A Defense of the Catholic Religion: The Necessity, Existence, and Limits of the Infallible Church (Early Modern Catholic Sources) 0813237734, 9780813237732

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A DEFENSE OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION

E A R LY M O D E R N C AT H O L I C S O U R C E S Volume 9

Editorial B oard Ulrich L. Lehner

Trent Pomplun

University of Notre Dame

University of Notre Dame

Series Editor

Series Editor

Paul Richard Blum

Susannah Monta

Loyola University Maryland

University of Notre Dame

Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra

Felipe Pereda

University of Texas at Austin

Harvard University

Wim DeCock

Jean-Louis Quantin

KU Leuven

École Pratique des Hautes Études (PSL)—Sorbonne

Simon Ditchfield University of York

Carlos Eire Yale University

Marco Forlivesi D’Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara

Erin Rowe Johns Hopkins University

Jacob Schmutz Université Catholique de Louvain

Jean-Luc Solère Boston College

B e da M ay r, O SB

A DEFENSE OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION T h e N e c e s si t y, E x i st e nce , a n d L i m i ts of a n I nfalli ble C hu rc h

Translated by

Ulri ch L. L ehn er

The Catholic Universit y of America Press Washington, D.C.

Copyright © 2023 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. ∞ Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress ISBN: 978-0-8132-3773-2 eISBN: 978-0-8132-3774-9

Contents Contents

C ontents

Introduction: The Ecumenical Vision of Beda Mayr, OSB (1742–94) by Ulrich L. Lehner

1

A DEFENSE OF TH E C ATH OLI C R ELI GI O N Preface, which must be read by necessity

21

First Section: Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith

31



§ 1. 31

§ 2. Christ, and the apostles preached to be understood, and to be understood by all.  33 § 3. The writings of the apostles and evangelists were left with the intention of being understood by us.  34 § 4. Because the writings of the New Testament are intended for Christians of all times, it must be possible to find their true meaning even today.  36 § 5. God has foreseen that His words will be interpreted differently by different people.  36 § 6. Therefore, God either had to be indifferent whether the revealed truths were understood correctly, or he was not.  37 § 7. God cannot be indifferent whether one understands his revelation correctly or incorrectly.  37 § 8.

God was not indifferent whether His revelation would be rightly or wrongly understood, and at the same time foresaw that His words would often be misunderstood. He therefore had to give us a means by which we could infallibly detect their true meaning.  37

§ 9. 38

v



vi Contents § 10.

According to the economy that God has otherwise observed when communicating a revelation, it is not probable that he has left it to every man to determine the meaning of revelation by the ordinary rules of hermeneutics. 39

§ 11. According to the nature of the revealed truths, it is not probable that God has left their explanation to individual insight.  43 § 12. The Bible alone cannot be a rule of faith for us, because from it alone cannot be determined with certainty what Jesus taught.  50 § 13. Answering the objections  61

Second Section: Existence of a Living Judge of Faith § 14. 76 § 15. 76 § 16.

To interpret the scriptures means to connect with their words the very concepts, the very meaning, which the authors of the scriptures have connected with them.  79

§ 17. Therefore, the best interpreters of the scriptures are those who know the concepts and the meaning of the authors.  80 § 18. The terms and the meaning of the biblical authors are best known to those who have heard the explanation of them from these authors themselves.  80 § 19. The explanation of the whole Gospel by the biblical authors was heard by the first Christians and especially by the teachers they established everywhere.  81 § 20. Those interpret the scriptures most reliably who accept the interpretation of those who have heard it from the apostles themselves.  81 § 21. Tradition or transmission, as we consider it here, is the unanimous testimony of the whole Church to the divine revelation of a doctrine.  81 § 22. The propagation of Christian doctrine through oral tradition does not contain any intrinsic contradiction. 82

76

Contents vii

§ 23. The propagation of Christian doctrine through oral tradition does not contain any extrinsic contradiction. 83 § 24. If God really wanted to propagate the Christian doctrine through oral tradition, it is certain that he made arrangements by which it would always be preserved pure.  83 § 25. It was also very fitting that God chose the path of tradition for the propagation of pure doctrine. 85 § 26. We really have a unanimous testimony of the whole Church about what Christ and his apostles taught, or an oral tradition.  86

Third Section: Infallibility of This Judge of Faith on Grounds of Reason § 27.

88

It is historically and to the highest degree morally certain that this testimony, or this tradition, has not been falsified out of ignorance, malice, or any other accidental cause.  88

§ 28. Tradition, or the unanimous testimony of the Church, has always been regarded as the rule of faith from the beginning of Christianity.  92

§ 29. 98



§ 30. 110



§ 31. 113

§ 32. A sure mark of revelation is that a doctrine has been transmitted as a revealed one at all times, everywhere, and by all.  116 § 33. These three characteristics of a tradition must be limited just as they are limited in the proof of the existence of a revelation.  118

§ 34. 127

Fourth Section: Infallibility of the Judge of Faith from Revelation § 35. The infallibility of the Church founded by Christ can also be proven from revelation.  131

§ 36. 149

131

viii Contents

§ 37. 159



§ 38. 166

Fifth Section: Which Church Is the Infallible One?

§ 39. 167

§ 40. The Church is a society of people who seek to worship God in the way prescribed by Christ.  167 § 41. The first church founded by Christ and the apostles did not err in doctrines of faith and morals.  168 § 42. If the first church was infallible, it accepted all doctrines of faith and morals. And consequently, all those who accused it of error were mistaken.  169 § 43. That church is therefore the true one, from which either individual people or societies separated, or which excluded these people and societies from its community because they were guilty of errors.  169 § 44. From the first infallible church, which remains infallible, the false teachers of all times have really been separated, or they have separated themselves.  170 § 45.

Among the number of particular churches from which others have separated, or from which the other new sects have been excluded, there has always been the Roman Church, or the Roman particular church has always been a part of the true Church.  172

§ 46. That church is therefore the true church of Christ, which was always united with the Roman particular church. 174 § 47. The true Church must be united.  175 § 48. The true Church must be holy  178 § 49. The true Church must be Catholic.  179 § 50. The true Church must be apostolic.  181

§ 51. 182



§ 52. 183

§ 53. The simple-minded and unstudied can reasonably believe that Jesus and his apostles are the founders of the Christian religion.  185 § 54. He can reasonably believe that what Jesus and his apostles taught was revealed by God.  185

167

Contents ix

§ 55. He can reasonably believe that Jesus and his apostles presented the doctrine that the Church claims as its own.  186

§ 56. 187



§ 57. 189



§ 58. 190

Sixth Section: The Boundaries of Infallibility

§ 59. 193



§ 60. 194

§ 61. Christ appeared in the flesh to redeem men and to teach them the way in which they should make use of this redemption and apply it to themselves.  196 § 62. If, after the work of redemption, Christ’s only purpose is to teach us how to be saved, then all the arrangements He has made have this purpose.  196 § 63. Because the means exist only for the sake of the end, no further interpretation or effectiveness can be granted to them than is necessary to achieve the end.  197 § 64. As the foundation of the Church itself, so also all its power, so all the advantages given to it, are nothing else but means to the end to lead the people to eternal bliss.  197 § 65. The infallibility of the Church is a means to the end of ushering people into the Christian order of salvation.  197 § 66. I call the infallibility of the Church that privilege that Christ gave to his Church to teach everything without danger of error, which is indispensably necessary or useful to the believers for the attainment of salvation, and not to be able to teach anything that leads away from the order of salvation.  198 § 67. If this concept of infallibility is accepted, it can be proven just as well as before when it is extended further.  202 § 68. This so limited infallibility of the Church Protestants themselves admit, and must admit.  203 § 69. Doctrines that have not been directly revealed can still be called revealed.  204 § 70. There is another kind of union possible between us and the Protestants than our theologians have hitherto believed. 208

193

x Contents § 71. Plan for a Reunification  210

§ 72. 211

§ 73. From the purpose for which Christ conferred infallibility on His Church, it follows that it cannot be infallible in the canonization of deceased Christians.  225

§ 74. 229

§ 75.

From the ultimate purpose for which Christ promised infallibility to His Church, it does not follow that the latter must be infallible in approving the rules of an Order and the Order itself.  232

§ 76. From the purpose of infallibility it does not follow that the Church must be infallible in the so-called factis dogmaticis. 233

§ 77. 239

Bibliography 247 Index 251

A DEFENSE OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION

Introduction Introduction

Introduction

The Ecumenical Vision of Beda Mayr, OSB (1742–1794) Ulric h L. Leh n e r One of the most intriguing figures of Catholic theology in the eighteenth century is the Swabian Benedictine Beda Mayr (1742–94). His main work, a three-volume fundamental theology of 1787–89, not only demonstrates his intellectual acumen but also how ambiguous the Catholic understanding of “dogma” and “revelation” was. Mayr tried to use the unsettled debate about what constitutes a binding teaching to propose a plan for overcoming the separation of the Christian churches. The methodology he proposed might be the first Catholic attempt that deserves the label “ecumenical.”

Biography Felix Nolanus Mayr was born to a wealthy family of farmers on January 17, 1742, in Taiting, close to the village of Dasing in the diocese of Augsburg.1 After attending the abbey school at Scheyern and the high school in Augsburg, he studied philosophy for two years in Munich 1. Gerhard J. Rauwolf, “P. Beda Mayr OSB (1742–1794): Versuch einer ökumenischen Annäherung,” Jahrbuch des Vereins für Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte 33 (1999): 317–53.

1



2 Introduction and then mathematics in Freiburg im Breisgau. In 1761, he was received into the Benedictine Abbey of the Holy Cross in Donauwörth, where he professed his solemn vows on September 29, 1762, and received the name Beda. After three years of studying theology in Benediktbeuern, he was ordained a priest on January 6, 1766. Just a year later, Mayr was appointed to serve as professor of philosophy and theology in the abbey, a duty which he fulfilled until 1785.2 Besides teaching, he regularly preached in churches of his diocese and through his pastoral work also established a number of friendships with Protestant peers. Mayr’s main area of research, however, was dogmatic and foundational theology, then still called apologetics. In order to be well equipped for this task, he did not shy away from engaging with the writings of Protestant Enlighteners. He was convinced that the Church had to be aware of contemporary intellectual currents, since they affected its ability to disseminate its doctrine. Nevertheless, unlike most of his colleagues, Mayr did not merely engage with these writers in order to defeat their doctrinal “errors” but often agreed with their analysis of a problem or an argument. This fact alone was sufficient to raise suspicions among intransigent Catholic zelanti. Yet, besides this interest in the philosophical and theological thought of others, he was also deeply committed to demonstrating the compatibility of science and faith. This can be seen most clearly in his support for the Copernican view that earth revolved around the sun, already stated in his doctoral dissertation of 1768. Although the scientific community had long endorsed the Copernican system, until 1757 Catholics had been censored for publicly embracing it.3 Thus, its public defense was still relatively new, and many did not know how to articulate it without damaging the truth claims of Holy Scripture. Mayr 2. He also had a great interest in astronomy, physics, and mathematics, and published his findings. See Beda Mayr, De Copernicano mundi systemate dissertatio (Dillingen: 1768); Mayr, “Brief über den neulich gesehenen Kometen,” Baierische Sammlungen und Auszüge 17 (1766), 546–66; Mayr, Abhandlung von der Bewegung der Körper in krummen Linien, und Anwendung derselben auf unser Sonnensystem (Augsburg: 1779). 3. Maurice Finocchiaro, Retrying Galileo, 1633–1992 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 138–39.

Introduction 3



thought that the work of the Jesuit Roger Boscovich, an eminent Enlightenment figure, provided the proper frame for achieving just that. After all, he convincingly explained that science could not contradict Holy Scripture because the Bible never intended to teach scientific information in the first place.4 A Protestant reviewer was so impressed by Mayr’s theses about the physical world that he wrote: “This author puts many Protestant academies to shame, who are still caught up in scholastic quibbles.”5 Nevertheless, Mayr achieved more fame with his homilies, which appeared in several volumes, as well as a small book that argued in favor of the vernacular in the Catholic liturgy.6 These volumes established his reputation as a theologian who was willing to break with the textbook style of scholasticism, dialogue with the culture of the day, and teach the faith without superstition or credulity. In 1778, however, Beda Mayr caused a major controversy when a long, personal letter to his friend, the school reformer and ex-Benedictine Heinrich Braun (1732–92), was published without his knowledge under the title First Step toward the Future Reunification of the Catholic and Protestant Churches.7 In it, Mayr proposed concrete steps toward a reunification of the churches. Especially his willingness to sacrifice Catholic doctrinal positions was seen by many as borderline heretical. 4. Beda Mayr, De Copernicano Mundi. On Boscovich, see Jonathan A. Wright, “Ruggiero Boscovich (1711–87): Jesuit Science in an Enlightenment Context,” in Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe, ed. Ulrich L. Lehner and Jeffrey Burson (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 353–70. 5. E. G. Baldinger, Auszüge aus den neuesten Dissertationen über die Naturlehre . . . (Berlin and Stralsund: 1773), 18. 6. Beda Mayr, Prüfung der bejahenden Gründe, welche die Gottesgelehrte anführen, über die Frage, soll man sich in der abendländischen Kirche bey dem Gottesdienst der lateinischen Sprache bedienen (Frankfurt und Leipzig: 1777). See Manfred Probst, Gottesdienst in Geist und Wahrheit: Die liturgischen Ansichten und Bestrebungen Johann Michael Sailers (1751–1832) (Regensburg: Pustet, 1976). Cf. Lehner, On the Road to Vatican II: German Catholic Enlightenment and the Reform of the Church (Augsburg: Fortress, 2016), 171–92. 7. Beda Mayr, Der erste Schritt zur künftigen Vereinigung der katholischen und der evangelischen Kirche, gewaget von—Fast wird man es nicht glauben, gewaget von einem Mönche (“P.F.K. in W.” [fictitious location]: 1778). See Wilhelm Haefs, Aufklärung in Bayern: Leben, Werk und Wirkung Lorenz von Westenrieders (Neuried: Ars Una, 1998), 107–8.

4 Introduction Even the eminent Wolffian Jesuit Benedict Stattler (1728–97) considered Mayr’s little pamphlet important enough for a detailed critique.8 In 1783, however, Mayr’s First Step was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books.9 An official investigation of the monk’s orthodoxy, carried out by the local bishop and his interrogators, nevertheless did not find anything heretical in his writings or teaching and praised his following the rule of St. Benedict. However, the bishop of Augsburg would have liked to silence Mayr as a professor, but since the abbey was independent, the conciliatory Abbot Gallus Hammerl (in office 1776–93),10 permitted Mayr to continue teaching as professor. The next years were less turbulent and thus allowed Beda Mayr to produce a number of immensely important publications. In the 1780s he published a defense of the veneration of the saints,11 a number of plays, a book on church/state politics,12 a small pamphlet on an ecumenical reunification academy;13 and then, as the fruit of decade-long research, his trilogy. These three volumes of the Defense of Natural, Christian and Catholic Religion (1787–89) expressed a new style of theological reflection.14 Although he followed the classical model of foundational theology, and thus proved the existence of God (demonstratio religiosa) in the first volume, God’s historical revelation in the Old and New Testaments (demonstratio Christiana) in the second volume, and finally the identity of Christ’s church with the Catholic Church 8. Benedict Stattler, Plan zu der alleinmöglichen Vereinigung im Glauben der Protestanten mit der katholischen Kirche und den Grenzen der Möglichkeiten (Munich: 1791), 159–279. 9. Beda Mayr, Apologie seiner Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion; Eine Beylage zu seiner Vertheidigung der natürlichen, christlichen und katholischen Religion (Augsburg: 1790), 168. 10. Arnold Schromm, “Wissenschaft und Aufklärung im Benediktinerstift Heilig– Kreuz Donauwörth,” Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte 54 (1991): 288. 11. Beda Mayr, Die Verehrung und Anrufung der Heiligen . . . (Augsburg: 1781). 12. Beda Mayr, together with Thomas J. von Haiden, Grundsätze zur Feststellung und Aufrechterhaltung der Eintracht zwischen der politischen und kirchlichen Macht (1785). 13. Beda Mayr, Entwurf eines Religionscollegiums nach den Bedürfnissen unsrer Zeiten (s.l.: 1786). 14. Beda Mayr, Vertheidigung der natürlichen, christlichen, und katholischen Religion, 3 vols. (Augsburg: 1787–89).

Introduction 5



(demonstratio Catholica) in volume three,15 Mayr wrote in a German that echoed the literary circles of Weimar. His style differed refreshingly from the dry, scholastic tone of his peers.16 Moreover, he demonstrated that he had wrestled with the ideas of Enlightenment thinkers and did not easily dismiss them. After all, the guiding idea of the whole project was to show the intelligibility of Catholic theology according to “the needs of the time.”17 Among these needs was not only a sober approach to exegesis that would not come into conflict with science, but also a response to the critics of revelation and a rebuttal of Protestant critiques of Catholicism. Instead of continuing the polemical feuds of the past, Mayr irenically analyzed Lutheran and Calvinist arguments, weighed them, and argued that they were based either on misreadings of ancient texts or misunderstandings. He consequently believed that education about authentic Catholic teaching could remove stumbling blocks to a reunion of the churches. Many Catholic theologians, however, were not supportive of Mayr’s approach. They saw in him a scholar who conceded too much to Protestantism. Mayr, on the other hand, identified in Catholic circles a widespread fear of free discourse and a petrified insistence on theological opinions (opiniones). The latter, however, were not truths of faith, as he reminded his readers, but merely reasonable explanations of the faith that could not demand obedience. Their authority consisted merely in their rationality. Blocking the free discussion of such opinions, whether they came from Thomistic, Scotist, Suarezian, or Augustinian “schools,” not only poisoned the academic discourse within Catholicism, but also made a reunification with the Protestant churches impossible.18 15. For the history and structure of theologia fundamentalis, see Gerhard Heinz, Divinam christianae religionis originem probare: Untersuchung zur Entstehung des fundamentaltheologischen Offenbarungstraktates der katholischen Schultheologie (Mainz: Grünewald, 1984). 16. A similar approach was chosen by the Salzburg Benedictine Simpert Schwarzhueber, Praktisch-katholisches Religionshandbuch für nachdenkende Christen, 4 vols. (Prague: 1785ff). In contrast to these, Benedict Stattler’s German (as well as his Latin) was quite cumbersome. 17. Beda Mayr, Vertheidigung der natürlichen, christlichen und katholischen Religion, vol. 1 (Augsburg: 1787), preface. 18. This is also a concern for Ludovico Muratori, De Ingeniorum Moderatione in

6 Introduction Major examples of such opinions were the Immaculate Conception and papal infallibility, which both Lutheran and Reformed Christians rejected. If these were, however, not part of the deposit of faith, then assent could not be demanded of the faithful; and if they were the reason for Protestants not returning to the Catholic fold, they could simply be abandoned or theologically “defused.” Like the dogmatic theology of François Véron (1575–1649), this move rested very much on the idea of delineating the boundaries of defined Catholic teaching (de fide divina). Both agree therefore on a dogmatic minimalism: only those teachings that had been always and everywhere believed (Vincent of Lerins), and publicly declared as such, could be de fide divina. Unlike Véron, however, who argued that the Church spoke always infallibly about God’s revelation when it identified its content, Mayr had a different view. For him, the Church could err in identifying revelation.19 Such a criticism of papal infallibility, which was not defined as a dogma until 1870, drew the ire of the Jesuits who defended their vision of an Ultramontanist Church.20 Especially Johann Hochbichler, later a teacher of the famed Tübingen theologian Johann Sebastian Drey,21 began to attack Mayr.22 His vitriolic polemic not only compared the monk’s red hair color and limp to those of Judas Iscariot, the betrayer of Christ, but also labeled him heretical.23 For the next three years, Beda was caught up defending his work, until a fellow Benedictine, Wolfgang Frölich of Regensburg, caused him to surrender. This monk Religionis negotiis (Paris: 1714), whom Mayr repeatedly paraphrases in volume 3 of his defense—most often, however, without acknowledging his debt. 19. Johannes Beumer, “Zu den Anfängen der neuzeitlichen Kontroverstheologie: Die Regula fidei Catholicae des Franciscus Veronius,” Catholica 17 (1963): 25–43; François Véron, “Regula Fidei Catholicae,” in Religionis Naturalis et Revelatae Principia, ed. Luke Hooke, (Paris: 1774), 3:609–725; Véron, Regle générale de la foy catholique séparée de toutes autres doctrines inférieures en authorité (Paris: Taupinart, 1645). 20. The Society of Jesus had been suppressed by the papacy in 1773. It was not reinstated until 1814. 21. Carl Joseph Hefele, “Nekrolog auf Johann Sebastian Drey,” Theologische Quartalschrift 35 (1853): 341–49. 22. Johann Ev. Hochbichler, P. Beda Mayrs Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion theologisch untersuchet (Augsburg: 1790). 23. Hochbichler, P. Beda Mayrs, 11; 25. See also Rauwolf, “P. Beda Mayr,” 343. Mayr, Apologie, 133.

Introduction 7



was well connected in Rome and known for obsessively accusing others of heresy. This time, he was again successful. Frölich convinced the Roman censors that all three (!) volumes of Mayr’s Defense were extremely dangerous and possibly heretical. In 1792 they were all placed on the Index of Forbidden Books.24 This had immediate repercussions for Mayr’s readers. After all, no Catholic was now allowed to read them on pain of excommunication. Dispensations for reading censored books were almost exclusively granted to theology professors, but never to the interested laity, which Mayr also had desired to reach by writing in the vernacular. It is no surprise that the battle to defend his own orthodoxy exhausted the monk, who died in his abbey on April 28, 1794.25 Yet, censorship alone would not have stopped a dissemination of Mayr’s ideas. The entire intellectual climate had changed. The French Revolution and the bloodbaths it caused had changed the perception of Enlightenment thought, be it secular or religious. Many, especially within the Catholic Church, who had previously viewed the Enlightenment with suspicion, now felt vindicated and began, like Frölich, to actively campaign against the Enlighteners in their own ranks. Catholic Enlighteners like Beda Mayr were singled out as traitors. The arrest of Pope Pius VI by Napoleon and the consequent imprisonment of his successor Pope Pius VII only exacerbated their oppression.26 Soon afterwards, however, Napoleon’s occupation of the German Rhineland motivated the German princes in 1802–3 to dissolve Catholic prince bishoprics, abbeys, monasteries, colleges, and universities many of which had previously disseminated the ideas of the Catholic Enlightenment. This effectively upended the structure that enabled intellectual engagement with modern thought. The elimination of the political role of the prince bishops left Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire without 24. Hubert Wolf, ed., Römische Bücherverbote: Edition der Bandi von Inquisition und Indexkongregation 1701–1813 (Paderborn: Schöningh 2009), 327–29. Frölich frequently denounced colleagues to the Inquisition and branded them with all kinds of derogatory labels such as “illuminati,” “freethinkers,” “heretics”; see, for example, the comments in Oberdeutsche Allgemeine Literaturzeitung 2, no. 129 (October 31, 1791): 809–12. 25. Rauwolf, “P. Beda Mayr,” 320. 26. Cf. Ambrogio A. Caiani, To Kidnap a Pope: Napoleon and Pius VII (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2021).

8 Introduction effective leadership. Thus, they began expecting it increasingly from the Roman Curia. After all, the imprisonment of Pius VII had made the popes moral leaders again. The newly kindled love of the chair of St. Peter, however, was incompatible with theologies like Mayr’s, which questioned papal prerogatives and infallibility. In the new vision of Catholicism that emerged during the nineteenth century, any theological ambiguity that had allowed free discourse was increasingly eliminated by the newly labeled and highly disambiguating “ordinary magisterium” of the popes. Enlighteners like Mayr went out of fashion and were accused of “dangerous rationalism.”27 It is therefore not surprising that Mayr’s works, written in German and thus at the time only for a small audience, were read only by a few. Among them was Johann Michael Sailer (1751–1832), the leading figure of German Catholic Romanticism, and Johann Sebastian Drey (1777–1853), a member of the Catholic Tübingen school. While Sailer had been a personal friend of Mayr, Drey had begun his career as a student of Mayr’s most sinister enemy, Hochbichler. Soon, however, he began rejecting the latter’s paranoid fear of the Enlightenment and called Stattler, Mayr, and the Cistercian Stephan Wiest the fathers of the modern theological discipline of apologetics.28 Nevertheless, even Drey’s reception was short-lived, and only in the twentieth century did theologians and historians begin remembering Mayr’s intellectual achievement and struggle. Nevertheless, it is not the reception history that makes an author an important voice, but his thoughts and his standing in the discourse of the time. Numerous manuscripts only achieved fame generations after they were penned because an unprejudiced readership had emerged that was willing to engage with them. Applying this standard to the works of Beda Mayr immediately demonstrates how unique his voice was in eighteenth-century Catholic thought. His enlightened contemporaries celebrated the monk as starting a discussion about the bound27. Hubert Wolf, Verdammtes Licht: Der Katholizismus und die Aufklärung (Munich: CH Beck, 2019); Wolf, Der Unfehlbare: Pius IX und die Erfindung des Katholizismus im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich: CH Beck, 2020). 28. Abraham Kustermann, Die Apologetik Johann Sebastian Dreys, 1777–1853 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), 58–62, 128.

Introduction 9



aries of dogma, the extension of ecclesiastical infallibility, and the nature of revelation. They praised his willingness to creatively interact with the tradition of Catholic doctrine, to push back against prejudices, and to fight superstition. Most importantly, however, Mayr fearlessly engaged with the thought of his time not in order to refute it, but to find what was good and true in it, in order to make it useful for Catholic apologetics. With this vision, he was two hundred years ahead of his time, in particular in his devotion to ecumenism. Only the new intellectual climate of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) allowed some of Mayr’s ideas to once again be discussed. Andrea Pangrazio (1909–2005), who like Mayr was deeply committed to ecumenism, shared at the council the idea of a hierarchy of truths like the one Mayr had envisioned: Some truths are on the level of our final goal, such as the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. . . . Other truths are on the level of means toward salvation, such as that there are seven sacraments . . . These truths concern the means which are given by Christ to the church for its pilgrim journey here on earth; when this journey comes to an end, so also do these means. Now doctrinal differences among Christians have less to do with these primary truths . . . and deal mostly with truths on the level of means.29

Pangrazio’s ideas, however, also show the limits of the concept Mayr envisioned. After all, his hierarchy of truths presupposed an abstract, propositional concept of dogma that was no longer compatible with the model of revelation that Dei Verbum (1965) taught.30 It relied on the expectation that one could design a neatly defined genealogical tree of dogmas, separating trunk from branches.31 29. William Henn, The Hierarchy of Truths according to Yves Congar, O.P. (Rome: Gregoriana, 1987), 160. See also Ulrich Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum—Theologiegeschichtliche Hintergründe und mögliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im Ökumenismusdekret des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gespräch (Munich: 1968); Armin Kreiner, “Hierarchia Veritatum: Deutungsmöglichkeiten und ökumenische Relevanz,” Catholica 46 (1992): 1–30. 30. Hans Waldenfels, Offenbarung: Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil auf dem Hintergrund der neueren Theologie (Munich: Hueber, 1969); Guy Mansini, Fundamental Theology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 9–42; Gerald O’Collins, Revelation: Towards a Christian Interpretation of God’s Self-Revelation in Jesus Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–18. 31. Cf. Walter Kasper, Dogma unter dem Wort Gottes (Mainz: M. Gruenwald, 1965), 25–50.

10 Introduction

Overview of Defense of the Catholic Religion The intention of Mayr’s third volume, published in this edition, was the proof of the Catholic Church as the one true Church that had fully preserved the teachings of Christ. Nevertheless, this apologetic endeavor was paired with an ecumenical one: Mayr, who was profoundly scandalized by the disunity of the Christian churches, presupposed an ecumenical methodology. Instead of following the majority opinion of Catholic theologians, he wanted to give those voices a hearing that conceded the most to Protestant demands. Consequently, he decided to follow in his arguments the minority opinion among Catholic theologians if their path promised to bring about an agreement with Protestants.32 This, he hoped, would break up the petrified confessional frontiers and start a dialogue between the churches. Mayr’s plan was probably the first time a Catholic proposed an “ecumenical method.” It enabled a way for a genuinely Catholic theology to be exercised that was nevertheless directly focused on a reunification of the churches. In the first section of the book, Mayr proves the necessity of an infallible judge in matters of faith. With finesse he shows that Holy Scripture cannot be the only rule of faith, as Protestants hold. For if everybody interpreted Scripture according to one’s own insight there would never be an end to differing interpretations, and readers could never have certainty about the most necessary truths of salvation. Moreover, he observes that when Protestant churchmen force their followers to accept the confessional interpretation of a verse, they merely impose their private reading upon them, since they cannot claim to be infallible interpreters. Consequently, Mayr argues, a Protestant’s trust in his or her church authorities is tantamount to blind faith. If, however, there exists an infallible interpreter of Scripture instituted by God, then private interpretation of Scripture and doctrine are not only unnecessary but also against the expressed will of God. Reason, however, would expect God to appoint such an interpreter in order to guarantee that the message of salvation was properly transmitted from generation to generation. 32. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:XI.

Introduction 11



After proving the logical necessity of the existence of such a judge, Mayr goes on, in the second section, to prove his actual existence. This infallible interpreter is identical with the sacred tradition found within the Catholic Church. Tradition, however, is for Mayr the uniform witness of the entire Church. Thus, he follows Vincent of Lerins’s principle that “what all Christians at all times and everywhere believed must be regarded as true.”33 Thereby he effectively reduces tradition to the first few centuries of Church history. This, however, also lays the foundation for the failure of his project, because he conceives revelation as a static piece of information and not as a personal encounter that deepens over time. While Protestants argued that an unwritten tradition would have been much easier to corrupt than Scripture, Mayr shows that this argument could also easily be used against a written form of transmission such as Scripture. Instead, he demonstrates why God would have wanted to rely on the dynamic of tradition rather than on a mere textual transmission of his word. Consequently, a Catholic who trusts the reliable account of sacred tradition does not believe blindly but rather reasonably. This universal tradition, he argues, must be infallible because it echoes the Christian faith of all times and all places. In the fifth section, Mayr finally demonstrates that the Roman Catholic Church is the infallible Church founded by Jesus Christ. For this he relies on the marks of the Church as one, holy, Catholic, and apostolic. Yet, he acknowledges that among all these, apostolicity has probably the greatest power to convince non-Catholics. After all, it can be historically shown that the Church of Rome has always kept and defended the faith of the apostles, and that all other churches broke off from it, or from communion with it. This lays the foundation for the Church’s claim to infallibility in the worldwide episcopate: the decisions of the bishops must be grounded in the early tradition of the Church that was shared by all churches and was defended by the See of Rome. By making the early Church the only rule of faith, however, dogmatic development seems almost excluded or at least marginalized. 33. See Thomas G. Guarino, Vincent of Lerins and the Development of Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2013).

12 Introduction Certainly, the concept of development was not on anybody’s radar at the time, but Mayr’s extreme doctrinal classicism would have made it impossible for later doctrinal decisions to fulfill the standard he had just established. Revelation consequently appears as something static, a set of propositions and information that is handed on to the next generation. The reader of the first five sections would have encountered nothing earth shattering. The text provided a lucid exposition of standard arguments, albeit improved and adapted. Yet, if one begins reading the sixth section, a different Beda Mayr emerges—one who suddenly pushes against the limits of orthodox Catholic belief and who makes bold suggestions to overhaul Church teaching. After all, it is in this section that he introduces the concept of limited ecclesiastical infallibility. For him, such a humbler understanding of infallibility could bring about a reunification with the Protestant churches. This, however, would come at a price. It meant that the Catholic Church not only had to become aware of the limits of infallible doctrinal decisions, but also acknowledge that many of the doctrines that divided Protestants and Catholics were not directly revealed, as the Church claimed. This was theological dynamite! After all, this theory silently presupposed that there were doctrines that could be proven neither from Scripture nor tradition, and which had been erroneously transmitted as truths of faith. He even considered it possible that the Council of Trent’s inclusion of the socalled Apocrypha in the Catholic canon could have been such a mistaken claim.34 In a book-length appendix, which for editorial reasons is not included in this edition,35 Mayr applied these ideas to a number of teachings and showed how Catholic doctrines could be reintroduced to Protestants, changing their doctrinal status from revealed to mere ecclesiastical teaching, for which in most cases only silent acceptance, but not obedience of intellect and will, was expected. A reunion academy 34. Cf. Franz Xaver Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche in Aufklärung und Romantik: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung für die Zeit der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), 398. 35. For an easily accessible edition of the German original text see Lehner, ed., Beda Mayr, 235–350.

Introduction 13

should do the hard work of inquiring how such doctrinal compromises could be achieved.36

The Concept of “Indirect” Revelation The third volume of Mayr’s Defense deserves a place in the annals of Catholic theology not only as an ingenious defense of the Catholic faith, but especially as the first example of ecumenical Catholic theology. After all, Mayr did not downplay the differences in doctrine nor reduce confessional creeds to their smallest common denominator. Instead, he took the differences seriously and developed a structure within which a reunion in “reconciled diversity” was possible. In order to achieve a reunion, Mayr was willing to reinterpret Catholic teachings that Protestants vehemently rejected. Thereby he hoped to eliminate impediments that could hold Protestants back from embracing the Catholic faith. He began such a reinterpretation by inquiring whether the Church had ever called such teachings revealed and whether it had perhaps incorrectly labeled them. If they were truly revealed, every Christian would have to embrace them as the true faith handed down from the apostles. If they were not directly revealed and did not enjoy universal acceptance in the ancient Church, then they could be labeled as indirectly revealed doctrines. Since Mayr had already reduced the rule of faith to the early Church, it was only consequential that all later dogmatic decisions would have to appear to him as indirectly revealed.37 As 36. More about this academy in Ulrich L. Lehner, “Introduction,” in Beda Mayr OSB: Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion nach den Bedürfnissen unserer Zeit (1789): Der erste Schritt zur künftigen Vereinigung der katholischen und evangelischen Kirche, ed. Ulrich L. Lehner, Brill’s Texts and Sources in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2009), i–xc; Christopher Spehr, Aufklärung und Ökumene: Reunionsversuche zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten im deutschsprachigen Raum des späteren 18. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). 37. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:279: “Directly revealed, I call only those teachings, which Christ and the apostles themselves have expressly presented. Indirectly revealed doctrines are those which have their basis in the Bible, but which are not proved from the Bible alone, but mainly from reason. One sees the truth of such a teaching from reason, compares it with the directly revealed truths, and finds that it not only does not contradict them, but also helps to further their intention.”

14 Introduction mere Church doctrines these could only ask for reverential obedience, but not for obedience of will and intellect. Opposition to such Church teachings did therefore not qualify as heresy. Most doctrines Protestants and Catholics contested were, in Mayr’s view, such Church doctrines and could therefore be circumvented for the sake of a reunion of the churches—but how? Certainly, one could not simply give them up—but what if one could demonstrate to Protestants that although these teachings were not necessary for salvation, they were still useful for obtaining it? In that case, one could keep them, he reasoned, and Protestants could no longer identify them as impediments to becoming Catholic. He suggested that for theoretical teachings, Protestants could be allowed to believe the opposite of such a doctrine, but in the realm of practical teachings, such as the necessity of auricular confession, silent acceptance of the practice would have to be demanded. These ideas echoed the suggestions of the seventeenth-century controversialist François Véron, and those of toleration and indulgence in John Locke.38 Such concessions, however, hinged on a more fundamental question—namely, whether the Church could and did err when it defined these Church doctrines as directly revealed. If the Church had, for example, erred in calling purgatory a revealed doctrine, then Protestants, who rejected this teaching, could not invoke this dogma as a reason not to enter reunification talks with Catholics. A critic could, of course, counter that a church that could err in such important questions was no longer trustworthy. Therefore, Mayr restricted the Church’s fallibility [sic!] to the revelatory status of a doctrine: The Church could only err in calling doctrine directly revealed. Yet, since the Church cannot teach anything that distracts from the way to salvation, the specific doctrine must nevertheless be considered useful. This theological idea was utterly new and reduced ecclesial infallibility to a mere formality. Mayr’s understanding of indirect revelation and of dogmas de fide ecclesiastica was nothing short of idiosyncratic. His contemporaries— 38. François Véron, Méthodes de traiter des controverses de religion . . . (Paris: 1638); and Véron, Regle general de la foy catholique, separée de toutes autres doctrines . . . (Paris: 1645). For the ideas of toleration and indulgence for nonconformists in John Locke, see J. C. Walmsley and Felix Waldmann, “John Locke and the Toleration of Catholics: A New Manuscript,” The Historical Journal 62 (2019): 1093–115.

Introduction 15



for example, the Catholic Enlightener and Augustinian Canon Eusebius Amort39—regarded indirect revelation as a necessary conclusion from directly revealed truths, and thus as a part of revelation.40 For them, indirect revelation was just as binding as direct revelation. For example, the Council of Trent declared the seven sacraments to be directly instituted by Christ.41 Yet, Protestants accepted only baptism and Eucharist. Therefore, Mayr wondered, whether one could regard those two as directly revealed, and the other five as indirectly revealed through Christ in the Church. Nobody can really deny the Church the power of instituting new sacraments, because of the ordinary promise of Christ to bind his grace to external signs, which the Church finds necessary to remind the faithful of important truths and to strengthen their inner holiness.42

For his contemporaries, the rendering of the other five sacraments as indirectly revealed would not have had any significant impact, because they would still have believed them as a defined teaching every Catholic had to accept. Yet if they had substituted their understanding of indirect revelation with Mayr’s, then a major shift would have occurred. Had Catholics followed this plan, the other five sacraments would not have to be fully accepted by Protestants in a reunified church. The monk, however, was too timid to spell out this conclusion, but instead claimed that the Council of Trent had not settled the question of which sacraments were directly or indirectly revealed.43 It is perhaps here where Mayr’s biggest theological innovation lies—in the intentional misappropriation and redefinition of the existing theological term “indirect revelation,” or as Franz Bantle aptly put it:44

39. Eusebius Amort, Theologia eclectia, moralis et scholastica, vol. 1 (Augsburg and Würzburg: 1752), tract. 4, pars 2 de fide, disp. 1, q. 6, Notandum 5, 55. 40. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:280. 41. Council of Trent, 7th session (1547) DH 1600–1630, at Can. 1 (1601). 42. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:368. 43. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:282–83. Mayr also shows that in his view the diaconate as well as the indissolubility of marriage are only “indirectly” revealed; cf., Vertheidigung, 3:365–71. 44. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:371.

16 Introduction What the theologians of the past and of more recent times understand by mediate or indirect revelation would fall in Mayr’s system in the category immediate or direct revelation. Is it possible that Mayr did not realize this? In my opinion he realized it very well! It appears to me that Mayr wants to minimize or even hide the “new” and “outrageous” aspect of his project.45

One could even go so far as to say that Mayr conflated the terms dogmata ecclesiae, dogmas of the Church, and doctrinae Catholicae, Catholic teachings. While the first were considered the deposit of faith, the latter were not. Interestingly, he used both interchangeably and thus proposed in reality a discussion about defined teachings. Bantle’s point cannot be emphasized enough: Mayr reverses what indirect revelation meant. For him it is no longer revealed by God, not even by conclusion, and thus not a necessary part of the faith. Indirectly revealed teachings are supererogatory to him. They are pious and useful, but not necessary for salvation. Likewise, he conflates dogmata ecclesiae and doctrinae Catholicae in order to make settled doctrine appear to be open to abandonment and reinterpretation. Had the Catholic Church followed it, it would have had to acknowledge that it taught errors for hundreds of years; namely, that certain truths were dogmata fide divina credenda. The Church would have appeared to have inflated God’s word and thus commit theological suicide. This, however, would have been tantamount to a surrender to Protestant critics.46

The Concept of Limited Infallibility Mayr’s discussion about the concept of infallibility has its background in early modern Catholic ecclesiology. Most writers of the time extended infallibility in teaching on faith and morals only to the universal episcopacy and ecumenical councils. The infallibility of the pope alone was highly contested and remained so until 1870.47 45. Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche, 403. 46. Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche, 405. 47. Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche, 45. Cf. Engelbert Klüpfel, Institutiones theologicae dogmaticae in usum auditorum, (Vienna: 1789), 1:150–51. For the historical context see Adam Bunnell, Before Infallibility: Liberal Catholicism in Biedermeier Vienna (Vancouver, B.C.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press: 1990).

Introduction 17



Yet what were the limits of the Church’s infallibility? If the purpose of infallibility was, as Mayr argues, the certainty of salvation for the faithful, it could not extend beyond faith and morals. Moreover, it seemed that it could only pertain to those truths that were necessary to obtain salvation and not to supererogatory truths.48 Consequently, he conceived infallibility largely as a negative protection from error.49 Following this concept of limited infallibility, the Church would not commit a material error if it incorrectly labeled an indirectly revealed doctrine as “directly revealed,” but merely a formal error. After all, the Church was never promised infallibility in this area anyway, because such a mistake does not affect the order of salvation.50 Nevertheless, Mayr tries to save the overall infallibility of the Church by pointing to the primacy of practice: The doctrine, which we presuppose, is good and leads us into the order of salvation. In this the Church does not err since it recommends a certain doctrine as useful. But the faithful do not necessarily need to know whether the doctrine is of direct divine origin, because the doctrine aims at the improvement of the heart, and such a proposition does not have any necessary influence on doctrines of faith or morals. Therefore, such declarations cannot be part of ecclesiastical infallibility. Consequently, the Church does not lose trustworthiness if it errs in things that are beyond the sphere of infallibility.51

The Problems of Doctrinal Development and of Ecclesiology For an eighteenth-century theologian it was clear that the Catholic faith had not changed since the time of the apostles. It had merely grown in exposition, but not in substance.52 Historical research in the eighteenth 48. Cf. Mayr, Apologie, 210–11. 49. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:269: “I call the infallibility of the church that privilege which Christ gave to his church to teach everything without danger of error, which is indispensably necessary or useful to the believers for the attainment of salvation, and not to be able to teach anything which leads away from the order of salvation.” 50. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:270f. 51. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:274. 52. Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche, 468–71. For on overview of the mindset of Catholic doctrine before Newman’s theory of doctrinal development, see the brilliant

18 Introduction century, however, showed how some doctrines had developed and changed over time. This insight challenged the paradigm of unchanging Catholic doctrine, but also ecclesial infallibility. One answer was to sacrifice the claim of ecclesial infallibility altogether. Radical contemporaries such as Felix Anton Blau (1754–98) or Benedict von Werkmeister (1745–1823) did just that. Mayr, on the other hand, tried to make his historical insight—the belief in the ancient Church as the only rule of faith—compatible with a limited ecclesial infallibility. Consequently, he crafted an area in which the Church’s infallibility could be preserved and defended but gave it up for areas where massive doctrinal change had occurred.53 Without a theory of doctrinal development like John Henry Newman’s, Mayr could not, however, reconcile the truth claims of Church teachings with ecumenical needs other than by changing the past through his reinterpretation of indirectly revealed dogmas. Mayr’s idea had, however, also drastic consequences for his view of the Church. After all, could a largely fallible Church be anything more than a pedagogical institution? Could it still occupy the office of the mediator of salvation? Moreover, how could the Church be the voice of Christ in the world, if it had to avoid calling this or that belief “revealed,” tiptoeing through the world of theology, hoping not to break up the fragile community of a reunited Christendom (if Mayr’s plan had worked)?54 Mayr’s reductionist ecclesiology was not uncommon at the time. Like many he overemphasized the Church’s pedagogical office and its function as a protector of religious knowledge, while more traditional theologians overstated the role of the papacy, turning ecclesiology into “hierarchology.” Moreover, the reunited Church that Mayr envisioned seems utterly antihierarchical and deeply Protestant: After all, the “new” Church could not demand submission of intellect and book by Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1957, several reprints). 53. Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche, 418–72. On the need for correction, see 343. Felix Anton Blau, De regula fidei catholicae (Mainz: 1780), 10–18. Benedict von Werkmeister, Thomas Freykirch: Oder freymüthige Untersuchungen über die Unfehlbarkeit der katholischen Kirche [. . .] (Frankfurt and Leipzig [i.e., Göttingen]: 1792). 54. On the theological discussion of the Church in Catholic Enlightenment thought, see Philipp Schäfer, Kirche und Vernunft (Munich: Hueber, 1974).

Introduction 19



will to “mere Church doctrines” and would have to permit the faithful to individually judge them. This, however, would have resulted in a divided community. Perhaps it could have been a reconciled diversity, but since reconciliation must be built on some kind of truth, it remains unclear what that truth would be.55 Would the Church Mayr envisioned not have been merely concerned with the most utilitarian way to Heaven instead of being Christ’s teacher to humanity? The ecclesiological agenda that Mayr articulates in six points seems to at least suggest that: “I. All doctrines of faith and morals, which have been accepted at all times, everywhere, and by all as the teachings of Christ and the apostles, are teachings that necessarily belong to the order of salvation. Protestants accept these with us anyway. II. All doctrines which are accepted by Catholics alone are doctrines which do not necessarily belong to the order of salvation. It is still in doubt whether they have always, everywhere, and by all been regarded as directly revealed by God. III. The Church does not impose these teachings on Protestants as directly revealed. And it also leaves it open whether they are directly revealed, because it only depends on whether these doctrines do not contradict revelation and promote its ultimate purpose, but not on whether they are directly revealed. IV. Catholics show that all their distinctive doctrines do not contradict revelation, but rather promote its ultimate purpose, and Protestants accept them as such. V. If doctrines are merely speculative, Protestants should be free to believe them inwardly at their own peril, or not; only outwardly should they keep silent about them, and not deny them. But if they are practical at the same time, it depends on whether the exercises based on the doctrine are prescribed by the Church merely as useful or as necessary. They should not be required to do the former, but the latter. How they can comfortably perform these actions without hypocrisy, we will say later. VI. If Protestants do not accept these doctrines and do not perform the actions related to them, they must not be condemned, but the 55. Stattler, Plan, 159–279; Spehr, Aufklärung und Ökumene, 138.

20 Introduction Church is authorized to exclude them from its external communion because they do not obey its leadership.”56

Editorial Comments The aim of this translation was on the one hand to be as faithful as possible to the original text, but on the other hand to produce a readable account. Only in a few instances, therefore, have I preferred to break up a long, run-on sentence. This was usually the case when a rather complicated theological argument was presented. At times, Mayr’s typesetter seems to have forgotten to add numbers or misplaced them. I tacitly corrected these misprints as well as occasional misprints in citations. Mayr’s citations are given in a modern format for easier use. Throughout the text, I rendered the German noun Ansehen as “authority,” since the Latin quotations Mayr draws upon to explain his thought all use the term auctoritas. I preferred “reputation,” only in a few instances, usually in places where the text discusses historical witness and virtue. Where appropriate, I gave the original German in [brackets]. The editor’s footnotes are marked by [square brackets], while Mayr’s own footnotes are not. The translation relied on the only edition of the work, printed in Augsburg in 1789. 56. Mayr, Vertheidigung, 3:288–89.

Preface Preface

A Defense of Catholic Religion

Preface, which must be read by necessity [III] I promised the last part of the Defense of Religion before the end of this year. Here it is. May I satisfy the expectations of my readers as much as I have fulfilled my promise! My situation is too precarious for me to hope for this. I want to defend the Catholic religion. Will not some non-Catholics—I may also say some pseudo-Catholics—look down on me with pity and regard me as an unfortunate advocate of a desperate cause? [IV] I would like to draft preliminaries for a future peace treaty between Catholics and Evangelical Lutherans. And there it could easily happen that the not unusual fate of the peacemakers would befall me. Since they want to forgive one party too much and concede too little to the other, they generally make enemies of both, and in the end have to defend themselves against them. I am also a monk! And people who judge us by the cut of our dress, our scabby heads, and the diameters of our bellies seldom trust monks with anything sensible, but expect stupidity, attachment to the old, pedantry, and inflexible stubbornness. As a defender of Catholicism, I can be ridiculed, as a peacemaker called a heretic, and as a good simple monk I am considered not worthy of attention. If I did not know all this from my own experience, the examples of my predecessors as well as publicly available writings would have taught me. It is now the favorite opinion of many Protestants that it is futile work to strive for a unification of the separated churches—unity in faith would not even be possible, since each one, according to his talents and insights, must necessarily form a different conception of doctrines of faith than the rest of mankind. They refer to the many [V] attempts at

21





22 Preface unification which all have failed. Malicious reviews of some writings that have only recently come out on this point, and the now fashionable clamor about the proselytizing actions of Catholics, make me suspect how my writing might be received by many Protestants. Certain Catholics write and teach about the infallibility of the Church, about its power and prestige, about general councils in such a way that it seems difficult to find any difference between them and the Protestants. On the other hand, others are still so attached to traditional school nonsense1 that they regard scholasticism and Catholicism as synonymous. They raise their voice if someone only wants to offer a logically correct definition of the sacraments or grace instead of the old and incorrect ones. The principle, which is correct—that innovations in matters of faith are dangerous—is extended as far as possible. And if someone should even dare to draw conclusions from truths recognized a long time ago that have not been noticed so far, although they are necessarily connected with them, such a person will certainly be called out as a dangerous innovator. He will be considered a heretic and maltreated in public writings. The gentlest will shrug their shoulders and speak of him with a thoughtful expression: For my sake, I will stay with the old—I want to live and die as a Catholic Christian. I do not deny it, it is very comfortable to retreat into this asylum of stupidity—I stay with the old. One says something and does not need to think about the difficulties, which are raised daily by the opponents of religion. I do not begrudge people who make themselves so comfortable, or have to make themselves so comfortable, their reassurance. Yet they should not suppress or refute others, who consider it necessary to undertake a revision of traditional school opinions, by authoritative statements or invoking the misused motto terminos patrum ne transgrediaris.2 I am not deterred by what I have stated so far from presenting my thoughts to the learned public. Even if they are judged wrongly by many and rejected by others because they are new or seem to be new, there are others among Catholics as well as Protestants who make it their law 1. [Mayr uses the term “Schulschlendrian.”] 2. [Translated: “You shall not go beyond the Fathers.”]

Preface 23



to examine everything and to keep what is good. They do not judge an opinion according to general prejudices, which are so unjustly regarded as equal to the axioms of mathematics: no theologian has yet gone so far, this is new, therefore reprehensible—this is old, therefore good—Has he alone fallen from Heaven, that he wants to see something that no one before him has seen?—The ancients were no fools either, and yet knew nothing of it, etc. I do hope to encounter some theologians, and another theologian less opposed to me, who judge my thoughts worthy of examination. I even hope to meet Protestants who will tell me: This man deserves to be heard. What he says is not entirely void after all. This would be of real profit for me! I would like to have such people as readers, who can put aside all their previous opinions and examine what I say without prejudice. They may reject me afterwards or not; so be it. If I do not succeed in convincing them, their reasons, I hope, will convince me. I have already experienced a few times that I was gradually applauded for things that I dared to say aloud for the first time in our region, after I had been almost universally condemned when I presented them for the first time. This was the case with my treatise twelve years ago, in which I expressed my opinion about the use of the vernacular in our liturgy and wrote about indulgences for the deceased. Even in the infamous First Step,3 of which I speak in this book, some soon saw that the noise that was made about it was quite unnecessary, and that my intention was neither evil nor my principles [VIII] un-Catholic. Here and there to encounter an unbiased verdict would strengthen me against the attacks of a hundred others, who will shout in the heat of their zeal: anathema! Should, after a hundred years, a good man pull my Defense of the Catholic Religion out of the dust of a library, read it, and say that I was not entirely wrong, hail to him and to me! The judgments of my contemporaries about my work may now be what they will, but nobody will be able to deny my personal orthodoxy, even if one believes to have reason to suspect the orthodoxy of 3. [This refers to Mayr’s anonymously published pamphlet Beda Mayr, Der erste Schritt zur künftigen Vereinigung der katholischen und der evangelischen Kirche, gewaget von – Fast wird man es nicht glauben, gewaget von einem Mönche. “P.F.K. in W.” [fictitious location]: 1778.]

24 Preface my writing. I hope that this will not be called a fine scholastic distinction. I am not presenting here my convictions. The question is always: What belongs to the essence of the infallibility of our Church, and to what extent can we yield what does not belong to the essence of infallibility without harm? It is impossible for anyone in the world to be interested in knowing what I believe. That is my business, in which I must answer to God. Should I feign a faith that agrees with the faith of the Catholic Church, and yet inwardly think quite differently—may God [IX] protect me from that!—the Church could still remain calm since I presented an idea directed against its infallibility merely as my private opinion. I would, however, be condemned, like every willful sinner. The Church, were it aware of this, would pity me. But the final purpose for which it has been set up by Christ—namely, to teach everyone the way of salvation—could still be achieved, because its mission does not depend at all on my individual faith. In this work, I do not want to be seen as a man who wants to assert his own opinions and dogmatize them. I do not show myself here to the world as Beda Mayr, who makes his profession of faith to present his convictions to the world. I will always do that when the legitimate authorities demand it from me and, as I hope, to the complete satisfaction of the Church. I appear as a peacemaker, and at least I do not want to be regarded as anything else. A peacemaker who wants to mediate a settlement between two contending parties, however, has only to see how he, without violating the undeniable rights of one party, makes a proposal by which both parties can be united. He sets aside his private opinion, according to which it seems more probable to him that party A is right and not party B. He is expected to make a proposal as to how far both can be brought closer to each other [X] without losing their undisputed rights. To achieve this end, it is necessary that he everywhere, if he already has predecessors, takes the easiest way, and yields as far as he can. He inquires about the opinion of his brothers in office and others who have already pronounced a judgment on the topic. And if he finds that one of the ancients has already been quite lenient without having been reproached by the Church, he accepts this opinion with pleasure, because he hopes that it is the most suitable one for mediating a settlement. Thus, he worries little about whether his

Preface 25



opinion will find approval everywhere, or what others say about it. He only must know that this and that can still be asserted without ceasing to be a Catholic. All the newer theologians may say: This opinion is highly probable, almost an article of faith. They may be perfectly right. But I, as a peacemaker, cannot accept their opinion as settled, and cannot accuse others who contradict it of error, as long as the Church has not made an explicit statement about it. If I find even a few old, otherwise respected theologians who maintain the opposite stance, and whose doctrine the Church has not rejected, then I will propose their ideas, and ask whether we could not accept their opinion as a basis for a union. After all, could it not be that their ideas are closer to the Protestant doctrine than the opinions of more recent theologians? In the same way, as a peacemaker, I take up—certainly not out of an untimely desire for innovation—every newer explanation of a doctrine of faith that has come to my knowledge if it brings us closer to the Protestants and is not contrary to the teaching of the Church. I do not pay attention to whether the stricter party of the Catholics has howled against the defender of this declaration and scolded him as rash and enlightened. Until, however, the Church has made a pronouncement about the declaration of a doctrine of faith, such doctrine can still be included in the proposal for a union. In the meantime, I do not take anything away from the Church, since a real union could never come about before the Church itself has declared what it believes about every disputed point. It will take back, where I gave in too much; or yield, where I yielded. One will hopefully not reproach me that I conceived some extremely daring, audacious, and dangerous sentences in this book. It is not my business to conceive propositions. I only make suggestions that should be examined. I do not deny that I have pushed Catholic doctrine to the extreme, because I deliberately wanted to take the easiest way to unification. In this respect, I often preferred the particular opinion of a few to the more accepted general opinion, [XII] the more daring to the more certain, the new to the older, and the older to the newer—whatever seemed more suitable to bring about a union. From principles that are accepted, I drew consequences that I saw in them, even if others have not yet drawn them, because they perhaps overlooked them. This is the sole reason why I limit the infallibility of the Church more

26 Preface than it is usually limited, and why I do not insist on the facta dogmatica, canonizations, about the institution of some sacraments, or about auricular confession, as many other theologians do. They may be right, and I may be wrong. Nevertheless, it seems to me, the matter is still undecided, and in the meantime, until this decision is made, one will not take it amiss if I choose the lenient opinion, because then a union of the separated churches can be brought about more easily. I will explain the matter with a few examples. It is more generally accepted that the indulgences also reduce the punishment before God, and not only the canonical punishments. I know that. But there are Catholics who restrict them only to the remission of canonical punishments. Petzek puts forward this opinion,4 and Bishop Sciarelli in his Catechism5 [XIII] even commands his subordinate clergy to explain it to the people and to inculcate it. We have no explicit decision of the Church in favor of the first or the second opinion. No matter how probable the former may be, I do not dare to present it to the Protestant whom I invite to convert to our Church as an article of faith that he must necessarily accept if he wants to become a Catholic. I only tell him that this alone has always been accepted, by all and everywhere—namely, that indulgences are a remission of canonical punishments. He will have no difficulty in accepting this. The unification is therefore much easier to bring about if I take the easier opinion as a basis. So why should I not be allowed to choose it, since a bishop and other learned men precede me in his example? It is the much more common opinion of theologians that all sacraments were directly instituted by Christ. I know that. But some older ones have assumed only an indirect institution for some sacraments. The Church has not definitely declared itself in favor of either the first or the second opinion. The unification is thus much easier if I 4. Joseph Anton von Petzek, Untersuchung, ob der Kirchenablaß eine Nachlassung der göttlichen Strafe sey, und ob dessen Wirkung sich auf die Seelen der Verstorbenen erstrecke? (Freiburg im Breisgau: 1788). See also Beda Mayr, Die katholische Lehre von den Ablässen für die Verstorbenen bey Gelegenheit einer k. k. Verordnung auseinandergesetzt (Augsburg: 1787). 5. Nicola Sciarelli, Compendio del trattato-storico-dogmatico-critico delle indulgenze: Con un breve catechismo sulle medesime seconda la vera dottrina della chiesa proposta dal vesovo di Colle a’ suoi parrochi (Padua: 1789).

