn Kaspi’s prediction on the restoration of the Jewish state, see Freudenthal, “Providence, Astrology, and Celestial Influences,” 361 n. 77.

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errors in the transmission of the text. He also admits that our knowledge of the Milky Way is uncertain.34 Therefore, Judah’s brevity may also have to do with the fact that Averroes did not provide him with a clear-cut answer. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Samuel Ibn Tibbon, too, in his Hebrew rendering of the Arabic version of Aristotle’s Meteorology (1210) referred to differences of opinion on the Milky Way and likewise refrained from going into detail.35 (xii) mḥ/Meteorology ii.2 (the sea as the element of water) After having stated that “not every sea is the element of water,” Judah continues, “Concerning this, doubt exists, for it has already been explained that the element must be more simple, like the fire up high that is very simple. If so, how can the sea be the element of water, when its waters are salty?” This doubt is not found in Judah’s source-text, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Meteorology. Averroes says that the sea is the element of water, and Judah repeats this in the preceding paragraph. Judah’s remark is triggered by the consideration that the waters of the sea are salty, which implies that the sea cannot be a simple pure element, comparable to the celestial fire, the nature of which was explained in mḥ/gc i.3. As Judah will explain in a following paragraph (mḥ/Meteorology ii.4), the saltiness of the sea is due to the action of heating on it, that is, to a process of burning, as a result of which the sea contains an admixture. Judah does not offer a solution to the doubt he raises, nor does he go into further detail. (xiii) mḥ/Meteorology ii.15 (thunder) The discussion of thunder and lightning ends with the words, “It is also possible that thunder is produced only through the quenching of fire by the cold cloud in a cold place. Concerning this doubt exists.” It is not immediately clear concerning what exactly doubt exists. Perhaps he intends to say that this explanation is at variance with the explanation of the phenomenon of thunder with which he opened his account, namely that thunder is the strong powerful noise that is produced when the exhalation within a cloud is ejected from it vehemently. This is Aristotle’s view. The concluding sentence renders the words from Averroes’ Middle Commentary: “thunder may also be produced by quenching alone, that is to say, by the quenching of fire in a cold place of a cold cloud.”36 Averroes does not add that there exists doubt concerning this view,

34 35 36

For a discussion of Averroes’ account, see Lettinck, Aristotle’s Meteorology, 90–96. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Otot ha-shamayim i. 281–284, ed. Fontaine 1995, 35. mc Meteor. 134.2–3.

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but continues to mention and to refute the opinions of the ancients on lightning. His statement on quenching is however somewhat surprising since in the preceding passage he subscribed wholeheartedly to Aristotle’s view, whereas the view that thunder is produced by quenching was in fact Anaxagoras’ view. Judah again does not go into detail, and hence we cannot know whether he wished to criticize any view on the origin of thunder or merely wished to note that different views on the issue existed.37 (xiv) mḥ/Meteorology iii.4 (the rainbow 1) The phenomenon of the rainbow gives rise to two critical comments on Judah’s part. The first concerns the colors of the rainbow, which, in Judah’s account, are yellowish red, green, and a kind of purple. In his explanation of how these colors are produced he says that green is the result of the mixture of white (the reflection of the sunshine in the raindrops) and black (the cloud). He then briefly observes: “Concerning this there exists doubt, whether a greenlike color is produced from the mixture of white and black, or rather a kind of blue (tekhelet)” (mḥ/Meteor iii.4). Although he provides no clue as to which author has expressed this doubt, he probably had Avicenna in mind, especially, since the section on the rainbow in Avicenna’s Shifāʾ can be shown to have been consulted by Judah (cf. mḥ/Meteor. iii.6, and cf. also ii.13, n. 81). Avicenna had wondered why a leek-like (= greenish) color should emerge between the red and purple band, green being unrelated to either of these colors. According to him, the mixture of these colors gives instead rise to a color that is brighter than purple, but more purple than the bright red. Avicenna does not define this intermediate color by a more specific designation, nor can we know for sure what color exactly Judah ha-Cohen’s “kind of blue” represents. However, since he contrasts this color with “green,” it is plausible that what he had in mind was a color shade within the range of bluish-purple, and such a shade would fit Avicenna’s description. Again, Judah raises a doubt without going into detail or siding with either view. (xv) mḥ/Meteorology iii.7 (the rainbow 2) The second comment concerns the final cause of the rainbow. Here Judah is more explicit. At the end of the section on the rainbow, after having treated the formation of the rainbow, Judah notes that the natural explanation of Aris-

37

For the various views on how thunder and lightning are produced, see Lettinck, Aristotle’s Meteorology, 225–241. Interestingly, in the section on logic Judah gives the quenching of fire as the definition of thunder (ms O 43v).

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totle seems to contradict the words of Gen. 9:13, “I have set My bow in the clouds, and it shall serve as a sign of the covenant between Me and the earth.” According to Judah, this contradiction may be solved by assuming that Aristotle merely referred to three of the four natural causes, to wit, the material, formal and efficient causes. The final cause, however, was left out by the Philosopher, and it is precisely this cause that is provided by the biblical account. The final cause explains the function of the rainbow, namely that it is the token of the covenant. This is the divine cause. Judah adds that it is the “principal” cause (ha-ʿiqqar), and that Aristotle left it to “those who deal with what is principal as is his habit in all his words.” At first sight it might seem that we are dealing here with a kind of harmonization effort on Judah’s part, namely that the natural explanation and the biblical one supplement each other. However, his somewhat triumphant tone suggests otherwise. Significantly, Judah ends his digression by saying “Let not the discussion of the rainbow be greater than that on the heaven and the earth of which we maintain that they are created, while he (= Aristotle) says that they are natural. The thoughts of the wicked are beyond me.” The last phrase, a quotation from Job 21:16, is also found in mḥ/Physics viii.2 where Judah presents Aristotle’s theory of eternal motion and criticizes it by adducing biblical verses (cf. above).38 It can be inferred, therefore, that what he seeks to convey in the passage on the rainbow is that the biblical verse has the most important say in the matter.39 (xvi) mḥ/Meteorology iv.1 (forms of elements) mḥ/Meteor. iv opens with the statement that the forms of the elements are their qualities, that is, the two active qualities heat and cold, and the two passive ones, moisture and dryness. At this point Judah interrupts rendering his source, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Meteorology, by observing that there is a doubt concerning this statement, for how can form be a quality (that is, an accident), given that it is the form by virtue of which the thing is what it is.40 This observation, which reminds one of Abraham Ibn Daud’s criticism of Ibn Gabirol, who held that the selfsame thing can be a substance and an accident (er i.2), is not found in either of Averroes’ commentaries on the Mete-

38 39

40

See also Chapter Six, section 2. Interestingly, when explaining that physical knowledge is complete if we know the four causes (of a thing), Ibn Bājja mentions the rainbow as an example, saying that we want to know what it is, what brings it about, what its essence is and why it occurs (Commentary on the Physics, cf. Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, Appendix 1, 13.10–15). mḥ/Meteor. iv.1. Averroes, mc Meteor. 169.3–4.

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orology. In all fairness, it should be noted that Judah does not render his source accurately here, for Averroes does not say that the qualities are the forms of the elements, but rather that the principles of the elements are “in the way (or manner) of form.” Be this as it may, Judah refrains from elaborating on this “doubt.” On Animals The sections on animals contain a number of passages in which Judah contrasts views held by Aristotle and Galen on anatomical/zoological matters. These passages, some of which entail a criticism of Aristotle, will be discussed in Chapter Five. Here I will discuss four passages from Judah’s Generation of Animals in which Judah inserts comments that do not pertain to the controversy between Aristotle and Galen. (xvii) mḥ/ga xvi.5 (the nature of semen) In mḥ/ga xvi.5 Judah notes a contradiction between the statement that what prevails over the nature of semen is water and pneuma (cf. the beginning of this passage: “the substance of semen is airy and watery”), and a previous statement according to which semen is fiery in nature. It is indeed said at the beginning of this passage that the airy part, which prevails over semen, is hot and moist, and mḥ/ga xv.8 has it that semen is airy and fiery. The two conflicting passages seem to go back to Aristotle, ga 736a1 (semen is a compound of pneuma and water) and 736b34–35 (semen contains hot pneuma; cf. 737a1–6, where Aristotle explains that in generation the heat of animals operates through semen). It should be noted, though, that Aristotle asserts explicitly that this heat is not fire, so strictly speaking the contradiction is not found in Aristotle. In Averroes’ commentary it is said that the airy fiery part prevails in the pneuma.41 Again, Judah limits himself to recording the contradiction without going into detail. (xviii) mḥ/ga xvi.8 (rennet) In mḥ/ga xvi.8, when describing the action of the pneumatic part of semen on the menstrual blood Judah contends that “what has been said,” namely, that the [the action of] semen is like that of rennet in milk, is not true, for rennet mixes with milk in a certain blend whereas semen does not mix with menstrual blood. This may be taken to refer to Aristotle’s statement as articulated in mḥ/ga xv.13 where it is said that the menstrual blood and the male semen are mixed in the

41

Cf. mḥ/ga xv.8, n. 291.

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womb, and that in mḥ/ga xvi.7 where we read that the pneuma of the semen mixes with it in such a way that boiling and bubbling are produced. According to Judah, the analogy is flawed, for semen does not mix with menstrual blood in the way rennet mixes with milk. He adds that semen is like rennet in only one respect, namely that it provides the form to the embryo just as rennet provides milk with the form of cheese (mḥ/ga xvi.8). However, this is exactly what Aristotle himself asserted, as Judah himself wrote in an earlier passage, “Aristotle believes that the male semen is to menstrual blood as rennet is to milk in that it provides only the form” (mḥ/ga xv.13).42 Perhaps what Judah seeks to underline is that the airy part of semen evaporates after having “set” the menses, and thus, strictly speaking, does not mix with it.43 Nonetheless, it would seem that we are dealing here with an oversight on Judah’s part. (xix) mḥ/ga xviii.2 (sex-differentiation) After having recorded Aristotle’s explanation of the various causes of sexdifferentiation, Judah expands on his source by noting that this explanation presents a problem: “On this theory, a young man who generates females in his youth and during the summer, with [Aristotle’s] other conditions obtaining, ought a fortiori to generate females with the same woman in his old age. However, we see the opposite in some people, namely that someone generates in one and the same woman females when he is young and males when he is old, whereas [on Aristotle’s theory] it should have been the opposite.” Put differently, according to Judah, observation proves that the theory is false. This addition introduces a longer excursus on the role of the female semen, which will be discussed in Chapter Five, section 2 (ix). (xx) mḥ/ga xviii.11 (natural time of birth) In his account of the natural time of birth Judah takes issue with the classical theory that seven- and nine-month children will live, but eight-month children will die. He records the physiological causes that Averroes records in his commentary, but notes: “The explanation that this is caused by the decrees of the stars is more pleasing to the mind.” It is not clear whether “this” refers to the last part of Averroes’ exposition, which treats eight-month children, or to the general theory about the causes of the natural time of birth. In any case Judah’s remarks stand in stark contrast to Averroes, who describes as absurd the opinion of astrologers that the child will fall ill in the seventh month. The theory that

42 43

Arist., ga 729a10–14. Cf. also Chapter Five, section 2 (vii).

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the moment of birth of seven-month children was determined by the cycles of heavenly bodies was adopted by, among others, Ṭābit ibn Qurra. In this passage Judah thus criticizes Averroes, and his critique is occasioned by his astrological leanings.44 (xxi) mḥ/Soul ii.17 (the element fire) In the discussion of sight, which follows Averroes’ Epitome of the Soul, it is said that the reception of colors takes place through the medium of air and water, for these two elements are intermediate between the material and the immaterial. Then Judah adds, “one should raise the question whether fire is not more truly intermediate between the material and the immaterial.” This question, which remains unanswered, is not found in his source. (xxii) mḥ/Metaphysics (x comes “from” y) In addition, we should note that in his survey of the first treatise of Aristotle’s Metaphysics the author points to a contradiction with a statement in mḥ/ga. In the first treatise of the Metaphysics Judah records Aristotle’s statement that a thing can be “from” (or: out of) another thing in two senses, namely (i) “from” a boy comes a man, and (ii) air comes “from” water. He then adds that this statement is inconsistent with mḥ/ga xv, where a thing can be said to be “from” another thing in four senses, and that the two senses not mentioned in the passage in the Metaphysics are: (iii) an opposite can come into being “from” another opposite, and (iv) in the sense of “because of,” as when one says, “the effect is because of the agent.”45 In the passage of mḥ/ga (xv.6), however, he does not refer to a contradiction, nor does he decide in favor of any of the two views in either passage. What do these passages reveal about Judah’s critical attitude towards Aristotle’s natural philosophy? To begin with, it is important to note that Judah’s critical comments are not distributed evenly over the treatises on natural philosophy. Of the twenty-two passages enumerated thus far, sixteen concern doctrines that pertain to the first four books of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, and five treat views expressed in the Generation of Animals (although the last one is pointed out in the section on Metaphysics). The section on On the Soul yields only one comment and that on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia none at all. Apart from issues relating to the controversy between Aristotle and Galen, to be dis-

44 45

See mḥ/ga xviii.11, n. 474. ms O 101r19–24.

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cussed in the next chapter, the section on the Parts of Animals elicits no comments on Judah’s part. Furthermore, Judah is sometimes silent on certain issues where Aristotle’s commentators have pointed to contradictions or problems, and where one would have expected Judah to comment. A case in point is the question whether the fire found immediately under the sphere of the moon exists there in actuality, that is, in its pure form. Is it or is it not like the fire that we know in the sublunary world that burns and destroys? The question arose because of a difficulty in Aristotle: according to Meteor. 340b22–27, the region adjacent to the sphere of the moon is filled with a mixture of hot and dry air, whereas in On the Heavens it is said to be filled with fire.46 Judah discusses celestial fire in mḥ/Meteor. i.3, but does not say that there is a contradiction here. He simply renders Averroes’ account of the issue, recording, as Averroes does, Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle, and Averroes’ compromise solution.47 Similarly, certain statements of Aristotle that gave rise to different interpretations by his commentators and are amply discussed by Averroes go unmentioned by Judah. One example is the question of whether the heaven is in an essential or an accidental place.48 Another example concerns the doubts and objections raised by some of Aristotle’s early commentators on certain propositions in Physics vii.49 In other words, when surveying Aristotle’s natural philosophy, Judah did not seize each and every opportunity to point to inconsistencies or problematic passages in Aristotle’s thought, although it is likely that he was aware of these problems. We thus have to conclude that the number of passages in Judah’s survey in which he criticizes Aristotle are fewer than what one would be led to expect on the basis of Judah’s evaluation of Aristotle’s thought as voiced in his Introduction. In terms of quality or content, too, the harvest appears to be rather meager. In most cases Judah limits himself to pointing to an inconsistency within Aristotle’s thought or to a “doubt” without going into detail and without deciding in favor of a certain position (nos i, iii, v, vii, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxii). In one instance it is Averroes who is his target rather than Aristotle (no. viii). With regard to the eternity of motion (no. iv) and the final cause of the rainbow (no. xv) Aristotle’s positions are opposed by biblical verses, not by philosophical arguments. Something similar happens in his coverage of the incorruptible

46 47 48 49

See mḥ/Meteor. i.3, n. 8. Cf. Kurland 1958, 46–47. Arist., Physics 212a31–213a12. For this issue, see Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 45ff. and432ff., and Schwartzmann, “Where is the Heaven?”. mḥ/Physics vii.1, n. 166.

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nature of what is eternal (no. vi), where he adduces a biblical verse, suggesting that the “eternal” refers to “the Rock,” instead of to the heavens, as in his source. His rejection of Aristotle’s view regarding individual recurrence (no. x) stems from astrological considerations, and the same applies to no. xx. In nos xviii and xix Judah points to flaws in Aristotle’s views, although in the case of no. xviii he does not seem to do justice to the philosopher’s view. We can conclude that in writing these comments he did not intend to engage in a drawn-out discussion of Aristotelian views. They rather have the character of rabbinic hassagot, critical notes made in the course of studying a text that show the student’s perspicacity.50 At the same time, it is noteworthy that some of his comments seem to reflect a genuine interest in the problems at hand: consider the solutions that he proposes regarding the question of motion and the categories where he adduces Ibn Daud (no. ii); the issue of privation (no. viii), and the discussion of growth where he supplements his source with Alexander’s treatise on growth (no. ix). With respect to some other topics, too, Judah manifests a lively interest in issues that were debated in his sources. Sometimes he expands a little on the material he is presenting, for example, when he discusses various theories about the inhabitable parts of the earth (mḥ/Meteor. ii.12). Here he records Avicenna’s view that the region beneath the equator is more moderate than other climes, a thesis that was refuted by Averroes, and he adds some thoughts of his own, for example that habitability of islands in the ocean is not impossible. In his zoology, Judah also engages in scientific discussions and makes some additions to the issues discussed, as in his treatment of the color of eggs, and in that of the female contribution to generation (cf. Chapter Five). His critical attitude thus goes hand-in-hand with intellectual curiosity about the non-Jewish learning of his day. Does the relatively small number of interventions on Judah’s part imply that Judah agrees with the many statements that he includes in his survey where he does not utter any comment? This question must be answered in the negative, for the scattered observations discussed so far constitute only one part of Judah’s criticism. Another and more substantial part is couched in the two aforementioned longer passages that are intended as a critique of Aristotle’s system of thought as a whole. Both passages consist of a long list of Aristotelian doctrines, many of which have a parallel in his survey of natural science, where they are, however, recorded without any critical comments. It is to these two

50

My thanks to Dr R. Leicht for discussing this aspect of Judah’s criticism with me.

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lists, the first being found in the Introduction to the mḥ and the second in the treatise on biblical exegesis that I will turn now.51

2

Criticism of Aristotelian Philosophy as a Whole

In his Introduction Judah explains the relation between the two lists: the first list enumerates Aristotelian doctrines that the philosopher built on the basis of 48 premises (haqdamot). These premises constitute the second list, which, Judah announces, he will present in his explanation of biblical verses, in his comments on Prov. 2:16 (cf. below). The second list thus forms the basis for Aristotle’s demonstrations (mofetim) and proofs (reʾayot) for the doctrines recorded in the first list.52 2.1 The First List After having clarified in the Introduction that one of the purposes underlying his compilation was to bring back to the Law those who had wasted their time studying foreign books, Judah sets out to challenge the validity of Aristotle’s philosophy by drawing up a long list of Aristotelian doctrines that in his view are insufficiently proven.53 Before proceeding to do so, Judah wishes to alert the reader to the distinction between mofetim and reʾayot, a distinction that he describes along the same lines in his survey of the Physics (mḥ/Physics i.2, cf. above, 1.i). In the science of mathematics, he explains, one proceeds from the prior (that is to say, what is prior in reality) to the posterior. Therefore, the proofs adduced in mathematics are called “demonstrations” (mofetim): they are absolute. In the science of physics, by contrast, one proceeds from the things posterior to things that are prior. Therefore, the proofs adduced in this science are called “proofs” (reʾayot); in the hierarchy of proofs these rank below the mathematical proofs.54 In the list of doctrines that follows Judah differentiates between doctrines that have been established by a proof that belongs to the class of reʾayot—these he will label as nitbaʾer (“it has been shown”)—, and those that cannot even be ascertained by a reʾayah— these he will label as nitparesh (“it has been explicated”). All in all, Judah con-

51 52 53 54

C. Sirat published the Hebrew text of both passages as an appendix to her article “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 56–61. mḥ/Introd. 22. mḥ/Introd. 23–24, cf. Chapter Two, section 5. mḥ/Introd. 23. The terminology in this passage is slightly confusing, for the term mofet is used not only for “demonstrations,” but also as a generic term for “proofs.”

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cludes, there are three hierarchically ordered degrees of doctrines: (i) those of which not all the premises are explained by first axioms (muskalot rishonot); (ii) those that are not as absolutely proven as those in mathematical science, (iii) while the third and lowest degree consists of those that are not even proven by reʾayot.55 This last degree seems to correspond to the doctrines introduced by “it has been explicated,” and those that are proven by a reʾayah (as opposed to demonstrated by a mathematical proof) apparently correspond to those introduced by nitbaʾer = (ii). It is not entirely clear what falls under (i). If the hierarchy goes from higher to lower, as it seems to do, the first degree should correspond to mathematical doctrines, but Judah does not identify the teachings of (i) as demonstrations. It is also unlikely that the haqdamot of the second list, of which Judah says that some are first axioms56 fall under (i), seeing that these haqdamot constitute the starting-point for the reʾayot. Judah introduces the first list by the words “Here is the choicest of his statements in the Physics, On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption.” It runs as follows:57 – It has been shown (nitbaʾer) that the principles (rashiyot) are more than one but not more than three.58 – It has been explicated (nitparesh) that they are three, namely, form, privation, and prime matter, which is the substrate for these two contraries. It is said of privation that it is a principle [only] accidentally.59 – It has been explicated that prime matter exists; that it is neither generated nor corruptible; that it exists in potentiality,60 that is to say, that it is not bare of forms that supervene over it uninterruptedly. It is the first subject for all beings that are generated and corrupted.61

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mḥ/Introd. 23, end. Cf. the ḥaver’s observation in Halevi’s Kuzari i.13, according to which some of the opinions of the philosophers can be proven, whereas others are persuasive and still others do not even meet that condition. mḥ/Introd. 22. In the following footnotes, I provide the corresponding passage in Judah’s own survey in the mḥ (if there is a parallel) as well as the Aristotelian passage on which Judah’s wording seems to be based. It should be recalled, however, that Judah knew Aristotle’s teachings via Averroes’ commentaries. It is not always possible to find an exact parallel to Judah’s formulations of these teachings in the Aristotelian texts themselves. The references to Aristotle are therefore approximative. Arist., Physics 189b27–28; mḥ/Physics i.3. Arist., Physics 191b18–19; mḥ/Physics i.3. Cf. Arist., Physics 192a26–35; mḥ/Physics i.4. Arist., Physics 192a33; cf. mḥ/Physics i.4.

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– It has been explicated that natural things are composed of matter and form;62 that the term “nature” is predicated of matter and of form, but it is predicated of form in a truer sense than of matter.63 – It has been shown that the infinite in actuality cannot exist, whereas the infinite in potentiality necessarily exists.64 – It has been explicated that the place of the sphere is the convex side of the body around which it revolves.65 – It has been shown that the void does not exist.66 – It has been explicated that the dense can become rare and the rare dense without [anything] being added to it or taken from it.67 – It has been explicated that time exists, and that it exists by itself outside the soul and also for the sake of the soul.68 – Motion exists in that which is moved.69 – It has been explicated by induction that everything that is changed essentially changes into its contrary.70 – It has been explicated that motion exists only in three categories: quantity, quality and place.71 – It has been explicated that things are said to be “together” when there is no body between them at all;72 and “between” [when] there are at least three things: two contraries and an intermediate.73 – It has been explicated that motion is said to be one in genus (shoresh), in species (min) or in number. In genus how so? Like the motion that is in the same category. In species how so? Like the motion that is in one species within anyone of the species of that category. In number how so? When that which is in motion and the thing in which the motion takes place and the time in which motion takes place are all one in number.74 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Arist., Physics 193b6 (cf. also 190b20 and 194b24–27); mḥ/Physics ii.2. Cf. Arist., Physics 193b12–13; 19–22; mḥ/Physics ii.2. Arist., Physics 206a13–18; mḥ/Physics iii.3. Arist., Physics 212b18–20; mḥ/Physics iv.3. Arist., Physics 216b21; mḥ/Physics iv.5. Arist., Physics 217b8–12; no parallel in mḥ/Physics. Arist., Physics 223a21–29; no parallel in mḥ/Physics. Arist., Physics 224b25; cf. mḥ/Physics v.1: True motion takes place only in that which is moved. Arist., Physics 224b29–31; cf. mḥ/Physics v.2–3. Arist., Physics 225b6–8; mḥ/Physics v.4. Arist., Physics 226b21–22; cf. mḥ/Physics v.6, where things are said to be “together” when they are both in the same primary place. Arist., Physics 227a8; mḥ/Physics v.6. Arist., Physics 227b24–25; mḥ/Physics v.7.

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If, in addition, it is more perfect (temimah) and uniform, it can all the more be said to be one.75 It has been explicated that the motion from a contrary is both motion from something and motion into something. How so? Motion from health into sickness is the contrary [of the motion] from sickness to health, for one [motion is] towards sickness and the other towards health and one [motion is away] from health and the other [away] from sickness.76 It has been explicated that when one thing has two contrary motions, one of them is natural and the other one is forced upon it.77 Rest that is the contrary of motion is rest as in the starting-point of motion.78 It has been shown that a line is not composed of points nor time of instants. Magnitude cannot be composed of indivisible magnitudes.79 There cannot exist an infinite magnitude.80 Anything that changes is divisible.81 Its beginning and end are indivisible.82 That which is indivisible such as a point does not have motion essentially.83 Everything that is moved has a mover.84 The proximate moving agent which effects motion can do so only when it is in contact with what is moved by it.85 Circular motion is incommensurable with rectilinear motion. All the more so is motion in [the category] of quality incommensurable with motion [in the category of] quantity.86 The action of the whole exists in the parts in potentiality but it does not necessarily exist in actuality.87 It has been explicated that some things are always in motion and some are always at rest, whereas others are at times in motion and at times at rest.88

Cf. Arist., Physics 228b16–18; cf. mḥ/Physics v.7: Motion that is truly one numerically is circular (sovevet) and uniform. Arist. Physics 229a31–b3; cf. mḥ/Physics v.8. In the mḥ the example is not motion from health to sickness, but motion from black to white. Arist., Physics 230b12–23; cf. mḥ/Physics v.8. Arist., Physics 229b23–27; cf. mḥ/Physics v.9, and above section 1 (v). Arist., Physics 231a26–28; mḥ/Physics vi.1. Arist., Physics 206a7–8; mḥ/Physics vi.2. Arist., Physics 234b10; mḥ/Physics vi.3. Cf. Arist., Physics 236a6–29; mḥ/Physics vi.4. Arist., Physics 240b8–10, 241a10; mḥ/Physics vi.3. Arist., Physics 241b24–26; mḥ/Physics vii.2. Arist., Physics 243a3–5; mḥ/Physics vii.4. Arist., Physics 248a10 ff.; mḥ/Physics vii.6. Arist., Physics 250a24–25; no parallel in mḥ/Physics. Arist., Physics 253a230–232; mḥ/Physics viii.3.

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Locomotion is prior with respect to the other motions.89 – It has been shown that the first mover is not a body nor a force in a body.90 – The universe is complete because it is a body and it comprises its parts.91 – The motion of natural bodies is away from the center; towards the center, and around the center.92 – It has been shown that there exists a simple spherical body that moves in a circular motion.93 – It has been explicated that circular motion is natural to [this simple spherical body],94 and that [this body] is neither heavy nor light.95 Circular motion has no contrary.96 – The spherical body has no contrary.97 – It is not generated; nor is it corruptible,98 and it has no end. [In contrast,] each of the elements has an end. – It is impossible for there to exist other worlds apart from this one.99 Natural bodies have determined places.100 The material of which the world is constituted is contained in it.101 – Outside the world there is no body, void, plenum or time.102 – It is impossible that that which is eternal be generated and corruptible and that which is generated and corruptible be eternal.103 – It has been explicated that everything that is generated is corruptible and that everything that is corruptible is generated; and that what is not generated is not corruptible and that what is not corruptible is not generated.104 The heavens have six sides.105

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

Arist., Physics 260a28–29; mḥ/Physics viii.6. Arist., Physics 267b22–24; mḥ/Physics viii.7. Arist., Heavens 286b10–12; cf. mḥ/Heavens i.1, where it is said that the universe surrounds (sovevet) all its parts. Cf. Arist., Heavens 263b22–23; mḥ/Heavens i.2. Arist., Heavens 269a5–7; mḥ/Heavens i.2. Arist., Heavens 269b1; mḥ/Heavens i.2. Arist., Heavens 269b30–32; mḥ/Heavens i.2. Arist., Heavens 270a20; mḥ/Heavens i.2. Arist., Heavens 270a19; mḥ/Heavens i.3. Arist., Heavens 270a11–14; mḥ/Heavens i.3. Cf. Arist., Heavens 279a12–13; cf. mḥ/Heavens i.5. Arist., Heavens 273a14–15; cf. mḥ/Heavens i.5. Arist., Heavens 279a9–10. No parallel in mḥ/Heavens. Arist., Heavens 279a6,12–13; mḥ/Heavens i.5. Arist., Heavens 282a22–25; mḥ/Heavens i.9. Arist., Heavens 282b1–5; mḥ/Heavens i.9. Arist., Heavens 284b21; mḥ/Heavens ii.2.

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– From the existence of the heavens it follows necessarily that the earth and the four elements exist.106 – The circle is the principle of plane figures, and the sphere is the [principle] of solid figures.107 – It is necessary that the primary body should have the primary figure;108 that the motion of the heavens be uniform, swift and simple;109 that the stars move in [the heavens] as nails in a ship,110 and that the earth be spherical and in the center.111 – It is impossible for there to exist parts that are indivisible. – The corruption of one thing in its substance is the generation of another thing. – Two contraries are one in genus. – Things that act and undergo action are alike in genus but different in species.112 The agent and that which undergoes action are two contraries: the agent acts because of its form, and the patient undergoes action because of its matter.113 The being acted upon of the one by the other takes place through contact or through the intermediacy of another body between them that receives the action.114 – Mixture (ʿeruv) is something in actuality that is distinct from the things of which it is composed and that exist in it in potentiality.115 Mixture belongs to the category of quality.116 – The four elements are transformed one into another, and the generation of everything that is generated and corrupted is only through them.117 The list drawn up by Judah raises a number of questions, with respect to both form and content. We have already noted that it is not clear how exactly the three hierarchically ordered degrees of doctrines that Judah described before

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

Arist., Heavens 286a20–30; cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.3. Arist., Heavens 286b18–33; cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.6 Arist., Heavens 287a2–3; mḥ/Heavens ii.5. Arist., Heavens 288a11–12 and 290b3–4; cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.7. Cf. Arist., Heavens 289b33; cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.9. Arist., Heavens 297a6–8; cf. mḥ/Heavens ii.8. Arist., gc 324a6–7; cf. mḥ/gc i.6. Arist., gc 324b8–10; cf. mḥ/gc i.11. Arist., gc 323a10–12; cf. mḥ/gc i.11. Arist., gc 327b23–28; cf. mḥ/gc i.12. Perhaps the general notion that mixture involves the alteration of the qualities of the miscibles is meant; cf. mḥ/gc i.13. This is the general subject of Arist., gc ii.

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embarking on his list relate to the differentiation between nitbaʾer (it has been shown) or nitparesh (it has been explicated). Furthermore, contrary to what we might expect, not every single doctrine in the above list is labeled as either nitbaʾer or nitparesh. I have indicated by the sign “--” where either of these labels is used. We see that in the first part of this enumeration the two categories are neatly distinguished, but after the statement “it has been shown that a line is not composed of points nor time of instants,” the terms “it has been shown” or “it has been explicated” appear only seldom. Does this imply that the doctrines the status of which is not specified should be taken to belong to the class of the last mentioned occurrence of either of the two labels, put differently, that some doctrines are “clustered”? Judah does not say so explicitly, nor does he make clear under which category statements like “it is impossible” are to be subsumed. The corollary of this ambiguity is that it is not clear how many teachings can be said to be proven by a reʾayah, that is, that they qualify as doctrines that rank higher in the hierarchy of proofs than those that are labeled as “it has been explicated.” The qualification “it has been shown” appears explicitly only in regard of the following six doctrines: (i) the principles are more than one but not more than three; (ii) the infinite in actuality cannot exist, whereas the infinite in potentiality necessarily exists; (iii) the void does not exist; (iv) a line is not composed of points nor time of instants; (v) the first mover is not a body nor a force in a body, and (vi) there exists a simple spherical body that moves in a circular motion. Yet, if statements immediately following these doctrines are also to be classified as “it has been shown,” there are more than six doctrines that can be considered proven by a reʾayah. It is obvious, however, that the doctrines qualified as “it has been explicated” are more numerous than those that are proven. Furthermore, as noted, most of the doctrines in this list appear in Judah’s survey of natural philosophy without any critical comment on his part whatsoever. An exception is the item “It is impossible that that which is eternal be generated and corruptible and that which is generated and corruptible be eternal,” which is found in Judah’s survey on On the Heavens (see above, no. vi). There Judah deviates from his source by identifying Averroes’ “eternal” with the Rock, but he does not refer to the list under discussion, nor vice versa. There is thus no one-to-one correspondence between the list of unproven doctrines and the passages discussed in section 1 above. In addition, a discrepancy can be noted in that the doctrines in the list are taken only from the first three treatises on natural philosophy, whereas the specific passages discussed in section 1 included also “doubts” in other treatises belonging to natural philosophy, such as the Meteorology and the Generation of Animals.

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Judah’s distinction between demonstrative proofs (mofet; Arabic burhān) and persuasive proofs (reʾayah; Arabic dalīl) is found also in earlier medieval Jewish authors, such as Halevi, Maimonides and Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who equally consider the reʾayot to be inferior in rank.118 His direct source here, however, is Averroes, who in his Middle Commentary on Physics says that most of the demonstrations (mofetim in the Hebrew translation) in Physics are reʾayot whereas those in mathematics are mofetim muḥlaṭim.119 Yet Judah’s distinction between doctrines for which a reʾayah can be given and those which can only be said to have been “explicated” is not found in earlier Jewish authors and seems to be his own invention. Nor does it seem to have a basis in Averroes’ commentaries. For example, Judah qualifies as hitbaʾer the thesis that the principles are more than one, but not more than three, the term that is also used in the Hebrew translation of the corresponding passage in Averroes’ mc Physics,120 but the same designation is used in that translation for doctrines that Judah labels as hitparesh. In the case of mc Physics we do not have the Arabic text of Averroes’ commentary, but in other commentaries where we do have the Arabic, it appears that the Commentator’s terminology is not always consistent when it comes to proofs. For example, he offers five arguments for the thesis that there exists a natural body that moves in a circle, the first three of which are qualified as bayān and the last two as burhān, which seems to imply

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In declaring that one should not believe everything that the philosophers say with respect to physics and metaphysics because of their demonstrations (burhān) in logic and mathematics (Kuzari v.14), Halevi ranks mathematical proofs higher than proofs obtained in physical science. Cf. also n. 54 above. Also well known is Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s explanation under the entry mofet in his Perush ha-Millot ha-zarot, according to which there are two kinds of reʾayot: a strong one that does not admit of doubt, and one that ranks beneath the first one in terms of truth. The first kind, he continues, is called mofet and the second reʾayah, but sometimes the second kind is also called mofet “by widening the scope of the language.” It should be noted, however, that whereas for Ibn Tibbon reʾayah is the generic term which denotes both demonstrations and proofs, Judah ha-Cohen uses mofet to denote both proofs in general and as a specific term for mathematical proof as opposed to physical proof. In describing the different kinds of proofs he usually (but not always) takes care to indicate which use he has in mind by specifying the term, e.g. ha-mofetim ha-limmudim as opposed to ha-mofetim asher niqreʾu reʾayot. On the distinction between mofet and reʾayah, see Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 396–397; see also Harvey, Falaquera’s Epistle of the Debate, 33 n. 52. For the background in Arabic sources, see Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 86 ff., 107 ff. mc Physics i.1.2. For the shift in meaning of the term mofet from the biblical “miracle” to “proof,” see Lemler “Mofet.” mc Physics i.3.2 ed. S. Harvey, 1977, pp. 199ff. tr. 269 ff. Here the Greek term in Arist., Physics 189b28 is faneron (clear).

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that bayān has the same epistemological status as burhān.121 Thus, in spite of his assertion that most of the demonstrations in physical science are dalāʾil (reʾayot), the Commentator does not always distinguish between different kind of proofs. The criteria underlying Judah’s distinction between nitbaʾer and nitparesh therefore do not stem from Averroes. A similar inconsistency can be observed in Judah’s use of the term nitbaʾer (or hitbaʾer) in his survey of natural philosophy. Here it usually renders Averroes’ tabayyana (it has been explained; it has been made clear) or ẓāhir (it is manifest, clear, evident) and does not seem to have the specific technical meaning of a doctrine the truth of which has been “shown” as opposed to an “unproven doctrine” (nitparesh) or to a view the truth of which has been demonstrated by a mofet. It may also render tabayyana in a context where Averroes uses burhān.122 We also come across an instance of nitbaʾer beemet (demonstrated in truth?), which seems to be stronger than just nitbaʾer, although Judah did not single out this category in his listing of nitbaʾer-nitparesh-doctrines.123 We should also note that Judah’s use of terms for proofs in his survey is inconsistent too. Although by his own classification all the proofs used in natural science are reʾayot, occasionally we come across the term mofetim, as is the case in mḥ/Soul iii.1, where he says that Averroes provides three mofetim for the thesis that there cannot be more than five senses. In his survey of On Generation of animals he employs the terms reʾayah ḥotekhet (decisive proof or argument) and reʾayah berurah (clear proof or argument),124 although these terms do not occur in the passages where he discusses the difference between reʾayah and mofet, so that it is not clear whether these two kinds of reʾayah rank higher than reʾayah tout court. In addition, the terms ṭaʿam (reason) and ṭeʿanah (claim, argument) are also used in the sense of proofs or arguments, without any indication as to whether these terms should be regarded as synonyms of reʾayah, so that their epistemological status remains vague.125 It must

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mc Heavens 79.11–83.4. See Manekin, “Maimonides and the Arabic Aristotelian Tradition,” 195 n. 40: “To burhān as demonstration in the formal sense one should add bayān and its cognates which is often used in the sense of demonstration among Arab peripatetics and Maimonides.” Note that in modern English translations of Averroes’ commentaries (Arabic or Hebrew), too, nitbaʾer/hitbaʾer is rendered in various ways, for example: “it has been made clear,” “it has been explained,” “it is demonstrated,” “it is evident.” mḥ/Heavens i.6, on the spherical shape of the heavens. See below, Chapter Five, section 2 (vi and vii). In mḥ/Heavens i.6 Judah refers to Averroes ṭeʿamim for the sphericity of the heavens; in the parallel passage in the mc Heavens (ed. Al-Alaoui, 214.5–10) Averroes has tabayyana. In mḥ/ga xiii he uses the expressions ṭeʿanot sikhliyyot (rational arguments) when describ-

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be concluded, then, that Judah made no attempt to align his terminology for the subject of “proofs” in his coverage of Aristotle’s natural philosophy to that in his Introduction to the work. A likely explanation of this inconsistency is that the introduction and the survey reflect different stages of his study. In any case there has obviously not been an overall redaction to smooth out the differences regarding the terminology under discussion. 2.2 The Second List The second list forms part of a lengthy passage which contains a sustained critique of Aristotle, found in Judah’s biblical exegesis in Treatise 1. The critique starts with his comments on “the alien woman” of Prov. 2:16.126 This verse leads Judah to elaborate on the insufficiency of Aristotelian philosophy when it comes to attaining certain wisdom. Here Judah’s goal is the rebuttal of Aristotle’s demonstration of the eternity of the world, to which I shall turn in Chapter Six. It is in this context that he draws up the list of premises or propositions (haqdamot) that he announced in his Introduction. Its opening lines read: “I have deemed fit to record here Aristotle’s premises and principles (haqdamot wi-yesodot) on which he built his demonstrations (mofetav) and proofs (reʾayotav). He did not record these premises in the same order as we do here. Instead, they are to be found scattered in his books and I have assembled them one after the other.”127 The premises are the following: 1. the existence of motion; 2. the existence of nature; 3. nature is the principle of motion and rest; 4. contraries do not produce each other nor do they receive each other. How so? Heat does not produce cold nor does it receive it; 5. nothing can come into being from any chance thing, let alone from privation; 6. everything that comes into being or is corrupted has a subject from which it comes into being or is corrupted; 7. natural existents exist sometimes in actuality and sometimes in potentiality;

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ing Aristotle’s methodology, and ṭeʿanah nekhonah (sound argument) when referring to Galen; see below Chapter Five, section 1 (iii). This passages starts at line 631 in ed. D. Goldstein. Ed. D. Goldstein, 225 lines 704–705. The entire passage was published by Sirat (cf. above, n. 51) on the basis of ms Vatican 338, and later by D. Goldstein (lines 669–756) on the basis of ms Oxford, Bodleian 551, with reference to the Vatican ms and ms Leiden Or 4758.

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8. potentiality and actuality are distinct from each other; 9. every concrete128 body has its own specific place; 10. of everything that moves with a rectilinear motion the place of its whole and that of its part is one in species; 11. every concrete body has heaviness or lightness; 12. the first place surrounds that for which it is place. It is other than it and it is equal to it. It has above and below. Bodies rest in these places and move towards them; 13. something that is in a place essentially (biʾl-ḏāt) is that which is surrounded, not that which surrounds; 14. the cause of changes in movement of place is change in their natures and the natures of these places; 15. every motion is either natural or non-natural; 16. when of two moving agents one is faster than the other, it is said that the relation of the first of the motions to the second is either like the relation of the [first] mover to the [second] mover or like the relation of one recipient to the other, or that it is made up of both their relations; 17. number is not said in respect of fastness or slowness; 18. it is said that a thing is in time, that is to say that time surrounds it; 19. the contraries in contrary motions are that from which and that towards which; 20. that which is being moved and is one essentially has two rests: rest from which and rest towards which; 21. motion is from one contrary towards the other; 22. the continuous is composed of continuous things; 23. the fast will complete in a certain time a path/course that is longer than the slow will, and it will also complete the path/course that is completed by the slow in less time; 24. of everything that changes a part changes from something and a part towards something and it changes in time and from one thing to another; 25. everything that is moved by itself, not by something else, will likewise rest by virtue of itself, not by something else; 26. change in quality is alteration; 27. not every motion is comparable to any motion, nor can it be ascribed to less or more. How so? Motion in quality cannot be compared to motion in quantity, nor can rectilinear motion be compared to circular motion since it is not equal to it;

128

Or: object of touch (Hebr. memushash).

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28. that which is being moved because of an external moving agent is moved in a given way and in a given time. Not every moving agent moves everything that is in motion, nor in every way whatsoever and not in every time. Everything that is being moved in a finite time moves with a finite motion and in a finite way; 29. the potentiality of motion is prior in time to motion, for that which movable is prior in its potentiality to that which is moved in actuality, that is to say that potentiality is prior in time than actuality in everything which comes into existence; 30. it is absurd that all things are either in motion or in rest; 31. contrary motions are not one; 32. there are three kinds of motion: rectilinear, circular and composed of these two; 33. rectilinear motion is imperfect and circular motion is perfect as it is impossible for it to have increase or decrease; 34. everything that is corruptible comes into being from its contrary and passes away into its contrary and these two contraries have a common subject; 35. the motions of the contrary simple bodies are contraries; 36. that which is being moved will not complete an infinite course; 37. if more than one line of the circular body extends from the center, it is possible that these lines are moved until they return to the place from which they were thought to be moved, and if one of them was thought to rest while the other one is in motion it is possible that that which is in motion is moved until it coincides with that which rests; 38. if from something finite a finite part is taken away, the remainder will likewise be finite; 39. the circular body will complete its orbit in a finite time; 40. every goal is finite. What is similar to that is: “I have seen that all things have their limit” (Ps. 119:96);129 41. every body is either composite or simple; 42. the contrary of the everlasting is [that] which does not exist at all; 43. the cause of the multiplicity of rectilinear motions is the contrariety that is found in rectilinear motions; 44. the daily motion is faster than all motions; 45. the motion of the circular body is faster than that of other bodies; 46. change in motion takes place either through the moving agent or through that which is being moved or through both of them; 129

The continuation of the verse reads: “But Your commandment is broad beyond measure.”

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47. softness is weakness, and weakness is something that originates from nature (?); 48. growth is found in simple bodies such as flesh and bones and it is only found in composite bodies such as the hand through the intermediacy of the simple ones. The wider context of this list will be discussed in Chapter Six. Here it is important to observe that like the first list this one raises a number of questions. To begin with, in the Introduction Judah said of these haqdamot that “some are first axioms (muskalot rishonot), whereas others need more clarification than many things that need to be proven by means of indications/signs (otot) and demonstration (mofetim).” In the commentary on Proverbs, just before enumerating these premises, Judah expresses his amazement at Aristotle: “Some of his premises are known by the intellect and they are called first axioms (muskalot rishonot). But as for others, there are things in his books that are easier to understand and for which he had to find proofs and demonstrations (reʾayot u-mofetim). Therefore I am astonished at this man [= Aristotle] who examined the true reality of things that he should provide a proof (reʾayah), a sign (ot), and a demonstration (mofet) for the easiest of things, something that is almost a first axiom, and that human belief because of the intellect (emunat ha-adam bo mipnei ha-sekhel) is not sufficient for him in this. [On the other hand] you will find among most of these premises things that are much harder [to understand and] that the intellect cannot immediately grasp and [yet] he made them into a fundament on which he built his words although they are not first axioms and not proven (mevoʾar) in another science, as you will see.”130 Contrary to what one might expect on the basis of these words, however, Judah does not specify which of the listed haqdamot he considers to be first axioms or self-evident, and which ones are “much harder to understand.” It seems plausible to assume (albeit not certain) that the first two premises, the existence of nature and of motion would qualify as something that is selfevident, but for other premises of the list this is even less certain.131 What is 130 131

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 706–713. Averroes insists in Ep. Physics that the existence of nature is evident, ed. Puig, 12.3–7; cf. Aristotle’s statement that it would be childish to prove that nature exists, Physics 193a1–6. For the existence of motion, see Arist., Physics 251a10 and Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 599. See also Averroes, mc Physics i.2.2 (in reference to Arist., Physics 185a10–12) ed. S. Harvey, 184, tr. 248: in denying motion Parmenides and Melissus deny nature. Yet one may posit that what Judah had in mind with the statement “that nature exists” is the notion of natural causality that can be seen as a potential competitor of God and was therefore rejected by Nachmanides, cf. Langermann, “Acceptance and Devaluation,” 226–227.

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clear, however, is that the weakness he perceives in Aristotle’s system results from the fact that in his view the starting-points require more elucidation than the proofs themselves. Hence the proofs are uncertain. As Judah puts it with a rabbinic expression, “the guarantee needs another guarantee.”132 Another problem concerns the exact relation between the two lists. We learn that the haqdamot of the second list underlie the doctrines of the first, but Judah does not explain how precisely the premises relate to the doctrines of the first list; that is to say, which premise of the second list underlies the proof of a given doctrine in the first list. Not only is there no one-to-one relation between the two lists, there is even some overlap: the premise that motion in quality cannot be compared to motion in quantity (no. 27) appears also in the first list, albeit in a slightly different formulation. A shared characteristic of both lists is that each consists of teachings found in the first three books of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Also, as was the case with the doctrines of the first list, several of the haqdamot figure in Judah’s survey of natural philosophy without any critical comment. on his part. This is the case, for example, with proposition no. 3 on the definition of nature. A reader who studied the relevant section in Judah’s survey without reading the treatise on the explanation of biblical verses will not have gathered that the definition was among the premises the status of which was uncertain. This may have been the reason why Judah emphasizes the necessity of copying his compilation from the beginning to the end, for only a reader who attentively reads through the entire work will understand that what he will find or has found in Judah’s survey of philosophy is unreliable. It may be asked why he did not choose to highlight the doctrines and propositions of the two lists in his survey, emphasizing their questionable status or adding a comment, as he did in his interventions on the “doubts” reviewed above in section 1. The question cannot be answered with any certainty. We may suppose that he simply deemed it more convenient (and/or convincing) to collect all the items in these lists rather than integrate them in his survey. It is also possible that the two constituents of Judah’s critical examination of

132

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 757–758; cf. for example, bGittin 28b. Maimonides uses the same expression in Guide i.74, tr. Pines, 221 (beginning of the seventh method of the Mutakallimun to prove creation in time). In the same vein Crescas argues that “if the propositions (haqdamot) necessary for the proof of the principles (shorashim) have not been established by demonstrative reasoning, the principles (shorashim), too, will not have been conclusively established (mevoʾarot beʾur mofeti)” (tr. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 133 of Crescas’ Introduction to his Light of the Lord, when Crescas sets out to investigate Maimonides’ 25 propositions).

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Aristotle’s philosophy, that is, the search for “doubts” and the search for unproven doctrines and propositions, reflect two separate, albeit related goals/ projects or stages in his study of philosophy: the aim of the former (and perhaps the first in time) being to detect contradictions, and of the second to challenge the very basis of this philosophy. If we carry this supposition a little further, we might speculate that he was led to investigate critically the building blocks of Aristotle’s philosophy when he came across certain inconsistencies in the philosopher’s thought. However, here we are entering the domain of speculation. What is certain is that Judah’s general endeavor is to show that a great amount of uncertainty pervades Aristotelian philosophy. In this regard we must bear in mind Judah’s motivation (cf Chapter Two): his aim was not only to instruct, but also to alert the reader to the limitations of Aristotle’s philosophy. One may wonder whether Judah had Maimonides’ 25 premises of the introduction to Guide ii in mind when composing his lists. To be sure, only a few direct parallels between Judah’s lists and Maimonides’ list of premises can be pointed out,133 and Maimonides moreover presents his propositions as forming the basis for the proofs of God’s existence, unity and incorporeality, which is not Judah’s intention. Nonetheless some critique on Judah’s part seems implied, for Maimonides says of these propositions that “all of them have been given demonstrations as to which no doubt is possible. With regard to some of them, this has been done in the Book of “Akroasis” and its commentaries; with regard to others, in the book of “Metaphysics” and its commentary.” For “demonstrations” Maimonides uses the word burhān in these passages, translated as mofet by Samuel ibn Tibbon.134 Judah seems to be much less convinced regarding the extent to which his 48 premises can be proven or used in a demonstration.135 We do not know whether it was Maimonides’ list that induced Judah to draw up his lists, but we do know that the Guide inspired him to study the sciences. Therefore, his investigation into the status of philosophical proofs and

133

134

135

The doctrine “Anything that changes is divisible” on Judah’s first list corresponds to Maimonides’ premise no. 7, and “Everything that moves has a mover” with no. 17. Cf. also “if [motion] is more perfect and uniform it can all the more said to be one,” which is close to Maimonides’ premises no. 4 and 14. Guide, Introd. to Pt ii, prop. xxv: she-kevar hitbaʾaru kullam be-mofet ein safeq bo, ed. Even Shmuel, p. 209, tr. Pines 239. Cf. also: kullam baʾ aleihem ha-mofet, ein safeq be-davar mehem, ed. Even Shmuel, p. 205, tr. Pines 235. Al-Ḥarizi also has mofet here. By the same token, it can be argued that Judah would not agree to Maimonides’ assertion in Guide ii.22, according to which everything that Aristotle had taught regarding the sublunary world is “indubitably correct.” On this issue, see Chapter Seven, section 3.

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premises was probably also triggered by the debate on the study of philosophy in the 1230s. His assertion that “the guarantee needs another guarantee” has a parallel in the first letter that Judah al-Fakhar wrote to his antagonist David Kimhi in the exchange of letters during the first stage of the Maimonidean controversy. Judah al-Fakhar, who led the Toledo-community together with Judah’s teacher Ramah, had strong reservations regarding the study of philosophy. One of his points of critique is that philosophical proofs require great scrutiny, for they may contain misleading elements.136 This debate on the reliability of proofs may constitute the background of Judah’s endeavor. In any case, it is clear that Judah’s lists testify to a thorough and critical study of Aristotelian philosophy. Apparently he scrutinized his sources, either by himself or together with kindred spirits, culling from them positions that he considered to be uncertain and hence subject to doubt. Therefore, the compilation of the two lists does not merely stem from purposes of organization or systematization of the material studied, that is, that they be practical and “neutral study devices” to facilitate learning, they also serve a polemical aim.137 At the same time, they straddle the boundaries between translation and commentary. In her article on the evolution of the genre of philosophical-scientific commentaries R. Glasner points to a development in the stylistic patterns in discussions on doubts and queries (sefeqot, sheʾelot, or derushim), distinguishing several patterns.138 Following her classification, Judah’s interventions in his survey of natural science would fall under what she calls “single question/doubt pattern”: that is, scattered questions and doubts in the commentary on a text. The two lists would fall under the category characterized by Glasner as “numbered lists patterns,” lists of numbered questions, except that Judah refrains from going into the questions listed. We do not know if he intended this list to be a preparatory step towards a more thorough full-scale critique of Aristotle’s positions, like al-Ghazali’s refutation of the philosophers in the Tahāfut, but if so, it did not materialize. Judah’s lists, as well as his critique, may be viewed as an extended continuation of Judah Halevi’s list of critical questions addressed to the philosophers in Kuzari v.14. The critique of Aristotle’s philosophy in the mḥ is much more detailed and extensive than that in the Kuzari. In Halevi’s day the challenge was nascent Aristotelianism. In the approximately 100 years that elapsed between

136 137

138

Iggerot Qenaʾot, ed. Lichtenberg, 1d. On the role of lists in medieval Jewish philosophy, see Visi, “A Science of Lists?”. Focusing on lists in Maimonides’ oeuvre, the study contains useful general observations on the function of lists. Glasner, “The Evolution of the Genre.”

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the composition of the two works, knowledge of Aristotle’s philosophy among Jews had augmented considerably, in large part due to the writings of Maimonides and Averroes. On the other hand, compared to Crescas’ later trenchant critique in The Light of the Lord (completed ca. 1410), in which he attacks the list of Aristotle’s premises that Maimonides uses to prove God’s existence, unity and incorporeality, the critique in the mḥ can be called minimal. Yet Crescas’s claim that “there has not been found until now a critic of the proofs of the Greek (= Aristotle)”139 does not do justice to Judah’s efforts at challenging the validity of Aristotle’s philosophy, but of course it is uncertain whether Crescas knew the mḥ, and it is true that Judah’s criticism falls short of Crescas’ thorough refutation of Aristotelian doctrines. What Judah and Crescas have in common, however, is that they attack Aristotle’s system from within rather than on the basis of Scripture. They both sought to challenge Aristotle’s authority on the basis of a thorough knowledge of his thought, but where Judah’s criticism consists for a large part of a presentation of lists with supposedly unproven doctrines without much effort on Judah’s part to rebut them except for the eternity doctrine, Crescas, writing more than a century and a half after Judah and drawing on a wider range of sources, goes to great lengths to refute Aristotle’s views.140 To sum up, the level of criticism in the isolated passages discussed in the first section of this chapter differs from that in the two lists presented in the second half of this chapter. Judah’s critical attitude towards philosophy as displayed in the lists is more pronounced than that shown in his doubts and observations on contradictions in specific passages, interventions that have the character of rabbinic hassagot, remarks on the text under study. Yet taken together both forms of criticism undermine the very basis of Aristotelian (natural) philosophy and therefore constitute an unprecedented and massive attack on Aristotle’s system of thought. This attack may be taken to represent Judah’s position in the debate on the study of philosophy of his day. However, to gain a fuller picture of his attitude towards Aristotelian philosophy we must also look into a specific component of his critique, the controversy between Aristotle and Galen in matters zoological (Chapter Five). Moreover, we have to take into consideration his explanation of biblical verses in Treatise 1, since in that section, too, he regularly takes position in relation to Aristotle (Chapter Six). 139 140

Crescas, Or ha-Shem, Introd., 8 and W.Z. Harvey, Rabbi Hisdai Crescas, 46. See Wolfson’s classic study, Crescas’ Critique, Chapter i, Sources.

chapter 5

The Controversy between Aristotle and Galen In the preceding chapter we discussed the critical remarks that Judah inserted in his survey of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, to the exclusion of anatomicalzoological issues on which Aristotle and Galen held divergent opinions. The present chapter will address these issues as found in the zoological section of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. It should be recalled that Judah did not use the writings of the two Greek authorities directly. Instead Judah’s source is the Arabic version of Averroes’ On Animals, that is, his commentary on Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals and On the Generation of Animals. This commentary is no longer extant in Arabic, but has been preserved in the Hebrew translation by Jacob ben Makhir (1302). Averroes discusses the controversy between Aristotle and Galen in great detail.1 Although, as we shall see, the Commentator as a rule defends Aristotle’s views, he often tries to combine or harmonize the divergent views of the two classical authors, thus smoothing out the controversy between them. This procedure, for which H. Gätje has coined the term “Galenization of Aristotle,” is also to be found in some other of Averroes’ works.2 In what follows I will examine Judah’s approach to the controversy: can he be shown to side with either of the two authorities? To investigate this question I will adopt the order in which the issues under consideration appear in the mḥ.3

1

On the Parts of Animals

(i) The seat of the sense of touch The first issue of the controversy concerns the question of the location of the sense of touch (mḥ/pa xii.4). The question arises within the context of the 1 In his Colliget ii Averroes also addresses the controversial issues, see Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 291–297, who lists and discusses 22 issues. Averroes’ treatment of the controversy in his commentary On Animals with its reception in medieval Hebrew texts, such as the encyclopedias, merits a study of its own, which cannot be carried out here. Here I will relate to it only in as far as it is relevant for the discussion in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. 2 Gätje, “Averroes als Aristoteleskommentator,” 59–65, esp. p. 62, idem, “Zur Lehre von den Temperamenten,” 252, and Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 274–275, 301. Cf. Bos and Fontaine, “Medico-philosophical Controversies” for a presentation of the controversy in Nathan b. Yoʾel Falaquera’s Sefer Ṣori ha-Guf (late thirteenth-century?), which is likewise based on Averroes. 3 Not all of the issues on which Aristotle and Galen held different opinions are covered in Judah’s work.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_006

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discussion of the uniform parts, one of which is the flesh. According to Aristotle, the flesh is the organ of touch because the sense of touch must be located in an organ that is common to all animals, and this is the flesh.4 According to Galen, however, the nerves are the organ of touch.5 Judah’s source treats this issue at some length.6 Averroes’ exposition attempts to give credit to both views as can be inferred from his assertion that “the flesh is the primary and specific part for the sense of touch.” For although Averroes clearly reaffirms Aristotle’s position by this statement, his use of the word “primary” reveals that he could not dismiss Galen’s view altogether. That Averroes makes allowances for this view is also evident from his statement that when one holds the flesh to be the specific organ of touch, it does not make any difference whether one says that sensation takes place by the flesh itself or by the flesh through the intermediacy of the nerve.7 In other words, Averroes tries to harmonize the divergent views of the two authorities. To determine the part played by the nerves, Averroes inserts a discussion of whether or not all animals have nerves, in which he concludes that the extent to which the nerves are involved in the sense of touch remains doubtful as long as it has not been established by dissection that all animals have nerves.8 In Judah’s brief account of the controversy no traces of this attempt at harmonization by Averroes are to be found, nor does the word “primary” appear. Therefore, it is more obvious in the mḥ that we have to do with a controversy than it is in Averroes’ commentary. Judah rounds off this issue by raising the question: “If this is so (namely, that the nerve is the seat of touch), what would he say with respect to animals that do not have nerves? One does not answer the lion but in his face.9 However, had he been here, he would have said that these animals have something analogous to the nerve.” It is noteworthy that these words, even though they echo Averroes’ discussion of whether or not all animals have nerves, do not have a parallel in Averroes’ commentary, nor

4 Arist., pa 647a14–24. 5 Galen, up iii.11; v.9. 6 Comm. Anim. 422v–423r. References are to ms Paris, héb 956/9. The version in this manuscript is a revision of Jacob ben Makhir’s translation by Samuel ben Judah of Marseille, see the introduction to the online translation of the text by G. Bos (preprint) at: https://www.researchgate​ .net/publication/326299859_Averroes_Sefer_Ba'alei_Hayyim_De_animalibus. 7 Ibid. 422v. 8 Ibid. 423r. 9 bGittin 83b. For the use of this phrase in the Resurrection controversy and during the Maimonidean controversy of the 1230s, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition, 51 and 143, n. 96; also Melamed, On the Shoulders of Giants, 45–46.

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in Falaquera’s account of the issue under consideration.10 Judah’s addition, in which he makes use of a Talmudic dictum, may be seen as an attempt to act as Galen’s advocate, since he provides an answer in favor of Galen’s position. This would imply that in the controversy concerning the seat of touch Judah leans towards Galen’s view. In addition, it should be noted that Judah does not reproduce Averroes’ exclamation of praise directed at Aristotle in this passage: “How marvelous is the divine power that can be found in the demonstrations that this man [= Aristotle] gave and how far are they removed from superficial thinking.”11 (ii) The heart vs the brain The next controversial issue concerns the question of the primacy of the heart vs that of the brain. Judah treats it in two passages. In mḥ/pa xii.5, where the heart is the subject of discussion, he briefly contrasts Aristotle’s opinion that the animal has one part, namely, the heart, for sensation, locomotion and nourishment, to that of Galen who believed that the brain is the principle of sensation and locomotion, and the liver that of nutrition. Judah then proceeds to discuss other simple parts, such as blood, suet and lard, and the “marrow of the head,” that is, the brain (mḥ/pa xii.11). Here he is a bit more extensive, and this time he first gives Galen’s view according to which the brain is the principle of sensation and locomotion, since injury and health of the brain affect the bodily parts.12 He then continues: “The controversy between him and Aristotle is that, according to Galen, [the brain] is the first cause of sensation and locomotion, whereas according to Aristotle their first cause is the heart, the brain being the second cause, since it moderates the heat of the heart, for the heart is their first cause.” In this second passage no mention is made of the liver and nutrition. The terms “first cause” and “second cause” point to Averroes’ treatment of the issue, and they form part of the Commentator’s attempt at harmonizing Aristotle’s view with that of Galen.13 Averroes is ready to concede that the brain plays

10 11 12

13

df 211v–212r. Comm. Anim. 423v1–2. “Superficial” lit.: the beginning of (thinking). Translation slightly modified after Bos’ unpublished working translation. mḥ/pa xii.11. Galen notes that animals immediately lose motion, sense-perception, breath and voice, once one of the ventricles of the brain is wounded or affected by pressure, cf. Galen, Usefulness of Parts viii.3, see Gätje, “Averroes als Aristoteleskommentator,” 289– 293. For Galen’s experiments to prove that the brain is the center of the nervous system, see also May, Galen on the Usefulness, 62–63. Comm. Anim. 423r 5–10; 425r4–426v15.

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some part in sensation and locomotion, but he makes its role, namely to moderate and balance the innate heat, subservient to that of the heart—the source of the heat—in these functions.14 Drawing on Meteorology Book iv, where it is said that nature in its operations uses cold only “accidentally” and “in second intention,” he concludes that the brain is the cause of sensation and motion only in second intention, and that it serves the heart. Averroes is even ready to admit that in the case of sight, hearing and smell the brain plays, as he puts it, “a partial primary role,” since this is in agreement with what Aristotle believes. The last section of this discussion throws more light on the Commentator’s attitude vis-à-vis Aristotle and Galen. Here he notes that, contrary to what Galen thought, Galen’s discoveries (that were obtained through dissection) do not contradict Aristotle’s statements, but instead complement them.15 Aristotle, Averroes continues, provides “general proofs (mofetim) that are based on premises that are natural, general and essential,” and such proofs cannot be refuted by the senses at any time.16 In other words, Averroes intimates that Galen relied on observation rather than on logical proof. Judah omits most of Averroes’ lengthy argumentation. Given his brevity it is not easy to determine whether he sides with either position. Yet he does not appear as prone as Averroes was to make Aristotle’s view prevail. Moreover, the fact that in a later passage, on the internal parts, he states as a fact that the brain is the principle of the nerves, sensation, locomotion and the psychic spirit, without even referring to Aristotle’s view on the primacy of the heart, seems to indicate that he prefers Galen’s view.17 (iii) The internal parts The heart is again discussed in mḥ/pa xiii.7 within the wider context of an account of the internal parts. Here Judah notes that in Aristotle’s opinion the

14 15

Aristotle says that the brain is necessary to moderate the heat in the region of the heart at pa 652b20–22. Av. Comm. Anim. 426v6–8: ‫ובכלל הנה מה שהתפרסם לגאלינוס וזולתו בנתוח אחר זמן אריסטו מאלו הדברים אמנם‬ ‫המחוייב ממנו מה שילך מזה דרך התמימות והשלימות למאמרי אריסטו לא מה שילך דרך‬ .‫הסתירה והבטולים למאמרי ארסטו כמו שחשב זה גאלינוס‬ Cf. his statement in the Chapter on Respiration (Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 274– 275):

‫ل الأمور التى يظّن بجلينوس أنه يناقض فيها أرسطو ليست فى الحقيقة مناقاضات وإن ّما هى‬ ّ ‫ولذلك ج‬ ‫كالتتميمات والز يادة‬. 16 17

Comm. Anim. 426v8–10. mḥ/pa xiii.8.

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heart is the principle of blood, of the [vital or animal] spirit (or: pneuma) and of nutrition, whereas according to Galen the blood vessels (ʿoreqin) are the principle of the blood, the liver [that of] nutrition, the heart being the principle of the vital spirit. After having mentioned the two positions he continues: “He [= Galen] adduces proofs (reʾayot) based on what he observed in his examination (ʿiyyun) of the parts, which is called the science of tašrīḥ.18 Aristotle has only rational arguments (ṭeʿanot sikhliyyot), not based on examination (ʿiyyun). Averroes makes Aristotle’s opinion prevail, as is his habit when someone expresses doubts about Aristotle. Even if one has provided a sound argument (ṭeʿanah nekhonah) which is self-evident, as a person learned in tašrīḥ does, he will refute it and try to reconcile what is manifest from the statement of tašrīḥ with the words of Aristotle, as if Aristotle were an angel of God, whom one should not criticize.” Here it is obvious that Judah favors Galen’s position and that he criticizes Averroes for always attempting to defend Aristotle’s view even if it is patently wrong. Interestingly, by maintaining that “Aristotle has only rational arguments (ṭeʿanot sikhliyyot), not based on examination (ʿiyyun),” Judah also seems to reject Averroes’ professed approach to prefer rational arguments to observation through dissection (cf. preceding section), at least if we take the term “examination” (ʿiyyun) to refer to dissection here, as it seems to do given the context. Also, Judah seems to discard Averroes’ position that proofs (mofetim) should be based on premises that are natural, general and essential and cannot be refuted by the senses (cf. preceding section). Judah’s account of the issue under consideration is an abridged and not entirely accurate rendering of Averroes’ description of the controversy.19 In the next passage of the mḥ, however, Judah again records the divergent views, this time a bit more extensively, and here he quotes his source almost literally: “Galen places the origin of the non-pulsating vessels and the blood and the nutritive faculty in the liver, whereas the origin of the pulsating vessels— which are called širyān20—and the animal spirit (or vital pneuma) lies in the heart, and this is the motion of the pulse and the natural heat.”21 As Judah indicates, Averroes makes Aristotle’s view prevail on the basis of rational arguments. The commentator refers to the Posterior Analytics, while at

18 19

20 21

The Arabic tašrīḥ means “anatomy” or “dissection.” Averroes writes that the liver is the principle of blood, the veins and the nutritive faculty, and the heart is the principle of the pulsating veins and the pneuma, Comm. Anim. 432v9– 11. The Arabic term for “the artery.” mḥ/pa xiii.8, cf. Comm. Anim. 432v10–13.

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the same time recording where the two authorities agree, thus again trying to harmonize their different views. Concerning Galen’s anatomical experiments he says that “in our time” the truth cannot be established.22 Averroes also says that he does not understand what exactly Galen meant by “the vital faculty,” which, according to Galen, should be posited as a third faculty separate from sensation and nutrition.23 Throughout his investigation Averroes stresses the primacy of the heart and its function as the principle of nutrition. His inquiry into the controversy, in which he also refers to Avicenna’s views, is very long and Judah passes over most of it in silence.24 Like Averroes, Judah points out that Aristotle and Galen agree that the formation of the blood of the artery is in the heart.25 Yet Judah’s next statement, “in Galen’s view, none of the parts is fed by the heart except for the lung,” again pays no attention to the rival view of Aristotle, according to which the bodily parts are fed by the heart seeing that it is the heart that produces blood. Averroes devoted a long exposition to this topic, at the end of which he established as true Aristotle’s view that the heart is the origin of veins, blood and the nutritive faculty. Nonetheless, he also again incorporated Galen’s view by granting the liver a “partial primacy” as nutritive faculty. This partial primacy is not absolute, for it is subordinate to that of the heart, since the liver can only perform its actions by means of the natural heat that reaches it from the heart. The heart is thus the first mover in the production of the blood in the liver.26 As the Commentator puts it: “It is appropriate to believe that the relation of the blood that is produced in the heart to the blood that is produced in the liver is like the relation of form to matter.”27 In other words, he attempts to minimize the differences between the two authorities, which comes down to a harmonization of the two views. The same tendency is obvious in his statement: “what Galen and the anatomists concluded on the basis of anatomy does not contradict his [= Aristotle’s] general statement. There rather is perfection in it or what is in the manner of perfection.”28 As we have seen, Judah limits himself to mentioning Galen’s position. Although he points out that Aristotle and Galen agree that the heart is the origin of formation of the blood in the artery, he does not take over Averroes’ attempts

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Comm. Anim. 433v33. But cf. also below, text to n. 66. Ibid. 432v–433r. The entire discussion covers fols 432v–436v. Comm. Anim. 432v22–23. Ibid. 435v–436r. Ibid. 435v. Ibid. 436r10–11. Cf. above, n. 15.

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at harmonization. Quite the contrary, he makes it clear that empirical anatomical proofs are to be preferred to rational proofs. His derisory remark to the effect that Averroes blindly follows Aristotle “as if Aristotle were an angel of God” clearly reveals his critical attitude.29 (iv) The cavities of the heart Judah’s account of the heart contains a brief passage on the cavities of the heart. After having stated that the hearts of large animals have three cavities and that of small animals two, we read: “According to Aristotle, the right cavity is hotter than the left, whereas Galen holds the opposite.”30 In Averroes’ account we find more information: according to Aristotle, in animals that have three cavities this is for the better, because three is better than two (for in a series of three there is a beginning, a middle and an end, and the middle is the more noble), but Galen does not believe that there are animals with three cavities. According to Galen, animals that have lungs have two cavities, whereas animals without lungs have only one cavity which comes instead of the lung.31 Averroes does not investigate the issue any further. Unfortunately, his concluding sentence contains a textual problem. Some manuscripts read that the dispute between the two authorities can only be settled “by what is seen/attested (hanirʾeh),” and others “by what is generally accepted (mefursam).”32 As A. Gaziel has suggested, the different readings may go back to two different readings in the Arabic, mashhūd and mashhūr respectively.33 In any event, Averroes does

29

30 31

32 33

In her article “Aristotle and Galen” S.M. Connell explores the interpretation according to which Galen’s science is based on better empirical methods than Aristotle’s and thus supersedes Aristotle’s theoretical rationality. In this view, which originated in the Middle Ages, Aristotle “was depicted as an enemy of observationally grounded scientific progress” (p. 405). She challenges this notion with respect to the controversy between Aristotle and Galen on the role of the female in procreation and concludes that regarding this point Aristotle might be regarded as a more careful observer, “and thus even as a better scientist than Galen” (414). Connell’s study relates to the Latin Middle Ages and the Renaissance and does not take into consideration Arabic and Hebrew texts, but it is noteworthy that the same assessment of Galen as a practitioner of empirical method as opposed to Aristotle’s rationalism is found in our text. mḥ/pa xiii.9; Arist., pa 667a1–6. Galen criticized Aristotle’s view on the number of ventricles of the heart in Usefulness of Parts vi.9. According to Galen, the vital spirit is produced in the left side of the heart, which may have been the source of the notion that in the physician’s view the left ventricle was hotter. Comm. Anim. 436v28–29. There is no parallel to this sentence in Falaquera’s df. Gaziel, The Biology of Levi ben Gershom, 236 n. 177. Gaziel notes that Gersonides was not sure as to the meaning of the term mefursam.

