A comprehensive history of India- vol 5 Delhi Sultanat, edited by Mohammad Habib and K A Nizami

A comprehensive history of India- vol 5 Delhi Sultanat, edited by Mohammad Habib and K A Nizami

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A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA IN TWELVE VOLUMES Volume Five The

Delhi

Suitanat

(a.d. 1206-1526)

A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA Volume

Five

The Delhi Sultanat (A.t). 1206-1526)

Efiited htj MOHAMMAD HABIB KHALTQ AHMAD NKAMI

Published under the auspices of THE INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS

PEOPLE P E L H

S

PUBLISHING HOUSE A H M E D A B A P

BOMBAY.

Augfut 1970 (P89)

PBIMTED

IN

INDIA

By D. P. Sinha at New Age Printing Fi-ess, Rani Jhansi Road, New Ddhi 55, and published by him for People’s Publishing House P Ltd,.Bani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 55.

FOREWORD and the Editorial Board of the Comprehensive History of India project of the Indian History Congress have great pleasure in presenting the Fifth Volume of the history, second to be published in the series so far. The Indian History Congress had decided at its Lahore Session in 1940 to prepare and publish a Comprehensive History of India in twelve volumes based on latest research to serve as a reference work for students of Indian history. The work was planned at the Aligarh Session in 1943 and a Board of Editors appointed and contributors selected. Thanks to the efforts of Dr Tara Chand, adequate funds were collected to finance the project. The

Publication

Committee

k was hoped then that the volumes will flow in quick succession and the entire scheme will not take more th^in ten years to complete. And early success in preparing three or four volumes, whose chapters in.manuscript were received by us, strengthened that hope. But many circumstances prevented realisation of that expectation. The tragic death of several editors and contributors necessitated changes. Politioal conditions as a result of partition also created a situation not congenial to scholarly pursuits: Nonetheless, one volume was sent to the press in 1951 which took six years, again because of circum¬ stances beyond our control, to be published. •

The issue of one volume had encouraged the belief thatfc other volumes will not take much time to follow. But again thirteen years have elapsed for die second volume to be published. As Secretary of the Editorial Board, I owe an apology to the general public for this inordinate delay which sometimes is incidental in a cooperative work of this nature. Chapters written many years before havfe to be revisfd and rewritten to bring them in tune with die latest researches, arid editing is a long and tedious affair. The present volume has taken five years to edit. •

I express my grateful thanks to the joint Editors, ProtessDrs M. Habib and K. A^. Nizami, for the devotion and industry which they have applied to this work in a spirit of dedication without which its completion wt>uld have been well nigh impossible. I am thankful

vi

THE DELHI SULTANAT

lo the coiilributors who did not resent my reminders and without grudging time or energ}' have undertaken this labour of love to sqrve die advancement of Indian historical scholarship. Lastly I acknowledge with tlianks the cooperation of the People's Publishing House who liavc undertaken to publish these volumes. In conclusion I avail myself of this opportmiity to record here our deep obligation to the donors and contributors whose generosity has made possible the preparation of the Comprehensive History of

India. 21 May 1970

Bisheshwar Prasai)

Secretary Editorial Board

PREFACE It

for the Editors and contributors of the Volume V of the Comprehensive History of India to present to students of history this volume roughly covering four centuries of Indian history, which were fraught with momentous changes and developments. It is a pleasure

This volume was planned by a Committee of the Indian History' Congress which met at Aligarh in 1943. The plan of the committee laid down that there woul(,l be orre chapter for each dynasty of the Delhi sultairat and one clrapter for the dynasties of every province. We have kept this scheme unchanged. But the accumulation of his¬ torical material during these years had disturbed the neatness of tlic arrangement and chapters had to be divided into sections. Beyond that, the contributors had full freedom about sub-sections and passage headings. . The Editors have to convey tlicir grateful thanks to tlic- contributors for their invariable courtesy and kindness in considering such sugges¬ tions conccrniiig the uniformity of spellings etc. as we ventured to make to them. But for their full cooperation, the production of this volume might have been dilficult. Wc deeply regret our inability to have followed any system of diacritical marks, the main reasons being (a) the difference of pronun¬ ciation of letters in India, Iran and Arabia, (b) the various systems of diacritical marks followed in the various regional languages of India; (c) tlie cost to the press and our lack of staff. We have, therefore, spelt proper names as they are pronounced in northern and southern India by persons who write Uieir names according to pronunciation whi^i has descended to us from the middle ages. But as far as possible yrc have followed a uniform system of spelling proper names. The respon¬ sibility of spelling Persian and Arabic names has had to be shouldered by the'Editors; tor the spelling of provincial names the contributors are responsible. * •

The basis of this volume is cooperation between scholars who have studied the history of various Indian regions and formed their opinion

vlii

THE DELHI SULTANAT

on the best literary, epigraphic, numismatic and other eAudence avail¬ able. Eveiy scholar has written according to his own opinion; the unity that underlies this whole volume is the fact that persons g^uinely in search of historical truths not seldom come to the sdme condusidns. As Editors our only duty was to keep them informed of each other’s contributions to prevent overlapping. Nevertheless we and the con¬ tributors have been of the opinion that a certain amount of overlapping is necessaiy for putting the facts concerning various regions in their proper perspective. We have to confess that our first attempt was to ask various contributors to write simultaneously. This led to chaos and some contributions had to be rewritten. Our second attempt, which has resulted in this volume, was to supply every contributor with the chapters that had been written for the previous period or which covered the history of the neighbouring regions for the same period. Thus the contributor on Rajasthan was supplied with necessary chapters on the history of the Delhi sultanat and his opinion was again used for the necessary corrections of the history of the Delhi sultanat. It has not been possible for us to use more than a fraction of the material at our disposal, but the main object of the volume is to condense the most important information with reference to the past and to provide a starting point for future researches. ft

As the history of India is closely related with that of the countries to our north and north-west, we thought it better to begin the volume with a general account of these countries from the rise of Islam to the age of Babur so that the movements of Indian and Asian history may be seen in a wider perspective. It was intended to end the volume about 1525 but the contributors on the provincial dynasties have given a very brief account for the period from the first battle of Panipat to the avnexation of the provinces to the Mughal empire. In the case of the Vijayanagara enroire the story is continued for all its dynasties till about the time or Aurangzeb. We have done the best we could with the material at present aVailalble but "history is a progressive science and we are content if we have advanced it only by a few millimetres with reference to the thousands of miles which have to be traversed still. We express our grateful thanks to Dr Tara Chand, who collected the endowirient whidi made the starting of this series possible, and to Dr Bisheshwar Prasad, the Secretary, Editorial Board, for his cordial and inspiring cooperation. The People’s Publishing House 'has been extremely helpful.

PREFACE

ix

We deepl]^ regret that three of us—^Professor Srinivasachari, Dr Daudpotl and Mrs K. Nurul Hasan—^passed away before this volume could see the light of the day. • A bibliography of source material will be found in the Appendices to this volume along with the glossary. Out of regard for wond history as well as the history of India we have followed the Christian calendar, but days of Indian calendar have also been given where necessary.

27 May 1970

Mohammad Habib Khaliq Ahmad Nizami

CONTENTS

Foreword Preface

*

v vii

Chapter One THE ASIATIC ENVIRONMENT (Professor Mohammad Habib) I.

RISE OF MONARCHY AND THE COVERNING CXASSES AMONG THE MUSALMANS

1-3(1

(i) Arabia before the Rise ui Islam (ii) The I’rophet’s ‘Security System’ (ili) The Pious Caliphate (633-61) (Iv) Mu'awiya and the Dynastic Monarchies of Islam (v) The Umay>ad Empire (661*750) (vi) The Abbasids (750-1258) (vii) The Minor Dynasties of Ajam

I

t Hi

21 27 29

' •

II.



II r..

(i) Ihe Choznavkl and Seljuq Eiupiics (ii) Sultan Sanjar and the Cor Khan (Hi) Foundation of the Khwarazniian Empiic (iv) Alauddin Muhammad Kbwarazm Shah (v) The Ismailt Stale of Alamut (1090-1255)

.

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

>1-64

The Steppe Society ’ Early Legends to Yesugai Bahadur Early Struggles; Taichuls and Merkits Chen^'z’s Struggle with Jamukha, Wang Khuii and tlje Naiiuans Chengiz as Khan; Army Organization, Invasion of the Kin

THE MONGOL INVASION OF AJAM

Chengiz Decides on War _ The Khwarazm Shah’s Suicidal Military Policy Personality and Character of Chengiz Policy of Chengiz Khan: Reign of Terror, Wholesale Massacres and Physical Liquidation (v) Juwayni on the Extent of the Destruction (\i) Fate of the Ctties on the Jaxartes Frontier (vii) Sack of Bukhara and Samarqand (viii) Khwarafci

TT.i

~oo

>7 38 10 43 50

*I HE RISE OF CHENGIZ KHAN

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) IV.

oI

THE KI1\VAUAZMI.\.\ EMPIRE

.

51 57 59 00 62

.65-i^3

.• * *

po * 66 68 69 f7l 73 74 75

xii

THE DELHI SULTANAT (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv)

V.