Preface 27



may assume for some sacraments only an indirect institution by the Church in the name of Christ. The theologians may always assert the direct institution as the more probable opinion. But scholastic opinions must not be allowed to hold up the business of unification. I therefore choose here the easier opinion, which alone I can present with certainty as a generally accepted one, even if the stricter one should be more probable. I place the infallibility of the Church in the fact that it must teach us everything that is necessary for our salvation and can teach nothing that could lead us away from the order of salvation prescribed by Christ. This is the ultimate purpose of the infallibility conferred upon it, and even of its existence. From the perspective of this final purpose, I also determine the limits of infallibility, and admit that the Church can err, but not so far that it leads us away from the order of salvation or does not teach something that would be necessary for the order of salvation. My proposition, which I use as a basis for determining the boundaries of infallibility, is generally accepted: The end determines the means, and these have no further extension than the end itself. From this principle a striking consequence can be drawn, which is nevertheless logically included: It does not harm the infallibility of the Church, if it proclaims something to be revealed that is not revealed, if this teaching is not contrary to the order of salvation or the other definite revealed truths but augments them. I do not say that the Church has ever erred in this way, and it will be seen from the whole appendix that I have never made use of this consequence. One will perhaps fear, as soon as one reads this sentence, that I secretly wanted to undermine the whole of infallibility. No, that is not my intention. The appendix will vindicate me. I only wanted to show how one could apply this principle to the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament, and how one could consequently use this principle, if it is difficult to prove from Scripture or tradition that an article of faith, which the Church has claimed to be revealed, is in fact revealed. It seemed worth the effort to present this consequence to the scholarly world for examination. I trust my own judgment far too little. If it is correct, then it certainly can be of use. If it is incorrect, I will gladly entertain criticism. This principle is not inevitably necessary for my unification plan since I presuppose an

28 Preface indirect revelation. Should for a doctrine, which the Church calls revealed, no direct revelation can be proven, it is still possible to regard it as indirect revelation. Moreover, the consequence just mentioned loses its frightfulness and conspicuousness if one makes a distinction between direct and indirect revelation. The Church declares a doctrine to be revealed, and seldom specifies whether it is speaking of an indirect or direct revelation. If something is not revealed in the second sense, it is revealed in the first. And so, the Church has not erred at all. One will understand what I have just said only when one has read the sixth section in its entirety and thought it through. In the appendix, my intention is not to prove the truth of our different doctrines from revelation, although I could not avoid this entirely. I leave this work to the dogmatists. I only want to show that they are not unreasonable, not superstitious, not godless (as the Protestants imagine them); that every reasonable person can accept them, because they not only do not lead away from the order of salvation but clearly promote true Christianity, even if they are not revealed. Nevertheless, I maintain that these teachings are, if not directly, at least indirectly revealed. They can therefore by no means be regarded as an obstacle to religious unification. So much about the methodology of my work. But will it also have a benefit? Will it perhaps bring about a union between us and the Lutherans? If I am not completely mistaken, it should have a benefit, and that for both parties. Catholics will perhaps find individual ideas in this book which are not entirely useless in the future presentation of the doctrines of faith. They will realize that some Protestant teachings do not deviate so far from ours as they have so far imagined. I hope Protestants will say the same about ours. Consequently, Catholics will no longer view them in a false light, much less blaspheme them, as even the greatest scholars have done. In general, I hope to promote mutual loving toleration until we are in agreement. But I don’t expect unification any time soon and not for a very long time. The political obstacles to unification are still far too great. And all the theologians together cannot dissolve them. Yet, it must be to our credit if we clear away theological obstacles in the meantime. I know that I have touched only on a few of these, but seemingly the most essential. Yet, who can say everything at once? In the meantime, many

Preface 29



hopefully brood this egg. Perhaps a second one will follow. Others have already cleared away other things that were considered offensive to Protestants. Happily, I therefore do not have to do everything by myself and expect a lot from time and circumstances. Hopefully, nobody will accuse me of proselytism, and even secret proselytism, although this complaint has become somewhat popular. I have deliberately left out nothing that could cause a difficulty, much less disguised something, [XVIII] in order to catch Protestants more easily. I am not capable of any such dissimulation. Here is everything I think, presented to the eyes of the world. Judge for yourself and condemn or absolve me as I deserve. Yet, do not accuse me of a crime if all I wanted to do is communicate my conviction of a truth to others. If this is proselytism, then all people in the world are proselytizers. I also do not intend to spread a poison quietly among my brothers in faith with which they could deny infallibility, but rather a weapon to oppose the enemies of revelation and the foes of Catholicism. The preceding parts are directed against freethinkers anyway. To the opponents of the Catholic Church, I explain the infallibility of the Church. Catholics know that the opinion of a private person is no rule of faith. By the way, I had a quite laudable intention for this book that could profit my Catholic readers: The number of those who no longer want to be satisfied with our doctrines is not small. But what do they do? So, the Church has erred, they say, since they ordered to believe this or that doctrine—Trent was not a general council—the Church can decide nothing at all in matters of faith—so they say, so they teach. [XIX] Undoubtedly, these scholars fell for these assertions only because they thought they could find neither a clear statement of Scripture nor a general tradition for certain doctrines. Thus, they saw no means to save the infallibility of the Church and the reputation of the Council of Trent, which had decided these doctrines. Instead, they gave up both, but unfortunately with it also the whole Catholic faith. Should not a person deserve praise rather than blame who makes an effort to find a middle way by which one can save these doctrines and the reputation of the Church at the same time? If I have not succeeded, one must nevertheless credit me with my honest intention and regret that I was not able to carry it out. But why did I write this in German? Could it not be offensive to un-

30 Preface learned readers? If one offers poison universally for sale, should one not also offer antidotes universally for sale? Moreover, truth is truth in all languages, and if I am right, it should not be concealed from anyone in the present troubled times if the evil is not to become worse. Finally, my book will never become a piece of popular culture,6 because it is not written for such a purpose. I know nothing more to say than what I have already said partly here, partly in the work itself. It is all the same to me whether someone in the world agrees with my opinion or not, whether the limits of infallibility extend further than I have stated them [XX ] or not. I do not impose my opinion on any soul. Nevertheless, I submit it for examination to every thinking man, and especially to the Church. This has even been granted to me by those, who would have had authority to deny it to me. I will never stubbornly defend my opinion as soon as I am corrected. I conclude with the threefold wish: that one may not misjudge my honest intention—that one may examine my assertions impartially, and if I have erred here and there, that one may not immediately discredit and belittle the whole book, since I am prepared, after instruction, to publicly confess my errors and correct them—and that God, whom I sincerely thank at the conclusion of this work for all that I have been able to accomplish through his assistance, may not let it be without benefit. Donauwörth, 24 October 1789 The Author 6. [“Volkskultur.”]

First Section Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith

First Section

Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith § 1. [1] The truth and divinity of the Christian religion have been proved in the second part of this series. But now a very important question arises: Which of the many religions claiming to be Christian is the true religion presented by Christ and his apostles? The question becomes more and more necessary every day since new Christian belief systems are being formed all the time. The most important [2] ones in our time, are presented thus in a recent piece of scholarship:1 I. Miracles may be possible, but they cannot be proven. Judaism and Christianity have suppressed much that is harmful and have brought about much that is good. One must therefore regard both as institutions of divine providence. Providence, however, only partly cooperates or permits in these institutions, as can be seen from the fact that their leaders and promoters had faults and imperfections about them, and that their documents contained contradictions and uncertainties. One must therefore only accept the core and the essence of these religions, which all reasonable people among them also consider to be the core and essence. II. Jesus is a divine messenger, authenticated by miracles, through whom God wanted to establish the true religion. In order to win the 1. Johann Konrad Pfenninger: Sokratische Unterhaltungen über das Aelteste und Neueste aus der christlichen Welt. Ein Versuch, 3 vols. (Leipzig: 1786–1789).

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Jews, he used their expectation of the Messiah, connected some of their ancient prophecies to this expectation, gave them a spiritual interpretation, and pretended to be a king of Israel who would rule over all nations in a spiritual manner. One must honor his memory and follow his divine doctrine about duty. Moreover, the documents of the Old and New Testaments must be understood as reasonably and rationally as possible, for Jesus and his disciples obviously used Jewish ideas of the atonement through sacrifice, of the Messiah, of angels [3] and devils, bodily resurrection, etc. The number of miracles must be reduced. The Christian religion must be cleansed of all human additions and nonessential doctrines and brought as close as possible to align with natural religion. III. It is the plan of providence that by miracles and direct divine institutions the total decay of religion and virtue was abated, that by the patriarchal tradition, the guidance of the fathers of Israel, Moses and his people’s history, and some subsequent messengers of God, the concept of the one God and his service to the world were preserved, and the way paved for a higher, purified knowledge and virtue. This has been accomplished by Jesus, the real King of men, and by his messengers, and will continue to be accomplished more perfectly in the future. About the documents of the Bible, the members of this group think almost like the previous ones. IV. The adherents of this system take the apostolic creed as their doctrinal basis, but explain it V. either according to the Helvetic2, VI. or Augsburg Confession3, VII. or according to the sayings of the infallible Roman Church. But even if these parties bind themselves to their confession, or to the sayings of the Church, in these newer times they seek to explain their systems not only with the help of biblical documents and [4] tradition, but also through philosophy. They aim at demonstrating the confor2. [The Helvetic Confessions are among the most widely held Reformed doctrinal statements.] 3. [The Augsburg Confession is a major doctrinal statement of Lutheranism.]



Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith 33

mity of the latter with sound reason, and one could distinguish the systems of the older adherents from the newer ones, not in essence, but because of their simple and more thorough presentation.

VIII. Jesus acquired a commonwealth through his blood. This alone constitutes the essence of Christianity: to believe, to love God, to live virtuously. About the other points everyone may think what he finds most probable. The other systems are of no importance. The man who is to convert to Christianity, or who, as a true devotee of the Christian revelation, does not yet know to which party he is to adhere, must, as far as I can see, accept one of these two points: Either it is all the same to God to which of the Christian parties I profess, or only one alone is the true one to which I must adhere. If the former is true, he can ask again: Has God allowed me to freely think about all revealed doctrines as I wish? Or must I accept at least some of them as correct, but can reject others, which some claim to be revealed, according to my insight? Let us now see in what way such a man can proceed and find certainty.

§ 2. Christ, and the apostles preached to be understood, and to be understood by all. [5] This sentence needs no proof, for if God wanted to teach us directly through Jesus and his apostles, to refresh the knowledge of natural religion, to explain it more clearly, and at the same time to communicate new messages to mankind, if he wanted to make known a new law, then he, as the wisest, most powerful, and most loving lawgiver, had to choose such means for it that correspond to this final purpose and could bring about the general happiness of the human race. But the first and most necessary thing is to understand what God wants to make known to us through his messengers. It was therefore essential that they preached in such a way that they could be understood, and that they clearly presented everything that is necessary for the salvation of every human being in particular, and for the general happiness of the human race.

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First Section

§ 3. The writings of the apostles and evangelists were left with the intention of being understood by us. The Evangelists recorded the story of the Savior and his speeches, so that the Christians of those times, who had not seen him and heard him speak, [6] would receive authentic news of the fate of their founder; and if not their own, then it was God’s intention that this testimony of the Evangelists should also come down to posterity, and teach the Christians of all times what Jesus has done and said. Luke’s intention in writing the Acts of the Apostles was to tell how the famous churches were established through the proclamation of the gospel, especially the one in Jerusalem, and what St. Paul did for spreading Christianity. The other writers of the New Testament wrote to the Christian congregations and private individuals as the occasion arose, sometimes to instruct them better on particular points of faith or morals, sometimes to oppose the spreading errors and abuses, sometimes to strengthen or comfort the faithful, sometimes to make useful decrees, etc. All these final purposes could not have been achieved if they had not been expressed in their writings in such a way that they could be understood. If one does not want to deny all common sense within these scriptures, they could not have written with any other intention than to be understood. There are three objections to this. Even if the writers of the New Testament wanted to write clearly and understandably, perhaps they, as unstudied people, were not so skilled in expressing themselves that they could be understood. Perhaps no language is of such a nature that its expressions are not ambiguous. [7] Rousseau says: “Human language is not definite enough. God himself, if he were worthy to speak to us in our languages, would say nothing to us about which one could not still argue.”4 Perhaps the writers have sometimes had to hide their true intentions and, with all sincerity and good will, have not been able to express themselves as they wished. 4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 9: Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain and Related Writings, edited by Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace (Dartmouth, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), 56.



Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith 35



Unstudied or not, that is of little consequence. Of course, such a person will not write elegantly and according to the rules of art, but still write comprehensibly. This is also proven if one looks at the text. Whatever is contained in the New Testament—its main points can be understood and must have been much easier to understand in those days, when people were still accustomed to its peculiarities of language, customs, and traditions. Moreover, one does not need to deny that the expressed thoughts are sometimes not coherent, that some grammatical constructions are odd, that here and there something could have been said more clearly, and so on. This was to be expected from unstudied authors. However, if one seriously believes that human language, because of its vagueness, is utterly unsuitable for making one’s intentions and thoughts clearly known to others, then one should not say that twice, [8] because one runs the risk of not being understood. What counts as excessive doubtfulness if it is not that statement? In human society we always talk to each other and understand each other. No one is deterred from speaking for fear of being misunderstood. One writes books with the intention of communicating one’s thoughts to others. And now Rousseau comes and teaches us that we cannot understand each other. If, however, people are quite successful in expressing themselves in such a way that they can be understood by others, I think that God, if he wants to make his will known to people, could certainly also explain himself in such a way that every reasonable person can understand him. But the fact that there may be people who, in defiance of straight, simple reason, abandon the natural understanding of words and impute their own false beliefs, that has nothing to do with it. We are not talking about whether humanity wants to understand the revelation, but whether revelation is defined in a way that humanity can understand it. Finally, I do not see any reason that could lead the writers of the New Testament to speak darkly and vaguely. They certainly did not conceal the truth out of fear of men. On the contrary, they spoke so clearly and firmly that they incurred the hatred and opposition of the Jews and pagans, who knew only too well what the Christians taught.

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First Section

§ 4. Because the writings of the New Testament are intended for Christians of all times, it must be possible to find their true meaning even today. [9] Several passages of these scriptures instruct us that Christianity is to continue until the end of the world. God must therefore also have made arrangements so that it can continue. But it cannot be preserved unless the Christians of all times can claim authentic proofs that show irrefutably that their religion is of divine origin. They must also know at all times not only that God has revealed something through Jesus, but also what he has revealed. If it has pleased God to have written documents that testify what Jesus did in the world as a divine messenger and what he taught, so that Christians can use them at all times to prove that and what God has revealed through Jesus, then these documents must be written in such a way that they can always be understood. Otherwise, they are useless for the final purpose for which they were established, and God would have chosen a means by which the final purpose could not be achieved at all, which is impossible. Consequently, it must always be possible to determine the true meaning of the biblical writings, at least to the extent that it is necessary to prove from them that God has revealed something and what he has revealed.

§ 5. God has foreseen that His words will be interpreted differently by different people. [10] God, who created man, also knows how he made him and with what abilities he equipped him. Furthermore, he also knows the many different situations in which different people come. He knows what a single insignificant circumstance can contribute to completely change a man’s mood. Revelation might have been as clear and distinct as it could have been, but it was easy to foresee that some people would misinterpret its words out of malice, others out of punishable ignorance, and still others out of excusable ignorance. In the same way, God had to know beforehand that great multitudes of people would be embarrassed by not knowing where truth could be found. In a word, God, according to his omniscience, must have foreseen that a multitude of



Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith 37



sects would arise among Christians, all of whom would dispute among themselves as to the true meaning of those words in which a revealed truth was to be contained.

§ 6. Therefore, God either had to be indifferent whether the revealed truths were understood correctly, or he was not. [11] For he who foresees that the announcement of his decision will be understood at times correctly, at other times incorrectly, but nevertheless reveals this will, either only speaks to seed contention among men without any concern whether his words are to be understood, or he must, despite all foreseen misinterpretations of his words, seriously intend to be understood correctly.

§ 7. God cannot be indifferent whether one understands his revelation correctly or incorrectly. Otherwise, there would be no divine intention for a revelation at all. He could then never have intended to bring back to our memory the forgotten truths of natural religion, to explain them more clearly, and to give us new knowledge that is indispensable for our peace and happiness. (§ 2)

§ 8. God was not indifferent whether His revelation would be rightly or wrongly understood, and at the same time foresaw that His words would often be misunderstood. He therefore had to give us a means by which we could infallibly detect their true meaning. [12] For he who earnestly desires the final end must also arrange the means without which the final end cannot be obtained and enable the use of these means.

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First Section

§ 9. Such means are possible only in two ways. Either the true meaning of the words, which are supposed to contain a revealed truth, must be found with certainty according to the rules of hermeneutics or the art of interpretation, as with every other book, or if this is not the case, God himself must have established an infallible interpreter and explainer of his words, to whom one must turn in case of doubts about the meaning of the revelation. Revelation may be transmitted to posterity in writing or orally, but it is of no use if we do not understand what God desires from us. For this very reason all kinds of Christian sects came into being and still exist. One party holds something to be an essential [13] part of revelation, a revealed doctrine of faith, while another party rejects it, because neither can agree on the meaning of the words on which this doctrine of faith is said to be founded. For example, the Socinians 5 disagree with other Christians about the passages on which we base the divinity of Christ, while other Protestants do not share the same interpretations on which Catholics base the necessity of confession or transubstantiation. In such cases there is no other means of putting an end to doubts than by assuming one of two possibilities: the first one is that Scripture infallibly explains itself according to the rules of the art of interpretation. The second one is that a divinely confirmed interpreter is consulted. Indeed, most Christian parties that are nowadays divided adhere to one of these two principles. We do not want to speak of fanatics. They all accept as true that Christian revelation is contained in the writings of the New Testament, although Catholics also admit a tradition besides the written revelation. The whole dispute is about whether the true meaning of the Bible can be determined from the rules of hermeneutics with such certainty that one can convincingly establish what God has revealed in every dispute that arises, or whether one must wait for the pronouncement of the Church, which is supposed to 5. [The Socinians rejected belief in the Tinity and were therefore also called Antitrinitarians.]



Necessity of a Living Infallible Judge of Faith 39



be an infallible interpreter of Scripture, and act according to its ruling. The former is said by Protestants, with whom alone we have to deal in this paragraph, the latter by [14] Catholics. If this dispute were settled, we would soon be united in all other points. As soon as man is no longer bound to a symbolic precept [symbolische Vorschrift] of the Church, or to any authority, he will, as a Christian, search the Bible for himself and choose from it that which he finds most nourishing for his active life and gives him most reassurance. Whatever is obscure he will discard, because he believes that God cannot demand faith of him, nor submission of the will, where revelation is unclearly explained and thus it is uncertain what must be believed or done. As he wants to stick to his conviction, he also does not want to condemn others, but live peacefully with them, because he assumes that everyone is only obliged to believe and to do what he finds clearly prescribed in the Bible. According to the different circumstances in human history, the forms of the presentation of religion would have to be very different; and yet, based on these ideas, no one would be authorized to exclude a person from the fellowship of his church. If, on the other hand, it is agreed that the Church must determine the true meaning of revelation, then all disputes about it cease as soon as it has spoken. It is easy to see, then, that this is the first and most important point we must discuss: How can the meaning of revelation be so correctly determined that I can rely on it without endangering my salvation? This is what we will now have to examine.

§ 10. According to the economy that God has otherwise observed when communicating a revelation, it is not probable that he has left it to every man to determine the meaning of revelation by the ordinary rules of hermeneutics. I. [15] Although it might be almost impossible for us today to consider that a human person would not recognize a God, since the concept of God and of a creator is such a crucial part of our lives, it was different for the first human beings. God first had to reveal himself to them as the creator of all things, as the only almighty and benevolent God.

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Otherwise, centuries could have passed until they would have arrived at this idea themselves. In the same way he revealed himself to the patriarchs and especially to Abraham. To preserve this first knowledge of natural religion, and to propagate it once it was established, God chose the way of tradition. The fathers of the families had to teach their children about what they had heard directly from God Himself. At that time, there were no scriptures from which each person could compile his own religious system, nor was it left to individuals to invent the most important truths of religion. II. The Mosaic system of religion, too, was preserved in its purity only by tradition; for although [16] the Jews had to copy the code of law and read it diligently, the fathers of the household were also instructed to explain the law to their families, to remind them of God’s benefits, and if they themselves had doubts, to seek advice from the priests about its meaning. But as soon as they deviated from the laws, God sent new prophets who had to restore the purity of the religion. So, everything was done by way of teaching, through tradition, and not through self-guided examination of Scripture. III. The way Christ established and propagated his religion makes it very probable that he wanted to maintain its integrity only through tradition. Even though he proved by reason some doctrines whose rationality was demonstrable, he nevertheless procured faith mainly through miracles, and the unimpeachable testimony that these miracles really happened guarantees, even to us, that all his doctrines are true and divine. But this means nothing else than that we are convinced of the divinity of his teachings only through tradition. The apostles did not convert the world by profound philosophical proofs, even though they did not neglect them where they were well placed. But they knew far too well that thinking and philosophizing is only for a few, and that most people must be guided by authority. And therefore, for the conviction of the people, [17] they generally made use of miracles, which they either worked themselves, or to which they testified. From this it became clear that Jesus and they had been sent by God, and consequently that their teachings must be true. When Jesus sent out his disciples, he said to them: Go, preach, and say that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils



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(Mt 10, 7.8). Miracles were to be the proof of their mission as well as of the truth of their teaching. And Paul appeals to the Corinthians that he did not convince them with human knowledge and rhetoric, but with proofs of spirit and power, so that their conviction was not based on human wisdom, but on the power of God (1 Cor 2: 4, 5). Paul is speaking of the power of God that he has demonstrated, not of the power that his teaching gives its sincere confessors. In general, the entire ministry of the apostles and their immediate followers consisted only of testifying: They only testified to what they had seen and heard. When they were to choose another apostle to replace Judas, they made sure that it would be a man who had been with them ever since Jesus, baptized by John, began his ministry until the day of the Ascension, and thus could be a witness of His resurrection (Acts 1: 21, 22). When the Jews wanted to forbid them to preach, they answered: We must [18] tell what we have seen and heard (Acts 4: 20). See also 1 Jn 1: 1, 3. The apostles also imposed on their immediate successors in the teaching office only the duty to testify to what they had seen and heard. They only had to keep diligently the integrity6 of the deposit of faith, as they had received it from the apostles: What you have heard from me through many witnesses, entrust also to the believers who are qualified to also teach others (2 Tim 2: 2). Hold fast the norm of pure doctrine, which thou hast heard of me, in the faith and love that are in Jesus Christ. Keep the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells within us. (Ibid. 1, 13.14.) From this, then, it follows that Christian doctrine, according to the will of the apostles, according to their institution, should be preserved by tradition. One should neither add to nor subtract anything from doctrine. The apostles had to preach what they had seen and heard. Their successors had to preach what they heard from the apostles. They had to appoint such teachers, too, as were skilled to teach others the unchanged truth that they had received from their teachers. From the beginning of the world and of revelation, it was never forbidden to think about revelation, to convince oneself of its truth with the help of reason. It was never forbidden to those who wanted to accept the revelation, to explain its reasonableness. [19] Rather, this 6. [“Getreu und rein bewahren.”]

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was useful, and often necessary. But we also see that in the natural and Mosaic laws, and even in Christianity, the propagation of revelation was organized only through tradition. All teachers were to be only witnesses, and called to teach, not what they intellectually conceived through the diligent use of reason, but what they had seen and heard from the direct witnesses of the revelation. They were not supposed to be inventors or arbitrary interpreters, but merely witnesses and safekeepers of the revelation. Therefore, it is not probable, according to God’s economy, which he has always observed in the communication of his revelation, that he has left it up to every person to determine the meaning of revelation in all cases with the help of hermeneutics. I have added the restriction for all cases, for when we speak of written revelation, we do not want to claim that a Christian will not be edified from reading the Bible. Such a person can clearly understand much in its text without outside help, without tradition, and thus correctly determine the meaning of revelation. Yet, a Christian will also come across passages whose meaning is not immediately clear, and in the case of contrary opinions among Christians about these passages, such a person will remain doubtful or conceive a private interpretation or will believe that salvation cannot depend on the correct understanding [20] of such a passage, because otherwise God would have expressed Himself more clearly. Nevertheless, such a person cannot find reassurance on any of three points. For if God had set up someone who could infallibly determine the meaning of Scripture in doubtful cases, a seeker would be bound to appeal to this explainer for explanation and would not be allowed to rely on his own insights. He would not be allowed to believe that his salvation could not depend on a truth that ceased to be doubtful when he had it explained to him. Now, according to what we have proved, it is not probable that God has left it up to everyone to determine the meaning of Scripture for all cases. Rather, it is probable that, according to the arrangements made by God for the preservation of pure revelation, the true meaning of Scripture is to be preserved by tradition.



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§ 11. According to the nature of the revealed truths, it is not probable that God has left their explanation to individual insight.

I. Some of these truths are truths of faith, which must be accepted as true only because of the testimony of God, and which reason not only would never have discovered but even now only understands fragmentarily. These truths are, however, not contrary to but above reason, and have nevertheless a powerful influence [21] on the practice of Christian virtue. Others are practical truths, or rules, according to which we must arrange our lives if we want to be happy in this world and in the world to come. It was wrong to leave both of these, once they were recorded in the writings of the New Testament, to the mere interpretation of men. For it is a daring enterprise to explain truths correctly that one does not comprehend. Only accidentally one gets it right; however; only if one presupposes the right ideas. The doctrine, for example, of the divinity of Christ and his incarnation certainly goes beyond understanding, and yet without it, millions of people would lose a powerful reason for virtue if Jesus was not God and had not atoned for us—although the Socinians and others believe this doctrine has not much influence on practical Christianity. We base this doctrine on many biblical proofs. But our opponents try to give a completely different explanation of these passages. I will presuppose, since I cannot scrutinize their hearts, that each party explains these biblical passages according to their true convictions and applies to them all hermeneutics necessary. From this application each party then ascribes to this doctrine an important influence on morals or not. [22] Experience teaches, however, that therefore neither party can convince the other of the truth of its explanation. The Socinian is convinced that his rules of interpretation are so correct, their application so infallible, and his reasons so evident, that he cannot even imagine that Catholics, Lutherans, and others are not convinced by them. The Catholic and Protestant believe that in their explanation everything is so clear, so evident, and proven that they hardly resist accusing the other part of a deliberate distortion of Scripture. If one were to say that in such cases God had left it up to humans themselves to decide which party they would choose according to their insights, whether they would be-

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lieve in the divinity and incarnation of Jesus or not, and that he would judge each person according to their best insights, then one would be presupposing that {1} God is indifferent whether humans can know for certain or not what he has revealed about this point. It would not matter whether these teachings are used as {2} motives to love him more, since he gave his incarnate Son for us, and {3} whether they would have any influence on human morality or any important connection with morality at all. These three presuppositions are all extremely uncertain that a person who is serious about taking the safest way to Heaven cannot be reassured by them, for they are all based on another presupposition, the certainty of which determines whether they are reliable. If God has established an infallible judge of faith, [23] whom one can question, he is not indifferent about whether we believe in the divinity of Jesus or not, not indifferent whether we can acquire certitude about it or not. He will not judge us according to our insights alone, because we have the opportunity to be taught about this doctrine since he set up a judge for this purpose. He is not indifferent about whether we have this motive to love him or not. And finally, in the case that the infallible judge declared that Jesus was true God, it should not be assumed that this doctrine would have no importance for morality. Therefore, before the question is decided whether there is a judge of faith established by God, none of these presuppositions can be true. It is also not certain, because if God wanted to give a revelation, he wanted us to be able to know for certain what he reveals. Otherwise, his revelation would have missed its purpose. He could not, therefore, leave us in uncertainty about whether to believe in the divinity of Jesus and build our morality on it or not. The doctrine of the divinity and incarnation of Christ has a very important influence on Christian morals; for even if I do not know anything about this mystery, I must love God because of His perfections and the innumerable good deeds He does to me and all of humanity. Yet I must be even more convinced [24] of His infinite love for me when I am assured that He gave his own Son to redeem the ungrateful human race. Jn 3: 16. This is a new and strong reason to love God out of gratitude. Nothing can convince me better of the greatness of sin than that it had to be erased by the blood of the divine Son.



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God cannot be indifferent to whether we understand the doctrines of faith contained in revelation, because they have an important influence on morality. The assumption that God has left the explanation of doctrine to individual, conscientious insight is based on another equally uncertain assumption. It presupposes that God has not appointed a judge of faith. Therefore, it cannot be probable that God has left the explanation of revealed truths to each person’s discernment until the latter is disproven. The same must be said about moral truths. Christian moral teaching is opposed to the evil inclinations of our nature. Therefore, one could reasonably fear that it be distorted by carnal wisdom and adapted to our evil inclinations. Given the different ways in which people think, this would have happened and did indeed happen. It was therefore not a sufficient means of preventing the corruption of Christian moral doctrine for its explanation to be left to fallible human insights. After all, somebody who explains it possesses no [25] certainty that he has found the truth and no certainty whether God would be satisfied with his findings if he missed it, since this again depends on the discussion of the preliminary question whether God has set up an explainer of revelation or not. II. It is not probable that everyone may explain revelation according to his best insights, if we look only at the concept of revelation itself. Revelation is the disclosure of those truths that human reason would not have come across at all, or only after a very long time. God came to the aid of our weak reason. That which he has revealed to us therefore cannot depend on our reason, except so far as we may, and must, convince ourselves of the agreement of revelation with reason. As soon as we know with certainty that God has spoken, all human inquiry into whether what he has said is true ceases. Demanding to decide by reason whether he has revealed this or that would mean to subject God’s insights7 to human insights. God has not allowed His prestige to be lowered that far, or even to put it at risk. It is advantageous for our reason that we can see the correspondence of revelation with other natural truths, although none of us can decide for himself what was re7. [“Einsichten.”]

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vealed. This must indisputably be presupposed before reason can claim its rights. III. [26] It is not at all probable that God has prescribed for us, in the realm of religion, any other way of arriving at the truth than the way we must tread if we wish to ascertain the reality and truth of other historical facts. Whether something that depends on the free will of men has happened or not, we cannot fathom by reason; but if we have not been eyewitnesses, we must rely on the testimony of others. Facts can only be proven by testimony. Now the question is: What has God revealed? This question concerns a fact. The question is not only whether God has revealed something, but also what he has revealed; the former would be of no use to us if we did not also know what the revelation contains. And since God, when he spoke, had to speak something certain and definite, it is just as much a fact that God spoke this and nothing else, as it is a fact that he spoke. The former question—whether God spoke—can only be decided by testimony, and we have discussed the existence of the Christian revelation by testimonies, just as the Protestants do it. See Part II of our book. Thus, we proved the authenticity of each book of the New Testament, § 166–171, the integrity, § 174, the credibility of biblical history, § 176–185, and finally that true miracles were performed to confirm the divine mission of Jesus and [27] his disciples, § 205–220. Because of the prophecies we have referred to testimonies in § 236. Consequently, the second question, what has been revealed, cannot be decided other than by testimonies, because like the first it presupposes that God, when he revealed something, must have revealed something certain and definite. The same witnesses, therefore, who tell us that God has revealed something, must also tell us what he has revealed. Reason’s only work is to inquire whether the witnesses are credible and their testimonies unadulterated, and to ask how their testimonies must be understood. If it has achieved its task, we may conclude from these testimonies with moral certainty what God has revealed, just as we conclude that he has revealed something. These witnesses must be credible on both accounts, or they are not credible at all. If they lie about the what, why should they not be suspected of lying also about the that?8 8. When a dispute arises about the meaning of a biblical passage, Catholics refer



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Let [28] us elaborate this proof. The Christian doctrine was not discovered by humans, but God made it known to us through Jesus. This announcement is a fact, the certainty of which can only be proven by testimony. Why should divine wisdom not have based the certainty of the teachings on the same testimonies, since it is also a fact that Jesus made these and no other teachings known? Facts are considered undoubtedly true when they are transmitted to us by an uninterrupted series of witnesses who originate with the event itself, or are simultaneous when the event was remarkable, public, and accessible to the whole world, [29] or when it is connected with monuments that are common in all places. We have used these reasons to prove the existence of the revelation. All this is also found when the question is to be decided: What has God revealed? The teaching of Christ belongs to the public facts. It has always been presented publicly, and not only in one place, but in all the churches that the apostles established after their dispersion into the world. Some philosophical sects and secret societies taught their teachings secretly, and still do. Yet Christ, his disciples, and the first Christians regarded their religious truths as common property, which they could not withhold from anyone who wanted to be taught. There can be no doubt that Christ and his apostles publicly presented the genuine, unadulterated revelation. Consequently, what they taught to tradition, by which the true meaning of the Bible must be determined, that is, by the unanimous testimony of all churches at all times and in all places. They must have understood the passage exactly the same way, and if one cannot cite such unanimous testimony, one cannot demand that somebody’s explanation be accepted as the undoubtedly correct one. Since it is not possible that this unanimous testimony is false, they ascribe infallibility to the decisions of their Church. Thus, it can be seen that Catholics prove the truth of their doctrines in the same way and on the same grounds as Protestants prove the existence of revelation. Therefore, if they do not want to harm themselves and weaken their weapons against the enemies of revelation, I believe they should never argue with us about whether tradition is an appropriate means of determining the meaning of Scripture. If they do not admit this, they will never prove the existence of revelation. It must be taken as true for the time being that tradition, if it exists, determines the meaning of Scripture. They can only argue about the existence of the same. Then we must show them the unanimous testimony of the churches at all times and in all places; otherwise, we cannot demand assent from them. The dispute about the force of the proof from tradition should never have come into existence. These reasons of our opponents are now used by the enemies of revelation.

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was also publicly known. But once this teaching was made public, it was no longer easy to distort it. Everyone who was once instructed in it could easily perceive whether the subsequent teachers preached what had previously been presented to them as the teaching of Christ. If such a person came to another church, he would hear whether the teaching of that church was the same that was preached in his own. The more Christianity spread, and the more different churches came into contact with each other, the easier it became to discover any errors of churches deviating in doctrine. [30] The fact that Christ delivered certain teachings admits the same evidence as any other historical fact. Witnesses are questioned in court not only about what they have seen, but also about what they have heard, and if they are found credible on the first point, they are also believed on the second. One relies even more on their testimony if they are in public office and had the special task of paying attention to what they would have to testify. Thus, one has more respect for the seal and signature of a notary, more for the testimony of a public envoy than of a private citizen. The shepherds of the Church hold a public office, are charged to teach others again what they have been taught, to faithfully preserve the deposit of faith, to testify to what they have seen and heard, as the apostles did; they even swear at the beginning of their office that they will neither add nor subtract anything to the teaching of Christ. The series of witnesses continues uninterruptedly from the first contemporaries to our times. What Christ taught, the apostles heard and understood. What the apostles taught was heard and understood not only by those who were appointed by them as teachers of the people, but also by the other believers. Thus, the teachers once properly instructed, could never distort the true teachings of Christ and the apostles without the believers and the other churches [31] noticing it. As the teachers had to watch for the purity of the faith among the people, so the people watched for the purity of the faith among their shepherds. This can be seen clearly from the many and great disturbances that always arose when a shepherd wanted to teach something different from what the people had previously believed, or when individuals contradicted the teachings of their shepherds.



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The testimonies about what Christ taught have not only been handed down and preserved by oral teaching but have also come down to us in writing. They are found in the Gospels and apostolic writings, to whose authenticity, integrity, and credibility all believers—or the whole Church—testify, but also in the writings of the so-called Church Fathers, and Church scribes,9 in the creeds, and conciliar decisions. These written testimonies, combined with the oral transmission of all churches in all times and places, give an unimpeachable testimony to the teachings of Christ and the apostles. Finally, also the worship practices testify to the teachings of Jesus. These actions express visibly what the Church believes. If the teaching changes, the ceremonies must also change. But these cannot change without the faithful noticing it. If it can now be proved that a certain ceremony, common in the outward service of God, was customary from the beginning of Christianity, [32] it also follows that the doctrine that is sensually presented by this ceremony, is just as old. From the public and unanimous testimony of the teachers, from the written testimonies of the Fathers and Church writers, and from the external liturgical rituals, one can recognize with certainty what Christ and the apostles taught. Therefore, it is not at all credible that God would have prescribed another way—namely, the uncertain use of individual reason—by which we could seek out their teachings. This is even more the case, if one considers that the same witnesses and testimonies that tell us that God has revealed something also tell us what he has revealed—and both facts are proved by the same witnesses. Reason only has to examine what the witnesses say and whether they are credible. Yet reason is not permitted to overturn or change the fact itself, just as reason is never permitted to dispute proven facts on grounds of reason alone.10 Nor does it have any cause to do, for if moral certainty puts a fact beyond doubt, reason has to accept it. No fact can be shown 9. [“Kirchenscribenten.”] 10. Nicolas Bergier, Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion, avec la réfutation des erreurs qui lui ont été oppofées dans les différens fiècles, vol. 10 (Paris: 1784), 452–61. I have freely translated his proofs into German here, although I conducted them in the same way long before his works came into my hands, as my older writings prove.

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that would have a greater moral certainty than that [33] Jesus delivered particular teachings. The objections will be more conveniently resolved below.

§ 12. The Bible alone cannot be a rule of faith for us, because from it alone cannot be determined with certainty what Jesus taught. This Catholic teaching seems highly annoying to Protestants, because thereby the Bible, which is a work of God and therefore perfect, is accused of an imperfection. After all, what is the use of the Bible if it does not contain a complete rule of faith? Those desiring authentic information about the faith were directed to the Bible but would be introduced to Pyrrhonic skepticism if the Catholic statement was true that Scripture was not understandable without external help. These and similar objections have been refuted so often and so plausibly that one must wonder why they are still raised by contemporary Protestants. Now that they have been mentioned, we will refute them not any better than previous theologians. To avoid any ambiguity, I must explain the above sentence before I prove it. I do not yet ask here whether the New Testament contains all doctrines of faith and morals every person must know, [34] but assume this for the sake of the argument. My main question, however, is whether the use of hermeneutical rules is sufficient to teach God’s revelation to everyone and eliminate all doubts people may have. I respond to this in the negative. I. It is a well-known fact that the biblical passages on which the doctrines11 of the Trinity, of the divinity, incarnation, and satisfaction 11. Now, of course, they have ceased to be important to some Protestants, and whoever can no longer convince himself of their correctness from the Bible does not mind rejecting them or explaining them in his own way and is nevertheless called a Protestant. This deviation from their symbolic writings must not be held against them, as if they had therefore ceased to be true Protestants, as some Catholics do: For since in these very writings there is also the article that everyone may explain the Bible according to his best insights, and in this the difference between the Catholic and Protestant religion is to be set, then he still remains a Protestant who, according to this article, believes to find something different in the Bible than the authors of the



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of Christ, which are so important to us and to the Protestants, have been built, are in our days no longer explained in a way that these doctrines follow from them. Thus, we have [35] two opposing, and often even more different interpretations of the same biblical passages, which are supposed to contain important revealed truths. Everyone can choose for himself the one that is the best according to his insights and determine his private or individual religion according to it. But since only one interpretation can be the one that says exactly what Christ has revealed, such a person cannot be assured that the explanation he deemed the most probable is also the true one and contains the meaning12 of the revelation. How could he then find such assurance? Through the Bible? Nowhere could it tell him that he has correctly explained the passages up for dispute. Perhaps he could find such assurance by having correctly and diligently applied all the [36] rules of the art of interpretation? I will admit that he could create such assurance for himself, although it does require much, and although the lack of success of so many others, who after honest and diligent research embraced a contrary explanation, should make him a little suspicious of his own certitude. Nevertheless, he does not know for certain that he has understood the revelation according to Christ’s intensymbolic writings would have liked to have found in it. Either they and their symbolic writings should not have been considered members of the realm right from the beginning, or they must now put up with the necessary consequences of this principle and the deviation from the old Protestant religion. This is now confirmed by a fact, which our old polemicists foresaw, namely that as soon as the dam has been broken and Scripture must no longer be explained according to tradition, no single doctrine of faith will remain untouched; indeed every single one will be emphatically disputed. As soon as the Bible, like other scriptures written by men, may be explained only according to the common rules of hermeneutics, or what is just as much, according to the light of reason, so many different religions must arise, as there are different insights among men. The Protestants rejected the authority of tradition as the surest means of explaining the Bible, and instead chose reason as its interpreter. But since no one had the right to determine how far reason might venture, everyone went as far as seemed good and reasonable to him. And so this principle of Protestantism led first to Socinianism, and soon to Deism. I do not mean to say that all who have become Socinians, or Deists have become so by the very application of this principle, but that nothing can stop one who accepts it from becoming so.” 12. [“Sinn.”]

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tion, because it remains possible that he has erred. Moreover, he must be aware from his own experience that he rejected some explanations after previously holding them to be true, because the careful study of Scripture convinced him that the new insights should replace his old convictions. Could this course of revision not again begin anew? After all, it is quite common among people to renounce a belief that they previously considered to be the only true one when they gain new insights. Consequently, such a seeker has only one consolation: If I cannot guess through no fault of my own the true meaning of revelation, God will judge me only according to my present insights. Yet this consolation is based on a hypothesis whose truth must first be proven; namely, that God has left it to anybody to search for the meaning of his revelation through reason and has not entrusted this deposit of faith to an infallible interpreter. Before this is proven, the seeker cannot say with certainty [37] that if he errs, he errs without fault. Moreover, Christ preached only for this purpose, and his disciples recorded his teachings so that we might accept them in the very sense in which they were delivered. (§ 2.3.) It is therefore not enough that each person has his own private religion, but all must have the same. Thus, whoever sees an erring brother who wishes to be instructed, is obliged to teach him the true meaning of the revelation, because he is convinced that he has really found it. He cannot, however, immediately infuse13 into him his conviction, but can only communicate his reasons; that is, he can only present the reasons that have convinced him that he has found the true meaning of revelation. He must therefore first agree with the seeker on the rules of the art of interpretation. How impossible it is to convince others of the truth of one’s opinion this way, can be seen from the everlasting disputes among the Christian sects. Every party considers his way of explaining the Scriptures to be the most reasonable and knows how to criticize others. Why would Christ have chosen a path for the propagation or preservation of the true meaning of revelation, which contains so many difficulties? It is, after all, a path that involves the one who is eager to learn in innumerable disputes and leaves him without certainty. [38] How badly served is the simple believer by this stance! 13. [“eingiessen.”]



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He would like to know, and should know, what Christ actually taught, but first has to ponder whether, for example, the Lutheran or Socinian observes the rules of scriptural hermeneutics better. Is he able to make up his mind and find inner peace? Can he believe that he sees the matter just as well and even better than those learned men, who, after all their studies, cannot agree on the meaning of Scripture? Indeed, it is of little help to the inquisitive, but otherwise unlearned Christian who has doubts about the divinity of Christ, if he is to judge for himself the opinions of scholars, or if he is told: Believe what seems certain after careful research in the Scriptures. You may find the divinity of Christ in the Bible or not, God is always satisfied with you. But he wants to know with certainty whether Christ is true God and whether he has revealed his divinity. As one can see, they put up Scripture as the only rule of faith in vain as long as the meaning of all textual passages on which the doctrines of faith are based, are determined. This meaning, however, cannot be determined as long as there is no agreement on the rules of interpretation, or as long as several parties arrive at different results when applying the same rules. Unfortunately, this will always happen since the powers of understanding and cultural background are different in every person for many reasons. [39] If God was indeed not indifferent whether men would believe with certainty or not what He has definitely revealed and could only reveal Himself in a definite form, He could not leave His truth to the uncertain guesswork of humans. He must have provided at least one unmistakable means, a means that is just as useful and easy to use for the simple-minded, for the businessman, whose other occupations do not allow him to make profound investigations, as it is for the scholar; in a word, a means by which the meaning of Scripture can be determined with certainty in all doubts. If they do not subsequently accept this means, then the fault lies with them. But if the meaning of Scripture, which in some passages is doubtful, is first to be determined according to the rules of hermeneutics, and according to sound reason, God would not have taken sufficient care to preserve that true meaning of the Bible that He has placed in the text. After all, He must have foreseen that disputes would arise about its interpretation: So many interpret it out of all kinds of reasons and without bad intention according to different rules or arrive

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with the same rules at different results. It was not enough that He left us the Bible. He should also have given us rules according to which anyone who applied them would certainly find the truth; [40] that is, the meaning of the Revelator. About that which we must believe—and that is all that God has revealed, because He has revealed it—everyone must be able to have certainty with ease. Only about this one has the freedom to believe or not. But if somebody is left in uncertainty about what God has revealed and has to make laborious investigations that never lead to a reassuring certainty, then for the greatest part of the human race—indeed for all—revelation is a very ambiguous benefit of God. It would indeed be a benefit, which even the most honorable human beings might not be able to enjoy, as one could see from the innocently erring Christian religious parties, or all those people who, for the sake of other business, cannot be bothered with difficult investigations about religion; or others again who, because of the different situations in which providence has placed them, are not skilled, cultivated or intellectual enough for these investigations.14 [41] II. If the Greeks and Romans had established public archives in which the originals or authentic copies of all the works of their beautiful minds had been deposited, and if these had come down to us, we could correct the uncertain text variants in some editions, which force 14. One could of course heavily criticize my statement that revelation would no longer be a benefit, if the human being would first have to decipher Holy Scripture himself. One could say that I spoke dishonorably of the reputation of Holy Scripture or denigrated reason, which is a gift from God. However, we Catholics are since the Reformation used to hearing such criticisms, whose pretense for the honor of God’s word can easily deceive well-meaning Christians. How often were we accused of valuing or esteeming the divine Word too little, because we did not accept the Bible as the single, true rule of faith? Now, however, would be the time to say farewell to such miserable accusations, which impress only vulgar people. We will see whether we can defeat these accusations or not. Meanwhile I remain convinced that a divinely revealed religion, which God intended to become a common good and intended to be understood as God wanted it to be understood, has to be discoverable in all its teachings without a burdensome investigation and without great effort. The method used by Protestants to determine the meaning of the Bible seems to me to be too indefinite, too burdensome, largely unusable, and does not produce confidence. That is why I call revelation an equivocal [zweydeutig] benefit. Of course, I cannot do anything if somebody wants to distort my intentions—be that as it may!



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the reader sometimes to a probable conjecture about the best reading variant, because one could easily compare the various copies with each other. If we still had the original writings of the apostles and evangelists, we would compare them with the originals in case of any doubt about the integrity and authenticity of our copies. But this is not so. We have no other testimony, therefore, that testifies for the integrity and authenticity of our New Testament than the testimony of the Church; that is, of so many Christian congregations scattered throughout [42] the world, who, as so many archives, have preserved the New Testament scriptures as they received them from the hands of the apostles and the first Christians, and have secured them against all falsification by daily use in worship and private edification. Through the testimony of the Church, we know that our copies are unaltered and correspond to the original text. Only the Church can reassure even the unlearned Christian, if somewhere doubtful readings of important biblical passages are found, which one is the true one, by testifying in which sense the text has been understood by Christians from all times. All comparisons of different copies, which perhaps have not even all been discovered, give only a probable conjecture for the true reading. Now, if the various churches can bear valid testimony to the authenticity of the text and the accuracy of the copies, why should they not be just as worthy of belief when they testify to the meaning in which the text of Scripture has been understood from the beginning of Christianity by the apostles, and subsequently by their immediate disciples, and so on down to us? The authenticity and integrity of the Bible are facts. That they are taken in a certain sense from the apostles, and were so understood by the Church, is again a fact. Both facts are confirmed by the same witnesses. If these therefore deserve faith in regard to the first fact, why should they not also deserve [43] it in regard to the second? But if they deserve it, then the Bible alone is not the only interpreter of itself. III. When the Bible explains itself, it does so by keeping the parallel passages together, by connecting the disputed passages with the preceding and following passages, by considering the final purpose and the circumstances of the speaker, and so on. This, however, does not lead to much progress. The most honest men—honesty, skill, diligence in investigation, we must never deny these in our opponents in their

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search for truth (unless we have substantial reasons for it or want to face the same reproach from them)—also understand the parallel passages differently than we do, find a different connection between the preceding with the following, a different purpose, and different circumstances and so forth. What, then, do we do about that? Should that which is equally important for everyone, for the common man as well as for the scholar, only be extracted from the text after long disputes and through such tiresome investigations, which in the end lead only to probabilities? IV. The vast majority of Christians cannot read the original texts, but must make do with translations made by fallible men, some of which are often deliberately deceiving such as the Bahrdtian translation.15 He who wants to draw his faith from the Bible alone [44] must therefore first know whether his translation is faithful. Since he cannot compare it himself with the basic text, he must rely on the testimony of scholars who say that the translation agrees with the basic text. But since these scholars are not infallible and err themselves, and since they can conceal the truth despite all their erudition, the good, unlearned Christian has no certainty that his Bible is authentic. How can he explain the Bible through the Bible? The case is different than for any other book of historical content. If I believe the history of Livy, Herodotus, or Caesar, if I want to explain each of the obscure passages in their writings through themselves or from the testimonies of other historians, then the testimony of antiquity, which has accepted these writings as authentic, will certainly impress me. Yet, first of all, they do not contain anything that exceeds human reason. What a man has written of human and natural things, a man can understand. Not so with the Bible, which contains mysteries that the human mind cannot fathom. After all, the human mind can easily deceive itself if it wants to impute its own hypotheses to the text. Secondly, if I explain a passage of an ancient historian incorrectly, the error has no harmful consequences. It is, however, universally important to me that I know with certainty what God has revealed, so that I can submit to the order of salvation 15. [Mayr means the translation by Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, Das Neue Testament oder die neuesten Belehrungen Gottes durch Jesum und seine Apostel: Verdeutscht und mit Anmerkungen versehn (Berlin: Mylius, 1783).]



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[45] prescribed by Him. I can therefore calm myself with the testimony of deceptive men who tell me that the works of Livy, Caesar, and others, are genuine, I can explain them according to my best insights by the ordinary hermeneutic rules. Yet, if my salvation depends on it, I would want to know with certainty and reassurance what God has revealed and must have divine evidence. I must know that the Christian religion has been declared to be divine by miracles and prophecies—that its first preachers can claim divine testimony for themselves—and that God Himself has established an infallible interpreter of its words. With us Catholics, even the simple Christian can easily come to this certainty, as will be shown below, where we will present the motives of his faith. V. In fact, very few Protestants, especially among the common people, make use of Scripture as the only rule of faith, nor can they make use of it. Those scholars who draw up their own system of faith from the Bible differ greatly from one another, as their recent theological writings show, and it would be difficult to find two thinking theologians who outwardly profess the same creed; for example, the Evangelical Lutheran one, and agree about all points of faith. Indeed, the principle is even put forward that because everyone has to form different ideas about the same doctrine according to his own situation, there can be no unity [46] of faith, and consequently no reunion of the separate parties possible. This, however, neglects that God had revealed and demanded that we should believe precisely what he has revealed. But among the unlearned, there is an almost uniformity of belief. But do not think that it is an effect of diligent Bible reading! The Lutheran finds the Augsburg Confession, the Reformed the Helvetic, or the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Socinian the Cracovian during his reading. The young person already has the system of faith in his head together with all kinds of theological proofs before he can even think about their meaning. It is no wonder that when he matures, he extracts from them what his teachers, parents, and preachers have previously infused into him. It is also indisputable that the same person who is now born in a Lutheran congregation and firmly believes that the Bible is entirely in favor of the Augsburg Confession would find in Scripture the system of another church if he had been educated in that other faith. The Bible as Bible teaches us nothing; only the true meaning of the Bible is what

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makes it salutary and instructive for us. The common people, however, mostly determine the meaning in the way Luther, Calvin, or rather their pastor determines it, and I would not know how a confirmand in a Lutheran congregation would get away with finding in his [47] preliminary examination of Scripture instead of the Lutheran that of the Reformed or even the Socinian system.16 Thus the greater part of every Christian party is led only by the reputation of others to find in the Bible what it is supposed to find, and everywhere happens what happens with us, albeit with the important difference that in the other creeds the unlearned have to believe merely a single man, or at best a consistory, but with us the whole Christian Catholic Church of this day and age as well as the entire history. This remark has not only been made by the Catholics of all times, but also by the more recent opponents of revelation, [47] and many have therefore judged that the common Catholic people still have a more reasonable and firmer basis of faith than among other Christian parties. After all, I can always reasonably believe that the true meaning of Scripture is more correctly understood by that party that dates back to the times of the apostles, and can show that always, everywhere, and all have explained Scripture as they explain it, than any other that has only recently come into being and is based only on the word of one man who differs from the opinion of all other Christians. The opponents of revelation reproach all Christian parties in general that their 16. One should not even make a big noise about the compulsion of conscience among Catholics, as if the monster could not also be found anywhere else in the world. I would first try to teach a person who could not find inner peace in our system of faith, and only if he was resistant to learning, I would exclude him from the community of the other believers, but in a way that this excommunication extended only to the spiritual realm. The same, I believe, would be done by every other Christian pastor, because he cannot declare a member of his congregation who professes other doctrines than those accepted in his church, unless the congregation itself consents to them. After all, the community does not declare the doctrines that the confirmand rejects to be nonessential. But from the fact that we hold more doctrines to be essential than Protestants, it does not follow that we alone arrogate to ourselves the necessary compulsion of conscience, but merely that we extend it to more content. Forced conscience remains everywhere, as long as a congregation does not tolerate every member who dissents or forms his own doctrinal opinion.



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faith is a blind faith.17 Even Protestants accuse us of this. If blind faith is a faith based on authority, then according to the majority of their congregations, this affects them much more than it does us. Among them, too, thousands build on authority. Yet the misfortune is that we are convinced that God speaks through the Church, which means that we—we may be right or not—in our opinion build on a divine authority, while their followers must confess that their faith is based only on a human authority, namely their teachers.18 Authority is throughout the measuring stick that the greatest [49] number of each party upholds. It depends, however, who can most reasonably rely on his authority. And by all accounts this is the authority of the Catholic Church, as we shall show. If we Catholics had nothing else speaking in our favor, it would still be this—that God did not want to instruct us about the most important thing, about religion, in any other way than how we otherwise arrive at the knowledge of the most important truths according to his order. This is always the way of authority. Our most important and necessary knowledge comes from parents, teachers, and other people whose words we believe. And we do very well to do so. Why should God have made an exception in the case of religion, and urge us to discover its important truths for ourselves, since we can so easily err on one side, but on the other side can be so easily and safely taught about it by the Church? VI. [50] As God has nowhere commanded that every man should 17. [“Köhlerglaube.”] 18. I do not mean to say that the enemies of revelation have reason to reproach any Christian party for blind faith. After all, their faith is for the most part as blind as that of any Christian can ever be. It depends only on whether they first get hold of the writings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Spinoza, the author of The System of Nature, Hume, and others [i.e. Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach], and whether they have done so before they have learned to think, tamed their passions with extreme measures either too much or too little; whether they had acquired some religious feelings [Empfindungen] of their own; whether they have accidentally met a deist, an atheist, or a skeptic; whether they have used the diligence they should use and could have used to find the truth right from the very beginning, or not. From these and similar circumstances it mostly depends on whether one becomes a deist, atheist, materialist, or sceptic. One believes the party among which one has fallen and is —surprisingly even among the latter— often guided by authority.

