A Companion to State Power, Liberties and Rights 9781447325833

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“An interdisciplinary toolbox of theories, concepts, perspectives and institutional insights that are fundamental to grasping the complexities of human rights, civil liberties and their relationship to state activity and inactivity.” Ross McGarry, University of Liverpool, UK “The concision and insightfulness of this volume will be of tremendous value to all those who need a compact account of the topics listed.” Brice Dickson, Queen’s University Belfast, UK

It will be suitable for undergraduate and postgraduate students on a variety of courses such as Criminology, Criminal Justice, International Relations, Politics, Social Policy, Policing Studies, and Law, as well as other researchers in these areas. Sharon Morley is Deputy Head of Department of Social and Political Science and senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Chester, UK. Karen Corteen is a senior lecturer in criminal justice at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Paul Taylor is Deputy Head of the Department of Social and Political Science at the University of Chester, teaching criminology and criminal justice. Jo Turner is a senior lecturer and Programme Leader for criminology at the University of Chester, UK.

Morley, Turner, Corteen and Taylor

Laid out in a user-friendly A–Z format, it includes entries from expert contributors with clear direction to related entries and further reading. The contributors critically engage with the topics in an accessible yet challenging way, ensuring that the definitions go beyond a simple explanation of the word or theme.

a com panion to

s tate power, liberties & rights

Ed it e d b y

Interest in the study of state power, civil liberties, human rights, and statesponsored crime is growing and there is a need for a book which brings these topics together. This book, part of the Companion series, provides succinct yet robust definitions and explanations of core concepts and themes in relation to state power, liberties and human rights. The entries are bound by their interrelatedness and relevance to the study of crime and harm and the volume draws on established and emerging commentaries from other social and political disciplines.

a compan ion to S tat e p ow er, li b ert i e s & r igh ts

“An insightful volume by an international team of scholars, worth reading by anyone concerned with state power and responsibility for civil liberties and human rights.” Sheying Chen, Pace University, USA

Ed i t e d b y

Sharon Morley Jo Turner Karen Corteen Paul Taylor

criminology ISBN 978-1-4473-1034-1

www.policypress.co.uk @policypress

PolicyPress

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20/12/2016 16:46

A COMPANION TO STATE POWER, LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS Edited by Sharon Morley, Jo Turner, Karen Corteen and Paul Taylor

First published in Great Britain in 2017 by Policy Press North America office: University of Bristol Policy Press 1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press Bristol BS2 8BB 1427 East 60th Street UK Chicago, IL 60637, USA t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 t: +1 773 702 7700 [email protected] f: +1 773 702 9756 www.policypress.co.uk www.press.uchicago.edu [email protected] © Policy Press 2017 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 978-1-4473-2582-6 paperback ISBN 978-1-4473-2581-9 hardcover ISBN 978-1-4473-2584-0 ePub ISBN 978-1-4473-2585-7 Mobi ISBN 978-1-4473-2583-3 ePdf The right of Sharon Morley, Jo Turner, Karen Corteen and Paul Taylor to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Andrew Corbett Front cover image: www.alamy.com Printed and bound in Great Britain by by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

A companion to stateIndex power, liberties and rights

Contents Contributors viii Acknowledgements xxi Preface xxii A Amnesty International 1 Animal Rights 3 Anti-apartheid Movement 5 Arms Trade 8 Asylum 10 Authoritarian Populism 13

Drones 66 Drug Control 68 Drug Trafficking 70 Duty of Care 72 E Environmental Protection 75 Ethical Policing 77 Ethnic Cleansing 79 European Convention on 82 Human Rights European Court of Human Rights 83 European Union, The 85 Exceptional State 87 Extradition 89

B Border Control 17 Bribery 19 C Capital Punishment 21 Censorship 23 Child Soldiers 26 Citizenship 28 Civil Disorder and Unrest 30 Civil Liberties 31 Collective Violence 33 Conflict Resolution 35 Constitutionalism 38 Corporations 40 Corps 42 Corruption 44 Counterterrorism 46 Coup 48 Crimes of the Powerful 50 Critical Criminology and State Power 52

F Feminist Security Studies Food Security Forced Migration Foreign Policy

93 95 97 99

G Gendercide 103 Genocide 105 ‘Girl’ Soldiers 107 Globalisation 109 Governmentality 111 Green Criminology 112 Guantánamo Bay 115

D Data Protection 55 Deaths in Psychiatric Detention 57 Democracy 59 Democratic Policing 61 Disarmament and Demobilisation 63

H Habeas Corpus 117 Hague Convention 119 Hate Crime 122 Hegemony 124

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A companion to state power, liberties and rights Holocaust, The 127 Honour-based Violence and Honour 129 Killings Humanitarian Intervention 132 Human Rights 134 Human Trafficking 136

O Organised Crime

P Paramilitary Groups 195 Parliamentary Privilege 197 Peacekeeping and 199 Capacity-building Police Violence 201 203 Political Crime Post-conflict Resolution 207 Prisoners’ Rights 209 Prisoners’ Rights Post-custody 211 Private Security 213 Proportionality 215 Protest 217

I Identity Cards 139 Immigration 141 Imperialism 143 Insecurity 145 Intelligence 147 149 International Court of Justice International Criminal Courts 151 International Humanitarian Law 152 (IHL) 154 International Human Rights International Tribunals 156 J Jus ad bellum Jus in bello

159 161

K Knowledge, Power and the State

165

L League of Nations Legal Pluralism

167 169

191

R 221 Rape as a Weapon of War Reconciliation 223 225 Refugee Convention (1951) Rendition 228 Resistance 230 232 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Riots 234 Risk 236 S Semi-penal Institutions Social Control Social Harm Social Justice Social Movements Social Policy and Human Rights State, The State Crime State Harm State of Denial State Policy, Rights and Multiculturalism State Power State Punishment State Terrorism

M Mass Incarceration 173 Militarism 175 Military Conflict 177 Multiculturalism 178 N National Identity 183 National Security 185 Neoliberalism 187

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239 241 243 245 247 249 251 253 255 257 259 261 263 265

A companion to state power, liberties and rights Contents Index State Violence 267 Stop and Search 269 Surveillance 271 Surveillance of Electronic 273 Communications and the Law

V Violence 293 W War 297 War Crimes 297 World Bank 300

T Theories of the State 275 Torture 277 Transitional Justice 279 U United Nations, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child United Nations Security Council Universal Declaration of Human Rights

X Xenophobia 303 Z Zemiology 305

283 285

Appendix: International campaign 307 groups and sources of interest Convention, legislation, statute and 311 treaty index Subject index 312

287 289

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Contributors Obijiofor Aginam is assistant director and head of governance for Global Health at the United Nations University–International Institute for Global Health (UNU–IIGH) in Kuala Lumpur, and concurrently adjunct research professor of law at Carleton University, and visiting professor in the IR3S, University of Tokyo. Dr Aginam has held visiting professorships at universities in Costa Rica, Italy, South Africa and Japan. He is the author of Global health governance: International law and public health in a divided world (2005, University of Toronto Press). He holds a PhD from the University of British Columbia. Gabriel Amitsis is associate professor of social security law in the Department of Business Administration at the Technology University of Athens, Greece. He has undertaken academic research and teaching since 1998 on the regulation of social security, anti-poverty, employment, social entrepreneurship and migration policies. He is the author and co-author of 20 books and has published in international edited books and journals. Linda Asquith is a senior lecturer in criminology at Leeds Beckett University, UK, and has previously worked at Nottingham Trent University, UK, and the University of Leeds, UK. Her PhD on post-genocide life was awarded by the University of Huddersfield, UK, in 2015. Her current research focuses on life after miscarriages of justice. David Balsamo is professor of social science and dean of faculty at the University of Chester, UK. He has worked as a painter and decorator, operating theatre technician, probation officer and latterly as an academic. His varied career has provided the impetus for a sustained interest and commitment to the sociology and political economy of work. David’s doctorate examined the management of teaching and research in the neo-corporate university and was informed by the perspectives and cognitive dissonances of being an academic manager. Philip Bean is emeritus professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Loughborough, UK, and a former director of the Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice. He was secretary (1993–96) and later president of the British Society of Criminology (1996–99) and an associate of the General Medical Council (2000–05), sitting on their Fitness to Practice, Health and the Professional Panels. He is the author/editor of over 20 books and numerous papers in learned journals, mainly on mental disorder and crime, and drugs and crime, but also on other matters in criminology, namely, criminological theory. He is currently (since 2014) a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge, UK.

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Mark Bendall is a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Chester, UK. He has published on corporate social responsibility and state power, and has given conference papers spanning identity politics and criminalised identities. In 2007, he was shortlisted for Marketing Initiative of the Year at the Times Higher Awards. Monish Bhatia is a lecturer in criminology at the Abertay University, Scotland. His teaching and research surrounds borders and the control of immigration, racism and harm. Monish is currently co-editing a volume on Media, crime and racism. Last year, he successfully completed a Carnegie Trust-funded project on destitution and drug use among asylum seekers, and his doctoral thesis focused on the impact of policies and procedures on asylum seekers and ‘illegal’ migrants in the UK. Josepha Close is a researcher in international law who concluded her doctoral thesis at Middlesex University, London, UK. She holds a master’s degree in law from the University of Liège, Belgium, an LLM in public international law from Queen Mary University, London, UK, and a graduate diploma in law from BPP University, London, UK. Her research interests include international criminal law, human rights and transitional justice. Salvatore Coluccello works in the School of Humanities at Coventry University, UK. His main research interests are in organised crime, human trafficking and people smuggling, as well as the contemporary history, politics and culture of Italy. He is the author of Challenging the mafia mystique: Cosa Nostra from legitimisation to denunciation (2016, Palgrave Macmillan), he also co-edited Eurafrican migration, legal economic and social responses to irregular migration (2015, Palgrave Macmillan) and is currently working on a documentary exploring the status of the mafia and anti-mafia movement in Sicily. Karen Corteen is a senior lecturer in criminal justice at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Areas Karen has published in include victimology, critical criminology and hate crime. Her research interests comprise: zemiology; occupational-related harms within the sports entertainment industry; victimisation, survival and resistance; and visual victimology. Meriel D’Artrey is head of the Department of Social and Political Science and a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Chester, UK. Meriel has an MA in politics from the University of Edinburgh and an MSc from the London School of Economics, UK, in the history of political thought. Her research for her DProf was on the teaching and learning of politics. Bleddyn Davies has been a lecturer in law at Liverpool John Moores University, UK, since 2011. Prior to that, he was a teaching fellow and PhD candidate at the University of Liverpool, UK, completing his PhD in 2010. Among other viii

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teaching interests, he teaches the law of armed conflict at undergraduate and postgraduate level. His research interests are primarily public law. Sinclair Dinnen is a senior fellow with the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. His research examines legal pluralism, policing, security governance, politics and state formation in post-colonial societies. He has conducted extensive research and policy work in Melanesian countries, particularly Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. Zaira Drammis is the head of monitoring and evaluation at ActionAid International. Prior to joining ActionAid, she worked at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International for 15 years in different positions, including campaigning and crisis response. She then created Amnesty’s dedicated unit focused on strategy, evaluation and learning. She is an Argentine national living in London. Karen Evans is a senior lecturer at the University of Liverpool, UK, in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, where she teaches and has published on the themes of gender, gendered justice, community, the city and crime. Martin Evans lectures in international development at the University of Chester, UK. His interests lie in rural political and economic geographies in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in conflict and ‘post-conflict’ situations. This research focuses on Casamance in southern Senegal, the scene of West Africa’s longest-running civil conflict. His current project concerns the intersection of environmental and social change in Casamance and its implications for agriculture. Carmen Gebhard is a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. She previously held academic posts at the University of Nottingham, UK, the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna and the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht. Her research focuses on European Union politics, security and defence policy and small state foreign policy. Helena Gosling is a senior lecturer in criminal justice at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. In 2015, she completed her PhD, entitled ‘An invitation to change? An ethnographic study of a residential therapeutic community for substance use’. Helena has published articles in a number of leading journals, including Criminology and Criminal Justice, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice and the International Journal of Crime, Justice and Social Democracy.

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Kirsty Greenwood is a PhD researcher at Liverpool John Moores University, UK, and visiting lecturer at the University of Chester, UK. Kirsty’s master’s thesis explored the regulation of ‘deviant’ women within the semi-penal institution of Liverpool Female Penitentiary (1809–1921). Her research interests include historical and contemporary carceral mobilities, the community punishment of women and gender-specific penal regimes. Ros Hague is a lecturer in politics and international relations in the Division of Politics and International Relations, Nottingham Trent University, UK. Her research interests are in feminist theory and environmental theory, specifically looking at theories of autonomy, questions of identity and the human relation to nature. Matthew Hall graduated with a PhD from the University of Sheffield, UK, in 2007, having previously graduated from Sheffield’s MA in international criminology programme. He became a lecturer in law and criminal justice in 2008 and a senior lecturer in 2011, both at the University of Sheffield School of Law. In 2014, Matthew was appointed professor of law and criminal justice and director of research at the University of Lincoln, UK, School of Law. He has been interviewed on behalf of the European Commission as an expert contributor in the field of victimology to assist the development of a new directive on victims’ rights and has also advised the South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development concerning a review of South Africa’s Victim Empowerment Scheme. More recently, Matthew has pioneered research on environmental victimisation and the application of environmental justice principles in the criminal justice system at the national and international levels. Ruth Healey is a senior lecturer in human geography at the University of Chester, UK. She has worked in the field of asylum and refugees since 2003. Specifically, her research explores asylum seeker and refugee experiences in host countries, with a particular focus on integration policies and notions of belonging. Charles T. Hunt is Vice-Chancellor’s research fellow at the Centre for Global Research in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne. His research focuses on United Nations (UN) peace operations and peace-building. He has worked with the Australian government assessing their role in peace operations and consults for the UN and a number of international humanitarian non-governmental organisations. Peter Joyce is a principal lecturer in criminology at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. His research interests are in criminal justice, policing and protest, and his recent publications include Palgrave dictionary of public order policing, protest and political violence (with Neil Wain) (2014, Palgrave), Criminal justice: An

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introduction (2013, Routledge) and Policing: Development and contemporary practice (2011, Sage). Nitasha Kaul is a multidisciplinary academic and writer. She is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR) at the University of Westminster, London, UK. She has previously been a tenured academic in economics at the Bristol Business School and in Creative Writing in Bhutan. She has researched/written/spoken within and outside academia on identity, political economy, democracy, feminist and postcolonial theory, Kashmir, and Bhutan. Recently, she has addressed issues of nationalism and neoliberalism in contemporary India and the question of nation states and refugees in Europe. She has authored books including Imagining economics otherwise (2007, Routledge) and a Man Asian Literary Prize-shortlisted novel Residue (2014, Rainlight). Alexander K.  Lautensach, PhD, is associate professor at the University of Northern British Columbia, Canada. In 2010, he published Environmental ethics for the future: Rethinking education to achieve sustainability (Lambert Academic Publishers). His current research focuses on human ecology, cross-cultural education and environmental ethics. His work in human security centres on health-related and environmental aspects, as well as cultural safety. Sabina W. Lautensach, PhD, serves on several university faculties lecturing in International Relations, human security and anthropology. She is the founding editor of the Journal of Human Security (JoHS) (see: http://www.librelloph. com/journalofhumansecurity). As director of the Human Security Institute, she coordinates collaborations with colleagues worldwide. She and Alex Lautensach co-edited the first university graduate-level textbook in human security, Human security in world affairs: Problems and opportunities (2013, Caesarpress). Maggy Lee is professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong. She is principal investigator on a number of research projects, including the fear of crime, lifestyle migration in Asia and female transnational migrants. Her books include Human trafficking (2007, 2012, Willan) and Trafficking and global crime control (2011, Sage). Nicholas Lord is a senior lecturer in the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice in the School of Law at the University of Manchester, UK. Nicholas has research expertise in white-collar, financial and organised crimes and frauds. His recent book Regulating corporate bribery in international business (2014, Routledge) was the winner of the British Society of Criminology Book Prize 2015. David Lowe was a counterterrorism detective in the UK and is currently a principal lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University, UK, whose expertise on xi

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terrorism and security is frequently requested by UK and international media. Among his many publications is his 2015 book Policing terrorism (CRC Press). Giuseppe Maglione is a lecturer in criminology at Edinburgh Napier University, Scotland. He received a PhD in legal theory from the University of Florence, Italy, and carried out research at the University of Cambridge, UK, Oslo, Norway and at the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg, Germany. Ian Marsh is principal lecturer in criminology at Liverpool Hope University, UK. He has written, co-written and edited a number of books, including, most recently, Crime, justice and the media (2nd edn) (2014, Routledge), Sociology: Making sense of society (5th edn) (2013, Pearson) and Crime and criminal justice (2011, Routledge). C. Augustus ‘Gus’ Martin is a professor of criminal justice administration at California State University, Dominguez Hills, where he also served for nearly 10 years in academic administration. Dr Martin’s research and professional interests are terrorism and extremism, homeland security, and the administration of justice. He is author of a number of books on the subjects of terrorism, homeland security and juvenile justice. Agnieszka Martynowicz is a doctoral candidate at the School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy at Ulster University. Her PhD research focuses on the situation of Polish male prisoners in Northern Ireland. She is also an independent researcher in the areas of human rights and international humanitarian law, criminal justice, and migration. Simon Massey is a senior lecturer at Coventry University, UK. His main research interest is conflict management and Africa’s peace and security architecture. He has also published on irregular migration from Africa to Europe and on politics and security in Guinea-Bissau, Chad, the Comoros and Madagascar. Liam McCann is a principal lecturer and critical criminologist at the University of Lincoln, UK, and has been programme leader there for their undergraduate and postgraduate criminology programmes. His research interests include state crime, racism, policing and the pedagogy of students’ use of feedback. His teaching philosophy is that education facilitates intellectual empowerment and can and should assist in securing greater social justice. Jude McCulloch is professor of criminology at Monash University, Australia. Her latest book is Pre-crime: Pre-emption, precaution and the future (with Dean Wilson) (2016, Routledge).

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Samuel Mercer is a PhD researcher with the Department of Social and Political Science at the University of Chester, UK. Samuel’s research is focused on the political role of ‘work’ in society and in assessing the ramifications of defining and subsequently refusing ‘work’ for society, politics and its study. Gill Miller leads the programme in international development studies at the University of Chester, UK. Annual visits with students to meet United Nations (UN) agencies in Geneva have provided insights into the operations and challenges facing the UN. Research interests include the geography of health in the developing world, and transitions from school to higher education. She writes regularly for Geography Review and the Geographical Association, and is trustee of the Field Studies Council and an international microfinance nongovernmental organisation. Sharon Morley is deputy head of the Department of Social and Political Science and a senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Chester, UK. Sharon’s research interests include young women’s experiences of violence, gender, space and self-regulation. More recently, her research and publications have spanned the areas of violence in society and the victimisation of health and social care professionals, as well as media representations of mentally disordered offenders. Sharon is a member of a number of sexual violence research networks. Kate Moss is professor of criminal justice at the Central Institute for the Study of Public Protection, University of Wolverhampton, UK. Her research centres on the problem of women’s homelessness, which she has researched for the European Commission. She has written six single-authored books and over 60 journal articles, papers and monographs. Karen Murphy (PhD, LLM, BSocSc) is a human rights consultant and researcher at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland. Karen has worked in academia and practice, with United Nations and European Union agencies and non-governmental organisations in Africa, the Middle East and Ireland. Her work focuses on: human rights and conflict, terrorism and insecurity; humanitarian policy and protection; gender equality and gender-based violence; and migration. Emma Murray is a senior lecturer in criminal justice in the School of Law, Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Her work is dedicated to the problem of veterans within the criminal justice system, and, more recently, what the testimonies of veterans who have been convicted of an offence post-combat reveals about war and governance in the 21st century. Gabe Mythen is professor of sociology based at the University of Liverpool, UK, and director of the Economic and Social Research Council North West xiii

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Doctoral Training College. His academic research is located at the intersection of sociology, criminology and social policy, and is oriented towards critical studies of risk and security. Orla Ní Cheallacháin is a Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholar funded by the Irish Research Council and a PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland. Her research interests include critical security studies, state responses to non-state violence and the politics of language use. Her doctoral research explores the dynamics of counterterrorism legislating processes in the UK. Angus Nurse is director of criminology and sociology programmes in the School of Law, Middlesex University, London, UK. His background is in nongovernmental organisation (NGO) policy work and in investigations, with 10 years’ NGO and eight years’ quasi-judicial experience. He researches and teaches green criminology, environmental law and human rights, and has authored two research monographs and a textbook on environmental crime. Christian Pangilinan is C.V. Starr lecturer and director of transnational legal practice at Peking University School of Transnational Law in Shenzhen, China. Previously, he provided legal aid to asylum seekers in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Christina Pantazis is a reader in zemiology in the School for Policy Studies at the University of Bristol, UK. She has co-authored a number of articles (with Simon Pemberton) on the UK’s counterterrorism policies, their impacts on communities and the implications for civil liberties. Julie Papastamatelou holds a master’s degree in social sciences from the University of Mannheim, Germany. She has further pursued a master’s degree in criminal justice studies (University of Portsmouth, UK), a master’s degree in criminology (University of Berne, Switzerland) and a master’s degree in European Union studies (University of Salzburg, Austria). She currently works as a lecturer and researcher in Germany. Tina G. Patel is senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Salford, UK. Tina’s research and teaching interests relate to ‘race’/racism, exclusion, police and violent behaviour. Tina is currently researching victims’ perceptions of racially motivated hate crimes, and the use of social media to facilitate neighbourhood relations. She is the author of several books, including the 2016 text Race and society, published by Sage. Sergio Peña-Neira is associate professor of law at Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins, Chile, has a doctorate from the International University of Andalucia, Huelva, and is a member of various associations related to international law and xiv

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the philosophy of law (Transnational Institute and Center of Politics, Philosophy and Law of KCL, ILA, CISDL). His lines of research are: international law, the philosophy of law and comparative law. He has various publications in Spanish and English. Gary R.  Potter is a senior lecturer in criminology at Lancaster University, School of Law, UK. He has been teaching a specialist undergraduate course in green criminology for nearly 10 years, is a member of the International Green Criminology Work Group (see: https://greencriminology.org) and co-editor of The geography of environmental crime: Conservation, wildlife crime and environmental activism (with Angus Nurse and Matthew Hall) (2016, Palgrave). Jason L. Powell, PhD, is a professor and teaches criminology at the University of Chester, UK. His research is on ageing, crime, social care, community development, qualitative methodology, social justice and the global dynamics of population ageing. He has published over 400 refereed articles, book chapters and reports, and has published 65 books. He is series editor of International Ageing and International Social Policy for Springer Publishers. He is associate editor of The Canadian Journal of Sociology and is editor-in-chief of US-based international journal Illness, Crisis & Loss (Sage). He has been visiting professor in the US, European Union, Canada, South Africa, Jordan and Australia. Tamara Quiroga is associate professor of law at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and Universidad Católica Argentina. She has been working on public law, particularly, international law, in the Max Plank Institute for International and Comparative Law in Heidelberg, Germany. Her field of research is international law and criminal law. As a former student of a postgraduate programme on human rights at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, she is doing research in her field in Europe. Larry Ray is professor of sociology at the University of Kent, UK, and a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences. His research and publications address sociological theory, globalisation, post-communism, collective and interpersonal violence, and biosocial theories. Recent publications include Violence and society (2011, Sage) and Violence and society – towards a new sociology (with Jane Kilby), Sociological Review Monograph Series (2014, Wiley-Blackwell). Joe Rigby is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Chester, UK. He was awarded a PhD from the University of Lancaster, UK, in 2014 for his research into the politics of racism, migration and border control in contemporary Europe. He is currently working on preparing the manuscript for publication in 2016. Jeffrey Ian Ross, PhD, is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice, College of Public Affairs, at the University of Baltimore, US. He has specialised in xv

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corrections, policing, political crime, violence, urban subcultures and crime and justice in Native American communities for over two decades. Ross is the author, co-author, editor and co-editor of several books. Federica Rossi holds a PhD in political sociology from the University of Paris Ouest Nanterre, France, and is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France. Her PhD analyses the controversial debates of the 1970s, political violence and counterterrorism in Italy. Her current research focuses on the movements of victims of terrorism. David Scott is a senior lecturer in criminology at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. He is an editor of the Howard Journal of Crime and Justice and the journal Justice, Power and Resistance. David has published widely on prisons, punishment and critical criminology and his most recent book is Emancipatory politics and praxis (2016, EG Press). Gay W.  Seidman is professor of sociology at the University of WisconsinMadison, US. Her publications include Manufacturing militance: Workers’ movements in Brazil and South Africa (1994, University of California Press) and Beyond the boycott: Labor rights, human rights, and transnational activism (2007, Russell Sage Foundation). Her current research project explores the dynamics of transnational ‘shaming’ movements, including the anti-apartheid movement (Social Research, 2015, vol 82, no 4). Laureen Snider is an emeritus professor of sociology at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. Recent publications include: About Canada: Corporate crime (2015, Fernwood); ‘Interrogating the algorithm: debt, derivatives and the social reconstruction of stock market trading’, Critical Sociology, 24 February 2014 (available at: http://crs.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/02/21/0896920513504603); ‘Law, regulation and safety crime: Exploring the boundaries of criminalizing powerful actors’ (with Steve Bittle), Canadian Journal of Law & Society, June 2015; and ‘Examining the Ruggie Report: can voluntary guidelines tame global capitalism?’ (with Steve Bittle), Critical Criminology, 2013, vol 21: 177–92. Carly Speed is currently studying for a PhD in criminology while also teaching the subject at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Her PhD research investigates the deaths of detained patients in England and Wales, following on from her master’s research in this area, which was shortlisted for the Howard League John Sunley Prize in 2014. Steve Spencer is a senior lecturer in sociology at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. He has worked at several universities in Australia, with a background in anthropology and cultural and media studies. His research interests include the exploration of ‘race’, ethnicity, media representation and social identities, and the xvi

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visual and popular cultural mediation of social and political values in everyday life. Current research has focused on inner-city areas of Sheffield and the ways in which perceptions of place and social identity become inextricably connected. Other interests include the exploration of contested spaces through collaborative ethnographic work with groups who have experienced oppression in Australia and in Nova Scotia, Canada. Elizabeth Stanley is reader in criminology and Rutherford Discovery Fellow at the Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Her research has focused on state crime, human rights, institutional victimisation and issues of justice in relation to events in New Zealand, Timor-Leste, West Papua, South Africa, Chile and the UK. Kelly Staples is a lecturer in international politics at the University of Leicester, UK. She obtained her PhD in politics from the University of Manchester, UK, in 2008, and is the author of Retheorising statelessness (2012, Edinburgh University Press). Her ongoing research is on responsibility and protection in international relations. Paul Taylor is deputy head of the Department of Social and Political Science and a senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Chester, UK. He is the associate editor of the journal Illness, Crisis & Loss (Sage) and sits on a number of journal editorial boards. Paul has written and researched in the area of the importance of occupational culture in fields such as the military, mental health care and policing. In addition to this, he publishes in the area of ageing, psychiatric care/control and mental health and criminal justice discourse and policy convergence. Edgar B. Tembo is a senior lecturer and the programme leader for both the politics and the international relations degree programmes at the University of Chester, UK. In addition to broader, contemporary, security issues, Dr Tembo’s research centres upon counterterrorism. He is the author of US–UK counterterrorism after 9/11: A qualitative approach (2014, Routledge). Manuel Terol is professor of law at the Faculty of Law of Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain, and received his PhD from the Universidad de Seville, Spain. He is a member of various European associations related to public law, particularly, constitutional law. His lines of research are constitutional law, environmental law, the theory of law and the interpretation and application of international law into national and European Union legal system. Between 2008 and 2011, he contributed to the new constitution of Morocco. He has published extensively and regularly and has been the director of PhD theses and a contributor to seminars and conferences on the aforementioned subject.

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Steve Tombs is professor of criminology at the Open University, UK. He has a long-standing interest in the incidence, nature and regulation of corporate and state crime and harms. Recent publications include: Social protection after the crisis? Regulation without enforcement (2015, Policy Press) and The corporate criminal. Why corporations must be abolished (with David Whyte) (2015, Routledge). He is a trustee and board member of Inquest. James Treadwell is a senior lecturer in criminology at Birmingham City University, UK. He is known for undertaking ethnographic and qualitative research for a number of crime and criminal justice-related projects. His books include Riots and political protest (with Simon Winlow, Steve Hall and Daniel Briggs) (2015, Routledge); Football hooliganism, fan behaviour (with Matt Hopkins) (2014, Palgrave Macmillan) and Crime and criminology: The essentials (2006, 2013, Sage). Jo Turner is a senior lecturer at the University of Chester, UK. Jo’s eclectic mix of research interests come under the broad umbrella of comparative criminology: comparisons with the past – the history of criminal justice; comparisons globally – state crimes in the international arena; and gender-based comparisons – women’s experiences of the criminal justice system. Azrini Wahidin is a professor of criminology and criminal justice at Nottingham Trent University (NTU), UK. Prior to her appointment at NTU, she established the criminology undergraduate degree programme at Queen’s University, Belfast, in the School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work. A selection of her publications include Ex-combatants, gender and peace in Northern Ireland: Women, political protest and the prison experience (2016, Palgrave Macmillan) and Older women and the criminal justice system: Running out of time (2004, Jessica Kingsley Publications). She sits on various editorial boards and has written a number of key criminology textbooks. She holds a visiting professorship in the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya. Sandra Walklate is Eleanor Rathbone Chair of Sociology at the University of Liverpool, UK, and adjunct professor at QUT in Brisbane, Australia. Internationally, she is recognised for her work in victimology and research on criminal victimisation. In 2014, Sandra received the British Society of Criminology’s outstanding achievement award and she is currently editor-in-chief of the British Journal of Criminology. Lyn Warrener focuses her research on examining girls’ participation in the 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002) and the challenges they faced during the post-conflict reintegration process. Girl soldiers are perhaps one of the most under-represented groups of ‘war-affected’ citizens. The official story of the conflict, reflected in the literature and international organisations’ reports, xviii

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largely omits the participation of girl soldiers. Her research challenges mainstream narratives that recount the so-called post-war period, which are silent on the experiences of girls. Leanne Weber is Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. She researches border control using criminological and human rights frameworks. Her books include Crime, justice and human rights (with Elaine Fishwick and Marinella Marmo) (2014, Palgrave) and The Routledge international handbook on criminology and human rights (with Elaine Fishwick and Marinella Marmo ) (forthcoming, Routledge). Lisa White is a senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Lincoln, UK, where she delivers courses that lie at the intersection between criminology and International Relations. Lisa has a particular interest in state crime, human rights and conflict. Her recent monograph is entitled Transitional justice and legacies of state violence: Talking about torture in Northern Ireland (2015, Routledge). Gary Wilson is a senior lecturer in law at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. He specialises in international law, particularly relating to collective security within the United Nations system, statehood and secession, and the use of force. He is the author of The United Nations and collective security (2014, Routledge) and numerous other publications. Mark Worrell is associate professor of sociology at SUNY Cortland, USA, and associate editor of the journal Critical Sociology. Mark has published widely in critical social theory journals, including Telos, Rethinking Marxism and Current Perspectives in Social Theory. His latest book on terror and imperialism was published in 2013 by Routledge.

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Acknowledgements With the completion of this, the third Companion in the series, comes the pleasure once again to thank those involved in translating an initial idea into print. Without the continued support of Policy Press, and the guiding expertise of Senior Commissioning Editor Victoria Pittman, what presents here would not have been possible. Gratitude also goes to those in the editing, production and marketing departments of Policy Press, in addition to those who have been involved in scrutinising and reviewing initial proposals for the series and this book. Working with a wide range of contributors on this Companion, and those previous, has been a hugely enjoyable experience. As editors of this collection, we have never tired of learning from the valuable perspectives of others within and outside of academia. The diversity of voices here in this book, we hope, vitalises the current and future critical debates in this area, nationally and internationally, and provides a rich source of reference that can be kept close at hand. Thank you to all involved, contributors, professionals at Policy Press and critical friends who have offered constructive advice and support along the way – it has been a pleasure working with you all.

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Preface The precariousness of individual and collective civil liberties and human rights is a dominant theme of scholarship, media commentary, policy debate and public concern. Being inextricably bound to matters of state power, its extent, form and function have a direct influence on the accessibility to, protection of and wider structural patterns of liberties and rights. The need to analyse politics and the assumed upholders of protectionist strategies – that is, governments themselves – is an important endeavour for many, including those writing, researching, informing and challenging practice, abuse or neglect. The Companion presented here aims to do just that. It is a forum of voices, all of which pose deliberately critical questions on how (if at all) justice in respect of individual rights and liberties may manifest as an issue of centrality, as a fringe matter, be curtailed or be the victim of entrenched authoritarianism. This Companion delivers a suite of progressive conversations and evaluations drawn from disciplinary areas such as criminology, law, International Relations, politics, military studies and peace studies. The context of modern state power as social control is a prevailing dimension of the dialogue here between the covers of the book. Readers are provided with exacting analyses of national and international institutions, governance strategies, and protection mechanisms. This technical detail gives a precise awareness of the complexities of the task in hand, not least due to the differing contexts and realities of the democratisation of state power, blatant and cloaked class interests upheld by state power, and the ignorance and acceptance of prejudice. History has taught us of the irrevocable damage that failures to uphold individual rights and civil liberties can have. Genocide, mass incarceration, state-sponsored torture and hate crimes are just a few examples of the outcomes of how the individual liberties and rights (of some) accrue, or do not accrue, a status of importance. These damning indictments of the modern era are not confined, as the public may be led to believe, to countries or continents outside of those designated as ‘developed’ Western nations. On the contrary, while events affecting rights and liberties may be qualitatively different in nature and scale globally, the principles of infringement, postponement and unrecognition by states are the same in their basic make-up – that is, basic freedoms that should be guaranteed commonly become neglected amid an increased power of the state. The richness of critical debate in the field of state power is captured in this Companion. Experts have eloquently distilled the complexities of topic areas into short, succinct and analytically powerful entries. The catastrophic dangers of ignorance towards rights and liberties emerge here often, be that in examples of cruel political or military regimes, or veiled by the justification of enhancing xxii

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security and countering threat. Whatever the example, and as this text shows, nations around the globe remain territories where, in a variety of ways, personal freedoms can, and do, routinely become undermined. Law may not prove beneficial for all, as, indeed, structures of legislatures may be flawed themselves or international human rights law may be ignored in part or altogether due to perceived obstructions to power and sovereignty. The difficulties in monitoring, policing, advocating and gaining compliance is all too apparent. Such difficulties are extrapolated throughout this book, but so, too, are some of the initiatives that aim to counter the complexities of and subverting of state responsibilities for civil liberties and human rights. What is clear is that the continuation of developed strategies of engagement with nations and their governments is crucial, which is something that non-governmental organisations and others continue to build. However, while intrinsic, issues of responsibility do not only rest with governments themselves; the critical gaze must also remain attuned to other potential powerful rights-violators (such as corporations), who may or may not be allied to the activities of state interests. The editors anticipate that this Companion will serve as a useful and valuable aid to those interested in such an important area. The expertise of contributors and the introductory yet sophisticated tone give readers a sense of the unevenness and intricacy of historical and contemporary social and global concerns. This text has been a pleasure to compile and we hope that readers will find its contents informative and illuminating. Sharon Morley, Jo Turner, Karen Corteen and Paul Taylor 2016

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A AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Amnesty International (AI) is the world’s largest human rights campaigning organisation. It was founded in 1961 by the British lawyer Peter Benenson and has grown to have seven million members and offices or groups in more than 70 countries. It is largely funded by individuals who take part in the organisation’s decision-making processes. AI investigates and exposes human rights violations through campaigns and by lobbying governments and corporations. Peter Benenson was inspired to create AI when the then military government of Portugal imprisoned two students for raising a toast for freedom. Benenson (1961) wrote an article in the British newspaper The Observer, entitled ‘The forgotten prisoners’, which cited Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and called for an ‘Appeal for Amnesty’. Other newspapers reproduced the article, raising concern in Western Europe and the US. From the short appeal initiated by Benenson, AI rapidly became an international movement, with an International Council of Advisers and an International Secretariat comprising researchers, lawyers and campaigners. In 1968, the United Nations and the Council of Europe confirmed AI as an acknowledged consultant group. In 1977, AI won the Nobel Peace Prize. AI’s mandate in the 1960s was to work for the release of ‘prisoners of conscience’ – or those imprisoned for the non-violent expression of their views. In the 1970s, its mandate expanded to include: opposition to the death penalty; campaigning for the right to fair trials; and the exposure and ending of extrajudicial killings 1

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for political reasons. In the 1980s–1990s, AI’s members approved further work to improve refugees’ rights and to oppose torture. In the year 2000, during its International Council meeting in Dakar, Senegal, AI approved the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights within its mandate – or the ‘full spectrum’ of rights. This transition was shown by the ‘Demand Dignity’ campaign of the late 2000s, which included action to reduce poverty. AI’s success is based on its ability to empower ordinary citizens in different countries to participate in campaigns against powerful states and institutions. In particular, the campaigning technique of letter writing (or, more recently, emails, SMS messages and tweets) has allowed people from all over the world to take action, such as urging governments to change legislation, protect the rights of minority groups or intervene urgently in cases of prisoners sentenced to death. The ability for individuals to take action against injustice remains one of AI’s most effective methods: in 2014, AI’s letter-writing campaign ‘Write for Rights’ claimed to have generated more than 2.3 million actions that contributed to the release of Cambodian housing rights activist Yorm Bopha. Yet, at the same time, AI has also found itself challenged by the focus of some of its own campaigns, and the apparent need for reform. For example, in 2010, a former senior official of AI criticised the organisation for supporting Mozzam Begg, a former Guantánamo Bay prisoner during the so-called ‘war on terror’, on the grounds that Begg was a noted supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which AI had already criticised for suppressing human rights. In 2013, some of AI’s own members criticised the organisation for planning to campaign for the decriminalisation of prostitution without differentiating the rights of prostituted people versus the potentially illegal or unethical acts of pimps, brothel owners and buyers of sex. AI has also been criticised for making allegedly excessive payments to former Secretary General Irene Khan following her resignation in 2009. The incident provoked generalised outrage within AI and caused controversy in the European media. Since 2011, AI has downsized its headquarters in London and opened new regional hubs in Europe, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America. These actions will allow AI to become more influential within growing developing and middle-income countries, and to develop a more popular appeal, instead of relying on its traditional London base alone. ZAIRA DRAMMIS See also: Citizenship; Human Rights; Torture

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Readings Benenson, P. (1961) ‘The forgotten prisoners’, The Observer, 28 May. Goering, C. (2007) ‘Amnesty International and economic, social and cultural rights’, in C. Goering (ed) Ethics in action: The ethical challenges of international human rights nongovernmental organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 204–17. Hopgood, S. (2006) Keepers of the flame: Understanding Amnesty International. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Martins, K. (2004) ‘An appraisal of Amnesty International’s work at the United Nations: established areas of activities and shifting priorities since the 1990s’, Human Rights Quarterly, 26(4): 219–32. Power, J. (2001) Like water on stone: The story of Amnesty International. London: Penguin.

ANIMAL RIGHTS

‘Animal rights’ is an umbrella term that refers to the reality that, despite being sentient beings, animals generally lack their own rights (Kean, 1998). They are often protected under the law only insofar as such protection is considered to be commensurate with human interests. Advocates for animal rights argue for legal rights for animals, including the idea that animals should be given legal personhood, but it can also incorporate the idea that animal interests should be legally protected even where animals lack the same rights and status as humans. Animal rights arguably originate in the work of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73). Their writings on utilitarianism argue that consequences are the measure of whether an action is right or wrong and that the ‘value’ of consequences can be measured by how much happiness or wellbeing is caused by an action. Utilitarianism incorporates the perspective that doing the right thing means that everybody has an equal share in happiness and no individual’s happiness has greater value than another’s. Animal liberation, Peter Singer’s (1975) landmark text, primarily contextualised animal rights within utilitarianism and questions of whether animals can suffer, encompassed in the belief that suffering in animals often causes humans to suffer. The principal argument is that it is immoral to allow animals to suffer or to cause harm to animals, even if the animal itself is not provided with any legal rights or moral status. Animal rights advocates may also argue that, as sentient beings, animals can feel pain and on this basis should not suffer harm given that they have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering, and, as sentient beings, should also be given legal rights (Regan, 2004).

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Regan (2004, p xiv) argues that animal rights ‘is more than a philosophical idea; it is also part of the name of a burgeoning social justice movement, the animal rights movement’. Kean (1998) identifies that animals’ interests have become the subject of discussion by legislators, journalists, social protest groups and the general public. Animal protection has become a legitimate interest of government, legislators and law enforcement and is a developing area of law in the form of both anti-cruelty statutes and laws designed to promote animal welfare and prohibit certain specified actions considered to be harmful to animals. However, rather than there being a single homogeneous conception of animal rights, a range of perspectives exist: from an absolute ‘pure’ animal rights perspective, which contains a prohibition on all animal use, through to a protectionist stance that pursues the incremental protection of animals and the minimisation of pain and suffering but that allows some animal use, for example, for food. Animal rights are often spoken of as being legal rights commensurate with legal personhood, yet it is worth distinguishing between giving animals the same rights as humans and a distinct form of legal personhood, and the recognition of certain rights that animals may have that are arguably already enshrined in law. Animals are often protected by animal welfare laws that prohibit certain cruel practices and deliberate, unnecessary harm caused to non-human animals. However, animal protection via welfare laws falls short of providing animals with actual legal rights. As a result, animals cannot be victims of a crime even where animal abuse and cruelty offences form part of the criminal law. Green criminology’s ‘species justice’ perspective argues that contemporary criminal justice needs to extend beyond traditional human ideals of justice as a punitive or rehabilitative ideal, to incorporate shared concepts of reparative and restorative justice between humans and non-human animals. In effect, the criminal justice system needs to be modified to provide for a broad criminal justice perspective: justice for all sentient beings, not just for humans. Wise (2000, p 49) argues that: Every human has the basic legal right to bodily integrity. We are all legally disabled from invading each other’s bodies without consent. Every human has the basic right to bodily liberty as well, so that we’re legally disabled from enslaving and kidnapping each other.… But no nonhuman has these rights. Wise (2000) argues that animals, legally classified as property or things, are unable to assert rights or have them properly protected on their behalf. Animal rights movements seek to address this position. ANGUS NURSE See also: Habeas Corpus; Social Justice; Social Movements 4

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Readings Kean, H. (1998) Animal rights. London: Reaktion Books. Regan, T. (2004) The case for animal rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Rowlands, M. (2009) Animal rights: Moral theory and practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Singer, P. (1975) Animal liberation. New York, NY: Avon. Wise, S. (2000). Rattling the cage: Toward legal rights for animals. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

Perhaps more than any other social movement in the late 20th century, the antiapartheid movement drew support from every corner of the world. By the time Nelson Mandela became the country’s first democratically elected leader in 1994, South Africans’ struggle against racial exclusion had become a global symbol of social movement success, and offered an important model for transnational activists. In the years after the Second World War, colonial administrations and settler control were gradually replaced by independent governments in most of Africa. However, South Africa’s sizeable white minority resisted the ‘winds of change’, and in 1948, a government elected only by white people imposed a new, more rigid set of policies, explicitly designed to protect white supremacy and racial hierarchies. Under policies collectively known as ‘apartheid’, or ‘separateness’, the ruling Nationalist Party pushed African households into segregated urban areas, moved black children into segregated and explicitly unequal schools, prohibited black workers from taking skilled jobs, required African adults to carry ‘passes’ to travel in white-designated areas, and, above all, denied black South Africans most political rights. In the 1950s, anti-apartheid activism inside South Africa generally mirrored anticolonial efforts in other parts of the world: activists organised petitions, protests, strikes and boycotts. Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC), along with other anti-apartheid groups like the Pan-Africanist Congress, the South African Community Party and many smaller organisations, mobilised supporters for broad demonstrations against racial exclusion; South Africans of all races participate in large campaigns of non-violent resistance, from the 1952 Defiance Campaign to the 1960 Anti-Pass campaign. The South African government responded harshly to demands for democracy and equality. As anti-apartheid protests escalated, thousands of activists and 5

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demonstrators faced jail, criminal charges or exile. In 1960, police shot and killed 69 demonstrators protesting against the hated ‘pass laws’ in Sharpeville near Johannesburg; a few months later, the government outlawed the ANC and any other party that called for ordinary electoral democracy in South Africa. Frustrated, many South Africans began to feel that their country could only attain democracy through armed struggle, of the sort that had recently ended colonial control in Algeria or Kenya. Over the next few years, as activists in several different organisations tried to build underground movements, Mandela and other leading activists were captured and sentenced to long prison terms. Many, like the Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert Sobukwe, died in jail; other leading activists, including Mandela, were sentenced to long jail terms, often on the notorious Robben Island prison just outside Cape Town. Between 1960 and 1990, ordinary political activity was essentially banned for most South Africans: simply supporting ‘one-person, one vote’ could lead to charges of ‘supporting the aims of a banned organization’, which carried a five-year jail sentence. Over time, the government tried to consolidate white control over the 87% of the country set aside for white people – including the country’s major cities, mines and richest agricultural areas – while reinforcing a racialised migrant labour system by denying Africans citizenship, and restricting most African households to regions that had been designated ‘bantustans’, or ‘native reserves’. During those decades, anti-apartheid activists learned to innovate, constantly improvising new strategies for mobilising popular support, both inside South Africa – where innovative tactics often had to circumvent harsh restrictions on political speech or activities – and around the world, as exiled South Africans and international sympathisers looked for new ways to exert pressure on the regime from outside. Inside South Africa, new waves of activism created cycles of experimentation and repression: activists often sought legal openings, until those opening were closed; activists would then seek new opportunities, protesting against racial inequality and exclusion in many different settings. University students organised the Black Consciousness movement on college campuses; high school students rejected unequal education and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in segregated schools; workers began to organise trade unions in South Africa’s factories and mines. Township activists organised community protests over inadequate housing and public transport, to support striking workers, or – especially as repression grew ever harsher – by organising mass funerals for the many victims of repeated police violence. By the mid-1980s, South Africa’s black townships were in turmoil: above ground, trade unions, student groups and community organisations mobilised a campaign to make the country ‘ungovernable’. Often linked through secret networks to 6

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exiled leaders of the ANC (and sometimes coordinated with infrequent ANC efforts to mount guerrilla attacks on military or strategic government targets), the rolling uprising prompted further repression – yet protests, demonstrations and occasional acts of sabotage continued through the 1980s, despite what amounted to a military occupation of many black communities. Through these decades of protest, an international anti-apartheid movement responded to waves of South African activism. Although the United Nations first passed a resolution defining apartheid as a ‘crime against humanity’ in 1966, international institutions showed little inclination to intervene directly in South Africa’s internal affairs, while Western governments continued to see South Africa as a key ally. Exiled anti-apartheid activists tried to draw attention to South Africa’s conflicts: in London, regular demonstrations outside the South African embassy reminded British passers-by of their country’s continued links to South Africa; in the US, anti-apartheid activists protested against bank loans to the South African government. However, until the mid-1980s, Western governments failed to impose significant sanctions on South Africa. Frustrated, international anti-apartheid activists sought new ways to isolate South Africa. In Britain and the Netherlands, shared colonial histories prompted many consumers to boycott South African wine and oranges, but international anti-apartheid activists also pursued less obvious paths to isolate the regime. In one of the most innovative tactics, an international campaign to ban South Africa’s segregated sports teams gained momentum, especially after the International Olympics Committee withdrew South Africa’s invitation to participate in 1963 when the government insisted on an all-white team. For decades, South African teams were banned from many international competitions, and in the few sports, like rugby, that did permit South African participation, vociferous protests regularly reminded global audiences that apartheid denied basic rights to most South Africans. Similarly, US anti-apartheid campaigners used consumer boycotts and civil disobedience outside the South African embassy in Washington, but they also turned to new tactics, including divestment. From the early 1970s, US antiapartheid activists urged local institutions to sell their shares in companies operating in South Africa, hoping to shame businesses that profited from South Africa’s repressive and racialised labour controls. Ongoing discussions about apartheid within religious denominations, universities, pension funds and even local city governments prompted ordinary Americans to pay attention to an otherwise distant foreign policy issue, and raised pressure on policymakers to further isolate the apartheid government. Facing ongoing domestic turmoil and intensifying international economic and political pressure, South Africa’s political and business elite began to fracture. 7

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By 1989, some white business leaders were already meeting secretly with ANC leaders in exile, and Nationalist Party politicians began quietly to speak with Nelson Mandela in prison. Finally, in February 1990, the government released Mandela and other prisoners, unbanned the ANC and other political parties, and opened the negotiations that, four years later, would lead to South Africa’s first democratic elections, and Mandela’s election as president. GAY W. SEIDMAN See also: Citizenship; Social Movements; State Violence Readings Thom, H. (2006) Anti-apartheid and the emergence of a global civil society. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. Williams, E. (2015) The politics of race in Britain and South Africa: Black British solidarity and the anti-apartheid struggle. London: IB Taurus.

ARMS TRADE

The trade in arms incorporates the sale of new arms such as mines, tanks, guns, bombs and so forth, the components to make such arms, the transfer of older, used or reconditioned arms, and the cross-border movement of other security-related items. It is unique in terms of international business; it consists of transnational companies that are treasured as national assets, receiving the political and financial support, and the custom, of governments. The trade is notoriously secretive; it is no surprise that countries might want to hide or even exaggerate their stocks of arms.The absence of regulations or lax controls on the arms trade and inadequate controls on arms transfers has led to the widespread availability and misuse of weapons. However, recent attempts by the United Nations (UN) to address such problems have led to the controversial Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in December 2014 following years of debate (Lustgarten, 2015). At the time of writing, 72 states have ratified the treaty, and a further 59 states have signed but not ratified it (see: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/). The process of negotiating the ATT necessarily brought together all UN member states with the aim of producing binding standards and controls for the export of weapons from one state to another. As such, these controls can be seen to be discriminatory as one state can determine whether or not an arms export should come about and therefore potentially deny another state the weapons that it wants to buy (Bromley et al, 2012).

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For the majority of the 20th century, arms companies were essentially national assets manufacturing weapons systems and arms to meet domestic need. They were bound up with the defence ambitions of the host country, were often state-owned and were inseparable from the countries’ own armed forces. The majority of overseas arms transfers and sales were to strategic partners drawn along Cold War lines (see: http://www.sipri.org). The political implications and worries over national security and secrecy prevented cross-border research and manufacture. The end of the Cold War in the 1980s and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 changed the arms trade. Worldwide military expenditure fell, with a slight increase with Western nations rearming during the Gulf War tensions in the 1990s. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see: http://www.sipri.org), which records the volume of military imports of major conventional weapons, estimated that arms imports dropped by somewhere between a quarter and a third at that time. Alongside the drop in imports, governments detached themselves from state arms companies and reduced spending on research. No longer connected to governments, and with a generalised globalisation of trade, arms companies began developing into multinational companies and competing in what had developed into an international trade. Yet, arms manufacturers necessarily remain in close collusion with states. Their products are still seen as national assets. Moreover, their customers are governments of other states, and states continue to use their arms industries as a diplomatic tool in international relations, granting arms deals with other nations as part of wider agreements. The US is by far the world’s biggest arms exporter, responsible for around 40% of the licit global trade – estimated to be worth around USD60 billion a year (Feinstein, 2011). Other countries with sizeable industries include China, France, Germany and the UK. Although the major arms companies are located in a few countries, buyers exist all over the world, often in countries with poor human rights records. According to Oxfam, only 52 countries regulate their arms brokers, and most of these do not maintain criminal sanctions for illegal sales (see: https:// www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/conflict/controlarms). Virtually all illicit arms transfers are small arms. Despite the general downward trend of the arms trade since the end of the Cold War, there is no such trend in the international transfer of small arms and light weapons (Kinsella, 2014). The use of small arms contributes to the employment of child soldiers – small arms and light weapons are inexpensive, simple, durable and portable. Zweifel (2012) argues that they can easily be recycled from one conflict to another, be sold on by former soldiers, be looted from stockpiles and are attractive to innovative

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entrepreneurs looking for a profitable trade with lax controls. Despite the ATT, the trade in small arms will probably remain difficult to control. JO TURNER See also: Child Soldiers; National Security; United Nations, The Readings Bromley, M., Cooper, N. and Holtom, P. (2012) ‘The UN Arms Trade Treaty: arms export controls, the human security agenda and the lessons of history’, International Affairs, 88(5): 1029–48. Feinstein, A. (2011) The shadow world: Inside the global arms trade. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kinsella, D. (2014) ‘Illicit arms transfers to Africa and the prominence of the former Soviet bloc: a social network analysis’, Crime, Law & Social Change, 62(5): 523–47. Lustgarten, L. (2015) ‘The Arms Trade Treaty: achievements, failings, future’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 64: 569–600. Zweifel, M. (2012) ‘Taking up arms’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 24(1): 108–13.