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not side with either view, and the same applies to Judah. He merely records the two opinions without expressing any preference. (v) The diaphragm The brief passage on the diaphragm opens by stating that this part separates the heart from the lung. The reason that is provided for the separation is that it is appropriate that the ruling part, that is, the heart, be separate from the serving parts to which the lung belongs (mḥ/pa xiii.19). This goes back to Aristotle who says that in this way the noble parts are divided off from the less noble ones.34 Judah does not refer to Aristotle, but continues by saying that, according to Galen, the diaphragm has another usefulness, namely that through it the animal can move his chest when breathing.35 Averroes elaborates on Aristotle’s view, explaining that the partition was necessary so as to prevent the exhalations produced in the process of concoction from ascending from the intestines to the higher parts of the body and causing damage to the soul-functions. Galen, however, the Commentator continues, was of the opinion that the diaphragm served a “more necessary and nobler usefulness,” namely that it enables the animal to move its chest in respiration.36 In the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary it is said that the diaphragm is an ʿaṣl, which seems to transliterate the Arabic ʿaḍal.37 Averroes explains that this part and its usefulness was not yet known at the time of Aristotle. Only after Aristotle was it discovered that every voluntary motion is effected by an ʿaṣl, except for a small number of motions. Averroes then adds: “We have to praise Galen because of this usefulness and we have to connect it with the usefulness mentioned by the first (thinkers) and we also have to praise him for the things that have been expounded in (the field of) anatomy.”38 In all probability what is meant here by the word ʿaṣl is not the usual sense of “muscle”, but “nerve”, for the nerves were not yet known to Aristotle, and in the continuation of the passage Averroes quotes Galen as saying that many nerves arrive at the diaphragm.39 34 35

36 37 38 39

Arist., pa 672b21. In Usefulness of Parts iv.14 Galen says that the diaphragm must not be prevented from moving freely by any part below it. According to Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 306– 307, Averroes’ source of Galen’s position on the diaphragm may not have been the Usefulness of Parts, but rather a lost text on the thorax. Comm. Anim. 440r7–19. The ms Paris of Comm. Anim. has ʿ-ṣ-m, which is probably a mistake for ʿ-ṣ-l, which appears in the next line. Comm. Anim. 440r26–28. Perhaps we have to read ʿaṣab (nerve) here. According to Bürgel, the words ʿaḍal and ʿaṣab are often confused, Bürgel, Averroes “contra Galenum,” 335 notes 18 and 21. Cf. also ibidem, 313.

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Judah does not say clearly which explanation he follows, nor does he repeat Averroes’ remark that Aristotle was unaware of the existence of nerves or the commentator’s praise of Galen. However, regarding another question on the diaphragm, viz. why the middle of the diaphragm contains little flesh, it is obvious that Judah prefers Galen’s opinion to that of Aristotle, for here he reproduces Galen’s explanation without even recording Aristotle’s position (mḥ/pa xiii.19). Averroes described Aristotle’s opinion as follows: it contains little flesh so as to prevent it from drawing in moisture from the body, which could cause illness.40 Judah skips over this, limiting himself to stating that according to Galen the middle of the diaphragm contains little flesh because of the great amount of nerves that arrive there from the brain, and that is the reason why the brain is damaged when the diaphragm is ailing.

2

On the Generation of Animals

(vi) The role of the testes In mḥ/ga xv.3 Judah describes the divergent views of Aristotle and Galen on the function of the testicles in generation. Aristotle held that the testicles are not necessary for generation given that there are animals such as serpents and fish that do not have testicles and yet produce semen and procreate. In animals that have testicles, their existence is for the better, for in those animals the semen is not emitted quickly.41 Galen’s opinion was instead that the testicles belong to the governing parts of the body: they are as necessary for the production of semen as the brain is for the faculties of sensation and locomotion, and the heart for the vital faculty. Judah’s description summarizes the lengthy treatment of the issue by Averroes. As is the case with other issues of the Aristotle-Galen controversy, Averroes defends Aristotle’s position while also taking into consideration Galen’s view. He starts his investigation by stating that the testicles “have some activity with respect to semen through which generation and impregnation take place.” His point of departure is that Aristotle’s argument that the testicles are not necessary in generation since not all animals have them (whereas all animals have the two governing parts, heart and brain) is true. That they are not necessary is also evident from a comparison with the role of female breasts in producing milk: milk cannot be produced without breasts, but semen can be produced

40 41

Comm. Anim. 440r28–29. Arist., ga 717a16–30.

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without testicles.42 A crucial element in his discussion is the argument adduced by Aristotle that a bull was found to have impregnated a cow immediately after having been castrated. Aristotle explained that this could happen because the seminal passages had not yet been drawn up, so that semen could still pass through them.43 From this Aristotle inferred that the testicles have the same function as the stone-weights that women hang on their looms when they are weaving.44 According to Averroes, the case of the bull is not compelling evidence (reʾayah ḥotekhet) that the existence of the testicles is necessary for the production of semen; their function is rather to secure that the semen is not emitted too quickly. Cessation of generation is not due to the excision of the testicles but to the fact that in castrated animals the seminal ducts are drawn up and become too narrow for the passage of semen. Cessation of procreation is thus no sufficient proof for the alleged necessity of the testicles, as held by Galen. However, at the same time Averroes seems to call into question the validity of this proof when he says that if the proof concerning the bull adduced by Aristotle is true, the existence of the testicles is not necessary, but if the proof is not true, there is reason for doubt. Averroes leaves the issue undecided and concludes in the end that it is better to adhere to adhere to Aristotle’s view as long as “this question” is not resolved. Apparently “this question” refers to the validity of the proof with the bull. The problem seems to be that the proof was employed by both Aristotle and Galen, but that the two authorities had different aims in adducing it. They both accept that a bull immediately after castration has procreated and also agree that the explanation of this occurrence is that the seminal passages had not yet been drawn up. However, the conclusion Galen draws from this case is different from that of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, this occurrence proved that the testes are not necessary for generation: the removal of the testes results after a while (but not immediately) in the being drawn upwards of the seminal passages which before castration had been straight. In other words: the case of the bull shows that the function of testes is that they serve as weights for the passages. For Galen, by contrast, it proved that they are necessary for the animal to generate, for their removal makes generation cease, albeit not immediately.

42 43 44

Comm. Anim. 452r–v. Arist., ga 717b1–5. Galen had ridiculed this view in his On Semen i.16.1, saying that it was “so clearly false that not even an untrained person would fail to see it.” Tr. DeLacy, On Semen, 132–133.

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Averroes does not differentiate between the two ways in which the proof was used. However, the fact that he refers to uncertainty with regard to the proof seems to indicate that he was willing to make allowances for Galen’s view even though he ends up formally adopting Aristotle’s view. Moreover, he makes a distinction between animals in general and animals with testes. He considers proven that testes are not necessary for the production of semen in so far as this is semen of animals, but the question whether testes are not necessary for the production of semen in animals in so far as these animals have testes requires investigation. Although he does not say so explicitly, it may be inferred from his words that considering the class of animals as a whole Aristotle’s position is to be preferred, whereas Galen’s view may hold true for animals that are equipped with testes. If this interpretation is correct, the distinction that Averroes draws here should be seen as an attempt to reconcile the opinions of the two authorities, and this may explain his statement that the testicles have some activity with respect to semen. Judah does not side with either Aristotle or Galen explicitly. Yet from the fact that he opens his account with the statement: “the testicles are the first cause of generation” it would seem that he considered Galen’s view, which he describes briefly at the end of the paragraph, to be authoritative. He does not repeat Averroes’ criticism of Galen, nor the Commentator’s comparison of the production of semen with that of milk in females. At the beginning of the paragraph, he brings up the proof of the bull as follows: “However, what has been told about a bull that mounted a female immediately after it had been castrated and that this female was impregnated, [this happened] because these [seminal] passages in the testicles had not yet been drawn up and therefore it was not impossible for the semen to pass through it.” It is not entirely clear what the status of this proof amounts to in Judah’s account. Seeing, however, that it follows the statement that “the testicles are the first cause of generation,” it may be inferred that he took it to convey that the testicles are necessary in generation. (vii) Semen In his account of semen Judah refers twice to an opinion held by Galen and rejects it. The first view concerns the airy part of the seminal fluid, the pneuma. Judah regards as false the view that this part causes pain in the uterus when it dissolves from the embryo once the parts of the embryo are completed (mḥ/ga xvi.9). Aristotle is not mentioned here, nor in Averroes’ discussion of the issue.45

45

Comm. Anim. 464r33–35.

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The second view has to do with the question of whether the male semen is a part of the embryo, as Galen believed, or an instrument as Aristotle held (mḥ/ga xvi.10). The context of this controversial issue is the question why some bodily parts are not replaced when they are cut off. Galen’s explanation that this is because these parts are formed from semen is rejected; instead, it is because the airy part has decayed. A bit later on in this passage Judah reports that Galen adduced another argument in support of the doctrine that the male semen is a part of the embryo, based on an experiment by Hippocrates. Hippocrates had ordered a woman (in Judah’s rendering: a prostitute) to have an abortion by jumping up and down a few days after she had conceived, and when the semen fell out a membrane of the embryo was seen to have formed around it. According to the physicians, this proved that the semen is a physical part of the embryo.46 The mḥ, however, states that this is not a clear proof (reʾayah berurah), for it only shows that the semen acts like an instrument that is not separated from the material on which it operates until that which is formed is completed. In other words, on this issue the mḥ may be taken to follow Aristotle’s position. (viii) Temperature of the white and the yolk of eggs mḥ/ga xvii.4 treats the question of why there are two colors in eggs, white (the albumen) and yellowish (the yolk). In this regard the question arises whether the white of the egg is hotter than the yolk or vice versa. Averroes attempted to reconcile Aristotle’s position, according to which the white is hotter than the yellowish part, with that held by “the physicians,” according to which the yolk is hotter. He does not mention Galen by name, but argues that the contradiction between the two views is only apparent, since the physicians admit that the yolk is only hot in relation to the human body, not that it is hot in itself.47 Here Judah does not refer explicitly to a doubt, but ventures an opinion of his own, introducing it by the words “It seems to me.” In his view, a small white part is also found in the middle of the yolk. It is this white from which the chick is formed, not from the outer hot one, as Aristotle believed. If this is true, Judah continues, it is not necessary to argue that the albumen is hot or that the yolk is cold in relation to the constitution of man. On this theory the yolk is hotter than the surrounding white in an absolute sense. I have not been able to find a source for this theory.48

46 47 48

Cf. Comm. Anim. 463v24–28. Comm. Anim. 469v–470r32; Arist., ga 752b19–22. Could Judah be referring to the white yolk or latebra here?

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(ix) The female contribution to generation Judah ha-Cohen pays considerable attention to the question of what the female contributes to generation. In mḥ/ga xv.9 he briefly describes the divergent positions of Aristotle and Galen: “Aristotle is of the opinion that it is the menstrual blood that has the power to generate, not the female semen. According to Galen, however, the female semen, too, has a power that is suitable to generate.” In the next paragraph, after having discussed how the various parts of the embryo are formed, a process in which the menstrual blood, the male semen and the female semen are involved, he states that it is impossible that the existence of the female semen should be in vain, for how, he exclaims, can nature do something that is in vain? (mḥ/ga xv.10). He then raises some other objections to the assumption that the female semen does not play a role in generation, one of which is that if the male semen is the [sole] agent in generation by providing the form (as Aristotle held), why does it sometimes form males, and sometimes females? He announces that he will provide the solution in mḥ/ga xviii. The solution that he presents there is that the role of the female semen is to provide the form in the generation of females, so that its existence is not in vain (mḥ/ga xviii.3–5). The question of what exactly the female contributed to generation was a hotly debated issue in medieval zoological and medical writings.49 As was the case with the other controversial questions, Judah bases himself on Averroes’ account of the issue, but, as we shall see, here he also draws on rabbinic literature. Again, Averroes reiterates the Aristotelian view, according to which the menstrual blood constitutes the material factor which the female contributes to the formation of the embryo. It is the passive factor in generation, whereas the male is the active one. The male contribution to reproduction, the sperm, provides the form and the principle of movement to the embryo.50 At the same time, however, Averroes gives credit to Galen’s opinion according to which the female semen plays a part in generation. Galen had argued that the ovaries, or, in his parlance, “the female testes,” have the same shape as the male testes and that the female discharge, which he called the female semen, although less perfect than the male semen, performs the same functions in generation as the male semen, and thus that it has generative power.51

49 50 51

For a more detailed examination of this issue, see Fontaine, “The Facts of Life” and Connell “Aristotle and Galen.” Comm. Anim. 456v; Arist., ga 727b31, 729a30–32. Galen expounds his views on the female semen in up xiv and On Semen ii.

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In a long-winded argumentation Averroes refutes this theory.52 Although he could not deny the existence of the ovaries and also conceded that the female semen has some usefulness in that it incites the desire for intercourse and thus secures continuation of the human species, he rejected Galen’s view that the female semen has reproductive power. To refute this, he advanced the logical argument that there cannot be two constituents that both have generative power in one individual: it is either the menstrual blood or the female semen. Moreover, he adduced arguments based on observation, namely Aristotle’s argument of wind-eggs: hens can produce eggs without having been trodden by a male, but such eggs do not have a chick in it. Another Aristotelian argument is that women can conceive without deriving pleasure from sexual intercourse (that is, without emitting semen). To this Averroes added that he has questioned trustworthy women who confirmed this, and that this explains why their husbands made sure to have intercourse in circumstances where the woman was not likely to enjoy it.53 Averroes was even prepared to accept that the ovaries were made “in vain,” on the grounds that the male, too, possesses some part that apparently serves no part in generation, namely his breasts. In his view, the female testes are comparable to the eyes of moles that have all the membranes of the eye, except for the lens, and hence cannot see. In sum, Averroes tried to adhere to the Aristotelian position as closely as possible, but nevertheless incorporated some Galenic tenets. Or, to put it somewhat differently: he took over those Galenic doctrines that were simply unavoidable to accept (and he even says that Galen advanced strong arguments for his view), but at the same time tried to downplay their importance. In his examination of the issue he once more seizes the opportunity to sing Aristotle’s praises: “We have to praise God for having singled out this man with perfection and for having assigned to him the highest degree that is possible for man, which no man in any generation can reach.”54 Averroes’ use of the term “female semen,” however, is ambiguous. In some passages he considers the menstrual blood and the female semen to be two different substances, whereas in others the female semen is identified with the menses. To be sure, to a certain extent the ambiguity goes back to the two Greek authorities and their terminology. Aristotle himself was not wholly consistent with regard to the female semen. Although in certain passages he denied its

52 53 54

Comm. Anim. 456v–459v. Ibid. 457v16–20. See below, note 61. Comm. Anim. 457v10–12.

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existence, there are other passages where he designates the menstrual fluid as semen. As for Galen, the precise relation between menstrual blood and female semen is not entirely clear either. Hence, in modern research there is no consensus as to how much exactly Galen deviated from Aristotle.55 Judah’s account of the issue under consideration is much more succinct than that of his source. He omits Averroes’ lengthy refutation of Galen and it cannot be doubted that he takes the existence of female semen for granted. However, he also records Aristotle’s view that the menstrual discharge is the matter for the embryo and notes that this fluid is suitable to the male semen with a view to generation. On the other hand, he adds a qualification to Aristotle’s analogy that semen acts on the menstrual blood as rennet does in milk: whereas rennet mixes with milk in a certain blend, semen does not mix with the menses; it merely provides the form (mḥ/ga xvi.8).56 Apparently, in Judah’s opinion, the mere analogy does not explain how the semen acts in the menstrual blood; it ought to be added that male semen gives the form.57 It is difficult to say whether this modification is Judah’s own invention or whether he was inspired by some statements by Avicenna who also seems to imply that the Aristotelian analogy is not entirely fitting.58 Although Judah, unlike Aristotle, assigns a role to female semen, this does not imply that he follows Galen unconditionally. He classifies as absurd the view that the menstrual blood forms certain parts of the body, and the female semen other parts and the male semen still other ones, by which he apparently refers to the physician’s theory (as found in Averroes) according to which the so-called sanguineous parts (heart, liver, viscera) are formed by the menstrual blood and the white, bloodless and membranous parts (brain, ligaments) by the male semen.59 Judah states that the menstrual blood is the material from which all the bodily parts are formed, whereas Galen held that both male and female semen provide the embryo with form and matter. Judah’s own theory about the role of the female semen entails in fact a criticism of the views of both Aristotle and Galen (as he found them articulated in

55 56

57 58 59

Cf. Fontaine, “The Facts of Life,” 344–346; see also Connell, “Aristotle and Galen” on the different approaches of Aristotle and Galen to this issue. For the analogy of semen to milk, cf. Arist., ga 739b21–26, where Aristotle says that “the action of the semen in ‘setting’ the female’s secretion in the uterus is similar to (Gr. ‘osper) that of rennet upon milk” (tr. Peck). It should be noted, however, that this is precisely what Judah records as Aristotle’s view in mḥ/ga xv.9, cf. above Chapter Four, section 1 (xviii). Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Ḥayawān, 404.6–6 and 425.7–10. Galen, up xiv.11; On Semen i.6 and i.11.

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Averroes’ commentary), as well as of Averroes. According to Judah, the female semen plays an active part in sex-differentiation, for he believes it to determine the gender of the female embryo. He explains this in what may be seen as an excursus on Aristotle’s theory of epikrateia (predominance), according to which the cause of sex-differentiation lies in the degree to which the male semen is able to gain predominance over the menstrual blood.60 As Judah goes on to explain, according to Aristotle, the strength or weakness of male semen is dependent on five factors, namely, age; [bodily] constitution; the blowing of winds; [the nature of] the place, and the nature of the water and the air (mḥ/ga xviii.2). He then raises an objection, based on observation, namely that sometimes a man generates in one and the same woman females when he is young and males when he is old, which runs counter to Aristotle’s theory. This objection introduces his own view that the instrument which produces and forms males is the male semen, whereas the female semen produces and forms females. He emphasizes that his theory shows that the existence of the female semen is not “in vain,” a theory on which he expresses his amazement (mḥ/ga xviii.3). This criticism applies to Aristotle and to Averroes, who had suggested that the existence of the ovaries is in vain. However, he also emphasizes that his own theory differs from that of Galen, for he does not accept Galen’s view that the female semen forms certain parts of the embryo. Here he endorses Averroes’ refutation of Galen’s view. On his own theory, the female semen contributes the form of the female embryo, but it does not form bodily parts (mḥ/ga xviii.4). The last part of the excursus is devoted to answering objections that could be raised to the solution that he proposes (mḥ/ga xviii.5). Here it becomes clear that his source of inspiration is rabbinic literature. He invokes rabbinic sayings like “the upper one prevails” as evidence that the semen which is emitted last during intercourse determines the gender of the offspring.61 Thus, when the male “contains himself in the belly,” meaning that the female emits her semen first, a male will be produced.62 If the woman emits no semen at all, for example because she is in a state of fright, she begets a male, in consonance with the information provided by Averroes’ “trustworthy women.” The female semen moreover plays a part in resemblance (mḥ/ga xviii.6).

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Arist., ga 765b35–766b26. bPes 76a: “What comes last gives the form,” i.e. when the female emits her semen first, a male will be produced and when the male is the first to emit and the female the last, the embryo will be of the female gender. bNiddah 31a. On the use of this Talmudic dictum by medieval Jewish authors see Barkaï, Les infortunes de Dinah, 62–63 and 71 ff.

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In sum, regarding the issue of the nature of female contribution to generation Judah ha-Cohen cannot be classified as an adherent either of Aristotle or of Galen. Instead, his treatment of the subject exhibits a certain independence from the two authorities and also from Averroes. Of Galen’s view he accepts only the notion that the female semen makes some contribution to generation, but not the theory that it gives matter and form to the embryo as the male does. What we find instead is that he opted for a solution that was in line with traditional teaching on the subject, for the existence of female semen was generally acknowledged by Talmudic sages. Rabbinic authority is moreover adduced in the passage that strength or weakness of the male semen is dependent on five factors: Judah quotes a Talmudic passage in corroboration of Aristotle’s words that one of the five factors is the nature of the place.63 Here it should be recalled that in the section on On Generation of Animals Judah elaborates on his material by inserting a long passage from bBekhorot (cf. Chapter Three, 3.2). At first sight, this passage seems intended to supplement the material of his source, treating as it does reproduction of various animals and comparing the gestation period of animals to those of trees. Yet the passage ends with an allusion to the aggadic story about R. Joshua, who in a series of questions and answers outwitted the Athenian sages, reputed for their wisdom. Therefore, the subtext of this passage suggests that traditional science is to be preferred to Greek science, a message that would be consistent with Judah’s attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy in general. There are two more passages in the zoological section in which Judah is more expansive than his source. In mḥ/ga xviii.9 he discusses the question why “bastards resemble the fathers more than legal children.” Referring to Job 24:15, “The eyes of the adulterer watch for twilight,” he says that this is “because of the love of the lover for his beloved. Consequently, the [male] semen prevails in respect of genus, individual form and resemblance.” Apparently, in cases of illegal offspring both male and female resemble the father. In another passage he adds that the purpose of circumcision is to purify the newborn of the remnant of menstrual blood, a remark that has no parallel in his source (mḥ/ga xviii.5).64

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bBer 5a: “he who places his bed between north and south will have male offspring.” Aristotle explains the five factors at ga 767a2–35. The precise meaning of this statement is not clear. It may refer to the fact that the menstrual blood provides the material for the embryo, so that the mother has passed on ritual impurity to the child, or to the impurity of the mother following childbirth (Lev. 12:2–8).

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It should not be overlooked that Galen’s influence is also noticeable in passages where he is not mentioned by name. For example, in the section on the liver the mḥ, following Averroes, pays attention to the process of how the concocted food is transformed into blood (mḥ/pa xiii.14). This piece of information derives from Galen. Another example is mḥ/pa xiv.2 where the usefulness of the gall bladder is discussed. Here Judah ascribes to Aristotle the opinion that the usefulness of this part is that it attracts the blood that is not suitable for nourishing the parts. This view is not found in Aristotle’s pa. Judah mentions also another use, namely that it stirs the intestines to expel the dung. No authority is mentioned here, but from Averroes’ commentary it becomes clear that it was Galen who held this view.65 In the passage on the usefulness of the hands Judah briefly notes that the nails of the hands of man serve two purposes: protection of the fingertips and support of the flesh of the hands (mḥ/pa xiv.9). According to his source, Aristotle mentioned only the first function and Galen provided the second use, i.e the supporting of the flesh at the fingertips so that the hand can seize tiny objects.66 Averroes adds that Galen denied the “first use” given by Aristotle, although this use is apparent. Similarly, the section on apes (mḥ/pa xiv.13) goes back to Galen’s description of this animal. Galenic doctrines are also found in sections other than those that treat zoology. In mḥ/Soul ii.23 we learn that the watery humor in the eye that lies behind the crystalline humor is what Galen calls the vitreous humor.67 Another Galenic viewpoint emerges in mḥ/gc ii.9, where it is explained that composite bodies come into being from the elements by way of the mixture. Here Judah quotes Averroes as criticizing Galen who posited the existence of a balanced blending, that is, a balanced constant mixture in which none of the qualities prevails.68 At this point we should return to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, whether Judah ha-Cohen can be found to side with either Aristotle or Galen with respect to the controversial issues between the two authorities. Due to Judah’s conciseness the question is not so easy to answer. What is clear, however, is that he does not take pains to defend Aristotle’s positions as Aver-

65 66 67 68

In either case the idea would be that the child has to be purified because the blood of the mother renders it unclean. I wish to thank Prof. A. Eran for her help with this passage. Comm. Anim. 442r. Ibid. 447r21–23 and 448v22. This piece of information is repeated at the end of mḥ/Soul ii.24. For a discussion of Averroes’ criticism of Galen’s view, see Eichner, Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar, 148–157.

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roes does. In another respect, too, he does not follow Averroes. As we have seen on several occasions, Averroes often incorporates Galenic views, but in the end reaffirms those of Aristotle, thus reinterpreting Aristotle’s theories in light of Galen’s discoveries. Towards the end of Book Eleven of his Commentary he describes his position vis-à-vis the two Greek sages along the following lines: Aristotle’s description of animals in the first ten books of On Animals (that is, the History of Animals), which was based on his own perception or on trustworthy reports, was so complete that those who came after him could add only little details, but the situation is different with the science of dissection, since that science was further developed by the time of Galen.69 Averroes continues by saying that that he will pay attention to what Galen has discovered and to their divergences on the use of the parts. He adds: “however, as regards the points concerning dissection on which they differ, it is impossible in our time to discover the truth.”70 As noted above (no. ii), part of Averroes’ harmonizing approach was to regard Galen’s discoveries as supplementing Aristotle’s views, not as contradicting them. Such an approach, Averroes holds, is wholly appropriate. In this way man can achieve ultimate perfection in every part of knowledge, which constitutes human happiness. Should one choose to contradict the words of an earlier sage out of a desire for victory or in order to be remembered, his words will be of no use; they will only cause confusion and doubt and thus forestall that which is intended for man.71 Judah does not repeat this conviction in his survey. Moreover, he omits the passages in which Averroes praises Aristotle’s achievements or, occasionally, Galen’s. As noted, in some instances we find the harmonizing tendency that characterizes Averroes’ treatment of the controversy, for example when Judah uses the terms “first cause” and “second cause” (no. ii). In other instances, however, Averroes’ solution to smooth out the differences between Aristotle and Galen is less marked in the mḥ than in its source, and the divergent views are brought out more prominently (no. i). In this case, as well as in others, Judah

69 70

71

Comm. Anim. 421r20–25. Ibid. 421r27–28. Cf. also above, n. 33. Averroes seems to follow Al-Farabi, who also opined that in cases where dissection was required it was difficult to decided whether Aristotle or Galen was right, but that in all other cases Aristotle’s logical arguments are to be followed, see Bos and Fontaine, “Medico-philosophical Controversies,” 33–34. Comm. Anim. 426v11–14: ‫ובזה הצד מההשתמשות יהיה כבר הלכנו נוכח הדרך הצודקת‬ ‫בהשלמת החדשים מאמרי הראשונים עד שיגיע לאדם שלמותו האחרון בחלק חלק מחלקי‬ ‫הידיעה וזאת היא ההצלחה האנושית ואולם מי שילך דרך המחלוקת אם לאהבת הנצוח או‬ ‫לאהבת הגבורה או שיהיה נזכר אחריו שהוא השיג על הראשונים אז לא יהיה בדבריו תועלת‬ ‫כי אם מבוכה וספקות והרחוק מן הכוונה אנושית‬. The same passage is found in Falaquera’s df 215vb.

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seems to favor, although not always explicitly, Galen’s position (nos ii, iii, second question of v, vi). Regarding the question of whether semen is a part of the embryo or an instrument, he sides with Aristotle (no. vii). On the other hand, he ridicules Averroes for blindly following Aristotle (no. iii). There are also certain issues where Judah, in true encyclopedic fashion, describes the differences without stating his own view (no. iv, first question of v). On yet other issues, however, he does venture an opinion of his own, namely, regarding the formation of the chick in the egg (no. viii; here Galen is not mentioned explicitly, the reference is to “the physicians”), and, most prominently, on the question of the female contribution to generation (no. ix). This last question receives ample attention from Judah. Here he advances his own theory, which is in part based on the views of both Aristotle and Galen, but deviates from them in other respects. This theory is informed by rabbinic dicta on the role of the female semen. Interestingly, the mḥ is the only one of the three thirteenth-century Hebrew encyclopedias which exhibits an alternative view on the usefulness of female semen.72 To sum up, in the zoological sections of the mḥ Judah continues to level criticism at Aristotelian views, this time within the framework of the controversy between Aristotle and Galen. Here he contrasts Aristotle’s methodology (the use of rational arguments, ṭeʿanot sikhliyyot) and Averroes’ endorsement of it to Galen’s proofs (reʾayot) that are based on anatomical examination (ʿiyyun and tašrīḥ), clearly revealing his preference for the latter. Yet he does not take over Galen’s views in all instances, and certainly not when they contradict rabbinic teachings. 72

In his medical compendium Sefer Ṣori ha-Guf, Nathan b. Yoʾel Falaquera (cf. above, n. 2) likewise adduces the statement from bNiddah 31a, but he does not assign the same role to the female semen as Judah, cf. also n. 62 above.

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Judah ha-Cohen’s Explanation of Biblical Verses Introduction Judah ha-Cohen’s attitude towards Aristotelian philosophy was discussed at regular intervals in the preceding chapters, and notably in Chapters Four and Five, where we examined the different levels of his criticism of Aristotle’s system of thought. To gain a fuller picture of his appreciation of Aristotle’s philosophy, however, we also have to explore Judah’s interpretation of biblical verses as contained in the first of the three so-called “treatises” (maʾamarim) of the mḥ. Appended to Part 1, the treatise consists of 1130 lines in print and discusses verses from Genesis (lines 7–361), Psalms (363–503) and Proverbs (this section occupies more than half of the treatise, lines 504–1130).1 It is not a wordfor-word or verse-for-verse explanation; Judah comments on selected verses or chunks of passages, while referring also to verses in other biblical books, and occasionally adducing texts from rabbinic literature. In the survey of Aristotelian philosophy that precedes the treatise Judah refers to his biblical comments from time to time, and conversely, in Treatise 1 he explicitly mentions some of Aristotle’s doctrines presented in his survey. Oftentimes he interprets biblical verses in such a way that they are in congruence with the contents of Aristotle’s teachings. Other explanations, however, in particular in the section on Proverbs, criticize Aristotle’s philosophy. Furthermore, we find comments on topics that are not treated in his survey, or on topics that were touched upon in Judah’s introduction, but are elaborated on in more detail in the treatise under discussion. The present chapter aims to investigate how Judah ha-Cohen’s comments in this treatise relate to the preceding philosophical part: what can be learned from them about Judah’s thought and about his attitude towards the study of (Aristotelian) philosophy? To this end the chapter is structured as follows: I 1 This section of the mḥ was edited by D. Goldstein in huca 52 (1981), 203–252. References are to the lines in this edition. Goldstein planned to treat Judah’s biblical exegesis in an English translation which he apparently prepared, but no such work has ever been published. C. Sirat (“La qabbale”) has translated long passages into French. For Judah’s influence on later exegetes, see D. Goldstein, “The Citations of Judah ben Solomon.” Goldstein’s unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Commentary of Immanuel ben Solomon of Rome on chapters i–x of Genesis (1966), which is available online, contains translations of a few passages that are quoted by Immanuel of Rome.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_007

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shall first present a thematic overview of Judah’s philosophical explanation of biblical verses (section 1), and then review those passages in Treatise 1 that contain a critique of Aristotle’s philosophy and have not yet been discussed in Chapter Four above (section 2). Thereupon, I will list which of the views that Judah advances in the treatise under consideration do not have a direct parallel in his overview of philosophy (section 3). The last section will be devoted to the contextualization of Judah’s philosophical exegesis (section 4). Two methodological notes are in order. First, my presentation of Judah’s exegetical comments is not exhaustive; it is limited to an outline of the main ideas that are found in his commentary. It does not include, for example, many cases where Judah says, “and similar to this is x” (we ha-domeh lo …), x being another verse or a verse where the same expression occurs. Second, although I will largely follow the order of Judah’s explanations of specific biblical verses, I have chosen to systematize them and arrange them topically. This approach will help to bring out his views in a more focused manner. Although featuring in different places and in various contexts, the following themes appear to be central in his interpretations: (i) the three worlds, (ii) emanation and the creation of light, (iii) the celestial world, (iv) the physical world and nature, (v) the rational soul and man’s perfection, (vi) knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge, (vii) ethics, and to a lesser extent (viii) providence, and (ix) resurrection and the world to come.

1

Thematic Survey of Judah’s Philosophical Explanations of Biblical Verses

(i) The three worlds The first theme to be considered is that of the three worlds: the higher immaterial world, the world of the spheres and the world of generation and corruption. In the Introduction to the mḥ this tripartite division of all that exists was linked to the threefold division of the sciences. As was the case in the Introduction, the theme emerges here at the very beginning of the treatise.2 Commenting on “In the beginning” (Gen. 1:1) Judah points out that the construction be-reshit baraʾ alludes to one of the secrets of the Torah (sodot ha-Torah).3 The fact that be-reshit is not followed by a noun as in the genitive construct, but instead 2 Cf. Chapter Two, section 1.1. 3 As noted in Chapter Two, n. 2, the translation of biblical verses generally follows the jsb translation, but in cases where the kjv translation brings out Judah’s interpretation more clearly I use this translation, as is the case here.

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by a verb, so that it stands apart shows that the letter beth in be-reshit means “through,” “by means of,” as is the case with the Arabic preposition bi. Accordingly, the expression be-reshit should not be interpreted as conveying that the world has been created “in the beginning,” but instead that God created the two lower worlds through the immaterial world, which is the first thing (reshit) to proceed from God.4 Put differently, the two lower worlds proceeded from the power of the immaterial world, which, in turn, proceeded from the power of God. This is why it is said of wisdom (ḥokhmah) in Prov. 8:22, “The Lord created me at the beginning (reshit) of His course as the first of His works of old.” Through this explanation, which Judah considers to be “a great secret,” wisdom is equated with the immaterial world. This interpretation is in accordance with his conviction, expressed in the Introduction, that the term “ḥokhmah” tout court refers to the wisdom of the upper world. The emanation comprises ten gradations (maʿalot), one above the other.5 In sum, the first verse of Genesis explains the hierarchical order of these three worlds and the emanation of the two lower stages from the highest. The creation narrative, however, deals exclusively with the two lower worlds, not with the higher world.6 Another verse that alludes to the hierarchical order and to emanation of the three worlds in stages is Ps. 19:2, “The heavens declare the glory of God.” This verse teaches us that the Glory of God descends first on the immaterial world, for the word “declare” (mesapperim) does not mean “to tell to someone”; it rather conveys the notion of emanation. From there the emanation passes on to the firmament (raqiaʿ), and the firmament in turn passes it on to the lower world.7 As was already clear from Judah’s introduction to the mḥ, he finds the three worlds referred to in a number of scriptural verses, such as Deut. 10:14 and Neh. 9:6.8 In the treatise under consideration he adduces more verses, for instance, Isa. 66:1, “The heaven is My throne and the earth is My footstool,” where the words “throne,” “foot,” and “stool” stand for the upper world, the sphere and the earth respectively.9 Another example is found towards the end of the treatise, in the section on Proverbs, where Judah interprets the expressions “his name” in Prov. 30:4 as referring to the separate intellect (identified with “heavens”) 4 This implies that reshit is a principle. 5 Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 18–20. 6 Ibid., lines 7–16. A bit further on (lines 21–29) Judah explains how the six letters of the word be-reshit correlate with the six days of creation. 7 Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 372–376. For the continuation of the passage see section 3. The jsb translation translates raqiaʿ by “expanse.” I have preferred “firmament” in my discussion. 8 See Chapter Two, section 3. 9 Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 480–481. Cf. also lines 1065–1067 commenting on Ezek. 2:10.

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that moves the sphere, and “his son’s name” in that verse to the sphere (the heavens of the heavens).10 From Ps. 150:1–2 Judah infers that the three worlds possess various degrees in terms of simplicity or being compounded. The immaterial world constitutes the utmost degree of simplicity, therefore it is described with only one word: beqodsho (“in His sanctuary”), whereas that of the spheres is described by two words: bi-reqiaʿ ʿuzzo (“in the sky, His stronghold”), since it is more compound. The lower world is even more compound which is why the plural is used: bigevurotav (“His mighty acts”).11 The expression halleluhu (“Praise God”) in this verse can be explicated in two ways: 1) not even the immaterial world can comprehend the greatness of God, let alone the other existents, and 2) each existent praises God in accordance with its own (extent of) greatness, for the comprehension (hassagah) of man is not like that of the sphere, and that of the sphere is not like that of the immaterial world.12 It is important to note that the theme of the three worlds appears also in other contexts throughout Judah’s explanation of biblical verses. One comes across it in explanations related to the notion of emanation (cf. next section); to the issue of the position of man (see below: section v, the rational soul), to the attainment of knowledge (section vi), and to providence (section viii). It also emerges in other parts of his encyclopedia, which is why I will return to the theme in Chapter Seven. (ii) Emanation and the creation of light In Judah’s expositions of the emanation of the three worlds light is a recurring theme. Of all created things light is the most lofty. Judah infers this from Gen. 1:4, “And God saw that the light was good,” for light is the only individual created being of which it is explicitly said that it was good. As for other created beings Scripture uses these words “collectively,” that is, Scripture says in respect of the day on which they were created “that it was good.” Given this special position light may be called “the true good.” This light, however, is not to be equated with sunlight, for if it were, there would be no point in separating it from darkness, since darkness is nothing but the privation (einut) of sunlight. Instead, it refers to the world that is wholly light and long (she-kullo or we-arokh), in comparison to which the light of our world is called darkness. To that light refers Ps. 97:11, “Light is sown for the righteous,” and Job 33:30, “the light of life.”13 10 11 12 13

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1081–1086. Ibid., lines 485–488. Ibid., lines 488–493. Ibid., lines 30–43. Cf. also below, section (x).

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In what follows the author specifies that the light referred to in the creation narrative is actually of two kinds: the emanation of the active intellect on the two worlds, the light of which it is said “it was good” (and it is this light that is spoken of in Gen. 1:4), and the perceptible light of the sun of which it is said “God called the light Day” in the next verse. The light referred to in “Let there be light” (Gen. 1:3) denotes the emanation on all the created beings that derive their essence from it. However, the expression “let there be” is used only in connection with the world of the sphere in which the created beings are incorruptible, whereas with respect to the corruptible world other expressions are used, such as “let the water … be gathered” (Gen. 1:9) or “Let the earth sprout vegetation” (Gen. 1:11). Moreover, the twofold occurrence of a form of the verb “to be” in Gen. 1:3, “Let there be light; and there was light” indicates that the power of the light that is the immaterial world emanates on the world of the spheres as well as on the earth. Thus, from the light that emanated from God two lower worlds came forth. In contrast, with respect to the world of the spheres Scripture says “Let there be a firmament” without repeating “and there was,” for the power of the spheres emanates solely on the nether world.14 In the preceding section we have seen that the immaterial world from which the two lower worlds emanate is equated with reshit and ḥokhmah. From the explanation of Gen. 1:3–4 it appears that the immaterial world is also equated with light as well as with the active intellect.15 Later on we learn that the immaterial world is to be identified with the “throne of the Lord” in Ex. 17:16, the “hand” in the same verse standing for the world of the heavens. The light of the upper world does not emanate on every existent of this world always, nor in a uniform way or in the same proportion, as it does on the world of the spheres. This is why man should pray to his Creator that he endow everything with this emanation according to its capacity, as Moses (Ex. 33:13) and David (Ps. 51:13) did, for through this emanation each thing reaches its perfection.16 Elaborating on the emanation of light, Judah asserts, referring to his own survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics xi (which renders the contents of book Lambda),

14 15

16

Ibid., lines 43–56. There is a problem here in that Judah does not explain how exactly the identification of the immaterial world with the active intellect relates to the statement that there are ten degrees of emanation. If he conceives of the active intellect as the last in the series of emanation of the intellects, as is commonplace in medieval philosophy, it is difficult to see how this intellect can at the same time be identified as the immaterial world as a whole. Ibid., lines 56–64.

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that each existent on earth, from what originates out of putrefaction to the most elevated degree, i.e., man, receives this emanation in accordance with its nature. In this regard he likens the way in which light—which is form—acts on the two lower worlds—which are matter (albeit both of a different kind)— to that in which male sperm acts on the menstrual blood in the formation of the embryo. Much as the heart of the embryo is formed from the pure part of the blood, the world of the spheres is formed out of the best part of matter, whereas the lower world is formed out of the inferior part of matter, just as the other parts of the embryo such as nails, bones and hair, are formed out of the coarse part of blood.17 In his interpretation of Gen. 1:2, “the earth being unformed and void,” Judah likewise interprets emanation/creation in terms of light. Light, that is, primary form (ṣurah rishonah), moves all created things and brings them into being out of non-being. However, when these two worlds, that of the heavens and that of the earth, were formed (noṣeru), but not yet “set” (nitlaqaḥ) and strengthened by the power of this light, they were like dead (“unformed and void”). Once the light had acted on them they were moved and perfected, as indicated by the word “good,” which in Hebrew denotes “perfection” (hashlamah) and “end” (or “completion,” takhlit). After this light had come to spread in the lower worlds and became fastened and predominant in their parts, all the possible existents came into being. The fixity and corruptibility of all existents and of the two lower worlds depend on the extent to which they are fortified by the light.18 In what follows (lines 88–104) Judah explicates the various meanings of the expressions “that it was good,” “very good” and “good” in the creation narrative. The upshot of his exegesis is that when the expression “very good” is used for a created being this does not denote that this being reached absolute perfection, but instead, the perfection that was possible for it to attain by virtue of its nature, for only the Creator is the true good. This piece of exegesis is based on Judah’s discussion in his section on Meteorology about the extremes of the qualities, for example of heat, although he does not explicitly refer to that discussion.19 17 18

19

Ibid., lines 65–74. That light is form to the two lower worlds that are its matter is also stated in lines 134–135. Ibid., lines 74–87. In a later passage Judah says that God’s ṣelem, that is, his form, is light, as opposed to the form of man that cannot be separate but must be involved in matter for the purpose of procreation, lines 237–242 (elaborating on Birkat nissuʾim). Ibid., lines 88–104. The designation of God as the “true good” seems to contradict Judah’s earlier statement (lines 34–35), according to which the emanated light was called the “true good.” Perhaps this is the reason why he distinguishes three categories of “good,” namely: “that it was good,” “very good” and simply “good.” The first would refer to the emanated

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(iii) The celestial world According to Judah, from the use of the definite article in “the heaven and the earth” (Gen. 1:1)20 it can be inferred that there is only one heaven and one world, which is, observes Judah, in accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine.21 A passage in the creation narrative that speaks about the heavens is Gen. 1:14–15, “Let there be lights in the firmament of the sky” etc. In Judah’s view, this verse conveys four matters concerning sun and moon. First, the lights are attached to the firmament of the heavens like nails to the mass of the heavenly body. Second, they remain fixed at the place that is assigned to them, that is, that they do not move themselves, but that they are moved by the motion of their spheres like the nails of a ship. Third, the matter of the heavens is simple and pure (“to shine upon the earth”); its mass does not hide the light of sun and stars. From eclipses we know, however, that the bodies of the moon and other planets are less pure and denser than that of the sphere, which is why the lower can hide the light of the upper in the case of a conjunction. Finally, the absence of the last waw in meʾorot indicates that the moon derives its light from that of the sun.22 Linking Ps. 102:26, “Of old You established the earth; the heavens are the work of Your hands” to the discussion in bḤagigah 12a–b on the question whether the heavens were created first or the earth, Judah explains that heavenly matter is prior to earthly matter as regards nobility and rank. Moreover, this verse shows that the earth was created because of the heavens, so as to serve as a fixed point for the heavens around which to revolve. Therefore, the earth is conceived of as the foundation and the heavens as the ceiling.23 The expression: “the earth is My footstool” (Isa. 66:1, cf. above ad i) means that the earth is the first place of the body that rotates on it, which is the sphere, and hence the earth is called the stool of the sphere.24 In another passage Judah again invokes bḤagigah. The rabbinical statement, “the heavens (shamayim) are fire (esh) and water (mayim)”25 is explained by him as follows: it may be taken literally in which case it would teach us that God made the firmament out of these two elements, provided one keeps in mind that these two heavenly elements are of a different nature than their earthy counterparts. After all, Judah avers, some of Aristotle’s predecessors, too, were

20 21 22 23 24 25

light, the second to existents that attain the best possible perfection, and the third to God alone. For the analogy with the quality of heat, cf. mḥ/Meteor. i.3. kjv translation. The jsb translation omits the article in this phrase. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 137–138. Ibid., lines 139–152. Ibid., lines 439–443. Ibid., lines 481–482. bḤag. 12a.

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of the opinion that the stars were composed of fire. Another explanation is that this statement should be considered a metaphorical way of saying (mashal umeliṣah) that in the heavens two extremes are brought together, namely fire, which is the most hot and dry of everything, and water, which is the most cold and moist of everything, and that, as a result, the compound of the two is perfectly balanced and simple. However, the general rule about the nature of the heavens is that they are devoid of all qualities, in accordance with what Aristotle taught.26 Commenting on Prov. 13:11, “wealth gotten by vanity shall be diminished”27 and Prov. 30:15, “Four [things] never say, Enough,” Judah interprets the latter verse as meaning that the four (primary) qualities are not to be found in the sphere, and the former as conveying that the sphere (“wealth”) is not subject to change unlike things that are composed from the four elements (“vanity”).28 As for the influence of the celestial world on the sublunar world, Judah explains, elaborating on Ps. 19:2, “The heavens declare the glory of God,” that everything that happens on earth, such as generation and corruption or the succession of kingdoms, is caused by the motion of the sphere which, in turn, is caused by the intellect that emanates from the first cause (ʿillat ha-ʿillot). Ps. 19:3, “Day to day makes utterance,” refers to the diurnal motion of the upper sphere. Since the stellar constellations differ from day to day, no two days are alike with respect to the events occurring on them, especially the particulars.29 Later on, discussing Prov. 3:19 (“The Lord founded the earth by wisdom; He established the heavens by understanding”), Judah refers to his comment on Ps. 19:3, saying that what will happen on a particular day will not happen on any other day, until the revolution (of the heavenly sphere) has returned to the same day if God wishes to arrange it in that way. No miracle would be involved in this, as miracles fall outside the domain of nature.30 This verse from Proverbs refers to the order and wisdom that exist in the universe due to the uninterrupted and uniform motion of the sphere, and teaches that He who created the existents in this world out of nothing is eternal. It also alludes to the infinite constellations and dispositions formed by these motions as opposed to the immobility of the earth.31

26 27 28 29 30 31

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 319–331. kjv translation. The jsb has: “Wealth may dwindle to less than nothing.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1019–1021. For the continuation of the explanation of this verse, see below. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 376–381. Ibid., lines 792–795. Ibid., lines 784–787.

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Continuing his exegesis of Ps. 19, Judah interprets vs. 5 (“Their line32 is gone out through all the earth”) as conveying that by means of the heavens geographical longitudes and latitudes can be defined. The “end of the world” in the same verse refers to the imaginary circles inscribed in the heavens; the circles by which the earth can be measured and the differences in (length of) nights and days in various regions can be defined. Furthermore, this verse teaches that every strip of land on earth has a heavenly counterpart that watches over it to the exclusion of other places, since each place is characterized by specific properties, as Ptolemy explained in his Quadripartitum.33 The next verses of this Psalm (vs 5–7) allude to astronomical doctrines and to the movement of the sun along the ecliptic. In this regard Judah refers to Abraham ibn Ezra’s exegesis of Ps. 19:5–6 on the course of the sun. The words of the next verse “nothing escapes his heat” mean that everything on earth needs the sun’s heat for its generation and its growth.34 Prov. 13:11 (“but he who gathers little by little increases it”) forms the point of departure for some comments on the motions of the spheres. Connecting the word yad (hand) in this verse to the number ten ( yod) he infers from it that all the spheres are moved by the upper sphere, which in turn is moved by God, and that each sphere has its own specific motion. From the word memuskhet (“deferred”) in the next verse Judah infers that this motion is by attraction (meshikhah) in accordance with al-Biṭrūǧī’s view.35 From other verses where the word ofan (“wheel”) is used it can be deduced that the spheres move like wheels or circles, and the “work of the chariot” also alludes to this.36 The use of ṣevaʾam (Gen. 2:1 “their array”) with ṣavaʾ in the singular implies that there is one host for the heavens and the earth, with everything on earth having a heavenly counterpart. The seven metals gold, silver, iron, tin, bronze, lead and mercury, for instance, have one of the seven planets as their heavenly counterparts. The four elements, too, have a heavenly counterpart, such as “waters above the firmament,” although these elements are of a different nature, the names of the earthly elements being used homonymously (beshuttafut). The four letters of ṣevaʾam teach that everything on earth falls under one of four classes: elements, minerals, plants and living beings.37 32 33 34 35 36 37

kjv translation. The jsb translation has “Their voice carries throughout the earth,” reading qolam instead of qawwam. Judah derives the word “line” (qaw) from qawwam. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 382–388. Ibid., lines 389–398. Ibid., lines 1027–1034. For Judah’s interpretation of the first part of Prov. 13:11 see above. Ibid., lines 1033–1036. Ibid., lines 308–318. Here Judah says that he will explain elsewhere that also plants and animals have a counterpart. I have not been able to locate the relevant passage in the mḥ.

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In a later passage, when explicating Ps. 150:3 (tr. 4: “Praise Him with timbrel and dance, praise Him with lute and pipe”) Judah deals with the relation between the nine spheres and nine musical instruments, warning, however, that he is not an expert in this field. Here he moreover assures the reader that in the future God will turn all the powers of the stars to the good.38 (iv) The physical world; matter and form; Nature As noted above (section ii), the two lower worlds stand to the upper world as matter to form. Allusions to matter and form can be found in the creation narrative. Judah concedes that the expression “nature” that is so often used by the philosophers does not occur in Scripture (or, as he calls it, Sefer ha-Berit). Instead, Scripture uses the verbs baraʾ, yaṣar and ʿasah when referring to matter and form.39 He then goes on to expand on the difference between these three terms and on the difference between the biblical concept of creation and Aristotle’s doctrine on the origin of the world. Beriʾah denotes the comingto-be of something from nothing ( yesh me-ayn), that is, something that was neither matter (golem) nor form before. For Aristotle, “nothing” (ayn) is one of the principles, as set forth in Treatise One of the Physics.40 According to the philosopher, ayn is the privation of form whereas prime matter (ha-golem harishon) is the eternal substrate for the succession of forms similar to wax that receives different imprints; it is neither generated nor corruptible. In Genesis, however, it denotes absolute privation or nothingness; before creation no first matter existed, for God created (baraʾ) it and he also created form. From their combination everything that exists was made. At this point Judah adds that it entails no heresy (kefirah) to state that prime matter is a substrate for all existing things and that it continuously puts off forms to put on other forms, as long as one bears in mind that first matter was created. Nor does it entail denial of religion (hakhḥashah ba-dat) to maintain that prime matter is alluded to in Ex. 24:10, “under His feet there was the likeness of a pavement of sapphire.”41 For the succession of forms Scripture uses the term yeṣirah as in Gen.

38 39 40 41

Ibid., lines 493–504. Ibid., lines 115–116. Cf. mḥ/Physics i.3. The allusion is probably to Maimonides’ interpretation of Ex. 24:10 in Guide i.28 and ii.26. In his Malmad ha-Talmidim Jacob Anatoli reports about discussions between him and Fredrick ii and with Scotus on the interpretation of this verse, see Weber, Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim, 266 ff. For the implications for the doctrine of creation of the understanding of the verse as referring to prime matter, see Weber’s discussion, ibid.

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2:7 (“The Lord God formed man from the dust of the earth”), where the verb denotes that a part of prime matter puts off the form of earth and puts on the new form of man. Judah concludes that Aristotle “is guilty” of kefirah with respect to the term beriʾah, but that he does not contradict religion (setirah badat) with respect to yeṣirah. ʿAsiyah, finally, is a synonym for both yeṣirah and beriʾah.42 In Gen. 1:26–27 the word naʿaseh (“Let us make”), which is here a synonym for baraʾ, has the plural prefix, since it refers to the creation of matter (demut) and form (ṣelem) of man. In contrast, wayyivraʾ (“and God created”) in Gen. 1:27 refers to the creation of the form alone, that is, the intellect, which is man’s essence; therefore it has the singular prefix. The thinking part of the soul remains after death and this form is unconnected to matter. Hence it is said “in our image,” for God is intellect and subject and object of intellection. The use of the verb yaṣar would have been impossible here as this term denotes the succession of forms in matter, whereas the form referred to here [that is, the intellect] is not the form referred to in Physics i.43 Judah finds Plato’s teaching that form is masculine and matter feminine expressed in Prov. 1:8, “My son, heed the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the instruction of your mother”: father stands for form and mother for matter. “Father” is said first because form is more worthy of the name nature than matter which exists because of form.44 That form ranks higher than matter can also be deduced from Gen. 6:6, “And the Lord regretted that He had made man on earth.” God regretted because man’s existence on earth is connected with animal desire; hence the expression “he had made” (ʿasah), which stands for the compound of matter and form.45 In fact, it would have been better for form to have remained unattached to matter, as can be learned from the Sages’ statement in bEruvin 13b, “it would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created,” and from Eccl. 4:3, “And happier than either are those who have not yet come into being.” According to Judah’s explanation, this last verse and the preceding (“Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive”) describe what he calls the “three ways of man”: 1) form before it is attached to matter (the unborn); 2) form which is attached to mat-

42 43 44 45

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 117–131. In the same vein Judah interprets be-hibarʾam in Gen. 2:4 as referring to matter that was created first, out of nothing, lines 332–333. Ibid., lines 157–170. The printed text does not have the reading muskal (object of intellection), but it appears as a textual variant. Ibid., lines 170–172 and 573–575, commenting on Prov. 1:8. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 177–180.

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ter (the living), and 3) the form which has already been separated from matter (in a dead person). The condition of being separated is more praiseworthy than that of being attached, as may be gathered from “wherefore I praise the dead … more than the living” (vs. 2), but verse 3 teaches that in fact the first condition is in fact more praiseworthy, “And better than both of them is he who has not yet been.” The condition of the soul before its attachment to the body is like that of a king in his palace; the soul that is attached to the body is like “a king who is held captive in the tresses,”46 while its separation from the body is like someone who is released from prison and returns to his kingdom.47 However, although form in its first condition is more praiseworthy than in the other two, since it is pure from mud, for another reason the third condition is more excellent: it is only after its dissolution from matter that form comes to know its beauty and excellence, as opposites can be known only by their opposites. It was for this reason that soul was attached to body and hence there is no contradiction involved with Scripture’s statement, “And God saw all that He had made, and found it very good.”48 Elaborating on the expression demut as denoting prime matter and linking it to Eccl. 3:20, “all are of the dust and all turn to dust again,”49 Judah explains that every created being on earth has the same first matter, just as every single part of the body is formed from one common matter, i.e. blood.50 First matter is also alluded to by “the leech” (ha-ʿaluqah) in Prov. 30:15. The “two daughters” referred to in this verse are the two passive qualities moist and dry, whereas “give, give” refers to the active qualities hot and cold. The “three things that are never satisfied” (ibidem), Judah goes on to explain, allude to the transformation of the primary qualities into one another, “as we have written in On Generation and Corruption that the transformation of water into fire takes place through the intermediacy of air or earth, and that of air to earth through the intermediacy of fire or water.”51 (v) The rational soul and the perfection of man Besides the connection between soul and body (see preceding section) Judah has more to say on the soul, in particular on the rational soul. Although all cre-

46 47 48 49 50 51

Song 7:6. “Tresses”: the exact meaning of rehaṭim is not sure. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines180–192. Ibid., lines 193–199. The jsb translation has: “both come from dust and both return to dust.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 202–207. Ibid., lines 1019–1026. For the continuation of Judah’s interpretation of this verse (“four things say not”), see preceding section.

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ated beings have the same matter, there are different gradations among them. The differences depend on the extent to which they receive form. Also among man there are different degrees, for although the just and the wicked have the same (human) form, in the former their potentiality has been actualized, so that they will have eternal life, whereas in the latter it has not. To this Judah adds that the greatest fault of man is his laziness to bring his form into actuality.52 His aforementioned statements about matter and form serve as a basis for his expositions on the form of the human soul and the desire of this soul to ascend to the immaterial world. For Judah the human form belongs to the third degree of separated forms, that is, the form that is separated from the body after death.53 As noted above, Gen. 6:6 speaks about the earthly desires in which the human soul was sunken in the generation before the flood. It has, however, a counterpart in Deut. 4:32, “ever since God created (baraʾ) man on earth.” In this verse the verb baraʾ is used because it refers to the form of man, whereas ʿal (on) in “on earth” (ʿal ha-areṣ) should be taken here to mean “above” as opposed to “on earth” (ba-areṣ) in Gen. 6:6; it alludes to the form which desires to ascend and to hold on to the immaterial world.54 A similar interpretation is found a bit later on. Judah finds another allusion to the ascent of the rational soul to the higher world in Isa. 42:5, “Who gave breath to the people upon it [= the earth], and life to those who walk thereon,” interpreting “breath” (neshamah) as the rational soul and “upon it” (ʿaleyha) as a reference to ascent (ʿaliyah), whereas “they that walk thereon” (bah) stand for the animals, “life” being a homonym (that is, used for both animals and man). To this he adds that this is like “that God made man on earth” (Gen. 6:6) because the souls of that generation were like animals.55 In what follows Judah discusses the motion of the soul. According to him, in many verses Scripture uses the reflexive form56 of the verb halakh (“to walk”) to describe the motion of the rational soul in its pursuit of the sciences (bi-derishat ha-hokhmot). Therefore, when it was said to Abraham: “Up, walk (hithallekh) about the land” (Gen. 13:17), the imperative “walk” does not refer to physical walking—the motion of the soul being different to that of the body—, for Scripture does not say that Abraham walked “through the land in its length

52 53

54 55 56

Ibid., lines 210–214. Ibid., 220–221. Judah refers here to the three “aforementioned” degrees of separate forms. It is not entirely clear what he means here, for in the preceding section he discussed three “ways” or “states” of forms, but not three kinds of separate forms. Ibid., lines 226–234. Ibid., lines 243–246. The text has the itpeʿel, the Aramaic equivalent of Hebr. hitpaʿel.

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and its breadth” (ibidem), but instead that he “dwelled” in it (vs. 18). Hence the imperative “walk” incites Abraham to move his intellect to acquire knowledge of the existing things and of the constitution of the earth, since for this activity rest of the body is required. By contrast, rest of the soul is required when the needs of the body (that involve motion) are attended to, therefore Scripture differentiates between qal and hitpaʿel. Following this line of exegesis Judah takes God’s promise to Abraham in Gen. 13:17 (“for I give it to you”) to mean: I will give you knowledge and a “wide heart” to know the essence of existing things, as it is said, “God endowed Solomon with wisdom” (1 Kings 5:9).57 However, Judah goes on to clarify, it is important to note that Scripture reserves the hitpaʿel of halakh exclusively for those who are worthy of (or: prepared for, nakhon) this degree, such as Abraham, Noah and Hanokh, or for those who want to follow their way, but not for those “whose bellies are filled with the mud of Greece.”58 These people who speak “evil counsels against the Creator and are wise in their own eyes” leave the path of hithallekh. This explains why in Isa. 2:5, “O House of Jacob! Come, let us walk by the light of the Lord,” the verb “walk” appears in the qal, for, as is evident from the next verse “and they please themselves in the children of strangers”, the addressees do not yet follow the right way.59 As for specific faculties of the souls, Judah observes that Prov. 4:9, “She will adorn your head with a graceful wreath,” alludes to three faculties that are located in the human brain, namely imagination, thought (or: cognition, maḥshavah) and memory (zekher), three faculties that are described in the Parva Naturalia. Through the combination of these three faculties man’s thinking about the things he wishes to do is accomplished. However, in Judah’s opinion the first word of this verse, titten, should be interpreted as exhorting man to combine these faculties and occupy himself with the sciences (that is, as a form in the second person singular masculine). Whether or not this combination will be well-fixed, so that it can be called “grace,” is dependent upon man’s own will.60 As mentioned in the preceding section, the thinking part of the soul remains after death. The survival of the rational soul can also be inferred from Prov. 2:21, “For the upright will inhabit the earth.”61

57 58 59 60 61

Ibid., lines 246–260. On this expression, see below, n. 145. Ibid., lines 263–269. kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 882–889. Ibid., lines 781.

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The special position of man in the hierarchy of created beings also engages Judah’s attention. He interprets Gen. 5:2 (“And when they were created, He blessed them, and called them Man”) as saying that man insofar as he is man is called adam by virtue of his form.62 Of the three letters of this name the first refers to the intellect, the second to the soul and the third to the body, the three components of man.63 Yet in another passage Judah contrasts the meaning of adam to that of ish. Commenting on Prov. 8:4, “Unto you, o men (ishim), I call and my voice is to the son of man (benei adam),”64 he observes that whenever the term ish without further qualification occurs in the Bible, it refers to someone who is perfect as regards intellectual and ethical virtues, which is why it is used only for someone who is ḥasid. The term ish thus denotes someone who is perfect in actuality, whereas ben adam is used for someone who is perfect only in potentiality and has to actualize this potentiality by listening to the voice that calls upon man to walk in the right way. In other words, man (adam) can reach perfection by striving to become ish.65 From the next passage we learn that ish stands for someone who has reached knowledge of the three worlds: the aleph alludes to the intellect, the yod to the sphere and the shin to fire, which is the most noble element of the world of corruption and generation, for Aristotle says in Meteorology iv that fire is the form of the other elements.66 The theme of the three worlds in combination with the meaning of ish likewise recurs in his explanation of Prov. 8:20–21. Judah’s point of departure is yesh in Prov. 8:21, the yod and shin of this word referring to the two lower worlds that are accessible to the senses (designated also as musar and binah respec-

62 63 64

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66

Ibid., lines 217–218. Ibid., 296–297. Judah does not explain here how the three letters aleph-dalet-mem relate to intellect, soul and body, the explanation is found instead in Treatise 2, ms O 190r. kjv translation. The jsb translation has: “O men, I call to you, my cry is to all mankind.” This verse is the second of the three verses with which Maimonides opens his Introduction of the first part of the Guide. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 939–954. The same verse is interpreted slightly differently in lines 412–414: there the expression benei adam is said to refer to those who “occupy themselves with the human intellect” and to those who have attained knowledge about the superior world in accordance with their potentiality. Ibid., 955–960, cf. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Maddaʿ hDeʿot iv.6, where it is said that angels of the tenth degree are called ishim. Judah adds that he will explain in Treatise 2 (on the explanation of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet) why someone who is perfect in actuality is called ish. In all probability, what Judah is referring to is the excursus on “Moses was a very humble man (ish)” (Num. 12:3) at the end of Treatise 2, ms O 197v– 198r.

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tively). Here he distinguishes between three degrees, adam constituting the first, that is, the degree of man possessing knowledge in potentiality and worthy of becoming ish. The second degree is yesh (“to inherit substance” vs. 2167), which denotes someone who has acquired knowledge of the two perceptible worlds and thus has passed from potentiality to actuality. In contrast, “I will fill their treasures” of the same verse refers to the third and highest degree, namely that of ish, the perfect man, who has knowledge of the upper world, represented by the letter aleph. As Judah remarks in passing, non-Jews are not worthy of this.68 In his explanation of Prov. 4:18 (“The path of the righteous is like radiant sunlight [Nogah]”) Judah presents additional musings about light (cf. above, section ii), since, in his view, the verse describes human perfection in terms of light and darkness. The apprehension of the just in this world is likened to the night. In contrast, when their apprehension after the separation of the soul from the body is complete, it will be like a strong light which relates to its former degree as the light of the sun to that of Venus when its light is continuous with that of the sun. When the soul is still entangled/involved (mesubakh) with the body and is not occupied with human perfection, it is in a dark night. But once it starts to strive for perfection and apprehension it will gradually come out of the darkness and light will begin to shine upon it (“ever brightening,” in the same verse) and when it has reached the stage that this apprehension is continuous without interruption, it is called “the perfect day.”69 (vi) Knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge a. The sciences in relation to the structure of the Book of Proverbs As noted in the preceding section, Judah explains the ascent of the soul and the perfection of man in terms of the acquisition of knowledge. The subject of knowledge and the pursuit of the sciences receives much attention in Judah’s biblical exegesis, and especially in his explanation of Proverbs, for in his view, this biblical book is concerned with the sciences, their various degrees and the proofs employed in them. Moreover, it deals with the virtues (ḥasadim) and the opinions (deʿot) to be learned from the sciences.70 It will thus come as no surprise that the author interprets many verses of this biblical book as referring to issues related to knowledge, such as the importance of study; the process of learning; the hierarchy of the sciences, and the relation of the sciences to the 67 68 69 70

kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 976–984. Ibid., lines 906–919. Instead of “the perfect day” the jsb translation has “until noon.” Ibid., lines 504–505.

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three worlds. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the study of the sciences is the main theme in Judah’s understanding of Proverbs. Judah views the structure of the book of Proverbs as follows: the book starts with an account of the three sciences; their natural order, and their order of learning. The biblical names of the three theoretical sciences are provided by Prov. 1:2: “For learning wisdom (ḥokhmah) and discipline (musar); for understanding words of discernment (binah).” Wisdom tout court (ḥokhmah) stands for divine science; discipline (musar) for physics, and discernment (or: understanding, binah) for mathematics, since the study of things abstract from matter requires understanding.71 Physics is called musar because it is concerned with things that are composed of matter and form and are subject to motion and change (sarim). Moreover, from Prov. 1:7 (“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge”) we learn that fear of God ( yirʾah) must precede the three sciences.72 In Judah’s understanding, these three sciences are covered in what he calls the first three sections of the Book of Proverbs. The first starts at Prov. 1:8 (“My son, heed the discipline of your father”). Discipline (musar) stands for physical science, in which form and matter should be studied together.73 Section two is about divine wisdom and starts at Prov. 1:20: “Wisdom cries aloud in the streets; raises her voice in the squares.”74 This verse contains an allusion to the various degrees that can be attained in this science: the lowest is “outside” (ḥuṣ), that is to say, in the streets. This refers to Ben Zoma, who, according to R. Joshua, was “still outside.”75 Then follows “in the squares.” The next stage is “at the head of the busy streets,” while “at the entrance of the gates” (vs 21) is the uppermost degree.76 Section three is about mathematics and starts at Prov. 2:1, “if you accept my words,” for amaray (my words) is related to imrei binah, since the verb amar refers to things that are said/predicated but do not have existence in reality (that is, abstract things).77 Here Judah also interprets tushiyyah (vs 7) as referring to logic, not in the sense of Aristotelian logic, but in the sense of “right

71 72 73 74 75 76 77

Ibid., lines 509–516. On these names see mḥ/Introd. 19; mḥ/Physics ii.3 and Chapter Two, section 1.2. Ibid., lines 557–558. Ibid., lines 568–575, cf. also above section iv, matter and form. The study of this science has ethical implications (lines 581–583, see below, section vii). Ibid., line 584. I follow the kjv translation of this passage. bḤag 15a. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 584–587. Ibid., lines 600–604.

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balance,” by means of which one can know divine science. The usefulness of this art is “guarding the path of justice” (vs 8), that is, to keep to the right method of proofs.78 Later on in his commentary Judah refers to a fourth section in Proverbs, which issues a warning against heretic sciences (minut) and idolatry.79 He does not indicate where this section begins. However, it is reasonable to assume that Prov. 2:13–16 belongs to it, for after having described the first three sections Judah interprets the words “who leave the paths of rectitude” (vs 13) as referring to foreign (ḥiṣoniyyot) sciences and idolatry, and the “alien woman” (vs 16) as heretic science (minut).80 In his view, the passage about the alien woman is connected to Prov. 29:3 (“he who keeps company with harlots will lose his wealth”), for “harlots” refers to the making of images, that is, idolatry. It is after this passage that Judah starts his critique of Aristotelian propositions (cf. above, Chapter Four, section 2.2 and below, section 2). Prov. 4:13 also contains an allusion to the three sciences: “Hold fast to discipline” refers to natural science; “do not let go” to mathematics, and “keep it; it is your life” to divine science.81 b. The order of learning and the relation between the sciences Although the natural order of the sciences with respect to priority is divine science, mathematics, physical science, Scripture puts physics before mathematical science in Prov. 1:3 (“for acquiring the discipline of wisdom,” la-qaḥat musar haskel), since this is the order of learning.82 The next verse (“for endowing the simple with shrewdness, the young with knowledge and foresight”) teaches that the order of learning proceeds from natural science to divine science, with the “simple” (petaʾim) representing the unlearned, and “knowledge and foresight” (daʿat u-mezimmah) pointing to the premises gained from the study of natural science, premises that are necessary for the study of divine science. Judah describes the process of learning in terms of “awakening” and “shaking off” ignorance.83

78 79 80 81 82 83

Ibid., lines 617–621. Ibid., lines 897–898. Ibid., lines 626–631. Perhaps vs 12 also belongs to it, for Judah explains “froward things” (kjv translation, Hebr. tahafukhot) as referring to sophistry (lines 625–626). Ibid., lines 904–905. Ibid., lines 516–520. kjv translation. The jsb has: “success” for musar haskel. On the order of learning, see also mḥ/Introd. 26 and section vii below. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 525–530, associating naʿar with ninʿar and ʿerah. Mezimmah as a term denoting “knowledge” was used by Abraham bar Hiyya and Abraham ibn Ezra,

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That natural science should precede divine science and that this order should not be reversed can also be learned from Prov. 8:33, “Heed discipline (musar) and become wise (hokhmah); do not spurn it.” This means that man should first become acquainted with many sciences and overcome his matter before engaging in divine science which ranks highest in the hierarchy of the sciences, and is the end (takhlit) of human apprehension. The person who keeps this order of learning will reach the stage referred to in Prov 8:34, “Coming early to my gates each day.”84 This order of learning has the additional advantage that it enables form to prevail over matter so that the evil inclination is subjugated, which is absolutely mandatory if one wants to pursue divine science. This is why physics, which deals with the movable (sar) is designated as musar (ethics).85 Likewise, mathematics (binah) precedes divine science in the order of learning. The word navon (“a man of understanding”) in Prov. 1:5 refers to the mathematician, whereas tevunah (“understanding” as in Ex. 36:1) designates bringing the knowledge of this science into practice.86 The mathematician needs divine science, as can be learned from Ex. 36:1 (“wisdom and understanding), for without ḥokhmah, that is divine science, Bezalel would not have known what God ordered him to make. The relation of divine science to mathematics is like that of theory to practice. Therefore, only the mathematician can master divine science completely, as is said in Prov. 14:33, “Wisdom (hokhmah) rested in the heart of him that hath understanding (binah).”87 The premises for mathematics, called taḥbulot (“wise counsels”) in Prov. 1:5, are taken from divine science, that is first philosophy, for they are proven (nitbaʾaru) in that science. The proofs in this science follow each other, and this is the meaning of understanding “one thing from another” in bḤagigah 14a.88 Later on, Judah again deduces from the same verse that the study of mathematics should pre-

84 85 86

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88

see “‫”ְמ ִזָמּה‬, peshat in Context—A Thesaurus of Pre-Modern Philosophic and Scientific Hebrew Terminology, ed. Reimund Leicht/Giuseppe Veltri, accessed Thu Mar 10 12:44:04 cet 2022, https://peshat.org/display/peshat_lemmas_00028523. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 588–595. Ibid., lines 581–583. Judah associates the term musar with the root s-w-r; cf. above, Chapter Two, n. 41. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 534–542. In this section I follow the kjv translation, for its rendering of words related to the root b-y-n as “understanding” correlates with Judah’s expositions elsewhere in his work. Again the kjv translation. In this regard it is noteworthy to recall that Judah considered alBiṭrūğī who mastered mathematical science, to be worthy of divine science, had he been a Jew, cf. above Chapter Two, section 1.2. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 543–547.