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learn to read, so he has not made the scriptures the only rule of faith; for how many Christians have been neglected in youth, and are now unable to read the Bible? They are bound only by the reputation of their teachers, whom they must believe. If one were to read the entire Bible to such people who do not know how to read, first, they must be certain that it is an authentic, unadulterated, and divine book—a truth, however, they can know only from the testimony of the Church. Secondly, they must first find out the meaning of doubtful passages by comparing them with other passages or from the context. Yet those who do not know the scriptures by heart, or cannot read them themselves, must again be guided by others, must believe every interpretation that they proclaim as reasonable, and must be satisfied if the doubtful passage is explained to them by another (which perhaps says something quite different and conceals the passages that would have elucidated them). VII. Finally, the apostles were sent only to preach the gospel, not to write it. Christianity had already spread throughout the world before there was a single writing of the New Testament. These were all written only on special occasions; for example, when disputes arose in a congregation or false teachers wanted to seduce the people, and for the most part contain only those [51] doctrines whose explanation was particularly necessary in the circumstances of a certain congregation. Just as Christianity could first be preached without the writings of the New Testament, so it could also be propagated and preserved without them through preaching, as many thousands have come to know it no other way than through the teaching of others and feel the blessed effects of it in themselves no less than those who think they have drawn their knowledge of Christianity from the Bible. It is the practice of the doctrine that makes man happy, whether he has encountered it by reading or hearing. The dead letter has no effect. Incidentally, the concern of Protestants is quite superfluous—that Christianity, as far as it would have had to reproduce itself only orally, would have quickly been adulterated, because also other oral traditions often get adulterated. Yet, if it was a divine action that the Christian faith should be preserved in this way, then we should let God take care of it. After all, even Scripture could also have been contaminated with errors, but God has prevented it—without a miracle being necessary. Did it then



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cost Him more effort to watch over the preservation of the pure oral tradition? Certainly, all those proofs that Protestants cite to show the integrity and authenticity of the Bible, we can also use to prove that tradition could not have been fabricated. Why should these proofs be valid for them, [52] but not for us? About this, however, in a later chapter. But if Christianity can be propagated with the same certainty orally as in writing, how can Protestants claim that Scripture is the only rule of faith, since the Bible nowhere says that? Where two ways of proliferation [Fortpflanzung] are equally possible, one cannot dismiss one of them out of hand. One must first examine whether God has perhaps chosen both for very wise reasons. We have already shown this, and we will show it here in more detail.

§ 13. Answering the objections I find myself compelled to answer all objections here, no matter how old they may be, even if they are mostly of very little substance. We Catholics cannot be held responsible for the fact that they are reheated again and again, even though they have long since been adequately answered. This matter is too important for us Catholics to leave even the slightest doubt standing. I. If it is up to the Church to explain Scripture, it has greater authority than Scripture itself, which proves or does not prove only according to the judgment of the Church. Catholics put the Church above the Bible and belittle it! This is a terrible accusation, but fortunately it is false and deceives only the simpleminded. Is a single Protestant therefore set above the Bible when he explains it? Is a judge [53] higher already than the laws because he explains them and applies them to special cases? This is exactly what the Church does. It only explains the meaning of doubtful biblical passages as it has been preserved by constant tradition, or testifies to the sense in which Christ and the apostles used certain passages. However, it must not invent an explanation that it considers adequate. The Church says what it has heard. Whether it knows the true meaning is to be discussed later. But provided that the Church knows it, it is really weakness if one wants to say that it sets itself above the Bible because the Church pro-

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claims it. Will I be more than the king, of greater renown than his decrees, if I know from the mouth of the king the meaning of his decrees, and make it known to the subjects who have a doubt about it? I could do this all the more if the king had given me the task of explaining the decrees. And indeed, Christ has given this authority to the Church, as we shall prove independently of Scripture. Incidentally, the Church itself reveres the Bible as its code of laws and acts according to it. II. If one wants to conclude from the fact that the teachers of different religious parties cannot agree on the meaning of a biblical passage, that one cannot arrive at certainty without a pronouncement of the Church, this assertion leads straight to Pyrrhonism. For what truth is there that has not been [54] disputed by one or more? Do they therefore cease to be truths? Or can one be less convinced of their correctness? I can, after all, by applying the hermeneutic rules bring out the truth, even if another concludes wrongly. Catholics themselves believe in the infallibility of the Church, even if it is disputed by a thousand others.19 We do not say that the true meaning of the Bible cannot be found because the parties cannot unite, but that it must be difficult to find it in the way Protestants seek it, and we prove this because they all believe they are using the same method and yet fall into different interpretations. There is no question about the possibility of discovering the right meaning of the Bible. It can be found, even if thousands of others do not find it and deny it. But it is very difficult to find it, especially for the unlearned, when he sees that even scholars and teachers of different parties do not agree on it. It is very difficult to convince oneself that one has found the right interpretation. The Bible contains not only truths as other human writings, which reason can comprehend, but also truths that transcend reason, and which can very easily be misinterpreted because they are truths that are not agreeable to our carnal self. [55] Since in this way man can very easily deceive himself in the explanation of the Bible, we consider it an indescribable blessing of God that he has seen to it that the true meaning of all revealed truths has been preserved in the Church through tradition, which we can consult 19. Christoph Matthäus Pfaff, Bündige Antwort auf die zwölf Briefe des P. Scheffmacher (Tübingen: 1750), 79.



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in all doubts, and which can tell us what is revealed with much more certainty than our reason. This, I think, does not lead to Pyrrhonism. In mathematical, philosophical, and other matters that are not beyond our reason, and on which our happiness does not depend, we may always use reason and always find the truth. And even if we err here and there, what is the loss? But in the case of things on which our salvation depends, I would like to have complete certainty that I have found the truth, since revealed truths cannot be proved a priori in the same way as mathematical ones. We can believe the infallibility of the Church, even if it is denied by Protestants, as we will prove. III. God has promised to enlighten everyone who reads the scriptures with the proper preparation and state of mind, so that he may understand them to the extent necessary for his benefit and salvation. These promises are found in Lk 11: 13: Your Father in Heaven will give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him. Jn 14: 26: The Holy Spirit will teach you [56] everything. 16, 13: He will guide you into all truth. Eph 1: 17, 18: Believers have the spirit of wisdom and understanding for the knowledge of God, which gives them enlightened eyes for their understanding, etc., etc. Therefore, the tradition of the Church is not needed to explain the scriptures. However, we Catholics also admit that everyone who reads the scriptures with an inquisitive heart, who asks God for the necessary enlightenment, will certainly have ample benefit from it, and we ourselves wish that everyone would read it daily for his edification. Nowhere does a Catholic claim that nothing in the Bible can be understood correctly without the explanation of the Church. Rather, much is so clear that even the common man will easily understand it. Yet some things are so sublime that even scholars cannot agree on the correct meaning. And this often happens in passages which seem to be the clearest; for example, in the words: This is my body, I and the Father are one, etc. There are passages in the Bible that were quite understandable to the listeners and readers in the times of the apostles, but which are no longer so easily understandable to us, who are not accustomed to the oriental customs and way of life and who are not quite familiar with the Hellenistic language. These passages often concern the most important doctrines of faith. To understand such passages, it is not enough only to invoke the

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grace of the Holy Spirit, and with proper preparation attempt the [57] reading of the Bible. I would be judging uncharitably if I believed that sincere Lutheran or Reformed men lacked the necessary preparation. On both sides, I see the most experienced men engaged in explaining the Bible, and yet they find, for example, contradictory sentences about the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. So, with all the confidence in the authority of the Holy Spirit, at least one party must be mistaken. This assistance of the Holy Spirit does not work miracles. It works only according to the receptivity of each soul. He cannot make the unlearned equally learned and cannot instill those natural aids to the explanation of the Bible, such as knowledge of the language, acquaintance with oriental customs, skill in keeping parallel passages together, correctness in reasoning, and so forth, where they are not present beforehand. The prayer of the unlearned Christian would be unreasonable and presumptuous: Lord, send me your Holy Spirit to teach me what I cannot understand according to my situation, make me more skillful than my teachers, who, with all their natural aids for explaining the Bible, do not agree. If, then, all the above scriptural passages were to be understood by all Christians—not by the apostles alone, but by all Christians of all times, not only by the first who could easily understand the Bible because at that time the miraculous gifts had not yet ceased—it could not be concluded that every Christian could immediately explain correctly all passages containing important doctrines [58] if he first invoked the assistance of the Holy Spirit. For his edification he will always be able to draw much from Scripture, even if he does not understand all the passages. Finally, if the assertion of Catholics is true that the Holy Spirit speaks through the Church—and we want to prove that this is correct—then it is also true that this Spirit guides us into all truth, teaches everything. All the above texts do not mean that anyone who reads the Bible, whether learned or unlearned, will immediately understand all the important passages. In the first passage Christ says: “If then you, being evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit—not the Holy Ghost—to those who ask him?” He encourages his disciples to trust in the heavenly Father who, according to his goodness, will give nothing but favor, only good dispositions, to anyone who asks him. But I can have all these



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dispositions without being able to explain the Bible correctly. Yes, if God has set up an explainer of the Bible whom I can consult, it would be foolhardy of me if I demanded that he should still give me the gift of explanation. After all, nothing is said about explaining the Bible. The words in Jn 14: 26; 16:13 obviously only concern the apostles to whom they were spoken. They had the direct support of the Holy Spirit, who taught them everything and guided them into all truth. They also had to have him, because without him it would have been impossible to preach the gospel. [59] This necessity ceases in regard to all other believers as soon as a more infallible interpreter of Scripture is established. The passage Ephes. 1 may only be read in context, and one can see easily that it does not speak at all of the Holy Spirit’s assistance in explaining the Bible. IV. The Bible is a work of God. Therefore, it must be perfect. How much more must God see to it that the Bible, which contains the teaching of salvation necessary for everyone, is intelligible to all? According to the opinion of the Catholics, however, the Bible would be extremely imperfect, because it not only does not contain all revealed truths, but also presents those so unclearly that one still needs an interpreter to understand it. Mosheim20 has already recognized that this Protestant argument is sophistry, if it is used to prove against us that Scripture must contain all doctrines of faith in order to be complete; which, however, does not really belong here, since we are speaking here only of the clarity, but not of the completeness of the Bible. Yet, it is also a sophism to conclude: The Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit. A work of divine wisdom cannot be imperfect or incomprehensible. [60] It is blasphemy to say that God cannot teach us other than by the help of men; for we do not say that the divine revelation, or the teachings themselves are imperfect or incomprehensible, but only the words, the expressions appear to us this way. God left it up to the apostles and authors of the New Testament to decide with what words and in what way they wanted to express the revealed truths, and only made sure that they did not express them incorrectly. It depended on the knowledge of the language and ability of 20. Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, Streittheologie der Christen . . . mit Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Ernst von Windheim, vol. 1 (Erlangen: 1763), par. 16, 320.

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each one, which words he used. Sometimes they also copied verbatim what Jesus had said. Their speech was mostly in Syriac or Greek and will have been perfectly understandable to the listeners and readers of those times. Up to this point, therefore, the Bible, this work of divine wisdom, cannot be accused of being imperfect or incomprehensible. But now we read the Bible, who are not Syrians or Greeks, we who know these languages only imperfectly; we read it after seventeen hundred years, during which many things have changed in the language; we read it without being as familiar with the customs, habits, and idioms of the Orient as natives were; we read it in our mother tongues, since it is extremely difficult to translate a book from an Oriental language into ours; we read them after the various interpreters [61] have already confused our minds by their contradictory interpretations; we read them mostly after we have been educated in a particular religion from our youth and are accustomed to certain interpretations, etc., so that some passages truly look difficult to us. The error, then, is in us, not in the scriptures, which are in themselves quite clear, except for the higher teachings, which are beyond our comprehension. How unreasonable, then, is it to accuse us of blasphemy and of reducing a work of the Holy Spirit to one of imperfection? Does one say that the writings of Livy or Xenophon are dark, if a beginner of Latin or Greek does not understand them perfectly? Should God work a miracle, so that after seventeen hundred years the language of the apostles would still be understandable to us, as it was in their times? This argument also presupposes what I just asked. One can never say that the Bible is imperfect because we do not understand all passages, if God had wise reasons not to prevent darkness from entering into some passages, and at the same time set up an infallible interpreter who could enlighten us about them. For then this darkness would also be in God’s plan, and the scriptures would correspond to the final purpose for which they must exist and truly exist. They would be perfect for this very reason and would not be so if they were any clearer. [62] We will state the causes of why God has not prevented some of the obscurities of Scripture in the next objection. The Protestants presuppose in their objection that Scripture is the only rule of faith and that therefore God could not possibly have permitted any obscurity in the Bible that would



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make an infallible interpreter necessary. If they do not presuppose this, their objection has no meaning at all. But if they presuppose it, they assume something to be certain, which first has to be explored. We know at least that there were fully instructed Christians before there was a Bible of the New Testament, and there are still thousands and thousands who have never read the Bible, nor could read it. Therefore, since oral teaching can replace whatever the Bible does if it is guided by an infallible interpreter, I do not see what right Protestants have to assume that the Bible is the only rule of faith, nor to accuse us of belittling the divine scriptures if we believe that they are dark in some passages. Our opponents may see to it that the reproach of dishonoring the scriptures does not affect them more than it affects us. They do not believe that all passages of the Bible, even those which they believe contain essential doctrines of faith, can be understood correctly without all knowledge of the language, without all preparation. It takes aids, it takes diligence to determine [63] the true meaning. This can be seen from their efforts of erudition, for example, when they refute a Socinian and want to put the evidential value of certain passages beyond doubt. The biblical passages must therefore be interpreted and explained before they have any weight as proofs. The Catholics also say the same. A scripture that requires interpretation, in which one must first compare passages with others, and then determine the meaning of each word by all kinds of auxiliary means, is dark. So, we both seem to agree then that Scripture is dark. No, they will answer, the passages themselves are understandable to everyone. It is only for the sake of those who are mistaken that one has to make such extensive investigations into their meaning in order to instruct them. And there is another big difference between us and Catholics. We explain the Bible from the Bible itself. But they need an external interpreter. To the first I answer that precisely because the Bible is so often misunderstood by others despite all diligence, it must not be clear to present readers, and I refer to everything I have said so far. Secondly, however, I say that we do not need an external interpreter. We explain the Bible from the mouths of those through whom God has communicated the revelation to us. They must have known best in what sense the teachings of faith are to be understood, in what sense they used their words. The first

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Christians learned this sense from them, and it has been preserved in the Church [64] through a lasting tradition. Only in this sense do we say that the Church can declare the Bible authentic and infallible. The Protestants may deny this, but they may not reproach us that we treat Scripture dishonorably, since we at least hold the opinion—whether it is true or not will be seen later—that we have explained Scripture from the mouths of its authors. We believe that God has set up the Church as an infallible interpreter. People who handle the scriptures so conscientiously are certainly less suspicious of dishonesty than those who take the liberty of allowing any simple-minded person to explain the Bible according to their own fallible insights. V. (1) Scripture is clear in itself and therefore does not need the interpretation of the Church. This is confirmed more than once in the Bible itself. Ps 19: 8, 9, it is said: The law of the Lord is irreproachable and draws souls to itself: the law of the Lord is faithful and gives wisdom to the simple. The commands of the Lord are right and gladden the heart. The commandment of the Lord is full of clarity and enlightens the eyes. Ps 119: 105. Your word shines unto my foot and makes my path bright. We have an even stronger prophetic word, and you do well to pay attention to it, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star [65] rises in your hearts. 1 Tim 3: 15–17: And because you point from childhood to the Holy Scriptures to instruct you, which can teach you salvation through faith in Christ Jesus; for all Scripture is inspired by God and profitable for doctrine, for correction, for chastening in righteousness, that a man, servant of God may be perfect, fitted for all good works. (2) If the scriptures were not clear, this would have happened either because God could not or would not speak clearly and plainly. The former and the latter argue against the infinite wisdom and goodness of a divine lawgiver, who certainly wanted to speak clearly in a book that is to guide men to eternal salvation and knew how to speak. And the third falls away by itself. What could have prevented God from speaking clearly? Lord von Mosheim, who cites this often-used polemical argument, also adds the restrictions that our theologians neglected and Protestants therefore could not understood properly. He says that those parts of Scripture are clear that contain doctrines of faith and morals necessary for salvation; the clarity does not refer to the things



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themselves and the manner of their possibility, but to the expression: One understands clearly what Scripture says, if one does not understand the mysteries themselves. In regard to chronology, geography, antiquities, etc., he gladly admits darkness in Scripture. That which is necessary for salvation can be found in the scriptures by every man [66] who has a sound mind, understands the language into which the Bible is translated, or in which it is written, and reads it attentively.21 (3) This is also evident from experience. Give the most simple-minded man the New Testament that he may read it for some time and then ask him if he has understood it. We will certainly receive a desired answer, at least as far as the necessary truths of salvation are concerned. The writing is as clear for us as a book can be that was originally written in a language foreign to us for a people that had completely different customs and traditions than we in the Occident. Lord von Mosheim could have spared himself the restrictions. No sensible Catholic has ever believed that the Protestants would also give out the mysteries clearly, or claimed that in chronology, geography, and so on, there were no obscurities in the Bible. We Catholics, when we say that the Bible is not clear throughout, understand this only of the doctrines of faith and morals necessary for salvation. Since, then, the point we are arguing about is correctly determined, let us see what the objections raised mean. The law of the Lord is called in the Bible a lamp, a light, full of clarity. Yet, does this word really make the Bible’s meaning clear? What kind of syllogism is that? No one will doubt that divine [67] law or revelation guides and enlightens us on the path to salvation. But are revelation and the Bible one? Revelation was there before it was written down, and the revealed truths can enlighten me without my having to learn them from the Bible. As it happens, what the Jews in David’s time and the first Christians understood quite well may now have become obscure to us, as I showed in answering the previous objection. Furthermore, we ourselves admit that the reading of Scripture, when undertaken with proper preparation and attention, is very useful to us, enlightens us, and improves us. But this can also happen even if we do not grasp 21. Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, Elementa Theologiae Dogmaticae (Nürnberg: 1764), vol. 1. ch. 2, 201–2.

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everything in it at once. Who, therefore, because a medicine does not help all diseases, would say that it is not healing, or that a light is not a light because it does not enlighten the distant objects as much as the ones nearby? Peter speaks of the prophetic writings of the old covenant and says that Christians could convince themselves of the glory of Jesus Christ from them just as well as he could—even if they had not, like him, been present on the mountain at the transfiguration of Christ and heard the voice from Heaven. That the prophets bear witness to the Messiah of the Savior, if they are understood correctly, is indisputable. It is also certain that the Jews in Peter’s time could understand the Old Testament much easier than we can. Does it follow from this that the Bible must be clear to us in all essential doctrines, [68] even without the explanation of the Church? The apostles themselves referred to the prophets in their teaching and explained them. The believers of those times, because the miraculous gifts had not yet ceased, who were themselves Jews by birth, and understood the basic language better than all our Hebrew language teachers, could understand a great deal in the Bible that is obscure to us now in our circumstances. To the passage 2 Tim 3: 15–17, I answer the same. Lord von Mosheim himself explains this text like this: Through the scriptures, a teacher of heavenly truths becomes qualified to fulfill all his duties, to teach, to punish, etc., so that a servant of God may be perfect in all good works.22 We readily admit all this. Our teachers also use the scriptures for this purpose. But it does not follow at all from this that everyone must or can explain the Bible for himself, that it is clear to everyone in all essential things, etc. The doctrines of Scripture, if they are not clear, are not clear. The teachings of Scripture, if they are properly understood, indisputably accomplish all that Paul says. To the second I answer: God has been able to speak clearly, but he did not want to prevent by any miracle that the knowledge of the biblical languages would not be partially lost with time. This is the common fate of all languages. He does not want to turn us into Orientals all at once, so that we could completely adopt their customs [69] and traditions. It is not His fault, therefore, if everything is not as clear to 22. Mosheim, Elementa Theologiae Dogmaticae, ch. 2, 169.



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us now as it was to the first Christians, for whom the writings of the New Testament were first written. He also wanted to speak so clearly that everyone can always know what is necessary for salvation. But whether one should draw this directly from the Bible himself, or learn it through the infallible instruction of others, that is another question. His goodness and wisdom are saved either way and even more so if we say that God has set up an infallible interpreter of his words. Who, in a matter on which his eternal salvation depends, would not rather have complete assurance that one is not mistaken than have to rely only on one’s own fallible insights? Whom should it not make fainthearted, if one knows from experience that one has rejected many a conviction, which up to a certain point one has held to be undoubtedly correct? How many passages did we consider to be proofs for a long time, and then found that they proved nothing? It is little comfort for the inquisitive man to say to himself: If you err here, God will not impute the error to you. After all, he wants to know the truth. I do not mean to say that we must therefore fall into general doubt, but it must be preferable if God Himself says to us: You do not err. And therefore, it seems to me to be much more in accordance with the wisdom and goodness of God, if in the most important matter of the world [70] he has set up an infallible interpreter of the Bible than leaving all explanation of to the fallible insights of individuals. In order to achieve this purpose safely, God could well have permitted that some darkness came into the scriptures by accident, for it is precisely through this that human reason learns its limits and the malevolent distortion of Scripture is prevented, because for every doubtful meaning of Scripture one must consult what the Church teaches. Without necessity, perhaps only a few would turn to the Church. Now, however, the bond of unity in faith is more tightly intertwined; the Christian, if he wants to have certainty in his faith cannot separate himself from his teachers. It is therefore wrong to call the darkness of Scripture an imperfection. Rather, it serves as a means to promote unity in the faith and thus achieves the purpose that Christ had in proclaiming the gospel. He wanted us to take his words always in the sense in which he brought them. And since he could not, without some miracle, prevent some things from becoming obscure to us that were quite understandable in His time, He safely achieved

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this purpose by limiting all private interpretations, which could lead to error, by establishing an infallible interpreter. A third argument. If you gave a simple-minded person the New Testament to read, would he say he understood it? I doubt it very much. [71] Certainly, one should not refer to experience. Where did anyone start the conversion of an unbeliever or the teaching of young people by giving them the New Testament to read? The essentials of the faith are taught to them beforehand through oral instruction, and then they are given the Bible to read. They then understand it. And how do they understand it? The Lutheran finds his belief system in it, the Reformed his own, and the Catholic his, because the explanation of the Bible had preceded this reading. However, even without preliminary instruction, everyone would find many correct rules of faith and moral precepts in it, because much there is easy to understand. Yet, he would also come across very important passages whose meaning he could not easily guess. Finding such meaning would depend on his own hermeneutic skills. Yet, just as such skills are different in different people, so interpretations turn out differently. VI. Christ himself directed the Jews to the scriptures when they wanted to convince themselves of his divine mission: You search the scriptures because you believe to find eternal life in them. And it is this them who bear witness of me. Jn 5:39 and Acts 17:11 praise the Bereans for searching the scriptures daily to see if they contained what Paul and Silas preached. [72] I am really ashamed in front of my readers that I have to answer such hackneyed and insignificant objections. Jesus does not speak here commandingly: Search the scriptures, but narratively: You search the scriptures. You consider the scriptures to be the word of salvation, and therefore read them diligently. This scripture bears witness to me. All this is quite true. A Jew could easily find the marks of the Messiah in the Old Testament and conclude from them that Jesus was the Messiah. A Christian can do the same. We do not claim that the whole Bible is incomprehensible. Does it follow, if this and that is clear in it, that everything is clear and that it is the only rule of faith? The Bereans did very well that they read the Bible daily. And God willing, the Christians followed them in it, and thereby became more and more fortified



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in the theoretical and practical faith. They convinced themselves that the prophets had really foretold everything as it had now come true according to the announcement of St. Paul. The Bible must have been much more understandable to the Jews than it is to us now, and they could not have been mistaken about Paul’s explanation. Just as little will we err if we follow the explanation of the Church. Again, if Scripture is recommended as a rule of faith, is it therefore the only rule? VII. If Scripture is not clear and distinct, what is it for? It becomes [73] quite superfluous. After all, the Church alone can teach us what we are to believe and do? This objection means as much as this: If the laws are not clear for themselves, what are they there for? Only ask the judge. He will decide what is right and what is wrong. The laws are sometimes clear enough, but sometimes, as works of men, unclear. And yet there are quarrelsome and cantankerous people who, despite the clarity of the laws, will go on disputing unless a judge puts an end to it. The book that is to be explained must always be there first. Incidentally, a sufficient reason for the scriptures must exist, even if they were no longer completely clear and were not the only rule of faith. First, the Bible preserves for us the history of religion as a monument of the highest historical credibility; second, as a monument that is clear in very many respects and also shows us what God revealed through the mouth of the prophets, Jesus and His apostles, at least in many and the most essential points, and is a guide to faith. Third, it serves us as a book of examples and edification. It is a different matter whether one can learn the most important doctrines of faith for oneself from the Bible, and it is a different matter whether one can also defend these doctrines and remove all doubts about them without an infallible interpreter. Even if most, and in the estimation of some, all doctrines of faith and morals were found in the Bible, [74] it could not be said that it is for all the only rule of faith. VIII. Jesus, as we ourselves say, foresaw very well that disputes would arise about the true meaning of the Bible. Therefore, if He wanted them to be settled in any other way than by looking at the Bible, He would have had to explain this clearly somewhere. For the first, He has also nowhere said that one must decide the disputes about the meaning of the Bible from its text. For the second, He

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really explained himself clearly about this. He did not send the apostles out into the world to write, but that they might teach the people orally: “Go,” he said, “and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and teach them to observe all things I have commanded you. I am with you to the end of the world.” He did not say, “I will be with your scriptures and make them clear to all nations who read them until the end of the world.” With you, with your teaching, I will be until the end of the world, consequently also with those who will teach after you by virtue of the mission I give you. That this is the true meaning of his words, we will prove elsewhere. Consequently, he wants the disputes to be decided by the teachers sent by him, not by the Bible. IX. [75] If one must be infallible to explain the scriptures, the Christian must also be infallible, so that he may correctly understand the meaning of the explanation given by the Church. Not at all. Common sense is always sufficient to comprehend a clearly stated proposition as we know from daily experience—one does not need infallibility! Yet, such common sense is not always sufficient to enlighten a dark sentence, especially if it speaks of objects of which the human mind cannot form a clear concept, or if it has been written in a language that is half foreign to me, or in such times and circumstances I cannot comprehend. If, therefore, my salvation depends on the correct meaning of such a sentence, God must have it made clear to me by an infallible interpreter. Once this has happened, I only need sound reason to understand it. So, it is not us Catholics, only those who make this accusation, who want to introduce general skepticism. If their pretense were true, one could not even understand the proposition that the whole is equal to all its parts taken together. X. The Church Fathers themselves refuted the so-called heretics from the scriptures, and thus assumed that someone could grasp the true meaning even without the explanation of the infallible Church, in which the false teachers did not believe. Even more, they even consider the scriptures to be the only guide to our faith. [76] Since the scriptures are clear in many passages, and since they themselves were praised by the opponents as a guide to the faith, the Fathers were well able to make use of them in their fight against here-



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tics, and to show them how little their new doctrines, which they wanted to base either on the scriptures or on false traditions, agreed with the Bible. Whenever the meaning of a passage was doubtful, or if the false teachers took a passage in a different sense than Catholics, the Fathers had to convict them of their error through the rules of interpretation or from tradition. This they also did, and we will show, as soon as we speak of tradition, that they also accepted tradition, like Scripture, as a guide to faith.

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Existence of a Living Judge of Faith § 14. If the Bible alone is not the rule of faith, God must have provided a sure means by which man can know what he must believe and do to be saved. (§ 8.)

§ 15. We will now seek this remedy. For the time being, however, we must remember that, if it really exists, the celebrated Protestant freedom of conscience cannot exist. [77] By freedom of conscience I mean the right to examine, independently of all human reputation, what God has revealed, and then to believe and do what everyone, after a conscientious examination, finds to be in accordance with this revelation. The freedom to act and believe even against recognized truth, and consequently also to sin, I am not talking about. Unfortunately, we all have this freedom. I only ask whether everyone has the freedom to piece his own belief system together with the help of Bible passages and to explain it according to his best insights. I say that no Christian has such freedom, except in the one case where he can consult the Bible alone. This freedom would be an obvious encroachment on the rights of God, for in the hypothesis that God has established another guideline for faith besides the Bible, we are no

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longer free to accept one but not the other. We would acknowledge thereby that God has the right to prescribe for us what we must believe and do, because we would accept His written word as the guideline for our faith and actions, and yet we would deny Him this very right, because we would be distorting His unwritten yet also revealed word, if this were the second guideline for faith. I know very well that Protestants reject my presuppositions of a guiding principle of faith other than the Bible and have never thought of demanding freedom of [78] conscience if that teaching were true. However, I cannot reconcile their statements. When there is talk of a union with Catholics, the first thing they say is: No, should we give up the freedom to think that was bought by our fathers with their blood? Should we give up our freedom of conscience? Counselor Michaelis1 writes the following:2 “I am afraid that the deviations of the Papal Church from ours are not logomachies but have substantial and important reasons. Suppose, however, that they were based merely on a misunderstanding of words; indeed, suppose that what no one in our Church would dare to hope, that the Papal Church were to accept all the doctrines of the Protestant Church merely with the reservation of the infallibility and supreme episcopal authority of the pope, and were to explain in the future the Council of Trent, which is not unskilled in this regard, with the same freedom that it has hitherto taken with regard to the Bible: I do not believe that a union would be desirable or acceptable, as long as it still leaves the Roman bishop, whom I now want to imagine as evangelical in faith, his prestige and spiritual universal monarchy intact. For why should I submit to a foreign monarch? And in a matter that allows no suzerainty, in my conscience? Supposing the spiritual [79] monarchy had nothing more intolerable about it than the secular, he who wanted to bring me and the Church in which I live back under the obedience of an evangelically thinking pope would appear to me just as the man who admonished the Dutch to submit again to the King of 1. [On Johann David Michaelis, a famous Enlightenment theologian, see Michael C. Legaspi, The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).] 2. Johann David Michaelis, Briefe von der Schwierigkeit der Religions-Vereinigung. An H. Pastor Aurand (Göttingen: 1759), 121.

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Spain after having obtained freedom, because he had renounced all the errors and peculiarities of Philip the Second, was a patron of the cause, a father to his subjects, and one of the greatest and best kings in Europe. Yet, they will rather choose freedom. After all, ecclesiastical monarchy is not harmless. If the governor of Rome is infallible, I believe that with all my heart then I am obliged to believe what he commands. If I think differently even in my heart, my conscience will accuse me of this as a sin, and I will be frightened and torn apart by the cruelest inner war between reason and conscience. Yet, if I utter my dissent I will be punishable before men, and according to the present institution of the papal church, I will have to expect punishments of which the freedom of our Church knows nothing.”3 It would be terribly wrong if the Protestants do not want to submit to the Church only because they do not want to give up the priceless and dearly purchased freedom of conscience that they enjoy in their church. This freedom can never be an obstacle to reunification or a reason for refusing it as it is seemingly for Protestants. [80] For there is still a preliminary question that must be answered: Are they even in lawful possession of this freedom? Only on the answer to this question does it depend whether they must submit to the Church or not. If an infallible interpreter of the Bible has been appointed by God, then this freedom completely disappears about content the interpreter has spoken about. If there is no such interpreter, then and only then can Protestants boast of their freedom of conscience and do very well if they do not allow themselves to be restricted by any human power. In the opposite case, however, it is not a man but God Himself who has restricted their freedom, who says through the mouth of the interpreter what one should believe and do, and if they accept his sayings, they submit to the authority of God, not of men. They can then complain as little about compulsion of conscience as they can complain about God giving a written revelation according to which they must act. The example about the Dutch also fails. These would be quite stupid if they did not want to submit again to the Spanish monarch and sacrifice their freedom when 3. Johann David Michaelis, “Briefe von der Schwierigkeit der Religionsvereinigung an H. Pastor Aurand, Secretair der Neuwiedischen Unionsakademie 1758,” in idem, Syntagma Commentationum (Göttingen: 1759), 121ff.



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God had told them beforehand that in case of refusal their states would fall apart, their actions would be completely ruined, and they would be deprived of all prestige; on the other hand, they could avoid all these evils through voluntary submission and make themselves extremely happy. But if God were to command them to submit completely in such a way, they would be rebels [81] against Him if they did not obey. All comparisons drawn from human things do not fit here, because we presuppose that God has commanded submission to the authority of the Church. Whether rightly, we will now examine. Whatever Protestants cite against the compulsion of conscience, which according to their opinion the decisions of the Church impose on them, and in favor of the rights of reason, they must dissolve themselves, because everything is just as true with a written revelation, and the opponents of all revelation accuse them of what they accuse us.

§ 16. To interpret the scriptures means to connect with their words the very concepts, the very meaning, which the authors of the scriptures have connected with them. Now that we have shown that revelation must be taken precisely in the sense in which it was given (§ 7), and that Scripture alone is not sufficient to determine this meaning for all important cases (§ 12), indeed that it is not at all probable, both according to God’s economy and according to the nature of revealed truths themselves, that He left the explanation of revelation to the insight of each individual (§§ 10, 11) , we can now approach our proof of the truth of the Catholic religion. We shall now prove that the means [82] which God Himself had to ordain for the explanation of revelation, and has indeed ordained, is tradition; and that the Church, when it decides something in matters of faith, collects only this tradition and makes it known, whereupon it has the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that it cannot err. The given definition of the interpretation of Scripture needs no explanation. It is the usual one, which is generally given in logic and accepted by all.

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§ 17. Therefore, the best interpreters of the scriptures are those who know the concepts and the meaning of the authors. For, if they know in what sense the biblical writers have taken their words, one can at least no longer doubt their efficiency in bearing witness to the sense of the authors. He who knows the truth can also tell it. Only a doubt could arise whether they would be sincere enough to tell the truth, as they would know it. Yet also this doubt can be lifted sufficiently that one must either give up all faith in a revelation or admit its sincerity.

§ 18. The terms and the meaning of the biblical authors are best known to those who have heard the explanation of them from these authors themselves. Christ and the apostles had in their teaching the intention to be understood by all (§ 2). [83] Also what the apostles and evangelists have left in writing is written only with the intention to be understood (§ 3) God foresaw that His words would be interpreted differently by different people (§ 5). Since it could not be indifferent to Him whether His revelation would be understood rightly or wrongly (§ 7), He had to arrange that the preachers of the gospel sent by him express themselves clearly and understandably; that is, that they awaken in their listeners just such concepts of the truths of salvation as they themselves had. On the part of God and the preachers of the faith, therefore, nothing can have been lacking that was necessary to awaken clear concepts in their listeners. Otherwise, the blame would fall on God if the listeners misunderstood His teachings because He did not present them to them clearly. The apostles must also have been assured that their disciples, whom they appointed as teachers of the people and commissioned to stick to the pure doctrine of the gospel, had previously grasped this doctrine correctly. Therefore, the concepts and the meaning of the biblical authors must be best known to those who have heard the explanation of them from these authors themselves. Perhaps others can—with the art of interpretation—bring out the meaning the authors have connected with



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their words. Who would, however, not rather trust those to whom the apostles themselves gave the testimony that they had rightly received their teachings, and could authentically [84] explain them to the people, by setting them up as teachers of the people?

§ 19. The explanation of the whole Gospel by the biblical authors was heard by the first Christians and especially by the teachers they established everywhere. This sentence is clear in itself and is put beyond all doubt by what we have said in the preceding §.

§ 20. Those interpret the scriptures most reliably who accept the interpretation of those who have heard it from the apostles themselves. The interpretation of the scriptures given by the apostles was the genuine and only true one. It was rightly understood by their listeners, and especially by the teachers of the first Christian churches (§ 18). Consequently, they too were skilled and capable of communicating it to others as they had received it. Their sincerity in bearing witness to what the apostles preached will be discussed later. If we continue this proof that the teachers instructed and appointed by the apostles’ hearers were again fit to instruct others, and so on down to us, it follows that the scriptures can be most reliably explained according to the tradition, or oral tradition, of the Church. Yet, now we want to explain the Catholic doctrine of tradition more clearly.

§ 21. Tradition or transmission, as we consider it here, is the unanimous testimony of the whole Church to the divine revelation of a doctrine. Just as Christ and his apostles proclaimed the revelation, so the faithful heard and understood it. When they testify to what they have heard,

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we call this testimony a tradition. But because the first hearers, as those who have long since died, cannot tell us directly what they heard, we receive this testimony indirectly through the successive series of believers from the first hearers down to us, whom we here call the whole Church. So, we do not take the word tradition for revealed doctrine itself, as theologians otherwise secretly do, but for the testimony that this or that doctrine was presented as a revealed one by Christ and the apostles. For the moment I am, however, not concerned whether there is such a tradition and whether such a doctrine can be found anywhere, which is backed by such unanimous testimony or in what church it is found. About all these points, as I hope, I will give satisfactory information below. [86] Here we will only examine whether such a tradition is possible, or whether the revelation could have been transmitted to us purely and unadulterated through an oral tradition; for several Protestants reject it for the reason that God could not have chosen an uncertain way such as tradition to preserve the purity of doctrine. They believe it would have been indecent for God to take this means. I will therefore prove that neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic impossibility of tradition can be shown, but rather that it is not only possible, but also appropriate that God chose this means for the propagation of pure doctrine.

§ 22. The propagation of Christian doctrine through oral tradition does not contain any intrinsic contradiction. First, it is not impossible that God reveals some truths to humans, which they would never have acquired themselves, or only very late. Part 2, Section I, § 1, 2. Protestants themselves admit this because they believe in revelation. Second, it is not impossible that people who have heard the revealed truths directly from the mouths of divine messengers do not write them down but communicate them to others orally. In the old covenant, the prophets had to announce many things orally to the kings and peoples, [87] which they could not have written down at all, if God had not urged them to do so. And how many truths are made known to us daily only by oral communication? Third, it is not



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impossible that those who have come to know a truth through oral instruction communicate it again to others, and these again to others in an unadulterated fashion; for although many people are inclined to lie, they do not necessarily lie. Rather, sincerity is natural to man, and insincerity is something assumed. But if God can speak, if what He speaks can remain unwritten, if it can be reproduced orally without falsification, then the oral propagation of Christian doctrine contains no internal contradiction and is therefore always possible.

§ 23. The propagation of Christian doctrine through oral tradition does not contain any extrinsic contradiction. In addition to the fact that we humans may not set any limits to God’s omnipotence, it costs God no more effort to keep the Christian doctrine pure and unadulterated in the oral tradition than it costs Him to bring this about in propagation through the Bible. He must only prevent in both cases that the purity of the doctrine does not suffer accidentally or intentionally through unskilled or malicious people. [88] But this requires nothing but will. His wisdom must only link all actions and circumstances from eternity in such a way that, without harm to the freedom of man, neither the Bible nor the oral tradition can be so falsified that one could no longer recognize the true revelation.

§ 24. If God really wanted to propagate the Christian doctrine through oral tradition, it is certain that he made arrangements by which it would always be preserved pure. God earnestly desires that all of us are saved and has preached the Christian religion so that through this means we may all surely attain our final goal. Therefore, he also had to take care of its preservation, so that its knowledge would always remain accessible. If he wanted to propagate the religion to us through tradition, it was necessary for him to take measures that would protect the Christian doctrine from any falsification.

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Now it is easy to answer the usual objection of Protestants. The Christian doctrine, they say, would be too much exposed to the danger of falsification in the case of an oral tradition, which is not the case if it is conserved in the Bible, for the traditions are presented to the people by their shepherds. If a single deceiver is among them and passes off a false doctrine for a doctrine received through tradition, [89] he will seduce a multitude of people who are bound to believe him blindly. If the pope himself does this, the other shepherds of souls will not even dare to speak up against it for fear of being banned from the Church. In the times of barbarism and ignorance, everything, no matter how false, could be declared as tradition, and one will not have to fear the opposition of lazy, comfortable, and ignorant shepherds. In fact, most errors have crept into the Church in this way. Yet, to falsify the truths preserved in the scriptures is impossible. Whoever would undertake this would have to destroy all copies, destroy the works of the Church Fathers, understand all the languages into which they have been translated, or have a multitude of assistants for the execution of his enterprise, etc. Thus, deception would be impossible, and a fraud immediately discovered. This objection, I say, is quite easy to answer, and would at best have weight only if the reality of the propagation of religion through tradition were unprovable. At the most, it says this much: It seems to us that religion is more easily preserved by the Bible than by oral tradition. Yet what entitles us to conclude this? God wanted to propagate religion only through the Bible. Easy and difficult are relative terms. What seems easy or difficult to us is not so in the sight of God. He only has to will [90] and one thing after another will happen. Nothing creates more or less difficulty for Him. If the existence of tradition can be proved, and God has chosen it as a means of propagation, then this preliminary argument, with which one wants to deny its possibility or probability, has no weight at all. Moreover, it is not even true that it is easier to falsify the tradition than the Bible. A falsifier of the Bible would have to change all copies and imprints, and a falsifier of the tradition would have to persuade all shepherds, all believers who are scattered all over the world, that they did not believe what they really believed. He would have to change all the works of the Fathers, Church authors and all,



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who are witnesses of what the Church has believed until today. This could not even be done by a Roman pope; one may believe him to have power and malice as much as one wants. Yet both things, as far as I can see, are impossible.

§ 25. It was also very fitting that God chose the path of tradition for the propagation of pure doctrine. Revelation, as we have just shown, can be preserved just as unaltered by oral tradition as by the Bible. The credibility, authenticity, and integrity of the Bible itself cannot be proved other than by tradition, which means by historical [91] testimony. It was therefore very fitting that God, who always seeks to achieve His end by very simple means, should at the same time use the means that already existed—tradition—to teach us what He has revealed; for this very tradition must also teach us that God has revealed something, and this is of no use to us if we do not also know what He has revealed. (§ 11. III.) The Bible alone cannot be a rule of faith in all cases (§ 12). By this means, God achieved several ends at the same time. The purity of the doctrine He revealed was preserved intact. The unity of faith and love was more securely promoted by connecting believers more closely with their shepherds through necessary oral instruction. If, on the other hand, the scriptures were to be the only rule of faith, and if everyone was allowed to explain them according to his own insights, there would soon be as many different religions as there are minds, because each head thinks differently. There would be as many divisions as there are proud, domineering, or restless people! This has been taught by experience from the beginning of the Church to our times. As soon as the unanimous testimony of the Church was rejected, everyone could make whatever one wanted out of the Bible. It was therefore very appropriate that God used the means of tradition to preserve the pure doctrine. Some, however, might object: There have been so many heresies and divisions among Christians. [92] Therefore, either there must be no tradition, or it is not a sufficient means to prevent them. Whether there is a tradition or not, we will hear in a moment. But

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the fact that heresies and schisms have arisen does not prove that tradition is not a sufficient means to prevent them and to preserve the unity of the faith. If there is only one medicine that has the power to cure the disease, that is enough. If the sick person rejects it and does not want to use it, then it is his fault. God invites everyone to faith; He gives us also the most appropriate reasons that can move us to accept it. He provides an easy means, namely tradition, by which we can safely learn what he has revealed. But he does not force anyone to use this means. The means is there, the use of it is up to everyone. And because many despise it and prefer to stick to their own insights, heresies and divisions arise. It would be quite different if the Bible alone had to be the rule of faith. It would naturally become incomprehensible to us in more and more passages, and since the insights and circumstances of the people themselves are so different, different interpretations would have to arise from it. For several passages we would become doubtful whether we have really grasped their true meaning. Here, therefore, there would be a lack of a secure means to learn all the revealed truths. Here would be a sick person who would like to be healed, but does not have medicine, and the blame would fall back on God Himself.

§ 26. We really have a unanimous testimony of the whole Church about what Christ and his apostles taught, or an oral tradition. [93] Other theologians generally conduct their proof of the existence of tradition in this way. They refer to some passages of St. Paul; for example 2 Thess 2:2; Tim 1:13; 1 Cor 2:23; Jn 16:12. They cite special doctrines that also Protestants believe and that cannot be proven other than by tradition. Each has his own special way, to which I do not want to object. I will also take the liberty of arranging my proof in the way that seems most appropriate to me and choose the reasons I like the most. However, I do not consider my argumentation new. Incidentally, without speaking of specific doctrines propagated by tradition, I will instead prove the existence of tradition as I have defined it above in general, its historical certainty and natural infallibility, indicate its characteristics, and show its supernatural infallibility, or the infallibility of



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the Church. This will be followed by an examination of which church is the infallible one, and the limits of infallibility will be determined. Finally, in an appendix, it will be shown how far Catholics and Protestants differ from each other in their characteristic doctrines. [94] That which Christ and His apostles taught was understood by the first Christians, and especially by the teachers of the people established by the apostles. (§ 19.) The first churches planted by the apostles thus knew what they had to believe according to the precepts of the apostles. Their teachers were therefore also capable of faithfully transmitting to others what they had received from the apostles. If they were able to do this, they could set up teachers who taught the same things that the immediate successors of the apostles had taught them. Just as well did the people, who received their faith instruction from the teachers, know what the pure Christian religion was. If we continue this proof in this way, we see that the general testimony of what Christ and the apostles taught must have been propagated in all places and at all times down to us, if the pure doctrinal concept had not otherwise been gradually falsified out of ignorance or malice, or in some other accidental way; that this did not happen, and could not have happened, we shall show in the following section. Thus the teachers, as well as their congregations, knew from the beginning of the Church until our times what Christ and the apostles taught. Or one must admit that teachers and believers did not understand each other, and the Church never knew what it believed. Consequently, we really have a unanimous testimony of what the pure doctrinal concept of Christ and the apostles contained, which means we have a tradition.

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Infallibility of This Judge of Faith on Grounds of Reason § 27. It is historically and to the highest degree morally certain that this testimony, or this tradition, has not been falsified out of ignorance, malice, or any other accidental cause. [95] Above all, in order to understand the following proof correctly, one must never forget that the object of tradition, or that to which tradition bears witness, is a historical fact. The question is: whether Christ and the apostles spoke what we Catholics claim to be their doctrine? The same is the question between the Christians and the opponents of revelation: Did Christ and the apostles work those miracles to which we Christians testify? Both are facts, and in courts of law one not only hears the witnesses in order to find out what a man has done, but also what he has said (§ 11. III.). Yet facts must be proved by testimony. Now everyone admits that a fact has happened and is morally certain in the highest degree if it is confirmed by a multitude of witnesses who have never seen each other and who could not agree on something among themselves, and who could not be induced by any common interest to deceive others by false testimony. [96] If, in addition, these witnesses are public dignitaries, if they have a special commission to speak the truth, and if they are even bound to do so by an oath, their testimony

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carries even more weight, and if they all agree with each other, no man will doubt their testimony. We therefore regard those whose testimony constitutes the tradition merely as historical witnesses who tell us what Christ and his apostles taught and take no account of the particular opinions they expressed about the how of Christian doctrine. These witnesses are either teachers of the people or the people themselves. As long as the people remain in communion with their teachers, and regard them as orthodox, it is certain that the outward faith, or the public creed of the teacher and his congregation, is the same. For a congregation to which its teachers would at once present new doctrines, hitherto unknown to it, would at once punish them, and separate itself from the communion of its shepherds (§ 11. III). Thus, we may only show here that the faith of the people’s teachers has remained the same. Now let’s do the proof ourselves. I. The teachers of the people were bound to speak the truth, or to recite what they had heard from Christ and the apostles or from their successors, or finally from the disciples of these disciples. This was the purpose of preaching in general, [97] and Paul expressly bound his disciples to it (§ 10. III) Before one was initiated as a teacher of the people by the laying on of hands, one had to be convinced of the candidate’s orthodoxy, he had to make his profession of faith. Soon the people testified to his orthodoxy, then the bishops assembled in a synod. In later times he had to send his confession of faith to the pope in Rome, was presented with a formula of faith, which he had to swear to, as it is done today. This creed was insisted upon especially by those whose orthodoxy was suspect in particular doctrines, for which we have enough examples in Church history. And as long as a teacher remained suspected of orthodoxy, he was not recognized as a legitimate teacher. Precisely by this public confession of faith, and by the oath he took on it, he obliged himself to teach to the believers entrusted to him what he had publicly acknowledged as the teachings of Christ. II. The teachers could not, through ignorance, falsify the genuine teaching of Christ and the apostles; for they bore witness to a matter that was widely known. The faithful knew what they had heard from

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the apostles or their teachers about certain doctrinal points, and the slightest deviation of their new bishop from what they were accustomed to would have struck them. The new bishop, too, had to know the doctrine of his predecessors, because he had to make his profession of faith [98] in them, and the doctrine of his predecessors could not be different from that of the whole Church, since he lived in the same community. It was therefore not possible that the tradition of his church remained unknown to him, or even if he did not take the trouble to investigate it, and immediately wanted to pass off something for a revealed doctrine that was not one, then he had for the time being his particular congregation, and then also all the other churches against him. III. The teachers could not falsify the tradition out of malice. What could have motivated them to commit this crime? Certainly not selfinterest, for it was very important to each bishop that he taught as the rest of the Church or his fellow teachers did; otherwise, the faithful would have objected to him, risen up against him and accused him, and the other bishops or in later times the pope, would have deprived him of his office. The deviation from the pure doctrine could never take place secretly and unnoticed, so that it would not have caused trouble and unrest. Pride, too, or eagerness to distinguish oneself from others by a new doctrine, could not be the cause of falsification; for if a teacher undertook to deviate from the teaching of the whole Church, he harmed only himself and his followers. He either separated himself from the Church or the latter excluded him from its fellowship. His private teaching not only had no influence on that of the Church, but [99] rather placed orthodoxy in a brighter light, because his deviation gave occasion for every teacher to testify publicly for himself, or also in church assemblies, what had hitherto been taught in his church on the point in dispute. IV. The doctrine of the Church, or the general tradition, could not have been falsified by other accidental causes. Whatever accidental cause may be conceived, it could never have affected all the teachers of the Church at the same time and in the same way. It is impossible that an accidental cause should have affected all the teachers in Italy, France,



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Spain, through all of Asia and Africa, that all at once no longer knew or no longer wanted to know what the previous teaching of their particular churches had been. Neither ignorance nor malice can be assumed in all of them at the same time, and even if one were to assume one of the two, I still do not see how the teachers could have persuaded their congregations that their new doctrine was the one they had previously presented to them. If a fact is confirmed by so many witnesses scattered throughout the world, of whom one has no reason to suspect general ignorance, or malice, or conspiracy to deceive others, then it is morally certain in the highest degree that this fact really happened as it is told and testified. And it is a fact that Christ and His apostles presented certain teachings [100] as revealed. And for this fact a number of witnesses are cited, for whom neither ignorance, nor malice, nor collusion to deceive the world can be assumed. It is therefore morally certain in the highest degree that Jesus and His apostles really preached what tradition presents as their teaching, and consequently also morally certain in the highest degree that tradition has not been falsified. It will be easily understood that I do not consider the teachers of the Church to be judges of faith in the proper sense, although I have entitled this section Existence of a Living Judge of Faith. I do not believe at all, as I will explain in more detail later, that the Church receives new and direct revelations from God, by virtue of which it would be authorized to make a judicial pronouncement in faith disputes, but its whole authority consists in the fact that it testifies to what has been held to be a teaching of Christ and the apostles in all Christian congregations from the times of the apostles on. The apostles themselves were set up by Jesus only as witnesses of what they had heard and seen: You shall bear witness. And they presented themselves merely as witnesses: We testify to what we have heard and seen. If one wants to call the giving of this testimony a judicial pronouncement, then I am also satisfied. Whether, by the way, these witnesses, in giving their testimony, have to enjoy the special assistance of the Holy Spirit so that they cannot err at all [101] or whether they have supernatural infallibility, we shall see in its place.

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§ 28. Tradition, or the unanimous testimony of the Church, has always been regarded as the rule of faith from the beginning of Christianity. To prove this, we will now cite historical testimonies from antiquity, and we do not demand that the Church Fathers be accorded greater prestige than any other historian. But one must also be fair and not disparage them further. The usual answers of Protestants to the proofs from the Church Fathers are: 1. That the Fathers, who admit a tradition, do not understand it to mean necessary truths of faith that are not found in Scripture. 2. That Scripture and tradition were understood to be one by the Fathers.1 3. That the Fathers allowed tradition in historical matters or in matters concerning Church discipline. The first answer does not concern us at all; for we take tradition for the unanimous testimony of the whole Church without regard to particular doctrines. The question here is only whether the unanimous testimony of the Church has been accepted as a principle of faith at all. The other two answers will be refuted by citing the passages themselves. I. [102] Eusebius says that the martyr Ignatius, when he was led to Rome, recommended to all bishops and congregations that they should adhere to the tradition left by the apostles.2 It cannot be said that he identified here tradition with the scriptures—for the tradition, which he understood, was not yet written—because as Eusebius states, in order that it might be known all the more securely to posterity, he confirmed it by his testimony, and recorded it. Ignatius also had to speak of traditions that did not only concern Church discipline or ceremonies, because he recommended the tradition to them with the intention that they would beware of the evil or false beliefs of the heretics. II. Irenaeus:3 “The tradition of the apostles, made known throughout the world, can be found in every church by all who wish to see the truth, and we can count the bishops established by the apostles, and their successors, down to us, who have never taught such a thing as these heretics dream. But because it would be too boring . . . to name 1. Mosheim, Streittheologie, 1:291, note b. 2. Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, III, ch. 36. 3. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, III, ch. 3.



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the series of bishops of all churches, we may only cite the tradition of the greatest, oldest, and most well-known Church, founded by the two most glorious apostles Peter and Paul, the tradition it received from the apostles, and the faith it preached and propagated through the succession of bishops down to us, [103] in order to shame those who teach differently than they should. In this Church the tradition derived from the apostles has always been preserved.” These and several other similar passages of Irenaeus are so striking and testify so clearly to the authority accorded to tradition at that time that one must be reasonably surprised when opponents refer to this very Church Father to deny tradition. It is true, Irenaeus rejects the tradition of the heretics—of Carpocrates, Marcion, Basilides, Corinthus, Hermogenes, and the Valentinians. But what was this tradition? These false teachers pretended, as Mosheim himself says, that Jesus did not teach everything publicly, but entrusted some of his disciples with a part of His teaching, which they were to make known only to certain persons. In a word, Irenaeus rejects a tradition that was not based on the general testimony of the apostolic churches and could not prove its apostolic origin. And this also rejects the entire Catholic Church, which does not recognize any mason-like secret tradition. It is quite wrong what Mosheim says, that among the heretics one first finds the unwritten word, which the Roman Church accepts. Among them one finds a fictitious divine word, which had no general uninterrupted testimony since the times of the apostles on its side. Our tradition is general and apostolic. And on this Irenaeus built. Just as [104] clear are the words of the same immediately in the following main part. “It is not proper to seek truth elsewhere, or from others, which can easily be found in the Church, since the apostles have deposited in it, as in a rich treasury, all that is superfluous to the truth . . . If a dispute arose over an insignificant question, should we not take refuge in the oldest churches in which the apostles sojourned, and take from them what is certain and true for the present question? But how, if the apostles themselves had left no writings, would one not have to adhere to the succession of transmission which they left to those to whom they entrusted the churches? This is the order—or tradition—many barbarian nations obey, who believe in Christ, and who, without ink or letter, keep the law written in their hearts by the

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Spirit.” It is almost ridiculous that one needs the last words of Irenaeus to prove that he rejected tradition. One concludes thus: If the apostles had left no writings, one would have to follow tradition. But they have left writings; therefore one does not have to follow the tradition.4 Besides the fact that this conclusion is not in itself correct, since it is still possible that tradition must be followed even in the case the apostles left writings, which would have to be done all the more if they had left none; besides which, I say, it is evident [105] from the passage itself, that Irenaeus here not only refers to tradition in doubtful questions, in so far as it informs us which writings come from the apostles, but also that one can find doctrinal truth independently of the writings of the apostles, because it is also found among barbarian Christian nations who can neither read nor write. III. Clement of Alexandria does not speak at length about tradition, but he makes his opinion of the authority of tradition clear. He praises his teacher Pantenus for having adhered closely to tradition and considers himself fortunate to have learned from skilled men not worldly sciences and vanities of pagan philosophy, but the teachings of the Church and the tradition of the apostles.5 One can say that by tradition he understood the teaching of the biblical doctrine. But then he would have had to express himself differently, and say that Pantenus explained the Bible correctly, and that others had presented the true teaching of the Bible to him. Undeniably, Pantenus and others did this, but Clement does not speak of the Bible directly, but of the tradition according to which the Bible is explained correctly, of the teaching of the Church, which is one with the tradition from the apostles. Other passages of this writer are too obscure to be useful here. IV. [106] Tertullian shows in several places that in his time tradition was considered a rule of faith. For example,6 against the heretics, who claimed that some churches did not understand the teachings of the apostles, he says: “All (churches) are said to have erred. . . . Is it probable that so many and so large churches have come through error to the same faith? A thing never has the same outcome for all. In the 4. Mosheim, Streittheologie, 1:292. Note b. 5. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 274–75. 6. Tertullian, De Præscriptione Haereticorum, chs. 27–28.



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end, different churches would have arrived at different doctrines. By the way, what is found to be the same in many is not error. So, no one should dare say that those who have handed this down have erred.” Tertullian is speaking here of doctrines of faith, as the context shows. In the thirty-first chapter,7 he explains the gospel parable, in which it is said that the householder first sows good seed, and then the enemy sows weeds among it, thus: “The seed is the word of God. Thus, it is evident from the order itself that the tradition which is older comes from the Lord himself and is true. That, however, comes from without, and is false, which was later spread among them.” Obviously, here he takes the tradition derived from the apostles as a rule of faith, and, if I may say so, sets apostolicity as a mark by which true tradition can be distinguished from false. This he confirms still more clearly in the following main [107] section, where he demands that the heretics should prove the origin of their doctrines from the times of the apostles: “They may show us the origin of their churches, develop the succession of their bishops in such a way that the first bishop had either an apostle, or an apostolic man who remained in communion with the apostles, as his predecessor and beginner.” Thus, he continues, the Church at Smyrna, at Rome, and other places can prove the origin of their Church and of their doctrines. And even if the heretics could also do this, they would still gain nothing; because their doctrine, as soon as it was compared with the doctrine of the apostles, would demonstrate its falsity. Tertullian therefore suggests two ways in which the error could be safely discovered—the tracing of the doctrine back to the times of the apostles, or the comparison with that handed-down doctrine that was preserved in the apostolic churches. Our theologians also cite another well-known passage8 from this writer. But Mosheim is right when he says that Tertullian is speaking here only of Church laws and ceremonies that could be retained according to the old tradition, even if they were not prescribed in Scripture. V. Origen lays down a rule of faith to which one must adhere in the various opinions [108] about important doctrines of faith, and says: “Since there are many who say that they think according to the doctrine 7. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, ch. 31. 8. Tertullian, De corona, ch. 4.