ASYLUM

‘Asylum’ may be understood as sanctuary from one state provided by another. It is given to someone who has sought protection from persecution within their country of origin.The individual may have already experienced persecution or it is recognised that they will experience persecution if returned to their country of origin.The perpetrators of this persecution may be the government of the country of origin or another body within that country from which the government is unable to protect the individual. In the modern era, the main reasons for seeking asylum have related to four key issues: 1. Postcolonial separation and decolonisation (eg the partition of Pakistan from India in 1947); 2. Cold War geopolitical rivalries between superpowers (eg the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]); 3. conflict related to land and resources (eg Afghanistan, Sudan, Colombia); and

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4. wars of nationalism and independence (eg Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam), and civil war based on tribal, ethnic and/or religious conflict (eg Syria, Iraq) (Hyndman, 2009). Upon receiving asylum, an individual is described as a refugee. The United Nations’ (UN’s) 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who: owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] of the protection of that country. (United Nations, 1951, p 16, Article 1.2, cited in UNHCR, 2010, p 3) This definition has been the basis on which these states have made asylum decisions. A total of 147 nations are party to this Convention or the 1967 Protocol (Hyndman, 2009). However, individual states have varied in two main ways: (1) in the asylum process that they have adopted; and (2) in how they have interpreted the convention. There are two main ways in which an individual may seek permanent asylum. The first route is where an individual who is fleeing persecution in their country of origin arrives in another country and makes their intention to seek asylum known to the authorities. If they have not gone via another country where it is safe for that individual to claim asylum (known as a ‘third country’), then the current host country will allow the individual’s application. This individual is henceforth known as an asylum seeker until their case is reviewed. Figure 1 provides a flow chart of the UK’s asylum process. If an individual’s case is deemed creditable, they will receive refugee status. If an individual’s case is not determined as fitting the definition of a ‘refugee’, but it would not be possible for the individual to be returned to their country of origin, for example, due to political unrest, then the individual may receive humanitarian protection. The second route is where an individual who flees persecution in their country of origin arrives in a refugee camp and temporarily settles there. Resettlement schemes attempt to provide permanent options for such people. Working with host nations, organisations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identify individuals and families to receive refugee status in particular countries. These individuals then arrive in their host nation as a refugee. Yet, countries vary in the number of placements they offer. Amnesty International (2015) notes that during Syria’s refugee crisis, Germany has pledged 35,000 places for Syrian refugees, whereas the remaining 26 European Union countries have pledged around 8,700 resettlement places altogether.

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A companion to state power, liberties and rights Figure 1: UK asylum process

Enter the UK

Claim asylum

Screening interview Dublin/3rd country case

Detained fast track/ detained nonsuspensive appeal

Substantive/ asylum interview

Asylum decision Negative Go to: After a refusal

Positive

Refugee Status Humanitarian Protection

Source: Right to Remain (2015).

The second way in which states differ is in how they have interpreted the convention. For example, the category of ‘particular social group’ is tenuous and non-specific (Crawley, 2001). Some countries, such as Canada, will accept gender and sexual orientation as a ‘particular social group’; however, other countries do not. This means that an individual who could prove that they need protection from persecution on the basis of, for example, their homosexuality would receive refuge in one country following the 1951 Convention but not another. RUTH HEALEY See also: Border Control; Refugee Convention (1951); United Nations, The; Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Amnesty International (2015) ‘Syria’s refugee crisis in numbers’. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-innumbers/ Crawley, H. (2001) Refugees and gender: Law and process. Bristol: Jordans. Gov.uk (2015) ‘Asylum’. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/browse/visasimmigration/asylum

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Hyndman, J. (2009) ‘Refugees’, in D. Gregory, R.J. Johnston, G. Pratt, M. Watts and S. Whatmore (eds) The dictionary of human geography (5th edn). Oxford: Blackwell, pp 628–9. Right to Remain (2015) ‘The legal process: claiming asylum’. Available at: http:// righttoremain.org.uk/toolkit/claimasylum.html UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) (2010) ‘Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees’. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf

AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM

The term ‘authoritarian populism’ attempts to explain the often broad appeal of policies and practices that repress many people’s civil liberties and human rights. Authoritarian regimes are easier to explain when they are dictatorships imposing draconian powers upon their oppressed populaces. For liberals, it is the somewhat incongruous appeal of authoritarianism to many people in neoliberal democracies that is focused upon in the examination of its ‘populism’. What attracts so many people to policies and practices that repress others, and may even repress them too, appears at odds with morality and fairness and seems therefore somewhat perverse (Brake and Hale, 1992). The shape and form of authoritarian regimes is politically contested, as is their denial of human rights and freedoms, which is habitually portrayed as an insignificant but necessary, even temporary short-term, restriction required to curtail threats – real, imagined and/or exaggerated. It is therefore not surprising that such regimes vigorously reject claims that they are authoritarian and profess the need and support for controls and restrictions as essential counters to ‘threats’. The ‘popularity’ of authoritarianism is highly contested; nonetheless, it is relentlessly reinvigorated by key conservative ideologues that particularly focus upon notions of liberalism and rights having ‘gone too far’ and the purported collapse of social order (Box, 1987). Central to authoritarian populism is this ideological depiction of society being in crisis (Hall et al, 1978), necessitating allegedly common-sense solutions to a wide variety of social problems, as exemplified in the recourse to ‘hang them’ and ‘flog them’ orotundity on law and order. This adulation of ‘traditional conservative beliefs’, principally that instilling social discipline is the easy solution to social problems, makes authoritarianism appeal quite literally as ‘the simple answer’. Authoritarian populism has aided the consensual surrender of rights and freedoms in exchange for the promised protection of the strong state and its agencies. This 13

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facilitated what Hall (1980) explained as a long process of ‘drifting into a law and order society’ as rights and liberties were dramatically curtailed and state powers were greatly extended, resulting in what Scraton (1987) termed ‘the authoritarian state’. This new, yet purportedly restored, ‘order’ was framed around anxieties and fears wherein people accepted and even demanded increased repressive policies, powers and practices, craving fetishlike the safety and security that their introduction, it was promised, would deliver. This assured social order has never materialised despite the ongoing neoliberal assurances and continued recourse to knee-jerk reactionary social policies. The problem for liberals is the political and ideological rigour of everyday authoritarian populism and draconian law and order policies (Downes and Morgan, 2002). The growth of authoritarian populism was also assisted by simple quasi-academic solutions, for example, Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) ‘broken windows’ would-be panacea on crime. Politically, authoritarian populism has been acquiesced to by the emergence of so-called ‘realism’ and the claimed exposures of ‘the reality’ of the harms of crime and criminality. These, it was claimed, had been denied and or romanticised by unrealistic criminologists labelled and marginalised as ‘left idealists’ (Lea and Young, 1984). The acceptance of demands for a zero tolerance of crime, which informed much of New Labour’s policies on anti-social behaviour orders and curfews, typifies such capitulation to authoritarian populism. However, that purported ‘realism’ appears to more critical observers to be a thin guise upon the substance of what is offered, which is palpably draconian and illiberal, that is, authoritarian. Authoritarianism remains disconcertedly popular despite its specious pre-modern characteristics, as exemplified by John Major’s comment as the UK’s Prime Minister in 1993 that we should ‘understand less and condemn more’. Authoritarian populism also persists due to the relative dearth of more critical explanations among dominant political and media discourses in contemporary society. LIAM McCANN See also: Civil Liberties; Human Rights; State Power Readings Box, S. (1987) Recession, crime and punishment. London: Macmillan. Brake, M. and Hale, C. (1992) Public order and private lives: The politics of law and order. London: Routledge.

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Downes, D. and Morgan, M. (2002) ‘The skeleton in the cupboard: the politics of law and order at the turn of the millennium’ in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford handbook of criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 286–321. Hall, S. (1980) Drifting into a law and order society. London: The Cobden Trust. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order. London: Macmillan. Lea, J. and Young, J. (1984) What is to be done about law and order. London: Penguin Books. Scraton, P. (ed) (1987) Law, order and the authoritarian state: Readings in critical criminology. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Wilson, J. and Kelling, G. (1982) ‘Broken windows: the police and neighbourhood safety’, Atlantic Monthly, 249(3): 29–38.

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B BORDER CONTROL Borders and border control have long been core concerns of the modern state, yet they have only recently become major topics of social-scientific and popular debate. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some commentators suggested that the world was on the cusp of a new era of freedom of movement, in which national borders would exert less of a constraining hold over the movement of people. Yet, celebratory accounts of a ‘borderless world’ were short-lived, as new walls and fences sprang up, replacing the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War. According to Andreas (2000, p 140), close cataloguer of the changing nature of borders and border control around the world, this was ‘especially evident along the territorial fault lines between lands of wealth and lands of poverty’, such as along the southern border of the US and the southern and eastern borders of the European Union (EU). During the last decade of the 20th century, and particularly after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, the policing of borders in the global North was ‘transformed from a low-priority and low-maintenance activity into a high-profile campaign attracting growing political attention’ (Andreas, 2000, p 140). In 2006, for instance, the US government passed the Secure Fence Act, committing over USD1 billion of federal funds for the construction of some 700 miles of steel and reinforced concrete fencing along its southern border with Mexico; while in Europe, as internal border controls have been relaxed between member states of the EU, the patrolling of the EU’s external borders has been intensified. Frontex, the EU’s border force, now receives an annual budget of over €90 million 17

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for coordinating border control at the frontiers of the EU. By some estimates, European borders will soon be more fortified than they have ever been since the Second World War. Undoubtedly, one of the most disturbing consequences of this intensification of border control has been the rising number of people who die trying to cross borders undetected. Between January 1993 and June 2015, UNITED for Intercultural Action – a European network against nationalism, racism and fascism, and in support of migrants and refugees – recorded 22,394 deaths on the borders of Europe. While the idea of ‘Fortress Europe’ or, indeed, ‘Fortress America’ certainly captures the sense in which powerful new impediments to migration and mobility have been developed in recent years, the imagery of the border as a fortress is nonetheless inadequate for grasping the changing role of borders in today’s world. Indeed, border control is no longer simply restricted to the geographical space of the border itself, but also involves identity checks in hospitals and places of work, for instance, or is outsourced to carrier companies – such as airlines, railways or road hauliers, who are required to guarantee that unwanted migrants have not managed to infiltrate their cargo (see, eg, Andreas, 2003; Walters, 2006). Instead of simply blocking flows of people, as the image of the fortress suggests, borders rather play an important role in regulating the conditions under which people are able to move, live and work, producing different tiers of citizenship, rights and belonging (Balibar, 2004). In this context, Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (2007) have proposed the term ‘borderscapes’ as a way of conceptualising the way in which borders and border-like spaces are continually being reproduced through different institutional and social practices – not just in the sense of the proliferation of controls on the movement of people, but also in terms of the way in which borders define and delimit access to rights, representation and redistribution, as the daily deaths around the world’s borders testify. Borders and border control look set to be key sites of struggle for social justice in the 21st century. JOE RIGBY See also: European Union; Globalisation; Immigration Readings Andreas, P. (2000) ‘Introduction: the wall after the wall’, in P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds) The wall around the West: State borders and immigration controls in North America and Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 1–11. Andreas, P. (2003) ‘Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century’, International Security, 28(2): 78–111.

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Balibar, E. (2004) We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rajaram, P.K. and Grundy-Warr, C. (2007) ‘Introduction’, in P.K. Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr (eds) Borderscapes: Hidden geographies and politics at territory’s edge. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp ix–xl. Walters, W. (2006) ‘Border/control’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2): 187–203.

BRIBERY

Bribery involves an illicit transaction and relation that comprises at least two willing or consenting actors: one who ‘actively’ offers, promises to give or gives, and one who ‘passively’ requests, agrees to receive or accepts, a bribe or inducement. The bribe receiver may, of course, be more ‘active’ in demanding bribes but such distinctions are made in law and in the discourse of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN). A central feature of bribery is the intent to influence the receiver’s behaviour for the benefit or advantage of the giver by inducing a desired service or a specified action or omission. In cases of extortion, consent can be unwilling although the bribery is still likely to benefit both parties. Bribes can originate within licit and illicit markets, or at the intersections of these within ‘grey’ markets, such as when those engaging in criminal enterprise seek to divert the proceeds of their crimes into the legitimate financial system. The scale and scope of bribes can vary. They can take myriad forms, from monetary payments (potentially billions, as in cases of corporate bribery, or small-scale cash payments, ‘kickbacks’ or donations) or exchanges of value (eg including shopping trips, tickets for sporting events, attendance at conferences in exotic locations, etc), through to non-monetary favours, such as the provision of prostitutes or current/future employment for self, family or social network. The purpose of bribery has been variously conceptualised and categorised. A common distinction is made between bribes that are ‘according to rule’ and bribes that are ‘against the rule’. The distinction here refers to whether the intent is to ensure the commission or omission of an act or service that a public official would otherwise undertake as part of their routine, daily activities, or not. ‘According to rule’ may involve a border official expediting the movement of lorries through checkpoints on receipt of a ‘pay-off’ (ie allowing legitimate lorries through borders is part of the official’s occupational role), or the accelerating of an application process for the granting of a permit or licence. Such bribery often involves low-level payments and could be a singular transaction or series of transactions, which are commonly referred to as ‘facilitation payments’. In the aggregate, such bribes can become quite substantial, particularly when involving transnational corporations, 19

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who may make such payments regularly and see them as the costs of doing business. ‘Against the rule’ requires the official to breach their occupational duties, such as notifying a particular company of the details of competitor bids during the tendering process for public procurement contracts, or awarding a contract to a company that is less suited to state/public needs than another in exchange for a bribe (ie the official is abusing the trust inherent in the occupational role). Such bribery often involves high-level, systematic payments to ensure anti-competitive and/or unlawful behaviour by politicians and public officials, such as inappropriately allocating public contracts and creating conflicts of interest. At its most basic level of organisation, bribery can be thought of as a transaction or a process. This process requires inputs (eg the creation of funds to finance the supply side of the bribery, whether a cash payment or some other tangible inducement) and generates outputs (eg a tangible advantage) and outcomes (eg the continuance of business in a particular sector or market, or the facilitation of criminal enterprise). Bribery can also be organised at the transnational and multi-jurisdictional level. This creates obstacles for law enforcement, particularly when seeking to obtain evidence from other jurisdictions or when attempting to ‘follow the money’, as complex economic mechanisms and structures (such as the use of corporate vehicles and shell firms, and secretive offshore financial centres) enable bribe givers and receivers to conceal illicit finances while also retaining control over them. Bribery, like all crime, is an offence that has been so labelled. Like all human behaviour, bribery transactions and relations must be understood within particular contexts and (organisational) cultures. In some countries, gift giving is a prelude to the trust needed to conduct business. In the West, international aid is rarely the charitable gesture it seems and is often a prelude to developing business relationships. However, both could be constructed as bribery. Differing cultural and normative frameworks throughout the globe shape the (il)legality of these actions in different countries. However, by framing the anti-corruption agenda in relation to the substantial social, political, economic and environmental harms that bribery can cause, international organisations such as the UN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have sought to ensure the creation and harmonisation of normative standards towards bribery through international legal frameworks, such as the UN Convention Against Corruption 2003 and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1997. NICHOLAS LORD See also: Corporations; Corruption; Crimes of the Powerful Reading Lord, N. (2014) Regulating corporate bribery in international business. Aldershot: Ashgate. 20

C CAPITAL PUNISHMENT Capital punishment is the judicially ordered execution of a prisoner as punishment. Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that ‘in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1966). Such serious crimes are often called ‘capital offences’, or ‘capital crimes’. The word ‘capital’ is rooted in the Latin term capitalis, referring to the head, and hence the term ‘capital crime’ developed, as the original method of punishment was beheading – the loss of one’s head. Capital punishment was a dominant method of punishment throughout the world until the late 18th century, when changing ideas as a result of the Enlightenment in Europe led to its gradual decline, but not complete abolition. The purpose of capital punishment was essentially to prove the state’s power, reminding people what would happen to those who broke the law (Banner, 2002). In the UK, capital punishment was used for a wide range of offences, with no proportionality between the punishment and the crime committed. In 1810, the UK had at least 223 capital offences, which included all felonies except petty larceny and maiming (Hood and Hoyle, 2008). By the end of December 2011, 97 of 197 countries (49%) had abolished capital punishment for all crimes (Vollum et al, 2015). Despite this, the majority of people in the world live in countries with capital punishment. Most countries that retain capital punishment are run by military dictatorships or undemocratic 21

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regimes. The only Western democracy that still executes its citizens is the US. Despite the United Nations General Assembly stating that capital punishment should only be reserved for serious crimes, a number of countries have sentenced individuals to death for crimes that did not involve intentional killing, such as drug-related offences in Thailand and economic crimes in Vietnam (Amnesty International, 2015). According to Amnesty International (2015), in 2014, 55 countries are known to have sentenced at least 2,466 people to death, a 13% increase on 2013. Alongside this, in the same year, there were 601 executions in 22 countries. The five top countries for numbers of executions are the US, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China, although the death penalty in China is a state secret, so any figures related to China’s use of capital punishment are based on witness statements and watchdog groups. Similarly, while Iran claims that it executed 289 people in 2014, Amnesty International (2015) claim that there were at least 743, with at least 14 of those executions being of individuals below the age of 18. In 2014, 50% of Saudi Arabia’s executions were for non-lethal offences, including witchcraft, adultery and sorcery. The majority of Iraq’s executions were for terrorism-related offences, with the main method being hanging, and there were 1,724 prisoners under sentence of death as of August 2014 (Death Penalty Worldwide, 2015). In the US, there were 35 executions in 2014, all via lethal injection. Until recently, the lethal injection was delivered via a three-drug protocol. First, an anaesthetic or sedative was used (usually midazolam hydrochloride), followed by pancuronium bromide, which functioned to paralyse the prisoner, and finally potassium chloride, which would stop the prisoner’s heart. Recently, there has been a shortage of some of the drugs used as part of this three-drug protocol, which has led to some states using either two drugs or one drug for the lethal injection (most commonly, pentobarbital for single-drug executions, with the addition of midazolam for two-drug protocols). Some states have seen problematic or ‘botched’ executions as a result of using a single drug; in Oklahoma, for example, Clayton Lockett’s execution failed to progress as planned due to using an untested mix of drugs and it took 43 minutes for him to die (The Guardian, 2014), prompting President Obama to call for a federal review of the death penalty (Reprieve, 2014). In some states, this drug shortage has led to the postponement of some executions, for example, Ohio has postponed all executions until 2017 because of the inability to source the appropriate drugs (CNN, 2015). Furthermore, the American Pharmacists Association has discouraged pharmacists from participating in executions, arguing that it is contrary to the role of pharmacists as providers of health care (Death Penalty Information Centre, 2015). As a result of these problems, some states have changed their execution protocols to utilise different methods of execution, such as firing squad (Utah), electrocution (Tennessee) and nitrogen gas (Oklahoma). However, there may also be a broader change in attitudes about capital punishment in the US, which 22

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has seen a decline of 33% in the number of executions in 2015 and the lowest number of executions since 1991. Hence, the trend towards abolitionism in the US seems to be moving rapidly, supported by a more general policy movement towards justice reinvestment rather than mass incarceration. LINDA ASQUITH See also: Amnesty International; Civil Liberties; Human Rights Readings Amnesty International (2015) Death sentences and executions 2014. London: Amnesty International. Banner, S. (2002) The death penalty: An American history. Massachusetts, MA: Harvard University Press. CNN (2015) ‘Ohio delays executions until 2017’. Available at: http://edition. cnn.com/2015/10/19/us/ohio-executions-delay/ Death Penalty Information Centre (2015) ‘APhA House of Delegates adopts policy discouraging pharmacist participation in execution’. Available at: http:// www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/APhAResolution.pdf Death Penalty Worldwide (2015) ‘Death penalty database’. Available at: http:// www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Iraq Hood, R. and Hoyle, C. (2008) The death penalty: A worldwide perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprieve (2014) ‘Clayton Lockett’. Available at: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/ case-study/cases-clayton-lockett/ The Guardian (2014) ‘Scene at botched Oklahoma execution of Clayton Lockett was “a bloody mess”’, 13 December. Available at: http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/dec/13/botched-oklahoma-execution-clayton-lockettbloody-mess United Nations General Assembly (1966), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December, Treaty Series, 999, p 171. Vollum, S., Del Carmen, R.V., Frantzen, D., San Miguel, C. and Cheeseman, K. (2015) The death penalty: Constitutional issues, commentaries and case briefs (3rd edn). London: Routledge.

CENSORSHIP

Censorship is a highly controversial area of social control as it encompasses restraining a purportedly fundamental human right: the freedom of expression. Despite legislative attempts to protect the freedom of speech from censorship, the 23

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lack of effective resilience in such legislation queries the actual purpose of such laws, except it being primarily ideological. Post-1948, and the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therein the principle of the freedom of speech, it might be mistakenly assumed that censorship was henceforth assigned to history (Caso, 2008). However, censorship continues and, contemporarily, it is only the contested need for, and extent of, censorship that remains contentious. At its core, censorship attempts to control and restrict communications, ideas and representations that are considered harmful and/or dangerous. History is littered with fluctuations in censorship policies and practices that correlate with both reactionary concerns about changes to forms of media and communication, and changing socio-political ideas and values. Censorship necessitates the scrutiny and appraisal of the purported or actual risks and harms that communications, representations and images may contain, but the accuracy of such assessments is often unclear (Boyle, 2005). Political censorship attempts to suppress opponents’ alternative political ideas and is commonly characterised or caricatured as being the direct result of governmental commands. In reality, most political censorship results from the ‘coincidence’ of the interests of key ‘primary definers’, who censor access to media or distort what was actually said or happening into propagandist disinformation. The ideological semantics utilised in censorship obscures truth in Orwellian-like doublespeak typified in oxymorons such as ‘friendly fire’ and the ‘war on terror’. This resulting censored version of events, the ‘official discourse’, is what the primary definers wish to communicate at the expense of more critical discourses (Burton and Carlen, 1979). The attempt to ‘prevent’ ‘political indoctrination’ and ‘radicalisation’, and the purported threat of radical extremists, has resulted in state censorship initiatives in Britain such as broadcasting bans. Counterinsurgency proponents claim that this prevents the corrupting and dangerous consequences of observing such material, and that this risk of harm both necessitates and legitimates the censorship (Hillyard, 2005). Therein the right to the freedom of expression is purportedly ‘balanced’ against other protective anti-discriminatory rights, with the concept of proportionality applied to the likely effects of, for example, ‘hate speech’ (Hare and Weinstein, 2010). Changes in socio-political beliefs have both curtailed and expanded censorship; this is particularly relevant to previously heteronormative depictions in contemporary neoliberal societies, as exemplified in the dominant neoliberal view that most forms of pornography are relatively harmless and should only be restricted by age in order to protect children. Anti-pornography feminists argue that protection is necessary from ‘the sexually explicit subordination of women 24

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that dehumanises, objectifies and degrades women and often sexualises and celebrates their abuse … [which is] central to maintaining women’s inequality and subordination in all spheres of life’ (Boyle, 2005, p 29). The complexity of such debates necessitates wider reading and this definition cannot hope to elucidate adequately; nevertheless, the widespread infantilisation, objectification and blatant exploitation of women and children in pornography exists on a worrying continuum, wherein the boundaries of acceptable and permissible, and unacceptable and illegal, meander incongruously. The long history of the alleged causational links between violence and ‘new’ media, purportedly threatening society, such as violent videos, violent video games and music such as gangster rap, often delineates a social conservatism utilised to affirm the need for censorship. Contemporary moral panics around ‘sexting’, particularly involving teenage girls, therein caricatured as bereft of agency and self-esteem, even pathologised as biologically irrational, have led to the censorial criminalisation of private and consensual adolescent sexual intimacy at the expense of focusing on the greater problem of ‘the pervasive and continuing problems of sexual violence and harassment’ (Hasinoff, 2015, p 14). Nonetheless, while the state, media corporations and key primary definers continue to have the dominant censorial control of political debates, the expansion of other methods of communication, in particular, social media, has challenged and critiqued such discourses and led to the critical and alternative representations of the citizenjournalist (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). LIAM McCANN See also: Neoliberalism; Social Control; Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Boyle, K. (2005) Media and violence. London: Sage. Burton, F. and Carlen, P. (1979) Official discourse: Discourse analysis, government publications, ideology and the state. Oxford: Routledge & Kegan Paul Books. Caso, F. (2008) Censorship. New York, NY: Facts On File. Greer, C. and McLaughlin, E. (2010) ‘We predict a riot? Public order policing, new media environments and the rise of the citizen journalist’, British Journal of Criminology, 50(6): 1041–59. Hare, I. and Weinstein, J. (2010) ‘General introduction: free speech, democracy, and the suppression of extreme speech past and present’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds) Extreme speech and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 1–10. Hasinoff, A. (2015) Sexting panic: Rethinking criminalization, privacy, and consent. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 25

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Hillyard, P. (2005) ‘The “war on terror”: lessons from Ireland’, European Civil Liberties Network. Available at: http://www.ecln.org/essays/essay-1.pdf

CHILD SOLDIERS

Under Article 8 of the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities’ is a war crime. Thus, in international law, a ‘child soldier’ is defined as any person aged 15 years or younger who takes part in armed conflicts or military operations. However, the 2002 United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) sets 18 years of age as the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities and for compulsory recruitment by state armed forces and non-state armed groups. Under OPAC, states may accept volunteers from the age of 16 years (eg in the UK) but must deposit a binding declaration at the time of ratification or accession setting out their minimum voluntary recruitment age and outlining certain safeguards for such recruitment. Moreover, the 2002 OPAC stipulates that its state parties ‘shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons below the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities and that they are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces’. More recently, the 2007 Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which provide guidelines on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all categories of children associated with armed groups, define the term ‘child soldier’ more broadly: A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes. So, while the Rome Statute has strengthened the legal protection of children, it has received widespread criticism for setting a 15-year age limit for voluntary recruitment instead of 18 years of age. Sinha (2013) argues that child soldiers should be considered ‘super-privileged’ combatants who are entitled to special treatment. He says that the Geneva Conventions explicitly treat child soldiers as possessing ‘super’ privileges above and beyond standard privileged combatants, and that the conventions label child soldiers as ‘victims’. The victimhood of children and young people who are 26

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labelled ‘child soldiers’ can be seen in their enlistment. Many children enmeshed in conflict are abducted or recruited by force, while others join out of desperation, believing that armed groups offer their best chance for survival. Across time and cultures, children have been involved in some way or another in conflict, but their intentional recruitment is an increasing occurrence (Williams, 2011). In some cases, they are also being appropriated as child soldiers by state or non-state armed groups or forces perpetrating mass atrocities and/or genocide (Grover, 2012). Despite their youth, children and young people can be prosecuted for war crimes if found guilty, although the OPAC limits the punishment that a child can receive. Evidence from the UN and various human rights organisations working on behalf of children and young people embroiled in conflict suggests that child soldiers are active in at least 14 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand and Yemen. Indeed, as recently as September 2015 at the ICC, the trial commenced of the Congolese army general, Bosco Ntaganda, for ‘enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities’ (ICC-01/04-02/06 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntanganda), among the 18 indictments against him for war crimes while leading fighters of Hema ethnicity to drive ethnic Lendus out of the north-east region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo – charges that rival those against the Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony, the subject of a controversial internet campaign in 2012 (Karlin and Matthew, 2012). Despite achievements over the last decade or so in the international movement to prohibit the use of child soldiers, many, many children and young people continue to suffer severe psychological trauma, needless deaths, lifelong disabilities, sexual violence and slavery. JO TURNER See also: Disarmament and Demobilisation; ‘Girl’ Soldiers; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Readings Grover, S. (2012) ‘Child soldiers as victims of “genocidal forcible transfer”: Darfur and Syria as case examples’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 17(3): 411–27. Karlin, B. and Matthew, R. (2012) ‘Kony 2012 and the mediatization of child soldiers’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 24: 255–61. Sinha, A. (2013) ‘Child soldiers as super-privileged combatants’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 17(4): 584–603.

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Williams, J. (2011) ‘The international campaign to prohibit child soldiers: a critical evaluation’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 15(7): 1072–90.

CITIZENSHIP

At its most basic, citizenship can be defined as the legally recognised membership of a political community. Citizenship is conferred in law through the community’s constitution and is practically administered through its governing body. It is usually attained through birth but can also be conferred through a process known as naturalisation, in which the status of citizen can be bestowed upon individuals.To be a citizen is to attain important legal, political and social rights and protections, and for this reason, it is often regarded as a preferred status. The citizen is said to enjoy equal rights alongside all other citizens to full participation in all aspects of the community, shaping laws and political representation and thereby holding rulers to account.As a consequence, citizenship differs from other types of political affiliation, such as the status of subject. In return for these rights, the citizen is obligated to demonstrate a degree of loyalty to the community and to behave responsibly within it, as in certain circumstances, citizenship can be revoked and the rights of citizenship denied. The concept of citizenship was first developed within the classical city-state of Athens and later Rome, but for centuries, citizenship was limited to particular groups, with women, the poor and slaves denied this status. Bourgeois revolutions in 17th- and 18th-century Europe helped to challenge narrow definitions of citizenship, and it is more commonly identified today with nationhood and the idea that all born within national boundaries will be automatically conferred the rights of citizenship. As the entire globe has divided itself into nations, citizenship has come to be seen as universal, but, in reality, many are still denied citizenship in their country of birth and remain stateless and without essential rights. Even with the full status of citizenship, certain groups continue to be denied all the rights of citizenship. Children, for example, are denied the right to vote, as are prisoners in many countries, and women and the landless have had to struggle in many countries to win suffrage. Within many nations, the rights of citizenship have been limited by sex, race, class and even faith, and have been utilised as a mechanism of exclusion as much as of inclusion. What we now consider as modern citizenship has been shaped by the struggles of the excluded to attain equal status as citizens (Turner, 1990). Marshall (1981) argued that in the 20th century, along with legal and political rights, the concept of citizenship expanded to include social rights, such as the right to education, health and welfare. Marshall (1981) considered this a more or less permanent element of citizenship within

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social democracies; however, in recent years, these rights have increasingly been the subject of much discussion and debate. A liberal understanding of citizenship would infer that rights of citizenship have developed to their fullest extent within advanced Western democracies. However, conferment of citizenship within liberal democracies has also required the subordination of minority groups and minority positions to dominant legal and political discourses. States can use their power to withhold citizenship as a means to limit and control the actions of those living under their jurisdiction, in effect, producing a passive and obedient populace. This is particularly true in times of war and crisis, when patriotic duties and a strong identification with the state are required. Furthermore, those who do not align themselves with the state project or who by their membership of marginalised and/or excluded groups raise questions as to the universal benefits of citizenship are more likely to be denigrated, devalued and subject to extensive state control as a consequence. National legislative bodies also control the definition of citizenship and governments have used concepts such as ‘the active citizen’ to withhold social and legal rights from those who are considered as avoiding their required responsibilities, limiting and containing citizenship rights to those who they regard as ‘deserving’. Some theorists of citizenship (see Turner, 1990) have argued that models of top-down, state-controlled citizenship could be replaced by more radical models developed through grass-roots action from below, which stress inclusivity and rights for all. These models, it is suggested, allow the building of citizenship rights in more complex, multi-faith and multi-ethnic societies that do not conform to the old models represented by the European liberal project, which has been dominated by Western values and interpretations of the individual, the state and the law. KAREN EVANS See also: Forced Migration; Human Rights; Immigration Readings Marshall, T.H. (1981) The right to welfare and other essays. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Turner, B.S. (1990) ‘Outline of a theory of citizenship’, Sociology, 24(2): 189–217.

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CIVIL DISORDER AND UNREST ‘Civil disorder’ or ‘unrest’ is commonly conceived of as behaviour that is defined as such by the state and its agencies of law enforcement. Legal definitions of civil disorder are incredibly vague and can encompass anything that is classed as a public disturbance, which can involve as few as three people.The use of the term ‘civil disorder’ conjures up images of a riotous ‘unruly mob’ that is threatening, violent and disruptive, and this characterisation is typically used by the state to condemn collective, usually street-based, activity that is perceived as threatening social order in some way. Of course, the state controls definitions of social order, too, and is the only body that has the power and the means through which it can be enforced. The concepts of disorder and unrest are thereby defined from above and utilised to control action from below. Disorder is typically proclaimed from above as senseless and without base, whereas for those involved, it can be motivated by purpose and anger or feelings of despair, and can be perceived as an attempt to wrest back some power within lives that otherwise have little autonomy. Martin Luther King famously described rioting as the language of the unheard and while this memorable phrase demonstrates a call to hear the silenced voice and to understand its pain, his words also betray an acceptance of the normative definitions of what disorder is and where it emanates from. Civil disorder and unrest, however, can also be instigated from above and by the powerful in society, although this is often missing from normative descriptions; the powerful have been known to foment civil unrest for their own purposes and right-wing ideologues to use street violence as a tool to unsettle and disrupt social solidarity in order to create division and disorder. Disorder can also be a cultural, carnivalesque affair, celebrating thrill-seeking, excitement and transgression (Presdee, 2002), or an example of community resistance to oppressive practices (Sivanandan, 1990). Whatever form it takes, civil disorder is not an invention of modern times; it has a long history stretching back as far as human activity has been systematically recorded. While denigrated and condemned at the time it occurs, hindsight can often reveal the necessary purposive function of disruptive action. Such action may challenge what are later commonly considered as injustices, reveal a state out of step with the needs and wishes of the populace over which it governs, or demonstrate a popular demand for changes in the rule of law or the ways in which a society is constituted. In order to understand disorder and civil unrest, it is important to disrupt the normative frameworks within which civil disorder is understood. As research has demonstrated, civil unrest can be relatively ordered, non-violent and entered into in an attempt to bring about positive social transformations (Seligman, 2011). However, civil unrest is often poorly understood by contemporary observers, even when they are sympathetic to its perpetrators. Any disturbance to the everyday 30

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‘peace’ of the streets lies outside of the ordinary run of life and is consequently often treated as a shocking event. Scholars and commentators alike look to the minutiae of the events, the psychology of the crowd, the spread and contagion of the action, and the motivations given by those engaged in disruptive acts, and the events are explored from these perspectives. The focus is on those engaged in the action rather than on the institutions and structures that have contributed to an unsafe and threatening environment within which unrest might thrive. Civil disorder is therefore usually considered as a breaking of the social contract from below rather than from above. As civil disorder is that which is seen by the state as threatening to its preferred social order, it is more than likely to be met with violent responses that can exacerbate tensions and prolong the initial disturbance. States will often use techniques previously honed in military exercises and warfare on public streets, justifying their actions by reference to criminality and disruptive social elements. There is evidence to suggest that these techniques can become normalised and utilised in everyday policing situations, contributing to further tensions on the streets and specifically in areas that are perceived by the state as already troublesome and unruly. KAREN EVANS See also: Collective Violence; Resistance; Social Control; State, The Readings Presdee, M. (2002) Cultural criminology and the carnival of crime. London: Routledge. Seligman, A.I. (2011) ‘“But burn – no”: the rest of the crowd in three civil disorders in 1960s’ Chicago’, Journal of Urban History, 37(2): 230–55. Sivanandan, A. (1990) Communities of resistance writings on black struggles for socialism. London and New York, NY: Verso Books.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Civil liberties are fundamental rights and freedoms that provide individuals with protections from abusive state power. In the UK, these liberties have developed over a long period following a number of developments, including the signing of Magna Carta in 1215, which guaranteed habeas corpus, confirming lawful imprisonment and the right to trial by jury, and the Bill of Rights in 1869, which provided freedom of speech and freedom from cruel and unusual punishments or excessive fines. Following the atrocities of the Second World War, these legal texts 31

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provided inspiration for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Created in 1950, the UK was the first country to ratify the Convention in 1951. Today, the most important legal text protecting civil liberties in the UK is the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The 1998 HRA incorporated the ECHR into domestic UK law, thereby allowing individuals to defend their rights in UK courts rather than the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. The HRA is a ‘higher law’ that all other laws and policies must confirm where ‘possible’. Crucially, it requires ministers to produce a compatibility statement when proposing new legislation (s 19), and places an obligation on courts to interpret the legislation’s compatibility with the human rights legislation (s 3). Paradoxically, the recent extension of human rights laws and norms in the UK coincided with the expansion of state powers. Following the events of September 2001, and the ‘war on terror’, five major pieces of counterterrorism legislation were enacted in just eight years (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2013). As the UK moved to a state of emergency, many exceptional measures became permanent, the definition of terrorism was broadened to include acts of non-violence, police stop-and-search measures were widened and made more discretionary, the period of pre-charge detention was extended, and terrorist suspects could be indefinitely imprisoned without trial. These measures were justified by a centre-right alliance consisting of ‘Blairites’ in the Labour Party and ‘Tory Hawks’ within the Conservative Party on the grounds that the liberties of the (suspect) minority should be sacrificed in order to maintain the freedoms of the (lawabiding) majority (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2011). This fundamental altering of the relationship between the state and citizen drew criticism from academics, campaigning organisations such as Liberty, Statewatch and Cage, as well as individual politicians like the libertarian Conservative MP David Davis, who resigned his parliamentary seat in 2008 in protest at the ‘big state’. Critics argued that the response was disproportionate and could lead to the undermining of security, not its enhancement. There was concern that the legislation had contributed to the Muslim community becoming a ‘suspect community’ such that the sacrificing of liberties was being borne disproportionately by them. At the same time, attention was drawn to the ‘normalisation’ of powers – the idea that the powers were being used for purposes unrelated to terrorism, with the effect of reducing everyone’s liberty. In what was described as a new tide of ‘judicial activism’, the Law Lords in December 2004 successfully used their powers under the 1998 HRA to argue that the indefinite detention of non-UK citizens without trial was incompatible with Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and Article 14 (prohibiting discrimination) – ending the UK’s own version of ‘Guantànamo Bay’. In the case of Gillan and 32

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Quinton v UK, the ECtHR ruled in January 2010 that the indiscriminate stopand-search powers under the Terrorism Act (ss 44/45) breached respect for private and family life (Article 8) – paving the way for more restricted police powers. Through these judicial, and other, developments, the worst excesses of the new security state characterising the UK have been slowly dismantled. Yet, at the time of writing, the use of the HRA in this way to protect individual freedoms has led to the recent Conservative government announcement that it will introduce a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to replace the HRA. The current proposals seek to reduce human rights laws to the most serious of cases, make others dependent on citizenship or good behaviour, and to circumscribe the ECtHR’s role to an advisory capacity in UK matters of human rights. Rather than seeing continuities between the two, the government appears to be setting up an artificial divide between, on the one hand, Britain’s long tradition of upholding civil liberties since Magna Carta and, on the other, the ‘imported’ and ‘distorted’ values of the ECtHR. CHRISTINA PANTAZIS See also: European Court of Human Rights; Habeas Corpus; State Power; Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2011) ‘Reconfiguring security and liberty: political discourses and public opinion in the new century’, British Journal of Criminology, 52(3): 651–67. Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2013) ‘Resisting the advance of the security state: the impact of frameworks of resistance on the UK’s securitisation agenda’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 41: 358–74.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Violence is one of the most studied and controversial topics in the social sciences and beyond academia because of the normative and political charge it carries.The expression ‘collective violence’ restricts the domain of application of the concept of ‘violence’, but it is also used to designate a great diversity of phenomena over the centuries and across the world. It generally designates physical damages on persons and/or properties perpetrated by at least two people, whose actions are coordinated.

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A theorisation of the concept through a comprehensive and systematic analysis of different forms of collective violence has been attempted by the sociologist Charles Tilly (2003). Drawing on a variety of case studies, he reaches a definition of collective violence as a collective behaviour stemming from the political interaction between groups that are in competition for power: it emerges from the ebb and flow of collective claim making and struggles for power. It interweaves incessantly with nonviolent politics, varies systematically with political regimes, and changes as a consequence of essentially the same causes that operate in nonviolent zones of collective political life. (Tilly, 2003, p 238) The author emphasises three main features of collective violence: the relational mechanisms; its association with politics and political claims; and its connection with non-violent actions, from which it grows out of. Whereas it appears outside the conventional forms of politics, it always involves state agencies as repressive or controlling powers. However, when governments or institutions directly take part as collective actors of violence, this changes the scale and the intensity of the conflict, which may escalate into a different kind, such as wars and civil wars. Tilly’s (2003) analysis has the advantage of underlining the interactive character of collective violence, as well as to point at the political system, processes, structures and opportunities that impact on its deployment, practices and means. Therefore, this approach rejects explanations of collective violence in terms of both behavioural patterns, stressing impulses and emotions, and simple allegiance to destructive ideologies. Violent forms of protest have long been considered as a pathological aberration or labelled as irrational, especially when they occur in Western democracies, perceived as having sufficient channels for expressing claims in a non-violent manner. Thus, interpretations of political violence have often been imbued with value judgements that constituted an obstacle to a comprehensive and adequate explanation of its emergence and dynamics. Empirical studies in political sociology have shed light on different aspects of collective violence. Violence is part of a power relation: oppressed groups may resort to violence to express their identity and solidarity in a system where they have no or little access to conventional channels of negotiation and representation. Violence can also constitute a means, used along with non-violent actions, to impose negotiations and/or to gain visibility in a context where the disruptive potential of the conventional protest repertoire is limited. Wieviorka (2009, p 16) considers violence as an expression of the ‘exhaustion of conflict’: when the conditions for a sustained and articulated conflict opposing contentious claimants fail, violence emerges. Seferiades and Johnston (2012) have pointed out that 34

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times of crisis, characterised by the ‘loss of political meaning’, may be considered as conditions favouring the appearance of collective violence, interpreted as a quest for political meaning. Other studies (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Della Porta and Fillieule, 2004) have highlighted the dynamics of collective violence and its escalation in the interaction with repressive powers, such as police and military forces. Despite claims of a decline in collective violence in Western democracies, recent events across Europe (riots in France and the UK, violent demonstrations in Greece, Italy, France, etc) attest to the fact that recourse to violent forms of protest continues to be an option in particular circumstances. Consequently, its analysis, interpretation and conceptualisation continue to be a challenge for both social and political scientists. FEDERICA ROSSI See also: Protest; Social Movements; Violence Readings Della Porta, D. and Fillieule, O. (2004) ‘Policing social protest’, in D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds) The Blackwell companion to social movements. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp 217–41. Della Porta, D. and Reiter, H. (1998) Policing protest: The control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Seferiades, S. and Johnston, H. (eds) (2012) Violent protest, contentious politics and the neoliberal state. Farnham: Ashgate. Tilly, C. (1978) From mobilisation to revolution. New York, NY: Random House. Tilly, C. (2003) The politics of collective violence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wieviorka, M. (2009) Violence: A new approach. London: Sage.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict is as old as the existence of diverse human societies. Although various definitions of social and political conflicts abound, several components are always present in a conflict situation: two or more actors are perceived to be pursuing conflicting goals, threatening violent behaviour or perceiving a threat, or violence is actually used.

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Resolution means to give the parties what they perceive as necessary (relating to the causes of conflict) without additional costs to people or country. It represents the start of a new relationship, agreed upon freely by all parties. It does not depend on outside interference or control. Emphasis must be on a long-term relationship. As Burton (1986, p 41) reflects: ‘[c]onflict resolution, intervention in relations between nations and states, cannot be based on trial and error, hit and miss or some ideology.… There has to be a high level of prediction and certainty associated with the intervention.’ Sources of conflict can include: the balance in a struggle for power; collapse of political systems (Cold War) or states (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR], Czechoslovak Socialist Republic [CSSR]); post-colonial tensions; ethnic unrest (ancient hatreds); economic and environmental disputes over access to rare or limited resources; and cross-border transgressions (threat to international peace, alarming migration patterns). Conflict analysis precedes resolution; for strategies to be developed and actions to be suggested, it is essential to understand the background, history and current events from different perspectives. Such analysis is based on a comprehensive collection and assessment of available data about the conflict that aids in identifying factors and trends underpinning the conflict. These should be synthesised for evaluation: ‘What possible means of resolution are indicated?’; ‘What stages of interjection into the conflict present themselves and by whom?’. Analysis is an ongoing process and requires the parties to adapt to changing dynamics and circumstances. Parties to conflict resolution can include state actors, intergovernmental actors, non-governmental actors, corporations and regional alliances. Forums include bilateral and multilateral meetings at the highest levels of government, formal and informal channels of diplomacy, and the international community at large. Resolution mechanisms include third-party intervention, the use of envoys, ongoing negotiations and confidence-building measures. Conflict resolution agreements tend to focus on the cessation of hostilities, a schedule of withdrawal of forces (military, peacekeeping) and a timeline for elections and other political and economic arrangements. The United Nations endorses different approaches to conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and facilitation/inquiry. However, these usually only result in settlements (a measure of gains and losses), not real resolution because: 1. The problem-solving approach offers only a simple settlement, not a resolution of a conflict. 2. The traditional approach is to try to arrive at a decision on the basis of consensus – what is ‘right’ for everybody. If this fails, parties often attempt 36

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coercive bargaining or threaten with more traditional power politics, which often ends in an imposed settlement (an agreement that led to new conflict was, for example, the Treaty of Versailles). 3. Judicial settlement (and arbitration) is not suitable for serious conflicts as the settlement – or arbitration – is again imposed upon the parties without their participation. For effective conflict resolution to occur, parties must move beyond the notion of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ and aim for ‘win–win’ outcomes. For this process to be successful, the resolution must focus on the underlying assumptions, values, beliefs and goals that initially caused insecurity and injustice between the parties. Therefore, it is often suggested that the invitation of an independent third party to the negotiations who is not familiar with the conflict and the political values and goals of the conflicting parties can assist in reaching a mutual resolution. However, it is the parties themselves that need to define and set the terms of their negotiations; the third party or parties must be able to maintain the same support for all parties involved throughout the talks, so it is important that they do not hold prejudices against either party. Only the parties to the conflict themselves – without outside interference – can resolve the conflict. Long-term solutions are based on a thorough mutual understanding of concerns, fears and demands. Any negotiated ‘win–win’ agreement must meet the security and ethno-cultural needs of all parties. ALEXANDER K. LAUTENSACH and SABINA W. LAUTENSACH See also: Insecurity; Peacekeeping and Capacity-Building; Reconciliation Readings Burton, J.W. (1986) ‘The procedures of conflict resolution’, in E. Azar and J.W. Burton (eds) International conflict resolution: Theory and practice. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p 41. Cloke, K. (2001) Mediating dangerously: The frontiers of conflict resolution. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991) Getting to yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in (2nd edn). London: Penguin Books. Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2005) Contemporary conflict resolution. London: Blackwell Professional.

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CONSTITUTIONALISM There are difficulties in defining constitutionalism and, indeed, no real consensus about what it is (Rosenfeld, 1994), for example, whether it requires a written constitution, as in the US, or non-written constitution, as in the UK. However, in its broadest terms, it is regarded as placing limitations and restraints on government, that is, controlling, limiting and restraining the power of the state.These limitations and restraints are enforced politically and judicially. Regardless of these difficulties, Vile (2012, p 408) defines constitutionalism ‘as a belief in the need to establish and support those values in the political system which provide for stability and to maintain the procedures which protect the liberty of the individual in a democratic society’. Thus, constitutionalism is associated with liberalism and the protection of individual rights against the state, as well as a commitment to the principle of the rule of law rather than rule by arbitrary power. Accordingly, the executive, legislature and judiciary are regulated by law. Doctrines associated with constitutionalism include: the separation of powers; and the power of judicial review. First, the theory of limited government and the separation of powers marked the introduction of liberal or modern constitutionalism. This theory stresses the need to limit the power of government to prevent arbitrary political power and allow civil society to flourish. This is attributed to human rights and civil liberties, which are fundamental to liberal constitutionalism. The doctrine of the separation of powers aims to put checks and balances in place to avoid the use of arbitrary power. The second doctrine of the power of the judiciary emphasises the independence of the judiciary and the important role that the courts play in protecting fundamental constitutional values, including human rights. Indeed, judicial review provides courts with the power to declare acts of the legislature to be unconstitutional. More recently, some scholars suggest that an unprecedented amount of power has been conferred upon the courts even though this institution is non-representative and therefore anti-democratic. Regardless, courts are thought to be insulated from external pressures, including political pressures, therefore being impartial. This impartiality provides an avenue for redress through the courts. However, this can be prohibitive to many people due to the high legal costs associated with pursuing legal recourse. Furthermore, judges may be drawn too deeply into politics, undermining the separation of institutional powers that relies on judicial neutrality. Barber (2015) highlights how much discussion on constitutionalism reflects what he calls negative constitutionalism. He argues that constitutionalism is too often only considered in relation to the legal enforcement of constitutional rules, that is, checks and balances in place to restrict the use of arbitrary power. Barber (2015, 38

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p 1) draws attention to the positive dimension of constitutionalism, that is, ‘the creation of an effective and competent set of state institutions’. With the creation of these state institutions comes positive change for the good of all people. Concepts of constitutionalism have recently been challenged with the introduction of counterterrorism legislation, principally the right to a fair trial. Democratic governments react to ‘emergency’ situations, which can result in national security overriding civil liberties, as evident in control orders in the UK under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (see Walker, 2007). Critics argue that rather than protect individuals from oppressive government practices, constitutionalism can actually mask such practices (Unger, 1986). Indeed, the law is a powerful tool that has been and continues to be utilised by powerful individuals/groups to secure and maintain their status. Constitutionalism has evolved, and continues to evolve, over time, for example, from ‘thin’ constitutionalism, with its focus on the allocation of power and legal enforcement, to ‘thick’ constitutionalism, with the irreversible delegation of powers to various institutions, including central banks and other financial institutions, as well as constitutional courts (see, eg, Gustavsson, 2010), and the ability to reflect the shared goals of a particular society. More recently, there is a move to international constitutionalism, which recognises commonalities between countries and constitutions. SHARON MORLEY See also: Civil Liberties; Democracy; State Power Readings Barber, N.W. (2015) ‘Constitutionalism: negative and positive’, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper: No. 7/2015:1-25. Available at: https://ora.ox.ac. uk:443/objects/uuid:3b2c7894-1ef9-42a3-99de-ddabe109b293 Gustavsson, S. (2010) ‘Thick and thin constitutionalism’, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 112(1): 37–40. Rosenfeld, M. (1994) ‘Introduction: modern constitutionalism as interplay between identity and diversity’, in M. Rosenfeld (ed) Constitutionalism, identity, difference, and legitimacy: Theoretical perspectives. Durham and London: Duke University Press, pp 3–38. Unger, R. (1986) The critical legal studies movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Vile, M.J.C. (2012) Constitutionalism and the separation of powers (2nd edn). Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

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Walker, C. (2007) ‘Keeping control of terrorists without losing control of constitutionalism’, Stanford Law Review, 59(1): 1395–464.