OuTiimign of Yeme and Subetai Tuliiis Conquest of Khurasan and Mery Naishapur Herat March of Chcngiz to the Indus Career of Sultan Jalaluddin Mankbarni Mongol Conquest of Ghur

84-100

THE gA-ANS AND THE MONGOL ULUSES

(i) The Uluses (ii) The Mongol Qa-ans: Ogtai (iii) Interregnum: Turakina Khatun: Kayuk (iv) Mangu Qa-an (v) Qiihalai and Ariq Buqa (vi) llalakus March to Iran (vii) Annihilation of the Heretic Kingdom ol Alamut (viii) End of the Abbasid Caliphate (ix) Capture of Syrian Cities (x) Egyptian Victory over the Mongols (xi) The II Khans of Persia (xii) The Ogtai and Chaghatai Rulers of Central Asia VT.

76 76 77 78 i 79 SO 80

84 85 86 86 87 87 88 89 92 93 95 97

.

101-31

AMIR TIMUR

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (civ) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii)

Crimes, Apologia and Confessions Causes of Timij^’s Success The Conquest of Power The Jattah Campaigns Khwarazm Tughtamish First Khurasan Campaign: Herat Second Khurasan Campaign Sistau and Southern Afghanistan Mazendaran The Three Year Campaign Partial Crisis of 1388-89 The P]astern Campaign of 1391 Campaign Against Tughtamish through the Qipchaq The Five Year Campaign (1392-96) The Indian Campaigir The Seven Year Campaign (1399-1404) The Last Campaign

101 105 107 *'110 110 111 * 112 112 113 113 . 115 . 116 116 117 118 124 129

Cfiaplcr Two FOUNDATION OF THE DELHI SULTANAT (Professor K. A. Nizami) t.

132-42

INIRA ON THE EVE OF THE TURKISH INVASION

• '

(^ (ii) (iii)

Tin: Caste System The Turkish Pressure * Muslim Settlements before the Ghurid Conquest

.

132 136 137

xiii

CONTENTS U.

« • HISTORY OFrfJHUR DOWN TO THE RISE OF

143-55

SULTAN MU KZUDDIN

• (i) • (ii) (iii) (iv) III.

(1175-92)

156-65

Multan Uchch Nahrwala Peshawar Lahore Tabarhinda Tarain Mu'izzuddin’s Preparations Battle of Tarain

CONQUEST OF NORTHERN INDIA

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) tvi) (vii) V.

143 145 148 153

INDIAN CAMPAIGNS OF SULTAN MUEZZUDDIN

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vO (vii) (viii) (he) IV.

Ghur • The Shansabani Dynasty Conversion of Ghur Tlie Seven Stars

156 156 156 157 157 159 159 161 162

(1192-1206)

166-79

Consolidation of Turkish Power in Ajmer Post-Tarain Expansion and Problems Mu‘izzuddin’s Banaras Campaign Mu'izzuddin’s Campaign of 1195-96 Malik Bahauddin Tughril Muhammad Bakhtiyor Kbalji Last Indian Campaign of Mu'izzuddin and His Assassination

180-90

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TURKISH CONQUEST

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

166 167 168 169 170 171 178

Mu*i/zuddin’s Character and Achievements Motives of the Campaigns Causes of Turkish Success Impact of the Turkish Ctmquest

180 182 183 186

Chapter Three THE EARLY TURKISH SULTANS OF DELHI (Professor K. A. Nizami) I.

SULTAN QUTBUDDIN 'AIBEK

(0 The Dynasties; Problem of Nomenclature (ii) The Governing Class (iii) The Evolution of Turkish Slave-OflScers (iv) Aibek’s Position at the Death of Mu'izzuddin Ghnri ^ (v) Problems of Aibek (vi) Eastern Affairs (vii) Achievements of Qutbuddin Aibek (viii) Aram Shah.

*

191-208 J



191* ^191 194 197 201# 203 204 206

.

xiv II.

SULTAN SriAMSUDDIN ILTUTMISH

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) III.

The Families of Forty (Ghihalgani) SlaveOiGcers Sultan Riiknuddin P'iniz Shah Sultan Razi>’a Mu'izzuddin Bahrain Shah Sulian Alauddin Mas'ud Shah

SITLTAN NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) * (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) • (xix)

*

Controversy about lltulmish’s Name Early Life of Iltutmlsh' The Problems I’acing Iltutmish The First Pluise (1210-20) llie Second Phase: Chengiz'Khan and Mankbarai (1221*27) The Third Phase (1228-36): Bengal and Bihar Raiithambhor and Mandor Operations against Qubacha Investiture from the Caliph, Death of Prince Nasiniddin Rebellion in Lakhnauti; Gwalior, Kalinjar, Malwa Character and Achievements of Iltutmish The Problem of Succession

SUCCESSORS OF SHAAISITDDIN ILTOTMlSH

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) IV.

THE DELHI SULTANAT

Genealog>' Accession, PoUcy and Character First Regnal Year Second Regnal Year Thud Regnal Year Fourth Regnal Year Stnigglc of Jzzuddin Balban Kishlii Khan svfth Sher Khan Fifth anti Sixth Regnal Years Seventli Regnal Year Eighth Regnal Year Ninth-Regnal Year Tenth Regnal Year Eleventh Regnal Year Twelfth Regnal Year Caret'!- tif fkhtiyaruddin Yuzbek Tughrfl Khan Thiitecnth Regnal Year Fourteenth Regnal Year Fifteenth Regnal Year End of the Shamsi Dynasty; Accession of Balban

209>3i 209 210 213 '214 215 217 218 210 219 220 222 230

232*55 232 234 237 244 250

256-76 256 * 266 258 258 259 259 260 261 262 262 264 ' 266 268 268 269 271 271 272 273

1 V.

SULTAN B\LBAN AND KAIQUBAD

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) .(v) (vi)

Problems Facing Balban after His Accession Consolidation Preferred to Expansion Tlieor>' of Kingship Balban's Court Balban and the Turkish Nobility Remganization of the Anrty

277-310 277 280 280 284 285 286

CONTENTS •

(vU) (viii) (lx) • (x) • (xi) (xii) (xiil)

XV

’•)

Rcst^piption of Tqtas' in the Doab Administrative Measures and Orj'iinizatiou of Government HebeUion of at Laldmauti , Sultan ^fuliainniad, The Martyr Prince The Last Davs of Sultan Balhan Achievements and Failures of Balhan Roij^n of Mu'izziiddin Kaiquhad

288 200 292 207 300 301 303

Chapfer Four THE KHALJIS JALALUDDIN KllALJI

-Professor A. B. M. Hcahilnillali ALAUDDIN KHALJI

- Professor Banarsi Prasad Saksena QUTnUDDlX MUBAltAK KIIALJl

- Professor Banarsi Prasad Saksena NASmiTDDlN KHUSRAU KHAN

- Professor Mohammad Ilabil) I.

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) iyiii) If.

Accession of Jalaluddin F’iriiz Jalaluddin Firuz’s Feelinjps and Sentiments Revolt of Malik Chajju Hruz's Magnanimity J''iniz's Military Expeditions F’irnz and Conspirators—Case of Sidi Mania Conspiracy of Ali Curshasp Assas*sination of jalaluddin Finjz Khalji

ALAUDDix khalji: cONyuKST OF POWER

(i) • (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) HI.

311-25

JALALUDDIN Fiarz KHALJI

311 312 313 310 3IT 319 321 32-1

(1296-1301)

Capture of Delhi Accession and the Coalition Government Nfultan The Invasion of Kadar, Battle of Jaran-Manjur The Fall of the Old Nobility Conquest of Gujarat Siwistan Schemes about Founding New Religion Invasion of Qutlugh Khwaja; Battle of Kill « Conquest of Ranthamhhor; The Three Rebellions (1299-1300)

326-48 326 328 331 331 332 334 336 336 337 3-^1

ALAIIDDIN KHALJI: MEASURES FOR PREVENTING REBELLIONS; IJ^ND REVENUE REFORMS; CHITOR; TARCHI

(i) (ii) (iii) (Iv)

l‘>>ur Measures for Suppressing Rebellions The Sultan and the Hindu Chiefs Alauddin’s Land Revenue Reforms Conversation with Qazi Mu^is

(1301-03)

349-71 *3^9 352 356 362

THE DELHI SULTANAT (v) (vi) (vIO IV.

Invasion of Warangal; Conquest of Chitor Targhi Invests DetU The Padmini Legend; Chitor during Alauddin’s Reign

ALAUDDIN KHALJl: THE ECONOMIC HEGCLATIONS

866 868 370 372-&1 \

(i) The Object of the Regulations' (ii) The ‘Mandi' or Grain Market (iii) The Sera-i Adi (iv) The Markets of Horses, Slaves and Cattle (v) The Genial Markets (vO Review of Barani's Account V.