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of Christ, and some of them differ from their predecessors in doctrine, hold that which is taught in the Church (ecclesiastica prædicatio) and which has been handed down from the apostles through the orderly succession of their successors, and has remained in the churches until now. Only that truth must be believed, which in no point deviates from the ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition.”9 Nevertheless, Lord von Mosheim10 may refer to this same Origen as a witness against tradition, because he says in the twenty-sixth homily on the book of Numbers, chapter 6: “But this will seem like a fable if it is not proved from Scripture,” and concludes from these words that he rejects everything as fables that is not proved from Scripture. The conclusion itself is not binding: Origen is saying that what he is talking about must be proven from Scripture. Thus, in Mosheim’s opinion, everything must be proven from Scripture. Something can be so clearly contained in Scripture that all other proofs become superfluous. However, it does not follow from this that all other doctrines are also so clearly contained in it. Moreover, Origen here gives us, as he often does, an allegorical interpretation [109] of a scriptural passage. Obviously, he could not refer in this method to any tradition, because this interpretation certainly did not come from the apostles. He was therefore forced to seek out a scriptural passage that confirmed his opinion and invoked the Letter to the Hebrews, which seems to confirm what Origen says, but does not prove that his interpretation of the former biblical passage is correct. VI. Cyprian wants to refute Pope Stephen, who proved the validity of heretical baptism from tradition. The shortest way would have been to show his opponent that he was introducing a new and hitherto unknown rule of faith in the Church—namely, tradition. But Cyprian does not do that. Rather, he himself presupposes with Stephen that tradition is a rule of faith, but he claims that this is his opinion, not Stephen’s. He does not object a word to the principle cited by Stephen: Nihil innovetur, nisi quod traditum est (one should not dare to innovate against tradition), and only states that he is not guilty of this crime because not he, but Stephen acts against it, because he merely refers to a human and not to a divine tradition, as he, Cyril, does. Incidentally, 9. Origen, De Principiis, bk. 1, ch. 2. 10. Mosheim, Streittheologie, 1:292, note b.



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he himself teaches: “If the truth is doubtful and wavering in one point, we must return to its divine origin and to the evangelical tradition. . . . All human error will cease when we return to the beginning and [110] origin of tradition.” The dispute was not about the evidential value of tradition, which both sides admitted, but about which party had the support of tradition on his side, just as it is often disputed which party has the authority of the Bible on their side. I do not want to cite several passages from the Church Fathers after the first three centuries, and this all the more so since Protestants themselves admit that the younger Fathers, as they say, have already fallen into the bad habit of polemicizing out of convenience or self-interest in their rebuttal of the opponents of tradition. What they want to prove from these Fathers against tradition will be answered below. In the same way, I did not want to cite Justin, Hippolyte, and others, because I did not want to go far without need. VII. The Church itself has proven by its way of proceeding that tradition has always been regarded as a rule of faith. Heresies were refuted through it and doctrines of faith were decided at councils. In the Church assemblies at Ephesus and Chalcedon, the Fathers appealed to the tradition of the churches and the Church Fathers against Nestorius and Eutyches. The fifth general council says that it decided what was communicated to it by Scripture as well as by the teachings of the Church Fathers. The seventh general council used mainly tradition against the iconoclasts. [111] The eighth says:11 The ordinances of the universal and apostolic Church, which were received through tradition, must be kept and preserved. The holy Fathers Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus refuted the Macedonians by explaining the scriptural texts according to tradition. This is what Jerome did against Vigilantius, Augustine against the Pelagians, and all the Fathers against the false teachers whom they refuted. What did it take? The Protestants themselves admit this. Among others, Walch12 says of the Council of Ephesus: “In the middle of the Church, where the assembly was, the books of the scriptures were placed. This was called parading with God’s word; for the outcome showed that 11. Act. 10. can. 1. 12. Christian F. Walch, Entwurf einer vollständgen Historie der Kirchenversammlungen (Leipzig:1759), 281.

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no one was serious about dutifully granting his office the power of deciding disputes of faith. The names and writings of the venerable fathers dismissed Peter and Paul.” From these mocking words, which this great scholar should have softened somewhat to preserve his honor, it is evident that he himself saw that the conciliar authorities had used tradition as a rule of faith. And they were right to do so. They also appealed to Scripture, but since false teachers explained it differently, they would never have been able to cope with these opponents if they had not shown them how the disputed positions [112] were understood by the whole of antiquity. They could never hope that their explanation alone would be accepted as correct. But since their opponents themselves accepted tradition as a rule of faith, like the scriptures, they acted very sensibly in using tradition as an aid in interpreting the Bible. Now there was nothing left for the false teachers but to say outright: We do not want to believe. VIII. Even the Greek Church, which has long been separated from the Roman Catholic Church, and which has certainly not accepted a single doctrine to please the latter, considers tradition to be a rule of faith, as Nicole and Arnauld prove from several testimonies. For brevity’s sake, I refer to the latter’s Perpétuite de la foi de l’eglise catholique.13 It was nothing less than an innovation, then, when the Council of Trent, in its fourth session, expressed itself thus: “According to the example of the orthodox fathers, the assembly receives and venerates with equal affection and reverence the traditions, which concern both faith and morals, and which were given orally by Christ or the Holy Spirit and propagated through an uninterrupted series in the Catholic Church, just as the Holy Scriptures themselves.”

§ 29. [113] Answer to the objections. I. Even though the apostles preached true Christianity, it was still possible that 1. their first listeners misunderstood them; 2. that some, out of malice or stubbornness, gave false explanations of the apostles’ teachings and made their own additions, 13. Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Perpetuité de la foy de L’eglise catholique touchant l’eucharistie, 4th ed. (Paris: Savreux, 1666), part 3, chapter 8.



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which were gradually accepted by the whole Church; 3. the teachers gradually forgot what the apostles had said, and perhaps even subordinated their own opinions, which was easily done, since the people blindly followed their teachers or were forced to follow them by excommunications; 4. this became even more possible when the popes assumed the highest authority [Ansehen] in the Church and dictated to everyone what to believe. The first falls away by itself. Christ and his apostles intended to be understood when they taught the faithful. And they were certainly understood (§ 19) because otherwise they would not have achieved the final purpose of their preaching ministry. Nor did they set up teachers of whom they were not assured had a correct grasp of the teaching of the gospel. Of course, there were false teachers in the times of the apostles who deviated from what they had heard from them. But their deviation was immediately noticed and rebuked. [114] To the second. That some, out of malice or stubbornness, gave false explanations of the apostles’ teachings is true. They wanted to unite the dreams of the Jews or the principles of their philosophy with the teachings of Christianity. But we also know that teachers and people opposed them and detested them as heretics. It is not enough to say that a false explanation could have crept in and could have been accepted by the Church. One must also show that it really happened. As the Church has always stood guard for the preservation of the Bible, so it has also stood guard for the preservation of pure doctrine. And what the Protestants answer to the enemies of the Bible when they claim that it has been falsified, we answer to them when they claim that the tradition has been falsified. It was impossible for individual false teachers to corrupt the tradition once it was known to all teachers and believers. Finally, if God chose the tradition as a means for the propagation of the evangelical doctrine, He also had to see to it that it was preserved unadulterated, and all the concerns of the Protestants are superfluous. To the third. It was impossible for the teachers to gradually forget what the apostles had said. Things that had to be recited and explained so often, things about which they were tested when they took office, things that had to be known not only to them but also to all their subordinates, could not be forgotten so easily. The faith of the teachers was

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rather bound to the faith of the people, [115] and they already knew what they had to believe before a new teacher took office. It was therefore not acceptable if the new teacher wanted to teach something different from what had previously been believed. Moreover, even if he had dared to do so, the error would have lasted only a short time; for since the people were not bound to the teachings of their bishop alone, but also looked at whether his teachings were in accord with those of the whole Church, they would have soon discovered that he was presenting a false doctrine. The people profess the common, or Catholic Church, and therefore know quite well that their teacher must agree with the Church. How can one even assume that in a whole congregation, or Church, which besides the bishop also consists of priests, scholars, and common people, everybody will immediately join the first best teacher who presents a new doctrine? Some have dared to do so and have stubbornly insisted on asserting their errors throughout their entire diocese. But one has also bravely opposed them, like Nestorius. Or even if they achieved their purpose, nothing more happened than that their entire congregation separated with them from the fellowship of the rest of the Church. And thereby their intended falsification of tradition has become only too noticeable. To the fourth. Even the pope himself could not bring about a general falsification of tradition with all his authority nor falsify the Bible. [116] He would have had no time to destroy simultaneously all the writings of the Church Fathers, abolish all older conciliar documents, and bring about a change in the minds of all bishops and believers, so that all no longer knew what they had hitherto believed. If one wants to tell me that a lot of doctrines were really introduced into the Church this way, when in those dark times one depended so completely on the authority of the popes (for example, the doctrine of veneration of the saints, the veneration of images, transubstantiation, the doctrine of purgatory, etc.), then one presupposes something here, which will be asked later— namely, that these doctrines are not founded in tradition. Whether this is so or not, we will see in its place. II. No man, no single teacher is infallible. Therefore, all teachers together are not infallible either, and the whole tradition can be gradually falsified by them. It is not only possible that individual teachers



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can change the tradition, but there are enough examples that this has really happened. Many have erred, have persisted in error, and have also dragged their congregations into it. This oft-repeated objection has already been answered many times. It leads to Pyrrhonism. A single witness can lie. So also the witnesses of all times, of all places, can all lie together, even if they stand in a public office, and have been specially set up as witnesses of what they have seen and heard, even if they could not [117] have conspired to deceive each other, even if no common advantage induced them to lie, but a general harm to them and all men would result from it? Who could admit this without at the same time renouncing all historical faith? But if this argument does not apply anywhere, if there is talk of historical witnesses and facts, why should it apply here, since there is also talk of a fact? For it is asked whether one can rely on the unanimous testimony of all times, of all teachers and believers, of all churches, and believe that Christ and the apostles taught what they present as their doctrine? Every man for himself can freely lie. But if several people testify about a public fact under the circumstances we have mentioned, their testimony becomes morally certain. If several people want to lie, they do not lie in the same way; each follows his particular ideas, his passions, his interest, as Tertullian already noted. (§ 27, IV.) But if they all agree, this is a proper proof that they speak the truth, which has triumphed over all these obstacles. If individual teachers have erred, they have deviated from the main article they swore to believe in the universal Church. It is impossible, however, that they could have drawn all the other teachers and congregations into error with them; the remaining teachers may now be scattered throughout the world or be together with the false teachers in a church assembly. [118] They would have to make them know that until then they had not believed what they really believed, they would have to be able to destroy the natural attachment that everyone has to remain with the religion in which he was brought up, they would have to make a few hundred bishops or teachers inclined to testify at once to something false against their convictions. And it is otherwise said that the priests and theologians are very contentious creatures who stubbornly stick to what they have once set their minds to. Can so many minds be broken and changed at once? Does it not require a miracle?

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When the Protestants left our Church community, it was much easier. There, everyone was left free to think as he wished. Here, on the other hand, all teachers would have to renounce what had hitherto been brought into their church and instead accept the opinion of another, without being given more freedom to think. III. But through tradition, lies about facts have spread, which have been generally believed. Therefore, one can never rely on them; for example, the false Decretals of Isidore, which were first accepted in France by Pope Nicholas I, then in Germany, and finally in the whole Church for several centuries. Very early, the so-called Canones apostolicos, the Apostles’ Creed, was issued as the work of the apostles. In later times, nothing more was needed than for a simple-minded monk [119] to invent a fictitious account about the heavenly origin and the descent of the scapular, the rosary, the Portiuncula indulgence,14 the vestments made in Heaven, religious habits and girdles, of stigmata, of the miraculous origin of Santa Maria Maggiore, of the translation of the House of Loreto, and so forth. If one of these tales was even included in the breviary and preached about diligently, it was believed so universally that clear-thinking men, who can no longer convince themselves to believe these things, even now often run the risk of being accused as freethinkers, or at least as doubters, and are often maltreated. In this way, the origin of many Catholic teachings in the Dark Ages can be understood, and how they could have become so universal that they are now presented as teachings dating back to the beginning of Christianity. This argument means by itself nothing. Or who allows the conclusion: There are fables, so there is no history? Second, the authenticity of the Bible can be disputed in the same way and is indeed disputed. One says: There would have been so many false gospels—the false Decretals were generally accepted as authentic for a long time. Consequently, it could have been the same with our alleged four genuine Gospels. So many false miracles are told in the Catholic Church. This could [120] probably easily be applied also to biblical accounts, etc. Now the Protestants reply: There are rules according to which one can examine the witnesses and their statements. One must adhere to these in order to 14. [On Mayr’s view on indulgences see Mayr, Die katholische Lehre von den Ablässen für die Verstorbenen . . . (s.l.: 1787).]



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distinguish truth from fiction. This is exactly what we say about the various traditions. In the following section, we will state the rules by which it can be determined with certainty which traditions are genuine and of divine origin, and which are not. If one examines all the narratives mentioned in the objection according to these rules, it will become apparent that they cannot be compared at all with the tradition we are talking about here. Whether they can still be true, by the way, must be decided according to the rules of common criticism, which will certainly break the staff over all of them. But that the belief in these things could do no harm to the infallibility of the Church, even if it were universal, we shall also show in the following §. IV. The bishops who gave testimony of the tradition in the councils were very often stupid, and what is more, wicked and passionate men. Through these impure channels the Word of God is said to have flowed to us, they are said to have been instruments of the Holy Spirit! In the councils, the simple-minded, whose number was always the greatest, were guided by their fellow bishops, whom they considered more skilled and learned. They often followed their pronouncements without understanding what the question was. Yes, they could not even sign their own names, [121] and had to appeal to others who, as can be assumed, would not have failed to increase the number of signers at their desire and need. The heads of the parties, which means the most devious, most eloquent, and most conniving bishops, who also had most influence on emperors and princes, understood well the art of presenting their private opinion as the doctrine of tradition, of drawing the simpler and pious fathers to their party, or dragging them away with by eloquence, disguise, threats, and force. Many an honest man who disagreed with them kept silent for fear of being maltreated or deposed. Who can expect therefore to learn the pure doctrine from general and ecumenical councils? This way, not only the opponents of revelation15 describe the fathers of the councils, but also a number of Protestants, especially Mr. Walch in his History of the Church Assemblies.16 15. Paul-Henri Thiry d’Holbach, Tableau des Saints, ou Examen de l’esprit, de la conduite, des maximes & du mérite des personnages que le christiannisme révère & propose pour modèles (London: 1770), 2:10. 16. [Mayr refers to Christian W. F. Walch, Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie

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I would just like to remind the reader that almost everything that is said here against tradition, could also be said against the authenticity of the Bible. And thus, one can answer what Protestants respond to the enemies of revelation. [122] After that, our opponents seem to confuse the concepts of sinlessness and infallibility in most of their objections. When some Catholics still asserted the infallibility of the pope, it was a very common argument: Shall the most godless popes in the tenth century, Gregory VII, Boniface VIII, Alexander VI, Leo X, Julius II, etc., also have been organs of the Holy Spirit? People who can make such objections truly do not understand what we teach. Infallibility is quite compatible with human frailty. We do not want to speak here of the infallibility that belongs to the Church because of the special support of the Holy Spirit. The bishops may be wicked, and if you like, also stupid, but can they not testify to what they have seen or heard? Can they not say what has been taught and believed in their particular churches? Must a historical witness, if he is to be believed, be of completely blameless character? Or if this can also be demanded of individual witnesses, does a unanimously attested fact become uncertain because there are ten scoundrels among the three hundred witnesses? Rather, one would conclude: this fact must be historically correct because witnesses are in complete agreement about it, who otherwise were blinded by so many passions, prejudices, and interests. These would have rather motivated them to make different statements, if the truth had not been clearly evident, [123] than that dared them to contradict this truth. Even if one assumes a special assistance of the Holy Spirit for the decisions of the councils, this can still exist together with the malice of bishops, for the infallibility promised to them is not a personal privilege, which God bestows on each bishop or pope in view of his merits and for his special benefit, but for the good of the whole Church, so that the Christians can be taught by their shepherds what they have to believe and do. To achieve this end, it was not at all necessary for God to make angels out of the bishops through a violent transformation. He left human nature der Kirchenversammlungen (Leipzig: 1759). Walch (1726–84) was a Protestant church historian and theologian in Göttingen.]



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as it was, with all its weaknesses and faults. Indeed, the teachers of the Church cannot really boast about this privilege, and never regard it as a personal privilege, because it sets narrow limits to their eagerness to distinguish themselves through their own insights. They may teach nothing but what they have received from their predecessors; they are only witnesses, and if they want to venture further, they must expect opposition from their subordinates and priests, loss of their office, and exclusion from the Church community. And such expectations do not please fiery heads and proud people who would like to do great things with their own wisdom. But let us follow the objection step by step. It is false that the bishops have very often been wicked, [124] passionate, and stupid. That some have been, no reasonable man will deny. At the Council of Nicaea there were some venerable men who had steadfastly confessed the faith during the time of persecution, and other excellent bishops. The people elected their leaders themselves, and there were also the strictest Church laws on how these elections should be conducted. Were these never taken into consideration? Did the people elect only scoundrels? The rest has already been answered. The simple were guided by the devious? Did the imperial delegates, who attended the conciliar meetings for the preservation of order, did the laity, who were mostly also present, admit this? Were the people equally satisfied when their bishops brought from the Church assembly a new doctrine home that was quite unknown to them? Were the bishops themselves so stupid that they did not even know what had been taught in their churches thus far? Yes, they couldn’t even write their name. That’s an accusation out of thin air. Where is the proof? That some bishops, who could not attend the synod because of age, weakness, or other business, sent procurators and had others sign for themselves surely cannot be cited as proof? Where is proof that the signatures were duplicated at will? [125] The cleverest ones asserted their opinion and carried away the others. One would think that all councils would have been like the robber synod at Ephesus. It did not matter in the conciliar meetings that one bishop forced his private opinion upon the others and disputed them all into the ground [sie alle zu Boden disputierte]. Everyone only

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had to testify to what had been taught in his church up to that point, and only according to this unanimous testimony, or according to the majority of the witnesses, was a decision made. V. In the councils, tradition often stood against tradition; indeed, one council rejected a doctrine according to tradition, which another council accepted on the testimony of tradition. Three hundred and eighteen bishops at Nicaea established the divinity of Christ, and six hundred bishops at Rimini rejected it. Thirteen part-provincial, part-general assemblies from 322 to 383 were against, and fifteen part-provincial, part-general Church assemblies from 323 to 368 for Arius. And only after several centuries, when one had argued enough, most bishops found it good and beneficial to the honor of Christianity if its founder was a God, and so the teaching of the Council of Nicaea received the upper hand. Tradition, then, is nothing but a wax nose that one can turn as needed. Who would want to accept it as a rule of faith?17 [126] A tradition that did not have the characteristics of a genuine tradition was cited against the genuine one, just as wrongly explained scriptures are cited against correctly explained ones; that is true. But never was a proven genuine tradition cited against another and contradicted it. In the Council of Rimini, where not six hundred but only four hundred bishops were present, the teaching of the Council of Nicaea was neither overturned nor contradicted. In the latter it was decided that the Son was of the same essence as the Father, and the Council Fathers used the word ὁμοούσιος to express this. At Rimini, not the opposite was confirmed—namely, that the Son was not the same being as the Father, not ὁμοούσιος, but a creature. Thus, the tradition of the Fathers of Nicaea does not contradict that of the Fathers at Rimini. In both formulas of this latter Church assembly, it is said: The Son is similar to the Father in everything—He is similar to the Father according to the Bible. Of course, this expression was not sufficient to contradict the error of Arius, for the expression like should have been used instead of similar; but it did not confirm or approve it either. The bishops were weak and short-sighted enough to be duped by the Arian bishops Ursacius and Valens; they allowed themselves to be frightened 17. D’Holbach, Tableau des Saints, 2:15.



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into signing a formula that was not sufficiently clear. But their opinion was not at all that they had approved of the heresy of Arius, [127] as they expressly declared when they were at liberty to do so. They were astonished that one now desired to make them Arians. And so, Jerome’s expression is to be understood: The world was astonished that it was now Arian, or should be. By the way, we would like to know of a general ecumenical council at which the opposite of the teaching of the Nicene doctrine was asserted! The whole history of the Church knows of none. Even the fifteen particular councils cited did not straightforwardly contradict the Nicene faith. The Fathers did not dare to say that the Son was not God. They only insisted that the word ὁμοούσιος should be suppressed under the apparent pretext that it could not be used to reintroduce Sabellianism. In this way they deceived many bishops into agreeing to the suppression of this word, even though they otherwise remained good Catholics. VI. Yet, Augustine himself says that often previous general Church meetings are improved by subsequent ones, when through experience one discovers what was unknown and hidden before.18 He cannot speak here of doctrines of the faith, as if new and previously unknown ones were discovered, of which the opposite would have been taught in the preceding councils, for since the Church no longer receives any new revelations, all teachings that are decided later must have always been there and believed. [128] Thus, he speaks only of particular incidents: a bishop may be condemned at one council and be absolved again in the following, or vice versa, because in the meantime his innocence or his crime has come to light. Yes, even a council that is considered ecumenical for some time can be rejected afterwards if an error is discovered due to which it could not be ecumenical. VII. Gregory of Nazianzus was of a quite different opinion about the tradition as it is made known by the general Church assemblies. He writes thus:19 “I, if I am to speak the truth, am of such a mind that I avoid every meeting of bishops, for I have not seen that one ever ended happily and cheerfully but increased and enlarged evil rather than abating it. For their obstinate quarrels and their arrogance cannot be 18. Augustine, De Baptismo contra Donatistas, bk. 2, ch. 3. 19. Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 55.

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sufficiently described in words, etc.” And in a poem, he compares the meetings of the bishops to gatherings of pheasants and geese that wage war with each other, where nothing but quarrels and revelations of hitherto concealed shameful deeds are heard, and mutual hatred of the parties arises. Gregory wrote about the year 377 and spoke of the meetings of the Arians. It was a tumultuous time and he himself was not spared from calamities. This could have made him averse to [129] such councils. Already at the second general Council at Constantinople, which he himself attended, things were calmer, and also at most of the other general assemblies. VIII. I was indeed ashamed in our times to mention those objections from Scripture from which one once wanted to prove that tradition could not be a rule of faith, because it is expressly forbidden to add to the word of God or to take away from it. It will be understood that we consider tradition itself to be the Word of God, and that it is not necessary to argue with us about addition, but about whether tradition is the Word of God. So let us only hear what is objected to in the second proposition, that tradition has always been regarded as a rule of faith. Tertullian says:20 “I adore the completeness—plenitudinem—of Scripture, which makes known to me the Creator and the creatures. . . . Hermogenes may also show that his opinion is written therein. If it is not written, he fears the punishment, which is promised to those who add to or take away from Scripture.” In another place21 he declares, “Take from the heretics what they have in common with the heathen, and let them prove their opinions from the scriptures. And they will not be able to stand.” And again, “What you adduce besides the scriptures I do not accept.”22 [130] In these three passages Tertullian does not speak of a divine tradition, but of a human, new, and invented one. Hermogenes added to the words: In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth the explanation: from matter, not from nothing. Of course, there was no tradition about this in the New Testament, and Tertullian rightly said: “I am 20. Tertullian, Contra Hermogenem, ch. 22. 21. Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, ch. 3. 22. Tertullian, De carne Christi, ch. 7.



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satisfied with the completeness of the scriptures, which do not know your new addition.” In the second passage he wants to say: “Neither pagans nor heretics know anything about the resurrection of the flesh. We know this doctrine from Scripture, which speaks of it explicitly and clearly. One must therefore reject human traditions that are contrary to Scripture.” In the third, he speaks against Apelles, who denied and asserted based on his own insight, without the support of Scripture and tradition, that Christ did not have a true human body. As soon as the scriptures clearly contain a doctrine, and someone refers to an opposing tradition, one must always answer him as Tertullian did, because the Word of God cannot contradict itself, whether it is written or unwritten. And in this way, one must also explain the other passages of the Church Fathers, when they say: One must only follow the scriptures, namely in the matter of which they speak, and which was clearly contained in the scriptures. For example, Origen in the first homily on Jeremiah, and Tract. 25. in Matt n. 18. since he himself elsewhere accepts tradition, Athanasius Orat. contra gentes & contra Appolinarius [131], Gregory the Great in Job. I. 23. c. 19. bk. 18. ch. 14. Eusebius advers. Sabell. lib. II. inter opera Sirmondi T. I. p. 18.20.28. Cyril of Jerusalem Cateches. ill. 4. p. 30.37. Basil in Ascet. Theophilus of Alexandria Epist. I. pasc. Jerome in several places, Cyril of Alexandria In Julianum libr. 7. Augustine bk. 2. de doctr. Christ. ch. 9. n. 14. and Tract. 49. in Joann. They assert the sufficiency of Scripture either in the matter at hand or in general, if it is only explained correctly, for which the surest way is tradition, or they reject human traditions that did not have the characteristics of a true tradition and were contrary to Scripture, which cannot be said of the tradition that we admit. How many objections the opponents would have spared themselves if they had understood what they were saying correctly, or if our theologians had expressed themselves more clearly? I do not accept any doctrine of faith that is not either clearly or obscurely expressed in Scripture. In the latter case, tradition is needed as an explainer, and also in the former case when some, out of malice or ignorance, distort the clear words of Scripture. In the appendix you will see how I explain myself about some doctrines that do not seem to be contained in Scripture.

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§ 30. To conclude this matter, I will cite and illuminate a passage from H. C. R. Rambach’s Notes on Sarpi’s History [132] of the Council of Trent, because I have this book in front of me. I could just as well cite any other polemical writing by a Protestant. For their arguments, and—with pain I say it—their biting and insulting style of writing is almost always the same as soon as they come to speak of a characteristic doctrine of the Catholics.23 Rambach wants to give the reasons why the Council of Trent granted traditions [sic!] an equal standing with the Bible, and writes thus:24 “First of all, because among the traditions there is one on which almost all others depend, namely that the pope is the successor of Peter and has therefore primacy over the universal Church. Since this is a tradition that has no support in Scripture, but rather Scripture speaking against it, carnal prudence required the pope to disparage Scripture and elevate the tradition on which his assumed primacy is based.” We have already shown that long before the Council of Trent, long before the popes had great influence on the decisions of the Church, even from the beginning of Christianity, tradition was accorded equal status with Scripture. Trent therefore introduced no new doctrine, and the motives given by Rambach are quite wrong. We do not want to get involved here at all in the question of whether the pope is entitled to primacy, and whether it cannot be proved from the Bible if he is entitled to it. [133] Yet, what must Protestants, who are not familiar with our system of faith, think when they read these uncharitable words that the pope has disparaged Scripture, while elevating tradition in its place? The Catholics are godless people, they will think, who take offense at the Bible and put human statutes in its place. Is this accusation well founded? The council itself says that one must accept the traditions pari pietatis adfectu, with the same reverence as the Bible; that is, one must 23. [Friedrich Eberhard Rambach (ed.), Paolo Sarpi—Historie des Tridentinischen Concilii mit des D. Courayer Anmerkungen, herausgegeben und mit einer Vorrede begleitet von Friedrich Eberhard Rambach, 6 vols. (Halle: 1761–65). Rambach (1708–75) was a widely read German Lutheran theologian.)] 24. Rambach, Historie, 55.



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not elevate tradition above the Bible. We place the unwritten Word of God next to, not above, the written word, or rather we say that the same Word of God has been preached that has also been written, and one as well as the other has always been preserved in the Church. If, however, a doctrine originated from God had never been written down but had only been propagated orally, and thus now had to be believed like the written word, the accusation would be unjust. When a Protestant interprets the Bible as best as he can, he does not disparage it, but trusts his own insights. We treat the scriptures much more respectfully and explain them according to tradition, to which we also attribute a divine origin, or we explain God’s Word from God’s Word. Does a judge disparage the laws who knows from the mouth of the lawgiver himself their true meaning and explains them according to this meaning? After all, Protestants would [134] like to say: Catholics consider tradition to be the word of God, and yet it is not. We wanted to answer them. But they should never accuse us of dishonoring, of disparaging the Bible. At most, such action would only be material if it were really true. “The Pope had a completely different power over tradition than over Scripture. It is true that he and his council have done enough wrong to it. But he cannot destroy it and melt it down; and even if he has preferred the Vulgate to the basic text (?),25 he must still leave the text alone, since it is in the hands of Jews as well as Christians. Yet, traditions he can handle quite differently. They are his creatures, which he can shape as he pleases, and the whole reputation they have in the Roman Church depends on him.” So the popes would really like to destroy the Bible, if only it were possible? This thought insinuates Rambach at least in inexperienced readers, especially those who have been introduced to the pope as the Antichrist since their youth. Yet, that is only a minor matter here, as is the edifying [sic!] accusation that the pope and his council have blasphemed Scripture. If a Reformed or Socinian interprets a passage of Scripture differently from a Lutheran or even if a Deist rejects all revelation, he is fraternally excused. We do not know the heart, it is said, we believe that they acted from conviction, [135] but if a Catholic, a 25. [This question mark is in the original text.]

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pope, a whole Church has the misfortune to give a passage a different interpretation from that which Rambach holds to be the true one, they commit sacrilege at once against the scriptures.26 To explain the Bible according to one’s insights does not mean sacrilege. Only a willful and deliberate distortion of the Bible is sacrilege. But how do we know that the Council of Trent willfully and deliberately distorted the scriptures? When will we finally be treated as fraternally as all others who are also considered to be in error? The main thing here is that the pope is supposed to have a completely different power over tradition than over the scriptures. A terrible power! He is allowed to explain the scriptures according to the tradition. If he can prove this tradition, he is believed. And if he cannot, no one is bound by his explanation. It would be quite different if the pope were allowed to invent traditions of which the whole Church knew nothing before him, and everyone had to believe his words, as is falsely claimed here. If one believes a papal explanation of Scripture, it is not because of him or because of his reputation, but because one knows from the testimony of the whole Church, which supports the explanation of the pope, that it is the true explanation given by Christ [136] and the apostles themselves. God is believed, not the pope. The true traditions are not creatures of the pope, but of God. From this can be explained why Cyprian opposed Pope Stephen, because the latter demanded according to tradition that the heretics should not be baptized again. He did not reject tradition itself, but the tradition to which Stephen referred, because he believed it to be unjust and merely human. And from this one can see whether the pope would dare to pretend to present a false tradition. “One will find few among the heaped-up heap of traditions only a few, which do not have reputation or interest of the pope in mind. Indulgences, purgatory, privileged altars, private mass, auricular confession, penitential taxes, dispensations, annates, jubilee feasts, etc., and a hundred other things (why not a thousand?) are all channels through which innumerable sums of money flow to the Roman court. Holy Scripture was not at all suitable for achieving this end, and the 26. I am sure that if a Lutheran Protestant had used this expression against a Reformed Christian, he would be reprimanded in all scholarly newspapers as intolerant. Against Catholics it is seemingly acceptable.



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pope had to create an unwritten word from which he could expect all these gains. Before the Council of Trent, the popes referred only to the traditions, but at Trent it was established that they were to be accepted together with Holy Scripture pari pietatis adfectu.” Special traditions of special teachings are none of my business. I speak only of the unanimous testimony of the whole Church that a doctrine has been revealed [137] by God. But which Catholic was ever so stupid as to assert that it was a doctrine revealed by God and attested by an unbroken tradition that one must pay the annates to Rome or send money there for dispensations? Who invoked tradition for the sake of privileged altars? Who has said that it is clear from tradition that Christ instituted jubilee feasts? These are all things that must not be subsumed under tradition. The doctrine of purgatory, of indulgences, of private Mass, and of auricular confession, if only explained correctly, can be proved from tradition as well as from Scripture. And I think that if they are explained correctly, all of them together should not earn the pope a penny. Therefore, even if the pope has misused the venerable tradition for his own interest, which is yet to be proven, he is not the originator and creator. It has always been there and has always had divine authority.

§ 31. Let us now briefly summarize the whole proof of tradition. Tradition is the unanimous testimony of the whole Church about the divine revelation of a doctrine. It is possible that such a testimony can exist because it contains neither an intrinsic nor an extrinsic contradiction, §§ 22, 23. It is also reasonable that God chose this way of propagating his revelation. § 25. There is really such a testimony [138] of the whole Church about the teachings of Christ and his apostles, or a tradition. It is historically and in the highest degree morally certain that this testimony was not falsified out of ignorance, malice, or any other accidental cause. § 27. This testimony has also been regarded as a rule of faith from the beginning of the Church. If, then, the scriptures are best interpreted by those who are acquainted with the terms and meaning of the authors, § 17, and it is best known to those who have heard the explanations

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from their authors, § 18, and these are the first Christians, and especially the teachers of the people established by the apostles, § 19, as well as those who adhere to their explanations, § 20, then it is certain that the safest interpreter of Scripture is the tradition that really exists. One can neither doubt the efficiency § 17–20, nor the truthfulness or sincerity of these witnesses § 27. Whether Christ and his apostles delivered a certain doctrine or not is a historical fact. Facts have the highest degree of moral certainty when the honesty and sincerity of the witnesses who testify on their behalf are beyond dispute, and especially when these witnesses are so numerous, never see each other, and agree on something among themselves that they could not be led to lie about by any common interest, when the witnesses are moreover men who occupy a public office and are ex officio bound by an oath to tell the truth. [139] Thus tradition explains Scripture with the meaning that the first authors associated with it, and consequently correctly, or at least not incorrectly.27 An explanation without error is an infallible explanation. Thus, Scripture is infallibly explained from tradition. This, then, is a proof of the infallibility of the Church, by which word I understand only the multitude of witnesses of all times and all places, on merely natural grounds, or from reason. It presupposes nothing but that Christ and his apostles presented the teachings of Christianity, and therefore presented them so that they might be understood, and that instead of them they again set up other teachers, and these again others, for the same purpose, which Holy Scripture regarded merely as historical witnesses, and history confirms. Thus, I cannot be reproached for making a circular proof of the infallibility of the Church from Scripture, but then the meaning of Scripture from the infallibility of the Church. This I call the natural infallibility of the Church; or if one prefers, a proof of the infallibility of the Church from reason. This proof is perfectly similar to that, or rather perfectly the same, which Protestants and all Christians use to prove the existence of a divine revelation, and of the Bible as a book of faith, as I have extensively proved in § 11, III. It must therefore be valid in both cases, or it is not valid at all. [140] I do not see, therefore, how a Christian who conse27. [“. . . und folglich richtig, oder sie fehlet nicht bey der Erklärung.”]



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quently admits a revelation can deny the infallibility of tradition according to my explanation, or better said, of the Church. Both points—that God has revealed something, and what he has revealed, must be proved from the same tradition. The infallibility of the Church has no other reason than any other moral certainty of a fact; for Christianity is a revealed religion, and revelation is a fact. Therefore, as with every other fact, one must prove its existence or that it really happened, or that Christ and his apostles revealed this and that. There are, however, irreproachable witnesses that establish this moral certainty. Another fact is that Jesus and his apostles were divine messengers, which again can only be proved for us by witnesses, since we have not seen their miracles ourselves, nor heard their prophecies. From the moral certainty of these two facts, it follows that God revealed certain teachings, and that we must believe them as the Word of God. It is very good to set up the proof in this way and present it on rational grounds, before one deduces the infallibility of the Church from biblical texts. From this both the opponents of revelation and Protestant theologians, who have made so much noise reviling and ridiculing the infallibility of the Church, can see that they have not even rightly understood the point in question [141] and that, even if this infallibility had no ground but the certainty of a human testimony about a fact, it would still be tasteless to reject it. Fortunately, however, the infallibility of the Church also has in its favor the testimony of Scripture, which can be correctly explained by the Church after its infallibility has been proven on grounds of reason. We shall prove this in a moment. However, we must first indicate the characteristics of a divine tradition, or of a tradition stemming from Christ and the apostles themselves, so that it may be known when infallibility takes place or when the testimony of the witnesses is reduced to a moral certainty. Nevertheless, no other restrictions can be placed on the credibility of the witnesses than the same Protestants themselves assume with respect to the witnesses of revelation in general. I will undoubtedly be reproached for having spoken too early of bishops, councils, and the Church, without even providing a definition of these terms. And if I had wanted to write according to the strict mathematical method, this reproach would certainly be justified. But

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since I did not want to go far without necessity and could presuppose among all my readers an approximate notion of what these words might mean among Catholics, I could not avoid showing in the meantime, at a distance, the use of those principles that I have [142] established. The definitions will follow soon enough in their place.

§ 32. A sure mark of revelation is that a doctrine has been transmitted as a revealed one at all times, everywhere, and by all. It is a common objection that one could not distinguish the genuine and divine tradition from a false one. One complains that the Council of Trent has established the authority [Ansehen] of the traditions but has not included a catalog listing them. Thus, it is said, one runs the risk of still getting new articles of faith as soon as it pleases the Church or the pope to refer to tradition. Let us see if these complaints are justified. The abovementioned characteristics of a true tradition are given by Vincent, a monk of Lerins, in his Commonitorium:28 “We should keep what has been believed everywhere, at all times, by all. . . . But this will happen if we follow universality, antiquity, and consensus. We shall follow universality if we accept that faith alone as the true one, to which the whole Church scattered through the world professes. We shall follow antiquity if we do not deviate [143] from those attitudes which are known to have been inherent in our holy forefathers and fathers. We shall follow the consensus if we assent to the declarations and opinions of all, or nearly all, bishops and teachers of antiquity.” All kinds of objections have been made against the reputation of Vincent. Mr. Walch calls his writing a polemical book, not without important errors.29 Mosheim30 even believes, because Vincent was a Semipelagian, that he invented this rule for the purpose of his error, because he did not know how to answer the passages that St. Augustine quoted from the letters of the Apostle Paul in any other way except by having recourse to a fictitious 28. Vincent of Lerins, Commonitorium, ch. 3. 29. Christian W. F. Walch, Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Ketzereien, Spaltungen und Religionstreitigkeiten bis auf die Zeit der Reformation (Leipzig: 1762), 1:45. 30. Mosheim, Streittheologie, 1:311.



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tradition. Whether or not I would like to accept the rule of Vincent with all the provisions that he gives of it, and thus the criticism Dallæus wages against it in De usu Patrum31, it is nevertheless certain that Vincent is not the inventor of the rule. Before him, Tertullian and Augustine had already used it; it is also the basis of all the passages of the Fathers cited in § 28, and the Church has always examined tradition according to it. St. Augustine writes in the third book against the Donatists, chapter 3: “What the whole Church [144] teaches, which has not been introduced by any council, but has always been retained, is rightly regarded as something that originated with the apostles themselves.” We have here the everywhere always, and all. A similar passage is lib. 3. de Bapt. c. 7. Tertullian’s words have already been cited in § 28. Mr. Walch, op. cit., deals with him quickly by dismissing Tertullian’s writing De praescriptione as a role model of bad polemics, because he gives tradition a decisive authority, which the Protestants do not like at all. These marks of a genuine tradition are precisely those which Protestants must accept without any hesitation, indeed must accept themselves, if they want to prove the existence of a revelation or the authenticity, integrity, and credibility of the New Testament. Thus, these marks must either be sufficient to distinguish the genuine tradition from the false one, or they are not sufficient to distinguish, for example, false writings from the genuine apostolic ones. We proved in vol. 2, part 2 § 167 the authenticity of the Gospel of Matthew32 from the testimony of Papias, Justinus, Tatian, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Ammonius, Origen, and Eusebius, just so as Doctor Less33 does. And so, we proceeded with the remaining writings of the New Testament. We did nothing else than to show that everyone everywhere has always [145] regarded the Gospel of Matthew as authentic. We proved that the Gospels came down to us 31. Jean Daill (Dallaeus), Joannis Dallaei De Usu Patrum Ad Ea Defi nienda Religionis Capita, quae sunt hodie Controversa (Geneva: 1686), 231. 32. Beda Mayr, Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion, vol. 2/2 (Augsburg: 1789), 213–23. 33. [Gottfried Less (1736–97) was an influential Lutheran theologian, whose apologetic work Beweis der Wahrheit der christlichen Religion (1768) was widely read also by Catholic scholars. His The Authenticity, Uncorrupted Preservation and Credibility of the New Testament (London: 1804) appeared in English translation.]

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unaltered, because they still contain what the Christians always found in them, because a general falsification was impossible, because all the old versions, citations, and commentaries agree with our present Gospels, § 174. But this was again nothing else than referring to the fact that all have always and everywhere had the same Gospels. In order to prove that we now still have the same doctrine that was preached by Christ and the apostles, or what is one thing, to prove that what is now taught comes from the apostles, we proceed in the same way. We show that the same doctrine has already been presented by the most prominent teachers of the Church, either in the church assemblies, or otherwise in writings, or in the teaching of the faithful, that the contrary doctrine has been rejected and its confessors excluded from the fellowship of the faithful. We show that Papias, Justinus, Tatian, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, etc., and later Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, etc., taught the same things that we teach. We show that a general falsification of the doctrine was impossible. Obviously, then, he who denies that the tradition is of divine origin, which has the three aforementioned qualities, overturns all evidence for the existence of a revelation. If all who everywhere and at all times accept a doctrine [146] for one revealed by God can be deceived, they can likewise be deceived if they accept the writings of the apostles as authentic, and whatever is used to defend the reputation of these latter witnesses can also be used by Catholics to prove the divine origin of their tradition. See § 26.

§ 33. These three characteristics of a tradition must be limited just as they are limited in the proof of the existence of a revelation. The first restriction is: In order to recognize whether something is considered by all to be a divine doctrine, it is not necessary that one knows from each individual church that it considered this doctrine to be revealed. It is enough that it is known of several and of the rest the opposite is not known, that the rest did not contradict when the greater part held a doctrine to be revealed; for it is indisputable that many writings of the ancients, in which a testimony to this doctrine



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could be found, have perished; and that the first Christians were more concerned to believe rightly and to live righteously than to record what they believed. They did this only on special occasions; for example, when a false teacher arose who presented something differently than they believed, or when a doctrine had to be explained in more detail for some other reason. Even in the first three centuries it was not possible to hold general conciliar meetings, and also [147] the following ones were mostly limited to the discussion of those doctrines about which there was a particular dispute at that time. It thus appears that the teachers of the Church, when a dispute arose over a doctrine, were unanimous in the explanation of it. We are forced to make a similar restriction regarding the proof of the existence of revelation, and we have also made it in vol. 2/2, p. 223,34 and in answer to the objections p. 245. One must be content with the citation of a few witnesses on behalf of the others, etc. The second restriction. Something can have been believed everywhere without being able to produce explicit proofs for its ubiquity. In the first three centuries, because of the persecutions, it was not possible for the particular churches to maintain fellowship with one another, much less, as we have just recalled, to convene a general Church assembly. One must therefore be satisfied if here and there a single witness appears who presents a doctrine, and then pay attention whether the individual churches, when this doctrine was either disputed or touched upon in a council, were unanimous. Then one may no longer doubt that they already believed this doctrine beforehand, and only did not explicitly express it because of a reason. One would find it unreasonable if the opponents of revelation demanded for the authenticity of each book of the New Testament explicit testimonies of the Church at Jerusalem [148], Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and all the other individual churches. You must be satisfied that we cite individual testimonies of individual churches and show that all the churches were in agreement about the Canon of the New Testament when the question about it was raised in the council. Third restriction. The word always also suffers a necessary limitation. 34. Beda Mayr, Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion, vol. 2/2 (Augsburg: 1789), 223.

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As it happened to some writings of the New Testament that they remained unknown to some churches for some time, and were only gradually accepted everywhere, so it could also happen to some teachings. Letters of the apostles were written to individual churches and could remain unknown to others who had no special connection with these individual churches, nor could they be in communication because of the situation of the Christians at that time. Therefore, their authenticity was doubted for some time. Thus, it was also possible that the apostles, or even their immediate successors who founded the churches, here and there found reason to be more specific about specific doctrines. In other places they stayed for a short time and were driven away again when they were only half done with the teaching. It could also happen that some of the leaders of the congregation forgot the teachings of the apostles again, mixed their own opinions with it, or presented it only incompletely due to negligence or died in the middle of the teaching, leaving behind a half-instructed congregation. This explains why a particular church often did not know a tradition [149] on which the other one was based, or protected an opposing tradition, as happened in the dispute over the baptism of heretics or the Easter feast. Just as individual Fathers either rejected some writings of the new covenant or doubted their authenticity, so it happened with some doctrines. Only when the leaders of individual churches came together or communicated the particular tradition of his church to the other, did it become apparent which writings and which teachings had or had not their origin from the apostles themselves. Therefore, it cannot be abused to dispute tradition that some churches, or Church Fathers, and scribes do not report some doctrines that we derive from revelation, or some explanations of Scripture, that others even assert the opposite, that some churches only later speak of a doctrine of which they seem to have known nothing earlier, or that for some doctrines one cannot always cite the testimony of the whole Church scattered throughout the world. The same restriction of all, everywhere, and all the time is just as readily accepted in the proof of the existence of a revelation. I must add another unavoidable restriction, or rather explain it better, because it is already contained in the general rule, and has only



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been disregarded due to the carelessness of some theologians. We have said that this is a revealed doctrine, which has always, everywhere, [150] and by all been taken for a revealed doctrine. What is also legitimized by the above three characteristics and is thus considered of apostolic origin, has always been observed by all, and everywhere, but has not been viewed as a doctrine made known by God without which one could not attain blessedness: such a practice cannot be claimed as a tradition, which the faithful are bound to accept because of the revelation, although they must still accept it because of the general use and commandment of the Church. An example is the mixing of water with wine at consecration. This usage has always, everywhere, and by all been observed, presumably by the apostles and by Christ himself according to the custom of the Jews. A priest who neglects this, even though he knew and remembered the rite, would undoubtedly sin, but would still consecrate validly. Furthermore, something can be taught generally in the Church now, without it therefore being taught by the Church as a doctrine at all times, everywhere, and by all. And this difference, I ask, should be quite well noted. It is quite different when theologians declare something to be certain and possibly even revealed, and again somewhat different when the Church itself says: “You must believe this if you do not want to lose your afterlife; God has revealed it.” [151] The Church has not appointed theologians, nor even individual bishops, as its administrators so that they generally determine for the faithful what they are to believe. This is only the right of the whole Church when it makes a pronouncement in general councils, or when the pope presents something as an article of faith, and the whole Church accepts it as an article of faith. Thus, all newer theologians can say: This is an article of faith. Their consensus does not constitute an article of faith if this truth has not been regarded as such from the tradition of all churches at all times and everywhere, or if the whole Church has not declared it to be an article of faith; for all theologians together are only individual men who, as people who may be versed in their science, have prejudices; each one has his own view and a limited knowledge of other reasons. One knows too well that they have said quite often: Hoc est de fide, haec decisio est

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fidei proxima.35 They are not the Church, and until the Church speaks, everyone can examine their reasons and see whether they have the universal tradition on their side. I will only say that some follow others, and their name only stands there, ut faciant numerum, so that they can parade among the number of theologians, but throughout their lives they have never read the Fathers or councils, or did not even have the opportunity to read them—just think of the libraries of the Mendicants and non-Mendicant monasteries before the invention of the printing press, the secular priests who wrote theological books, and then consider what sources [151] they were able to use—and then consider that others cannot cite a proof for their claims but simply shout: This is what the pope said in this and that bull, this is now to be generally believed. Consider this and then say whether the agreement of all theologians is sufficient proof that God has revealed something that they claim to be a truth of faith. Even the pope may present something to the Church— just not explicitly as a doctrine of faith—which the whole Church would have to follow, but what he has presented would still not be a doctrine of faith. It has been taught in the Church, but not by the Church. One must still consider whether the Church has always and everywhere unanimously taught in this way and regarded the point as a revealed doctrine. To give an example, take the doctrine of indulgences for the dead and the living. We know that the newer theologians have almost universally taught that indulgences also effect a remission of temporal punishment before God, and since 1477 it has also been believed that indulgences can be granted to the deceased per modum suffragii. There was no lack of people who accused those of heresy, or at least of the greatest impudence, who claimed the opposite of these two doctrines accepted by theologians. The authority [Ansehen] of the Church and the theologians was invoked. But the dispute was soon settled. If the Church no longer receives new revelations, and if that tradition is genuine that has always been accepted everywhere and by all [153] as revealed by God, then this very tradition speaks for the fact that indulgences can only be a remission of ecclesiastical punishments, but not a remission of temporal punishment before God. The latter doctrine has no testimony, at 35. [“This is de fide. This decision is fidei proxima.”]



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least no general one of antiquity, as not only the learned professor of canon law at Freiburg in Breisgau Joseph von Petzek,36 but before him also Wigand Kamper37and the famous Eusebius Amort38 have proven.39 If, then, theologians now almost universally teach that indulgences also extinguish temporal punishment before God, while the ancients maintained the opposite, and indeed, from the beginning of the Church indulgences were regarded only as a remission of ecclesiastical punishment; then without doubt, according to our rule, the younger doctrine must give way to the older, and since the Church decided nothing more at Trent than that they receive authority from God to grant indulgences, without determining what indulgences are, one must regard the newer doctrine as a doctrine that was indeed put forward in the Church, but not by the Church. Therefore, one can regard the old one as the true one, since it has always been accepted everywhere and by everyone and still exists, and because it has only been extended by popes and theologians in more recent times, but never officially rejected. In addition to the [154] newer doctrine, it was always believed that indulgences were also a remission of ecclesiastical punishment. The indulgences for the deceased are quite new. If they were now generally accepted, which is not so, this would again only be a doctrine in the Church, but not of the Church, a doctrine that has no old tradition in its favor, and therefore is not an article of faith. One sees from this what weight that well-known argument of the theologians has. Thus, the whole Church teaches, or believes, when things 36. Joseph Anton von Petzek, Untersuchung, ob der Kirchenablaß eine Nachlassung der göttlichen Strafe sey, und ob dessen Wirkung sich auf die Seelen der Verstorbenen erstrecke? (Freiburg: 1788). 37. Wigand Kamper, Historia indulgentiarum cum reflexionibus dogmaticis (Mainz: 1787). 38. Eusebius Amort, De Origine, Progressu, Valore, Ac Fructu Indulgentiarum, Nec Non De Dispositionibus Ad Eas Lucrandas Requisitis, Accurata Notitia Historica, Dogmatica, Polemica, Critica (Venice: 1738). 39. [This argument, however, leaves out the possibility of a development of doctrine, according to which the principle must have been antecedent but not the exact doctrine. Mayr’s view leads therefore to a static classicism in which antiquity is the unchangeable measuring stick for doctrine. Contemporary theologians have pointed to the problems of such a view; see for example Franz Xaver Bantle, Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche in Aufklärung und Romantik (Freiburg-Basel: Herder, 1976).]

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are spoken of that have only arisen in more recent times but are now generally accepted. The present generality decides nothing if it is not derived from the times of the apostles, and if a doctrine is now only accepted, but not claimed to be revealed.40 The Church is infallible only if it bears witness to what God has revealed. In all other cases, the name of the Church is misused. After all, it is no longer the Church that decides, but the theologians. Popes can present a doctrine, the other bishops can agree with it, it can be practiced in the Church without being regarded as a doctrine of faith, because it lacks the unanimous testimony of all times and places, according to which alone the doctrines of faith can be determined by the Church. Therefore, one cannot immediately say, “This is how the whole Church teaches or believes,” but only, “This is how it is taught or believed in the whole Church.” And between these two expressions there is an important difference. [155] What the Church teaches is an article of faith; what is taught in the Church may or may not be true, because the infallibility of the Church extends only to revealed truths. God can admit that the popes and all the individual bishops err in unrevealed things, without it being a disgrace to them, because they are outside the sphere of their infallibility, beyond which he has not promised them His assistance. Thus, God can admit that the pope canonizes a man and that he is venerated by the whole Church as a saint, without it becoming an article of faith that he is really holy. It is even possible that he is not; for the Church has no revelation that this man is holy, nor does it refer to any revelation. Thus, it may be generally believed in the Church that Mary was conceived without original sin, and yet it is not yet an article of faith.41 The Church, or the popes, and bishops themselves, declare this doctrine to be only a pious and godly opinion, not a revealed doctrine, and this is what they consider the faithful to be. Many strong reasons support the assumption that it is true, even if God did not find it necessary to reveal it. Yet, it could also be false without disgracing the Church; for the Church does not want to define anything in this matter, only popes and bishops state their opinions and do not declare themselves to be infallible. But he who himself 40. [An identical stance is taken by Jacques B. Bossuet’s (1627–1704) Histoire des variations des Eglises protestantes (1688).] 41. [This became a dogma in 1854 with Pius IX’s Ineffabilis Deus.]



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confesses that he can be mistaken, and only states his opinion, [156] has no shame from being mistaken. It would be quite another thing if the Church were to take the immaculate conception for a revealed truth and were thereby mistaken; then, there would be an obvious proof that God had abandoned his Church. But now one can admit that the Church errs in things that the Church itself does not regard as revealed, because this does not much damage to its reputation just as if the pope, with all the bishops, asserted that the sun moves and the earth stands still, or if they stated that the scapular was brought from Heaven to Simon Stock; for these are not matters to which its infallibility extends, or in the decision of which it claims to be infallible. But far be it from me to deny the immaculate conception of the Mother of our Savior [157] by what I have said thus far. My intention was only to show that one should not immediately invoke the reputation of the Church when something is now generally accepted and believed that has not been believed at all times, everywhere, and [158] by all, and is not even now claimed to be a doctrine of faith.42 42. But surely the Church bases public worship on this truth? For example, it ordered the celebration of the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Should God allow the Church to present a false object for veneration to the faithful? Would this not make it ridiculous in the eyes of its enemies? In general, the Church teaches only that the veneration of the saints is useful and praiseworthy, but not that it is necessary. Popes Sixtus III, Pius V, Gregory XV, Alexander VII, and Clement XI presented the feast not as of the Immaculate Conception, but of the Conception of the Immaculate Virgin to the faithful and thus not as a feast based on a certain and revealed truth of faith, but on a pious conviction. Thus, the popes did not speak in the person of Christ as teachers of the faith but made known to the faithful a godly doctrine. Nowhere did Jesus promise that he would prevent all error in godly opinions of the popes, bishops, and believers. Thus, without this being detrimental to the reputation of the Church, he can allow it to err. Incidentally, in Mary we always venerate Christ, [157] and celebrating the feast of the Immaculate Conception in the true theological sense means nothing other than remembering on this day a special grace that God, as is devoutly believed, bestowed on the most blessed Virgin. We cannot venerate the conception itself. And because we presuppose that God has decorated her with this grace, we find one more privilege to venerate her, and to test the infinite goodness of God, which has shown itself so graciously toward her. None of her devotees is of such a nature that he would not revere her and praise God in her if her conception had not been immaculate. The godly opinion is only another reason for doing so. This motive may or may not be true, but we venerate her and praise God in her, and thus the actual object of

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Since only that is an article of faith which the Church presents to us as such, and derives either from clear passages of Scripture, or from tradition according to the stated rule, one cannot count as rules of faith what the Fathers assembled in a general council touch upon only incidentally, or which they already presuppose without deciding it, or even what they cite as the motive for their decision.43 What they touch upon by chance is not the subject they are now examining and about which they want to gather tradition, but is only mentioned as an already known and accepted example. How can that become an article of faith that they themselves do not intend to decide, and which has not already been decided, merely because it is occasionally touched upon? Furthermore, if one presupposes something as certain, it does not follow that one necessarily regards it as a revealed truth. It can be presupposed either because it is already certain on grounds of reason or because it seems certain, or because something is held to be true according to general opinion. What is cited as the motive for the decision is still different from the object of the decision. It can happen that, in addition to true reasons for a decision, false ones are also cited, or less adequate ones. Thus, a doctrine of faith may be decided [159] because of unanimous tradition, and yet the supporting scriptural passage may not prove what it is supposed to prove. Because some theologians have argued for the necessity of confession in order to prove the text: Confess your sins to one another, the Fathers at Trent also used it for this purpose. But this does not make it an article of faith that must be understood in favor of auricular confession, and the doctrine veneration always remains real. I suppose that the false rumor spreads that all of Abyssinia had converted to the Catholic faith, or that the hereditary enemy of the Christian faith had been completely destroyed in a battle, and the pope decreed a general feast of thanksgiving for it. This motive of thanksgiving would be false. The thanksgiving itself would remain praiseworthy, and God could well allow the pope, all bishops, and believers to err in such a motive. But God could not admit that the Roman Pontiff, in a false cause, misused His name to unite the faithful in celebration of a feast that has no true object. . . . Why not? Did God prevent it when the popes, in the name of Jesus, and as they said, by virtue of the power given to St. Peter and to them by Christ, absolved subjects from the oath of allegiance, and bound all to avoid contact with their masters? 43. [See the same argument in Muratori, De Ingeniorum, lib. 1, c. 13, 122.]