CORPORATIONS

The word ‘corporation’ is derived from the Latin word corpus, which means a body of people. In simple terms, a corporation is a fictitious legal person (also known as corporate personhood), distinct from the actual persons who created it, and is meant to be separate from the state, owned/controlled by its members or shareholders.The inception of corporations can be traced back to ancient Rome. Initially, corporations were largely non-profit entities that built institutions (like universities and hospitals) for the public good. However, from the 17th century onwards, money and profits became its major focus, and this wealth was used to finance British colonial expansion. The East India Company (EIC) was the world’s very first commercial transnational corporation, trading in spices, textiles and luxury items. At its peak, the EIC ruled over a fifth of the world’s population, generating revenue greater than the whole of Britain and commanding a private army a quarter of a million strong (Robins, 2002).The EIC got involved in politics and acted as an agent of British imperialism in India – and became infamously known for corruption, brutality and appalling administration. The EIC was eventually dissolved, and then began the British Raj, direct imperial and violent rule of India by the British state. Later, with the birth of neoliberalism in the 1970s and economic policies such as deregulation, privatisation, reductions in public spending and free trade, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan created a perfect environment for corporations to grow and flourish. This also resulted in dramatic growth in corporate criminality, causing deaths, fatal injuries and varying degrees of harm. Steven Box (1983, pp 20–2, cited in Tombs, 1995) defines corporate crime as: illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization, in accordance with the goals of that organization, which have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, consumers … the general public or other organizations. Some of the well-known cases of crimes committed by corporations in Britain are the Hatfield rail disaster, the Transco gas pipeline explosion and the Clapham rail disaster (to name a few), where companies were fined millions of pounds for the breach of health and safety regulations but not convicted for corporate manslaughter. 40

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A significant proportion of harms inflicted by corporations are difficult to prove, such as consumer fraud, environmental pollution and behaviours that risk the lives and health of workers and the general public. According to critical criminologists, the victims of corporate crimes are often silenced, rendered invisible or find it difficult to prove their victimisation, for instance, the lengthy struggle to prove that Hinkley groundwater contamination in California by Pacific Gas and Electric caused serious illnesses and diseases among its residents. This was captured in the film Erin Brokovich. A similarly case is the ongoing struggle for the victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy in India, where communities continue to suffer from serious long-term physical health issues due to a toxic chemical leak at a pesticide plant owned by the Union Carbide Corporation (a wholly owned subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company since 2001). In a large number of cases, harms committed by corporations are often not defined as crimes, therefore resulting in no ‘crime victims’. According to Whyte (2007, p 446), the visibility of victims of corporate crimes occurs only when the actual victims and their advocates make their ‘voices heard with such volume and persistence that politicians perceive that their positions of power are in jeopardy if they do not act to protect and serve victims of corporate crime’. Corporations have now taken over various roles and functions, including but not limited to: the criminal justice system; the immigration system; energy supply; transport; pharmaceuticals; food; and banking and the financial sector. As their reach has expanded, so have the crimes and their (invisible) victims. It is important to remember that, historically and to the current day, corporations and their greed for profits have caused deaths, injuries and immense suffering. Therefore, as Tombs and Whyte (2015) assert, corporations must be abolished. MONISH BHATIA See also: Corruption; Imperialism; Neoliberalism Readings Corporatewatch (no date) Homepage. Available at: https://corporatewatch.org/ Robins, N. (2002) ‘Loot: in search of the East India Company, the world’s first transnational corporation’, Environment and Urbanization, 14(1): 79–88. Available at: http://eau.sagepub.com/content/14/1/79.full.pdf Tombs, S. (1995) ‘Corporate crime and new organizational forms’, in F. Pearce and L. Snider (eds) Corporate crime: Contemporary debates. Totonto: University of Toronto Press, pp 132–46. Tombs, S. and Whyte, D. (2015) The corporate criminal: Why corporations must be abolished. London: Routledge. Walters, R. (2010) ‘Toxic atmospheres: air pollution, trade and the politics of regulation’, Critical Criminology, 18(4): 307–23. 41

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Whyte, D. (2007) ‘Victims of corporate crime’, in S. Walklate (ed) Handbook of victims and victimology. London: Routledge, pp 446–63.

CORPS

The term ‘corps’ (pronounced ‘core’) is used to describe a wide range of military formations and functions. The most common application of the term internationally defines the coming together of two or more military divisions of ground combat forces as a result of need in times of war; however, in the UK, a corps also refers to a professional branch or skill set, such as the Marine Corps or Signal Corps. In its broadest sense, the Corps is an organised military unit that is trained to perform specific duties. Classical approaches to studies of the military and its structure have taken the same shape as other studies of institutions (eg prisons and schools) to ascertain distinct features, such as the values, behaviours, norms and rules. The military organisation is distinct for many reasons, not least its occupational culture and the use of lethal force, which places the solider in a unique relationship with the state. In order to analyse military corps beyond their specific functions, one must first consider the military as an institution. The military is a social phenomenon that is understood across a range of intellectual traditions, disciplines and sub-disciplines, for instance, sociology, International Relations, politics, peace studies, war studies, law, psychology and, more recently, criminology all consider the military, while military sociology and critical military studies take the military as their subject. Higate and Cameron (2006) suggest that this vast literature approaches the military organisation in one of two ways: either they follow an ‘engineering’ model of analysis or they follow an ‘enlightenment’ model of analysis. The engineering model is attributed to traditional military sociology in North America and Europe and is concerned with the functioning of the military and the modes in which military objectives are met. These research projects are positivist by nature and acknowledge the effects of the military (and their specific corps formations) on individuals as variables to be identified, measured and mapped (Winslow, 2007). The enlightenment model, by contrast, seeks to bring individual subjectivities to the surface that are by and large hidden. This approach comes to know the values, behaviours, norms and rules of military corps as they are experienced by the regulated subject. This research is inevitably concerned with gendered 42

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norms, identities and systems, which are carefully constructed ‘as a consequence of their positioning in relation to gendered systems of power and privilege’ (Woodward and Jenkings, 2011, p 255). Armed forces are predominantly male and rely upon conditioned male roles shaped by social constructions of what it means to be a male heterosexual warrior (see Winslow, 2010). The function of any military corps is to effect military objectives, with the division of labour rationalised accordingly. Woodward and Winter (2007) critique these gendered norms as anything but natural. Instead, these gendered systems are specific and intentional, with the potential to use lethal force central at the core of military corps arrangements. As such, any analysis of military formations must understand that gender politics not only represent powerful representations of masculinity and femininity in operations, but also serve to reinforce militarism more broadly. When one starts from the premise that state power can be analysed at the microlevel as well as the macro-level, new understandings of how that power is enacted, executed and experienced are possible. To date, this sort of research has been able to unpack military masculinities, female integration, sexual behaviours and attitudes. Thus, the vulnerability of soldiers, as well as how they may exploit their power, are further realised through an interpretive scholarship. These new directions not only illustrate the merits of coming to know the armed forces in this way, but also understand the civil–military relationship in such a way that the very conditions that make militaries possible are understood (Ouellet, 2005). EMMA MURRAY See also: Militarism; State Power Readings Caforio, G. (ed) (2003) Handbook of the sociology of the military (handbooks of sociology and social research). New York, NY: Springer. Higate, P. and Cameron A. (2006) ‘Reflexivity and researching the military’, Armed Forces and Society, 32(2): 219–33. Ouellett, E. (2005) New directions in military sociology. Whitby: De Sitter Publications. Winslow, D. (2007) ‘Military organization and culture from three perspectives’, in G. Caforio (ed) Social sciences and the military. London: Routledge, pp 67–88. Winslow, D. (2010) ‘Military sociology and gender’. Available at: http://www. fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/om-fhs/Organisation/ILM/Sociologi%20 och%20ledarskap/Dokument/Gender%20and%20Military%20Sociolog Woodward, R. and Jenkings, N. (2011) ‘Military identities in the situated accounts of British military personnel’, Sociology, 45(2): 252–68. Woodward, R. and Winter, T. (2007) Sexing the soldier: The politics of gender and the contemporary British army. London: Routledge.

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CORRUPTION On one level, corruption is about corrupt agents working in capitalist structures. Hence, corruption is defined by Transparency International (2015) as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain which eventually hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority’. On another level, corruption is beyond agents and about corrupt structures themselves – whether political, corporate or social. Both levels require consideration, for the more corrupt the structure, the more easily the corrupt agent will prosper within it. Corruption is global. Despite global agreements such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, committing 41 nations to criminalise bribery, many signatories breach their publically held obligations, with half the nations never having brought a prosecution for bribery (Transparency International, 2015). The true extent of corruption may depend on how rigorously it is detected. Transparency International focuses on the public sector, yet even previously reputable Western private corporations have perpetrated acts of corruption, for example, the recent revelations that some car manufacturers defrauded environmental regulators in millions of vehicles. It is unclear whether companies such as Volkwagen are anomalous in their fraud, or if this is normalised in the industry (Kollewe, 2015). Historically and contemporarily, due to the hidden figure of corruption, the sizeable problem may be larger still, and it is premature to put a final figure on its extent (Rose-Ackerman, 2000). The overlap of personnel at the upper echelons of societies, whether democratic or authoritarian, produces a shared interest and a conflict of interest, for example, between a military, industry and a political class, as C. Wright Mills noted in 1958. This conflict of interest spans multiple sectors, including a media–industrial complex. As the phone-hacking scandal in the UK laid bare, tentacles of a private sphere corrupting the public were evidenced by the bribery of police officers, the illegal interception of communications and the intimidation of parliamentarians (Jones, 2014). Yet, in theory, a functioning judiciary and some separation of powers at least bring hidden deviance into public light. In other states, while there are similarities, insufficient checks and balances mean that corrupt tentacles grip tighter. Apart from the catastrophic consequences of internal conflict and the external impact of war, weak governance, flawed public institutions like the police and the judiciary, and a compromised corporate media tend to mark out those nations most vulnerable to corruption. Critics note a marked decline of transparency across virtually all continents, from Libya, through

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to Australia, Brazil, Spain and Turkey, with North Korea the least transparent of all (Transparency International, 2015; Zaloznaya, 2015). What features characterise states less susceptible to the charms and harms of corruption? A judicial system unbiased to the class distinctions of the participants, an ethical power elite, open budgetary accountability and a genuinely independent press are safeguards to corruption (Transparency International, 2015). The longer the exposure to democratic norms, the less tightly tentacles of corruption grip (Fan, 2009). Strategies to curtail corruption include, first, protecting motivated agents challenging corrupt structures, such as whistleblowers – from disaffected bankers revealing systemic tax avoidance with acquiescence of some government tax collectors, through to conscience-led crusaders like Edward Snowden revealing state-corporate abuse of private communications. A tiny minority of employees have hugely raised the critical consciousness of the abuse of power, whether by corporations or agencies of the state such as the US military. However, in practice, far from being rewarded for their public service, individuals revealing corruption or abuse often tend to be detained arbitrarily, like Julian Assange, or otherwise restricted, like Chelsea Manning, even in those societies most selfdefining as ‘free’ (Manning, 2015). Second, there are global campaigns such as unmaskthecorrupt.org, indicating that civil society groups unveil corruption. In persisting in this exposure, their resourcing is dwarfed by the transnational organisations and states that they aspire to track. Third, different types of media illuminate corruption. Traditionally, there is the conduit of investigative journalism, which felled corrupt presidents via the Washington Post and spot-lit deviant priests and corporate complicity via The Boston Globe. Less traditionally, social media empowers netizens (Hauben and Hauben, 1997), using smartphones to publicise personal or systemic corruption. An asymmetric strategy by civil society actors promises multiple points of visibility and, at times, accountability. This can generate a global discourse on corruption, set off even by those victimised by it. Just as corruption appears as entrenched as ever, the means to uncover and challenge it seem more accessible than ever to those underneath the power elite. MARK BENDALL See also: Bribery; Corporations; Crimes of the Powerful Readings Fan, C. (2009) ‘Political decentralization and corruption: evidence from around the world’, Journal of Public Economics, 93(1/2): 14–34. 45

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Hauben, M. and Hauben, R. (1997) Netizens: : On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet. 1st edn, New York, NY: Wiley. Jones, O. (2014) The establishment. London: Penguin. Kollewe, J. (2015) ‘Volkswagen emissions scandal’, The Guardian, 10 December. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/10/volkswagenemissions-scandal-timeline-events Manning, C. (2015) Homepage. Available at: https://www.chelseamanning.org/ (accessed 1 February 2016). Mills, C.W. (1958) ‘Structure of power in American society’, British Journal of Sociology, 9(1): 29–41. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2000) Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. New York, NY: Yale University Press. Transparency International (2015) Homepage. Available at: http://www. transparency.org.uk/ (accessed 1 September 2015). Zaloznaya, M. (2015) ‘Does authoritarianism breed corruption? Reconsidering the relationship between authoritarian governance and corrupt exchanges in bureaucracies’, Law & Social Inquiry, 40(2): 345–76.

COUNTERTERRORISM

‘Counterterrorism’ is a broad term used by policymakers and practitioners to describe the strategies and tactics utilised by states to reduce, prevent and respond to terrorist violence. Martin (2015, p 178) makes a noteworthy observation in stating that while counterterrorism refers to broader policies intended to reduce or prevent terrorism, ‘[a]s a corollary, anti-terrorism refers to target hardening, enhanced security, and other defensive measures seeking to deter or prevent terrorist attacks’. As such, anti-terrorism can be considered a subset of broader counterterrorism strategies. ‘Terrorist violence and the responses to it sit at a kind of half-way point on the spectrum of ordinary crime through to military violence bordering on war’ (Tembo, 2014, p 37). It is for this reason that those agencies charged with countering terrorism rarely have that as a singular purpose. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks upon the US, counterterrorism activity globally can be said to have been undertaken by three main policy instruments: intelligence, law enforcement and military force (Tembo, 2014). The manner and extent to which they have been used in different states varies. This variation is linked to the way in which state leaders conceptualise the threat posed. For example, the UK, although aligning itself ‘shoulder to shoulder’ politically and militarily (Hewitt, 2008, p 31) with the foreign policy actions undertaken by the incumbent George W. Bush administration in Washington DC post-9/11, 46

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recognised the potential for home-grown threats to emerge. As such, the UK government put a considerable amount of effort into enhancing the effectiveness of those agencies focused on law enforcement and domestic intelligence gathering. In contrast, the US adopted a stance that focused very much on the prevention of individuals from overseas undertaking acts domestically and so erred towards the use of military force. When it comes to the development and implementation of a counterterrorism strategy, states face a number of issues and dilemmas, which begin with the need to strike a balance ‘between the social acceptability – particularly with regard to individual rights – and effectiveness of that strategy’ (Tembo, 2014, p 37). Whereas totalitarian regimes, ‘unimpeded by any judicial or humanitarian constraints’ (Wilkinson, 1974, p 136), are able to swiftly contain any semblance of insurrection, democracies (broadly defined) are, by their political nature, at a tactical disadvantage, needing to adhere to rules and regulations, particularly those related to habeas corpus (Schmid, 1993). Schmid goes on to note that in the development of a counterterrorism strategy, states often pose the question ‘Do we want to sacrifice some democratic substance in order to be effective against terrorism or do we have to tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the sake of maintaining the civil liberties and political rights which we cherish?’ (Schmid, 1993, p 15). This dilemma of acceptability versus effectiveness is further heightened by an acknowledgement that states cannot provide total protection from terrorist violence. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 1984 attempted assassination of UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and other members of the incumbent Conservative government, the Irish Republican Army released a statement: ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once, you have to be lucky always’ (Brown et al, 1984, p 1). In many ways, this statement goes to the heart of what it means to counter the threat of terrorism and perhaps offers a partial rationale for some of the methods that have been used. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that contentious practices in the name of counterterrorism have occurred, for example, extraordinary rendition, enhanced interrogation (arguably a euphemism for torture), drone strikes, targeted assassinations, preemptive military actions and ever-more intrusive means of monitoring data in order to deter, hinder or counter the threat of terrorist violence. Counterterrorism, therefore, is the means by which a state responds to the threat or reality of terrorist-related violence. The manner in which it is undertaken varies from state to state and is dependent both on the political nature and on the manner in which that state conceptualises the threat posed. Counterterrorism policymakers will use varying degrees of law enforcement, intelligence and

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military force as a means of responding to the threat while being aware of the acceptability versus effectiveness dilemma noted earlier. EDGAR B. TEMBO See also: Guantánamo Bay; Habeas Corpus; National Security Readings Brown, P., Brown, C., Hetherington, P., Hearst, D. and Parry, G. (1984) ‘Cabinet survives IRA hotel blast’, The Guardian, 13 October, p 1. Hewitt, S. (2008) The British war on terrorism. London: Continuum. Martin, G. (2015) Understanding homeland security. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications Inc. Schmid, A. (1993) ‘Terrorism and democracy’, in A. Schmid and R. Crelinsten (eds) Western responses to terrorism. London: Frank Cass, pp 14–24. Tembo, E. (2014) US–UK counter-terrorism after 9/11 – A qualitative approach. London: Routledge. Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political terrorism. London: Macmillan.

COUP

A ‘coup’ is often conceptualised as a form of leadership change associated with politics, war and the military within and across nation states (Pathmanand, 2014). Coups involve a small group of conspirators that engage in plotting to seize state power and then doing so on their own or with the support of others (Ferguson, 1987). Coup attempts often fail, but if state power is taken and held, the event is defined as a coup d’état (Luttwak, 1968). The term coup d’état, defined as ‘blow against the state’, comes from Napoléon Bonaparte’s use of his troops on the 18th Brumaire (9 November 1799) to overthrow the Constitution of the First French Republic and ultimately to place himself in power as Emperor (Ferguson, 1987). Situated in a global context, the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa have seen the most coups, with 40 states experiencing 83 successful and 112 failed coups between 1956 and 2004 (Pathmanand, 2014). A coup can be successful when those people loyal to the legitimate government are removed and subsequently replaced (Ferguson, 1987). In its historical context, most coups have been military coups involving elements from the state’s own military/security services/police because their militarised power is needed to rebel any opposition (Ferguson, 1987). When coups overthrow 48

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elected governments, they are forceful, illegal means of political change. When coups are against dictatorships, they are sudden and unexpected means of political change (Huntington, 1968). Both failed and successful coups may involve many deaths as a result of fighting between the coup participants and armed forces, or they may be non-violent coups in which no one dies (Sutter, 1999), for example, the failed coup in Russia in 1991 when members of the military temporarily removed President Gorbachev from power (Pathmanand, 2014) or the failed coup against President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2002, which lasted only two days. Chavez had accused the US government (George W. Bush administration) of being secretly involved in attempting to remove him because of his opposition to the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan (Pathmanand, 2014). To prevent coups, and, in many cases, to consolidate their power base, leaders sabotage their own militaries and state-building projects to protect themselves from the risk of a coup (Migdal, 1988). When leaders stack armed forces with loyalists rather than relying on merit-based standards for promotion, and when they divide their armies into numerous, mutually suspicious rival forces that check and balance one another, they may sacrifice governmental effectiveness to minimise the chances of a successful coup (Pathmanand, 2014). In Iraq, for example, Saddam Hussein (before he was ironically overthrown by the George W. Bush Administration in 2003) executed generals who were successful in combat to prevent them from using their popularity to challenge the regime. At the same time, when nation states have political institutions that have less engagement with the population, such as political parties, legislatures, courts and bureaucracies, they may suffer frequent military interventions into politics (Sutter, 1999). Huntington (1968) called such nation states praetorian polities. Hence, the type of coups that they experience and the style of the consequential military rule depend upon the degree of political participation among the population: (1) when participation is low, only among elites, oligarchical coups and rule occur, as in Paraguay under Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89); (2) when participation is moderate, including both elites and the middle classes, radical coups and rule happen, as in Egypt under Gamal Nasser (1956–70); and (3) when participation is high, including all social classes, the results are mass coups and rule, as in Argentina under Juan Perón (1946–55). Huntington’s (1968) legacy to the study of coups illuminates a complex conceptual matrix – the relative strength of political institutions, and the level of political participation that are key to understanding why coups happen. JASON L. POWELL and PAUL TAYLOR See also: Military Conflict; State Power; War

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Readings Ferguson, G. (1987) Coup d’etat: A practical manual. New York, NY: Sterling. Huntington, S. (1968) Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Luttwak, E. (1968) Coup d’etat. London: Penguin. Migdal, J. (1988) Strong societies and weak states. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pathmanand, U. (2014) ‘Coup d’État’, in M.T. Gibbons, D. Coole, E. Ellis and K. Ferguson (eds) The encyclopedia of political thought. London: Wiley, pp 767–8. Sutter, D. (1999) ‘Legitimacy and military intervention in a democracy: civilian government as a public good’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 58: 129–43.

CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL

In 1976, Frank Pearce published Crimes of the powerful, an incisive Marxist analysis of the illegal, socially harmful acts committed by corporations and states. Pearce only discussed ‘crimes’ – acts proscribed by criminal statutes – specifically, crimes against competition (price-fixing, conspiracy to reduce trade) and crimes against workers/unions (collusion, racketeering, bribery, strike-breaking). Definitional debates have long raged over whether ‘crimes of the powerful’ should refer only to acts that a state has declared as criminal offences or to all corporate and state acts that cause injury and harm.The rationale for labelling legal acts as ‘crimes’ is that powerful elites shape the laws meant to govern them. State elites do this directly; corporate elites usually indirectly, as legitimised ‘stakeholders’ with the right to participate. Thus, it is not surprising that socially injurious acts committed by states and corporations – their thefts, negligence, socio-cultural and environmental destruction, torture, surveillance, and bribery – are typically criminalised (or, more commonly, regulated) only after ‘disasters’ (mining cave-ins, oil spillages, garment factory fires, tainted food) have destroyed lives, property and cultures. At this point, media, activist and opposition groups gain (short-lived) leverage. With global crimes, the International Courts of the United Nations may become involved. Since such ‘disasters’ have happened numerous times, most ‘developed’ states have many regulations, watchdogs and crimes and human rights codes to comply with. However, these are typically regulatory/administrative or civil laws, enforced not by the police, but by state regulatory officials with limited jurisdiction and sanctioning authority, and no power to incarcerate offenders. Crimes of the powerful cause thousands more injuries and deaths per year than the ‘street crimes’ that dominate mass media and policing priorities, and cause much greater financial damage (see Tombs and Whyte, 2015). With capital globalised 50

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via ‘free’ trade and technological ‘advances’, the harms inflicted are no longer restricted to one nation state. Trillions of dollars were lost, for example, in the sub-prime mortgage debacle of 2008, when world gross domestic product (GDP) declined 6% and USD25 trillion was obliterated overnight. Governments and the economies of several countries (Ireland, Iceland, Greece) collapsed, and lives and life chances were destroyed. To this day, none of the chief executive officers of the major US banks, the primary perpetrators, has served a day in jail – despite the fact that misrepresenting toxic securities as ‘triple A’ investments and falsifying mortgage costs are illegal. Moreover, consider the social harms inflicted by the perfectly legal art of offshoring, tax evasion by powerful corporations and elites. It is estimated that USD7.6 trillion of the world’s wealth, money that could fund public social safety nets (child and health care, guaranteed minimum incomes, pensions, etc) if paid into state coffers, is hidden in tax havens and other offshore assets (Zucman, 2013, cited in Barak, 2015). Dividing ‘crimes of the powerful’ into state or corporate crimes, while useful for investigative purposes, is misleading because the two are linked in numerous complex, mutually beneficial ways. ‘The capitalist state has a stake of one kind or another in virtually all crimes of the powerful’ (Barak, 2015, p 19); it makes corporate crimes possible by legalising corporate harms through free trade zones (eg where worker protections and safety and environmental standards are low or non-existent), by refusing to recognise or name corporate harms, by cutting the budgets of regulatory agencies, and by defining corporations as ‘stakeholders’ at the regulatory table where law passage and punishment are decided. It also commits crimes of its own, violations of international or domestic law such as torture, genocide, supporting terrorists, selling arms to blacklisted regimes and bribery. Corporations enable state harms as well, both directly by offering bribes and other inducements to state officials (overseas trips, tickets to sporting events or sex), and indirectly through collusion with corrupt regimes, lobbying to legalise human rights violations and/or suppressing unions and activists. Hundreds of measures to prevent and sanction ‘crimes of the powerful’ have been suggested, from voluntary corporate social responsibility codes to capital punishment through mandatory forfeiture of corporate charters, and global sanctions through national and/or international law. Crimes perpetrated by the powerful will only be meaningfully challenged, however, when the social, economic and political power of capital and the capitalist state are weakened – a task that worsening inequality and resource depletion may (or may not) accomplish. LAUREEN SNIDER See also: Corruption; Social Harm; State Power 51

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Readings Barak, G. (ed) (2015) The Routledge international handbook of the crimes of the powerful. New York, NY: Routledge. Pearce, F. (1976) Crimes of the powerful. London: Pluto Press. Tombs, S. and Whyte, D. (2003) ‘Unmasking the crimes of the powerful’, Critical Criminology, 11(3): 217–36. Tombs, S. and Whyte, D. (2015) The corporate criminal: Why corporations must be abolished. London: Routledge. Whyte, D. (ed) (2009) Crimes of the powerful: A reader. Buckingham: Open University Press.

CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND STATE POWER

Critical criminology emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s; its origins can be traced to the former radical criminology and Marxist criminology of the late 1960s. Critical criminology highlights the significance of capitalism and unequal class relations to the socio-economic and political ordering of society, law and order, and agents and mechanisms of social control, including the criminal justice system (Sim et al, 1987). Critical criminology was soon to encompass a recognition of unequal race/ethnic relations, gender/sexual relations and socially marginalised and excluded identifiable groups. There is no widely accepted definition of critical criminology – there coexists a diversity of critical criminologies (Carrington and Hogg, 2002; DeKeseredy, 2011). Influences on the origins of critical criminology include progressive social movements and critical theory. Hudson (2011, p 331) outlines the challenges posed by the ‘early phase’ of critical theory emanating from the Frankfurt School. They include: ‘incisive critiques’ of positivist methodology and positivistic concepts of value freedom and objective knowledge; a more critical approach to acts of ‘information interpretation’; and an emancipatory agenda (Hudson, 2011, p 331). These ideas influenced and are shared by critical criminologists. Another key characteristic of critical criminologists is their unashamed political stances and their struggle for civil liberties and human rights in the context of state power. An understanding and analysis of power was and remains crucial to critical criminologists’ rejection of criminology as taken for granted by the status quo. Criminology’s concern with and focus on the individual actor was refuted and replaced with an analysis of the state and state power (Sim et al, 1987; Barton et al, 2007). This enabled a critical-criminological focus on the state’s use and abuse of power. Subsequently, malfeasance on the part of state institutions as result of a betrayal or abuse of their power was and is subjected to scrutiny. These include: 52

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police corruption; deaths in police and prison custody; abuses within immigration detention centres and mental health institutions; and the violences of poverty, social exclusion, austerity and cuts to public services – to name a few. Critical criminologies concern themselves not with the aetiology of crime, but with processes of criminalisation, in the understanding that the powerful make, administer and enforce the law – and that their dominant subject of regulation and coercion are those with the least power (Barton et al, 2007). Yet, powerful betrayals, abuses, harms and crimes are committed largely with impunity. Critical criminologies have in common a rejection of punitive, authoritarian and populist ‘solutions’ to the state-defined ‘problem of crime’. All strands of critical criminology are unified by their concern with the ‘unequal distribution of power or of material resources’ (Friedrichs, 2009, cited in DeKeseredy, 2011, p 7). They advocate social justice as opposed to criminal justice and looking at the crimes and harms of powerful perpetrators through a zemiological framework (Hillyard, 2013). Grounded in the subjugated view from below, they emphasise the importance of acknowledging and analysing social harm and harms beyond that of a criminal justice and criminal law remit (Barton et al, 2007). Thus, critical criminologies want the criminological imagination to venture outside state-defined acts of crime to viewing the state as complicit in harmful crimes, acts and omissions. This means a shift in the emphasis from conventional crimes to the crimes and harms committed by powerful actors, including agents of the state and corporate actors. This includes an analysis of state-corporate, green and institutional crimes and harms. It prioritises state responsibility and state accountability in areas such as punishment and incarceration, asylum and immigration, ecocide, responses to terrorism and surveillance and regulation. The confident critical criminology of the 1970s and 1980s has diversified and there are ongoing debates concerning the merits of such diversification and the future direction of critical criminology. Critical criminology may comprise an array of voices, yet a major defining and distinguishing feature of it was, and continues to be, its recognition of power and power inequalities. In particular, it continues to unveil the uses and abuses of state power and the state’s role in the reproduction, organisation and management of a structurally unequal society and in the violation of human rights and civil liberties – all of which it is committed to change for the better. KAREN CORTEEN See also: Social Harm; State, The

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Readings Barton, A., Corteen, K., Scott, D. and Whyte, D. (2007) ‘Conclusion: expanding the criminological imagination’, in A. Barton, K. Corteen, D. Scott and D. Whyte (eds) Expanding the criminological imagination: Critical readings in criminology. Cullompton: Willan, pp 198–213. Carrington, K. and Hogg, R. (2002) ‘Critical criminologies: an introduction’, in K. Carrington and R. Hogg (eds) Critical criminology: Issues, debates, challenges. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp 1–12. DeKeseredy, W. (2011) Contemporary critical criminology. Abingdon: Routledge. Hillyard, P. (2013) ‘Zemiology revisited: fifteen years on’, in J. Gilmore, J.M. Moore and D. Scott (eds) Critique and dissent. Ottawa, Canada: Quill Books, pp 219–33. Hudson, B. (2011) ‘Critical reflection as research methodology’, in P. Davies, P. Francis and V. Jupp (eds) Doing criminological research (2nd edn). London: Sage, pp 328–44. Sim, J., Scraton, P. and Gordon, P. (1987) ‘Introduction: crime, the state and critical analysis’, in P. Scraton (ed) Law, order and the authoritarian state: Readings in critical criminology. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp 1–70.

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D DATA PROTECTION Globally, greater volumes of information about individuals is gathered, stored and communicated. Data protection is about treating this information about individuals with respect, it encompasses personal information that is, or is intended to be, processed automatically or manually. In the UK context, in order for data to be personal, it must relate to a living person who can be identified from the data or from the data and any other information in, or likely to come into, the possession of the data controller (Data Protection Act 1998 [DPA]). The European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive (94/56/EC) was introduced in 1995, with Article 1 stating that ‘In accordance with this directive, member states shall protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy and with respect to the processing of personal data’. This directive allows the transfer of data to ‘third countries’ outside the EU only if these third countries have ‘an adequate level of protection’ (Article 25), known as ‘Safe-Harbour’. This agreement created a voluntary self-certification programme for US companies/organisations. However, the Luxembourg Court annulled the Safe-Harbour agreement because ‘mass surveillance carried out by the US National Security Agency PRISM programme is not consistent with EU data protection rules and goes beyond the proportionality and necessity principles in the name of security’ (Carrera and Guild, 2015, p 2). Additionally, as identified by Schwartz and Solove (2014, p 902), ‘information that is “identifiable” in the European Union may not

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be subject to privacy law in the United States and people outside US cannot request rectification or erasure of personal data’. In the UK, the DPA regulates how and when information relating to individuals may be obtained, used and disclosed. The Act also allows individuals access to personal information relating to them, to challenge the misuse of it and to seek redress. The Act places a duty on any person or organisation that holds personal information to comply with the eight data protection principles. These require personal data to be: • fairly and lawfully obtained; • held only for specific and lawful purposes and not processed in any manner incompatible with these purposes; • adequate, relevant and not excessive for these purposes; • accurate and where necessary kept up to date, not kept for longer than necessary; • processed in accordance with the rights of the person to whom the data refer; • kept securely to ensure that data is not lost, disposed of or misused; • protected by appropriate technical and organisational measures against the unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against the accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data; and • not transferred out of the European Economic Area unless the destination has an adequate level of data protection. The DPA can impose financial penalties on companies/organisations of up to £500,000 for data breaches; however, at the time of writing, current levels are small, and are predominately issued against public sector companies (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2016). Also, Korff (2010) contends that the Act is excessively complex and therefore not user-friendly. Additionally, although many organisations, predominantly large and medium organisations, employ a data protection officer, who has oversight responsibility for data protection and controls in accordance with the DPA, there is no statutory obligation: organisations are not required to appoint them (Carey, 2004). New legislation intended to be implemented in the EU in 2017 aims to harmonise data protection requirements across the EU and will see large organisations being obliged to appoint a data protection officer. It also proposes that any individual or company who handles data will be held responsible for its security, including, for example, ‘cloud’ providers. Currently, for small organisations, responsibility for data protection is being assumed by staff without adequate training; therefore, they may find it difficult to interpret the Act (Carey, 2004). There are currently no plans under the proposed new (2017) directive to change this. Other legislation relevant to data protection include the Human Rights Act (Article 8) and the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

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The use of the internet creates additional problems for data protection, for example, ‘cookies’ used to develop website user profiles in order to target marketing material may not be considered a priority for regulators, who may take a ‘soft approach’ to regulation. Additionally, there is the increasing use of devices such as the ‘cloud’, which brings risks to the security of personal data, for example, does the user know where personal data is being stored? SHARON MORLEY See also: European Union, The; Human Rights; Proportionality Readings Carey, P. (2004) Data protection: A practical guide to UK and EU law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carrera, S. and Guild, E. (2015) ‘Safe-harbour or into the storm? EU–US data transfers after Schrems judgement’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 85/November. Information Commissioner’s Office (2016) ‘Data protection enforcement’. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/enforcement/ Korff, D. (2010) The United Kingdom, country study A6 of comparative study on different approaches to new privacy challenges, in particular in light of technological developments. Brussels: European Commission. Schwart, P.M. and Solove, D.J. (2014) ‘Reconciling personal information in the United States and European Union’, California Law Review, 102(4): 877–916.

DEATHS IN PSYCHIATRIC DETENTION

In 2007, it was found that 23% of individuals in England had at least one psychiatric disorder (McManus et al, 2009). Therefore, it was unsurprising that between 1 April 2013 and 1 March 2014, the Mental Health Act was used 53,176 times to detain patients for longer than 72 hours.This was 5% more than in 2012/13 and 30% more than in 2003/04 (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2014). Between 2000 and 2013, there were 4,573 deaths of detained patients in England and Wales and this accounted for 60% of all deaths in state custody during this time (Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, 2013). Particularly contentious areas surrounding the deaths of individuals in psychiatric detention are the inquest and investigation processes. In 2015, the charity INQUEST published a report that examined deaths in mental health detention and three key themes were highlighted: first, the number of deaths and problems related to 57

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reporting and monitoring; second, the lack of provisions in place to ensure postdeath accountability and future learning from these deaths; and, third, the lack of an independent investigation system compared to deaths in police and prison custody (INQUEST, 2015). Regarding this latter point, INQUEST highlighted that when an individual dies in police or prison custody, these deaths are subject to an independent investigation by either the Independent Police Complaints Commission or the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman. Therefore, when a coroner’s inquest occurs, information is drawn upon from the independent investigation. In contrast, when an individual dies in psychiatric detention, the hospital trust responsible for an individual’s care at the time of their death usually carries out an internal investigation regarding the circumstances surrounding the death. As a result, when a coroner’s inquest takes place regarding a death in psychiatric detention, it has to rely on information gathered from this internal investigation. INQUEST argued that because of this, the coroner may be unable to fully investigate systemic failings or provide guidance regarding the prevention of future deaths. Furthermore, INQUEST highlighted that hospital trusts investigating themselves does nothing to improve family or public confidence in the system. It was also noted within the report that bereaved families are often not involved in internal investigations conducted by hospital trusts and also experience difficulties in accessing information and documents related to the investigation. Similar concerns were also highlighted in a 2015 inquiry by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which examined the deaths of individuals in psychiatric detention in addition to deaths in police and prison custody of those with mental health problems. Of particular interest to the EHRC was compliance with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 2 is the right to life and compels the state to safeguard the lives of those in its custody. If, however, an individual dies in custody, the Article 2 obligation of the state extends to carrying out an investigation, which should be prompt, independent, involve the bereaved family and be open to public scrutiny. The inquiry found that repeated basic errors had been made, lessons were failing to be learnt and there was a lack of appropriate systems and procedures in place, which had contributed to the non-natural deaths of hundreds of people in these different forms of detention (EHRC, 2015). Finally, reiterating the views expressed by INQUEST, the inquiry found that the current system was opaque, with bereaved families not being including in their relatives’ care or an investigation following a death. CARLY SPEED See also: European Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights

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Readings EHRC (Equality and Human Rights Commission) (2015) ‘Preventing deaths in detention of adults with mental health conditions’. Available at: https:// www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/adult_deaths_in_detention_ inquiry_report.pdf Health and Social Care Information Centre (2014) Inpatients formally detained in hospitals under the Mental Health Act 1983, and patients subject to supervised community treatment: annual report, England, 2013/14. Leeds: Health and Social Care Information Centre. Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody (2013) ‘Statistical release 2013’. Available at: http://iapdeathsincustody.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2015/02/Statistical-analysis-of-recorded-deaths-2000-to-2013.pdf INQUEST (2015) Deaths in mental health detention: An investigation framework fit for purpose? London: INQUEST. McManus, S., Meltzer, H., Brugha, T., Bebbington, P. and Jenkins, R. (eds) (2009) Adult psychiatric morbidity in England, 2007 results of a household survey. Leeds: The Health and Social Care Information Centre.

DEMOCRACY

The term ‘democracy’ originates from the Greek combination of dêmos or ‘people’ and krátos or ‘power/rule’, and brings with it the idealised notion of ‘people power’, a form of government that was famously characterised by Abraham Lincoln as a ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. The vexed question of ‘Which people?’ has led to a vast literature exploring the gaps between democracy as an ideal and the real nature of functioning democracies. Democracy has been re-imagined by thinkers in a variety of traditions: liberal, Marxist, critical, radical or a mix. The historical origins of democracy refer to Athens in the 5th century BCE, though antecedents can be found further back in time. In his comprehensive history of democracy, John Keane (2009) traces the period from 2500 BCE to 900 CE as the age of assemblies, the next 10 centuries as the ascendency of representative democracy and the present as the beginning of an era of ‘monitory democracy’, a deeper and more continuous public scrutiny of power that extends beyond elections. Athenian democracy was ‘direct’, meaning that a proportion of the population (adult male citizens) could assemble, debate and vote on laws and policies. Such direct democracy, with expanded suffrage, now survives in places at local levels (eg some cantons of Switzerland) and is also witnessed when a referendum is used to determine people’s views on political matters. Representative (or ‘indirect’) democracy has been the major structuring principle 59

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of government over the last few centuries. The ‘representative’ body (such as the parliament) ‘represents’ by both ‘standing for’ and ‘acting for’ the people. While full suffrage is not achievable for some (for instance, prisoners) and others have only been enfranchised in recent centuries (for instance, women and the working classes), there is also the question of the ‘foreigner/non-citizen’ that continues to pose a philosophical and political challenge to normative democratic ideals at a global level. Feminist critiques of liberal democracy point to how the individual self that structures most democracies is a gendered construction that is tied into patriarchal definitions of how the ‘political’ realm is defined. It is also worth remembering that in large parts of the erstwhile colonised world, Western democracies ran empires and the arrival of democracy as a system of government in many countries of Asia and Africa cannot be understood without reference to nationalist struggles for decolonisation. In contemporary times, democracy has become a signifier with strategic meanings, being a status claimed by states to project themselves as genuine representatives of people’s will, to assert their legitimacy in the international arena or even to suggest that curbs on accepted democratic principles like the right to freely dissent are actually their euphemistic ‘special’ version of a democracy (North Korea is a ‘Democratic Republic’, China is a ‘Socialist Democracy’, Russia is a ‘Sovereign Democracy’). Moreover, in different ways, voter apathy, vested interests and populism can seriously challenge democratic systems, the former two by facilitating actually unrepresentative or elite-led governments and the latter by a majoritarianism (right- or left-wing) that may become cultural as well as political by turning against minority groups. As a result of 20th-century Cold War polarisation, the relationship between democracy as a political system and capitalism as a suitable accompanying system of economic relations has received much emphasis as a best means to ‘freedom’. It is in this context that we can see the myriad means of US ‘democracy promotion’ around the world, an ideological policy endeavour that has contributed to the literature on ‘democratisation’. On another front, the system of democratic governments functioning for the welfare of all people in accordance with the rule of law has been challenged by various revelations of several undemocratic official practices, ranging from the illegal use of torture to unwarranted surveillance. The ‘Occupy Movement’ has galvanised the ‘99%’ (a term for the politically enfranchised majority that senses a de facto powerlessness) and gained much momentum in recent years. Finally, the distinction between ‘procedural’ or ‘formal’ aspects of democracy (such as elections and institutions) and more ‘substantive’ democracy (genuine influence of people upon power) is vital to maintain because achieving a maximalist

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democracy is perhaps a collective journey under the absurdist idealist sign of ‘can’t be achieved, must be achieved’. NITASHA KAUL See also: Civil Liberties; State, The Readings Grugel, J. and Bishop, M.L. (2013) Democratization: A critical introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Isakhan, B. and Stockwell, S. (2011) The secret history of democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaul, N. (2010) ‘Democracy in the non-West: facts, fictions and frictions’, in Centre for Bhutan Studies (eds) Beyond the ballot box: Report from the deepening and sustaining democracy in Asia conference. Thimphu: Centre for Bhutan Studies, pp 115–33. Available at: http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/2633/ Keane, J. (2009) The life and death of democracy. London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. Sitrin, M. and Azzellini, D. (2014) They can’t represent us! Reinventing democracy from Greece to Occupy. London: Verso Books.

DEMOCRATIC POLICING

Democratic policing has been defined in numerous ways but a fundamental requirement is that it requires police forces to act as the servants of the people from whom they derive their legitimacy to operate. It is underpinned by a number of key principles. The first of these is legal accountability – the police operate within a legal framework and are answerable to the law for their actions (whether these constitute omissions or commissions). In many countries, legal accountability is reinforced by ethical requirements to ensure that actions undertaken by the police are morally defensible, as well as being legally sustainable. Ethical requirements are typically embraced in a code of ethics that forms an integral aspect of the professional standards that police officers are required to uphold. This is underpinned by internal disciplinary mechanisms that can sanction officers failing to meet the professional obligations laid upon them. Second, democratic policing requires the police to be accountable to democratic government structures (Boyd-Caine, 2007, p 3). They must be politically accountable for their actions to ensure that what they do (or do not do) is subject 61

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to the scrutiny of those that exercise authority and power on behalf of the general public. A particular objective is to ensure that community concerns shape the policing agenda. If this is not the case, popular confidence (which is an important underpinning of democratic policing) will be undermined. In England and Wales, the contemporary underpinning of democratic policing is provided for in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. This sought to align local concerns with police actions by creating the office of Police and Crime Commissioners, who are directly elected by the public in police force areas (outside of London) in England and Wales. Their ultimate power to sack their chief constable is to secure compliance with local concerns, which the commissioners embody on local police and crime plans. Similar arrangements occur in many localities in the US. As a key concern of political accountability is to ensure that public concerns influence police actions, it is often reinforced by mechanisms to provide for citizen engagement in policing. One of these is consultation. The ability of the public to engage in this process requires transparency, whereby the police provide information enabling the public to be meaningfully involved in such exercises. Democratic policing also requires police forces to be socially representative of the communities in which they operate in order to secure good relationships between themselves and the public (Council of Europe, 2001). The incorporation of all social groupings within the ‘police family’ provides some insulation against the harassment and discrimination that persons not represented in the police ranks might otherwise experience and helps to ensure that the criminal law is applied to all citizens. Democratic policing entails legal and political accountability being reinforced with a further requirement that emphasises the need to promote and facilitate the political values that are inherent in a liberal-democratic political system. One aspect of this relates to protest. The ability to protest differentiates totalitarian regimes from liberal democracies but it has been observed that ‘[t]he majority of jurisdictions, including Canada, Germany, Spain and the USA, have at one time or another adopted an approach of “strategic incapacitation” – creating obstacles to participation in demonstrations’ (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2009, p 30). Thus, democratic policing entails an acceptance by the police that protest is a key political entitlement in a liberal democracy and requires them to adopt an approach towards it that is founded on negotiated management, requiring them to enter into communication and cooperation with those who wish to protest.

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Finally, democratic policing extends to the internal operations of police forces. It has been observed that ‘internally democratic police organisations will operate in ways likely to foster or reinforce democratically desirable models of policing’ (Bradford and Quinton, 2014, p 1025) and, conversely, that organisational injustice tends to generate ‘cynical and authoritarian attitudes, which reduce officers’ commitment to democratic models of policing’ (Bradford and Quinton, 2014, p 1046). Although police forces are organised in a hierarchical fashion with a militarystyle command structure, democratic policing can be promoted within such an environment. Contemporary developments such as Problem-Oriented Policing involve junior officers in key decisions that relate to crime prevention. Additionally, democratic policing requires the existence of effective internal procedures to ensure that all members of staff are treated fairly and that complaints that relate to issues such as harassment and discrimination are effectively dealt with. PETER JOYCE See also: Civil Disorder and Unrest; Democracy; Police Violence; Private Security Readings Boyd-Caine, T. (2007) Stamping out rights: The impact of anti-terrorism laws on policing. New Delhi, India: Commonwealth Human Rights Institute. Bradford, B. and Quinton, P. (2014) ‘Self legitimacy, police culture and support for democratic policing in an English constabulary’, British Journal of Criminology, 54(6): 1023–46. Council of Europe (2001) The European code of police ethics. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2009) Adapting to protest: Nurturing the British model of policing. London: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. Manning, P. (2010) Democratic policing in a changing world. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION

Disarmament and demobilisation applies to combatants, whether under the control of a state or its enemies, whose fighting role is no longer needed or desirable. Historical examples abound: ancient Rome pacified areas as it expanded its control in return for Roman-imposed security, and shrewdly granted its own 63

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legionaries allocations of land when their terms of service ended to give them new livelihoods. Britain’s experience at the end of the Second World War, when some five million men and women were ‘demobbed’, is now viewed as a success story although, at the time, it was a politically charged and socially problematic process (Allport, 2009). In the post-war period, however, experiences of disarmament and demobilisation have been mixed. The end of the Cold War, particularly, has brought an increasingly complex, diverse and fragmented landscape of conflict, in which disarmament and demobilisation programmes have, in turn, burgeoned. They have focused mainly on armed non-state actors, that is, rebel groups or militias. Their rationale is both practical – to remove the means of (armed) violence – and symbolic – to help build wider stability, confidence and security. The programmes have various acronyms, particularly DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) or DDRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion/rehabilitation and reintegration), both indicating the social aspects built into them. Problems evident in the disarmament process include arms proliferation; a buoyant arms market, typically acting across international borders, makes it difficult to remove weapons from circulation altogether. Cheating can also undermine disarmament programmes, particularly if weapons are handed over in return for incentives like cash payments and/or job training. In the DDR programme at the end of the war in Sierra Leone at around the turn of the millennium, a significant proportion of the weapons handed in were found to be unusable, just a means by which combatants (or sometimes civilians posing as combatants) could benefit from the scheme (Berman, 2000). As in other settings, better-quality weapons may have been kept in hidden arms dumps. To be effective, therefore, disarmament programmes require accurate verification and monitoring, together with transparent disposal of the weapons themselves. Effective demobilisation of former combatants means giving them a viable, alternative livelihood. During wartime, they may have received some form of pay and/or other remuneration from robbery, extortion, smuggling or extractive activities such as artisanal mining. The post-conflict state and national economy are generally impoverished, however, providing fewer opportunities for the demobilised. International aid may play a role but initiatives to redeploy combatants into civilian livelihoods typically receive short-term attention before donors move on to crises elsewhere. Demobilisation is necessarily longer-term, though, as recognised in Mozambique, where over two decades after the end of its civil war, post-conflict issues around land tenure still constrain possibilities for former combatants to farm. Attempts to reintegrate former rebels into the state security apparatus or private security companies have seen mixed success; in some cases, they have become actors in renewed insecurity or conflict. The danger also exists that any livelihood programmes are seen to reward those who took 64

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up arms while civilian victims of violence are unsupported, creating grievances. Furthermore, such programmes may have dangerous ‘demonstration effects’ in other countries, leading to reproduction of conflict elsewhere. Still, in the right circumstances, combatants may voluntarily demobilise. Wars of longue durée but with diminishing momentum and deep-seated fatigue and poverty among fighters may see them return home on their own. The diversity of experience of disarmament and demobilisation means that lessons learned from one process cannot necessarily be transposed into different contexts but some common points emerge. First, such a process is not purely technical, but an exercise in politics: the necessary power and resources to implement such programmes must be matched by some willingness or incentive to cooperate among those standing down. Second, it can only work within and tailored to a definitive peace settlement; it is not a panacea in post-conflict circumstances and one size does not fit all. Finally, such a settlement should seek to reconstruct a different sort of society to that which gave rise to the conflict. Like all reconstruction measures, disarmament and demobilisation must be recognised as a consequence of political failure to prevent war from happening in the first place. MARTIN EVANS See also: Arms Trade; Conflict Resolution; Military Conflict; PostConflict Resolution Readings Allport, A. (2009) Demobbed: Coming home after the Second World War. London: Yale University Press. Berman, E.G. (2000) Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Occasional paper no. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Mehler, A. (2009) ‘Peace and power sharing in Africa: a not so obvious relationship’, African Affairs, 108(432): 453–73. Pantuliano, S. (ed) (2009) Uncharted territory: Land, conflict and humanitarian action. Rugby: Practical Action in association with Overseas Development Institute, London. Spear, J. (2006) ‘Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration in Africa’, in O. Furley and R. May (eds) Ending Africa’s wars: Progressing to peace. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp 63–80.

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DRONES Remotely controlled drone aircraft are commonly used as surveillance assets and weapons of war. Armed drone aircraft became integral components in the US counterterrorist arsenal after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the US homeland. The US deploys armed drones from the US mainland and foreign military bases operated by the Central Intelligence Agency and military personnel. Armed drones have also been deployed by the UK, but much more modestly in comparison to the US effort. During the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’, the use of armed drone aircraft became a readily available option in addition to other options for the targeted killings of terrorists. In the US policy context, targeted killings have historically been a politically controversial option, especially in the post-Vietnam War political environment. The debate resulted in Executive Order 12333, released by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981, which expressly forbade the assassination of adversaries. This prohibition was reversed after the 9/11 attacks, when the US implemented an assassination policy as a counterterrorist option (Risen and Johnston, 2002); armed drones became an integral component of this policy from its inception. One of the first acknowledged drone strikes occurred in November 2002, when an Al-Qaeda leader was assassinated in a remote area of Yemen by a rocket fired from a Predator drone. US citizens who join terrorist organisations are also targeted for assassination as a matter of policy, for example, US-born cleric Anwar al Awlaki was killed by a drone strike in October 2011 (Risen and Johnston, 2002). A second American travelling with al Awlaki was also killed in the attack. The number of drone attacks increased markedly from 2008. During this period, the use of armed drone aircraft was expanded to at least six countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US launched hundreds of drone strikes, resulting in thousands of casualties. In Somalia, the US targeted the leadership of the al Shabaab Islamist militia using armed drone aircraft. Armed drones were also used extensively in Yemen against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The frequency and lethality of drone strikes has been considerable. For example, in Pakistan from 2004 to mid-2011, approximately 2,000 militants were reportedly killed during US drone attacks (Roggio and Mayer, no date). The numbers of known drone attacks in Pakistan were reported annually, as follows (Roggio, no date):

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• • • • • • • • • • •

2004: one attack; unknown operative casualties. 2005: one attack; unknown operative casualties. 2006: three attacks; 122 operatives killed. 2007: five attacks; 73 operatives killed. 2008: 35 attacks; 286 operatives killed. 2009: 53 attacks; 463 operatives killed. 2010: 117 attacks; 801 operatives killed. 2011: 64 attacks; 405 operatives killed. 2012: 46 attacks; 300 operatives killed. 2013: 28 attacks; 123 operatives killed. 2014: 24 attacks; 152 operatives killed.