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cede that of divine science.89 The study of mathematics is moreover implied in Prov. 2:1, for this science is required for the fulfillment of the commandments (referred to in this verse) that depend on the position of the heavenly bodies.90 The study of mathematics sharpens the intellect and helps one to understand divine science. To this stage Scripture refers in Prov. 2:5, “Then you will understand the fear of the Lord, and attain knowledge of God.”91 This statement concludes a passage on the order of learning and again invokes Prov. 1:20–21 as alluding to the various stages on the path of learning (cf. above, section vi a). The beginning of the process should be that knowledge of God’s existence and unity be engraved in one’s heart together with the realization that God has created everything from nothing, as well as the fear of God (Prov. 1:7). Thereupon the study of physics gives rise to pious conduct, which means that matter is subordinated to form so that the evil inclination is subdued. Subsequently one’s thought will remain pure from all labor (ʿamal) and one can probe into divine science, that is, the tradition (qabbalah) that was transmitted from mouth to mouth from the mouth of the Force, as indicated by Prov. 2:6 (“For the Lord grants wisdom”). Then one enters the pardes gradually, slowly and in peace. As described in Prov. 1:20–21, the first stage is “outside” (ḥuṣ), then “in the squares,” afterwards, “at the head of the busy streets,” and finally, “at the entrance of the gates.” When one has reached this stage, one does not need to ponder the faulty books of idolatry and heresy in which there is no wisdom. Instead, they lead one to death, as do the words of the alien woman (Prov. 2:16). Judah states that the process sketched by him shows how one should “follow the way of the good and keep to the paths of the just” (Prov. 2:20).92 c. The process of learning In several of his comments on the book of Proverbs Judah deals with other issues pertaining to the process of learning, such as the appropriate time for study or the question whether man can attain these sciences by himself or with the help of a teacher. Elaborating on his exegesis of Prov. 8:21 (above, section v) Judah infers from the words “to inherit substance”93 that man can acquire knowledge of the two

89 90 91 92 93

Ibid., lines 815–819: Whosoever wishes to study divine wisdom first has to study mathematical science, otherwise he is a ksil. Ibid., lines 600–605. Clearly, “mathematics” in this section designates the mathematical sciences, including astronomy. Ibid., lines 776–778. Ibid., lines 767–780. kjv translation.

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lower perceptible worlds by himself. This knowledge is like an inheritance from father to son; for the key to attaining this knowledge is in man’s own hand; he should use his intellect and let it proceed from one thing to another. If he fails to acquire knowledge of these two worlds, he should be rebuked for it. However, it is different with knowledge of the divine world, which cannot be apprehended by the senses: man cannot acquire divine science by his intellect. As can be inferred from the expression “I will fill their treasuries” (vs. 21), God grants this knowledge to whom he wishes. For this reason no prophet ever prayed for knowledge of the nature of the elements, for the human intellect can attain this knowledge by itself. Instead, prophets prayed for the gift from God’s treasure-house. The same notion is to be found in Prov. 19:14, “Houses and riches are the inheritance of fathers, and a prudent wife is from the Lord.”94 According to Judah, this verse teaches us that man needs knowledge in life, or to be more precise, knowledge of the two worlds, for “houses and riches” stand for the corruptible world and for the world of the spheres respectively. Just as man cannot live without these goods, knowledge of these two worlds is absolutely necessary for him.95 In another passage, however, Judah groups the two upper worlds together, contrasting them to the lower world in respect of the process of learning. Commenting on Prov. 4:5 (“Acquire wisdom, acquire understanding: do not forget”) he asserts that man cannot forget mathematics and divine science once one has mastered these sciences.96 A similar ambiguity concerns the question for which science a teacher is required. Although he inferred from Prov. 8:2 that one can master physics and mathematics by oneself, he interprets tevunah in Prov. 2:2 (discernment or understanding) as saying that a student can attain mathematical knowledge by himself once he has acquired its premises with the help of a teacher, for the demonstrations in mathematics are complete, that is to say that they are demonstrations of cause and existence. In contrast, musar and divine science can be studied only with the help of a distinguished teacher (rav muvhaq mequbbal qabbalah shlemah). This piece of exegesis seems to contradict his earlier explanation.97

94

95 96 97

kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 987–1006. This somewhat contradicts mḥ/Introd. 23: “in contrast, knowledge of the upper world automatically yields knowledge of the two lower worlds.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1008–1011. Ibid., lines 869–873. Cf. Chapter Two, section 3. Ibid., lines 607–611.

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The need for a teacher is likewise alluded to in Prov. 4:7, “the beginning of wisdom is—acquire wisdom.” Judah understands this verse as conveying that one should learn the “chapter headings” from a ḥakham mequbbal, while the second part of the verse exhorts one to retain this knowledge and to really acquire it. He then goes on to explain that the expression salseleha (“exalt her”98) in the next verse is to be understood in the sense of the cognate Arabic word and that its meaning is like shalshela (chain): this expression refers to the next stage in which one understands one thing from another thing.99 Here “wisdom” seems to refer to divine wisdom. As for the right time of study, Judah finds an allusion to it in Prov. 3:28 (“Do not say to your fellow: ‘Come back again; I’ll give it to you tomorrow, when you have it with you’”). Judah interprets “fellow” as referring to “thought” and links the verse to Song 5:2 (“I was asleep, but my heart was wakeful: Hark, my beloved knocks”). The lesson to be derived here is that in studying the sciences one may happen to learn more in one hour than in a whole year, for if knowledge emanates, it is as if a source is opened and then one passes quickly from one thing to another. When such a moment presents itself—usually when one is awake at night—one should immediately direct one’s thought to it and not wait until the next day.100 The preceding verse in Proverbs (3:27) teaches that one should not withhold wisdom (that is, divine science) from someone who is navon (that is, has acquired mathematics) and is worthy of receiving it. To this Judah adds, however, that not everyone who has reached this degree (that is, of divine science), is able to let others benefit from it.101 d. The limits of study and the limits of knowledge From the foregoing it is obvious that Judah attaches the greatest importance to the pursuit of knowledge. In this vein he continues his explanation of Prov. 3. He takes the next verse (vs 29), “Do not devise harm against your fellow who lives trustfully with you” to mean that one should direct the thought (maḥshavah) of one’s heart to the sciences and not to idle things when one is able to occupy this maḥshavah with things that are secure (beṭaḥ), that is to say, beneficial, namely the sciences.102 Likewise, Ps. 85:12 teaches us that when we occupy ourselves with the knowledge of the true (nature of) existing things “justice looks down from heaven.”103 98 99 100 101 102 103

kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 874–881. Ibid., lines 823–831. Ibid., lines 819–822. Ibid., lines 832–834. Ibid., lines 435–437.

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As mentioned in the preceding section, the obligation to study implied in Prov. 8:21 is vital for Judah. However, what is equally important to him is the question of the “right way” in studying and the limits of study. In his view, these issues underlie King Solomon’s two requests in Prov. 30:7–8, “Two things I ask of you; do not deny them to me before I die. Keep lies and false words far from me; give me neither poverty nor riches, but provide me with my daily bread.” Judah’s discussion of this passage constitutes the end of his treatise on the explanation of biblical verses. He underlines that this verse contains the only prayer uttered by Solomon in the book of Proverbs and that, moreover, these two requests comprise everything the soul and the body need for those who understand these two things. The first request, “Keep lies and false words far from me” refers to the two kinds of “impossible” mentioned by Aristotle in On the Heavens ii. The first is called shawʾ in Hebrew (“false words”); this is what is called “the impossible false” (ha-kazzav ha-nimnaʿ) by Aristotle and “false oath” (shevuʿat shaw) by the Rabbis (mShev. 3:8). The second kind of impossible is called divrei kazzav in Hebrew (“lies”), and “possible false” (ha-kazzav ha-efshari) by Aristotle. These are two species (minin) belonging to the same genus (shoresh). By praying to remove false words and lies from him, Solomon in fact asked God that he be given true knowledge of the premises.104 The second request (“give me neither poverty nor riches”) was dependent on the first. Whereas the first implied knowledge of the true premises in as far as this is required and possible, Solomon asked in the second request that he would gain strength for study (derishah) and investigation (ḥaqirah) and that he would stop when he had reached the limit, as can be derived from the continuation of the passage, “lest, being sated, I renounce, saying: ‘Who is the Lord?’ or, being impoverished, I take to theft, and profane the name of my God” (vs 9). “Riches” is Scripture’s expression for study and investigation, while “poverty” denotes laziness. In other words, Scripture teaches us that one should not be devoid of study, but neither should one study ad infinitum. Too much study leads to denial of God, whereas lack of study leads to incorrect views, for example, that God is corporeal. These are the two extremes to be avoided in studying. The middle way is expressed by “But provide me with my daily bread” (leḥem ḥuqqi, vs. 8), which means “let me study as far as the intellect can reach and let me stop there.”105 Although man is obliged to use his intellectual capacities, he should refrain from unlimited inquiry. Intellectual

104 105

Ibid., lines 1095–1104. Ibid., lines 1103–1115. kjv translation: “Feed me by food convenient for me.”

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pursuit up to an appropriate limit is called “righteousness” (ṣedeq) and “convenient food”; Judah associates ḥaqirah with ḥuqqi.106 These two extremes are again referred to in the very last lines of the treatise. Here Judah adduces biblical verses that caution man in this regard. Num. 15:39 (“so that you do not follow your heart”) warns against unlimited study, which leads to heresy, and against “doing what Aristotle and his students did,” while Isa. 40:25 (“To whom, then, can you liken Me …”) forms a scriptural proof for God’s incorporeality and indivisibility.107 In dealing with the limit of study Judah finds it moreover important to note that the limit imposed by Prov. 30:8 applies only to the study of these two lower worlds, and to man whose status is that of yesh (cf. section v above). With respect to divine science, another limit applies, namely that expressed by Ex. 33:22, “I will put you in a cleft of the rock.” This verse conveys that there is also a limit to the knowledge that God grants to the person who has reached the degree of ish.108 In an earlier passage Judah associated this verse with the rabbinic statement in bḤagigah 13a (quoting the Book of Ben Sira): “search not out things that are hidden from thee.” This is the limit that was possible for Moses to attain, but Aaron did not reach the degree of Moses, nor did Elia attain what Isaiah attained, for there are various degrees in divine science. In itself, however, this science is infinite.109 In the same passage Judah elaborates on the degrees of divine science and the relation of the divine world to the two lower worlds by adducing a parable about a king whose servants were as numerous as the sands of the sea: horsemen, bowmen, wise men, judges, dancers, scribes, gate-watchers and so on. The fame of the king’s court had spread and a certain person from a faraway country wished to visit it. After having dressed up appropriately he arrived at the palace but was allowed to see only the “servants of the servants.” He then desired to see their overlords, but all he was allowed to see were the gatekeepers, for such was his rank. On seeing the latter the visitor realized, however, that they were 3200

106

107 108

109

Ibid., lines 1115–1119. Two later thirteenth-century authors also explain Solomon’s prayer as referring to “the middle way” in study, cf. below Chapter Seven, section 6. In his commentary on Proverbs Saadya also explains Prov. 30 as indicating the limits of knowledge, ed. Derenbourg/Lambert, pp. 184ff. According to him, “riches” stands for kefirah and “poverty” for robbery, ibid., p. 189. Ibid., lines 1126–1130. Cf. Maimonides, Guide i.55. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1120–1126. The same explanation of niqrat ha-ṣur, that there is a limit to what even the most excellent of men can know, is found in the excursus on “Moses was a very humble man” (Num. 12:3) at the end of Treatise 2, ms O 197v. On the various interpretations of niqrat ha-ṣur by Maimonides, see Kasher, “Maimonides’ Interpretations.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1040–1045.

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times as noble as the former. Judah’s conclusion is that what man can attain of the higher world is 3200 times as much as knowledge of the lower two worlds, and that this was the limit that was given to Moses. Judah arrives at this figure by means of an involved explanation deriving from the discussion of the size of the flying scroll (Zech. 5:2) in in bEruvin 21a in combination with the words “and it (the scroll) was written within and without” of Ezek. 2:10 and the measurement of the heavens by a span (Isa. 40:12).110 Moreover, he continues, the words “within and without” convey that this science should be revealed only through parables (mashal) and flowery style (meliṣah).111 A few lines later Judah infers from Prov. 25:2–3 (“It is the glory (kavod) of God to conceal a matter; and the glory of a king to plumb a matter”) that it is impermissible to speak about “the Cause of Causes (ʿillat ha-ʿillot),” as is implied in bḤagigah 16a “whosoever takes no thought for the honor (kavod) of his Maker,” whereas one is allowed to speak about the separate intellects (who are referred to as “kings” in vs 2).112 This dictum occasions Judah to indicate the limits of king Solomon’s knowledge. He infers from Prov. 30:3, “I have not learned wisdom, nor do I possess knowledge of the Holy One,” and vs 4, “Who has ascended heaven and come down?” that Solomon grasped that every sphere has its own separate intellect as Aristotle explained (beʾer), but that he did not grasp why the order of the planets is as it is or why this particular motion is because of that particular motion, since Aristotle did not explain this.113 What transpires in the passage that follows is that there are many questions regarding the influence of the spheres on the terrestrial world and on the exact arrangement of providence on the lower and higher beings (providence being alluded to in Prov. 30:6 “shield”), but that the answer to these questions is, “do not add to His words” (Prov. 30:7) that is to say, “until here you have permission to speak.”114 (vii) Ethics The book of Proverbs provided Judah with a wealth of material concerning the pursuit of knowledge. The same book also contains the starting-points for his musings about ethics, a topic that is likewise of great importance for him. At

110 111 112 113 114

Ibid., lines 1046–1062. One wonders how Judah’s use of the figure of 3200 relates to the 32 paths of wisdom in Sefer Yeṣirah. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1063–1067. Ibid., lines 1070–1073. Ibid., lines 1076–1080. This passage is reminiscent of Maimonides’ critical questions on the process and causes of emanation in Guide ii.22. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1081–1093.

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the beginning of his explanation of verses from Proverbs, Judah states that the virtues and man’s character belong to the subject matter of this biblical book. The virtues comprise those by which man’s character is perfected; those that pertain to one’s relation with the Creator; those that apply to the relation with one’s fellow man, and it also comprises good manners (derekh ereṣ) and the needs of the body.115 Judah emphasizes more than once that the study of the sciences should be preceded by fear of God (Prov. 1:7). Fear of God is the beginning or principle of wisdom, in the way a point is the beginning of a line.116 Related to this is the notion that ethical perfection should precede the study of the sciences. From Prov. 1:3 Judah deduces that righteousness, justice and equity must first be “weighed” by the intellect before embarking on the study of natural science.117 As noted before, Judah links the science of physics with ethics. Physical science, referred to as musar (“instruction” / discipline) in Prov. 1:8, deals with form in so far as it is attached to matter. According to Judah’s interpretation, the usefulness of the science of physics consists in that it teaches one to subdue one’s evil inclination so that form can prevail over matter. Then one will acquire the virtues and be worthy of studying divine science. “A graceful wreath upon your head” (Prov. 1:9) alludes to the proper arrangement of the principles matter and form in which form gains the upper hand on matter, as can be inferred from the similarity between the words rosh (head) and reshit (principle).118 In contrast, Prov. 4:1 speaks about form alone (“the discipline of a father”), unlike Prov. 1:8 (“the discipline of your father … the instruction of your mother”). The latter verse deals with the beginning of wisdom and this is why matter and form are mentioned. Once one has acquired the science of ethics and divine science one should proceed to abstract form from matter and to look into the forms, leaving the things of matter behind, which is why Prov. 4:1 does not mention “mother.”119 Wholly in line with the requirement that someone who wishes to study the sciences should first pursue fear of God and ethical perfection, Judah ha-Cohen insists that practical virtues (ha-ḥasdiyim ha-maʿasiyim) should precede intellectual ones (ha-ḥasdiyim ha maddaʿiyim), for which he bases himself on the passage starting with Prov. 4:20 and on Avot 3:9, “he whose works exceed his

115 116 117 118 119

Ibid., lines 505–508. Ibid., lines 558–561. Cf. also lines 611–615, and above, section vi a. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 520–524. Ibid., lines 576–584. Ibid., lines 847–852.

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wisdom, his wisdom endures.” Instructions concerning the improvement of one’s character traits (tiqqun deʿot) are to be found in Prov. 4:23ff. The exhortations contained in these verses partly address the sensitive faculty of the soul and partly the appetitive faculty. Others concern the mouth and the lips, as for example, the exhortation in Prov. 4:24, “Put crooked speech away from you” that instructs man to be trustworthy, and that his “yes” and “no” be true, which is the basis for moral perfection. The heart as the principal organ is the root (shoresh) for the removal of vices and the practice of virtues.120 What it all comes to is to steer the middle way intermediate between two extremes, as Judah finds expressed in vs. 26, “Keep straight the path of your feet.”121 As noted, here he observes that where Scripture says ish without further specification, as in Prov. 8:4, the reference is to a man who is perfect with regard to practical and intellectual virtues.122 In this regard it is relevant to note that Judah ends his exegesis of Prov. 8:20–21 on the transition from adam to ish (cf. above section v) on an ethical note: the three letters of ish (aleph-yod-shin) also stand for the first letters of the words Elohim (God, aleph), yeraʾ (fear, yod), and shemor (keep, shin) respectively in “Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole [duty] of man” (Eccl. 12:13123). This verse conveys that the goal of the species called man (adam) is to fear God and keep the commandments; then he will be called ish, that is, someone who is perfect in the species and is called up to the upper degree.124 Prov. 8:8 also contains a lesson about the middle way. To someone who deviates from the middle course towards one of the extremes, retribution will be meted out by means of the other extreme. To give an example: someone who is parsimonious will not leave this world without losing all his wealth, whereas a spendthrift will attain a condition for which people will pity him, and it is the same with other character traits.125 In another context, when commenting on Ps. 36:9 ff. Judah elaborates on how pride can adversely affect learning. One interpretation of the prayer “Let 120 121

122 123 124 125

Ibid., lines 924–938. kjv translation. Here he adds that ish without further specification, as in Prov. 8:4, refers to a man who is perfect with regard to practical and intellectual virtues, cf. above, section v. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 939–943. kjv translation. This interpretation of the letters of the word ish differs from that given in lines 955–960 (see above section v). Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 984–987. Ibid., lines 961–968. Cf. Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Maddaʿ, hDeʿot ch ii on the middle way.

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not the foot of the arrogant tread on me” (vs. 12) is that it is a request to be freed from “the yoke of time,” that is, from those who grow haughty, so that one can free oneself to engage in the secrets of existing things that are known to “them that know thee” (vs 11).126 To this he adds that pondering the question of why the wicked have power in this world keeps one from studying the secrets, and that the wicked despite their power in the nether world cannot attain the upper world.127 In a passage that concludes his explanation of verses from Genesis Judah addresses the well-known question of whether the thought of transgression is worse than the act itself (cf. bYoma 29a). Here he also discusses the topic of the evil inclination and the influence of the stars on it. Committed to astrology as he may be, he holds that the stars cannot force man not to subdue his evil inclination.128 (viii) Providence As noted above (section ii), the emanation from the upper world on the lower is a theme that recurs on various occasions in this treatise. In the section that is devoted to an explanation of Psalms we find it linked to the issue of providence. The key term here is ḥesed (benevolence). In his exegesis of Ps. 36:6–7 ff. Judah explains that the expression ḥesed stands for the divine emanation that emanates from the immaterial world (ha-shamayim); it is called “the fountain of life and light” (vs 9). Emunah (faithfulness or beneficence) denotes the emanation from the upper world on the world of the sphere, while ṣedakah and mishpaṭ (righteousness and justice) denote the emanation on the lower world. Judah then adds: “This is how providence (hashgaḥah) reaches man and animals.”129 The association of providence with ḥesed also emerges in his com-

126

127 128

129

Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 417–423. Pride is one of the two vices that receive particular attention from Maimonides in hDeʿot, see preceding note. The term “grow haughty” (mitgaʾeh) also appears in Judah’s statement about his aim in writing the mḥ (see above, Chapter Two, section 4). One wonders whether the passage here also has a polemical undertone. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 425–429. Ibid., lines 351–361. In Treatise 2, on the explanation of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet he upholds the freedom of the will against Ptolemy. Referring to Deut. 30:19 and mAvot 3.16 he maintains that it is possible for man to be stronger than the influence of the stars, and that prayer can ward off evil decrees of the stars (ms O 188v; see also 193v–194r: the stars are subordinated to God’s command; when one fulfills the commandments and with perfect faith evil decrees of the stars will be forestalled). The freedom of the will also features in Judah’s introduction to his excerpt of Ptolemy’s astrology: after having stated that everything that comes from above is good, he tries to reconcile astral determination with human freedom, see ms O 174r–v, and ed. Spiro 1886, 2r–v. See now Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 59, 72–73. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 399–410.

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ments on Ps. 62:13 where Judah observes that providence belongs to God’s acts of benevolence and that the retribution of man’s actions falls under it.130 In this context Judah moreover addresses those who deny providence. Commenting on Deut. 4:39 (“that the Lord alone is God in heaven above, and on earth below”), he first explains that in is not used here in one of the nine senses in which a thing can be in another thing as enumerated in Physics iv, for God is the place of the world and the world cannot be his place.131 He then reminds his readers of his earlier explanation of Deut. 10:14 (“Behold, the heaven, and the heaven of heavens is the Lord’s, thy God, the earth also, with all that therein is”132) according to which this verse speaks about the three worlds.133 His next step is to relate the verse to vs. 12, inferring from it that man’s “nothingness” notwithstanding, God’s providence extends to the earth and everything that is therein, and not only to the sphere of the moon as some philosophizers (mitpalsefim) taught. Moreover, contrary to what some people claim, it extends to all species of animals and plants, not in a general way.134 Judah also interprets Ps. 8:2 as referring to providence, and here, too, he rebukes those who deny individual providence. Providence emanates firstly from the immaterial world on the heavens and from there on the earth. Since providence extends to man, it is given to “infants and sucklings” (vs 3) to acquire wisdom by themselves when they grow up and examine how they developed from blood into sperm and then into an embryo until they became ensouled and finally a being endowed with intellect.135 When studying this process one will find the cause of each stage and the cause of the cause until one reaches the First Cause and then one can “put an end” (or: to silence, vs 3) to the statements of the “denying heretics” (ha-koferim ha-mekhaḥeddim).136 Towards the end of the treatise he again emphasizes individual providence while pointing to the purposefulness in creation in which nothing exists in vain.

130 131 132 133 134

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Ibid., lines 346–350. For the equation of ḥesed with providence see also lines 446–450. Ibid., lines 334–336, cf. also line 438. The dictum “God is the place of the world” is found in Gen. R. 68:9. kjv translation. This was stated in the Introduction, cf. Chapter Two, section 3. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 336–346. In the same vein, lines 446–450. Judah again emphasizes individual providence in Treatise 2, ms O 190r and 198r. On the term mitpalsefim, cf. below, section 4. Perhaps this echoes Maimonides’ example about the difficulty that someone who grew up without ever having seen a female of any kind would have in believing that his origin was in his mother’s womb, Guide ii.17. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 363–371.

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From this he concludes that it is useful for man to pray.137 It is at this point that he discusses Solomon’s prayer in Prov. 30:7 (cf. above, section vi d). (ix) Resurrection and the world to come The subject of the resurrection of the dead emerges only once, namely in Judah’s explanation of Gen. 2:8, “And [God] placed there [= Eden] the man whom He had formed,” an explanation in which he creatively plays with the root ʿ-d-n of the name Eden. Taking as his point of departure the use of the word yaṣar in this verse, which denotes a compound of matter and form,138 and interpreting the nota objecti et as referring to the soul and not to the intellect, he asserts that the part of man that enjoys the delights (mitʿadden) of the Garden of Eden is not the separate intellect which Scripture refers to as ṣelem, but instead the soul which cannot entirely avoid involvement with matter. Likewise, it is the compound of body and soul that will enjoy resurrection, but not as long as (beʿodenu) it is still in this life. Nor is this the delight the soul enjoys in the immaterial world once it is separated from the body. Instead, it is a different kind of delight (ʿiddun) that only the first man experienced in the Garden of Eden and which we will experience at the resurrection. Yet it is logical, Judah adds, that in that stage we will be primarily concerned with the soul’s delight and less so with that of the body, contrary to our condition in this world.139 The world to come is referred to a few times in Treatise 1, for example in Judah’s explanation of Prov. 4:10, “and you will have many years of life.” According to Judah, this verse tells us that the goal of divine wisdom is to acquire the world to come. Years will be added to one’s lifetime, for the life of this nether world is not truly life. Only the life of the world to come is truly called life, for there is no death in it, but the soul survives and enjoys the radiance of the divine presence.140 Also, he interprets the twofold occurrence of the word “day” in Prov. 8:34 as referring to this world and to the next, invoking here the saying of Avot 4:16, “Prepare yourself in the vestibule.”141 As we have seen above (section ii), one of the meanings of “light” in the creation narrative is that it refers to the world that is wholly light and long (she-kullo or we-arokh), in comparison to which the light of our world is called darkness.

137 138 139 140 141

Ibid., lines 1089–1094. Cf. above, section ii. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 274–282. Cf. also line 292 where Judah associates Eden with ʿednah (pleasure). Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 893–903. Ibid., lines 596–599.

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At this juncture it is useful to list the Aristotelian doctrines that Judah explicitly quotes or refers to in his biblical exegesis, in the order in which they appear in the treatise. For some of them he provides a reference to the book in which the specific doctrine is found: – each existent, ranging from the lowest degree—which comes into being out of putrefaction—to the most noble—man—receives emanation in accordance with its own nature as Aristotle states towards the end of Book xi of his “divine science” (lines 65–68) – privation is one of the principles, Physics i (lines 118–119, cf. mḥ/Physics i) – there is only one heaven and one earth (lines 137–138, cf. mḥ/Heavens i) – the form alluded to in Gen. 1:26 (ṣelem) is not the form referred to in Aristotle’s Physics i (lines 167–168) – some of Aristotle’s predecessors held that stars are fiery (lines 321–322) – the heavenly body is devoid of all qualities, as Aristotle explained (lines 330– 331) – the (nine) senses in which a thing can be in another thing enumerated by Aristotle in Physics iv (lines 334–336 and 343–345) – he who knows divine science is a ḥakham waday as Aristotle mentioned in Treatise iii of that science (531–533; “that science” is Metaphysics) – When commenting on Prov. 3:30 “Do not quarrel with a man for no cause, when he has done you no harm,” Judah refers to a distinction made in the Posterior Analytics between demonstrative disputation (merivah mofetit) and non-demonstrative disputation (merivah she-einah mofetit). In his view, the biblical verse teaches that one should not declare something false that has not been disproven (nitbaʾer be-mofet), because “he has said nothing that is contrary to your religion.” (This is the meaning of “When he has done you no harm”) lines 837–840 – imagination, cogitation and memory, three faculties of the soul that are mentioned in Parva Naturalia accomplish man’s thought about the things he wishes to do (lines 882–883) – fire is the form of the other elements as Aristotle explained in Meteor. iv (lines 957–958) – transformation of water into fire takes place through the intermediacy of air or earth (lines 1024–1025; here Judah refers to his own survey of On Generation and Corruption) – Aristotle explained that every sphere has its own intellect (1077–1078) – two kinds of “impossible” are mentioned in Aristotle’s On the Heavens ii: “false that is impossible” and “false that is possible” (lines 1100–1101)142 142

There is no parallel to this in mḥ/Heavens ii; the reference seems to be to mḥ/Heavens

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In addition, views by other authorities than Aristotle also emerge in the treatise, such as Plato’s view that form is masculine and matter feminine (cf. Timaeus 49a, 51a, 94b), as well as doctrines that relate to Part 2 of the mḥ, for example Ptolemy’s opinion that every strip of land has its heavenly counterpart (Quadripartitum iv), and al-Biṭrūğī’s views on planetary motion. Furthermore, throughout the treatise one comes across philosophical notions that figure in Part 1 and that are referred to here without explicit mention of Aristotle, for example on the formation of the embryo, the subject matter of the sciences, the term “nature,” the succession of forms on matter, or the status of demonstrations in the mathematical sciences. In general the passages reviewed above can be viewed as corroborating, illustrating or supplementing doctrines that are treated in the preceding philosophical survey in one way or another. Thus we see that besides his survey of Aristotelian philosophy, he also transmits philosophical notions through the medium of biblical exegesis.143 Yet he also points to differences between a biblical teaching and an Aristotelian doctrine, as is the case with his interpretation of “form” in Gen. 1:26: this is not the same form as Aristotle’s. Similarly, there is a difference between Aristotle’s understanding of “privation” in Physics i and that implied in the term baraʾ in Gen. 1, namely absolute non-existence.144 Also, tushiyyah refers to a different kind of logic than that of Aristotle’s.145 Moreover, the treatise also comprises critical comments explicitly directed at Aristotle and/or his followers. As already noted, the verse Num. 15:39, “so that you do not follow your heart” is explained as referring to “Aristotle and his pupils,” a comment that is found nearly at the end of the treatise (lines 1127– 1128). Likewise, we already mentioned a scathing remark about those “whose bellies are filled with the mud of Greece.” The “mud of Greece,” Judah is quick to explain, consists of “evil counsels against the Creator”; these people are wise in their own eyes.146 In addition, the treatise contains a sustained critique of

143

144 145 146

i.8, cf. Arist., Heavens 281b2 ff. Cf. also Arist., Metaph. 1004b17–26. On Judah’s coverage of this passage in the section on metaphysics, see Zonta, “A Case of ‘Author’s Variant Reading’,” 474 n. 37. For exegesis as an integral part of philosophical activity, see Lemler, “Sceptical Exegesis,” 118–124. Robinson discusses the transmission of philosophy through biblical exegesis, “Secondary Forms of Philosophy,” 244–247, and more extensively in “Philosophy and Science.” See above, no. iv. See above, section vi b. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 265–269. This expression carries an epistemological connotation, cf. Plato’s image of the soul sunk in “barbaric mud,” which refers to a domain that is for-

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Aristotle’s system of thought as a whole. It is to this aspect of Judah’s biblical exegesis that we shall turn now.

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Comments That Criticize the Aristotelian System of Thought

As noted in Chapter Four (section 2.2), the treatise on biblical exegesis contains a list of 48 haqdamot that, according to Judah, form the basis of Aristotle’s proofs and demonstrations.147 Some of these premises and principles are first axioms, Judah said, whereas others are not sufficiently proven, so that, as he put it, “the guarantee needs a guarantee.”148 The critique of the Aristotelian system of thought as a whole starts with his comments on Prov. 2:16, “From the alien woman whose talk is smooth.”149 In Judah’s view, these words apply to “the wisdom of heresy” (ḥokhmat ha-minut), since they are words that at first sight seem to be true, like some of the words of Aristotle who spoke about the eternity of the world. Judah then goes on to explain that what Aristotle said concerning this belongs to that which goes from what is posterior to that what is prior in nature, for these posterior things, i.e. the composite things, are more known to the senses than the simple things. Therefore, Judah continues, Aristotle groped in the dark with respect to what is prior, and this kind of proof is the opposite of the absolute demonstrations that are made in mathematics.150 Aristotle, he goes on, already explained this whole subject. If the things that are prior in nature were (also) prior in knowledge, then the demonstrations concerning them would be complete.151 In what follows Judah refers to “the precise version of Aristotle’s words,” which, in his rendering come down to the following: things that are known completely with a complete knowledge in which there is no flaw (ha-devarim ha-yeduʿim bishlemut yediʿah shlemah she-ein bah dofi) can only be found in men that are truly men, namely pious men (ḥasidim), much as only someone whose body

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eign to the soul (Republic 533c–d). Nachmanides also used the words “the mud of Greek thought” in a polemical context, see Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 145. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 714–756. Ibid., lines 756–757, see Chapter Four, section 2 (i). Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 631–632. In the lines preceding it Judah equated “men who speak duplicity” of vs 12 with a sophist, and the foreign woman with foreign sciences, such as the making of idols. In Judah’s view, Prov. 3:31 (“the lawless man”) and vs 33 (“the wicked”) also refer to the sophist, lines 841–846. For the perception of philosophy as a seductive woman during the 1303–1305 controversy, see Freudenthal, “Holiness and Defilement,” 178–181. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 632–636. Cf. mḥ/Phys. i.2. Ibid., lines 636–638.

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is of sound composition can be called completely healthy. Furthermore, the things that are known to us are not the things that are known to others, not even in the same person when he is old, for perceptible things are known to young people, but the general intelligibles are more known to old people.152 Thus, in Judah’s view, Aristotle himself admits that only ḥasidim can have complete knowledge of a thing. From this he infers that “since we are people with a religion (anshei dat), we know the things that are prior in nature before the things that are posterior,” put differently, “the beginning of our wisdom is the end of the wisdom of Aristotle. For the end of what Aristotle explained is the existence of a first mover.” As Judah clarifies, “we know and it has been explained to us from the beginning that there is a first existent, the Creator, and therefore these natural things are explained to us easily.”153 To recapitulate his line of argument thus far: Aristotle’s methodology is false since he proceeded from the posterior to what is prior and hence his demonstrations are not complete. Complete knowledge can only be attained by pious men, a view that Judah ascribes to Aristotle himself. People with a religion qualify as pious, and thus Jews know the things that are prior in nature before the posterior things. Hence they know ab initio what Aristotle arrived at after many investigations: that there exists a first mover; a first mover that Judah equates with the first existent who is the Creator. At this point he deems it necessary to refute a possible objection, namely that it has been explained before that, in the order of learning, physics (which goes from what is posterior in nature to what is prior) should precede divine science (cf. above, section 1 vi b). He solves this problem by differentiating between Aristotelian divine science (that is, the Metaphysics) and “our divine science.” When Scripture places natural science (also called musar) before divine science it is not “our divine science” that Solomon had in mind, Judah argues, but instead that of Aristotle. “For we have already explained that the only result of the divine science of Aristotle is the existence of a prime mover who is incorporeal, and this is a first axiom with our infants, praised be God. But since Aristotle was among those who disbelieve in the Creator (kaferu baboreʾ), about whom it is said, ‘They have been false to (kiḥashu) the Lord and said: “It is not so”’ (Jer. 5:12), he had to prove his existence. This is the end of his wisdom, whereas it is the beginning of what we teach an infant as soon as he begins to speak, namely Shemaʿ Yisraʾel and the first verse of Genesis.”154

152 153 154

Ibid., lines 638–643. Ibid., lines 644–648. Ibid., lines 649–655. Cf. mḥ/Introd. 14: “even if you know the text of the thirteen treatises

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Although the expressions kaferu and kiḥashu carry the notion of “denying,” Judah does not suggest here that Aristotle denied the existence of a first being, for he concedes that the Philosopher’s inquiries resulted in the acceptance of the existence of an incorporeal first mover, a mover that Judah identified as the first being. But as the mention of the Shemaʿ and Gen. 1:1 make clear, what Judah seeks to emphasize is, first, that the existence of the divine is “innate” in Jews, whereas Aristotle came to recognize this existence after a long intellectual process, and, second, that Aristotle’s divine science, unlike the divine science of the Torah, does not teach the existence of a first existent or mover who is also a Creator. That the notion of a Creator-God is at stake is apparent from what follows, for Judah next sets out to attack Aristotle’s doctrine of the eternity of the world. First, he observes that “our wisdom differs from that of Aristotle.” He then goes on to explain that Aristotle erred and made others err as well. The proofs for everything the Philosopher set forth in the books on natural science are not complete. For many things he could not find a cause, not even in his zoology and his other books.155 At this point, however, Judah somewhat exonerates Aristotle by saying that there may be other books by him that have not come down to us, so that we do not know exactly on which views he settled. Moreover, he asserts, one has to make allowances for Aristotle, for after all he strove to discover the truth all by himself.156 Nonetheless, regarding one thing Aristotle was “ignorant and foolish” ( yivʿaru we-yikhselu, Jer. 10:8157), namely the eternity of the world. This applies not only to Aristotle, but also to “all those of our holy religion who followed him.” He then states that Aristotle taught nothing more and even less than what Jewish belief teaches, which is why one should adhere to the religious view rather than rely on Aristotle. Here he adds: “may the Holy One praised be He return us in complete repentance before Him.”158 Judah then proceeds to refute Aristotle’s proofs (reʾayot) in support of the doctrine that the heavenly body is eternal. His rebuttal is introduced by the observation that even if Aristotle’s demonstrations (mofetim) were true, one cannot rely on them since they are based on sense-perception, and sense-

155 156 157 158

of Aristotle on Metaphysics, you will attain no more knowledge of that world than that there exists a Prime Mover, [who is the] Rock […].” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 656–662. Ibid., lines 662–664. “Ignorant”: The jsb translation has “dull.” The verse in Jeremiah continues: “Their doctrine is but delusion.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 665–668.

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perception cannot teach us anything about the immaterial world. He supports this conviction, which he also advanced in his Introduction, by biblical verses, “Our ways are not his ways and our thoughts are not his thoughts,” and Isa. 64:3 (“No eye has seen them, O God, but You”).159 Yet biblical verses are not sufficient here; it is necessary to refute the philosopher on his own terms, that is, philosophically. This is of crucial importance for Judah. He explains: “even if one grants Aristotle that his demonstrations (mofetim) are true from the point of view of human reasoning that is based on sense-perception, we will nonetheless destroy (neshabber) of Aristotle’s proofs (reʾayot) concerning this important matter what we can destroy on the basis of his own science. This will be [judged as] righteousness for us, and whosoever will destroy them even more, may he receive additional righteousness.”160 Put differently, for the sake of argument Judah is prepared to accept the thesis that Aristotle’s demonstrations and arguments can yield knowledge; therefore, to invalidate the eternity doctrine (“this important matter”) the Philosopher’s arguments have to be investigated from within, on the basis of his own philosophy. It should be noted that in his coverage of On the Heavens he listed the doctrine that the heavenly body is not generated and not corruptible without refuting it philosophically (mḥ/Heavens i.9). There he equated “the spherical body” or “the eternal” with “the Rock blessed be He,” adducing the biblical verse “I will put you in a cleft of the Rock” (Ex. 33:22). This maneuver obscured that in his source (and in Aristotle) the discussion leads up to the conclusion that the heavens are eternal.161 Earlier on, in his presentation of Physics viii, he equated the First Mover with “the Rock.” In that passage Judah rejected Aristotle’s doctrine of eternal motion by adducing Job 21:16, “the thoughts of the wicked are beyond me,” and other biblical verses that express the limited capacity of human reason (cf. Chapter Four, section 1 iv), without, however, refuting this doctrine philosophically, and without referring to the thesis that the universe is eternal. It is in his comments on “the alien woman” that he finally sets out to rebut the doctrine of the world’s eternity by proving Aristotle wrong on philosophical grounds. The philosophical refutation that Judah advances here attacks Aristotle’s proof that the heavenly body is not generated and incorruptible, with which he was familiar through Averroes’ Middle Commentary on On the Heavens. As

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Ibid., lines 669–673. Cf. mḥ/Introd. 16 (where Isa. 64:3 was also adduced) and 18. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 673–676, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 97. As Dr R. Leicht observed (e-mail communication), the expression neshabber is reminiscent of al-Ghazali’s term Tahāfūt, the title of his refutation of the Muslim falāsifah. See mḥ/Heavens i.9, notes 54 and 55 and Chapter Four, section 1 vi.

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Judah specifies, it was argued in On the Heavens i that the spherical body is not generated and not corruptible since generation and corruption are out of and into contraries and there is no contrary to circular motion.162 Judah presents the proof in the form of a syllogism. The first premise is that everything that is generated comes into being out of a contrary and everything that is corrupted is corrupted into a contrary because it has something that is a substrate for the two contraries.163 Judah is prepared to accept this premise with the proviso that it is valid solely with respect to something that comes into being out of something, “not with respect to something that comes into being ex nihilo ( yesh me-ayn), as in our religion.”164 The second premise is that the revolving body has no contrary,165 for contrary simple bodies have of necessity contrary motions and there cannot be a contrary to circular motion.166 He does not reproduce in extenso Averroes’ argumentation (which follows Aristotle’s in On the Heavens 270b32–271a33) in support of the thesis that there cannot be a contrary to circular motion, but summarizes it as follows: “the course (hillukh) of contrary bodies is contrary, and by the method of conversion of the contradictory (nezer ha-setirah, ʿaks al-naqīḍ) it follows that the body whose course is not contrary [that is, the revolving body], does not have a contrary.”167 The logical expression that Judah uses here is not found in the corresponding passage in his source, nor in Averroes’ Epitome of On the Heavens.168 162

163 164 165 166 167 168

Cf. Arist., Heavens 270a13–23: the body whose natural motion is circular is not subject to alteration. A simple body must have a simple motion. Averroes’ discussion is found in mc Heavens i.6, ed. Al-Alaoui, 85, from which Judah quotes some sentences literally (see next notes). C. Sirat discussed this passage in her first article on the mḥ, see Sirat “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 54–56. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 677–678, cf. Averroes, mc Heavens 85.6–7. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 682–684. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 678–679, cf. Averroes, mc Heavens 85.8. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 684–685, cf. Averroes, mc Heavens 85.12–13. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 685–687. The Hebrew and Arabic expressions are found in line 686. The Arabic expression is, however, found in Ep. Physics, ed. Puig 100.10, see also Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, 486. Unfortunately, the two manuscripts that underlie the two published texts of the mḥ’s passage by Sirat and Goldstein have a mistake in the Arabic term ʿaks al-naqīḍ here. Sirat reproduces ms V, which has ʿakm instead of ʿaks (and gezer instead of nezer), whereas ms O, which forms the basis for Goldstein’s edition, has ʿind. In both mss Arabic terms are often corrupted, see my Introduction to the Edition. The last letter of the second Arabic word is spelled by a tsade, which is Judah’s way of rendering Arabic ḍād. The Hebrew expression nezer ha-setirah is a bit unusual. Klatzkin lists the expression nezer ha-mishpaṭ (s.v. nezer) with a single textual passage, taken from the section on logic in the mḥ, and provides hefekh and hippukh as synonyms for nezer. In the section on logic (ms O 20v) ʿaks is written above the Hebrew nezer; the expression (nezi-

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It is this second premise that Judah sets out to attack.169 His point of departure is the question whether the contrariety in the simple bodies from which of necessity contrary motions evolve is a contrariety with respect to all qualities or not. The answer is that this is not the case, for fire is not contrary to earth in all its qualities since they both share the quality of dryness. So the contrary movements of fire and earth are not due to their being contraries in all their qualities. It is the same with fire and water, for although they are contraries, the contrariety in their movements is not absolute: fire is absolutely light, but water is not completely heavy, and the definition for two things to be contraries implies that they are utterly remote from each other. Thus the contrariety of their motions is not due to the contrariety of the bodies moved. Hence it does not follow that only contrary bodies have opposite motions, for fire and earth are not contraries yet they have opposite motions. Nor does it follow that the motions of contrary bodies are opposites, for fire and water are contraries but their motions are not. Therefore the supposition that the course of contrary motions must also be contrary is not valid, and hence the conclusion that if their course is not (by a) contrary the bodies are no contraries is not valid. The upshot of this reasoning is that the premise that the revolving body has no contrary cannot be proven, and hence the conclusion that this body is not subject to generation and corruption collapses. It is after this section that Judah draws up the list of 48 unproven premises presented above in Chapter Four (section 2.2). The link between this list and the refutation of Aristotle’s proof for the eternity of the heavenly body is the lack of certainty involved in Aristotle’s premises. As noted in Chapter Four, according to Judah, some of these premises are first axioms that are clear to the intellect and do in fact not need a demonstration whereas others, which are much harder to understand, are not proven at all and yet Aristotle makes use of them in his demonstrations. In the passage under consideration we have a case where an unproven premise leads to a false doctrine. For the other premises in the list this is not spelled out, but the implication is clear: not only could Aristotle not prove anything regarding the immaterial world, his proofs regarding

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rato ha-setirah) with the Arabic equivalent and its explanation is found a bit further on in the section on topical inferences, ms O 30v. Wolfson (Crescas’ Critique, 541) traces the origin of a similar expression in Crescas, hippukh ha-soter to Aristotle, Topics 113b25–26. For Judah’s idiosyncratic terminology, see above Chapter Three, section 5, and see Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, 129, who gives conversio per contrapositionem as the Latin equivalent. I thank Prof. C. Manekin for discussing this term with me. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 690–703.

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the sensible world are not reliable either since they are based on premises for which there is no proof. The wider context of this list is thus the unreliability of the doctrine of the eternity of the world.170 In what follows Judah returns to this theme, saying that “there are still great controversies among the philosophizers (mitpalsefim) who came after him regarding this issue of the eternity. Some of them think that the matter has been well-explained with no doubt remaining in it (mevoʾar beli safeq), whereas others have doubted this. Some people have refuted his proofs, whereas others have answered (heshivu) those who refuted them and still others have answered these. In sum: whosoever plunges deeply into these things in order to furnish a sign and proof (ot we-mofet) from the senses so as to make this proof revealed and generally accepted, like the demonstrations of mathematics, will not succeed. Why should we exert our souls by striving for something which has no end and why do we neglect our perfect Torah (toratenu ha-temimah) and follow instead tohu that will bring no benefit?”171 After his rebuttal of Aristotle Judah resumes his explanation of Proverbs, but not until he has clarified that knowledge of God’s existence and unity in combination with the fear of God, as well as the realization that God has created everything out of nothing, enables one eventually to “enter the pardes” gradually (cf. above, section vi b). Then there is no need to study the defective books of idolatry and heresy of which one thinks to find wisdom in it while in fact it is not to be found there.172 That the doctrine of the eternity of the world is the bone of contention in Judah’s critique of Aristotle’s philosophy is evident from the fact that Judah also emphasizes the notion of God as creator and/or creation ex nihilo in several other passages in the treatise under consideration. To mention a few examples: in his comment on Gen. 1:1 he exhorts man to pray to the Creator that all existents receive the emanation in accordance with their potentiality (lines 60–62). In another passage on the creation narrative he says that only the Creator is the true good (line 100). Prov. 3:19 teaches that He who created the existents in this world out of nothing is eternal (lines 787–788).173 The term baraʾ means the

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Judah’s critique does not seem to take into consideration Maimonides’ assertion that Aristotle knew that he has no demonstration for eternity, Guide ii.13, tr. Pines, 289–290. Cf. also Maimonides’ observation that philosophers are divided on the issue of the origin of the world, Guide i.71, tr. Pines, 180. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 758–766. “Some of them” and “others”: Hebr. Yes she-. These words can also be rendered as referring to “somebody” in the singular. Ibid, lines 767–779. These lines relate to Prov. 2:16–20. Cf. also Chapter Three, section 3.3.

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creation of something from “absolute nothing/non-existence,” not from a preexisting substrate (prime matter) that is called “nothing” without being so in reality. The affirmation of creation ex nihilo thus appears to be the big issue for Judah; the more Aristotle can be refuted on this point, the better it is. Furthermore, it is significant that the verse from Job that Judah invoked to deny the thesis of the eternity of motion in his account of Physics viii (“the thoughts of the wicked are beyond me”) emerges also in this context. It appears in the passage where Judah maintains that “the end of Aristotle’s wisdom is the beginning of our wisdom.”174 It is also found, quite unexpectedly one might say, in Judah’s coverage of the philosophers’ explanation of the rainbow in his survey of the Meteorology. There he insists that Aristotle provided only the material, formal and efficient cause of the phenomenon— the natural causes—leaving “the final cause, which is the principal one (haʿiqqar), to those who deal with what is principal […].”175 The final cause is that the rainbow shall be a token of the covenant, put differently, this is a divine cause. To this he adds, “let not the discussion of the rainbow be greater than that on the heavens and the earth of which we maintain that they are created, while he [= Aristotle] says that they are natural,” which is followed by the same verse from Job. “Natural” in this context stands antithetical to “created,” thus meaning “eternal.” That the biblical verse is adduced three times, each time in a context that relates to the thesis of the world’s eternity, indicates that this thesis (“this important matter”) is indeed the main target of Judah’s criticism. His elaboration on the rainbow suggests that one should not be too concerned about the philosophers’ explanation of this phenomenon: the doctrine of the world’s eternity is far more important. It should also be noted that Judah does not offer a proof for creation; his refutation of the thesis that the heavens are eternal seems to serve as an indirect proof that the universe is created.176 In view of the emphasis that Judah places on the notion of God as creator it is useful also to refer briefly to his précis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics that immediately precedes Treatise 1. Given Judah’s critical observations in the area of natural philosophy and his misgivings about the usefulness of the Metaphysics one might expect that the mḥ’s survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics would be the object of severe criticism. Surprising as it may sound, this is not the case. Judah’s presentation of the Aristotelian work is a fairly straightforward render-

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Cf. above, and notes 146–147. See mḥ/Meteor. iii.7 and Chapter Four, section 1 xiv. For this procedure, see Davidson 1987, 12–13.

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ing of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s book in abridged form.177 It contains several long quotations from this commentary, and the only critical comment is found in Treatise One, where Judah points to a contradiction with Treatise xv of the Book on Animals.178 Yet compared to Averroes’ Middle Commentary Judah’s rendering reveals an important shift of emphasis in that the notion of being qua being as the subject matter of metaphysics does not figure prominently in Judah’s presentation. Instead, he underlines that the discipline of metaphysics is concerned with causes, more precisely, that it explores “the principles and ultimate causes of existing things, not insofar as they are known qua existing things, but insofar as they exist according to a cause.”179 In his coverage of Book Lambda, which Judah considers to be the most important of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he focuses on the cause of all, the substance that is the principle of the universe, who is the first unmoved mover that moves everything in as far as it is the object of desire. It is this part of Book Lambda that receives the most extensive treatment on Judah’s part. Instead of focusing on the theme of “being qua being” he thus directs the reader’s attention to the First Cause, and what is significant here is that he regularly drops the term “the Rock” in his account, for example after the appellations that Averroes uses to describe Aristotle’s deity. In so doing he explicitly identifies the deity of Metaphysics Book Lambda with the God of Scripture. What is more, the usage of the term “the Rock” invests the deity with the notion of creation, for, as noted, it was this appellation that he employed in Physics viii and Heavens i to buttress his opposition to the doctrine of the world’s eternity. Judah thus goes much beyond Averroes’ account. The role of God as creator is further emphasized at the end of his account of the Metaphysics. In a passage that marks the transition from this account to the treatise on the explanation of biblical verses he contrasts the God of “Aristotle and his commentators” to that of “Jacob’s inheritance (ḥeleq Yaʿaqov),” for according to the latter, God is “the Creator of everything ( yoṣer ha-kol huʾ),” which Judah says he will explain in Treatise 1. Again, the notion of creation, which played an important role in the Maimonidean controversy, emerges as a topic of the utmost importance. As noted, the term “we 177 178

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On this section of the mḥ, see Fontaine,“The First Survey.” I draw on that study in the paragraph that follows. Cf. above Chapter Four, section 1 xxii. Perhaps Judah refers to actual discussions about the explanation of the phenomenon of the rainbow. Nachmanides, for example, in his commentary on Gen. 9:12, says: “We must, against our will […], believe what the Greeks say, [viz.] that the rainbow is a natural effect […] of the sun’s shining upon the damp air, for one sees the likeness of a rainbow in a vessel of water [that is] placed before the sun.” (Translation Langermann, “Acceptance and Devaluation,” 233). ms O 106v.

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will destroy” (neshabber) in his refutation reminds one of al-Ghazali’s Tahāfūt, but if it ever was Judah’s intention to compile an in-depth comprehensive refutation of the philosophers, it does not seem to have been realized; the issue of the world’s origin is the only question that Judah addresses at some length.

3

Additions to Judah’s Philosophical Survey

Not all of Judah’s comments presented in section 1 above are directly linked to his overview of philosophical views surveyed in Part 1; we also find comments that are only indirectly related to such views or derived from them, and others contain material that was not previously discussed. These comments, which occupy a rather extensive part of his explanation of biblical verses, offer some insight into Judah’s thought. In what follows I will briefly list what is new or more extensive in comparison with the survey of Aristotle’s philosophy.180 I adopt the topical order mentioned at the beginning of the present chapter. As for the theme of the three worlds, the treatise on biblical exegesis considerably expands on his expositions on the issue in his Introduction: he elaborates on the hierarchy of the three worlds, how they proceed from and relate to God, and on their degree of composition. Whereas emanation does not figure prominently in the survey of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, in this treatise it attracts much attention, in particular the relation between emanation and “the good” and “light.” The dualism between light and dark was touched upon in the Introduction, but in his biblical comments light is associated with form, perfection, the active intellect and the world to come. We also learn that there are ten spheres (sections i–ii). Judah’s musings about the celestial world relate in part to doctrines described by him in Part 1, but they elaborate on the difference between celestial and earthly matter, on the influence of the celestial world on the sublunar world, on the order and wisdom that exists in the universe, on stellar constellations, and we hear that everything on earth has a counterpart in heaven. We are also told that the first intellect emanated from the First

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It should be noted that the treatise also contains a number of passages from rabbinical literature that Judah relates to scientific themes treated in Part 2 of the mḥ, which follows Treatise 1. Lines 446–459, for instance, invoke bḤullin 60b (on the moon’s complaint about its small size), whereas the next passage refers to an experiment of the Rabbis to prove that there is no latitude at the equator (bbb 74a). Another scientific topic, on the number of stellar configurations, is found in lines 796–814 (without reference to a rabbinic passage).

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Cause, and that the upper sphere is moved by God (section iii). With respect to the physical world (section iv), Judah’s comments elaborate on the relation of form to matter (invoking Plato’s view of form as male and matter as woman), and on the survival of the soul after death. The separation of the soul from the body is spoken of as a release from prison. Moreover, his explanation of the creation of first matter brings out where Aristotle contradicts religious views, and delineates to what extent Aristotle can be charged with kefirah. The comments on the rational soul (section v) touch on subjects that were not explicitly mentioned in the section on On the Soul, such as the different ranks among man, man’s perfection, the actualization of his potentiality, the ascent of the soul to the immaterial world, the study of the sciences, and ethical conduct. Judah’s expositions on the study of the sciences and the pursuit of knowledge (section vi) tie in with those in his Introduction, but are far more extensive here, in particular in his explanation of the Book of Proverbs. He underlines the importance of the study of the sciences, addressing their interrelation, the order and process of learning and the “golden mean” in the study of the sciences. Much attention is devoted to the study and status of divine science, and the critique of Aristotelian philosophy, in particular of the doctrine of the eternity of the world, is continued and expanded. Explanations related to ethics, providence, resurrection and the world to come (sections vii–ix) occasionally refer to views discussed in Part 1, but mostly concern matters that did not surface in that part. Judah emphasizes the importance of the fear of God, and discusses the virtues. The ethical factor implied in the order of learning constitutes an addition to what was said about the order of study in the introduction; there Judah merely observed that one should study natural science before engaging in divine science so as to accustom one’s intellect gradually to the sciences, not that natural science teaches one to subdue one’s evil inclination. Judah affirms belief in individual providence (against “the philosophizers”) and in bodily resurrection. In sum, his comments on the themes of the last three sections concern religious topics and are more loosely related to the scientific part than those discussed in sections i–vi. What can be learned from Treatise 1 about Judah’s own philosophical views? Interestingly, while the treatise in part supplements and elaborates on Aristotelian views that were presented in the philosophical overview, it also comprises certain elements that can be labeled as un-Aristotelian, notably the doctrine of emanation. Although the notion of emanation of course features in Jewish Aristotelians like Maimonides, the extent to which it figures in Judah’s comments on Genesis 1 is conspicuous, certainly in view of the fact that in his coverage of the Metaphysics he reproduces, apparently without disapproval,

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Averroes’ criticism of emanation.181 His description of God as “the pure Good” and his expositions on the theme of light, too, are more consonant with earlier Jewish thinkers of a neo-Platonic brand, such as Abraham bar Ḥiyya than with Averroes’ Aristotle. The emanation of light is a key element in the first chapter of Abraham bar Ḥiyya’s Hegyon ha-Nefesh, and in Megillat ha-Megalleh this author draws up a hierarchy of five light-worlds in his explanation of Gen. 1:3–5. Y.T. Langermann notes that light also plays a central role in Isaac Israeli’s cosmogony and figures prominently in the thirteenth-century anonymous commentary Doresh Reshumot.182 Judah’s assertion that everything was first created in potentiality and then was actualized on a specific day of the creation is also reminiscent of a similar teaching in Megillat ha-Megalleh.183 His ideas about the upward motion of the soul and the comparison of the separation of the soul from the body with a release from prison strike a distinctly neo-Platonic tone. We thus conclude that whereas his survey of the writings of “the philosophers” bears a clear Aristotelian stamp because it is based on Averroes, in Treatise 1, where he speaks more “with his own voice,” we find an admixture of Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian elements (the latter often characterized as neo-Platonic184). Yet this coexistence is not unusual; after all it is found in several other thirteenth-century Jewish thinkers as well (see also Chapter Seven, section seven), and translators like Hillel ben Samuel and Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel both rendered Aristotelian texts as well as non-Aristotelian ones into Hebrew. Judah’s teachings about emanation and light are bound up with his notions about the three worlds, which is arguably the most salient feature of Judah’s own thought. As noted, he has a lot to say on this topic, and since it figures in several parts of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, we will defer its discussion to Chapter Seven. At this point, it should be emphasized that Judah does not present a straightforward or coherent philosophical system. His ideas can be culled from his disparate comments, but he does not emerge as a systematic thinker. Moreover, while some of his exegetical comments are creative, others seem rather far-fetched or are likely to provoke impatience in a modern reader. At times he

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See ms O 115v. Langermann, “Cosmology and Cosmogony,” 218. Megillat ha-Megalleh, ed. Poznanski, 8–10, 15, cf. the Appendix on Abraham bar Ḥiyya’s interpretation of the Story of the Creation in Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides as Biblical Interpreter, 228–232. On the use of the label neo-Platonic, see Langermann, “Cosmology and Cosmogony,” 222 n. 63.

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contradicts himself, for example on the question of whether or not man can acquire knowledge of the world of the spheres by himself (above, section 1 vi c).185 It is important to underline that his exegesis should be seen as inspired by the motivation that underlies the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah: he wishes to show that Jews are not devoid of scientific knowledge, since for several philosophical views support can be found in biblical verses. One may also note the absence of certain philosophical themes that were discussed by earlier or contemporary thinkers: prophecy or God’s knowledge do not feature in this treatise. The same applies to the topic of divine attributes, although Judah devotes some attention to it at the end of Treatise 2.186

4

Judah’s Biblical Exegesis in Context

Having completed our overview of Judah’s biblical exegesis, we should now address the question how his explanations relate to those of other philosophers-exegetes in his day. To begin with, seeing that Judah by his own declaration was inspired to study the sciences by Maimonides’ Guide, the question whether Maimonides’ biblical exegesis in the Guide has left its traces in Judah’s explication of biblical verses suggests itself. It can immediately be said that the number of exact or close parallels is in fact quite small. In part this has to do with the fact that Judah’s comments focus on Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs (with occasional glances at other biblical books), whereas the scope in the Guide is much broader. However, also for verses that are discussed or explained by both authors one can find only a few similarities as far as specific comments are concerned. For example, although both authors understand reshit in Gen. 1:1 as a principle, Maimonides interprets the preposition in be-reshit as “in,” whereas Judah understands it as “through” or “by means of” (cf. above, section 1 i). Their interpretations also differ with respect to the nota objecti et in the same verse: according to Judah, it means that there is only one world, as taught by Aristotle, and Maimonides takes it to mean “with.”187 Another example is the expression “the throne of the Lord” in Ex. 17:16. According to Maimonides, the 185

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Another example: all the spheres are moved by the upper sphere, which in turn is moved by God (above, section iii), but we also read that the motion of the sphere is caused by the intellect that emanates from the first cause (ibidem). ms O 197v–198r. In an excursus on the verse “Moses was a very humble man” (Num. 12:3) he appears to endorse the negative interpretation of the words “great, mighty, awesome” (in the prayer based on Deut. 10:17). Perhaps the excursus was conceived of as a brief sermon. Guide ii.30, tr. 349–350. For Maimonides’ interpretation of be-reshit, see W.Z. Harvey, “A Third Approach,” 296 and Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides as Biblical Interpreter, 215–220.

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term “throne” refers to God’s sublimity, which is not a thing outside his essence, whereas Judah understands it as referring to “the heavens.”188 To be sure, at times a reminiscence or echo of Maimonides’ interpretations may be detected. We already saw that Maimonides’ explanation of Ex. 24:10 was probably alluded to in Judah’s discussion of prime matter (above, section iv), and that Prov. 8:4, “Unto you, o men, I call,” a verse to which Judah pays much attention, features as one of the opening verses of Maimonides’ introduction to the first part of the Guide. Also, despite the different context in both authors, Judah’s interpretation of “infants and sucklings” of Ps. 8:2 in a passage on providence (above, section viii) may be interpreted as triggered by and reacting to Maimonides’ simile of someone who grew up without ever having seen a female and hence would at first not be able to believe the explanation of his origin in his mother’s womb. Moreover, it is hard not to be reminded of Maimonides’ famous parable of the ruler’s palace in Guide iii.51 when one reads Judah’s parable about the traveler who came to see the King’s court and the different ranks of the king’s officers, which is an allegory on the different levels of knowledge (above vi d). All in all, however, the differences with Maimonides’ explanations of specific biblical verses or passages far outnumber the similarities. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that as a whole the Guide has had considerable impact on Judah’s comments, both with respect to the topics he treats and his approach of reading the Bible through a philosophical lens. Many of the themes treated by Judah in this part of his work are discussed in the Guide. Guide i.34, for example, emphasizes the proper order of study and the necessity of preliminary study for attaining wisdom. Like Maimonides in this chapter, Judah scorns laziness in studying the sciences, thus underscoring the importance of study. Also, Maimonides adduces in i.34 the conversation in b. Ḥagigah 14a in which R. Yoḥanan answered R. Elazar that he was not yet old enough to be taught the Account of the Chariot, and Judah refers to it in the same context, namely the orderly study of the sciences.189 It is moreover conceivable that Judah’s exposition on the limits of Solomon’s knowledge and the uncertainty pertaining to questions on the heavens bears on Maimonides’ perplexity expressed in Guide ii.24.190 As to his general approach, there seems to be little doubt that Judah’s allegorical reading of the Bible was informed by Maimonides’ method of the philo188 189 190

Guide i.9, tr. 35 (and cf. i.28, tr. 60); ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1037–1039. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 594–596. Ibid., lines 1076–1080. See the Aleph forum devoted to this passage in Aleph 2008, 151–339. See also Chapter Seven, section 3.

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sophic exposition of Scripture, even though, unlike Samuel ibn Tibbon, Moses ibn Tibbon, Jacob Anatoli and Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel Ḥen, he does not explicitly acknowledge this.191 For example, Maimonides views the entire book of Proverbs as a parable on the married harlot as he explains in the Introduction to Part i of Guide, and Judah follows in Maimonides’ footsteps by interpreting the biblical book as a parable, albeit more broadly than Maimonides; in his view it treats the study of the sciences, the married harlot (the alien woman) representing heretic science.192 Like Maimonides, Judah strongly opposes the literal interpretation of biblical verses that ascribe corporeality to God; these verses should be explained in a non-literal manner. The correct interpretation of anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible and rabbinic literature was a pressing issue and subject of fierce polemical debate in Judah’s day, as can be deduced, for example, from Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Maʾamar Yiqqawu ha-Mayim, ch. 20.193 Regarding the knotty question of Maimonides true position on the world’s origin, it is hard to determine what Judah took to be Maimonides’ true view, but perhaps his utterance “Why should we exert our souls by striving for something which has no end” is intended as a veiled critique of the extensiveness with which Maimonides treated the issue in the Guide.194 Regarding this question it is tempting to speculate who Judah has in mind when referring to “those of our religion who follow Aristotle’s doctrine of the world’s eternity,” but in the absence of a more detailed description it is impossible to say anything with certainty. One may think of Samuel ibn Tibbon, who was believed by his opponents, such as Jacob ben Sheshet, to believe in the eternity of the “world,” yet on the other hand, Judah considered the account of creation as narrated in the first chapter of Genesis to be limited to the generation of individual beings in this world, much as Ibn Tibbon did. Regrettably, Judah’s rather general and perhaps deliberately vague description does not allow us to infer how Judah understood Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation of Aristotle’s eternity thesis.195

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For the acknowledgment of these four authors, see Ravitzky, The Thought of R. Zerahia, 31. These four authors explicitly positioned themselves as followers of Maimonides, which Judah ha-Cohen did not. It should be borne in mind, though, that pre-Maimonidean authors, like for example Saadya and Abraham Ibn Daud also read the Bible through a philosophical lens. See Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides as Biblical Interpreter, 125–143 on Maimonides’ understanding of the married harlot in Prov. 7 and J. Stern, Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 356–360. On this debate, see Fraenkel, “The Problem of Anthropomorphism.” Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 762–763, see above, section 2. On Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s conception of the eternity of “the world” and its reception, see

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By the same token, it is hard to determine whom Judah had in mind when referring to the “philosophizers (mitpalsefim) who came after Aristotle” among whom there were “still great controversies regarding this issue of the eternity.”196 Is this an oblique reference to Samuel ibn Tibbon? The term mitpalsefim is ambiguous: it can carry a neutral meaning (people who are engaged in philosophy), but also a negative one (would-be philosophers, people who are not well trained in philosophy).197 Given the polemical context of this passage, it is likely that the derogatory meaning is intended here. G. Licata has observed that during the Maimonidean controversy the term was “employed in conservative circles that were hostile to radical philosophical theses, such as the eternity of the world.”198 The connotation of “someone not well versed in philosophy” does not seem to suit Samuel ibn Tibbon, but if Judah intended the term in reference to those who held radical philosophical theses, it could be directed against Ibn Tibbon, at least if Judah took him to be an adherent of the eternity thesis, which, as noted, is not certain. One also wonders whether the word “answered” (heshiv) in the lines where Judah elaborates on the “great controversies” should be taken as referring to the treatise Meshiv devarim nokhaḥim, Jacob ben Sheshet’s rebuttal of Samuel ibn Tibbon.199 Yet what is clear, is that Judah’s emphasis on the question of the world’s origin, the only issue where he seeks to refute Aristotle in detail, has to do with the fact that this was a hotly debated issue in his day. It was a matter of great concern to his fellow Toledan Judah al-Fakhar, who discerned in the Guide radical views on the issues of creation and miracles.200 Judah ha-Cohen’s biblical exegesis also reflects the contemporary debate on other controversial issues. He upholds belief in individual providence, and here too he rejects the view of some of “the mitpalsefim” who believe that God’s providence extends only to the sphere of the moon (cf. above, section viii). Judah also affirms his belief in bodily resurrection, another controversial issue, but this theological tenet receives less attention on his part (cf. above, section ix). As to miracles, his sole remark about this issue is that they fall outside the domain of nature.

196 197 198 199 200

Freudenthal’s elaborate discussion, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Avicennian Theory”; see also Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 239–240. See above, n. 158. See now Licata’s enlightening study, “The Term mitpalsef.” Ibid., 164. On Jacob ben Sheshet’s understanding (or non-understanding) of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s views, see Freudenthal “The Kabbalist R. Jacob ben Sheshet of Girona.” See Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 259–260. It is noteworthy that this was also one of the questions that engaged Judah’s patron, Frederick ii, see Weber, Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim, Chapter Five, on Anatoli’s treatment of the question.

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Whether or not Samuel Ibn Tibbon was his target in his remark about Aristotle’s followers regarding the issue of eternity, Judah’s approach to single out specific biblical books brings to mind that of Samuel Ibn Tibbon in Perush Qohelet. The latter planned to write a commentary on the internal meanings in the book of Proverbs, and his Commentary on Ecclesiastes contains many passages from Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs, the three books that are the focus of Judah’s explanations.201 Ibn Tibbon also refers to a commentary on Genesis, yet, like that on Proverbs, apparently it was never completed.202 Judah does not spill much ink on the principles underlying his method of interpretation. We look in vain for any well-defined hermeneutical principles. Only in his exposition of Prov 1:6, “to understand a proverb (mashal) and the interpretation (meliṣah),”203 does he devote a few words to the way he reads Scripture. The expression mashal (parable, or allegory), he intimates, is used to indicate that a certain matter (ʿinyan) has a more profound content or meaning (ʿinyan) than what is apparent from the plain meaning (peshuṭo). Meliṣah, which in this context has the connotation of figure of speech, also has two meanings (that is, an external and an inner/hidden one), but this locution refers to only one word or term, whereas a mashal consists of “many words.” Thus, the book of Proverbs contains expressions that outwardly point to a certain thing, but at the same time indicate something else, as for example the word “woman,” which also means “matter,” or the use of the word “wealth” for “heaven.”204 In fact, he goes on to explain, every verse of the book of Proverbs contains three meanings for those who study the book thoroughly: 1) the plain, literal meaning, 2) the philosophical meaning and 3) a secret (sod) from the sitrei Torah that has not appeared to philosophers. These multiple meanings are hinted at in Prov. 25:11, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in settings of silver.”205 In differentiating between three meanings of the book of Proverbs, Judah goes beyond Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Maimonides before him, who both discerned a twofold meaning in biblical allegories, an external revealed one and an internal concealed one. In his preface to the first Part of the Guide, Maimonides expounded the biblical verse as conveying that the external meaning 201 202 203 204 205

See for example the digression on Prov. 1:1–7 (ed. Robinson 2007, paragraphs 102–124) and on 8:22–36 (paragraphs 336–353). See Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2007), 17. kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 547–553. Ibid., lines 554–557. The jsb translates the word maskiyyot with “silverplated vessels” and kjv with “pictures of silver.”