ALAUDDIN KHALJl; THE LAST MONGOL INVASIONS—MALWA AND RAJASTHAN

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

392-99

Invasion of All Beg, Tartaq and Targhi Invasion of Kabk, Iqbal Mud]>ir and Mudabir Tai Bn Conquest of Malwa Conquest of Siwana Conquest of Jalor No Rajasthan Policy Punishment of the Ismaili Borahs

392 393 395 396 396 397 399

ALAUDDIN KHALJl .* !«£ DECCAN AND THE FAR SOUTH

400-1.7

(v) (vi) (vii) VI.

372 379 382 384 886 387

^0 Conquest of Baglana; Second Invasion of Devagiri ^ " The Warangal Campaign (iii) The Campaigns of Dwara Samudra and Ma'abar

'400 403 410

\ »

VII.

ALAUDDIN KHALJl: THE LAST YEARS; KAFUR

418-27

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 4.v)

Massacre of the New Muslims Khixr Khan's Marriages.;^ Malik Kafur in Deva^b Three Successive Groups of Aiauddin’s Officers Alauddin’s Last Days; Murder of Alp Klian; Khizr Disinherited and Imprisoned (vi) Sultan Shihabuddin Umar; Regime of Malik Kafur

\’III.



QUTBUDDIN MUBARAK SHAH KHALJl

418 419 . 420 420 422 425

428-44

(i) Regency, Accession and Early Policy (ii) Hie Problem of Hasan Baradu and the Degeneration of the Sultan (iii) Settlement of Gujarat ^Iv) Mubarak’s Conquest of Devagiri ^ (v) Second Siege of Warangal (vi) Conspiracy of Asaduddin; Mubarak’s Punishments (vii) Rebellion of Malik Yak Laldchi; Khusrau Khan in Ma’abar (vii) _ The Sultan and Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya (lx) Murder pf the Sultan ^

428 430 432 433 435 436 438 440 442

CONTENTS

xvii

445-59

NASmUI»Ar KHUSRAU KHAN • (i) Accession of Khusrau Khau (ii) Beginning of the Struggle (ill) Battle &f Saraswati (iv) Battle of Lahrawat

445 450 453 454

Chapter Five THE TUGHLUQS GHIYASUDDIN TUGHLUQ

-Professor Banarsi Prasad Saksena MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

-Professor K. A. Nizami Fmuz SHAH TUGkLUQ

- Professor Banarsi Prasad Saksena SUCCESSORS OF FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ

-Professor Mohammad Habib I.

SULTAN GHIYASUDDIN TUGHLUQ

(1320-25)

460-83

(i) Name and Ethnic Origin (ii) Early Career (iii) Rise to Power (iv) The Problems before the Sultan (v) Economic Measures (vi) Reorganization of the Army (vii) The Warangal Campaign (viii) Tlie Jajnagar Expedition (ix) A Mongol Invasion (x) The Gujarat Campaign (xi) The Bengal Campaign (xii) The Attack on Tirhut (xiil) The Afghanpur Tragedy (xiv) The Sultan and Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya (xv) Estimate

460 461 463 464 466 469 469 472 47v3 473 474 475 476 480 482 •

II.

SULTAN MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

(1324-51)

484-565

Accession Chronology The Political and Religious Concepts and Attitudes of tl\e Sultan Invasion of Tanxiashirin Conqtiest of Kalanaur and Farashur (Peshawar) Rebellion of Bahauddin Gnrshasp Conquest of Kondhana Rebellicm of Bahram Aiba Kanialpur Insurrection Rebellion of' Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Exodus to Devagiri The Token Curr^cy

485 486 491

4^8

sAo 500 503 504 505

^5 506 515

xviii

THE DELHI SULTANAT

(xiii)/The Khurasan Expedition (xiv) RebeJlion of Sehwan (xv> The Qarachil Expedition (xvi) Famine, Plague and the Successful Rebellion of Ma'abar (xvii) Revolutions in Bengal (xviii) Establishment of Independent Hindu Ftincipalities in Southern India (xix) Kampila (xx) The Nagarkot Campaign (xxi) Rebellions (xxii) The Khilafat as a Protecting Glacis (xxiii) The Sultan's Attempt at Rehabilitating Agriculture (xxiv) Revolt of the ‘Sadah’ Amirs and the Emergence of the Bahmani Kingdom (xxv) Frustrations of a Despot (xxvi) Rebellion of Taghi; Death of Sultan Muhammad (xxvii) The Sultau’s ‘Siyasat’ (Death-Penalties) (xxviii) Personal Character, Expansion and Contraction of the Sultanat (xxix) Bureaucracy of Muhammad bin Tughluq III.

FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ

(i) Election; March to Delhi (ii) Rebellion of Khwaja-i Jahan Ahmad Ayaz (iii) First Administrative Acts and Reforms (iv) First Bengal Campaign (v) Achievements in^ivil Engineering (vi) The Second Bengal Campaign (vii) The Jajnagar Campaign (viii) Four Years of Peace (ix) The Kangra Campaign (x) The Thatta Campaign (1365-67) (xi) The Tas-Ghariyal (xii) The Collection of ‘Slaves' (xiii) Later Constructions; Astdta’s Pillars (xiv) The ‘Karkhanas’; Fruit Gardens, Measures of Relief for Muslims (xv) Prices and Wages (xvi) Vanishing of the Invincible Army of Delhi (xvii) Visit to Bahraich; Fanatical and Reactionary Measures; Abolition of ‘Non-Shari‘at’ Taxes (xviii) Great OfReeis of Firuz Shah (xix) Last Years of the Reign

• S19 521 522

523 530 e>

531 532 532 532 537 538 540 550 553 555 556 561

566-619 566 570 573 582 585

^89 591 593 594 595 599 800 601 6Q3 604 606 609 613 617

I

IVi

SUCCESSORS OF FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ

. (1) Ghiyasuddin Tughluq Shah 11, 1388-89 ,(4i) Abu Bakr Shah, 1399 (iii) Conflict of Abu Bakr and Sultan Muhammad ‘ (iv) Alauddin Sikandar Shah (v) Accession of Nasiniddin Mahmud (vi) Career of Sarang Khan (vii) Events at Delhi, 1394-98

620-29 620 620 621 623 623 623 624

CX>NTENTS

six

1

(viii) (ix)

Cai;pec of Mallu Iqbal Khan, 1390-1405 Restoration of Sultan Mahmud, 1405-12

626 627

Chapter Six

THE

SAIYYIDS (1414-51) (Professor K. A. Nizami)

I.

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) II.

630-40

KHIZR KHAN

Rise of Khizr Khan Khizr Khan’s Entry into Delhi The Genealogical Myth Campaigns of Khizr Khan Western Provinces Placed under Shahzada Mubarak Pjstimate of Khizr KhaAi

MUBARAK SHAH

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii) (xxiii)

(1421-33)

632 635 635 636 637 640

641-58

Nomination by KJuzr Khan Administrative Arrangements in the North-Western Region Rebellion of Jasrath Attempts to Rehabilitate and Garrison Lahore Conflict with Jasrath Campaigns against Katehr and Kampil Baltic against Jasrath Malik Mahmud Hasan in Multan Alp Khan's Attack of Gwalior Revolt in Mewat Bayana and Gwalior Conflict with Ibrahim Sharqi Campaign against the Mewatis Campaign against the Khokars Mewatis Again The Gwalior Campaign Revolt of the Sons of Saiyyid Salim Incursion of Shaikh Ali of Kabul Revolt of Jasrath Campaign against Mewat Shaikh Ali again Curtailment of the Authority of Sarwarul Mulk and Its Reactions Assassination of Mubarak •

641 641 641 643 643 644 645 645 645 646 647 648 649 649 649 650 650 651 653 654 654 655 686 I

III.

SUCCESSORS OF MUBARAK SHAH

(i) (ii)

Muhammad Shah (1434-43) Sultan Alauddin Shah (1443-76)

659-63 •

659 ^ 662

THE DELHI SULTANAT

XX

Chapter Seven THE LODIS (1451-1526) (Professor K. A. Nizami) I.

(i) (il) 11.

664-72

INTRODUCTORY

Hie Afgjhans in India Rise of the Lodis to Power

BAHLUL LODI

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (Vi)

(vii) (viii) (ix) (x)

(1451-89)

(i) (iO (iil) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) % IV.