Internationally, approximately 2,400 people were killed by armed drones from 2009 to 2014 (Serle, 2014). At least 273 civilians are also reported to have been killed by drones during this period (Serle, 2014). In reply to vigorous denunciations of the civilian death toll, the US has argued that such casualties resulted from the embedding of militants near civilian homes and neighbourhoods. Regardless, drone-initiated assassinations of extremists have resulted in the elimination of significant numbers of command-level leaders of extremist movements. The UK has never deployed armed drone aircraft to the same degree as the US. The UK rarely confirms drone attacks carried out by its assets. The UK’s first acknowledged drone attack occurred in November 2014 against an Islamic State target in the Iraqi city of Baiji. The Ministry of Defence confirmed that a Reaper drone, controlled by the Royal Air Force, struck Islamic State extremists who were activating improvised explosive devices. Prime Minister David Cameron confirmed that a drone strike in Syria was carried out in August 2015 to kill Islamic State extremists. He stated that three extremists were killed, including two Britons who had joined Islamic State. Thus, in a similar manner as the US, the UK confirmed that armed drone aircraft are used to kill Britons who join extremist movements. Collaboration between the US and UK on the use of armed drone aircraft was demonstrated in November 2015, when both nations declared with reasonable certitude that a Briton had been killed in Syria by US drone aircraft. The intended target was Mohammad Emwarzi, colloquially known as ‘Jihadi John’, who had become a prominent member of Islamic State. He had been seen in several Islamic State broadcasts taunting the West and serving as an executioner of Western hostages. The fluid nature of the global terrorist environment requires nimble adaptation by counterterrorist planners. The rise of ideological ‘brands’ such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in many regions means that the deployment of large military assets is often not a viable option. However, the use of armed drone technologies 67

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allows nations such as the US and the UK to surgically strike terrorist operatives globally with minimal on-site presence by military and intelligence assets. GUS MARTIN See also: Counterterrorism; Insecurity; Surveillance Readings Risen, J. and Johnston, D. (2002) ‘Bush has widened authority of C.I.A. to kill terrorists’, New York Times, 15 December. Available at: http://www.nytimes. com/2002/12/15/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-al-qaeda-bush-haswidened-authority-cia-kill.html?pagewanted=all Roggio, B. (no date) ‘Charting the data for U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2015’, The Long War Journal. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistanstrikes Roggio, B. and Mayer, A. (no date) ‘Charting the data for U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2011’, The Long War Journal. Available at: http://www. longwarjournal.org/?s=charting+the+data+for+Us+airstrikes+in+pakistan Serle, J. (2014) ‘More than 2400 dead as Obama’s drone campaign marks five years’, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 23 January. Available at: https:// www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/01/23/more-than-2400-dead-asobamas-drone-campaign-marks-five-years/

DRUG CONTROL

All societies have some form of drug control; differences are often only a matter of emphasis. There is a general measure of agreement that certain drugs such as cocaine and opiates should be controlled, but how, and in what form, is often open to dispute. What is meant by ‘drugs’, whether in Britain or elsewhere, has largely been defined by international treaties, aided, of course, by local conditions. In Britain, control has been through a series of dangerous drugs Acts dating back to 1920, and latterly by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Yet, not all drugs included are dangerous, and some that are dangerous are not included. The inclusion and exclusion of certain drugs can only be explained historically, some as a result of those international treaties, others by the social conditions of the time. At the time of writing, so-called ‘legal highs’ are added to the prohibited list, although the justification for doing so again raises the difficult question of the justification for imposing controls. In general terms, however, the 1971 Act includes those 68

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drugs that provide a measure of dangerousness but also give pleasure, unlike those under other medicines and poisons legislation, which may simply be dangerous. The control of drugs through legislation, defined as prohibition, is but one part of an elaborate system of control. In Britain, drug control, as defined by the government (Department of Health, 2010), involves three major aims. First, to reduce demand; this means creating an environment where those who have never taken drugs are able to resist any pressure to do so, and making it easier for those who are drug takers to stop. Second, to restrict supply; this means attacking the supply system through interdiction and prosecuting and confiscating the profits of the traffickers. Finally, to build recovery; this includes both drug user and community with plans for additional treatment programmes, some optional, others less so. Other countries, of course, have different priorities, but most would place treatment at the forefront, even if they attached it to some form of criminal justice sanction. A great deal of the current debate on drug policy centres around prohibition, or rather around demands to replace it with a different system of control. The debate is often wide-ranging with no clear agreement on the way forward, except opponents of prohibition saying that it is not working and needs to be replaced. Prohibition, some argue, creates high levels of criminality (as a result of making possession and supply illegal), especially through organised crime. Moreover, the contention exists that it produces a group of offenders who would not otherwise break the law. The solutions offered are varied, with some involving massive social and legal changes if accepted. There are the legalisers, that is, those wanting to remove all restrictions on currently proscribed substances. Others suggest a harm reduction approach, which means accepting that the drug problem is here to stay and that the aim should be to reduce the harms to users and society. Others argue for medicalisation, that is, to prescribe all banned substances. Others wish to decriminalise, which means reducing the penalties, whether for possession or supply (Bean, 2010). However, the UK government has set itself against change, making it clear the present system works: ‘The fact that drugs are illegal deters people from misuse.… The law also provides opportunities through the criminal justice system to identify and engage drug using offenders in treatment’ (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 2002). In practice, most governments adopt a mixture of policies, albeit usually with one dominant. In Britain, emphasis is on prohibition, yet harm reduction features regularly in government thinking (where drug users are supplied with sterile needles to avoid other harms such as hepatitis), as well as medicalisation (where it is possible for heroin users to receive maintenance supplies from registered physicians) and decriminalisation (where penalties for the possession of selected drugs have been reduced/abolished).

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The debate about the future direction of drug control is likely to continue. The likely direction is for selected drugs, such as heroin, crack/cocaine and Ice (methamphetamine), to remain strictly controlled, with others regarded as less dangerous being less so. PHILIP BEAN See also: Drug Trafficking; Organised Crime Readings Bean, P.T. (2010) Legalising drugs: Debates and dilemmas. Bristol: Policy Press. Department of Health (2010) Drug Strategy 2010: Reducing demand, restricting supply, building recovery. Home Office. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98026/drug-strategy-2010.pdf House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (2002) ‘The government’s drug policy. Is it working?’, Third Report of Session 2001–02, Vol 1 HC 318-1, paras 265–76.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking involves the distribution of illicit drugs, usually by large-scale operations that can, and often do, cross national boundaries. Trafficking can also include the involvement of other syndicates that distribute drugs at a local level. Trafficking and traffickers differ according to the drugs being smuggled, the source of production and obstacles to local distribution. Methods change, with new routes and outlets constantly being developed. In the main, cocaine comes from the Andean region in South America and heroin from Afghanistan, whereas manufactured drugs such as ecstasy, LSD or Ice (methamphetamine) are produced worldwide. Cannabis is also produced worldwide, where much of the demand is covered by local production. This involves less international trafficking than for cocaine or heroin and so reduces the risk of seizures. With manufactured drugs, local pockets of production move as factories are closed down (Bean, 2014). The main trafficking routes for cocaine are from Colombia and Mexico towards North America, Western and Central Europe, and other parts of South America (UNODC, 2013). Recent data show that traffickers have developed new markets in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, etc), South East Asia (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand) and Oceania (Fiji, New Zealand and Australasia). Some of these markets are small but have growth potential that favours an increase 70

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in use (UNODC, 2013). For the opiates, nearly all illegal production comes from Afghanistan, which currently accounts for 75% of all illegal supplies. The remainder comes from the so-called ‘golden triangle’ (Burma, Laos and Thailand), with some from Iran, Turkey and the Andean region. Trafficking in heroin usually follows the traditional Balkan route (Afghanistan to Turkey and then into Western Europe), although other routes are opening up. There are, for example, new distribution networks being developed in West Africa, leading the UNODC (2013) to report that the opiate market continues to be extremely adaptable and flexible. Selling is invariably culture-specific; international traffickers tend to sell to their own ethnic group, believing these to be the only ones to be trusted. Transportation methods vary, including container shipments, jet aircraft, the use of tourists (especially as a way of testing out new routes), and postal packets. The internet is increasingly used to sell manufactured drugs, nationally and internationally, so closing down or monitoring internet sites has become a new priority for governments. At the national level, trafficking operates at three levels: upper, middle and lower or street level. All are fluid and made up of diverse trafficking enterprises that change their modus operandi over time. All are organised; they need to make a profit, collect debts, sell the drugs and keep as far away from enforcement agencies as possible. There is no single overarching structure. At the upper level in Britain, about 400 organisations are responsible for bringing drugs into the country. They usually have between 15 and 20 staff (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007). They tend to remain small-scale enterprises because of the impact of law enforcement and the need to avoid detection. Whereas these upper-level traffickers import the drugs, middle-level traffickers distribute them to the street level. The size of the business is related to the competition; those in larger cities have competition, and those in smaller cities are monopolies. At the street level, traffickers, or low-level dealers, operate in markets that are either open or closed. Open markets provide their clients with the basic criteria, often supported by a core of dependent users, including prostitutes, who help to distribute the drugs. Sex markets support the development and buoyancy of drug markets. Closed markets operate on the basis of established networks, where drugs are sold only to known or recommended customers. Significant barriers have to be breached before a newcomer may purchase drugs. At these lower levels, trafficking will be mainly in lower-class neighbourhoods, with the bulk of the resident population living in poor conditions. This is more so for heroin than for cocaine and cannabis, which have a wider customer base and are sold in a variety of social settings.

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Trafficking, at whatever level, poses particular problems for law enforcement. At the international level, it requires considerable international cooperation, and at all levels requires flexibility to meet the ever-changing tactics used by the traffickers. PHILIP BEAN See also: Corruption; Drug Control; Organised Crime Readings Bean, P.T. (2014) Drugs and crime (4th edn). London: Routledge. Matrix Knowledge Group (2007) The illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom: Home Office online report 20/07. London: Home Office. Available at: http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/ rds/pdfs07/rdsolr2007.pdf UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) (2013) World drug report 2013. Vienna: UNODC.

DUTY OF CARE

The duty of care is a particularly important principle within the criminal justice system, being concerned with protecting the human rights of persons being held in captivity.The duty of care falls most often on prison staff, police, employees of closed mental health facilities and private security personnel contracted to manage prisons or immigration detention centres.As individuals who have been deprived of their liberty are often not in a position to meet their own fundamental needs, this responsibility applies instead to those who are charged by the state with holding them in custody. Prisoners and detainees are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses, including victimisation by other inmates, due to the relatively closed environments in which they are being held. A socio-political climate that encourages excessive punitivism towards those who have been convicted of crimes, or harsh treatment of unconvicted persons suspected of committing criminal offences, transgressing immigration laws or being dangerously mentally ill, can also increase the likelihood of human rights violations. Overcrowding due to a lack of resources or arising from legislation that deliberately increases the use of imprisonment and reduces access to bail in the name of community safety can also create conditions in which the expected standards are more likely to be breached. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated through General Comment 21, issued in 1992, that prisoners enjoy the same rights as everyone else, subject to ‘restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment’. This 72

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places on custodial officers and managers a duty of care to ensure, inter alia: the maintenance of prisoners’ physical and mental health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]); access to education (Article 13 of the ICESCR); enjoyment of culture (Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and Article 15 of the ICESCR) and family life (Article 23 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ICESCR); and the rights to work (Article 6 of the ICESCR) and leisure (Article 7 of the ICESCR). Article 10 of the ICCPR stipulates that ‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’ and should be provided with opportunities for rehabilitation. The prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 7 of the ICCPR) and the right to life (Article 6 of the ICCPR) are especially relevant in prisons and detention centres, where the closed environment can render inmates vulnerable to mistreatment by prison staff or predation by other prisoners. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955 clarify the extent to which these rights are expected to be protected within custodial settings. This standard-setting document also acknowledges the needs of newly released prisoners in relation to employment and housing, thereby extending the concept of the duty of care beyond the custodial setting to include a period of aftercare. It is also important to recognise the duty of care that applies to short periods of custody in police cells or when police officers are attempting to take criminal suspects into custody. The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 1979 requires that medical care is provided to persons in custody when needed (Article 6) and that force is used only ‘when strictly necessary’ (Article 3). The vulnerabilities of certain groups, including women, children, indigenous people or cultural minority groups, elderly prisoners, individuals with physical or intellectual disabilities, and refugees who have experienced trauma both before and after incarceration, raise particular issues in relation to the duty of care. While individual breaches in the duty of care may be addressed, at least in theory, through litigation or individual complaints mechanisms, systemic failures to meet the fundamental needs of particular groups of prisoners and detainees sometimes become the subject of special inquiries. In contemporary societies, coercive powers are vested in a wide range of public and private officials. The duty of care, as both a legal and moral principle, articulates the responsibility associated with those powers to ensure the well-being of individuals being held in, or taken into, custody. LEANNE WEBER 73

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See also: Human Rights; Prisoners’ Rights; Prisoners’ Rights PostCustody; Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Easton, S. (2011) Prisoners’ rights: Principles and practice. London: Routledge. Rodley, N. and Pollard, M. (2009) The treatment of prisoners under international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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E ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION In recent decades, ‘environmental protection’ has become a topic of marked academic and political debate, particularly concerning the vested interest of the state and the role of powerful corporate entities in influencing the passing and enforcement of relevant legal provisions and regulations.Although the widespread legal and political attention now being focused on environmental harms is a relatively new phenomenon, it is not without historical antecedents. McMurry and Ramsey (1986) describe how in 14th-century England, the Crown prescribed capital punishment for Englishmen who defied a royal proclamation on smoke abatement. In recent years, authors from sociological and criminological backgrounds have joined the legal debate on environmental protection by marshalling radical arguments to the effect that social harms often derive from powerful social elites. Stretesky et al (2014) have recently stimulated this discussion by adapting Schnaiberg’s (1980) ‘treadmill of production’ to the question of ecological destruction. Their resulting ‘treadmill of crime’ model grounds ‘green crimes’ in the contemporary capitalistic imperative to increase production and the unimpeded pursuit of such production. Green crimes are defined by Stretesky et al (2014) widely as incorporating harms that are not officially criminalised. Commentators (see Shapiro, 2012) have highlighted many examples of how environmental protection has often come second place to combined state and corporate power interests. One example comes from the Nigerian Delta, where, 75

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since 1950, oil exploitations by Royal Dutch Shell have had dramatic effects on the local environment, its human and animal populations, and, in particular, the indigenous Ogoni people. The Nigerian state’s complicity with such harms was brought to international attention when prominent Ogoni environmental activist and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa was executed following his conviction for inciting the murder of four Ogoni chiefs. The charges were widely viewed as false and the trial dismissed as fixed by the authorities. One of the most frequently repeated examples of state-corporate crime with a specific environmentally destructive component is that of the alleged collusion between the US government and the Dow Chemical Company. Particular attention has been paid to Dow’s production and the US deployment of so-called ‘Agent Orange’ and ‘Napalm B’ in the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1971. Katz (2010) argues that since the Second World War, Dow Chemical Corporation and the US government have developed and maintained a long-term, mutually rewarding, symbiotic relationship in order to accumulate political and economic hegemony. This is accomplished under the guise of national security and international developmental assistance, resulting in transnational corporations not being held accountable for numerous environmental protection crimes and harms. In legal terms, efforts towards environmental protection often take the form of regulatory (sometimes self-regulatory) mechanisms rather than the criminalisation of environmentally destructive activities, principally because proving cases of environmental harm to the criminal standard brings numerous difficulties, especially when establishing causation. Regulatory systems are also considered more cost-effective and speedy. Nevertheless, charges of regulatory capture and related concepts lie at the heart of many of the criticisms of environmental regulation regimes. Capture is said to occur when regulated entities have substantial influence over policymaking. In other words, it is an accusation that a regulatory agency has failed to serve the public interest or the interests of the environment. Shapiro (2012) has thus argued that the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, was facilitated to a significant extent by the regulatory capture of the US Mineral Mining Service (now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management). In Japan, regulatory capture has been blamed for the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. In the US, Simon (2000) argues that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has long since shown signs of capture by the waste industry, and that given its past (criminal) activities, it was inevitable that the waste industry would corrupt the EPA, and that is exactly what has happened. Of course, much has been written more generally about regulatory capture, with some economists predicting that it is inevitable in most regulatory situations. This is because those with the highest stakes in promoting regulatory arrangements that benefit themselves have a definite political voice (eg major polluting corporations), whereas those who 76

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benefit from stricter regulations (the majority of the public) are more diverse and thus not able to mount the same political pressures to protect the environment. Needless to say, what could be added from the eco-centric perspective is that ‘nature’ and non-human animals are unable to mount pressure at all in most cases. Furthermore, because the regulation of any complex industry requires specialist knowledge and expertise in that industry, in practice, the regulators and regulated become the same people over time. MATTHEW HALL See also: Corruption; Green Criminology; Social Justice Readings Katz, R. (2010) ‘The corporate crimes of Dow Chemical and the failure to regulate environmental pollution’, Critical Criminology, 18: 295–306. McMurray, R. and Ramsey, S. (1986) ‘Environmental crime: the use of criminal sanctions in enforcing environmental laws’, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 19: 1133–69. Schnaiberg, A. (1986) The environment: From surplus to scarcity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shapiro, S. (2012) ‘The complexity of regulatory capture: diagnosis, causality and remediation’, Roger Williams University Law Review, 102(1): 101–72. Simon, D. (2000) ‘Corporate environmental crimes and social inequality: new directions for environmental justice research’, American Behavioral Scientist, 43(4): 633–45. Stretesky, P., Long, M. and Lynch, M. (2014) The treadmill of crime: Political economy and green criminology. Abingdon: Routledge.

ETHICAL POLICING

Ethical policing aims to ensure that actions taken by police forces and by individual police officers are both legally correct and morally defensible.These actions may relate to professional behaviour or the conduct of officers’ private lives.The desire to deliver policing that accords to ethical standards of conduct has been advanced at international and national levels. At the international level, ethical policing has been associated with attempts to influence the overall philosophy of policing and is especially directed at states whose policing practices were founded on the Roman Law model of policing

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and its philosophy of policing by coercion in order to maintain the power of the government (Bowden, 1978, p 215). Underpinning these initiatives was the belief that ethical policing should be based upon the principle of policing by consent, which was implicitly viewed as the most ethically appropriate philosophy for the policing of liberal-democratic societies. This belief underpinned the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979, which emphasised the need for law enforcement to serve and protect the community, to protect human rights, to use force only when necessary, and to avoid the use of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. A later development seeking to advance ethical policing internationally was The European Code of Police Ethics (Council of Europe, 2001), adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 19 September 2001. The code provided ‘a set of principles and guidelines for the overall objectives, performance and control of the police in democratic societies governed by the rule of law’ (Council of Europe, 2001, p 18). It asserted that ‘respect for the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] … is possibly the most significant symbol of a police service in a society governed by the rule of law’ (Council of Europe, 2001, p 30). It was argued that ‘the public consent to, and, indeed, welcome the exercise of legitimate authority by the police so long as the police are seen to carry out their tasks towards worthwhile, democratic ends in an ethically acceptable manner’ (Council of Europe, 2001, p 16). Developments associated with ethical policing have also taken place at the national level. In England and Wales, this took the form of the Code of Ethics (College of Policing, 2014), which provided a set of ethical principles to reinforce the existing Standards of Professional Behaviour and to ensure that policing was in accord with the human rights agenda. The Code rested on nine policing principles (accountability, fairness, honesty, integrity, leadership, objectivity, openness, respect and selflessness) derived from the 1995 Nolan Principles for Public Life. A key objective of the Code was to return to the values of Sir Robert Peel (Home Secretary in 1829 and credited as a key architect of the first Metropolitan Police Act that created the Metropolitan Police force in London, England) to ensure that all who worked in the police forces behaved in a manner most likely to win the trust and support of fellow citizens. The Code aimed to advance the principle of policing by consent by promoting ethical standards in decision-making. The principles and standards of behaviour that were embodied in the Code of Ethics were thus placed at the heart of the ‘National Decision Model’ (introduced in 2012), which aimed to ensure that a common template was used to arrive at a decision based on an assessment of 78

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risk. Ethics committees were subsequently set up within some police forces, a key role being to ensure that corporate decisions adhered to considerations set out in the Code of Ethics. The International Association of Police Chiefs (IAPC) has also been instrumental in promoting police ethics. These are currently enshrined in the 1991 Police Code of Conduct, which operates alongside a revised version of the 1957 Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. These pronouncements required officers to perform their duties impartially and treat all citizens equally, and emphasised the need for officers to perform their duties with integrity and to respect confidentiality. Although the IAPC is international in composition, the declarations relating to police ethics have been especially influential within US police departments. Ethical policing is a laudable endeavour; however, numerous examples exist that serve to undermine or challenge such principles or objectives. PETER JOYCE See also: Democratic Policing; Human Rights; State Violence Readings Bowden, T. (1978) Beyond the limits of the law: A comparative study of the police in crisis politics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. College of Policing (2014) Code of Ethics: A code of practice for the principles and standards of professional behaviour for the policing profession of England and Wales. Coventry: College of Policing Ltd. Council of Europe (2001) The European Code of Police Ethics. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. MacVean, A. and Neyroud, P. (2012) Police ethics and values. London: Sage. Neyroud, P. and Beckley, A. (2001) Policing, ethics and human rights. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

ETHNIC CLEANSING

‘Ethnic cleansing’ currently lacks formal definition as an international crime, yet it appears frequently in resolutions of the United Nations (UN), the reasoning in cases at International Criminal Tribunals (most commonly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]) and the campaigns of nongovernmental organisations.The most detailed attempt at definition is contained in the ‘Final report of the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international human 79

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rights law in the former Yugoslavia’ (United Nations Security Council, 1994, p 56), which defines ‘ethnic cleansing’ as the: rendering [of] an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area … by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Such elements hint at the relationship between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and other international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Many of the acts referred to in the preceding quote are war crimes within themselves, and become crimes against humanity when systematic or widespread, and directed against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack. Crimes against humanity also include persecution against an identifiable group on ethnic grounds, which clearly incorporates the ‘ethnic’ dimension of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The relationship between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide is, however, potentially more complex. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations, 1948) defines genocide as: acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: by killing members of the group or causing [them] serious bodily or mental harm, or by deliberately inflicting … conditions of life calculated to bring about … physical destruction in whole or in part.… [Or] by attempting to prevent births within the group or by forcibly transferring children of the group to another. For Lieberman (2010, p 43), ‘ethnic cleansing’ is closely tied to geography and to the forced removal of ethnic groups from particular areas, yet it may ‘overlap with genocide when the forced removal of population leads to a group’s destruction’. The ICTY has convicted for genocide in cases relating to Srebrenica, where 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed after being taken from the United Nations ‘Safe Haven’ and surrounding areas by Serbian forces. Additionally, 20,000 Bosnian women were removed and bussed to distant Bosniak-held territories. The judgments against Radislav Krsti and Vidoje Blagojevi for their involvement in Srebrenica suggested that the murder of the men and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ displacement of the surviving women and children had been calculated to bring about their physical destruction, and was therefore evidence of genocide. Cases involving Srebrenica remain the only successful prosecutions for genocide at the ICTY at the time of writing. 80

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The existence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ remains controversial. It is not unique to any particular form of government and can be observed across continents and throughout history. For Mann (2005), it exists on a spectrum from non-violence to violence and might include aspects of ‘voluntary assimilation’ – though this formulation perhaps overstates the extent to which the demise of, for example, ‘minority languages’ is truly voluntary. Euphemistic terms like ‘ethnic cleansing’ often act as a smokescreen, allowing acts like forced removal to avoid being named as genocide, thus avoiding the censure that comes with such terminology. The concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’ also suffers from a lack of precision around the meaning of ‘ethnicity’, though it is most often taken to refer to a group that is defined by both itself and others as sharing a common culture, language and history, even if such things may be oversimplified, inaccurate and/or exaggerated. The manipulation of historical memories can play a role in ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a group seeks to portray itself as homogeneous, powerful and yet at risk, often with the ‘Other’ marked as an existential threat. LISA WHITE See also: Genocide; International Human Rights; War Crimes Readings Lieberman, B. (2010) ‘“Ethnic cleansing” versus “genocide”’, in D. Bloxham and A.D. Moses (eds) The Oxford handbook of genocide studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mann, M. (2005) The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Nations (1948) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf United Nations Security Council (1994) ‘Final report of the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international human rights law in the former Yugoslavia’, U.N. Doc.S/1994/674 (1994), 27 May. Wergin, K. (2014) ‘Problematic precedents: the conflicting legacies of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 54(2): 463–500.

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EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; formally, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is an international treaty that entered into force in 1953, drawing substantively on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It enshrines a range of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms to anyone subject to the jurisdiction of any member state of the ECHR. The ECHR established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an entity based in Strasbourg mandated with the oversight and enforcement of the ECHR, which makes the ECHR the first binding international treaty for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in history. It is also unique in the way it provides legal protection for individuals against human rights violations, unusually assigning natural persons an independent and active role in the international law (which is normally dominated by states and their institutional representatives). The rationale for putting such an international legal provision in place has been very much informed by the traumatic experiences of the Second World War in particular; however, it was also very much inspired by the ambition to deflect any influences coming from political communism in Europe, which can be seen in the many – albeit not very specific – references to the guiding principles of ensuring a functioning and effective political democracy. To ensure that the ECHR would find acceptance with all (then 12) members of the Council of Europe, the range of rights covered in the main body of the convention had to reflect a number of compromises. There was a general understanding that the ECHR would be a living document, which could later be amended in the form of additional protocols. Today, the rights and fundamental freedoms covered by the ECHR include the right to life, to protection against torture and inhuman treatment, to freedom and safety, to a fair trial, to respect for private and family life, to freedom of expression (including freedom of press), thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The institutional context in which the ECHR was drafted is the Council of Europe, so it is not to be confused with the more recent and comprehensive Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was adopted in December 2000 and entered into force in December 2009 (following continued discussions about whether the European Union [EU] should have its own bill of rights or whether the EU should and could become part of the ECHR instead). As the EU Charter comprises all personal, civil, political, economic and social rights enshrined in the ECHR, its existence has also somewhat increased the importance of the ECHR. This is not least reflected in the increasing number of cases and judgments dealt with by the ECtHR, which has reached over 18,000 at the time of writing. Together, the EU Charter and the ECHR constitute a 82

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strong acknowledgement of the role of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the conception of democracy in Europe. As of May 2015, there are 42 parties to the ECHR, thus encompassing a majority of the (now 47) members of the Council of Europe, as well as all (now 28) member states of the EU. In fact, any candidate for EU accession needs to be a signatory to the ECHR before starting negotiations over full membership. Membership of the Council of Europe is equally tied to general endorsement of the ECHR. That said, not all parties to the treaty have, in fact, ratified all components of it: only 14 out of 42 signatories have ratified all substantive parts of the ECHR (including all protocols). The UK, for instance, has signed but not yet ratified Protocol 4, which prohibits imprisonment for debt and for the inability to fulfil a contract. It has also not signed Protocol 7 (covering rights related to migration, criminal law and the equality of spouses), and, along with a number of other countries, such as Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, Protocol 12 (which prohibits discrimination). Despite these ongoing issues related to full ratification, the ECHR remains a centrepiece of European democracy that not least offers a crucial access point for individuals in their defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms. CARMEN GEBHARD See also: European Union, The; Human Rights; United Nations, The Readings Rainey, B., Wicks, E. and Ovey, C. (2014) The European Convention on Human Rights (6th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greer, S. (2009) The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, problems and prospects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Court of Human Rights is an international court that has jurisdiction to address allegations of violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, known as the European Convention on Human Rights.The Convention is an instrument of the Council of Europe that entered into force on 3 September 1953, is supplemented by 16 Additional Protocols and was established this court with the mandate to find against states that do not fulfil their undertakings. Member states of the Council of

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Europe are bound by the Convention and its Protocols through their incorporation into their domestic legal order. The number of judges on the Court is the same as that of the state parties to the Convention (47 at present). The judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from lists of three candidates proposed by each state. They are elected for a non-renewable term of nine years. The Court is based in the Human Rights Building in Strasbourg and has five Sections in which Chambers are formed. Each Section has a President, a Vice-President and a number of other judges. A Chamber is composed of the President of the Section to which the case was assigned, the ‘national judge’ (the judge elected in respect of the state against which the application was lodged) and five other judges designated by the Section President in rotation. The Grand Chamber is made up of the Court’s President and Vice-Presidents, the Section Presidents and the national judge, together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. When it hears a case on referral, it does not include any judges who previously sat in the Chamber that first examined the case. The Court cannot take up cases of its own motion, but examines applications in the form of: (a) ‘individual applications’ lodged by any person, group of individuals, company or non-government organisation (NGO) having a complaint about a violation of their rights; and (b) ‘inter-state applications’ brought by one state against another. Since the Court was established, almost all applications have been lodged by individuals who have brought their cases directly to the Court alleging one or more violations of the Convention. Almost 50,000 new applications are lodged every year. Cases can be brought directly by individuals; it is sufficient to send the Court a duly completed application form with the requisite documents. However, the registration of an application by the Court is no guarantee that it will be admissible or successful on its merits. The Convention system provides for ‘easy’ access to the Court, enabling any individual to bring a case even if he or she lives in a remote region of a member state or is penniless; there are no fees for proceedings before the Court. There are two main stages in the consideration of cases brought before the Court: the admissibility stage and the merits stage (ie the examination of the complaints). The processing of an application also goes through different phases. However, the Court always encourages parties to negotiate a friendly settlement. If no agreement is reached, the Court will proceed to examine the merits of the application. Judgments finding violations are binding on the states concerned and they are obliged to execute them (Christoffersen and Madsen, 2013). When the Court finds against a state and observes that the applicant has sustained damage, it awards

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the applicant ‘just satisfaction’ (ie a sum of money by way of compensation for that damage). An analysis of the relevant case law (European Court of Human Rights, 2015) shows that almost 55% of the violations found by the Court concern either Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). Then, in about 13% of cases (European Court of Human Rights, 2015), the Court has found a serious violation of the Convention under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (right to life and prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe monitors the execution of judgments, particularly to ensure payment of the amounts awarded by the Court to the applicants in compensation for the damage that they have sustained (The Committee of Ministers, 2015). GABRIEL AMITSIS See also: European Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights Readings Christoffersen, J. and Madsen, M. (eds) (2013) The European Court of Human Rights between law and politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. European Court of Human Rights (2015) ECHR – overview 1959–2014. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers (2015) Supervision of the execution of judgements and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights – 8th annual report. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

EUROPEAN UNION, THE

Giorgio Agamben (1995), upon presenting his theory on authority and the conditions under which power is derived, asked readers not to consider how the powerful commit crimes against human beings, but rather to question how the constructed juridico-political conditions allow for such crimes to be committed by authority in the first place. Examining the existence of state power within the European Union (EU) and the consequences of it on the liberties and rights of those within it yields a complex power relation that sets the trend for a world increasingly dependent on supranational power, that is, power that transcends national boundaries and governments.

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The liberties and rights that are promoted and guarded by the EU are derived from a set of common goals and values established following the atrocities of the Second World War. The EU is purposefully designed to undermine the power of nation states, and the provisions it puts in place with regards to the protection of rights and liberties serve as the most poignant example of this. The freedom to move between member states, and the unconditional protection within those states by a standard and universal set of rights, ensures that the benefits of citizenship are derived from supranational power, relinquishing the nation state of significant control over them. As an EU citizen, this protection need not be applied for, or earned. However, this does not signal an end to state power within the EU; on the contrary, state power emanating from within the EU to external entities and actors increases in its strength. Hannah Arendt’s (2009 [1951]) work on totalitarianism sought to exemplify how the nation state’s power is, in part, derived from its ability to exclude. This power, recognised both by Arendt (2009) and later by Agamben (1995), creates a complex power relation whereby the sovereign power of the nation state is able to transcend the territorial boundaries that once defined it. The power to exclude is not a passive action, but, in fact, a political decision; a decision that, by its very nature, includes those in the law that are at first sight excluded from it. Agamben (1995) saw this relation as that of the ban, whereby people are not excluded from law, but merely banished by it. The political wilderness that one finds oneself in when banished by the law is the space that allows for the creation of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in order to determine the conditions under which exclusion and inclusion can be justified. This deliberate creation of what Arendt (2009 [1951]) termed ‘superfluousness’ – the political decision to exclude – exemplifies the conditions under which nation states find the power to justify actions that one would otherwise consider unthinkable. This complex power relation comes to a head when the EU is faced with a situation like the ‘migrant crisis’ in the summer of 2015. As refugees set off from North Africa in search of protection in Europe, many died off the coast of Italy as the nation states of the EU deliberated over their acceptance, knowing that the political recognition of these people by any one of the EU member states would mean that their protection would have to be guaranteed by all member states. What must be raised here is not the moral question on the part of the nation states (‘How could you let those people drown in the sea?’), but rather the conditions created that allowed for these refugees to die without any political representation or protection. These conditions are embodied by the ‘superfluousness’ of the refugees, a state made possible only by the internal exclusion from law by sovereign power. Rather than representing a complete dissolution of state power through the evanescence of territorial integrity, the EU embodies sovereign power at its strongest. Rights and liberties become subject more than ever to the sovereign 86

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power of nation states. The deliberation over the granting of these protections sees human beings embody homo sacer, and it is only in this state that their deaths off the coast of Italy can be ignored by both criminal law as murder and by politics, as these people were never truly recognised as ‘alive’ in the first place. SAMUEL MERCER See also: Citizenship; Human Rights; State, The Readings Agamben, G. (1995) Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Arendt, H. (2009 [1951]) The origins of totalitarianism. Milton Keynes: Benediction Classics. Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, A. (2001) Citizenship and governance in the European Union. London: Continuum. Dickson, J. and Eleftheriadis, P. (2012) Philosophical foundations of European Union law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayden, P. (2008) ‘From exclusion to containment: Arendt, sovereign power, and statelessness’, Societies Without Borders, 3(2): 248–69.

EXCEPTIONAL STATE

The terms ‘exceptional state’, ‘state of emergency’ and ‘state of exception’ imply exceptions to protections of human and civil rights during an emergency, deviating from a pre-existing paradigm of normality to which the state will presumably return post-crisis. This is premised on an understanding that while law is omnipresent, it is responsive to exceptional situations during which governments can restrict human rights or customary law to protect public safety or the fundamental rights of others, subject to strict limitations. However, some rights are absolute and can never be limited or suspended. Customary international law accommodates an emergency situation through the doctrines of ‘state of necessity’ and ‘force majeure’, providing that in exceptional circumstances, ‘a state’s failure to comply with its obligations is not unlawful’ (Duffy, 2005, p 297). This includes when an act is the ‘the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril’ or due to ‘the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen external event beyond the control of the state’ (Duffy, 2005, pp 297–8).

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International human rights law permits the state to limit rights in exceptional circumstances not amounting to a state of emergency – with the exception of absolute rights – to protect public safety, public order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. These restrictions must: (1) be provided for in clear and accessible law; (2) serve one of the legitimate aims set out in the convention being limited, such as security or public order; and (3) be strictly necessary and proportionate to meet that aim (Duffy, 2005, p 291). A state of emergency occurs when a government deems it necessary to suspend (rather than limit) one or more international treaty rights. Many international and regional human rights treaties provide for derogation (suspension) from obligations in certain circumstances, subject to six conditions: 1. it must be a response to a public emergency threatening the life or community of the nation and based on an actual and real threat, continuing only until strictly necessary by the exigency of the situation; 2. it must be officially declared to other state parties to the treaty being derogated from, the oversight treaty body and domestic courts; 3. absolute and inalienable rights cannot be derogated from (the rights to life; freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery; and prohibition of retroactive criminal measures); 4. derogations must be consistent with other international treaty and customary law obligations; 5. the measures must be necessary and strictly proportionate to the situation; and 6. derogations must be non-discriminatory and ‘measures that would otherwise be justifiable will be impermissible where they are applied solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’ (Duffy, 2005, pp 292–7). The legitimacy of a ‘state of emergency’ depends on whether it is formal (de jure) or informal (de facto) and whether the conditions in the state actually constitute a serious public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The International Law Association refers to a ‘good’ de jure emergency where only necessary measures were taken in response to a real threat, having been officially declared, while a ‘bad’ de jure emergency describes extraordinary measures taken, following the formal declaration of an emergency in the absence of a real threat, by a government operating out of self-interest or anti-democratic motives. Other illegitimate emergency situations include: a ‘classic’ de facto emergency, where extraordinary measures are taken in response to a real threat, but without formal declaration; an ‘ambiguous’ de facto emergency, where extraordinary measures are taken in the absence of a real threat and without formal declaration, increasing the application of permanent severe security laws; an ‘institutionalised’ emergency, whereby a government terminates a formal state of emergency having first incorporated many measures into ordinary laws, after the emergency has passed, thereby normalising the exceptional; and ‘ordinary repression’ characterised by 88

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severe restrictions on human rights without a threat or any formal declaration and without any benchmark of normality (Fitzpatrick, 1994). The state of emergency poses threats to human rights protection by restricting fundamental rights, as envisaged by the system of legitimate and justified temporary derogations. It often features the invasion of absolute rights, including the violation of due process and freedom from torture and liberty. In addition, it facilitates changes to the allocation of powers within government, including reducing the power of the legislature and judiciary while consolidating the power of the executive, thereby removing checks and balances for rights safeguarding (Fitzpatrick, 1994). KAREN MURPHY See also: Human Rights; State, The; State Power Readings Duffy, H. (2005) The ‘war on terror’ and the framework of international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fitzpatrick, J. (1994) The international system for protecting rights during states of emergency. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

EXTRADITION

Extradition is the process by which a person can be removed from one state or nation and transferred to another, by request, in order for that person to be subject to criminal proceedings or punishment. Mutual assistance in the prevention of crime, the apprehension of suspects and the prosecution of offenders are the cornerstones of tackling the complexities of transnational crime. Cooperation and an agreement to surrender, or gain the surrender of, a fugitive between different states or nations is sometimes viewed as a challenge in respect of international law enforcement, despite the presence of reciprocal agreements and treaties. Multilateral conventions, international instruments and bilateral extradition treaties structure the policy and process of extradition. Indeed, states have set about developing their systems of extradition along the lines of efficiency and effectiveness, as well as cooperation. The example of the European Arrest Warrant bears these hallmarks of a managed mechanism by which European Union (EU) member states can take advantage of a developed network of cross-border systems, national agencies and local police forces (Pérignon and Daucé, 2007). Similarly, 89

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contemporary concerns over terrorism and the perceived need for enhanced information sharing and intelligence has sculpted the extradition policy and debate in nations such as the US and Europe (Mitsilegas, 2003). Taking the UK as an example, the law of extradition is contained in the Extradition Act 2003 (updated by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the AntiSocial Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014). This Act covers extradition to Category 1 (member states of the EU) and Category 2 (those outside of the EU – currently listed at around 100 and set by the secretary of state) territories, extradition to the UK, and police powers and warrants. Of critical concern in these matters are human rights, with the Extradition Act 2003 emphasising that extradition should take place efficiently and effectively unless doing so breaches the individual’s human rights. Whether a criminal act amounts to an extradition offence will be determined in the process of completing/issuing a warrant for arrest and the extradition hearing. The role of the judge is to determine that extradition would be proportionate and compatible with the person’s human rights. Export extradition from countries such as the UK is the responsibility of the secretary of state; however, extradition cannot be ordered if: • the person could face a death penalty (unless the secretary of state gets adequate written assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out); • there are no speciality arrangements with the requesting country – ‘speciality’ requires that the person must be dealt with in the requesting state only for the offences for which they have been extradited (except in certain limited circumstances); or • the person has already been extradited to the UK from a third state or transferred from the International Criminal Court and consent for onward extradition is required from that third state or that Court (unless the secretary of state has received consent) (Extradition Act 2003; see UK Government, 2016). Appeals to extradition orders can be made under the Extradition Act 2003. This would first be heard in the High Court, and if permission is granted by the High Court, then the case can be reviewed ‘on a point of law’ in the Supreme Court. In cases where an appeal is not upheld, at the time of writing, the person may take their case to the European Court of Human Rights. Extradition treaties and arrangements differ around the globe. For example, Brunei does not have an extradition treaty with the US, and it should not be assumed that extradition treaties exist just because there may be diplomatic ties. Moreover, extradition does occur internationally in the absence of due process and official treaties between states/nations. 90

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While arrest warrants are issued and extradition hearings occur frequently, issues of human rights, diplomatic disputes and challenges to the justifications for extradition appear in the world’s media, often with public attention drawn. Three particular cases are outlined in the following by way of example: At the time of writing, Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, has secured asylum in the embassy of Ecuador in London, UK. He is sought by the US and also Sweden. He is under a criminal investigation in the US for his involvement in the publication of more than half a million Pentagon and US State Department documents in 2010. Simultaneously, Swedish prosecutors wish to interview Assange on accusations of sexual misconduct. While offering to assist in these matters with Sweden, Assange remains in London amid fears that he will be subject to an onward extradition from Sweden to the US. Assange has not been charged with any crime, but UK-based extradition hearings have taken place to review the validity of the order. The finding and the appeal have been upheld and the UK has a duty to extradite Assange to Sweden. However, with him gaining asylum from the Ecuadorian government in the London embassy and the ongoing criminal investigations into Assange by the US, cases such as this highlight the complexities of extradition and mutual assistance. Ex-intelligence and security analyst Edward Snowdon is currently living (a year of temporary asylum followed by three-year limited residency) in Russia. Snowdon is the subject of a pursuit for extradition by the US for the theft of government property and charges under the Espionage Act 1917. As a former contractor of the National Security Agency, Snowdon leaked documents on the US surveillance programmes. Supporters of Snowdon have argued that he has successfully whistle-blown on questionable practices of the state and mass surveillance that affect the public’s privacy. As the US lacks extradition ties with Russia, its attempts to engage with Snowdon remain deferred. In 2002, British citizen Gary McKinnon was arrested in London, UK, accused of hacking into US military computers. Extradition proceedings were authorised in 2005 with a recommendation to the home secretary for extradition by Bow Street Magistrates and the home secretary’s agreement coming in 2006. A High Court appeal commenced in 2007; however, this was dismissed in the same year. Using the argument that McKinnon had been ‘threatened’ with life imprisonment in the US, the case was taken to the Law Lords in 2008. Similarly, this appeal was rebutted. In the same year, McKinnon’s appeal case was lost at the European Court of Human Rights; simultaneously, though, McKinnon’s lawyer revealed that McKinnon had recently been diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome. An appeal to the home secretary in 2008 once again failed. In 2009, the Home Office suspended the extradition in light of new medical evidence; however, it blocked McKinnon from appealing to the UK Supreme Court. The year 2010 saw a judicial review into McKinnon’s case in addition to meetings between the UK 91

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prime minister and US president and a review of extradition laws in the UK for fear that extradition legislation failed to protect UK citizens sufficiently. British Home Secretary Theresa May blocked the extradition to the US of McKinnon in 2012, and later that year, McKinnon learned that he would face no charges in the UK either. Extradition and extradition laws attract criticism and concern. The cases highlighted here offer insights into the complex nature of criminal investigations and international cooperation. While many jurisdictions offer opportunities for individuals to appeal against their extradition order, and legislation puts a duty on states to reflect on possible human rights violations, balancing the power of states and nations and the rights of individuals can be complex (Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, 1998). Indeed, what is often apparent are the complex legal procedures set within intricate political and diplomatic matters. State power and the preserving of human rights in law-and-order matters continue to be sites for critical enquiry. Witnessing exactly what the interests are of the various parties across jurisdictions continues to be a pressing matter. PAUL TAYLOR See also: Human Rights; Rendition; State Power Readings Dugard, J. and Van den Wyngaert, C. (1998) ‘Reconciling extradition with human rights’, American Journal of International Law, 92(2): 187–212. Mitsilegas, V. (2003) ‘The new EU–USA cooperation on extradition, mutual legal assistance and the exchange of police data’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 8(4): 515–36. Pérignon, I. and Daucé, C. (2007) ‘The European Arrest Warrant: a growing success story’, Era Forum, 8(2): 203–14. UK Government (2016) ‘Extradition: process and review’, Home Office. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/extradition-processes-and-review

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F FEMINIST SECURITY STUDIES Feminist Security Studies (FSS) has highlighted the masculinised culture of security, both in practice and as an academic discipline. In so doing, it has drawn attention to the way in which key areas of analysis such as war, combat, the military, conflict resolution and peace have been dealt with in the absence of any understanding of gender difference, but, more importantly, of a gender hierarchy – there has been a failure to engage with the way in which international institutions are inherently masculine. In the case of war, feminists have drawn attention to the previously invisible role of women; men do not simply become soldiers and fight, they use weapons produced by women in low-paid factories (Enloe, 2015), they rely on a largely silent system of domestic support and, of course, they are (re)produced by mothers. Feminists specialising in this area have highlighted the problematic assumptions in fields such as International Relations, which also surround the idea of combat, in particular, highlighting the devastating role played by sexual violence. In this case, FSS has tried to highlight how sexual violence and rape in war are issues that should be taken seriously. There have also been key challenges to the pervading masculinity of various militaries, their unwillingness until recently to consider women as possible front-line troops and the prevalence of sexism and homophobia. Deep-rooted assumptions about masculine and feminine roles have been exposed in reactions to and the treatment of women terrorists, still assumed to be an abnormality. Gentry and Sjoberg (2015) highlight how there appear to be ‘terrorists’ and ‘female terrorists’, with divergent accounts of the motivations for their acts – 93

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terrorists are motivated by political goals, whereas ‘female terrorists’ are motivated by psychological factors; the former have rational goals, the latter’s are irrational. Some feminist perspectives have also emphasised the importance of women in post-conflict situations, rebuilding shattered communities post-war, and the significance of what could be achieved by including women in peace negotiations. FSS challenges the notion held in the discipline of International Relations that the state is more significant than the individual, that the predominantly masculinised business of doing international relations is simply ‘how it is done’, but also that there are specific units of analysis on which security studies should focus and those on which it should not. Inevitably, this feminist approach brings with it disciplinary crossover and opens up possibilities for gaining knowledge, as is evidenced by recent investigations in the journal Politics & Gender (see, eg, 2015, vol 11, no 2) into the connections between FSS and feminist political economy. FSS has widened the concept of security and has problematised traditional boundaries. ‘Security’ has been broadened to go beyond a focus on state actions (military budgets, strategy and diplomacy) to include the analysis of security at a more focused level – the security of communities and individuals, and, generally, the experience of people’s day-to-day lives, have all become significant areas of analysis for FSS. Hence, there has been a focus on the role of education, environmental protection, women’s reproductive rights and preventing domestic violence – these, it is argued, are not issues that should be considered in addition to issues of security, but rather issues that should be seen as fundamentally part of those issues. Thus, the second-wave feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ has become highly significant for thinking about security. The vulnerability of individuals, groups and communities all contribute to the larger and global issues of security in this view. Epistemologically, FSS leans more towards the critical and constructivist approaches familiar to International Relations, with much emphasis being placed on the material lives of women, how issues of security are framed linguistically from a vantage of male privilege, how security has been constructed as a masculine notion of men defending their territory against other men and how, in all of this, there has been a tendency to simplify the nature of the security problem. Security is more than states defending themselves; it is more complicated and more difficult to deal with because it involves looking not just at boundaries and the defence of those boundaries, but also at the intricate level of power and domination that pervades the international system from the international to the individual. Thus, FSS encourages looking beyond the state to increase an understanding of how to deal with security issues. ROS HAGUE

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See also: Militarism; Military Conflict; Rape as a Weapon of War Readings Enloe, C. (2015) ‘Closing reflection: militiamen get paid; women borrowers get beaten’, Politics & Gender, 11(2): 435–8. Gentry, C.E. and Sjoberg, L. (2015) ‘Terrorism and political violence’, in L.J. Shepherd (ed) Gender matters in global politics. London: Routledge, pp 120–30.