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of a parable is like silver, whereas the concealed internal meaning, which is like gold in comparison, is only visible to someone who looks through the very fine holes of the silver work. Ibn Tibbon elaborated on this by stating that his intention was to “widen the holes.”206 Judah does not use this expression, nor does he explain how the third meaning can be inferred from Prov. 25:11. In fact, the majority of Judah’s comments, not only on Proverbs but also on other biblical books, reflects a philosophical understanding of Scripture. We do not hear much about the literal meaning of the text. Occasionally there are philological comments that usually are intended to support his philosophical interpretation. About Ps. 36:12, “Let not the foot of the arrogant tread on me” (cf. above, section vii), he says that it can be interpreted in two ways: its plain meaning is that it is a prayer to be freed from “the yoke of time,” that is, from those who grow haughty, so that one can free oneself to engage in the secrets of existing things, and the second is that the praying person asks to be protected from his own haughtiness. Our author does not elucidate what the “secrets of existing things” are. Only a few times in his commentary does he hint at the “secrets of the Torah,” and it is not altogether clear what he means by it. As mentioned above (section i), the expression occurs in his explanation of the words “in the beginning” in Gen. 1:1, where the “secret” consists in the connection of the word “beginning” in Gen. 1:1 with the same word in Prov. 8:22, the correct interpretation of reshit being that it stands for the immaterial world by which God created the two lower worlds. An allusion to an esoteric teaching is also found in his observation that the expression “the image of God” in Gen. 1:26 appears twice; here he contends that there are interpretations that are not fitting to write down, “and he who understands will understand.”207 Within the framework of his discussion of the limits of knowledge, illustrated by the parable of the king’s servants, he tells us that wisdom about the immaterial world should be revealed only through parables (mashal) and rhetorical expression (meliṣah).208 Here he moreover asserts that one is not allowed to speak about the “Cause of causes,” invoking the explanation of Prov. 25:3 (“Like the heavens in their height, like the earth in its depth, Is the mind of Kings—unfathomable”) in bShabbat 11a: “If all the seas were ink and all the reed quills, and the heavens parchment and all the people scribes, this would not be sufficient to write the space of authority,” adding that this is

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See Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes, ed. Robinson (2007), Introd. par [20] and index s.v. Prov. 25:11; and ibid., 48 and 105. For Maimonides, see Guide, Introd. to Part i, tr. Pines, 11–12. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 219–220. Ibid., lines 1063–1064. Cf. above, section 1.(vi).

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a ḥidah and mashal about the upper world.209 Yet in the passages in his survey where Judah refers to Aristotle’s doctrines and treatises, the words ḥidah, mashal and meliṣah do not emerge; there Judah simply writes, Aristotle “said,” “mentioned” or “explained” (cf. the list above at the end of section 1), without alluding to a secret meaning. Hence “the secrets of existing things” does not appear to refer to the allegorical philosophical interpretation. Judah’s contemporary Jacob Anatoli, a philosopher-exegete who stands firmly in the Maimonidean tradition of philosophical exegesis, distinguishes in his Malmad ha-Talmidim between sitrei Torah and sodot: sitrei Torah denote scriptural matters that are concealed from the masses but not from the philosophers, that is, the more profound content of biblical verses, whereas prophetically revealed secrets are called sodot; even philosophers can only know them through revelation, not by philosophic demonstration.210 Although this distinction is similar to Judah’s second and third meaning in the Book of Proverbs, the author of the mḥ does not seem to differentiate between the terms sitrei Torah and sodot, as is evident not only by his phrase “a secret (sod) from the sitrei Torah,” but also by the beginning of Treatise 3, where he unequivocally identifies sitrei Torah with sodot.211 Jacob Anatoli’s Malmad is roughly contemporaneous with Judah’s enterprise.212 Their interpretations of biblical verses reveal some interesting parallels. For one, they devote much attention to the book of Proverbs. This biblical book is the most frequently cited in the Malmad.213 As Aviezer Ravitzky observed, Anatoli also interprets the emanation from intelligences in terms of light, and he, too, views divine wisdom as an instrument of creation.214 Moreover, like Judah, Anatoli compares the progressive study of the sciences to the gradual access to a building: the study of mathematics, which is preparatory, 209

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Ibid., lines 1073–1075, commenting about Prov. 25:3, cf. above section vi d. Judah adopts only the interpretation of the first part of the verse, namely that the heavens on high are unsearchable, but not the second part, for in his view one can investigate the separate intellects (alluded to as “the heart of kings”). “The space of authority”: Sirat, “La Qabbale,” 200 translates: “tout ce qui dépend de l’autorité suprême.” Gordon, The Rationalism of Jakob Anatoli, 157–158 on wa-yishlaḥ 32b. For Anatoli’s esoteric interpretations, see now Weber, Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim. ms O 198v. Opinions differ as to the Malmad’s time of composition. According to Gordon (The Rationalism of Jakob Anatoli, 122), it was completed in 1249, whereas Weber maintains that Anatoli may have started the work before he immigrated to Italy around 1231 and completed it no later 1247 (Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim, 4). Gordon, The Rationalism of Jakob Anatoli, 173. In his introduction to the Malmad Anatoli complains that “the books of Solomon” were only little studied, ed. Palermo 2004, 391. Ravitzky, The Thought of R. Zerahia, English summary, vii.

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places one in the outer antechamber, while natural science occupies the inner antechamber. Someone who masters metaphysics enters into the innermost chamber, “the habitation of God.” This ultimate stage was attained by Moses.215 This is similar to Judah’s parable of a visitor who traveled a long way to see a king, but was allowed only to see the “gatekeepers,” with Moses representing the highest stage of knowledge that is possible for humans (see above, section vi d). There is no need, however, to suppose influence here. Even if the two authors met in Italy, as some scholars surmise, their common source of inspiration for this simile seems to have been Maimonides’ parable of the king’s palace in Guide iii.51. As we shall see in the next chapter, another common theme between the two authors is that of the three worlds. What emerges from Treatise 1 about Judah’s attitude towards the study of (Aristotelian) philosophy? The first thing to be noted is that he is convinced of the necessity of a philosophical interpretation of Scripture, a conviction that he shares with Maimonides and Samuel Ibn Tibbon, but also with his teacher Ramah.216 Furthermore, he does not seem to have had too many compunctions about disclosing the philosophical content of Scripture to his readers. Reason is the hermeneutical key for understanding biblical verses, and in many cases “reason” is identical with Aristotelian or other philosophical views. It is manifest that he attaches great importance to philosophical study. Indeed, philosophical study is a duty. The book of Proverbs is taken to be a parable about the pursuit of the sciences. However, as his criticism of Aristotle’s methodology in this treatise makes abundantly clear, there is a limit to what reason can teach us. When it comes to the issue of the origin of the world, Aristotle’s teachings have to be strongly refuted. Judah rebuts the doctrine of the eternity of the world in a philosophical argumentation, not by solely adducing biblical verses, as he had done in his presentation of natural philosophy. Creation appears to be the bone of contention for Judah. His unambiguous affirmation of creation ex nihilo as well as his rational explanation of Scripture must be viewed against the backdrop of the historical context, namely the Maimonidean controversy. We see that Treatise 1 further develops the program as unfolded in Judah’s motivation (cf. Chapter Two, section 4): it further diffuses philosophical knowledge by interpreting biblical verses philosophically and it demarcates the boundaries of what philosophy can achieve. Moreover it provides hints about Jewish divine science, albeit sparingly.

215 216

Gordon, The Rationalism of Jakob Anatoli, 294–295. Septimus 1982, 57.

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In sum, Judah’s treatise on biblical exegesis has a twofold function. First, it brings his position vis-à-vis Aristotelian philosophy into sharper focus. His comments partly support and partly oppose Aristotelian teachings and delineate quite precisely what counts as kefirah (namely, the eternity of matter). Second, the treatise opens a window onto his own views. Diffuse and fragmentary as they may be, they shed some light on his intellectual outlook. As was the case with the critical comments and interventions discussed in Chapters Four and Five, in this treatise we hear his authorial voice. Both aspects are important for assessing Judah’s place in the history of medieval Jewish thought. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

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Judah ha-Cohen’s Place in the History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy After having examined Judah’s Introduction to his work (Chapter Two), his sources and his manner of compilation (Chapter Three), his criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy (Chapters Four and Five), and his explanation of biblical verses (Chapter Six), we should now summarize our results and consider Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen’s place in the history of medieval Jewish thought. A word of caution, however, is in order. As noted in Chapter One, the present study is primarily based on an examination of the sections on natural philosophy in the mḥ, the Introduction and Treatise 1. I have not systematically investigated the other sections (Judah’s surveys of logic, geometry, astronomy, astrology and his Treatises 2 and 3). Once the entire work has been studied, it will be possible to determine whether my assumptions and conclusions can be confirmed and where they should be corrected, refined and adjusted.1 Another caveat lies in the fact that my findings are based on the Hebrew version of Judah’s work. There is no way of knowing how this version relates to the lost Arabic original and consequently, whether Judah changed his views in the course of time.

1

The Reception of Averroes

A striking and important feature of the philosophical portion of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah is the omnipresence of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle. Judah ha-Cohen’s survey of Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy (and also of Aristotle’s Metaphysics) is almost exclusively based on the commentaries of Averroes. For virtually every statement in his survey a parallel can be found in these sources, for the most part in the Middle Commentaries, and occasionally also in the Epitomes. Judah does not seem to have read texts by Aristotle or Galen in Arabic. In a few instances, however, he appears to have derived his

1 Fortunately, the sections on astronomy and astrology have recently been investigated by N. Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology. Concerning Judah’s inconsistency with regard to terminology, Garshtein’s conclusions are similar to mine, cf. above Chapter Three, section 5. For Judah’s survey of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Zonta, “The Place of Aristotelian Metaphysics” and Fontaine, “The First Survey,” but this section requires further study.

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_008

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information from sources other than Averroes, namely the Arabic translation of Alexander’s treatise On Growth and Avicenna’s Shifāʾ.2 The comprehensive use of Averroes’ commentaries in the mḥ implies that already during his formative years in Toledo, Judah underscored the importance of Averroes as the transmitter of Aristotle’s thought. The sustained and almost exclusive reliance on the commentaries marks a new stage of Aristotelianism in medieval Jewish philosophy. Earlier in the thirteenth century, Samuel Ibn Tibbon had made use of some commentaries, but not to such an extent. The mḥ is therefore the first manifestation of the reception of Averroes’ commentaries among Jews, long before Averroes’ fame became widespread (“a household-name”) among Jews in the Provence in the fourteenth century. By the same token, the mḥ also represents a break with twelfth-century Jewish Aristotelians, such as Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides, who knew Aristotle as interpreted by Al-Farabi and Avicenna (or Al-Ghazali), and who usually rendered the Philosopher’s words as articulated by the falāsifah. Since the mḥ contains many literal or almost literal quotations—in abridged form—from Averroes’ Arabic Middle Commentaries on Aristotle, commentaries that often preserve the Aristotelian text, the mḥ provides more direct access to Aristotle’s own words than the twelfth-century Jewish Aristotelians. It is moreover noteworthy that this first comprehensive usage of Averroes’ commentaries preceded that in the Latin world, where in the 1220s and 1230s only some selected commentaries were studied. The interest in the commentaries seems, however, to have been limited to a relatively small circle in Toledo in Judah’s day, a circle that centered around Judah’s teacher, R. Meir ben Todros Abulafia (Ramah), and it did not have an immediate follow-up among Jews in Spain.3 The sustained usage of Averroes’ commentaries in the mḥ should not lead to the conclusion that Judah was the first “Averroist” in Jewish thought. Modern scholarship is divided as to the criteria for this description, but since Judah does not cite, either with approval or disapproval, any of Averroes’ writings other than the commentaries, he can be said to belong to the history of Jewish Averroism only in the sense that he was an early and eager, albeit critical student of Averroes’ commentaries. Moreover, to a certain extent the philosophical portions of the mḥ can be viewed as belonging to the early stage of the Arabic-into-Hebrew translation movement of these commentaries.

2 See Chapter Three, sections 2.1 and 2.2.1. 3 See Chapter Three, section 2.3.

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Maimonides and the Maimonidean Controversy

Judah asserts that Maimonides’ Guide kindled in him “a burning/raging fire” to study the sciences. The mḥ can be seen as the result of this endeavor.4 Although Judah’s biography does not yield precise dates, the most likely date for the composition of the Arabic version of the mḥ is the 1230s. This was the period of the second stage of the Maimonidean controversy during which the question of the permissibility of the study of philosophy and the use of the allegorical method was at stake. Seeing that Ramah of Toledo had been involved in the first stage on the issue of the resurrection of the dead (in which he strongly objected to Maimonides’ position), and played an important role during the second,5 and given, moreover, that Judah was considered to be an expert in the sciences (at least the mathematical ones) at a young age, it seems safe to assume that his study in his formative years was influenced by the contemporary debate in Toledo.6 References to Maimonides are scarce in Judah’s compilation. Maimonides is called “the Lamp of the Exile of Jerusalem (ner golat Ariel),” and “the true sage, our Master, The Teacher of Righteousness.”7 This last expression occurs in a passage in the section on astronomy where Judah explains that the order of the planets as adopted by Ptolemy and “the true sage” is not correct. It is to be noted that Judah criticizes a view endorsed by Maimonides without explicitly mentioning him by name. There are moreover no direct references to teachings in the Guide or to other Maimonidean works, yet in some passages in Judah’s explanation of biblical exegesis in Treatise 1 echoes of Maimonides’ expositions are detectable. For example, Judah seems to adopt Maimonides’ notion of “the middle way” in ethical conduct, and in the same treatise one may discern an echo of Maimonides’ simile of a man who grew up without ever having seen

4 The expression derives from Jer. 20:9. Maimonides quotes the biblical verse in Guide ii.37, where the context is that of a prophet who has received the divine overflow and finds himself unable to refrain from addressing the people, even though they do not want to hear his call. In the passage preceding it, Maimonides refers to the “intellectual overflow” and “additional perfection” (tr. Pines 374–375) that causes men of science to compose books, for it is in the nature of such persons to transmit their knowledge to others. 5 See Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture. 6 See also next section. According to Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 150–151 it is possible that the debates started already two decades before the controversy itself. Fraenkel (“The Problem of Anthropomorphism,” 99–100) also notes that debates about issues of anthropomorphism “apparently took place over some time before the actual controversy erupted.” 7 On these passages, see Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 44 and Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 40.

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a woman.8 Also, Maimonides is perhaps one of the unnamed addressees in Judah’s treatment of the problem of the world’s origin: here Judah denounces those who “plunge deeply into […] something which has no end,” a statement that may be viewed as an oblique reference to Maimonides’ extensive investigation of the issue.9 According to C. Sirat, the author of the Guide is also the target in a passage on Talmudic aggadot, according to which someone who attempts to explain the secrets of the aggadot through Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics is like someone who “crowns a great king with a crown of clay.”10 Yet, although Judah does not express any explicit opinion on specific philosophical teachings in the Guide, he unambiguously comes to Maimonides’ defense when it comes to Maimonides’ aim in writing it. In the very passage in which he acknowledges the Guide as his source of inspiration he writes, “I know in truth that the author’s [= Maimonides] intention was merely to redirect (le-hashiv u-lehaḥzir) those who erred (mi she-shagag) with respect to the words of Aristotle to hold fast again to our holy Torah, and that one ought not suspect the lamp of the Exile […] of the things that he has been suspected of by some people of this generation. Those who err (ha-shogeg) in their study of his treatise … resemble the eyes of a bat that gazes at the sun.”11 Judah’s wording in this passage is significant: the verbs shagag (to err, which occurs twice) and le-lehaḥzir also appear in Judah’s description of his motivation underlying his own work: he, too, declares that he wishes to redirect to the Torah those who had lost their way in the books of Aristotle.12 Judah thus presents himself as pursuing what he understands to be Maimonides’ aim. Unfortunately, Judah does not specify what exactly it was that Maimonides was suspected of.13 Septimus refers to the above passage when noting:

8 9 10

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Guide ii.17. Chapter Six, section 2. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 45. For the epistemological connotation of “clay” or “mud,” see Chapter Six, n. 145. On the problem of the interpretation of difficult or embarrassing aggadot, see Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, esp. Ch. 1. Tr. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 98, slightly modified; boldface and addition of Hebrew words are mine. Chapter Two, section 4. Interestingly, as observed by Freudenthal, “Les sciences,” 54 n. 71, this was also Nachmanides’ interpretation. Cf. Berger, “Judaism and General Culture,” 99. In his Introduction to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, too, refers to “accusations” against Maimonides, see Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 206 and cf. Robinson’s translation, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2007), 175: “Many of our contemporaries despised what he had to say, and even spoke against him: they considered his light as darkness.” Falaquera, in his Mikhtav ʿal devar ha-Moreh affirms that he had not found in the Guide any of the dibbot (calumnies) that were put forth against Maimonides; instead,

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“Castilian anti-rationalists will not say explicitly just what objectionable doctrines they impute to the Guide,”14 and adds that Judah was probably referring to “fellow Castilian anti-rationalists.”15 Septimus depicts Judah as a representative of the “philosophically knowledgeable anti-rationalism” that characterizes also his teacher Ramah, Ramah’s brother Josef ben Todros and Judah al-Fakhar.16 He expresses roughly the same assessment about our author (“a sophisticated Castilian anti-rationalist”) in another passage, but also portrays Judah, together with Ibn Latif, as “defenders of Maimonides and of similar intellectual-spiritual complexion.”17 According to Gad Freudenthal, however, Judah was one of the three Maimonideans who sought to diffuse in their encyclopedias the achievements of Greco-Arabic science and philosophy and to show its compatibility with the Torah of Moses.18 The two assessments, a “Maimonidean” and a “sophisticated anti-rationalist,” may sound contradictory, yet need not necessarily exclude each other. Indeed, they nicely illustrate the difficulty of determining Judah’s position. As Septimus himself acknowledges, the relation of the “old Spanish aristocracy” to rationalism cannot yet be clearly defined.19 The members of this circle (with which Judah apparently was associated) need not be viewed as one monolithic block; they may well have entertained different views on the various issues that were debated. Therefore, qualifications such as “rationalist” or “anti-rationalist” or “Maimonidean” and “anti-Maimonidean” are not always so helpful. Unlike the cases of Ramah and Judah al-Fakhar, we have no letters by Judah ha-Cohen on his stance in the controversy, perhaps because he was still very young when the debate raged (and given his terse style one may wonder whether he would have been able to express his views as eloquently as they did). As we have seen, he claims to have been inspired by the Guide to study the sciences, and he displays a certain admiration of Aristotle’s accomplishments. He follows in Maimonides’ footsteps in propagating a rationalistic reading of biblical verses and like him, and like Samuel Ibn Tibbon, he strongly opposes the ascription of corporeal notions to God. If a comparison with Ramah and Judah al-Fakhar is at

14 15 16 17 18

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he claims, Maimonides sought to annul the words of the heretics against the Torah, cf. ed. Lemler, “Shem Tov Falaquera’s Letter,” 41. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 101. Ibid., 98. Ibid., 62. Ibid., 97. Cf. Freudenthal, “Les sciences,” 53, “trois maïmonidiens, désireux de diffuser les acquis de la science et de la philosophie gréco-arabes et d’en montrer la compatibilité avec la Torah de Moïse.” Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 72.

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all possible, it would seem that he shared with them a concern about the belief in a corporeal God as well as about radical rationalism that can lead to heresy, as is evident from the last passages of his biblical exegesis.20 At the same time, he seems to be less hostile regarding rationalism and more favorably disposed towards Maimonides than Judah al-Fakhar.21 On the other hand, “inspiration” does not necessarily imply acceptance or support, and his reticence regarding the mention of Maimonides’ name may suggest a certain reservation towards or criticism of the latter’s thought. A comparison of his position with that of Nachmanides with regard to Maimonides is complex, not only because Judah does not specify any of Maimonides’ doctrines, but also because Nachmanides’ stance in the controversy has been subject to divergent interpretations.22 Yet, although Judah’s precise position vis-à-vis “the Lamp of Exile” views cannot be delineated, there seems to be little doubt that the mḥ should be seen against the backdrop of the controversy. Apart from the issue of anthropomorphism and the status of aggadot, Judah addresses other themes that were core issues during the controversy, such as the doctrine of creation and the question what counts as kefirah and minut.23 Other features that connect the emergence of this encyclopedia to the controversy of the 1230s are his musings about sevara and his concern about the validity of proofs.24 This brings

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Above, Chapter Six, section 1 (vi d). On Judah al-Fakhar’s position, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 88 and 163, n. 165, see also Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 178. In his letter to David Kimhi (Iggerot Qenaʾot 3b) Judah al-Fakhar exclaims that he wishes that the Guide had never been written and never been translated. He also composed a poem in which he called Maimonides a sinner, Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 179 n. 1. Al-Fakhar also objected to Maimonides’ exegesis of biblical parables, cf. Lemler, “The Sceptical Exegesis,” 116 n. 39. See Berger, “How did Nahmanides propose?”. According to Nachmanides, the issue of anthropomorphism played an important role in the Maim controversy, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 79ff. From Falaquera’s Mikhtav ʿal devar ha-Moreh, too, it appears that belief in creation and God’s incorporeality were hotly debated in the controversy. The terms kefirah and minut figure prominently in the letters exchanged during the controversy. For kefirah see also next section. For sevara, see Chapter Two, section 3. In a letter to the scholars of Provence, which forms part of the epistolary exchange during the Maimonidean controversy, Josef b. Todros Halevi Abulafia of Burgos, the brother of Judah’s teacher Ramah, also contrasts sevara in the sense of “logical deduction” to qabbalah (in the sense of tradition): faith should rest on qabbalah, not on sevara, (Ginzei Nistarot iii, 159), see Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 181. In Shaʿar ha-shamayim, the work of Judah’s contemporary Isaac ibn Latif, who was likewise critical of the usefulness of philosophy, we come across the expression hokhaḥot ʿal pi heqesh u-sevara, which denotes philosophical method, cf. Zimran, Philosophy, Tradition, and Esoterica, 17. For the emphasis on adequate proofs in relation to the controversy, see Chapter Four, section 1. Nachmanides, too contrasts sevara, as reasoning that

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us to Judah’s attitude towards Aristotle and his criticism of the Philosopher’s thought, which is directly linked to the debate on the permissibility of the study of philosophy.

3

Judah’s Attitude towards Aristotle’s Philosophy

In Chapter Two (section 5) we noted that Judah’s attitude to Aristotle’s philosophy is marked by a certain ambivalence. We find him oscillating between a “positive” and a “negative” evaluation of the philosopher’s thought, that is, between appropriation/acceptance and what may at first sight seem a rejection of philosophy. On the positive side, one may point to the fact that he interprets many biblical verses in such a way that they are in agreement with Aristotelian teachings and to the fact that he labels Aristotle’s achievements as “certainly not a small matter.” (Chapter Six). Also, oftentimes he displays a genuine intellectual interest in the philosophical topics he presents. On the negative side, apart from occasional derogatory qualifications of philosophy as “Greek mud,” we find severe criticism of Aristotle’s methodology. Given this circumstance, is it possible to define his position towards philosophical study more clearly? To address this question, it should first be observed that all in all the passages in which Judah displays a “negative” attitude towards Greek philosophy far outweigh those in which he is more “positive” on its accomplishments. It is no exaggeration to say that criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy is a hallmark of his presentation of natural philosophy.25 This becomes immediately evident in the Introduction of his work. Judah’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy as articulated there can be summarized as follows: in contradistinction to what philosophers believe, their method, labeled by Judah as sevara (discursive reasoning, philosophical speculation), cannot provide certain knowledge of immaterial objects, since it is based on sense-perception. To attain such knowledge, one needs instead revelational knowledge (qabbalah). Moreover, for many of his doctrines concerning the natural world Aristotle has not succeeded in providing demonstrative proofs of the kind that are used in mathematical science

25

is not authoritative, to qabbalah in the introduction to his Torah-commentary. According to Idel “ ‘We have no Kabbalistic tradition on this’,” 59 n. 33, Nachmanides’ distinction is “obviously influenced by Halevi.” I am grateful to Prof. M. Idel for this reference. It should be noted that criticism is characteristic of his presentation of the sciences as a whole, see below, section 5. Interestingly, his survey of logic does not contain critical comments, which confirms C. Manekin’s assessment that logic is “ideologically neutral,” Manekin, “Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture,” 122.

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(mofetim). Only very few of these doctrines can be proved by the kind of proofs that are called reʾayot, which in the hierarchy of proofs rank lower than mofetim.26 To define Judah’s attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy more precisely, it is therefore necessary to assess the extent of Judah’s criticism. Here it will be helpful to distinguish between two levels of criticism: one that considers Aristotle’s thought as containing doctrines that provide explanations of various phenomena in the natural world—which I will call the “internal” level—, and one that contrasts the Aristotelian corpus as a whole to revelational knowledge— which I will call the “external” level–. Although these two levels are entangled in Judah’s expositions, it will be helpful first to consider them separately. I shall start with what I have called the “internal” level, Judah’s criticism of disparate doctrines of Aristotle’s natural philosophy—doctrines which, it may be recalled, he was familiar with through Averroes’ commentaries. He expresses his criticism in two extensive passages, one in the Introduction and the other in Treatise 1 as well as in a number of critical remarks on specific doctrines that he inserts in his survey of natural philosophy.27 The two long passages consist of lists: the first enumerates a large number of Aristotelian views that Judah considers to be not sufficiently proven and the second presents 48 unproven premises that underlie these views. All in all, these criticisms testify to a thorough examination of the Philosopher’s thought. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the sum total of the scattered critical comments in his survey of natural philosophy appears to be not very large, and not very incisive at that. On the basis of the list of unproven Aristotelian doctrines in the Introduction the reader of the mḥ might be led to expect that Judah will exploit each and every opportunity to criticize Aristotle’s teachings in the exposition that follows. This, however, is not the case. In his overview of philosophy we find a number of “doubts” or questions raised in regard of specific doctrines. Such doubts concern views listed in the first four treatises on natural philosophy,28 and in the zoological sections, where they pertain primarily to the controversy between Aristotle and Galen on anatomical and zoological issues.29 Some of Judah’s comments are directed at Averroes for whom, as Judah perceives it, Aristotle is “an angel of God.” Most of the doubts, however, are not addressed in detail, they are formulated very succinctly and point to inconsistencies or contradictions within Aristotle’s thought, whereas some have more the character 26 27 28 29

Chapter Two and Chapter Four, sections 2 and 3.1. For details, see Chapter Four. Chapter Four, section 1. Chapter Five.

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of “scholastic” annotations. Only on a few occasions does Judah venture a solution or an opinion of his own regarding these questions. In most cases, however, they do not contain a detailed treatment of the doctrine under consideration, but some serve to undermine the reliability and veracity of the Philosopher’s system. Moreover, there is hardly any correspondence between the items enumerated in the two lists and the “doubts” that Judah raises in his coverage of natural philosophy. Also, the observed lack of certainty in the philosopher’s thought does not sit well with the fact that in his explanation of biblical verses Judah is prepared to adopt many of Aristotle’s doctrines and with his claim in the Introduction that allusions to the two lower worlds (that of nature and that of the spheres) in biblical verses can be laid bare by the speculative faculty.30 How can we account for this state of affairs? Perhaps the key to an explanation lies in his comment on Prov. 3:30, “Do not quarrel with a man for no cause, when he has done you no harm.” He takes this verse to convey that one should not argue about something that “does not go against your religion.” This, I believe, is why Judah’s criticism focuses on one specific doctrine of Aristotle, that of the eternity of the world. Here, he insists, Aristotle was “ignorant and foolish,” a reference to Jer. 10:8, the continuation of which reads, “their doctrine is but delusion.” It is concerning this doctrine, he underlines, that Aristotle should be refuted as much as possible.31 He attacks it in his explanation of the section on the alien woman of Prov. 2:16, who speaks smooth words that are, however, false, which he links explicitly to “some of the words of Aristotle, on the eternity of the world.” His refutation consists of a syllogistic reasoning in which he argues that one of the premisses that Aristotle laid down in On the Heavens to prove the eternity of the heavenly body is false, which leads, in turn, to the conclusion that the eternity of this body cannot be proven.32 Although the argumentation is embedded in a more general attack that evinces epistemological skepticism vis-à-vis Aristotle’s thought as a whole and aims to demonstrate its unreliability, it is in particular this thesis that is the main target of Judah’s attack on Aristotelian philosophy. Apparently, other issues were less relevant to him once he had dismissed Aristotle’s methodology. This procedure is in line with his interpretation of Prov. 3:30—other doctrines were not really worth quarreling about. It is the topic of eternity vs creation that is the bone of contention.

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mḥ/Introd. 25. Here he uses the expression le-hakkot ʿal qadqod (lit. to hit on the head of someone or something), cf. Maimonides in Guide i.74, 7th proposition towards the end, tr. Pines 222 “to demolish,” cf. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique, 570. Chapter Six, section 2.

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As noted, Judah’s emphasis on this topic should be seen against the background of the Maimonidean controversy, as was the case with his statements on the Guide. He also alludes to contemporary discussions about the origin of the world, saying that Aristotle’s view found adherents among Jews, and that there were different interpretations of it, but leaves us in the dark as to who he has in mind.33 In Treatise 1 Judah unambiguously affirms creation ex nihilo. The connection with the controversy transpires from his use of the words kefirah (heresy) and hakhḥashat ha-dat (denial of religion). These two terms are key-terms in Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s Epistle of the Debate and appear at the beginning of the debate between the pietist and the scholar, who quarrel on what counts as heresy (or infidelity). The same verse adduced by Judah (Jer. 5:12, “They have denied the Lord”) emerges in the Epistle.34 As S. Harvey has shown, Falaquera’s treatise reflects the discussion of the 1230s, even though it was composed a few decades later.35 Viewed against this background Judah’s delineation of precisely what in Aristotle’s doctrine falls under kefirah is crucial: by believing in the eternity of matter Aristotle contradicts the biblical notion of beriʾah, which for Judah entails creation ex nihilo, but the philosopher cannot be charged with kefirah when he maintains that prime matter is a substrate for all existing things.36 This passage draws a clear line of demarcation between a view that can be accepted and one that cannot. The verbs kafar and kaḥash emerge again in the last section of his explanation of biblical verses. In his view, Prov. 30:8–9 exhorts us to steer a middle course between two extremes, that is, too little study (“poverty”) and too much study (“riches”). Laziness in studying leads to entertaining wrong opinions about God, such as ascribing corporeality to him, which comes down to “heresy,” whereas too much study qualifies as “denial.” Judah expands upon this piece of exegesis: Solomon asked that he be given to know the limit of speculation by the human intellect—there is an end to what man can know. It is perhaps no coincidence that in the last 23 lines of his biblical exegesis the verb darash, the verb that resonates in the very title of his work, Midrash haḤokhmah occurs seventeen times.37 This last section of the treatise, which is

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Chapter Six, section 4. Falaquera, Epistle of the Debate, ed. S. Harvey 1987, 58–60 (trans. 18–21), see in particular 59.21–60.2 (trans. 21). The jsb translation has: “They have been false to the Lord.” S. Harvey, “Falaquera’s ‘Epistle of the Debate’ and the Maimonidean Controversy,” 75– 76. Chapter Six, section 1. (iv). On the title, see below, section 5.

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also the end of the philosophical part of the encyclopedia, and can thus be viewed as a kind of climax, reveals as much concern on Judah’s part about the lack of philosophical study as about radical rationalization. Indeed, its very last line warns the reader for “what Aristotle did,” as well as for the belief in divisibility of God, which implies His corporeality.38 In sum, in his view Jews are permitted, even required to study non-Jewish science and hence they must be instructed in it, not only for polemical reasons so as to be able to refute claims raised by non-Jewish scholars, but also to buttress belief in God’s incorporeality. Yet at the same time they should be aware of the limitations and limits of this type of study. This position nicely reflects the description in his twofold motivation, and seems to have been the guidingprinciple in his own study of philosophy: seeking instruction in non-Jewish science and the same time determining “how far one can go.” His “burning fire” to study philosophy, then, went hand in hand with an eagerness to expose its weaknesses. Rather than rejecting the study of philosophy in toto Judah thus seeks to delineate its boundaries. This attempt should be viewed as a response to the challenge of his day, and thus as contributing to the contemporary debate about the permissibility and desirability of the study of philosophy.39 I shall now turn to the “external” level, that is, the distinction that Judah draws between Aristotle’s system as a whole (physical science and metaphysics) and “Jewish wisdom.” The relation between these two sets of wisdom is complex, as is already evidenced by the fact that he designates both as ḥokhmah. Therefore, to further assess his attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy, it is appropriate to consider his use of the terms ḥokhmah and ḥokhmah elohit. To begin with the term ḥokhmah, it can be said at once that Judah’s use of it is not free from ambiguity.40 It is used in the sense of “wisdom,” “philosophy,” “science,” and “discipline.” It is identified with daʿat of Prov. 1:7,41 and in mḥ/Physics

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Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1127–1130. It may be surmised that, when in Italy, Judah’s attitude towards Aristotelian philosophy was less negative than when he wrote his work in Toledo where this question was fiercely debated, but since we are not in a position to compare the Hebrew version to the original Arabic, it is impossible to know. See also the discussion in Chapter Two, section 3. The same can be said about its Arabic equivalent ḥikma, which in all probability was the term Judah used in the Arabic version of his work. On the Arabic term, see Goichon, “Al-ḥikma,” and Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 35 ff.; Encyclopedia of Islam 3 s.v. ḥikma. On the various meanings of the Hebrew term from biblical times onwards, see Sirat, “Deux mots de philosophie juive,” who also devotes a paragraph to Judah’s use of the term (p. 242). Ed. D. Goldstein, line 768. Cf. lines 622–623: Judah interprets Prov. 2:10 as saying that a man

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vii.4 it is the equivalent of yediʿah in Averroes’ mc Physics. It also stands for “science” or “scientific discipline,”42 especially when it is used in the plural, or in the construct state (as in ḥokhmat ha-limmudim, mathematical science). In sections where we have Judah’s Arabic sources we find that ḥokhmah renders both ʿilm and ḥikmah, whereas maddaʿ renders both ʿilm and ʿaql (see Glossary). The expression ḥokhmah simpliciter (that is, not in the construct state) in Scripture is taken by Judah to denote “divine science,” the highest of the three sciences.43 Various types of ḥokhmah can be distinguished: the ḥokhmah of the sophist is not that of the pious man (ḥasid).44 In other passages ḥokhmah appears to be the equivalent of filosofyah, as may be inferred from a passage in his presentation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Here we read that knowledge of the truth is called filosofyah, for the ultimate goal of theoretical knowledge ( yediʿah maḥshavit) is truth.45 Knowledge of the truth is attained by knowledge of the causes and principles of things, and since Judah qualifies knowledge of the principles of things as the end of ḥokhmah the two terms appear to be synonyms.46 Judah also reiterates Aristotle’s statement that philosophy is the most lofty science (as opposed to sophistry and dialectics), which is why it is rightfully called ḥokhmah. Apparently he endorses this claim, for he illustrates it by comparing philosophy to the capable woman whose praise is sung in Prov. 31:29, “Many women have done well, but you surpass them all.”47 Moreover, the twofold use of ḥokhmah as referring to both philosophical knowledge and religious knowledge comes to the fore in Judah’s assertion “the beginning of our wisdom (ḥokhmah) is the

42 43

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has ḥokhmah of something when he has gained knowledge of it. Here Judah uses the Arabic expression (in corrupt form) haẓharat nafsuhu bihā, and renders it by: she-nitʿaṣṣema nafsho bah, which apparently means something like: when it has been substantialized in his soul. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 248 and 712. Ibid., lines 509 ff., and mḥ/Introd. 19. Perhaps this echoes Maimonides’ view that the term ḥokhmah “used in an unrestricted sense” means the apprehension of God, Guide iii.54, tr. Pines 636; Ar. al-ḥikmah al-maqūlah bi-ʾ iṭlāq (p. 469), Hebr. trans. by Ibn Tibbon: ḥokhmah stam. For Maimonides’ use of “ḥokhmah” in combination with “Torah” in his Mishneh Torah, see Twersky, Introduction, 495–500. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 844–846. ms O 101r, cf. Arist., Metaph. 993b20. ms O 106v22–28, cf. Arist., Metaph. 1025b3–19. In another passage of the section on Metaphysics ḥokhmah, as “knowledge of the principles of existing things” (hiʾ yediʿat rashei ha-nimṣaʾin) appears to be the equivalent of sophia. ms O 111v, cf. Arist., Metaph. 1059a17 (beginning of Book xi). ms O 102v.

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end of his [= Aristotle’s] wisdom (ḥokhmah).”48 Yet when Judah asserts that it is important to refute Aristotle on the basis of his own ḥokhmah, the term clearly denotes philosophy.49 Turning now to the term ḥokhmah elohit, this expression, too, is used in a twofold sense. As an equivalent of Aristotle’s Metaphysics it is identified as “first philosophy” ( filosofyah rishonah). This is naturally the case when Judah renders Averroes’ words, but also when he speaks “in his own name.”50 In the Introduction it refers both to Aristotle’s Metaphysics but also to knowledge that transcends the realm of sense-perception and can only be grasped by revelation.51 Here ḥokhmah elohit is also qualified as “certain wisdom” (ḥokhmah waddaʾit), an appellation that refers to knowledge of the superior, immaterial world, knowledge that cannot be attained by the human intellect, put differently, not by philosophical speculation (sevara). Surprisingly, however, Judah supports this claim by invoking Aristotle’s statement in Metaphysics iii, according to which only the person who possesses this certain wisdom can be truly called “wise (ḥakham).”52 A somewhat similar twofold use of the term ḥokhmah elohit is found in the section on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet: the letter lamed is associated with the planet Saturn, the sphere of which points to divine wisdom. This, Judah explains, is manifested by the shape of the letter, with its top raised upwards, which is why Aristotle called the most important book of this science Lambda, and why the gemara is called taLMuD.53 Both metaphysics and traditional Talmudic learning are thus designated as ḥokhmah elohit. The terminological overlap notwithstanding it is important to mention that Judah often emphasizes the contrast between the two sets of divine wisdom. That the two types are not identical is also apparent from the phrase “our divine wisdom” in the passage in which he describes the motivation underlying his

48

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Treatise 1, ed. D. Goldstein, line 646. Septimus notes that David Kimhi in his correspondence with Judah al-Fakhar uses ḥokhmah to refer to philosophy (Hispano-Jewish Culture, 86). Ed. D. Goldstein, line line 675. See, for example, mḥ/Physics i.4: “what first form is will be explained in first philosophy,” and Treatise 1, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 534–535. The heading of his excerpt on the Metaphysics reads: The first treatise of divine wisdom, which is called Metaphysics. Chapter Two, section 3. mḥ/Introd. 17 (cf. above, Chapter Two, section 3), and in similar vein Treatise 1, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 532–533. ms O 189v.

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work.54 This type is the only certain wisdom; it is revealed only to Israel and relates to the wisdom of the nations as daylight to the light of a candle.55 The opposition between the two types of ḥokhmah elohit is pictured in other ways as well, one of which is the well-known image of different types of women. Whereas ḥokhmah elohit in the sense of philosophy, as the most lofty science in the hierarchy of sciences, was classified as “the capable woman” of Prov. 31 (cf. above), when contrasted with revelational wisdom it is identified with heresy through the image of “alien woman whose talk is smooth” of Prov. 5. Aristotle’s ḥokhmah is moreover associated with prostitution in Judah’s explanation of Num. 15:39 (“and that ye seek not after your own heart and your own eyes after which you use to go a whoring”56) at the very end of Treatise 1.57 Another image, found in the Introduction, is that of the inkstand: the occupation of the nations with the sciences can be compared to [the effort of] someone who embellishes an inkstand for a scribe and furnishes it with golden straps and the like, while forgetting to make a place for the ink, which after all is what an inkstand is for, put differently, it is the most essential part of it.58 Furthermore, the contrast between the two sets of knowledge is poignantly expressed in the aforementioned assertion that the “end of Aristotle’s wisdom is the beginning of our wisdom,” even though the same term (ḥokhmah) is used here for both types of wisdom.59 The same conviction is expressed in Treatise 1 where it introduces the refutation of Aristotle’s view on the world’s origin,60 and is reiterated in Treatise 3, which is devoted to the secrets (sodot) of Talmudic aggadot.61 Both passages convey that the net result of the study of the

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mḥ/Introd. 21 (cf. above, Chapter Two, section 4). mḥ/Introd. 17 (cf. above, Chapter Two, section 3). kjv translation. Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1127–1228, and cf. above, Chapter Six, n. 148. The association of the alien woman and prostitutes with heresy was also commonplace in the Latin world, see Ferrante, Woman as Image, 8 ff. and 21 ff. Introd. 25. The context is the study of divine science. I have not been able to find a parallel to this image in other texts. This assertion seems to be another variation of the well-known saying: “The first in thought is the last in action,” cf. S.M. Stern, “The first in thought.” Cf. above Chapter Six, section 2. “For we have already explained that the only result of the divine science of Aristotle is the existence of a prime mover who is incorporeal, and this is a first axiom with our infants, praised be God […] This is the end of his wisdom, whereas it is the beginning of what we teach an infant as soon as he begins to speak.” ms O 208v: “for the philosophers the end of apprehension is to provide a proof for the existence of God, His Unity, and that He is the first cause and the first existent of all that exists, and this is the beginning of our wisdom, for us who possess the holy Jewish religion.”

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philosophers’ books is very shallow indeed, an assessment that dovetails with the evaluation of Aristotle’s science in the mḥ’s Introduction.62 In that same treatise, towards the very end of the mḥ the difference between the science of Jewish revelation and the philosophers’ books is described with yet another set of terms: “root” or “principal” (ʿiqqar) as opposed to “secondary” (ṭafel):63 “Wake up, my brother from your sleep, hold fast unto the tree of life, our holy Torah, our heritage, and if you have studied in “bitter waters,”64 throw from the tree of life into them and they will turn sweet, and make our Torah into the root (ʿiqqar) and the books of the nations secondary (ṭafel), for they wrote them out of enmity.”65 This “wake-up call” brings to mind Judah’s second purpose in his motivation, namely that he composed his book in order to bring back to the Torah the person “who has exerted his thought and wasted his time on these books so that he will be redirected to the occupation with our holy and perfect Law.” Yet in this passage, towards the end of the book the tone is somewhat more hostile than in the introduction, for there we did not hear that the non-Jewish philosophers wrote their books “out of envy,” but rather that Jews could retrieve their lost wisdom from these books. The pairs of opposites employed by Judah clearly entail a value-judgement: Aristotelian divine science ranks lower than the superior traditional Jewish sci-

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mḥ/Introd. 14: When you study these books and occupy your thought with these sciences in order to acquire knowledge of everything that exists, from the beginning to the end, you will see in the end that you can attain knowledge of very few things only, even of those concerning the two worlds perceived by the senses: the world of the spheres and that of generation and corruption. As for the immaterial world, even if you know the text of the thirteen treatises of Aristotle on Metaphysics (ḥokhmah elohit), you will attain no more knowledge of that world than that there exists a Prime Mover, [who is the] Rock, one, living, and who is neither body nor force in a body, and that for each sphere there is a separate intellect. That is all you will learn concerning this world, if you occupy your thought with these treatises. (Tr. after Sirat, A History, 253). Cf. the similar evaluation in Treatise 1, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 658–659, see above Chapter Six, section 2. Here it is instructive to bring to mind Judah’s exposition on the rainbow; philosophy can explain the natural causes of the phenomenon, that is the material, formal and efficient cause, but not its first and final cause, which is the principal (ʿiqqar) cause, namely that it is the token of the covenant, see above Chapter Six, section 2. Interestingly, Judah also says with regard to Ptolemy that he omitted the ʿiqqar and treated the ṭafel, see Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 65. ms O 208v. The text has shanita, but the correct reading may well be shatita (drunk), alluding to Ex. 15:23. Ibid. Here he also repeats his judgment expressed in Treatise 1, according to which the relation of the knowledge of the two lower worlds as found in the philosophers’ books to that of the spiritual/immaterial wisdom is 1:3200, referring to the interpretation of Zecharya’s flying scroll in bEruvin 21a (above, Chapter Six, section 1 vi d).

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ence, and since this superior form of wisdom is given to Israel only, non-Jewish books are of limited value. So far the relation between the two sets of divine wisdom can be summarized as follows: Aristotle’s divine science yields some important knowledge about the immaterial world, notably that there is a first cause, who is an unmoved mover. But the existence of a first principle was already known from Jewish divine wisdom, and this wisdom moreover provides certain knowledge that philosophy cannot attain. Revelational divine science is therefore wisdom that is more valuable than Aristotle’s divine science. Compared to Jewish wisdom, that of Aristotle is inferior and secondary. Judah’s imagery and terminology gives rise to the impression that his attitude towards Aristotle’s thought on this “external level” is more dismissive than that described for the first “internal level” in the domain of natural philosophy. This impression seems to be corroborated by the fact that, unlike the précis of natural science, the outline of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is not interrupted by critical remarks. The only critical observation is found in his coverage of Treatise 1, where Judah points to a contradiction with On the Generation of Animals xv (cf. Chapter Four, section 1.xxii). It is only towards the end of his outline that he, rather out of the blue, contrasts the Aristotelian treatise to “Jacob’s inheritance” (cf. above, Chapter Six, section 2), thereby suggesting that the Metaphysics as a whole can be dispensed with. Does this amount to a complete rejection of Aristotle’s “divine science”? This is not necessarily the case. To further define Judah’s attitude towards nonJewish philosophy, we have to raise the question what in Judah’s view constitutes Jewish divine wisdom, or more precisely: what is the surplus of this type of wisdom over that of Aristotle? Unfortunately, Judah does not provide much information on the contents and nature of “our divine knowledge.” He defines it as qabbalah, which is handed down orally from the mouth of the Force.66 It cannot be learned from books; one learns its chapter headings from a ḥakham mequbal.67 As noted, in Judah’s parlance, qabbalah denotes traditional revealed knowledge as opposed to knowledge attained by syllogistic reasoning and philosophical speculation (sevara).68 C. Sirat already observed that the mḥ does not reveal any trace of sefirotic qabbalah.69 It is true that in his biblical exegesis he distinguishes, 66 67 68 69

Ed. D. Goldstein, line 771. Ibid., line 875. See above, Chapter Two, section 3. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 50 and n. 23.

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alongside a literal and an allegorical sense, a third sense in the Book Proverbs, namely “a secret (sod) from the sitrei Torah that has not appeared to philosophers,” but references to these secrets are not very prominent in his interpretations of biblical verses.70 It is also true that he professes belief in metempsychosis, and he even calls it “a principle of our religion” at the end of his survey of On Generation and Corruption. This kabbalistic doctrine is found also in Sefer ha-Bahir, and in Judah’s contemporaries, Nachmanides and the kabbalist R. Azriel of Gerona (d. 1238).71 Yet in the case of Judah ha-Cohen, the idea seems to be more inspired by his astrological beliefs than by kabbalistic propensities.72 Kabbalistic or mystical leanings are also detectable in his explanation of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet in Treatise 2 (on which more below). There can be little doubt that the divine knowledge of the revelational type is knowledge about God and the upper world. Judah’s reluctance to disclose what precisely it entails is in line with his contention in the introduction that one of his aims was to provide “hints about our divine science.” In one passage in Treatise 1 where the subject of discussion is the proper order of learning, an order that culminates in the study of divine wisdom, he seems to imply that it is maʿaseh merkavah (“the work of the Chariot”), but even here the exact meaning is unclear as Jewish philosophers use this term to denote Aristotle’s metaphysics, and therefore it does not necessarily refer to revelational wisdom here.73 C. Sirat is probably right in opining that the three treatises appended to the two scientific parts convey this traditional divine knowledge, that is, his musings about the explanation of biblical verses, of the letters of the Hebrew

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Chapter Six, section 4. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 112 and 171, n. 68. Judah mentions Sefer Bahir in Treatise 3 (ms O 206v), see above Chapter Three, section 1.3. Septimus has analyzed the attitude of Judah’s teacher Ramah to qabbalah, and concluded that Ramah is a “nonkabbalistic anti-rationalist” (Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 111). In this regard he quotes G. Scholem, who held that “Ramah’s use of ‘qabbalah’ was the very opposite of the esoteric sense given it by the kabbalists,” (ibid. 169 n. 37; in Scholem, Ursprung und Anfänge, 359 n. 85: “schnurstracks entgegengesezt”). Septimus concedes, however, that the relation Kabbalah and philosophy is complex, and that “divine science plays a central and structural role in the pursuit of spirituality” for both philosophers and kabbalists (Hispano-Jewish Culture, 111). Ed. D. Goldstein, lines 594–596. The reference is to b Ḥag14a: R. Joḥanan offered R. Elazar to teach him “the work of the chariot,” but R. Elazar answered, “I am not old enough.” Judah interprets the passage as teaching that one must first master other sciences before embarking on divine science. For the parallel with Guide i.34, see above Chapter Six, section 4.

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alphabet, and about Talmudic aggadot.74 This suggestion is corroborated by the placement of his précis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the mḥ. As noted, this section is not found after the survey of mathematics where one would expect it on the basis of Judah’s outline of the philosophers’ classification of the sciences, but instead after his survey of natural philosophy. The mḥ’s survey of mathematics is not followed by one on metaphysics, but by Treatises 2 and 3 (See Chapter Two, section 3). The placement of these treatises therefore suggests that they should be taken to constitute an alternative and, more importantly, a superior “divine wisdom,” one that is not the same as Aristotle’s. Yet the situation is a bit different for Treatise 1, for many of Judah’s explanations of biblical verses are in fact in congruence with Aristotelian doctrines, which would imply that not all the contents of this treatise fall under the type of divine knowledge that Judah contrasts with Aristotle’s thought. Nonetheless, on a few occasions in this treatise does Judah refer to “the secrets of the Torah” or hints to a hidden meaning by saying: “and he who understands will understand.”75 In Sirat’s view, a long passage at the end of Treatise 1 is more explicit on the contents of divine science than others.76 This passage, which was discussed above (Chapter Six, 1 vi d) concerns the limits of divine science: it conveys that the prophets differed with respect to the degree that they could attain in this science; a complete mastery of it was withheld even from Moses (who was put “in the cleft of the rock”, that is, he received the limit of what can be attained by the human intellect), whereas Solomon realized that he could not know the exact arrangement of the celestial world or the way in which the heavens influence the terrestrial world. The upshot of that discussion is that Aristotle’s explanations of these matters are not sufficient and that reason falls short of grasping them; but Israel’s prophets acquired some knowledge of this science. On the basis of this section Sirat suggests that for Judah divine science is about the knowledge of the names of the separate intellects and the relations between the existents of the higher world and the spheres, as well as those between the spheres and the lower world.77 In the second treatise, on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, which is in fact a mixture of cosmology, astronomy, astrology, ethics and biblical exegesis, Judah intimates that more about the relations between the various realms can

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Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 46. Chapter Six, section 4. Sirat, “La qabbale,” 198–201. The passage that Sirat translates (on the basis of ms V) corresponds to ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1040–1093. Sirat, “La qabbale,” 201.

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be learned from the inner meaning of the Hebrew letters.78 In the introduction to the mḥ he explains that he included this treatise because it had occurred to “some” that the Hebrew letters are devoid of meaning, and that they are but signs for the composition of words and for speech. Quite the contrary, the author insists, many great meanings may be derived from their number, order, names and forms. In fact, everything that exists can be explained through these letters, from the beginning until the end, for him who will understand.79 He reiterates this view at the beginning of Treatise 2, saying that the explanation of the letters is a secret of the secrets contained in Scripture, and he who knows it with a perfect knowledge, will know everything that exists from beginning to the end.80 Interestingly, the phrase “from the beginning to the end” also occurs in the Introduction with regard to Aristotle’s philosophy, where Judah claims: “When you study these books and occupy your thought with these sciences in order to acquire knowledge of everything that exists, from the beginning to the end, you will see in the end that you can attain knowledge of very few things only […]” (mḥ/Introd. 14). I tend to assume that the use of this expression in the passages concerning the letters of the Hebrew alphabet is not coincidental: Judah consciously contrasts the paucity of knowledge that results from studying Aristotle’s philosophy to the complete knowledge that can be attained by traditional Jewish learning. The implication is that the latter is superior to the former, and that the knowledge hidden in the Hebrew letters indeed constitutes an alternative to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Judah claims, however, that what he himself has understood of it is only a small portion of it, “like a drop from the ocean.”81 Whereas Treatise 2 is clearly connected to the subject matter of the scientific second part of the mḥ, dealing as it does with astronomy and astrology, the 78

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For treatise 2, see Sirat, “La qabbale” and 1981, “L’explication.” “Some Remarks.” According to Langermann (“Some Remarks,” 381), it is the “logical next step in Judah’s program,” see also 378–379 and 385–387. On this treatise, see now Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 38 ff. Garshtein notes that this section deserves a more extensive study. mḥ/Introd. 27. Interestingly, his contemporary Isaac Ibn Latif is of the opinion that “those who wish to explain the secrets of the intelligible world by the letters of the alphabet are victims of their own imagination” (Sirat, A History, 257). Does this difference of opinion reflect a debate between the two Toledan authors? In this respect it is noteworthy that Ibn Latif explicitly rejects the doctrine of transmigration of souls, cf. Heller-Wilensky, “Isaac Ibn Laṭif,” 220. ms O 187v. ms O 188r. These expressions are also employed in Judah’s appraisal of the knowledge of the philosophers: the knowledge that they have attained of the immaterial word is “a drop from the ocean,” yet it certainly not “a small matter” for someone who was unaided by revelation, cf. mḥ/Introd. 16.

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relation between science and Treatise 3 is less transparent. Devoted to Talmudic aggadot, Judah classifies it as belonging to the “secrets.” When describing its contents in the introduction he said that it treats Divine Unity and other matters. The first part of the treatise presents a long portion from Ḥagigah, and then provides shorter sections from the tractates (in this order) Rosh ha-Shanah, Pesaḥim, Yoma, Menaḥot, Yevamot, Ketubbot, Nedarim, Qiddushin, Soṭah, ʿEruvin and Bava Batra. In a sense it is connected to Treatise 1, since the common denominator is the correct interpretation of traditional texts, but here the subject is the interpretation of Talmudic stories, not biblical verses. The interpretation of Talmudic aggadot posed problems for Judah and, more generally, for Ramah’s circle, because, taken literally, many aggadic stories were perceived as problematic in that they seem to ascribe corporeality to God.82 The themes treated in the excerpts are roughly creation, angels, the heavens, the world to come, Moses’ prophecy, the name of God, and the heavenly journey. Occasionally he hints at a secret explanation that he does not wish to divulge, saying that the secrets of divine science cannot be written down, but must be “transferred from the heart” from one person to another.83 He also expresses the view that in the time of the Rabbis the explanation of these stories was a glorious science (ḥokhmah mefoʾarah, cf. bTaʿanit 7a) that was hidden from those who were not worthy.84 On the whole, however, Judah does not seem to add many comments on the excerpts. Once he interrupts his presentation by noting that one should not conceive of an angel as a soul-faculty, nor as the active intellect, in other words, not in a philosophical manner.85 His main observations are found at the introduction and at the end of the treatise under consideration, and can be summarized as follows: the aggadot in these tractates should not be understood literally, yet they contain secrets that cannot be learned from Aristotle’s books, and were revealed only to Israel. Their contents are therefore utterly distinct from the contents of Aristotle’s books. To understand them one needs hidden (lit.: profound) premises that are transmitted orally in a tradition that goes back to Moses.86 The treatise ends on the exhortation to strive for “fear of God,”

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On this topic, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, Chapter v, and Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, especially Chapter i. ms O 207r. ms O 206v. At the end of the excerpt from Menaḥot, ms O 205v. ms O 198v. It is here that Judah expresses the view that whoever tries to explain these secrets with the help of Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics is like someone who wishes to crown a great king with a crown of clay, cf. above, section 2.

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for without it the secrets of divine wisdom cannot be known.87 We recall that in his explanation of biblical verses Judah also postulated the fear of God as a condition for the study of the sciences in general (Chapter Six, section 1.vi). Fear of God is thus a prerequisite for studying both types of science. Unfortunately, the treatise on Talmudic aggadot has not yet been the subject of an in-depth investigation, and the same applies, albeit to a lesser extent, to Treatise 2.88 For a more precise understanding of Judah’s concept of ḥokhmah elohit and its contents, as well as for its possible connection to nascent mystical or kabbalistic ideas we will therefore have to wait until these two treatises have been explored in detail. Nonetheless, what emerges from the above considerations is that in Judah’s view, revelational divine science comprises knowledge of the upper world and its relation to the lower worlds that cannot be learned from Aristotle’s books. Indications to it can be found in the inner meaning of some biblical verses, in Talmudic aggadot and in the hidden meaning of the Hebrew alphabet. A basic feature of it is the connection between the letters of the alphabet with the three worlds (cf. below section 4). This ḥokhmah in the sense of a lofty spiritual wisdom, true wisdom, goes beyond ḥokhmah in the sense of philosophy, and since it is based on revelation it offers more than philosophy can do, namely certain knowledge. It is superior also in the sense that it was known already to Jews, who did not have to toil to acquire philosophical knowledge. At the same time, one cannot help noticing that the two types of divine science are inextricably bound up with each other, for Jewish divine science presupposes and comprehends the subject matter of philosophical knowledge even though it transcends it. The extent to which Aristotle’s philosophy and traditional wisdom are intertwined comes to the fore in those assertions where Judah supports a claim concerning revelational divine science with the help of an Aristotelian view, a procedure that at first sight seems contradictory. I recall that the statement in the Introduction, according to which he who knows divine science is a ḥakham waday is backed up by a reference to Aristotle in Treatise iii of “that science” (= Metaphysics).89 Similarly, at the beginning of Treatise 3 Judah states that once one has learned the (hidden) premises of divine science, it will not be difficult to remove one doubt by means of one premise, for Aristotle taught in On Generation and Corruption i that the corruption (disappearance) of one thing is the very generation of another. Judah again invokes Aristotle’s authority when acknowledging that it was Maimonides who 87 88 89

ms O 209r. See above, n. 77. mḥ/Introd. 17.

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kindled in him “a raging fire.” Quoting Aristotle’s statement in Metaphysics i to the effect that one must acknowledge one’s debt to one’s predecessors even if these contributed only a little, he exclaims: “how much more must we, who possess the holy religion be thankful to those who helped us.”90 Given this interconnectedness, Judah’s attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy can certainly not be viewed in terms of a wholesale rejection. To be sure, he is ambivalent towards the value of non-Jewish learning, but his ambivalence can be characterized more in terms of an “and-and” attitude than as an “eitheror.” Although some of his comments have the effect of belittling the value of non-Jewish learning, somewhat paradoxically he needs this learning in order to raise the intellectual level of his fellow-Jews to that of the non-Jewish world and at the same time to demonstrate the superiority of Jewish knowledge. Thus, in order to prove the superiority of Jewish tradition studying non-Jewish science is not only legitimate, it is required. What is rejected is non-Jewish science as a source of authority, not its study as such. A comparison of the wisdom of the nations with received wisdom shows that the Torah encompasses all scientific knowledge, in particular about the upper world, and has thus more to offer than Aristotle. One needs the tradition to acquire knowledge about prophetic metaphysics, not the philosophers’ metaphysics. By showing the surplus of traditional learning Judah fullfils his promise to revert to the Torah those who have lost their way in studying the sciences. This will make the “bitter waters” sweet. In sum, Aristotelian philosophy and revelation are not completely exclusive epistemological spheres for Judah. Judah’s attitude towards philosophy brings to mind that of Judah Halevi in the Kuzari. There are indeed several similarities between the two Judah’s. Both authors contrast the uncertainties of Aristotle’s metaphysics to the certainty of mathematical science (Kuzari v.14). In that passage Halevi states that the philosophers’ proofs in the domain of logic and mathematics should not lead one to believe that their proofs concerning matters physical and metaphysical are demonstrative. This conviction has a parallel in the mḥ’s statement that the philosophers think that they can attain knowledge of the three worlds, including the higher world, on the basis of sevara (Introd. 16), which is impossible: since there is no analogy between the physical and non-physical worlds there cannot be decisive philosophical demonstration in the realm of the higher world.91 Both Judah Halevi and Judah ha-Cohen maintain that the philoso-

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ms O 144v–145r; cf. Arist. Metaph. ii 993b11–19. See Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary (2002), 116–119.

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phers overreach themselves.92 Also, both thinkers claim the superiority of the Hebrew language (Kuzari ii.67ff.). Like Judah ha-Cohen, Halevi, too, makes certain allowances for Aristotle: had he known Jewish tradition, he would have believed in creation (Kuzari i.65 and cf. iv.13).93 Therefore, as several scholars have argued, Halevi’s attitude towards philosophers displays a certain ambivalence, for he was clearly attracted to several of their views and recognized the value of the use of reason. According to H. Kreisel, “Halevi’s work is in a crucial sense as much an intellectual grappling with philosophy as a polemic against it.”94 Much the same can be said about Judah ha-Cohen’s work. In both the Kuzari and the mḥ we thus have to do with a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s thought and therefore, despite their critique, these works both belong to the Aristotelian tradition in Jewish thought. Returning to the statement that the philosophers overreach themselves, the author of the mḥ does apparently not take into consideration Maimonides’ assertion that the insufficiency of the human intellect was recognized by the philosophers.95 This is somewhat surprising, for Judah’s reservation with respect to knowledge of the immaterial world comes close to Maimonides’ epistemological skepticism vis-à-vis Aristotle’s expositions on celestial physics, expressed in Guide ii.22.96 Yet he goes beyond Maimonides in that he does not accept the latter’s position in the same chapter, according to which everything that Aristotle had taught regarding the sublunary world is “indubitably correct,”97 a view that Maimonides reiterates in Guide ii.24, saying that “all that Aristotle states about that which is beneath the sphere of the moon is in accordance with reasoning.”98 Elsewhere Maimonides notes that in divine matters there are numerous things about which there is perplexity, but “few in matters pertaining to natural science.”99 Caution is required, though, for in modern scholarship there is no consensus on Maimonides’ true position regarding the

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Abraham Ibn Daud, a pre-Maimonidean thinker who defends the study of philosophy, also criticizes the philosophers for thinking that they can know everything, cf. Ha-Emunah haramah ii.4.3, ed. Eran, 502–504. A similar sentiment is expressed by Falaquera, Epistle, ed. S. Harvey, 77.12, tr. 47 (on the issue of miracles), and later, in the controversy of 1305, by Abba Mari, cf. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 162, n. 150 (on creation). Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” 34. Guide i.71, tr. Pines 180. As is well known, Maimonides declares that Aristotle himself knew that the eternity of the world could not be demonstratively proven, Guide ii. 15. Tr. Pines 320, and cf. Guide ii.3, tr. Pines 254. Tr. Pines 319. Cf. above, Chapter 4, section 2.2. Tr. Pines 326. Guide i.31, tr. Pines 66.

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limits of the intellect nor on the question whether his critical epistemology also includes terrestrial physics.100 Therefore, and since we do not know how Judah understood Maimonides’ view on the veracity of knowledge of the sublunar world, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which he differed from Maimonides in this respect. What is clear is that he does not accept the claim that Aristotle provided certain knowledge about the physical world. Quite the contrary, he considers only a handful of Aristotle’s claims on the physical world to be proven (Chapter Four). How does Judah’s reservation vis-à-vis the validity of Aristotle’s philosophy relate to that of other thirteenth-century thinkers? In the aforementioned Epistle of the Debate, which reflects the controversy of the 1230s, Falaquera has his scholar say, “I know that what the philosophers apprehend of the divine science and the natural science is very little and that there are some doubts about even this little.”101 In the same vein, this authors writes in the Introduction to Part 2 of his Deʿot ha-Filosofim: “Philosophers have many opinions concerning physics which contradict some of the teachings of the Torah” (and here he refers explicitly to the issue of eternity) and that most of what they maintain in metaphysics is conjecture (omed).102 Similarly, Judah’s Toledan contemporary Isaac ibn Latif challenges Aristotle’s physical system, and like Judah, this author is concerned with the limits of reason and with the question how “true knowledge” can be obtained. Ibn Latif, too, expresses skepticism vis-à-vis the philosopher’s method since it is based on sevara, the term also used by Judah, and he launches incisive criticism at Aristotelian doctrines. Ibn Latif expresses his attitude towards philosophy in a parable in Shaʿar ha-shamayim that describes three visitors who come to visit a

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These complex questions are discussed extensively by Davidson, Fraenkel, W.Z. Harvey, Ivry, Kraemer, Langermann, and J. Stern in a dedicated Forum, entitled “Maimonides on the Knowability of the Heavens and of their Mover. Guide 2:24” in Aleph 2008. On the question of the limitation of the intellect, see the classic study by Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge.” For Maimonides’ own “doubts,” see W.Z. Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics, 59–60. Tr. S. Harvey, 36; Hebrew text 70.18–20. See also 74.18–21 (tr. 43). For the text and translation of the passage, see Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 85–86. On Falaquera’s critical attitude towards Maimonides’ praise of Aristotle, see S. Harvey, “Did Maimonides’ Letter,” 63–64. In his commentary on the Guide ii.22 Falaquera challenges Maimonides’ statement concerning the reliability of Aristotle’s physics, adducing several doctrines on which Aristotle’s commentators were divided, cf. ed. Schiffman 2001, 272–282, especially lines 78–81 and 290–293. Falaquera’s reasoning in these last lines resembles that of Judah: if the human intellect falls short of attaining knowledge concerning sensible things, how much more is this the case with immaterial things.

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magnificent building and wished to understand how it was made.103 The building stands for the world and the visitors represent three types of students with different levels of knowledge: 1) the Talmudic scholar; 2) the philosopher whose knowledge is based on sense-perception, and 3) the one who derives his knowledge from the craftsman of the building, and this is prophetic knowledge. Yet as is the case with Judah, Ibn Latif’s evaluation of the insufficiency and flaws of philosophical knowledge does not entail a complete rejection of philosophy. Instead, it exposes its weaknesses and argues that additional methods are necessary for attaining certain knowledge. Unlike Judah ha-Cohen’s, however, Ibn Latif’s criticism of Aristotle’s system does not seem to be based on a perusal of Averroes’ commentaries, but rather on the works of Al-Farabi and Avicenna, and of course on Maimonides’ exposition of Aristotelian views.104 In a careful study, Y.T. Langermann has qualified Nachmanides’ attitude towards science as one of “acceptance and devaluation”.105 A close comparison with the writings of Nachmanides, which is outside the scope of the present study, could reveal whether or to what extent Judah’s stance differs from that of the philosopherkabbalist-biblical commentator from Girona. In general, however, in the history of medieval Jewish critique of Aristotle by Sephardic authors Judah can be viewed as standing halfway between Halevi, compared to whom the criticism in the mḥ is more extensive, and Crescas, compared to whom it is more basic (Chapter Four, section 2.2).

4

The Three Worlds

A salient feature of Judah’s compilation is the recurrence of the theme of the three worlds and their relation to the various sciences. Right at the beginning of the mḥ we are informed that the division of all existence into three worlds corresponds to the philosophers’ division of the sciences in three parts, with divine

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For this parable found in Shaʿar ha-shamayim i, chapter 3, and more generally Ibn Latif’s criticism, see Zimran Philosophy, Tradition, and Esoterica. Like Judah’s parable in his Treatise 1 (cf. above, Chapter Six, vi d) the “building-parable” of Ibn Latif was in all probability inspired by Maimonides’ parable of the palace in Guide iii.51. For Ibn Latif’s sources, see Zimran, Philosophy, Tradition, and Esoterica. Introduction, section 4.1. One of Ibn Latif’s objectives seems to have been to harmonize philosophy and Kabbalah. Sirat (A History, 256) contends that “Ibn Latif’s critique of Aristotelian science is as fundamental as that of Judah ha-Cohen, although it is vaguer.” Heller-Wilensky (“Isaac Ibn Laṭif,” 191) is of the opinion that “Ibn Latif to a certain degree marks the beginning of the anti-Aristotelian trend which culminates in the philosophy of Ḥasdai Crescas.” Langermann, “Acceptance and Devaluation.”

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science corresponding to the upper, immaterial world. Mathematical science and natural science are associated with the world of the spheres and the world of generation and corruption respectively. Even though his views about this theme are presented in a fragmentary manner, his pervasive usage of it can be considered to be innovative. To be sure, the notion of the division of the sciences into three parts is found in numerous other Arabic and Hebrew texts.106 The idea of a tripartite structure of the universe, too, is certainly not new with Judah ha-Cohen. It is found in various Arabic and Hebrew texts, and was used also by kabbalistic authors. In his study on Nissim Ibn Malka G. Vajda observed, “Les spéculations grécoarabes et juives sur les “mondes” mériteraient une monographie.”107 To the best of my knowledge, such a comprehensive study on the origin and development of this idea has not yet been carried out; yet we can point to some parallels with other authors in Judah’s environment. Maimonides writes that the existents that are below the Creator are divided into three parts: the separate intellects, the bodies of the spheres, and the bodies that are subject to generation and corruption.108 He does, however, refer to “parts,” not to “worlds.” In contrast, a tripartite division into three worlds is found in the biblical commentaries of both Abraham Ibn Ezra and David Kimhi.109 These commentators do not use Judah’s term ha-ʿolam ha-ruḥani but instead ha-ʿolam ha-ʿelyon.110 The motif of three worlds (ha-ʿolam ha-ʿelyon, ha-ʿolam ha-emṣaʿi, ha-ʿolam ha-shafel) plays a pivotal role in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Ḥayy ben Meqiṣ, where it is connected with the protagonist’s journey and the ascent of the soul.111 The theme figures promi-

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109 110 111

Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie, 163 and Wolfson, “The Classification of the Sciences,” 295; Klatzkin, Thesaurus, s.v. ḥokhmah. Vajda, Juda ben Nissim Ibn Malka, 95–98. Vajda lists some of the authors and works in which the idea is found. Incidentally, it may be remarked that Vajda used the same expression “qui mériterait une monographie” à propos Judah ha-Cohen’s mḥ, see his review of Tocci’s Ph.D. in rej 1964, 221. Guide ii.11, tr. Pines 274–275, cf. also the end of ii.10 (tr. Pines 273), where Maimonides relates this structure to the rabbinic saying in Bereshit Rabba x, according to which the angels (which are identified with the separate intellects) constitute the third part of the world. Ibn Ezra in his explanation of Ex. 3:15 (long version) and Ex. 25:7 (short version); David Kimhi in his explanation of Isa. 6:3. Sermoneta (Un Glossario, 83) notes that the term ha-ʿolam ha-ruḥani is not found in Tibbonid-Maimonidean terminology. On Ibn Ezra’s treatise, see Hughes, “The Three Worlds.” The importance of the theme in Judah’s work was already recognized by D. Goldstein: “The tripartite system recurs again and again in his work, and it is the basis for his attitude to science, pedagogics and the nature of man” (“The Commentary,” 203).