V

1

(1489-1517)

Aocessiou Campaign agaiifst Alam Khan Lodi, Isa Khan Lodi and Barbek Shah Campaign against Tatar Khan Lodi and Sultan Asliraf Attack on Jaunpur by the Bachgoti Rajputs Campaign against Rai Bhid Invasion of Husain Sharqi Invasion of Rewa and Administrative Arrangements at Jaunpur (3oup against the Sultan Campaigns against Gwalior, Dholpur and Mandril Foundation of the City of Agra The Gwalior Campaign Death and Estimate

SULTAN IBRAHIM I.ODI

(i) (il) (iii) (iv)

673-88

Conflict with the Sharqi Ruler Chastisement of the Nobles Conflict w'ith the Ruler of Jaunpur The Multan Campaign Conflict with Husain Sharqi Attack on Malwa Division of Kingdom Conflict with Kashmir Nizam Khan Sent against Tatar Khan Dcatfi of Bahlul, His Character and Achievements

SULTAN SIKANDAB LODI

TIL

667 668

(923-32/1517-26)

Accession Conflict with Jalal Reljitions with His Nobles Invitation to Babur and the Battle of Panipat

675 676 677 679 680 683 683 684 684 684

689-701 689 690 ’ 691 691 693 • 693 694 694 695 695 696 698

702-9 702 703 705 707

t

Chaplet Eight THE SHARQI KINGDOM OF JAUNPUR (Professor K. A. Nizami) (« (ii)

Foundation of Jaunpur Malik Sarwar Sultanus Sharq (1394-99)

710-32 710 710

CONTENTS (iii) (iv) (v) (vO (viO (vill)

Milbaralc Shah Sharqi (1399-1401) Ibrahim Shah Sharqi (1401-40) Mahnyid Shah Sharqi (1440-57) Mtihamniad Shah Sharqi (1457-58) Husain Shah Sharqi (1458-1505) Bahlul Captures Jaunpur



714 714 719 722 724 728

Chapter Nine KASHMIR (1320-1586) (Dr. R. K. Parmu) I.

SULTANS OF THE KASHMIR STATE (i) (ii) (ia) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii)

(1320-1461)

Hinchan ‘Sadruddiii’ (1320-23) Udayana-Deva (1323-39) Kota Rani (1339) Sultan Shamsuddin (1338-42) Jamshed (1342-44) Sultan Alatlddin (1344-56) Sultan Shihabuddin (1356-74) Sultan Qutbuddin (1374-89) Sultan Sikandar (1389-1413) Ali Shah (1413-20) Sultan Zainul Abidin (1420-70) Sultan Haidar Shah (1470-72) Hasan Shah (1472-84)

II. . POLITICAL GANGSTERS OF THE VALLEY (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)

733-61 738 740 741 741 741 741 742 743 745 750 751 759 759

(1484-1540)

Muhammad Shah (1484-87): First Reign Fath Shah (1487-99): First Reign Muhammad Shah (1499-1505): Second Reign Fath Shah (1505-16): Second Reign Muhammad Shah (15J6-28): Third Reign Shamsuddin lra(]i and the Nur Bakhshi Movement Ibrahim Shah (1528-29) and Nazuk Sliah (1529-30) Muhammad Shah (1530-37); Fourth Reign Mirza Haidar Dughlat (1540-50)

762-71 762 763 764 764 764 765 767 767 769

THE DELHISULTANAT

xxfl

Chapter Ten RAJASTHAN

(Dr. G. N. Sharma) l.

THE HOUSE OF MEWAR

(i) The Rise of the Rajputs (ii) Tlie Extent and Physical Features of Rajasthan (iii) Rajasthan and Its neighbours (iv) The Guhilots of Mewar, Bapa Rawal (v) Lakha (1382-1421) (vi) Mokal (1421-33) (vii) Kumbha (1433-68) (viii) Uda (1468-73) (ix) Raimal (1473-1508) (x) Rana Sanga (1508-28) II.

THE GUHILOTS OF VAGAD

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Samant Singh Jagat Singh and Devapala Rawal Vir Singh and His Successors Gopi Nath Somdas and Rawal Ganga Das Udai Singh •

782-802 782 783 784 784 786 787 788 794 795 797

803-6 803 803 803 804 805 805 «

m.

THE GUHILOTS OF PRATAPGARH

(i) (ii) IV.

THE RATHORS OF MEWAR

(i) (ii) (iii) *(iv) (v) (vi)

Vv

Khem Singh Suraj Mai

l*l»e founder of Rathor Dynasty Asthaii and Ilis Successors Rao Chunda (1384-1423) Rau Raiimal (1427-38) Jodha (1438-89) Jotlha’s Successors

THE RATHORS OF BIKANER

(i) ^ (a)

Bika (1465-1504) Rao Nara and Rao Lunakarna (1504-26)

807-8 807 807

809-14 809 809 811 811 812 813

815-17 815 816

.* VI.

^THE BHATIS OF JAISALMER

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Early History of Bhatis Conflict with Turkish Invaders Conflict with Khia- Khan and Alauddin Khalji Conflicts with Neighbouring Claus;

818-20 818 818 819 820

OONTONTS

xxiii

*

vn.

821>24

THE CHAUHANS OF AJMER

.

(i) (ii) (iii)

,

VIII. IX.

Early History of Chauhans Prithviraja III Mu'izziidfliu’s Attacks and the Loss of Ajmer

821 821 823

825-26

THE CHAUHANS OF NADOL

827

THE CHAUHANS OF JALOR

X.

828-30

THE CHAUHANS OF RANTHAMBHOR

(i) (ii) XI.

Govinda Raja and His Successors Namirdeva (1283-1301)

THE CHAUHANS OF SIROIll

(i) (ii) Xir.

XIIT.

' XIV.

831-32

'

831 831

THE CHAUHANS OF IIARAOTI

833-35

(i) (ii) (iii) (Iv)

Deora Kingdom Foundation of Sirohi

,

828 828

Deva Singh Samar Singh Napuji and His Successors Rao Narain

THE KACHHWAHAS OF UHUNDHAR

(i) (ii)

836-37

Origin of the Kachhwahas Dullah Rai and His Successors

THE YADAVAS OF KAHAITLI

(i) (ii)

833 833 834 835

833 830

838-39

Vijayapala and His Successors Raja Arjunpala and His Siicf’cssors

838 838 n

XV. XVI.

THE TANWARS OF DHOLPUR THE MEWATIS

840-41 842-44

Chapter Eleven

GUJARAT AND KHANDESH (Mr. S. A. I. Tirmizi) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

Timurid Invasion and the Disinte^ation of Tughhiq Empire Muzaffar Shah I, Muhammad Shah I Ahmad Shah Nasir and Miran Adil of Khandesh MuhammAl Shah U

845-97 8^5 846 851 862 862

THE DELHI SULTANAT

xxlv

(vi) Qutbuddin Ahmad Shah II (vii) Daiid; Mahiiuid I Begarha (via) Muzaffar Shah II (lx) Sikandar; Mahmud Shah II (x) Bahadur Shah

864 866

*879 !389 889

Chapter Twelve

MALWA (Dr. U. N. Day) I.

THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM OF MALWA

(i) Dilawar Khan Ghuri (ii) Hushang Shah (iii) Muhammad Shah Ghuri (iv) Mahmud Klialji I (v) Relations of Mahmud Khalji with Neighbcniring Kingdoms (vi) Ghiyas Shah (vii) Nasir Shah (viii) Mahmud Khalji U (ix) Malwa under Gujarat (x) Malwa Independent again (xi) Mughal Coiujmjpt of Malwa

898-937 898 900 906 907 914 924 926 928 933 935 936

Chapter Thirteen

ORISSA (Professor P. Mukhcrjec) I. II.

LATER GANGA KINGS SITRYAVAMSI GAJAPATl KINGS

t (i) (ii) (iii)

Kapilendra Purushottama Pratapa Kudra

938-45 946-64 946 953 957

Chapter Fourteen

* I.

THE BAIIMANI KINGDOM (Professor Ilaroon Klian Sherwani) .THE BAHMANIS OF AHSANABAD—CULBARGA

(i) (ii) (iu)

IntroducBon Ismail Shah Alauddin Hasan Bahmani

(iv) Muhammad I

965-83 9Q5 907 909

972

CONTENTS (V) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) n.

Alaucldin Mujahid Daud Shah Muhammad Shah 11 Ghiyasuddiii Tahmtan Shamsuddiii Daud 11 Tajuddin Firuz

THE ]BAHMANIS OF MUIIAMAI/VDABAD-BIDAR

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

Shihabuddin Ahmad 1 Alauddin Ahmad II Humayim Shah The Regency The Age of Mahmud Gawan and Muhammad Shah ‘Lashkari' Death Agonies of the State The Last Phase

sxv 976 977 977 978 978 979

9844008 984 987 990 993 995 1001 1006

Chapter Fifteen

THE SULTANAT OF MADURA (Dr. S. Abdul Qadir Husaini) *(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) ' (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)

(ix) (x) (xi)

Birth of the Sultanat Jalaluddin Alauddin Qutljuddin Ghiyasuddin Nasiruddin The Break in the Coinage Shamsuddiu Adil Shah Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah Alauddin Sikandar Shah Extent of the Madura Sultanat

1009-28

1009 1011 1013 1014 1014 . 1018 1019 1021 1025 1025

1020

Chapter Sixteen

THE VIJAYANAGARA EMPIRE (Professor Gurty Venkat Rao) I.

THE SANGAMA DYNASTY

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

(v) (vi) (vii) (viii)

(ix)

The Northern Invasions Revolt of the Deccan and the South Foundation of Vijayanagara Harihara and Bukka The First Bahmani-Vijayanagara Struggle Harihara H Deva Rava 1 Deva Raya II The End^of the Sangama Dynasty

1029-67 1029 1037 • 1040 ■ • 1042 .1046 1(160 1054

ion 1063

THE DELHI SULTANAT

xxyl II.

THE SALUVA DYNASTY

(i) (il) (iU) III.

THE TULUVA DYNASTY

(0 (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) IV.