FOOD SECURITY

The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing ‘when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life’. Commonly, the concept of food security is defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets people’s dietary needs, as well as their food preferences. It has functioned as the major regulator of population size throughout human history (Hopfenberg and Pimentel, 2001).The United Nations includes food security as one of the seven dimensions of human security, and it is one of the six universal goals of their Sustainable Development Goals. Globally and locally, five main factors affect food security. The quantitative supply of food is determined by its gross production, transport and processing, as well as wastage on its way to the consumer. Production itself is determined by the methods of production and their efficacy, the biocapacities of social-ecological systems and associated ecosystem services. Supply can be seriously curtailed under conditions where socio-political, economic or healthrelated security are compromised, as in the context of violent conflicts. At this time, the global quantitative supply is barely adequate to meet the needs of the existing population, despite appropriating 23.8% of the world’s net primary photosynthetic production (Haberl et al, 2007). Individual and communal access to food is governed, first, by supply and demand, market prices, and individual spending power, as well as population size. How much food can theoretically be made available to the individual depends on the individual’s ecological footprint and local per capita biocapacity. Second, trade relationships affect individual access to food. The third determinant of personal access to food is the extent of equity in a regional society and its economic system (Brown, 2011). The quality of available food refers to its nutritional value, benefits or hazards to health, as well as its composition and stability, which, in turn, are affected by methods of production and processing. Available evidence indicates that food 95

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produced locally and by organic means is qualitatively more valuable than food produced by large-scale industrial methods. Particular concerns focus on the genetic modification of agricultural species and chemical additives, as well as persistent pollutants that become concentrated as they travel up the food chain (bioaccumulation). Each of the aforementioned three main factors are affected by the dominant behaviour patterns, culturally conditioned, of societies and individuals. Contrary to common beliefs, human behaviour is determined only to a small extent by rational thinking; the major determinants are values, attitudes, beliefs and ideals. Ideologies, fads and advertising mainly shape those determinants, as evident by the current trend of some middle classes in some developing countries to increase their intake of meat (eg China), or of some urban young people preferring junk food in pursuit of their ideas about ‘progress’ and modernity (Davis, 2000). In order for food security at the socio-political, economic, health-related or environmental levels to be reliable, it must also be sustainable. A community’s food security is sustainable if it employs sustainable methods of production, processing and distribution. Many projections of future food security tend to falter over the false assumption that all unexamined variables remain constant. Instead, estimates of future food security must take into account all relevant manifestations of global change and current trends, especially climate change and its secondary effects, resource shortages, and population growth. Another misleading assumption is that emergency food aid can bring benefits beyond momentary relief (Fletcher, 1991). Sustainable food security is among the aims of resilience strategies for rendering a socio-ecological community less vulnerable to extrinsic perturbations. Despite some successes, future food security is jeopardised by the shrinkage of agricultural lands, declining food production, rising sea levels and growing populations (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2015). The predominance of large-scale industrial food production and its heavy dependence on chemicals, cheap energy and petroleum derivatives render food security extremely questionable. Switching to sustainable methods of food production and processing, more equitable distribution to prevent shortages and violent unrest, and less dependence on meat production will be essential to feed the global population of 10 billion expected by 2050 (Ehrlich and Harte, 2015). SABINA W. LAUTENSACH and ALEXANDER K. LAUTENSACH See also: Humanitarian Intervention; Insecurity; Social Justice Readings Brown, L.R. (2011) ‘The new geopolitics of food’, Foreign Policy, 186: 54–63. 96

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Davis, D. (2000) ‘Of hamburger and social space: consuming McDonald’s in Beijing’, in D. Davis (ed) The consumer revolution in urban China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp 56–88. Ehrlich, P.R. and Harte, J. (2015) ‘To feed the world in 2050 will require a global revolution’, PNAS, 112(48): 14743–4. Fletcher, J. (1991) ‘Chronic famine and the immorality of food aid: a bow to Garrett Hardin’, Population and Environment, 12(3): 235–40. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015) The state of food insecurity in the world 2015. Rome: FAO, p 1. Haberl, H., Erb, K.H., Krausmann, F., Gaube, V., Bondeau, A., Plutzar, C., Gingrich, S., Lucht, W. and Fischer-Kowalski, M. (2007) ‘Quantifying and mapping the human appropriation of net primary production in earth’s terrestrial ecosystems’, PNAS, 104(31): 12942–7. Hopfenberg, R. and Pimentel, D. (2001) ‘Human population numbers as a function of food supply’, Environment, Development & Sustainability, 3(1): 1–15. World Food Summit, 13-17 November 1996, Rome, Italy. Available at: http:// www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm

FORCED MIGRATION

‘Forced migration’ refers to the movement of persons from one state to another out of compulsion. Forced migration is generally contrasted with ‘economic migration’, a term used to characterise migration motivated primarily by the pursuit of employment or livelihoods. Unlike economic migrants, forced migrants have been compelled to migrate because of a fear of persecution or conflict, violence, human trafficking, and environmental conditions (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007). Forced migration comprises more than the movement or study of refugees or the concept of asylum, both of which pre-date the term. Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which has been signed by more than 140 countries, refugees include persons who have left their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution on the five grounds of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or membership in a social group. Under this definition, refugees do not include persons who have left their countries because of generalised violence or because of persecution not based on the five grounds listed. The 1951 Convention’s definition of refugees was criticised for eurocentrism (Davies, 2007). It initially applied only to refugees in Europe and its definition of refugees was not believed to reflect the primary causes for the compelled movement of migrants in Africa or Asia. For that reason, the definition has been supplemented in the Americas and in Africa by other conventions or declarations 97

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to extend legal protections to persons compelled to flee their countries for reasons other than persecution. The due extent of legal protections to forced migrants remains one of the key components of contention with respect to forced migrants. Refugees, victims of human trafficking and victims of torture enjoy legal protections greater than those of economic migrants and of forced migrants who do not qualify for such status. Refugees enjoy legal protections in a broad array of areas, including access to employment, which are extraordinary for non-citizens. However, the same protections and legal guarantees generally do not apply to persons compelled to migrate for reasons not covered by international treaties. Responses to forced migration have expanded. The concept of subsidiary protection in the European Union, for example, extends legal protection to persons who can raise other humanitarian grounds for protection. Legal developments have also expanded the scope of the refugee definition to include persons who have left their countries for reasons related to gender and sexual orientation. However, the international refugee definition is not expected to expand to include climate or economic migrants. Moreover, jurisprudential developments should be taken in the light of states’ increasing hesitation to permit forced migrants into their territory. In several parts of the world, refugees are required, for political, economic or cultural reasons, to reside in encampments and are not permitted to integrate into local communities. In addition, despite the disproportionate burden that forced migrants impose on developing nations that are next to migrants’ countries of origin, many developed nations impose significant barriers to entry (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011). These include limitations on the number of migrants accepted, visa regimes that prevent claims for protection being filed and refusals to permit vessels carrying migrants to land. Measures taken by states to prevent migrants from advancing legal claims for protection implicate contested notions over the relationship between state jurisdiction and territory. Although the United Nations refugee agency and human rights bodies advance the idea that states may not interdict forced migrants at sea and refuse to hear claims for protection, many states adhere to the position that protection obligations do not apply to persons who are not within their territorial boundaries. Hence, the situation of forced migrants seeking protection in other states remains precarious. CHRISTIAN PANGILINAN See also: Human Rights; Human Trafficking; Refugee Convention (1951)

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Readings Davies, S.E. (2007) Legitimising rejection: International refugee law in Southeast Asia. Leiden: Brill. Feller, E. (2006) ‘Asylum, migration and refugee protection: realities, myths and the promise of things to come’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 18(3/4): 509–36. Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2011) Access to asylum: International refugee law and the globalisation of migration control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and McAdam, J. (2007) The refugee in international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hathaway, J.C. (2005) The rights of refugees under international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, J. (2007) Complementary protection in international refugee law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FOREIGN POLICY

The term ‘foreign policy’ refers to the combined actions, reactions and interactions of an independent actor, usually a state, towards other independent actors operating in the international system (Hill, 2015, p 4). In the present day, an independent actor could, arguably, also be an entity with quasi-sovereignty, such as the European Union. An effective foreign policy should achieve advantageous outcomes in the external, or international, environment that satisfy the actor’s objectives, values or interests in its internal, or domestic, environment. In the 18th century, the consolidation of the Westphalian system of sovereign states exercising political self-determination led to a preoccupation with the relationship between foreign policy decision-making and the outcomes of policy. From a technical perspective, this mirrored the establishment of dedicated ministries of foreign affairs. Thus, after Westphalia and until the early 1950s, both the formulation and scrutiny of foreign policy remained largely the preserve of a small number of ‘experts’ deciding on specific, tangible political actions to be taken by the government of the sovereign state that they represented, aimed at affecting conditions and actors beyond that state’s borders. The scope and reach of a state’s foreign policy is largely determined by that state’s actual or perceived power. Classical realism, emphasising the anarchic character of the international system, requires a state to make policy decisions that defend and advance its ‘national interest’. Such a realist foreign policy should be judged on its ability to deliver security and prosperity. A state’s capacity to project military power, therefore, as well as other considerations such as its geo-strategic location and its physical and human capital, determines its position in the hierarchy of 99

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states. The classical realist position is reinforced by the rational actor model, whereby foreign policy decision-making is taken to be the preserve of a single unitary state actor making rational, that is, ‘self-interested’, responses to specific circumstances and dilemmas in order to maximise gains and minimise losses within a framework of possible options. The proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and the state-centric enmity between ideological blocs coincided with the expansion of social and behavioural research in, predominantly, US universities, lending the analysis of foreign policy added relevance. Treating the process of foreign policymaking as being as equally important as, if not more important than, policy outcomes, scholars adopted a multi-causal, scientific approach to foreign policy decisionmaking. From a psychological perspective, Irving Janis (1972) warned of the dangers of ‘groupthink’, the perceived need to maintain consensus within the decision-making group, devaluing the efficacy of the process and, hence, the settled policy. A further important study of the policymaking process by Graham Allison (1971) critiqued the rational actor model advocated by, for example, the economist Milton Friedman (1953), instead emphasising the role of competitive self-interest between rival organisations within a state’s bureaucracy in the foreign policy decision-making process. Arguably, these ‘turf wars’ between departments and ministries persist in the US, and elsewhere, contributing, for instance, to the failure to prevent the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) and undermining the post-conflict phase of the intervention in Iraq. From the 1970s, realism’s dependence on the relationship between an anarchic international system and foreign policy decision-making within states was progressively disputed by liberal scholars, who argued that states were no longer the only actors within the international system capable of exercising power. Arguably, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of a global capitalism reliant on complex transnational interdependence driving a new era of globalisation introduced sub-state, supra-state and non-state actors to the international system. The increased salience of non-state actors led Robert Putnam (1988) to develop the two-level game theory, whereby external and internal environments possess distinct, and often contradictory, foreign policy decision-making rationalities. For Putnam, balancing these divergent agendas is the main task for contemporary decision-makers. The liberal challenge to realist assumptions also introduced a more nuanced understanding of the types of power on which an effective, and affordable, foreign policy might be built. Joseph Nye (1990) introduced the ideas of hard and soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. The principal recourse of a realist foreign policy – hard power – is the direct use of coercion, military or economic, either as a threat or an actual intervention. An underused alternative – soft power – is the indirect use of persuasion, largely through the promotion of a state’s intrinsic values, to prompt the adoption of favourable policies by other international actors. As the scope of foreign policy has expanded across 100

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the spectrum of political and economic activities, so the ‘identity’ that a state projects as a society has become increasingly important in an information age where achieving foreign policy goals depends not only on whose army wins, but on whose story wins (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2007). SIMON MASSEY See also: European Union, The; Extradition; State Power Readings Allison, G. (1971) Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co. Friedman, M. (1953) Essays in positive economics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hill, C. (2015) Foreign policy in the twenty-first century. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Janis, I. (1972) Victims of groupthink. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin. Nye, J. (1990) Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. New York, NY: Basic Books. Putnam, R. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International Organization, 42(3): 427–60. Ronfeldt, D. and Arquilla, J. (2007) ‘The promise of Noöpolitik’, First Monday, 12(8). Available at: http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/1971/0

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G GENDERCIDE ‘Gendercide’ is a term coined by US feminist scholar Mary Anne Warren in her 1985 book Gendercide: The implications of sex selection to refer to the ‘deliberate extermination of persons of a particular sex (or gender)’ (Warren, 1985, p 3). It is the intentional killing of a group of people due to their gender identity. Warren drew an analogy between gendercide, a gender-selective mass killing, and genocide. In the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2 defined genocide as: any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. As Warren (1985, p 22) observed in her book, gendercide: is a sex-neutral term, in that the victims may be either male or female. There is a need for such a sex-neutral term, since sexually discriminatory killing is just as wrong when the victims happen to be male. The term also calls attention to the fact that gender roles have often had lethal consequences, and that these are in important 103

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respects analogous to the lethal consequences of racial, religious, and class prejudice. While other terms such as ‘femicide’ have been used to refer to the wrongful killing of women, often for cultural reasons, victims of gendercide may be either male or female. One form of femicide is ‘female infanticide’ – the deliberate killing of newborn female children in cultures with strong cultural preferences for male children. Different forms of gendercide, as sex-neutral genocidal practices, were prevalent in the earliest recorded genocides in modern history – the Armenian, Assyrian and Greek genocides during the Ottoman Empire, and the conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1999, p 196), ‘young men were the group that was by far the most targeted in the conflict in Kosovo’. As Jones (2000, p 185) observed, ‘an overriding tactic was evident in Serb military strategy: the gender-selective detention and mass killing of ethnic Albanian men, especially those of battle age’. Although gendercide has emerged as an important analytical framework in the study of ethnic conflict and genocide, some scholars argue that the gendercide literature is fraught with ‘analytical inconsistencies’ and ‘substantive limitations’. Gendercide, according to Carpenter (2002, p 77), ‘confuses sex and gender; is based on a misguided analogy with the legal term “genocide”; and constitutes too narrow a focus for the inclusive study of gender as a variable in comparative genocide studies’. This critique of the gendercide literature underscores the need for a holistic and interdisciplinary framework for the study of gender in comparative genocide studies in emergent and future ethnic conflicts across cultures, societies and regions. OBIJIOFOR AGINAM See also: Feminist Security Studies; Honour-Based Violence and Honour Killings; Rape as a Weapon of War Readings Carpenter, C. (2002) ‘Beyond “gendercide”: incorporating gender into comparative genocide studies’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 6(4): 77–101. Jones, A. (2000) ‘Gendercide and genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, 2(2): 185–211. Lindner, E.G. (2001) ‘Gendercide and humiliation in honor and human rights societies’, Journal of Genocide Research, 4(1): 137–55.

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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1999) Young men of fighting age – Kosovo verification mission. Warsaw: OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Economist (2010) ‘The war on baby girls: gendercide’, 4 March. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/15606229 Warren, M.A. (1985) Gendercide: The implications of sex selection. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

GENOCIDE

Genocide is often referred to as the ultimate crime, seen as the gravest of all violations of human rights, and considered the utmost state abuse of power. It was the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin who, in 1944, coined the term to literally mean the killing (cide, from Latin) of a race or tribe (genos, from Greek). Following the Holocaust during the 1939–45 war, the United Nations (UN), in 1948, instituted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention defined genocide as ‘acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group’. Although excluding political groups from the definition (Kuper, 1981), the Convention specifically gave authority to states in relation to pursuing those who commit genocide and deemed conspiracy, public incitement, attempts to commit genocide and complicity in genocide as also punishable. States therefore have an obligation, besides that of not committing genocide, to prevent and punish such violations by others. However, the focus of the definition is on intent rather than the numbers of people killed or method of killing.This is especially problematic as states deny that intent was there (Cohen, 2005). Although the term and the Convention resulted from the genocide of the Jewish people during the 1939–45 war, the genocide of the Armenian people in Turkey in 1914 is the first instance of mass killing generally recognised as genocide by the international community (but not Turkey). However, since ratification of the Convention in 1951, more rather than fewer genocides have taken place – with (at the time of writing) ongoing events in North Korea since the mid-1990s, Dafur since 2003 and in Libya, Yemen and Syria since 2011 being labelled by various human rights organisations as amounting to genocide. Mass killings may be a crime as old as humanity itself, but considering the sheer scale of the atrocities that have been committed since the beginning of the 20th century, genocide can be identified in its current form as a uniquely modern crime. Cassese (1990) argues that genocide becomes a reality only under conditions of late modernity. He theorised that the immense numbers of deaths during 105

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a genocide are made possible by the modern state – through its bureaucratic apparatus, its centralised power structures, its monopoly of economic and military resources, and, last but not least, new technologies. The modern era has also seen the growth of intra-state conflicts, with differences within states being used as a basis for extermination, for example, between the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda in 1994. Modern genocide rests on perceptions that any perceived disloyalty to the state must be dealt with; it is necessary to maintain dominant ideologies, often by persuading people to support the most outrageous policies through demonstrating a palpable threat. States draw economic and political benefits from killing – genocide is an efficient form of gain. Using Hitler’s policies as an example, there was a material gain from those killed such as the use or sale of their possessions, as well as their hair, dentures, glasses and gold fillings, and the free labour of those not immediately killed. Ironically, this was the case even though Nazi propaganda claimed that the Jewish people were a barrier to economic prosperity. Genocide does not result from chaos and anarchy – the organisation of the death camps was systematic, bureaucratised and extremely efficient. Genocide is the product of order, authoritarianism, political theorising and indoctrination (Bauman, 1995). Genocide has to be meticulously administered. Some scholars debate the role of the state in executing genocides. For example, Barta (1987) distinguishes between a genocidal state and a genocidal society. While there was an absence of intent and thus blame, the genocide of Aboriginal Australians was executed through the social relations inherent in the system of colonisation, a phenomenon that could also be seen in the colonisation of the New World in the 15th and 16th centuries. MacKinnon (1993) argues, using the example of rape of Bosnian Muslim women during the 1992–95 BosniaHerzegovina war, that the role of gender is at least as important as the role of the state. However, regardless of the questions raised by scholars and although genocide appears to be the antithesis of modernist rationality and post-war sensitivity, the conditions that make genocide possible exist within the structures of the modern state itself. JO TURNER See also: Holocaust, The; Human Rights; Responsibility to Protect (R2P); War Crimes Readings Barta, T. (1987) ‘Relations of genocide: land and lives in the colonisation of Australia’, in I. Wallimann and M.N. Dobkowski (eds) Genocide in the modern age: Etiology and case studies of mass death. New York, NY: Greenwood Press. 106

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Bauman, Z. (1995) Life in fragments. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Cassese, A. (1990) Human rights in a changing world. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Cohen, S. (2005) States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kuper, L. (1981) The prevention of genocide. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. MacKinnon, C.A. (1993) ‘Crimes of war, crimes of peace’, UCLA Women’s Law Journal, 4(1): 59–86.

‘GIRL’ SOLDIERS

From time immemorial, the discourse of war has been intensely gendered. Largely, girls remain invisible under the ambiguous term of ‘child soldiers’. In gender-neutral terms, the needs and liberties of girls during conflict and postconflict reconstruction are under threat from governments, as well as national and international bodies (MacKenzie, 2010). Female children, as well as male children, are soldiers in contemporary wars and they participate, or are forced to participate, in an array of different roles, for example, as combatants, human shields, spies, domestic servants and sex slaves. Child soldiering is a growing global phenomenon and its manifestation in subSaharan Africa has been endemic, complex and devastating (Wessells, 2006). In one of these recent conflicts in Sierra Leone, it was noted by Gberie (2005) that child soldiers were playing a major role in the conflict. The children, under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and part of a larger armed group, moved through the country evoking fear among the civilian population. Many of these child soldiers were girls – ‘invisible’ girls. Crucially, when discussing girls within armed groups, girls are typically mentioned in contexts of victims of sexual violence, highlighting girls as ‘wives’, a reward for male soldiers, or as victims of terror (MacKenzie, 2010). Such representations or recognition not only exclude them from more general discussions of girls and violence, as well as analyses of warfare. Such neglect can contribute to further violations of girl soldiers, including remaining captive to boys and men who had abducted them during the conflict. As demonstrated earlier, armed conflict often exacerbates the gender inequalities that exist in different forms and to varying degrees in all societies, and thus renders girls particularly vulnerable when conflicts erupt. Armed groups often target girls’ bodies, repeatedly using them as the battleground on which war is waged. Rape is often used as a military and political strategy to cause humiliation 107

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and to incite terror and fear; moreover, in Sierra Leone, it was used to destroy the cohesion of communities by undermining their cultural values (MacKenzie, 2010). Therefore, girl soldiers’ lives are steeped in hardship, danger and exposure to violence, including gender-based violence and rape. Research has found that, in many cases, girl soldiers are reluctant to self-identify or be identified as such for fear of stigmatisation (Warrener, 2010). In the case of Sierra Leone, where power imbalances discriminate against girls, many former girl soldiers were unable to reintegrate into their families and communities. Others feared discrimination and stigma by their family and community because of the role they played as a soldier. Such circumstances left (and continues to leave) many girls with little or no choice other than living a life on the streets (Warrener, 2010). Exploited in war, girl soldiers are then left with little choice other than to support themselves through prostitution due to the lack of extended family in post-war settings. To end this silence, former girl soldiers need a platform on which to tell their own stories of war and of survival, and its impact and potential solutions. However, empirical research undertaken by Warrener (2010, p 142) found that during a meeting with one such platform – the Women’s Empowerment Organisation in Freetown – the participants described Sierra Leonean’s Reintegration and Rehabilitation (RR) programme as gender-blind, arguing that “it did not take into consideration the roles the girls played”, thereby “not providing for their rights and concerns”. In spite of the exclusion of countless girls in the process, it was hailed to have been a success by the Sierra Leone government and the United Nations (Mazurana and Carson, 2004). The international community and policymakers are more regularly agreeing the need to address a range of challenges in war-torn societies. Initiatives include addressing issues such as preventing future armed conflict, redressing past human rights abuses and restoring social networks damaged by armed conflict, such as family reunification (Mazurana and Carson, 2004). Thus, it is essential that any undertaking that seeks to improve conditions during or following conflict take account of issues intrinsic to matters of age and gender. LYN WARRENER See also: Child Soldiers; War Crimes Readings Gberie, L. (2005) A dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone. London: C. Hurst.

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Mackenzie, M. (2010) ‘Securitization and de-securitization: female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone’, in L. Sjoberg (ed) Gender and international security: Feminist perspectives. London: Routledge, pp 151–67. Mazurana, D. and Carson, K. (2004) From combat to community: Women and girls of Sierra Leone. Washington, DC: Women Waging Peace Policy Commission. Warrener, L. (2010) ‘The “invisible” girls of Sierra Leone’, unpublished thesis. Wessells, M. (2006) Child soldiers: From violence to protection. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

GLOBALISATION

‘Globalisation’ became a key point of reference in discussions of contemporary social change from the mid- to late 1990s onwards. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989 brought a much more extensive integration of the global economy as formerly socialist and communist states liberalised their economies, and embargos and sanctions on trade were lifted. Facilitated by improvements in transportation and communication technologies, this new round of global economic integration coincided with rising flows of people, ideas and images, leading many commentators to talk of the rise of a global consciousness, global culture and global age. Despite the widespread use of the term, ‘globalisation’ remains a contested concept in both social-scientific and popular debates, with evaluations ranging from the critical to the celebratory. Nonetheless, it remains a useful shorthand or point of reference to describe the processes of social change associated with the late 20th and early 21st century. Political scientists David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (Held et al, 1999) usefully identify three different perspectives prevalent in social-scientific debates over the nature, meaning and significance of globalisation. First, there is what they term the ‘hyper-globalist’ perspective, which generally stresses both the novelty and irreversible nature of contemporary globalisation, and more often than not is associated with those defending the spread of free market economics around the world. Next, there are the ‘sceptics’, who emphasise the continuity between global capitalism and historical forms of globalisation, such as imperialism and colonialism. Lastly, there is the ‘transformationalist’ perspective, which stresses both points of continuity and change in contemporary globalisation. Held et al include their own studies of globalisation in the ‘transformationalist’ perspective, and provide the following, relatively uncontroversial, definition of globalisation: ‘Globalisation can usefully be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social 109

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relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power’ (Held et al, 1999, p 16). A key point of debate, in this respect, has been the extent to which the ‘transcontinental flows and networks of activity, interaction and power’ have affected the territorial power and authority of contemporary nation states. The increasing capacity of transnational corporations, for instance, to organise production and channel profits in a way that escapes regulation is often cited as an example of the way in which globalisation has undermined the power of the nation state. In 2005, there were 77,000 transnational corporations worldwide, with 770,000 foreign subsidiaries, employing 62 million workers and jointly responsible for the sale of goods and services equivalent to half the gross domestic product of the world that year. The size and reach of transnational corporations (Wal-Mart alone is thought to be the world’s 44th largest economy) is considered by many to be a significant challenge to the power of nation states (O’Byrne and Hensby, 2011, pp 154–7). For some, such as the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (2012), globalisation has produced a problematic ‘separation of power from politics’. While democratic structures of decision-making remain tied to the institutions of the nation state, power has shifted to a ‘supra-national, global space, cut off from political supervision and guidance’ (Bauman, 2012). Other analysts, such as David Harvey (2007), emphasise how globalisation has, in fact, been promoted by powerful nation states, in particular, by ‘globalising’ politicians committed to free market economic ideas. In any case, what is certain is that the forces of globalisation are producing changing configurations of ‘territory, authority and rights’ (Sassen, 2006) in which scales other than the national are becoming increasingly important in the exercise and contestation of power. JOE RIGBY See also: Democracy; Neoliberalism Readings Bauman, Z. (2012) ‘Politics, the good society and Westphalian sovereignty’, Social Europe. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/2012/05/politics-the-goodsociety-and-westphalian-sovereignty/ Harvey, D. (2007) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. O’Byrne, D.J. and Hensby, A. (2011) Theorizing global studies. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Sassen, S. (2006) Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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GOVERNMENTALITY Governmentality is a concept developed by social theorist Michel Foucault (1991) and can be defined as the way in which the state exercises control over, or governs, the body of its populace through ‘action at a distance’. Foucault himself introduced governmentality during his lectures on biopolitics at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. Foucault (1991, p 88) explains that his interest in the art of government was beyond an interest in how it guided actions for men and women, being rather to understand the ‘reasoned way of governing best’ and how social institutions contribute to that best form of governing. Governmentality, for Foucault (1991), is directly related to how people act in society and are expected to act, and the art of governing occurs through various social policies, institutions and ideologies. Governmentality also refers to the way in which people are taught to govern themselves, shifting power from an allencompassing authority, like the state, and dispersing it among both populations and individuals. Governmentality can therefore be understood as how conduct is shaped, making ‘the art of governing’ an embodied experience (Foucault, 1991). According to Foucault (1991), governmentality allows for the creation of ‘docile bodies’ to be used in modern economic and political institutions. While governmentality can broadly focus on the process of governing individuals, Foucault was specifically interested in neoliberalism as a form of governmentality because of the way in which it involved individuals in the process of governing. Through neoliberalism, Foucault argued that individuals were taught to govern themselves, showing how the power of governing becomes embodied, and illustrating self-subjectivity. An explicit example of governmentality as a way to control human bodies is the way in which prisons are designed. In his work Discipline and punish, Foucault (1977) explains that early prisons designed by Jeremy Bentham were designed as a ring of cells observed by a single guard tower in the centre. Bentham called this design a Panopticon, and the panoptic design of prisons allows for a single guard to observe many prisoners. The prisoners are never aware of whether or not they are being observed, and since prisoners are never sure if they are being under external surveillance or not, they are forced to assume that they are being observed and internalise self-control of their own behaviour. The Panopticon example can also be used to metaphorically describe how a population self-censors or embodies forms of control in wider society (Foucault, 1977). Similarly, social gerontologists (researchers interested in the study of age, ageing and the life course) have also described how neoliberal governmentality includes scenarios in which a group of people is controlled through institutions or taught to 111

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govern itself. Estes, Biggs and Phillipson (2003), in particular, have been useful in showing how the US health-care system is a form of neoliberal governmentality. For example, by emphasising individual responsibility and behavioural health as a critical component of well-being, the health system as a whole attempts to have individuals govern their own bodies. Similarly, Estes, Biggs and Phillipson (2003) have shown how market-based medical systems – in which health care is thought of as a commodity – serve as a form of neoliberal governmentality. Conceptualising health care as a commodity changes the relationship that the state has with the individual: individuals must govern their own access to care rather than relying on the state to provide a necessary and desirable service. A critique of governmentality includes Kerr’s (1999) critical assessment that the concept only views power as ‘top-down’ and does not account for struggle and transformative power processes. Kerr (1999) argues that the idea of governmentality ignores individual subjective experiences and choices. For Kerr (1999), governmentality places too much emphasis on the way in which institutions of power shape human beings. He writes that the idea of governmentality ‘beheads social subjectivity’ and gives rise to the notion that humanity can never escape from systems of power and governmentality; thus underplaying human agency. JASON L. POWELL See also: Neoliberalism; State, The; State Power Readings Estes, C., Biggs, S. and Phillipson, C. (2003) Ageing, social theory and social policy. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, NY: Random House. Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’ (trans R. Braidotti and revised by C. Gordon), in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp 87–104. Kerr, D. (1999) ‘Beheading the king and enthroning the market: a critique of Foucauldian governmentality’, Science and Society, 63(2): 173–203.

GREEN CRIMINOLOGY

Green criminology is a branch of criminology that focuses on environmental crime, although a wider conceptualisation would include the analysis of environmental harms from a criminological perspective, the application of criminological thought 112

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to environmental issues or the relationship between the natural environment and criminal justice.Within the heading ‘environmental crime’, two major categories are distinguishable: primary and secondary ‘green’ crimes (Carrabine et al, 2009). Primary green crimes are those that ‘result directly from the destruction and degradation of the earth’s resources’ (Carrabine et al, 2009, p 316), and include acts of pollution, habitat destruction and animal abuse. Secondary green crimes are those relating to the flouting of rules that seek to regulate environmental disasters’ (Carrabine et al, 2009, p 318), such as illegal trafficking in wildlife or hazardous waste, or the misuse of corporate or state power in the suppression of environmental protest (up to and including the murder of activists). Other areas of research that have been presented under the ‘green’ criminology banner include the role of environmental degradation in causing crime (eg the relationship between lead pollution and violent crime, or the criminal activities of environmental protesters), the environmental impact of crime and crime prevention (eg around the cultivation and eradication of drug crops), or the possible relationship between an increased interaction with nature and a reduction in recidivism among ‘traditional’ offenders. As with other areas of criminology, ‘crime’ can be broadly or narrowly defined, referring specifically to those acts proscribed by law or to a wider range of transgressive, deviant or harmful activities. As such, green criminologists may study illegal logging, poaching and breaches of clean air or water regulations, or may focus on deforestation, hunting or pollution more generally (ie whether illegal or not). Regardless of narrow legalistic or broader zemiological definitions, environmental harm can be seen in terms of offenders, offences and victims. It follows that a variety of established criminological concepts can be applied to problems of ecological harm: causation (whether on the level of the motivation of individual offenders or the criminogenic nature of socio-economic structures); law enforcement and crime prevention; the treatment of offenders; victimisation and victimology; concepts and processes of justice; and so forth. With roots in radical traditions within criminology and other social sciences, much green criminological work focuses on the role of powerful economic institutions (especially transnational corporations) in causing environmental harm. Furthermore, it casts a critical eye on the disproportionate impact that such harm has on the powerless and economically marginalised (which, in biocentric rather than anthropocentric variations, may include non-human victims). Notions of ecological and environmental justice are used to supplement or supplant more narrowly focused ideas of criminal justice in defining and analysing environmental harm (eg White, 2011). The sub-field of environmental victimology focuses on the experiences and distribution of those exposed to the most serious impacts of ecological degradation, such as health problems, food and water shortages, loss of traditional livelihoods, or displacement from homelands. A particularly important 113

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body of work here is the study of environmental racism, where non-white populations are disproportionately exposed to pollution and other environmental harms, whether on a global or local level of analysis (eg Pellow, 2004). However, with criminalisation a particularly common governmental (and supragovernmental) response to environmentally harmful activities, environmental crimes are increasingly the focus of more traditional mainstream or administrative criminologists as well. Also, positivistic traditions such as ‘rational actor’ and ‘situational crime prevention’ theories have made significant contributions to attempts to combat crimes such as poaching and illegal deforestation. Reflecting these diverse antecedents and the complexities of interactions between the ‘social’ and ‘natural’ worlds (and also, at times, reflecting concern with the political and ideological connotations of the label ‘green’), criminological work focusing on environmental harm has also appeared under the headings eco-global criminology, conservation criminology, environmental criminology and crime science (Gibbs et al, 2010; White, 2011). Regardless of nomenclature, the criminological study of environmental issues draws on a range of theoretical and methodological traditions within criminology (positivist and interpretivist, quantitative and qualitative, orthodox and critical), as well as from the biological and ecological sciences, and shares the common goal of reducing or preventing a range of environmentally harmful activities. GARY R. POTTER See also: Animal Rights; Corporations; Crimes of the Powerful; Environmental Protection Readings Carrabine, E., Igenski, P., Lee, M., Plummer, K. and South, N. (2009) Criminology: A sociological introduction. London: Routledge. Gibbs, C., Gore, M., McGarrell, E. and Rivers, L., III (2010) ‘Introducing conservation criminology: towards interdisciplinary scholarship on environmental crimes and risks’, British Journal of Criminology, 50: 124–44. Pellow, D.N. (2004) ‘The politics of illegal dumping: an environmental justice framework’, Qualitative Sociology, 27(4): 511–25. South, N. (1998) ‘A green field for criminology? A proposal for a perspective’, Theoretical Criminology, 2: 211–33. White, R. (2011) Transnational environmental crime: Toward an eco-global criminology. London: Routledge.

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GUANTÁNAMO BAY Guantánamo Bay in south-eastern Cuba is a natural harbour leased to the US. The US occupied Guantánamo Bay after the Spanish–American War of 1898, and obtained a lease from the Cuban government in 1903 as a stipulation for the removal of US military personnel. In 1934, the US was granted a new lease agreement to occupy Guantánamo Bay in perpetuity, unless the site is either abandoned or returned by mutual agreement of the Cuban and US governments. Guantánamo Bay is also the site of an important US Navy base, and in 2002, the base served as a detention centre for suspected terrorists captured during the US’s global ‘war on terror’. On 7 October 2001, the US and the UK jointly began military operations in Afghanistan by launching Operation Enduring Freedom. The stated reason for the operation was to end the Taliban government’s protection of the Al Qaeda network and Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. Suspected terrorists who were captured during the early phase of the war were initially detained at allied military bases in Afghanistan. However, US leaders soon began considering alternative detention facilities outside of Afghanistan. One ostensible reason was because the number of prisoners became substantial, thus providing a practical reason for finding alternate facilities for long-term detention (Glazier, 2008). Another reason, not denied by US officials, was that the US wanted to transport highvalue prisoners to more secure and covert sites where they could be interrogated for important intelligence information (Rumsfeld, 2003; Fisher, 2006). The Guantánamo Bay base was selected because of its relative isolation and sound security, and (significantly) because officials concluded that it was outside the jurisdiction of the US judiciary. Thus, beginning in January 2002, detainees were transported to Guantánamo Bay. The first detainees in Guantánamo Bay were housed in an area called Camp X-Ray, a facility mostly consisting of outdoor open-air wire cages. Photographs of the first Camp X-Ray prisoners provided images of men in orange jumpsuits, often kneeling, shackled and wearing eye blinders and ear covers. US Marines guarded them, and photographs also depicted Marines escorting detainees under strong restraint. These images created a great deal of international criticism, so that for many critics the Guantánamo Bay, detentions became synonymous with perceived human rights violations from their inception. Prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay were initially interrogated using traditional and accepted methods, such as psychological manipulation, moral suasion and other techniques used by law enforcement personnel. Officials quickly concluded that these methods were ineffective for producing actionable intelligence, and detainees were thereafter subjected to harsher interrogation methods. These 115

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methods were termed ‘enhanced interrogation’ and were legally supported by attorneys assigned to the US Department of Justice, who wrote legal memoranda explaining the legal foundation for permissible enhanced interrogation, vis-àvis impermissible torture. It was determined that legally permissible enhanced interrogation methods included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, shackling in ‘stress positions’, humiliation, exposure to extreme temperatures, bright lighting and loud music. Although many of these harsh interrogation methods were used at the Guantánamo Bay facility, some of the harshest methods were applied at covert detention sites established internationally and managed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Several legal challenges, administrative decisions and judicial decisions affected policy options for the treatment of detainees. The June 2004 Rasul v. Bush US Supreme Court decision held that federal judges could hear challenges to detentions filed under writs of habeas corpus. The executive branch of government created a Combatant Status Review Tribunal and later an Administrative Review Board to review whether prisoners should continue to be detained. Review panel decisions led to some detainees being released. The Supreme Court prevented efforts to circumvent judicial review in its June 2008 Boumediene v. Bush decision, which held that Guantánamo Bay prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to challenge their detentions. The federal District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently heard several-dozen petitions brought by detainees. Although both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama expressed their desire to close the Guantánamo Bay detention centre, political realities thwarted their plans. For example, proposals to move remaining prisoners to mainland detention centres were met with strong opposition. To date, the Guantánamo Bay facility remains operational without a clear indication on when the detention programme will cease. GUS MARTIN See also: Counterterrorism; Habeas Corpus; Rendition Readings Fisher, W. (2006) ‘The worst of the worst’, TRUTH OUT, 30 April. Available at: http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/62459:william-fisher-the-worst-of-the-worst Glazier, D. (2008) ‘A self-inflicted wound: a half-dozen years of turmoil over the Guantanamo Military Commissions’, Lewis & Clark Law Review, 12: 131. Rumsfeld, D. (2003) ‘Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S. Central Command’, 21 April, declassified in part 9 July 2010. 116

H HABEAS CORPUS Charles II passed ‘habeas corpus’ in 1679 to safeguard individuals from unlawful or arbitrary imprisonment. It refers to the ‘Great Writ of Liberty’ being clearly stated in the Magna Carta, clause 39, that ‘no free man shall be imprisoned except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land’. As such, habeas corpus holds a fundamental position in the UK constitution. A petition of habeas corpus is a civil proceeding brought by a prisoner against the government official who detained him/her in order to challenge the legality of his/her detention.The petition addresses issues of procedural correctness to determine that the court made a legal or factual error rather than the issue of guilt or innocence. The Act is a remedy by which representatives of the state are brought to account for the detention of a person. Habeas corpus, meaning ‘you have the body’, requires an imprisoned person to be brought before the judge or court when determining the legality of confinement or detention. Imprisoned or detained people can make an application themselves or someone can make the application on their behalf. In order to make the process accessible to all, the application form and guidance notes are available in electronic form. Although introduced in Britain, it was extended into other countries as part of English common law, thus influencing other legal systems across the world. For the legal theorist William Blackstone (1765, cited in Ferrell, 2011), the procedural right to file a writ of habeas corpus is fundamental to preserving liberties.

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Although still in effect today, the Act has been suspended on numerous occasions in the UK, for example, during the First and Second World Wars with the use of internment and during the conflicts in Northern Ireland. Recently, detention without charge has been discussed in relation to anti-terror legislation. Examples of its suspension in the US include during the Civil War, during Reconstruction, during the Spanish–American War and during the Second World War after the bombing of Pearl Harbour. The importance and use of habeas corpus has diminished over the years with the introduction and extension of statutory protections that are now in existence to protect a person’s liberty. This was highlighted by the then UK Lord Chancellor in 2001: Despite its status, the writ’s practical importance has diminished as more flexible methods of protecting liberty have been established either by specialised statutory procedures or more generally by way of judicial review. This has led to calls either for its abolition or its merger with judicial review. Indeed, the right to challenge arrest or detention is now incorporated into international human rights standards, as evident in, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. However, there has been renewed focus on habeas corpus in light of terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the ensuing ‘war on terror’. As Ferrell (2011, p 2) highlights, ‘the right has been invoked in response to aggressive state detention practices employed against suspected terrorists’. For example, Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, which was introduced in the UK in 2001, allowed for the indefinite detention of people suspected of terrorist activities without evidence or trial. In the US, Reinhardt (2015, p 1219) argues that ‘Habeas Corpus has been transformed over the past two decades from a vital guarantor of liberty into an instrument for ratifying the power of state courts to disregard the protections of the Constitution’. Indeed, the controversies surrounding habeas corpus in the context of counterterrorism and the Camp Delta detention camp, at Guantánamo Bay, are stark and ongoing, particularly in light of the US president’s pledge to close and end internment at Guantánamo Bay, which, to date, has not been achieved.

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More recently, habeas corpus has been used to test the legality of the detention of immigrants, extradition proceedings and detention under the current Mental Health Act, as well as child custody cases. SHARON MORLEY See also: Counterterrorism; Duty of Care; Guantánamo Bay; Prisoners’ Rights Readings Ferrell, B.R. (2011) ‘Access to habeas corpus: a human rights analysis of U.S. practices in the war on terrorism’, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 20(Spring). Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1824635 Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper (2001) ‘The Administrative Court: proposed changes to primary legislation following Sir Jeffery Bowman’s review of the Crown Office list’, July. Available at: http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/bowmanrev/ bowman.htm Reinhardt, S.R. (2015) ‘The demise of Habeas Corpus and the rise of qualified immunity: the court’s ever increasing limitations on the development and infringement of constitutional rights and some particularly unfortunate consequences’, Michigan Law Review, 113(7). Available at: http://repository. law.umich.edu/mlr/vol113/iss7/3

HAGUE CONVENTION

Widespread pillage and the destruction of people and property have often been linked to the consequences of war. After the Second World War, there were calls for the recovery of cultural property taken by the Nazis, with the US being instrumental in this endeavour. This call later resulted in the introduction of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (known as the Hague Convention). It is the first international treaty to protect cultural property during times of armed conflict. The Protocol was agreed at The Hague, Netherlands, in 1954, entering into force in 1956, the Second Protocol was agreed in 1999 and came into force in 2004. The purpose of the Convention is to protect both movable and unmovable cultural heritage artefacts, ranging from archaeological sites to manuscripts and books. The aim is to protect the cultural legacy and property of states during armed conflicts.

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The Convention requires state parties to adopt protection measures, including compiling inventories, making preparations for the removal of movable artefacts and employing authorities to safeguard cultural property. Furthermore, it regulates the behaviour of states during armed conflict and military occupation to ensure the safety of cultural property and to reduce the likelihood of such property being destroyed. The Hague Convention is the oldest international agreement to protect cultural property. The Hague Convention is premised on the principle that cultural property is valuable to all people and not just citizens of the country where it resides. Article 1, Chapter 1 defines cultural objects as ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every person’. Article 3 imposes a duty on state parties to implement peacetime measures to protect their own cultural property; however, it does not specify what measures should be taken, thus giving great discretion to each state as to what measures are taken. Article 4 requires states to protect cultural property from ‘theft, pillage or misappropriation’. More recently, this has become of great importance with the destruction of archaeological sites in countries such as Iraq and Syria. A number of states, including the UK, did not ratify the First Protocol on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient protection of cultural property. For many of these states, concerns included: the lack of adequate criminal sanctions; the ambiguity of many of the terms used; and the fact that the special protection regime that it proposed was considered too political (DCMS, no date). The Second Protocol of 1999 was introduced to overcome deficiencies in the 1954 Convention. This Second Protocol created a new category of enhanced protection for cultural heritage, including legal protection at a national level for cultural property that was considered to be of particular importance. This Protocol also established the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict. The main function of this committee includes; the granting, suspension or cancellation of enhanced protection; the suspension of the implementation of the Second Protocol when it would interfere with a military objective in times of armed conflict; and consideration and distribution of funds for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. The fund provides financial assistance both in peacetime and during armed conflict for the protection of cultural property. It also provides financial assistance after armed conflict for the recovery of cultural property. Chapter 4 of the Second Protocol provides legal sanctions against serious violations in order to provide enhanced protection for cultural property. States are obliged to adopt appropriate legislation to ensure that the violations come under domestic law (Boylan, 1993). Although concerns were addressed with the introduction of the Second Protocol, UK laws are not sufficient to enable the UK to meet these obligations in full. 120

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Measures have been taken to introduce/amend UK legislation; however, to date, these measures are not fully sufficient (DCMS, no date). Many challenges still exist that undermine the aims of the Hague Convention. For example, the success of the special protection provision is limited because of practical difficulties, such as meeting the eligibility criteria for special protection status. With regard to legal protection for violations: first, Article 28 fails to provide clear guidance on which violations of the Convention can be prosecuted; second, it does not provide the mental intent required to punish such violations; and, third, there is no guidance on the minimum and maximum penalties for violations, thus hindering uniform application across states (Chamberlain, cited in Howe, 2012). Furthermore, there is a lack of enforcement, with, first, no central enforcement body and no sanctions for non-compliance, leaving compliance and enforcement to individual states (Posner, cited in Howe, 2012). Second, the Convention requires states to ‘respect cultural property but it does not provide guidance on what this entails’, thus the Convention’s ‘broad language means that states can manipulate the meanings of the words to suit their own ends’ (Howe, 2012, p 414). Third, very few states have undertaken any significant measures during peacetime to ensure protection for cultural property. Finally, Article 4(2) in the First Protocol allows for the waiving of the Convention for military necessity; however, under the Second Protocol, this has been linked to a military objective. This means that cultural property must be protected unless it interferes with a military objective and not military necessity, thus undermining the protective powers of the Convention in times of armed conflict (Chadra, 2001). SHARON MORLEY See also: United Nations, The; War Crimes Readings Boylan, P.J. (1993) ‘Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’. Available at: http://http://unesdoc. unesco.org/images/0010/001001/100159eo.pdf Chadra, N. (2001) ‘Protection of cultural property during armed conflict: recent developments’, WorldLII. Available at: http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ ISILYBIHRL/2001/12.html DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, UK) (no date) ‘Hague Convention’. Available at: http://old.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_ property/6630.aspx Howe, Z. (2012) ‘Can the 1954 Hague Convention apply to non-state actors: a study of Iraq and Libya’, Texas International Law Journal, 47(2): 403–25.

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HATE CRIME The term ‘hate crime’ came into popular use in the 1980s to describe a wide range of intimidating and often violent acts committed against groups frequently seen as deviant or stigmatised. Such acts of abuse have a long history, and in the US, hate crime is particularly identified with the persecution of African-Americans and the civil rights movement. Hate crime could be considered to mirror societal power relations, and identifying minority groups as threatening may be seen to bolster the often fragile dominance of social hierarchies. Perry (2001, p 10) suggests that hate crime ‘attempts to create simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator’s group and the “appropriate” subordinate identity of the victim’s group’. There is evidence that politicians and the rhetoric they use help to legitimate the prejudices that give rise to hate crimes. For example, Poynting and Perry (2007) cite the use of political expressions of hate and bigotry with regard to Muslims in both Canada and Australia. Some consider hate crimes to be an especially late-modern phenomenon, indicating a desire for consensus thwarted in an era of obsessive reflexivity characterised by ‘contingency, risk and ambivalence … forced on us by the decline of institutions in an age of reflexive judgement’ (McGhee, 2005, p 4). Indeed, ‘hate’ itself is not a straightforward concept. Relying on legal definitions of hate may simply reproduce an ‘uncontested acceptance of the state’s understanding of hate’ and, indeed, ‘the ways in which the interests of the state converge with the commission of particular forms of hate’ (Patel and Tyrer, 2011, p 34). Examples of narrowly ascribed cultural definitions might include the abundant negative imagery around Muslims and the ‘war on terror’ or vitriolic outbursts against immigrants and asylum seekers in the popular media. In one case, fleeing refugees from Libya were referred to as ‘cockroaches’ (Hopkins, 2014). Such language, arguably, provides a permissive context for the expression of hatred. Hate crime then appears to reflect social and political realities, and these mediated discourses contribute to drawing the boundaries of social identity against which perceptions of social difference are perceived. Much hate crime literature focuses on specific categories, typically: race or ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation and transgender. By far the greatest number of hate-related crimes are racially motivated, for example, in the UK between 2011 and 2012, out of 43,748 reported hate crimes, 35,816 (82%) involved race (Law Commission, 2014). Preventative groups have raised awareness about the diverse forms of hate crime, including: bullying and harassment through texting and abusive emails, leaving rubbish outside people’s homes, breaking windows, throwing objects, spitting, hitting, arson, and murder (see Stop Hate UK website: www.stophateuk.org). 122

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It is considered that the especially brutal aspects of some hate crimes impact by a sort of ‘vicarious traumatisation’ (Noelle, 2002) and serve as ‘message crimes’, sending out threats to the victim’s community, leaving them feeling isolated, vulnerable and powerless. Hate crimes are largely unreported, suggesting that powerlessness is a tangible part of the climate of fear that such crimes create. In some cases, police have been contacted multiple times but little or no effective action has been taken and victims are unable to access any support in an intolerable and persistent situation. Perry (2009) and others have noted the danger of seeing all hate crimes as generically similar as they are difficult to neatly define due to the diversity of groups targeted, types of acts committed and varied profiles of perpetrators. The forms in which ‘hate’ is expressed in these crimes vary enormously, being dependent on complex dynamics of social, cultural and historical contexts. Finally, the suggestion that such crimes reinforce the dominance of powerful elites in society is thrown into question by the incidence of hate crimes against subcultures. For example, in the UK, the violent attacks on largely middle-class members of Goth and Emo subcultures have been committed by those from socially and economically deprived backgrounds (see Garland, 2012; Garland and Hodgkinson, 2014). Combating hate crime effectively is difficult; it stems from complex individual and societal factors relating to individual personality or specific contextual factors like economic pressure and conflict, coupled with a sense of boredom and opportunism. Gerstenfeld (2013) suggests that thrill seeking seems to motivate hate crime more than the actions of extremist groups or even ingrained prejudices. Therefore, the trend towards harsher penalties may prove less effective at treating the complex root causes than more informed community-based interventions that employ restorative justice approaches (see Walters and Hoyle, 2011). STEVE SPENCER See also: Multiculturalism; State Policy, Rights and Multiculturalism; Violence Readings Garland, J. (2012) ‘Difficulties in defining hate crime victimization’, International Review of Victimology, 18(1): 25–37. Garland, J.M. and Hodkinson, P. (2014) ‘“F**king freak! What the hell do you think you look like?” Experiences of targeted victimisation among Goths and developing notions of hate crime’, The British Journal of Criminology, 54(4): 613–31.

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Gerstenfeld, P.B. (2013) Hate crimes: Causes, controls, and controversies (3rd edn). London: Sage. Hopkins, K. (2014) ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants’, The Sun, 17 April. Law Commission (2014) ‘Hate crime: should the current offences be extended?’, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 213. Available at: http://www. lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp213_hate_crime_summary. pdf McGhee, D. (2005) Intolerant Britain? Hate, citizenship and difference. Basingstoke: Open University Press. Noelle, M. (2002) ‘The ripple effect of the Matthew Shepard murder: impact on the assumptive worlds of members of the targeted group’, American Behavioral Scientist, 46: 173–85. Patel, T. and Tyrer, D. (2011) Race, crime and resistance. London: Sage. Perry, B. (2001) In the name of hate. New York, NY: Routledge. Perry, B. (2009) Hate crimes. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Poynting, S. and Perry, B. (2007) ‘Climates of hate: media and state inspired victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 19(2): 151–71. Walters, M.A. and Hoyle, C. (2011) ‘Exploring the everyday world of hate victimisation through community mediation’, International Review of Victimology, 18(1): 7–24.

HEGEMONY

Hegemony is the social, political and cultural domination of one group in society or wider geographical region. In Marxist theory, hegemony is the orchestrated cultural dominance of the ruling class’s ideas and values as the inevitable social order, which is willingly accepted. The Enlightenment and classical theories of legal rationality and the ‘natural and logical’ emergence of the social contract, and therein people’s rational compliance to the rule of law, exemplify early modernity’s alignment with hegemony (Beccaria, 2013 [1764]).This entrenchment of the existing social relations results in the wilful acceptance of its logic and the widespread belief that there are no practical alternatives, as those are marginalised as fundamentally unrealistic. Analysis of hegemonic values has also been widely applied to issues such as gender politics and, in particular, masculine cultures (Connell, 2005). The practices of securing hegemony are much less monolithic and omnipotent than some suggest; as these values are oppressive and contrary to the lived realities of all bar the elite, they naturally generate ‘some’ resistance. Gramsci 124

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therefore emphasised that hegemony could not be tenable without some degree of compromise in order to secure the active consent of the governed, but he noted that ‘such sacrifices and compromises cannot involve what is essential’ (cited in Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p 71). This hegemonic state project entails ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class maintains and justifies its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules’ (Gramsci, cited in Buci-Glucksmann, 1980, p 93). Capitalist hegemony has had to respond dynamically to the changing modes of production and labour relations, and, as such, it has never been secured and its legitimacy must be endlessly pursued. Therein, a balance is sought via a trade-off between despotism and ideological acceptability, explained in Thompson’s (1975, p 263) analysis of the rule of law: ‘The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just’. Thus, the pursuit of ideological hegemony helps to restrain the excesses of capitalism, as law cannot seem to be just without on occasion being such (Thomson, 1975). Problematic in analysis of hegemony is the susceptibility to caricature its victims as dupes with ‘false consciousness’. This neglects the rigour and relative coherence of the fundamental ideologies of hegemony: racism, sexism and classism. Similarly, it fails to acknowledge that the working class understands their comparative powerlessness and the long history of repeated failure of purportedly progressive movements, and even supposedly socialist governments, to tangibly change their lot. Thus, many victimised therein reluctantly bear their exploitation as a ‘fact of life’, fearful of the forces weighed against them should they not, distracted by ‘lottery win’ dreams and occasional spectacles of consumerist idolatry, personifying Marx’s ‘commodity fetishism’ (Dobra, 2010). Hegemony’s many supporters and apologists are experts in victim blaming and condoning exploitation and they utilise crude self-serving reductionist ideological clichés justifying the common-sense logic of the existing social order, epitomised in the Thatcherite clichés ‘you can’t spend more than you earn’ and ‘there is no alternative’ (Brake and Hale, 1992). It is not the intellectual rigour of such weak self-styled parables that gives them their strength; their problematic logic is rooted in core ideological values of the historic institutions of religion, law and education that buttress, as ostensibly fair, the hegemonic social order, despite its gross and everyday injustices. Contemporary regional hegemonic projects are popularised by neoliberal cultural anxieties that ‘uppity’ nation states are refusing to cow to declining Western industrial and political might (Chomsky, 2007). Thus, counter-insurgency experts proliferate and cultural hegemony has resorted to militaristic hegemony obscured by a linguistic doublespeak that clouds the reality of the practices and 125

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consequences of the war on terror (Halliday, 2010). This ability of the capitalist hegemonic power blocs to repeatedly negate real and tangible threats to their power is astounding, particularly since the ruling class is not homogeneous and is barely unified, bar their desire to maintain their power, wealth and privileges, and to continue capitalist labour exploitation. Capitalism’s interests increasingly abrogate the nation state’s interests, as the interests of transnational capital are prioritised via globalisation and industry, and commerce roams the world with an ease that migrant workers can only dream of. Thus, in hugely wealthy neoliberal nations, the excesses of capitalist exploitation abound and yet are ‘accepted’, via ideologies central to the rigour of hegemony, as the upshot of personal failings and/or alleged ‘fecklessness’. Thus, at the core of neoliberal hegemony is disorder, wherein ‘the market is to be free; the people are to be disciplined’ (Hall, 1980, p 5). LIAM McCANN See also: Authoritarian Populism; Governmentality; Imperialism; Neoliberalism; State Power Readings Beccaria, C. (2013 [1764]) ‘On crimes and punishments’, in E. McLaughlin and J. Muncie (eds) Criminological perspectives: Essential readings (3rd edn). London: Sage, pp 5–15. Brake, M. and Hale, C. (1992) Public order and private lives: The politics of law and order. London: Routledge. Buci-Glucksmann, C. (1980) Gramsci and the state. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Chomsky, N. (2007) Failed states: The abuse of power and the assault on democracy. London: Penguin. Connell, R. (2005) ‘Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the concept’, Gender and Society, 19(6): 829–59. Dobra, A. (2010) ‘What does Marx mean by the “fetishism of commodities”?’, E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy. Available at: http://cogprints. org/7127/1/dobra10b.pdf Hall, S. (1980) Drifting into a law and order society: The 1979 Cobden Trust human rights day lecture. London: Cobden Trust. Halliday, F. (2010) Shocked and awed: How the war on terror and jihad have changed the English language. London: I.B. Tauris. Thompson, E. (1975) Whigs and hunters: The origin of the Black Act. London: Penguin.