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nently also in the works of Judah’s contemporaries Isaac ibn Latif112 and Jacob Anatoli. In the latter’s Malmad ha-Talmidim the notion of three worlds is found, for example, within the context of learning and harkening to God’s voice (117v– 118r) and in relation to Matan Torah and the commandments and (122v–123r).113 Yet given its persistent use throughout the mḥ it would seem that the notion of the three worlds is more pronounced in Judah ha-Cohen’s thought than in any of these authors. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the theme serves as a Leitmotiv in the work since it emerges at regular intervals in his encyclopedia.114 In the Introduction it forms the starting-point for his exposition on the classification of the sciences and the hierarchical structure of the universe; for Judah’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy and more generally for his appreciation of non-Jewish science, and for his distinction between two sets of “divine knowledge.” In the Introduction the author moreover mentions biblical verses that in his view refer to the three worlds.115 These notions recur in other sections of the work, to begin with the treatise on biblical exegesis, where the theme is most prominent.116 Here too, it emerges right at the beginning of the treatise. In his comments on Genesis it is linked with the concepts of emanation, light, and providence. A bit later, when commenting on verses from Proverbs, it features in the context of the acquisition of knowledge: the hierarchy of the sciences, the order of learning, man’s perfection, and the limit of study, and also in relation with criticism of Aristotle’s methodology. The next time the theme occurs is in Part 2, the section on astrology, and here again we find it in the opening lines.117 The context is emanation, the prob-

112

113 114 115 116 117

See for example Shaʿar ha-shamayim i, chapter 9. In this work the world of the spheres is also referred to as “the middle world” (Zimran, Philosophy, Tradition, and Esoterica, 43), whereas the upper world is usually referred to as ha-ʿolam ha-ʿelyon. S. Heller-Wilensky (“Isaac Ibn Laṭif,” 204) notes that Ibn Latif identifies the upper immaterial world with the sefirot. For the significance of the number 3, see Weber, Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim, 230. See Fontaine, “The Theme of the Three Worlds.” In what follows I draw on that article. See Chapter Two, section 3. See Chapter Six, section 1 (i). This section was published by J. Spiro under the title Otot ha-Shamayim (Warsaw 1886). This part of Judah’s work enjoyed a certain popularity, for it was copied several times separately, see below, Introd. to the edition, section 1. For a study of this section and the incomplete state of the 1886-edition, see now Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 53ff. For the notion of the three worlds, see ibid. 34 n. 68.

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lem of evil and human suffering, and the question how astral determination can be reconciled with free will. Suffering is for the good, Judah asserts, for it leads man to examine his actions, so that he be worthy of the higher world, which is the highest good. Here we learn that the upper world is the root or principal (ʿiqqar), whereas that of man is secondary (ṭafel), a distinction, we recall, that Judah also drew with respect to the relation between the Torah and non-Jewish books (see above, section 3). In Treatise 2 the motif of the three worlds plays a central role, for it forms the basis of Judah’s speculations on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Again, Judah brings it up at the beginning of the treatise. The 27 letters (22 consonants plus the five final forms) can be divided into three groups of nine letters (units, tens, hundreds), each group relating to one of the three worlds, in descending order, going from the more simple to the more compound. In his musings about the various letters, his explanation of the lamed (associated with the planet Saturn) is of particular importance: because of its upper stroke, it stands, so to say erect for the higher world and higher learning, Jewish (Talmud) and non-Jewish (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book L).118 As such it is opposed to the letter qof, the downward stroke of which points to the lower world. Judah moreover connects the acrostic aleph-yod-qof to the three worlds.119 Immediately after Treatise 2 the motif appears yet again, this time within the framework of anti-Christian polemics. Judah refutes an otherwise unnamed scholar who raised the question how Jews could be the Chosen People and a holy nation given what this scholar regarded as “the accidental existence” of Israel and its observed status of servitude.120 In his rebuttal Judah employs the notion of the three worlds: the non-Jewish scholar would be right, he argues, if all that exists were only this world of generation and corruption, that is, this lower world. However, this lower world compares to the waste in a body where the lower parts serve the higher ruling parts. It is true that the nations have dominion over Israel in this world, but Israel’s proper domain is the upper world. It is a matter of justice that the nations should have dominion in this world, since the higher world is given to Israel. This upper world is like the inner sanctum of a palace, for which Israel must prepare in this world, Judah maintains, invoking the saying in mAvot 4:16, “Prepare thyself in the vestibule,

118 119

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Cf. above, preceding section. Tr. Sirat (“L’explication,” 41): “Aristote a appelé le livre ou il parle de la science divine lambda car touts les autres livres sont la voie qui y mène, et le livre lambda est la base sur laquelle est batie toute sa métaphysique.” ms O 195v–196r. On this disputation, see Sirat, “À la cour de Frédéric ii Hohenstaufen” and Fontaine, “Religious polemics.”

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so that you may enter in the banqueting-hall.” Put differently, the lowly status of the Jews is only temporary. At this point it is important to note that in countering his opponent’s claim, Judah strikes an eschatological note, namely by referring to the world to come in which the roles will be reversed. In a certain sense, Judah’s speculations about the upper spiritual world come to a climax here. In Treatise 1 he had associated this world with “light,” describing it with a rabbinic expression as “the world that is wholly light and well-balanced.”121 Then, in Treatise 2, in his exegesis of Isa. 64:3, he interprets the letter zayn as referring to the ziv ha-shekhinah (the splendor of God’s presence) that the righteous will see in the world to come. The highest of the three worlds is identified here with the world to come, which will be illuminated by the shekhinah, unlike the situation in this world, which is illuminated only by the sun. Put differently, here the cosmologicalontological scheme of the three worlds assumes a temporal dimension, and this line of thought is pursued in the religious disputation, where the upper world is definitely conceived of in a temporal sense, as the world to come. The turn to the temporal aspect and the equation of the upper world with the world to come seems to be no coincidence. Before engaging in the disputation, Judah had presented an astrologically based Messianic calculation, according to which Messianic redemption was to be expected in 1260. This computation is based on an interpretation of Jewish history in terms of the reign of the planets, in particular Saturn, and on the counting of the yovelot. As C. Sirat already pointed out, 1260 was also the year which the famous Christian visionary, Joachim of Fiore (1132–1202), had assumed to mark the beginning of a new era, the last of the the three “status,” or ages in history, one that would belong to the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit.122 This “new age” would be characterized by spirituality and a life of contemplation as well as by conversion of Jews and Muslims. It would be an age of spiritual enlightenment in which mankind would be led by “spiritual men.” Joachim’s ideas became wide-spread after his death, and gave rise to much religious turmoil and fervor, especially after 1240. Given that Judah worked in a Christian environment, it can hardly be assumed that he would have been unaware of the ideas that circulated in the Christian world, and all the more so since his patron, Frederick ii was a central figure in contemporary Messianic speculations. Recently, I.J. Yuval has pointed to the possible influence of Joachimite ideas in an anony121 122

bQidd 39b. For an exposition of Joachim’s ideas, see the literature mentioned in n. 41 in Fontaine, “The Theme of the Three Worlds”. For a comparison between some notions advanced by Joachim and kabbalistic doctrines, see Scholem Ursprung und Anfänge, 410ff.

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mous Hebrew text that divided history into three stages and predicted the coming of the Messiah for 1240.123 As for Judah ha-Cohen, Y.T. Langermann has aptly noted that the year 1260 “was dangerously close to the publication of the Hebrew version of the mḥ,” (1247) and he raises the question whether the work was perhaps meant to prepare the Jews for a new era of enlightenment.124 This suggestion is appealing. As we have seen, Judah attaches great importance to the acquisition of knowledge and he associates the upper world with light. The theme of “light” emerges on several occasions in his biblical exegesis. However, if this hypothesis is correct, it would seem to apply only to the Hebrew version, unless we assume that Judah was familiar with Joachim’s theories already when he studied in Toledo and drafted the Arabic version. This possibility cannot be ruled out, but in my view, his main concern in the 1230s was the question of the legitimacy of the study of philosophy in view of the Maimonidean controversy. As I argued above, his contribution in this debate consisted in defining the extent to which the study of philosophy was acceptable for Jews. Although the theme of the three worlds played an important part in determining his position in the controversy, we cannot know when and how his speculations about the three worlds and their relation to the sciences developed. It is therefore conceivable that at some point his views on the subject received a further impetus by Joachim’s theories once he became acquainted with them, and this could well explain the transition from the use of the motif as a cosmological, ontological, and epistemological concept to that in a temporal sense. The need for a new computation may have become particularly urgent after the Messianic hopes for the year 1240 that had engaged both the Jewish and the Christian world had proved to have been in vain. In this light, it does not seem too far-fetched to assume that the calculation for 1260 emerged at the time when Judah produced his Hebrew version. His calculation of the Redemption may then be viewed as reflecting and at the same time reacting to Joachim’s views on the age of the spirit, especially since Judah’s calculation centers around the numbers three and seven, numbers that are also of particular importance in Joachim’s scriptural exegesis. In any event, it can be said that the theme of the three worlds serves as a unitary idea and organizing principle for the version of the mḥ as we have it now. The backbone of his thought, it provides him with a framework in which he can elaborate on many diverse issues. It is also noteworthy that the motif is absent in those parts of the work that reproduce extracts from his sources, but 123 124

Yuval, Two Nations, 291–295. Isaac Ibn Latif’s Shaʿar ha-Shamayim offers a description of the Messianic age that begins in 1240 (ibid., 272–273). Langermann, “Some Remarks,” 389.

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occurs in those sections where Judah speaks in his own voice. Besides the scattered critical comments in his survey of natural philosophy, it is in particular in these sections that he presents himself as an independent author. If he can be credited with any contribution to Jewish thought, it would be his elaboration of the motif of the three worlds in a manner not found in earlier or contemporary authors.

5

The mḥ as the First Hebrew Encyclopedia of Science and Philosophy

The mḥ is usually considered to be the first of the three major thirteenthcentury encyclopedias of science and philosophy, the other two being Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim and Gershom ben Solomon’s Shaʿar haShamayim. All three works aim to present their readers with a survey of contemporary scientific knowledge, but there are important differences between them. Y.T. Langermann has already pointed to some features that sets Judah’s compilation apart from the two other encyclopedias, dubbing it “in certain respects, the richest and most interesting of the medieval Hebrew encyclopedias.”125 To begin with, the mḥ offers the must comprehensive outline in terms of range of subjects. The later two works, for example, do not treat logic or geometry. Another difference lies in the combination of scientific and Jewish traditional learning in the mḥ; Falaquera’s df and Gershom’s Shaʿar do not include religious topics such as the explanation of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, although the latter adopts a biblical framework.126 The mḥ disseminates scientific knowledge not only through excerpts of authoritative philosophical-scientific sources, but also through biblical exegesis. Moreover, Judah does not limit himself to providing his readers with nonJewish contemporary learning but also develops his own thoughts and relates them to the scientific portions. The mḥ thus belongs to the type of encyclopedia that not merely organizes knowledge, but also presents the author’s own worldview. Lest the authorial voice be lost on the reader, Judah instructs the reader to copy and study the work in its entirety.127 The specific outlook of the 125 126

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Langermann, “Some Remarks,” 371. See Freudenthal, “The Aim and Structure.” On the other hand, it should be noted that Falaquera drew on a wider variety of sources and seems to have been more learned in philosophy. The practical use was different from the intended one, as is evident from the fact that the majority of the surviving manuscripts contains only specific sections of the work, see Introduction to the Edition.

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work has to do with Judah’s dual motivation: he sought to spread contemporary learning, but also to revert to the Torah those who had lost their way in the study of the sciences and to point to Jewish divine science. The polemical motive and the critique of Aristotle’s methodology that results from it are absent in the later two encyclopedic works. It should be noted that Judah is not only critical towards Aristotle’s philosophy and Averroes’ defense of it, but also towards the astronomical views of Ptolemy and Maimonides. He substituted their views, which he deemed incorrect, with al-Biṭrūğī’s, who, according to him, “would have been worthy of divine wisdom, had he been a Jew.”128 Also in the section on Metaphysics he prefers alBiṭrūğī’s astronomical views, and this is also the case in Treatise 2.129 Here Judah also ventures some opinions of his own, criticizing other astrologers. A critical stance towards his sources is thus a general feature of the mḥ.130 As noted, the mḥ’s presentation of Averroes’ commentaries reveals a certain lack of clarity and completeness in its coverage. One also comes across references to later sections that have no match (Chapter Three, section 4).131 Nonetheless it is obvious that the author compiled his work on the basis of a preconceived plan and that he intended it to form a coherent whole, which is why, for example, he included only those sections of the Elements that were necessary for the study of astronomy. The conceptual structure brings us to the question of the meaning of the title of the work. As suggested in Chapter One, the title Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah can 128

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ms O 161v; V 256r, also in Parma 421. Judah notes: “Know and understand that a great secret has been revealed to him. If he had been a Jew he would have been appropriate for divine wisdom as it is said be-lev navon tanuaḥ ḥokhmah, as we have explained in the verses of the Book of Proverbs.” See Chapter Three, section 1.2. Judah’s criticism of Ptolemy and his use of al-Biṭrūğī has now been studied by Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, Chapter 2. Langermann (“Some Remarks,” 378) observes that Judah was one of the few medieval Jews to have read al-Biṭrūğī’s book. The mḥ is also the first text to provide quotations from the Arabic version of Ibn Aflaḥ’s Correction of Ptolemy’s Almagest; of portions from alBiṭrūğī’s Kitāb al-Hayʾa, and of Ptolemy’s Quadripartitum to Hebrew readers, as pointed out by Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 27 ff. and 53. Interestingly, also Judah’s patron, the emperor Frederick ii, displayed a critical attitude towards written sources, and also towards Aristotle. Himself an expert in falconry, the emperor was convinced that Aristotle in his zoology was not always right, cf. Walz 1994, 172–175. In this regard we recall Judah’s claim that Aristotle could not find a cause for many things, not even in zoology (Chapter Six, section 2). It is not possible to know whether Judah wrote these lines in Toledo or in Italy, but it is noteworthy that Judah shared a critical stance towards written sources with the emperor. This is not the case with references to earlier sections: where Judah writes “as I already mentioned,” there is a correspondence to the intended passage.

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be viewed as a translation of the Arabic Ṭalab al-ḥikmah, which is the title of Saadya’s commentary on Proverbs, and was rendered by Derenbourg/Lambert as Recherche de la Sagesse.132 In one of the manuscripts of the mḥ one comes across a Latin note that refers to the title as Inquisitio Philosophiae Aristotelis.133 In Die arabische Literatur der Juden Steinschneider chose Die Erforschung der Weisheit.134 In modern scholarship the Hebrew title Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah has been rendered in various ways. In her first French article Sirat wrote that one could translate it “assez inexactement” as Exposé sur la Science,135 and in her 1985 English book as the Exposition of Science. Other translations that have been put forward include: The Learning of Science;136 The search for wisdom; Investigation of wisdom;137 The Quest for Wisdom;138 Inquiry into science/wisdom;139 El estudio de la ciencia.140 In view of the wide semantic range of both the word ḥokhmah (see above, section 3) and the root d-r-sh (to search, demand, examine, interpret, expound, discover, preach) with its connotation to midrash, the genre of homiletic interpretation of the Bible, all these translations and several others are defensible.141 In the section on logic the term midrash is used a few times in the sense of “investigation” or “quaestio”.142 The expression midrash ha-ḥokhmah appears there in a passage that goes back to Post. Anal. 79a17–22 and has the meaning of “investigation (or: study) of science.”143 Judah himself writes in Treatise 1 in his explanation of Ps. 39:7 (on the word “walking”) that derishat ha-ḥokhmot, the pursuit of the sciences, is what constitutes the motion of the rational soul. As noted, in the last section of his biblical 132

133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

According to Derenbourg/Lambert, the editors of Saadya’s commentary, the name ṭalab al-ḥikmah is Saadya’s appellation for the book of Proverbs, not only for his commentary or translation, Preface, p. vii, n. 3. For Saadya, to acquire wisdom the student needs five things: 1) a pure heart; 2) love of wisdom; 3) a teacher; 4) means of living, so that his heart is free for study, and 5) time (pp. 11–12). The expression ṭālib al-ḥikmah occurs in his explanation of Prov. 30 (ed. Derenbourg/Lambert, p. 184), whereas ṭalab al-ḥikmah is also found in Saadya’s Emunot we-Deʿot X, and see ed. Qafah 314, n. 63. ms Wien, Oesterr. Nationalbibliothek, hebr 42. Steinschneider 1902, par. 117. Sirat, “Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen,” 39 and eadem, A History, 250. Zonta, “Medieval Hebrew Translations,” 30 (no. 122). Manekin, “Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture,” 120. Freudenthal, “Providence,” 336, and see his note 3. Fontaine, “The Early Reception,” 212. Long ago, in a conference session A. Ivry playfully suggested “A Midrash on Ḥokhmah.” Valle Rodríguez, “La Introducción de Judá Cohén.” On the history of the term midrash, see Mandel, The Origins of Midrash. For example, ms O 43r, as the equivalent of mevuqqash. See also the Table in Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, 133, where the Arabic equivalent is given as maṭlūb. ms O 40r.

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exegesis forms of the root d-r-sh pop up in abundance. The context in that section is the obligation to study and the boundaries of knowledge. I believe that Judah’s title is deliberately ambiguous: its double-entendre is intentional and reflects his dual motivation: the book divulges scientific knowledge and searches for certain wisdom through critical investigation of science. In as far as the work provides a survey of science and philosophy, the title should be understood as: “The study (or: exposition) of science.” Yet in as far as the work directs the reader to a higher form of knowledge, the title might better be interpreted as: “The search for (or: pursuit of) wisdom.”

6

Reception

There are not many references to the mḥ in later works of Jewish philosophy, which may have to do with the fact that full translations of the commentaries that he excerpted became available in Hebrew in the course of the thirteenth century. Nonetheless there are indications that the Hebrew redaction of the mḥ has had some impact in Italy, and notably his explanation of biblical verses and his philosophical terminology. Judah’s philosophical exegesis of biblical verses has found its way to Immanuel ben Solomon of Rome (d. 1330).144 Immanuel refers to him as Judah Toleitoli, and as D. Goldstein writes: “His Midrash Hochmah provides Immanuel with much material, and that section of it which deals with the Maʿaseh Bereshit, interpreting the nature of man’s soul in a thoroughly neo-Platonic way, is particularly utilised.”145 Immanuel’s commentary on Genesis contains several sections that are verbatim or almost verbatim quotations from Judah’s expositions that Immanuel cites approvingly.146 In contrast, Zeraḥya b. Shealtiel Ḥen claims in his commentary on Proverbs, Imrei Daʿat, written in the 1280s, that no expositor on this biblical book was helpful for him and that no one “in my generation” had undertaken to explain its hidden things (taʿalumot).147 Nonetheless a few similarities between Zer-

144 145 146

147

See D. Goldstein, “The Commentary,” 204. Unpublished Ph.D. by D. Goldstein, The Commentary of Immanuel ben Solomon (1966), 20–21. These passages are translated in Goldstein. For the Hebrew text of Immanuel’s quotations in his commentary on Gen. 1, see Tocci, Il commento di Emanuele Romano, 49.15–50.3; 62.24–65.11; 98.22–28; 104.15–24; 112.8 ff.; 118.20–119.15; 121.26–30; Goldstein, The Commentary of Immanuel ben Solomon, 122.7 ff. Imrei daʿat ed. Schwarz, p. 1. Zeraḥya acknowledges, though, that Maimonides has shown how to explain the book of Proverbs.

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aḥya’s and Judah ha-Cohen’s explanations can be discerned, but, according to Zeraḥya, any similarity is due to coincidence: “If I mention something that another expositor has already mentioned, this is not intentional, but coincidence.”148 Attention has also been called to some features of Judah’s philosophical terminology that are found in Hillel ben Samuel of Verona, Moses of Salerno, and later also in Eṣ Ḥayyim by the Karaite Aharon b. Eliya.149 As noted above, a marginal note in ms Oxford, Mich 551 may point to a meeting between Judah and a certain R. Hillel.150 We do not know whether Hillel of Verona was intended, but the similarity of Hillel’s terminology to that of Judah may point in that direction. The mḥ circulated in Karaite communities in the Byzantine region, but the relation between Aharon b. Eliya’s Eṣ Ḥayyim and the mḥ has not yet been investigated. In addition, C. Manekin notes that Shmarya ha-Iqriti’s logical terminology is “reminiscent of the Italian Jewish terminology employed in Judah Ibn Matqah’s Midrash Ḥokhmah.”151 This also suggests acquaintance with Judah’s work in Italy, since Shmarya the Cretan was engaged at the court of Naples in the service of king Robert until 1328. Another indication for familiarity with the mḥ is the anonymous ms Vat. Urb 39, copied in Italy in 1311, in which “Judah from Toledo” is referred to, and this manuscript features the idiosyncratic title Sefer ha-awiri for Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of the Meteorology (Otot ha-shamayim), which title is Judah’s designation for meteorology. It is likely that this anonymous scribe or author studied science with the help of the mḥ.152 Abraham Abulafia, too, was aware of Judah’s

148

149 150 151

152

Ibid., p. 3. One similarity concerns the explanation of both authors that “four” in Prov. 30:15 refers to the two active and two passive qualities (ibid. p. 81 and mḥ Explanation of biblical verses, ed. D. Goldstein, lines 1021–1023). Moreover, like Judah, Zeraḥya understands Prov. 30:7–9 as referring to the middle way in acquiring ḥokhmah: one should not strive for too much (“riches” = ribbuy ha-ḥaqirah), for this will cause sefeqot we-shibbushim, nor study too little, so that one would be like the fools (Imrei daʿat ed. Schwarz, pp. 80–81). His Provençal near-contemporary, Levi ben Abraham, explains the passage along similar lines in his Livyat Ḥen: Solomon asked to be shown “the middle way”; shaw stands for absence and negligence of study, and kazzav for too much hitḥakkemut, which leads to minut (short version of Maʿaseh be-reshit, ed. Kreisel 2004, 418). Cf. above Chapter Six, section 1 (vi d). Rosenberg, Review of G. Sermoneta, Un glossario, 440 and see Zonta, La filosofia antica, 122. See Chapter One, and Introduction to the Edition. Manekin/Biesterfeldt ii.247 (at addendum to Steinschneider, hü 499) and Manekin, “Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture,” 128 n. 84. On Shmarya, see also Bowman, The Jews of Byzantium, 131 ff.; 262. Vat. Urb. 39, f. 71 (https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Urb.ebr.39). My thanks to Dr R. Leicht for this information (e-mail communication, 31 January 2021).

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book, as M. Idel has pointed out. Abulafia notes that in the town where he was staying a part of the book was missing.153 Idel has also drawn attention to a parallel between Abulafia and Judah ha-Cohen regarding the restoration of the Jewish kingdom.154 As appears from the manuscripts there was indeed some interest in Judah’s work. In particular the marginal and interlinear annotations of ms O show traces of an early reception of the encyclopedia in Italy.155 Ivry has suggested that the presentation of philosophical knowledge in the mḥ was intended to be accompanied by oral instruction.156 We have no evidence in support of this suggestion, but oral instruction, either by the author himself or by someone else, would certainly not have been superfluous given the idiosyncratic terminology and the concise rendering of his sources. Regardless, the traces of reception in Italy seem to corroborate Aviezer Ravitzky’s thesis that the works of Anatoli and Judah ha-Cohen played a role in the increased interest in philosophy and science that characterizes the second half of Italian intellectual life.157 By the time Judah translated his work into Hebrew not much philosophical work was available in Hebrew in Italy, apart from the logical and astronomical texts translated by Jacob Anatoli. Anatoli complained about the lack of response to his philosophical sermons in his day (in Italy or Provence?), but in the second half of the thirteenth century we find Hillel of Verona studying and translating philosophical texts (c. 1260?) and Zeraḥya b. Shealtiel Ḥen doing the same in the last quarter of the thirteenth century in Rome. That the study of philosophy made important strides in Italy in the second half of the thirteenth century may well have been due in part to Judah’s efforts.158 In this regard, it is worthwhile to take into consideration M. Zonta’s suggestion that Judah introduced in Italy the second redaction of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics that underlies Zeraḥya Ḥen’s Hebrew translation.159 Be that as it may, Judah’s Hebrew translation of his own work, embedded in the translation activity of the court of Frederick ii, forms part of

153

154 155 156 157 158 159

Idel, “Abraham Abulafia’s Studies and Teaching,” 97–98. Idel suggests that this was in Messina. One wonders whether this copy could have been ms O, in which a large part of the mathematical part is missing. If so, this manuscript was incomplete already at a very early stage. Idel, “Some Concepts of Time and History in Kabbalah,” 174–176. See Introd. to the Edition, section 3, and Appendix to the Introduction. Ivry, “The Soul of the Hebrew Encyclopedists,” 413. Ravitzky, The Thought of R. Zerahia, 72 and idem, “The Hypostasis of the Divine Wisdom,” 6–7. Ravitzky, The Thought of R. Zerahia, 72. Zonta, Il Commento medio di Averroè, 58.

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the cultural transfer of the study of philosophy from the Arabo-phone world of Toledo to the Hebrew audience in Italy. The only indication of reception in Spain so far is the commentary of Baḥya ben Asher (1255–1340) on Genesis, which contains material that goes back to the mḥ.160 It has not yet been explored, however, whether Baḥya drew on Judah’s work directly, which would imply that the work (or at least Treatise 1) circulated in Spain, or whether he knew these exegetical comments from another source. Another trace of reception outside Italy is found in Elʿazar b. Mattityahu’s supercommentary on Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Torah-commentary, the first complete commentary on this work, probably written in the Byzantine zone after 1270.161 The supercommentator mentions Judah ha-Cohen and his work in his comment on Deut. 32:35 “At the time that their foot falters.” Following Ibn Ezra, the supercommentator says that this verse contains a “great secret.” Ibn Ezra did not disclose the secret, but his commentator says that it is about retribution and redemption for Israel following the constellation of the stars, and that Judah ha-Cohen elaborated on this when speaking about the stars, week-years, shemiṭot and yovelot.162 In all probability the reference is to the section of the mḥ on the calculation of Messianic redemption, which is found at the end of his Treatise 2.

7

The mḥ within the Context of the Thirteenth Century

Some forty years ago A. Ravitzky wrote: “Generally speaking, the interpretation and work of the Maimonidean scholars of the thirteenth century have not yet gained appropriate scholarly attention.”163 Fortunately, during the past decades our knowledge of the works of thirteenth-century Hebrew-writing Jewish thinkers has increased considerably, which is in part thanks to Ravitzky’s own studies. Following Ravitzky’s 1977 PhD on Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Zeraḥya Ḥen, Ibn Tibbon’s thought and his interpretation of Maimonides has 160 161 162

163

See D. Goldstein, “The Citations of Judah ben Solomon.” Elʿazar ben Mattityahu’s supercommentary is discussed in Visi, The Early Ibn Ezra Supercommentaries. For biographical data, see pp. 108–110. I wish to thank Dr Orly Shoshan, who provided me with this information in an e-mail correspondence. Dr O. Elior kindly informed me that “Midrash ha-Ḥokhmot” by Judah ha-Cohen mi-Toledo is referred to in the anonymous ms London 236 Perush sodot shel R. Abraham b. Ezra, alongside Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Jacob Anatoli and Ruaḥ Ḥen (fols 6–8). However, no specific reference to Judah’s text is given there. Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and the esoteric character,” 212 n. 21. (The article in this collection is a reprint of the article in ajs Review 6, 1981).

judah’s place in the history of medieval jewish philosophy

251

moreover been the subject of detailed studies by C. Fraenkel, G. Freudenthal, J.T. Robinson and of course by Ravitzky himself. Shemtov Ibn Falaquera’s writings were studied by R. Jospe, S. Harvey and M. Zonta, whereas Y. Schwartz has done important work on Hillel of Verona. More recently analyses of Isaac Ibn Latif’s Shaʿar ha-Shamayim (Zimran) and Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim (Weber and Halper) have seen the light. We can also point to the studies on Moses ibn Tibbon by H. Kreisel and O. Fraisse and to Y.T. Langermann’s article on the anonymous commentary Doresh Reshumot. Research on Moses ha-Levi is currently being conducted by Y. Meyrav.164 More generally, our knowledge of the Arabic-into-Hebrew and Latin-into-Hebrew translation movements has been greatly advanced in the past few decades. It is still too early to present a comprehensive analysis of the intellectual currents in Judaism in what has been called “the long thirteenth century.” Yet as a result of these studies we gain ever more insight in the reception of Maimonides’ work and the diverse reactions triggered by it. The intellectual landscape shows a very broad palette of trends and tendencies: rational exegesis in the footsteps of Maimonides; Aristotelianism and Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle alongside a continuation of un-Aristotelian modes of thought (“neoPlatonism”); emergence of mysticism and Kabbalah; upcoming familiarity with scholasticism, philosophical disputes with non-Jews; the development of the literary genre of encyclopedias and the spread and popularization of philosophy in which the use of Hebrew as a language/vehicle for works of science and philosophy becomes increasingly important. Far from being an uninteresting epigonic period devoid of originality, or a mere interlude between the manifestation of great minds like Maimonides and Gersonides, the thirteenth century emerges more and more as a dynamic multifaceted epoch in which philosophy developed in a variety of ways. While it may be true that this period in Jewish thought did not produce “big thinkers,” it certainly witnessed “big changes.” Where does Judah ha-Cohen stand in this intellectual landscape? Responding to the challenge posed by Maimonides’ rationalism, the mḥ reflects and epitomizes in kaleidoscopic manner several of the trends mentioned above. As such, Judah’s work displays similarities with various post-Maimonidean thirteenth-century thinkers. A shared characteristic with, for example, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Moses Ibn Tibbon, and Jacob Anatoli is that he aspired to disseminate philosophic ideas not only through translations of scientific works,

164

It should be noted that it is not certain whether Moses ha-Levi lived in the thirteenth century.

252

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but also through biblical exegesis. Furthermore, like other works belonging to the Arabic-into-Hebrew translation movement, such as Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim or Moses Ibn Tibbon’s and Anatoli’s translations, the mḥ forms part of the canonization process in which Averroes’ fame as a commentator of Aristotle was established. At the same time, on account of the co-existence in the mḥ of Aristotelian and un-Aristotelian elements that are more akin to so-called neo-Platonic ways of thought, Judah’s work ties in with thinkers like Hillel of Verona and Zeraḥya b. Shealtiel whose interests comprise not only Aristotelian but also neo-Platonic writings, a tendency that is also noticeable in Falaquera. Inasmuch as the mḥ manifests a tinge of mysticism, albeit not sefirotic-kabbalistic, it also displays some similarity with the anonymous Doresh Reshumot and its light-metaphysics, as well as with Judah’s contemporary Isaac Ibn Laṭif in whose writings illumination likewise plays an important role. With the latter’s Shaʿar ha-Shamayim, Judah moreover has a critical attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy in common. In this work one encounters, as is the case in Judah’s mḥ, a parable that is inspired by Maimonides palaceparable at the end of the Guide as well as the theme of the three worlds. These are two features that are also found in the rationalistic interpretation of Scripture in Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim, a work that is roughly contemporaneous with the mḥ. With regard to the theme of the three worlds and a propensity to letter-mystique, once can also point to Nissim Ibn Malka. The first thirteenth-century encyclopedia of science and philosophy thus has much in common with other works produced in the same century and further research will in all probability unearth more parallels with these or other authors.165 In particular, an examination of similarities between the mystical aspects of the mḥ and the works of philosophically knowledgable Kabbalists like Nachmanides and Abraham Abulafia seems to be a promising area for further research. A comparison with Ibn Laṭif’s philosophical-mystical thought and with Jacob ben Sheshet’s kabbalistic concept of knowledge might also be rewarding.166 Yet we can point to two features that are specific, or even unique for Judah’s compilation. The first is the omnipresence of Averroes’ commentaries in the

165

166

Cf. also Idel, “Abraham Abulafia’s Studies and Teaching,” n. 241 on the mḥ: “The mixture between a sort of linguistic gnosis designated as Kabbalah, astronomy, and philosophy, more specifically some Averroistic elements, adumbrates the later developments in Jewish culture, like the different mixtures found in the writings of Rabbi Hillel of Verona, Rabbi Isaac Albalag, and Rabbi Moses Narboni.” Cf. Tirosh-Samuelson, “Kabbalah and Science in the Middle Ages,” 502–508, and n. 167, and Freudenthal, “The Kabbalist R. Jacob ben Sheshet of Girona.”

judah’s place in the history of medieval jewish philosophy

253

philosophical part. The unprecedented large-scale use of the commentaries may be viewed as the first emergence of an “Aristoteles Hebraicus”-corpus, even though we have to do with a critical reception of philosophical thought.167 The second is constituted by the theme of the three worlds that forms the backbone of Judah’s thought and creatively comes to fruition throughout the mḥ. It is in unfolding this theory in diverse sections that we hear his permanent authorial voice. Both features constitute a novelty in Jewish philosophy and herein lies Judah’s individual contribution to medieval Jewish intellectual history. 167

For the analogy with the Latin world in the formation of an “Aristoteles Hebraicus”-corpus, see Zonta, La filosofia antica, 76 ff.

appendix a

Examples of Judah’s Manner of Excerpting Averroes’ Commentaries For a clearer perception of Judah’s procedure in excerpting his sources as described in Chapter Three I will here present a comparison of his account to that of his source for some selected passages, namely, (1) the beginning of his outline of the Physics and (2) a section from that of On the Heavens. The method followed by Judah in these samples may be regarded as representative for his manner of compilation.

1

Physics

1.1 mḥ/Physics i.1 The Object and Contents of Physics Judah ha-Cohen’s exposition in this section is based on Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Physics. Since the Arabic version of this commentary is no longer extant, references in what follows are to the Hebrew translation of this commentary, ed. S. Harvey 1977 (= H). I have divided the exposition of the mḥ into smaller text-units. (i)

Judah’s opening sentences read: :‫ ואותן העילות הן ארבעה‬.‫אמר ענין חכמת הטבע היא לידע עילות הדברים הטבעיים‬ ‫הגולם הצורה והפועל והתכלית‬

These two sentences reproduce the end of Averroes’ introductory observations about the aim of the Physics and the structure and contents of Physics i. Judah omits these observations as well as some general remarks as to the question of how knowledge is acquired. His opening sentence reproduces H 180.4–5: ‫שכונתה אמנם היא העמידה על סבות הדברים הטבעיים הארבע ר״ל ֹ החומר והצורה‬ .‫והפועל והתכלית‬

omitting, however, Averroes’ last part of this sentence which reads (H 180.6):

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_009

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255

.‫הרחוקות מאלו והקרובות המיוחדות והכוללות‬ (ii) The next sentence of the mḥ is again a literal, but abridged reproduction, cf. .‫וענין זה הספר הוא נתינת העילות הראשונות הכוללות לכל הנמצאים הטבעיים‬ with the boldface words taken from H 180.6–9: ‫ולזה היתה כונת זה הספר נתינת הסבות הראשונות הכוללות לכל הנמצאות הטבעיות‬

‫והמשיגים הכוללים וזה במה שאפשר לתתו מהם בזאת החכמה והם החומר הראשון‬ ‫והסבה האחרונה המניעה‬

(iii) Judah’s next statement is about the causes that will be treated in this science: ‫והשתי עילות בלבד מאלו והן הגולם והפועל יתבארו בחכמה הזאת והצורה והתכלית‬ ‫יתבארו בחכמה אלהית‬

Here Judah has abridged his source not by omitting some words, as in the preceding sentence, but by reformulating Averroes’ account, cf. H 180.9– 12: ‫ואמנם הצורה הראשונה והתכלית הראשון הנה אין בזאת החכמה הקדמות נגיע מהם‬ ‫אל ידיעתם כפי מה שיראה אחר זה אבל העמידה על שתי הסבות האלה תהיה בחכמת‬ .‫האלהית‬

It is not difficult to see why Judah left out Averroes’ explanation of why the formal and final cause do not belong to the domain of physics, as this explanation continues the opening remarks of this section on how knowledge is attained. Since Judah skipped over that section, he had to adapt this statement too, so as not to confuse the reader to whom that piece of information was not available.

256

appendix a

1.2 mḥ/Physics i.2 The Method Followed in Physical Science After this general information on the science to be treated in this section, Judah, still following Averroes, proceeds to describe on which kind of proofs this science is based. (iv) He begins his exposition by stating that the proofs that are used in this science are called ‫ מיני המופתים הנעשים בזו החכמה הן הנקראין ראיות‬:‫ראיות‬

which echoes Averroes’: ‫ואמנם המופתים המעמידים על הסיבות הדרושות בזאת החכמה הם המופתים הידועים‬ (H 180.14–15). ‫בראיות‬

(v) Similarly, when going on to explain what these proofs amount to, he remains close to his source, cf. mḥ: ‫כלומר שנעלה מהדברים המתאחרים אצל הטבע—והן הידועות אצלינו והן הדברים‬ ‫המורכבים—אל הידועים והמוקדמין אצל הטבע והן הפשוטין שנרכבו אלו מהן‬

with H 180.15–17: ‫וזה שממנהג הדרך אליהם שיהיו מן הענינים שהם יותר ידועים אצלנו והם הענינים‬ ‫המאחרים אל הענינים הקודמים אשר הם יותר ידועים אצל הטבע‬

As for the last words of the sentence (v) ‫שנרכבו אלו מהן‬, they appear to summarize Averroes’ somewhat longer explanation in H 180.18–20: ‫והענינים המתאחרים הם המוחשים המורכבים כמו זאת הארץ הרמוז אליה וזה החי‬ ‫ והענינים הקודמים הם הסיבות והיסודות אשר מהם הורכבו הדברים‬.‫הרמוז אליו‬ ‫המוחשים‬

Besides being very brief here, Judah also omits the examples given by Averroes.

judah’s manner of excerpting averroes’ commentaries

257

(vi) Judah then contrasts this kind of proofs to the demonstrations that are used in mathematics: ‫וזה בחילוף המופתים הלמידיות לפי שבחכמת הלימודים נלך מהמוקדם באמת אל‬

,‫ ובכאן מהמאוחר אל המוקדם ולפיכך נקראו המופתים הלמידיות גמורות‬,‫המאוחר‬ .‫כלומר שאין בהן ספק לפי שהן על תכלית הבריאות בגמרא‬ This, too, is an abridgment of what Averroes says in the corresponding section of his Commentary (H 180.20–181.5), but Judah ha-Cohen underlines the indubitable character of mathematical demonstrations more than does Averroes. He says that there is no doubt in these demonstrations since they constitute the utmost and absolute degree of soundness. Averroes merely refers to the fact that these demonstrations are ‫מוחלטים‬ (absolute). (vii) The mḥ concludes the description of the different kinds of proofs by the observation that the proofs in physics are called “re’ayot” because of the order of learning in this science, which is from the “general” (or: common ‫ )כללי‬to the “specific” (or: particular ‫)פרטי‬. Therefore, the mḥ states, the Physics deals with general notions, whereas the following books on natural philosophy are devoted to specific subjects: ‫ כמו‬,‫ונקראו אלו ׳ראיות׳ דרך הלימוד הנעשה בזו החכמה הוא מהכללית אל הפרטית‬ ‫ ולפיכך יש בזה הספר כללות זו‬.‫שהמופתים הנעשים בה הן מהמורכבין אל הפשוטות‬ .‫ והספרים שאחריו הן מדברים על מצוי מצוי מהמצואים‬,‫החכמה של טבע‬

To this Judah adds that Aristotle follows this order because the general is more known to us than the particular. (‫לפי שהדברים הכלליים הן ידועין אצלנו‬ ‫)יותר מהפרטים‬ In the corresponding section, Averroes is considerably more elaborate, which is why I will not quote him verbatim. Averroes explains Aristotle’s procedure by pointing out that the general relates to the particular (‫ חלקי‬or, more often: ‫ )מיוחד‬as the composite to the uncompounded (simple) and in turn, as “that which is more known” to “that which is less known” (H 181.10–17). As a proof that the general is more known than the particular he invokes Aristotle’s example of an infant which will take initially every woman it sees for his mother.1 Furthermore, Averroes men-

1 Arist., Physics 184b12 ff. The example as formulated by Averroes does not seem to be very ade-

258

appendix a

tions as an advantage of this approach (namely, from the general to the specific) that it avoids repetition (H 182.1–9). All this is skipped in the mḥ. (viii) However, we find Judah adding to his source in the very last statement of this paragraph. Here he points out that there is a contradiction between what Aristotle says here concerning the order of learning and an earlier statement made in the Posterior Analytics to the effect that the general is more remote from sense-perception than the specific: ‫ויסתור זה למה שנאמר בספר המופת כי הדברים הכלליים יותר רחוקים מההרגש‬ .‫והפרטים יותר קרובים ממנו‬

This observation is missing in the Middle Commentary on the Physics, as well as in the Epitome.2 1.3 (i)

mḥ/Physics i.3 (Beginning). On the Principles The first sentence of this paragraph briefly states that the principles are finite in quantity and quality: ‫יש לראשיות חקר בכמות ובאיכות‬. This brief statement summarizes a long and detailed discussion of the nature of the “principles” in the mc, a discussion that involved an investigation of the relevant opinions of Aristotle’s predecessors, all of which Judah leaves out. The thesis that the principles are finite is Judah’s starting-point, whereas in the Middle Commentary it was the result of a thorough enquiry.

(ii) The same applies to the next statement ‫הראשיות ראוי להיותן משני נדגיים‬. This, again, is one of the results Aristotle obtained from his investigation of earlier views. Aristotle concluded that all earlier thinkers in one way or another identified the principles, or elements, with contraries.3 Averroes covered the entire discussion. (iii) The next words ‫ ומוצע לשני נגדיים‬in fact belong to the ensuing discussion about the number of principles as its subject of enquiry. Again, the mc presents the Aristotelian discussion in great detail. In the mḥ, the entire

quate at first sight, for it suggests that an infant is unable to distinguish its mother and father from other males and females. However, as pointed out by Konstan (1975, 241ff.) Aristotle refers here to the linguistic development of small children. 2 The observed contradiction is discussed in Chapter Four, section 1.i. 3 Arist., Physics 188b27, cf. also 188a19.

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259

investigation has been reduced to the observation that Aristotle established three such principles, namely form, matter and privation: .‫ועמדה דעתו כי הן שלשה הצורה והגולם והאין‬ 1.4 mḥ/Physics ii.1 For the benefit of the non-Hebrew reader I will now illustrate Judah ha-Cohen’s method by comparing the mḥ to the mc with the help of their English translations. The contents of the first paragraph of mḥ/Physics ii correspond to Aristotle, Physics 192b9–35. I will quote the relevant passage of the mḥ in full. For easier reference the issues referred to in this section are numbered from i–x: (i) Of beings, some are natural, some are [produced by] art and some are [produced] by accident. (ii) The natural beings are: the elements and what is composed of them. (iii) Things produced by art are, for example, a chair and a box and the like. (iv) An example of things [produced] by chance is when one goes outside and finds a gold dinar. (v) The difference between natural beings and things due to art is that the natural ones have a principle of motion primarily and essentially and not accidentally, whereas if there is motion in things due to art, this is only insofar as they are natural, not insofar as they are produced by art. (vi) How so? The downward movement of a chair is not because it is a chair, but because it is a heavy body. (vii) If things produced by art contain the principle of motion in themselves, for example, the doctor who heals himself, this is not essentially, but only accidentally, that is to say insofar as it is accidental that the sick person is a doctor. (viii) Some of these beings have a principle of motion essentially, but not primarily, for example the sailor who moves the ship by means of his limbs. (ix) Some natural things have only one of the kinds of motion, like the heavens, which have only motion of place, whereas some have two or three [kinds] and other ones have all kinds of motion. (x) What we learn from all this is that nature is the principle and cause of motion and rest of the body in which it inheres primarily and essentially, and not accidentally. If we compare these items to Averroes’ commentary on the Aristotelian text, we will find the following differences and parallels. To begin with, in Averroes the

260

appendix a

order is: i, ii, ix, v, vi, vii, viii, x. The items iii and iv are found later on in Averroes’ account, whereas the items ii, v, ix and x are treated more extensively.4 Some more details: ad (i): To the three kinds of beings listed by Judah, Averroes adds a fourth kind, namely, beings that are produced by choice. (H 212.7) This last category is not to be found in Aristotle.5 It is absent from the Epitome; therefore it is possible that Judah ha-Cohen, while taking over the wording of the mc throughout this section, followed the Epitome in this respect. Furthermore, Judah changes the order, for after describing the class of natural beings, Averroes immediately sets out to explain that not all kinds of motion are found in every existent (= ix), after which he proceeds to explain that there is a difference between natural beings and things due to art with regard to their principle of motion (= v). ad (ii–iv): as examples of simple natural existents (or bodies) Averroes mentions all four elements separately, and plants and animals as examples of compound natural existents. He does not, however, give any examples of artificial or chance existents. So Judah is more concise than his source regarding the first class of existents, but more extensive regarding the two other. ad (v): When contrasting natural beings and things due to art Averroes is considerably more elaborate. Firstly, he refers to the principle of motion and rest in natural things, whereas Judah does not refer to rest here. Furthermore, his statement regarding the motion of artificial things is clearer than the equivalent in the mḥ, for Judah says that when motion is found in artificial things, these things solely move because (‫ )מפני‬they are natural, not because (‫)מפני‬ they are artificial. This statement is bound to sow confusion. From Averroes we can gather the correct reading: “in artificial things the principle of motion does not exist insofar as (‫ )מצד מה‬they are artificial” (212.16–17). ad (vi): The example of the chair is the same in both texts. It is not found in the Epitome. After having dealt with this category of existents (artificial existents that have the moving principle essentially, but not primarily) Averroes again emphasizes

4 For Averroes’ mc, cf. ed. Harvey ii.1.1, 212.5–213.10 (tr. 285–286); cf. Arist., Physics 192b8–32. 5 According to Harvey, 357 n. 1, Averroes is following Themistius here.

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261

that natural beings have the principle of motion essentially and primarily (‫על‬ ‫)הכוונה הראשונה‬. Judah omits this, apparently because he felt this was repetitious. ad (x): Averroes elaborates on the definition of nature by explaining what is meant by “motion and rest” and why the terms “accidentally” and “primarily” are included in the definition.

2

Heavens

2.1 mḥ/Heavens i Lastly, I will compare the first paragraph of mḥ/Heavens with Averroes’ mc Heavens, a commentary that is available in Arabic. References are to ed. AlAlaoui. ,‫ והוא הנחלק לשלשה ריחוקים‬,‫ הגוף‬.‫הרצוף הוא הנחלק לדברים יקבלו החילוק תמיד‬ .‫הוא שלם לפי שאין לו ריחוק אחר יעתק אליו‬

(i

,‫ והוא הרוחב‬,‫ כי הקו יעתק לשטח בתוספת ריחוק אחד‬,‫אבל השטח והקו אינן שלמים‬ .‫והשטח יעתק לגוף בתוספת העומק‬

(ii

.‫( השלשה הן מספר שלם לפי שהן תחלת המספר שיש לו ראשית ואמצע וסוף‬iii ‫ מצד שהוא גוף ומצד שהוא סובב בכל חלקיו ולפיכך הוא יותר‬:‫העולם שלם משני צדדין‬ .‫שלם מהגוף‬

(iv

.‫וכבר נאמר במאמר שני מהשמע כי הכל והתמימות צורה לחלקים‬

(v

The statements of which this paragraph is composed go back to the following passages in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on On the Heavens i: i)

is a verbatim translation of mc 74.2: ‫المتصل هو المنقسم الى اشياء تقبل الاقسام دائما‬

ii)

renders the source paraphrasingly with some words translated literally, cf. mc 75.22–76.3:

‫‪262‬‬

‫‪appendix a‬‬

‫… انه ظاهر من أمر الجسم أنه لا يمكم فيه الانتقال إلى جنس آخر من الأعظام بز يادة بعد‬ ‫عليه‪ ،‬كما أمكن في الخط أن ينتقل إل السطح بز يادة بعد عليه‪ ،‬و أمكن في السطح أن ينتقل‬ ‫إلى الجسم بز يادة بعد عليه أيضا‪ .‬وإذا كان ذلك كذلك فبين أن ما لا يمكن فيه الاانتقال‪ ،‬فلا‬ ‫يمكن فيه الز يادة‪ ،‬وما لا تمكن فيه الز يادة فهو تام‪.‬‬ ‫‪iii) is a combination of a literal translation (with one change in order) of‬‬ ‫‪mc 74.15:‬‬ ‫أعني أن الثلاثة أول الأعداد التي لها مبدأ‪ ،‬منتهى ووسط‬ ‫‪and of mc 75.6:‬‬ ‫فعدد الثلالة عدد تام‬ ‫‪Note that in Averroes’ text iii precedes ii. Averroes’ exposition on the num‬‬‫‪ber three is more elaborate.‬‬ ‫‪is an abridged translation of mc 76.6–10:‬‬

‫)‪iv‬‬

‫أن العالم بأسره يوجد له التمام بجهتيه‪ :‬احدهما من حيث هو جسم واحد‪ .‬والجهة الثانية من‬ ‫حيث انه محيط بجميع … أجزائه }وانه ليس يحيط به شيء‪ ،‬إذ كان هذا شأن الكل‪ {.‬فالعالم‬ ‫اذن تام من حيث ليس هو جزءا لشيء‪ ،‬ومن حيث هو … جسم‬ ‫‪The bracketed words are not reproduced by Judah, and the statement:‬‬ ‫ולפיכך הוא יותר שלם מהגוף‬

‫‪is a rather free rendering of:‬‬ ‫فالعالم اذن تام من حيث ليس هو جزءا لشيء‪ ،‬ومن حيث هو جسم …‬ ‫‪renders mc 76.12–13:‬‬ ‫فان الكل كالتمام والصورة للجزء‬ ‫‪but the reference to Physics ii is not found in the mc. Judah omits Aver‬‬‫‪roes’ addition that this is so regardless of whether the universe is finite or‬‬ ‫‪infinite (lines 13–14).‬‬

‫)‪v‬‬

appendix b

Arabic Words in the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah The mḥ contains a number of Arabic words in Hebrew transliteration that occur at regular intervals throughout the compilation. These terms and expressions seem to be the only remnants of the original Arabic version of Judah’s work. In all likelihood, when translating his book into Hebrew, Judah left the Arabic in cases where he found it difficult to find Hebrew equivalents. This appears to be the case especially with terms pertaining to topics in the sections on meteorology, zoology and psychology. The following table shows the Arabic expressions that Judah uses in the textportions edited in this volume, that is, the Introduction to the mḥ and the survey of natural philosophy. The transliterated Arabic terms are given according to the spelling adopted in the edition; variant readings are not recorded here. When the Arabic terms are taken from extant Averroes’ commentaries they appear without parentheses in the fourth column; if the Arabic source is no longer extant (for example in cases where Averroes’ commentaries have not been preserved in Arabic) they are given in parentheses. Where Judah provides Hebrew equivalents they are listed in the third column, again in the spelling adopted in the edition. A transliterated term marked with * denotes a conjecture; sometimes the spelling in the manuscripts is corrupted. For general comments on Judah’s use of Arabic, the reader is referred to Chapter Three, section 5. For some Arabic words occurring in Treatise 1 of the mḥ, see Chapter Six, section 1 (i); section 1 (vi c); section 2, n. 168, and Chapter Seven, n. 41.

Passage in mḥ

Introduction 318.7 Introduction 318.9 Introduction 318.9 Introduction 318.14

Arabic term as given in mḥ

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given)

‫מחזז‬

English translation

(‫ )محزز‬insect

‫כחלות‬

bluishness (of eyes)

‫זרקות‬

blackness (of eyes)

‫נזועית‬

appetitive faculty

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_010

264

appendix b

(cont.)

Passage in mḥ

Introduction 324.12 Introduction 324.14 Introduction 336.16 Introduction 336.16 Physics 364.12 Physics 364.13 Physics 370.9 Physics 374.3 Physics 382.12 Heavens 394.5 Heavens 402.11

Arabic term as given in mḥ

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given)

‫ׄגדל‬

‫טוביקא‬

‫ׄטן‬

‫מחשבה‬

‫באלאסתקרא‬

(‫ )جدل‬Topics (‫ )ظن‬opinion (‫ )بالاستقراء‬by induction

‫באלדאת‬

‫בעצם‬

‫מחצל‬ ‫אן‬ ‫מתתאלי‬ ‫אנאת‬ ‫תואטו‬ ‫אתיר‬ ‫מלכה‬

‫מסופר‬ ‫עתה‬ ‫טורדין‬ ‫תאימות‬ ‫יש‬

Meteor 438.12

‫ׄגוהר‬ ‫מעאדן‬ ‫סכנגבין‬ ‫לז ׄגה‬ ‫אללזו ׄגה‬ ‫סהלה אלנחצאר‬ ‫עסירה ואנחצאר‬ ‫בתואטו‬

. . . . ‫קל ההעצר‬ ‫והעצרו ממנו קשה‬ ‫בתאימות‬

Meteor 444.3 Meteor 446.11 Meteor 448.5 Meteor 450.4 Meteor 458.1 Meteor 458.6 Meteor 460.6 Meteor 462.9

‫אלשהב‬ ‫ׄצעפ אנדפעה‬ ‫מד‬ ‫נ ׄצג‬ ‫אקאלים‬ ‫זלזלה‬ ‫צואעק‬ ‫ׄגוהר לטיף הואי‬

‫חולשת מסירתו‬ ‫מתיחות‬ ‫בשול‬ ‫נופים‬ ‫רעש‬ ‫אבני אלגביש‬ ‫עצם דק אוירי‬

gc 418.2 gc 424.4 gc 424.11 gc 426.2 gc 428.2 gc 428.15

English translation

‫בעצם‬ ‫מקורות‬

(‫ )بالذات‬substantially/essentially (‫ )محصل‬measured time (‫ )انى‬now (‫ )المتتالى‬in succession ‘nows’ ‫ تواطؤ‬synonymity ‫ اثير‬ether ‫ ملـكة‬positive/possession (see below, comment 1) ‫ جوهر‬substance ‫ معادن‬minerals ‫ سكنجبين‬oxymel ‫ لزجة‬cohesive ‫ اللزوجة‬cohesiveness ‫ سهولة الانحصار‬easy to determine and ‫ عصيرة الانحصار‬difficult to determine ‫ تواطوء‬synonymously, univocally (see below, comment 2) ‫ الشهب‬shooting stars ‫ ضعف انضفاعه‬porosity ‫ مد‬flow ‫ نضج‬concoction/digestion ‫ اقاليم‬zones/climes ‫ زلزلة‬earthquakes ‫ الصاعقة‬thunderbolt ‫ جوهر لطيف هواى‬fine airy substance

265

arabic words in the midrash ha-ḥokhmah (cont.)

Passage in mḥ

Arabic term as given in mḥ

Meteor 466.17

‫מחור אל מנטקה‬

Meteor 470.18 Meteor 472.1

‫ה ׄצם‬ ‫נ ׄצ ׄג‬

Meteor 472.9–10 Meteor 472.14 Meteor 474.13 Meteor 474.13 Meteor 476.1 Meteor 476.5 Meteor 476.16 Meteor 478.4 pa 482.3 pa 488.14 pa 490.13 pa 492.8 pa 496.4 pa 496.6 pa 496.6 pa 498.3 pa 500.8 pa 500.14 pa 502.14 pa 504.6–8 pa 504.11 pa 508.13 pa 510.8–15 pa 512.11 pa 516.2 pa 518.6 pa 522.7

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given)

‫עיכול‬ ‫בישול‬

‫עצארה נייה‬ ‫הסחוטות החיות‬ ‫הדברים המתעכלים אלנ ׄצ ׄג‬ ‫מ ׄגרי‬ ‫מדביק‬ ‫ׄגירא‬ ‫דיבוק‬ ‫ׄגמוד‬ ‫קפוי‬ ‫לז ׄגה‬ ‫תהביה‬ ‫כהרבא‬ ‫מחזז הגוף‬ ‫דרוז‬ ‫החי שגופו מחזז‬ ‫קרע‬ ‫מנקרות‬ ‫נגניג‬ ‫מחזז‬ ‫תמסאח‬ ‫אלמסחאה‬ ‫מכאלב‬ ‫להאה‬ ‫אלתשריח‬ ‫שריאן‬ ‫סלחפאה‬ ‫מתאנה‬ ‫צפיקא‬ ‫אנפוחה‬ ‫מיראק‬ ‫חומה‬

‫ריחוף‬

‫מדרסות‬

‫הגידין הדופקין‬

English translation

‫ محور المنطقة‬axis of the circle (of reflection) ‫ هضم‬concoction ‫ نضج‬digestion, idem 474.6, 8 ‫ العصارات النيئة‬unripe juices ‫ نضج‬things boiled ‫ مغر‬viscous, sticky ‫ لزجا كالغراء‬sticky like glue ‫ جمود‬coagulation, solidification ‫ لزجة‬viscous ‫ تهبيه‬evaporation ‫ كهر باء‬amber (3 times) (‫ )محزز‬insects (idem 522.3) (‫ )دروز‬sutures (‫ )محزز‬insects (‫ )قرع‬knocking (‫ )منقر‬beaks (idem 550.5) (‫ )نغانغ‬gills (‫ )محزز‬insect (‫ )تمساح‬crocodile (idem 506.13, 526.9 and 540.16) (‫ )مسحاة‬spade (‫ )مخالب‬claw (‫ )لهاء‬uvula (‫ )التشريح‬anatomy/dissection (‫ )شر يان‬artery (‫ )سلحفاة‬turtle (idem 530.10) (‫ )مثانة‬bladder (‫ )صفاق‬close-textured (‫ )انفحة‬rennet (‫ )مراق‬omentum (‫ )حمة‬sting

266

appendix b

(cont.)

Passage in mḥ

pa 528.8 ga 536.3 ga 542.1 ga 544.9 ga 546.9 ga 548.14 ga 556.8 ga xvii.9 ga 582.14 ga 582.14 ga 582.15 ga 586.11 ga 586.12 Soul 598.1 Soul 598.11 Soul 600.9 Soul 600.15 Soul 602.15 Soul 602.15 Soul 602.15 Soul 604.9 Soul 610.11 ff. Soul 614.13 Soul 616.9 Soul 618.2 Soul 618.3 Soul ii.25–28, 30 Soul 622.3 Soul 622.4 Soul 622.4 Soul 622.5–6 Soul 622.6

Arabic term as given in mḥ ‫אנתאיין‬ ‫תוכמה‬ ‫החי המחזז‬ ‫נפסיה‬ ‫אלה‬ ‫כטאף‬ ‫*קב ׄג‬ ‫אלמרוינא‬ ‫ אזרק‬,‫זרקות‬ ‫ אכחל‬,‫כחלות‬ ‫שהלה‬ ‫פנך‬ ‫שנזאב‬ ‫אל ׄגואהר‬ ‫אלי‬ ‫חיואן‬ ‫החי המחזז‬ ‫נזוע‬ ‫שוק‬ ‫תכייל‬ ‫שכץ‬ ‫משף‬ ‫קחף‬ ‫מתכיילה‬ ‫שכל מכרוט‬ ‫תוהם‬ ‫שפאף‬-‫שפיף‬ ‫אנעכאס‬ ‫תצוית אלחיואן‬ ‫אלה אלתנפש‬ ‫אלנגמא‬ ‫צראר הלילה‬

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given)

‫נפשית‬ ‫כלי‬ ‫חחמס‬

(‫)انثيان‬ (‫)تخمة‬ (‫)محزز‬ (‫)نفسي‬ (‫)آلة‬ (‫)خطاف‬ (‫)قبج‬

‫נפשי‬

‫עצמים‬ ‫חי‬ ‫כעסנית‬ ‫תאוה‬ ‫דמיון‬ ‫נפרד‬ ?‫מספג‬ ‫הכח הדמיונית‬ ‫צורה מחורשת‬ ‫בינה‬ ‫חזירה לאחור‬ ‫הוצאת קול החי‬ ‫כלי הנפשיה‬

(‫)ازرق‬ (‫)كحل‬ (‫)شهلة‬ (‫)فنك‬ (‫)شنزاب‬ ‫الجواهر‬ ‫الية‬ ‫حيوان‬ ‫محزز‬ ‫نزوع‬ ‫شو ق‬ ‫تخيل‬ ‫شخص‬ ‫مش ف‬ ‫قح ف‬ ‫متخيلة‬ ‫شكل مخروط‬ ‫توهم‬ ‫شفي ف‬ ‫انعكاس‬ ‫تصو يت الحيوان‬ ‫الية التنفس‬ ‫النغمة‬ ‫ص رار الليل‬

English translation

testicles indigestion insects (idem 542.7) psychic instrument swallow partridge see below, comment 3 bluishness blackness bluish-black color fennec grey squirrel substances organic animal insects appetitive anger desire imagination particular transparent cranium imagination cone-shaped figure imagining transparent rebounding production of sound by animals organ for respiration voice cricket

267

arabic words in the midrash ha-ḥokhmah (cont.)

Passage in mḥ

Soul 622.15–16 Soul 624.7 Soul 624.7 Soul 626.2 Soul 628.12 Soul 630.12 Soul 632.11 Soul 634.9 Soul 638.5 Soul 642.15 Soul 644.2

Soul 644.7

Soul 644.11 Soul 646.1 Soul 648.4 Soul 648.6 Soul 648.9 Soul 648.11 Soul 650.5 Soul 650.8 Soul 650.8 Soul 652.9 Soul 652.18 pn 656.9

pn 656.9 pn 658.2

Arabic term as given in mḥ ‫מן אל ׄגוהר‬ ‫אלהואיי‬ ‫בנפסג‬ ‫נילופר‬ ‫אל נגאניג‬ ‫אפראטאת‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫אלנגם‬ ‫תכייל‬ ‫אנפעאל‬ ‫אשפאף‬ ‫תכליק אל מעקול‬ ‫אולא וקבולה‬ ‫תאניא‬ ‫אלעקל‬ ‫אלמסתפאד אי‬ ‫אנה נסתפידה‬ ‫מבדא‬ ‫אטלאק‬ ‫אעדאמהא‬ ‫אלאעדאם‬ ‫אלעמלי‬ ‫אפטס‬ ‫אלאלאת‬ ‫אחואל‬ ‫מלכה‬ ‫כח הנזועית‬ ‫נשאניא‬ ‫אח ׄצארה‬

‫חפ ׄט‬ ‫אלמתכייל‬

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given) ‫מן העצם האוירי‬

‫קיצונים‬ ‫בעצם‬

‫דמיון‬ ‫מפעל‬ ‫יצירת המושכל‬ ‫תחלה‬

‫ من الجوهر الهواء‬airy substance (‫)بنفسج‬ (‫)نيلوفر‬ ‫النغانغ‬ ‫افرظات‬ (‫)بالذات‬ ‫نغم‬ ‫تخيل‬ ‫انفعال‬ ‫إشفبف‬ ‫تخليق المعقول اولا‬ ‫وقبوله ثانية‬

‫השכל הנאצל‬ ‫מלשון תועלת‬ ‫ראש‬ ‫בגמרא‬ ‫פקידתן‬ ‫הנפקדות‬ ‫המעשי‬ ‫רחב אף‬ ‫כלים‬ ‫איכויות‬

‫הבאתו ליש‬

‫שימור‬ ‫הדבר המדומה‬

English translation

‫مبدا‬ ‫اطلاق‬ ‫اعدامها‬ ‫الاعدام‬ ‫العملي‬ ‫افطس‬ ‫الالات‬ ‫احوال‬ ‫ملـكة‬ ‫نزوع‬ ‫نش طة‬ ‫احضاره‬

violet waterlily gills extremities (fingertips) substantially/essentially pitch/melody imagination passivity transparency first, bringing the intelligible forth, and, second, receiving it the acquired intellect

principle absolutely/simpliciter its privations privations the practical (intellect) snub-nosed utensils dispositions habit appetitive faculty energy/vigor the reinstating of it (idem in 658.4 and 662.9) ‫ حفظ‬retention ‫ المتخيل‬the imagined object

268

appendix b

(cont.)

Passage in mḥ

pn 658.4 pn 658.8 pn 664.9 pn 666.9 pn 670.10 pn 674.3 pn 674.7

Arabic term as given in mḥ ‫אח ׄצאר אלכיאל‬

Hebrew equiva- Arabic term lent (if given) ‫הבאת הדמיון‬

‫אלוהמיה‬ ‫*אלגמאה‬ ‫ותח ׄצר חיניד‬ ‫השראיין‬ ‫אלמ ׄגהולה‬

‫המוסכלות‬

‫אלשכצי‬

‫מיוחד‬

‫?הגימוי‬ ‫ותביא אז‬

English translation

‫ احضار الخيال‬the reinstating of the image ‫ الوهمية‬estimative faculty ‫ اغماء‬unconsciousness ‫ وتحضر حناىد‬and then it reinstates ‫ الشرايين‬the arteries ‫ المجهولة‬the (previously) unknown ‫ الشخصية‬particular

Comments: 1. See Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico ebraico del xiii secolo, 77. 2. See Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico ebraico del xiii secolo, 51. 3. The word ‫ אלמרוינא‬is probably a corrupted rendering of the Arabic ‫المرو ية‬, which is found, for example, in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Soul, see ed. Ivry, 127.20 (translated there as the “deliberative” part of the soul). The Hebrew rendering ‫ אלמרוינא‬is found in ms O; mss C and V have other corrupted forms of the term, while it is absent from mss B and N.

Arabic Terms in the Section on the Metaphysics Arabic terms in transliteration occur also in other sections of the mḥ. Here I will limit myself to Judah’s survey on the Metaphysics.1 The most frequently used Arabic terms are ‫ גוהר‬and ‫ דאת‬that are found also in the part on natural philosophy. It is noteworthy that in the section on Metaphysics Judah usually (but not always) indicates whether the Hebrew ‫ עצם‬renders the Arabic ‫ذات‬ or ‫( جوهر‬and in one case ‫)عين‬. One also comes across some other terms that occur in the survey of natural philosophy, like ‫( מבדא‬Hebr. ‫)ראש‬, and a form of the Arabic root ‫ حضر‬which was left untranslated in the section on pn, but for

1 Arabic terms occurring in the sections of astronomy and astrology have recently been studied in Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, Chapter Two.

‫‪269‬‬

‫‪arabic words in the midrash ha-ḥokhmah‬‬

‫‪. The same‬קיים ‪ is rendered as‬חאדר ‪which we found a Hebrew equivalent here:‬‬ ‫‪. There is one instance of what‬נפרד ‪ which is translated here as‬שכץ ‪obtains for‬‬ ‫‪ (“thatness”).‬انية ‪ renders‬כייה ‪I believe is a neologism:‬‬ ‫‪The following table lists the occurrences of Arabic terms in mḥ/Metaphysics‬‬ ‫‪as found in ms Oxford, Bodleian Mich 551 (ms O).‬‬

‫‪Arabic term‬‬

‫الجواهر‬ ‫?‬ ‫الجدل‬ ‫مبدا‬ ‫حاض ر‬ ‫اسطقس‬ ‫ازلى‬ ‫بالذات‬ ‫ج وهر‬ ‫و ح دة‬ ‫اشتقاق‬ ‫انية‬ ‫بالذات‬ ‫ج وهر‬ ‫الاضداد ؟‬ ‫اضداد‬ ‫بالذات‬ ‫بالذات‬ ‫انية‬ ‫الشخص‬ ‫الاشخاص‬ ‫دل ك‬ ‫ج وهر‬ ‫شاخص الجوهر‬ ‫بالذات‬ ‫جوهره‬ ‫بالغراء?‬ ‫بالشاخص‬ ‫بالجواهر‬

‫‪Hebrew equivalent (if‬‬ ‫)‪given‬‬ ‫העצמים‬ ‫?פתיחה‬ ‫ראש‬ ‫קיים‬ ‫יסוד‬

‫בעצם‬ ‫עצם‬ ‫אחדות‬

‫?‬ ‫כייה‬ ‫בעצם‬ ‫עצם‬ ‫הנגדיים‬ ‫הנגידים‬ ‫בעצם‬ ‫בעצם‬ ‫נפש הדבר וכייתו אניתה‬ ‫הנפרד‬ ‫הנפרדין‬ ‫כגון המירוח‬ ‫עצם‬ ‫נפרד העצם‬ ‫בעין‬ ‫עצמו‬ ‫בדבוק‬ ‫בנפרד‬ ‫בעצמים‬

‫‪Arabic term as given in‬‬ ‫‪mḥ‬‬ ‫אל ׄגואהר‬ ‫מצאדרה‬ ‫אל ׄגדל‬ ‫מבדא‬ ‫חאדר‬ ‫אסטוקס‬ ‫דברים פשוטים צוריים‬ ‫אזלייה‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫ׄגוהר‬ ‫וחדה‬ ‫אשתקאק‬ ‫אניה‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫ׄגוהר‬ ‫אלצדאד‬ ‫אצדאד‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫אניה‬ ‫אלשכץ‬ ‫אלאשכאץ‬ ‫דלך‬ ‫ׄגוהר‬ ‫שאכץ אל ׄגוהר‬ ‫באלדאת‬ ‫ׄגוהרה‬ ‫באל ׄגדא‬ ‫באלשאכץ‬ ‫אל ׄגוהר‬

‫‪Metaph/ms O‬‬

‫‪ii, 101v‬‬ ‫‪iii, 102r‬‬ ‫‪iii, 102v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 102v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 102v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103r‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 103v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 104r‬‬ ‫‪iv, 104r‬‬ ‫‪iv, 104v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 104v‬‬ ‫‪iv, 105r‬‬ ‫‪iv, 105v‬‬ ‫‪vi, 107r‬‬ ‫‪vi, 107r‬‬ ‫‪vi, 107v‬‬ ‫‪vi, 108r‬‬ ‫‪vi, 109r‬‬ ‫‪vi, 109r‬‬ ‫‪vii, 110r‬‬ ‫‪vii, 110r‬‬ ‫‪vii, 110r‬‬ ‫‪ix, 111r‬‬ ‫‪xi, 112r‬‬

270

appendix b

(cont.)