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itself remains firm for other correct reasons. Thus, on the occasion of the twenty-third canon on justification, the same Fathers said that no one can avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout his life, except by the special grace of God, as the Church holds of the Blessed Virgin. The Fathers did not intend then to decide that Mary had never committed a sin; they only cited this opinion of the Church by way of example. Whether this is true must be proven by other reasons. The mere citation of the opinion in this canon does not make it a doctrine of faith.

§ 34. Answer to the objections. I. The stated characteristics of a genuine tradition vary greatly, for all the heretics of the earliest times have also referred to tradition. Consequently, these characteristics must belong to the false traditions as well as to the genuine ones, if there are any at all. Chemnitz44 says that the old heretics always had tradition on their lips.45 Papias, [160] in order to confirm his millennial kingdom, pretended to have a tradition that came from the Apostle John. Marcion had heard his heresy from the teaching disciples of St. Matthew. Artemon, Polycrates, and the Anabaptists all hid behind tradition. It was the Pandora’s box from which all superstitions, all abuses in the Church emerged. It does not depend on referencing sources. Otherwise, one would also have to reject the scriptures, because heretics referred to the Bible just as well as to tradition for the sake of defending their errors. And from the reference itself it is evident, as I will only remind you here in passing, that at that time the orthodox must also have regarded tradition as a rule of faith. Otherwise, the heretics would have acted extremely unreasonably if they had wanted to prove their teachings 44. [Martin Chemnitz (1522–86) was one of the most important German Lutheran theologians of the Early Modern Period. His Loci Theologici (1591) gave Protestant theology a methodological grounding. In polemical theology his Examen Concilii Tridentini (1574) was widely influential and set the tone for how Lutherans read the conciliar documents for the next two hundred years.] 45. Martin Chemnitz, Examen Concilii Tridentini (Frankfurt: 1606), vol. 1, pt. I, “de traditionibus,” 109ff.

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from a principle of which they knew beforehand had no authority among the orthodox. Furthermore, our opponents should realize that this argument could be used against them with just as much force. The heretics also appealed to false gospels that they themselves had forged, and to other sabotaged writings. Is therefore a proof from the New Testament shaky? They will not admit this but say that only those Gospels and writings are genuine which have been accepted at all times, everywhere, and by all—with the necessary restrictions of these three terms. This is exactly what we say about the traditions. Their authenticity or illegitimacy [161] must be determined according to the same characteristics. And because the heretics referred to such a tradition, which was not general in the above sense, or was not accepted at all times, everywhere, and by all, the Church did not care. No abuse has ever crept into the Church through genuine tradition, only through unlawful tradition;46 or at least no such abuse that would have damaged the essence of Christianity. And for the legitimization of these abuses, one has also referred to the scriptures. Yet, Christ never promised that no abuse would be able to creep into the Church. He only protects it from harmful errors. II. Even with the help of these characteristics, it is still very difficult to distinguish the genuine tradition from the false one. One would have to search through all the writings of the Church Fathers and scribes, all the monuments of the ancient Christians, consult all the churches, and then weigh strictly whether all of them are in complete agreement with each other on the same point; this requires a very extensive and, for most, impossible task. How much do Protestants have it? They have a single book, the Bible, which is always at hand, and gives information to anyone who is eager for doctrine, as he requires it. [162] In order to have a reassuring knowledge of tradition, there is no need for all these elaborations. We will present below a short proof, comprehensible to scholars and common people, by which they can easily know which tradition is genuine and which is not. But if one wants to acquire scholarly knowledge of tradition, then one must of 46. I do not want to move away from the main point of our dispute here, and thus admit without further ado to the Protestants that we have abuses that are based on illegitimate traditions.



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course put up with these difficult investigations. Yet, the scholar also has this work to do if he wants to prove the authenticity, integrity, and credibility of the Bible, as can be seen from vol. 2/2.47 We do not deny that in some points it is difficult to decide which tradition is authentic or not. That is why there are so many school disputes among us, which the Church leaves undecided, and must leave undecided, because there is no unanimity of tradition about them, and for this very reason it is rightly concluded that it has not pleased God to instruct us more clearly about these points. However, there are passages in the Bible about whose true meaning one can only make conjectures, and even these are very difficult to determine. God did not find it necessary for our souls to have this meaning preserved for us as well, which in certain times must have been quite clear and useful to the readers. In the meantime, those who want to examine the tradition according to the given rule have already been prepared. Special Church assemblies have been held, [163] in which individual bishops have presented the teachings of their churches. We have had several general councils, from which it can be seen what the whole Church has taught up to its time. Finally, I do not know whether the Protestants can boast of their very simple path to the knowledge of truth. Of course, the Bible is only one book; but it is also capable of several interpretations, and each party puts forward its own. The unlearned, even the learned, as long as he does not have a certain assurance that he has explained the text correctly, is in a sad situation. After all, he can never really have full assurance to calm his heart, as long as he lacks an infallible interpreter of the Bible, as I have already sufficiently shown. III. But why did the Council of Trent, since it made tradition equal to the Bible, not also immediately add a catalog of the traditions that have to be believed so that one does not lose Heaven? This is asked by Molinaeus, according to Sarpi.48 Is it not to be feared that the Church will still come forth with new doctrines that are beneficial only to its interests? The first question is just as if I wanted to ask: Why did the apostles not publish a catechism of all the necessary doctrines of faith, so that 47. Mayr, Vertheidigung, vol. 2/2:191–374. 48. Rambach (ed.), Paolo Sarpi—Historie des Tridentinischen Concilii, vol. 2, part 2.

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every Christian could see at once what one has to believe and do? Why have they left it either to the Church, as we do, or to the faithful, as the Protestants say, to collect the necessary doctrines of faith from the Bible itself, even [164] at the risk of error? What the Protestants answer to this, we also answer; for tradition is the same divine word as the Bible. If one can ask the Church about every doubt, a catalog is of no particular use. In addition, we have our symbolic scriptures,49 in which it is already determined, especially in the Tridentine itself, what we have to believe and do. But is it not to be feared that the Church will still establish new doctrines through tradition? No, there is no new doctrine that has not already been presented by Christ and the apostles, and has been believed everywhere, at all times, and by all. Only if someone were to deny it, then would happen what has always been done: the Church would collect this tradition and present it, and if it did not do this, but only wanted to say: “You must believe it!”, then no one would be bound to obey it. I say that this has always been done; for every bishop who signed a decision at an ecumenical council acted as a witness to the doctrine of his Church, and consequently all together acted in the name of the whole Church, which they presented. Even if a pope decided something as a doctrine of faith, and this news reached all the bishops, of whom none contradicted it but rather accepted this decision, then their witnesses confirmed that their tradition was in accordance with the tradition of the Roman Church. One has therefore not at all to be afraid of new [165] decisions based on tradition. If they have the tradition of the whole Church in their favor, they are not new and must be believed, because it is morally certain in the highest degree that Christ and the apostles taught precisely what tradition testifies. If tradition does not back them, they will never be accepted as a rule of faith, or rather never be presented as an article of faith. I would have much more to say about tradition, but I would rather postpone it until later, when I will show which church is the infallible one and what limits its infallibility has. In any case, because of our opponents, I found myself compelled to speak of conciliar churches and popes already here. 49. [Creedal documents.]

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Infallibility of the Judge of Faith from Revelation § 35. The infallibility of the Church founded by Christ can also be proven from revelation. I am now approaching my purpose and must first give a clear and definite concept of infallibility. Infallibility may be considered in two respects, either in regard to all the faithful in general, or especially in regard to the teachers of the Church, or the bishops. As regards all [166] believers, we say that they shall always retain those doctrines that have been delivered by Christ and his apostles. With regard to the teachers, we say that they have received a special privilege from God, or that Christ has promised them a special assistance of the Holy Spirit, by virtue of which they can all together without danger of error always teach what Christ and his apostles have taught and can teach nothing that is contrary to this. More briefly, one can say that the whole Church can never believe erroneously, and its teachers can never teach erroneously. So here we pay no attention either to individual teachers or to individual members of the Church. They can teach something different, and they can believe something different, than what Christ and his apostles taught, but never all teachers together, never all believers together. The privilege is not personal but is given to the whole Church. From what we shall say hereafter, when we determine which church is the infallible one, it will also follow that this privilege belongs to a visible, not an invisible church.

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I. The way of authority is the only one that God has chosen in the different epochs of revelation to instruct men, the only one that is the most suitable for all men. Reason develops slowly in us, and only after several years of childhood; it is also sufficiently cultivated [167] in the fewest, and can be cultivated enough in the fewest, that even in a matter so necessary and at the same time so difficult as the choice of a religion, they could make the necessary investigations. The worries about food, because man must eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, take away so much of a person’s time that he could never do without outside instruction. But if he needs such instruction, he must be able to rely with certainty that he will be given the religious instruction that God himself approves. Yet, he cannot do this unless God himself has appointed those who teach him to be his teachers and has provided them with such marks from which one can conclude with certainty that they are really teachers appointed by God. We will take up the thread of this proof later. Meanwhile, we want to confirm what has just been said in another way. The doctrine that God presents to us to believe is a revealed doctrine, and not always clear and comprehensible. Neither the learned nor the unlearned has enough ability to examine it. The result would always be: I do not understand it. All that can be done is to examine whether it is revealed. This I recognize not only from the Bible itself. For no scripture proves by itself, but by external testimony. I therefore need witnesses who tell me that God has revealed something; namely, that which is written in the Bible, or which is verbally conveyed to me by these witnesses. If it is certain that God has revealed this or that doctrine, it must be true; [168] but not vice versa, if it is true, it must also be revealed. If a doctrine is true and revealed, God must have distinguished the witnesses of the revelation by such marks that one can rely on them without danger of error and know for certain that they are witnesses established by God. For as in human facts the unanimity of the witnesses conveys to their testimony a human infallibility, and the highest degree of moral certainty; the same is the case with divine facts, or in revelation: the unanimity of the witnesses established by God himself must give their testimony a divine, if I may say so, and supernatural infallibility. Now we continue the proof from above.



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The mission of Jesus and his apostles has been proven by miracles and by the happy success of their preaching. The apostles are called messengers of Jesus Christ, and they have raised up other messengers to continue their teaching ministry: “We are from God,” says John.1 He who knows God hears us. He who is not of God does not hear us. This is how we distinguish between the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. The mission of the apostles still had to be proven by miracles, because they had happened in the land of the Jews before without witnesses, and Jesus was no longer on earth, who could have confirmed that he had sent them. The sending of the successors of the apostles was done by them publicly before the churches, [169] and therefore no longer needed miracles to be proved. Yes, these first shepherds exercised their teaching ministry under the eyes of the apostles, in the midst of the congregations that had been established by the apostles themselves. And from that time on, the teachers were always appointed by other already sufficiently certified teachers and received by the congregations as such, who had their authority from the apostles through a legitimate mission. The mission of these teachers is divine in its origin and will always continue to be divine as long as their succession is not interrupted. A teacher who has received his divine mission in the presence of the Church can send another in this way, and must send him in this way, because the teaching office must last as long as the Church lasts, as long as the knowledge of pure doctrine will be necessary to men until the end of the world.2 The testimony of the teachers for a doctrine is therefore no longer a merely human, but a divine testimony, divine in its origin—from Christ, and the apostles, who were divine messengers and who communicated their mission to others as it was given to them. Their successors are divine messengers like them. Likewise divine is the continuation, or what is one, the teachers of the Church are witnesses of revelation established by God Himself, and their testimony is therefore infallible. [170] One might freely object here that every apostle was infallible on his own. But every teacher was not, even according to our opinion. 1. 1 John 4:6. 2. Bergier, Traité historique, 10:511–16.

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Therefore, there would be a noticeable difference between the mission of the apostles and that of the teachers, and one should not rely so much on the testimony of the latter. I answer, however, that not every apostle would have been infallible by virtue of his mission alone, and that their personal infallibility was only granted to them by a special privilege, because otherwise they would not have been able to fulfill their teaching office in the circumstances of that time. It was just as necessary for them as the gift of working miracles, which also did not pass to their successors in the teaching office as a personal privilege. The apostles, since they could give no other testimony of their mission, had to be able to work miracles. They also needed the direct assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that they could teach nothing else than what Christ had taught. Who could otherwise rely on their teachings, since they were mostly simple-minded people, and were also suspected of not having understood everything that Christ had said, as can be seen from what happened to them before the death of their teacher. Since they also went out into all the world to preach the gospel and founded individual churches that had no close connection with each other, [171] it was not so easy for the believers to inquire from other churches whether the same things were being taught everywhere and by everyone. It was therefore necessary that each had the direct assistance of the Holy Spirit, who taught them all truths, and that they legitimized themselves by miracles as divine messengers. Indeed, if they themselves had doubted whether this or that was revealed, it would not have been possible for them, during their dispersion through the world, to seek counsel from other apostles, if they had lacked the direct assistance of the Holy Spirit. But once the teachers appointed by the apostles were established in the face of the Church, they no longer needed new miracles for legitimation, and the purity of the doctrine was already ensured by the sufficient dissemination of it throughout the then known world that it could no longer be generally falsified, and even more by a special vigilance of our Savior Himself, which, as we will see in a moment, was promised to the Church. So, neither the gift to work miracles nor their personal infallibility had to be passed on to each of their individual successors, because God does not effect by miracles what he can just as easily obtain by a shorter and natural way.



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II. Even if we had no special promise of the Savior for the infallibility of the Church, it could be proved. The nature of the issue itself required that Jesus made His Church infallible, and success has shown that he really did it. It was impossible that his teachings, which set such displeasing limits to the folly and curiosity of men and are so contrary to the inclinations of [172] the human heart, would not attract constant attacks, secret distortions, and open denials. Without the special care and vigilance of its founder, this teaching could not have been preserved in its purity, and if it had been generally falsified, the ultimate purpose of Jesus’ divine mission would also have been thwarted. The whole history of the Church is nothing but a narrative of these perpetual battles against his teachings. How could it not have been defeated, not completely destroyed, if the hand that built the Christian religious edifice had not also protected it from complete overthrow? What would have become of the mission of Jesus, of the so-laborious planting of the gospel, if philosophy with the retinue of all human passions had achieved its purpose of destroying the Christian doctrine, which it had always intended, still has, and will always have? But Jesus has already made this impossible by the establishment of his Church. He built the continuity of his teaching on the general tradition, on the highest moral certainty of human testimony. The stubbornness of the philosophers, however, has never wanted to submit to this law and has always opposed the plan of divine wisdom. Nevertheless, it has continued for eighteen hundred years. This is not a work of man, but a miracle of God’s special providence. As the mission to preach the gospel is divine, so this gospel [173] and the Church are sustained only by the special providence of God. Yes, one will say, the Church preserves the teachings of Jesus through a special support of God, but the Church and the teachings are no longer pure; they are mixed with the doctrines of men and superstitions. God’s special providence is expressed only in the preservation of the Bible, through which alone the purity of the first doctrine of Christ can be restored. We need to remember the old presupposition that the Bible alone is sufficiently clear and distinct for all and that everyone, without needing infallible instruction, can draw from it the genuine system of faith

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preached by Christ. If this premise is not true, and if the pure doctrine has been falsified in the visible Church, then it is only by chance that it is restored from the Bible; for the supposed restorers can be just as mistaken as their predecessors, who have corrupted the pure doctrine. And should God have let [salvation] depend only on an approximation, how would the doctrine of His Son, planted with so much effort, survive? Should He not have made a permanent arrangement so that it would always have to be preserved and could be recognized by everyone with certainty? But we have shown enough that the whole premise is false (§ 12). God [174] therefore had to arrange it himself that not only the Bible, but also its authentic explanation, in so far as it is necessary for the knowledge of the doctrine preached by Christ, should always be preserved; consequently that the Church, as well as its doctrine, should remain pure. For this purpose, no means was sufficient other than to attribute to the teachers an infallible authority, if he did not want to send new messengers just as often as errors broke out, and to authorize them by new miracles. Therefore, the infallibility of the teachers must be arranged by God Himself. III. From this, too, it appears that God has a special reason for the infallibility of His Church, in that he has always preserved in it two qualities to which all other churches that emanate from it have never made a claim, but to which it has made a very strong claim. It is easy to prove that these qualities belong to it alone, and to no other church. I will name these first. The first is catholicity, or universality of doctrine. The word catholicity has often been understood to mean only a society of believers spread throughout the world. In this sense, however, the Protestant religion would boast of this advantage just as much as the Catholic religion. The Catholic Church is a society that accepts no doctrine other than the doctrine of Jesus Christ, the universal doctrine, or that which all churches in union with the Roman Pontiff profess and regards this very uniformity of doctrine as the only mark of truth, antiquity, and apostolic origin. Already in the times of Irenaeus and Tertullian, those teachings were rejected as false that did not [175] have the tradition of the churches founded by the apostles on their side, and it is known that this is still the peculiar character of our Church to refer to the generality of doctrine. But no congregation separated from our



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Church, with the exception of the heretics of the first times,3 has ever claimed this privilege. All these congregations reject, and rather abhor, this universality of doctrine. By renouncing the title of being confessors of the Catholic religion, they also deprive themselves of the essential characteristic of Christ’s teaching. All non-Catholics base their faith on biblical passages, which they explain according to their own insights. In this way they get almost as many different religions as there are heads, and no universal one. All of them claim that we build our religion on a mere human reputation, because we base it on tradition, and do not see that their scriptural explanation is nothing but a human fallible explanation. The second quality is the divine mission of the teachers. That our Church has always boasted of this can be seen from the passages of Irenaeus and Tertullian, which have been cited (§28, II and III), and how we still refer to it has been shown in this §1. Of course, the Protestants would also like to appropriate this advantage. But they absolutely cannot. If they want [176] to arrogate to themselves no other right than that which every man has to teach others according to his own insights, they must not reckon themselves among those who were sent forth with the same authority by the apostles or their lawful successors as these were by Christ. This authority obviously says more than communicating his insights to others. They must be witnesses of what they have seen and heard, shepherds whom Christ has set up to govern the Church of God, having the power to loosen and bind. If they want to be special divine messengers, they must prove their mission. As soon as they teach something different from the Church from which they came, one has the right to ask them: Who sent you? A layman cannot have the ordinary mission; from the times of the apostles only legitimately established teachers have communicated to other teachers. Just as little can the authorities give him what they themselves do not have. If he was previously a legally appointed teacher of the Church, he lost his mission precisely because he used it against the order established by the apostles and always observed by the Church. And since he accuses the 3. They referred to the tradition, but not to a general one. They wanted to have a special one, which had only been communicated to a few by the apostles and had been silently transmitted to them.

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Church of error, he himself admits that it does not have the right to give a valid mission, and the Church certainly did not give it to him so that he could teach against it. He must therefore prove that he has received an extraordinary mission, like the apostles. And he can never do that. [177] These two characteristics—the confession of the universal doctrine and the derivation of the mission of their teachers from the apostles, to which Catholics always referred, and to which their opponents always rejected the first and cannot appropriate the second—are again a striking proof that Jesus always distinguished his Church and made it recognizable. But why, if those who wanted to enter it did not find truth and pure doctrine in it? That would rather have been a means of plunging them into error. Yet such is hardly imaginable of such a kind and wise teacher. Instead, we must conclude that he kept that Church pure in doctrine, which, by these two conspicuous advantages, of which no other community could boast, attracted the eyes of all those eager for doctrine, at least of those who sought the natural and shortest way to the truth. And this way has meant always that the Church must be the true one which has moral certainty on its side since it has preserved the pure teaching of Christ. And this moral certainty is based on the universality of its doctrine and on its mission to teach, which derives from the apostles. IV. There are passages in Scripture that, taken as they stand, contain in their natural sense, without any doubt, either a promise of Christ that his Church will be infallible, or say outright that it is so. Only for the sake of the system once chosen did one fall into unnatural [178] and extremely forced interpretations. These passages have also been understood by tradition, or the naturally infallible Church (§ 31) at all times and everywhere, as the infallibility of the Church. And because this Church, whose infallibility is already certain on grounds of reason, is also the infallible interpreter of Scripture (ibid.), its explanation must also be true, and the infallibility of the Church must be demonstrable from revelation. In Mt 28: 19.20 Christ tells His disciples: “Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have always commanded you: And behold, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.” Mi-



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chaelis translates μαθητεύσατε with make disciples of all the Gentiles. According to the Greek text it is correct that here the expression, until the end of the world, does not mean until the outermost borders of the earth, but until the last day, until the time of the fall of this world. And so those who are addressed here, and whom Christ gives this promise, cannot be the disciples of the Savior alone, who could not remain alive until then, but must include their successors in the teaching office, who also have to teach the nations to keep everything that Christ has commanded, and also all those who would believe through the word of the apostles. The I am with you does not mean bodily presence, but a presence of love, [179] provision, help, and protection of Christ, of which his disciples, as long as the world stands, may take comfort, says again Michaelis.4 All this I admit. Yet one can still ask, of what does this care actually consist? Whether Jesus promised nothing more than that he would strengthen his disciples in their preaching ministry so that they would not be defeated, or whether he also promised them and their successors the support that they would never err in the presentation of his teaching, or whether he promised the whole Church the preservation of pure doctrine? If one merely adheres to the text without preconceived ideas, this question is quickly decided. Jesus promises the disciples his support on the occasion of them being sent out to preach. Thus, it extends to their mission. This support can be twofold; either that they can present his teaching unadulterated, or that they can more easily overcome the difficulties that are connected with preaching. The former assistance, as it seems, could not be promised to them further because Jesus had already promised it to them before. However, since this promise did not apply to the apostles alone, but also to their successors in the teaching office, or to all his disciples, this support must also be included if he promised it. And he has promised it. With regard to the preaching of the gospel, [180] the most important thing was that no one was mistaken in proclaiming and accepting his teaching. Otherwise, the final purpose for which the Magisterium [Lehramt] was instituted would have been defeated. The assistance in adversities in 4. Johann David Michaelis, Erklärung der Begräbnis- und Auferstehungsgeschichte Christi nach den vier Evangelisten mit Rücksicht auf die in den Fragmenten gemachten Einwürfe und deren Beantwortung (Halle: 1783), 349.

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general was promised to those who began to preach the gospel long ago. Nothing is more natural than what Jesus said with these words: Go, preach, I will be with you, not only so that you will not be subject to the hardships of the preaching ministry, but also that you will always present the pure teaching of the Gospels. And because Christians must believe what infallible teachers present to them, these words also mean that this support will have the effect that the Church will never fall into error. Thus, a double infallibility is promised here—namely, that the teachers will always teach correctly and the faithful will believe correctly. How tradition has understood this text, we will show hereafter. Mt 16, 18: You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell will not overcome it. Again, I say that this passage is a promise of the infallibility of the Church. Jesus promises that the Church he builds on the rock, which may be himself, or his teaching, or Peter (which is not the point here), will not be overcome by Hell; that is, it will never cease but always continue. Yet while a church that deviates from his [181] teaching could still call itself the church of Christ, it would no longer be the Church he founded, for different forms of teaching also give rise to different churches. Therefore, if his Church is not to be overpowered by Hell, it must always retain his teaching. If this is so, it never errs in doctrine, and is therefore infallible. And because this infallibility comes about through the powerful promise of Christ, the Church is infallible according to revelation. The Protestants have taken a lot of trouble to destroy the evidential value of this passage. I will list the interpretations that are known to me, so that one can see how unnatural and forced they all are. 1. This passage can be explained in such a way that the word αὐτῆς refers to the rock and not to the Church. This would mean that the gates of Hell will not overcome the rock, and the Church could therefore still be missing, as a house built on a rock can collapse without the rock suffering. This is how Hilary, Leo the Great, and even the Council of Trent, Session 3, have explained it. In the end, it is not important whether this αὐτῆς refers to the rock or to the Church. The rock is nobody other than Christ, Peter, or the confession of Peter. Christ built his Church on a rock only so that



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it, like the rock, would last until the end of the world and the gates of Hell would not overpower it. Christ was on earth only because of the Church; Peter was [182] elected head only because of the Church; Peter’s confession was to become the confession of the Church. Since the continuance of the rock is promised here, which only exists because of the Church, the continuance of the Church is also promised for this very reason. The comparison with a material house built on a rock does not fit here at all. The rock is not there for the sake of the house, as it is for the Church. The house can therefore crumble, and yet the rock can continue. But if the Church founded by Christ continues until the end of the world, then his religion must have also preserved the pure religion [Religion], because a church with another religion would no longer be the Church he founded. 2. Although it is said of the Church that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it, it may nevertheless fall into error for some time without contradicting this promise, if only it is cleansed of this error afterwards, as it really happened at the time of the Reformation, and still happens.5 After all, it has deviated from its primeval holiness. Another is that the gates of Hell will never completely overpower the Church; another is that they will not introduce any error into it. Christ promised the former, not the latter. The Church can fall into error, but error can never affect the reason for salvation. The Church is no longer the Church that Christ founded as soon as it falsifies a single revealed teaching. But if this Church has ceased, it has obviously been overcome by Hell, and the [183] promise of the Savior has not been fulfilled. Individual members may well deviate from holiness, just as they may also fall into error, but the doctrine of the Church must always remain unadulteratedly Christian and holy. The Church is nothing other than a society of people who outwardly profess to believe what Christ has prescribed. If their inward faith agrees with this confession, so much the better. If it is otherwise, they are hypocrites. If they live according to this faith and adjust their worship of God accordingly, they are holy Christians; if they believe differently and live differently, 5. [This statement suggests that Mayr believes in the continuing reform of the Church, an ecclesia semper reformanda, although the term was not used in Catholic theology until the twentieth century.]

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they are false Christians. God has not promised to bind man’s free will and prevent him from deviating inwardly from the faith and outwardly from the precepts of the faith. But he has promised by the above words that the society of men who will profess the doctrine revealed by him shall continue until the end of the world. It is therefore of no use to say that the true Church has always lasted, because there have always been witnesses of truth who more or less contradicted the false doctrines of the Church; for, first of all, one cannot put forward a single so-called witness of truth who contradicted the Church, and who himself did not fall into any error. Even the Protestants cannot approve all the teachings of the Albigensians, Waldensians, Hussites, or Wycliffites, whom they nevertheless count among the witnesses of truth. Since neither this nor any other church community [184] was free from all errors of faith according to their pretensions, the church has really been overwhelmed by Hell. Now you could assume an invisible church that has kept itself pure from all false teachers. But where was it? And how does it prove its rightful descent from the apostles, which is only put beyond doubt by the fact that what it teaches has been taught at all times, by all, and everywhere? This necessarily presupposes a visible society. 3. The promise of Christ is only conditional. The gates of Hell will not overpower the Church if it remains on the rock on which it is built and does not tear itself away from it by any error. Then Christ would have said: the Church will not fall into error if it does not deviate from my teaching; or in other words, if it does not fall into error? And why would it be necessary to build the Church on a rock if the Savior’s speech was only conditional? He would have said: If you hold to my teaching, you will not err—a thing every Christian knows anyway. Yet he says: I will build my Church on this rock—he speaks of an arrangement that he will make so that the Church will always stand firm, not of a condition. 4. This promise only applies to the Church in the times of the apostles. Hell did not harm the early Church, but it did harm the later Church. [185] As if Christ had founded his Church only for about sixty years and had not promised the apostles to be with them until the end of the world—that is, as we have explained, also with their successors.



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5. This promise applies to the whole Church of Christ, or his whole body at the same time, and therefore also includes the triumphant Church, which, of course, Hell can no longer harm, even if the pilgrim Church on earth is overcome. Yet why was it then necessary to found the Church on a rock? Why even a promise? Did it occur to anyone that the devil could still turn the saints in Heaven away from the faith? 6. The word Ἅιδης for Hell can also only express the state of death, as is often the case in Scripture, Acts 2: 27, 31; 1 Cor 15: 55, Rev 6: 8, Is 38: 10, Ps 118: 18. Thus, this passage means that the Church will not be killed by the persecutions and will not be completely destroyed. Without getting into a side argument about the meaning of this word in this passage, I accept what our opponents want. Thus, the Church continued in the time of persecutions, and as persecutions never cease, will the promise of Christ never cease either? Good. The Church of Christ cannot be thought of without the teaching that Christ has presented, as I have said and proved often enough. If, therefore, in this passage the Church is promised its continuance during persecutions, [186] among which those against doctrine are the most dreadful, the continuance of pure doctrine, or infallibility, is also promised. 7. These words of Christ contain a prophecy. Therefore, their meaning cannot be determined until the fulfillment is certain. History shows, however, that the most famous churches in the Orient have long since fallen away from the true faith, and the Occidental Church has not only lost many members but has also made itself guilty of a great deal of error. In the first place, no one will admit that one cannot determine the meaning of a prophecy before it has been fulfilled. It could be true of some dark predictions, but certainly not of a lot of others that one could understand as soon as they were given. It is one thing to understand a prophecy, another to see its fulfillment. The fulfillment can certainly not occur before the appointed time; otherwise, the prediction would be false for that very reason. Yet one can understand what has been predicted. There are, however, other (if I may say so) standing predictions [stehende Weissagungen] that one understands immediately, and whose fulfillment one sees continuously. One of them is the one

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mentioned above: I am with you until the end of the world. The apostles understood this immediately, and we understand it too. This is the basis of our trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and so far, we have seen that we have never been deceived. Such a prophecy is also the one we are talking about here. [187] As soon as one hears it, one understands what it wants to say, and one constantly sees its fulfillment. However, the Oriental churches have fallen away from the faith, and many Christians in the Occident? Precisely because of this, the Church has been cleansed of erring members, and if some churches separated from the Church, then this very Church remained. Or was it because some fell away from the Church that its doctrine was also falsified? The Occidental Church has errors—according to the opinion of the Protestants, of course. But we will never admit that. Before we are proven to have false doctrines, nothing may be concluded against the infallibility of the Church. As a third proof from the Bible, the following is generally cited. 1 Tim 3, 15f: “I am writing this to you and hope to come to you soon. But if I tarry long, that thou mayest know how thou ought to conduct thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, a pillar and foundation of the truth. And it is evident that there is a great mystery of godliness, which has been revealed in the flesh.” Here the Church is called a pillar and foundation of truth. Thus, one can adhere to the Church without fear of missing the truth, and so on. But there are again so many excuses that one must struggle with the opponents for a long time before one can conclude anything. Some say that Timothy himself is [188] called here a pillar and foundation of truth, that the text thus says as much as: You are a pillar etc. as the apostles in Gal 2: 9 are called pillars, and in Eph 2: 20, Rev 21: 14 where they are called foundations. Others use the words pillar and foundation of truth and say that the apostle calls the mystery of the Incarnation, of which he speaks, a pillar, etc., because other truths of Christianity are built on it. Others say that it is improbable that the apostle should call the Church a house, a pillar, and a foundation at the same time, etc., as one can read in H. Chancellor Pfaff ’s Answer to the Scheffmacher Letters, pp. 27–29.6 Some of these 6. Christoph Matthäus Pfaff, Bündige Antwort auf die zwölf Briefe des Pater Scheffmachers, eines Strasburgischen Jesuiten, über die fürnehmste Streitfragen zwischen der



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excuses, especially the last one, are very weak. Yet since we have already accumulated the main evidence from other passages, we do not need to get involved any further with these. V. If a dispute arises as to the true meaning of a scriptural text,7 it can be determined from [189] tradition in the most correct way, and without danger of error. Thus, we shall first cite the opinion of individual Fathers and Church scribes, and then that of the whole Church, in favor of infallibility. We have already stated above (§33) the reason why in the early times of Christianity one should not look for eviRömischen und Protestantischen Kirche (Tübingen: 1750), 27–29. [Johann Jakob Scheffmacher, SJ (1668–1733), was professor of polemical theology in Strasbourg. Christoph Matthäus Pfaff (1686–1760), an eminent Lutheran theologian and chancellor of the University of Tübingen, responds in this work to one of Scheffmacher’s polemical writings.] 7. I might add here the reminder that we Catholics do not believe that tradition, or in my sense the unanimous testimony of the Church, is sufficient to explain all and every passage of the Bible, but only those of which there is really a tradition. For the Church can explain only that about which it has received a revelation. Neither Christ nor the apostles have explained the whole Bible anywhere. Many things that are only briefly and obscurely touched upon in the New Testament we shall only see clearly in the next world. Many things that have no close and necessary connection with our order of salvation [Heilsordnung] we do not need to know for sure now, even if they could have been useful for another purpose at one time, or still will be. If Christ and the apostles did not explain the whole Bible, no explanation of the whole Bible could have been preserved by tradition. The Church also does no longer receive new revelations. From this it can be seen that the Church cannot settle some disputes about the meaning of some biblical passages, and must let some academic disputes continue, and that it is very natural since the Fathers differ so often in the explanation of some scriptural texts. They explained them according to their different insights because they had no tradition. No Church Father was infallible for himself, and thus cannot be assumed to have found the true meaning more than a recent, skillful interpreter of Scripture. It is therefore necessary to restrict this principle, which is too often abused: Scripture must be explained according to the opinion of the Church Fathers only when they explain Scripture from tradition, which can be seen from the fact that they are in such cases all, always, and everywhere unanimous. Otherwise, their explanations must be examined according to the rules of the art of interpretation, and no special value must be attached to them either because of their sanctity or because of their erudition, although they must not be mocked maliciously or despised as ignorant by people, as unfortunately happens all too often.

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dence about the prestige [Ansehen] of tradition or the infallibility of the Church. What Irenaeus says about the prestige [Ansehen] of tradition in general has already been stated. Of the Church he says: “The light of God has been entrusted to it; the Church everywhere speaks the truth, [190] and it is ἑπτάμυξος, the lamp of Christ, which carries the light.” Lib. 5. c. 20. n. 1.8 And again: “It is not necessary to seek truth from others, which can be so easily taken from the Church; since the apostles have deposited in it, as in a rich receptacle, all that belongs to truth, so that everyone who wishes may take from it the drink of life.” Clement of Alexandria: “He has ceased to be a man of God, a man faithful to God, who has opposed the surrender of the Church and has entered into the opinions of human heresies.” bk. 7. Strom. “Only that doctrine which is with us comes from God.” bk. 6 Strom. Nevertheless, before these sentences, he speaks of the doctrine of the Church. I must confess that this passage proves nothing more than that the doctrine of the Church conforms to Scripture, but he also proves this from tradition, and says that all are mistaken who do not adhere to tradition. We have already mentioned his words above in connection with tradition. Tertullian has several undoubtable passages that back the infallibility of the Church. This one should delight us: “The apostles first bore witness to the faith in Jesus in the land of the Jews, and planted churches. After that they went out into the world. . . . Therefore, they built churches in every city, from which the rest borrow the proclamation of faith and the seed of doctrine, [191] so that they become churches.” De Præscript. c. 20.9 In the twenty-first chapter he continues: “If the Lord Jesus Christ sent the apostles to preach, it is not necessary to accept any other preachers than those whom he sent. . . . But what they preached, that is, what Christ revealed to them, again, as I will show, cannot be shown [darthun] other than through the churches which the apostles established. . . . All doctrines, therefore, which agree with these apostolic and mother churches, must be considered true.” etc. Origen states in Homil. I. in Genes:10 “The Church enlightens all who 8. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, bk. 5, ch. 20, 1. 9. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, c. 20. 10. Origenes, In Genesim homiliae, hom. I.



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are in the night of ignorance by the light it has received from Christ.” Similar expressions are often found there. Cyprian writes in the letter to Pupinianus:11 “Christ says to the apostles, and through them to the leaders, who have been put in the place of the apostles and succeeded them: He that heareth you, heareth me: he that rejecteth thee, rejecteth me. . . . He who is not with the bishops is not in the Church.” Likewise says Cyril of Alexandria in the synodal letter to Nestorius: “Besides this, you must confirm in writing, and by oath, that you curse any of your ungodly and impious teachings, and in the future [192] will think and teach as we do, and as all other bishops, teachers, and leaders of the peoples who live in the Orient and Occident; for this is the faith of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, in which all orthodox bishops in the Orient and Occident agree.”12 St. Jerome says in Dial. contra Luciferanos:13 “All these creeks of sentences I could dry up by the only sun of the Church.” In the works of St. Augustine there are several passages that express his opinion about the reputation [Ansehen] of the Church. We will be content to mention only a few of them. “It is superfluous to ask what the general Church thinks about this. It is enough that it is in favor of the opposite.”14 “We can say with certainty and confidence what has been established by the consensus of the general Church, which is under the leadership of our Lord and God Jesus Christ.”15 “It is either extremely ungodly, or intolerably proud, if one does not want to give preference to the Church.”16 And nothing is better known than that passage in contr. epist. Manichæi ch. 5: “I would not believe the Gospel if I were not moved by the reputation [Ansehen]17 of the Catholic Church.”18 The generally accepted opinion of infallibility in the Church can 11. Cyprian of Carthage, Epistula LXIX ad Pupinianum. 12. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistula XVII ad Nestorium, 13. Jerome, Dialogus contra Luciferanos. 14. Augustine, De haeresibus. 15. Augustine, De baptismo, bk. 7, ch. 53. 16. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ch. 15. 17. [Most modern translations have “authority.”] 18. Augustine, Contra Epistulam Manichaei, ch. 5.

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be seen most clearly from the fact that all new opinions [193] that were put forward at various times by the false teachers, were rejected in the councils as soon as circumstances permitted it. The heretics were refuted either from Scripture or from tradition. If the former was done, the Fathers asserted that they were infallible in explaining the Bible, and that the contrary explanation of the heretics was false. If the latter, they declared that the true doctrine preached by the apostles was preserved intact in the Church. If they had not considered their judgment decisive and infallible, they would never have been justified in excluding somebody from the fellowship of the Church and declaring those heretics who opposed their decision. Certainly, this was also done by individual bishops and particular councils. But for this very reason, because their judgments were still considered to be erroneous, it was permissible to appeal to general councils, which either confirmed or rejected these judgments. But from the pronouncement of a general council there was no possibility of appeal. He who was condemned by such a council as a heretic was not only regarded as one who would be excluded from the communion of the Church, but his teaching was also universally regarded as heresy. Not only did the bishops arrogate to themselves infallibility in matters of faith, but also the people considered their decisions infallible. What is the point of the Protestants’ objection? That the Church in earlier times never invoked its infallibility, never opposed the heretics [194] in order to put an end to all disputes? In the first place, the heretics were people who had to doubt the infallibility of the Church precisely because their teaching opposed the teaching of the Church. Yet against people who do not recognize my authority, I cannot refer to it, as everyone understands. Thus, the Church could not exactly oppose the heretics with its infallibility. However, it did not shy away from great efforts and reached the same goal by some detours. The Church invoked the general tradition, which would mean nothing if it were not infallible, because this tradition is identical with infallibility, or rather its foundation, and thus proved the Church’s infallibility. Or if it also refuted the heretics from the scriptures, this meant: My explanation of the scriptures is the true one, because it has for itself the general testimony of all believers at all times and in all places. And that meant



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the Church referred to infallibility after it had proven it and refuted the heretics with it. Also, other proofs for the infallibility of the Church could be cited from Scripture as well as from tradition, but they can be found in the writings of our dogmatic and polemic19 theologians because I do not want to become more extensive in this matter.

§ 36. Answer to the Objections. 1. In the fourth century, no one thought of giving the Church infallibility; for when the Arians rejected the [195] Council of Nicaea and desired a new one, they had their way, and convened the Council of Sardica, which was attended by three hundred bishops.20 2. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 itself declared that it would be reasonable to assemble a new council in the Occident, which should examine the same questions should someone not be satisfied with the conclusions of Chalcedon. 3. As is known, the fifth general council was rejected by a large part of the Church. 4. Even the Council of Trent must not yet have considered itself infallible, because it asked the pope to confirm its proceedings.21 I. If I wanted to cite witnesses of the always believed infallibility of the general council, I would have to fill many sheets of paper. But why should I repeat things that have been said so often? One can find 19. [Polemic is not used in the pejorative sense here. It signifies a genre of theology called polemical theology, which dealt with the attacks and criticisms of Protestant theology. Another name for this genre was controversial theology. St. Robert Bellarmine is often regarded as the “father” of this theological discipline.] 20. Jacques Basnage, Histoire de l’Eglise, vol. 2 (Rotterdam: 1669), 1580–85 [Jacques Basnage (1653–1723) was a French Reformed theologian.] 21. Johann Peter Miller, Compendium theologiae polemicae (Leipzig: 1768), 68–69. [Johann Peter Miller (1725–89) was a German Protestant theologian, who at times worked as secretary for Johann Lorenz von Mosheim. He was interested in building a bridge between Enlightenment theology, Lutheran Orthodoxy, and Pietism. Like Mayr, he largely avoided a polemical style.]

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the testimonies in any good dogmatic theology—I only mention here Tournely22 as the best known. If one reads his collected testimonies23 impartially, one will have to convince oneself that the Church has never doubted the infallibility of the general councils. But since up to this point, I have only ascribed infallibility to the Church in general, without [196] having yet determined whether it exercises it in the general Church assemblies, or through the popes, or through its teachers scattered throughout the world, I presuppose the former doctrine as true, and answer the objections, because the latter also concern the infallibility of the Church in general. 1. The Church assembly at Sardica was not called together with the intention of reforming Nicaea in matters of faith. In fact, with all the dogmatic decisions of Nicaea, it was always considered only as an appendix to it. Although at Nicaea the teaching of Arius had already been condemned, his followers still held council upon council, and heaped intrigue upon intrigue, in order to assert their doctrine either directly or by surreptitious means. The orthodox did not fail to oppose them with councils on their part, and to expose the intrigues of their opponents. Unfortunately, the [Arians] had the Emperor Constantius on their side, and consequently also the power to suppress the orthodox bishops. Nobody felt this more than the innocent Athanasius.24 There was little hope that the dispute could be brought to an end by the mutual holding of councils. Thus, both emperors, Constantius and Constans, finally attempted to resolve the matter of Athanasius and the other disputes in a new general council. The bishops of both parties were satisfied with this, although the Arian-minded [197] bishops 22. [Honoré Tournély (1658–1729) was a widely read French Catholic theologian, who also defended Gallicanism and played a major role in the persecution of Jansenism.] 23. Honoré Tournély, Praelectiones Theologicae. De Ecclesia Christi (Venice: 1755), 5:187–88. 24. [St. Athanasius was exiled for his resistance to the Arian heresy. On Arius see Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), on the aftermath of the Council of Nicaea in general see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy. An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).]



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had the intention to deceive the orthodox and to condemn Athanasius, while the latter flattered themselves to save Athanasius and to confirm the doctrine of Nicaea once again. Thus, the Council of Sardica was convened, and Catholics did not even think that it should not remain with the conclusions of Nicaea.25 So who doubted the infallibility of the Church? Not the Catholics. At most the Arians. And perhaps not even these. 2. It would have been very good if Dr. Miller had cited the passage of the Council of Chalcedon.26 Since this did not happen, shall I read through the records of the entire council and then guess which passage he meant? Since I read through these files once and can no longer remember such a passage; I will only give a general answer. To the complete conviction of their opponents, the Fathers could very well admit that a Church meeting could still be held in the Occident. They knew in advance that it would only confirm their decision. And so, their opponents would have been deprived of all excuses. One often concedes something to one’s opponent that would not be necessary but is effective in eliminating all excuses. 3. The fifth general council was not rejected because of the doctrine of faith, but because of its well-known three chapters. It was believed that the Council of Chalcedon and that of Constantinople were opposed to each other, since the former had approved [197] the three chapters, while the latter had rejected them. In reality, however, it was not so. The former did not speak of the doctrine, but of the persons of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Ibas. Ibas, after confessing his error, was absolved. So was Theodoret. The Council of Constantinople spoke of their writings, which were rejected. Some churches in the Occident were of the opinion that the Council of Constantinople had condemned innocent people who had already been absolved. That is why they opposed this council. But that the Church can err in such cases, we admit ourselves, where we speak of persons and not of doc25. [The Council of Sardica, often also called Serdica, took place in modern day Sofia/Bulgaria in 343. See Ayres, Nicaea, 122ff.] 26. [Miller, Compendium, 68 had claimed: “Quod Concilium Chalcedonense a. 451 declarabat, si quis stare suis decretis nollet fas esse, novum Concilium, idemque in occidente orbe appellare, iisdem de quaestionibus habendum.”]

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trines.27 It is a different matter: this teaching is heretical. The Church can decide that. Another: Theodoret asserts this doctrine. It cannot, as we will say below. Also, for some time it was doubted whether this council was ecumenical. 4. The Council of Trent rightly requested confirmation from the pope, so that the conformity of the whole Church, the head with the members, would be proved beyond all doubt. II. If the decisions of the Church were infallible, and thus the Fathers were guided by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, there is no longer any difference between the Bible and these decisions. Both are of equal weight and authority [Ansehen]. And yet it will be difficult to admit that, for example, the Creed of Nicaea belongs in the canon of the Bible just as much as the Gospel of Matthew. [199] Just as the testimony is different from the thing it testifies to, so is the decision of the Church different from revealed truth. God has revealed something, and the Church testifies that he has revealed it. The Holy Spirit only assists the Church in giving its testimony so that it does not err, yet without communicating a new revelation to it. The evangelists, on the other hand, had a direct revelation from the Holy Spirit. If the canon is understood to be a collection of writings that were written by inspiration and under the influence of the Holy Spirit, then the Gospel of Matthew belongs to the canon, and the Creed of Nicaea does not. The remaining differences may be read in Bellarmine.28 By the way, I can admit that in regard to ours, the Bible and conciliar decisions are of equal weight, without disparaging the first. I believe the Bible because I am convinced from tradition that it contains truths that God himself has revealed. I believe the decisions of the Church because I am convinced from reason and from the Bible itself that the Church cannot be wrong when it testifies that something has been revealed by God. The reason of my faith is always the infinite truthfulness of God, he may make his truths known to me through the Bible or through 27. [Mayr means the condemnation of authors. He is convinced that the Church can err in such censorship judgments but not in judgments of faith and morals.] 28. Robert Bellarmine, Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fide adversus hujus temporis haereticos, vol. I, disp. 4, ch. 12.



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tradition. And so, Gregory the Great can say: “He accepted and revered the first four general councils, like the [200] four Gospels. He sees only the certainty” of things made known to us by the Gospels or by the decisions of the Church assemblies. III. One can never be sure that the Church has decided anything, and consequently all of its so-called decisions are useless. Catholics understand by the Church all the bishops united with their head, the Roman Pontiff, whether they are assembled in a council or scattered throughout the world. Already in the case of an alleged decision, I cannot be convinced that it was made with the consent of all the bishops. If a decision is to be valid, I must know that the bishops took all possible care to investigate the truth, and consulted the tradition of all churches‑—that they did not allow themselves to be blinded by passions—that their votes were completely free—that they were true bishops, were truly baptized and consecrated, etc. In order to be assured of these things, one needs either a direct inspiration from God, or another decision of the Church, and again another, which confirms the legality of this decision ad infinitum. Protestants should notice that this objection does not contain any difficulty or that it hits them as well as it hits us. They believe the Bible. Yet they have no special and direct revelation that the Bible is the Word of God. [201] They prove it to themselves only by reason, and can make only two kinds of conclusions, one of them is this: A book of which all antiquity testifies that it was written by direct inspiration and with the assistance of the Holy Spirit is really a divine book. This is the second: A book that has all the inward characteristics of divine inspiration is a divine book. They may take the first or the second way, in either case their belief in the authority of the Bible is a mere human belief; they convince themselves merely by reason that the Bible is God’s Word. In the first case, they must presuppose that the witnesses to the inspiration of the Bible took all possible pains to investigate whether a certain book was inspired by God—that they consulted the tradition of all churches—that they were skillful enough to investigate the truth and did not let themselves be blinded by passions nor by preference for Christianity, etc. In the second case, they must presuppose that the witnesses to the inspiration of the Bible took all possible pains to investigate

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whether a certain book was inspired by God. By the right use of reason, they must obtain a moral certainty of all this. In the second case it is just the same. Through the use of reason, they must determine what the characteristics of a book given by God are, and again, that these characteristics belong to the Bible. Even when interpreting Scripture, they cannot convince themselves that they have found its true meaning in any other way than through reason, by applying the rules of the art of interpretation. [202] In no case do they demand a direct revelation from God that the testimony of the ancients to the inspiration of the Bible is correct and authentic, or that they have not erred in the use of their reason. What is valid for them must also be valid for us. Without receiving a new revelation, without the Church having to decide again that this or that decision is a decision of the whole Church, we can convince ourselves from reason alone, and very easily. If a decision is accepted by the whole Church united with its head as a decision of the whole Church, then I am convinced that it was made with the approval of all bishops. Yet, of this general assumption, as of every other historical fact, I assure myself using reason, and I arrive consequently at a moral certainty that the decision is a decision of the whole Church. Moreover, nothing is easier than knowing whether the bishops were all unanimous about a decision. If a doctrine is presented everywhere as one decided by the Church, and no bishop standing in communion with the head of the Church contradicts it, then I am morally certain that this decision is a decision of the whole Church. How every common and unlearned person can convince himself of this, I will say at the end of this work. Reason is sufficient to remove also the remaining doubts completely.29 The bishops may or may not have been baptized and properly consecrated, they may or may not have freely given their votes, they may or may [203] not have allowed themselves to be blinded by passions, they may or may not have devoted all their diligence to the investigation of the truth, all this does not concern me in the least, as long 29. [Mayr begins this argument with the number 2, but there is no number 1 in the previous passages. Thus, the editor decided to begin a new paragraph instead of inserting an incorrect number.]



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as it is not publicly known [weltkundig], and as long as it can be proved that there was no lack of an element which is required for a lawful general decision. For provided that God has set up the Church as a witness and judge of the faith,30 he cannot let the correctness and binding force of its decisions depend on things that we cannot possibly discover. He must prevent, and so arrange everything that even without miracles, and without new revelation, it may yet be decided what is true, [204] even if some parts of a lawful decision were lacking; for he who wants the end, also wants the means. A decision would never be of any help to us if it could be rendered invalid by a secret and undetectable error, and lead us into error. God directs everything by completely natural means in such a way that the faithful can never be led into error even by a decision that is not completely lawful. In short, we Catholics have as good a moral certainty from reason that something is a decision of the whole Church and is in conformity to revelation as Protestants have moral certainty that the Bible is divine. Christ should have explicitly said that he wanted to prevent everything in the decisions of the Church that could make them appear in any way suspicious. I do not see why he would have had to say this. We know that he promised it his support, and that he who wants the end must also want the means, if he is also wise, kind, and powerful enough. Since Christ can still achieve his purpose, by the way, if he also leaves the bishops their natural freedom, and does not prevent by 30. Protestants always say: this and that could be undermined in an ecclesiastical decision. Thus, I can never rely on one, and the infallibility of the Church is useless. Yet, they should rather conclude like this: If the Church is infallible, then such and such a thing cannot fall short, or even if it did fall short but remained unknown, could do no harm to the truth of the decision; for if the Church is infallible, then God, who directs us in this hypothesis to the Church so that we may hear the truth from its mouth, must also guarantee that it teaches the truth. Therefore, the preliminary question is only this: Is the Church infallible? Has Christ promised it infallibility? If this is established, then I am unconcerned whether the Church’s decisions are in accordance with revelation, as soon as I know that something is generally regarded as a decision of the whole Church. It is reasonable to conclude that the Church is infallible; therefore, it has not erred in a decision that I must regard as its own. Yet that is not true the other way around: Perhaps a decision can have this or that error; therefore, infallibility can be of no use as long as infallibility is correct and the error cannot be discovered.

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violent means that no errors at all creep into the form of the decision, it is quite superfluous to demand such an explicit declaration from God. Here, as everywhere, he takes the quite simple and natural path, and his providence shines forth only the more brilliantly, if he nevertheless achieves his purpose of teaching the faithful through such frail and weak instruments as the bishops and popes [205] sometimes were. IV. Catholics maintain that the Church exercises its infallibility either in general councils, or through its scattered bishops, by deciding disputes of faith. Neither the first nor the second is correct. If a council is ecumenical, and presents the whole Church, it no longer needs the acclamation of the other bishops, who were not present at the council, in order to have legal force. And yet this seems to be necessary, because the fifth general council was not accepted as a general one until all bishops in the Occident recognized it as such, nor did it exclude from the communion of the Church those who opposed it. That of the scattered bishops some can individually err is certain. Without taking into account the scholastic disputes as to whether the pope is infallible without a council or without the consent of the other bishops, or whether these are infallible in or outside of a council without the consent of the pope, it is the doctrine of all Catholics that God has conferred infallibility on the Church. He did not establish members without a head, nor a head without members, but the head with the members, and formed them into the Church. Only then is the Church certainly infallible, when the head agrees with the members. God has never admitted, and will never admit, that the greater part of the bishops should [206] separate themselves from the head in doctrines of faith and morals, because otherwise one might be in doubt where to look for the Church. Nevertheless, if this impossible case were to occur, the Church would be where the head agreed with the members, who might now constitute the greater or lesser number. Now I want to answer the objection first. The second part: Every single bishop is fallible; therefore all of them together are fallible, I have already resolved above § 28 II. It belongs to an ecumenical council that all bishops united with the head are called to it even if not all appear at the event. Nevertheless, even those who do not appear are legitimate witnesses of the tradition of their churches. It is therefore reasonable



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that the conclusions of the council be communicated to them as well, so that by their participation it may be shown that the teaching of the council is in accordance with the unanimous tradition. But this does not give it its legal force. It already has it in itself as soon as it is certain that the council has been general in the manner just determined, and that no obvious error has crept into its documents. See the previous objection. But if some churches oppose the council as soon as its conclusions are made known, one will have to conclude from this that it is not yet regarded as general and complete. And this was the case with the fifth one mentioned. The Western bishops [207] complained that Vigilius had condemned the three chapters so arbitrarily and out of fear of man, without first consulting them. Only success would show whether the whole Church would accept such a council as an ecumenical one or not. Such gradual acceptance took indeed place in the Occident. If, finally, even some particular churches remained separated from the party united with the main body, and were regarded by them as apostate, the unifying power of the council would remain, and it would have to be considered an ecumenical one, if the convocation of the council took place in the proper form and no obvious error has been committed. V. Why has the Church never decided that it is infallible? How odd! Do the judges decide that they are judges? They prove it by the fact that they settle the disputes. The Church does not make new articles of faith; it only declares or testifies to those that already exist. And therefore, the Church only presents the tradition to convince its opponents. This is the only means of obtaining reasonable obedience to its decisions. If the Church did not do this, and invoked its infallibility absolutely, and decided the same, how much would the opponents cry out that it demanded blind obedience? VI. The pretended infallibility of the Church is no means for ending disputes over faith. Rather, they only become greater when one part claims infallibility [208]; for this claim condemns all others. If one allowed, however, everyone to search the scriptures for himself, and believe what he finds, then all could live together in peace and harmony. Following the other way, though, creates unchristian persecutions among those who do not want to stand with a church that desires to

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be infallible. One can see that sects always persist despite the Church’s decisions. The question cannot be whether the Church really puts an end to all disputes of faith, but whether infallibility is a means to end them. There may be a medicine that would certainly cure the disease, but if recalcitrant patients do not want to make use of it, surely the medicine is not to blame? The disease will persist, as the parties of other faiths continue to exist, because they do not submit to the pronouncement of the Church, and God does not take away anyone’s freedom. The Church condemns no one. It only teaches what Christ has taught. And Christ himself pronounces judgment on those who do not believe, even if they are convinced that His teaching is presented to them. The Church never presumes to judge this condition. The Church, since it does not know the depths of the human heart, never decides that an individual persists in error against his conviction. Persecutions of those who think differently, as long as they keep quiet and do not try to spread their errors, are always unchristian. The fact that they have been persecuted does not matter here.31 In fact, individual regents, [209] bishops, and popes can err as well as Protestants, who are also sometimes persecuted. Yet the Church has never defined it as a doctrine of faith that one must persecute those who believe otherwise, or that one must necessarily have an inquisitional court. Only this would be a harmful error. The assertion of the infallibility of the Church is therefore not the cause of the unrest in the world, but the presumption of men who, proud of the knowledge of the truth that God has communicated to them, want to 31. [Mayr defends therefore the toleration of other Christian churches and communities in a Catholic territory as long as these “keep quiet and do not spread their errors.” In practice, however, it was difficult to draw the line between quiet and loud: After all, if members of a Protestant church wanted to attend a service in their church and left the city on a Sunday, they performed a publicly visible action in which they “defied” the Catholic religion. See Benjamin Kaplan, Divided by Faith. Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Benedict Stattler, a contemporary of Mayr, argued against toleration in Wahres Jerusalem, oder über religiose Macht und Toleranz (Augsburg: 1787). On toleration and tolerance in the Catholic Enlightenment see Ulrich L. Lehner, Catholic Enlightenment. The Forgotten History of a Global Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 47–73.]