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HOLOCAUST, THE For months and years, the problem of the remote future has grown pale to them and has lost all intensity in the face of the far more urgent and concrete problem of the near future: how much will one eat today, if it will snow, if there will be coal to unload. (Levi, 1979, p 42) Levi’s biographical description of his capture, imprisonment and eventual escape from the Auschwitz Concentration Camp is a viscerally compelling account of one individual’s experience of the Holocaust. To survive without reference to the ‘remote future’ is the psychic and spiritual counterpart of the annihilation of human bodies by the death machine unleashed by Nazi Germany in the mid20th century. The Holocaust should be seen as integral to the functioning of the Nazi state, which, after coming to power in Germany in 1933, bestowed racial superiority and corresponding subhumanity to European citizens, enacting this perverse taxonomy through the Nuremberg Laws while it simultaneously began to push its boundaries eastward. Holocaust means ‘sacrifice by fire’. In the mid-1930s, the Jewish population of Europe was over 9 million; by 1945, it is estimated that at least 6 million Jews had been murdered, alongside Russians, Poles, Roma, homosexuals, communists, the disabled and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Holocaust was driven by a racial, ideological and behavioural identification of those constructed as a threat to an idealised and imaginary notion of purity, and by a utilitarian imperative to eliminate opposition. It represented a devastating elision of the discredited ‘rationality’ of eugenics and the mythological projection of destiny to be guaranteed by the triumph of the superhuman over the designated inferior. The Jewish population of Europe was a particular target. When the Nazis gained power in Germany, they systematically intimidated the domestic Jewish population by removing property and assets and encouraging emigration. The invasion of Poland and then the Soviet Union in 1941 brought in excess of 4 million Jews directly into Nazi control. Hilberg (1961) notes how this motivated a response to the so-called ‘Jewish Question’, eventually formulated at the Wannsee Conference of 1942, where it was decided that the Jews of Europe were to be exterminated regardless of any geographical boundary. This marked the inception and planning of the ‘final solution’. However, it is important to note Hilberg’s (1961) point that extermination was under way before Wannsee, particularly through the operation of mobile death squads in the Soviet Union during 1941. It was the specific promulgation of the final solution as policy, during 1942, that led to the construction of extermination camps such as Treblinka and Auschwitz. As would be expected, possible explanations are both complex and controversial and only a hint of the various contours described by the arguments can be outlined 127

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here. First, as Bauer (2002) demonstrates, when attempting to understand the particular fate of European Jews, there has been an intellectual shift from history to analysis. Bauman (1989) may be regarded as a key protagonist here. This is because as a sociologist, he relates the Holocaust not to a failure of rationality, in an otherwise linear route to modernity, but as integral to modernity itself. Indeed, it is the routine and rational systems of modern bureaucracy that facilitated physical destruction in the concentration camps. One feature of bureaucracy is the way in which the rules of instrumental rationality are designed to operate without reference to moral evaluation; in the context of a society broken by a previous war and facing the humiliation of incipient economic collapse, the ‘conceptual Jew’ (Bauman, 1989, p 40) became identified as the target for isolation, segregation and eventual annihilation. Bauman’s (1989) approach is controversial. He applies Weber’s fears regarding the adverse consequences of totalising bureaucracy to the Holocaust as a particular event. However, he firmly rejects anti-Semitism as its cause. Therefore, his analysis is ultimately non-particularistic; for Bauman (1989), the Holocaust is not something specific – ‘belonging’ to the Jews – it has universal meaning. In a convincing critique of Bauman (1989), Bauer (2002) elaborates how universality and specificity should be seen not as diametrically opposed, but rather as dialectically interrelated. The identifiable nature of both the victims and perpetrators, specifically the anti-Jewishness of the latter, generates universal explanatory significance because potential future victims and perpetrators of events, such as happened in mid-century Europe, will also be identifiable in relation to specific ethnic, national or racial characteristics. This is well summarised by his sobering recognition that ‘although the Holocaust has no precedent, it could become one’ (Bauer, 2002, p 74). His approach therefore provides a corrective to what may be regarded as the overtly functionalist orientation of Bauman by introducing an appreciation of the historically based role of intentionality in explaining the Holocaust. DAVID BALSAMO See also: Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Violence; War Crimes Readings Bauer, Y. (2002) Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bauman, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: Polity Press. Hilberg, R. (1961) The destruction of the European Jews. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle. Levi, P. (1979) If this is a man and the truce. London: Abacus.

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HONOUR-BASED VIOLENCE AND HONOUR KILLINGS Honour killing are acts of violence perpetrated against females when an honour code is perceived to have been broken. Breaking the honour code is regarded as bringing ‘shame’ upon the family and/or community. This shame is related to the perceived promiscuous behaviour of females, the rejection of arranged marriage and sexual autonomy. Thus, honour killings form part of a continuum of violence and coercion against females, including forced marriage, violence, threats and harassment, and emotional and financial abuse. In the UK, the Crown Prosecution Service (2016) defines honour-based violence as: a collection of practices, which are used to control behaviour within families or other social groups to protect perceived cultural and religious beliefs and/or honour. Such violence can occur when perpetrators perceive that a relative has shamed the family and/or community by breaking the honour code. This challenge to family and/or community values or codes is linked to normative scripts of masculine and feminine behaviour. These traditional roles include men as assertive, aggressive and challenging perceived insults, slights to family and/or community honour. Thus, males have an explicit role in maintaining women’s conformity to family and/or community. Accordingly, through conformity to traditional feminine values and social norms, women maintain their honour and that of the family and/or community. The use of the term ‘honour’ has been challenged by academics and campaigners (see, eg, Krants and Garcia-Moreno, 2005; Grewel, 2013) as they state that the crimes committed against females are dishonourable. Indeed, they argue that the term perpetuates violence against females and often results in victims’ reluctance in seeking help and support from outside the family and/or community. Historically, honour killings were perceived to be related to certain religious practices, including Islam. More recently, this view has been challenged as there is little religious support for honour killings. In fact, this practice pre-dates Islam and Christianity. Thus, this practice is not associated with a particular religion as it is recorded across Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslin and Sikh communities and, as such, crosses cultural and religious boundaries. Gill identifies three distinct features of honour killing that differentiate it from other forms of violence against females:

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1. honour killings occur within the framework of collective family structure, communities and societies; 2. they involve a premeditated act, designed to restore a societal construction of honour as a value system, norm or tradition; and 3. they are based on men’s putative right to control women’s sexual and social choices, with concomitant perceptions of women as the property of men (Gill, 2008, cited in Asquith, 2015, p 76). A further distinction is made between honour killings and domestic violence as the former is perpetrated by the community and family members, including mothers, brothers and uncles, as well as husbands and partners, while the latter is committed by husbands and/or partners. Incidences of honour killings in Western countries are increasing. A study conducted by Chesler (2010, p 4) indicates that honour killings ‘Accelerated significantly … between 1989–2009. This may mean that honour killings are genuinely escalating … or that honour killings are being more accurately reported and prosecuted, especially in the West, but also in the East’. In the UK alone, more than 11,000 cases of honour killings were recorded by police between 2010 and 2014 (Talwar and Ahmad, 2015). Research in the UK (see Dyer, 2015) has found that victims are often taken abroad to their family’s place of origin before being murdered for perceived dishonourable behaviour. In India and Pakistan, more than 2,000 honour killings are recorded each year (Laccino, 2014). However, this figure is thought to be a gross underestimation of the number of females killed in the name of honour. Reliable figures do not exist. As noted, honour killings in Western European countries are increasing; however, it is only more recently that law enforcement agencies and the courts in these countries have taken these acts seriously. Previously, honour killings were misunderstood due to ignorance and indifference. This situation was compounded by the secretive nature of honour killings and the support received from wider family and community members, making it difficult to investigate and prosecute, resulting in a low number of convictions. In combating the murder of females for perceived insults to honour to family and/ or community, many countries have introduced revisions to legislation, including the Human Rights Act in the UK. Additionally, a number of conventions aim to address such violence (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence; United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women). Despite these developments, honour killings often go unreported or ignored by law enforcement agencies worldwide. Furthermore, some countries are introducing changes to their legislation that may put more 130

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females at risk of honour killings, for example, Afghanistan has changed legislation banning relatives of an accused person from testifying against them (The Guardian, 2014). Additionally, ‘cultural relativism and political correctness often prevent the necessary steps being taken to identify and protect those at risk of honour based violence and honour killings’ (Dyer, 2015, p 32). In addition to the introduction of legislation, there is the requirement to move towards multi-agency engagement, as well as providing sufficient funding for victim support services. Raising awareness is also essential in combating honour killings, for example, in education, policing and health care. SHARON MORLEY See also: Human Rights; Multiculturalism Readings Asquith, N. (2015) ‘Honour, violence and heteronormativity’, International Journal of Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 4(3): 73–84. Chesler, P. (2010) ‘Worldwide trends in honour killings’, Middle East Quarterly, 17(2): 3–11. Crown Prosecution Service (2016) ‘Honour based violence and forced marriage’. Available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/honour_based_violence_ and_forced_marriage/ Dyer, E. (2015) ‘Honour’ killings in the UK. London: The Henry Jackson Society. Grewel, I. (2013) ‘Outsourcing patriarchy: feminist encounters, transnational mediations and the crime of “honour crimes”’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15(1): 1–19. Krants, G. and Garcia-Moreno, C. (2005) ‘Violence against women’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 59: 818–21. Laccino, L. (2014) ‘India and Pakistan account for 2000 honour killings every year’, International Business Times, 30 January. Available at: http://www.ibtimes. co.uk/india-pakistan-account-2000-honour-killings-every-year-1434501 Talwar, D. and Ahmad, A. (2015) ‘“Honour crime”: 11,000 UK cases recorded in five years’. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk.33424644 The Guardian (2014) ‘New Afghanistan law to silence victims of violence against women’, 4 February. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ feb/04/afghanistan-law-victims-violence-women

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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION Humanitarian intervention can be described as the use of military force by one or more states against another state, aimed at preventing and ending egregious human rights violations against a civilian population being perpetrated by the state at which the intervention is targeted.While no formal legal definition exists: its fundamental premise is that outside powers have the right, and perhaps, under some circumstances, the duty to intervene to protect people in other countries who are being victimised, even if what is taking place is a conflict within a State’ (Gutman et al, 2007, p 227; see also Ryniker, 2001) Distinct from ‘classical intervention’ – which is political in nature, involving one state coming to the aid of another or imposing its will by force – ‘humanitarian intervention’ challenges the premise that state sovereignty is in all instances inviolable by prioritising concern over the effect that conflict has on civilians over concern for state sovereignty. It is also distinct from humanitarian relief/ assistance, or international sanctions, although these may be used in conjunction with a humanitarian intervention to achieve the same aim of protecting civilian populations (Gutman et al, 2007). The notion of humanitarian intervention gained prominence in the 1990s, when United Nations (UN) officials and humanitarian organisations sought to operate safely in conflict-affected situations. By the end of the decade, the political discourse increasingly focused on promoting ‘moral action’ in foreign policy, and in the 2000s, rhetoric shifted to the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’. This gave weight to the notion that the UN Security Council (UNSC) should intervene to prevent atrocities but did not resolve the question of whether one or more states should act alone if consensus cannot be reached by the UNSC. The Charter of the UN mandates the UNSC to allow the use of force in situations that represent a threat to international peace and security or as a matter of individual and collective self-defence. International humanitarian law, through Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, obliges states to take action jointly or separately in accordance with the UN Charter where grave violations of that law are committed. However, there is no explicit international legal provision to undertake a military intervention to protect civilian populations. The political nature of the UNSC raises critical questions regarding the designation of, and response to, a threat. First, some commentators argue that it now seems ‘generally accepted that the Security Council can declare anything it likes to be a “threat to international peace and security”, subject not to any genuinely objective constraints of law but only to the political vetoes of its permanent members’ 132

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(Gutman et al, 2007, pp 228–9). Determinations can thus be shaped by public opinion and broader political considerations. Second, international humanitarian law stipulates that perpetrators of grave breaches be tried and prosecuted by national or international courts but stops short of mandating international military intervention; however, the UNSC toolkit extends beyond that and includes diplomacy, sanctions and military action. Third, when a unanimous UNSC decision to intervene cannot be reached, questions arise about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Legitimising factors do not denote legality under international law, and some commentators argue that law and interference are fundamentally opposed, arguing that international law precludes intervention, and where intervention takes place, the law has been abandoned (Ryniker, 2001; Gutman et al, 2007). Humanitarian imperative is sometimes used by advocates of humanitarian intervention on the basis that the rights of the civilian population to be protected from grave violations outweigh other considerations, including, for instance, the implications for political processes: ‘Within international humanitarian law … the leap from provisions providing for the delivery of humanitarian relief to military intervention is a long one, but not too long for those politically motivated to do so’ (Gutman et al, 2007, p 229). Opponents argue that state sovereignty is inviolable and that the ultimate impact that military intervention has on civilians is difficult to estimate. Ultimately, the international political community must balance the obligation to prevent human rights abuses with the need to prevent instability arising from unauthorised interventions (Walling, 2015). Regardless of the grounds for the intervention and the status of UNSC authorisation, where armed force is used, international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles apply. The latter are critical to providing life-saving humanitarian assistance, and to preventing any conflation between armed action and humanitarian actors, which risks a threat to the safety of humanitarian personnel and operations, as well as a narrowing of humanitarian space. KAREN MURPHY See also: Feminist Security Studies; International Humanitarian Law; Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Readings Gutman, R., Rieff, D. and Dworkin, A. (2007) Crimes of war (2nd edn). London: W.W. Norton & Company. Ryniker, A. (2001) ‘The ICRC’s position on “humanitarian intervention”’, International Review of the Red Cross, 83(842): 527–32.

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Walling, C.B. (2015) ‘Human rights norms, state sovereignty, and humanitarian intervention’, Human Rights Quarterly, 37(2): 383–413.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The historical construction of ‘human rights’ defies easy explanation. For some, evidence of human rights values around power, justice and freedom can be ‘seen in the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1792–50 bc) … and the [edicts of Emperor] Ashoka of India (c. 597–38 bc)’ (Freeman, 2011, p 15). For others, a recognisable concept of human rights can only be linked back to the European Enlightenment. During this period, Hobbes (1651) argued that man gives up his natural freedom to a sovereign ruler in order to be protected from the natural freedoms of others. Hobbes posited that this social contract would bring about stability and social order (see Macpherson, 1962). Other Enlightenment thinkers engaged more explicitly with individual rights themselves. Locke (1689) viewed the natural state of individuals as being largely peaceful. A government could act as the best guarantor of an individual’s life, liberty and property, but could rightfully be removed when they failed to protect these rights and the public good (see Macpherson, 1962). Such ‘natural rights’ arguments can be used to support innate dignity and universal human rights, even if the Enlightenment positions of Hobbes and Locke were narrower. Although Hobbes recognised the personhood of women, his language is deeply patriarchal, and Locke’s concern for rights did not curtail his support for colonialism. Other Enlightenment thinkers disputed any relationship between rights and nature. For Bentham (1834, cited in Bedau, 2000), the idea of natural rights was ‘nonsense upon stilts’. He offered a different formulation in which rights were created by law and were only defensible if they sought to promote the ‘greatest good’. Such utilitarianism rejects natural rights and can also justify torture when viewed through the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario so beloved of philosophers. In this scenario, authorities have a suspected ‘terrorist’ in their custody who has (or is assumed to have) knowledge of a bomb primed and ready to explode, killing those around it. Utilitarianism, at its most extreme, justifies torture for the purposes of saving the lives of others. The unpredictability of torture in gaining accurate information and the low likelihood that all elements of this hypothetical scenario would be present in reality have not prevented it from appearing in numerous media depictions and philosophical debates. Discussions around human rights have crystallised around tensions between universalist and cultural relativist approaches. The universalist position understands rights as ‘universal’, that is, that rights apply to all, regardless of age, ‘race’, gender, 134

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class, religion, politics, nation or other category. Such thinking is explicitly referred to in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations, 1948), which states that ‘the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. The document sets out ‘negative’ civil and political rights, which limit state action, such as freedom from torture, but also imputes ‘positive’ social and economic obligations onto states to, for example, provide social security. Despite the existence of the UDHR (United Nations, 1948) and numerous binding international treaties, tensions around the role of culture in legitimising rights remain. Arguments in support of cultural relativism often emerge from the belief that the dominant conceptualisation of human rights reflects Western values and is an attempt at ‘cultural imperialism’. The relativist intention to critique imperialism and to recognise the role of culture is well-intentioned and has face value, particularly when ‘human rights’ are misappropriated to justify armed intervention for example, or when organisations like the International Monetary Fund make aid conditional on a state’s movement towards a free market economy. Yet, a closer reading of the workings of international human rights treaties challenges the ‘Western rights disguised as universalism’ critique. Too often, theoretical claims of cultural relativism exaggerate differences between cultures and ignore differences within. It is difficult to talk, for example, of a ‘Western penal culture’ when the US ‘supermaxes’ its penitentiaries and executes its citizens, while Sweden closes its prisons. Also, reproductive freedoms in (most of) the UK contrast sharply with those of Ireland. Discourses around ‘Asian values’ similarly falsely homogenise the lives of billions of people. In practice, cultural relativist critiques of universalism downplay the significance of the vagueness of rights language contained in international treaties, the space made for culture in qualified rights or the existence of reservation regimes that allow states to ‘drop out’ of many supposedly ‘universal’ human rights obligations. LISA WHITE See also: Amnesty International; International Human Rights; Responsibility to Protect (R2P); Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Bedau, H.A. (2000) ‘“Anarchical fallacies”: Bentham’s attack on human rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 22(1): 261–79. Donnelly, J. (2003) Universal human rights in theory and practice (2nd edn). London: Cornell University Press. Freeman, M. (2011) Human rights: An interdisciplinary approach (2nd edn). Cambridge: Polity Press. 135

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Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Locke, J. (1689) Two treatises of government. London: Awnsham Churchill Macpherson, C.B. (1962) The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations (1948) ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking is not a new phenomenon.There are historical continuities in the commodification of people, from state-sponsored slave-trading systems and other forms of labour servitude in the 17th and 18th centuries, to the modern global traffic in men and women and body parts. In the contemporary context, human trafficking as a social problem is shaped by the tensions and inequalities associated with globalisation and a differential freedom of movement in a stratified world order. Human trafficking takes many different forms and occurs largely among vulnerable populations. Despite media reports and policy statements that human trafficking is widespread and on the rise, there remains an absence of reliable statistical data. There is no sound methodology to estimate the number of people trafficked. More importantly, critics have argued that ‘poor information, presented as fact, contributes to poor decision making and sometimes highly damaging, unintended outcomes’ (Gallagher, 2014). One of the difficulties in measuring the trafficking problem is that ‘human trafficking’ remains an imprecise and highly contested term. There are multiple, sometimes oppositional, understandings of what constitutes trafficking and who counts as a trafficked victim. In the trafficking discourse, sexual exploitation has attracted the greatest amount of attention, for a number of reasons: a conflation of trafficking with prostitution; an anti-prostitution stance shared by political conservatives, the religious Right, feminist abolitionists and other moral entrepreneurs; and media fascination with morality tales of women and girls working as ‘sex slaves’. In this dominant paradigm, only the trafficked persons who conform to the image of an ‘ideal victim’ (see Christie, 1986) in the hierarchy of trafficking victimhood based on self-presentation and individualised moral worthiness (eg no prior involvement in the sex industry) can capitalise on its associations, expect compassion and access service provisions. In contrast, other forms of exploitation, such as the forced or bonded labour of men and the domestic servitude of women, tend to be seen as less politically significant or morally offensive in the trafficking discourse. Labour trafficking often exists as part of a continuum of abuse in the labour conditions and relations 136

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in mainstream economic sectors, especially in so-called ‘dirty, dangerous, difficult jobs’. Nevertheless, as critics have argued, ‘in the absence of a global political consensus on minimum employment rights … it [is] extremely difficult to come up with a neutral, universal yardstick against which “exploitation” can be measured’ (Anderson and Rogaly, 2005, pp 17–18). There are also paradoxes about what is to be done about trafficking. In principle, trafficked persons are to be dealt with as victims of crime and human rights violations, rather than as criminals: they should not be prosecuted, detained or punished because of their irregular migration or labour status. In practice, there is constant slippage in anti-trafficking debates between controlling illegal immigration and human trafficking along gendered and racialised lines. Many irregular migrants are criminalised and immobilised by state authorities in the name of trafficking control while trafficked victims are arrested as immigration offenders, processed in the criminal justice/immigration control apparatus, and incarcerated in immigration detention centres. As such, trafficking control and other border policing strategies have to be understood in the context of increasingly punitive state responses in controlling an ‘underclass’ of unwanted migrants across the global North–South divide. Finally, the expansion of paternalistic state protection in anti-trafficking interventions raises key questions about the gendered impact of trafficking control on migrants. Rescue operations, gender-based bans on migration and fear-based sex trafficking prevention campaigns often target girls and women as at-risk population groups and employ messages that discourage migration. However, rather than reduce the problem of exploitation, such policies and practices tend to deny women their rights as full citizens, reduce whatever oversight and protection women might have had as legal migrants, and push them into the hands of more organised criminal groups, more dangerous routes and more vulnerable situations. MAGGY LEE See also: Globalisation; Organised Crime Readings Anderson, B. and Rogaly, B. (2005) ‘Forced labour and migration to the UK’, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Available at: http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/Forced_labour_in_UK_12-2009.pdf Christie, N. (1986) ‘The ideal victim’, in E. Fattah (ed) From crime policy to victim policy: Reorienting the justice system. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp 17–30.

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Gallagher, A. (2014) ‘The global slavery index is based on flawed data – why does no one say so?’, The Guardian, 28 November. Available at: http://www. theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/nov/28/globalslavery-index-walk-free-human-trafficking-anne-gallagher Lee, M. (2011) Trafficking and global crime control. London: Routledge. Lee, M. (2014) ‘Gendered discipline and protective custody of trafficking victims in Asia’, Punishment and Society, 16(2): 206–22.

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I IDENTITY CARDS Identity cards are documents that are expected to identify individuals and authenticate their claim to an identity. Variations of identity documents such as driving licences and passports have come to be a ubiquitous part of modern life for many people globally. However, national identity cards remain a contested and widely debated topic in the realms of academia, policymaking and governance. Identity cards may be thought of as a small plastic item with the details of a person, their picture and increasingly a microchip with biometric data, but this view of identity cards is just the tip of the iceberg; the actual assemblage of power and institutional links contained in the accompanying national identity registers are submerged beneath the surface and often beyond the view of the individual who is identified and authenticated in this manner. As a political technology of governance, the identity card mediates between the social and technological realms by mapping entitlement to identity, ‘sorting’ people and legitimating the administrative terms of their relationship to the state (see Lyon, 2009). Historically, there are cases of identity cards being introduced by governments during wartime as a temporary measure, but it is only in late modernity that there has been a consistent effort on the part of both governments and commercial organisations (especially technology companies) to introduce identity cards during times of peace. For example, during the First World War, basic paper identity cards were introduced in the UK and used for the purposes of conscription (studies find other concurrent rationales, ranging from administrative to financial), and the first national register lasted from 1915 to 1919. When identity cards were 139

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introduced again in 1939, they fared better because they had an inbuilt ‘parasitic vitality’ since they were tied in with people’s entitlement to getting food rations. Even so, ‘function creep’ (a proliferation of the number of additional uses of such cards beyond those initially intended) meant that they became unpopular and were scrapped in 1952. In 2006, the UK Labour government created a National Identity Register and introduced the cards again but the Identity Cards Act 2006 was repealed in 2010 by the Identity Documents Act 2010 during the term of the Coalition government. The rationale(s) given for introducing identity cards in different places is a combination of crime control, immigration, security, anti-terrorism and curbing ‘benefit fraud’ (it may also mention efficiency, identity theft or e-government). The actual, perceived and manufactured drivers of identity card rationales rarely overlap well, and the type of legislation that introduces them is important in order to address function creep. In practice, the effectiveness of identity cards is questioned since privacy and civil rights campaigners argue that identity cards (including those with biometric information) have been a target of fraud, and the centralisation of information plus interoperability across borders increases risk since technological capabilities are not invulnerable (see, eg, Neumann and Weinstein, 2001). They also ask about the social justice impact of such a culture of control and surveillance on those who are vulnerable and disadvantaged and may be disproportionately policed. Identity cards are resisted in the UK and the US (often on grounds of civil liberties); Australia and Canada also do not have them, though many European countries have mandatory or voluntary systems (studies find that voluntary systems end up having similar effects as mandatory ones since the having of cards becomes an expectation over time; see Beck and Broadhurst, 1998, pp 426–8). In contrast, India, China and countries in the Middle East have piloted identity card schemes that have not been resisted in this manner. In Hong Kong, the cards are often considered a success, and in Malaysia, the MyKad has been integrating numerous services into one card (for different perspectives, see the essays in Bennett and Lyon, 2008). The use of such identity cards not only ‘fixes’ a person’s identity, but may do so in ways that affect their choice of group identification. Especially problematic have been identity cards that include information on ethnic origin (such classification has been seen as an enabling or facilitating factor in ethnic cleansing and in genocides such as the Rwandan genocide; see Fussell, 2003) or religious beliefs (this has been an issue in places including Greece and Turkey). Identity cards

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continue to be the focus of research historically, internationally, in terms of their attributes/drivers/incentives and in terms of surveillance studies. NITASHA KAUL See also: Border Control; Data Protection; Immigration; Surveillance Readings Beck, A. and Broadhurst, K. (1998) ‘Policing the community: the impact of national identity cards in the European Union’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(3): 413–31. Bennett, C. and Lyon, D. (eds) (2008) Playing the identity card: Surveillance, security and identification in global perspective. London: Routledge. Fussell, J. (2003) ‘Genocide and group classification on national ID cards’, in C. Watner and W. McElroy (eds) National identification systems: Essays in opposition. Jefferson: McFarland and Company, pp 55–69. Lyon, D. (2009) Identifying citizens: ID cards as surveillance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Neumann, P.G. and Weinstein, L. (2001) ‘Risks of national identity cards’, Communications of the ACM, 44(12): 176.

IMMIGRATION

Immigration refers to the movement of people outside their country of birth, to a country that they wish to settle in and become a permanent resident or gain formal citizenship. There are a variety of push and pull factors for immigration, including: the lack of access to resources and services; war and conflict; political persecution; economic deprivation or unemployment; and for social and family betterment reasons. Immigration and, specifically, the decision to leave one’s country of birth, family and friends, and to move to an unfamiliar society, is a process that can be emotionally, physically, culturally and financially stressful. Yet, it can also be a process that is full of hope in its offer of opportunities to succeed. Immigration has been a feature of society for a very long time. Some relatively recent notable patterns of immigration include: Eastern Europeans to the US and Canada in 1918; the British to Australia in 1919; Indians, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans to the UK from 1947 onwards; North Africans to France, Spain and Italy in the 1950s; and the Vietnamese to Malaysia, Australia and the US in the mid-1970s. The number of migrants permitted into a country is influenced by that specific country’s policy on migration. Many countries, such as the UK and Australia, have an entry tariff, often in the form of a points-based system. For instance, in the UK 141

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system, points are awarded based on factors such as qualifications, future expected earnings and English-language skills. It has been argued that such a system would ensure that only migrants who could easily integrate and contribute to the ‘host’ society would enter the country – thus ensuring that immigration strengthens rather than drains a country’s resources. This is a key argument behind the use of so-called citizenship tests, such as the ‘Life in the UK’ test – also commonly known as the ‘British citizenship test’ – which was introduced in November 2005 across the UK (Patel, 2016). Although policymakers suggest that immigration policy is fair, albeit increasingly restrictive, over the years, critics have however highlighted its discriminatory nature, especially in terms of race, ethnicity and country of origin. Restrictive immigration policy often targets people of black and minority ethnic background, harnessing xenophobic sentiments while, at the same time, stoking irrational fears in wider society. For instance, black and minority ethnic immigrants are often presented as ‘job-takers’ and blamed for high unemployment rates among the ‘native’ population. They are also blamed for a range of criminal activities and considered to be a drain on resources and services, such as education and health care, as well as bringing in unwanted, or incompatible, religious beliefs and cultural traditions (Garner, 2007). A quick scan of the international press on any given day illustrates the staunch fear and hatred with which immigrants have come to be viewed. This helps to gain support for increasingly restrictive policies. For example, consider Britain’s tightening of the entry criteria via the Immigration Act 1971 (which favoured immigration of those people who came from ‘white’ Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, South Africa and Canada), and the UK’s later use of the ‘citizenship test’ as a way of determining those it considered relatively worthy of being allowed to be in the country. Similar policies are also found in the American, Canadian and Australian citizenship tests, which, along with the UK test, have been criticised for being unfair and discriminatory towards black and minority ethnic groups. Indeed, immigration is viewed within such a negative context that a rational debate about policy and practice is limited. Contrary to popular belief, research has found that immigrants are not a burden in the ways that they are perceived to be. In fact, they generally contribute positively to the economy, and thus cost less than they contribute. Despite this, though, the rights and liberties of immigrants are curtailed on a regular basis, and immigrants face a barrage of hostility and the denial of equal access to goods and services. Their citizenship status is constantly challenged to the extent that they are often considered to be lesser citizens or (unwanted) ‘guests’ of the ‘host’ country. Indeed, immigrants are often treated as second-class citizens, as was most recently illustrated with Canada’s passing of Bill C-24, which officially created a two-tier citizenship system whereby people who have immigrated to Canada

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(as well as those Canadians with another nationality, and those eligible to obtain another nationality) can be stripped of their citizenship. TINA G. PATEL See also: Border Control; Citizenship; Forced Migration Readings Cornelisse, G. (2010) Immigration detention and human rights: Rethinking territorial sovereignty. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Garner, S. (2007) Whiteness. Abingdon: Routledge. Jacobson, D. (1997) Rights across borders: Immigration and the decline of citizenship. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Patel, T. (2016) Race and society. London: Sage. Voss, K. and Bloemraad, I. (2011) Rallying for immigrant rights: The fight for inclusion in 21st century America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

IMPERIALISM

At its most fundamental level, imperialism refers to forms of domination over the political, social and economic life of peoples. It can be used to describe the Japanese, Ottoman and Soviet ‘Empires’ for example, but most anglophone scholarship refers predominantly to European imperialism and, more recently, to US-led expansion. Imperialism underpins related practices of colonialism, yet may operate in more diffuse and indirect ways. Imperialism and its consequences have shaped relationships between peoples, nations and states through the construction of borders, the control of resources and the imposition of markets. It has also amended or replaced pre-existing social, political and legal institutions and contributed to the policing of all aspects of cultural life – right through from dominant languages to freedoms of sexual expression.The practice of imperialism has also dispossessed communities, perpetuated and furthered inequality, and fuelled genocide. Following Young’s (2001) formulation, imperialism can be understood as the concept underlying practices of colonialism, and references to the former often include the study of colonialism as a means of exploring a particular aspect of imperialism. Colonialism has a long history, but most anglophone attention usually refers to the colonial empire building of European nations, primarily France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain, with occasional references to Belgium, Germany and Italy. The label of ‘European colonialism’ is valid in 143

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that the geographical spread of European power has been significant in its reach across many areas of the world, particularly since the 15th century onwards, and yet such labels present a false image of European homogeneity, hiding the complexity and violence of empire building within Europe, such as in the English control over Ireland. What is without question, however, is that imperialism by some powerful and wealthy European states was supported by range of colonial ideologies. Said (1993, p 9) defines imperialism as ‘the practice, the theory, the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan cent[re] ruling a distant territory … [which] lingers … in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices’. As such, imperialism incorporates and relies upon particular ideological formations, in which people are often ‘othered’, dehumanised and/or destroyed. Through imperialism, ‘civilisation’ was to be viewed through a very narrow lens, which failed to recognise (or purposefully ignored) pre-existing social, cultural, political and economic structures. The language of ‘terra nullius’ in Australia denied the existence of Aboriginal societies (both in actuality and in the abstract), just as the 15th-century language of the ‘New World’ and ‘discovery’ obfuscated the existence of indigenous peoples in the Americas. The growth of scientific racism and a deeply racialised anthropology became particularly influential in the imperialism of the 19th century, leading to further dehumanisation. The demarcation of people as ‘savages’ facilitated a cognitive dissonance that enabled violence and brutality against them. For those that survived, the ‘white man’s burden’ would be to bring them to ‘civilisation’, which even in its most benevolent forms, still involved forced acculturation, attempts to control belief systems and the disruption and/or destruction of preexisting social, political and economic structures. Such representations of the ‘other’ have – as Agozino (2003) rightly asserts – survived into the supposedly ‘post-colonial’ era of the 21st century. ‘Globalisation’ has largely come to replace the language of imperialism, with private companies increasingly joining state powers in shaping the trajectory of capital. The Leninist call to understand imperialism as the natural extension of capitalist economy resonates just as strongly today, as transnational corporations seek out cheaper labour, pressure disempowered communities into environmental destruction and collude with governments to restrict workers’ rights and freedoms. As Harvey (2003, p 15) argues in The new imperialism: ‘free trade and open capital markets have become primary means through which to advantage the monopoly powers based in the advanced capitalist countries that already dominate trade, production, services, and finance within the capitalist world’. In addition to this, the ‘war on terror’ has been used by states to create new opportunities to make profits, expand geopolitical influence and strengthen what Robinson (2014) calls the ‘military–security–industrial–construction–engineering–petroleum complex’. Furthermore, poorer states – often those formerly colonised – are pulled into 144

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the orbits of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and ‘given’ aid conditional on increasing privatisation and free market reform. Although resistance movements do exist and have made some gains, for example, around political independence for former colonial states, the ‘new imperialism’ described by Harvey (2003) has and will continue to impact upon the sociocultural, political and economic futures of both the ‘global North and South’. LISA WHITE See also: Hegemony; State Power; Theories of the State Readings Agozino, B. (2003) Counter-colonial criminology: A critique of imperialist reason. London: Pluto Press. Harvey, D. (2003) The new imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robinson, W.I. (2014) Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Said, E. (1993) Culture and imperialism. New York, NY: Knopf. Young, R.J.C. (2001) Postcolonialism: A historical introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.

INSECURITY

Insecurity is rooted in notions of threat, vulnerability and uncertainty. To be economically, socially or physically insecure is to be vulnerable to various threats that render survival uncertain. Much of modern Western political philosophy is predicated on the ubiquity of insecurity in human relations and, consequently, the legitimacy of political authority has been premised on the ability of the state to mitigate it. Scholarship from disciplines such as International Relations has also theorised on how conditions of uncertainty at the international level, resulting from a state of international anarchy, is an important dynamic affecting state behaviour. Thus, human affairs are often understood through the prism of an inescapable condition of insecurity. If insecurity is universally undesirable, it follows that security, as its opposite, must be universally desirable, and if insecurity exists in opposition to the desirable condition of security, both concepts must be understood together. Realist International Relations scholarship posed questions regarding who and what the referent object of security should be (normally the state) and who and what poses legitimate threats to this referent object. In this framework, security is the absence of threat and uncertainty. Perfect security is, at least, theoretically possible 145

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by identifying objective threats and formulating effective (usually emergency) responses to them. The claim of the existence of objective threats reinforces the notion of security as a universal, public good, but such a position is by no means certain. The so-called Paris School of critical security studies has challenged the view that security and insecurity are easy opposites. Rather, scholars working in this framework argue that the way in which security is defined determines conditions of insecurity. Thus, identifying, articulating and responding to insecurities is a mode of governmentality that draws the lines of fear for individuals and for collectives, and is supported by the emergence of professional networks of security agencies that attempt to monopolise regimes of truth around danger and threat (Bigo, 2006; CASE Collective, 2006). Furthermore, security is no longer an apolitical universal value; rather, insecurity becomes ‘a politically and socially constructed phenomenon’ (Huysmans, 2006, p 2). This position does not deny the existence of material threats; rather, it argues that the framing of a particular issue within a security framework is the result of social and political processes that determine who has legitimate claims to the security knowledge/ expertise necessary to identify security threats, and, subsequently, who and what should be feared. Other critical approaches to security have also argued that security practice is more than a simple reaction to existential security threats, arguing that a particular experience of security/insecurity is partly constituted by discourses of danger and identity attached to particular issues. Thus, the question of who and what constitutes a security issue becomes one of how security identities (referent objects) are created (Campbell, 1998; Fierke, 2015). Building on this discursive turn, Huysmans (2006, p 4) refers to ‘domains of insecurity’, which broaden the notion of insecurity beyond the naming of threats to a definition that recognises the processes behind the political and institutional framing of a policy issue that place it within a security field. However, ‘domains of insecurity’ are not constituted by discourse alone, but embedded in technocratic processes involving security technology, expert knowledge and routine and professional competition. This renders the politics of insecurity as a series of discursive and technocratic security processes that are applied to policy issues, but also concerns the nature of the political more generally. When security discourses and techniques are invoked, a different kind of politics is permitted in which security, however defined, is privileged over the rights and liberties of individuals subject to the state. For example, wholesale surveillance and derogations of human rights in the name of the ‘war on terror’ are only possibly because of the particular version of politics articulated by that domain of insecurity, which, in Huysmans’ (2006) view, pushes the politics of insecurity into a debate about the nature and limits of political organisation and social relations. ORLA NÍ CHEALLACHÁIN 146

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See also: Civil Liberties; Exceptional State; Feminist Security Studies Readings Bigo, D. (2006) ‘Globalized (in)security: the field and the ban-opticon’, in D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (eds) Illiberal practices of liberal regimes: The (in)security games. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp 5–49. Campbell, D. (1998) Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press. CASE (Critical Approaches to Security in Europe) Collective (2006) ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: a networked manifesto’, Security Dialogue, 37: 443–87. Fierke, K.M. (2015) Critical approaches to international security. Cambridge: Polity Press. Huysmans, J. (2006) The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU. London: Routledge.

INTELLIGENCE

Military tactician Sun Tzu wrote in his seminal piece, The art of war, that ‘[t]he reason why the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy wherever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge’ (Tzu, in Richards, 2010, p 5). In contemporary parlance, foreknowledge can be considered synonymous with intelligence. The primary benefit of intelligence, then, is to provide a ‘client’ with advanced knowledge so that they may conduct their affairs with the best possible advantage. Intelligence is often misunderstood to refer exclusively to the raw data that are collected in a clandestine fashion. While intelligence may well include raw data, the final intelligence picture may be obtained not only from secret sources, but also open sources of information. Indeed, Richards (2010, p 3) makes an apt point when suggesting that distinctions between intelligence, data and information are somewhat irrelevant outside of the Anglo-American vernacular: ‘[I]n French the word for intelligence (renseignement) is the same as for “research”, while Chinese languages make no distinction between information and intelligence. In German the word (Nachrichten) is synonymous with “news” or “information”’. When this is taken into account, one can see that intelligence has, in one way or another, always informed interactions between individuals and groups. Intelligence remains a critical aspect of statecraft that, certainly in Western states, has become increasingly and perhaps contradictorily public post-11 September 2001 (9/11). Indeed, ‘intelligence is more than just a theoretical construct – it is also a practical activity with very real consequences’ (Richards, 2010, p 3). While an intelligence 147

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report, or estimate, will be developed and presented in a manner devoid of political input, it will invariably provide the basis for action (or inaction), such as the distribution of a state’s military assets or, indeed, intervention, up to and including war. Intelligence, simply put, is the interpretation and development of information. The development of intelligence can be captured by an understanding of the six-stage traditional intelligence cycle (Tembo, 2014, p 53). In the first stage, the requirements and/or needs of the customer are identified. The customer may be an individual, an organisation or a government who requires information related to a specific theme, such as security. The second stage builds on the first by planning how data will be gathered and from what sources. One key question asked during this second stage may well include: will this data be drawn from Human Intelligence Assets (HUMINT), Electronic Signals (SIGINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) or from all three? At stage three, data are collected, while at stage four, they are processed. At stage four, this processing involves bringing together the raw data and cross-referencing and triangulating initial observations where possible. In stage five, the final analysis is undertaken to validate the data and to insure that they meet the requirements and/or needs of the customer. A report is also produced that is disseminated in stage six. This report provides an accessible interpretation of the raw data that have been gathered and processed in earlier stages. Following this sixth and final stage, customers may well develop further requirements and/or needs, and, as such, the cycle of planning, collection, intelligence, analysis and dissemination begins afresh. In many regards, therefore, ‘[i]ntelligence work rests on a form of historiography. It rests on a sense of past as well as of present and future events; that is, on an interpretation of the relevant history’ (Dover and Goodman, 2011, p 1), and, as such, the work of an intelligence analyst is never fully complete. Intelligence may be considered to be the systematic collection and interpretation of data. Intelligence-based reports may be from clandestine sources, open sources or, indeed, both. What distinguishes intelligence from raw data is the processing and analytical stages, as described in the traditional intelligence cycle outlined earlier. It should be noted that an intelligence report is only as good as the raw data fed into it and the analysis that is undertaken. As such, a good intelligence analyst will also have a good understanding of the raw data and the credibility of the sources from which they were obtained. EDGAR B. TEMBO See also: Counterterrorism; Data Protection; Surveillance

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Readings Dover, R. and Goodman, M. (2011) Learning from the secret past: Cases in British intelligence history. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2013) In spies we trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Richards, J. (2010) The art and science of intelligence analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tembo, E. (2014) US–UK counter-terrorism after 9/11 – a qualitative approach. London: Routledge.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been described by Thirlway (2010: 589) as ‘a standing mechanism available for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, to the extent that they wish to make use of it’. Although often referred to as the ‘World Court’, the term is misleading in implying an institution enjoying broad jurisdiction over international disputes when, in fact, its jurisdiction in any given case is dependent upon the willingness of the parties concerned to have it heard by the ICJ. The composition and operation of the ICJ is governed by its statute, which is annexed to the United Nations (UN) Charter, the court essentially functioning as the UN’s judicial organ. Created at the same time as the UN, the ICJ replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had served as the judicial arm of the League of Nations system, and on which the ICJ is closely modelled. The ICJ sits in The Hague, Netherlands. The ICJ is composed of 15 judges, who are each elected by the UN Security Council and General Assembly for an initial term of nine years, although they are eligible for re-election. Judges serve in their individual capacity and are not representatives of their national states. They are expected to be ‘persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law’ (Article 2, Statute of the ICJ). However, no two judges may serve concurrently who are nationals of the same state, and by convention, one judge will be elected from each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. There are two aspects of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, these being contentious and advisory. The ICJ was intended to function as a judicial body capable of resolving international disputes, and, as such, hears cases involving contentious matters brought by states against one another. Only states may be parties to proceedings before the ICJ. In light of the growing significance of non-state actors on the global level, for example, as parties to armed conflict and the instigators of terrorist 149

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actions, commentators such as Crawford and Grant (2007) have suggested that this constitutes a major limitation placed upon the role played by the ICJ. Another major limitation of the ICJ is the consensual nature of its jurisdiction. It may only hear cases where the parties concerned consent to it doing so. States may recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ unconditionally and on a permanent basis, or may consent to its jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. States may also place conditions on their consent to the ICJ having jurisdiction over cases involving them, for example, by excluding certain matters from its jurisdiction or providing that their consent is conditional on other states providing reciprocal consent. In practice, very few contentious cases are heard by the ICJ. Since 2000, it has typically heard three or four cases per year. In some cases, however, the ICJ has made important pronouncements on fundamental norms of international law. For example, in the Nicaragua case – which has come to serve as a key reference point for international lawyers – it made a number of observations in respect of the rules pertaining to the use of force by states. Judgments of the ICJ are, under Article 60 of its statute, to be regarded as final and without appeal. In practice, however, the ICJ has no means of enforcing its judgments. The ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction arises under Article 96 of its statute, which permits the UN Security Council and General Assembly to ask the Court for ‘an advisory opinion on any legal question’. This is potentially helpful where a particular issue proves controversial and there is a lack of consensus among the international community. In such cases, the ICJ’s opinion could be useful in settling the matter. However, the ICJ’s opinion is only advisory and has no direct legal impact on any given dispute or situation. Advisory opinions have been sought from the ICJ on several matters. These have included the powers enjoyed by the UN, the status of the Western Sahara, the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, Israel’s construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories and Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia. The criticism has sometimes been made of the Court, however, that it is often reluctant to pronounce in unambiguous terms on politically sensitive matters. GARY WILSON See also: League of Nations; United Nations Security Council Readings Crawford, J. and Grant, T. (2007) ‘International Court of Justice’, in T.G. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) The Oxford handbook on the United Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 193–216. Thirlway, H. (2010) ‘The International Court of Justice’, in M. Evans (ed) International law (4th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 589–617. 150

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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS International criminal courts are judicial bodies concerned with the application of international criminal law, the branch of international law regulating the criminal responsibility of individuals responsible for offences that are considered so grave that they are of concern to the international community as a whole and, thus, are proscribed at the international level. These so-called international crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. In the aftermath of the First World War, efforts were made to prosecute the nationals of the defeated powers responsible for serious violations of international law. However, these initiatives were frustrated by considerations of a primarily political nature (Bassiouni, 2014).The failure of this first attempt at enforcing international justice provided the necessary impulse to the Allies during the Second World War to ensure that the major criminals of the main Axis Powers (Germany and Japan) would be punished at the end of the war. For this purpose, the victorious powers established two International Military Tribunals (IMTs) in Nuremberg and Tokyo.Although the IMTs have been criticised as manifestations of victors’ justice (eg Erhard, 1949), they represented a major breakthrough in the development of international criminal law, which laid the foundation for modern international criminal courts. In the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings, United Nations (UN) organs worked on the development of international criminal law and, in particular, on the elaboration of the statute of a permanent international criminal court. However, these efforts were suspended during the Cold War, and it was not until the early 1990s that the civilian massacres that unfolded in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda shocked the world’s conscience and prompted the UN Security Council to establish two ad hoc international criminal tribunals following the Nuremberg model. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were created as subsidiary organs of the Security Council whose jurisdictions were circumscribed to the international crimes committed within the geographical and temporal limits of the conflicts in the Balkans and Rwanda, respectively. Their achievements have been enormous in terms of the refinement of the substance and procedure of international criminal law, the unprecedented conviction of heads of states for international crimes, and the respect for the due process rights of the accused (Schabas, 2006). The successes of the ad hoc tribunals contributed to the creation of renewed interest and political will towards the establishment of an international criminal court. Marking the culmination of a prolonged and complex negotiating process, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted by a UN Diplomatic Conference on 17 July 1998. The ICC is the first 151

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permanent international criminal court having a potentially universal reach. Unlike previous international criminal tribunals, its jurisdiction is complementary to that of domestic courts. Accordingly, it can only intervene in situations in which there is evidence of the inability or unwillingness of state authorities to investigate and prosecute instances of international crimes. Situations involving those crimes may be referred to the ICC by state parties to the Rome Statute or by the UN Security Council. Alternatively, the ICC prosecutor may open an investigation on his or her own initiative with the authorisation of the PreTrial Chamber. The ICC, being a treaty-based international body, is binding only on its state parties (at present, 123) and its jurisdiction does not apply to crimes committed before its entry into force, namely, 1 July 2002. The UN has established other criminal justice institutions in order to address situations of mass violence falling outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. These tribunals have been described as ‘hybrid courts’ because they are constituted of both international and domestic elements as regards the applicable law and the composition of the tribunal. Hybrid courts, as well as the practice of domestic courts in enforcing international accountability norms, complement the ICC and strengthen the increasingly entrenched universal principle that the most serious crimes must not remain unpunished. JOSEPHA CLOSE See also: Genocide; War Crimes Readings Bassiouni, M.C. (2014) Introduction to international criminal law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Cassesse, A. (ed) (2009) The Oxford companion to international criminal justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Erhard, H. (1949) ‘The Nuremberg trial against the major war criminals and international law’, American Journal of International Law, 43(2): 223–45. Schabas, W.A. (2006) The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

International humanitarian law (IHL), also referred to as ‘the laws of war’ or the ‘law of armed conflict’, is a set of ‘rules which, in times of armed conflict, seek to protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in the hostilities, and 152

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to restrict the methods and means of warfare’ (ICRC, 2002, p 4). IHL is part of international public law, and comprises a number of international treaties1 and customary rules (ie practices that states consider as legally binding). While, historically, ‘there has never been a war that did not have some vague or precise rules covering the outbreak and end of hostilities’ (ICRC, 2002, p 9), the codification of IHL in the form of treaties open to ratification by states began in 1864 with the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Since then, a number of international treaties regulating armed conflicts have been developed, the most prominent of those being the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions, agreed in 1977. In addition to offering a certain level of protection to those who do not take part (ie civilians) or no longer take part in hostilities (ie the wounded, combatants who laid down arms and prisoners of war), IHL provides regulation relating to the means and methods of warfare. International treaties, for example, now ban biological weapons (the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [biological] and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction) or anti-personnel mines (the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction). The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court established the first permanent international criminal court for the prosecution of certain crimes conducted in the course of armed conflicts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. While potentially providing a wide range of legal protections, the development of IHL has been largely reactive, with international agreement on new legal instruments being sought ‘too often after the events for which they were sorely needed’ (ICRC, 2002, p 10). Another criticism levelled at IHL is that it is significantly biased towards the regulation of international (inter-state) armed conflicts, to the detriment of protection offered in non-international (intrastate) and ‘internationalised’ conflicts, which are nowadays the prevalent form of hostilities (Stewart, 2003). In practice, IHL is rarely, if ever, applied in the latter. Recent advances in combat technologies, such as, for example, the use of drone strikes or the progressing development of autonomous weapon systems ‘capable of searching for, identifying and targeting an individual with lethal force’ (ICRC, 2015, p 5), bring new challenges to the application of IHL norms on the battlefield, including in establishing who the ‘parties to the conflict’ are. Further, implementation and compliance with IHL during hostilities is ‘heavily dependent on the political will of the parties to a conflict’ (ICRC, 2015, p 3) and often subject to political/politicised influence and negotiation. The same can be stated about the implementation of compliance mechanisms, such as prosecutions before the International Criminal Court, with major players in current conflicts – the 153

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US, Russia or Syria – still reluctant to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute. There is no doubt that in the 65 years since the four Geneva Conventions, the body of IHL has been significantly developed. It is also a body of law that, it seems, is most often broken or ignored by state and non-state actors alike. AGNIESZKA MARTYNOWICZ See also: Humanitarian Intervention; International Criminal Courts Note A full list of international treaties constituting IHL can be found at: https://www.icrc. org/ihl 1

Readings Henckaerts, J. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary international humanitarian law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (2002) International humanitarian law: Answers to your questions. Geneva: ICRC. ICRC (2015) ‘Challenges to international humanitarian law and humanitarian action: speech given by Mr Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, UNAM Law Faculty, 7 April, Mexico City. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/mexico-challengesinternational-humanitarian-law-and-humanitarian-action Sassòli, M., Bouvier, A.A. and Quintin, A. (2011) How does law protect in war? Cases, documents and teaching materials on contemporary practice in international humanitarian law. Geneva: ICRC. Stewart, J.G. (2003) ‘Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: a critique of internationalized armed conflict’, International Review of the Red Cross, 85(850): 313–50.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

International human rights are those human rights upheld in international treaties, as part of customary international law or in other political documents like the United Nation’s (UN’s) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Declaration combines with two major treaties (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]) to comprise the International Bill of Rights. The separation of these separate ‘generations’ – civil and political versus 154

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economic, social and cultural – of rights into separate treaties reflects Cold War disagreement between the Eastern bloc (which emphasised ‘freedom from want’) and the Western bloc (where the focus was ‘freedom from fear’) (see Nickel, 2014). Taken together, these instruments span a wide range of rights aimed at respect for human dignity, from the right to life and liberty, to the right of peoples to self-determination, to the rights to work and form trade unions. International human rights emerged after the Second World War as a way of committing states to certain standards in their treatment of individuals by forging consensus and formalising agreement. They can therefore be understood as limiting state power insofar as they advocate common standards and bind future governments to these standards. After the two major treaties came into force in the 1970s, a range of further treaties covering social groups (women, children, migrant workers and people with disabilities) and dealing with issues (torture, enforced disappearance and the death penalty) have been established (OHCHR, 2016). Each of these ‘core treaties’ has its own monitoring committee at the UN. These complement the work of the Human Rights Council (HRC), mandated by the Charter of the UN. As Donnelly (2012) notes, the extent to which international human rights actually limit state power is a subject of some controversy. The status of international law is complex, as is its relationship to state power. The treaties are consent-based, applying only to those states that freely ratify them, and subject, in some cases, to reservations. There are numerous state party reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, for example, which restricts the scope of the Convention’s gender-equality provisions. Even so, across the board, adoption levels of the core human rights treaties are high, and fundamental rights such as the right not to be tortured are now held to be ‘peremptory norms’, irrefutable in law. However, international law, like domestic law, is implemented and enforced by the executive branch of state governments. The monitoring committees provide an additional level of oversight, but this is limited by sovereignty norms, which explains why impunity can still prevail even when fundamental rights are violated. The development of international human rights has not been matched by a universal willingness or ability on the part of states to uphold those rights, or by fully effective international mechanisms to hold states to account for a lack of will. The HRC does undertake periodic review of state action on human rights, but this process relies on states’ voluntary participation. The UN also provides more objective accounts of the scope of international human rights through its Special Procedures, which grant country and thematic mandates to experts. Poorer states face particular problems when it comes to their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic and social rights, such as the right to education. 155

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These limitations on ‘positive’ or resource-dependent rights are acknowledged in the provision for their ‘progressive realisation’. The Millennium Development Goals and the Right to Development (adopted by the UN in 1986) have also developed as mechanisms for the fulfilment of peoples’ rights to social and economic development. The latter has been controversial, as Sengupta (2001) notes, because it implies a duty on the part of states in respect of non-citizens, and because it is a right owing to peoples, not individuals. Moves to make states responsible for the rights of people other than their citizens can also be found in conventions dealing with the rights of specific groups, such as refugees or stateless persons, and in the non-discrimination clauses of the core human rights treaties. Even so, while ‘international’ in scope, human rights remain closely tied to state power. Of particular promise in the future are mechanisms by which the individual can directly challenge state power, such as the HRC’s complaint procedure, as well as regional mechanisms, such as the European Convention and Court of Human Rights. KELLY STAPLES See also: European Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights Readings Donnelly, J. (2012) International human rights. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Nickel, J. (2014) ‘Human rights’, in E.N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2014/entries/rights-human/ OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) (2015) ‘Human rights bodies’. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/ HumanRightsBodies.aspx OHCHR (2016) ‘Core international instruments’. Available at: http://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx Sengupta, A. (2001) ‘Right to development as a human right’, Economic and Political Weekly, 36(27): 2527–36.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Article 33 of the United Nations (UN) Charter prescribes that states shall resolve disputes between them through peaceful means. Among the peaceful means available are diplomatic means – including negotiation, enquiry, mediation and 156

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conciliation – and legal means, namely, arbitration and judicial settlement. The main difference between both kinds of dispute settlement mechanisms is that whereas diplomatic means entail the freedom of the parties to accept or reject the proposed solution, legal means terminate the dispute by the issuance of a decision binding upon the parties (Merrills, 2011). Judicial settlement is the method that affords the parties the least degree of control over the resolution of the dispute. Indeed, while arbitration typically allows the parties to select the arbitrator(s) and determine the procedure and body of law applicable, judicial settlement involves the referral of the issue to a, generally permanent, body composed of independent and impartial judges who adjudicate the dispute on the basis of international law and according to a predetermined set of procedural rules. Pursuant to a classical conception of international law, international courts and tribunals (ICTs) are, first and foremost, concerned with the settlement of disputes between states, the traditional subjects of international law. There are only three global ICTs competent to adjudicate inter-state disputes. The oldest of them is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1946. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN and its statute has been ratified by all UN member states. It is the ICT having the widest subject-matter jurisdiction as it can deal with any type of international dispute. Only states can be parties to contentious proceedings before the ICJ; however, international organisations authorised by the UN may request an advisory opinion from the ICJ. The two other global ICTs – the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) dispute settlement system (Dispute Settlement Understanding [DSU]) – also have a potentially universal reach but their subject-matter jurisdiction is more specialised. While the ITLOS is competent to settle disputes pertaining to the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the DSU aims at resolving contentions between WTO member states relating to international trade. Both of these ICTs deal primarily with inter-state disputes, though intergovernmental organisations having recognised jurisdiction in the relevant field may also have standing before them. Alongside the global ICTs, several regional ICTs have been established in Europe, Latin America and Africa as a part of the intergovernmental organisations created to facilitate economic integration in those regions (Mackenzie et al, 2010). Most of them were modelled on the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the development of international human rights law and international criminal law marked a departure from the traditional understanding of states as the only subjects of international law. Indeed, while international human rights law grants to private persons rights actionable against the state, international criminal law attributes criminal responsibility to individuals responsible for crimes under international law (Tomuschat, 2012). In order to ensure the enforcement of these bodies of international law, ICTs 157

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before which individuals have standing, as claimants before human rights courts and as defendants before international criminal tribunals, have been established. Those judicial bodies are characterised as ICTs because, although their primary function is not to settle inter-state disputes, they adjudicate claims on the basis of international law. The most prominent of these ICTs include the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court. In this category of ICTs before which individuals have standing may also be classed the administrative tribunals instituted by the International Labour Organisation, the UN and other international organisations to settle disputes between themselves and their staff. JOSEPHA CLOSE See also: European Court of Human Rights; International Court of Justice; International Criminal Courts; United Nations, The Readings Mackenzie, R., Romano, C.P.R., Shany, Y. and Sands, P. (2010) Manual on international courts and tribunals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Merrills, J.G. (2011) International dispute settlement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomuschat, C. (2012) ‘International courts and tribunals’, in R. Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 499–514.