Metaph/ms O

xi, 115v xi, 117v xi, 117v

Arabic term as given in mḥ ‫מבדא אל ׄגואהר‬ ‫אעדאם‬ ‫באלדאת‬

Hebrew equivalent (if given) ‫ראש העצמים‬ ‫אינים‬ ‫בעצם‬

Arabic term

‫مبدا الجواهر‬ ‫اعدام‬ ‫بالذات‬

part 2 Critical Edition and English Translation of the Introduction and the Section on Natural Philosophy of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah

∵

Introduction to the Edition 1

The Manuscripts

At the end of the section on Metaphysics Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen entreated scribes to copy his Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah in its entirety, not just parts of it.1 Unsurprisingly, his words have not always been heeded. The majority of the extant manuscripts contain only certain sections of the work. Some portions of the mḥ clearly attracted more attention than others. Before going into more detail, it will be useful to recall its contents:2 Author’s Introduction Part 1. Philosophy: – logic (Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics) – natural philosophy (Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, On the Parts of Animals, On the Generation of Animals, On the Soul, On Sense/Parva Naturalia) – metaphysics (Aristotle’s Metaphysics) Treatise 1. Explanation of biblical verses (Genesis, Psalms, Proverbs) Part 2. Mathematical Science: – geometry (Euclid’s Elements) – astronomy (Ptolemy’s Almagest and al-Biṭrūǧī’s Principles of Astronomy) – astrology (Ptolemy’s Quadripartitum) Treatise 2. Letters of the Hebrew alphabet Treatise 3. Treatise on Talmudic Aggadot. In his annotated translation of Steinschneider’s description of the medieval Hebrew encyclopedias, C. Manekin updated Steinschneider’s list of manuscripts of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, recording 43 manuscripts or fragments of manuscripts.3 His list is nearly identical to the more recent one in the International Collection of Digitized Hebrew Manuscripts Ktiv, the main difference being that Ktiv lists three more fragments containing Treatise 2.4

1 ms Oxford, Mich 551, f. 124r, printed in ed. D. Goldstein, 206 lines 1–4. 2 For more details, see above, Chapter Two, section 2. 3 Manekin, “Steinschneider on the Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias,” 475–479. Manekin lists and numbers the manuscripts according to the alphabetical order of the libraries where they are found. In what follows I will adopt Manekin’s (= M) numbering, referring to: M 1, M 2, etc. 4 These are Florence Plut. ii.05 (imhm F 17657); Paris, bn, hébr. 711 (imhm F 11599) and Oxford,

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_011

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Of all the extant manuscripts Vat ebr 338 (M 38) is the most complete (for more details see below, section 3). Two others, Oxford, Bodleian Mich 551 (M 22) and Berlin Or. Qu. 837 (M 1) contain the greater part of the text.5 The other forty or so manuscripts contain the text only partially, be it fragments, sections or more substantial portions. Some of them may have been complete once, as they comprise sections both from Pt 1 and Pt 2.6 As for the partial manuscripts, the first thing to be noted is that there are no manuscripts that contain only the third treatise on Talmudic Aggadot. In contrast, the second treatise, on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, seems to have circulated independently, and thus to have enjoyed considerable popularity: Manekin lists nine mss that contain only this section of the mḥ, to which the three manuscripts listed in Ktiv should be added.7 In addition, one ms has this treatise together with the introduction to astrology that belongs to Part 2.8 Part 2, on mathematical science, is found it in its entirety (geometry, astronomy, astrology) only in the complete ms Vat ebr 338, and in Parma 2769.9 ms Cambridge Add 1737 carries the major part of it.10 Manekin lists six manuscripts that are limited to the section on astrology.11 Moreover, two mss contain an abridgment of the section on geometry.12 In sum, Judah’s survey of mathemat-

5

6 7 8 9

10

11

12

Bodleian, Mich 500 (imhm F 20475). Some other minor differences between the two lists are not relevant for our purposes, see also below, n. 12. The Oxford ms may have been complete once. Today 48 folios are missing between fols 155v and 156r in Part 2 (geometry and astronomy). The Berlin ms is a copy of the former, as was first noted by Steinschneider, Verzeichniss der hebräischen Handschriften, 1:121–126 (Berlin Catalogue, no 259). The same gap is found in this ms. For example, M 5, 7, 14 and 30. These are M 10, 11, 20, 23, 25, 26, 29, 37 and 39. M 13. M 38 and 30 respectively. ms Parma breaks off in Treatise 2. For the manuscripts containing the sections on astronomy and astrology, see also Garshtein, Astronomy and Astrology, 343. M 5. Cf., however, above, n. 5. Some of the other mss contain portions of it. For the mss containing the mathematical correspondence between Judah and the court of Frederick ii, see Arndt, Judah ha-Cohen and the Emperor’s Philosopher, 45–46. M 12, 18, 28, 33 (sections), 42, 43 (section, adapted), cf. also M 13 (cf. n. 7), which has Treatise 2 together with the introduction to astrology. Moreover, ms Madrid, Bibl. de la Real Academia de la Historia Hebr. 7 (imhm F 7370), a codex with 21 astrological texts, has the astrological part of the mḥ as text 12. M 15 and 21. Note that in the case of no. 15 (München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 246/6, fols 56–64v) it has not yet been ascertained whether the text is in fact part of the mḥ, cf. Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Handschriften, 118.

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ical science, or parts of it, was available in several manuscripts, but the section on astrology was the most popular.13 It is, however, Part 1, the philosophical part, the part that interests us here, that was the most widely copied. Nine mss contain the whole of Part 1:14 [A] Cambridge, University Library, Add 1737, fols 1–252 (imhm F 17492; M 5). * S.C. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts at the Cambridge University Library. A Description and Introduction (Cambridge 1997), 376–377. The beginning of the Introduction is missing; it contains also sections of Part 2. Byzantine, 15th c. [B] Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt 57, fols 1–127v (imhm F 22137; M 17). The text of the last fol continues on the fly-leaf. * A. Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (Oxford 1886–1906), vol. i, no. 1323; M. Beit-Arié / R.A. May, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. Supplement of Addenda et Corrigenda to vol. 1 (A. Neubauer’s Catalogue) (Oxford 1994), 220. Sephardic, mid 14th c. [C] Cambridge, University Library, Dd. 9.65, fols 1–121 (imhm F 15922; M 2). * S.C. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library. A Description and Introduction (Cambridge 1997), 377–378. Treatise 1 breaks off in the section on Proverbs. Byzantine, 16th c. [D] Cambridge, University Library, Add 1527/1, fols 1–99 (imhm F 17464; M 4). * S.C. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library. A Description and Introduction (Cambridge 1997), 377. Fols 97r–99r contain additional philosophical, astronomical and mathematical material. Oriental, 15th–16th c. [L] Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 4758/1, fols 1–101v (imhm F 17368; M 7). The beginning of the Introduction is missing. It contains also a small fragment of Pt 2 (99r–100v), fol. 99 is torn lengthwise; half of the fol. is lacking. 13 14

See Leicht, “Toward a History,” 275. In some manuscripts the beginning of the Introduction is missing. The sigla preceding various of the mss listed here are for future reference and are used in the apparatus to the edition.

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* M. Steinschneider, Catalogus Codicum Hebraeorum Bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno-Batavae (Leiden 1858), 53–60. Sephardic, 15th–16th c. [N] Oxford, Bodleian Library, Poc 343 (Uri 369), fols 1–104 (imhm F 22136; M 24). * A. Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (Oxford 1886–1906), vol. i, no. 1322; M. Beit-Arié / R.A. May, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. Supplement of Addenda et Corrigenda to vol. 1 (A. Neubauer’s Catalogue) (Oxford 1994), 220. Byzantine, 15 Iyar 5149 (1389). [O] Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich 551 (olim 414), fols 1–211 (imhm F 22135; M 22). * A. Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (Oxford 1886–1906), vol. i, no. 1321; M. Beit-Arié / R.A. May, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. Supplement of Addenda et Corrigenda to vol. 1 (A. Neubauer’s Catalogue) (Oxford 1994), 220, and cf. C. Sirat, Hebrew Manuscripts, 254–255; 302–304. Byzantine, c. 1300.15 [T] Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin–Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Or. Qu. 837, Band 1, fols 1–156; Band 2, fols 1–34 (imhm F 17879; M 1). * M. Steinschneider, Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin (Berlin 1897), 1:121–126 (no 259). Ashkenazi, 18th c. (?). [V] Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Ebr 338, fols 1r–323v (imhm F 377; M 38). * S. Assemanus and J. Assemanus, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae … I Codices ebraicos et samaritanos (Rome, 1756), 318–320; Benjamin Richler, ed. Hebrew Manuscripts in the Vatican Library. Catalogue (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana 2008), 287–288, and especially C. Sirat, Hebrew Manuscripts, 55–56, n. 12. Spain?, between end of 13th c. and 1379. The following incomplete mss comprise several sections of the part on natural philosophy:

15

For this date, see below, sections 2 and 3.

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[Lp] Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek B.H. 13/4, fols 26r–49v (imhm F 15679; M 8). Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On Sense, On the Soul. Contains also Metaphysics. * F. Delitzsch, Codices Hebraici ac Syriaci adiectis aliquot slavicis (Leipzig 1838), no. xxxix, 301–302. Saloniki, 1329. [M] Moscow, Russian State Library, Günzburg 1174, fols 1–101 (imhm F 48190; M 14). Physics, On the Heavens, Meteorology, one page of De Animalibus (contains also logic and sections of Part 2). * M. Steinschneider, Hebraeische Bibliographie 11 (1871): 43–44. Posen, 1 Cheshwan 1612. [P] Parma, Biblioteca Palatina 2769, De Rossi 421, fols 1r–214v (imhm F 13618; M 30). Middle of Animals ch. xiii; On the Soul, On Sense. Contains also Metaphysics, Treatise 1, Part 2 breaks off in Treatise 2. * G. Tamani/M. Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus versioni, commenti e compendi del Corpus Aristotelicum nei manoscritti ebraici delle biblioteche italiane (Venice 1997), 142, no. 88; M. Beit-Arié/B. Richler, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Palatina in Parma (Jerusalem 2001), 348, no. 1282. Oriental, 14th c. [Pr] Paris, Bibl. Nat. héb. 930/2, fols 61r–85r (imhm F 31966; M 27). On Sense (from end of Treatise 2), On the Soul. Contains also Metaphysics. *H. Zotenberg, Catalogues des manuscrits hébreux et samaritaines de la Bibliothèque Impériale (Paris 1866), 163; Sephardic/Italian., mid 14th c; 15th c. according to the imhm computerized catalogue. [R] Parma, Biblioteca Palatina 3023/7, De Rossi 771, fols 98v–144r (imhm F 13752; M 31). Introduction, logic, Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On Sense, On the Soul. Contains also Metaphysics. * G. Tamani/M. Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus versioni, commenti e compendi del Corpus Aristotelicum nei manoscritti ebraici delle biblioteche italiane (Venice 1997), 144–145, no. 93; M. Beit-Arié/B. Richler, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Palatina in Parma (Jerusalem 2001), 366, no. 1335/3.

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Prov. or Seph., 15th c. according to Tamani/Zonta; Italian, early 14th century, according to Beit-Arié/Richler. [W] Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Hebr. 42, 176 fols (imhm F 1319; M 41). Parts of Introduction, logic, end of On Sense, Metaphysics, On the Soul, parts of On Sense, Physics. * A.Z. Schwarz, Hebräische Handschriften der Nationalbibliothek in Wien (Leipzig 1925), 147. no. 137. The present order of fols is wrong: the end of On Sense starts on f. 74r, in the middle of the section on logic, and is followed by the section on Metaphysics. On the Soul starts on f. 116r, followed by On Sense and the rest of the section on logic. Physics starts on f. 162r and breaks off in Treatise vii. Sephardic/North African?, 14th c. Smaller portions belonging to the section on natural philosophy are found in: Cambridge, University Library, Add. 1031, fols 2r–36v (imhm F 17032; M 3). Part of Physics (contains also part of logic). * S.C. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library. A Description and Introduction (Cambridge 1997), 375–376. Provence, 15th c. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina 3024/1, fols 1v–4r (imhm F 13753; M 32). Small section of Meteorology (text breaks off at the beginning of Meteor. iv). * M. Beit-Arié/B. Richler, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Palatina in Parma (Jerusalem 2001), 366–367. Italy, early 14th c. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich 288 (imhm F 22378; M 19), fols 138r–142r, On Animals xi-beg. of xv. * A. Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (Oxford 1886–1906), vol. i, no. 1352. Italy, mid 16th–17th c. The Introduction (or parts of it), together with parts of the section on logic is moreover found in: New York, Jewish Theological Seminary 2301, fols 1r–32r (imhm F 28554; M 16), Italian, 16th c.

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St. Petersburg, Russian Nat. Libr. Evr. i. 417 (imhm F 52236; M 35), 8 fols, Byzantine, 15th c. St. Petersburg, Russian Nat. Libr. Evr. i. 418 (imhm F 52232; M 36), 10 fols, Byzantine, 15th c.

2

The Establishment of the Text: Preliminary Considerations

For a preliminary collation I selected those manuscripts that contain the complete text of the part on natural philosophy, or almost the complete text, to the exclusion of manuscript T, which is an eighteenth-century copy of O.16 Eight manuscripts, namely, A, B, C, D, L, N, O, and V meet this criterium, although in A, B and L the beginning of the Introduction is missing. Among these eight manuscripts, only N is dated (1389). ms O seems to be the oldest; it can be dated c. 1300 and perhaps even earlier.17 On the basis of watermarks B can be dated around 1350.18 The first deed of sale of V dates from 1380. This first collation was carried out on the basis of the Introduction of the mḥ and of representative portions of Physics, On the Heavens, Meteorology, as well as the first two Treatises of On Animals (pa xi–xii). Apart from the usual mechanical errors and mistakes in content, an important criterium for the reliability of the various text-witnesses is the rendering of the Arabic terms that are scattered throughout Judah’s text. As we have seen (Chapter Three, section 5), these terms can be considered to be the only remainder of Judah’s original Arabic text, and by the same token they reflect his Arabic sources. The spelling of these terms can thus be indicative for the degree of proximity to the Arabic version of Judah’s book or for familiarity with its Arabic background. The first collation revealed that these eight manuscripts can be divided into two main families, namely AOCV and BDLN, with regard to the spelling of Arabic terms, mechanical errors and separative readings. A significant finding was that, as a whole, the rendering and spelling of the Arabic terms is more accurate in the BDLN group than in the AOCV group. This last family can be further subdivided into CV and AO. Manuscript A turned out to be very close to, if not a direct copy of ms O, as is attested by the leʿazim and other annotations in the sections on the Physics and On the Soul that in O are written in the margins, and in A in the body of the text (cf. below, section 3). ms A moreover contains 16 17 18

Cf. above, n. 5. Sirat, Hebrew Manuscripts, 254–255 and 302–304. See also below, section 3. Cf. Beit-Arié, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts, 220. The watermarks are similar to Briquet no. 6679 and no. 3190.

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a number of errors that are not in O without offering interesting readings of its own. Hence it could be eliminated from consideration. Furthermore, although as a whole being more stable than the first group, the BDLN group could be subdivided into BN and DL. D and L contain several small shared omissions or errors not found in B and N. Moreover, both D and L are much stained and damaged; parts of them are illegible. On the basis of these findings I decided to collate manuscripts O, C, V, B, and N for the entire part on natural philosophy, while checking D and L only for specific passages. In addition, I occasionally consulted some of the manuscripts that carry only sections of the part on natural philosophy, in particular P, R, W, M, Lp for passages where OCVBN presented textual problems. More information on the five selected manuscripts is provided in the next section. Of the incomplete manuscripts, the following features are worth mentioning: Only two of them are dated: Lp (1329) and M (1612). According to M. BeitArié, manuscript R should be dated to the early fourteenth century, while Tamani and Zonta date it to the fifteenth century (cf. above, section 1). Among the partial mss, R and Lp carry the largest part of the books on natural philosophy. In both manuscripts, however, the sections on Meteorology and On Animals are lacking. Their absence is not due to a loss of text, the missing parts were either omitted by the copyist or already lacking in the manuscript from which the scribe was copying. Perhaps these sections were considered to be of less interest than the other books on natural philosophy. Another common feature of these two mss is that they both place On Sense before On the Soul, in contradistinction to the other manuscripts. Manuscript R, however, also carries the introduction of the mḥ and the section on logic, both of which are absent in Lp. Interestingly, the other texts found in ms Lp all bear on Maimonides’ Guide, and the last one is a copy of the Guide itself.19 The scribe notes that his exemplar was difficult to read which is why he left open space for passages that he could not read or understand. Lp and R have separative mistakes; R has more mistakes than Lp. R is not stable. It often conforms to BN, but at other times it shows proximity to OCV. Moreover, on various occasions it does not preserve the Arabic words. Lp has good readings at times (for example mḥ/Soul ii.12),

19

The other texts are: Sodot ha-Moreh; Perush ha-milot ha-zarot; Beʾur Moreh Nevukhim; Sefer ha-Sekhel we-ha-muskalot le-al-Farabi, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Introduction to the Guide. ms Pr appears to be related to R and Lp as is testified by a number of shared variants, omissions or mistakes and by the order: in Pr the section on On Sense also precedes that of On the Soul. In some cases, however, R and Pr have the same mistake, where Lp has not.

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which make emendations in the text unnecessary, but it is often illegible (for example, mḥ/Soul ii.18, beginning), but, as noted, in other places it has omissions. The other incomplete manuscripts (P, W, M) contain considerably less of the sections belonging to natural philosophy. Therefore, the following conclusions, based on the comparison of various problematic passages can only be tentative: – P is very close to C. The same applies to Cambridge, Add 1031. – M is very close to O. It features some of the leʿazim of O in the sections on Physics. Moreover, it shares with O an addition to the definition of nature with some slight variants (mḥ/Physics ii.2, cf. below, section 3.3). The copyist, Simha b. Isaac from Posen, took the book to be by Aristotle; Senior Sachs identified it as Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. Sol. Dubnow received it as a gift 18 Nissan 1788 in Amsterdam. – W starts at the end of the Introduction and besides logic and Metaphysics comprises only Physics, On the Soul and On Sense. The order of the folios is garbled (cf. above, section 1). According to A. Schwarz, it can be dated to the fourteenth century. This manuscript belongs to the BN family. It offers a stable text; in most cases it renders the Arabic terms correctly.

3

Characteristics of the Selected mss B, C, N, O and V

Before discussing the interrelation between mss B, C, N, O and V in more detail (section 4), I will first present some characteristics of each of these manuscripts, starting with B and N, and then move on to the OCV family. 3.1 ms B ms B, written in a beautiful Sephardi hand, is usually very legible, except for the first folio.20 Chapter headings are in larger letters, and from the section on Physics up to fol. 59r (in pa xiii) they are written in red ink, although not consistently. Arabic words are usually indicated by strokes above the letters. There are not many copying mistakes; a later hand has written some minor corrections in the margin. In Physics vii one finds a longer annotation in a later hand at the bottom of fols 38v–39r. The ms contains the whole of Pt 1, but unfortunately the beginning of the Introduction is missing (corresponding to mḥ/Introd.

20

According to Neubauer, it is much stained, but this is not the case in the sections on natural philosophy. In the section on Metaphysics and Treatise 1 it becomes indeed less legible. The first fol. is also stained and a bit damaged, and shows signs of restoration.

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1–10 and a part of 11 in my edition). The opening words of the text in the ms read: ‫ ומה שנפרט בו כל מקום ממנה‬with a space left open at the beginning of the line.21 These Hebrew words form part of mḥ/Introd. 11 (towards the end of the passage, p. 320, line 20) where Judah describes the contents of Ptolemy’s Quadripartitum ii. On the top of fol. 1r two partly illegible indented lines are written in a different hand: [?‫ספר חכמת העולם ויקרא שמו ספר כתאב אל ביאן וחכ]מת‬ ‫ודיני הכוכבים חבר ר׳ תנחום‬ ‫זצ״ל‬

The placement of these lines and the fact that they are indented suggest that they were intended to be read as the title of the book: Kitāb al-Bayān by R. Tanḥum ha-Yerushalmi. These lines were later put between brackets, and someone has written “false” before the first word. Moreover, between this “title” and the beginning of the text the following three lines have been added:22 ‫ אותו[ העולם והיסודות ונקראים בתוכו‬:‫והנה נאצל תחלה על אורי ]צ״ל‬ ‫משמי השמים על הארץ והגשמים ונקרא ספר דיני הכוכבים‬ ‫ספר ד מאמרות א בכללות זאת החכמה ב בחלוק הארץ‬

These lines are an abridged (and somewhat corrupt) rendering of the beginning of mḥ/Introd. 11: ‫ שכמו ששמי‬.‫וחלק המעשה הוא פעולות אלו הגופים העליונים בזה העולם התחתון‬ ‫השמים נעבדים לשמים שהוא העולם העליון כך הארץ נעבדת לשמי השמים והכל מכח‬ ‫ כיצד? מאמר הק׳ב׳ה׳ נאצל תחלה על אותו עולם הנקרא שמים ומהשמים‬.‫הק׳ב׳ה׳‬ .‫נאצל על שמי השמים ומשמי השמים על הארץ‬ ‫ותלמי חיבר בזה הענין הנקרא דיני הכוכבים ספר ד׳ מאמרות א בכללות זאת החכמה‬ ‫ב בחלוק הארץ‬

Five lines later, in the description of “divine science,” the name of Aristotle as the author of the thirteen books of Metaphysics has been substituted by that of R. Tanḥum ha-Yerushalmi. This is noted in the margin as “spurious.” The same 21 22

Fol. 1r (a later numbering). Although it is clear that the text has been tampered with in the first lines of fol. 1r, it is not so easy to see where the original text begins. It looks as if some words were erased and written anew in an attempt to imitate the style of the original copyist.

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happens later on in the Introduction (mḥ/Introd. 14), where the name of Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen has been erased and substituted by that of R. Tanḥum. The picture that emerges is that at some point someone provided the manuscript with a spurious title and author, ascribing the work to R. Tanḥum, presumably in an attempt to enhance the chances of selling it. Perhaps the first folio was already missing at that time, or the falsifier removed it. In all probability this was done in the East, where R. Tanḥum (c. 1220–1291) enjoyed considerable authority, and where his contemporary from the West will have been less known, so that the risk of discovery was smaller.23 The title Kitāb alBayān (Book of Explanation) apparently refers to Kitāb al-ījāz wa-ʾl bayān (“The Book of Simplification and Elucidation”), Tanḥum’s commentary on the Bible, but the title is so general that it could in fact cover everything. Since R. Tanḥum was well versed in several disciplines, including philosophy, it would be fitting to connect his name with an encyclopedic work.24 Judah’s name has also been tampered with in the heading of the section on logic immediately following the introduction, which is written in larger script. Unfortunately, however, the falsifier overlooked a later passage of the Introduction (mḥ/Introd. 22), where Judah’s name has remained intact, probably because here it was not written in large characters. 3.2 ms N Except for the beginning, this dated manuscript (1389) is usually very legible. The chapter headings are written in larger characters and some of them are decorated (only in the beginning). Often the last words of a part or section are indicated by three dots above letters. Arabic words are indicated by two strokes above the word. In one instance, N seems to have had access to Arabic words

23 24

Oral communication by Dr Uri Melammed. See Dascalu, A Philosopher of Scripture, 22–23. The extensive introduction to Tanḥum’s commentary is entitled Kitāb al-Kulliyāt. This last word is of course very similar to the Hebrew kelalot, which appears in the first lines of the manuscript. This may have been helpful in misleading the reader/buyer of the manuscript regarding the name of the author and the title of the work. In an e-m communication (July 2019) Prof. P. Fenton informed me that a few manuscripts in the Bodleian Library “acquired by Huntingdon and Pococke during their stay in Aleppo have forged titles. This was probably done by those who sold the mss to these clergymen in order to increase their commercial value. Indeed, Tanhum, though a secondary figure in Jewish literature, was overrated by Western scholars and was given exaggerated importance, because they acquired many of his works. By putting his name on a ms, its value thus went up. I presume that mh was acquired by them or sold to Oxford by someone who was aware of this interest.” I wish to thank Prof. Fenton for this information. See also Fenton, “Moritz Steinschneider’s Contribution,” 371–372.

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that are not found in the other mss.25 At times there are references to “another version” (‫)נ׳א‬, for example in mḥ/Meteor. i.1 and in the Introduction 24, where an alternative term for “the void” is listed (requt instead of panuy). Occasionally, an alternative technical term is noted in the margin as a clarification of a somewhat unusual term that appears in the body of the text.26 There are some marginal notes by a later user, for example on f. 32v: ‫וזו גדר הטבע‬. At times, arrows or pointers (in the form of a hand) appear in the margin. Moreover, there are some corrections in the margin or between the lines, either by the scribe or in a different hand. The letters waw and yod are sometimes hard to distinguish, and the same applies to waw and final nun. The manuscript displays many copying mistakes, mostly dittographies or omission per homoioteleuton, or words in which a letter is lacking (cf. section 4.ii). 3.3 ms O ms O is a most intriguing manuscript. As mentioned above, this ms was probably once complete, but in its present form lacks a considerable portion of Part 2 . It is one of the oldest, perhaps the oldest preserved manuscript of the mḥ. In her 2002 book Hebrew Manuscripts of the Middle Ages C. Sirat dates it to c. 1300, and perhaps even a bit earlier: the manuscript was sold several times, but it is uncertain how one of the deeds of sale should be read: 1287/88 or 1597/98. Sirat considers this last interpretation more likely.27 Yet even if this deed was not the first but the last of the deeds of sale, the manuscript was apparently copied fairly close in time to Judah’s composition of the Hebrew version of the work. The four deeds of sale show that the manuscript circulated in Karaite circles in Thrace and later in Crimea.28 According to S. Bowman, who translated the deeds, they illustrate the history of Karaite settlement in Greece in the fourteenth century.29 The script is Byzantine; it was written either in the Byzantine

25 26

27

28 29

See mḥ/pa xiii.1 n. 1. See mḥ/Introd. 24. For example, the term ayn (privation) is explained as heʿder. In mḥ/pa xii.1 the term golem (matter) appears twice in the body of the text. The first time N writes the alternative term ḥomer in the margin and the second time hiyuli. On Judah’s idiosyncratic terminology, see Chapter Three, section 5.4. C. Sirat provides a description and specimen of this ms on pp. 302–304. Here she writes that the manuscript was copied c. 1300 (p. 303). She discusses the deeds of sale on pp. 254– 255. In her article “À la cour de Frédéric ii” the date is given as “before 1288”. ms M, now in the Russian State Library in Moscow, is related to it; this ms is Fischl 26, see Steinschneider, Hebr. Bibl. 11 (1871), 43–44. ms D is also Karaite (Fischl 25), see ibid., p. 41. Bowman, The Jews of Byzantium, 253. For the translations see 232; 252–253; 292 (cf. also p. 278, no. 78*). Bowman notes that “the question of the influence of this book upon fourteenth-century Karaite philosophical treatises has not yet been examined” (p. 232).

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region or in southern Italy. For the largest part the manuscript is quite legible, although less so in the Introduction and towards the end. Chapter headings are in larger script or in bold; Arabic words are sometimes marked, but not consistently. At times, proper names and biblical verses are also marked. What is particularly interesting about this ms is that it contains a number of additions to the text, in the form of glosses in the margin, in the body of the text or between the lines, written in the same hand as the main text. This occurs notably in the sections on Physics and On the Soul. Some of these comments concern or contain leʿazim. The leʿazim are in Italo-Romance vulgar as spoken in northern Italy.30 A list of the leʿazim and comments is presented in the Appendix to this Introduction, where they are numbered in the order of appearance. The comments in this manuscript concern explanations or additions to the text, and are sometimes introduced by ‫פ׳‬. The longest addition in the body of the text is that on f. 46v (Physics ii.1), on the definition of “nature” (Appendix, no. 3). As for the marginal annotations, in a few instances the scribe indented some lines so as to leave space for them; they thus form part of the copying process. This occurs in the section on the Physics (f. 46r: comments on privation, Appendix, no. 1, and on the material form, Appendix, no. 2; f. 49r on the definition of time, Appendix, no. 7). In the survey of Metaphysics (f. 103r) the scribe also left some space for an explanatory remark. In some cases, however, the comments exceed the limits of the indented space.31 In the section On the Soul the explanatory notes are either incorporated in the text or found in the margin without indent. Other marginal annotations indicate the topic of discussion without further comment, in particular in the section on pn.32 There are also sporadic marginal notes that are corrections, sometimes in a later hand. Several of the leʿazim and comments have found their way into other manuscripts that belong to the family of ms O, in particular T and A. ms T, which is a late copy of ms O,33 also features the indents of its model. The scribe of A has inserted the comments into the body of the text but has not copied all the leʿazim. Among the other mss, only M and ms Cambridge, Add 1031 contain some of the leʿazim in the section on Physics, but these two manuscripts do not 30 31 32

33

I am grateful to Cyril Aslanov for his help in identifying the vernacular terms. The comment on the author’s speech impediment (f. 184r, cf. above, Chapter One) is also written next to an indented space. For example, f. 94v: “the definition of nature”, and fols 95v, 96v: “the judgments of the intellect”; or f. 98v: “these two are material causes,” and “final cause.” In the section on Metaphysics some marginal annotations are also found. The section on logic (f. 39v) contains a long annotation on the premises in the syllogism. Cf. above, n. 5.

286

introduction to the edition

carry the section On the Soul. The long addition on the definition of nature also surfaces in these three manuscripts.34 In M it is introduced by the words: ‫הגהת‬ ‫( מורי‬note by my teacher). These words are lacking in O, and unfortunately, it is impossible to determine who this teacher may be. Do these words refer to someone in the environment of the scribe of M, who copied it in 1612 in Posen, or, as seems more likely, to a teacher in the environment of the scribe of O? Interestingly, at times the marginal comments in O display a terminology that is different from the body of the text: for “subject” nose is often (but not always) written instead of Judah’s muṣaʿ, for “definition”gader instead of gevul, and for “moving” mitnoʿeʿa instead of Judah’s usual mitnaʿneʿa. In the section on On the Soul one addition reads shelemut (“perfection,” or “entelecheia”) instead of Judah’s tashlum. As was explained in Chapter Three (section 5.4), Judah’s Hebrew terminology is quite unusual, while the technical terms as given in the comments are more common, and are used, for example, in the Hebrew translations of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Physics. Some of O’s comments (Appendix, nos 1 and 20) appear to have a parallel in Averroes’ Middle Commentary. At regular intervals this manuscript moreover indicates a reading as false by two dots above the word, without, however, correcting it. It is difficult to establish whether the scribe of O or a later user marked these false readings. All in all, then, the manuscript clearly reveals traces of study. As to the whens and hows of these additions, however, nothing can be said with certainty. At first sight one might suppose that we have to do with a learned scribe who carefully studied the text and adduced other sources. This assumption, however, does not sit well with the fact that ms O is plagued by many scribal errors and misreadings (see examples below, section 4), errors that one would not expect from a learned scribe. Therefore, it seems more likely that the scribe of O found the additional material already in the copy he was working from, and for some reason found it worthwhile to copy this material also, perhaps with a view to completeness or in an attempt to enhance the value of his work. On this hypothesis, and seeing that the manuscript is dated to c. 1300 if not earlier, the comments and additions would go back to a period that is fairly close to the time that Judah translated his work (1247). In this regard the author’s statement that he translated his composition at the request of friends who did not know Arabic comes to mind. It is not impossible that the annotations reflect the

34

The scribe of O made a mistake in the word-order here, writing ‫במאמר במדרגת‬, which he (or someone else) corrected by indicating the proper order ‫ במדרגת מאמר‬by dots above the words. A and M have the correct order, but T has not.

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287

study of the text by students in a setting, with or without a teacher, where questions raised by the text were discussed and where some terms were explained in the vernacular. The fact that the explanatory material is found in particular in the sections on Physics and On the Soul may indicate that these portions attracted most attention. It is tempting to speculate whether this interest had anything to do with the translation activity of Zeraḥya ben Shealtiel or with Hillel of Verona’s philosophical endeavor, and whether the Hebrew texts by these authors were consulted by students or copyists of the Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. However, the scribe of ms O himself does not seem to have been directly connected to the environment where the comments originated for he experienced difficulties with the Arabic terms. Some examples of corrupted Arabic words will be given below. At times O displays lacunae where mss of the BNLD family have an Arabic term. This probably indicates that the scribe copied from a model that contained these terms, but that he did not understand them, and therefore decided to leave an open space, perhaps with the intention to supply them later on. As noted, the leʿazim point to central or northern Italy while the script is Byzantine. Although the possibility that the text was studied in the Byzantine region at that stage cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that O was copied by a Byzantine scribe in Italy where there was cultural exchange between the various Jewish communities.35 On this assumption the scribe had access to a model that circulated in Italy and that was very close to Judah’s own time. If we have to do with a Byzantine scribe this may also explain his unfamiliarity with the Arabic terms. 3.4 ms C In this manuscript the treatises on natural philosophy are numbered in the margin from 1 to 7 (aleph–zayn); the section on Metaphysics is numbered as 8 (ḥet). Chapter headings are in larger font. Several elements in the text are marked by dots above the letters, such as the names of Aristotle’s books in the introduction, biblical quotations and Arabic words. The same applies to words that the scribe apparently wished to emphasize; a case in point is Judah’s statement in Soul i that he will omit the opinions of Aristotle’s predecessors on the soul. Occasionally there are marginal annotations in the same hand that record

35

For examples of Hebrew manuscripts that display features of different cultural regions, see Bos et al., “A Glossary,” 177. As noted in Chapter Seven, n. 153, Abulafia refers to a manuscript of Judah’s work, of which a part was missing. Idel conjectures that this was in Messina. It is tempting to speculate on the relation between this manuscript and (the provenance of) O, but nothing can be said with certainty.

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the reading of another manuscript, indicated by sefer aḥer or lashon aḥer.36 It also contains some corrections, written on small slips of paper glued to the fols. On the top of the first fol. of this ms, above the beginning of the introduction, four lines are written that start with the words: ‫זה ספר מדרש הכמה אשר חבר אותו הפילוסוף הגדול הרב ר׳ יהודה הכהן בר׳ שלמה‬ .‫( בן מתקה‬s.l. ‫הכהן )נ׳ע׳ש׳ן‬

followed by the admonition to scribes not to copy only parts of the work. As far as I am aware, this is the only place in the section on natural philosophy where the author is referred to as Ben Matqa, the appellation that is found in some modern textbooks of medieval Jewish philosophy.37 A special feature of this ms is that at times it has a few additional words that are not found in other mss. These additions do not concern philosophical content but provide extra information on persons, books, or they are cross-references. For example, when referring to Frederick ii it adds: inperador.38 Other features that point to a tendency to completeness (or repetition) in C: unlike the other manuscripts, the beginning of the section on zoology repeats that the first ten treatises (the reference is to the History of Animals) are more concerned with ḥokhmat hahigayyon, an observation that was also made in the description of On Animals in the Introduction. In ga xvii.1 where reference is made to the Dorqeti family, a family that was already mentioned in ga xv.10, C is the only manuscript to repeat the information given in the earlier passage. Likewise, at the beginning of pn C writes the title as ‫ספר המורגש והמרגיש‬, the title that is also given in the other manuscripts, but adds an alternative title: ‫ונקרא גם כן ספר החוש‬ ‫והמוחש‬. At the end of Heavens ii.10 (on the stars) it has a more extensive reference to mḥ Pt ii than that found in in the other manuscripts. In the Intro, where Judah writes that Treatise 3 is about Haggadot, ms C has: “Haggadot that are taken from the Talmud.” An example of a more detailed cross-reference is Heavens i.4: the text refers to Physics v (‫)ה׳ מהשמע‬, and C writes the number in full, saying: Treatise Five of the Book of the Akroasis of the Physics (‫חמישי מספר‬ ‫)השמעי מהטבע‬. In general it writes numbers in full. In Heavens iv.6 it writes ‫ תיקון מלאכה‬instead of the Aramaic word ‫ליזבז‬, presumably in an attempt to make the text more understandable. In the Introduction the name of Ptolemy

36 37 38

For example, fol. 38r al-hiyuli -> lashon aḥer: ha-ḥomer. On this appellation, see above Chapter One, n. 18. I do not know of any other source or passage where Judah ha-Cohen is referred to as “the great philosopher.” For the different spellings of Frederick’s name, see Weber, Studies on R. Yaʿaqov Anatoli, 267 n. 534.

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is given as ‫ בטלמיוס‬or ‫ בתלמיוס‬instead of the Hebraized form ‫תלמי‬, and Aristotle’s name is written in full (‫)אריסטוטאליס‬. It also displays a tendency to correct grammatical “mistakes,” such as incongruence between masculine and feminine forms. 3.5 ms V As noted above, ms V, written in a Sephardi hand, is the most complete manuscript. Nonetheless, some fols are missing: the very last one (f. 324, belonging to Treatise 3), which C. Sirat has located in ms Vatican 428/9 (no 40 in Manekin’s list), and one between fols 115 and 116. Fols 111–112 (in the section on On Sense) are in a later hand, copied from another manuscript to replace lost fols.39 In the section on Physics one fol has disappeared between fols 50v and 51r, as a result of which the text corresponding to ii.4 (from ‫ וישיב‬ed. p. 352.13) until the end of iii.2 (‫ נענוע‬ed. p. 358.10) is missing. Moreover, the order is completely mixed up in Physics vi–viii (fols 53v17–55v16): Physics vi starts on f. 53v, but in line 18 after the words ‫( יחצוב מתנענע‬vi.2, ed. p. 374.10) the scribe continues with ‫ =( שבמורגשות והאיכות‬vii.5, ed. p. 380.12). He then goes on to copy the rest of vii, followed by the beginning of viii, until viii.3 ‫( וגם ביאר ממנו נצחית‬f. 54v17, ed. p. 386.11). At that point, apparently noticing his oversight, he goes on to supply the missing text of vi.2-vii.5 (fols 54v17– 55v16), after which he continues to copy the rest of viii (until the end of 56r). The most plausible explanation for this disorder is that the scribe overlooked a page or column from the model he was copying from, and when he realized it supplied the missing text. In these sections there are moreover several omissions per homoioteleuton. Unfortunately, the manuscript displays many incorrect readings. Occasionally it has corrections in the margin, for example at ga xvi.1 or indicates mistakes. Biblical verses are usually indicated with dots above the words. Towards the end it becomes far less legible due to corrosive ink. Yet an interesting feature of this manuscript is that Part 1 contains marginal annotations taken from Abraham Ibn Daud’s Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, from those sections where Ibn Daud adduces biblical verses, which, in his view, allude to or confirm the truth of the philosophical teachings presented by

39

I wish to thank Prof. C. Sirat for kindly putting at my disposal her own detailed description of this Vatican manuscript. Cf. also Sirat, “À la cour de Frédéric ii,” 55 and Richler, Hebrew Manuscripts, 288 and 370. ms Vat. ebr. 428, f. 135v contains a deed of sale of the manuscript in 5180 = 1419/20 or 5183 = 1422/3. The names of the owners were erased but the phrasing of the deed shows that the seller was a woman: ‫הנה אנכי הנזכרת מודית שמכרתי‬.

290

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him. These annotations are introduced by Ibn Daud’s own words: ketuvim romezim, or ketuvim meʿidim, followed by quotations from Ibn Daud’s treatise.40 In all probability the author of the annotations considered the subject of Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, namely the harmony between philosophy and religion, and Ibn Daud’s attempts to establish this harmony, to be relevant to the contents of the mḥ. Thus, this ms, too, was studied.

4

The Interrelation between mss B, C, N, O and V

In order to establish the interrelation between mss B, C, N, O and V and to determine which manuscript could best serve as the basis for my edition I adopted the following criteria for the full collation: (i) the rendering/spelling of the Arabic terms; (ii) the occurrence of mechanical mistakes, and of (iii) mistakes in content. It can immediately be said that this stage of the collation corroborated the findings of the preliminary probes (see above, section 2). In what follows I will summarize my findings. 4.1

Ad (i) Comparison of the Way in which the Arabic Terms Are Rendered or Spelled As noted, the mḥ contains a large number of Arabic terms. All in all, Part 2 displays over hundred Arabic terms (in Hebrew characters) that at times are written after the corresponding Hebrew term and at others without any Hebrew equivalent at all.41 Where possible, I checked these Arabic terms against the Arabic sources underlying Judah’s expositions, that is, Averroes’ Middle Commentaries and Epitomes that are extant in Arabic. As a rule, mss B and N have preserved the Arabic terms much better than group OCV where these words are often corrupted. In several instances OCV simply omit Arabic terms that are found in BN. Examples are mḥ/Intro 324.14 (‫ ) ׄטן בערבי‬and mḥ/Physics 374.3 (‫)אנאת בערבית‬. In other cases OCV render the Arabic terms incorrectly, for example in mḥ/pa 488.14 (‫ הדרון‬for ‫אלדרוז‬, sutures); mḥ/Soul 622.4 (‫ תטוית‬for ‫ תסויט‬sound), and

40

41

On these annotations, see Fontaine, “Abraham Ibn Daud and the Midrash ha-Hokhmah.” Abraham Ibn Daud wrote his philosophical book in Arabic in Toledo in 1160/1161; it was translated into Hebrew twice during the second half of the fourteenth century. The quotations are in all probability taken from Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, not from Ha-Emunah ha-Nissaʾah. Both translations are now available in the edition by A. Eran (2019). On the Arabic terms in the mḥ, see Appendix B and Fontaine, “Arabic Terms.”

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291

mḥ/Soul 644.7 (‫אלעקל אלמסתפאר‬42 for ‫אלעקל אלמסתפאד‬, the acquired intellect), whereas BN provide the correct form (in transliteration). Conversely, there are also some cases where OCV preserve the correct Arabic term while BN do not, as in mḥ/gc 424.4 where BN omit ‫ מעאדן בערבית‬and in mḥ/pa 500.8, where OCV give the correct Arabic term for “spade.” These cases, however, are much fewer than those where OCV omit or corrupt Arabic words.43 Moreover, mss O, C and V display among themselves more differences in the rendering of the Arabic than ms B and N. There are, for example, cases where O indicates by a lacuna that something is missing (that is, an Arabic term that is found in B and N), and CV omit the word(s) without a lacuna. Examples of differences in OCV: in mḥ/Meteor. 462.9 where O has an open space for the words ‫ ׄגוהר לטיף הואי‬, but CV do not indicate this. In another passage (mḥ/Heavens 412.11 the Arabic word ‫ וההיולאני‬is missing in OCV, and this is indicated in O and C by a lacuna, but not in V. Another example of variation among the manuscripts of this group is mḥ/Meteor. 448.5 where O spells the Arabic word for “flow” (mudd according to BN) as ‫ מד‬with a dot on the ‫ד‬, V ‫ מד‬without a dot, and C has apparently read the ‫ ד‬as a numeral and writes ‫מארבע‬. In mḥ/Meteor. 472.10 O writes the Arabic ‫( נייה‬raw) incorrectly as ‫כי‬, but C has the correct reading. Although the absence of Arabic words is sometimes better visible in O, this manuscript displays also some curious mistakes in the spelling of Arabic terms. I mention two instances: (1) instead of the Arabic ‫“( ולאעדמהא‬and due to its privations”), O splits up the word into ‫ ולא עדה מהא‬which makes no sense (mḥ/Soul 648.6); (2) in the Introduction O (336.16) renders the Arabic ‫“( באלאסתקרא‬by induction”) as ‫באל אם תקרא‬, even though this term appears correctly in the section on logic in the same manuscript. All in all, then, mss B and N can be shown to be more stable and reliable in their rendering of the Arabic terms, and thus to be more familiar with the vocabulary underlying Judah’s text, while the manuscripts of the OCV group

42 43

Misspellings with resh instead of dalet in Arabic terms are very common in this group of manuscripts. Mention should be made of one instance in which OCVNB all have a corrupted Arabic term: in mḥ/Soul 594.12 they read ‫אלא מי הו‬, where on the basis of the Arabic source, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Soul, one would expect instead ‫אלתצוור‬. It is hard to explain where and how this corruption originated.

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seem to go back to a Vorlage written by a copyist who did not always understand the Arabic terms. 4.2 Ad (ii) Mechanical Errors Mechanical errors such as omissions or dittography are of course found in each manuscript, but in general the OCV-group displays more such errors than BN, and N has significantly more errors, for example, missing words, than B. When mechanical errors are common to one group as a whole the text can usually be supplemented or corrected by the other group. For example, in mḥ/Soul ii.13 the missing words ‫ יתחייב … ההיולאני‬in OCV can be supplied by BN, whereas further on in that passage BN omit the words ‫ וישיג … מהצורות‬that are found in OCV. mss V and N appear to be particularly prone to omissions per homoioteleuton, while mss B and C have the least. The scribe of N was not very accurate. Quite frequently single words or one letter of a word are missing.44 There are also more cases of dittography in this manuscript, and in one case, in the section on On Sense, the scribe writes the same words even four times.45 In some instances the scribe seems to have caught his mistakes himself since at times we find him correcting a mistake immediately in the text after the word he misspelled. B and N have some shared omissions (as in mḥ/Phys. iii.3 and mḥ/gc ii.7), but in most cases where words are missing in N, B has the complete text. As noted above, ms V mixes up the order of mḥ/Physics vi–viii. 4.3 Ad (iii) Errors with Respect to Content mss O and V have relatively more errors with respect to content than mss B, N, and C, as is revealed by a comparison with Averroes’ commentaries in Arabic where these are extant, and/or their Hebrew translations (by Moses Ibn Tibbon, Jacob ben Machir, Kalonymus), and sometimes from a comparison with Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim, which is likewise based on Averroes’ commentaries. To begin with, there are of course certain mistakes that are common to all five manuscripts: in mḥ/gc 420.7, for example the Hebrew text seems to be corrupt. All manuscripts read here ‫ יגמרו‬instead of ‫( יפרו‬for “to grow” Judah uses the quite unusual term ‫פרה‬, which probably explains the confusion). Such cases are, however, seldom. In general, there are far more cases where the OCVfamily reveals a mistake than those where the BN family has mistakes.

44 45

Examples: mḥ/Phys. 344.8: ‫ מוקמין‬for ‫ ;מוקדמים‬mḥ/Phys. 364.1: ‫ לעמומית‬for ‫לעקמומית‬. See mḥ/Sense ii[3].4, app. ad locum.

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Examples of common errors of OCV:

mḥ

OCV

Correct reading in BN

Physics 360.5 gc 420.6 gc 420.7 Meteor. 466.2 pa 502.14 pa 522.1 ga 536.7

‫לאש תקח‬ ‫בעליתו‬ ‫שתגבל‬ ‫שיעופו‬ ‫הושט‬ ‫שלם‬ ‫פסק‬

‫לא שתקח‬ ‫כלילתו‬ ‫שתבדל‬ ‫שיטפו‬ ‫הושם‬ ‫של ים‬ ‫פרק‬

Examples of common errors of BN:

mḥ

BN

Correct reading in OCV

Physics 366.3 Heavens 410.6 Meteor. 476.4 Meteor. 478.5 ga 558.14 ga 562.6

‫תניע‬ ‫לפזור‬ ‫הצמח השנוי‬ ‫יעשה‬ ‫בחלבון‬ ‫המתפשט‬

‫תציע‬ ‫לעזור‬ ‫הצמר השרוי‬ ‫יעלה‬ ‫בחלמון‬ ‫הנתפסות‬

Furthermore, as was the case with the Arabic terms, mss O, C and V appear to display a greater variety of mistakes and different readings among themselves than mss B and N. ms O is particularly prone to mistakes, and the same can be said of V. The following table presents examples of errors in ms O:

mḥ

O

Correct reading

Physics 366.7 Heavens 408.7 Meteor. 454.11 Meteor. 466.7

‫בחמש‬ ‫יותר‬ ‫בשני‬ ‫בליל‬

‫בחדש‬ ‫חתר‬ ‫בש״ס‬ ‫בצל‬

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(cont.)

mḥ

O

Correct reading

pa 504.5 pa 512.13 pa 526.17 ga 568.9–10 Soul 612.8 Soul 626.13

‫המוח‬ ‫בבשר‬ ‫הריאה‬ ‫דיות‬ ‫שיתחזקו‬ ‫האבר‬

‫הרוח‬ ‫בשאר‬ ‫הלידה‬ ‫די להיות‬ ‫שיתחקקו‬ ‫האויר‬

Many more examples can be given. Some of the errors of ms O (and V) are reading-errors, while others seem to be the result of ‘dictée intérieure’ or ‘shorttime memory’: the scribe remembers for a short while what he is to copy and repeats it to himself, a process in which errors are likely to occur. A curious mistake occurs in mḥ/ga xvii.1 where O has the incomprehensible ‫דוקטי שמוליתה‬ instead of ‫דורקטי שמולידות‬. This mistake is the more remarkable since it repeats information that was given in mḥ/ga xv.10 on the Dorqeti family and refers to a Talmudic passage. Apparently at times the scribe was not paying much attention to what he was writing. Examples of errors in ms V:

mḥ

V

Correct reading

Introd. 318.4 pa 4 ga 544.2 ga 546.9

‫נזונית‬ ‫הרחם וחם הרחם‬ ‫הקושי‬ ‫לילי‬

‫נזועית‬ ‫החרס ועב החרס‬ ‫הכושי‬ ‫והכלי‬

Occasionally, C and V share the same mistakes, but C is far more accurate than V, for V has many minor errors that are not shared by C. C has had access to O (or to a manuscript that was very close to O), as is attested by some marginal variant readings indicated by ‫ ס״א‬that correspond to readings in O.46 We also come

46

See mḥ/Soul ii.17–18.

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across instances where O and V have the same lacuna, whereas C has the full text.47 In some cases a variant reading written in O above the line or in the margin appears in C and V in the text: in mḥ/Introd. 324.3 O has ‫ גזירה‬above ‫סברא‬, and C and V have both readings in the body of the text (‫)גזירה סברא‬. A case of shared contamination in OCV is found in mḥ/Physics viii.3 where these manuscripts have two terms for “rest.” C and V reveal also other common instances of contamination. In other cases, however, only ms C inserts a marginal gloss of O in the text (mḥ/Heavens 402.12: ‫מציאות ד׳ יסודות בהכרח‬ ‫)ממציאות הגלגלג‬. Like B, C has relatively few separative errors.48 In general, the OCV group is less stable than B and N. At times, V shares a reading with B and N, either a mistake or a variant reading, and there are also instances where O agrees with B and N, although this occurs less frequently. It is important to note that each of the selected mss occasionally offers good readings or a complete text where other manuscripts have a mistake or an omission; therefore, they are all valuable for the establishment of the text. This also applies to ms O and ms V, even though these manuscripts display relatively many errors. The value of C lies in the fact that it is relatively free from the copying-mistakes of O and V, which suggests that it had access to a Vorlage that contained a better text. On the other hand, as noted, C shows clear traces of explanatory additions that do not necessarily derive from Judah’s own text (cf. above). 4.4 Variant Readings Most of the mistakes mentioned thus far are due to misreadings or copy-errors. At this point, however, we have to consider variant readings between the two groups OCV and BN of a different type. These variant readings concern changes in word-order, grammatical differences or different technical terms. The following tables show representative examples of such variant readings. Changes in word-order:

47 48

In mḥ/gc 426.13 O and V have a lacuna after the letters ‫ כש‬where C has ‫כשאנחנו נעמוד‬ (BN: ‫)כשנעמוד‬. A few examples: B writes ‫ יולה‬instead of ‫( יוליד‬mḥ/Heavens 404.4); ‫ מאשר‬instead of ‫משאר‬ (mḥ/pa 494.3) and ‫ שהאור‬for ‫( שהאויר‬mḥ/Meteor. 442.5). C writes ‫ קדמות העולם‬instead of ‫( הקדמות‬mḥ/Introd. 334.3) and ‫ עורבים‬instead of ‫( עור בין‬mḥ/pa 500.7).

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Edition mḥ

OCV

BN

Introd. 324.16 Heavens 408.3 Heavens 410.5 Meteor. 440.9 Meteor. 474.12–13

‫במריבה לעולם‬ ‫באיחור ומיהור‬ ‫למטה ומעלה‬ ‫לח וקר‬ ‫מהן קשה ומהן רך‬

‫לעולם במריבה‬ ‫במיהור ואיחור‬ ‫למעלה ומטה‬ ‫קר ולח‬ ‫מהן רך ומהן קשה‬

Variants in grammar (conjunctions, prepositions or verbal forms):

Edition mḥ

OC(V*)

BN

Introd. 332.3 and Physics 364.9 Introd. 330.2 Physics 348.6 Physics 352.2 Physics 384.16 gc 436.10 Meteor. 440.9 Meteor. 448.12 Meteor. 454.1 Meteor. 460.7 Meteor. 466.1 Meteor. 468.10 Meteor. 470.12

‫אבל‬ ‫לידע‬ ‫כגון מי‬ ‫זולתי‬ ‫כמו‬ ‫שיהיה‬ ‫אלא‬ ‫באמצעות‬ ‫בעבור‬ ‫ליצא‬ ‫כאשר‬ ‫כיצד‬ ‫נתערבו‬

‫אך‬ ‫לדעת‬ ‫כמי‬ ‫בלעדי‬ ‫כגון‬ ‫שיהא‬ ‫כי אם‬ ‫על ידי‬ ‫מפני‬ ‫לצאת‬ ‫כמו‬ ‫היאך‬ ‫היו מתערבין‬

(V*: sometimes V shares the reading with OC, but not always.)

Variant technical terms:

Edition mḥ

OCV

BN

Introd. 316.6 Physics 344.13 Physics 350.4 Physics 382.1

‫אד‬ ‫מהנמצאים‬ ‫צד‬ ‫שבכמהות‬

‫הבל‬ ‫מהמצואים‬ ‫דרך‬ ‫שבנערות‬

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introduction to the edition (cont.)

Edition mḥ

OCV

BN

Physics 384.16 Heavens 398.12 Heavens 402.8 Heavens 404.2 Heavens 408.1 Heavens 408.2 gc 428.5 Meteor. 450.6 Meteor. 460.6 Meteor. 470.13 Soul 602.7

‫כשתתהוה‬ ‫השוא‬ ‫השמאלי‬ ‫וההויה‬ ‫חילוף‬ ‫מתבושש‬ ‫שהמאמר‬ ‫דונג‬ ‫הרטוב‬ ‫הארץ‬ ‫בשוה‬

‫כשתעשה‬ ‫הכזב‬ ‫הצפוני‬ ‫וההיווי‬ ‫נגד‬ ‫מתעכב‬ ‫שהדיבור‬ ‫שעוה‬ ‫הלח‬ ‫העפר‬ ‫בתאימות‬

Yet other variant readings concern differences in wording/formulation:

Edition mḥ

OCV

BN

Introd. 328.13 Meteor. 454.2

‫מאותה חכמה‬ ‫( תנעות‬O ‫ולמתינות )ולמתיחת‬ ‫הגלגל שם‬ ‫ושאינו שכון‬ ‫שכבר בושלו כל צרכם‬ ‫זה מה שמצאנו‬ ‫המראה שיתפעל בעבור התנועה‬

‫מספרו‬ ‫ומפני שתנועת הגלגל שם היא‬ ‫במתינות‬ ‫אבל המקומות שאינן שכונין‬ ‫המתעכלים‬ ‫שהושם‬ ‫התנועה כי המראה יתפעל‬ ‫בעבורה‬

Meteor. 454.9 Meteor. 472.14 Soul 604.9 Soul 630.9

We see that in general one can distinguish between OCV on the one hand and BN on the other with respect to these variant readings, although there are certain cases where the manuscripts of one group, and this is mostly OCV, display different readings among them. An example is the term ‫“( בגמרא‬absolutely,” “without qualification”). In mḥ/Heavens iv.1 B as well as N use this term four times. In the first instance OCV as a group replaces it with the synonym ‫;בתכלית‬ the second time only O and C do so; the third time only V does, whereas the fourth time only O has ‫בתכלית‬. In mḥ/Physics iii.2 O is the only ms to write

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‫בתכלית‬. Also, at times we come across instances where a given manuscript prefers a specific term that is not found in the other manuscripts, as is the case in the section on sleep and waking in On Sense, where C consistently writes ‫ יקיצה‬instead of ‫ קיצה‬of the other manuscripts. ms O displays far greater variety in the use of synonyms than the other manuscripts. It has, for example, ‫ מרכז‬for ‫( אמצע‬mḥ/Heavens 408.12); ‫והידיעה‬ for ‫( וההכרה‬mḥ/Soul 602.3), and ‫ התכלית או השלמות‬for ‫( התשלום‬Soul 598.2). Another example concerns the term for “definition”: BN write ‫גבול‬, but O usually prefers ‫גדר‬, albeit not consistently.49 As noted, O often also prefers ‫נושא‬ over ‫( מוצע‬subject) of the other manuscripts (as in mḥ/Soul 592.9, and ‫ סוג‬for “genus” instead of ‫( שורש‬ibid., and also mḥ/Physics 354.13 and mḥ/gc 422.8), but again not consistently.

What are we to make of this class of variant readings? They cannot be classified as mistakes and in general do not affect the sense of the text. Nor can one say in these cases that one group of manuscripts presents “better” readings than the other. Therefore one may justifiably raise the question whether these variant readings point to two different translations, or to a revision, be it by Judah himself or by someone else. This question is very hard to answer. As we have already noted, we cannot point to a consistent preference for one term over another in one manuscript or in a group of manuscripts. This applies to technical terms, such as ‫ תחלה‬and ‫( ראשית‬see, for instance mḥ/Heavens 392.5), or ‫ היווי‬vs ‫הויה‬, as well as to grammatical forms, such as the choice of ‫ יהא‬or ‫יהיה‬, or prepositions like ‫ כגון‬as against ‫כמו‬. For several expressions listed in the tables above no clear pattern or consistency can be detected. An interesting case-study is presented by the terms used for “cause.” In some passages BN prefer the term ‫ עילה‬whereas OCV have the Aramaic term ‫ גרמא‬but there are also passages where it is the other way around. The latter term is the most frequently used term for “cause” in the five selected manuscripts in the sections on Physics, Heavens, gc, Meteor, and pa, but not in the Introduction, where the most frequently used term is ‫עילה‬, which, in a few cases is alternated by ‫ גרמא‬in OCV. ‫ עילה‬also appears a few times in the sections Physics through Meteorology, but far less than ‫גרמא‬, and not in pa, while in ga the balance between the two terms is more or less equal. Then, in the section On the Soul we find ‫ עילה‬throughout in OCVBN, to the exclusion of ‫גרמא‬, and in On Sense,

49

In the section on the Soul, several passages. In one instance O has erroneously ‫הגדה‬, and in one case C also has ‫ גדר‬instead of ‫גבול‬. In mḥ/Soul ii.18, however, O does not replace ‫ גבול‬by ‫גדר‬.

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299

too, the usual term for “cause” is ‫ עילה‬against one occurrence of ‫גרמא‬. In the section covering the Metaphysics, both terms are used, at least in O, where the four Aristotelian causes are sometimes called ‫ עילות‬and sometimes ‫גרמות‬. In Treatise 1, in the explanation of biblical verses, we find again ‫עילה‬, also as an appellation for God in the expression ‫( עילת העילות‬the Cause of causes). Curiously, the very common term ‫ סיבה‬is found only seldom; it occurs in marginal annotations in O in the section on On Sense, and again in mḥ/ga xviii.1 where it appears in an addition to the text in O. This particular example suggests that Judah himself at some point changed his terminology. He may have become aware that the word ‫ עילה‬for “cause” was more common than the Aramaic and rather idiosyncratic ‫גרמא‬. It is also conceivable that in translating his text, he at times provided alternative Hebrew terms for certain Arabic words or concepts, perhaps as marginal notes. Also, we do not know whether he translated all treatises of Part 1 at the same time (cf. above, Chapter Three, section 5). If he translated in stages, this may also account for variations in terminology or style. Another possible explanation is that the use of synonyms originated among early students of Judah’s Hebrew version who were studying and discussing the text together. We have to take into consideration that Italian Jews in central/northern Italy around the midthirteenth century had had little opportunity to familiarize themselves with Hebrew philosophical texts and terminology. Therefore it is plausible to assume that those who requested the Hebrew translation felt the need to seek the help of someone who could explain problematic terms and issues, perhaps even from Judah himself. If this scenario is correct it is also not too far-fetched to surmise that a set of synonyms or alternative terms circulated among the early readers of the mḥ. In my view, there is no reason to assume that there were two different translations, for the number and nature of the variant readings do not support this assumption. Several of these variants may be due to specific stylistic preferences of scribes or matters of taste. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the sections on zoology hardly reveal differences in style or synonyms. This may indicate that these portions of the text attracted less attention from students, but also that we do not have to do with two altogether different translations. Do we have to do with a revision? This is possible, but if so, it was not carried out systematically or consistently. Also, it is not easy to determine whether OCV should be viewed as a revision of BN, or rather the other way around. If we consider the technical vocabulary, it would seem that some terms used by OCV, such as ‫ השמאלי‬or ‫ חילוף‬are closer to their Arabic counterparts than their respective equivalents ‫ הצפוני‬and ‫ נגד‬in BN. This could suggest that OCV represent the original version and that BN represent a revision that substitutes these

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terms by more “authentic” Hebrew ones. However, the Arabic terminology of Judah’s sources, and more generally, the entire text, is in better shape in BN, as we have seen. If BN represents a revision, it must be a revision of a version that did not have the many reading-errors manifested in O. In other instances the OCV-group may be interpreted as going back to a revision of a model that underlies BN, namely in cases where the readings in the OCV group seem to polish up the Hebrew of BN. A case in point is mḥ/Soul 630.9, where OCV have ‫ המראה נפעל בעבור תנועה‬instead of BN’s ‫התנועה המראה נפעל בעבורה‬. The problem with the assumption of a revision in either direction is that the alternative readings or synonyms are not found in all the sections on natural philosophy (as noted, there are hardly any in the sections on zoology), and where they are found, they do not occur consistently. Nor are they found in all manuscripts with the same frequency. ms O carries the most of such variant readings. In my view, therefore, the most likely scenario is that they derive from a learning environment close to the time of the Hebrew translation, an environment in which the Vorlage of O originated. In ms O most variant readings are found in the section on Physics and in that on the Soul, and these are precisely the sections where this ms has marginal annotations or additions in the body of the text, as we saw above (section 3), some of which have found their way to other manuscripts. In view of the early date of ms O (cf. above), the presence of the variant readings and extra material in this manuscript must date from a relatively early stage in the transmission and study of the text. It should be emphasized that the above considerations are based on my examination of those sections of the mḥ that are included in my edition, that is, the introduction and the part that treats natural philosophy.50 They are therefore preliminary. The study of other sections of the mḥ, in particular logic, is likely to yield relevant supplementary information.

5

Conclusions. The Establishment of the Text

In sum, each of the manuscripts B, C, N, O, and V displays its own separative errors or omissions per homoioteleuton; none of them has served as the Vorlage for any of the others. Moreover, each has its own value for the establishment of the text. However, on the whole mss B and N present a better version than mss O, C and V, as is evidenced by the fact that the Arabic terms in these manuscripts

50

I have also studied the section on Metaphysics (not included in my edition), but not compared the manuscripts systematically for this section.

introduction to the edition

301

are closer to the underlying Arabic sources than in the mss of the other family. This by itself need not be decisive, since it may simply indicate that the scribe of B (or of its model) had a good command of Arabic, but in combination with the other criteria it gains added significance. As noted, mss B and N also feature fewer errors and greater terminological consistency than the manuscripts of the OCV group. These three manuscripts, and in particular ms O, are important because their terminological variety and added comments in all probability reflect the study of the text in an early stage, but because of the larger number of mistakes in this group they cannot serve as the basis for the edition. ms C is late and should be used with caution because of its explanatory additions. Among mss B and N, B has much fewer mechanical errors than N and is relatively free from contamination. All in all, then, the collation conducted on the basis of the aforementioned criteria leads to the conclusion that ms B is the best candidate to serve as the basis for the edition of the part on natural philosophy of the mḥ since it generally has better readings and presents a coherent text that makes sense philosophically. The problem with this manuscript, however, is that the beginning of the Introduction is missing, and that its first folio has been tampered with (cf. above, section 3). The first line of fol 1v has disappeared since paper has been glued over a damaged spot. Therefore, for the Introduction paragraphs 1–11 I have relied on ms N, since it is closest to B, and occasionally also on the other selected manuscripts where N has errors. As of Introduction paragraph 11, p. 320 line 19, B serves as the basis of the text. In cases where B has clear errors in common with N I have adopted the reading of one or more mss of the OCV family, and in a few instances of one of the other, incomplete mss (cf. above).51 Given that Judah’s expositions are excerpts of Averroes’ commentaries, I have constantly compared the Hebrew text of the mḥ with these sources for the establishment of the text. However, since Judah alternates literal translations with paraphrases or summaries of the commentator’s words (cf. above, Chapter Three), the commentaries could not always be used to determine the correct reading. The same applies to the Hebrew translations of Averroes’ Arabic commentaries and to Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofim, which generally renders Averroes’ words more literally and extensively than the mḥ. Emendations, marked by an * in the text, are limited to cases where an error is likely to be the result of the faulty transmission of the text, for example when a word like “not” seems to have been incorrectly dropped, as is the case in Soul 51

See, for example mḥ/gc 420.1: correct reading must be: ‫( אז‬on the basis of D, L, R and Lp). nb have: ‫ ;או‬OCV have ‫אבל אם‬. For some reason B has more errors in mḥ/gc than in other sections.

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introduction to the edition

ii.12 where the Hebrew text reads “like it,” while the source-text, Averroes’ mc Soul and Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation have “unlike it,” which is the reading required by the context (cf. n. 76 ad locum). If, however, an error may go back to the author himself and is contained in all the mss, I have not “corrected” the text. An example is mḥ/Soul ii.6, “for the soul is potentially one and actually many.” Obviously, it must be the other way around, as is also evidenced by Judah’s source, the mc Soul (which is correctly rendered by Moses Ibn Tibbon), but all the manuscripts of the mḥ display the same reading (although L is illegible here). Of course, it is not always possible to determine with certitude whether an error is due to the author or to a scribe, which is why I have made as few emendations as possible. Scribal abbreviations in ms B or words that are abbreviated at the end of a line are written in full, for example: ‫ כלומר‬for ‫כלו׳‬, or ‫ אף על פי‬for ‫א׳ע׳פ׳‬. For purposes of reference I have divided the text into paragraphs. The interpunction is my own. Every fifth line in the Hebrew text is numbered; chapter headings are included in the line-numbering. Arabic words that are indicated in B as foreign words (usually by some vertical strokes above the letters) are italicized in in the Hebrew text; where they are not marked I have not italicized them. Words written in larger script and/or in square script in B at the beginning of a section appear in bold.

6

The Apparatus

The apparatus records the variant readings of mss O, C, V and N where I have adopted the textual reading of B. The order in which the variant readings are recorded is generally OCVNB. The following variants have not been recorded in the apparatus: – Abbreviations such as ‫ ר״ל‬and ‫אמ׳‬. In the Hebrew text of the edition these are written in full. – Orthographical variants unless the variant may involve a change in meaning. – Small mistakes in spelling that have immediately been corrected by the scribe, and do not affect the meaning of the text or small insignificant mistakes, for example an omitted letter. – Minor differences in the spelling of proper names that occur frequently, for example ‫ בן‬or ‫אבן‬. – Differences in the notation of God’s name: ‫ הקב׳‬or ‫הב׳‬. – Differences in the ending of the masculine plural, such as ‫ים‬- or ‫ין‬- or in the use of pronominal suffixes ‫ם‬- and ‫ן‬-.

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– Differences in the way numerals are written,52 for example ‫ א‬or ‫אחד‬. – Some other differences that are not noted as variants are: ‫ ש‬and ‫אשר‬ ‫ כן‬and ‫כך‬ ‫ זו‬and ‫ זהוזאת‬and ‫זה הוא‬ ‫ אלו‬and ‫אלה‬ …‫ מן ה‬and … ‫מה‬ ms C’s variant reading ‫ יקיצה‬for ‫ קיצה‬throughout the section on On Sense and elsewhere. Moreover, for reasons of expediency I have chosen to list the leʿazim and the marginal annotations in ms O (above, see section 3) in the Appendix to this Introduction, and not to include them in the apparatus. In the apparatus they are marked with an arrow, followed by the number in the list in the Appendix (for example, -> #1). For the marginal annotations from Abraham Ibn Daud’s Ha-Emunah ha-ramah in ms V, see my “Abraham Ibn Daud and the Midrash ha-Hokhmah.”

7

The English Translation

In cases where good English translations of Averroes’ commentaries exist, I have based my translation on them in those passages where Judah quotes his sources literally or almost literally. These are S. Harvey’s translation of mc Physics i–ii; S. Kurland’s translation of mc On Generation and Corruption, H. Blumberg’s translation of mc Parva Naturalia, and A. Ivry’s translation of mc Soul. I wish to thank Profs Harvey and Ivry as well as the Mediaeval Academy of America for kindly permitting me to use these translations. I have, however, adapted them where the context required this or to make technical terminology consistent with that used in other sections. Judah’s Hebrew is terse, technical and often not easy to understand. Due to its conciseness and to the occurrence of untranslated Arabic words in Hebrew characters it must have made heavy demands on its readers (cf. Chapter Three,

52

This includes the variant readings in Judah’s Introduction where he spells out the contents of the books on philosophy and science (mḥ/Introd. 2–14). Variant readings such as ‫ב‬, or ‫השני‬, or ‫שתים‬, to indicate ‘Treatise ii’ of a certain book have not been listed in the apparatus. The same applies to the words ‫“( דבר בו‬he speaks in it”) that ms V usually adds in this section after the mention of a specific book; I have noted only the first occurrence of it in mḥ/Introd. 2.

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section 5). Arabic words in Judah’s text are left untranslated in my translation so that they will have the same effect on the modern reader of English who does not know Arabic as they will have had on Judah’s intended audience, the medieval reader of Hebrew who was not familiar with Arabic. They are, however, explained in the notes. The terms that are marked in ms B—which forms the basis of this edition—as foreign words (usually by two vertical strokes above it) are written in transcription in italics; if they are not marked in the manuscript I have not italicized them. Occasionally I have added the Hebrew of a technical term between parentheses. In the notes to the translation I have tried to indicate the manner in which Judah excerpts his sources (see also Chapter Three) as follows:53 mc X (for example, mc Heavens) means: literal or almost literal quotation from Averroes’ Middle Commentary (= the source text) on X (in this case: On the Heavens), sometimes with omission of a few words. Cf. mc X means: fairly close rendering of source-text, but not complete, somewhat abridged, with omissions of parts of sentences. Summary or paraphrase means: reworking of the passage of the source-text, involving change of order, free rendering, some additional explanation, different examples etc. Needless to say, it is not always possible to distinguish sharply between these modes of excerpting. Where possible, I have also indicated the passages in Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy from which the expositions are derived. If the parallel to Judah’s source-text concerns more than one sentence in English, I have put the parallel passage between square brackets in superscript in my translation to indicate the beginning and end of the relevant passage, followed by a note-number that indicates the source. Note-numbers within such a passage concern specific information, for example on terminology or variant readings. Thus in the following passage from mḥ/Physics i: [because of the path of instruction that is taken here, which proceeds from the general to the particular, much as the proofsN1 that are employed in it proceed from composite things to simple things. Therefore, this book contains the general [principles] of physical science, whereas the books

53

The first footnote of each section (Physics, Heavens etc.) provides information on the (Arabic or Hebrew) editions (or manuscripts) of Judah’s sources and, if applicable, on their translations that I have used for the discipline under discussion. More extensive bibliographical references to these texts are found in the Bibliography.