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force others to think like them. We have only the duty to teach others in gentleness.32 But it would be no better if everyone were allowed to seek the truth for himself in the scriptures; for even among those who follow this principle, persecutions against people who do not find in the scriptures what they think they find are not uncommon. Whether one believes in an infallible Church or not, one can live together in peace and harmony, if only the conviction that one has the right religion is not joined by passions that turn the natural inclination to share one’s convictions with others into persecution.

§ 37. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Church is too important for me not to add a few things for a better explanation. As much as I wish and approve that every believer, scholar and [210] commoner should always diligently search the scriptures, I do not want to make everyone a judge of a disputed passage. He will find incomparably more comfort if an infallible Church explains these passages to him than if he must seek out their true meaning always in the danger of being mistaken. I will therefore present other proofs of the infallibility of the Church, at least in a different form, so that one can rely on them with greater certainty. I. Christ has come into the world to show us the way to salvation.33 We cannot become holy unless we enter into the order of salvation prescribed by him and do what he requires of us. Yet, we cannot do this if we do not know for certain what he requires. Since God has determined a certain order of salvation for us, he must also ensure that the true knowledge of this order of salvation is always maintained and remains always possible. Every person who is already in the Church, or who wants to enter it, must also be able to recognize what the or32. [The emphasis on gentle teaching is especially found in the works of St. Francis de Sales. See for example Lanfranco Fedrigotti, “St. Francis de Sales: Doctor of Divine Love and Evangelical Gentleness,” Theology Annual 31 (2010): 121–82.] 33. Hopefully, no one will conclude from these words that I therefore deny the main purpose of His incarnation—the redemption of the human race—but I have to remind readers of this because there are always “cricket catchers” who take pleasure in sucking poison from the most innocent words.

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der of salvation prescribed by Christ is like. He must therefore be able to find it in Scripture for the complete reassurance of his conscience without danger of error; or God must have seen to it that he is correctly instructed about it by the Church. [211] Even the essentials of faith he cannot always find in Scripture. The passages from which the most essential doctrines of faith are proved, are interpreted quite differently, each interpreter giving reasons for his interpretation. The inquisitive Christian or non-Christian cannot rely on the interpretation of individual teachers, and even less on his own. If a whole church, which certainly had its learned men, could err in this, as it really happened, because only one interpretation can be the true one, how may he flatter himself that he will find the truth? Teachers who are provided with all means of interpretation admit that they can miss the true meaning of the Bible. This business is all the more difficult for the unlearned, for the businessman who does not have skill or time enough to engage in extensive investigations. He would have to see the whole belief system in context, compare doctrine with doctrine, and convince himself that they can exist side by side. Nor may he hope for special support, for other commentators had—charity teaches him to think—the same right to it. His hope is also without reason, if he does not know that God instructs him to examine all doctrines himself and does not command him to go to the Church in doubtful cases. If the latter were the case, the hope for a special assistance from God would be presumptuous. And this is just the point in dispute, whether he or the Church is to decide, [212] and the scriptural passages that are to decide this question are interpreted differently. Moreover, Protestants have not even ultimately settled upon an interpretation. Finally, if one does not want to assume miracles without necessity, one must admit that the Holy Spirit in his inspirations is guided by the receptivity of the subject and teaches only what one can grasp. The unlearned, therefore, cannot reasonably hope that God will teach him things about which not even scholars could agree, and which he is not sufficiently prepared to grasp. This is all the more true with regard to those who cannot even read. Thus, the Church must be able to teach the order of salvation infallibly. This suits the unlearned and people who cannot be bothered with persistent study because they have other necessary business (that is, the greatest



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part of the people), much better than if they were instructed through the scriptures, from which they certainly could not remove all doubts despite great efforts. Consequently, God has certainly given the Church the gift of infallibility, without which it would be possible only for very few to recognize the order of salvation prescribed by Christ. This proof is derived from a truth that Protestants themselves accept; namely, that Christ came into the world to make known to us the order of salvation, and from daily experience. Thus, there is no circulus vitiosus here by proving the infallibility of the Church from the scriptures and explaining the scriptures according to the will of the Church. II. [213] Since Christ and his apostles made known the way of salvation, it was entirely up to them whether they wanted to record in writing everything they preached that was essential for our salvation, or whether they wanted to pass it on to posterity through oral tradition. It is not impossible that the pure doctrine could be preserved unharmed in one or the other way. There is neither an intrinsic contradiction nor extrinsic impossibility on the part of God’s omnipotence. Nothing else was needed than God’s will to proliferate revelation through tradition. This kind of proliferation is suitable for God and appropriate for us. He has always used this way to teach people, and in general we receive our most necessary knowledge through the teaching from others. Since an oral transmission of Christ’s teachings is possible, suitable, and credible, just as much as a written one, one must either prove that Christ did not want to transmit his teachings orally, or run the risk of finding them inauthentic and incomplete if one rejects the oral tradition. There is no proof that Christ did not want to propagate his teachings orally; for all scriptural passages that, according to the Protestants, show this (for example, that the scriptures are perfect, that they are a lamp unto our feet, that they teach man to be clear and plain enough to refute all errors), remain true, and yet they do not show that they are the only guide of our faith, [214] as we have already explained above, because everything depends on the final purpose for which God has given us the Bible. We have stated an ultimate purpose, which Protestants themselves do not deny (§ 13 VII). Protestants, however, do not prove correctly because they presuppose something that should have been first inquired about. They conclude that the scriptures must be the only

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rule of faith because they are perfect, clear, and plain, as if something could not be clear, perfect, and plain for a certain end, without having to have this same clearness, perfection, and clearness for another final end. They presuppose another final end of the Bible; namely, that it gives sufficient information to everyone in all doubts, without having proved it. Yet, if there is no proof that Christ only wanted to pass on his teachings in writing, then one must acknowledge that there are enough assumptions that he did not want to do so. He did not come and send his apostles to write, but to preach. They wrote only on external, accidental occasions and then presented these doctrines, whose explanation had become necessary precisely because of these occasions. They, like Christ himself, instructed the people in the scriptures. But only certain people, and in certain circumstances, as I have shown above, § 13. This does not prove that they declared the scriptures to be the only rule of faith. Another assumption lies in the words of the apostle 2 Thess 2, 15: [215] “Brethren stand and hold to the doctrines which you have learned either through our speech or through our letter.” It is impossible to prove that the apostles had to record in writing all the doctrines they preached, since God, if he wanted, could just as easily have preserved them pure and unharmed by tradition. Reason leads us to the possibility of an oral tradition, and since Scripture, even if it should not prove its existence, nevertheless gives us reasons to assume it because it is not inappropriate for God. Thus, the believer can, as soon as Scripture does not completely remove his doubts, reasonably adhere to the Church and let himself be instructed according to oral tradition, because it is certainly more reassuring for the simpleminded to trust the instruction of so many pious and learned men from the beginning of the Church than one’s own insights. III. One more proof I would like to add, which does not actually show that the Church cannot err, but that it has not erred; for it is not at all credible that it has fallen into error. In the first place, all our doctrines, by which we differ from the Protestants, are not such as to overthrow the foundation of the order of salvation. We shall even prove below that, for example, the doctrines of confession, of pardon, of purgatory, etc., rather promote than hinder the purposes of Christ and are



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good means for attaining eternal bliss according to the order [216] prescribed by Christ.34 Secondly, a corruption of doctrine was not even possible. It should have occurred either in the first three centuries at the time of the persecutions, or afterwards, when the Church received peace, or in the so-called Dark Ages until the Reformation, or after it. Not in the first three centuries. The apostles had presented the unadulterated teachings of Christ, and the Christians cared far too much about keeping them pure. A greater folly cannot be imagined than that they should have deliberately changed a doctrine for which they had to be ready to die at any moment, and thus robbed themselves of all the comfort of a joyful death. Knowing that they were now dying not for the 34. Even if our doctrines of distinction [Unterscheidungslehren] had not been directly revealed by God, but were only additions of the Church, they would still remain venerable and could not be rejected, because they help to promote the ultimate purpose of Christ, our correction and sanctification. At most, the Church could be said to have erred by claiming them to be directly revealed truths. But in this it would be right, that these teachings come indirectly from Christ, because no means permitted in itself, which promotes his ultimate purpose, can displease him, and he has bequeathed to his Church the power to make such decrees, which are not only necessary, but also merely useful for the eternal salvation of the believers. It was always a wrong and much too violent expression to call our doctrines of distinction unchristian and to praise the Reformation so highly because it abolished these unchristian doctrines and restored the pure gospel. What are these unchristian teachings? Doctrines that contradict the gospel and go against the order of salvation established by it? We have none of these, as will be shown. The Protestants have not yet understood us correctly, and perhaps we ourselves have not always presented these teachings with sufficient clarity. If unchristian doctrine means as much as a doctrine that Christ himself did not preach or have preached through his apostles, then one could at most admit this meaning; but the doctrines would not yet be condemned by this, for there may be means and actions that really promote salvation, without being expressly prescribed by a gospel, and which are included only as kinds under the general class, means to salvation, and the Church has the right to recommend such kinds as useful to its members according to time and circumstances. And even if the practices based on our characteristic doctrines were all abuses, it would be going much too far to call the Church a Babylonian whore and sow suspicion among the faithful about them. Every church will have abuses as long as its members are human beings. If these abuses can only exist with the Christian order of salvation, as ours do, then it is indeed obligatory to oppose them, but this must be done with great modesty, so that the evil is not made even greater, and by lowering the Church’s reputation, the faithful lose their trust in the Church, without which they are placed in the most terrible uncertainty when they doubt their faith.

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doctrine of Christ, but for their own, all hope of a better eternity would have fallen away. Furthermore, it was important to them to make sure that the teachings of Christ would not be changed by the wickedness of some people. That is why they steadfastly opposed the errors and false teachers and banished them from their community. This zeal of theirs also proves that error could not have crept in through carelessness. After that, after the times of persecution, [218] it was even less appropriate to falsify the doctrine. Christianity was spread everywhere at that time. It would have been necessary to persuade the faithful that the doctrine they had hitherto believed was false—that the whole Church had erred down to their own time. But this is much easier to say than to do. Some can certainly be seduced. But it is impossible for all of them. There were always enough people who observed the false teachers, always some who did not want to enter into an understanding with them. This is proven by the frequent church meetings, which were held even more often than necessary. Without a general conspiracy of all teachers as well as of all believers in all particular churches scattered throughout the world, a consistent falsification of even one single teaching of Christ is not conceivable. Did perhaps the popes in the ages of ignorance falsify them out of malice or stupidity? If the popes were as domineering as they are described, nothing was so contrary to their intentions, nothing was so opposed to their lust for power and their interest, as a falsification of the Christian doctrine undertaken out of malice. With all the stupidity of the times, no Christian ever believed that the pope had the power and the right to change the teachings of Christ. Rather, he was considered to be the governor of Christ, against whom he could not be, and for this very reason he was granted so many privileges. If he had dared such a falsification, his whole authority would have been at stake, [219] and instead of supporting his interest and his lust for power, he would have done himself the greatest harm. That one has always been attentive to the teachings of the popes is attested by enough facts. I will refer only to the second and third Church assemblies at Constantinople. What Pope Vigilius did in the first one did not please the churches in the Occident for a long time, and they resisted it until they were properly informed about the nature of the condemnation of the three chapters. In the second, even Pope Honorius was condemned either



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as a Monothelite or as a friend of it.35 If there had always been people who opposed other undertakings of the popes in matters that did not concern the essentials of religion, the whole Church would certainly have risen up against them as soon as they had wanted to introduce a hitherto unheard-of doctrine. This could just as little have happened out of ignorance. A general ignorance of the doctrines of faith never existed in the Church. There were always pious and, for the times, learned men who could resist the corruption. Yes, the stupidity of the times and the laziness of the teachers even prevented the falsification of the doctrine; for stupidity makes people cling stubbornly to the old and reject every innovation. The teachers, precisely because they were lazy, did not deviate one step from the teaching of the ancients, just as the latter did not deviate from the teaching of the apostles. If the pope had come with a new and false doctrine, there [220] would certainly have been much more noise about it than if in our enlightened times a pope had dared to do the same. One only has to remember how abominably often stupid Oriental monks expressed their enthusiasm and fanaticism, when they believed with or without reason, that the true doctrine was in danger. In the Occident, too, there was no lack of examples of their untimely zeal even against the popes. Thirdly, after the schism, after the restoration of the sciences, and after the Reformation, it was even less appropriate to falsify the true doctrine. One had to adhere to certain prescribed doctrinal formulas, everything was defined more precisely, and the vigilance of the opponents themselves had to make the Church extremely cautious in this matter. Thus, it is not at all credible that the Church could ever introduce a false doctrine or corrupt the true evangelical36 one.

35. [Pope Honorius (625–38) has been posthumously condemned and his pontificate cited as an example of an erring pope, who did not properly protect the deposit of faith from heresy. See Georg Kreuzer: Die Honoriusfrage im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit. Dissertation (Tübingen and Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1975); Anton Thanner, Papst Honorius I. (625–638) (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1989).] 36. [This is the first time in this volume that Mayr uses the adjective “evangelisch,” indicating the biblical foundation of Catholicism.]

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§ 38. If the infallibility of the Church is as well founded in reason as in revelation, it is certainly not right that the common man has been deprived of his only refuge in doubts of faith. Now he shall no longer trust the Church. He shall only search the Bible himself, and nevertheless consider as true and certain what he believes to find in it. Certainly, a stale consolation for him! The guidance “He does not err when he follows the guidance of the Church” has been taken from him, and nothing better [221] has replaced it. Of course, the freedom to investigate and think for oneself is of infinite value to the human spirit. But with this freedom there should also be a certain assurance that either the truth will certainly be found, or that God will not reckon it against us if we fail to find the truth, because here we are dealing with the most important thing in the whole world, with the sure path to salvation, and a misstep in the business of salvation has far more terrible consequences than if I err in the investigation of other truths. Yet, can Protestants assure themselves, and also their unlearned and zealous fellow Christians, that they will certainly find the truth, or that it will not be imputed to them if they do not find the truth? They can do neither one nor the other. How cruelly, then, have they acted against the common people that they plunged them into the most terrible uncertainty in the most important matter, and made them desolate! One may call what I say here a declamation, but my conviction urges me to do so. By the way, it is not my intention at all, in the manner of our contemporaneous polemicists, to insult Protestants by this. I admire their teachers, who, as I have no doubt, speak from conviction, but I must also attach those predicates to their teaching, which seem to me bleak and cruel, and I cannot call white what looks black to me. They also say that our Church exercises the most intolerable tyranny over consciences through its presumed infallibility. And yet we [222] feel so little tyranny, and are so comforted by it, as they are with their pretended freedom of conscience. If they are allowed to express their opinion about our doctrine, then why should we not be allowed to do the same? At least I have not said mine bitterly and insultingly, as they commonly do against us.

Fifth Section Which Church Is the Infallible One?

Fifth Section

Which Church Is the Infallible One? § 39. Very often I have read in the writings of Protestants the remark that even if the Church were infallible, it does not follow that this infallible Church must be the Roman Catholic Church. We are reproached that we never proved this. As unjust as this accusation is, because our theologians both state the characteristics of the infallible Church and also show that these taken together belong to the Roman Catholic Church alone, I will nevertheless take a different way to prove this. I can also spare the investigation of another question here, because it becomes quite unnecessary in my proof. It is said that infallibility can be granted to the church, but only to the invisible church, and it is also believed that the true church can become completely invisible. [223] My proof will show that this Protestant evasion will dissipate so that it is not even necessary to refute it.

§ 40. The Church is a society of people who seek to worship God in the way prescribed by Christ. That I am speaking here of the ecclesiastical and true Church is already evident from the definition. It is divided according to its members into teachers and learners, or believers, who have no public commission to teach others. We cannot use Bellarmine’s well-known definition of the

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Church here. He says: the Church is a society of believers united by the confession of the same faith and by the participation in the same sacraments under their rightful pastors, and especially under the Roman Pontiff. Certainly, this definition fits the true Church. But it presupposes several things that the Protestants do not yet admit; for example, that the Church must be united under a visible head. Also, Protestants have a completely different concept of both the legitimacy and authority of the shepherds. Here, therefore, where it is not yet established that the Roman Catholic Church is the true one, we must take as a basis a definition [224] our opponents accept just as much as we do. No one doubts that that the Christian church is the true one that worships [verehren] God as Christ has prescribed. By the word worship I understand the willing acceptance of all that Christ has revealed, and the endeavor to fulfill all his commandments, even if not every single member fulfills them perfectly. It is enough that no one doubts a truth revealed by Christ or the binding nature of his commandments. That church is indisputably the Church of Christ, the one he intended to found, which has retained his teachings in their entirety. Of course, this church would be even more perfect if all its members not only believed but also practiced everything he has prescribed. Yet, there is no such church, since we all lack in many things. Thus, I limit the truth of the Church, if I may say so, merely to the outward confession of its doctrines and the acceptance of all its commandments. If the above definition is still too vague for you, you could define the Church of Christ in this way: it is a society of people who accept all the doctrines of faith and the moral laws of Christ.

§ 41. The first church founded by Christ and the apostles did not err in doctrines of faith and morals. This sentence means as much as this: the correct meaning of the revealed [225] doctrines of faith and morals was known to the first followers of Christ and the apostles, because Christ and the apostles only preached in order to be understood (§§ 2, 3, 18, 19). Above all, the teachers appointed by the apostles had to know the true meaning of the rev-



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elation (§ 19). Consequently, the first church was infallible in the sense that it could know the true sense of the revelation and really did know it. But did this church not perhaps, against its better knowledge, deliberately falsify the doctrines of faith and morals? No, such a falsification is neither believable, nor was it possible (§ 27). In addition to this, there was the promise of Christ that he would preserve the church he founded until the end of the world, and that he would remain with the teachers forever, not only through the assistance of grace, but so that they could teach all nations what he had taught.

§ 42. If the first church was infallible, it accepted all doctrines of faith and morals. And consequently, all those who accused it of error were mistaken. Christ had preached the gospel only in the Jewish land. After him the apostles went out into the world and gathered Christian churches in various provinces of the Roman Empire, in Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Alexandria. All these special churches heard and understood [226] the pure doctrine of the Gospels, and together made up the true Church. I am not thinking here of any other bond between these particular churches than the same doctrine they shared. Unity in the doctrine of Christ was the distinguishing mark of this religious society. Since this society did not err, it is a necessary consequence that all individual people err who separated from it under the pretext of an error in matters of faith, or whom it excluded because they blamed it for errors.

§ 43. That church is therefore the true one, from which either individual people or societies separated, or which excluded these people and societies from its community because they were guilty of errors. A church that cannot err must show its infallibility precisely by not favoring error and excluding those who want to introduce it. And people who separate themselves from the infallible church show by this

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very fact that they defend errors and do not want to belong to the true church. Whoever wants to know the true church must only look for which church is the one from which others have broken off or that has excluded others from its fellowship. This alone can be the Catholic Church. [227] Since it is infallible in itself, and must remain so, all others are false teachers or false churches, whom the Church accuses of error, or who accuse it of error.

§ 44. From the first infallible church, which remains infallible, the false teachers of all times have really been separated, or they have separated themselves. Already in the first century, for example, Hymenaeus and Philetus taught that the resurrection of the dead had already happened and could no longer be expected. Paul delivered them to Satan so that they would stop blaspheming God. 1 Tim 1: 19, 20. 2 Tim 2: 17, 18. John the apostle, as Irenaeus says,1 left the bath in which Cerinthus was staying and said he feared that it would not collapse and kill the enemy of truth with him. In the second century, the Ebionites separated from the rest of the Christians because they no longer wanted to observe the Mosaic Law. In the same way, the Cerdonians, Marcionites, Bardesanes, Encratites, Basilidians, and Carpocratians separated from the rest of the Church or were excluded from it. Valentinus was expelled from the Church in Rome after he had spread his errors in silence for some time and confessed that his doctrine was different from the doctrine of the rest of the Church. Florinus and Blasius wanted to accuse the Church of heresy and were therefore excluded from the community of the other believers in Rome. [228] Pope Victor did the same in regard to the false teacher Theodotus. Montanus was first declared an apostate by particular Church assemblies, and finally by the whole Church because of his heresies. He himself established the Pepuzan congregation, separated from the rest of the Church. Tertullian, his follower, because 1. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, bk. 3, ch. 3.



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he considered the teachings of the Church to be erroneous, cut himself off from the church of psychics or Christians. In the third century, Sabellinus and Noetus wanted to understand the doctrine of the Trinity better than the rest of the Church, and it condemned them as heretics who did not belong to their community. Origen brought Berytlus back to the communion of the Church. Paul of Samosate, because he was convicted of his error by Malchion, had to leave his bishopric and was expelled from the Church. Pope Cornelius deprived Novatian and his followers of the communion of the Church. In the fourth century, the frequent councils and the repeated excommunications against the Donatists, Arians and their various parties, Apollinarists, Photinus, Macedonians, and Priscillianists, prove how zealously the Church secured the purity of doctrine. And so, it has continued until our times. Nestorians, Eutychians, Monothelites, Albigensians, Petrobusians, Waldensians, Hussites, Wycliffites, Lutherans, Calvinists, etc. were either excluded from the Church, or they separated themselves from it, because they either accused the Church of errors, or errors were discovered in them. [229] From this it follows that the first mother and ancestral church, or the congregations established by the apostles and their immediate successors, taken together, always remained a whole and just as it was in the beginning, retaining all doctrines of faith and morals as they had been received from the apostles. All this, however, the Church had to achieve by virtue of the infallibility promised to the whole body of the Church. Only from time to time did these united churches expel from themselves those persons and congregations who deviated from the original teachings and blamed them for errors, or individual persons and churches separated themselves from the mother and ancestral church under this pretext. The first infallible church existed before them, all the others are newer, and one knows their first beginners and founders; one knows that they separated from it, or that they were separated by it. It is therefore not at all difficult to distinguish that church, which has the apostles as its originators and has remained faithful to their teachings, from all other churches. This church is the true church (§40).

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§ 45. Among the number of particular churches from which others have separated, or from which the other new sects have been excluded, there has always been the Roman Church, or the Roman particular church has always been a part of the true Church. I. [230] I do not want to mention here any primacy conferred on the bishop of Rome as the successor of St. Peter, but only consider the Roman particular church as the noblest and most respectable part of the true Church; for my present proof, the preference of primacy is dispensable. In the preceding section, I have already named several false teachers and their defenders whom the Roman bishop, and thus also the Roman Church, opposed and excluded from their fellowship. Thus, at least in these cases, the Roman Church was united with the other particular churches, which together made up the true Church. II. Irenaeus says: “With this Roman church, because of its more powerful or greater eminence,2 all other churches must necessarily have to agree, that is, all believers everywhere.” Thus, at least in the time of Irenaeus, the Roman Church was beyond all suspicion of having ever departed from the true teaching of Christ, [231] because he presented it to all other churches and believers as the guide of their faith. III. Tertullian3 confesses that the Roman Church has opposed the teaching of Montanus: “I hear,” he says, “that an edict has been promulgated once and for all; the highest bishop, that is, the bishop of the bishops, says: I remit the crimes of fornication and adultery to those who have completed the penance of the Church.” Montanus counted these sins among those that could not be forgiven. Tertullian speaks here, although mockingly, as it seems, of the Roman Pontiff.

IV. In the controversy over the baptism of heretics, Cyprian had first the Roman, and then the whole Church against him. And yet one sees that, as soon as matters of faith were spoken of, he never doubted 2. Some read: propter potiorem, others propter potentiorem principalitatem. 3. Tertullian, Liber de Pudicitia.



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that the Roman Church was orthodox, indeed the center of the true faith; for when he speaks of Felicissimus, and Fortunatus, he expresses himself thus: “They dare to sail to the chair of Peter, that is, to the most distinguished church, where the unity of the priesthood has its origin.” But why should I undertake so much trouble to prove a thing that the Protestants themselves admit? They do not deny that in the first three centuries the Roman Church was held in great esteem by the others, [232] nor do they accuse it of claiming any doctrines of faith and morals that were different from the Christian churches. V. In the fourth century the Roman Church was among those who condemned Arius at Nicaea, Macedonius at Constantinople, the Donatists, and so on. And so it was, through all the centuries. It does not matter here whether the Roman Pontiff ’s envoys presided over the conciliar meetings or only attended the conciliar meetings like other bishops, not whether the popes presumed to rule over the other bishops (and rightly so) or not. It is enough that the Roman Church has always been among those churches that have anathematized the innovators in matters of faith and is now reproached for such heresy hunting. One could object here that popes have also been accused of error, and that the Roman Church was not always on the side where the true church is supposed to have been. But this objection does not invalidate my proof. Some, and perhaps all popes who could be accused of error in the doctrine of the faith can still be defended quite well. Yet even if this were not the case, we do not know of a single instance in the entire history of the Church in which the Roman particular church has ever been excluded from [233] communion and accused of error by the other churches, which were hitherto regarded as the true-believing church and still are. It is therefore certain that the Roman Church has always been a part of the true Church, and indeed the nobler and more excellent one.4

4. [Mayr does not count the mutual anathema of Latin West and Greek East in 1054 as an excommunication of the Roman particular church from the communion with the Byzantine Church.]

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§ 46. That church is therefore the true church of Christ, which was always united with the Roman particular church. Particular churches were founded by Christ and his apostles in the beginning. These all together were infallible. See the whole preceding section (sic! ), and they constituted the true Church. (§ 40). Thus, those who accused them of error erred (§ 42) and that church remained the true one that excluded others from its fellowship because they were guilty of error, or from which others separated under this pretext (§ 43). One or the other occurred with all those whom we know from Church history under the name of heretics or false teachers. They separated from the old church or were separated (§ 44). Among all those particular churches, or the true Church, from which others separated or were excluded, was always the Roman particular church. Thus, the true Church is the one with which the Roman particular church has always remained united. Therefore, without regard to the primacy of the pope, the true Church could well be called Roman Catholic, because the word Roman expresses [234] the characteristic by which the true church can be most easily distinguished from all others. Incidentally, I consider it a tasteless gibe if someone wants to claim that one should not say Roman Catholic, but Catholic-Roman Church. After explaining both words, one expression is as correct as the other. Those who now, as I hear, teach that Roman Catholic Church contains a contradiction, will, I hope, no longer find it after my explanation. What I have said here will hopefully also satisfy the Protestant demand, which I have mentioned in § 39. It has not only been proved that the Church in general is infallible, but that the Church which we understand under the name of the Roman Catholic Church is the infallible Church. However, I do not deviate from the usual road of our theologians and will also indicate those characteristics of the true Church that are common in our catechisms and religious books. These are unity, holiness, universality, and apostolicity. Of these so-called notes, or marks,5 I will only remind you for the time being 5. [The four marks of the Church are classical topoi of fundamental or foundational



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that they undoubtedly belong to the true Roman Catholic Church; but for that reason, they might not be the most appropriate, and for all the easiest to discover. Whoever, therefore, does not accept these marks as such, by which everyone can easily distinguish the true Church from the false one, does not deny that the Roman Catholic Church is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic.

§ 47. The true Church must be united. [235] The unity of the Church is grounded in two things. The true Church shall have one and the same doctrine throughout. The members of this church shall be united with their bishops, and these with their head, the Roman Pontiff. Now it is certain in itself that Christ and his apostles preached only one doctrine. Everyone who enters the true Church undertakes to worship God in the manner prescribed by Christ (§ 40). Therefore, the faith of all members of the church must be the same; that is, everyone must accept the same doctrines of faith and morals that Christ presented. The Church must therefore have, first of all, a unity of doctrine. Furthermore, if God has established a hierarchy in His Church, and in it has set the Roman Pontiff as the center of unity, if He has appointed bishops to govern His Church, the faithful must be in communion with their bishops directly, and through them indirectly with the Roman Pontiff, and obey them. Since it is proved that Christ really established such a hierarchical order in the Church, there must be unity of love in the Church, obedience of learners to teachers, or of the subordinates to their presbyters [Vorsteher]. Proofs of the necessity of this unity from Scripture and tradition can be found among our theologians. [236] Protestants make no claim to the second kind of unity anyway, since they do not grant the teachers of their church any legislative power, nor any other primacy based on divine right. Nor do they boast of unity in doctrine. They may well agree that Scripture is the only rule of faith. Yet since they leave it up to each one to explain it according to theology. See for example Aidan Nicholas, Figuring Out the Church: Her Marks and Her Masters (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013).]

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his own best insights, and do not want to be bound by the explanation contained in their symbolic6 writings, it happens that some believe to find a doctrine of faith in Scripture that others do not find in it, and again others discover even an opposing doctrine. Thus, one person may deny the deity of Christ because, in his opinion, it is not found in Scripture, because for him it contains proofs that Christ is not God, while another person will prove the deity of Christ from Scripture. Nevertheless, according to the once accepted principle that everyone may explain the Scriptures according to his own insights, one as well as the other must belong to the true Church, and no one may exclude the other. Experience also shows that there is no unity of doctrine anywhere in the Protestant churches. Indeed, our opponents even maintain that it would not be possible, given the different ways in which people think, for everyone to have the same ideas about the doctrines of faith, and therefore consider the effort to bring about unity among the various Christian parties to be a futile task. Therefore, the first characteristic of the true Church, unity, does not belong to the Protestant church. [237] The Catholic Church, however, has this characteristic, from the Orient to the Occident:7 It has everywhere the same essential doctrine of faith and morals, and if the theologians still argue about some doctrines, if here and there a ceremony or practice is still considered important, which elsewhere is regarded as indifferent or even as harmful, both parties agree that one can reject those doctrines without danger to salvation, and omit these exercises and ceremonies, because they are not supported by a clear revelation. Having shown that the true Church must be united, and indeed is, I must now also add that I do not consider unity to be such a mark by which one could easily recognize the true Church. Who should it serve? The non-Christian? Or the Protestant? Or the Catholic? It does not serve those who are not yet Christians. They would have to conclude something like this: Only with Catholics do I see unity in doctrine, only with them are the faithful under the bishops, and these under the 6. [By symbolic writings he means binding, creedal documents.] 7. [Literally “From the rise to the set,” or in German: “vom Aufgange bis zum Niedergange.”]



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pope. Only with them is obedience, etc. But before our Catholic system of faith is proven to such a person, he cannot make this conclusion. In order to see that Catholics are unanimous in doctrine, he must have at least a historical knowledge of our system of faith, so that he knows whether the particular churches are unanimous in doctrine. It is often extremely difficult to distinguish [238] whether the same doctrine is held everywhere, and a mere historical knowledge of it will not suffice if it is not at the same time philosophical. I am not even talking about the mysteries yet (for example, the doctrine of the Trinity), where it depends on a small word whether a sentence is heretical or orthodox, often only on a letter that can easily slip unnoticed by a non-Christian. Therefore, a person must fully understand the doctrine of the Church, of the sacraments, etc., if this person is to judge reasonably that there the doctrine is the same in all churches. Yet, if he were to find unity of doctrine in the Catholic Church without knowing that the Church must have a head and bishops, whom the other believers are bound to obey—then unity of love and obedience cannot serve him as a distinguishing mark of the true Church. For this adherence and obedience of the common people to their religious servants he finds among pagans, and often to a much stronger degree. And if he does not yet know that one is bound to this obedience in the true Church, then he will not be upset that he does not notice it in the Protestant church. In short, I think that it requires far too extensive an investigation before one is convinced that there is and must be unity of faith and love everywhere in the Church. Thus, I would not identify the mark of unity as the easiest mark that could lead a non-Christian to the recognition of the true Church. [239] It is not much different with a Protestant. If he is not convinced that the aforementioned two unities must exist in the church, he will not respect them. Yet it requires extensive investigation until he discovers the two propositions: the true church must be united and the Catholic Church is united. Before learning this, he cannot make the conclusion: Therefore, the Catholic Church is the true Church. He must at least be first convinced that Scripture is not the only judge of faith but that it must be explained according to tradition; moreover, that the Church is infallible and then that Christ has ordered a hierarchy in the

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Church. But a mark that presupposes so much prior knowledge until it can be considered essential is, in my opinion, not the most suitable way to lead one to the true Church by the shortest route. For a Catholic, however, this characteristic is certainly sufficient to keep him in his Church. He is already convinced that the true Church must be united. He is convinced that it is his Church. And in this respect, I let it count as a sign. Yet also Protestants comfort themselves to have unity in faith. They say that they are all united with Christ as their head. And this is their unity of love. They also agree on the fundamental articles of faith. This, they say, belongs to unity. The other doctrines, on which they do not agree among themselves, they regard as we do the school opinions, which may be doubted [240] without offending the faith. It is therefore easy to see that a Protestant must first be convinced of the correctness of our whole system of faith before the unity of the Church in our sense can be for him a mark of the true Church.

§ 48. The true Church must be holy The founder of the true Church was the most holy one. Therefore, he could not prescribe a religion that was not according to the divine perfections; that is, holy. Consequently, the true Church must have holy doctrines, or doctrines according to the perfections of God. These doctrines Christ himself has presented and still has them presented by the Church, so that its members may arrange their lives according to them, and thus also become holy. That is, the holiness of the Church must also be expressed through the holiness of its members. Finally, all ceremonies and exercises prescribed by the Church must be such that they can lead Christians to holiness. The mark of holiness belongs to the Catholic Church. All its doctrines of faith and morals are in accordance with the Holy Scriptures, which are explained according to the unanimous testimony of all antiquity, and if some have put forward a freer moral doctrine, which is contrary to the Gospels, the Church has never accepted or approved it. [241] The Church also has never lacked truly holy members who put Christ’s teaching into practice as much as is possible in view of human



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weakness, even if one might find some faults in canonized saints.8 Even the commandments of the Church and the ceremonies introduced by it are of such a nature that they can contribute indirectly to the sanctification of the Christian, if their meaning is rightly conceived. The positive doctrines concerning faith and morals are also sacred among Protestants, and I do not know of one of which the opposite could be proved.9 Nevertheless, they cannot not be understood like our polemicists did in the first heat of the Reformation. Certainly, Protestants themselves gave rise to such misunderstanding, because to strongly express their opposition to Catholic teaching, they made use of idioms that were annoying. The doctrine of good works serves as an example. Protestants, however, do not have all the articles of faith that we have. But what they have retained are sacred doctrines. That the Protestant church has never lacked, nor still lacks, virtuous and righteous men who arrange their lives according to the teachings of Christ, we must again admit. Their ceremonies and exercises, too, are skillful in leading men to holiness, although they should be even better and more touching. I do not, therefore, consider holiness, which certainly belongs to our Church, to be a suitable characteristic [242] by which one, whether non-Christian or non-Catholic, could easily arrive at a knowledge of the true Church; for besides the fact that the Protestant church can also be called holy in a certain sense, it requires too much knowledge of Catholic and Protestant dogmatics and morals, and other preliminary knowledge, until I can say with reason: this church is holy, and that one is not. But a sign that is to lead me to the knowledge of a thing [Ding] must be better known than this thing.

§ 49. The true Church must be Catholic. Our theologians are not quite unanimous in the definition of this word. Some, perhaps even most, understand by it the generality of the spread 8. [Such an open concession that even canonized saints were not “perfect” was quite extraordinary at the time.] 9. [This comment of Mayr leaves out, however, the central point of Reformed theology—namely, that free will and good works contribute nothing to one’s salvation— a teaching that has direct bearing on moral doctrine.]

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and the generality of the teaching. The true Church must be spread throughout the whole world, or the true teachings of Christ must be gradually proclaimed to all nations, as he himself commanded the apostles: Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, etc. Furthermore, the whole content of the Gospels, or all the teachings of Christ, must be proclaimed everywhere at all times. There is no doubt that the Church is Catholic in this twofold sense; for according to Christ’s command the gospel must be preached everywhere, and since he also promised that he would remain with his apostles, who must preach all that he had taught them until the end of the world, it is also certain that all his teachings will be proclaimed. And that both happened, history testifies. Other theologians, however, understand by the word Catholic Church a society that accepts as true only that doctrine which has always, by all, and everywhere been put forward, or the doctrine to which all churches united with each other and with the Apostolic See profess. Thus, catholicity is a sure sign of the true Church, its antiquity, and its apostolic origin. If catholicity means the spread of the true Church among all nations, then the Protestant church, according to its present state, could certainly also like to boast of this advantage. Among almost all nations one finds individual Protestants, even entire congregations, and if there are countries where there are none, there are also others where there are no Catholics, or no Catholic congregations. The magis [more] and minus [less], or the degree of spread, is somewhat difficult to determine since it varied even in the Catholic Church at different times. But as far as past times are concerned, there was no Protestant church at all three hundred years ago. If catholicity means, however, all the teachings of Christ taken together, which have been presented at all times, then the Protestant church enjoys this advantage only in so far as its essential teachings have been presented at all times; but, as they say, at the same time mixed with many errors. Since, however, Catholics [244] cannot admit this and prove the opposite, the Protestant church is not catholic in this sense either. If, finally, catholic defines a church that only holds the teachings of Christ which have been accepted by all at all times, everywhere, then the Protestant church itself has renounced this characteristic, since it rejects tradition for the explanation of the Bible and lets



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everyone explain the scriptures according to their own insights. In the final sense, therefore, this characteristic is certainly one that belongs to the Catholic Church alone.

§ 50. The true Church must be apostolic. The true Church, which was first founded by the apostles and rests on them as its foundation, must necessarily be able to show that its doctrine is of apostolic origin, and that its bishops, who present this doctrine, follow one another in an uninterrupted series from the times of the apostles and are legally ordained. Again, only the Catholic Church can fully claim this mark. The proof of this has been given in §§ 43–46. All false teachers have either been excluded from the Church or have excluded themselves. They can therefore no longer prove that their teachers have been established by the Church and have their authority to teach from the apostles. The epoch of the teachers of the Protestant Church, for example, begins only at the time of the Reformation, since the line of bishops in each of our churches [245] that is in communion with Rome, goes back uninterruptedly to the times of the apostles. It can be demonstrated that every first bishop of a certain diocese received the authority to teach, to administer the sacraments, etc., either from an apostle or from another bishop who was in communion with the apostles, who stood in communion with the whole Catholic Church, whose first bishops received this authority from the apostles and continued it. The series is not interrupted even if there is no bishop in a diocese for a long time and instead a so-called interregnum or if several men simultaneously claim to be bishops and one does not know who is the true one, or if illegitimate bishops intrude into a diocese. The Church is not a physical, but only a moral building, which does not collapse immediately if it is without a head for a few years. The first legally elected and ordained bishop then does not succeed the illegitimate bishop, but the last legitimate bishop. Often an intruded bishop can become legitimate by acceptance and consent of his church, if only his ordination has no other essential defects. Likewise, a bishop who has bad morals does not lose his power because it depends on the dignity of his person, not on his morals.

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§ 51. [246] We have not only proved that the church in general is infallible, but that this infallible church is the Roman Catholic Church; for the first church, which the apostles founded, was infallible and must continue to the end of the world (§ 41). Thus, all who accused it of error (§ 42) erred themselves and the Church remained the true one from which others separated only under the pretext that it had erred, or excluded others from its fellowship because they were guilty of error (§ 43). These are the false teachers of all times, or the so-called heretics, who individually or in whole congregations left the old church (§ 44). This church consisted of special united congregations, or particular churches, among which the Roman particular church was the most distinguished (§ 45). That church, or those united congregations, are therefore the true Church; among which the Roman particular church is the noblest and has therefore been called after it the Roman Catholic Church. Yet, what would happen if the Roman particular church separated itself from all the others or was even excluded from the community of the others because of an error? How could one then recognize the true Church? Or is perhaps this Roman Church infallible, so that this case is not even possible? I do not want to get involved here in the dispute about the infallibility of the pope or his Roman Church. [247] Therefore, I postpone the answer to this question until the case once becomes real.10 Up to now the Roman Church has remained united with the others, from which some separated under the pretext of a noted error, or it excluded others because of their innovations in religion, and I hope that it will always remain so, even if the Church were not infallible in itself. It is enough that God, by the quite natural way of providence, 10. [The First Vatican Council (1869/1870) decreed it a dogma that the Roman Pontiff can teach infallibly. See Richard Costigan, The Consensus of the Church and Papal Infallibility: A Study in the Background of Vatican I (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); John W. O’Malley, Vatican I: The Council and the Making of the Ultramontane Church (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2019); Hermann J. Pottmeyer, Towards a Papacy in Communion. Perspectives from Vatican Councils I & II (New York: Herder & Herder, 1998).]



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has arranged everything in such a way that it will not fall into any error, even if it could fall into it. And that God has arranged it this way can be assumed from what has happened so far. Yet, if the above case should ever occur, God will certainly see to it that his true Church still remains recognizable.11

§ 52. Yet, this whole proof of the infallibility and of the characteristics of the true Church will perhaps seem to some too artificial and too studied to be useful for the common crowd. Is there no other way to present it in a more comprehensible way? This, too, I will attempt, and it shall become apparent how unjustified therefore the Protestant accusation of Catholicism as blind faith is.12 May my attempt have the effect that they stop mocking us, since the faith of their common people [248] is nothing more and nothing less than such blind faith, which, however, has incomparably weaker foundations than the faith of the common Catholic. It would be time for them to stop riding against us on such wooden horses [Steckenpferden]. A few more reminders are necessary, before I present the proof itself. The faith of the unlearned as well as of the learned is based on the same reasons. The only difference consists in the fact that the commoners are not able to develop these reasons, to state them clearly, and to answer the objections that are made against them. The scholar, on the other hand, can do all that. We all begin to believe for the same reasons. Yet the scholar cultivates his powers of understanding better, he reads and thinks more about what he believes because he has opportunity, instruction, and time for it, while the unlearned person does not. However, faith is equally firmly founded in both. The latter is perhaps better off than the former because he does not know all the intellectual difficulties that can mislead the scholar. For his part, the peasant is as convinced as the scholar of his religion, namely that Jesus lived in the past and introduced the Christian religion, even if he could not prove 11. [Here Mayr suggests that the Church does not have the privilege of indefectibility, which means that it can fall into error.] 12. [Literally: “Köhlerglaube.”]

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this to a Turk or a pagan. It does not matter, therefore, whether one has thought about the faith for a long time or not, but whether the reason on which the faith is based is correct and undeniable. I am only to be led to the right path to salvation. Whether I am led by night without [249] knowing the whole region through which I must pass, or by day seeing all that lies along the road, does it really matter as long as I am on the right way? The one who believes simple-mindedly gains just as much in the end as the other who thinks about everything and broods, even though this thinking and brooding remain necessary for Christianity. The truth of Christianity, and the truth of the Catholic faith, is certainly no more difficult to prove than any other fact based on the certainty of human testimony, and consequently no more difficult to believe. Now the common people believe a lot of things that are indispensable for their peace, for their preservation, without clearly understanding the reasons for their faith. The same can happen with regard to divine faith. Several motives, which often form a unity, can at once carry away the common man that he must believe, and he believes firmly although he is unable to always express why he believes. Consequently, there is a world of difference between blind faith and a faith whose reasons one cannot develop clearly. This also happens very often with mere human faith. The subject believes correctly and firmly that his present sovereign is his rightful lord, but it would often be difficult for him to explain the reasons for his belief. Is his faith therefore a blind faith? [250] Far from it—he acts according to reasons, and not unreasonably. The faith of the simple consists of the following: First, the articles of my faith were revealed by God because Jesus and his apostles presented them. Second, Jesus and his apostles have revealed them because the Church testifies to them. I say that the simplest man can be sufficiently convinced of these two things, and can therefore reasonably believe them, even if he is not able to clearly state and explain the actual motives of his faith.



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§ 53. The simple-minded and unstudied can reasonably believe that Jesus and his apostles are the founders of the Christian religion.

A person knows that one counts now 1,789 years from the birth of Christ. The Christian religion, which has its name from him, was not always there; it must have begun after that time. A religion does not take its beginning from itself, without a preacher and founder, and the most ignorant man, if he is to accept a religion, must have someone to present it to him, to give him proofs and reasons. Now Catholics and false believers, Jews, and pagans, and Turks13 are unanimous in this— that Jesus founded and spread the Christian religion through the help of his apostles. [251] It must therefore be true after all; otherwise, all could not think so unanimously about this fact. Furthermore, he sees that the name of Jesus is invoked everywhere, the Christians who are called by him, the crosses, the images that remind the commoner of Jesus’s history; he hears the prayers addressed to him, the profession of faith in him, the teaching of his doctrine, notices the festivals that are celebrated in his memory, etc. Even if he cannot recite all this as it is written here, it is nevertheless certain that all these reasons taken together, even if obscurely expressed, create the reasonable conviction in him that Jesus and his apostles are the founders of the Christian religion.

§ 54. He can reasonably believe that what Jesus and his apostles taught was revealed by God. Such a commoner can conclude: I experience in myself how difficult it would be for me if I now had to accept a religion other than the one in which I was born, if, for example, I now had to become a Jew, Turk, or pagan, and other people will probably be like me. I at least would not surrender if I were not convinced that my present religion is false and that the one I am to accept is the true one. I would not believe it if someone told me that my good friend, [252] whom I saw die and buried some days ago, had come back to life, if I had not seen him alive myself or heard this from witnesses, whose testimony I could not possibly 13. [Muslims.]

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doubt. But now I know that almost the whole world has renounced its old religion and accepted the Christian one instead, that the apostles believed that their teacher, who had been executed in Jerusalem in the presence of many thousands of people, had risen from the dead and visibly ascended to Heaven. This would not have been believed if they had not obviously proved it. Consequently, there was no other proof than convincing them through the working of miracles. Otherwise, the people would not have been so convinced of the truths told by their master that they even sacrificed their lives to witness them. The festivals that are held in memory of these martyrs convince me of this. Yet, if the apostles worked miracles in proclaiming Christianity, their teaching is divine, because they must have been messengers of God. Again, I readily admit that the simple-minded man does not arrange his proof just as I lay it out here. Moreover, I also admit that my argument is incomplete. Yet as far as the commoner is concerned, these more or less realized reasons will affect and satisfy his mind and thus lead him to the truth. He does not notice the gaps in the proof, because he does not know the objections [253] that are made against it. Nor does he know the objections of the Pyrrhonists against the testimony of the senses, and yet he sees the sun in the sky just as the scholar who can resolve these objections.

§ 55. He can reasonably believe that Jesus and his apostles presented the doctrine that the Church claims as its own. A commoner sees that when a pastor or a bishop dies somewhere, another one is immediately appointed in his place. He knows that this new one must teach what his predecessor taught, or he would be excluded from the community of the Church, and he experiences himself that he teaches the same thing. And so, he thinks, it will always have been. And from this he concludes that the present bishops are both legitimate successors of the apostles in the teaching office and in authority, and that the pope is a legitimate successor of St. Peter, just as the present pontiff is a legitimate successor of his ancestor in authority. He knows one thing as well as the other.



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He further recognizes that his pastor, his bishop, and the pope have a spiritual and divine power, as his judge and his sovereign have a temporal one, and that he must obey everyone in matters concerning his eternal and temporal welfare. The predicate catholic, which his Church appropriates to itself, which is as old as Christianity itself, because it is already contained in the Apostles’ Creed [254]—this predicate teaches him that his Church has made it its fundamental law to always teach what has always been taught everywhere and by everyone. Consequently, the Church must also have always taught what it has received from the apostles. Yes, he sees that a falsification of the apostolic doctrine was impossible because the congregations or bishops scattered all over the world could not agree on a falsification among themselves, since their antipathy, national jealousy, attachment to a doctrine hitherto considered divine, and zeal for catholicity had to prevent them from doing so. Since no pastor and no bishop could falsify the true doctrine with impunity, he reasonably believes his pastor, who is in communion with his bishop, and this bishop with the Roman Pontiff, and with the whole Church, that he is still presenting to him that doctrine that Christ and the apostles presented. His faith is as reasonable as if he believes that a judge will judge him according to the laws of the land, as long as the sovereign and his courts, who know how the judge proceeds, do not punish his proceedings.

§ 56. These reasons, more or less developed, are the foundation of the faith of all Catholics, whether scholars or unlearned. They, the unlearned, believe not in the word of a single man, but in the word of a man who is in communion with the whole rest of the Church and teaches [255] what it teaches. They are convinced that the teaching of the Church could not be falsified. They believe that Church is Catholic and is characterized by its antiquity and immutability of doctrine. They believe the Church that leads them to the truth by way of instruction, a way to which they owe their most important and indispensable knowledge anyway, and which alone is the most suitable and safest for the unlearned as well as for the learned.

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Let us now make a comparison as to where there is more blind faith,14 among us or among the Protestants, and also where it is easier to find the truth. We are reproached that our unlearned members cannot rely on the authority [Ansehen] and testimony of the Church if they do not first take the Bible into their hands and convince themselves from it of the infallibility of the Church. They would first have to refute the objections of non-Catholics, and decide about the disputes of Catholic theologians as to whether infallibility is to be sought from the pope or from the general councils, etc. No, our unlearned take a shorter path: the general doctrine is the old doctrine, and the old doctrine is the apostolic doctrine, because the latter could not be generally falsified. All this follows from reason. I do not need biblical testimony to prove the infallibility of the Church, nor examination of tradition. That is now generally taught. So, it has been taught at all [256] times. So, the apostles taught it. This gives me a moral certainty that the present teaching is a revealed teaching, and if I do not accept this moral certainty, there is none at all. The unlearned Protestant, however, accepts the Bible as the written word of God on the word of his teacher. Without relying on the testimony of the Church, there is nothing that could prove that the Bible is the Word of God, not even the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, which, even if one feels it, can only show that the truths contained in the Bible are divine, but not the Bible itself—and not even this is valid, because the moral teachings contained in the Bible could also have been invented by men, and the mysteries invented, as long as the testimony of the Church does not tell me that the latter were not invented by human wisdom, and the former not fictitious. The belief in the divinity of the Bible on the part of a Protestant is therefore certainly a blind faith.15 It is just the same with regard to the integrity and credibility of the Bible. If a Protestant accepts the Bible as a divine, unadulterated, and credible book, comes the second difficulty: What does the Bible teach me? And this can be answered with regard to the vast majority of non-Catholics in this way: It teaches me what my teacher 14. [Literally: “Köhlerglaube.”] 15. [“Köhlerglaube.”]



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tells me, the system of the Protestant church, if my parents, my teachers, etc. are Protestant; or in another case, the system of the Reformed or Socinian church. The teacher leads the way, and the crowd follows. [257] He freely reads the Bible and convinces himself that his teacher is right. Yet he would also convince himself in the same way if his teacher told him to find Calvinism in it. Even there, under the cover of selfexamination, is again the blind faith16 in the teacher’s reputation. If an attempt were made to give the Bible to a hundred people who knew nothing but that the Christian religion was the true one, and to ask them to record the system of belief they would find in it without outside guidance, would a hundred evangelical or a hundred uniform systems come out? Without a doubt, one would always be different from the other. And yet these hundred persons would, under the leadership of one teacher, all have become either Protestant or Reformed, depending on whether he adhered to this or that church. So do not say that the faith of most of their unlearned is not a blind faith.17 Most of them, despite all self-examination, stick to the doctrine they have learned in their youth, and that one depends on which party the first teacher of the youth belonged to. Of course, this is also the case with Catholics. But the difference is that we have a moral certainty about the orthodoxy of our first teachers, who are in communion with the whole Church, while the unlearned Protestant cannot have such certainty about the orthodoxy of his individual teacher.

§ 57. [258] The creed of a Catholic Christian about any article of faith is thus this: 1. I believe that this article is revealed because the Catholic Church teaches it to me. 2. I believe that the teaching that the Church gives me about this article is infallible, because the teachers of the Church are sent by God, and this is the general teaching of the Church. 16. [“Köhlerglaube.”] 17. [“Köhlerglaube.”]

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3. I believe that the teachers are sent by God, or their mission comes from God, because by virtue of their succession and consecration it is the same as the mission of the apostles, which was certainly divine. 4. I believe that the mission of the apostles was divine, because they proved it by miracles, and all the reasons that are given for the divinity of the Christian religion can also be applied to them. 5. I believe that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God because the Catholic Church believes and teaches it so. 18

§ 58. Answer to some objections. I. Before the unlearned can rely on the reputation of the Church, he must investigate whether this reputation is established, legitimate, and divine. And this inquiry is as difficult and as extensive as the immediate one, whether this [259] or that doctrine is divine. II. The infallibility of the Church is a doctrine of faith. I must therefore first see whether this doctrine is really revealed, and Catholics can never avoid the path of their own investigation. To call this an investigation is to confuse the meaning of the word. If I believe something that is based on obvious and undeniable facts that are obvious to everyone, it does not require heavy, extensive work or efforts that exceed the powers of the unlearned. Thus, the peasant knows his rightful lord and his authority, and he knows that he must obey them, without first needing to investigate at length. His only reason is that he is the rightful successor of the previous sovereign, and that this is established by his lord. As soon as such obvious facts are available, one acts on them and does not investigate for long. It is the same with the reputation of the Church. The simple Christian knows that his teacher is a lawful successor of the previous one, his bishop a lawful successor of the previous one, because the Church has consecrated and appointed him. He knows that one can go back to the times of the apostles, who had their authority from God and communicated it to their successors just as they had received it. He knows that the gen18. Bergier, Traité historique, 10:544–69.



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eral teaching must be the old one, and that this must be the apostolic one, and that his teacher recites the general teaching because he stands in the fellowship of the Church. The undeniability [260] of these facts compels him to rely on the reputation of the Church without any other extensive investigation. The infallibility of the Church is founded, as we have already proved, on those proofs that demonstrate the divinity of the Christian religion. Therefore, it is also a doctrine of faith. I do not need to consult the Bible first. With this the unlearned can satisfy himself without further new investigation. The infallibility of the Church has been proven by the same miracles by which the divinity of Christianity has been proven. So, I can and must accept it as an article of faith (§ 31, 35). III. If one wants to be convinced that the Roman Church is the only visible and true Church, one must first find out the disputes between the Greek and Latin churches, the Nestorians and Armenians, who also claim this advantage. And even if a born believer could spare himself this trouble, a pagan would still have to get involved if he wanted to choose wisely among the many churches. If this investigation were necessary for a Christian, it would not be so difficult to carry it out. One could only proceed in this way. The true Church of Christ is infallible. Thus, the Greek, Nestorian, and Armenian churches erred, since they accused the old Church of error, and therefore separated from it, or were separated from it. But I do not see why one cannot be convinced of the truth [261] of a matter without knowing and seeking out all objections that are made against it. Millions of people firmly believe in a God, and yet, before they believe, do not examine the objections of the atheists. The unlearned Christian is satisfied if he knows the true Church and leaves it to the scholars to investigate why other churches cannot be the true ones. God did not give us the knowledge of religion so that we can quarrel with each other about his teachings and remain Christian just in theory. Everything depends on the practice. If the unlearned Christian gets to know the true Church only once and thus has the true religion, he can practice it and live unconcerned about other churches and their opinions. When seeking the true Church, the pagan may perhaps fall into a false one. If, out of an insurmountable error, he believes this to be

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the true one and enters it, God will not impute his error to him. If he, however, finds the true Church, he does not need to examine the other churches. Only in the one case could the investigation become far-reaching for him if he first came into an erroneous church and could not convince himself that this was the true one. In that case, it could happen that he would have to examine one erroneous church after another until he finally found the true one. But even then, the work would not be too burdensome; for the error he discovered in the false church, and would find in one as in the other, would lead him ultimately [262] to the true Church, which only accepts the old general teaching as the true one. IV. If one must adhere to the old doctrine, the Peruvian will not be wrong if he sticks to the religion of Manco-Capac, the Indian not if he sticks to that of Brama. Yes, he will not be lacking, if he knows, as the Catholic knows, that his religion is divine in origin and has been propagated to him through tradition. But no one else knows this besides a Christian.

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The Boundaries of Infallibility § 59. Finally, we have come to the most difficult point in this whole matter. If this is properly determined, I believe that it will not be so difficult to settle some of the disputes that have hitherto existed between us and Protestants. It seems to me that they have argued about something that should never be argued about and have disregarded the very thing on which the whole matter depends. One argued about whether the Church was infallible, and one should never have argued about that. The Protestant who doubts the infallibility of the Church can no longer prove the existence of a divine revelation either; because both are based on the same witnesses and testimonies, [263] which neither always nor ever prove anything. Without rejecting all moral certainty arising from testimony, one cannot deny the infallibility of the Church (§ 32). Our theologians, on the other hand, claimed that the Church was infallible, but did not set the boundaries beyond which the realm of infallibility does not extend. It has been said that the Church is infallible only in doctrines of faith and morals. But now the question arises: What are these doctrines of faith and morals? One answers: All those teachings that the Church identifies as such. This seemed to the Protestants to be extremely questionable. They realized that they would have to put up with not only all the doctrines of faith that had already been decided, but also those that were still to be decided as soon as they would admit the infallibility of the Church. So, they took the shortest way,

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and denied infallibility itself. Perhaps they would not have asserted an idea that endangered the foundations of Christianity if our theologians had expressed themselves more precisely [bestimmter] about the limits of infallibility. We should never have argued about infallibility, but at most only about its limits. If there is still a way to unification between us and the Protestants, it does not consist in giving up the doctrine of infallibility. We Catholics will never be able to do that. But neither will it consist in Protestants accepting this doctrine unconditionally without further specification. They will never do this either. [264] In the first case we would have to all become Protestants, in the second they would have to all become Catholics. The best thing would be if a middle course could be found, so that infallibility would remain, and yet Protestants would not be forced to accept all the teachings of the Catholic Church as divinely revealed doctrines. If it is possible to find such a middle course, it cannot be done otherwise than by restricting the infallibility of the Church within narrower limits without its prestige suffering.