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J JUS AD BELLUM The Latin term ‘jus ad bellum’ essentially refers to the body of rules that regulate the circumstances in which states may have recourse to war (or, in contemporary terms, the use of armed force) against one another. The jus ad bellum is complemented by the jus in bello, which is the body of law applicable to the means by which armed conflict is waged. Historically, the legitimacy of the use of armed force by states was assessed by reference to theological notions of ‘just war’, and prior to the 20th century, there was little legal regulation of the use of force by states. Although Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations sought to delay states’ entitlement to have recourse to war, and the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact saw states renounce warfare as an instrument of national policy, no stringent prohibition was placed upon the use of force per se until the United Nations was created at the end of the Second World War. The principal regulatory framework for the use of force between states is provided by the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) essentially places a prima facie prohibition on ‘the threat or use of force [by a state] against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. This prohibition has, according to the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, evolved into a fundamental norm of customary international law. Notwithstanding its phrasing, Article 2(4) is widely considered to impose a blanket ban on the use of force between states. Two exceptions are, however, provided by the Charter. Where the United Nations Security Council determines that there exists ‘a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ under Article 39, it may decide on the initiation of 159

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military enforcement measures under Article 42 for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The original Charter scheme envisaged that the Council would be provided with forces of its own for this purpose, in accordance with special agreements entered into with member states. In practice, these were never implemented and, instead, the Council ‘authorises’ willing states and organisations to conduct military enforcement action on its behalf. A wide range of situations have given rise to the Council’s utilisation of this power, including humanitarian crises, the need to protect civilians during conflict, the overthrow of democratic government, and the invasion of one state by another. States may also use force in self-defence, although the exact parameters of this right are much debated. Article 51 affords states an ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs’. Two issues have proven especially controversial in terms of the most appropriate interpretation of what is permissible in the exercise of the right of self-defence. The first concerns the circumstances in which a state may use force in self-defence against a state on the basis that it is culpable for the actions of a non-state actor. Traditionally, a state was regarded as being liable for the actions of those actors over whom it could be said to enjoy ‘effective control’, although in the wake of the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001 (9/11), a new standard of ‘harbouring’ was put forward chiefly by the US, which envisaged states being held to account for the actions of terrorist groups operating from their territory, regardless of the extent to which they fell under the control of the state. The second controversy relates to the time at which the right of self-defence may be exercised. While a state may clearly respond to an actual armed attack that has taken place, there appears to be considerable support for the continued existence of a right of anticipatory self-defence that has longer historical origins in customary international law and permits a state to apply force in anticipation of an armed attack that is imminent. Recent attempts have been made to invoke a right of pre-emptive self-defence, which would permit a state to take military action to remove a potential threat before it has even reached the point where an armed attack is imminent. However, pre-emptive self-defence has been widely criticised and it cannot be said to be accepted as lawful. Action taken in self-defence must generally conform to certain standards, including necessity and proportionality, in order to safeguard against abuse. GARY WILSON See also: International Court of Justice; Jus in Bello; State, The; United Nations, The Readings Corten, O. (2010) The law against war: The prohibition on the use of force in contemporary international law. Oxford: Hart. 160

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Gray, C. (2008) International law and the use of force (3rd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gray, C. (2010) ‘The use of force and the international legal order’, in M. Evans (ed) International law (4th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 618–50.

JUS IN BELLO

‘War is hell’, General Sherman tells us, but even in this most lawless of states, some law has been imposed. Jus in bello (literally, law in war) is the cannon of law that is applied once peaceful relations have broken down. It is distinct as a body of international rules from the jus ad bellum, or the law relating to the use of force between states in international law. The former relates to the battlefield conduct of individuals; the later relates to the conduct of the international relations between states. Jus in bello is a complex mix of treaties and customary international law (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2006). The precise rules that apply will depend on context. First, an armed conflict must have broken out between states or within a state. This is not always easy to determine, but it is effectively a question of fact. International tribunals have placed emphasis on the widespread nature of any violence and the level of intensity of the fighting (Solis, 2016). If an armed conflict has broken out between states, the full range of international legal protections will apply. If an armed conflict has broken out within a state, some basic level of protection will apply; however, the full breadth of international law will not. This is partly because international law has historically been unable to intercede in the internal affairs of states (Solis, 2016). Whenever an armed conflict breaks out, the belligerent parties are governed by the customary rules of warfare and the specific rules laid out in any treaties to which they are signatories. There is some overlap between those categories. For example, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are so widely signed that international tribunals have repeatedly found them to have customary effect and will be binding on any state whether they have agreed to them or not. This is of critical importance in an era where states can be born in armed conflict. For example, during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, newly emerging states and their armed forces became automatically bound by those rules (Solis, 2016). There are four fundamental customary rules that apply to all armed forces. These are target distinction, proportionality, military necessity and a prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering. They essentially require: that an officer making 161

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targeting decisions always distinguishes between civilian and military objects; that any killing of civilians or damage to civilian property (‘collateral damage’) is strictly proportionate to the military advantages flowing from the attack; that any action is necessary in military terms; and that the methods and means of warfare employed will not cause unnecessary suffering (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2006). Additionally, there is an array of treaties that regulate the conduct of warfare in specific ways. For example, one subset of jus in bello, referred to as international humanitarian law, or sometimes Geneva Law after the Geneva Conventions, makes detailed rules for the humane treatment of persons placed hors de combat by wounds, sickness, capture or their civilian status. The first and second Conventions deal with the protection of sick and wounded armed forces on land and at sea, respectively; the third Convention deals with the protection of prisoners of war; and the fourth Convention deals with the protection of civilians, particularly in occupied territories (Clapham and Gaeta, 2015). The other broad sub-set of jus in bello, sometimes, for historical reasons, called Hague Law, regulates the methods and means of warfare. For example, a series of Conventions have been adopted that seek to limit the choice of weaponry available. These include the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and the Ottawa Landmines Treaty 1997. Although these Conventions have not entirely eliminated the use of these weapons, they have generally been successful in securing nearcomprehensive condemnation of any state who uses such weapons, such as the widely reported use of sarin gas in the Syrian conflict in 2013. Other treaties seek to protect the natural environment from attack, for example, the Environmental Modification Convention 1977, adopted partly in response to US use of toxic defoliants in Vietnam, or to preserve cultural treasures for future generations, for example, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property 1954. Unusually in international law, the breach of any of these rules could lead to individual criminal responsibility on the part of both an individual solider acting illegally or a commander who gave an unlawful order. These crimes could be tried either before domestic criminal tribunals or the International Criminal Court (Clapham and Gaeta, 2015). BLEDDYN DAVIES See also: International Court of Justice; Jus ad Bellum; State, The; United Nations, The

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Readings Clapham, A. and Gaeta, P. (2015) The Oxford handbook of international law in armed conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Henckaerts, J. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2006) Customary international humanitarian law. Geneva: ICRC. Solis, G. (2016) The law of armed conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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K KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE STATE See: Authoritarian Populism; Censorship; Civil Liberties; Crimes of the Powerful; Governmentality; Hegemony; Neoliberalism; Risk; State Power

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L LEAGUE OF NATIONS The League of Nations (hereafter called the League) was an international organisation created in 1920 in the aftermath of the First World War. It was founded as a result of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and was the initial idea of Woodrow Wilson, the then President of the US.The League was established to encourage disarmament, discourage aggression between nations, maintain peace through collective security and protect minority groups through international law. Thus, its main activities were: international peace and security; mandates; the protection of minority groups; and functional cooperation, including the codification of international laws. The covenant for conflict resolution was built into the Treaty of Versailles. The League consisted of an assembly of all members, a council made up of five permanent members and four rotating members, and the International Court of Justice. During the 1920s, the League managed to settle or defuse numerous international conflicts. Its greatest success, however, can be seen in its work on the International Labour Organisation, slavery and human trafficking. By the 1930s, 58 nations had joined the League. The League marked the first attempt by the international community to establish an international organisation to safeguard world peace and cooperation (Tams, 2007). In spite of these successes, the League’s aims were too ambitious, its organisation was cumbersome and its decisions had to be unanimous. As a result, it failed in its main purpose, which was to prevent further global conflict. Furthermore, despite 167

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Wilson’s enthusiasm to create the League, the US, Germany and Russia were not members. The absence of these countries, particularly the US, undermined the collective security of countries, which required the unity of all countries to secure peace. Furthermore, due to the US being a significant economic nation, imposing sanctions on other nations proved difficult. Additionally, the League could not compel its members to comply with sanctions. Thus, the failure of the League has been partly attributed to the fact that economic sanctions were ineffective. This was mainly due to the self-interest of its members and the US. Furthermore, despite the League being created to resolve disputes between nations, its powers were limited. For example, many member states refused to allow the decisions of the League to impinge upon national sovereignty. As Hilpold (2013, p 91) highlights: ‘The League of Nations, although being a genuine international organisation, had not emancipated itself sufficiently from the sovereignty of its member states … that prompted the League to act overcautiously and often even biased towards state interests.’ The ineffectiveness of the League in maintaining peace and resolving disputes has also been attributed to the fact that it did not have an army and so was reliant on member states to raise one in times of conflict. However, many member states were unwilling to raise an army because they were fearful of this affecting their own self-interests. Consequently, there are numerous examples of the League taking no action against aggressive nations, for example, the Vilna incident of 1920 and the Corfu incident of 1923. Even when action was taken, the League’s decisions were often undermined by the Conference of Ambassadors. A number of further incidents discredited the League and undermined its power. These included Japan’s expansion in Manchuria and China, Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, and Hitler’s repudiation of the Versailles Treaty. As a result, the League ceased its activities and, in 1946, was replaced by the United Nations. Although the League is often regarded as a failure, it did inspire the formation of the United Nations. Additionally, the enduring legacy of the League was its social and welfare work; indeed, many of the humanitarian agencies in existence today have their origins in the work of the League of Nations. Furthermore, despite its demise, the League has been accredited with bringing about extraordinary changes in the conduct of international relations (Walters, 1952). SHARON MORLEY See also: Human Trafficking; International Court of Justice; United Nations, The

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Readings Hilpold, P. (2013) ‘The League of Nations and the protection of minorities – rediscovering a great experiment’, 17 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law, Social Science Research Network (SSRN): 87–112. Tams, C.J. (2007) League of Nations, Oxford Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walters, F.P. (1952) A history of the League of Nations, Vol 2. London: Open University Press.

LEGAL PLURALISM

Legal pluralism is an analytical concept developed by socio-legal scholars to describe the simultaneous existence of different legal orders in the same social field. It rejects the positivist notion of legal centralism, which views all law as necessarily emanating from, and being administered by, the state. Pluralists define law broadly to include other major forms of normative and regulatory ordering, such as custom or religion, that engage in quasi-legal activities such as dispute resolution. In contrast to centralist representations of law as uniform and exclusive, pluralists depict a far messier and more complex situation of overlapping orders, comprising diverse actors, institutions and rules operating at different scales. This broader understanding of law presents legal pluralists with a major conceptual challenge. What is the basis for distinguishing between state law and other normative systems from a legal pluralist perspective or, put another way, what makes a normative order a legal one? The question of what ‘law’ means in this context remains largely unresolved. Griffiths (1986), a leading theorist of legal pluralism, distinguished between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of pluralism. The ‘weak’ form is compatible with legal centralism and refers to a single legal order (eg state-centred) that permits some degree of recognition of other forms of law, such as customary or religious law, within that order. In this conception, the state remains the basis of the legal order. By contrast, ‘strong’ legal pluralism rejects all notions of legal centralism and views state law as merely one form of law among others. Some scholars adopt a more pragmatic approach and take law to mean whatever social actors identify as such. This allows them to capture legal pluralism in the widest sense while avoiding having to define law. The coexistence of different normative and regulatory orders is increasingly acknowledged as a normal state of affairs in all social environments, from the most local levels to the most expansive transnational level. Contrary to notions of legal development that view state law as progressively displacing other forms of law, legal pluralism is found in all parts 169

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of the world, including the global North. The condition of legal pluralism has a long history that is often overlooked owing to the dominance of the ideas of legal centralism. As Tamanaha (2008) reminds us, the ideology of legal centralism emerged out of the historical processes of state-making in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Prior to that time, Medieval Europe contained multiple forms and sources of law, administered in a variety of courts and other forums. State consolidation entailed the monopolisation of law and a corollary contraction in legal pluralism. The colonisation of much of the non-Western world during the 18th and 19th centuries provided the next setting for the expansion of legal pluralism. Colonial laws and institutions were introduced into social arenas already occupied by a profusion of indigenous normative orders based in local customary values and practices. Strategies of ‘indirect rule’ entailed deliberate attempts to forge articulations between local and colonial orders, often through empowering local leaders or chiefs to preside over ‘native courts’ and settle disputes according to local custom. The diverse legacies of the kinds of legal pluralism produced by colonialism remain extant in many parts of the post-colonial world. Whereas a condition of ‘weak’ pluralism exists in some countries, with aspects of pre-existing local orders incorporated into state legal systems, in others, these customary or traditional systems operate largely independently of the state. Contemporary globalisation has resulted in yet another wave of legal pluralism that manifests itself in the growing role of non-state actors in quasi-legal and regulatory roles formerly associated with states. This would include the massive expansion of market forces in areas like policing, security and dispute resolution, as well as the increasing role of regional, international and transnational regulatory regimes and actors. Legal pluralism has also acquired prominence – in a more instrumental sense – in the policy discourses and practices of international actors involved in peace-building and development engagements in conflict-affected countries and so-called ‘fragile states’. This reflects recognition of the often significant role of non-state institutions and actors, including customary and religious entities, in the social ordering of many parts of the world, particularly in the global South, and the need to engage with these realities. SINCLAIR DINNEN See also: Globalisation; Peacekeeping and Capacity-Building; State, The Readings Griffiths, J. (1986) ‘What is legal pluralism?’, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 24: 1–56.

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Kyed, M.K. (2011) ‘Legal pluralism and international development interventions’, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 43(63): 1–23. Tamanaha, B. (2008) ‘Understanding legal pluralism: past to present, local to global’, Sydney Law Review, 30(3): 375–411.

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M MASS INCARCERATION The term ‘mass incarceration’ will be used to describe the institution that has emerged in the US and the UK over the past two decades. Mass incarceration is defined by extreme rates of imprisonment, the size of a prison population and the concentration of incarceration among the most marginalised (Garland, 2001). In the case of the US, one such marginalised group is young black males. More than 60% of the people in prison in the US are drawn from ethnic minority groups. For black males in their 30s, one in every 10 is in prison or jail on any given day (The Sentencing Project, 2013). If current trends continue, 30% of all black males who are born today will spend some of their lives in prison (Bottoms, 1983; Mathiesen, 1983; Cohen, 1985; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Wacquant, 2014). Mass incarceration also reflects a series of penal policies and practices. For example, the developments of determinate sentence structures, the ‘war against drugs’, mandatory sentencing, truth in sentencing, the emergence of private prisons and actuarial crime control build upon one another to produce the steady flow of prisoners into custody today. Unlike the previous functions of the prison (to rehabilitate, treat, punish), the prisons of mass incarceration are devoted exclusively to fulfilling the incapacitative function of secure containment (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997), more recently referred to as ‘humane containment’ (Simon, 2000), or as warehousing (Wacquant, 2009). In the US, there has been the development of Supermax prisons (which are very high-security institutions), which rely on total lockdown isolation to control 173

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prisoners and support mass incarceration strategies of ‘supersizing’ overall prison populations. At the same time, this approach to imprisonment reduces internal sources of legitimacy in the day-to-day management of the prison and its regimes. Mass incarceration has come to play a central role in the new culture of crime control (Garland, 2001; Western, 2006). Contemporarily, in some countries, the rise of penal populism and the move towards cementing mass imprisonment challenges the legitimation, and presence of, penal welfarism. The expediential growth of the prison population, together with changes in the administration of incarceration, can only lead to degrading and inhuman punishment, which is more likely to contribute to the psychological immiseration of offenders. The strategy of mass incarceration might be regarded in some quarters as a feasible solution to the problem of social order and control; however, it is a deeply unattractive and painful one. In keeping with the history of imprisonment, this is especially the case for the poor and marginalised (Rusche and Kircheimer, 1968). While the architecture and functions of the prison have changed over time, the deleterious effects of imprisonment remain unchanged, as are the individuals subjected to it. AZRINI WAHIDIN See also: Critical Criminology and State Power; Human Rights; Prisoners’ Rights Readings Bottoms, A. (1983) ‘Neglected features of contemporary penal systems’, in D. Garland and P. Young (eds) The power to punish: Contemporary penality and social analysis. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, pp 166–202. Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of social control: Crime, punishment, and classification. London: Polity. Feeley, M. and Simon, J. (1992) ‘The new penology: Notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its implications’, Criminology, 30: 449–74. Garland, D. (2001) The culture of control: Crime and social order in a contemporary society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Mathiesen, T. (1983) ‘The future of control systems – the case of Norway’, in D. Garland and P. Young (eds) The power to punish: Contemporary penality and social analysis. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, pp 130–45. Rusche, G. and Kircheimer, O. (1968) Punishment and social structure. New York, NY: Russell Sage. Simon, J. (2000) ‘From the big house to the waste-house: rethinking prisons and state government in the 20th century’, Punishment and Society, 2: 213–34. The Sentencing Project (2013) Report of the sentencing project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding racial disparities in the US criminal justice system. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project. 174

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Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the poor: The neo-liberal governance of insecurity. London: Polity. Wacquant, L. (2014) ‘Class, race and hyperincarceration in revanchist America’, Socialism and Democracy, 28(3): 35–56. Western, B. (2006) Punishment and inequality in America. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. Zimring, F.E. and Hawkings, G. (1997) Incapacitation: Penal confinement and the restraint of crime. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

MILITARISM

Militarism is a dynamic and multifaceted concept that enables many disciplines across the social sciences to analyse a range of social phenomena that arise from the complex interplay between society, the military and politics (Ben-Eliezer, 1998). As such, militarism is drawn upon to make sense of a number of different ideological, behavioural, institutional, political, economic and structural practices that prepare society for war and, perhaps more importantly, to support war.When concepts are used in a variety of ways, they inevitably become fragmented and difficult to define. Enloe (2007), however, reminds us that militarism is not a singular idea, but a package of ideas, which, taken together, situate military values in civilian affairs. Once military values are firmly positioned into a society, so, too, are military priorities. Central to militarism is organised violence, yet its effects are far more wide-reaching than the physical violence enacted and experienced by people – it is also a discursive process that shapes cultural and economic landscapes – militarism, then, is a transformative process (Enloe, 2000). It is important to note that the nature of the society that is studied and its relations to its military and politics are always significant to how militarism functions in that context. Therefore, while militarism is a universal concept, the specificities of the geopolitical context being studied are always dominant in each analysis. When thinking about state power, rights and liberties, as is the case in this volume, the ideology that legitimates militarism is important, as are the effects that it has upon the hierarchies of people (eg gender, race and class). The ideological facets of militarism are also specific to the context in which they are functioning. For instance, contemporary studies of militarism in the global North tend to focus on a militarised popular culture, from (mis)representations of war by media outlets and commemorative events, to the governance of speech in recent years (see Kelly, 2012). In the global South, analyses often look to the victimisation of civilians, organised violence in the name of security and/or values and the oppression of certain groups (namely, women) (see Enloe, 2000). Nonetheless, any focus on militarism addresses an imaginary that naturalises military presence, where physical 175

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force is considered progressive and the acts of the military are celebrated, while militaristic ideas of order, regime, sacrifice and discipline (Ben-Eliezer, 1998) blur the boundaries between civil and military affairs (Adelman, 2003). Trajectories of militarism and all of its facets can be traced throughout history; however, new media technologies of the 21st century, in particular, have markedly changed relations between society, politics and militaries, as mediated ‘realties’ of war and the welfare or security of soldiers and citizens permeate societies. In the UK, at least, some of this is purposefully visible, such as police forces adopting military characteristics, the use of military personnel to support domestic security systems, recruitment strategies and increased taxes for defence, all sitting alongside discourses of what it means to be British. Militarism also has less visible effects, such as the governing of speech, restrictions on educators, the vilification of religious practices, narratives of hate and extremism (see Kelly, 2012), and, in what Stahl (2010) referred to as ‘militainment’, reality TV and interactive gaming, meaning that the public can interact with militarism as virtual citizensoldiers. All of this explains why (in the global North at least) societies continue to accept state-sanctioned violence and war in the pursuit of political goals (ie militarism legitimises the military and its functions). It should be noted that not all countries are wedded to the values of militarism, for example, Costa Rica and Iceland do not have a military. Moreover, it is often found that not all members of society experience or contribute to militarism in the same way. Enloe (2007, p 11) explains that, as a result, ‘observers have crafted a second, complementary concept “militarisation”’. The militarisation of a society is a consequence of the normalisation of militarism in that society. EMMA MURRAY See also: Corps; Jus ad Bellum; Jus in Bello; Military Conflict Readings Adelman, M. (2003) ‘The military, militarism, and the militarization of domestic violence’, Violence Against Women, 9 (9): 1118-52. Ben-Eliezer, U. (1998) The making of Israeli militarism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Enloe, C. (2000) Maneuvers: The international politics of militarism women’s lives. Berkeley, CA: University California Press. Enloe, C. (2007) Globalization and militarism: Feminists make the link (2nd edn). Maryland, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kelly, J. (2012) ‘Popular culture, sport and the “hero”-fication of British militarism’, Sociology, 47(4): 722–38. Stahl, R. (2010) Militainment Inc: War, media and popular culture. New York, NY: Routledge. 176

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MILITARY CONFLICT The conceptual origins of the term ‘conflict’ derive from the Latin for ‘a contest’ (conflictus) and the clashing or striking together of different objects. Military conflict, in particular, is the clashing of two or more organised entities by means of armed troops. Nothing like routine armed conflict can be found in history until the late Neolithic period, and the first real war did not occur until about 5,000 years ago with the rise of dynastic city-states in the area that is now Iraq. Military conflicts are distinguished by the use of weapons and the specialised training of personnel that are either full-time or reserve members of the armed services. Armaments may assume material forms, like rifles and artillery, or immaterial forms (ideals), such as ideological propaganda or misinformation. Military conflict may be a means to capture natural resources, geopolitical leverage or moral intimidation. For example, at the end of the Second World War, the US deployed atomic weapons against the Japanese not to end a war that had already ended, but to signal to the Soviet Union that the US considered itself the master of the world and that its hegemony should not be challenged (Worrell, 2011). Some conflicts combine many complex motivations, such as the US invasion of Iraq.While most people assume that the intervention was one of simply securing petroleum, the full explanation would have to take into account not only natural resources, but also revenge for past insubordination and demonstrating to other regimes that disobedience would be punished in the most severe manner. The most common form of military conflict, for example, the First World War, involves the direct engagement between two or more forces using combat and support personnel (organic or proxy in origins), material, and ideological elements towards whatever end is in sight. Other forms of military engagement may take the form of indirect actions. For example, in the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Korea, Cuba and Vietnam became ‘hot’ centres, where, in the case of Vietnam, the country was divided into the North (‘communist’) and South (‘democratic’), and trained and equipped to destroy the other side with weapons supplied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the US, respectively. Aside from direct and indirect conflict, military action may assume a positive form, whereby what is done to another force is the primary consideration (eg the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour), but there is also the case of negative forms, where what matters is not what is positively done, but the actual inaction of a force for its benefit. The boundaries between these aspects of the direct, indirect, positive and negative are fluid and can be found operating in one and the same conflict. During the 1991 invasion of Iraq, the US administration and high command encouraged an internal rebellion against Saddam Hussein but when it appeared that not only were politically suspect groups involved in the 177

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rebellion, including communists, but also a successful revolt would probably weaken Iraq vis-à-vis a more dreaded foe, Iran, US forces stood aside and allowed the anti-Hussein rebellion to be crushed by Iraqi forces (Al-Marashi and Hadi al-Khalili, 2009). The use of military force can be so complicated at times that a war at one time and place can actually be a war against another target at another time altogether – as is the case of the US involvement in Afghanistan that is, in large part, a war against its official ally, Pakistan, with an eye towards the relations between China and India towards the US (Worrell, 2013). It is when motivations and goals become so opaque and convoluted to even those who prosecute them at the highest levels, that fictions such as the ‘war on terror’ become increasingly important as a legitimating veneer. Military conflicts may be limited in scale to individual or isolated occurrences. However, these often escalate into regional or particular conflicts of longer duration, or, in the worst cases, become total or universal in scope, such that virtually the entire world finds itself enmeshed in hostilities and the most powerful weapons available at that time are employed (eg the use of thermonuclear weapons today). MARK WORRELL See also: Jus ad Bellum; Jus in Bello; Militarism; War Crimes Readings Al-Marashi, I. and Hadi al-Khalili, A. (2009) ‘“Iraqis” bleak views of the United States’, in D. Farber (ed) What they think of us. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 1–26. Hamblin, W.J. (2006) Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC. Oxon: Routledge. Worrell, M.P. (2011) Why nations go to war: A sociology of military conflict. New York, NY: Routledge. Worrell, M.P. (2013) Terror: Social, political, and economic perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.

MULTICULTURALISM

‘Multiculturalism’ is a relatively new term, becoming prominent from the 1970s onwards in debates about the coexistence of different cultures, usually ethnically diverse, and the benefits and alleged problems that arose from such social changes. It is a term that, like ‘moral panic’, has slipped into common usage despite ambiguous understandings of what multiculturalism really means, but that is largely due to 178

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its broad and elastic use and often disparaging portrayal (Lentin and Tilley, 2011). Multiculturalism is usually the product of immigration into nation states and their towns and cities, but it can also be the product of the mixture of distinct cultures within a given state. The formation of Northern Ireland exemplifies the latter, wherein the biculturalism of two very distinct cultural groups – nationalists and unionists – were geographically gerrymandered despite their very distinct and antagonistic cultural, religious and political traditions and aspirations (Farrell, 1976). Supporters of multiculturalism believe that protecting the rights of all citizens to preserve their cultural heritage will not endanger other cultural traditions and values. On the contrary, multiculturalism promotes respect for and appreciation of cultural diversity, as well as its maintenance and coexistence, extolling its contribution in stimulating forms of cultural expression and social and economic development (Wieviorka, 1998). Core to such liberal values is a strong belief that cultural diversity and pluralism are beneficial to society, and that purported problems arising from multiculturalism are exaggerated and/or the product of intolerance and discriminatory policies and practices. Therefore, in order to assist the specific, not the misnamed ‘special’, needs of minority groups, multicultural resources are provided to facilitate their fairer access to diverse forms of social provision, which they may otherwise be marginalised from. Multicultural values are informed by a political understanding of history and the influence of diverse cultures that have shaped all societies, what Chicago School sociologists described as the difficult process for immigrants of ‘invasion and succession’ (Cortese, 1995). Multiculturalism is politically and ideologically the antithesis of xenophobic and racist beliefs, which espouse preventing immigration and promote the forced social integration, and rapid cultural assimilation, of migrants as the only way of ensuring social cohesion. Such illiberal beliefs have been politically exploited in right-wing political discourses, but they have also been echoed in numerous purportedly left-wing and liberal ones (Gilroy, 1987). Scathing criticisms of multiculturalism occurred more recently in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s claim that it had ‘utterly failed’, and British Prime Minister David Cameron’s claim that ‘state multiculturalism has failed’, wherein he claimed that its alleged reluctance to challenge reactionary beliefs, values and practices had contributed to radicalisation. Such fundamentally conservative discourses sustain and yet disguise racism behind a veil of purportedly natural cultural anxieties and antagonisms. What should worry such self-proclaimed ‘centre-ground’ politicians is the fact that the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, who massacred liberals opposed to Islamaphobia in Norway, cited Merkel’s and Cameron’s claims that multiculturalism had failed at his trial. Breivik incorrigibly and disgracefully maintained that his victims were ‘not innocent’, but had precipitated their victimisation as ‘These were young people who worked to actively uphold multicultural values’ in an exemplar of the extremes of intolerance (Pidd, 2012).

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Opponents of multiculturalism also exaggerate the cultural cohesion of the dominant culture in order to obscure the cultural diversity found within all cultures, such as within professed singular ‘British culture’, wherein there are, for example, clear distinctions built around social class, the regions and diverse subcultures. These ideological anomalies are downplayed as insignificant and inconsequential in order to romanticise a mythical harmonious society that, in reality, has never actually existed (Pearson, 1983). Antagonists also distort the alleged problems of cultural diversity and the extent and cost, both economic and social, of multicultural projects, maintaining that these actually inhibit shared values and integration, leaving minority ethnic groups trapped by their cultures, not by the everyday racism and xenophobia they experience (Lentin and Tilley, 2011). These anti-multiculturalism developments are most evident contemporarily in the ideological and political war on terror and the resulting massive expansion in reductionist Islamaphobic beliefs, wherein ‘individual psychological or theological journeys, largely removed from social and political circumstances, are claimed to be the “root cause” of the radicalisation process’ (Kundnani, 2012, p 5). Such ideas are epitomised in the rhetoric of ‘a partnership between government and all those individuals, groups and communities, who want to see extremism defeated’ (May, 2015, p 7), which neglects the proscriptive agenda of anti-radicalisation that mandates unequivocal political and cultural support for, even state criminality in, the war on terror (Kramer and Michalowski, 2005). LIAM McCANN See also: Border Control; Human Rights; Immigration; National Identity; State, The Readings Cortese, A. (1995) ‘The rise, hegemony, and decline of the Chicago School of Sociology, 1892–1945’, Social Science Journal, 32(3): 235–54. Farrell, M. (1976) Northern Ireland: The Orange State. London: Pluto. Gilroy, P. (1987) There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack: The cultural politics of race and nation. London: Routledge. Kramer, R. and Michalowski, J. (2005) ‘War, aggression and state crime: a criminological analysis of the invasion and occupation of Iraq’, British Journal of Criminology, 45(4): 446–69. Kundnani, A. (2012) ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, Race & Class, 56(2): 3–25. Lentin, A. and Tilley, G. (2011) The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age. London: Zed Books.

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May, T. (2015) ‘Home Secretary foreword’, in HM Government, Counterextremism Strategy (Cm 9148), London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. McVeigh, R. (2015) ‘Living the peace process in reverse: racist violence and British nationalism in Northern Ireland’, Race & Class, 56(4): 3–25. Pearson, G. (1983) Hooligan: A history of respectable fears. London: Macmillan. Pidd, H. (2012) ‘Remorseless and baffling, Breivik’s testimony leaves Norway no wiser’, The Guardian, 17 April. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/apr/17/breivik-court-boasts-killing-utoya Wieviorka, M. (1998) ‘Is multiculturalism the solution?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(5): 881–910.

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N NATIONAL IDENTITY National identity is a highly contentious concept that describes the sense of social cohesion of peoples from, or originating from, a particular geographic area. Problematically, that geographic area may not necessarily be a recognised nation state; nonetheless, those people share cultural traditions and political perspectives that they believe unify them. This sense of national identity unites, often via patriotism, otherwise very distinct classes of people through a sense of historical and cultural links that figuratively bond them in a harmonious pride in their perceived prestige (Wood, 2014).The ideological role of possessive nouns is crucial in the construction of this oneness, as all classes of people, even the destitute, claim ownership of their county, belonging exclusively to their nationality and therefore implicitly, and often explicitly, at the exclusion of others. How this sense of national identity, and even the nation state, comes about is also highly contested and at the core of such arguments is the disputed negative or positive value it has. In dominant contemporary neoliberal ideologies, there is a propensity to see national identity and its features as positive elements of other neoliberal nation states and their peoples. The relatively ‘constrained’ competitiveness between nationalities is formally ritualised in events such as the Olympic Games, wherein core ideological values of neoliberalism, such as the virtues of competition, are espoused (Bairner, 2015). Ceremonial self-adulation occurs through national anthems and flags at such events, which ‘become powerful visual agents in the production of ethno-nationalistic identities’ (Zuev and Virchow, 2014, p 191). 183

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Conversely, the national identities of non-neoliberal states tend to be marginalised as unsound in failing to conform to neoliberalism. There has been, and continues to be, considerable endeavour applied to contain and constrain the competing interests of national identities, such as the historic examples of arranged marriages between the nobility of differing nations, political pacts agreeing boundaries to colonial expansion and allegiances against external threats epitomised in Cold War affiliations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The regrettable long history and continuation of wars demonstrates the recurring failure of the objectives of such alliances. National identity is usually perceived negatively when it becomes overly insular and defensive, focusing on caricatured threats to a nation and its peoples. Rightwing political parties and groups exploit national identity in xenophobic and racist political agendas, illustrated contemporarily in their often gratuitous attacks upon multiculturalism (see ‘Multiculturalism’, this volume). In the UK, groups such as the English Defence League and the UK Independence Party, the neofascist archetype, exploit and exaggerate changing features of nationhood, such as the alleged demise of political and economic self-determinism within the European Union, while idealising an anachronistic national identity (Polyakova, 2014). National identity can therefore clash with the neoliberal rhetoric of society being ‘open’, ‘welcoming’ and ‘inclusive’, yet also purportedly needing to curb and curtail ‘alien’ migrants due their ridiculed different cultures and allegedly alien values. European history of colonial rule abounds with examples of attempts to suppress national identities; much of this was achieved through cultural suppression, illuminating ‘how culture participates in imperialism yet is somehow excused for its role’ (Said, 1993, p 128). Marxists argue that the exploitation of national identity, distinctive language and cultural traditions is a natural resistance to oppression, and differentiate the nationalism of the oppressed from the nationalism of the oppressor (Lorimer, 1999). The history of the state of Israel evidences those allegedly clear differences in the nationalism of the oppressor and oppressed, which is lamentably nebulous (Sorkin, 2014). In such perspectives, the close ties of religious values, apparently authenticating the social order of the nation and it peoples, is often evidenced in the primacy of religious orthodoxy and fundamentalism (Bruce, 2000). Globalisation has been interpreted as foreshadowing the demise of national identity, wherein borders would become anachronistic in the predicted ‘global village’, as transnational communications enhance shared understanding of our world and humanity (Gow, 2010). Disappointingly, the promises of neoliberal globalisation, in particular, the free movement of peoples, have not materialised

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and, instead, reactionary nationalistic barriers and concerns about national identity abound. LIAM McCANN See also: Hate Crime; Identity Cards; Multiculturalism; Neoliberalism Readings Bairner, A. (2015) ‘Assessing the sociology of sport: on national identity and nationalism’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 50(4/5): 375–9. Bruce, S. (2000) Fundamentalism. Cambridge, MA: Polity. Gow, G. (2010) ‘Marshall McLuhan and the end of the world as we know it’, English Studies in Canada, 36(2/3): 19–23. Lorimer, D. (1999) Fundamentals of historical materialism: The Marxist view of history and politics. Sydney: Resistance Books. Polyakova, A. (2014) ‘Strange bedfellows’, World Affairs, 177(3): 36–40. Said, E. (1993) Culture & imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus. Sorkin, M. (2014) ‘Civilian objects’, Nation, 299(20): 42–4. Wood, S. (2014) ‘Nations, national identity and prestige’, National Identities, 16(2): 99–115. Zuev, D. and Virchow, F. (2014) ‘Performing national-identity: the many logics of producing national belongings in public rituals and events’, Nations & Nationalism, 20(2): 191–9.

NATIONAL SECURITY

The term ‘national security’ is not only an essentially contested concept, but also incorporates two equally controversial ideas: the idea of the nation and that of security. The idea of a nation is not synonymous with that of a state.Yet, the concept of national security is focused, primarily, on that of the state. It would be more reasonable to consider the concept of national security as state security or even, more accurately, nation-state security. The term ‘national security’, as discussed here, therefore, is in reference to the national security of sovereign states. ‘Security’ is yet another term that proves illusive when searching for a universally acceptable definition. Understanding of security is inherently tied to both epistemological and ontological questions of knowledge. How is it known, for example, that something is secure or, indeed, insecure and in need of securing? What, indeed, is security and insecurity? Such questions suggest that the very nature of national security is not only a social construction, but also a contested 185

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concept devoid of individual, national and international consensus as to its meaning, particularly with regard to its analytical and policy-oriented scope (Williams, 2013). Within academic disciplines such as International Relations, theories of national security developed significantly during the Cold War period. These theories helped provide a basis for many of the policy decisions that dictated superpower rivalry during this period. In an adoption of Hobbesian principles, rationalchoice-based methodologies espoused by theoretical frameworks such as realism not only placed the nation state at the centre of international politics, but also insured that its security was of paramount importance when political leaders undertook foreign policy decisions. During this period, it was thought that the primary threat to any one nation state was from other nation states. As such, security dilemmas developed that, in turn, led to arms races and ultimately nuclear brinksmanship. Even during the Cold War period, in which rational choice featured heavily in the thinking of policymakers, the subjective nature of what was and was not a national security issue was increasingly self-evident. The safeguarding of the nation state from threats in the form of military capabilities from other nation states dominated political thinking during this period. A broadening of both academic and policy-oriented understandings of what it meant to be secure, from the 1980s onward, facilitated a re-evaluation of the concept of national security that offered more credence to the essentially contested nature of the term. Critical theories such as constructivism, feminism and human security not only encouraged replacing the nation state with the individual as the referent object in the study of international relations, but additionally offered an understanding of national security not purely in terms of the military capabilities of other nation states, but also with regard to issues that transcend traditional state boundaries as well. These included disease, the environment, resource scarcity and asymmetrical threats such as those posed by terrorist organisations. Despite the broadening of the concept of national security, Senator and Roman Consul Marcus Tullius Cicero’s maxim ‘salus populi suprema lex eslo’ (‘the safety of the people must be the highest law’) has always been applicable (Stockton, 1971, p 95). The security of the nation state – national security – is fluid. At its heart is the preservation of the territorial integrity in which the nation state exists from both external and internal threats. Broadening out, national security may also include the ability for a state to pursue its own agenda in the face of external factors such as environmental threats. EDGAR B. TEMBO

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See also: State, The; State Power; Theories of the State Readings Hobbes, L. (1651) Leviathan. London: Andrew Crooke at the Green Dragon. Richards, J. (2012) A guide to national security: Threats, responses and strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stockton, D. (1971) Cicero: A political biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, P. (2013) ‘Security studies: an introduction’, in P. Williams (ed) Security studies: An introduction. London: Routledge, pp 1–12.

NEOLIBERALISM

There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come in to being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton manufacturers – the leading free trade industry – were created by the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. (Polanyi, 2001, p 145) It is perhaps unusual to begin a discussion of neoliberalism – seen as a late 20thand early 21st-century mode of economic, political and social organisation – with the work of a thinker who first came to prominence in the late 1940s, a period that saw the inception of the interventionist welfare state in Western Europe and the expanded role of the state in North America during the aftermath of the Second World War. The social reality of collectivism, planning and enhanced welfare provision appears somewhat at odds with both the contemporary experience and consciousness of a ‘privatised’ existence mediated through the market as a transcendent reality. However, in the brief discussion that follows, it is argued that Polanyi, who did not specifically describe or comment upon neoliberalism, is of significance in drawing attention to both the state and its role as a creator, facilitator and enforcer of economic regimes. His approach in The great transformation (Polanyi, 2001) is important because it focuses attention on the deliberate and conscious creation of social institutions centred on the market, together with the social relations surrounding them. One way of understanding neoliberalism is to consider the way in which market-based relationships have been actively inserted into the interstitial ‘spaces’ structuring social life and that therefore give it both meaning and purpose. In order to help this understanding, it is important to recall some of the context in which neoliberalism developed and the alternative to which it was opposed.

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Hayek (1944) is perhaps the most influential progenitor of neoliberalism. Unsurprisingly, his theoretical and practical antagonist was the expanded realm of state activity and social welfare integral to the Keynesian remodelling of Western economies touched on earlier. In The road to serfdom, Hayek (1944) suggested that individual freedom was under threat as a result of state intervention to drive economic and social planning. While the force of his prescription for policy was directed at the West, the totalitarian regime of Stalin in the East deeply influenced his thinking. The antidote to the shackling of human freedom to what he regarded as the compromising realities of collectivism, shaped by the state, was the free market. He saw the market, through a number of complex formulations, as both a guarantor of freedom and as a mechanism embodying the closest approximation to the expression of human nature. Interestingly, as noted earlier, Polanyi’s work emerged at roughly the same time as Hayek’s. His approach, however, could not have been more different. Distinguishing between societies utilising the market as a ‘tool’ and those where the mechanism becomes a pervasive reality – that is, capitalist economies – he describes the active crafting of market-based relations by the state. Doogan (2009, p 103) specifies this by noting ‘foundational and developmental aspects of state intervention’. In the former, the conditions for capitalist development are secured, while in the latter, the state concerns itself with the imperative of reactive responses to ‘market outcomes that threaten the very existence of the state’ (Doogan, 2009, p 108), creating the intriguing possibility that laissez-faire was planned while planning was not (Bugra and Kaan, 2007). Hayek laid the foundations for neoliberalism as an all-encompassing mode of governance, which became increasingly influential post-1973 as the effects of the oil crisis and recession began to impact on Western economies. It can also be persuasively argued that Polanyi is of deep influence to critics of neoliberalism, most notably, Wacquant (2012, p 68), who emphasises the role of the state as the ‘core agency that actively fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to making the fiction of markets real and consequential’. The passing of what is described by Hobsbawn (2003, p 258) as an ‘exceptional phase’ in the history of capitalism saw the reassignment of formally collective social provision to the individual. Post-1975, the idealised individual increasingly became the target of either cajolement or coercion by the state in order to effect compliance with the demands, requirements and rigours of the regime, the latter being increasingly seen in the operation of policies on work and punishment (Wacquant, 2010). In a collateral series of developments, the state operates in tandem with the corporate sector to commodify aspects of public provision that were formerly free from direct exchange relationships. This is a means of compensating for the decline in traditional manufacturing and also a strategy that delivers complementary ideological benefits. While both Polanyi and Wacquant highlight the dynamic re-engineering of marketised relations by the state, they 188

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differ regarding the stability, or otherwise, of neoliberalism. The former suggests the cyclical operation of ‘foundational’ and ‘developmental’ phases, while the latter is silent on the idea of cyclicality, lending implicit support to Hobsbawn’s exceptionality and, fundamentally, to the notion that neoliberalism embodies the boom-and-bust nature of capitalist economic relations (Chun, 2016). DAVID BALSAMO See also: Globalisation; Governmentality; State, The Readings Bugra, A. and Kaan, A. (2007) Reading Karl Polanyi for the twenty-first century: Market economy as political project. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Chun, C. (2016) ‘The dominant and everyday discourses of neoliberalism and globalisation’, in J. Flowerdew and J.E. Richardson (eds) The Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies. London: Routledge, pp 1–26. Doogan, K. (2009) The new capitalism? The transformation of work. Cambridge: Polity. Hayek, F.A. (1944) The road to serfdom. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Hobsbawm (2003) The age of extremes. Abacus: London. Polanyi, K. (2001) The great transformation (2nd edn). Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Wacquant, L. (2010) ‘Crafting the neoliberal state: workfare, prisonfare and social insecurity’, Sociological Forum, 25: 197–220. Wacquant, L. (2012) ‘Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism’, Social Anthropology, 20(1): 66–79.