Saluva Narsimha The Regent Narasa Nayaka Vira Narasimha

Krishna Raya Achyuta Raya Salakaraju Tiruinala (Ustirper) Sadasiva Raya Battle of Bakshasa-Tangadi, 1565

THE ARAVIDU DYNASTY

(0 (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

Tirumala Raya Sri Ranga 1 Venkata Raya 11 Sri Ranga II Ramadeva Raya Venkata III Sri Ranga III and after

..

1068-73 1068 1070 1Q73

1074-91 1074 1084 1087 1087 1089

1092-1103 1092 1093 1094 1097 1098 1099 1100

Chapter Seventeen

GINGEE (Professor Srinivasachari)

1104-15

SIND AND MULTAN (Dr. U. M. Daudpota)

1116-34

1.

Chapter Eighteen

Sind under the Carniuthtuns; the Ghaznavid and the Ghurian Invasions The Sumirahs (ii) • (iii) The Samniahs: List of Jains (iv) Conflict with Delhi (v) Jam Nizamuddin (vi) The Arghuns and Jam Firuz (vii) Vicissitudes of Multan (viii) Litarary Activity during the Arghuii Period

(i)

1116 1118 1123 1125 1127 1128 1132 1133

Chapter Nineteen • •

BENGAL (Mrs. K. Niinil Hasan) (i) (ii) (iii)

Governors of Lakhnauti Sultan Nasiruddin Bughra (1281-87) Sultan Ruknuddin Kaikaus (1291-1301)

1135-60 1135 1144 1145

CONTENTS *(iv). (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii)

xxv/i

Sulta^ Shamsuddin Fimz Sbah (1301-22) Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah Civil Wars in Bengal Sultan Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah (1342-57) Sifcandar Shah (1357-89) Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah (1389-1409) Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah (1418-31) Shamsuddin Ahmad Shah (1431-35) Restoration of the Ilyas Shahi Dynasty; Nasiruddin Mahmud Shah (1442-58) Ruknuddin Barbck Shah (1459-74) Shamsuddin Yusuf Shah (1474-81) Jalaluddin FatK Shah (1481-87) Saifuddin Firuz (1487-90) Nasiruddin Mahmud (14^-91) Shamsuddin Muzaffar (1491-93) Alauddin Husain (1493-1519) Nasiruddin Abul Muzaffar Nusrat Shah (1519-32) Alauddin Firuz (1532-33) Ghiyasuddin Mahmud (1533-38)

1145 1146 1148 1148 1150 1151 1152 llv53 1153 1153 1154 1154 1155 1155 1155 1155 1158 1159 1159

Appendices I. II.

GLOSSARY BASIC MATERIAL

Illustrations (art plates) Index

' 1161-73 1174-89 following page 1190 1191-1273

Chapter One

THE ASIATIC ENVIRONMENT I.

ARABIA

RISE OF MONARCHY AND THE GOVERNING CLASSES AMONG THE MUSALMANS BEFORE

THE

RISE

OF

ISLAM

is about one-third of the United States in size, but it is an arid region and could not under medieval condition!-have supported a population of more than eight or ten millions. North of it lies the Fertile Crescent, where we find some of the earliest achievements of ancient civilization. For assistance in their con.stant wars with each other and for the protection of their frontiers against the unruly Arab tribes, the Byzantine and the Persian empires had organized two minor principalities in the ntWh; the Ghassanids of Bostra were subordinate to the Byzantine empire and the Lakhmids of Hira to Persia. Nominally the subjects of botli principalities were Christians, but Christianity does not seem to have taken a deep root in their hearts. In southern Arabia there are sufficient periodic rains to warrant a systematic cultivation and here also we come across the remains of ancient civilizations. ‘Of the four best-known kingdoms of ancient Arabia, viz. Saba, Ma’in, Hazramaut and Qataban, the first three—and these were the most important ones—are mentioned in the Old Testament.’l Though Arabia became a single community on the bftsis of one language some centuries before the rise of Islam, the distinction between south Arabian (or Yamanite) and north Arabian (or Modharite) persisted long into the Muslim period. The Arabic word for king is malik, but the Arabians never used the title of mdlik except fdr foreign rulers and the partially Romanised and Persianised dvnasti^s of Ghassan and Hira; the kings of Banu Kindah formed the. only exception to this rule.2 •• Between the principalities of Ghassan and Hira in the north.and The Arabian Peninsula

1 Hitti, History of tht AkAs, 42. 2 Ibid., 28.

2

THE ASUTIC ENVIRONMENT

Yamaii aud Hazramaut in the south lies the extensive region of Arabia Felix—^not ‘happy Arabia* to be suie, but Arabia whidi had never known any organized government or central executive authority. Tbe climate is hot and dry; the mean temperature of the Hijaz low-bed |s nearer to 90“F than to 80°F and that of Medina is a little over 70®F. The largest oases are not more than 10 sq. miles and their chief fruit is the date-palm. Of course, human beings cannot live except in society, and society must be based on some ‘security arrangements’ so that the minimum of cooperation for social life may be possible. The basis of security arrangements in Arabia Felix—^the Arabia that mattered primarily to the early Muslims—was the blood-tie. Families were organized into clans and clans into tribes. Tlie tribes, in general, had no executive authority. In practice an Arab depended on his clan; if he was injured, ho expected nis clan to get him proper compensation; if he was mur¬ dered, he expected the clan to fell his murderer, or if that was not possible, his clan would kill some individual from the hostile clan or obtain compensation for his heirs. There was no judiciary, but arbiters could be appointed in special cases by mutual consent. The protection given by the blood-tie could be strengthened by hilf, or confederation of clans for mutual protection, and /itenr, the granting of protection by a stronger to a weaker clan. Clan conflicts and tribal conflicts tended to multiply and continu(*d for years. ‘Of the time of ignorance wh^ch precedc'd Muhammad,* Gibbon writes, ‘1,700 battles are recorded by tradition.'^ More serious than actual combats was the constant fear that haunted the minds of men, whose clans were at war. There was no universally accepted principle for the internal organi¬ zation of the tribe or the clan. The law of primogeniture was not known to the heathen Arabs and it has been rejected by Islam. The best son— or the best man—^liad to lead; primogeniture would have meant the ruin of the clan. The head of the tribe or clan may be elected or monOy acknowledged, there could be no binding law or custom about it; if the acknowledged chief was slack or lazy in looking after the interest of the clan or behaved in an erratic or wilful manner, he \yould be replaced by a rival. In any case no chief could hold his post after he had lost the confidence of his constituency. The moral ideal of the Arab tribes, generally referred to as murawtoah,' was in consonance with their social organization. Professor Nicholson has defined murawivah to mean ‘bravery in battle, patience in misfortune, persistence in revenge, protection of the weak and defiance of the strong.' But the virtues of generosity, hospitality, loyalty, 3 Deolinf and Fall of thf Bfln\an Fmpire, Chap. L, Bury's edition, 340.

AHABU BEFORE THE RISE OF ISLAM

3

I

fidelity and honour must be added to complete the list. The great repository of the principles of murawwah is the highly developed poetrv of pre-Muslim Arabia, which, however, was not put into writing till the period of the great Abbasids. The only three cities which we need mention here were dominated by the clan system. The religious centre of the whole of Arabia was the Ka'ba, the foundation of v^mich (according to Quranic tradition) had been laid by Abraham and Ismail. It was, in any case, a very ancient structure, sacred to Allah, ‘the Lord of the Worlds*. We have to imagine it as a roofless structure; the present small room was built during the vouth of the Prophet and has been preserved in the same form since then. The rites of haj are performed not in the Ka'ba itself but in the ground round it, known as llatim. Some twelve generations before the rise of Islam, one Fihr (or Quraish) o])tained the custody of the Ka'ba and his descendants built the city of Mecca round it; they also made a reputation for themselves as merchants, for a large part of the commerce of India and southern Arabia with the west was in their hands. The Quraish made themselves the leading tribe of Arabia, but we have to remember that Mecca, described in the Quran as ‘a valley without cultivation*, had no income except from pilgrims and from trade. ‘Almost the only organ of government in Mecca was the Council or Mala. This was the assembly of the chiefs (>r leading men of various clans. The Council was merely deliberative and had no executive of its own. Each clan was theoretically independent and could go its own way, and, therefore, the only effective decisions of the Mala were the unanimous ones.*4 Some four days* journey from Mecca is the city of Ta*if at the height of 6,000 feet, ‘a bit of Syrian earth comparable with Lebanon*. It was inhabited by the Saqif tribe, but wealftiy Meccans also had property there. Yasrib, later called Medina (i.e. the city of the Prophet) was not exactly a city but a series of settlements, some 20 miles by 20^ miles, several days* journey north of Mecca and some eighty miles from the Red Sea. Its strategic importance lay in the fact that, in alliance with the neighbouring tribes, it could stop Mecca’s very profitable trade with the Byzantine empire. The Jews, their main tribes being Qainuqa, Banu Nadir and Quraizah, probably settled in Medina first; later on two south Arabian tribes, the Aus and Khazraj, pushed themselves in and became more prominent. But the Aus and l^azraj could not pull on together and the Jews were also drawn into the conflict. Thte two tribes fought a terrible battle at Bu'as about a.d. 617. Neither party could win, but the atmosphere (ff hatred, distrust and suspicion creafed 4 Maat^pamcay Wat^

MiJmvnad in

9.