§ 60. We ourselves admit that infallibility has certain limits. Thus, all say that this infallibility does not extend to merely philosophical and historical matters that have no connection with the history of religion, and even if the Church were to decide something about it, no one would be bound to believe at the risk of losing Heaven. Other theologians, also Catholic, go further, and say that the infallibility of the Church does not extend to the canonization of the saints, to the approval of ecclesiastical orders, to the so-called facta dogmatica, or to matters of discipline, so that those ordinances, institutions, and ceremonies must always be the most appropriate that are pronounced by it; or even, if they were good at a certain time, remain so forever. In short, infallibility is restricted merely to doctrines of faith [265] and morals.1 Could it not perhaps be limited still more? 1. [Cf. the discussion of ecclesiastical authority and infallibility, and consequently freedom, in Ludovico Muratori, De Ingeniorum Moderatione in Religionis Negotiis (Paris: 1714), bk. 1, ch. 10–24.]



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Perhaps someone will interrupt me now and say: So, the author is trying to persuade us to abandon some doctrines of faith? That is a heretical, godless desire. Whoever does not have the patience to hold back his judgment until he has read my whole proposal and thought it through, may in God’s name pick up stones and throw them at me. Modest readers will wait with their judgment and with their assumptions until they have the whole argument before them. It all depends on finding a correct and unchanging rule according to which it can be determined without danger of error what is an article of faith.2 If, then, among our dogmas there were some which, according to this rule, could not be articles of faith, they might still be true in themselves, as there are many other natural and unrevealed truths. But Protestants could not be urged to believe them, even if they lost their blessedness, because the Church had decided them, so long as they did not also, as we do, make sense of them on grounds of reason. And the infallibility of the Church would not come into question. For the Church is infallible only in articles of faith. And in our presupposition, these doctrines cannot be articles of faith. It does not yet follow from this that the Church has decided something false or erroneous; for what it has decided may be true, [266] without it therefore already having to be an article of faith or revealed by God. And even if it were erroneous, it does no harm to the Church’s infallibility, which does not extend beyond its sphere, as little as it harms it if it canonizes one who may not be sacred. Again, some people may have misgivings. But I ask him to put them aside in the meantime, until he has read the context of all my sentences. By the way, everything that I am going to say here should not be considered as my own opinion yet. My intention is not to dogmatize here. It is an idea that has occupied me for a long time, and I want to present it for consideration to men who have much deeper insights than I do. If it receives their applause, I think it should really deserve attention. If they find something wrong with it, I am also satisfied, and 2. [The classic early modern text for determining what was an article of faith and what was not, was François Véron’s (1575–1649) Règle générale de la foy catholique (Paris: 1645), translated by J. Waterworth under the title The Rule of Catholic Faith (Birmingham: 1833).]

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I will accept with gratitude the remarks they want to share with me about it. Only to those who will perhaps condemn and denigrate me about it, I cannot answer. Proposals for peace may always be made, and even if they are reprehensible in themselves, the one who has made them in the most honest and best opinion does not deserve to be mistreated. Our present theologians all still hold rigidly to the traditional boundaries of infallibility. Who knows if one will not find even older boundaries that limit the area of infallibility even more narrowly? If the effort I have spent on this [267] was in vain, then we have one more to add to the hundred projects that are daily in vain.

§ 61. Christ appeared in the flesh to redeem men and to teach them the way in which they should make use of this redemption and apply it to themselves. This was indisputably the main cause of Christ’s appearance on earth, as all non-Socinian-minded people admit. That he sealed his teaching with his blood—that he gave us examples of a virtuous life, does not contradict our statement. He was therefore virtuous, he put the seal on his teachings by voluntarily accepting death, so that we should learn from him to live and die virtuously, and thereby make use of his redemption.

§ 62. If, after the work of redemption, Christ’s only purpose is to teach us how to be saved, then all the arrangements He has made have this purpose. All institutions are means to an end and are only ordered so that the end may be safely achieved through their application. Therefore, whatever Christ has ordained is there for the purpose of leading us directly or indirectly to salvation.



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§ 63. Because the means exist only for the sake of the end, no further interpretation or effectiveness can be granted to them than is necessary to achieve the end. [268] This is self-evident.

§ 64. As the foundation of the Church itself, so also all its power, so all the advantages given to it, are nothing else but means to the end to lead the people to eternal bliss. This is evident from § 62. If, then, one wishes to judge whether this or that power, this advantage or this privilege belongs to the Church, one has only to consider whether this power, this advantage, this privilege is necessary to lead men directly or indirectly into the order of salvation prescribed by Christ, or not. If it is necessary, it is also due to the Church; for he who wants the end also wants the means, and Christ certainly gave his Church all the power without which the end cannot be attained. But if it is found that this power has no necessary connection with the salvation of men’s souls, it may indeed come to the Church for some other reason, but not because it is to be a means to the end of the Church; for it is not.

§ 65. The infallibility of the Church is a means to the end of ushering people into the Christian order of salvation. [269] This sentence is admitted by all Catholic theologians, and I have already proved the necessity of this infallibility above. The Church must be able to infallibly tell everyone who enters its community, asks it for advice in doubt, and entrusts himself to its guidance, what he must believe and do if he wants to be saved, and the Church must be able to say what Christ has prescribed for this purpose.

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§ 66. I call the infallibility of the Church that privilege that Christ gave to his Church to teach everything without danger of error, which is indispensably necessary or useful to the believers for the attainment of salvation, and not to be able to teach anything that leads away from the order of salvation. For infallibility is a means to the end of the Church’s existence. The Church exists for this purpose, and infallibility is conferred upon it for this reason, that it may introduce humanity to the Christian order of salvation (§65). First, therefore, it must teach the whole order of salvation prescribed by Christ without danger of being mistaken and of misleading others; secondly, it must be able to teach nothing that would lead humans away from the order of salvation; [270] for this alone is not enough for it to teach all that Christ has taught. In addition to the teachings of Christ, it could present others that are in themselves erroneous and contrary to them. In fact, the Protestants claim this about the Church. They admit that the true order of salvation has never been lost in it; but they also say that gradually such doctrines have crept in that men have derived from the Christian order of salvation, such as the doctrine of veneration of the saints, which is said to be detrimental to faith and trust in Christ. This twofold infallibility is indispensable for the Church to teach everything that is necessary for the salvation of the soul and to teach nothing that is contrary to the teachings of Jesus. If it has this, then every believer can safely leave himself to its guidance, and the Church achieves the ultimate purpose of its existence. First, therefore, it does no harm to the infallibility of the Church if, in addition to the order of salvation, it teaches something and even commands it as a means for the faithful, if this is not contrary to the order of salvation but is still useful and helpful to them. Secondly, it does no harm if the Church proclaims these means as prescribed by Christ himself, even though they come from the Church alone. The Church erred and misled the faithful3 to such an extent that something was 3. [This claim was considered outrageous by contemporary theologians and Church authorities.]



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considered revealed that was not, but this error changed nothing in the order of salvation, because it was not contrary to it and the prescribed means were still useful for the easier [271] promotion of salvation. Infallibility achieves its purpose perfectly when it teaches the whole order of salvation and nothing that is contrary to it. Now, according to our presupposition, it teaches the whole order of salvation and in addition something that is not contrary to it, but as a suitable means of promoting the salvation of souls. We want to explain this by some examples. Let us make this assumption: It is not revealed that there is a place of purification, and yet the Church defines it as a revealed truth that there is a purgatory. The Church is therefore mistaken in that it claims something to be revealed that is not revealed; or, if I may express it this way, it is mistaken about the form or the framing, under which it presents the matter to the faithful. But from this it does not yet follow that the Church is mistaken in the matter itself. It can, after all, still be true that there is a place of purification, even if it is not revealed that it exists. Yet this teaching must not contradict revelation but must rather introduce humans into the order of salvation. If this is the case, the doctrine itself remains salvific, and the infallibility of the Church attains the purpose for which alone it was conferred (§ 63, 64, 65). Whether the people believe the Church only that the doctrine of the existence of a place of purification is suitable and useful to introduce them to the order of salvation, or whether they also believe that this doctrine is really revealed, has no different effect. The purpose of infallibility is achieved in both cases. The believer who is [272] convinced of the infallibility of the Church in matters concerning the order of salvation always knows that the doctrine of purgatory is useful. Consequently, I do very well when I pray for the deceased, when I guard myself against small sins, and when I seek to do enough for the justice of God already in this world. On the point that a doctrine is also revealed, which is recommended as useful and in accordance with revelation, the Church has no need of infallibility, and if it errs in this regard, it errs in a matter that is not indispensably necessary to introduce humans to the order of salvation, and that is after all an area for which infallibility has not been promised. Moreover, to err in such matters is as little a disgrace to the Church as if it errs in

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merely philosophical matters, an area for which it was also not promised infallibility. The Church has decided that the books of the Maccabees and other second rank [zweyten Range] writings of the Old Testament are canonical.4 Does it follow from the ultimate purpose of infallibility that it must be infallible in this decision? It seems that this is not necessary. If the believer only knows that these writings contain nothing that is contrary to the order of salvation, but much that can promote the attainment of blessedness, he can safely leave himself to the guidance of the Church, which must be infallible in such matters; he can read them for his own private edification, and also accept [273] as true the doctrines that are proved from them. The certainty that these books are also directly of divine origin has no influence on his faith, at least none that would change anything in the order of salvation. The Church claims to have a revelation about these and similar teachings. But one should distinguish between two things, the doctrine and its origin. About the doctrine itself, the Church must be able to judge infallibly whether it is necessary or useful for the order of salvation, or whether it is harmful (§ 64–66). Yet, the Church does not have to judge with respect to the origin of a doctrine. If a teaching is only recommended to the faithful as useful, such as the veneration of the saints, the Church could be mistaken about its origin. It could declare a doctrine to be divine, a book to be divine, without this having any influence on the order of salvation, in view of which alone infallibility has been promised to it and is necessary. If someone does not believe these teachings and does not do what they recommend, he omits something that is useful for salvation but not necessary, and still remains orthodox in all other teachings that necessarily concern the order of salvation. But if another believes them, and at the same time holds them to be divinely revealed doctrines, he believes something false in regard to the origin of these doctrines, but not a false doctrine. And this is the only thing that matters if he wants to be saved and safely commit himself to the Church’s guidance to salvation. If he knows that the Church infal4. [The idea that the deuterocanonical books are not part of revelation is deeply problematic, not only because they contain crucial texts for Catholic doctrine. Fallibility in this context would also imply undermining the whole of Scripture as revealed.]



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libly shows him [274] the way to this end and can teach him nothing that would lead him astray from it, then he can be completely reassured, even if the Church is mistaken as to the origin of a doctrine and considers it revealed, when in fact it is not revealed. Since, then, in the case of such doctrines, the believer only needs to be convinced that the doctrines are good, but not that they are of direct divine origin, one could also conclude from this that infallibility is conferred onto the Church only with respect to the first point, but not with respect to the second, since infallibility is conferred only for the reassurance and instruction of the faithful. An error concerning the origin of a doctrine can do as little harm to the Church itself and lower its authority among the faithful as if it had unanimously decided against Galileo that the earth stood still and the sun moved around it. Even if all physicists and astronomers proved that the matter could not possibly be as the Church says, a Christian should not doubt the Church’s infallibility, for he knows that the Church has been given no other infallibility and for no other purpose than to guide the faithful into the order of salvation. Yet he realizes that he may well be saved even if he believes that the sun or the earth are moving, because this has no influence on the inward improvement of his heart, and in general on all doctrines of faith and morals. Thus, his confidence in the infallibility of the Church cannot be diminished if it [275] errs only in a matter that does not belong to the sphere of its infallibility, because all Catholics admit that the Church can err in such matters. If, however, because of the authority of the Church, someone wanted to believe that the sun moves around the earth, which is false, this error would not prevent him from attaining Heaven, and would be a harmless mistake. It would be the same if the Church were mistaken about the divine origin of a doctrine and it were proven that it did not come directly from God. The teaching, as we presuppose, is good and leads into the order of salvation. In this, then, the Church cannot be mistaken since it recommends the teaching as useful. The believer does not need to know whether it is directly of divine origin, because it has no necessary influence on the improvement of the heart, and in general on the doctrines of faith and morals. Therefore, it does not belong to the sphere of the infallibility of the Church. Consequently, it cannot

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diminish people’s trust in the Church if it errs in matters that do not belong to the sphere of its infallibility. I easily foresee that a great many objections could be raised against this concept of infallibility, and I will hereafter answer all those that occur to me. Let me now only mention a few remarks, which are very important, and even if they do not yet make a complete union between us and the Protestants possible, they certainly remove many [276] obstacles that have stood in the way of this union up to now.

§ 67. If this concept of infallibility is accepted, it can be proven just as well as before when it is extended further. The concept is: The Church teaches everything that is necessary for our salvation, and it teaches nothing that leads away from it or can be harmful to us with regard to our salvation. We proved that this infallibility belongs to the Church because unanimous testimony gives moral certainty that God has revealed something (§ 31). This argument remains with all those doctrines that have this unanimous testimony for themselves. If in some doctrines of the Church this testimony is lacking, or cannot be asserted with certainty, they can nevertheless still be true, and we shall see how the latter can be distinguished from the first. We proved them from the mission of Jesus, his apostles, and the teachers (§ 35, I) from the nature of the Church, and its preservation up to now (ibid. II), from the attributes which the Church has always ascribed to itself (ibid. III), from the promises of Christ that the Church should never be overpowered by the gates of Hell, that he would remain with the teachers of the Church to the end of the world, that the Church was the foundation and pillar of truth (ibid. IV), from [277] tradition (ibid. V). Otherwise, we could not reliably know the way of salvation (§ 37, I). Because God could and wanted to propagate his revelation also in writing (ibid. II). Because really no doctrine can be shown that would conflict with the order of salvation, and any falsification of doctrine was impossible (ibid. III). All these proofs still stand, if only the Church teaches everything that is necessary for the order of salvation and teaches nothing that leads away from it, even if it claimed a doc-



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trine as revealed that does not come directly from God, because the faithful no longer need certainty about this point as soon as they know that the doctrine itself is good, and that it can do them no harm in attaining Heaven if they also differ with the Church on this point (§ 66).

§ 68. This so limited infallibility of the Church Protestants themselves admit, and must admit. They do not deny that the Catholic Church, despite all the other errors for which they blame it, has still preserved the true order of salvation. They do not doubt that the Savior will preserve his Church in such a state until the end of the world that it will always be possible to find the true order of salvation. With regard to those doctrines of our Church in which they differ from us, and which they declare [278] to be errors, we have only to show them that they are useful for the attainment of Heaven and are not contrary to the order of salvation, even if they should not have been revealed, as we believe, and that they acted unjustly by declaring them pestiferous for the soul, superstitious, and unchristian. In the whole Bible there is said to be nothing about the veneration of saints and images, nothing about the pope, auricular confession, and other doctrines in which we differ, and the Church acclaims these as praiseworthy, useful, and at the same time as revealed. Yet, if the latter is not demonstrable, will it therefore be a false church, will it be the Babylonian whore, from which one must necessarily separate oneself, which one must publicly detest? No, that would be an exaggeration. On the one hand, one must admit that the true order of salvation is still in the Church; on the other hand, one cannot prove that these teachings, taken in the meaning of the Church, are harmful to the order of salvation; rather, I will show that they are useful, even if they do not always, for all times, and for all people, provide the benefit that one expected from them. The infallibility of the Church would remain unimpaired. And that the Protestants cannot dispute the infallibility of the Church at all without at the same time overthrowing the proof of the divinity of the Christian religion has already been shown in § 31 and elsewhere.

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§ 69. Doctrines that have not been directly revealed can still be called revealed. [279] Perhaps some who read the foregoing were distressed about the infallibility of the Church, because it was admitted that the Church could claim something to be revealed that was not revealed. But there I was only talking about direct revelation, and this must be distinguished from indirect revelation. Directly revealed, I call only those teachings that Christ and the apostles themselves have expressly presented. Indirectly revealed doctrines are those that have their basis in the Bible, but which are not proved from the Bible alone, but mainly from reason. One sees the truth of such a teaching from reason, compares it with the directly revealed truths, and finds that it not only does not contradict them, but also helps to further their intention. One even discovers passages in the Bible that seem to speak for these natural truths. If the Church decides on such a doctrine, it can always be said that it is at least indirectly revealed, because it does not contradict the direct revelation, promotes the intention of the same, and seems to have its basis in the Bible. Theologians usually call those indirectly revealed doctrines whose truth is connected with the truth of a directly [280] revealed doctrine, or which necessarily flows from it (for example, that I was born in original sin is an indirectly revealed truth, because it follows necessarily from the general doctrine: All men sinned in Adam). Otherwise, this general proposition would not be true if I were not included among them. Thus, it is also an indirectly revealed doctrine that Christ had all the essential qualities of man in himself, because it is directly revealed that he assumed human nature; for where nature is, its qualities must also be. Yet, one would speak more definitely if one called these doctrines co-revealed truths, or necessary corollaries from the directly revealed truths. By indirectly revealed truths, however, I do not mean those that follow directly from revelation, but those that do not contradict it and are nevertheless in accordance with it; and are, moreover, proved by reason. If Christ has promised his assistance to his Church, that it must teach everything that belongs to the order of salvation, and can teach



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nothing that leads away from it, and if he has communicated to the Church the authority to teach in general, then it is also revealed by this very fact that every teaching that the Church presents does not contradict a direct revelation, but promotes its final purpose. And in this respect every such doctrine may be regarded as indirectly revealed, though the reason for believing it is not the immediate revelation itself, but the authority [281] of the Church. By the way, I do not at all admit that such a truth decided by the Church can be false. Only that its status as directly revealed can be false. And this difference alone is important enough, as we shall see presently. Such indirectly revealed truths are still further distinguished by the scholastic theologians, for these have never the testimony of the whole Church, but only of individual men, and whoever rejects them is not guilty of disobedience to the authority of the Church. Nor are they based on irrefutable truths of reason. The difference I have made between directly and indirectly revealed truths—according to my explanation—is not new, and not unheard of in our Church. One has already accepted dogmata fidei and dogmata ecclesiastica, and doctrines that one must believe only fide ecclesiastica,5 and others that one must believe fide divina. Several merely ecclesiastical institutions and ordinances were often attributed by the Church to divine institution, which were certainly 5. [A truth is believed fide ecclesiastica (or fide mediate divina), with ecclesial faith, if it is taught infallibly by the Church as a consequence of revealed doctrine. Particular truths—for example, whether this or that council was orthodox, are believed fide ecclesiastica and thus on the basis of the moral certitude the Church offers. See Franz Hettinger, Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik (Freiburg: 2nd. ed., 1888), 765. Mayr’s idea rests on the assumption that the Church’s faith cannot grow and develop. Everything that was added after the creed was formed and was not universally accepted by all churches must be seen as mere Church teaching. This shows nicely the problematic character of such a traditionalist or as Bantle calls it “classicist” understanding of revelation, which Newman overcame. Veritates catholicae are usually considered infallible, however some are merely certae and as such not conclusively part of the deposit of faith. Doctrinae ecclesiasticae are in the scholastic hierarchy of truths those which the Church propagates but which are neither formally nor materially revealed—see Mathias Scheeben, Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik, vol. 1 (Freiburg: 1873), 187.]

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not directly revealed by God. If, therefore, they are to be accepted as certain truths, they must be regarded only as indirectly revealed truths which, though true in themselves, do not flow as necessary corollaries from the directly revealed truths, as truths that seem to have their certain ground in direct revelation [282] and reason, and which one accepts due to the authority of the Church. 1. The Church Council of Trent declared that all seven sacraments were instituted by Christ. Yet older and newer theologians believe it is not a doctrine of faith that Jesus instituted all the sacraments directly. They believe that some were instituted by Christ, but others by the Church, because it saw that the ultimate purpose of revelation would be furthered thereby and had received the authority from Christ to determine in more detail what it would find beneficial to the salvation of believers. Thus dogmata fidei, doctrines of faith, and dogmata ecclesiae, doctrines of the Church [Kirchenlehren], the former revealed directly, the latter indirectly, would not be revealed in such a way that one could prove that they must necessarily be deduced directly from revelation, but only in such a way that they would be in accordance with the final purpose of revelation, because one can prove from reason that they are not only not contrary to it, but even promote its final purpose, because the Church accepts them as such. 2. It is defined that the hierarchy, which consists of bishops, priests, and servants, is determined by divine order. Are the servants, who are not bishops, not priests, also directly appointed by Christ? Some say yes, others no. They derive the latter from the appointment of the apostles, who received from Christ the power—a power that also passed to their successors—to make such arrangements [283] as were found conducive to the furtherance of Christ’s purpose. The divine institution of deacons is therefore not direct, but only indirect, and we believe it to be dogma fidei or divinum, with respect to bishops and priests, and dogma ecclesiæ with respect to deacons. 3. It is defined that according to the evangelical [evangelische] and apostolic doctrine, marriage is indissoluble in case of adultery. And yet many doubt whether this indissolubility is not merely a law of the Latin Church, because it does not reject the contrary practice of the Greeks as



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heresy.6 Thus, it is at most a dogma ecclesiæ that according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine marriage is indissoluble, which means that the Church considers this to be revealed, and yet it cannot be revealed, because otherwise it could not admit the contrary doctrine of the Greek church in union with Rome. Consequently, the Church could be mistaken as to whether something is directly revealed or not. Although it is otherwise more reasonable, without regard to special circumstances, to extend the indissolubility of marriage to this case as well, also because this seems to have its grounding in Scripture. 4. Amort,7 in his Demonstratio critica Religionis catholicæ,8 mentions a great many things that are supposed to be juris divini, or directly instituted by God, and yet are not [284] according to the opinion of all the newer theologians and canonists; for example, the residence of bishops, the immunity of the Church, the power of popes to reserve certain cases of conscience, the power of the Church to impose obstacles to marriage, the forty-day fasts, etc. The same can be said of all these that they are not in themselves contrary to direct revelation, but in accordance with it.9 It can be said that they are in general, if one does not want to inquire their origin, in concordance with reason. Yet, it cannot be said that they are directly revealed. The expression, Juris divini, is therefore to be understood as corresponding to an indirect institution of such teachings, which has its origin in the Church. Thus, theologians have distinguished doctrines and things that one must believe fide divina, and others that one must believe only fide ecclesiastica, and whoever denies the latter is therefore only an audacious person, as they say, but not a heretic. Who does not know the difference they make among various propositions? Of one it is said: It is res fidei, 6. Anton Joseph Dorsch, Beyträge zur Verbesserung des äussern Gottesdienstes in der katholischen Kirche (Frankfurt: 1789), 128, 129. 7. [Eusebius Amort (1692–1775) was one of the most eminent theologians of the Catholic Enlightenment. A member of the Augustinian Canons of Polling in Bavaria, he was a close friend and correspondence partner of Pope Benedict XIV. See Karin Precht-Nußbaum, Zwischen Augsburg und Rom: der Pollinger Augustiner-Chorherr Eusebius Amort (1692–1775): Ein bedeutender Repräsentant katholischer Aufklärung in Bayern (Paring: Augustiner-Chorherren-Verl, 2007).] 8. EusebiusAmort, Demonstratio critica Religionis catholicae (Venice: 1744). 9. Amort, Demonstratio, 254b.

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of the other, Hæc propositio est fidei proxima. He who will not believe that one canonized by the Church is holy will be called a rebel, but not a heretic. The famous Benedict Stattler says:10 “The sentence ‘The book Augustine by Jansen is not orthodox,’ must be believed only fide ecclesiastica, not fide divina, that is because of the [285] authority of the Church, which is infallible in deciding it.” And this amounts to what I have said, that there are divine doctrines of faith that are directly revealed, and Church doctrines that are only indirectly revealed.

§ 70. There is another kind of union possible between us and the Protestants than our theologians have hitherto believed. Under the regularly assumed extension of infallibility, our theologians only give way in matters of discipline. Recently also the aforementioned scholar asserted this approach in the preface to the sixth part, where he, like so many others, wanted to refute me without having seen my system, basing his criticism merely on my proposal.11 This has been said often enough for three and a half hundred years, and Stattler’s plan for a reunification12 is basically not a hair’s breadth different from all previous ones, and listed only marginal issues that hindered the unification. We must in any case discard all of these marginal things, not as erroneous, but as dispensable because they no longer fit the present circumstances, although many things can in themselves further the intention of the revelation, and because the return of so many brethren to the unity of the faith is a far greater good than the retention of all these things. The main issue on which the possibility of a [286] union depends is whether we cannot yield in matters of faith without offending 10. Benedict Stattler, De locis theologicis (Weissenburg: 1775), § 113. 11. [Mayr means here Benedict Stattler, “Anacaephaleosis ad DD. Protestantes in Germania et Propositio Conditionum sub quibus solis Unio Religionis Exoptata possibilis est,” in Theologia Christiana Theoretica, vol. 6 (Eichstätt: 1780), II–IV, who attacked Mayr, Der erste Schritt, vehemently.] 12. [Benedict Stattler, “Anacaephaleosis.” In 1791 Stattler published a new piece on reunification, see his Plan zu der alleinmöglichen Vereinigung im Glauben der Protestanten mit der katholischen Kirche und den Grenzen der Möglichkeiten (Munich: 1791).]



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the infallibility of the Church. If this infallibility is not extended further than its purpose requires, this certainly seems possible. If the Church is infallible only in so far as it is necessary for the initiation of the faithful into the order of salvation, it may and can demand nothing more of those who abandon themselves to its guidance than this: First they have to believe firstly that the person who accepts and practices the Church’s teachings will indisputably find Heaven, and they have to believe secondly that none of its teachings leads away from eternal bliss, but are useful for achieving it. Such an understanding will be sufficient for Catholics and Protestants because those who follow the Church’s guidance in this frame of mind will certainly reach Heaven. And this is the ultimate purpose for which a church exists and for which it has the gift of infallibility. Even if it teaches only according to the guidance of sound reason something that seems to have its basis in real revelation, it is enough for the reassurance of the faithful and for the preservation of the Church’s authority that the believer knows that it cannot lead anyone astray from the path to salvation because of the assistance of the Holy Spirit and other reasons already mentioned, but rather gives useful means to salvation, even if it considers them to be revealed when they are not. Protestants could pass over the point whether the doctrines in which we differ are all directly revealed, for this is really [287] a secondary question, which has no influence on the order of salvation that both churches accept as prescribed by Christ. It depends only on whether the doctrine itself is good for the advancement of the Christian on the way to salvation. And this we must show. Or could Protestants not leave it undecided whether these doctrines were really revealed directly, or whether they were only introduced by the Church because it found them to be in accordance with revelation? We do not want to impose these teachings on them as divinely revealed; we want to concede to them that the Church can err to such an extent that it can claim something to be revealed that is not revealed after all. This alone they should accept from us, that these teachings are not against reason and not against revelation, but rather help to promote its ultimate purpose, which we will prove to them. The Church, however, will then have to relax its strictness somewhat and may no longer condemn Protestants because they do not want to regard these Church

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doctrines as doctrines of faith. This is all the more because the Church itself regards some of them as unnecessary for obtaining salvation and merely as useful. Consequently, it should not impose the acceptance of these doctrines on them but leave their acceptance free. If the reasonableness of these teachings is apparent to them, they will accept them. If they will not become as clear to them as they are to us, then at least they may not condemn us for them any more than we may condemn them. The difference between them and us will then no longer concern doctrines of faith but Church doctrines. [288] Whoever does not accept the latter is not guilty of heresy, only of disobedience to the Church, if the Church prescribes certain practices relating to the doctrines. If, however, they are merely speculative doctrines, he may not publicly contradict them, but may inwardly believe according to their convictions and at their own risk what they consider is good. I hope, however, to put all the doctrines that divide us in such a light that it will not be difficult for Protestants to accept them.

§ 71. Plan for a Reunification I. All doctrines of faith and morals, which have been accepted at all times, everywhere, and by all as the teachings of Christ and the apostles, are teachings that necessarily belong to the order of salvation. Protestants accept these with us anyway. II. All doctrines that are accepted by Catholics alone are doctrines that do not necessarily belong to the order of salvation. It is still in doubt whether they have always, everywhere, and by all been regarded as directly revealed by God. III. The Church does not impose these teachings on Protestants as directly revealed. And the Church also leaves open whether they are directly revealed, because it only depends on whether these doctrines do not contradict revelation and promote its ultimate purpose, but not on whether they are directly revealed. IV. [289] Catholics show that all their distinctive doctrines do not contradict revelation, but rather promote its ultimate purpose, and Protestants accept them as such.



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V. If doctrines are merely speculative, Protestants should be free to believe them inwardly at their own peril, or not; only outwardly should they keep silent about them, and not deny them. But if they are practical at the same time, it depends on whether the exercises based on the doctrine are prescribed by the Church merely as useful or as necessary. They should not be required to do the former, but the latter. How they can comfortably perform these actions without hypocrisy, we will say later. VI. If Protestants do not accept these doctrines and do not perform the actions related to them, they must not be condemned, but the Church is authorized to exclude them from its external communion because they do not obey its leadership. The rest will be said below, where we will deal specifically with each doctrine of distinction and where I will show how far the Church can yield and how Protestants would have to behave.

§ 72. Answer to the objections. I. If the Church can claim that something is revealed which is not revealed, its whole authority falls away. [290] Or why should I believe the Church when it says that the Gospel of Matthew is a divine book, when I am permitted to doubt whether the two books of Maccabees are divine writings, since the Church accepts them as such as revealed. The Church is the witness of revelation. We would like to consider it first just as that, and meanwhile bracket the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit. It is morally certain that its testimony must be true if it is unanimous; that is, if a book has been accepted as divine at all times, everywhere, and by all. That this testimony exists for the Gospel of Matthew, we have shown in the second part. This is not the case with the books of the Maccabees. We know that they are missing in several canons of the Bible of the Old Testament. Certainly, however, Melito, in the canon of the Council of Laodicea, in Pseudo-Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory the Great, in John Damascene, and several others accept these books as canonical. The testimony for the divine origin of the Maccabean books is therefore not

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as unanimous as the testimony for the Gospel of Matthew. Therefore, it is also not morally certain to the same high degree that these books are divine. To speak humanly of the matter, then, one might say that there is a testimony to the Gospel of Matthew that one may not reject without overturning all moral certainty. Yet such strong testimony is lacking [291] for the books of the Maccabees. If the Church now proclaims these books to be canonical, it bases its decision according to the rules of criticism, and thus according to reason, on the testimony of the majority, and rightly so. Thus, it can be proved to Protestants that the teaching of the Church, which accepts the divine authority of these books, is reasonable. It can also be proved that there is nothing in them that contradicts revelation, but that they contain much that promotes its ultimate purpose of it; for example, so many striking proofs of God’s special guidance for his chosen people and for the preservation of the Mosaic religion. Therefore, the doctrine that these books are divine is indeed qualified as a Church dogma [Kirchendogma], and the Church could present and declare it as such. If, however, these books were not directly revealed, the infallibility of the Church would not suffer. This infallibility—I am now speaking of supernatural infallibility—consists, according to its ultimate purpose, only in teaching everything that a person must know in order to be saved and initiated into all truth, and in teaching nothing that could lead him away from it. Since these books contain such things that promote the final purpose of revelation and the happiness of humanity, but nothing that could lead away from it, the decisive question of whether these books were really inspired by God belongs only accidentally to the realm of infallibility. Thus, the authority of the Church would not fall if it claims these books to be divine, even if they were not. [292] When I say this, I do not yet deny that these books are divine. I only want to make a suggestion as to whether the Church could not moderate13 its demand on the Protestants. According to the opinion of theologians, it demands that Protestants accept these books as divine, and condemns those who deny their divinity as heretics. Would it not be enough if they regarded the doctrine that these books are divine only as a Church dogma, which is 13. [The use of the term suggests a strong influence by Muratori, De Ingeniorum Moderatione.]



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not directly revealed, and which one would not be obliged to believe on pain of losing Heaven? But in this way, could one also deny some second rank writings of the New Testament, the deuterocanonical books,14 their divinity? Could then not the Church claim every godly book, which does not contradict the revelation, to be directly revealed? I do not deny the divine inspiration of a single writing of the New Testament. Neither does any Protestant. Some of them argue, however, about the Book of Revelation. The deuterocanonical writings of the New Testament have been unanimously accepted by all churches as divine as soon as the sufficient testimonies for them had been collected. Only until then some churches and private persons withheld their judgment about them. Therefore, their divine origin cannot be doubted. Since, by the way, not a single book, no matter how godly, has for itself the testimony of antiquity that it was inspired by God to an apostle or evangelist, [293] the Church cannot raise any of them to the rank of a divine book. II. According to this opinion, I no longer owe belief to the Church when it decides a Church dogma. Consequently, I would not have had to believe the Church in the past when it presented a directly revealed doctrine of faith, and therefore never at all, because it is not possible to distinguish between what is a dogma of faith and what is a dogma of the Church. The authority of the Church is thus subjected to the judgment of men, who are free to regard something as a dogma of faith or of the Church. I am obliged to believe the Church, even if it puts forward a Church dogma, namely that this is not against the order of salvation established by Christ, but rather promotes it, and this I believe because the Church is promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by virtue of which it must teach everything that is necessary for our salvation and cannot teach anything that leads away from it. In the case of a dogma of faith, I must also believe it, because it is based on the unanimous testimony of all churches, which have always been, and everywhere. In this case I have 14. [The term has somewhat fallen out of use for the New Testament, but included for Protestants the Letter of James, the Letter to the Hebrews, etc., all of which Luther had placed at the very end of his Bible translation.]

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a moral certainty that the doctrine was revealed directly. And from this arises the difference between dogma of faith and Church dogma. Dogma of faith is that which has been believed at all times, everywhere, and by all, before the Church decided it in later times, even if the greater part had accepted it before. The latter has its undoubted foundation in Scripture, or if Scripture does not express it [294] definitely enough, it must be explained according to the unanimous testimony of the ancient Church. Of this neither Scripture speaks expressly, nor is the tradition about it unanimous. If it is now admitted that in the case of a dogma which is not stated clearly enough in Scripture that one may still investigate, even after the decision of the Church, whether it is testified to by the unanimous traditionor not, it does not follow from this that the judgment of the Church is subject to the judgment of men. The inquiry is not concerned with whether the dogma itself must be accepted, whether it is in accordance with revelation, or useful for the order of salvation; for due to the infallibility of the Church it is already true that the doctrine cannot contradict the order of salvation, but rather promotes it. I may only examine whether the dogma is old or new, whether it is a dogma of faith or of the Church. If the Church does not receive any new revelations now, as all theologians teach, the sum of the dogmas cannot be increased, it must remain the one it already was in the apostolic Church. The Church can only develop more clearly the truths already contained in the Bible or present those that have already been presented everywhere and by everyone. Nothing can be presented to me now as a doctrine of faith that was not already generally believed in the old Church.15 However, because the Church has also received from Christ the power to make arrangements and proclaim decrees that promote the ultimate purpose of revelation, [295] and is infallible in this, it can also establish doctrines which only have a probable grounding in revelation. These are now no longer pure Catholic dogmas, but Church doctrines that are true but not directly revealed. The Church can order things that are merely useful, but not necessary for the attainment of salvation. One may well examine whether these things are necessary and recognized as such by the old Church, or whether they are only 15. [This leads to the problem of a static interpretation of revelation, and of course does not allow the development of doctrine.]



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useful and of recent origin. Such an investigation should be welcome by everybody. Thus, we may examine whether a council was a “general” one before we consider ourselves bound to accept its propositions and ordinances. Why should we not be allowed to examine whether the tradition on which the Church is founded was universal, since this examination in particular is not intended to withdraw our obedience or to deny its infallibility, but only to enable us to recognize whether the decided doctrine is a doctrine of faith or of the Church.16 III. If, then, it is not true that everything the Church decides is to be taken for directly revealed truth, but rather that it can proclaim something that is not revealed as revealed, then such a decision seems completely superfluous. It even imposes an unnecessary constraint on our conscience. Let everyone think about such non-revealed things as they please. For the most part, the dispute between Catholics and Protestants [296] is only about whether this or that doctrine is revealed, not whether it is good or true in itself. If, therefore, the Church could have erred in that decision, it has decided nothing at all. The Church can and must decide as soon as disputes arise as to whether something is necessary or useful for the salvation of the faithful. That is why God has given it infallibility. I will explain the matter with an example. The question arises whether auricular confession was instituted by Christ himself, and those who deny this are ready to reject it as soon as it is admitted to them that auricular confession was introduced only by the Church. In this case, the faithful do not know whether they still must confess or not. The Church, which is set up to guide them on the way to salvation, must help them out of their uncertainty and tell them what to do, because the doctrine of confession is not merely speculative, but practical. In the case of merely speculative doctrines that do not directly concern revelation, as in the case of 16. [Mayr makes it a necessary condition that the person undertaking such an examination accepts the authority of the Church and the usefulness of the doctrine. The possibility to reject the doctrine is expressly rejected. All Mayr allows is the determination of the revelatory status of a doctrine, whether it is de fide divina or de fide ecclesiastica. He follows in this regard Muratori’s rules for a moderate freedom in theology, laid out in idem, De Moderatione, bk. 1, ch. 2–3: The doubt of the investigating person, who forms the proposition “Does God exist?” does not doubt God’s existence but tries to elucidate his existence better.]

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school disputes, it can remain silent. If the Church now decides that confession is instituted directly by Christ himself, the faithful always have certainty because of the infallibility of the Church that auricular confession not only does not lead away from the order of salvation, but rather promotes it and is useful. And that alone is what they really need to know in order not to be misled by the opponents of the faith.17 They know again that the Church can bind them to confession, even if this commandment had not been given directly by Christ himself. [297] The decision of the Church is therefore nothing less than superfluous. It preserves a very useful means of promoting the salvation of souls in its authority. It is still possible with this decision of the Church that auricular confession was not instituted by Christ himself. Of great importance is that auricular confession is useful and corresponds to the ultimate purpose of Christ; of secondary importance is that auricular confession was ordered by Christ himself. Even if the latter were an error, it is harmless regarding salvation because people are only improved by confession, but not by the belief that confession was instituted by Christ.18 After all, correction is the purpose of revelation, is a part of the order of salvation, and thus also the purpose of infallibility. We Catholics believe that a voluntary good work is meritorious; for example, hearing19 a Holy Mass. Now if someone believed that it was an express commandment of God that he had to hear Mass, he would not lose his merit because of it; this good work would really be a means of salvation for him. It is the same with confession. I may or may not believe that it is instituted by God, but in itself it always remains a means of salvation. I can admit that the dispute between the Church and its opponents 17. [Mayr does not seem to see that this kind of magisterial teaching would make every proclamation that mentions the revelatory status of a doctrine impossible. After all, the Church does not teach “this is useful,” but rather states “it is part of the faith and revealed.” Whenever the Church says “revealed” it must, according to Mayr, be understood as “useful and promoting salvation.” Is the consequence not that revelation itself is dissolved? The faithful would have to accept the Church’s decision but at the same time bracket its words “revealed” and reinterpret it.] 18. [One can see here a trend in Mayr to see the sacraments merely as tools of moral transformation.] 19. [At the time, one described the participation in the Mass as “hearing.”]



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has always been whether this or that doctrine was revealed, even if it is not generally true. [298] Either the question was about a doctrine which stood in direct connection with another doctrine of faith, in which case the Church had to and could infallibly decide that this doctrine was revealed. This was the case in the disputes with the Nestorians, Eutychians, and Monothelites, etc. Or the dispute concerned a practical doctrine that was not directly connected with the doctrines of faith and was not clearly contained in Scripture. It is certainly true that the opponents began by denying that such a doctrine had been revealed, but that was not all they wanted. The doctrine itself and the practice on which it was based were to fall away, and therefore they also tried to prove mostly by reason that such a doctrine was nonsensical, contradictory, and godless. The Church opposed them and decided that the doctrine was divine, useful, not contradictory, and pious. Thus, the Church decided something very important indeed: namely, exactly what the faithful had to know if they wanted to reasonably lay aside their doubts, even if they had erred in claiming this doctrine to be revealed. IV. If the Church could be mistaken in saying that something is a divine revelation when it is not, I am not bound to believe it fide interna20 and divina when it decides something. Yet, this is a godless and heretical proposition. I must believe the doctrine itself fide interna, and divina; namely, in so far as that which it prescribes is not contrary to the order of salvation, but useful for its advancement [299], but I am not bound to believe fide interna, and divina,21 in the case of Church dogmas, that they are directly revealed on pain of losing Heaven. For example, I must believe that marriage is a sacrament, and that the veneration of the saints is useful, but I am not obliged to believe, on pain of losing salvation, that Christ has directly instituted marriage as a sacrament or directly recommended the veneration of the saints as useful. If I want to doubt the latter, I can do so at my own peril. It depends on whether I have sufficient reasons before me to rely in this matter more on my insights than on the judgment of the Church. Rarely, perhaps never, can 20. [With internal faith.] 21. [Accepting a truth as revealed by God.]

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a single person trust oneself so much. The Church always presumes for itself that it knows best what Christ has taught, instituted, and decreed. If, however, someone inwardly doubts this, he should keep this doubt to himself or express it only to people who are capable of resolving it. He owes all outward obedience to the decisions of the Church, as, according to the French, to the decisions of the pope, as provisional decrees, because such decisions are necessary to eliminate the doubts of Christians, and no one is authorized to mislead people who think and believe otherwise without necessity, as long as he does not know that he alone is right, and all the less so, since what he might discover is for the faithful according to his opinion not of any importance [300] for their situation. The Church has already taught them what is necessary and useful for their salvation. At most it could only say to them: that which you regard as revealed is not revealed. But that no longer interests them, if they only know what is necessary or useful for their salvation. On the contrary, it can make them confused and reduce the authority of the Church among them. V. Shall then a person become a hypocrite who, for example, does not inwardly believe that Christ has instituted auricular confession? Should he confess after all? Yes, he must confess. And he can do so without hypocrisy. As soon as he is convinced that confession does not harm the order of salvation but is rather very useful for his improvement, he must confess, 1. out of obedience to the Church that commands it, 2. so that he does not offend his neighbor, 3. because he cannot rely on his insights with such certainty that he could assert with complete assurance of himself, and indeed assert against the Church, that auricular confession was not instituted by Christ. 4. He must confess for the sake of the sacrament’s benefit that he too can acquire according to his conviction. Thus, according to the rules of prudence, he must prefer what is certain to what is uncertain in a matter so important and affecting his eternal salvation. It is certain that he is on the path toward salvation when he confesses; confession, incidentally, may be necessary or merely useful, because the Church teaches everything that is necessary or useful for [301] it, and can teach nothing that leads away from it, precisely because it is infallible. It is not certain that he is on the way of the order of salvation if



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he does not confess; because he opposes the Church, and yet does not, like it, have the gift of infallibility. Whoever confesses for these reasons is not a hypocrite, even if he does not inwardly believe that confession was directly prescribed by Christ. He makes use of confession as a means for salvation. And it remains so, whether prescribed by Christ or not. This is also true of the veneration of the saints, and of most of the doctrines of distinction—of the rest after that—he can believe and go along with everything without hypocrisy, and with conviction of the usefulness of these things. But if one once admits that these teachings are only Church doctrines and Church commandments, not regulations of Christ Himself, then it is to be feared that people will no longer care about them and, for example, will refrain from confession altogether. Only the conviction that confession was prescribed by Christ Himself can powerfully induce them to perform such a grave act. I do not think much of those who confess only because they have to, whether Christ or the Church has prescribed it. For them, confession is mostly only a mechanism in which the soul hardly plays a part. Instead, show the Christian that confession is the most useful means of improving the heart, without which he cannot be in the order of salvation; deprive him of his false notion of the difficulty [302] of confession, and he will gladly make the effort out of love for his own salvation, even if it were not commanded by Christ. VI. But at least he will have to be hypocritical if he has to take and swear the Creed of Pius IV when he assumes an ecclesiastical office or any other office? Not even that. He confesses and swears that he accepts and believes all the doctrines contained in the creed, as they are presented by the Church, either as necessary or as useful. And this he can do with the best conscience on the testimony of an infallible Church. But he does not confess that he accepts every doctrine as a truth directly revealed by God. There are also unrevealed truths that promote the ultimate purpose of revelation. But some things in the aforementioned professio fidei could and should be defined more precisely without thereby harming the infallibility of the Church, in order to prevent all fears of conscience.

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VII. The concept of infallibility given here is quite new, and consequently, like every innovation in religious matters, suspicious. Such general arguments and prejudices [Vorreiter], as they were called in the times of scholasticism, I reject. They are, of course, conveniently used to refute someone without much effort. After all, one does not have to say more than this: This is new, therefore erroneous. And unfortunately, such scholastic [303] sayings make the greatest impression on people who do not want to think and examine for themselves, but regard what is taught in schools as the ne plus ultra of science. Yet, if such hunting slogans [Waidsprüche] had any meaning, we would still stand by the meanderings of the scholastics, and marvel at the dark Scotus like an oracle, who himself dressed doctrines differently than the Church Fathers had done. But is this concept of infallibility new? In essence, I think not. It has always been taught that the Church is and must be infallible. And this for the reason that everyone who wants to enter the Church, or is already really a member, can find the way of salvation through its guidance, and the place where the pure teaching of Christ is preserved. The teachers must never teach anything else, and the believers who follow the Church must never believe anything other than what is necessary and useful for salvation. This alone is the essence of an infallible Church, and this alone is the purpose of infallibility. I also associate this meaning with the concept of the infallible Church, which teaches everything that is necessary or useful for salvation and can teach nothing that could lead us astray from the path of salvation. My concept of infallibility is therefore certainly not new. Only the restriction of infallibility could be new. But even that I cannot quite admit. Everyone must admit that infallibility has its limits. It does not extend to everything, not to merely historical, [304] or philosophical, etc., objects. Yet, where are the limits to be placed if it has some? This the theologians of old cannot determine arbitrarily and neither can newer ones. In the scriptures, and in revelation in general, the limits are not exactly determined. The most certain way to determine the extent and limits of a means is to judge it on the purpose for which it exists. The purpose of infallibility is to guide people on the path of salvation. Infallibility therefore extends to everything, and to that alone, which is necessary to guide humans on



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the way of salvation, so that they may be saved. But this only means that the Church can infallibly teach everything that is necessary for salvation and can teach nothing that leads away from it. Did not the older theologians teach just this in other words? And is my concept of infallibility new? Only in this do I differ from them, perhaps at first sight, in that I distinguish dogmas of faith, or directly revealed truths (or, if you will, necessary truths of faith presented by Christ himself) from those which the Church later established, and which I call Church dogmas,22 or merely useful23 doctrines for the salvation of souls. The first have always, everywhere, and by all been recognized as such, and the contradiction of some recent opponents does not harm them. The second have been added gradually, and have not had general agreement on their side, as can easily be seen from the sour effort that theologians [305] undertook to harmonize Church Fathers and councils with each other, and all together with general doctrine. The first must be accepted as divinely revealed, the others at least as true; that is, as such as are not contrary to revelation, and so even promote its ultimate purpose. This alone is new, then, that I add: the Church can err in these latter, which do not have the unanimous tradition for themselves, and claim them to be directly revealed, when they are perhaps not. After all, it does not need to be infallible in this, if only the teachings are good in themselves and promote the salvation of men. Protestants can all the less deny this, if I may say so, natural infallibility of the Church, since they concede to every private person the faculty of choosing something according to the guidance of reason, which, though not necessary for the salvation of the soul, is nevertheless expedient. Should the Church, which still 22. [For the theological qualifications of doctrinal teaching, the so-called theological notes and the corresponding censures see Claudius Montaigne, “De Censuris seu de Notis Theologicis,” in J. P. Migne, Theologiae Cursus Completus 1 (1863): 1111–222; Joseph Pohle/Michael Gierens, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1931), 8th ed., 1:20–27; Sixtus Cartechini, De Valore notarum theologicarum et de criteriis ad eas dignoscendas (Rome: Pontifical University Gregoriana, 1951). A very thorough theological reflection is presented by Johann B. Heinrich in idem, Dogmatische Theologie (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1876), 2:606–31. 23. [The label “useful” shows a tendency of Enlightenment thinkers to judge doctrines according to their immediately recognizable “value,” which was usually moral improvement.]

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enjoys the assistance of the Holy Spirit, not also be able to prescribe such means of salvation as guide the faithful to salvation? Catholics, on the other hand, should willingly offer their hands to anything that can restore to them so many brothers who have been separated from them without harming the Church. If, finally, my restriction of infallibility as far as the accidental is concerned sounds new and unusual, I console myself with the fact that today one tries to define several theological concepts as precisely as possible, both to save the honor of the Church and to avoid the objections of the opponents. Such precision also helps answer the objections of the opponents more easily [306] and one avoids paying attention to the clamor of those who do not want to move the [confessional] boundaries that their scholastic forefathers, who were mere fallible men and who mostly just repeated each other, have set. If I have not done well, I will gladly let myself be convicted of the opposite by a gentle teacher.24 You only have to prove the proposition: Everything that the Church claims to be a direct revelation must be revealed, and it is insufficient for its infallibility if such only promotes the salvation of the faithful. And if this could be proved, it would first have to be shown that the Church has declared all the doctrines in which Protestants and Catholics differ to be directly revealed and that it has commanded them to be believed as such. The Church has the power to make useful arrangements for the good of the faithful without making a mistake. Perhaps the approved invocation and veneration of the saints, and many other doctrines, are of this nature. VIII. According to the stated restriction, the Church could lie or tell an untruth. This must deprive it of all authority among the faithful. The abominable word lie does not fit at all. The Church has no intention of deceiving anyone. In the main matter that is necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, the Church never tells an untruth. What it praises as necessary or useful, it really is. In the case of merely useful things, therefore, it would concern a secondary matter: [307] whether these doctrines are directly revealed. And this secondary matter has no necessary connection with the infallibility of the Church because 24. [Invoking a gentle teacher seems to indicate that Mayr does not give much credence to loudly shouting critics who condemn him outright. Instead, he is interested in arguments put calmly before him for examination.]



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doctrine may be true without being revealed. And every well-informed believer knows that the Church can err in matters in which infallibility is not promised or necessary. It depends on the inner truth, not on the outer origin of such doctrines, which are only useful for salvation. If the first is beyond doubt, as I will show of all doctrines in which we differ, then the believer can abandon himself to the guidance of the Church in the greatest confidence. Thus, it has been from the beginning of the Church. It became clear to the believers, or their teachers, very early on that some merely natural truths, some practices, do not contradict the ultimate purpose of revelation, but are rather suitable to stimulate the zeal of the believers, or to introduce them more easily into the order of salvation. Therefore, they connected these teachings with Christianity, and gradually introduced these practices, and all the more so because they found some scriptural passages that seemed to contain those teachings and to favor these practices. In this way, even a very early tradition, such as a pronouncement of the Church, will always prove the truth of a doctrine and the suitability of a practice for the advancement of salvation, but not always the divine origin of both, if such doctrine was not already at the beginning claimed and regarded as divine. I would therefore conclude only [308]: This teaching, this practice is of divine origin, as the general tradition testifies. Therefore, it is true and useful for obtaining salvation. But I would not conclude vice versa: This teaching is true, and its practice is useful. Therefore, it is also of divine origin. IX. This restriction of infallibility does not bring us one step closer to the Protestants, because they have to accept all our teachings and practices, which they will never understand. Therefore, besides being dangerous, it is also superfluous. I cannot yet get involved here in any specific controversial doctrine and show how close we can get and where to give in if we accept my opinion. This will be the subject of the following section. Yet, for the meantime a general answer. If the Church doctrines are not directly revealed, not absolutely necessary for salvation, but only useful, then the Church has been able to establish them because they are true. But if they remain true at all times, it may be more useful at one time and less useful at another to insist on the acceptance of these doctrines and to

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pursue the practices that are based on them. Thus, some of the exercises that Protestants find objectionable could be dispensed with altogether. Nevertheless, they must not accuse the Church of any error, because it has so far demanded these useful exercises from the faithful. Thus, the infallibility would remain unimpaired, [309] but simultaneously a stumbling block removed. This could happen, for example, in the veneration of images, relics, and saints. Other doctrines, which until now have been imposed on Protestants as directly revealed, would perhaps be gladly accepted by them if they were shown to be perfectly in accord with reason and useful for the advancement of salvation. I hope this will be the case with the doctrine of confession, as I shall present it, and with the doctrine of the other sacraments. In other doctrines, about which we have argued so far, I believe we are already in agreement anyway. And in this way, we should already come much closer to each other, even if not all difficulties could be solved at once. The rest has been said above, § 71, or will occur hereafter. This restriction of infallibility is therefore as little superfluous as it is dangerous. These are the objections, some of which came to my attention myself and some of which were made by others. If I am in a position to answer the other ones that are made to me, I will do so with all modesty. If, however, I am convinced of the falsity or harmfulness of my opinion, which I do not yet assert as certain, but only submit to the examination of those who possess more thorough insight than I do, then I will gladly discard this section of my book and apologize to my readers for the annoyance I have caused. I take God as my witness that this is my sincere attitude, not hypocrisy. [310] I know well that even open enemies of religion often use this language, who are concerned with nothing less than conviction, and who only reject with bitter derision those who take the trouble to teach them better. I have written everything here not out of a desire for innovation, but with the best intention of submitting a proposal to others for consideration, by which we could lead many of our erring brethren back into the fold of the Church, if it should be acceptable. I will not be denied the placet conatus, even if my project itself could not be approved.



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§ 73. From the purpose for which Christ conferred infallibility on His Church, it follows that it cannot be infallible in the canonization of deceased Christians.

Although it has never been generally believed that the Church is infallible in this matter,25 at least never in such a way that it was counted among the articles of faith, even though the theologians who went furthest only declared their opinion to be more probable than the opposite one, there are nevertheless people to whom it sounds offensive when someone says that the Church is not infallible in its canonizations. I remember very well some felt condemning me as a heretic when I shared with them this opinion. Yet, this does not deter me from freely expressing my opinion again. [311] Canonization is a solemn judgment of the Roman Pontiff, by which he declares that someone is included among the number of saints and may be publicly venerated in the Church as a saint. I am speaking here of canonization, as it is common in our days, and since the times of St. Ulrich, Bishop of Augsburg, who was the first to be solemnly canonized.26 In the past, bishops and primates were the first to canonize saints in their jurisdictions, or perhaps it was only the people who began to pay public homage to godly persons after their death. This veneration was gradually adopted by other churches, and finally became general. The difference between canonization and beatification does not belong here. The popes first make very strict inquiries as to whether the life of the person to be canonized was such that he or she could be presented to the faithful as a model of virtue, and whether God testified to his or her holiness by miracles during lifetime or after death. How this is done can be seen in the book of Benedict XIV, de Canonizatione Sanctorum.27 25. [A contemporary analysis of this problem is William Diem, “The Infallibility of Canonizations: A Revisionist History of the Arguments,” Nova et Vetera 17 (2019): 653–82.] 26. [St. Ulrich, a tenth-century saint, is the patron of the diocese of Augsburg, in which Beda Mayr’s abbey was located.] 27. [Benedict XIV, De Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione.

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I do not want to touch upon or examine here the form nor the principles, according to which one proceeds. I will only remind the reader that canonization can be attributed to the whole Church only in so far as the pope performs the act and the whole Church consents. I. [312] Infallibility has been conferred on the Church only so that it may initiate men into the order of salvation (§ 65). The Church must therefore be able to say everything that is necessary for salvation and teach nothing that leads us away from it (§66). It is not necessary for any man to know that Camillus de Lellis, for example, is a saint, just as the veneration of saints is not even required. It is enough for the Christian if he knows from direct revelation that God does not leave a single good action unrewarded. This alone, and not the assurance of the Church that this or that person is holy, can and must be the best motive for him to live virtuously, and the saints in general, who certainly exist without the declaration of the Church, he can nevertheless call upon and venerate. Infallibility in canonizations is not necessary for the Church and is no more useful than if it had never been conferred for this end. If no means extends beyond the end to which it is a means, infallibility cannot extend to canonizations, which the Church can well do without. II. The Church does not receive any new revelations. What it now decides or presents must have already been revealed by Christ and the apostles. Yet, Christ and the apostles certainly did not leave us the truth that, for example, Carlo Borromeo or Pius V lived holy lives and worked miracles. [313] Therefore, the Church cannot present this truth to us without the risk of error. Yes, the opponents answer, we are not so unreasonable as to believe that the Church bases its canonizations on an old or new revelation. We only say that the Church has the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who does not let it err in canonizations. But the Church can expect this assistance only in matters for which it has been promised. Yet, where is the promise that the Holy Spirit will also assist it in canonizations, Libri IV, 5 vols. (Bologna: 1734), many subsequent editions. A helpful English extract was published in three volumes in 1850 and reissued in 1950 under the title Benedict XIV, Heroic Virtue: A Portion of the Treatise of Benedict XIV on the Beatification and Canonization of the Servants of God, 3 vols. (New York: Dunigan, 1950–52).