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that follow it deal with each of the beings, for general things are more known to us than particular things]N2 the note at the end of the passage (N2) provides the parallel to Judah’s sourcetext, with the translation into a modern language (if available) and the passage on Aristotle on which it is based (if applicable), while the note within the passage (N1) is more specifically about a certain term. Besides terminology, the notes may also provide information on material omitted or added by Judah in comparison to his source, or to relevant passages in other texts. The translation of biblical verses generally follows The Tanakh. A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures according to the Traditional Hebrew Text, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2014, except for cases where this translation does not match Judah’s interpretation of a biblical verse. When Judah refers to the Commentator, I have written “Ibn Rushd” in the translation, but in my notes and in the rest of this study I refer to the Muslim philosopher as “Averroes.”

8 B C N O V

Sigla, Abbreviations and Symbols ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt 57 (imhm F 22137) ms Cambridge, University Library, Dd. 9.65 (imhm F 15922) ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Poc 343 (Uri 369) (imhm F 22136) ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich 551 (imhm F 22135) ms Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Ebr 338 (imhm F 377)

⟨⟩ * || X– X+ Xm ditt idem l x ill partim ill lac lf

words supplied from Judah’s source conjecture end of lemma omitted in ms X added in ms X marginal reading of ms X dittography the same in line x illegible partly illegible lacuna error indicated by a scribe or a later reader, usually by means of dots above the letters

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introduction to the edition

sl written above the line transpos. post transposed after ? uncertain reading -> #1, 2 etc. (in Physics and On the Soul) see no. 1, 2 etc. in the Appendix to the Introduction of the Edition (glosses in ms O) A superscripted 1, 2 etc after a Hebrew word indicates the first, second etc. occurrence of the word in a line. A superscripted 1 after a siglum indicates an erroneous reading that has been corrected in the ms. Example: N1 ‫ הדברים‬:‫ האיברים‬means that N has corrected the erroneous reading ‫ הדברים‬to ‫האיברים‬. In the translation or in the notes to the translation: [] indicates words not in text including references to biblical verses and quotations from rabbinic literature () Hebrew term, added in the translation for clarification kjv King James Version jsb Jewish Study Bible lit. literally gc Generation and Corruption Meteor. Meteorology pa Parts of Animals ga Generation of Animals pn Parva Naturalia

Appendix: Additional Material in ms O The following list contains the marginal annotations and additions in ms O in the sections on the Physics and On the Soul. Most of them are in the same hand as that of the main text. Some of the annotations concern leʿazim (see above, section 3). In what follows the leʿazim are in boldface. In the critical apparatus these leʿazim, annotations and additions are referred to as #1, #2 etc. with the numbers corresponding to the numbers in the list below. The list does not include marginal comments in O that merely indicate the topic of discussion at hand. #1 fol. 46r, left margin, indented annotation in mḥ/Physics 346.6 at ‫וכל נמצא מורכב‬ ‫מגולם וצורה‬: ‫א׳כ יהיה ההעדר תחלת ההויה במקרה ועם כל זה הוא הכרחי במציאות ההויה ר׳ל‬ ‫מצד שהוא מקרה דבק בלתי נפרד לנושא אשר ממנו ההויה א״כ מחויב שתהיה הויה‬ ‫בעבור בלתי נמצא במקרה ר׳ל במקרה שהוא לנושא היה בו זה ההעדר מאותו הדבר‬ ‫מתהוית)?( ממנו‬

(Cf the similar statement in mc Physics 205.1–4, tr. S. Harvey, 1977, 276). #2 fol. 46r, right margin, indented annotation in mḥ/Physics 346.11 at ‫וערכו מהצורה‬ ‫כערך העץ‬: ‫יש צורה שיקראוה המלעזים פורמא איליניאוזא כלו׳ צורה חמרית או היילונית והיא‬ ‫נפסדת בהפסד חמרה‬ ‫ותמצא בכל הגופים הטבעיים ואינה מוציאה דבר מן הכח אל הפועל אך הצורה‬ ‫האמיתית היא בנפש ומוציאה לפועל מה שבכחה כמ׳ שנפש הנגר מוציא מן העץ תיבה‬ ‫בפועל אחרי היותה בו בכח‬

The word ‫ =( איליניאוזא‬illegnosa?) is vocalized as iliniyoza and derives from legno/legnum = wood, cf. Gr. hule. #3 fol. 46v, long addition in body of text after definition of nature in mḥ/Physics ii.1, end:

© Resianne Fontaine, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004526433_012

‫‪308‬‬

‫‪appendix: additional material in ms o‬‬

‫וזה הגדר הוא תולדת מופת בעבור כי מציאות הקודם מבואר בעמצו וכן חיוב הנמשך‬ ‫וחיבור זה המאמר הוא חיבור הקש תנאי נשנה בו הקודם ונולד הנמשך אחריו‪ .‬והוא‬ ‫במאמר במדרגת במדרגת מאמר )במאמר במדרגת ‪ (O1‬שיאמר כך אם היו הדברים‬ ‫הטבעיים הם אשר להם התחלה שבה יתנועעו וינוחו מעצמם בעצם ולא במקרה ויהיה‬ ‫הטבע אותו הדבר שבו יתנועעו וינוחו כבר יחוייב שיהיה הטבע התחלה וסבה שבה‬ ‫יתנועע וינוח הדבר א׳כ הוא בעצמו תחלה לא בדרך מקרה‪ .‬ובא זה המאמר נתלה‬ ‫במאמר אפלטון‪ .‬ולכן התחיל בו ארסטו ויהיה הטבע לפי זה ולא אמ׳ והטבע הוא‬ ‫התחלה וסבה‪.‬‬

‫‪#4‬‬ ‫‪:‬שהיא ‪fol. 48r, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Physics 356.14 at‬‬ ‫תכלית מושלמות‬

‫‪#5‬‬ ‫‪:‬גודל ‪fol. 48r, left margin, indented annotation in mḥ/Physics 358.11 (line 1) at‬‬ ‫בלעז מנייטודין והגודלים מנייטוטידיני והם הכמותים כמ׳ הקו והשטח שיעתקו אל‬ ‫האורך והרוחב והגודלים אינם גופים‬ ‫’‪: ‘manyitudin’ (= magnitude/magnitudinem) and plural ‘manyitutidini‬מנייטודין‬

‫‪#6‬‬ ‫‪:‬השגה ‪fol. 49r, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Physics 364.9 at‬‬ ‫אינפרשיאון בלעז‬

‫’)‪‘inpression(e‬‬ ‫‪#7‬‬ ‫‪fol. 49r, left margin, indented annotation in mḥ/Physics 364.9 at definition of‬‬ ‫‪time:‬‬ ‫קצת מחכמי הגוים יגדרו הזמן עוד בגדר אחר ויאמרו שהוא מודו ותנועה שהות תנועה‬ ‫בתנועה בדברים המשתנים וצ׳ל שאינו גדר נכון כלל ואולי הוא נכון לפי דקדוקם‬

‫‪on this definition, see Wolfson, “Note”.‬‬

309

appendix: additional material in ms o

#8 fol. 50v, right margin, gloss to mḥ/Physics 374.5 ‫אי אפשר‬: ‫צ׳ע תמיד כי איך יאמר הנה‬

It is not clear whether the gloss relates to the word ‫ הנה‬or on ‫תמיד‬. The parallel passage in Averroes mc Physics 69v13–14 reads ‫ עתה‬instead of ‫הנה‬. #9 fol. 85r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 592.2 ‫חשיבות המוצע‬: ‫פיר׳ חשיבות החכמה עצמה כחשיבות חכמת הפילוסופיא על חכמת הרפואות‬

#10 fol. 86r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 596.11 after ‫במעשה‬: ‫ונקרא צורה בכח‬

#11 fol. 86r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 596.12 after ‫במעשה‬ ‫ונקרא צורה אמתית‬

#12 fol. 86r, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 600.3 at ‫העילה והמציאות‬: ‫קשון אדארפקטון‬

‘casium’/‘cashium’ < Lat. causam ‘ad adfectum’ < Lat. … factum O has an alternative definition of soul at the end of mḥ/Soul ii.4 (fol. 86r): ‫שלמות ראשון לגוף כליי או מורכב בעל חיים בכח לגוף‬

perhaps an echo of Aristotle’s definition in 412a27: “having life potentially”?

310

appendix: additional material in ms o

#13 fol. 86v, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 600.16 after ‫הרגש‬: ‫יש לו הפעלות פישיאון ב״ל בתענוג ובנזק‬

‘pession’/ ‘peshium’ < Lat. passio, (the same laʿaz is used by Hillel of Verona in his Tagmulei ha-nefesh, ch. vii, see ed. Schwartz, pp. 258 and 262). #14 fol. 86v, right margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 602.4 at (?) ‫שורש אחר‬: ‫פי׳ בשכל החמורמן)?( בפועל‬

#15 fol. 86v, right margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 602.7 at 1‫( בתאימות‬O has ‫)בשוה‬: ‫פי׳ שתהיה תכלית אחת נוהגת)?( תכלית ליזון ולנוע ולהרגיש בבת אחת‬

#16 fol. 86v, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 602.7 at 2‫( בתאימות‬O has ‫)בשוה‬: (?)‫פי׳ כל בעלי חיים נכנסין בגדר חי בבת אחתיים‬ #17 fol. 87r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 604.9 after ‫מעשה‬: ‫שמא הוא גדר הזנה הוא בעבור‬

#18 fol. 87r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 606.2 after ‫להוליד‬: ‫בזה השלים מה שהשלים מיני העיבור‬

#19 fol. 88r, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 610.10 at ‫מספג‬: ‫גוף בהיר פרוויאו ב׳ל או טרשפרנט‬+ :‫והמספג‬

‫פרוויאו‬: pervium?; ‫טרשפרנט‬: trasparent

(ms C has the same marginal note, preceded by ‫)כלומר‬.

311

appendix: additional material in ms o

#20 fol. 88r, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 610.13 at ‫הצבע‬: ‫פירוש כמו שהצבע הוא מפעל הראות כן האור הוא מפעל המשף ומוציאו אל הפועל‬

(ms C has the same note at the end of mḥ/Soul ii.17). Cf. mc Soul 67.4–5: “Light functions as color or the transparent when it is in perfection.” #21 fol. 88v, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 612.4 after ‫שפאף‬: ‫והגעת האויר את הצבע למראה הוא באלאשאפאף‬

#22 fol. 89r, supralinear gloss in mḥ/Soul 616.4 to ‫הסבכה הברדית‬: ‫גלציאה‬

g(a)lazia (?) #23 fol. 91v, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 630.9 after 2‫בעצם‬: ‫ר״ל שהשיג שזהו ראובן מצד שהוא ראובן שנקר׳ להיות לבן‬

#24 fol. 92r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 632.18 after ‫שחור‬: ‫פ׳ שאם היו ב׳ כחות כל א׳ מרגיש א׳ בלתי הא׳‬

#25 fol. 92r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 632.18 after ‫לשנים‬: ‫ר״ל הם ב׳ כלים כי‬

#26 fol. 92r, addition in body of text to mḥ/Soul 632.19 after ‫להיות‬: ‫כח א׳ לכלים חלקים ויהיה כח אחד‬

312

appendix: additional material in ms o

#27 fol. 93v, left margin, annotation in mḥ/Soul 648.8 at ‫המובדלים‬: ‫פ׳ כמו הצורות הנבדלות‬

#28 fol. 94v in mḥ/Soul 648.8–9: two vernacular terms above the line, for the theoretical intellect (‫ )שפיקולו‬and for the practical intellect (‫)פרטיסו‬. Both terms (albeit in slightly different spelling) are found also in Hillel of Verona’s Tagmulei ha-nefesh ii.2 as equivalents for the Hebrew terms, see the list of leʿazim in Sermoneta’s edition, 251–253. Here it may be added that the vernacular ‫ארגומנט‬ ‘argument’ that is added to gezerah (Intro 13) in the margin of ms O likewise appears in Hillel’s Tagmulei ha-nefesh (Introduction).

‫‪ 1‬בעזרת מוציא לאור כל תעלומה אתחיל לכתוב ספר מדרש החכמה‬

‫תודיעני ארח חיים שובע שמחות את פניך נעימות בימינך נצח‪ .‬ארח חיים למעלה למשכיל‬ ‫למען סור משאול מטה‪.‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫לפי שכל יצירותיו של הק׳ב׳ה נחלקים לשלשה חלקים—רוחאני וגלגלי ועולם ההויה‬ ‫וההפסד—‪ ,‬לפיכך חלקו הפילוסופים את החכמות לשלושה חלקים‪ :‬חכמת הטבע וחכמת‬ ‫הלימודים וחכמה אלהית‪ .‬חכמת הטבע כוללת ידיעת הראשיות והתנועות וטבע גוף השמים‬ ‫וטבע אלו הדברים הנמצאים אצלנו ומהותם והרכבותם והשגותם ומקריהם כיסודות ומה‬ ‫שנרכב מהן כמקורות והצמחים ומיני החי‪ .‬וחלק ארסטו זאת החכמה לאלו השבעה ספרים‬ ‫הנמצאים בידינו עתה והן‪ :‬ספר השמע הטבעי‪ ,‬וספר השמים והעולם‪ ,‬וספר ההויה וההפסד‪,‬‬ ‫וספר האוירי‪ ,‬וספר החי‪ ,‬וספר הנפש‪ ,‬וספר המרגיש והמורגש‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬ספר השמע הטבעי יש בו כללות הטבע והתחלותיו‪ .‬וחלקו לשמונה מאמרות‪ .‬המאמר‬ ‫הראשון ביאר בו כי הראשיות שלושה‪ :‬הצורה‪ ,‬והאיין‪ ,‬והגולם‪ ,‬וכי הצורה והגולם שניהם‬ ‫ראשית באמת אבל האין שכנגד הצורה הוא ראש במקרה‪ .‬מאמר ב׳ דיבר על שם ”הטבע“ ועל‬ ‫”מה בטבע“ ו”הטבעי“ ועל מה זה יאמר כל אחד מאלו‪ ,‬ודבר בעילות‪ .‬מאמר ג׳ דיבר בתנועה‬ ‫ובמה שאין לו חקר‪ .‬מאמר ד׳ במקום ובפנוי ובזמן‪ .‬ה׳ בהשגות התנועה‪ ,‬כגון מה המתנענע‬ ‫מעצמו ובמקרה והתנועות הנגדיות והנחות הנגדיות והדברים הנגללין בעבורם ונכללין עמהן‬ ‫מהשגות התנועה‪ .‬ו׳ בטבע הרצוף ואם הגודל מחובר מחלקים שאינם מתחלקין או ממתחלקין‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬בעזרת … מדרש החכמה‪ 2 OCV- :‬שמחות‪ 4–5 O- :‬ההויה וההפסד‪ :‬הויה והפסד ‪ 5 O1‬את‪:‬‬ ‫‪+‬כלל ‪ 6 V‬אלהית‪ :‬האלהות ‪ ‖ C‬והתנועות‪ :‬והתנועה ‪ 7 OCV‬והשגותם‪ :‬והשגיהם ‪ 8 V‬כמקורות‬ ‫‪+ :N‬אלמעאדין ‪ ‖ Nm‬ומיני‪ :‬ומי ‪ 9 V‬בידינו‪ :‬אצלנו ‪ ‖ C1‬והן‪ :‬שהם ‪ ‖ C‬והעולם‪ :‬והארץ ‪ 10 N‬החי‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬הראשיות‪+ :‬הן‬ ‫‪ 11‬הטבעי‪O- :‬‬ ‫מיני החי ‪ ‖ OCV‬המרגיש והמורגש‪ :‬המורגש והמרגיש ‪CV‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ OCV‬שלושה‪ :‬שלש ‪ ‖ OCV‬שניהם ‪ 13 V lac.‬ראשית‪+ :‬הווים ‪ ‖ N‬אבל האין‪ :‬והאין ‪ ‖ V‬שכנגד‬ ‫… במקרה‪ :‬כנגד הצורה ‪ ‖ N‬מאמר ב׳‪ :‬המאמר השני ‪ :C‬המאמר הב׳ ‪ ‖ V‬דיבר‪+ :‬בו ‪ 13–14 OCV‬ועל‬ ‫מה‪ :‬ומה ‪ ‖ OCV‬ועל … והטבעי‪ 14 N- :‬והטבעי ועל‪ :‬והטבע על ‪ ‖ V‬ועל מה‪ :‬על מה )?( ‪ ‖ O‬ודבר‬ ‫בעילות‪ ‖ N- :‬דיבר‪+ :‬בו ‪ 15 OCV‬מאמר ד׳‪ :‬ד׳ ‪+ :O‬דבר בו ‪ ‖ V‬ובפנוי ‪ 16 O ill.‬והנחות‪ :‬והכחות‬ ‫‪ ‖ CV‬ונכללין‪ :‬ונגללים ‪V‬‬ ‫‪1 When Judah explicitly refers to biblical verses, for example by saying “as it is written,” I have‬‬ ‫‪put them between quotation marks. When Judah adopts (parts of) biblical verses as his own‬‬ ‫‪language, they appear in italics, as is the case here. Unless otherwise indicated I follow The‬‬ ‫‪Jewish Study Bible. Jewish Publication Society Tanakh Translation (2014; henceforth: jsb). I‬‬ ‫‪have, however, followed the Authorized King James Version (henceforth: kjv; see the online‬‬ ‫‪version at http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org) in passages where this translation is more‬‬ ‫‪consonant with Judah’s interpretation of a biblical verse than The Jewish Study Bible. The con‬‬‫‪tents of Judah’s Introduction are analyzed in Chapter Two.‬‬ ‫‪2 Ruḥāni: I prefer the translation “immaterial” (although it is not a literal translation) to the‬‬ ‫‪more usual “spiritual,” for the Hebrew term refers to the intelligible world that cannot be‬‬ ‫‪perceived by the senses, as opposed to the material things of the world of generation and‬‬ ‫‪corruption and that of the spheres, see also below, par. 14.‬‬ ‫‪3 Hebr. eṣlenu, that is, in the world of generation and corruption.‬‬ ‫‪4 For Meteorology the Hebrew text has Sefer ha-Awiri here as well as in par. 5 below.‬‬

‫‪N 6r‬‬

Introduction With the help of Him who brings to light hidden things [Job 28:11].1 I shall begin to write the book Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah. You will teach me the path of life: in Your presence is perfect joy; delights are ever in Your right hand [Ps. 16:11]. For an intelligent man the path of life leads upward so that he may avoid Sheol below [Prov. 15:24]. 1 Since everything that the Holy One blessed be He has created is divided into three parts—the immaterial (ruḥāni);2 that which belongs to the spheres, and the world of generation and corruption—, the philosophers accordingly divided the sciences into three parts: natural science; mathematical science, and divine science. Natural science comprises knowledge of the first principles, of motions, the nature of the heavenly body and the natures of these things that exist with us,3 their essence, composition, properties and accidents, such as the elements and what is composed of them, like minerals, plants and [various] kinds of animals. Aristotle divided this science into these seven books that are at our disposal today, namely: Physics; On the Heavens and the Earth; On Generation and Corruption; Meteorology;4 On Animals; On the Soul, and On Sense and Sensible Objects. 2 The Book of Physics contains the general principles of nature.5 [The philosophers] divided it into eight treatises. In the first Treatise [Aristotle] explained that there are three principles, namely, form, privation and matter, and that form and matter are truly principles, whereas privation, which is the opposite of form, is a principle [only] accidentally. In Treatise Two he discussed the terms “nature,” “what is by nature” and “the natural,” and [the question] of which things each of these [terms] can be predicated, and he [also] treats the causes. In Treatise Three he discussed motion and infinity. Treatise Four: on place, the void and time. Five: on the properties of motion, such as what is moved essentially6 and what is moved accidentally, contrary motions and contrary states of rest, and the properties of motion that result from them and are included with them. Six: on the nature of the continuous, and [the question of] whether a magnitude is composed of indivisible or divisible parts. [It is] also on

5 In what follows I render sefer as “book” and maʾamar as “treatise.” The Hebrew term for “principle” in this sentence is hatḥalot, whereas in the next sentence its synonym rashiyot is used. 6 “Essentially”: The Hebrew text has me-ʿaṣmo. In the corresponding passage in mḥ/Physics v.1 one reads be-ʿeṣem, which is why one would expect here be-ʿaṣmo. However, since there are no variant readings in the mss that I have consulted, I have not emended the text here.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪316‬‬

‫וכן בזמן אם הוא מחובר מרגעים אם לא‪ .‬וכי כל מתנענע מתחלק ומה שאינו מתחלק אינו‬ ‫מתנענע ואיזו תנועה שיש לה חקר ואיזו תנועה שאין לה חקר והיא הסובבת בלבד‪ .‬ז׳ כי כל‬ ‫מתנענע יש לו מנענע וראוי שיהא מצוי בהכרח מנענע ראשון מעצמו בלי שיתנענע מדבר‬ ‫חוצה לו‪ .‬וכי הגוף המנענע נוגע בגוף המתנענע וביחס שבין המנענע והמתנענע‪ .‬ח׳ בתנועה‬ ‫הראשונה אם היא נצחית אם לאו‪ .‬וכי המנענע הראשון אינו גוף ולא כח בגוף וכי התנועה‬ ‫הקודמת בטבע היא תנועת ההעתקה‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬ספר השמים יש בו ד׳ מאמרות‪ .‬א׳ בגוף וכי העולם שלם וחיוב מציאות גוף פשוט עגול לא‬ ‫כבד ולא קל ואיננו הווה ונפסד‪ .‬וכי העולם אחד ואין חוצה לו פנוי ולא מלא וכי כל הווה נפסד‪.‬‬ ‫ב׳ בסבות תנועות השמים‪ .‬ודיבר בכוכבים ועילות שנוי תנועתם וצורותם וזולתי זה מהשגותם‬ ‫ובארץ וכי היא כדור ובאמצע‪ .‬ג׳ ביסודות‪ .‬והשיב על האומרים כי יש מצוי חלק שאינו מתחלק‪.‬‬ ‫ד׳ בכבד ובקל‪.‬‬

‫‪ 4‬ספר ההויה וההפסד יש בו שני מאמרות |‪ .‬א׳ כי ההויה וההפסד האמיתיים הן בעצם‪.‬‬ ‫וההפרש שבין ההווי והחלול ובפריה ובנגיעה ובנפעל ובפועל וידיעת העירוב והמזג‪ .‬ב׳‬ ‫ביסודות ובחילול מקצתן למקצתן והרכבת הדברים מהן ומיני עילות ההויה הכללית‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪ 5‬ספר האוירי ארבע מאמרות‪ .‬א׳ באויר ובאש ובמים ובמהותם ובמקרים המשיגים להם‪.‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫ובאור ובהבל ובדמיות הנראים באויר ובבעלות הזנב ובמגרה ובמקום מן האויר שירד ממנו‬ ‫המים והשלג והברד ושירד ממנו הגליד והכפור וברוחות ובנהרות ובימים‪ .‬ב׳ בטבע הים ועילת‬ ‫מליחותו ובגולם הרוחות ובמקומות השכונות מן הארץ וברעש וברעם ובברק‪ .‬ג׳ בעגולה‬ ‫הנעשית סביב הירח ובקשת נח ובעמוד‪ .‬ד׳ כי צורות היסודות הן החום והקור והרטיבות‬ ‫והיובש‪ .‬ודבר בעיכול ובבישול וזולתן מהנפעלות‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬וכן‪ :‬וכי ‪ ‖ OV‬לא‪ :‬לאו ‪ 2 OCV‬שיש … חקר‪ :2‬אין לה חקר ‪ 3 OCV‬שיהא מצוי בהכרח‪ :‬בהכרח‬ ‫שיהא מצוי ‪ 4 OCV‬וביחס … והמתנענע‪ 6 V- :‬היא‪ :N- :‬היה ‪ 7 V‬השמים‪+ :‬והעולם ‪8 CV‬‬ ‫ואיננו‪ :‬ואינו ‪ ‖ OCV‬מלא‪ :‬מלוי ‪ 9 O‬בסבות‪ ‖ N- :‬ועילות‪ :‬וגרמות ‪ 9–11 OCV‬תנועתם … ובקל‪- :‬‬ ‫‪ 9 N‬וזולתי‪ :‬וזולת ‪ 10 C‬והשיב‪+ :‬השיב ‪ 12 CV‬וההפסד‪ ‖ O- :‬יש בו‪ 13 O- :‬ובפריה‪ :‬והפריה‬ ‫‪ 14 O‬עילות‪ :‬גרמות ‪ ‖ OCV‬הכללית‪ :‬הכלליות ‪ 15 OCV‬ספר האוירי‪+ :‬יש בו ‪ 16 CV‬ובהבל‪:‬‬ ‫ובאד ‪ ‖ OCV‬ובמגרה‪ :‬והמגירה ‪ ‖ OCV‬שירד‪ :‬שיצא ‪ 17 V‬ובימים‪ :‬ובמים ‪ ‖ V‬ועילת‪ :‬וגרמת ‪OCV‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬מליחותו‪ :‬מליאותו ‪ 19 N‬ד׳ כי‪ :‬דבר בו ואמר ‪ ‖ V‬צורות‪ :‬צורת ‪ ‖ ON‬הן‪ :‬מן ‪V‬‬ ‫‪7 Cf. n. 4 above.‬‬ ‫‪8 “Affections”: Hebr. nifʿalot.‬‬

‫‪N 6v‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

317

time, whether or not it is composed of moments. Furthermore, that everything which moves is divisible, and that which is not divisible does not move, and which kind of motion is finite and which is the motion that is infinite, namely circular motion only. Seven: that everything that is moved has a mover and that there must of necessity exist a First Mover [which moves] by itself without being moved by something external to it. Also, that the body which causes motion is in contact with the body that is moved, and on the relation between the mover and that which is moved. Eight: on [the question of] whether or not primary motion is eternal; that the First Mover is neither a body nor a force in a body, and that the motion which is prior in nature is locomotion. 3 The Book On the Heavens contains four treatises. One: on body; that the universe is complete; and that there must of necessity exist a simple circular body which is neither heavy nor light nor subject to generation or corruption; that the universe is one, and that outside it there is no void or fullness, and that everything which is generated is corruptible. Two: on the causes of celestial motion. [Aristotle] discussed the stars and the causes of change in their motions, their shapes and their other properties; on the earth, that it is spherical, and that it is in the center. Three: on the elements. [Aristotle] refuted those who maintain that there exists a part which cannot be further divided. Four: on the light and the heavy. 4 The Book On Generation and Corruption contains two treatises. One: that true generation and corruption is that of a substance; on the difference between generation, alteration, growth, contact, passion and action, as well as the knowledge of mixture [and] blending. Two: on the elements and their alteration into one another, [the way in which] things are composed of them, and the kinds of causes of generation in general. 5 Meteorology7 [contains] four treatises. One: on air, fire and water, their essences and the accidents that befall them; on light and exhalation, the colors that are seen in the air, comets and the Milky Way, the region of the air from where water, snow and hail descend as well as dew and hoarfrost and with winds, rivers and seas. Two: on the nature of the sea and the cause of its saltiness, the material of winds, the inhabited regions of the earth, earthquakes and thunder and lightning. Three: on the halo that is formed round the moon, Noah’s bow and the rod. Four: that the forms of the elements are heat and cold, moisture and dryness. It also discusses digestion and concoction as well as other affections.8

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪318‬‬

‫‪ 6‬ספר החי י׳ט מאמרות‪ .‬י׳א הראשונים דיבר בהם יותר בחכמת ההגיון‪ .‬י׳ב בדם ובחלב‬ ‫ובמוח ובעצם ובאיברים המורכבים‪ ,‬כמו הראש והעינים והחוטם והשפתים והלשון‪ .‬י׳ג בפה‬ ‫ובשינים ובצואר ובאיברי חלל הגוף‪ ,‬כמו הלב והכליות והכבד והטרפשא והמיעיים‪ .‬י׳ד באיברי‬ ‫החי שאין לו דם‪ ,‬כמו הסרטן‪ .‬ודיבר בידי האדם ובחזה ובשדים ובאיברים החיצונים מן החי‬ ‫שמוליד ביצים ובעוף ובדלפין‪ .‬ט׳ו בתולדת ובזרע‪ .‬י׳ו בזכרים ובנקבות ובשכבת זרע ואם יש‬ ‫בה נפש ואם לאו והיאך יעשה העובר מהשני זרעים ומפני מה הפרד עקר‪ .‬י׳ז בתולדת החי‬ ‫המוליד ביצים ובביצי הדג ובתולדת החי אלמחזז ובתולדת החי החרסי‪ .‬י׳ח בעילות הזכרות‬ ‫והנקבות והדמיון ורוב הלידה במקצת החי ומיעוטה במקצתו ובחלב‪ .‬י׳ט במי שעיניו לבנות‬ ‫ונקראת זרקות ובמי שעיניו שחורות ונקרא כחלות ובשער החלק והשעיר ושנוי קולות החי‬ ‫ובצמיחות השינים‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬ספר הנפש ג׳ מאמרות‪ .‬א׳ הזכיר בו תחלה כמו פתיחה מה הדברים שצריך לחפש בעבורם‬ ‫בחכמת הנפש‪ .‬ואחר כך הזכיר עצות הקדמונים במהות הנפש והשיב עליהן‪ .‬ב׳ דיבר בכח‬ ‫הזנה והמרגישה‪ .‬ג׳ דיבר תחלה כי ההרגשים חמשה‪ ,‬לא פחות ולא יותר‪ .‬ואחר כן דיבר‬ ‫בהרגש השותף והכח הדמיונית והדברנית והנזועית‪.‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪ 8‬ספר המרגיש והמורגש ג׳ מאמרות‪ .‬א׳ ברגשים‪ .‬ב׳ בזכר והזכרון והשימור‪ ,‬והשינה והקיצה‪,‬‬ ‫והחלומות‪ .‬ג׳ באורך ימים‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬חכמת הלימודים‪ :‬לפי שזה הגוף העגול הסובב תמיד לא השגנו ממנו כי אם תנועתו‬ ‫בלבד‪ .‬וזאת התנועה היא בסבוב כמו שנתבאר בחכמת הטבע וגם נתבאר כן בהבטה‪ ,‬לפיכך‬ ‫לא היה איפשר לנו חשבונה ולעמוד על ביאור תנועת הגופים המתנענעים *בה ואיכותיהם‬ ‫ופרטיהם אלא בידיעת איכות העגולות הנעשות על ידי סבוב הכדור וחיצובן אלו על אלו‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬ספר‪+ :‬מיני ‪ ‖ OCV‬החי‪+ :‬ונקרא גם כן ספר בעלי חיים יש בו ‪ ‖ V‬מאמרות‪ :‬מאמר ‪ 2 O‬והחוטם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬בזכרים‪ :‬בזכרות‬ ‫‪ 4‬האדם‪ :‬אדם ‪C‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬והכליות והכבד‪ :‬והכבד והכליות ‪OCV‬‬ ‫ובחוטם ‪C‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ V‬ואם‪ :‬אם ‪ 6 OCV‬לאו‪ :‬ל ֹא ‪ ‖ V2‬והיאך‪ :‬וכיצד ‪ ‖ OCV‬עקר‪ :‬עיקרי ‪ :O‬עיקר ‪ 7 V‬אלמחזז‪:‬‬ ‫אלמחוז ‪ ‖ O‬בעילות‪ :‬בעילת ‪ 8 OCV‬לבנות‪ :‬לבנים ‪ 9 OCV‬ונקראת‪ :‬ונקרא ‪ ‖ OCV‬זרקות‪par- :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ tim ill V‬שחורות‪ :‬שחורים ‪ ‖ OCV‬החלק‪ :‬החלוק ‪ 11 O‬הנפש‪+ :‬יש בו ‪ ‖ CV‬הזכיר‪ :‬דבר ‪‖ V‬‬ ‫מה‪ :‬ומה ‪ ‖ OCV2N‬הדברים‪ :‬דברים ‪ 13 N1‬ג׳ דיבר‪+ :‬המאמר הג׳ דבר בו ‪ ‖ V‬ההרגשים‪ :‬הרגשים‬ ‫‪ 14 OCV‬והדברנית‪ :‬והכח הדברנית ‪ ‖ OCV‬והנזועית‪ :‬והנזונית ‪+ :V‬ונקראת מעוררת והקיצה‪OCV :‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬המרגיש והמורגש‪ :‬המורגש והמרגיש יש בו ‪+ :CV‬החוש והמוחש ‪ ‖ Nm‬והשינה‪ ‖ O1- :‬והקיצה‪:‬‬ ‫והיקיצה ‪ 16 C‬ימים‪ :‬הימים ‪ 17 OCV‬הסובב‪ :‬סובב ‪ 19 N‬הגופים‪+ :‬שהם ‪* ‖ C‬בה‪ :‬בהם ‪OCVN‬‬ ‫‪Hebr. ḥokhmat ha-higgayon. Judah refers here to the History of Animals, cf. Chapter Two,‬‬ ‫‪section 1.2.‬‬ ‫‪That is, the insects, or annelid animals, see Appendix Arabic terms.‬‬ ‫‪“Light”: lit. “white.” The Hebraized Arabic terms zarqut and kaḥlut mean “bluish” and‬‬ ‫‪“blackish” respectively.‬‬ ‫‪Nuzuʿit, another Hebraized Arabic term, denotes the appetitive faculty. mss OCV add in‬‬ ‫‪explanation of the Arabic term: “which is called the meʿoreret” (appetitive).‬‬

‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

319

6 The Book On Animals [contains] nineteen treatises. In the first eleven treatises [Aristotle] discussed mostly the science of logic.9 Twelve: on blood, fat, the brain, bones and the composite parts such as the head, eyes, nose, lips and the tongue. Thirteen: on the mouth, teeth, the neck, and the parts inside the body such as the heart, kidneys, liver, the diaphragm and the intestines. Fourteen: on the parts of bloodless animals, such as the crab. Moreover, [Aristotle] discussed the hands of man and the chest, the breast, and the external parts of oviparous animals, as well as the bird and the dolphin. Fifteen: on reproduction and semen. Sixteen: on males and females, the emission of semen, and the question of whether or not semen possesses a soul. Moreover, [he discussed the question of] how the embryo is formed from the two semina and why the mule is barren. Seventeen: on the reproduction of the oviparous animals, the eggs of fish, and also the reproduction of the muḥazzaz10 and that of testacea and crustacea. Eighteen: on the cause of [formation of] males and females and resemblance, about [the question of] why some animals have many offspring whereas others have few, and also on milk. Nineteen: on people whose eyes are light,11 which is called zarqut, and those whose eyes are black, which is called kaḥlut, and also about straight and curly hair, the different voices of animals and the growth of teeth. 7 The Book On the Soul [contains] three treatises. In One Aristotle noted by way of introduction why the science of the soul must be pursued. Next, he related the opinions held by the ancients on the essence of the soul and refuted them. In Two he discussed the nutritive faculty and the sensitive faculty. In Three he first related that there are five senses, no fewer and no more, and next he discussed the common sense, the imagination, the rational faculty and the nuzuʿit.12 8 The Book On Sense and Sensible Objects [contains] three treatises. One: on the senses. Two: on memory, recollection and retention; [on] sleep and wakefulness, and [on] dreams. Three: on longevity. 9 The mathematical sciences: Inasmuch as this [heavenly] spherical body rotates continuously, we apprehend of it only its motion. This motion is circular, as has been established in natural science and by observation. Therefore, we can calculate it and establish an account of the motion of the bodies moved by it, as well as of their qualities and particulars, solely by knowing the property of the circles traced by the rotation of the sphere and their intersections with one

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪320‬‬

‫ואי אפשר ידיעתן אלא בחכמת גימטריא‪ .‬לפיכך הוצרכנו בתחלה לידיעת השטחים‪ ,‬והם‬ ‫מבוארים בששה מאמרים הראשונים מספר אקלידס‪ ,‬ואחר כן בידיעת הצורות הגופניות והן‬ ‫במאמר י׳א י׳ב י׳ג ממנו‪ .‬ואחר כך בידיעת | הצורות העגולות הנעשות על שטח הכדור והן‬ ‫בספר תאודוסיוס‪ .‬ואחר כן בידיעת המשולשות בעלות הקשתות הנעשות על שטח הכדור‬ ‫וצורת החצב והן בספר מילאוש‪.‬‬ ‫וזאת חכמת הלימודים נחלקת לז׳ חלקים‪ :‬המספר‪ ,‬וגימטריא‪ ,‬ומוסיקא‪ ,‬ותחבולות‪,‬‬ ‫והבטות‪ ,‬וחכמת הכבדים‪ ,‬וחכמת הגלגל‪ .‬ולא הזכרנו מכל אלו בחבורינו זה כי אם חלק‬ ‫גימטריא וחכמת הגלגל בלבד‪.‬‬

‫‪N 7r‬‬

‫‪ 10‬וחכמת הגלגל שני חלקים‪ :‬ידיעה ומעשה‪ .‬חלק הידיעה הוא ידיעת תכונות תנועות השמים‬ ‫והכוכבים‪ ,‬ולקות מה שילקה מהן‪ ,‬ומדת הארץ ומקצת הכוכבים וזולתי זה מהדברים שנתבארו‬ ‫בזאת החכמה‪ .‬ותלמי כלל הכל בי׳ג מאמרות של ספר אלמגסטי‪ .‬השני מאמרות הראשונים‬ ‫ממנו הזכיר בהם כללות השמים והארץ ושינוי אורך היום והצל בכל מקום כפי רחבו מגלגל‬ ‫המישור‪ .‬ג׳ בתנועת השמש‪ .‬ד׳ה׳ בתנועת הירח ושינוי המראה‪ ,‬ומדת המאורות והארץ‪ .‬ו׳‬ ‫בקיבוץ המאורות ונכחם ובלקותם‪ .‬ז׳ח בכוכבים הקיימים‪ .‬ט׳י׳יא בתנועת חמשת כוכבי לכת‬ ‫באורך‪ .‬י׳ב בעמידתם ונזירתן ויושרם‪ .‬י׳ג בתנועתם ברוחב‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 11‬וחלק המעשה הוא פעולות אלו הגופים העליונים בזה העולם התחתון‪ .‬שכמו ששמי‬ ‫השמים נעבדים לשמים שהוא העולם העליון‪ ,‬כך הארץ נעבדת לשמי השמים והכל מכח‬ ‫הק׳ב׳ה׳‪ .‬כיצד? מאמר הק׳ב׳ה׳ נאצל תחלה על אותו עולם הנקרא שמים‪ ,‬ומהשמים נאצל‬ ‫על שמי השמים ומשמי השמים על הארץ‪ .‬ותלמי חיבר בזה הענין הנקרא דיני הכוכבים | ספר‬ ‫ד׳ מאמרות‪ .‬א׳ בכללות זאת החכמה‪ .‬ב׳ בחילוק הארץ‪ ,‬ומה שנפרט בו כל מקום ממנה‪ ,‬ועל‬

‫‪ 1‬בתחלה‪ :‬בתחלת ‪ 2 V‬מאמרים‪ :‬מאמרות ‪ ‖ C‬הגופניות‪ :‬הגופיות ‪ 3 C‬במאמר י׳א‪ :‬בי׳א ‪‖ N‬‬ ‫הצורות‪ 4 OCV- :‬תאודוסיוס‪ :‬תאודיסיוס ‪ :V‬תאורסיוס ‪ 5 N‬מילאוש‪ :‬מיליאוש ‪ 6 V‬וגימטריא‬ ‫ומוסיקא‪ :‬והגימטריא והמוסיקא ‪ 7–8 V‬ולא … הגלגל‪ 9 N- :‬הגלגל‪+ :‬היא ‪ ‖ V‬תנועות‪10 N- :‬‬ ‫וזולתי‪ :‬וזולת ‪ 11 OCV‬ותלמי‪ :‬ובטלמיוס ‪ ‖ C‬של‪ ‖ N- :‬השני‪ :‬שני ‪ 12 OCV‬ושינוי‪ :‬והשנוי ‪‖ V‬‬ ‫היום‪ :‬הימים ‪ 13 OCV‬המראה‪ :‬המרחק ‪ 14 C‬ובלקותם‪ :‬ובלקות ‪ 15 OCV‬ונזירתן‪ :‬ונזורתן ‪:O‬‬ ‫וגזרתם ‪ 16 N‬פעולות‪ :‬פעולת ‪ ‖ V‬ששמי‪ :‬שמי ‪ 17–19 OC‬נעבדים … השמים‪ 17 N- :1‬העולם‪O- :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬ותלמי‪ :‬ובטלמיוס ‪ ‖ C‬ספר‪ 20 OCV- :‬כל‪ :‬בכל ‪V‬‬ ‫‪“Property”: lit. “quality” (eikhut).‬‬ ‫”‪“Spherical triangles”: lit. “triangles composed of arcs traced on the surface of the sphere.‬‬ ‫‪“Mechanics”: lit. “the science of devices” (ḥokhmat ha-taḥbulot).‬‬ ‫‪“Astronomy”: lit.: “the science of the sphere” (ḥokhmat ha-galgal). The same Hebrew term‬‬ ‫‪occurs in the next sentence and in the first sentence of the next paragraph.‬‬ ‫‪“Stars and planets”: Here, as well as later on in this sentence, the Hebrew has kokhavim,‬‬ ‫‪which I take to include both stars and planets.‬‬ ‫‪Judah quotes here part of Deut. 10:14. The verse is quoted in full later on, mḥ/Introd. 15.‬‬ ‫‪The first folio of ms B, the manuscript on which my edition is based, starts at this point. A‬‬ ‫‪spurious title is added above the first line, cf. Introduction to the edition, section 3.‬‬

‫‪13‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬ ‫‪18‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬

‫‪B 1r‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

321

another.13 Knowledge of these [things] can be obtained only by the science of geometry. Therefore, we firstly need knowledge of planes, which are explained in the first six treatises of Euclid’s book. Then [we need] knowledge of solid figures, which are [treated] in Treatises Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen. Then [we need] knowledge of the circular figures traced on the surface of a sphere, and they [are treated] in Theodosius’ book. Then [we need] knowledge of spherical triangles14 and the shape of the sector figure, to be found in Menelaos’ book. This mathematical science is divided into seven parts: arithmetic, geometry, music, mechanics,15 optics, the science of weights and astronomy.16 However, of all of these we treat in our book only the parts of geometry and astronomy. 10 The science of astronomy consists of two parts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical part comprises knowledge of the models for the motions of the heavens and the stars and planets;17 eclipses in bodies in which eclipses occur; the size of the earth and of some stars and planets; as well as other things that are explained in this science. Ptolemy included all this in the thirteen treatises of his Almagest. In the first two treatises he discussed the heavens and the earth in general, the differences in the length of the day and [the length of] the shadow in every place according to its [geographical] latitude in relation to the equator. Three: on the motion of the sun. Four and Five: on the motion of the moon and its parallax, [and about] the size of the luminaries [with respect to] the earth. Six: on the conjunction[s] of the luminaries and their opposition[s], and their eclipses. Seven and Eight: on the fixed stars. Nine, Ten and Eleven: on the motions of the five planets in longitude. Twelve: on their stations, retrogradation, and direct motion. Treatise Thirteen: on their motion[s] in latitude. 11 The practical part [treats] the effects of these upper bodies upon this lower world. For just as the “heaven of heavens” is subservient to “the heavens,” which constitute the upper world, so also the earth is subservient to the “heaven of heavens,” and all this depends on the power of the Holy One blessed be He.18 How so? The word of the Holy One blessed be He emanated first over the world called “the heaven” and from this world it emanated on19 “the heaven of heavens,” and from there on the earth. On this subject, which is called “the judgments of the stars,” Ptolemy composed The Four Treatises.20 One: on the general principles of this science. Two: on the division of the earth and what is specific to each part of it; what is indicated by eclipses of the luminaries,

20

That is, the Quadripartitum.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪322‬‬

‫מה יורו לקויות המאורות והקיבוצים והנוכחים כפי טבע הכוכבים והמזלות‪ .‬ג׳ בחיי הנולד‬ ‫ודעותיו‪ ,‬ד׳ בעשרו והצלחתו‪.‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪ 12‬החכמה האלהית‪ :‬חיבר בה ארסטו מאמרות הרבה ונמצא בידינו מהם י׳ג‪ .‬אחד בפתיחה‬ ‫ודבר בו בעילות‪ .‬ב׳ במספר השאלות העמוקות הנדרשות בזו החכמה‪ .‬ג׳ בתשובה על‬ ‫הקדמונים‪ .‬ד׳ בפירוש השמות הרגילים בהם בעלי חכמת הטבע‪ ,‬כגון על מה יורה שם‬ ‫הטבע‪ ,‬והראשית‪ ,‬והיסוד‪ ,‬וההכרח‪ ,‬והאחד‪ ,‬וההויה‪ ,‬והעצם‪ ,‬והמשונים והדומים‪ ,‬והמקבילות‬ ‫והנגדיות‪ ,‬וקודם ואחר‪ ,‬והכח‪ ,‬והכמות‪ ,‬והאיכות‪ ,‬והצירוף‪ ,‬והתכונה‪ ,‬והשלם‪ ,‬והנפעל‪ ,‬והחלק‬ ‫והכל‪ ,‬על מה זה יאמר כל אחד מאלו המלות‪ .‬ה׳ כי מיני החכמות יעלו לפילוסופיא הראשונה‬ ‫בהכרח‪ .‬ו׳ בהוייה‪ .‬ז׳ בעצם‪ .‬ח׳ בפירוק הדברים הנאמר עליהם הכח והפועל באמת לא בכנוי‪,‬‬ ‫וכי הפועל מוקדם על הכח בכל מיני ההקדמות וגם בזמן‪ ,‬אלא שהמקבל לפועל הכח מוקדם‬ ‫בזמן בו על הפועל‪ .‬ט׳ בדברים הנאמר עליהם שם האחד בעצם‪ .‬י׳ בהתחלות שנחקור בעבורם‬ ‫בזאת החכמה ומה מוצע זאת החכמה‪ .‬י׳א—והוא מאמר למד—יחקור בעבור ראשיות העצם‬ ‫וההתחלות ובעילת הכל‪ ,‬היאך נתחייב בהכרח למצוא ראש ראשון והוא עילת הכל ומנענע וחי‬ ‫ואינו גוף ולא כח בגוף‪ .‬ובתנועות גלגלי כוכבי לכת ובשכל‪ ,‬וזה המאמר הוא המובחר שבספר‬ ‫זה‪ .‬יב׳ בדברים המביטים בהם בחכמת הלימודים‪ .‬וביאר בו כי טבע הדבר הכללי מצוי בדברים‬ ‫הפרטיים בכח ולא בפועל‪ .‬י׳ג כי המצטרף חסר מהרבה משאר עשרה מאמרות‪ ,‬וכי הראשיות‬ ‫אין ראוי להקדימן דבר אחר‪ ,‬וכי גוף השמים אינו מחובר מגולם וצורה אלא צורה בלבד‪.‬‬

‫‪ 13‬ולפי שלא היה איפשר לפילוסוף להשיג אלו הענינים אלא בכלי כמו הקרדום לנגר—‬ ‫והיא מלאכת ההגיון—חבר קודם מאלו ספר בהגיון‪ ,‬והוא שמונה ספרים‪ :‬א׳ בשמות ובעשרה‬

‫‪ 1‬והנוכחים‪ :‬והנכחים ‪ :OC‬והנכחיים ‪ ‖ V‬בחיי‪ :‬בחי ‪ 3 OCV‬החכמה‪ :‬חכמה ‪ ‖ B‬האלהית‪ :‬אלהות‬ ‫‪+ :N‬ונקרא גם כן אחר הטבע ‪ ‖ V‬ארסטו‪ :‬ר׳ תנחום ‪ ‖ B‬ונמצא‪ :‬שנמצא ‪ ‖ B‬י׳ג‪ :‬אמר רבי תנחום היר׳‬ ‫יג ‪ ‖ B‬בפתיחה‪ :‬בפתחיה ‪ 4 O‬החכמה‪ :‬חכמה ‪ 5 N1‬יורה‪+ :‬זה ‪ 6 C‬הטבע‪ :‬הטבעי ‪ ‖ C‬וההויה‪:‬‬ ‫וההויות ‪ 7 OV‬והתכונה והשלם‪ :‬והשלם והתכונה ‪ 8 OCV‬והכל‪ ‖ V- :‬יעלו‪ 10 O- :‬ההקדמות‪:‬‬ ‫הקדמות ‪ ‖ OCV‬שהמקבל‪ :‬שמקבל ‪ ‖ O‬הכח‪ :‬בכח ‪ ‖ N‬מוקדם‪ :‬המוקדם ‪ 11 O‬הנאמר‪ :‬הנאמרים‬ ‫‪ ‖ OCV‬עליהם‪ 12 O- :‬זאת‪ :‬אותה ‪ ‖ V‬בעבור‪ :‬בו בחיבור ‪ 13 V‬היאך‪ :‬כיצד ‪ ‖ OCV‬עילת‪ :‬עזרת‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הכל‪ :‬אכל ‪ 14 C‬ובתנועות‪ :‬ובתנועת ‪ ‖ CN‬שבספר‪ :‬שבספרו ‪ 15 OCVN‬בדברים‪ :‬דברים‬ ‫‪ 16 N‬הפרטיים‪ :‬הפרטים ‪ ‖ V‬ולא‪ :‬לא ‪ ‖ OCV‬י׳ג כי‪ :‬המאמר השלשה עשר דבר בו המאמר ‪‖ V‬‬ ‫הראשיות‪ :‬ראשיות ‪ 18 N‬להשיג‪ 19 B ill :‬מאלו‪ ‖ B- :‬ספר‪ :‬ספרו ‪ ‖ OCV‬ובעשרה‪ :‬העשרה ‪:V‬‬ ‫בעשרה ‪OC‬‬ ‫‪“Character”: Hebr. deʿotav.‬‬ ‫‪“State”: the Hebrew term tekhunah has many different meanings, cf. Klatzkin’s Thesaurus‬‬ ‫‪iv, pp. 191–196. Judah does not strictly follow Aristotle’s order. I am inclined, however, to‬‬ ‫‪assume that Judah is referring to “having”/“state” (Arist., Metaph. 1022b4–14) rather than‬‬ ‫‪to “disposition” (ibid. b1–4).‬‬

‫‪21‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

323

conjunctions and oppositions according to the nature[s] of the stars and the zodiacal signs. Three: on the life of the newborn and his character.21 Four: on his wealth and prosperity. 12 On Metaphysics. [Aristotle] composed many treatises on this [science], thirteen of which are in our possession. One serves as introduction and [in it] he discusses causes. Two: on the number of profound questions that are investigated in this science. Three [is] in reply to the ancients. Four: on the explanation of terms that are commonly used by the philosophers of nature, for example what is indicated by the terms “nature,” “principle,” “element,” “necessary,” “one,” “being,” “substance,” “different” and “like,” “opposites” and “contraries,” “prior and posterior,” “potentiality,” “quantity,” “quality,” “relative,” “state,”22 “perfect,” “affection,” “the part and the whole”; [and it explains] of what each of these terms is predicated. Five: that the [various] kinds of the sciences necessarily ascend to first philosophy. Six: on being. Seven: on substance. Eight: on the distinction in things of which potentiality and actuality are said in truth and not equivocally, and [it explains] that actuality is prior to potentiality in every kind of priority, even with respect to time, but that in what receives the actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time. Nine: on things of which the term “one” is predicated essentially. Ten: on the principles that we investigate in this science and [it investigates] what the subject of this science is. Eleven:— and this is Book L—investigates the primary principles of substances, the cause of the All, and why a first principle necessarily exists that is the cause of everything, the moving agent, a living being, not a body nor a force in a body. [This treatise] also treats the motions of the planetary spheres and the intellect. It is the choicest of this book.23 Twelve: on the things that are studied in the mathematical sciences. [Aristotle] explained in [this book] that the nature of the universal is found in particular things in potentiality, not in actuality. Thirteen: that the category of relation is deficient in many respects in comparison with the other categories; that it is not fitting that the principles be preceded by anything else, and furthermore that the heavenly body is not composed of matter and form, but only of form. 13 Since it was impossible for the philosopher to apprehend these things without a tool, such as the axe for a carpenter, that is to say, the art of logic, [Aristotle] first wrote his book on logic, which contains eight books.

23

That is, of the Metaphysics.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪324‬‬

‫מאמרות ובהשגותם‪ .‬ב׳ ספר המבטא בענין השם והפועל והמלה והמאמר השלם ושאינו שלם‬ ‫והגזירה השנית והשלישית הפשוטה והסורה ובעלות הצד ושאינן בעלות צד הכללית מהן |‬ ‫והפרטית וההינית והשללית והגזרות הנגדיות‪ .‬ג׳ ספר הסברא דיבר בו בתחלה בגבול הסברא‬ ‫מהו‪ .‬וצורת הסברא משלשה קצוות‪ :‬קצה גדול וקצה קטן וקצה אמצעי מושא על הקטן מוצע‬ ‫לגדול‪ .‬ויתחבר מאלו הג׳ קצוות שתי הקדמות והקו האמצעי הוא נשנה ויולד מאלו השתי‬ ‫הקדמות תולדה‪ .‬ודיבר בו באיכות הצורות הסבריות וכמותן ואיזה מהן תוליד‪ ,‬ומספר מיני‬ ‫הצורות‪ ,‬וכיצד יתערבו הג׳ מדות שהם החייב והבינוני והאפשרי במיני הצורות‪ ,‬ומיני הסברא‬ ‫הנשאי שלשה ובסברא התנאי והחוזר והישר והביאור בעיגול‪ .‬ד׳ ספר המופת הזכיר בו גבול‬ ‫המופת ואמר כי הוא סברא מחוברת מהקדמות אמתיות כלליות מוכרחות עצמיות‪ .‬ואחר כן‬ ‫בגבולים ואחר כן באיכות עשיית המופתים והגבולים במלאכות והדיברה המופתית והמריבה‬ ‫המופתית‪ .‬ה׳ ספר ספסטה הזכיר בו המלות המטעות והן ששה והענינים המטעים והם ח׳‪ .‬ו׳‬ ‫ספר טוביקא גדל דיבר בו תחלה במקומות‪ ,‬והן הכללות שיעשו בהן הסברות‪ ,‬והן מקומות‬ ‫המציאות הגמורה ומקומות המסבר ומקומות השורש והפרט ומקומות הגבולים‪ .‬ואחר כן‬ ‫דיבר בו כי תועלת מלאכת טוביקא היא המחשבה הקרובה לאמת‪ .‬והמחשבה ׄטן בערבי‬ ‫הוא שיסבור בדבר שהוא כך ואיפשר להיות על דרך אחרת‪ .‬ולפיכך נפרט ה ׄגדל כי הוא יסור‬ ‫במריבה ואין בזה המופת כי הוא לא יסור לעולם במריבה‪ .‬וגבול ה ׄגדל כי הוא סברא מחובר‬ ‫מהקדמות מפורסמות‪ .‬ז׳ ספר הדיברה והיא מלאכה תועיל הצידוק בלבד בלי מופת ברור‪.‬‬ ‫והצידוק הוא מחשבה שיש בה נחת רוח בלא מופת‪ .‬ובזאת המלאכה יכנס השקר יותר ממה‬ ‫שנכנס במלאכת טוביקא‪ .‬ח׳ ספר השיר יבאר בו כי מלאכת השיר היא משלים ודמיונים מבלי‬ ‫שיהיו כן על אותו התואר‪ .‬ותועלת זאת המלאכה היא להדמות הדבר בתכלית מה שיוכל‬ ‫להיות‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬ובהשגותם‪ ‖ B ill :‬ספר המבטא‪ 2 B ill :‬השנית‪ :‬השניית ‪ ‖ V‬והשלישית‪ :‬והשלישיית ‪‖ OCV‬‬ ‫והסורה‪ 3 B ill :‬והפרטית … בגבול‪ ‖ B- :‬דיבר בו‪ ‖ O- :‬בתחלה‪ ‖ O ill :‬הסברא‪ :‬הגזירה ‪ :Osl‬גזירה‬ ‫ארגומנט ב״ל ‪ 4 Om‬משלשה‪ :‬משלוש ‪ ‖ C‬מוצע‪ :‬נושא ‪ 5 Osl‬ויתחבר‪ :‬ויחובר ‪ :O‬ויתחברו ‪‖ C‬‬ ‫ויולד‪ :‬ויוליד ‪ 6 OC‬תולדה‪ :‬תולדת ‪ 9 C‬סברא‪ :‬גזירה ‪ :Osl‬גזרה סברה ‪ ‖ CV‬מחוברת‪11 BN- :‬‬ ‫ספסטה‪ :‬ספסטינה ‪ ‖ V‬והן ששה‪ ‖ OCV- :‬והם ח׳‪ :‬והם שבעה ‪ 12 CV‬גדל‪ :‬גודל ‪ ‖ V‬שיעשו‪ :‬שיעשה‬ ‫‪ 14 CV‬בו‪ ‖ OCV- :‬היא‪ :‬הוא ‪ ‖ O‬לאמת‪ :‬באמת ‪ׄ ‖ V‬טן בערבי‪ 15 OCV- :‬הוא‪ :‬היא ‪ ‖ CV‬להיות‪:‬‬ ‫לנטות ‪ ‖ C‬אחרת‪ :‬אחר ‪ ‖ CV‬נפרט‪ :‬מפרט ‪ ‖ OCV‬ה ׄגדל‪ :‬ה ׄגידל ‪ :O‬ה ׄגדל ‪ :C‬הגודל ‪ ‖ N‬יסור‪ :‬יסיר ‪N‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬לעולם במריבה‪ :‬במריבה לעולם ‪ ‖ OCV‬ה ׄגדל‪ :‬הגודל ‪ :VN‬הגדל ‪ :C‬ה ׄגידל ‪ 17 O‬הצידוק‪19 V- :‬‬ ‫שנכנס‪ :‬שיכנס ‪ ‖ V‬היא‪ :‬הוא ‪ 20 B‬היא‪O- :‬‬ ‫‪“Certainty”: Hebr. emet (truth). It is likely that Judah uses emet here in the sense of the‬‬ ‫‪Arabic yaqīn. I thank Prof. Ch. Manekin for this observation.‬‬

‫‪24‬‬

‫‪B 1v‬‬

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325

Book One deals with terms, with the ten categories and their properties. Book Two is On Interpretation, in which [Aristotle] first discussed nouns, verbs and particles [and next] complete and incomplete sentences, binary and tertiary propositions, simple and retractive propositions, those possessing modality and those that do not, [and] which ones of them are universal or particular, and affirmative, negative and contradictory propositions. Book Three is Prior Analytics, in which he first established what the definition of the syllogism is, and [he explained] that the form of the syllogism consists of three terms: the major, the minor and the middle term, which is the predicate of the minor and the subject of the major. From these terms two premises can be composed with the middle term being repeated and from these two premises a conclusion can be obtained. Moreover, [Aristotle] discussed in this book the quality and the quantity of syllogistic figures; which ones of them are concludent; the number of the various species and how the three modes, that is, the necessary, the assertoric and the possible, are mixed with the kinds of figures; that there are three kinds of ostensive syllogisms: the conditional syllogism; the per se impossible, and direct and circular proof. Book Four is the Posterior Analytics. He mentioned in it the definition of demonstration and states that it is a syllogism composed of true premises that are universal, necessary and essential. Next, he treated definitions and how demonstrations and definitions are formed in the arts, with demonstrative rhetoric and demonstrative disputation. Book Five is On Sophistical Refutation. Here he dealt with fallacies dependent on diction, which are six in number, and sophistic notions, of which there are eight. Book Six is the Topics, ğadal, in which he first spoke about topics, that is, the topics (rules) from which syllogisms are formed. These are existential topics in general; topics taken from arguments; topics of genus and particular, and topics of definition. Next, he expounded that the usefulness of the art of Topics is opinion, ẓann in Arabic that is closest to certainty,24 namely that it argues that a thing is so-and-so, but that it is possible that it is in a different way. Therefore, ğadal (topical inference) is distinct, for it can be invalidated in disputation, and there is no demonstration in it, whereas demonstration can never be invalidated in disputation. The definition of ğadal is that it is a syllogism that is made up of generally accepted premises. Book Seven is the Rhetoric and this is an art that is useful for assent without clear demonstration. Assent is opinion with which the mind is at ease without demonstration. Falsity occurs in this art more easily than in the art of Topics. Book Eight is the Poetics, in which he explained the art of poetry, that is to say, likenesses or similes of things without these things [in truth] being as they are described. The usefulness of this art is that it imitates a thing in the best possible way.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪326‬‬

‫‪ 14‬אמר יהודה הכהן בר׳ שלמה הכהן ז׳צ׳ל מטוליטלה‪ :‬כשאתה מעיין באלו הספרים‬ ‫ותתעסק מחשבתך באלו החכמות בעבור שיעלה בידך ידיעת כל זה המצוי מראש ועד סוף‪,‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫אתה תמצא לבסוף כי לא יעלה בידך ואפילו מידיעת השני עולמים שהם הגלגלי ועולם ההויה‬ ‫וההפסד המושגין בהרגש אלא דברים מועטים מאד‪ .‬אבל העולם הרוחאני אפילו תדע בגרסה‬ ‫יג׳ מאמרות ארסטו בחכמה אלהית לא יעלה בידך מידיעת אותו | עולם יותר ממציאות מנענע‬ ‫ראשון צור אחד חי ואינו גוף ולא כח בגוף‪ ,‬וכי יש לכל גלגל שכל מובדל‪ .‬זהו בלבד העולה בידך‬ ‫מאותו עולם כשתעסוק מחשבתך באותן מאמרות‪.‬‬

‫‪ 15‬ויש בתורתינו הקדושה ובשאר ספרי הקדש הרבה פסוקים שהזכיר בהם אלו הג׳ עולמות‪.‬‬ ‫בתורה דכתיב ”הן ליי׳ אלהיך השמים ושמי השמים הארץ וכל אשר בה“‪ .‬השמים הוא העולם‬ ‫הרוחאני כי זה השם של שמים הוא שותף יורה על העולם הרוחאני וגם על הגלגלי ועל האוירי‪.‬‬ ‫אבל ”שמי השמים“ אינו נאמר כי אם על הגלגל בלבד והוא שם ליווי קניה‪ ,‬כמו ”עבד עבדים“‪,‬‬ ‫כלומר שזה הגלגל הקרוי ”שמי שמים“ הוא נעבד לאותו עולם הרוחאני הנקרא שמים‪ ,‬כעבד‬ ‫לאדון‪ .‬וראיה כי שם הגלגל האמתי הוא ”שמי השמים“ שנאמר‪” :‬אתה עשית את השמים שמי‬ ‫השמים וכל צבאם הארץ וכל אשר עליה“‪ .‬תראה כי סמך ”וכל צבאם“ עם ”שמי השמים“‬ ‫והזכירם על הסדר‪ :‬השמים תחלה‪ ,‬והוא העולם הרוחאני‪ ,‬ושמי השמים אחריו‪ ,‬והוא הגלגל‪,‬‬ ‫ואחר כן הארץ‪ .‬ועוד מה שנאמר בספר תהלים‪” :‬הללו את יוי מן השמים“ הוא העולם הרוחני‪,‬‬ ‫והזכיר פרקיו באמרו ”הללוהו במרומים הללוהו כל מלאכיו“‪ ,‬ואחריו ”הללוהו שמי השמים“‪.‬‬ ‫וכבר הזכיר פרקיו באמרו‪” :‬הללוהו שמש וירח“ וג׳ ואחר כן‪” :‬הללו את יי׳ מן הארץ“‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬אמר‪+ :‬המחבר ‪ ‖ V‬אמר … מטוליטולה‪ :‬אמר רבי תנחום הירושלמי ז׳צ׳ל ‪ ‖ B‬ז׳צ׳ל‪+ :‬נ׳ב׳ג׳א׳ת‬ ‫‪ ‖ OCV‬מטוליטלה‪ :‬מטליטולה ‪ ‖ OCV‬באלו הספרים‪ 2 CV- :‬בידך‪ :‬בדעתך ‪ 3 N‬שהם‪+ :‬עולם‬ ‫‪ 3–4 V‬ההויה וההפסד‪ :‬התחתון והפסד ‪ 4 B‬מועטים‪ :‬מעטים ‪ ‖ CV‬העולם‪ :‬מהעולם ‪ :V‬בעולם ‪‖ O‬‬ ‫העולם הרוחאני אפילו‪ :‬הרוח והגוף וה ‪ 5 B‬ארסטו‪ :‬של ארסטו ‪ :OV‬לארסטוט׳ ‪ ‖ C‬בחכמה‪ :‬בחכמת‬ ‫‪ 6‬ראשון‪ :‬הראשון ‪‖ N‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ O‬אלהית‪ :‬האלהית ‪ ‖ OC‬מידיעת‪ :‬מידיעותו ‪ ‖ B‬עולם‪ :‬העולם ‪OCV‬‬ ‫בלבד‪ 7 O- :‬כשתעסוק‪ :‬כשתעסק ‪ :CV‬כשתתעסק ‪ ‖ O‬באותן‪ :‬בארבעה ‪ ‖ B‬מאמרות‪ :‬המאמרות‬ ‫‪ 8 OCVN‬הרבה פסוקים‪ ‖ V- :‬שהזכיר‪ :‬ויש ‪ 9 B‬השמים‪ :‬שמים ‪ ‖ O‬וכל אשר בה‪ :‬וגו׳ ‪10 O‬‬ ‫של‪ :‬על ‪ ‖ O‬האוירי‪ :‬האויר ‪ 11 OCV‬הגלגל‪ :‬הגללים ‪ :O1‬הגלגלים ‪ ‖ O2CV‬ליווי קניה‪ :‬לווי ליווי קניה‬ ‫‪ :B‬ליווי וקנייה ‪ 12 CV‬שמים‪ :‬השמי ‪ ‖ N‬עולם‪ :‬העולם ‪ 13 OCV‬השמים‪+ :‬פסוק ‪ ‖ OCV‬את‪O- :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬וכל … עליה‪ :‬וגו׳ ‪ ‖ OC‬עליה‪ :‬בה ‪ ‖ V‬סמך‪ :‬סמוך ‪ 15 V‬הגלגל‪ :‬הגלגלי ‪ 16 VN‬תהלים‪ :‬תלים‬ ‫‪ ‖ OCV‬הוא‪ :‬כלומר ‪ 17 OCV‬פרקיו‪ :‬פרטיו ‪ ‖ C‬במרומים ‪ 18...‬הללוהו‪ 17–18 OC- :‬כל מלאכיו …‬ ‫הללוהו‪ 17 V- :‬מלאכיו‪+ :‬הללוהו כל צ ‪ ‖ N‬ואחריו‪ :‬ואחר כן ‪ 18 N‬ואחר כן‪ :‬ואחריו ‪OCV‬‬ ‫‪My translation of this paragraph largely follows that of Sirat, A History of Jewish Philoso‬‬‫‪phy, 253. “The text of […] Metaphysics”: perhaps what is meant is: even if you know them‬‬ ‫‪by heart.‬‬ ‫‪The translations of biblical quotations in this paragraph follow the kjv, since the jsb trans‬‬‫‪lation “the highest heaven” for shemei-shamayim does not bring out Judah’s notion of the‬‬ ‫‪hierarchy of the three worlds and the place of shemei-shamayim therein.‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪26‬‬

‫‪2r‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

327

14 Judah ha-Cohen ben Solomon ha-Cohen of Toledo, blessed be the memory of the righteous, said:25 When you study these books and occupy your thought with these sciences in order to acquire knowledge of everything that exists, from the beginning to the end, you will see in the end that you can attain knowledge of very few things only, even of those concerning the two worlds perceived by the senses: the world of the spheres and that of generation and corruption. As for the immaterial (ruḥāni) world, even if you know the text of the thirteen treatises of Aristotle on Metaphysics (ḥokhmah elohit), you will attain no more knowledge of that world than that there exists a Prime Mover, [who is the] Rock, one, living, and who is neither body nor force in a body, and that for each sphere there is a separate intellect. That is all you will learn concerning this world, if you occupy your thought with these treatises. 15 Our Holy Torah and the other sacred books contain many verses in which these three worlds are mentioned. As for the Torah, it is written, “Behold, the heaven, and the heaven of heavens is the Lord’s, thy God, the earth also, with all that therein is” [Deut. 10:14].26 “The heaven” is the immaterial world, for this term “heaven” is a homonym; it denotes the immaterial world and also that of the spheres and that of the air.27 However, the term “heaven of heavens” is said of the sphere alone. It is a term denoting relation and possession28 like “a servant of servants” [Gen. 9:25], that is to say that the [world of the] sphere[s] that is called “heaven of heavens” is subservient to the immaterial world, which is called “heaven,” just as the servant is subservient to his master. The proof that the true name for the [world of the] sphere[s] is “heaven of heavens” is the verse that reads: “thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth and all things that are therein” [Neh. 9:6]. You see that Scripture connects “with all their host” with “the heaven of heavens,” and that it mentions [the three worlds] in their order: first the heaven, that is, the immaterial world, next the “heaven of heavens,” which constitutes the [celestial] sphere[s], and next the earth. Furthermore, [this is confirmed by] what is said in the Book of Psalms, “Praise ye the Lord from the heavens” [Ps. 148:1], that is, the immaterial world. Scripture mentions [the heaven’s various] parts by saying “Praise ye him, all his angels” [Ps. 148:2], and then “Praise him, ye heavens of heavens” [Ps. 148:4]. Scripture [also] mentions its parts by saying, “Praise ye him, sun and moon” [Ps. 148:3] and “Praise the Lord from the earth” [Ps. 148:7].