4

THE ASIAHC ENVIBONMENT ' f

'

.

was such as to make life in each other s neighbourhood absolutely impossible. So both parties appealed to Muhammad to come and live with them and to decide all disputes on behalf of Allah as a neutral outsider. The mass of the Arabs were idol-worshippers. They acknowledged Allah as the Supreme Being and His name came at the head of all documents. But Allah was not the object of worship. The Quran refers to three important idols—Lat, Manat and Uzza—whose intercession was sought as the daughters of Allah. It would be useless enumerating the idols of other tribes. Some 300 idols, or representations of idols, were put in the Ka‘ba in spite of the small space available, but only one of them, Habal, was a statue. ‘Nowhere do we find genuine devo¬ tion to a heathen deity.’ The pagan Arabs had no religious scriptures and no deeply thought-out mythology. Colonies of Jews and Christians had settled at various places, but we find no anti-Christian or antiJewish sentiment among the heathen Arabs. The Jews in Arabia, as in world history, remained true to their tradition, even if not well-in¬ formed about it. With reference to the challenge of Islam, all we need say is that the Arabs, whether pagan or Christian, merely followed the religion of their forefathers; they did not like their traditional thoughts being disturbed or their ancestors being traduced. Meagre though mav have been ttic faith of pagan Arabs in their idols, they did, not like them being dismissed as non-existent. Above all, they resented the Prophet’s demand that every belief should be subjected to a pro¬ longed process of rethinking and criticism in terms of the spiritual his¬ tory of mankind. After the Prophet had taken possession of Mecca, most Christians, who belonged to the heretical sects and would have been punished for their religion in the Byzantine empire, preferred to accept the Muslim creed. THE prophet’s ‘SECURITY SYSTEM’

Maulana Shibli, the greatest biographer of the Prophet in our country, does not estimate the Prophet primarily as ‘a man of affairs’ on the ground that he was essentially a spiritual and moral teacher. Tliis is correct and no biography of the Prophet, however brief, can i^ore a reference to his religious teachings. Still from the viewpoint of the growth of political institutions, the main work of the Prophet was the establishment of a ‘security system’ for the whole of Arabia, except the regions subordinate to Byzantine and Persia. It was the rock on vdiich his successors built. •Muhammad, son of Abdullah, son of Abdul Muttalib, son of Hashim of the tribe of Quraish was bom about the year a.d. 570. His father died before his birth and his mother, Amina, died when

THE PROPHET'S 'SECURITY SYSTEM*

S

he "was six; he was, therefore, brought up by his uncle, Abu Talib, the head of the clan and the father of his cousin, Ali. Abu Talib’s financial condition was not good; so Muhammad as a boy had to look after goats, but in his youth he made a good career as an honest and reliable executive in the management of carawans. He was twenty-five when he married Khadija, a rich widow of forty, whose carawan he had managed. It is unfortunate that the collectors of the biographies and the traditions {hadises) of the Prophet tell us practi¬ cally nothing of ‘the preparatory period' of his life. But two propositions may be safely laid down. When he had to manage the ‘security system’ for the whole of Arabia, it was found that he was so remarkably well-informed about the internal tensions and economic conditions of every tribe and clan that it was impossible to deceive him. Secondly, he must have made a careful study of Jewish, Christian and Hellenic ideas as they prevailed in Arabia. Tradition, probably correct, says that he used to retire for days together with his simple fare to meditate in the comfortless cave of Hira. In his fortieth year Muhammad went tlirough a prolonged spiritual experience which left him convinced that he was a Nabi (Prophet) and a Rasul (Messenger) commissioned by Allah to establish, or rather to re-establish, the age-old religion of mankin^—the religion of Adam and Noah, of Moses and Christ and of all other prophets ‘between whom we make no distinction.’5 {Sura 2:136). This did not mean that he accepted either Christianity or Judaism as current in his day. He hid the greatest respect for Chirst as the ‘Spirit of Allah’ and ‘His 5 European writers have needlessly wasted their time and energy in applying their modem-minded psychology to discover what the Prophet felt and experienced. First, as Professor Watt admits, there are only ‘scraps of source material' tliat have ciiine to us from Az-Zuhri or Ibn-i Sa‘d, who collected his material in the reign of Walid, over a hundred years after the event. Maulana Shibli insists that the whole story of Az-Zuhri should be rejected because it is not confirmed by earlier authorities. Secondly, the story consists of impossible legendary elements and completely ignores the Prophet’s work as a thinker. Both the Quran and the traditions are clear as to how Prophet behaved when he received a revelation. He would wrap himself up in a blanket and perspire profusely, whatev^ the temperature, and for a period, which never exceede'd a few mimites, his thoughts were so concentrated that he could attend to nothing else. Then he dictated what had been revealed to him and his followers committed it to memory, lliese dictated revelations form the Quran. Obviously, a verse thus dictated and immediately published could not be changed or altered, but a later verse could* cancel a previous verse. • ‘We must distinguish’, says Professor Watt, ‘the Quran from the normal con.sciousrih.ss of Muhammad, since the distinction was fundamental for him. From the first he must have distinguished carefully between what, as he believed, came to him from a supernatural source apd the products of his own mind. Just how he made this

6

THE ASIATIC ENVIRONMENT

Word', but he was uncompromisingly hostile to the doctrine of Trinity in any shape or form. With reference to die Jews, he denied that tliere could be any chosen people’—chosen, that is, by birth. ‘The pious amongst you are nearest to Allah', says the Quran. The Allah of Muhammad is not a tribal deity but the Lord of the Worlds {Rabbul 'Mamin). The pagan Arabs were told that the idols worshipped by them as ‘daughters of Allah’—or as intermediaries in any form—^were non-existent. Allah must be worshipped direct. ‘Think of Me and I shall think of you,' says the Quran \Sura 2:152); and again, ‘When My creature prays to Me, I am near.’ {Sura 2:186). The oasis of the new creed, called Islam, is an uncompromising monotheism. All Musalmaiis are equal and brothers and Islam will tolerate no monkery or ordained priesthood. For about three years Islam was preached as a secret creed. Then the Prophet was ordered to preach it publicly and an opposition was inevitable. Abu Talib did not accept Muhammad's creed but extended to him the protection of his clan. Since the Quraish had no organised executive, Uiey had no means of really persecuting the Musalmans. Slaves who accepted Islam could be tortured by their owners, and the Musalmans had no alternative but to purchase them. But free-born Musalmans, who had the protection of their clans, could only be abused and harassed, specially when they were praying in the Ka‘ba. The Prophet advised some of his followers to migrate to Abyssidia and there were probably two migrations. The experiment of boycotting the clans of Hashim and Muttalib was tried for two years [circa 616-618) and then given up. The Prophet and his followers were only exercising that freedom of religious choice which Arabian tradition had given to all Arabs; also both groups were of the same blood and closely allied by marriages. So some ten years passed in a discussion or ‘dialogue’ which is preserved for us in the early verses of the^ Quran. No loss of life is recorded as the result of pagan persecution. But in A.D. 619 the Prophet’s wife, Khadija, and his uncle, Abu Talib, died, and Abu Jahl, as the new head of the Hashimi clan, publicly withdrew the clan protection from Muhammad. This left the Prophet practically in the position of an outlaw. Fortunately for Islam, he was invited to Medina by a combined delegation of Aus and Khazraj and « •

distinction is not very clear, but the fact that he made it is as clear as anything in history.’ {Muhammed in Medina, 52-53). Professor Watt is here expressing the orfliodox Mitslim opinion. The distinction to which he draws attention is the distinction between the Quran and the Uadises (the precepts and actions of the Prophet). The Quran alone is the uncontested text for all Musalmans; it has been preserved from the very first both in writing and in mmnory. ^

THE PHOPhfiT‘S ‘SECUftltY SYSTEM*

7

went there in a.d. 622. According to a document, generally referred to as the Constitution of Medina,6 some clauses of which probably belong to the first year of the Prophet’s life there, he seems to have guaranteed the clan system at Medina and the powers he took to himself were extremely circums¬ cribed. ‘The clan chiefs’, says Watt, ‘retain their authority apd no executive power, except in wartime, is given to the Prophet. His main power is judicial—the maintenance of peace.’ Now according to the customs of the ‘era of ignorance’ Muhammad was not entitled to be the head of a clan, let alone a tribe. Nevertheless with the establishment of a ‘Muslim home’ at Medina, a new organization— the Muslim religious community or millat—began to develop and no one could deny that Muhammad was both its founder and supreme head. The order, ‘Obey Allah and His Prophet’ is repeated by the Quran about forty times, but the Prophet is also directed ‘to consult the Musalmans about their affairs’ and the principle—‘they decide their affairs by common discussion’—is laid dowti for the general guidance of all Musalmans. The millat did not immediately cancel the executive power of the clan organizations, for the Prophet had nothing to put in its place. But the executive power of the clans and tribes was abolished by the first Caliph and his advisers as the result of the War of Apostacy (Riddah) and a state, propbrly so-called, was orga¬ nized; still the memory of the tribal and clan organizations, their affections and hatreds, lived on till tlie end of the Umayyad dynasty. But so far as the Prophet was concerned, the Muslim millat of which he was the head, was from, the very beginning superior to the Muslim clans. It is diflBcult to say how the above-mentioned Quranic injunctions were interpreted. Some things are, however, clear. The Prophet respected the skill of all craftsmen and he demanded that in the sphere of ‘religion-building’, which was the sphere of his special skill, his orders should be obeyed, even if there was no direct Quranic injunction. As good examples we may quote his precepts to the effect that tliere is to be no monasticism in Islam, that devotions which have the mortification of the flesh for their object aie not to be permitted, and that no one may leave more than one-third of Kis property by will and disinherit his heirs from what is left. On the other hand the Prophet, by the very nature of his profession, had to make himself accessible to all men and women. He was there 6 This flocumnnt is given to ns by Ibn-i Ishaq, who wrote in the early .days of the Abbasid dynasty. Ho dors not quote his authority, but some clauses could only have been written in the year before the battle of Badr; others are clearly ‘ later additions.