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since the veneration of the saints is not necessary for eternal bliss, but only useful, and cannot be connected with the canonization of each particular person? The Church is infallible only in the proclamation of Christian doctrine and in the presentation of those facts that the apostles have made known orally or in writing. III. In a canonization, the Church relies on the testimony of individuals who can deceive themselves or others, and for whose evaluation it has been promised no infallibility and no assistance of the Holy Spirit. First, the Roman Pontiff relies on the testimony of others who say that the candidate for canonization has lived a holy life. Now, no man can see the heart of another. No matter how much the outward actions of a man may have the appearance of holiness, we know that there are also hypocrites who often conceal their inward wickedness under the disguise of piety; we know that the inward [314] opinion, the final purpose, and the motive of an action corrupt such piety entirely if they are evil. Since nobody sees into the soul of another, one can deceive oneself, or be deceived by others, if one infers from outward actions, because they seem good, that also one’s heart is good. The testimony about holy conduct, on which the pope must rely, is not infallible. It is the same with the testimony about miracles that are said to have happened before or after the death of a saint. I do not deny that one can be convinced of the existence of a miracle, or even of the fact that a miracle really happened. Otherwise, I would invalidate everything I have said about religious miracles. Nevertheless, it is also possible here that the few witnesses say something wrong, or that one regards something as a miracle, which was none. Yet, if these testimonies are all correct, then a moral certainty arises that the candidate for canonization is really holy, which I myself gladly admit. Then, however, this judgment of the Church is a human judgment, not a judgment that it is authorized to pronounce by virtue of the infallibility bestowed upon it by God. Just as every man can discern the moral character of another, just as he can distinguish by close and long observation whether someone is a hypocrite or a truly pious Christian, just as he can convince himself whether an event is a philosophically and historically correct miracle, so can the Church; and because it [315] makes the most rigorous investigation of the life of the saint and the miracles supposed to have been

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performed by him, the Church is all the more certain that its judgment is correct. However, in such judgments it always remains true what Innocent III said: “We reply that the judgment of God is always based on truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived. The judgment of the Church is sometimes based only on opinion, in which it often happens that one deceives oneself or is deceived. Therefore, it sometimes happens that he who is bound by God and the one who is free before God, are still bound by the pronouncement of the Church.”28 Although I do not say that the Church is not infallible in canonizations by virtue of divine assistance, I do believe with the famous Muratori in his book De Ingeniorum Moderatione, bk. 1, ch. 17 that it would be impertinent and impudent if someone were to claim that the Church has erred in canonizations or that a saint canonized by it is not a saint; for even if both scenarios are possible, one knows how much care the Church takes before pronouncing its judgment. It might be as difficult to prove that the Church has erred as that it has not. It is enough that it utilizes all possible human prudence. Much less can I approve [316] of the fact that in our day people take the liberty of treating saints who have been canonized by the Church publicly as scoundrels, daydreamers, or even fools, even in public writings. Their intention is to dispel the prejudices of the common people but fail miserably in their aim and cause great harm. Such satire usually embitters people, and either they persist all the more stubbornly in what they hold dear, or because they do not know how to make a distinction, throw away the true with the false, and abandon religion altogether. In matters that really belong to religion, or are considered religious by the people, reasonable and modest instruction is always more useful than biting ridicule. Nevertheless, of course, I would wish that in Rome the saints were more praised for their charitable actions and active Christianity, which true saints cannot lack, than for monastic virtues, exaggerated mortification, and false humility. Then, some would not have been offended by the life of Benedict Labre.29 28. Cap. 29, De sententia excommunicationis [Corpus Juris Canonici, lib. V, ch. 29]. 29. [Mayr refers to St. Benedict Labre, who was for Enlighteners a scandalous figure since he embodied what they deplored: lack of education, clinging to traditional forms of devotion, and living off the alms he received. See Ulrich L. Lehner, Catholic



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§ 74.

Answer to the objections. I. The honor we pay to the saints is somewhat of profession of faith, because by it we indicate that we believe in the glory of the saints. The Church cannot err in its public profession of faith.30 [317] In the profession of faith the Church can certainly not err, not even in believing in the glory of the saints and in venerating them. But quite different from this is the question whether this or that individual is a saint. In the decision of this latter question, which is no more necessary or useful to salvation than the preceding points, the Church can err. Thus, the adoration of a consecrated host is a kind of profession of faith because we thereby indicate that we believe in the presence of Christ; but the Church can still err in deciding whether this individual host is consecrated. II. The Church cannot err in the general doctrine of morals, and to the doctrine of morals belongs the canonization of the deceased; for by canonization the faithful are obliged to venerate and imitate these persons. First of all, it is not true that anyone is obliged to venerate the saints. Everyone is free to do so. Secondly, true virtues can be presented for imitation, even if the person who practiced them was not holy. To moral doctrine belongs only that such and such a thing is a virtue, but not that such and such a thing was a virtue in a certain individual. Thus, almsgiving is a virtuous act that I may recommend for imitation, although perhaps a certain person, whom I present for others to imitate for the sake of almsgiving, gave alms out of vain ambition. The Church praises [318] almsgiving in itself and presupposes that it is done with the necessary Christian spirit. Likewise, I can say that the consecration of the host belongs to the moral doctrine. For by the consecration the faithful are obliged to adore the host. But does it follow from this that the Church can infallibly judge whether this or that host is consecrated? The Church is holy. But it would be detrimental to its holiness if Enlightenment. The Forgotten History of a Global Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 166–70.] 30. Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibetum IX, a. 16.

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it could present a godless person to the believers for veneration and imitation, who is then really venerated. The Church remains holy in its founder, in its doctrine, in its members, and in its ceremonies, in which its holiness actually consists (§ 48), even if a certain individual is not holy. Even if the Church canonized a godless person, it would only commend his outwardly good actions, not his godless deeds for imitation. It would never hold an ungodly person worthy of veneration if it knew that he had been ungodly, just as it would never let a host be adored if it knew that it had not been consecrated. And yet it may often have happened that an unconsecrated host was adored without harming the sanctity of the Church. Perhaps, somebody could argue: The Church never chooses to worship an individual host, but does set up an individual person for veneration. Thus, in the first case, its sanctity does not suffer, but it does in the second. The Church, when it commands consecrated hosts to be adored, bases its decision on the moral certainty [319] that these hosts are really consecrated, and also punishes the one who dishonors them, or does not want to worship an individual host that is believed to be consecrated. And yet this host may not be consecrated. Thus, the Church commands the worship of any individual host that is considered consecrated just as well as it recommends the veneration of every individual saint. IV. If the Church could deceive itself in this regard, it would be exposed to great contempt. How would not the devils rejoice if they saw Hell fires on the altars? What a triumph for our enemies, if we celebrated feast days in memory of evildoers! First of all, I do not say that the Church deceives itself. All can be holy who it canonizes. The Church can judge rightly according to the rules of reason, without needing the assistance of the Holy Spirit for this, or without this being promised to it. And secondly, no one can reasonably rejoice or triumph when the Church errs in a matter in which it has not been promised infallibility and has never declared that it ascribes to itself an unnatural infallibility in this matter (§ 33). Incidentally, it can even happen that one venerates saints who never existed. There are scholars who doubt the existence of St. Veronica,



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St. Catherine, and others. In the saints, however, only Christ is venerated; consequently, the veneration has at least an indirect, if not an immediate object. [320] So it may be with the veneration of relics, which are only too often false. In the end, the veneration goes to Christ. But as far as imitation is concerned, this one takes place; we may be presented with real or fictitious examples of virtue, if only what we are presented with is a truly virtuous act. V. If the one who is canonized were not truly holy, one could not allow his veneration. Such a person can be holy, and I myself say that through the testimony of the Church one has a moral certainty that he is, even if such certainty is not based on the support of the Holy Spirit. Moral certainty, however, is sufficient as a basis for veneration. Otherwise, children could not honor their father, nor subjects their prince. The latter have only, like the former, a moral certainty that this is their true father or their rightful prince, and heir to the throne. VI. How, then, can the Church not only permit but command the public veneration of a canonized man? The clergy must pray the corresponding breviary hours in his honor and say Mass in his honor. If the Church is not infallible, how can it be justified to bind one under a sin, for example, to invoke Gregory VII at Mass, of whose holiness one cannot become convinced?31 First, it is undoubtedly true that our breviaries and missals are not irreformable, and in general the entire external church service could be arranged more expediently for our present times [321] and way of thinking. Secondly, he who has pledged obedience to the Church on assuming his office must nevertheless also submit to its commandments. And he can do this all the more, since the Church does not command him on pain of losing Heaven to believe that Gregory VII is a saint, but only that the Church declares him to be a saint according to human insights. His own insights are also merely human and fallacious, and consequently he can subject them to the Church. In the end, he only wants to worship God in his saints, and does not let his devotion depend on the condition that this or that person must necessarily be a saint. But 31. [Gregory VII was canonized in 1728 and stood for the superiority of the church over the state.]

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if someone could not convince himself that Gregory VII could be a saint, I do not believe that he would sin if he prayed a different hour and celebrated a different Mass. I would have to get into a completely different matter here if I wanted to explain my thoughts in more detail.

§ 75. From the ultimate purpose for which Christ promised infallibility to His Church, it does not follow that the latter must be infallible in approving the rules of an Order and the Order itself. One can consider such approval in several respects.32 It could only be based on the fact that an order could be useful to the Church of God. Here the [322] Church proceeds merely according to human presumptions, in which it can deceive itself. The Church may hope that the order will render it important services, and yet it may become harmful, or its members may gradually forget their duties and do more harm than good. That is why we have examples of orders that the Church has first solemnly approved, but later on abolished. It is the same here as in all things that belong to Church discipline. The Church can introduce no discipline, approve nothing that would be contrary to faith and moral teaching. But this does not mean that it must always make the most appropriate ordinances. Ceremonies and practices can be ancient in the Church, yet that does not mean that they were the best for ancient times, nor do they have to be retained for our times, since something could be suitable for other times and circumstances but no longer for ours.33 32. [See for example the discussion in Johann B. Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1876), 2:632–54.] 33. One can see from this how little meaning it has when somebody says: “This usage, this ceremony is ancient in the Church. Therefore, it must not be changed.” All one can say is: “So this use, this ceremony is neither against the faith nor against good morals. Thus, it is useful.” But since it was introduced by men and according to human prudence, there is still a double question to be answered: Could nothing better and more appropriate have been introduced at the beginning? Or if this was really the best and most appropriate thing to do at that time, is it still the best and most appropriate thing to do in our times, in which the circumstances have changed? Before answering this, one can never demand the retention of an old usage merely out of reverence for antiquity.



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[323] Or the approval is based on the fact that the rule itself is in accordance with the laws of Christianity. In the case of such an approval, it must be noted that since neither the religious orders in general nor one in particular are necessary in the Church, an approval of whatever rule of an order is never to be regarded as a decision for the whole Church, just as no one is bound to enter an order. Nevertheless, it is certain that the whole Church can never approve a rule that contains something against faith or good morals. Otherwise, the Church would teach and recommend an error in faith, which it cannot do according to its infallibility. Yet, it seems that in some religious rules, things were approved which are against the spirit of the gospel, such as false concepts of evangelical poverty and humility; for example, that it means [spiritual] perfection to leave one’s own and to live at the expense of others, that the contemplative life is more perfect than the active one in the world, etc. But once the true evangelical doctrine of faith and morals had been established, the Church allowed some people who intended to follow these teachings even more perfectly than others to live according to their insights. The approval of the rules of the order is based on this alone. The Church did not, by the way, get involved in the investigation of all minor details, all the more so since it did not have in mind to make the [monastic rule] a law for the whole Church. In certain circumstances, and under certain conditions, all these things [324] prescribed in the rules may be good for individual persons. The Church leaves it to the people, and must leave it to them, to examine for themselves whether they are in such circumstances—for example, whether it is better for them or whether they can be of more use to themselves and others, if they leave what is theirs and live on alms, and so on.

§ 76. From the purpose of infallibility it does not follow that the Church must be infallible in the so-called factis dogmaticis. This matter has been extremely complicated due to the Jansenist controversies. On the one hand, so many subtleties and quibbles have been devised to block any possible exit for the Jansenists to avoid the condemnation of the known five propositions; on the other hand, the

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Jansenists have been so busy thwarting all attempts of their opponents by their distinctions that I would have had to go into great detail if I wanted to tell the whole story. It may be read in Mosheim’s Church History of the 18th Century, which Mr. Schlegel has published,34 but also in other historical accounts and dogmatic theology. I will deal only with the matter itself and be as brief and clear as possible. With every doctrine that an author presents, two things can be asked. Honorius the Pope wrote [325] to Sergius: Christ has one will. The Church can be asked two things: First: Is it true that Christ has only one will? The answer to this was given in the sixth general council: Christ has two wills, one divine and one human. Therefore, the teaching that Christ has only one will is heretical and erroneous. No one doubts that the Church is infallible in deciding a doctrine, or in determining what is or is not according to revelation. Second, one may ask: Does the epistle of Honorius contain the opposite of this definite doctrine, or has it only asserted a will in a sense contrary to this doctrine? Here, then, the question is no longer of the doctrine alone, but of the doctrine as a certain author presents it. Whether an author associates an erroneous meaning with a certain proposition is a fact, a factum, and because this fact is associated with a doctrine, it is called a factum dogmaticum.35 Now the question arises: whether the Church is infallible when it makes a statement about such a fact, for example when it says: The words of the epistle of pope Honorius: Christ has one will have a heretical meaning. I say with the famous Muratori and others: no. I. The infallibility of the Church, according to its ultimate purpose, requires only that it should be able to teach infallibly, and should not be able to teach anything that leads away from salvation. [326] Yet, this the Church can perfectly accomplish if it is infallible only in judging a doctrine in itself, because the faithful could care less to know whether an author has asserted a doctrine in a heretical or nonheretical sense. The Church does enough when it warns its subjects against a suspicious and 34. Johann Lorenz Mosheim, Vollständige Kirchengeschichte des Neuen Testaments, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Johann Rudolph Schlegel, vols. 5–7: Kirchengeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Heilbronn: 1784–88). 35. [See, for example, Johann B. Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1876), 2:585–606.]



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perhaps dangerous path. Those who are obedient children of the Church and do not have enough skill and prudence to extract the author’s meaning through the rules of the art of interpretation, will thereby become aware of a dangerous path. The others, however, who are able to examine for themselves and make use of the same means that the Church itself must employ to decipher the true meaning of the author, can always do so, but they have to remember and realize that the Church’s decision is not about the author’s meaning but about the doctrine itself and that this decision is the rule of faith for them. Whether this or that author presents a doctrine according to revelation or not, does not change the doctrine for which the teaching of the Church must be infallible, and also the preservation of the correct doctrine does not depend on it. The Church can still fulfill its duty by forbidding dangerous and suspicious books, even if it is not infallible in judging their meaning. In the same way, the state sometimes bans books. And yet it is not infallible in judging their meaning, but nevertheless rightly demands obedience. So does the Church—its infallibility [327] remains firmly established. By virtue of it the Church teaches its subjects all doctrines of faith and morals, by which alone they must be guided. If, however, a private person sets himself up as a teacher of the faithful, the Church judges his teaching according to its own. If it seems to the Church that he agrees with it, the Church approves. If it is suspicious to the Church, it forbids it. Yet it may be mistaken, for it proceeds only according to human wisdom. The Church concludes only: if the author took the words in the usual meaning, if he understood these and those passages as I understand them, then his teaching is right or wrong. Yet, it may well happen that the author connected completely different ideas with his words, and gave this passage a different meaning, which the Church cannot possibly know. It is quite reasonable that the Church forbids or rejects writings that are suspicious to it, because the faithful would also read them according to the common understanding of the words and thus find a false teaching in them, but it is not necessary that the Church is infallible in this decision, because the faithful are to be guided only by the teaching of the Church, not by that of a particular teacher. II. The Church can command us to believe nothing on pain of losing salvation, and thus fide divina, but what has been revealed to it.

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Nothing has been revealed to it that is not necessary or useful for the faithful for the preservation of salvation. But this does not mean that the faithful must know whether, for example, the Augustine36 of Jansen contains no errors. [328] God did not reveal at the beginning of the Church that Jansen would write a book in the seventeenth century under the title Augustine, in which five partly heretical, partly highly suspicious propositions would be contained, which the pope would extract. And as the Church in general no longer receives new revelations, it is also not necessary that God revealed this at the time of the rejection of these propositions, because the true doctrine of faith and morals had already been established bseforehand, according to which the faithful must be guided, but not according to Jansen’s Augustine. On such occasions, the Church can certainly declare again what it believes, but it is not necessary that God grants the Church extraordinary assistance, so that it can infallibly judge the doctrine of Jansen. After all, the Church may be mistaken or not. Jansen may have understood his propositions in the sense the Church took them or not, but it is not mistaken in stating the doctrine and the faithful know what they have to believe and do. III. The words of a sentence in or out of context are often ambiguous. God did not want to prevent this possible ambiguity. He leaves every author the freedom to combine the concepts with the words he chooses. The Church can prevent this ambiguity just as little. It cannot force an author, who perhaps wanted to connect the meaning A with his words, to connect the meaning B, in which his sentences are heretical. [329] God has only promised the Church the support so that it can determine the true meaning of revelation and collect this revelation from the tradition infallibly. IV. The reputation of the Church is better served by denying infallibility in factis dogmaticis than by assigning it to the Church. Even our opponents do not regard the infallibility of the Church in factis dogmaticis as a certain and foregone conclusion, but only assert their opinion as highly probable, not yet as an article of faith. Perhaps there could 36. [The title of the controversial book by bishop Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638). It is considered to be the text that sparked the Jansenist controversy.]



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one day be a case that would show that the Church is not infallible in this matter. The Church would then infallibly be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers and others if its infallibility had hitherto been generally asserted therein. Yet its reputation would be saved if this infallibility had never been attributed beforehand. Therefore, it is certainly more beneficial for the Church’s reputation to deny the infallibility in factis dogmaticis until this dispute37 is decided on irrefutable grounds. Since, therefore, no sufficient reason has been given why the Church must be infallible in such matters, and since the assistance of the Holy Spirit can be ascribed to it only in such matters without which the order of salvation established by Christ cannot be preserved, it is at least probable that the Church can err in factis dogmaticis. From this, however, it does not follow that the Church has already really erred in such a fact. The Church may have used so much prudence [330] and caution that it was not humanly possible for it to err. The famous theologian Benedict Stattler, who has illuminated much of dogmatic theology, and has earned little gratitude from pedantic churchmen,38 makes the following statements about this question: I. The question whether a text is orthodox or heterodox is not a question about a fact, but only whether the text agrees with revealed truth. II. The decision about a merely human fact, for example whether Jansen wrote this or that sentence, whether he understood what he wrote, whether Jansen also thought inwardly in this way when he wrote down the sentence, how his doctrines must be understood outwardly in context—this decision may be true or false, but it has no influence on orthodoxy39 and does not change it. III. In judging such merely human facts, the Church is not entitled to infallibility, which is only promised to it so that it can teach what Christ taught. The Church can teach that, whether Jansen was understood by it or not. [331] 37. [The dispute whether dogmatic facts are infallible or not.] 38. Truth is truth to me, whether it is said by a Jesuit, an ex-Jesuit, or anyone else. It does not depend on the dress or the order. My applause, which I have to give him for many arguments—of course also often not—can seem all the less partisan, since he attacks me in the preface to the sixth part of his dogmatic theology, and because he did not understand me, allowed himself to make attacks on me, which perhaps only his zeal for the good cause can excuse. [Cf. Benedict Stattler, Theologia Christiana Theoretica, vol. 6, De Sacramentis (Eichstätt: 1780).] 39. [It is not clear what the object of orthodoxy is here.]

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IV. The judgment about the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of a proposition presupposes a judgment about the literal meaning of this sentence and its context and expresses: This text is in accordance with a divinely revealed doctrine or not. This judgment is not a judgment about a fact, but about the meaning of the words in a context. V. The Church is infallible in judging the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of a proposition, for if the Church could declare an intrinsically heretical proposition to be orthodox, or vice versa, those who believed the Church would be led into error, and those who did not believe the Church might conclude that, just as it can err in judging a proposition in its context, so it could err in judging a single text, and so never believe the Church, whereby the whole authority of the Church would perish. VI. The infallibility of the Church in judging the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of a text is only morally certain, but not revealed, and one is not obliged to believe it fide divina, but only fide ecclesiastica, because of the authority of the Church.

I agree with all these propositions, except the fifth, and consequently also the sixth. If the Church can only teach infallibly what we are to believe and do, then its infallibility is already saved, even if it cannot infallibly say whether this or that text in the context of a book is orthodox or heterodox, for what Stattler [332] adds does change that. The false teachers, he says, seek to conceal and defend their errors under the appearance of truth. Therefore, the Church must be infallible in exposing the hidden errors and condemning them; otherwise, the faithful could be seduced by them, and their very authority could be eroded. Of course, the Church must warn its subjects of dangers and forbid suspicious writings. If it does this, all danger is already averted, and for this it does not need to be infallible. A sovereign, a bishop—who are also not infallible—likewise forbids his subordinates to read books that could be dangerous, and they certainly owe them obedience. The Church uses extreme caution to extract the true meaning of a text in context, according to the rules of hermeneutics, and then compares the doctrine presented with that which is revealed. For this reason, it can also rely on the fact that the believers who read this text and explain it, proceed exactly as it does, and every reasonable person will find the same orthodox or nonorthodox meaning in it. Nevertheless, if someone could come up with a different interpretation, he will know in which sense the Church has approved a book, because he is not un-



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familiar with the teaching of the Church, which alone is a rule of faith for him, and no other book. The Church has not even presented any Church Father40 as a certain rule of faith, except in so far as it held his teaching to be consistent with that of the Church, and should it turn out that he had not understood his teaching as the Church did, or that his words in context had a different meaning than those by which it expressed its doctrine of faith, it would have no hesitation in rejecting his opinion. Every approval of a proposition occurs only on the condition that it agrees with the doctrine of the Church that has been already stated beforehand. Not this proposition, but the doctrine of the Church is the rule of faith. Therefore, even if the Church should err in judgment of a proposition, neither the faith nor its authority would suffer. Not the faith, because it must be guided by the teaching of the Church, not by the possible interpretation of an ambiguous sentence of a man. Not its authority, because it is not claimed that the Church must be infallible in judging a proposition. Yet it is no disgrace to err in a matter where human prudence is all that matters, and where the Church has no infallibility.

§ 77. Answering the Objections. The Church has always considered itself infallible in the evaluation of a book or a sentence in its context. Therefore, it is. Thus, the Fathers said at the General Council at Ephesus, Act. I. We all condemn the Epistle, and the doctrines of Nestorius: we condemn the ungodly faith of Nestorius. He who does not condemn him [334] condemns himself. This is even more explicitly stated at the fifth general council, where the notorious three chapters were rejected as entirely Nestorian. And thus we have a lot of writings that the whole Church has condemned as heretical. The Church has condemned all writings and individual sentences only according to the meaning that it gave them according to the rules of the art of interpretation, and which they had to have according to the pronouncement of reason, if the authors had not otherwise deliberate40. [Perhaps an allusion to Jansenists, who overemphasize the importance of St. Augustine.]

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ly, or by chance, or out of ignorance, put another meaning into them, and because this meaning contradicted its doctrine, the Church had to condemn these writings or sentences. It presupposed that Nestorius took the words person, Mother of God in the usual and everywhere accepted sense. Since he claimed there were two persons in Christ and denied the title Mother of God to the most holy virgin, but the Church recognized only one person in Christ according to revelation and also called Mary the mother of God, it could rightly condemn Nestorius and his sentences, because the Church had to conclude from the context that Nestorius had taken the word person and Mother of God in its own sense. Under this presupposition, both assertions of Nestorius were heretical. However, it could be that Nestorius associated other terms with both words than did the Church, and that he had not expressed himself clearly enough either deliberately, or by accident, or out of [335] ignorance. The decision of the Church, then, does not actually apply to the sentences of Nestorius, in so far as they are really heretical in this context, but only in so far as they must be declared heretical according to the common rules of interpretation, because then they do not agree with the teaching of the Church. I am not speaking here of Nestorius’s inner faith, but of the expression he used. His sentences, as they lie there, can be Catholic or heretical, depending on whether these or other ideas are connected with the words, and for this also the context is important, because words of the context can be interpreted differently. The Church imposes its meaning on them, and for very good reasons, but only for human and rational reasons, because it is not promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit in its judgment. It can therefore rightly condemn Nestorius, and yet it is possible that the Church understood his words in a different sense than he did. But then he would have to blame himself for being condemned. Why did he not express himself more reasonably? This answer applies to all other similar condemnations. I. Am I therefore not obliged to believe that Nestorius was a heretic and that his teaching was heretical? That Nestorius was a heretic I am not at all obliged to believe, for the Church could not possibly know his true inner disposition, nor how far his error was surmountable or insurmountable. [336] I am, however, obliged to believe that Nestorius’s



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teaching was heretical in the sense in which the Church understood it, but not that this was really Nestorius’s understanding.41 II. So could all heretics who have been condemned so far have been wronged? So, all heresies could rise again? Would this be such a great misfortune for the Church if all those who were previously considered heretics had not been heretics? Would the Church not rather rejoice to see so many members united with it whom it had hitherto misjudged? Truly the Church has no advantage if the heretics are really heretics. No injustice would be done to anyone whom it has condemned. Each one would have to take the blame for his condemnation, because the Church cannot judge people according to the inward dispositions of the heart, which remain unknown to it, but must adhere to what they themselves make known about their dispositions. Why did they express themselves so ambiguously, so vaguely, that they had to be misunderstood in a human way [menschlicher Weise]? For this reason, however, not a single heresy would be revived. Every teaching in the sense in which the Church has condemned it would remain a heresy, even if it had not been understood this way by the author. III. Thus, all the condemnations that the Church pronounces on certain propositions are doubtful, and [337] one cannot blame a person who rehashes a doctrine condemned by the Apostolic See. As for a doctrine rejected by the whole Church, it is certainly heretical in the sense in which it has been rejected by the Church. For this reason, however, it is not forbidden, if it is possible, to show that a certain author did not defend it in this sense. The judgment of the Apostolic See alone, if it does not receive the applause of the whole Church, is never infallible, and therefore the bull Unigenitus is not yet to be regarded as dogmatic. It would be very audacious if someone wanted to defend a sentence rejected by the pope. But no one is prevented from showing, if he can, that this proposition can be asserted in a Catholic sense. IV. The promise of infallibility must be extended as far as one can. It is the same as with the graces that a temporal prince bestows for the 41. [Mayr seems to have forgotten numbering this paragraph with “I.”]

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sake of the common good. It is assumed that he wanted to promote the common good as much as possible through the bestowal of grace, and he extends it as far as he can. This must be presumed even more of the best of all princes, of Christ the founder of the Church, who certainly imparted to it all the advantages that could contribute to the increase of its authority, or without which it would run the risk of being despised. Such an advantage is infallibility, which must therefore be extended to the facta [338] dogmatica, because it contributes to the authority of the Church, and the latter would be exposed to contempt if it could err in factis dogmaticis. The extent of infallibility, since it is not without limits, can be determined most securely from its purpose, which is to lead the faithful safely to salvation. The Church is infallible so far as it is necessary for this purpose. This does not mean that the Church must be infallible in factis dogmaticis, for it is not exposed to contempt if not infallible where it has not been promised infallibility. Could, however, its authority be increased this way? That may well be the case. But if one wanted to grant the Church all the advantages that would increase its prestige and authority, one could think of many more and argue in a very similar way for the extension of the powers of the secular princes. Yet, such graces cannot be extended beyond their purpose. Those people, who ascribe to their princes privileges that demonstrably do not belong to them, do not act prudently. They are called court flatterers and jeopardize the reputation of their lord, for as soon as it is proved that he is not entitled to those advantages that they wanted to appropriate to him, one begins to doubt their true advantages. It is therefore better not to ascribe to the Church any other advantages than those that are certain and that can always be defended. Otherwise, a case might arise that would destroy the presumed advantages and shed suspicion also on the true ones. It is [339] out of concern for the best interest of the Church, not hostility against it, not insolence, if one ascribes to it no advantage that does not undoubtedly belong to it. V. The Church is infallible in the judgment of simple propositions, even out of context. Consequently, it is also infallible in the judgment of propositions in context. Yes, it is. The Church can always say: according to the concepts that



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I associate with the words of this sentence, it agrees with the revealed teaching, or it does not agree. But in the case of a sentence in a book and its context, the Church can never say whether it is heretical in the sense of the author or not, because it cannot know which concepts he connected with the words of the sentence and the context. The Church can only decide whether a sentence is orthodox or heterodox, if the author thought by the words what it thinks, and what other reasonable people usually understand by these words. VI. If the Church is not infallible in factis dogmaticis, it is also not infallible in the judgment of tradition, for if it wants to say: such and such a thing has been believed by this and that particular church, by this and that Father, the Church always judges a factum dogmaticum. If it can be lacking in this advantage, it can also be lacking for the whole tradition, and then all its infallibility crumbles. The same applies to the explanation of the Bible. If the Church is not infallible in matters that do not belong to the ultimate purpose of infallibility, as the judgment of a facti dogmatici is, it does not yet follow [340] that it is not infallible in matters for which it has received the assurance of infallibility. After all, the Church is infallible so that it can tell the faithful what God has revealed, and for this purpose it is necessary that it is also able to explain Scripture infallibly according to tradition. But it is not necessary that it be able to infallibly decide facta dogmatica. If a doubt arises about the meaning of a biblical passage in its context, the Church first determines its meaning according to the art of interpretation, because it is already assured in advance that the Holy Spirit expresses clearly and definitely what he wanted to teach men, and does not, as men do, conceal the true meaning by chance or out of ignorance. Then the Church examines the tradition to help it determine the meaning of the passage, and in that it cannot err in judging the statement of individual churches or Church Fathers, because the Church is promised the support of the Holy Spirit for this purpose. In this case alone, it acts as the representative of Christ. VII. If the Church is not infallible in factis dogmaticis, no one is guilty of considering himself a heretic, even if he has been condemned by the Church. If such a convicted heretic defends a doctrine that has been rejected

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by the Church in a sense other than that which the Church has condemned, he may only explain himself better, and the Church itself will no longer consider him a heretic. If, however, he asserts his doctrine in the very sense that the Church has rejected, then he is and remains a heretic. VIII. [341] Either one is guilty of believing fide divina, for example that the known five propositions of Jansen are heretical, or not. If one is guilty, the Church is infallible in factis dogmaticis, because nothing but the pronouncement of the infallible Church can impose the obligation of belief. If one is not obliged, then one is also not obliged to conform to the judgment of the Church and can still consider these sentences orthodox. Nevertheless, the Church was not satisfied with this; it also demanded that one should believe not only that these propositions are heretical, but that they are also heretical in the sense Jansen himself understood them, as they stand in context. One is bound to believe that the five propositions of Jansen, understood as the Church has understood them, are heretical, provided that the judgment pronounced on them by the pope has been accepted by the whole Church. For this reason, however, the Church is not yet infallible in factis dogmaticis. Outwardly, one is obliged to follow the pronouncement of the pope, not to contradict it, much less to defend the condemned propositions. But inwardly everyone can believe what seems to him the most reasonable. This is the so-called silentium religiosum, the silence out of reverence for the Roman See. “But the Church was not satisfied with that? It demanded that one should believe that the propositions had been condemned in the way Jansen understood them, [342] that they had been lifted out of his book Augustine, and that they had in context the same meaning that the Church had attached to them?” How often does one use Church, where more appropriately one should say pope! The pope demanded this, but not the whole Church. And as long as this does not happen, it cannot be considered a decision in matters of faith that the silentium religiosum about papal decisions and the outward obedience to them are not enough. The pope demanded that one should believe that the five sentences of Jansen were correctly understood as he rejected them, but this cannot be understood in any other way than that Jansen must have understood them



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in this sense if he wanted to write sensibly and coherently. But whether Jansen did not perhaps connect other concepts with his words, about which he did not explain himself clearly enough, the pope could not know. I will give only one example. The sentence: One of the Trinity has suffered, can be condemned by the Church, if it connects this meaning with it: The Son of God according to his divine nature has suffered, and this sentence can really stand in a book in such a connection that one must conclude that the author would have meant it in this sense. And yet it is possible that he believed: One of the Trinity had suffered in the assumed human nature but had not expressed himself in such a way that one could conclude this from his words and context. This can also happen in other cases. IX. [343] The Church is established by Christ as the judge of doctrine and disputes in matters of faith. Therefore, it must also be able to judge the teachings of a book or an author infallibly. The Church must be able to judge whether a book or a sentence contradicts the clearly revealed truth or not, according to the concepts that must be connected with it in accordance with the art of interpretation. No one disputes this prerogative. But from this it does not follow that the book, or the sentence in this context, is really heretical. Perhaps the author, whether he was serious about it or not—for I am not speaking here of his actual inner faith—has connected other concepts with the words, for which the Church does not have the Holy Spirit’s authority of judgment. The book, or the sentence thus taken in the sense of the Church, is certainly heretical, and I must believe that fide interna. No silentium religiosum helps here. But that the author must have thought so when writing the book, as the Church imagines him, whether he was serious or not, I am not obliged to believe fide interna, and here the silentium religiosum is sufficient. I do not see in the least how this silence can be detrimental to the authority of the Church because it concedes it all privileges that flow from the purpose of infallibility. With this I will conclude this matter. It will be easy to see that I differ from the defenders of infallibility in factis dogmaticis only in expression, [344] but not in the matter itself. But yet this distinction seemed important to me, especially in view of what I have yet to say: for in the following appendix, I shall sometimes endeavor to show that

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some Protestant doctrines, which have nevertheless been rejected, are not different from ours. I do not deny that they are really heretical in the sense in which the Church understood them, and had to understand them, because the Protestants did not express themselves clearly enough in the first heat of controversy. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Protestants had a different meaning in mind. If I have erred in this matter, it cannot be imputed to me that I have done so out of malice or rebellion against the Church. My intention is pure, and I seek nothing but to facilitate a union between us and them. Having a favorite idea [Lieblingsidee] leads often to overlooking difficulties, because one is constantly focused on one concept or imagines these difficulties to be less important than they really are. I only wish that all those who will judge me think and speak as honestly as I do. I am not afraid of criticism and am willing to bear it, even severe criticism. With this, the proof of the truth of the Catholic religion, which I promised to give in this third part, is finished.

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248 Bibliography ———. Die Verehrung und Anrufung der Heiligen. . . . Augsburg: 1781. ———. Vertheidigung der natürlichen, christlichen, und katholischen Religion. 3 vols. Augsburg: 1787–89. ———. Apologie seiner Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion: Eine Beylage zu seiner Vertheidigung der natürlichen, christlichen und katholischen Religion. Augsburg: Rieger, 1790. Mayr, Beda, with Thomas J. von Haiden. Grundsätze zur Feststellung und Aufrechterhaltung der Eintracht zwischen der politischen und kirchlichen Macht. 1785. Michaelis, Johann David. “Briefe von der Schwierigkeit der ReligionsVereinigung.” In Syntagma Commentationum, 1:121–70. Göttingen: 1759. ———. Erklärung der Begräbnis- und Auferstehungsgeschichte Christi nach den vier Evangelisten mit Rücksicht auf die in den Fragmenten gemachten Einwürfe und deren Beantwortung. Halle: 1783. Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von. Streittheologie der Christen . . . mit Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Ernst von Windheim. Vol. 1. Erlangen: 1763. ———. Elementa Theologiae Dogmaticae. Nürnberg: 1764. Muratori, Ludovico. De Ingeniorum Moderatione in Religionis negotiis. Paris: 1714. Petzek, Joseph Anton von. Untersuchung, ob der Kirchenablaß eine Nachlassung der göttlichen Strafe sey, und ob dessen Wirkung sich auf die Seelen der Verstorbenen erstrecke? Freiburg: 1788. Pfaff, Christoph Matthäus. Bündige Antwort auf die zwölf Briefe des P. Scheffmacher. Tübingen: 1750. Rambach, Friedrich Eberhard, ed. Paolo Sarpi—Historie des Tridentinischen Concilii mit des D. Courayer Anmerkungen, herausgegeben und mit einer Vorrede begleitet von Friedrich Eberhard Rambach. 6 vols. Halle: 1761–65. Schwarzhueber, Simpert. Praktisch-katholisches Religionshandbuch für nachdenkende Christen. 4 vols. Prague: 1785. Stattler, Benedict. Theologia Christiana Theoretica. Vol. 6. Eichstätt: 1780. ———. Plan zu der alleinmöglichen Vereinigung im Glauben der Protestanten mit der katholischen Kirche und den Grenzen der Möglichkeiten. Munich: 1791. Véron, François. Méthodes de traiter des controverses de religion. . . . Paris: 1638. ———. Regle general de la foy catholique, separée de toutes autres doctrines. . . . Paris: 1645. ———. Regula Fidei Catholicae. In Religionis Naturalis et Revelatae Principia, edited by Luke Hooke, 3:609–725. Paris: 1774. Walch, Christian F. Entwurf einer vollständgen Historie der Kirchenversammlungen. Leipzig:1759. ———. Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Ketzereien, Spaltungen und Religionstreitigkeiten bis auf die Zeit der Reformation. Vol. 1. Leipzig: 1762. Werkmeister, Benedict. Thomas Freykirch: oder freymüthige Untersuchungen über die Unfehlbarkeit der katholischen Kirche. . . . Frankfurt and Leipzig [i.e., Göttingen]: 1792.

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250 Bibliography Lehner, Ulrich L., and Michael Printy, eds. A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2013. Mansini, Guy. Fundamental Theology. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018. O’Collins, Gerald. Revelation: Towards a Christian Interpretation of God’s SelfRevelation in Jesus Christ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Probst, Manfred. Gottesdienst in Geist und Wahrheit: Die liturgischen Ansichten und Bestrebungen Johann Michael Sailers (1751–1832). Regensburg: Pustet, 1976. Rauwolf, Gerhard J. “P. Beda Mayr OSB (1742–1794): Versuch einer ökumenischen Annäherung.” Jahrbuch des Vereins für Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte 33 (1999): 317–53. Schäfer, Philipp. Kirche und Vernunft. Munich: Hueber, 1974. Schromm, Arnold. “Wissenschaft und Aufklärung im Benediktinerstift Heilig– Kreuz Donauwörth.” Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte 54 (1991): 287–98. Spehr, Christopher. Aufklärung und Ökumene: Reunionsversuche zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten im deutschsprachigen Raum des späteren 18. Jahrhunderts. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005. Valeske, Ulrich. Hierarchia Veritatum—Theologiegeschichtliche Hintergründe und mögliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im Ökumenismusdekret des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gespräch. Munich: Claudius, 1968. Waldenfels, Hans. Offenbarung: Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil auf dem Hintergrund der neueren Theologie. Munich: Hueber, 1969. Walmsley, J. C., and Felix Waldmann. “John Locke and the Toleration of Catholics: A New Manuscript.” Historical Journal 62 (2019): 1093–115. Wolf, Hubert. Verdammtes Licht: Der Katholizismus und die Aufklärung. Munich: CH Beck, 2019. ———. Der Unfehlbare: Pius IX. und die Erfindung des Katholizismus im 19. Jahrhundert. Munich: CH Beck, 2020. ———, ed. Römische Bücherverbote: Edition der Bandi von Inquisition und Indexkongregation 1701–1813. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009. Wright, Jonathan A. “Ruggiero Boscovich (1711–1787): Jesuit Science in an Enlightenment Context.” In Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe, edited by Ulrich L. Lehner and Jeffrey Burson, 353–70. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014.

Index Index

I nde x

Abraham, 40 Africa, 91 Alexander VI, Pope, 104 Alexander VII, Pope, 125 Alexandria, 119 Amort, Eusebius, 15, 123, 207 angels, 32, 104 Antioch, 117, 119, 169 Apelles, 109 apostles duty to preach, not to write, 60, 162 and their successors, 41, 80–82, 87, 89, 92, 96, 133, 134, 139, 142, 186, 190, 206 Arius, 106, 107, 108, 149, 150, 151, 171, 173 Arnauld, Antoine, 98 Asia, 91 Athanasius, Saint, 109, 150, 151, 211 atheism, 59, 191 Augsburg, 1 Augustine, Saint, 97, 107, 109, 116, 117, 118, 147, 208, 236, 239, 244 Bahrdt, Carl Friedrich, 56 Bantle, Franz, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18 Basil the Great, Saint, 97 Basnage, Jacques, 149 Bellarmine, Robert, Saint, 149, 152, 167 Benediktbeuern, 2 Bereans, 72 Bergier, Nicolas, 49, 133, 190 Berytlus, 171 Biblicism, Protestant problems of, 188, 189 bishop dignity of his office, 181 errancy of single bishop, 101, 156

bishops sins of, 104 Blasius, 170 Blau, Felix Anton, 18 Boniface VIII, Pope, 104 borders of orthodoxy, 6, 22 Braun, Heinrich, 3 Caesar, Julius, 56, 57 canonizations, 124, 179, 194–95, 208, 225–31 Chadwick, Owen, 18 Chalcedon, Council of, 97, 149, 151 Chemnitz, Martin, 127 church apostolicity, 181 authoritative decisions, 217 Catholicity, 180, 181, 187 expulsion of false teachers, 170 fallibility in disciplinary questions, 151 fallibility in pious opinions, 125 final end, 197 four marks of the, 174–85 hearer of God's message, 61, 82 holiness, 141, 178–79 as interpreter of Scripture, 68 as a moral building, 181 as society of worshippers, 167 union with Roman Church as sign of true church, 174–75 Churches, Oriental, 144 Clement of Alexandria, 94, 117, 118, 146 Clement XI, Pope, 125 concessions, theological, 25 confession, 26, 32, 38, 89, 112, 113, 126, 138, 140, 141, 162, 168, 203, 215, 218, 219, 224

251





252 Index conscience, 58, 76, 77, 78, 79, 160, 166, 207, 215, 219 Constans, emperor, 150 Constantinople, Council of, 151 Constantinople, Second Council of, 108, 151 Constantius, emperor, 150 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 2 Cornelius, Pope, 171 credibility of ancient sources, 46, 55, 56, 73, 85, 115–17, 129, 188 Cyprian, 96, 112, 147, 172 Cyril of Alexandria, 109, 147 Cyril of Jerusalem, 96, 109, 211 Daill, Jean (Dallaeus), 117 deism, 51, 59, 111 development of doctrine. See dogma devils, 32, 40, 170, 230 d'Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, 59, 103, 106 doctrine apostolic origin, 95 doctrines. See also opinions, theological doctrines, revealed, 132, 185 acceptance by the whole church, 154 directly, 28, 163, 199, 203–4, 209, 211, 215, 218, 221–22 indirectly, 12, 13, 204–9, 211, 223 juris divini, 207 preservation in the Church, 148 status of, 118, 119, 121, 122, 193, 199–200, 205–10, 218–19, 238–46 dogma, 1, 26, 206–7 definition of, 6, 214 development of doctrine, 12, 17, 18, 213–15 Donauwörth, 2, 30 Drey, Johann Sebastian, 6, 8 Enlightenment, 3, 5, 7, 8, 18 Ephesus, Council of, 97, 239 Ephesus, robber synod of, 105 Eusebius, 92, 109, 117, 123, 207 Eutyches, 97 excommunication, 58, 173

facta dogmatica, 26, 194, 233–39, 242–46 faith based on authority, 59, 189–90, 214–18 blind, 59, 183, 184, 188, 189 determination of articles of faith, 195 and innovation, 22, 96, 107, 220 motives for, 57, 115 rule of, 11, 72, 74, 95 unity in, 21, 71, 85, 86, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176, 214 fallibility. See also infallibility, ecclesial of church in disciplinary questions, 151 of single Church Father, 100–101, 145 fanaticism, 38, 165 Florinus, 170 France, 90, 218 freedom of conscience, 76, 77, 78 freedom to believe, 54, 77 freedom to build religious belief, 76 freedom to think, 33, 41, 76, 78, 101, 102, 166, 178, 194, 215 French Revolution, 7 Frölich, Wolfgang, 6, 7 gentleness, 22, 159,222 Gregory of Nazianzus, Saint, 97, 107, 108 Gregory the Great, Saint, 109, 211 Gregory VII, Pope, 104, 231, 232 Gregory XV, Pope, 125 harmony, 157, 159, 221 Hell, 140, 141, 142, 143, 202, 230 hermeneutics, confessional, 38, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, 57, 62, 72, 238 rules of interpretation, 53, 57 Hermogenes, 108 Herodotus, 56 hierarchy of truths, 9, 205 Hilary of Poitiers, Saint, 140, 211 Hochbichler, Johann, 6, 8 Holy Spirit assistance for Church, 41, 63–66, 79, 91, 98, 103, 104, 131, 134, 138, 144, 152, 153, 160, 188, 209, 211, 213, 222, 226, 227, 230, 231, 237, 240–43 assistance for Councils, 103–4

Index 253

assistance for interpretation of Scripture, 243 Honorius, Pope, 165 Hymenaeus, 170 Ibas, 151 Ignatius, 92, 175 incarnation, of Christ, 43, 44, 50, 159 Index of Forbidden Books, 4, 7 indulgences, 23, 26, 102, 112, 113, 122, 123 infallibility, double, 140, 198 infallibility, ecclesial, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 47, 62, 63, 74, 77, 86, 87, 91, 103, 104, 114, 115, 124, 125, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 166, 167, 169, 171, 182, 183, 188–209, 212–16, 219–27, 230, 232–39, 241–45 boundaries of, 193, 103, 193–246 charism of all apostles, 133, 134 of the church Christ founded, 169 connection to true faith, 136, 142–44, 162 difference to sinlessness, 104 for divine mission of magisterium, 100, 137–39 ecumenical implications, 14, 162–66, 223 facta dogmatica, 194, 233–39, 243–46 fallible about origin of doctrine, 163–66, 200, 201 for guidance of the faithful, 166, 197, 201–9 and human frailty, 104 and mission, 127, 139 for peace within the church, 159 preservation from destruction, 140–44 as privilege, 17, 104–5, 134, 183, 197–202 as protection from error, 17, 131–43, 162 rational basis for, 115, 132, 154–55 for universality of doctrine, 136, 158 infallibility, natural, 114 infallibility, supernatural, 86, 212 innovation, theological, 22, 96, 107, 220 intolerance, religious, 112 Irenaeus of Lyon, 92, 93, 94, 117, 118, 136, 137, 146, 170, 172

irenicism, 5, 13 Italy, 90 Jansenism, 150, 208, 233, 234, 236, 237, 244, 245 Jeremiah, prophet, 109 Jerome, Saint, 97, 107, 109, 118, 147 Jesus, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 96, 98, 99, 101, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 121, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 169, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 187, 196, 197, 198, 202, 204, 206, 209, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 226, 229, 231, 232, 234, 237, 240, 242, 243, 245 divinity of, 38, 43, 44, 53, 106 Jews, 32, 35, 40–41, 69–70, 72–73, 99, 111, 121, 133, 146, 185 John Damascene, Saint, 211 judge of faith, infallible, 38, 39, 52, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 129, 138 promotes unity in faith, 71 reasonableness, 187 Julius II, Pope, 104 Kamper, Wigand, 123 Klüpfel, Engelbert, 16 Laodicea, Council of, 211 Leo the Great, Saint, 140 Leo X, Pope, 104 Less, Gottfried, 117 Livy, 56, 57, 66 Locke, John, 14 Luke, evangelist, 34 Lutheranism, 21, 28, 43, 53, 57, 58, 64, 72, 110, 111, 112, 117, 127, 145, 149, 171 Maccabees, 200, 211, 212 Malchion, 171

254 Index Mary, mother of God, 124, 125, 127, 240 Immaculate Conception, 124–27 Matthew, gospel of, 117, 127, 152, 211, 212 Mayr, Beda, 1–26, 56, 102, 117, 119, 123, 129, 141, 149, 152, 154, 158, 165, 173, 179, 183, 205, 208, 215, 216, 222, 225, 228, 241 Melito, 211 Michaelis, Johann David, 77, 139 Miller, Johann Peter, 149 miracles, 31, 32, 40, 41, 46, 57, 64, 66, 70, 88, 101, 102, 115, 133, 134, 136, 155, 160, 186, 190, 191, 225, 226, 227 Montanus, 170, 172 moral certainty, 46, 49, 114, 115, 132, 135, 138, 154, 155, 188, 189, 193, 202, 212, 214, 227, 230, 231 moral doctrines, 45, 178, 179, 181, 188, 229, 232 Moses, 40 Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von, 65, 68, 69, 70, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 116, 149, 234 Muratori, Ludovico, 5, 126, 194, 212, 215, 228, 234 Napoleon, 7 Nestorius, 97, 100, 147, 239, 240 Nicaea, Council of, 105, 106, 149, 150, 151, 152, 173 Nicole, Pierre, 98 Noetus, 171 notes, theological, 205, 221 Novatian, 171 opinions, theological, 5, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 52, 53, 59, 65, 68, 79, 89, 95, 96, 99, 102, 108, 116, 120, 147, 148, 166, 178, 191 canonizations, 225 church dogma, 211–14 consensus, 207, 212 difference to doctrine, 124–27 infallibility, 124, 148, 225 Mayr’s own, 125, 195, 223–24 school opinions, 27, 125, 178, 216 as tradition, 103, 105

ordination laying on of hands, 89 Orientals turning into, 70 Origen, 95, 96, 109, 117, 146, 171 Pangrazio, Andrea, 9 Pantenus, 94 Paul, Saint, 34, 41, 70, 72, 73, 86, 89, 93, 98, 116, 170, 171 peace, religious, 24 Pelagians, 97 Peter, Saint, 70, 93, 98, 110, 126, 140, 141, 172, 173, 186 Petzek, Joseph Anton, 26, 123 Pfaff, Christoph Matthäus, 62, 144, 145 Pfenninger, Johann Konrad, 31 Philetus, 170 Philip II, King, 78 Pius V, Pope, 125 Pius VI, Pope, 7 popes and Bible, 111 as center of unity, 175, 187 fallibility, 50, 153, 82, 115, 124–26, 244 heretical, 164, 165 infallibility with or without collegium of bishops, 156 petrine office, 141, 168, 187 primacy, 172–73 and tradition, 84–85, 100, 111–13, 126 prejudice, 23, 104, 121, 220, 228 priesthood unity of, 173, 187 prophecies, 32, 46, 57, 115 providence, 31, 135, 156, 182 purgatory, 100, 112, 113, 162, 199 Rambach, Friedrich Eberhard, 110, 111, 112, 129 reason proper use, 49–50, 63, 187 Reformed Church, 32, 57, 58, 64, 72, 111, 112, 149, 179, 189 religion, private, 52

Index 255

revelation, 28, 226 acceptance of, 77, 226 enemies of, 47, 58, 103, 104, 111, 119 as historical fact, 114 and human reason, 28, 31–35, 40, 49, 51, 56, 58–66, 113–15, 126, 152–66, 184, 190, 204–12, 217, 221–28, 230, 238–46 identifying of, 6, 121, 163, 199, 203, 211 interpretation by individual insight, 43, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53, 71, 79, 99, 100, 101 interpretation through tradition, 36–39, 61–76, 85–130, 163 oral transmission, 38, 49, 60, 61, 67, 72, 74, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 93–94, 98, 111, 161, 162 understandability, 34, 35, 36, 44–46, 63, 70–71, 74, 86–87, 99 as unity in Scripture and Tradition, 111 and the unlearned, 30, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 72, 129, 132, 154, 160, 166, 183, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191 Rimini, Council of, 106 Rome, 78, 89, 92, 95, 113, 119, 169, 170, 172, 181, 207, 221, 228 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 34, 35, 59 Sabellinus, 171 sacraments, 22, 168, 177, 181, 216, 224 institution by Christ, 9, 15, 26–27, 44, 206, 224 Sailer, Johann Michael, 8 saints, veneration of, 4, 100, 125, 143, 179, 194, 198, 200, 203, 217, 219, 222, 224–31 salvation doctrines and morals necessary for, 10, 14, 16–19, 24, 27–28, 33, 39, 42, 57, 63, 65, 68–74, 80, 136, 141, 145, 159–63, 166, 176, 179, 184, 196–210, 213–29, 234–37, 242 Sardica, Council of, 149, 150, 151 Scheffmacher, Johann Jakob, 145 scholasticism, 3, 5, 22, 24, 27, 156, 2o5, 220 school opinions. See opinions, theological

Schwarzhueber, Simpert, 5 Sciarelli, Nicola, 26 Scripture authenticity of text, 55, 116, 128–29 and Church, 50–76, 243 darkness of, 35, 66–74, 85–86 deuterocanonical books, 27, 200, 213 final purpose of, 161 infallible interpretation through tradition, 114 intention of authors, 34–37, 79, 80–81, 204, 208 interpretation, 32, 39, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 110, 111, 112, 114, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 145, 148, 152, 153, 161, 166, 188, 189, 204, 213 interpretation through tradition, 58, 81, 113–15 interpretation with consensus of the Church Fathers, 80–81, 113, 145 reading with the Holy Spirit, 64, 69 as rule of faith, 50–76, 85, 160 rules of interpretation, 38–43, 50–57, 62, 71–72, 145, 154, 159, 238 and tradition, equal reverence for, 98, 110, 111, 129, 152 sufficiency of, 50, 65, 96, 109 true meaning of, 58, 62, 145, 154, 159, 160, 235, 238, 243 Semipelagianism, 116 Silas, early disciple, 72 sinlessness, 104 Sixtus III, Pope, 125 skepticism, 59, 62, 63, 101 Smyrna, 95 Socinianism, 43, 53, 57, 58, 67, 111, 189, 196 Spain, 91 Spinoza, 59 Stattler, Benedict, 4, 5, 8, 19, 208 Stephen, Pope, 96, 112 Stock, Simon, Saint, 125 superstition, 3, 9, 28, 102, 127, 135, 203

256 Index Tertullian, 94, 95, 101, 108, 109, 117, 136, 137, 146, 170, 172 testimony, trustworthiness of, 34, 40, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 101, 103, 106, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 152, 178, 184, 185, 188, 193, 202, 211, 212, 213–19, 227, 231 Theodore of Mopsuestia, 151 Theodoret, 151 Theodotus, 170 theologians, 23–26, 57, 101 consensus of, 121, 122 their task, 121 toleration, 28, 158 Tournély, Honoré, 150 tradition agreement of all believers, 84 historical witnesses for, 89 protection from error, 83 Protestant critique of, 94 sufficent means for unity in faith, 86 trustworthiness of, 91 tradition, sacred, 27, 29, 32, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 51, 61, 62, 63, 68, 75, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 175, 177, 180, 188, 192, 202, 214, 215, 221, 223, 236, 243

criticism of, 94–110, 148–49 differentiation from false traditions, 108, 116–17, 127–29 human frailty and, 104 identical with infallibility and, 148 incorruptibility and, 99, 100 marks of genuine, 116–18 means for reasonable obedience and, 157 oral transmission of, 93–94, 161–62 as rule of faith, 95–98, 106, 113–16 as unanimous testimony of the whole Church, 84, 92, 101, 113 as Word of God, 94, 108–13, 130 Trent, Council of, 29, 77, 98, 110, 112, 113, 116, 123, 126, 129, 140, 149, 152, 206 unification, religious, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 77, 136, 194, 202, 208, 246 Ursacius, 106 Valens, 106 Vatican, Second Council of, 9 Véron, François, 6, 14, 195 Vigilantius, 97 Vigilius, Pope, 157, 164 Vincent of Lerins, 6, 11, 116, 117, 118 Voltaire, 59 Vulgate, 111 Walch, Christian W. F., 97, 103, 116, 117 Weimar, 5 Werkmeister, Benedict von, 18 Wiest, Stephan, 8

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Metaphysical Disputation II: On the Essential Concept or the Concept of Being Francisco Suárez Translated and annotated, with corrected Latin text, by Shane Duarte

The Predestination of Humans and Angels: Augustinus, Tome III, Book IX Cornelius Jansen Translated by Guido Stucco

The Catholic Enlightenment: A Global Anthology Edited by Ulrich L. Lehner and Shaun Blanchard Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics Francisco Suárez Translated and annotated, with corrected Latin text, by Shane Duarte

On the Motive of the Incarnation The Salmanticenses (Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca) Translated by Dylan Schrader