27 28

The air: that is, the world of generation and corruption. That is: status constructus.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪328‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ואף על פי שכל הנמצא הן אלו הג׳ עולמות‪ ,‬ידיעת האחד מהן—והוא הרוחני—הוא‬ ‫כולל ידיעת השתים‪ ,‬ולא בידיעת השנים נכלל ידיעת אותו‪ ,‬לפי שהוא עילה להם והן באים‬ ‫בעבורו ונמצאין מכחו‪ .‬ולפיכך אמר‪” :‬אל יתהלל חכם בחכמתו“ ואמר‪” :‬כי אם בזאת יתהלל“‪.‬‬ ‫ויחתרו הפילוסופים לדעת כל אלו הג׳ מהסברא בלבד‪ ,‬והיא דעת הכרס שעיקרו הוא ההרגש‬ ‫כמו שהזכיר בספר המופת ובספר הנפש‪ .‬וזה פלאי פלאות‪ :‬היאך יוכל לידע ולהשיג ולהגיע‬ ‫מההרגש לדבר שאינו מורגש כלל? לפיכך אותו המעט שהשיגו ממנו אף על פי שהוא כטיפה‬ ‫מן הים אינו מעט למי שהגיע אליו מפני הסברא מהשכל שעיקרו הוא ההרגש‪ ,‬והוא אינו מורגש‬ ‫כלל‪ ,‬שנאמר‪” :‬עין לא ראתה אלהים זולתך“ וג׳‪ ,‬לפי שאין אנו מרגישים כי אם גוף והוא אינו‬ ‫גוף‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬והואיל והדבר כן ואין עמנו מצד הסברא במה שנשיג פרטי אותה חכמה שהיא עקר ועילה‬ ‫וראשית לאלו השתי חכמות של שני עולמות‪ ,‬ראוי לומר על מי שלא נתעסק כי אם בחכמת‬ ‫אלו השני עולמים בלבד‪” :‬כולם תשובו ובאו נא ולא אמצא בכם חכם“‪ .‬שהחכמה הודאית אינה‬ ‫כי אם אותה הרוחנית‪ .‬והיודעה נקרא ”חכם“ כמו שאמר | ארסטו במאמר שלישי מספרו‪ ,‬לפי‬ ‫שאותו עולם הוא נקדם על אלו השנים במיני ההקדמות‪ .‬ומי שידע אותה חכמה אין צריך‬ ‫להטריח מחשבתו באלו כי מיד ידעם בקלות‪ .‬אבל מי שאינו יודע כי אם שני אלו בלבד צריך‬ ‫הוא עדין לידיעת אותו‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬ולפי שאותה חכמה אין אנו יכולין להגיע אליה מהסברא בלבד‪ ,‬לפיכך אנו צריכין לקבלה‬ ‫איש מפי איש מפי הגבורה‪ .‬ולפיכך כתוב‪” :‬השמים שמים ליי׳ והארץ נתן לבני אדם“‪ ,‬כלומר‬ ‫כי אלו השני עולמות‪ ,‬שהם הרוחאני וגם הגלגלי—ולפיכך אמר‪” :‬השמים שמים“—לא נתן‬

‫‪ 3‬אמר‪+ :‬הנביא ‪ ‖ C‬ואמר‪ :‬וג׳ ‪ ‖ OCV‬יתהלל‪:2‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬השתים‪ :‬השנים ‪OCV‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬הנמצא‪ :‬נמצא ‪O‬‬ ‫‪+‬המתהלל ‪+ :OCV‬וגו׳ ‪+ :O‬השכל וידוע אותי ‪ 4 C‬מהסברא‪ :‬מסברא ‪ 5 OCV‬כמו שהזכיר‪ :‬כאשר‬ ‫הזכיר ‪ :OCV‬כאשר הזכיר ארסטו ‪ ‖ C‬פלאי‪ :‬פלא ‪ 7 OCV‬הוא‪ 10 V- :‬פרטי‪ ‖ O- :‬חכמה‪ :‬החכמה‬ ‫‪ 11 O1V‬השתי‪ :‬השני ‪ ‖ O‬בחכמת‪ :‬בחכמות ‪ 12 OCV‬עולמים‪ :‬עולמות ‪ ‖ CV‬אמצא בכם חכם‪:‬‬ ‫אמר בכל חכמה ‪ ‖ OCV‬בכם‪ :‬בהם ‪ 13 NB‬מספרו‪ :‬מאותה חכמה ‪ 14 OCV‬שאותו עולם‪ :‬שאותו‬ ‫‪ :N‬שזה העולם ‪ ‖ OCV‬נקדם‪ :‬הנקדם ‪ ‖ O‬השנים‪ ‖ OCV- :‬ההקדמות‪ :‬הקדמות ‪ 18 OCV‬הגבורה‪:‬‬ ‫‪+‬יתב׳ ‪ 18–19 N‬והארץ … שמים‪NB- :‬‬ ‫‪Cf. translation Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, 253.‬‬ ‫‪Cf. Arist. Posterior Analytics 87b28 ff. and On the Soul 432a7; for this passage and Judah’s‬‬ ‫‪use of the term sevara, see Chapter Two, section 3.‬‬ ‫‪“[God]”: the Hebrew reads “it,” which seems to refer to the immaterial world, the knowl‬‬‫‪edge of which is the subject of this passage. However, in view of the biblical quotation‬‬ ‫‪that follows I have interpreted it as referring to God.‬‬ ‫”‪I have translated the Hebrew term ḥokhmah in this passage as “science” and as “wisdom,‬‬ ‫‪depending on the context.‬‬ ‫‪That is, wisdom (or: knowledge) of the immaterial world.‬‬ ‫‪“Priority”: I read the Hebrew here as ha-hiqqademut, The same reference to Aristotle‬‬ ‫‪(Metaph. 1004b17–26) is found in Judah’s Treatise 1 (on biblical exegesis), ed. D. Goldstein,‬‬ ‫‪“Commentary,” lines 532–533, cf. above Chapter Two, section 3 and n. 71 there.‬‬ ‫‪kjv translation.‬‬

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‫‪32‬‬ ‫‪33‬‬ ‫‪34‬‬

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329

16 Although all that exists is these three worlds, knowledge of one of them, namely the immaterial world, includes knowledge of the other two, whereas knowledge of that world is not included in knowledge of the two [lower worlds], for [the immaterial world] is their cause: they come [into being] because of it and they exist by virtue of its power. Therefore, it is written, “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom […], only in this should one glory […]” [Jer. 9:23–24].29 The philosophers endeavored to know these three worlds solely on the basis of syllogistic reasoning (sevara), that is to say, unfounded knowledge which has its root in sense-perception, as [Aristotle] observed in the Posterior Analytics and in his book On the Soul.30 Verily this would be truly baffling: how can one, on the basis of sense-perception, know and apprehend and attain knowledge of something that is not perceptible by the senses at all? Therefore, even if that little knowledge that they have apprehended about it is like a drop of the ocean, it is surely not little for someone who has attained it on the basis of syllogistic reasoning by the intellect, which is rooted in senseperception, given that [God]31 is not perceptible at all, as it is written, “no eye has seen [them], O God, but You etc.” [Isa. 64:3]. For we can perceive only bodies and He is not a body. 17 Seeing that this is the case and that on the basis of syllogistic reasoning we cannot apprehend the particulars of this science (ḥokhmah),32 which is the root, the cause and the principle of these sciences of the two [lower] worlds, it is appropriate to say with respect to him who occupies himself exclusively with these two worlds, “but all of you, come back now: I shall not find a wise man among you” [Job 17:10]. For certain wisdom is only that immaterial [wisdom].33 The person who possesses it is called “wise” (ḥakham), as Aristotle has observed in Treatise Three of his book, since this world precedes these two others in [various] ways of priority.34 He who knows this science does not need to exert his thought on these [other] sciences, for he will know them immediately and easily, but he who knows only these two [lower sciences] is still in need of that science. 18 Since we cannot attain that science on the basis of syllogistic reasoning solely, we need the tradition (qabbalah) that has been transmitted from man to man by divine command. Therefore, it is written, “The heaven, even the heavens are the Lord’s: but the earth hath he given over to the children of man” [Ps. 115:1635], that is to say that concerning these two worlds, namely the immaterial [world] and the world of the spheres—and therefore Scripture says, “The heaven, even the heavens”—, man is not granted the power to comprehend

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‫כח בבני אדם להבינם מדעתם לפי שכלם‪ ,‬כמו שנתן להם אותו הכח בארץ‪ .‬כי בעבור שהם‬ ‫שוכני בתי חומר יוכלו לדעת פרטי זה העולם מפני ההרגש והשכל‪ .‬אבל אלו השני עולמות‬ ‫ידיעת מהותן לא ניתן לאדם אלא הוא הבין דרכה וידע את מקומה‪ .‬ומודיע בה לנביאיו בלבד‪,‬‬ ‫כמו שנאמר‪” :‬כי לא יעשה יי׳ אלהים דבר כי אם גלה סודו אל עבדיו הנביאים“‪ .‬כלומר‪ :‬אינו‬ ‫מחדש דבר בעולם שלא היה לו סברא נאצל על בני אדם שלא היה כן קודם‪ ,‬ולא שכל נוסף‪,‬‬ ‫ולא השגה יותר מהראוי להרכבה אנושית‪ ,‬אך יודיע דרך קבלה בלבד סודו לנביאיו וליריאיו‪.‬‬ ‫כי מה שהשיגו הנביאים לא השיגוהו בעבור סברא ולא בעבור שכל נוסף בהם הרגילם אותו‬ ‫השכל לידע אותן הסודות‪ ,‬רק בעבור נבואה בלבד‪ .‬וכבר אמר דניאל ע׳ה בפירוש‪” :‬ואנא לא‬ ‫בחכמה די איתי בי מכל חייא רזא דנא גלי לי“‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬ואל יקשה בעיניך מה שאמרו רבותינו ז׳ל‪” :‬חכם עדיף מנביא“‪ ,‬כי אותו הוא בדברים‬ ‫שאיפשר להשיגם בסברא ולא השיגם הנביא בסברא כי אם בנבואה באמת‪ .‬כי מי שהשיגו‬ ‫בסברא יותר עדיף‪ ,‬אבל בדברים היוצאים מגבול הסברא באמת בלא ספק כי אותו שנאצל‬ ‫עליו ידיעתם יותר עדיף‪ .‬ולפיכך אמר קהלת‪” :‬ולא למדתי חכמה ודעת קדושים אדע“‪ .‬ואינו‬ ‫קורא בכתבי הקדש ”חכמה“ סתם אלא לחכמה האלהית בלבד‪ ,‬כי שאר החכמות הן בשם‬ ‫לווי‪ .‬ואמר ”יתרון לחכמה מן הסכלות כיתרון האור מן החושך“‪ ,‬כלומר‪ :‬ערך חכמה אלהית‬ ‫לשאר החכמות כערך האור האמתי שאין בו חשך מאור האש הנקרא חושך‪ .‬לפי שאותה‬ ‫חכמה היא אור בהיר‪ .‬וזאת החכמה לפי רום מעלתה וחשיבותה ושהיא כוללת כל החכמות‪.‬‬ ‫והוא העיקר שהכל תלוי בו‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬לפי‪ :‬מפני ‪ 2 OCV‬שהם שוכני‪ :‬שהשוכני ‪ ‖ V‬לדעת‪ :‬לידע ‪ ‖ OCV‬מפני ההרגש‪ :‬בהרגש ‪‖ CV‬‬ ‫והשכל‪ :‬ובשכל ‪ 3 C‬לאדם‪ ‖ C- :‬הוא‪ :‬אלהים ‪+ :V‬ית׳ ‪ ‖ C‬ומודיע בה‪ :‬והוא מודיע אותה ‪4 OCV‬‬ ‫אל עבדיו הנביאים‪ 5 NB- :‬מחדש‪ ‖ B- :‬דבר בעולם‪ :‬בעולם דבר ‪ ‖ OCV‬לו‪ :‬לא )?‪ ‖ OC2V (V‬כן‬ ‫קודם‪ :‬קודם כן ‪ 6 V‬אנושית‪ :‬האנושית ‪ ‖ O‬בלבד‪ ‖ OCV- :‬לנביאיו‪ :‬אל נביאיו ‪ 7 V‬שהשיגו‪:‬‬ ‫שהשיגוהו ‪ ‖ N‬הרגילם‪ :‬הרגילים ‪ 8 B‬לידע‪ :‬שידע ‪ 9 N‬רזא … לי‪ 10 OVNB- :‬הוא‪11–12 O- :‬‬ ‫ולא … בסברא‪ 11 V- :‬מי‪ :‬מה ‪ 13 CNB‬ידיעתם‪+ :‬הוא ‪ ‖ OCV‬קהלת‪ :OC- :‬שלמה ‪ ‖ V‬קדושים‪:‬‬ ‫‪+‬אמצה ‪ 14 N1‬בכתבי‪ :‬לכתבי ‪ ‖ NB‬האלהית‪ :‬אלהית ‪ ‖ V‬בלבד‪ 14–15 V- :‬בלבד … ערך‪15 B- :‬‬ ‫מן הסכלות‪ :‬מן הכסיל ‪ ‖ O‬חכמה אלהית‪ :‬החכמה האלהית ‪ 16 OCV‬הנקרא‪ :‬נקרא ‪ 18 C‬העיקר‪:‬‬ ‫עיקר ‪N‬‬ ‫‪I have changed “source” (maqor) of the jsb translation to “place” (maqom) in accordance‬‬ ‫‪with Judah’s text. In the biblical verse the subject of “understands” and “knows” is God,‬‬ ‫‪but it is possible to read Judah’s sentence as saying that although man cannot know the‬‬ ‫‪essence of the two lower worlds, he can know something about these worlds. In any event‬‬ ‫‪“He” of the next sentence refers to God.‬‬ ‫‪bBaba Batra 12a.‬‬ ‫‪The meaning seems to be that specific branches of wisdom are called “the science/wisdom‬‬ ‫‪of,” for example, “the science/wisdom of mathematics,” that is, ḥokhmat ha-limmudim,‬‬ ‫‪with ḥokhmah appearing in the construct state.‬‬

‫‪36‬‬

‫‪37‬‬ ‫‪38‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

331

them by his [own] knowledge, [which derives] from his intellect, in the way in which that power is granted to man with respect to the netherworld. For since [men] dwell in houses of clay [Job 4:19] they are able to know the particulars of this world by means of sense-perception and the intellect. However, knowledge ( yediʿah) of the essence of these two worlds is not given to man, but God understands the way to it; He knows its place [Job 28:23].36 He makes known this [knowledge] to his prophets only, as it is said, “Indeed, my Lord God does nothing without having revealed His purpose (sod) to His servants the prophets” [Amos 3:7]. This means that He did not create (meḥaddesh) anything in the world for which a syllogistic reasoning emanated on man that did not exist in the same way before, nor an additional intellect, nor an apprehensive faculty greater than what is appropriate for the human composition. Instead he makes known his secret (sod) solely by way of tradition (qabbalah) to his prophets and those who fear him. For that which the prophets apprehended was not apprehended by them on the basis of syllogistic reasoning or on the basis of an added intellect in them that enabled them to know these secrets, but solely by prophecy. Daniel, peace be on him, already explicitly stated, “Not because my wisdom is greater than that of other creatures has this mystery been revealed to me” [Dan. 2:30]. 19 Let it not be difficult in your eyes what our Rabbis of blessed memory said, “A wise man (ḥakham) is superior to a prophet,”37 for this applies to things that can be apprehended by syllogistic reasoning, whereas the prophet did not apprehend them by syllogistic reasoning, but through true prophecy. He who apprehends such things by syllogistic reasoning is superior, but as to things that transcend the domain of syllogistic reasoning it is doubtless true that he on whom knowledge of them emanates is superior. Therefore, Ecclesiastes said, “I have not learned wisdom (ḥokhmah), and yet do I possess knowledge of the holy ones” [Prov. 30:3]. For in the Holy Scriptures, only divine wisdom (ḥokhmah elohit) is referred to as just “wisdom” (ḥokhmah), for all other [branches of] wisdom have names [in which the term ḥokhmah appears] in the status constructus.38 Ecclesiastes also says, “I found that wisdom is superior to folly, as light is superior to darkness” [Eccles. 2:13], that is to say, that the relation of divine science (ḥokhmah) to the rest of the sciences is like that of true light in which there is no darkness to fire that is called darkness, for this wisdom is bright light, and it is the [true] wisdom because of its lofty rank and excellence, and because it contains all the sciences. It is the root on which everything depends.

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‫‪ 20‬מה שגלה הק׳ב׳ה ממנה לא גלה כי אם לישראל בלבד שנאמר‪” :‬מגיד דבריו ליעקב חקיו‬ ‫ומשפטיו לישראל״ וגו׳ לפי שחכמי אומות העולם לא הגיעה חכמת הפילוסוף מהם כי אם‬ ‫לאותן החכמות בלבד‪ .‬אך מי שנאמר בהם‪” :‬עם חכם ונבון“‪ ,‬עמהם הוא שורש וענף‪ .‬אבל‬ ‫בעבור שאבדה חכמת חכמינו ובינת נבונינו נסתתרה לא נשאר בידינו מאלו החכמות שנים‬ ‫שלשה גרגרים בראש אמיר‪ ,‬עד שהיתה תפארת החכם הישראלי | בזה הזמן אינה כי אם‬ ‫בידיעת אותם הספרים שהזכרנו או מקצתן‪ ,‬עד שנתבאר אצל בני עולם כי לא היתה חכמה‬ ‫בישראל ו”כי אויל עמי“‪ .‬לפי שהחכמות לא כתבום כי אם היוונים והועתקו ללשונות אחרות‬ ‫כפי שנתפרסמו חבוריהם‪ .‬וזה מריחוק ההשגחה בישראל‪ ,‬כמו שאמר ישעיהו ע׳ה‪” :‬הנני יוסיף‬ ‫להפליא את העם הזה הפלא ופלא“‪ .‬כלומר‪ ,‬כי זה פלאי פלאות להיות העם שנאמר בהן‪” :‬עם‬ ‫חכם ונבון״ וג׳ שסרה ממנו החכמה האמתית וישובו להתלות בחיבורי האומות‪” ,‬אזלו מים‬ ‫מני ים“ וחזר להתמלאות משקתות המים‪ ,‬שנאמר ”כי נטשת עמך בית יעקב כי מלאו מקדם‬ ‫ועוננים כפלשתים ובילדי נכרים ישפיקו“‪ ,‬שאין ערך חיבורי האומות לחכמת ישראל הודאית‬ ‫אלא כערך אור הנר למאור החמה ביום יהיה שבעתים‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬ומפני זה נשענתי ביי׳ אלהי ישראל ונערתי חצני אני יהודה כהן הקטן מקטני ספרד וחברתי‬ ‫זה הספר וקראתי שמו מדרש החכמה‪ .‬וכללתי בו עניני כל אותם הספרים שהזכרתי בעבור‬ ‫שני דברים‪ :‬האחד מי שירצה לעיין באותן החכמות ידע תחלה מכאן מה התועלת העולה בידו‬ ‫מאותן הספרים‪ ,‬וגם יעיין בזה החיבור ברמזים שמחכמה אלהית שלנו‪ .‬והמבין יבין ואם יזכה‬ ‫יבחין‪ .‬והתועלת השנית להיות מי שכבר הטריח את מחשבתו ואבד את זמנו באותן הספרים‬ ‫יהיה לו חיבור זה מחזירנו להתעסק בתורתינו הקדושה ”התמימה משיבת נפש“ ”מחכימת‬

‫‪ 3‬לאותן‪ :‬אותן ‪ ‖ V‬אך‪ :‬אבל ‪ 4 OCV‬בידינו‪ ‖ OCV- :‬מאלו‪ :‬מאותן ‪ ‖ OCV‬החכמות‪ :‬חכמות ‪5 N‬‬ ‫אינה‪ ‖ V- :‬כי אם‪ 6 OCV- :‬שנתבאר‪ :‬שנתברר ‪ ‖ OCV‬עולם‪ :‬העולם ‪ 7 V‬בישראל‪ :‬מישראל‬ ‫‪ ‖ V‬ללשונות‪ :‬אל לשונות ‪ 9 C‬ופלא‪+ :‬ואבדה חכמת חכ׳ ובינ׳ נבו׳ תסתתר ‪ ‖ B‬פלאי‪ :‬פלא ‪10 V‬‬ ‫שסרה‪ :‬סרה ‪ 12 OCV‬ועוננים … ישפיקו‪ :‬וגו׳ ‪ ‖ C‬שאין‪ :‬ואין ‪ ‖ OCV‬ישראל‪ :‬הישראלים ‪14 OCV‬‬ ‫כהן‪ :‬הכהן ‪ ‖ O‬ספרד‪ :‬בני גלות ירושלים אשר בספרד ‪+) CV‬ב׳י׳נ׳( ‪ 15 C‬הספר‪ :‬החיבור ‪17 C‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬והתועלת … מי‪ :‬והשני להיות בו תועלת למי ‪‖ C‬‬ ‫שמחכמה אלהית‪ :‬שמהחכמה האלהית ‪CV‬‬ ‫השנית‪ :‬השני ‪ ‖ V‬את‪ ‖ OCV- :1‬את‪ 19 V- :2‬חיבור זה‪ ‖ OCV- :‬התמימה‪ :‬תמימה ‪ ‖ NB‬משיבת‬ ‫נפש‪NB- :‬‬ ‫‪Cf. Isa. 29:14. Translation according to kjv with slight adaptations.‬‬ ‫‪Cf. Isa. 30:26.‬‬ ‫‪The title Midrash ha-ḥokhmah can be translated in various ways, for example “The Expo‬‬‫‪sition of Science,” cf. Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, 250, or “The Investigation of‬‬ ‫‪Wisdom,” cf. Manekin, “Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture,” 220, but also as “The Pursuit of‬‬ ‫‪Wisdom,” cf. Chapter Seven, section 5.‬‬

‫‪39‬‬ ‫‪40‬‬ ‫‪41‬‬

‫‪3r‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

333

20 That which the Holy One blessed be He revealed of it, he revealed only to Israel, as it is said, “He issued his commands to Jacob, his statues and rules unto Israel” [Ps. 147:19], for as regards the wise men of the nations, the wisdom of their philosopher has attained only these [lower] sciences of it. However, [the people] of which it has been said “a wise and discerning people” [Deut. 4:6] possess the root and the branch. However, since the wisdom of our wise men has perished and the understanding of our prudent men is hidden,39 only two or three berries on the topmost branch are left [cf. Isa. 17:6] of these sciences, so that in this era the splendor of the wise Jew lies only in his knowledge of the books that we mentioned or in some of them, as a result of which it has become clear to the Gentiles that there is no wisdom [Prov. 21:30] in Israel and that My people are stupid [Jer. 4:22]. For only the Greeks wrote [books on] the sciences and these were translated in other languages as their writings became widely known. This [happened] because Providence was far from Israel, as Isaiah, peace be on him, said, “Truly I shall further baffle that people with bafflement upon bafflement” [Isa. 29:14]. That is to say, it is “bafflement upon bafflement” that true science has departed from the people of which it is said “a wise and discerning people” [Deut. 4:6] so that they should become dependent on the writings of the nations. The waters of the sea fail [Job 14:11] and the water basins have become full, as it is said, “For you have forsaken [the ways of] your people, O house of Jacob, for they are full [of practices] from the east, and of soothsaying like the Philistines, and they abound in customs of the aliens” [Isa. 2:6]. For the relation of the books of the nations to the certain wisdom of Israel is none other than the relation of the light of the candle to the light of the sun at day when it shall be sevenfold.40 21 Therefore, I relied upon the Lord, the God of Israel, and I also shook out the bosom of my garment [Neh. 5:13], I, Judah ha-Cohen, the most insignificant of the insignificant of Sefarad and I have composed this book which I have called Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah.41 I included in it the subjects of all the books I mentioned because of two reasons: firstly, that anyone who wishes to study these sciences will know beforehand from this book what benefit can be derived from these books, and that he will look into the allusions to our divine wisdom contained in this book. He who understands will understand [Dan. 12:10], and if he is worthy he will distinguish [between the different kinds of wisdom]. The second benefit is that someone who has exerted his thought and wasted his time on these books will be redirected by this book to the occupation with our holy and perfect Law renewing life […] and making the simple wise; […] just,

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪334‬‬

‫פתי“ ”ישר׳ משמח׳ לב“ ”ברה ”מאירת עינים“ ”טהורה עומדת לעד“ אמת‪ .‬ומאלהי מרום ית׳‬ ‫אשאל עזר לעשות לשמו ית׳ יתרומם לעד‪.‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪ 22‬ודע כי ארסטו הקים מופתיו וראיותיו על הקדמות שמקצתן מושכלות ראשונות ומקצתן‬ ‫צריכין בירור יותר מהרבה ענינים שנצטרך לבארם באותות ובמופתים‪ .‬ואלו ההקדמות הן‬ ‫מפוזרות בספריו ולקטתים כפי היכולת‪ .‬ועלו כמו חמשים תמצאם כתובים בפירוש משלי‬ ‫בע׳ש׳ית‪ .‬ושם הם ראויין ליכתב כפי ענין אותה פרשה שתחלתה ”כי יי יתן חכמה“‪.‬‬

‫‪ 23‬וראיתי לכתוב בכאן מבחר דבריו שנתבארו כפי אותן ההקדמות ומה שיתחייב בעבורן‪.‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫וצריך שתזכור למה שנאמר כי מיני המופתים הנעשים בחכמת הטבע הן בחילוף מופתי‬ ‫הלמודים‪ .‬לפי שבלימודים נתהלך בהם מהמוקדם אל המאוחר‪ ,‬ובאלו של טבע מהמאוחר אל‬ ‫המוקדם‪ .‬ולפיכך הידועות אצלנו שם בחכמת הלמודים הן הידועות אצל הטבע‪ .‬ולפיכך היו‬ ‫המופתים הנעשים שם מופתים גמורים‪ .‬אך הידועות בכאן—בחכמת הטבע—| אינן ידועות‬ ‫בגמרא אצל הטבע‪ ,‬ולפיכך נקראים המופתים הנעשים בזו חכמת הטבע ראיות‪ .‬ועוד כי כל‬ ‫הדברים שנאמר בהן כי נתבארו בזו החכמה אינן מבוארים היטב ואפילו באלו המופתים‬ ‫הנקראים ראיות אלא המקצת מהן‪.‬‬ ‫הילכך מה שתראה שאני אומר בו ”נתבאר“ הוא מה שנתאמת במופת הנקרא ”ראיה“‪ .‬ומה‬ ‫שנאמר בו ”נתפרש“ הוא שלא נתבאר כל כך‪ ,‬ואפילו באותן המופתים הנקראים ראיות‪ .‬נמצא‬ ‫כי הן שלש מדריגות זו למטה מזו‪ :‬הא׳ כי הקדמותיו אינן כולן מבוארות במושכלות ראשונות‪.‬‬ ‫הב׳ כי אין מופתיו גמורים כמופתי הלימודים‪ .‬הג׳ כי אין כולם מבוארות ואפילו בראיות‪.‬‬

‫‪3‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬יתרומם לעד‪CV- :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬ברה‪ ‖ C- :‬עומדת לעד‪ ‖ O- :‬אמת‪ :‬משפטי ה׳ אמת צדקו יחדו ‪V‬‬ ‫הקדמות‪ :‬קדמות העולם ‪ ‖ C‬שמקצתן‪+ :‬הן ‪ ‖ OCV‬ומקצתן‪+ :‬הן ‪ 4 V‬צריכין‪ :‬צריכות ‪ ‖ V‬מהרבה‪:‬‬ ‫ממה )מה ‪ (O‬שצריך לבירור הרבה ‪ 5 OCV‬ולקטתים‪ :‬וליקטתי אותן ‪ ‖ CV‬תמצאם‪ :‬ותמצאם ‪:OC‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬ליכתב‪:‬‬ ‫ותמצא אותן ‪ ‖ V‬כתובים‪ :‬כתובות ‪ ‖ V‬משלי‪ :‬קצת )מקצת ‪ (V‬פסוקי ספר משלי ‪CV‬‬ ‫להכתב ‪ ‖ V‬פרשה‪ :‬הפרשה ‪ 8 OCV‬מופתי‪+ :‬חכמת ‪ 9 CV‬שבלימודים‪ :‬שבחכמת הלימודים‬ ‫‪ ‖ CV‬של טבע‪ :‬של חכמת הטבע ‪ 10 CV‬הידועות‪ :‬הידועים ‪ ‖ C‬הטבע‪ :‬חכמת הטבע ‪ 11 CV‬אך‬ ‫‪13‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬אצל הטבע‪ :‬ואצל הטבע ‪OCV‬‬ ‫הידועות‪ :‬והידועות ‪ :OV‬והידועים ‪ ‖ C‬ידועות‪ :‬ידועים ‪C‬‬ ‫כי נתבארו‪ :‬שנתבארו ‪ 15 OCV‬הילכך‪+ :‬מה ‪ 16 O‬שנאמר‪ :‬שאני אומר ‪ ‖ V‬נתבאר‪18 V1- :‬‬ ‫הלימודים‪ :‬חכמת הלימודים ‪C‬‬ ‫‪See ed. Goldstein, “Commentary,” lines 704–756. Examples of such premises are: “nature‬‬ ‫‪exists”; “motion exists”; “existing things exist sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in‬‬ ‫‪actuality.” Apparently the remark that these premises amount to about fifty has inspired‬‬ ‫‪the scribe of ms J to number the list of Aristotle’s “choicest of statements” (see next para‬‬‫‪graph) from 1 to 50. In fact, any attempt to number this list is arbitrary.‬‬ ‫‪Cf. mḥ/Physics i.2. This passage is translated in Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, 251.‬‬ ‫‪Ibid., 252. The term reʾayah can be translated both by “proof” and by “argument.” Here I‬‬ ‫‪have opted for “argument” because of Judah’s twofold use of the term mofet: in the sense‬‬ ‫‪of demonstration (in mathematical science), and also as a general term for “proof.” See‬‬ ‫‪also Chapter Four.‬‬

‫‪42‬‬

‫‪43‬‬ ‫‪44‬‬

‫‪3v‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

335

rejoicing the heart […], lucid, making the eyes light up […], pure, abiding for ever; […] true [Ps. 19:8–10]. From God in heaven I will ask help to make Himself a name for all time [Isa. 63:12]. 22 Know that Aristotle established his demonstrations (mofetim) and proofs (reʾayot) on the basis of premises (haqdamot), some of which are first axioms, whereas others need more clarification than many things that need to be proven by means of indications (otot) and demonstrations (mofetim). These premises are scattered in his books, and I have collected them according to my ability. They amount to about fifty and you will find them written down in my commentary on Proverbs with the help of God blessed be He.42 It is appropriate that they be written there in accordance with the subject matter of that section, the beginning of which reads: “For the Lord grants wisdom” [Prov. 2:6]. 23 Here I deemed it fit to write down the choicest of [Aristotle’s] statements that have been shown (nitbaʾaru) on the basis of those premises, and of what necessarily follows from them. You should bear in mind what has been said,43 namely, that the sorts of proofs (mofetim) adduced in physical science differ from the proofs (mofetim) adduced in the mathematical sciences. In mathematics one goes from the prior to the posterior, while in the [arguments in] physics one goes from the posterior to the prior. Hence, the things known to us there, in the mathematical sciences, are those known by nature. Therefore, the demonstrations (mofetim) in the mathematical sciences are absolute demonstrations (mofetim gemurim). However, those known to us here—in physics—are not known absolutely by nature, so that the proofs (mofetim) made in this physical science are called “arguments” (reʾayot) [and not demonstrations]. Furthermore, all the things of which it is said that they have been shown (nitbaʾaru) in this science have not been properly proven (mevoʾarim), not even by those proofs (mofetim) called “arguments” (reʾayot), but only some of them.44 Therefore, whenever I will say “it has been shown” (nitbaʾer), this refers to something that has been verified by [the kind] of demonstration (mofet) called “argument” (reʾayah). That of which I will say “it has been explicated” (nitparesh) refers to something that has not been proven (nitbaʾer) to the same extent, not even by those demonstrations (mofetim) that are called “arguments” (reʾayot). We [thus find] that there are three degrees of these [Aristotelian doctrines], one beneath the other. The first is that of which the premises have not all been proven (mevoʾarim) by first axioms. The second is that of which the proofs (mofetim) are not as absolute as the mathematical demonstrations (mofetim). The third is that of which not all [the statements] are proven (mevoʾarim), not even by arguments (reʾayot).

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪336‬‬

‫‪ 24‬ואלו הן מבחר דבריו שבספר השמע והשמים והיווי והפסד‪:‬‬ ‫– נתבאר כי הראשיות יותר מאחד ואינן יותר משלשה‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי הן שלשה וכי הן הצורה והאיין והגולם הראשון‪ ,‬שהוא מוצע לשני נגדיים אלו‪.‬‬ ‫ויאמר באין כי הוא ראש במקרה‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש מציאות זה הגולם הראשון וכי אינו הווה ונפסד‪ ,‬וכי הוא מצוי בכח‪ ,‬כלומר שאינו‬ ‫מעורה מן הצורות החוזרות תמיד עליו‪ .‬והוא המוצע הראשון לכל הנמצאים ההוין ונפסדין‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי הדברים הטבעיים מורכבים מגולם וצורה‪ ,‬וכי שם הטבע יאמר על הגולם‬ ‫והצורה‪ ,‬וכי הצורה יותר אמתית בזה השם מהגולם‪.‬‬ ‫– נתבאר בטול מציאות מה שאין לו חקר בפועל וחיוב מציאות מה שאין לו חקר בכח‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי מקום הכדור הוא גבנונית הגוף שיסוב עליו‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתבאר כי אין הפנוי מצוי‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי יעשה המחולחל מעובה והמעובה מחולחל מבלי שנוסף בו ולא יחסר ממנו‬ ‫דבר‪.‬‬ ‫– נתפרש מציאות הזמן והוא מצוי בעצמו מחוץ לנפש וגם בעבור הנפש‪.‬‬ ‫התנועה היא במתנענע‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש באלאסתקרא כי כל משתנה בעצם באלדאת משתנה לנגדו‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי אין התנועה מצויה כי אם בג׳ מאמרות בלבד והן הכמות והאיכות והאנה‪.‬‬ ‫– נתפרש כי יאמר בדברים כי הן יחד כשאין ביניהן גוף כלל‪ ,‬ומה ”בין“ פחות מה שיהא‬ ‫בשלשה שני נגדיים ואמצעי‪.‬‬ ‫– נתפרש כי התנועה האחת תאמר בשרש ובמין ובמספר‪ .‬בשורש כיצד? כגון התנועה‬ ‫שבמאמר האחד‪ .‬ובמין כיצד? כגון שהוא במין אחד ממיני אותו המאמר‪ .‬ובמספר כיצד?‬ ‫כשיהיה המתנענע והדבר שבו התנועה והזמן שבו התנועה כל אחד מאלו אחד במספר‪.‬‬ ‫ואם יצטרף לזה להיות תמימה ושוה יותר קל וחומר שנאמר כי היא אחת‪.‬‬ ‫– ונתפרש כי תנועה כנגד תנועה במה אליו ובמה ממנו יחד‪ .‬כיצד? כי התנועה שמהבריאות‬ ‫אל החולי היא כנגד שמהחולי אל הבריאות כי האחת לחולי והשני לבריאות וכי האחת מן‬ ‫הבריאות | והאחרת מן החולי‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬השמע‪+ :‬הטבעי ‪ ‖ CV‬והשמים‪ :B- :‬וספר השמים והעולם ‪ ‖ CV‬והיווי והפסד‪ :‬וספר ההויה וההפסד‬ ‫‪ 2 CV‬הראשיות‪ :‬הראש ‪ ‖ N‬משלשה‪ :‬משלש ‪ 3 C‬שלשה‪ :‬שלש ‪ ‖ OCV‬הצורה והאיין‪ :‬האין‬ ‫והצורה ‪ ‖ OCV‬והאיין‪ :‬פ׳ ההעדר? ‪ 4 Nm‬ויאמר‪+ :‬כי הן ‪+ :C‬שהן ‪ 5 V‬הגולם‪ :‬פ׳ ההיולי ‪‖ Nm‬‬ ‫וכי‪+ :‬הוא ‪ 6 V‬מעורה‪ :‬מעווה ‪ ‖ N‬המוצע‪ :‬הנושא ‪ :OCV‬פ׳ שעולם … ואינו נמצא הלי ]…[ ‪7 Nm‬‬ ‫הטבעיים‪ :‬הטבעים ‪ 8 O‬והצורה‪+ :‬ותנועה ‪ ‖ OCV‬השם‪+ :‬יותר ‪ 11 O‬הפנוי‪ :C1- :‬פנוי ‪ :Csl‬נ׳א ריקות‬ ‫‪ 14 N‬לנפש‪ 16 O- :‬באלאסתקרא‪ :‬באל אם תקרא ‪ ‖ O‬באלדאת‪+ :‬הוא ‪ 17 OCV‬מצויה‪ :‬נמצאת‬ ‫‪ ‖ OCV‬והאיכות והאנה‪ :‬והאנה והאיכות ‪ 18 C‬כשאין‪ :‬בשאין ‪ ‖ NB‬ומה‪ :‬צ׳ל לגרוס)?( נתפרש שיש‬ ‫בין שלשה נגדיים ואמצעי ‪ ‖ Om‬שיהא‪ :‬שיא)?( ‪ :O‬שיאמר ‪ 21 NB‬כגון‪+ :‬התנועה)?( ‪ ‖ O‬שהוא‪:‬‬ ‫שהיא ‪ 22 O‬כשיהיה‪ :‬כשיהא ‪ 23 OC‬יצטרף לזה‪ :‬נצטרף ‪ :C‬יצטרך ‪ ‖ NB‬שנאמר‪+ :‬בה ‪ :N‬שיאמר‬ ‫בה ‪ ‖ OC‬כי היא‪ :‬שהיא ‪ 24 OCV‬תנועה כנגד‪ :‬תנועת הנגד ‪ 25 OCV‬והשני‪ :‬והשנית ‪‖ OCV‬‬ ‫האחת‪ :‬אחת ‪N‬‬ ‫‪References to parallels in Aristotle’s writings will be given in Chapter Four.‬‬ ‫‪Judah starts his enumeration with Aristotelian doctrines taken from the Physics.‬‬ ‫‪The Arabic terms in this sentence mean “by induction” and “essentially” respectively. No‬‬ ‫‪Hebrew equivalent is given.‬‬

‫‪45‬‬ ‫‪46‬‬ ‫‪47‬‬

‫‪4r‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

337

24 Here are the choicest of his statements in the Physics, On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption:45 – It has been shown (nitbaʾer) that the principles (rashiyyot) are more than one but not more than three.46 – It has been explicated (nitparesh) that they are three, namely, form, privation, and prime matter, which is the substrate for these two contraries. It is said of privation that it is a principle [only] accidentally. – It has been explicated that prime matter exists; that it is neither generated nor corruptible; that it exists in potentiality, that is to say that it is not bare of forms that supervene over it uninterruptedly. It is the first substrate of all beings that are generated and corrupted. – It has been explicated that natural things are composed of matter and form; that the term “nature” is predicated of matter and of form, but it is predicated of form in a truer sense than of matter. – It has been shown that the infinite cannot exist in actuality, and so has the affirmation of the existence of the infinite in potentiality. – It has been explicated that the place of the sphere is the convex side of the body around which it revolves. – It has been shown that the void does not exist. – It has been explicated that the dense can become rare and the rare dense without [anything] being added to it or taken from it. – It has been explicated that time exists, and that it exists by itself outside the soul and also for the sake of the soul. Motion exists in that which is moved. – It has been explicated biʾl-istiqrā that everything that is changed biʾl-ḏāt changes into its contrary.47 – It has been explicated that motion exists only in three categories: quantity, quality and place.—It has been explicated that things are said to be “together” when there is no body between them at all; and “between” [when] there are at least three things: two contraries and an intermediate. – It has been explicated that motion is said to be one in genus (shoresh), in species (min) or in number. In genus how so? Like the motion that is in the same category. In species how so? Like motion that is in one species within anyone of the species of that category. In number how so? When that which is in motion and the thing in which the motion takes place and the time in which motion takes place are all one in number. If, in addition, it is more perfect (temimah) and uniform it can all the more so said to be one. – It has been explicated that the motion from a contrary is both motion from something and motion into something. How so? Motion from health into sickness is the contrary [of the motion] from sickness to health, for one [motion is] towards sickness and the other towards health and one [motion is away] from health and the other [away] from sickness.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫–‬ ‫–‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫–‬ ‫–‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪338‬‬

‫ונתפרש כי כשימצא לדבר אחד שתי תנועות נגדיות כי האחת טבעית והשנית אנסית‪.‬‬ ‫והשיכון שכנגד התנועה הוא השיכון במה ממנו‪.‬‬ ‫ונתבאר כי אין הקו מחובר מנקודות ולא הזמן מרגעים‪ .‬ואי איפשר להיות גודל מחובר‬ ‫מגודלים שאינן נחלקין ואי אפשר למצוא גודל שאין לו חקר‪.‬‬ ‫וכל משתנה נחלק וראשו וסופו אינו נחלק‪.‬‬ ‫אין למה שאינו נחלק כנקודה תנועה בעצמו‪.‬‬ ‫כל מתנענע יש לו מנענע‪.‬‬ ‫המנענע הקרוב הפועל לתנועה לא ינענע אלא אם יגע במתנענע‪.‬‬ ‫לא תיחס התנועה הסובבת לישרה קל וחומר שלא תיחס תנועת האיכות לתנועת הכמות‪.‬‬ ‫פועל הכל ימצא לחלקים בכח ולא יתחייב שימצא בפועל‪.‬‬ ‫נתפרש כי יש מהדברים מתנענע תמיד ויש שוקט תמיד ויש מתנענע ושוקט לפעמים‪.‬‬ ‫תנועת ההעתקה מוקדמת על שאר התנועות‪.‬‬ ‫נתבאר כי המנענע הראשון אינו גוף ולא כח בגוף‪.‬‬

‫העולם שלם מפני שהוא גוף ומפני שכולל חלקיו‪.‬‬ ‫תנועת הגופים הטבעיים הן מהאמצע ואל האמצע וסביב האמצע‪.‬‬ ‫– נתבאר מציאות גוף פשוט עגול יתנענע בעיגול‪.‬‬ ‫– נתפרש כי התנועה העגולית טבעית לו ואינו כבד ולא קל‪.‬‬ ‫התנועה הסובבת אין לה נגד‪ .‬הגוף העגול אין לו נגד ואינו הווה ונפסד ואין לו סוף‪ .‬וכל אחד‬ ‫מד ׳ יסודות יש לו סוף‪.‬‬ ‫אי איפשר למצוא עולמות אחרות חוץ מזה העולם‪ .‬ויש לגופים הטבעיים מקומות מוגבלות‪.‬‬ ‫הגולם שניתוקם ממנו העולם הוא מוכנס בתוכו‪.‬‬ ‫אין חוץ לעולם גוף ולא פנוי ולא מלוי ולא זמן‪.‬‬ ‫אי אפשר להיות הנצחי הווה ונפסד ולא הווה ונפסד נצחי‪.‬‬ ‫– נתפרש כי כל הווה נפסד וכל נפסד הווה ומה שאינו הווה אינו נפסד ומה שאינו נפסד אינו‬ ‫הווה‪.‬‬ ‫יש לשמים ששה צדדים‪.‬‬

‫‪ 8‬אלא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬תנועה‪+ :‬תנועה ‪N‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬נחלק‪V- :‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬התנועה הוא‪ :‬השיכון ‪N‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬אחד‪ :‬אחת ‪B‬‬ ‫‪+‬כי ‪ 9 N‬תיחס‪ :‬תיוחס ‪ :V‬יתיחס ‪ ‖ C‬קל‪ :‬וקל ‪ ‖ OCV‬תיחס‪ :‬תתיחס ‪ 10 O1‬בכח‪11 OCV- :‬‬ ‫מתנענע‪ :‬מתנועע ‪ 12 O‬על שאר‪ :‬לשאר ‪ 14 OCV‬חלקיו‪ :‬חלקו ‪ 15 OCV‬הטבעיים‪ :‬הטבעים‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬מהאמצע‪ :‬מאמצע ‪ 17 C‬ולא‪ :‬ואינו ‪ 20 CV‬אחרות‪ :‬אחרים ‪ 21 V‬מוכנס‪ :‬מכונס ‪23 OCV‬‬ ‫הווה‪ :‬ההוה ‪CV‬‬ ‫‪This doctrine and the following ones are taken from On the Heavens.‬‬

‫‪48‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

339

– It has been explicated that when one thing has two contrary motions, one of them is natural and the other one is forced upon it. Rest that is the contrary of motion is rest in the starting point of motion. – It has been shown that a line is not composed of points nor time of moments. Magnitude cannot be composed of indivisible magnitudes. There cannot exist an infinite magnitude. Anything that changes is divisible. Its beginning and end are indivisible. That which is indivisible such as a point does not have motion essentially. Everything which is moved has a mover. The proximate moving agent which effects motion can do so only when it is in contact with what is moved by it. Circular motion is incommensurable with rectilinear motion. All the more is motion in [the category] of quality incommensurable with motion [in the category of] quantity. The action of the whole exists in the parts in potentiality, but it does not necessarily exist in actuality. – It has been explicated that some things are always in motion and some are always at rest, whereas others are at times in motion and at times at rest. Locomotion is prior with respect to the other motions. – It has been shown that the First Mover is not a body nor a force in a body. The universe is complete because it is a body and it comprises its parts.48 The motion of natural bodies is away from the center; towards the center, and around the center. – It has been shown that there exists a simple spherical body that is moved in a circular motion. – It has been explicated that circular motion is natural to [this simple spherical body], and that [this body] is neither heavy nor light. Circular motion has no contrary. The spherical body has no contrary. It is not generated, nor is it corruptible and it has no end. [In contrast,] each of the elements has an end. It is impossible for there to exist other worlds apart from this one. Natural bodies have determined places. The matter of which the world is constituted is contained in it. Outside the world there is no body, void, plenum or time. It is impossible that that which is eternal be generated and corruptible and that which is generated and corruptible be eternal. – It has been explicated that everything that is generated is corruptible and that everything that is corruptible is generated; and that what is not generated is not corruptible and that what is not corruptible is not generated. The heavens have six sides.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

‫‪340‬‬

‫נתחייב בעבור מציאות השמים מציאות הארץ והארבע יסודות‪.‬‬ ‫העגולה היא תחלת הצורות השטוחות והכדור תחלת הגופניות‪.‬‬ ‫וחייב להיות הצורה הראשונה לגוף הראשון‪ ,‬וכי תנועת השמים שוה מהירה פשוטה‪.‬‬ ‫ותנועת הכוכבים בהם כמסמר בספינה‪ ,‬וכי הארץ עגולה ובאמצע‪.‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫אי אפשר למצוא חלקים שאינן נחלקין‪.‬‬ ‫הפסד הדבר האחד בעצמו הוא היווי לזולתו‪.‬‬ ‫שורש השני נגדיים אחד‪.‬‬ ‫הדברים הפועלין והנפעלין הן דומין בשורש משונין במין‪ .‬הפועל והנפעל שני נגדיים‪ :‬הפועל‬ ‫יפעל מפני צורתו והנפעל יתפעל מפני גולמו‪ .‬ותפעלת האחד בעבור האחר הוא בנגיעתו לו‬ ‫או במציעות גוף אחר ביניהן מקבל לפעולה‪.‬‬ ‫והעירוב הוא דבר בפועל | זולתי הדברים שמהם נתרכב והם מצוים בו בכח‪ .‬והעירוב הוא‬ ‫ממאמר האיכות‪ .‬וכי הארבע יסודות יתחללו אלו מאלו והיווי כל הווה ונפסד איננו כי אם מהם‪.‬‬ ‫עד כאן מבחר פניניו‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬ואתה תראה כי אין בספרי הקודש שלנו כתובים בפירוש ענינים אלו מפני שלא נזדקקו‬ ‫אלא לחכמה האלהית בלבד‪ .‬ולפיכך נקראו ”כתבי הקודש“ לפי שהם מלאים מעניני אותו‬ ‫העולם העליון שהוא קודש‪ .‬ולא נזדקקו לעניני שני עולמות אלו כי ממילא יודעו מכח ידיעת‬ ‫אותו עולם‪ ,‬בהפך מה שעשה הפילוסוף כי הוא חתר להבין אותו העולם מפני ידיעת אלו‪ .‬ולא‬ ‫זו הדרך לידיעתו‪ ,‬כי מי לא ידע בכל אלה אם ידע בתחלה אותו העולם העליון? ומפני זה לא‬ ‫תמצא אחד מהנביאים ומן החסידים שהתפלל להודיעו עניני שני עולמות אלו אך הם מתפללין‬ ‫כולם על ידיעת אותו העולם‪ ,‬כמו שביקש רבן של כל הנביאים‪” :‬הודיעני נא את דרכיך“‪ ,‬ואמר‬ ‫דוד ע״ה‪” :‬דרכיך יי׳ הודיעני“‪ ,‬לפי שמאותו עולם ידע שני עולמות אלו בהכרח‪.‬‬

‫‪ 3‬פשוטה‪ :‬ופשוטה ‪ 4 OCV‬בהם‪ :‬בה היא ‪ 6 OCV‬האחד בעצמו‪ :‬בעצמו האחד ‪ ‖ NB‬היווי‪ :‬הויה‬ ‫‪ 11 V‬והעירוב‪ :‬העירוב ‪ ‖ CN‬הדברים‪ :‬ההרכבים ‪ 12 N‬יתחללו‪ :‬יתחלל ‪ ‖ NB‬מאלו‪ :‬לאלו ‪‖ OCV‬‬ ‫איננו‪ :‬אינו ‪ 13 CV‬עד כאן‪ :‬אלו הן ‪ 15 OCV‬האלהית‪ :‬אלהית ‪ ‖ N‬לפי‪ 16 OCV- :‬העליון‪‖ C- :‬‬ ‫קודש‪ 17 V- :‬העולם‪ :‬עולם ‪ 18 VN‬בתחלה‪ :‬תחלה ‪ ‖ OV1‬ומפני‪ :‬מפני ‪ 19 O‬החסידים‪+ :‬ע״ה ‪‖ V‬‬ ‫שהתפלל‪ :‬שיתפלל ‪ ‖ N‬עולמות‪ :‬העולמות ‪ 20 V‬העולם‪ :‬עולם ‪ 20–21 OV‬כמו … עולם‪ :‬וממנו‬ ‫‪OCV‬‬ ‫‪Here begins the enumeration of doctrines taken from On Generation and Corruption.‬‬ ‫‪Hebrew: mivḥar peninav, which is the title of the collection of epigrams usually attributed‬‬ ‫‪to Solomon Ibn Gabirol in Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation. Cf. the description of the con‬‬‫‪tents of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (above, mḥ/Introd. 12) where Judah labels Book L as the‬‬ ‫‪“choicest” (muvḥar) of this book.‬‬

‫‪49‬‬ ‫‪50‬‬

‫‪4v‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

341

From the existence of the heavens it follows necessarily that the earth and the four elements exist. The circle is the principle of plane figures and the sphere is the [principle] of solid figures. It is necessary that the primary body have the primary figure; that the motion of the heavens be uniform, swift and simple; that the stars move in [the heavens] like nails in a ship, and that the earth be round and in the center. It is impossible for there to exist parts that are indivisible.49 The corruption of one thing in its substance is the generation of another thing. Two contraries are one in genus. Things that act and are acted upon are alike in genus, but different in species. The agent and that which is acted upon are two contraries: the agent acts because of its form and the patient undergoes action because of its matter. The being acted upon of one by the other takes place through contact or through the intermediacy of another body between them that receives the action. Mixture (ʿeruv) is something in actuality that is distinct from the things of which it is composed and that exist in it in potentiality. Mixture belongs to the category of quality. The four elements are transformed one into another, and the generation of everything that is generated and corrupted is only from them. These are the choicest of his pearls.50 25 You see that in our Holy Books nothing is written that explains these matters [explicitly], because they bear only on divine wisdom. Therefore, they are called “Holy Scriptures,” for they are replete with things pertaining to the superior world that is holy. They did not treat the things of these two [other] worlds, for they are known anyway by virtue of the knowledge of that world. This is contrary to the procedure of the Philosopher, for he endeavored to understand that [superior] world through the knowledge of these two worlds. However, this is not the way to [attain] knowledge of it, for who will not know these things, if he first knows this superior world? For that reason you will find none of the prophets and the pious pray to receive knowledge of these two worlds, but they all prayed to obtain knowledge of that [superior] world. Thus theMaster of the Prophets asked, “Let me know Your way” [Ex. 33:13], and David, peace be on him, said, “let me know Your paths, O Lord” [Ps. 25:4], for one will know necessarily these two worlds on the basis of [knowledge of] that world.

‫‪Author’s Introduction to the mḥ‬‬

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‫‪10‬‬

‫‪342‬‬

‫‪ 26‬ואף על פי שתמצא בפירוש משלי אזהרה לידע חמכת הטבע קודם שיתעסק בחכמה‬ ‫האלהית אינו כי אם בעבור להרגיל השכל מעט מעט בחכמות ולא יתחיל מיד באותה חכמה‬ ‫המעולה‪ ,‬כי הרבה תנאים צריך להיות באדם שרוצה לעלות במעלותיה‪ .‬ולא מפני שמכח‬ ‫ידיעת אלו השני עולמים ידע אותו אך צריך באותה חכמה לקבלה כמו שנפרש בעזרת שדי‪.‬‬ ‫לפיכך דומה עסק האומות באלו החכמות למי שמיפה קסת הסופר ועושה לו רצועות של זהב‬ ‫וכיוצא בהן וחיסר מקום הדיו שאין הקסת אלא בעבורו‪ .‬לפיכך חלק ה׳ק׳ב׳ה לאומות להתעסק‬ ‫בחכמות שני עולמות אלו בלבד‪ .‬ו”לא כאלה חלק יעקב כי יוצר הכל הוא“ ”כי יעקב בחר לו‬ ‫יה“ ”יי׳ הוא נחלתו“‪ .‬ואף על פי שעיקר ספרי הקודש הם בחכמת העליון אינן ריקנין גם משני‬ ‫אלו‪ ,‬כי יש בפסוקים הרבה רמזים שיוצאים מכח העיון‪ ,‬כמו שנבאר במקומו בש׳י׳‪ ,‬כי דברי‬ ‫אלהים חיים יוכלו להתפרש בכמה ענינים וכולן אמת‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬וראיתי לחלק זה החיבור לשני חלקים ושלשה מאמרות‪ .‬החלק הראשון בהגיון וחכמת‬ ‫הטבע ואחר הטבע של ארסטו ומאמר אחד בפירוש מקצת פסוקים מבראשית ותהלים ומשלי‪.‬‬ ‫והחלק השני בלימודים ושני מאמרים‪ .‬הא׳ בפירוש האותיות שלנו‪ ,‬שעלה על לב בני אדם‬ ‫שאין להם טעם ושהם סימנים בלבד לחיבור התיבות ולדבור לא יותר‪ .‬וחלילה חלילה להיות‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫האותיות הכתובות על הלוחות באצבע אלהים בלא טעם אך כמה וכמה טעמים גדולים יש‬ ‫להם ממספרם וסידורם ומשמותם וצורותם‪ .‬ומהם יתבאר כל זה הנמצא מראש ועד סוף למי‬ ‫שיבינם‪ .‬אך הבנתי מהם מעט כטיפה מן הים וכתבתי מה שהבנתי כדי להועיל לחבירי מה‬ ‫שעלה בידי‪ .‬והמאמר השני כתבתי בו מקצת הגדות שיש בהן מחכמת הייחוד וזולתה‪.‬‬ ‫ומאלהי אמן יתב׳ כל מי שידינני לכף זכות ולא יאשימני על השגיות‪ .‬וכבר אמר דוד ע״ה‪:‬‬ ‫”שגיאות מי יבין“‪” ,‬יהיו לרצון“ וגו׳‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬בפירוש‪+ :‬ספר ‪+ :V‬בספר ‪ ‖ C‬שיתעסק‪ :‬שנתעסק ‪ ‖ O‬בחכמה‪ :‬בחכמת ‪ 2 O :-V1‬מיד באותה‪:‬‬ ‫מאותה ‪ 3 O‬במעלותיה‪ :‬במעלתה ‪ 4 NB‬אותו‪ ‖ O- :‬אך‪ :‬כי אין ‪ :CV‬אין ‪ ‖ O‬באותה‪ :‬לאותה?‬ ‫‪ :C1‬אותה ‪ ‖ C2‬שנפרש‪+ :‬שם ‪ 5 OCV‬רצועות‪ :‬רציעות ‪ 6 O‬אלא‪ :‬כי אם ‪ ‖ V‬בעבורו‪ :‬להן ‪Nsl‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬עולמות‪ :‬עולמים ‪ 8 V‬ספרי‪ :‬ספר ‪ ‖ NB‬בחכמת‪ :‬בחכמות ‪+ :NB‬העולם ‪ 9 V‬בש׳י׳‪11 N- :‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬ואחר‪ :‬ומה שאחר ‪‖ V‬‬ ‫‪ 11–12‬וחכמת הטבע‪ :‬והטבע ‪O‬‬ ‫ושלשה מאמרות‪ ‖ V- :‬החלק‪N- :‬‬ ‫ואחר … ארסטו‪ :‬והחכמה האלהית והיא נקראת מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו ‪ ‖ C‬פסוקים‪ :‬הפסוקים ‪‖ B‬‬ ‫ותהלים‪ :‬ותילים ‪ :C‬וספר תלים ‪ ‖ V‬ומשלי‪ :‬וספר משלי ‪ 13 V‬בלימודים‪ :‬בחכמת הלימודים ‪ ‖ CV‬ושני‪:‬‬ ‫ושנים ‪ ‖ V‬מאמרים‪ :‬מאמרות ‪ 14 C‬ושהם‪ :‬כי הם )הן ‪ ‖ OCV (V‬לחיבור‪ :‬לדיבור ‪ 15 O‬הכתובות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ NB‬אלהים‪ 16 V- :‬ממספרם‪ ‖ B- :‬הנמצא‪ :‬המיצוי ‪ 17 NB‬שיבינם‪ :‬שיבין אותן ‪ ‖ V‬כתבתי‪:‬‬‫כללתי ‪ 18 O‬שעלה‪+ :‬מהן ‪ :C‬שיעלו לידם ‪ ‖ V‬הגדות‪+ :‬המלקוטות מקצת מסכתות מן התלמוד ‪C‬‬ ‫‪ 19–20‬ומאלהי … וג׳‪OCV- :‬‬ ‫‪Apparently the reference is to Treatise 1 of the mḥ, in which various biblical verses are‬‬ ‫‪explained in accordance with philosophical views.‬‬ ‫‪This treatise, which contains sections from the Babylonian Talmud, has not yet been inves‬‬‫‪tigated (cf. Chapter Seven, section 3), and the meaning of “the science of unity” here is not‬‬ ‫‪clear. Perhaps it refers to the question of the interpretation of aggadot that ascribe cor‬‬‫‪poreality to God, an issue that was debated during the Maimonidean controversy in the‬‬ ‫‪1230s.‬‬

‫‪51‬‬ ‫‪52‬‬

Author’s Introduction to the mḥ

343

26 It is true that you will find in the explanation of [verses from] Proverbs an exhortation that one should first study physical science before engaging in divine knowledge, but this is meant only to accustom the intellect gradually to the sciences, so that one will not start immediately with this lofty science, since someone who wishes to ascend in its degrees must meet many requirements. This does not mean that one would know the higher world through the knowledge of these two worlds; what he needs instead in that science is qabbalah, as we will explain there with the help of God almighty. Therefore, the occupation of the nations with these sciences can be compared to [the effort of] someone who embellishes an inkstand for a scribe and furnishes it with golden straps and the like, while forgetting to make a place for the ink, which after all is what an inkstand is for. Therefore, the Holy One blessed be He apportioned to the nations only the occupation with the sciences of these worlds, whereas not like these is the Portion of Jacob, for it is He who formed all things [Jer. 10:16]; For the Lord has chosen Jacob for Himself [Ps. 135:4]; the Lord is their portion [Deut. 10:9; 18:2]. Yet, although the Holy Books treat primarily this upper world, they are not devoid of the other two worlds either, for many verses contain allusions to them that can be laid bare by the power of speculation, as we will explain in its proper place,51 with the help of God almighty, for the words of the living God can be expounded in many ways and all of them are true. 27 I deemed it fit to divide this book into two parts and three treatises. The first part [is] about Aristotle’s logic, natural science and Metaphysics. Moreover, it contains a treatise that explains some verses from Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs. The second part [is] about mathematics and it contains two treatises. The first of them gives an explanation of our alphabet, for it has occurred to some people that these letters do not have a meaning and that they are but signs for the composition of words and for speech and nothing else. Heaven forbid that the letters that are written on the Tables by God’s fingers should be without meaning. How many great meanings may be derived from their number, order, names and forms. Everything that exists can be explained through them, from the beginning until the end, for him who will understand. However, I understand only a small portion of it, like a drop of the sea, and I have written down what I have managed to understand for the benefit of my fellow men. In the second treatise I have written down some Haggadot that contain [matters] of the science of unity and other ones.52 Everyone who will judge me according to the scale of merit without blaming me for errors will be blessed by God, Amen. David, peace be on him, already said, “Who can be aware of errors?” [Ps. 19:13]; “May [the words of my mouth and the prayer of my heart] be acceptable to You” [Ps. 19:15].

‫|המאמר הראשון מספר השמע‬

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‫‪15‬‬

‫‪ 1‬אמר‪ :‬ענין חכמת הטבע היא לידע עילות הדברים הטבעיים‪ .‬ואותן העילות הן ארבעה‪:‬‬ ‫הגולם והצורה והפועל והתכלית‪ .‬וענין זה הספר הוא נתינת העילות הראשונות הכוללות לכל‬ ‫הנמצאים הטבעיים‪ .‬והשתי עילות בלבד מאלו והן הגולם והפועל יתבארו בחכמה הזאת‪,‬‬ ‫והצורה והתכלית יתבארו בחכמה אלהית‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬מיני המופתים הנעשים בזו החכמה הן הנקראין ראיות‪ ,‬כלומר שנעלה מהדברים‬ ‫המתאחרים אצל הטבע—והן הידועות אצלינו והן הדברים המורכבים—אל הידועים‬ ‫והמוקדמין אצל הטבע‪ ,‬והן הפשוטין שנרכבו אלו מהן‪ .‬וזה בחילוף המופתים הלמידיות‬ ‫לפי שבחכמת הלימודים נלך מהמוקדם באמת אל המאוחר‪ ,‬ובכאן מהמאוחר אל המוקדם‪.‬‬ ‫ולפיכך נקראו המופתים הלמידיות גמורות‪ ,‬כלומר שאין בהן ספק לפי שהן על תכלית הבריאות‬ ‫בגמרא‪ .‬ונקראו אלו ”ראיות“ דרך הלימוד הנעשה בזו החכמה הוא מהכללית אל הפרטית‪ ,‬כמו‬ ‫שהמופתים הנעשין בה הן מהמורכבין אל הפשוטות‪ .‬ולפיכך יש בזה הספר כללות זו החכמה‬ ‫של טבע‪ ,‬והספרים שאחריו הן מדברים על מצוי מצוי מהמצואים‪ ,‬לפי שהדברים הכלליים הן‬ ‫ידועין אצלנו יותר מהפרטיים‪ .‬ויסתור זה למה שנאמר בספר המופת כי הדברים הכלליים יותר‬ ‫רחוקים מההרגש והפרטיים יותר קרובים ממנו‪.‬‬

‫‪ 3‬וענין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬אמר‪+ :‬כי ‪ ‖ OCV‬ענין‪ :‬תכונה או עיון ‪ ‖ Osl‬היא‪ :‬הוא ‪ ‖ OCV‬הטבעיים‪ :‬הטבעים ‪O‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬והשתי עילות‪ :‬ושני העלות ‪ :O‬ושתי העלות ‪ :C‬והשני העלות‬ ‫ועיון ‪ ‖ Osl‬הכוללות‪ :‬הכללות ‪N‬‬ ‫‪ 5 V‬והצורה‪ :‬אבל הצורה ‪ ‖ OCV‬יתבארו‪ 6 OV- :‬שנעלה‪ :‬שעלה ‪ 8 CV‬בחילוף‪ :‬בחילוקי‬ ‫‪ ‖ O‬הלמידיות‪ :‬הלמדיות ‪ :N‬המולידות ‪ 9 CV‬שבחכמת הלימודים נלך‪ :‬שבאותה חכמה נתהלך בה‬ ‫‪ 11‬מהכללית אל הפרטית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬נקראו‪ :‬ונקרא ‪ ‖ O‬הלמידיות‪ :‬הלימודיות ‪CVN‬‬ ‫)‪ O‬בהן( ‪OCV‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬והספרים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬בה‪ :‬בו ‪ ‖ OCV‬מהמורכבין‪ :‬מהמורכבות ‪OC‬‬ ‫מהכלליות אל הפרטיות ‪OCV‬‬ ‫הספרים ‪ ‖ OCV‬הן‪ ‖ OCV- :‬מהמצואים‪ :‬מהנמצאין ‪ ‖ OCV‬הכלליים‪ :‬הכללים ‪ 14 V‬מהפרטיים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬רחוקים‪ :‬רחוק ‪ ‖ O‬והפרטיים‪ :‬והפרטים ‪ ‖ N‬ממנו‪+ :‬ואנחנו נתיר זה במקומות‬ ‫מהפרטים ‪C‬‬ ‫אחרים ‪O‬‬ ‫‪1 References to underlying passages in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Physics i–ii (hence‬‬‫‪forth: mc Physics) are to Kalonymus’ Hebrew translation in the edition with English transla‬‬‫‪tion by S. Harvey (1977); for references to mc Physics iii–viii, see below, note 61. My thanks‬‬ ‫‪to Prof. S. Harvey for permitting me to use his English translation of mc Physics i–ii. From‬‬ ‫‪mḥ/Physics iv.6 onwards Judah has drawn also on Averroes’ Epitome of the Physics; refer‬‬‫‪ences are to ed. J. Puig (1983) with references to Puig’s Spanish translation (1987) in paren‬‬‫‪theses. For full bibliographical references to the editions and modern translations referred to‬‬ ‫‪in the notes, see the Bibliography. The opening sentence of mḥ/Physics abridges mc Physics‬‬ ‫‪i 179.4–5 (tr. 242). A comparison of the first paragraphs of mḥ/Physics i with Judah’s source‬‬‫‪text is given in Appendix A. For studies on Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics see‬‬ ‫‪Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique; Lettinck, Aristotle’s Physics, and Glasner, Averroes’ Physics.‬‬

‫‪35r5‬‬

The First Treatise of the Book on the Physics 1 [Aristotle] said: The aim of natural science is to gain knowledge of the causes of natural things.1 [These causes are four: the matter, the form, the agent and the end. The aim of this book is to give the first causes which are common to all natural beings.]2 Only two of these causes, namely, the matter and the agent, will be explained in this science, whereas the form and the end will be explained in divine science.3 2 [The kinds of demonstrations (mofetim) which are employed in this science are called “proofs” (reʾayot), that is to say, that we will proceed from the things which are posterior by nature—and these are the things [more] known to us, namely, the composite things—to the prior things, which are more known by nature. These are the simple [substances] of which these [posterior] things are composed.]4 [This is the opposite of [the procedure in] mathematical demonstrations, for in mathematical science we proceed from what is in truth prior to the posterior, whereas here [that is, in natural science] [we proceed] from the posterior to the prior. Therefore, the mathematical demonstrations (mofetim) are called absolute, that is to say, that there is no doubt about them, for they are completely sound. [The demonstrations in this science] are called “proofs” (reʾayot)]5 [[because of] the path of instruction that is taken here, which proceeds from the general to the particular, much as the proofs (mofetim)6 that are employed in it proceed from composite things to simple things. Therefore, this book contains the general [principles] of physical science, whereas the books that follow it deal with each of the beings, for general things are more known to us than particular things.]7 This contradicts what is said in On Demonstration, namely, that the general things are further from sensation and that the particulars are nearer.8

Cf. mc Physics i.1.1, 180.4–7 (tr. 243). Cf. mc Physics i.1.1, 180.9–12 (tr. 243). Cf. mc Physics i.1.2, 180.14–18 (tr. 243); cf. Arist., Physics 184a17–23. Cf. mc Physics i.1.2, 180.20–181.5 (tr. 244). Hebr. mofetim. Judah uses this term both in the sense of mathematical demonstrations and of proofs in general, see mḥ/Intro 23 and Chapter Four, section 1 (i). 7 Cf. mc Physics i.1.3, 181.7–12 (tr. 244); cf. Arist., Physics 184a23–b8. 8 Cf. Arist., Anal. Post. 72a1–5. For this observation, which has no parallel in Judah’s source, see Chapter Four, section 1 (i).

2 3 4 5 6

‫‪Physics‬‬

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‫‪346‬‬

‫‪ 3‬יש לראשיות חקר בכמות ובאיכות‪ .‬הראשיות ראוי להיותן משני נגדיים ומוצע לשני נגדיים‪.‬‬ ‫ועמדה דעתו כי הן שלשה‪ :‬הצורה והגולם והאין‪ .‬והצורה היא כנגד האין והגולם הוא המוצע‬ ‫לשניהן‪ .‬ראוי שנדע על איזה צד הוא האין ראשית‪ .‬אף על פי שהראשיות הן אלו הג׳ השנים‬ ‫מהן בלבד הן ראשיות באמת‪ ,‬כלומר הגולם והצורה‪ .‬אבל האין לא נאמר בו ראשית כי אם‬ ‫במקרה‪ ,‬לפי שלא נאמר בו ראשית אלא מפני שהוא מוקדם לצורה‪ ,‬וכשתמצא הצורה יסור‬ ‫האין שלה‪ ,‬ונשאר אותו המצוי מורכב מגולם וצורה‪ .‬וכל נמצא מורכב מגולם וצורה לא יהיה‬ ‫הדבר מכל דבר אלא מדבר ידוע וקל וחומר שיהיה מאין‪ .‬לא יהיה ההיווי כי אם ממצוי ולא‬ ‫יהיה מאין‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬הגולם הראשון | מציאותו ממוצעת בין האין והפועל‪ ,‬ומציאותו בכח‪ .‬וענין ”מציאותו בכח“‪:‬‬ ‫כלומר שאינו רק ממה בפועל‪ ,‬כלומר‪ ,‬לא יתרוקן מהצורות הבאות עליו תמיד ולא מהאפשרות‬ ‫החייב לו‪ .‬וערכו מהצורה כערך העץ מצד שהוא בכח תיבה לצורת התיבה‪ .‬והכח והאפשרות‬ ‫אינן בעצם הגולם אך הם השגות מהשגותיו לפי שהגולם באמת מוצע לכח ולאפשרות‪ .‬לפיכך‬ ‫הוא אחד במוצע‪ ,‬הרבה בכח‪* ,‬והאיניות החוזרין עליו כמו הדונג שהוא מוצע לקבלת החותם‪.‬‬

‫‪ 1‬לראשיות‪ :‬ליסודות ‪ ‖ CVNB‬להיותן‪ :‬להיות ‪ ‖ OCV‬ומוצע‪ :‬ונושא ‪ 3 O‬אף על פי‪ :‬אומר א׳ע׳פ‬ ‫‪ 6‬ונשאר … וצורה‪ ‖ #1