.8

THE ASIATIC ENVIRONMENT *

to preach, to learn and to convince. But it was impossible to consult all men and women about public affairs. So we find a body of advisers, foreshadowing the governing classes of later ages, collecting rouud the Prophet. They consisted primarily of three groups—emigrants {muhajirs) from Medina who had. rendered great services to Islam, the leading Muslim clan-chiefs of Medina {amars) and men of military and administrative skill. Tlie Prophet had no need for yes men* in his deliberations. He sometimes allowed his companions {sahaba) to override his preferences; sometimes he overrode their collective advice; on other occasions he asked them for their opinion and discussed a problem till a solution could be found. The final decision, however, lay with the Prophet; on a few minor matters we find him admitting his errors, but as a rule he succeeded in convincing his followers of the wisdom of his decisions. Apart from the group of munafiqs or hypo¬ crites, to whom the Quran refers but does not name, there was always an element of genuine true believers, who criticised the acts of the Prophet in peace and in war and, particularly, in the distribution of spoils; records of these criticisms—and of the Prophet’s answers—^have . been carefully preserved. Nevertheless, though in no sense an autocrat, Muhammad is the first executive officer or magistrate we find in the history of Arabia Felix. If he decided for war, he appointed the oflBcers to lead his forces and collected volunteers to fight his battles. He had also by public subscriptions {saclaqah and zakat) to find the monQy needed for his campaigns. In case of victory he distributed four-fifths of the spoils to his men and kejDt in his hands one-fifth of it for eight specified public purposes.7 As the sphere of his influence expanded, he appointed agents’ to act on his behalf and delegated such power to them as he considered necessary. Subject to public consultation and criticism, the final authority in all mattel^ lay with the Prophet. The Quran insists on the Prophet being properly respected, i.e. respect6d as a Prophet. Since he had no servants at his house, visitors were required to call three times for permission to enter. If no permission was given after the third call, they were requested not to take it ill but to call at another time. The Prophet, in his turn, followed the* same procedure when calling on others. Persons talking to the Prophet w'ere ordered not to raise their voices above his voice. Wlien the Pr9phet entered the mosque, the congregation was not expected •* 7 The eight objects are—the poor; the needy; the incapacitated; (payment to) persems'employed Ijy the administration: reconciliation of hearts; setting free of slaves; helping persons in debt; and relief to travellers (Quran, Sura IX: 60). The fact that all ..these items appertain to immediate needs has not been held to debar the state from undertaking Ibng-term pubh'c enterprises, when it has the means to do so.

THE TROTHET'S ‘SECUWtY SYStEM' •

^

«

to rise up out of respect for him, but they were required to move a bit ana make a place for him in the cenbe. .The Prophet had only one place, the mosque, for his five daily prayers as well as the transaction of all business. Maulana Shibli invites us to visualise the Prophet's mosque after the manner of an Indian Id-gah. A low kachcha wall enclosed a large area of land. A part'of this area was covered by a thatched roof of palm-leaves standing on palm-tree trunks. The Prophet used to lean on one of these trunks when delivering his sermons, but later on a caipenter made for him a mimber or pulpit—a structure of three steps, on which he could sit or stand when speaking. The floor remained kachcha for many years, but then it was paved with small stones to prevent rain-water from collecting. Tlie Prophet had none of the paraphernalia of a government or state. He needed no treasury, for all money was spent on the day it was received. His ‘agents' in distant parts were allowed to enrol a few soldiers, but the Prophet himself had no body-guard, soldiers or policemen. Muhammad remained throughout his life what a Prophet has to be—the most unprotected of men. The literature of later days refers to persons as his ‘body-servants’, but their services must have been purely honorary. We are also told of persons who acted as secretaries to the Prophet, but their services *must also have been purely voluntary. The Prophet had no secretariat or office and we are not told how the treaties and other records, of which the Prophet must have preserved a copy for reference, were kept. The Prophet had a seal, and when he dictated a letter or made a treaty, the names of the persons witnessing it were generally given. The following statement of Gibbon finds full support in all the authenticated traditfons of the Prophet. ‘The good sense of Muhammad despised the pomp of royalty; the Apostle of God submitted to the menial offices of the family; he kindled the fire; milked the ewes and mended with his own hand his shoes and woollen gannents. Disdaining the penance and merit of a hermit, he observed without effort or vanity the abstemious^ diet of an Arab or a soldier. On solemn occasions he feasted his companions with rustic and hospitable plenty, but in his domestic' life many weeks would elapse without a fire being kindled in .the hearth of the Prophet. His hunger would be appeased by a sparing allowance of barley bread; he delighted in the taste of milk and honey, but his ordinary fowl consisted of dates and watcr.f^... *. 8 Vol. V, 409.

to

THfi ASIATIC fiNVmCNMfiNT

According to the tradition of his companions, Muhammad was distinguished by the beauty of his person, an outward gift which is seldom despised except by those to whom it has been refused. They applauded his commanding presence, his piercing eye, his gracious smile, his flowing beard, his countenance that painted every aspect of the soul and his gestures that enforced each expression of the tongue.' The wars of the Prophet need only a passing reference here. His basic policy was to use both battles and alliances in order to win over the opponents of his religion by severe disciplinary punishments in a few cases combined with widespread forgiveness and generosity. The three battles due to the attack of the Quraish on Medina—^battle of Badr (March, 624), battle of Uhud (March, 625) and the battle of the Pitch (March-April, 627)—failed to shake the Prophet s power at Med^pia; in fact it grew owing to the failure of his opponents, for ill all the three battles the Musalmans were greatly outnumbered. The Prophet took a ransom from captives who could afford to pay it; the rest were set free unconditionally to reflect on the character and the creed of their opponents. In March, 628, the Prophet dccidtjd on a pacific offensive and marched with 1,200 •or 1,400 followers in pilgrim’s garb and the necessary sacrificial animals for a pilgrimage (umra) to Mecca.^.But on reaching Hudaibiya on the precincts of the sacred territory, he was informed that the Quraish—then led by a triumvirate of Ikrimah bin Abu Jahl, Suhail bin Amr and Sufwan bin Umayyali—^had decided to fight. Nevertheless, owing to the serious loss of their Byzantine trade, tliey were prepared for a treaty on the following terms:

.

(1) Pilgrimage next year; (2) Every tribe to be fi:ee to ally itself to the Prophet or to the Quraish; (3) Peace between the Prophet aigid the Quraish for ten years during which neither party was to attack a tribe allied to the other; (4) ‘Whoever of the Quraish comes to Muhammad without the permission of his protector (or guardian), Muhammad is to send back to them; whoever of those with Muhammad comes back to the Quraish is not to be sent back to him.’

The last clause did not apply to the heads of families or to married women, but it left the heads of the Quraish families free to torture and beg,t their dependents, who accepted the Muslim faith. In a clan-govorned Arabia flight to Medina was the only protection converts to Islam 9 A pilgrimage to Mecca on the prescribed dates in Zil Hij is haf; a pilgrimage at any other time is umnt.

THE PROSHErS ‘SECURITY SYSTEM’

11

could find. And now the Prophet was by treaty giving up that sole guarantee of protection to converts, with reference to the Qiuraish in the treaty itself, but by implication to all other heathen clans. The Prophet’s greatest believers and closest friends never wavered in their faith and respect for him, but they were definitely against the treaty. Had it been subjected to a referendum of the Musalmans, the Hudaibiya treaty would not perhaps have been accepted. Tlie Prophet, how¬ ever, was determined to accept the treaty. He had confidence in the expanding power of his Faith. No Musalmans had gone back to idola¬ try, and all Arab idolaters would come to Islam in their predestined time. He had no intention of breaking the provisions of the treaty, but he felt sure that Allah would find a way. He sealed the treaty and invited his followers to take a pledge to him—^thc ‘Pledge under the Tree’. Almost everyone present took the pledge. The Iludaibiya treaty was really a victory for Islam. Leading Mec¬ cans began to migrate to Medina, the most important bein^Khalid bin Walid, the great military genius of early Islam, and Amr ibnul ‘As, the future conqueror of Egypt. Some 70 converts to Islam, whom the Prophet refused to receive at Medina owing to the terms of the treaty, estaolished themselves at an independent centre north of Mecca and began to plunder the Meccan carawans; the Qyraish in their distress requested the Prophet to settle them at Medina so that they may be bound by the provisions of the treaty. Thus the unequal clause of the treaty disappeared. The Meccan triumvirate should have used the ten years of peace to build up their commerce and lay the foundation of a great alliance to preserve their old creed. But they proved remarkably short-sighted. There was a quarrel between Khuza'ah, a tribe allied to the Prophet, and Banu Ba^, who were allied to the Qiiraish. Mecca and Medina should have remained strictly neutral. But the Quraish leaders helped the Banu Bakr to crush the Khuza'ah and then beg^n to reflect on the consequences of their deed. The Prophet, on his part, decided on the fatiha of Mecca—the annexation of the territory, the winning over of its inhabitants and the raising of the sanctuary to a status it had never known before. But he could only dq so if he had a force that made resistance impossible and he is said to have collect:; ed about 10,(XK) followers. The object of the enterprise was not re¬ vealed till the army was two stages from Mecca. Sufyan bin Harb (father of the future Caliph Mu'awiya), the Prophet’s life-long enemy, came to see him and the Prophet granted protection to him and to all who sought refuge in his house. Later on protection wa*s given to all who dosed their doors and remained in their houses.

tHE AStAtiC fiNVlRONMfiNT

The city was entered by columns of the Muslim army from all the four sides (11 January 630) but stern orders were given prohibiting plunder and spoliation. The column led by Khalid killed 28 oppo¬ nents, but the otlier columns occupied the city peacefully. The idols were removed from the Ka'ba and from private houses, and Usman bin Talha, the custodian of the Ka'ba, was reappointed to his post. No one ujuv asked to accept Islam as a part of the settlement. A list of proscribed persons guility of particular crimes was published, but appeals to tlie Prophet’s clemency reduced it a good deal. Political and military opposition to the Prophet in the past was not considered a crime and his foremost opponents, like Sufyan bin Harb and the members of the Meccan triumvirate, served the new regime and prf>spcrcd. Having become the ruler of the Qiiraish, the Prophet had to meet the immediate challenge of their opponents, the Bedawin tribe of Hawazin and the Saqif of Ta’if, who had collected over 20,000 soldiers. They were defeated at the battle of Hunain, the chief feature of which was the unwillingness of both parties to kill. The Prophet took their cattle as spoils of war, but his opponents got back their wives and children by joining the new creed. ‘There is no compulsion in matters of religion’, the Quran declares {Sura 2 : 256). During the first thirteen years of his preaching life, the Prophet had placed his religious programme on a purely peaceful basis. His conversations at Medina, as recorded by the most reliable traditions, prove that he wanted his religion to expand in the only way a religion should—^l)y discussion, persuasion and acceptance. He was not prepared to tolerate the scriptureless idolatry of the pagan Arabs, but he made a clear distinction between them and the ‘People of the Book’ {Ahl-i Kitab); the Quran is firm in stating that the latter had started with truth but had deviated into error; consequently, though they are not accepted as men of ‘faith’ (iman), they are fully recognised as legal ‘religions’ [dins). Now after eight years of successful struggle, Muhammad was prepared to try the old experiment again. If the treaties handed to us by tradition are of any yaluc, the Prophet felt no hesitation in being the head of a political organization consisting of Musalmans and the ‘People of Book* and in guaranteeing the religious freedom of the latter. Owing to the privileges given to the ‘People of the Book’, the Muslim ulama of latter 'days have confined the term to religious groups whose scrip¬ tures are referred to in the Quran. But the Quran says clearly that it has iMit enumerated the names of all prophets and, by implication, tihe names of all revealed scriptures. The restriction made by the ulama has no Quranic justification.

THE PROPHErs 'SECURITY SYSTEM'

13

Muslim historians designate a.h. 9 (April 630-April 631) as the year of Deputations {Wafds). Apart from the region controlled by the maliks of Ghassan and Hira, deputations came to the Prophet from every part of Arabia and he was able to establish by treaties a security system under the guarantee of Allah and His Messenger. The Prophet believed in having treaties put in writing; he ^Iso dictated letters in a brief, terse and clear style, which are often in the nature of treatiesi TH^ D^AdtlC MONAfiCtilfiS 0^ i§LAM

23

Caliphate could be brought back again; the great mystics found a solution by ignoring the government altogether. Nevertheless, the majority of the ulama, like Imam Ghazzali, realized that the legality of the rights of the subjects—the legality of the decisions of the lawcourts, for example—depended upon the legality of the rights of the king. Therefore, in spite of his not being a caliph in accordance with the traditions of the Pious Caliphate, they were prepared to admit the legality of a king de facto; even the legality of tne normal acts of the judiciary and the executive during the regime of a usurper were recognized, though the usurper himself, for very good reasons, may have been put to death. Thus, in spite of the very great differences between the conditions of different Islamic countries, Islamic political history is dynastic his¬ tory; and the two great features of dynastic history among the Musalmans are, first, the customs or conventions concerning the devolution of the monarchy and, secondly, the extraordinary powers of a capable king. In both these respects, monarchy among the Musalmans differs from the normal monarchy among other peoples. The Abbasids accepted the procedure for the devolution of monarchy which had grown up among the Umayyads. Primogeniture was consi¬ dered irrelevant; the Musalmans have not considered it a proper prin¬ ciple cither for their public law or private law. Tire status of the mother was also generally, but not always, considered irrelevant. Tlie ruling king could nominate one of his nearest relations—a brother or a son—and take an oath of fealty to him from his leading officers and prominent citizens. The experiment of the king taking an oath of fealty to a number of heirs to succeed him in the order he had fixed was tried but did not succeed; the danger was that the first heir would disinherit all others in favour of one of his own sons. During the caliphate of the Umayyads and the great Abbasids nomination by the caliph and the oath of fealty were enough. But during later dynasties a new condition was added; the nomination of the deceased king had to be ratified after his death by the great officers of the state and they could alter the succession within the dynasty. If a king died without nominating an heir, the great officers of the state could elect one of his near relations, preferably a son, to succeed him. * Two hideous and very unpleasant features appeared with the pass¬ ing of ages. First, Muslim public opinion gradually reconciled itsdf to die fact that normal family affections, specially between brothers, had no place within the royal family. If a king had four sons, only one of 17 Fardcide—killing of the father—^was not, however, permitted by thd traditions of Muslim royal familiis and examples of it are very rare.

24

THE ASUTIC BNVffiONMENt

them could mount the throne, while the other three would be his rivals and were sure to rebel either on their own initiative or at the instigation of conspirators; it was, therefore, imagined that the ruling king did a service to himself, to the state, to the community and even to God, if he ensured the maintenance of the public peace by the annihilation of all his rivals and near relations. Killing perfectly innocent near relations for no other reason except that they may become possible rivals to him never disturbed the conscience of the most pious Muslim kings. Secondly, since providing the king became the privilege of a particular dynasty, the members of that dynasty naturally rose in public esteem and it was believed that so long as any member of that dynasty survived, he had a right to the throne and may possibly assert that right. Consequently a king, who came to power by overthrowing the old dynasty, could only ensure the stability of his own throne and the throne of his successors by putting to death or blinding all members of the former dynasty whom he could find. The wholesale massacre of the Umayyads by the Abbasids set the first example and later rebels had no alternative but to follow it. It has to be added that both the Umayyads and the Abbasids had no hesitation in killing such descendants of the Prophet from whom they feared a danger to their dynasty. ^ The royal crown’, says the wise but unambitious Hafiz, ‘is an attractive head-dress, but since it involves danger to life, it is not worth the headache it entails.* The challenges to a king’s power, both from his own relations and rebels, were so continuous and persistent that no king could remain on the throne for fifteen or twenty years unless he was head and shoulders above his rivals. On a rough estimate more than half the Muslim kings, who ascended the throne, have been imprisoned and killed; minors placed on the throne have rarely sur¬ vived, Akbar, the great, being a rare exception. On the other hand, the occupants of the throne had to put a large number of their nearest relations to death; ten per head would, perhaps, be a modest average. In estimating the power of the average and competent Muslim kings, minors and weaklings may be ignored. The powers they lost were won back by .their able successors. , It is difficult to .specify the powers of the Muslim king, but the following points are clear. Subject to the obligation of consulting his leading followers, the Prophet had the sole initiative in war and peace, and hi the appointment, dismissal and control of his ‘agents’. Abu Bakr in his first sermon admitted the right of the people to control the c aliph: ‘If I do well, support me; if ill, put me right; obey me as I obey the Lord and His Prophet; wherein I disobey, obey me not.’ Neverthe¬ less, die powers of the central government increased during the Pious

MlJ'AWtYA AND tHfi DYNaSHC M6NAft