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O ORGANISED CRIME With a turnover estimated at over USD2.1 trillion, which accounts for about 3.6% of world gross domestic product (GDP) (see: https://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html), organised crime groups are certainly as wealthy as ever. Organised criminal consortia have been able not only to successfully permeate the licit and illicit economy, politics, and civil society, but also to influence and exercise authoritative power over both the underworld and the upper world. Any analysis on organised crime consequently encapsulates another dimension of the broader subjects of power, governance and inequality. The topic has unquestionably been a captivating conundrum for scholars of different disciplines who have tried to find an overarching theory that could embrace the diverseness of distinct criminal groupings and the variation of diverse criminal endeavours (German academic Klaus von Lampe has so far collected some 180 different definitions of organised crime on his website, see: http://www. organized-crime.de/ [accessed 20 May 2016]).The notion of organised crime is a US creation that dates back to the late 19th or early 20th century; however, some signs of proto-organised criminal practices can already be found in pre-modern societies, as chronicles and folk tales of the time confirm. The understanding of organised crime in history shows negligible continuity and little acceptance. It was originally conceptualised through the work of US official commissions on organised crime examining the Mafia, or (La) Cosa Nostra, as an ethnic and hierarchically structured grouping, and a nationwide bureaucratic organisation associated with the monopolisation and provision of illicit goods 191

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and services. This mafia-centric view of organised crime has been exported to other parts of the world as a result of successful books and Hollywood films on the subject. However, by the 1970s, a new definition of organised crime came to light: the criminal phenomenon was explained as an economic and financial illicit enterprise (see Paoli, 2014). In recent times, new conceptualisations have emphasised the notions of networks and the harmful consequences of organised crime. Finding a generally accepted definition of organised crime has always proved a challenging task because of the wide range of relevant but different variables of which it is composed. An attempt was made to encompass the many conceptualisations of organised crime that had advanced in the past, alongside a new emphasis on the transnational nature of the phenomena, in the drafting and ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (or the so-called Palermo Convention). This Convention, which was opened for signature in December 2000, came into force in 2003 and, as of April 2016, has been ratified by 186 countries. An agreement was reached on what constitutes an ‘organised crime group’ and what is entailed by ‘transnational crime’: A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this convention in order to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit. According to the Palermo Convention, an offence is transnational if: a. it is committed in more than one state; b. it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; c. it is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or d. it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state. The UN definition is intentionally broad to include both groups with hierarchical structures and gangs and networks where the roles of members are not formally defined. Moreover, organised crime is best explained as a form of governance (see Varese, 2010). Organised crime groups seek to regulate and govern the production, supply and protection of goods or services illegitimately. A special set of resources, together with features that define organised crime in the past and present (a basic structure, continuity and some person who receives an advantage from this form of governance), are necessary acquisitions for such a group. Violence 192

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and corruption are critical resources for organised crime groups. Force ensures that decisions are respected and penalties are implemented; the use of force and corruption are also important tools for acquiring power and controlling territory. Finally, mafias are a kind of organised crime group that are best explained as political organisations that exert control over a territory where they are forms of governance. Members of these organisations typically share the same norms, rituals and code of conduct. Scholars and policymakers use the expression ‘mafia’ to refer to organised criminal groups such as Sicilian and American Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Chinese Triads. SALVATORE COLUCCELLO See also: Drug Trafficking; Human Trafficking; Violence Note Additional resources on organised crime can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html and http://www.organized-crime.de/ 1

Readings Galeotti, M. (2009) Organised crime in history. London: Routledge. Paoli, L. (ed) (2014) The Oxford handbook of organized crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Varese, F. (ed) (2010) Organized crime: Definitions and theories, vol I. Abingdon: Routledge.

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P PARAMILITARY GROUPS The term ‘paramilitarism’ refers to activities of groups related to the military, but which, at the same time, deviate from the regular military. In addition, paramilitarism can also include the maintenance of local security by armed nonstate actors. On some occasions,‘paramilitarism’ refers to the way in which a state uses violence against other entities, either through the employment of private contractors or through extra-state security forces. In numerous countries, the paramilitary secured the power of authoritarian military regimes. Most members of these groups belonged to the military. In contrast, in some countries of Central America, for example, Guatemala, paramilitary actors were armed civilians who had the goal of counter-insurgencies and the control of the population. There needs to be a differentiation of paramilitary activities, as sometimes the paramilitary (eg police units) are incorporated into the armed forces of a country in cases of armed conflicts. In such cases, paramilitary activities are legitimised by the state. Paramilitarism is often presented within academia and public discourse as a new phenomenon, a product of weakened states in the late phase of global capitalism (Hristov, 2010). However, this conceptualisation fails to consider the historical continuity of the phenomenon of paramilitarism, which evolved primarily for the securitisation of space and capital. Paramilitarism has a long tradition not only in Latin America, but globally. In the 1960s and 1970s, paramilitary organisations were employed by the US to support the combating of insurgencies, guerrilla movements and other social movements.

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Scholars argue that the phenomenon of paramilitarism is related to the formation of some states (eg Columbia), and especially to available state resources and the level of threat that a state faces (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2005; Rangel, 2005). It has been stated that paramilitarism is enhanced within weak states, which have to use additional sources to repress threats through the privatisation or outsourcing of violence since their own police apparatus is insufficient (Tobon, 2005). However, this view neglects the multidimensionality of the phenomenon since paramilitarism is not only about the political objective of implementing counterinsurgency measures. Rather, it has simultaneous economic, political and military dimensions. Throughout history, the aims of paramilitary operations have been the combating of guerrilla forces, the sanctioning of civilians perceived as being in favour of left-wing movements or as guerrilla supporters, supporting the armed forces of a country, and, on some occasions, operating in illicit activities. The lines between the political and economic elements of the paramilitary are blurred since its members often own enterprises and sometimes have networks at all levels of government. Furthermore, paramilitarism has often been linked to neoliberalism. In Columbia, paramilitarism enhanced the establishment of neoliberalism by implementing policies favoured by neoliberal politicians. Neoliberalism increases poverty and insecurity. This, in turn, leads to the availability of more people for recruitment in paramilitary organisations, which can trigger the displacement of more people and the enhancement of additional neoliberal practices. The linkage between the paramilitary and the state involves different elements, such as flows of weapons, information, capital and sometimes illicit commodities, and is a two-sided relationship where one side impacts the other. The benefits of these activities depend on the extent of cooperation between the members of the entities. JULIE PAPASTAMATELOU See also: Collective Violence; Constitutionalism; Neoliberalism; State Power; State Violence Readings Giraldo, J. (1996) Colombia: The genocidal democracy. Monroe: Common Courage Press. Hristov, J. (2010) ‘Self-defence forces, warlords, or criminal gangs? Towards a new conceptualization of paramilitarism in Colombia’, LABOUR, Capital and Society, 43(2): 14–56. Kayyvas, S.N., and Arjone, A.M. (2005) ‘Paramilitarismo: Una Perspectiva Teórica’, in A. Rangel (ed), El Poder Paramilitar. Bogotá: Planeta, pp 25-45. Lund, J. (2011) ‘The poetics of paramilitarism’, Revista Hispánica Moderna, 64(1): 61–7. 196

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Rangel, A. (2005) ‘Adónde van los paramilitares?’, in A. Rangel (ed), El poder paramilitar. Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia-Planeta. Tobon, W.R. (2005) ‘Autodefensas y Poder Local’, in A. Rangel (ed), El Poder Paramilitar. Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia-Planeta.

PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE

According to the UK Parliament: ‘Parliamentary privilege grants certain legal immunities for members of both Houses which allow them to perform their duties without interference from outside the House’ (see: www.parliament.uk). It therefore provides protection for those in power. The definitive source on the subject, now in its 24th edition, is Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice (Jack et al, 2011) (to give it is shortened name). One example of the privilege is in relation to freedom of speech for the UK’s members of the House of Lords and House of Commons during their official duties, though it is intended to protect the House as a whole, and individuals only by default. It is common for the privilege to be scrutinised, and in the UK, this is carried out by the Joint Committee of Privileges, whose reports are important to the implementation of the policy. In many cases, such as the UK, the privilege has developed out of ancient practice. While also being enshrined in law, as in the 1689 Bill of Rights, Hunneyball (2015) suggests that early iterations of it provided support to the Crown, yet the early 17th century saw it opposing the Crown. This reflects the emphasis in the UK on the evolving constitution being practice-based not written. Many would argue that the protection is for the few and threatens other individuals not in a position of power given that parliamentarians can make claims against them but without recourse from the individual. It can be argued that the origins of the practice were to protect freedom of speech by the executive from legislation. There has been some discussion over whether individuals can waive the privilege in order to be involved in defamation proceedings (Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999, 2013). Arguments about the privilege concern the notion of the state as conspirator against, or as protector of, freedom of speech. Given a rapidly changing constitutional context, it is difficult to ensure the relevance and appropriateness of the privilege. The need to incorporate rapidly developing social media initiatives into the framework of parliamentary privilege is proving to be challenging. No longer do MPs have the sole role in naming and shaming within what have been the safe confines of the Houses of Parliament. For example, someone ‘tweeting’ a comment made by an MP within the House raises not only issues for that individual, but also for the MP. It could 197

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be said that traditional customs and statutory requirements are being overridden by the ease with which any individual (MP or not) can access social media. It can therefore be argued that Parliament is no longer the central stage that it once was and that it is being bypassed by social media. This indicates a redefinition of the limits of the privilege. The concept of evolution and flexibility drives much of the commentary on parliamentary privilege, indicating that parliaments must adapt and evolve. The potential for tension between parliamentary privilege and the rule of law has been addressed in a number of publications, including reports (see Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999, 2013). Chafetz (2007) undertook a comparative analysis, examining parliamentary privilege in the US as well as the UK. The role played by parliamentary privilege as a vehicle for MPs to avoid prosecution and the place of parliamentary privilege within the European legal framework are highlighted in the debate. The European Courts have indicated the limited nature of absolute freedom of speech, even for those in power, within its legal framework. UK custom is for Parliament to be self-regulating and to decide what does or does not constitute parliamentary privilege. What falls under parliamentary privilege will be informed by the effect of that decision on the ability of a parliament to carry out its work. The 2013 report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege refers to the Canadian ‘doctrine of necessity’, which underpins the supremacy of the autonomy of legislative work (Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 2013). The courts, using the laws that Parliament created, can challenge parliamentary privilege claims. It has been suggested that parliamentary privilege should be codified under the law (Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999), though legal codification runs contrary to the UK’s legal framework. The idea was rejected by the 2013 report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in favour of individual challenges or protections. There is a preference for laws to be developed through cases. Parliamentary privilege is being challenged on a number of fronts, and needs to evolve in order to remain valid. Society may no longer accept that those in power should have privileges, which itself indicates that it is not just the concept of parliamentary privilege being challenged, but also the idea that those in power should be above the law which, given the sovereignty of Parliament, they can indeed claim to be. MERIEL D’ARTREY See also: Constitutionalism; Crimes of the Powerful; Democracy; State Harm

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Readings Chafetz, J. (2007) Democracy’s privileged few: Legislative privilege and democratic norms in the British and American constitutions. Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press. Hunneyball, P.M. (2015) ‘The development of parliamentary privilege 1604–29’, Parliamentary History, 34(1): 111–28. Jack, M., Hutton, M., Johnson, C., Millar, D., Patrick, S. and Sandall, A. (eds) (2011) Erskine May parliamentary practice (24th edn). London: LexisNexis Butterworths Law. Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1999) ‘Report’. Available at: http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt/jtpriv.htm Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (2013) ‘Report’. Available at: http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtprivi/30/3002.htm

PEACEKEEPING AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

The term ‘peacekeeping’ refers to multinational operations intended to create the conditions conducive to realising durable peace after war. Traditionally, this involved the deployment of primarily military personnel between opposing forces of warring countries in order to observe and monitor ceasefire arrangements and the implementation of commitments under peace agreements. The United Nations (UN) coined the term and mounted the first peacekeeping mission in 1948. While there is no explicit mention of peacekeeping in the UN Charter, the architects interpreted its provisions to create operations whose legitimacy and credibility were grounded in their adherence to a ‘holy trinity’ of principles: (1) consent of the parties to a conflict; (2) impartial treatment of those parties; and (3) minimum use of force (Bellamy et al, 2010, p 174). Falling somewhere between the peaceful measures envisaged under Chapter VI and the coercive measures, including the use of force, contained in Chapter VII, SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld legendarily referred to armed UN peacekeeping as ‘Chapter six and a half ’ operations. Seminal reports, such as Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for peace, were careful to conceptually distinguish peacekeeping from other activities, such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-building. However, the practice of UN peacekeeping is dynamic and has adapted to the changing nature of conflict. The changed global political climate at the end of the Cold War led to peacekeeping missions becoming more expansive multidimensional undertakings. Notably, missions were being sent to address conflict within countries rather than between them. In so doing, the boundaries between these concepts have blurred and ‘peacekeeping’ has become an umbrella term for a continuum of measures 199

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associated with the international community’s efforts to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts between or within countries. These modern missions are designed to provide the security, political and peace-building support necessary to sustain the war-to-peace transition in conflict-affected societies. The UN does not have a standing army to conduct these operations. Instead, member states contribute personnel on a voluntary basis – albeit with remuneration where appropriate. In 2016, the UN’s annual peacekeeping budget topped USD8 billion and over 120,000 military, police and civilian personnel were serving in 16 missions across the world. However, while peacekeeping is often associated with the UN, it is not the only organisation engaged in such operations. Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have developed their own capacities for peacekeeping and have mounted a number of operations both within and beyond their regional territories. The term ‘capacity-building’ emerged and became pervasive in the discourse of international development organisations in the early 1990s. Different definitions abound but it generally connotes an approach to social and economic development that seeks to identify and alleviate the barriers facing stakeholders in effectively achieving their development objectives. At an individual level, it refers to efforts to strengthen people’s skills and knowledge to determine their own values and priorities and to organise themselves to act on them. In other words, capacity-building is about empowering people to be the authors of their own development (Eade, 2005). At an institutional level, capacitybuilding involves supporting existing institutional infrastructures to reform in order to provide the organisational framework to empower development. As peacekeeping missions have increasingly engaged in attempts to resurrect political and economic institutions believed to be the bedrock for peaceful societies, they received criticism for being a conduit for the import of exogenous political and economic institutions. In response, peace-builders have appropriated the language and logic of capacity-building in order to reorient practice towards more locally owned, bottom-up processes of political and economic development. For example, post-conflict reconstruction often includes major programmes of security and justice sector reform. While this led to some improvements in process and outcomes, peacekeeping missions – after all, the instruments of state-based organisations – have tended to focus on building the institutions of the state. This can be to the detriment of individual or broader societal capacity-building – often equally important in the formation of peace and order in societies affected by conflict.

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Consequently, capacity-building has become a key part of the lexicon of conflict prevention and peace-building. As a result, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘capacity-building’ are often part of the same engagement by the international community – through the UN or other regional bodies and coalitions – in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. CHARLES T. HUNT See also: Humanitarian Intervention; Military Conflict; Responsibility to Protect (R2P); United Nations, The Readings Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. and Griffin, S. (2010) Understanding peacekeeping (2nd edn). Cambridge: Polity. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) Report of the UN Secretary-General: ‘Agenda for Peace’, New York: United Nations. Eade, D. (2005) Capacity-building: An approach to people-centred development. Oxford: Oxfam. Hughes, B.W., Hunt, C.T. and Kondoch, B. (eds) (2010) Making sense of peace and capacity-building operations: Rethinking policing and beyond. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

POLICE VIOLENCE

The policing of liberal-democratic societies should adhere to the principles of the rule of law, one aspect of which is that the police should act at all times within the law and abide by the constraints that this imposes upon their actions. However, this defence against the use of violence by the police is not consistently realised in practice. In any society, those subject to such actions are often minority ethnic communities (to whom the term ‘police property’ has been applied in England and Wales) (Lee, 1981), who have often experienced violent police actions, ranging from the differential application of police powers to the use of lethal force. The responses of those subject to such action have underpinned civil disturbances in countries that include England (the 1981 and 1985 disorders), France (the 2005 Banlieue riots) and the US (the unrest in 2014 following the shooting by a police officer of the black teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri).

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Public order policing poses a particular dilemma for policing. The requirement to handle large numbers of people requires the development of tactics and the utilisation of equipment and weaponry that have been dubbed ‘paramilitary policing’ (Jefferson, 1990, p 16), which may result in the use of aggressive behaviour and violence by the police at events that include demonstrations and industrial disputes. Although some aspects of violent police actions are legally justifiable (eg when police officers are faced with a threat that poses a serious threat to their personal safety or to that of other members of the general public), it is imperative that liberal-democratic societies employ procedures to ensure that the use of violence by the police is proportionate to the incident that they are dealing with. To achieve this, first, there needs to be adequate mechanisms to scrutinise the actions of police officers, in particular, concerning their routine interactions with members of the general public. In the US and increasingly in the UK, use is being made of body-worn video cameras that record an officer’s actions. Such devices can serve as powerful sanctions against the abuse of power and violence (as was the case in the UK, where the tape-recording of interviews in police stations under the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 curbed violence by detectives towards those they were questioning in connection with committing a crime). Second, the use of lethal force by police officers must be subject to adequate mechanisms of legal accountability. In Northern Ireland, the shootings of six unarmed persons in the County of Armagh by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1982 sparked the ‘shoot to kill’ controversy, in which the police were alleged to be acting in a manner akin to that of ‘death squads’ seeking to eliminate those who opposed the existence of the Northern Irish state. No officer was convicted in connection with these incidents, reflecting the situation that in the UK, there is a reluctance to prosecute police officers where a prima facie case seems to exist that such violence was disproportionate (and, in some instances, such as that of Charles Menezes in 2005, directed at the wrong person, resulting in an innocent man losing his life). A third and final consideration relating to curbing police violence is that the police must not be operationally controlled by the government. This is a key aspect of the Code of Ethics promoted by the Council of Europe in 2001, which argued that ‘in exercising their powers, the police should not receive any instructions of a political nature’ (Council of Europe, 2001, p 41). The ability of governments to formally or informally influence police operational decisions may encourage police violence because officers will know that any actions they undertake in furtherance of the interests of the government (whether legal or not) will have political backing.

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One example of this in the UK was the robust defence by the then prime minister of violent police actions undertaken at Orgreave in June 1984 (during the height of the 1984/85 miners’ disputes). This illustrates how a close link between government (which could not politically afford to let the strike succeed) and policing can encourage police violence. PETER JOYCE See also: Civil Disorder and Unrest; Ethical Policing; Protest; Violence Readings Council of Europe (2001) The European code of police ethics. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Jefferson, T. (1990) The case against paramilitary policing. Basingstoke: Open University Press. Lee, J. (1981) ‘Some structural aspects of police deviance in relation to minority groups’, in C. Shearing (ed) Organisational police deviance. Toronto: Butterworths, pp 49–82.

POLITICAL CRIME

Political crime is one of the most misunderstood concepts in the field of criminology and criminal justice. For numerous reasons, criminologists have traditionally ignored the study and teaching of political crime. Even though a number of logical and cogent reasons for this state of affairs have been articulated (Ross, 2012, pp 2–3), a respectable body of scholarly research on political crime has accumulated. A handful of academics have advanced definitions of political crime. One of the most useful efforts is that produced by Beirne and Messerschmidt (1991, p 240): crimes against the state (violations of law for the purpose of modifying or changing social conditions) … [and] crimes by the state, both domestic (violations of law and unethical acts by state officials and agencies whose victimization occurs inside [a particular country]) and international (violations of domestic and international law by state officials and agencies whose victimization occurs outside [a particular country]).

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Ten scholars have attempted to provide comprehensive treatments of the subject. These include Proal’s (1973 [1898]) Political crime, Schafer’s (1974) The political criminal, Turk’s (1982) Political criminality, Kittrie and Wedlock’s (1986) The tree of liberty, Ingraham’s (1979) Political crime in Europe, Hagan’s (1997) Political crime, Kittrie’s (2000) Rebels with a cause, Ross’s (2003) The dynamics of political crime, Head’s (2011) Crimes against the state, and Ross’s (2012) An introduction to political crime. Although the earlier books focused disproportionately on oppositional political crime (ie actions directed against the government), the later treatments have increasingly incorporated explanations for state crimes (ie government criminal actions against their own population and those of other countries). Some academics have examined political crimes, the tendency to incorporate crimes by the state has been occasioned by work starting in the early 1990s, and critical criminologists have been primarily responsible for examining crimes by the powerful (eg corporations, elites and states) or supranational crimes (ie crimes that transcend countries’ borders that are violations of moral and humane standards). These efforts were provided in the context of edited books with original chapters (eg Barak, 1991; Ross, 2000 [1995], 2000; Michalowski and Kramer, 2006). One of the earlier treatments was a collection of previously published journal articles (Friedrichs, 1998a, 1998b). More recently, books that have attempted to provide an integrated approach to the subject matter of state crime have been published (eg Rothe, 2009). On the other hand, the majority of research on political crime consists of descriptive case studies. By far the bulk of writing on political crime has been in the form of articles and books about individuals suspected of, charged with and convicted of various political crimes. Predictably, this work is done by journalists and aimed at a popular audience. One of the most favoured types of political criminal that is frequently profiled is spies (ie individuals who are alleged to or who have engaged in espionage). The majority of published works focus on political crime in advanced industrialised democracies, with a concentration on Anglo-American countries (eg Australia, the UK, Canada and the US). This is not because these countries are any more prone to political crime than others, but, in general, access to reliable information is easier in democracies, and the publication of the findings is typically easier. With the exception of the previously mentioned classic studies, few broad crossnational studies of political crime have been conducted. Cross-national studies of a subcomponent of political crime such as corruption, human rights violations or oppositional political terrorism are more common.

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Few experts have attempted to develop a holistic theory that explains the causal dynamics of this type of criminal/political behaviour. In many respects, understanding how these actions emerge, who is involved and why they take part is elusive. However, four attempts can be singled out. First, Merton (1938, 1964, 1966) provided one of the earliest explanations that, in part, touches on political crime. According to his anomic theory of deviance (ie strain theory), individuals live in societies that have a considerable amount of ‘structural dysfunctionalism’. This, in turn, leads people to experience an ends–means discrepancy. These processes combined together create stress. In order to minimise the discomfort, individuals have five options, one of which is rebellion (nominally a type of political crime). Second, Moran (1974, p 73) describes ‘sequential stages which in successive combination might account for the development of a political criminal’. The first are what he calls ‘predisposing conditions or background factors, the conjunction of which forms a pool of potential political criminals. These conditions exist prior to an individual’s decision to commit a political crime and by themselves do not account for his behavior’ (Moran, 1974, pp 73–4). The aforementioned conditions include the concept of strain and ‘a political problem solving perspective’, which consists of ‘situational contingencies which lead to the commission of political crimes by predisposed individuals’ (Moran, 1974, p 74). Moran advocates a five-stage ‘developmental model’ consisting of the following steps: (1) strain; (2) ‘political problem solving perspective’; (3) a turning point event; (4) commitment to act; and (5) engaging in the political crime. Third, Turk (1982) posits that, although power and inequality are important factors in explaining political crime, the cultural gap between offenders and authorities is the primary factor that leads to the commission of political crime. Ross (2003, 2012), anchoring his explanation in Sutherland’s differential association theory and conflict theory, developed the ‘ISOR’ explanation. He argues that political crime is the result of a complex interplay among individuals (I), situations/opportunities (S), organisations (O) and resource adequacy (R). In brief, although many political crimes are committed by groups that are formally or loosely structured, whether oppositional in nature or organised by state organisations, these activities are, in the final analysis, committed by individuals. These people are working within the structural confines of both informal and complex organisations, political systems, political economies, and different cultures. They make decisions and act, while often denying that any wrongdoing has occurred. Ross argues that the ISOR relationship is not simply a resource mobilisation theory or a crime prevention method brought into alignment with environmental design theories, but a more comprehensive explanation than previous attempts. Since the literature on political crime is more expansive than that which has been written in English-language sources, it would be useful at some point in 205

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time for individuals so motivated to look at this scholarship and see what sorts of additional insights could be gleaned. It is also necessary to keep in mind that, although case studies are important, scholars must move towards more comparative and integrative studies to develop and test hypotheses. Until the scholarly field of political crime moves in this direction, it will be a tertiary concern of mainstream criminology, be subject to superficial and highly selective overviews, and possibly be marginalised in the discipline. JEFFREY IAN ROSS See also: Corruption; Crimes of the Powerful; State Crime; State Harm Readings Barak, G. (ed) (1991) Crimes by the capitalist state: An introduction to state criminality. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Beirne, P. and Messerschmidt, J. (1991) Criminology. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Friedrichs, D.O. (1998a) State crime (Vol. 1). Aldershot: Ashgate. Friedrichs, D.O. (1998b) State crime (Vol. 2). Aldershot: Ashgate. Hagan, F. (1997) Political crime: Ideology and criminality. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Head, M. (2011) Crimes against the state. Farnham: Ashgate. Ingraham, B.L. (1979) Political crime in Europe: A comparative study of France, Germany, and England. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kittrie, N.N. (2000) Rebels with a cause. Boulder: Westview. Kittrie, N.N. and Wedlock, E.D., Jr (1986) The tree of liberty: A documentary history of rebellion and political crime in America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Merton, R.K. (1938) ‘Social structure and anomie’, American Sociological Review, 3(1): 672–82. Merton, R.K. (1964) ‘Anomie, anomia, and social interaction: contexts of deviant behavior’, in M.B. Clinard (ed) Anomie and deviant behavior. New York, NY: Free Press. Merton, R.K. (1966) ‘Social problems and sociological theory’, in R.K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet (eds) Contemporary social problems. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace. Michalowski, R.J. and Kramer, R.C. (eds) (2006) State-corporate crime: Wrongdoing at the intersection of business and government. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press. Moran, R. (1974) ‘Political crime’ (doctoral dissertation), University of Pennsylvania, USA. Proal, L. (1973 [1898]) Political crime. Montclair: Paterson Smith.

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Ross, J.I. (ed) (2000 [1995]) Controlling state crime (2nd edn). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Ross, J.I. (ed) (2000) Varieties of state crime and its control. Monsey: Criminal Justice Press. Ross, J.I. (2003) The dynamics of political crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Ross, J.I. (2012) An introduction to political crime. Bristol: The Policy Press. Rothe, D.L. (2009) State criminality: The crime of all crimes. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Schafer, S. (1974) The political criminal. New York, NY: Free Press. Turk, A.T. (1982) Political criminality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

POST-CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Post-conflict resolution defies easy definition. It can contain facets of conflict resolution, peace-building and transitional justice, as well as aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and conflict prevention. It looks both backwards and forwards, seeking to understand past conflicts in order to prevent their reoccurrence in the future. Attempts at post-conflict resolution include the establishment of new institutions and bodies, such as those tasked with preserving peace, for example, the United Nations (UN). Other responses might emerge from the precise conditions linked to the resolution of particular conflicts. Following the First World War, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles sought to strip Germany of territory, limit its armed forces, order it to pay reparations and make it seemingly accept responsibility for causing the conflict. This mixture of retribution, reparation and control was perceived as excessive by many in Germany and contributed to the creation of the economic, social and political conditions in which Nazi extremism would flourish. Such instances illustrate the complexities of post-conflict resolution and the balancing act that must take place between accounting for the past and avoiding conflict in the future. Post-conflict resolution contains a number of elements of transitional justice. It might involve criminal trials, such as those at Nuremberg between 1945 and 1949, during which a number of leading Nazis were tried, convicted and punished (Teitel, 2000). Such approaches are underpinned by incapacitation and retribution, but also aim to deter future abuses. Yet, they risk accusations of ‘victors’ justice’, where responsibility falls only on those defeated, ignoring other atrocities. Criminal trials may also be problematic in civil wars, where internal conflict has destroyed or otherwise compromised legal structures, or where the vast number of suspected perpetrators overwhelms the criminal justice system. 207

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These elements were present in domestic criminal trials in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Pressures on these structures were somewhat lessened by the existence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – a UN-backed court that tried those Hutu people suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide – and by the use of Gacaca hearings. Other elements of post-conflict resolution relate to the confiscation/return of property and the granting of reparations, both financial and moral. A number of Latin American states have paid reparations to the families of those killed and/or ‘disappeared’ by previous regimes, including those juntas supported by Western states. As a means of redress, reparations have a symbolic value, suggesting some acknowledgement of wrongdoing. However, their use still raises questions about how one should interpret responsibility, particularly when dealing with historical conflict. Nor do reparations of this sort overcome the difficulties inherent in ‘measuring’ harm, which can also be witnessed across a range of ‘justice’ contexts. Lustration can be understood as a further element of post-conflict resolution. This includes the ‘purging’ of those previously in positions of power and influence, along with the screening of future appointments, akin to the ‘decommunism’ measures enacted in Eastern European states in the 1990s. Although it may provide some reassurance, lustration is vulnerable to abuse and can be a way for a post-conflict regime to remove perceived dissidents, rather than a genuine way to make peace with the past and reconcile communities. Post-conflict resolution also concerns the ways in which conflict is represented, acknowledged and remembered (Hayner, 2001). This includes inquiries, days of remembrance, memorials and/or the use of truth commissions, as seen in Guatemala, South Africa and Sierra Leone, among others. Commissions can have widely varying remits and powers, and can exist in tandem with other postconflict mechanisms. At their most useful, they help create an ‘official’ record of the conflict, acknowledge harm caused and contribute to reconciliation. Yet, they can also be misused, manipulated or undermined by problematic mandates that deepen rather than heal social wounds. Their power to ‘heal’ can be exaggerated and romanticised, especially in situations with inadequate aftercare and support. As shown in South Africa, truth commissions also have limited influence in changing the social, political and economic structures that may have contributed to conflict in the first place. Post-conflict resolution can therefore take a number of forms. It overlaps with elements of peace-building, the setting up of new institutions and the reconciliation of various publics. It can contain both micro and macro elements and is heavily dependent on the historical, cultural, economic and socio-political

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exigencies and abilities of interested groups, who may have unequal access to power and influence. LISA WHITE See also: Conflict Resolution; Peacekeeping and Capacity-Building; War Crimes Readings Hamber, B., Nageng, D. and O’Malley, G. (2000) ‘Telling it like it is: understanding the truth and reconciliation commission from the perspective of survivors’, Journal of Psychology in Society, 26: 18–42. Hayner, P.B. (2001) Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity. New York, NY: Routledge. Teitel, R.G. (2000) Transitional justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS

Every citizen in the UK is entitled to certain rights, including those held at Her Majesty’s pleasure (prisoners). Generally speaking, prisoners (including those who are detained but have not been convicted of a criminal offence) are entitled to be treated with humanity, dignity and respect. Although this would seem a plausible way to work alongside some of society’s most complex and vulnerable people, the very notion that ‘wrongdoers’ have rights similar (but by no means equal) to that of ‘law-abiding’ citizens has been a point of contention for many years, most commonly deliberated and vilified by the mass media.Although some believe that all people should have access to certain rights, regardless of who they are and what they have done, others have argued that anyone found guilty of a crime should have their rights revoked. Whatever the perspective, there are human rights that every individual is entitled to under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), a treaty that is designed to protect basic human rights so that people are able to lead free and dignified lives. On 2 October 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) was implemented, incorporating the ECHR into English law. The ECHR contains many articles that are particularly relevant to prison life, specifying that no one should be subject to torture, inhumane treatment, punishment or forced labour. Everyone should have the right to life, liberty, security and a fair trial, as well as freedom of association and the right to marry (Loucks, 2000). These rights allow prisoners, among other things, the right to food and water, education, a solicitor and private 209

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legal counsel, freedom from discrimination and harassment, good health care, communication with those outside prison, freedom of religion, and the right to start a family. Under the HRA, all primary legislation and existing procedures and practices of public authorities, including public and private prisons, must be compatible with the principles of the ECHR (Scott and Flynn, 2014). Although a seemingly positive development, very little has changed in penal policy and practice since the introduction of the HRA. Prisoners continue to have fewer rights in comparison to their ‘law-abiding’ counterparts, and of the few rights that they do hold on to, they are commonly (re)defined and promoted as a privilege, something that can be earned rather than a fundamental human right. Recent media coverage of issues such as prisoners’ right to vote, the introduction of smoke-free prisons and the treatment of transgender prisoners (to name just a few) not only illustrates the complex and contested nature of the debate that surrounds prisoners’ rights, but demonstrates how the prison estate is a place of controversy, pain and suffering rather than a place where individuals are naturally treated with humanity and dignity. The interplay between a prisoner’s rights and staff/institutional discretion shapes an individual’s experience of imprisonment. The authority of penal administrators is derived largely, but not exclusively, from the Prison Act 1952, a statutory framework that confers a substantial amount of discretionary power upon penal officials, and the Prison Rules 1999 (Scott and Flynn, 2014). Although such frameworks are designed to protect prisoners and staff, many of the rules and regulations that govern penal environments and those within them are not designed to be legally enforceable. Rather, they are directory and therefore not intended to create legally enforceable rights. The protection of an individual’s rights is an important responsibility of the state that needs to be reflected in the exercise of the state’s functions. The prioritisation of an individual’s rights offers a way in which to challenge social exclusion and prisoner invisibility, recognising them as equal in status as opposed to a second-class citizen (Easton, 2011). However, the ability of the state to design and deliver a rights-oriented approach, whereby every member of society is considered to be equal before the law and treated with dignity, respect and humanity, is questionable given the damming effects and stigmatising properties of the prison place and, indeed, the wider criminal ‘justice’ system. HELENA GOSLING See also: European Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights; Prisoners’ Rights Post-Custody

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Readings Easton, S. (2011) Prisoners’ rights: Principles and practices. Abingdon: Routledge. Loucks, N. (2000) Prison rules: A working guide. Prison Reform Trust. Available at: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/portals/0/documents/ prisonrulesworkingguide.pdf Scott, D. and Flynn, N. (2014) Prisons and punishment: The essentials (2nd edn). London: Sage.

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS POST-CUSTODY

According to Raynor and Robinson (2005), the earliest use of the term ‘rehabilitation’ (at least in a legal context) was in France during the late 17th century, where it referred to the deletion or expunging of the criminal record. A century or so later, Beccaria proposed a similar definition of the term, arguing for the use of punishment as a way of requalifying individuals as juridical subjects (McNeil, 2014). Although there is no general consensus about the meaning, application and effectiveness of rehabilitative interventions that work alongside ex-prisoners, the desire to ‘correct’,‘restore’ and ‘reintegrate’ convicted lawbreakers remains a firm favourite on the socio-political agenda. While the criminal justice system in England and Wales (and, indeed, further afield) has progressed somewhat since the 17th century, attempts to rehabilitate those who are considered ‘wrongdoers’ continue to focus on the restoration of one’s citizenship in a de jure legal sense, rather than a de facto (accepted in practice but not necessarily obtained by law) sense (McNeil, 2014). The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 governs the responsibilities of, and protections given to, ex-offenders when in a position that may require the disclosure (or not, as the case may be) of any previous criminal convictions. The Act allows convictions, cautions, reprimands and final warnings in respect of a certain offence to be considered spent after a specified period of time, known as the rehabilitation period, which is decided by the sentence or disposal received. Once spent, the person is considered rehabilitated and the Act treats the person as if they had never committed an offence (NACRO, 2015). While the Act itself may treat individuals as though they have never committed a criminal offence, it is unable to create real and sustainable employment and rehabilitation opportunities for all (ex-)offenders or to reduce the discrimination, victimisation and marginalisation that surrounds individuals who have been entangled in the criminal justice system. Although the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 alludes that the rights of exoffenders are protected by law, it fails to recognise the nuanced ways in which the 211

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prison place (as well as the subsequent label of ‘ex-prisoner’) is able to permanently dismantle an individual’s ability to live a life that consists of individual, social and economic opportunities that are, at the very least, equal to those who have not been entangled in the criminal justice system. To date, it has been more than 40 years since the Act was first passed, yet there remains an air of uncertainty and caution, particularly among employers and ex-offenders, when it comes to understanding and effectively applying this particular piece of legislation. The Act is a barrier to rehabilitation, preventing rather than supporting ex-offenders in the quest to seek and obtain employment, for example, given the ambiguity that surrounds what constitutes a spent conviction and what ex-offenders are required to disclose to potential employers. The introduction of laws and interventions that claim to prioritise the right of an ex-offender to live a successful crime-free life not only ignore the complexities that surround the notion of rehabilitation and broader discussions of an individual’s human rights, but totally overlook how the design and delivery of rehabilitation is increasingly influenced by a preoccupation with public protection and risk management (McNeil, 2014). Upholding and supporting the rights of exprisoners is an important social issue for all members of society, not just those who have been involved with the criminal justice system, yet the inclusion of ex-prisoners within the local community remains a particularly controversial issue on both a social and political level. The marginalisation of ex-prisoners dilutes not only their ability to access a crime-free life, but also the likelihood of their ability to successfully disengage with the criminal justice system. It is important to recognise that the more prisoners and ex-prisoners are purposively excluded from full participation in society through the application of laws and the implementation of interventions that continue to restrict people’s rights postcustody, the more unjust and unequal societies become. HELENA GOSLING See also: Civil Liberties; Human Rights; Prisoners’ Rights Readings McNeil, F. (2014) ‘When punishment is rehabilitation’, in G. Bruinsma and D. Weisburd (eds) Encyclopaedia of criminology and criminal justice. New York, NY: Springer. Available at: http://blogs.iriss.org.uk/discoveringdesistance/ files/2012/06/McNeill-When-PisR.pdf NACRO (National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders) (2015) ‘Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. A NACRO guide’. Available at: https://www.nacro.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/rehabilitationof-offenders-act-1974-guide.pdf

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Raynor, P. and Robinson, G. (2005) Rehabilitation, crime and justice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian.

PRIVATE SECURITY

Any investigation of the topic of private security must appreciate the breadth and growth of this sector.The term ‘private security’ comes to encapsulate a variety of specific areas of activity and study in relation to the delivery of services of security, policing and/or protection. Private security is a growing marketplace, covering activities such as the monitoring of premises’ anti-theft systems, reassurance policing (eg guards, neighbourhood wardens), the protection of persons, private military companies, the security of valuables in transit, the custody of prisoners, security consultation and the guarding of premises, to name but a few. Scholarly analyses of security have typically focused on key institutions of the state, for example, the police and the military. However, more recently, authors have sought to explain and investigate the complexities of relations between private security companies and governments. For example, writers such as Dupont (2014) warn of the dangers of a simplistic reading of private security and public services as binary concepts or domains. Indeed, public–private relationships and policies are often politically and economically complex and entwined. Moreover, as scholars such as Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) posit, the conspicuousness of a private sector presence in traditionally public service delivery is often in response to the opening of market opportunities due to changes in national and international politics and the perceived benefits of corporate businesses in cash-stricken public services. Further, not only does such enterprise construe a particular character to the services being delivered; it also creates a hybridisation of public–private norms, values, knowledge and power. Private companies are therefore key actors in the anchoring of sensibilities over risk and security. As Sassen (2006) explains, the production of security is the outcome of cooperation between commercial organisations and governments. As the practices of the commercial security industry are endorsed by the state and government bodies, subsequently, public legitimacy and consent is secured. This then has the effect of placing private security operators as bastions of public protection. For some authors, such as De Waard (1999), the commodification of security, force and protection and the growth of non-state authority have been brought about by several influences, such as concerns over increases in crime, a recasting of priorities for the police, fiscal pressures on public services and a need to reconfigure public spending on services. Moreover, the claimed expertise of private actors has been seen to be a key constituent of private governance 213

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arrangements; however, as Cutler (2010) astutely asserts, the contemporary legalism that allows for such commercialisation to take place is not benign, but set against (and within) a backcloth of contemporary (transnational) capitalism. In the example of policing, systems of accountability and the governance of pluralised policing provision are a principal concern for many scholars and those involved in policy formulation (Jones and Newburn, 2006; Stenning, 2009). The presence of a diversity of private bodies and an ‘extended policing family’ (Crawford, 2014) brings with it significant challenges in terms of regulation. Attempts to license and professionalise the industry continue to evolve globally, as do attempts to create independent authorities to scrutinise the activities of organisations and their personnel. In contexts where nodal and plural policing appears as an embedded feature of democratic societies, and where systems of inspection and regulation of public law-enforcement agencies attract accusations of inadequacy, the challenge to bring controls over private contractors is formidable. Analysing security beyond the state requires interpretation that remains conscious of changing patterns of commercialised security operating amid (and being implicit in the [re]creating of) public–private convergence. Observance of the monolithic dichotomies of ‘public’ and ‘private’ appear redundant in the modern era of a multifaceted security apparatus when, indeed, the interconnectedness and production of activity, knowledge and power bears influence from both. PAUL TAYLOR See also: Corporations; Democratic Policing; State, The Readings Abrahamsen, R. and Williams, M.C. (2010) Security beyond the state: Private security in international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crawford, A. (2014) ‘The police, policing and the future of the extended policing family’, in J.M. Brown (ed) The future of policing. Abingdon: Routledge, pp 173–90. Cutler, A.C. (2010) ‘The legitimacy of private transnational governance: experts and the transnational market for force’, Socio-Economic Review, 8(1): 157–85. De Waard, J. (1999) ‘The private security industry in international perspective’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 7(2): 143–74. Dupont, B. (2014) ‘Private security regimes: conceptualizing the forces that shape the private delivery of security’, Theoretical Criminology, 18(3): 263–81. Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2006) ‘Understanding plural policing’, in T. Jones and T. Newburn (eds) Plural policing: A comparative perspective. Abingdon: Routledge, pp 1–11.

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Sassen, S. (2006) Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stenning, P. (2009) ‘Governance and accountability in a plural policing environment: the story so far’, Policing, 3(1): 22–33.

PROPORTIONALITY

Proportionality is a philosophical principle that is central to the control of state power and the legal protection of human rights. Proportionality comes into play when courts are required to consider whether a prima facie breach of a qualified right is justified on one of the allowable grounds. For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association (Article 22) may be subject to restrictions: which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. On the face of it, this provides a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ (ie discretion) for states to violate individual rights in the name of collective security, leaving the principle of proportionality to do much of the work of deciding whether a proven breach was ‘necessary’. While the ICCPR does not provide specific grounds on which states may violate the right to life, other than via the lawful imposition of the death penalty, the European Convention on Human Rights articulates the principle of proportionality in some detail in relation to this fundamental right. Article 2.2 states that deprivation of life is consistent with human rights requirements: when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. These legal constructions still leave considerable space for interpretation, and whether or not specific breaches of individual rights are considered to be necessary and proportionate is likely to be highly contested on political and moral grounds.

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The proportionality principle has also found its way into domestic jurisprudence that relies on human rights reasoning. The Canadian case R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, brought under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, provides an expansive and authoritative statement of the principle. In that judgment, Dickson CJ articulated three important components of a test for proportionality: First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair ‘as little as possible’ the rights or freedoms in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’. Beyond the courts, the principle of proportionality has a number of applications within penal theory and criminal justice practice. The ‘just deserts’ approach to sentencing requires that criminal sanctions are proportionate to the offence committed, and are reasonably consistent across offenders and in relation to offences of similar seriousness. As the goal is to achieve retribution, offenders need be punished only to the extent necessary to (notionally) balance the harm that was perpetrated. In contrast, where general deterrence is the primary principle guiding sentencing, the severity of sanctions may be determined by the desire to influence the behaviour of others. This approach could lead, in some cases, to severe sanctions and exemplary sentences that would be considered disproportionate by a ‘just deserts’ advocate. Proportionality is also an important principle in relation to police practice, particularly when articulating constraints on the use of police powers that potentially violate individual rights. The Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officers (OHCHR, 1990), adopted by the United Nations in 1990, specify that ‘whenever the lawful use of force or firearms is unavoidable’, police must ‘exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved’ (para 5(a)). Proportionality also features in ethical reasoning that is not framed explicitly in human rights terms. For example, police ethicist John Kleinig lists proportionality, along with intentions, seemliness, minimisation and practicability, as the factors that are relevant to making an ethical assessment of police use of force (Kleinig, 1996). As well as these formal applications in the legal process, the imposition of criminal sanctions and policing practice, the idea of proportionality appeals

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in a common-sense way to our sense of what is just and fair, and is therefore an important touchstone in any assessment of the use of power. LEANNE WEBER See also: Democracy; European Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights; State Power Readings Kleinig, J. (1996) The ethics of policing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) (1990) Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officers, www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx Tsakyrakis, S. (2009) ‘Proportionality: an assault on human rights?’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7(3): 468–93.

PROTEST

‘Protests’ have been defined as scenes of contestation in which individuals or groups try to change or prevent changes in institutionalised power relations by influencing decision-makers.While about 50 years ago, protests were considered to be undemocratic interventionS into politics, nowadays, they are viewed as essential for democracies. The causes of protest are manifold. Classical theories identify grievances resulting from relative deprivation, increased frustration or perceived inequalities as sources of protest, in particular, because protest has been considered as a means of the powerless. However, researchers of social movements argue that the main predictors of protest participation are efficacy, resources and opportunities (eg Kriesi, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). Protest movements, which are an organised form of protest, are characterised by diversity. Occupy Central in Hong Kong, the Tea Party movement in the US and the Basque and Catalan separatist movements in Spain are made of differing groups, resources and goals. While some protest movements pursue the goal of regime change, others aim at a change of policy or seek independence. After 2010, the media coverage of occurrences such as the Arab Spring enhanced the belief that protest is used worldwide to oppose non-democratic regimes. Nonetheless, protests also occur in capitalist systems, although these are different 217

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in terms of causes and goals. Moreover, the movements have different strategies in reaching their goals. Non-violent protests include demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts and roadblocks. In addition, a movement may use violent means for its goal achievement. The Arab Spring movements had the goal of regime change, but they differed in terms of intensity and success. The purpose of regime change lies in the replacement of an autocracy by a democracy. This involves new elections, new persons in functions of state institutions and constitutional changes. Regarding the means, while the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia was peaceful, the riot against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad evolved into an armed conflict. Protest movements that focus on a policy change aim at political reforms in specific policy areas. In this context, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US organises campaigns opposing social inequality and concentrates on the economic and financial policy of the state. The Occupy Wall Street protests were peaceful, in contrast to some movements with a radical environmental agenda, which are willing to use violence in order to foster political reforms. Independence protest movements have the objective of territorial separation from the state they belong to by establishing a new sovereign state. Such movements may pursue their goals with peaceful or violent means. Global protests have been characterised by waves and thus by periods of increased and decreased intensity. Currently, the frequency and intensity of protests is high, but a similar trend was also observed in the past. The rise of the peace and antinuclear movements in Western Europe and the US in the 1980s is considered to be the first wave of increased global protest intensity. The second wave dates back to the end of the 1980s and involves the democratisation process of Eastern Europe. With the Arab Spring, a third protest wave began, which decreased in intensity after 2012. In the 21st century, protest movements have become transnationalised and digitalised as they are no longer limited within national borders and can be facilitated through digital communication technologies. The transnationalisation of protest movements is characterised by contagion effects, since national protest movements are a source of inspiration for protest in other countries, and by the online coordination of protest activities. Information on the Arab Spring and protest movements such as Euromaidan in Ukraine are shared via social media. In Southern Europe, the protest of some countries against austerity measures has inspired protests in other countries. The Occupy movement, which was initially a US protest movement against social inequality, inspired a similar movement in

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Hong Kong, which demands free elections and democracy. These events have led sociologists to refer to an unparalleled intensity of global protest. JULIE PAPASTAMATELOU See also: Civil Disorder and Unrest; Democracy; Social Movements Readings Bethke, F.S. (2015) ‘Protest and resistance movements in the 21st century’, in M. Roth, C. Ulbert and T. Debiel (eds) Global trends 2015: Prospects for world society. Bonn: Development and Peace Foundation, pp 109–20. Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) Social movements: An introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Kriesi, H. (2004) ‘Political context and opportunity’, in D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell companion to social movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp 67–90. Meyer, D. and Minkoff, D. (2004) ‘Conceptualising political opportunity’. Social Forces, 82(4): 1457–92 Oliver, P.E., Cadena-Roa, J. and Strawn, K.D. (2003) ‘Emerging trends in the study of protest and social movements’, in B.A. Dobratz, T. Buzzell and L.K. Waldner (eds) Research in political sociology. Stanford, CA: JAI Press, pp 213–44. van Stekelenburg, J. and Klandermans, B. (2007) The social psychology of protest. Available at: www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/research/researchareasofstaff/ isppsummeracademy/instructors/Social%20Psychology%20of%20Protest,%20 Van%20Stekelenburg%20&%20Klandermans.pdf

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R RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR Modern-day wars have witnessed the deployment of rape as a ‘weapon’ of war by combatants. The ‘weaponisation’ of rape was widely reported in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of (DR) Congo, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. During the 100-day genocide in Rwanda, rape was systematically deployed as a weapon of war, and, in most instances, for the ‘wilful’ transmission of HIV to the victims.Although serious questions have been raised about the actual time of transmission or infection, and whether the ‘intent’ of the perpetrators could conclusively be to infect the victim with HIV, credible evidence from survivors confirm the deliberate nature of these acts. According to Nduwimana (2004, pp 75–6), one victim of rape during the genocide in Rwanda stated that: for 60 days, my body was used as a thoroughfare for all the hoodlums, militia men and soldiers in the district.… Those men completely destroyed me; they caused me so much pain. They raped me in front of my six children.… Three years ago, I discovered I had HIV/AIDS. There is no doubt in my mind that I was infected during these rapes. Notwithstanding the debate in social science literature on whether wartime rape is a significant factor in the spread of HIV either by design or as a by-product of systematic sexual violence, there is consensus that while the case of Rwanda might be exceptional, it was nonetheless a systematic attempt to eradicate a population. In one account, as Elbe (2002, p 168) observed, the rapists told a victim, ‘we 221

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are not killing you. We are giving you something worse. You will die a slow death’. In other accounts, captured women were taken to HIV-positive militia men to be raped. Sharlach (2000) and De Brouwer and Chu (2009) stated that about 500,000 women were estimated to have been raped during the 100-day genocide in Rwanda. While rape was systematically deployed in recent conflicts in Sudan, DR Congo, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Liberia and other places, it is often difficult to empirically determine the linkages between acts of rape and the transmission of HIV. This is because of the complexities of ascertaining the magnitude of sexual violence during wars, as well as the stigma associated with rape, which discourages victims from reporting the crime. This is particularly true of most African conflict situations, where cultural and traditional practices, beliefs and norms shape societal values and ethics. During the civil war in Sierra Leone that lasted almost 10 years, armed rebels and insurgents raped thousands of women. Vlachova and Biason (2005) estimated that about 64,000 women and girls experienced war-related sexual violence during the Sierra Leonean civil war. In the eastern region of DR Congo, various civil society groups and United Nations agencies reported widespread systematic rape involving thousands of women and girls. These acts of sexual violence were carried out with impunity and in flagrant violation of laws, customs and norms of war by virtually all sides to the conflict: militiamen, armed insurgents and members of the armed forces. During the Liberian civil war between 1999 and 2003, De Brouwer and Chu (2009) stated that about 49% of women between the ages of 15 and 70 experienced at least one act of sexual violence from a soldier or armed militia member. In comparison to the atrocities in the conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, which often involved the mass rape and cleansing of minority ethnic groups, it is fair to state that this is not therefore an African phenomenon. As De Brouwer and Chu (2009) observe, dating back to 1918–19, rape, forced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence were prevalent: in Europe during the First World War (largely by the German army and the armies of other Axis powers); in Asia during the Second World War (involving the Japanese imperial army); in Europe during the Second World War (involving the German army); and in BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo during the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. The ‘weaponisation’ of rape raises serious human security issues in conflict and post-conflict societies. In international humanitarian law – the set of norms that criminalise genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – precedents now abound on the conviction of individuals who systematically deployed rape as a weapon of war in Rwanda, the Central African Republic, DR Congo and the former Yugoslavia. In the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found the accused guilty of aiding and abetting acts of sexual violence involving the systematic rape of Tutsi women. These acts 222

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of the systematic rape of Tutsi women, carried out in areas under the authority of Akayesu, were accompanied with the intent to kill those women who were of Tutsi ethnicity. Despite precedents like Akayesu, and the recent decision of the International Criminal Court involving former Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, much effort is needed to effectively address the increasing weaponisation of rape in wars. OBIJIOFOR AGINAM See also: Genocide; International Humanitarian Law; Military Conflict; War Crimes Readings Aginam, O. (2013) ‘The “weaponisation” of rape and HIV/AIDS in African conflicts’, in T. Falola and N.A. Amponsah (eds) Women, gender, and sexualities in Africa. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, pp 327–34. De Brouwer, A. and Chu, S.K.H. (2009) The men who killed me: Rwandan survivors of sexual violence. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre. Elbe, S. (2002) ‘HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of war in Africa’, International Security, 27(2): 159–77. Nduwimana, F. (2004) The right to survive: Sexual violence, women and HIV/AIDS. Montreal: Rights & Democracy. Sharlach, L. (2000) ‘Rape as genocide: Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, New Political Science, 22(1): 89–102. Vlachova, M. and Biason, L. (eds) (2005) Women in an insecure world. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation refers to complex processes of rebuilding relationships following conflict. Rather than the negative peace signified by the absence of conflict, reconciliation involves positive peace, in which relationships between individuals, groups and institutions may be restored (Galtung, 1969). Its form is dependent upon the interactions between various sociocultural, political and historical contexts.According to Staub (2006, p 868), true reconciliation results in a ‘changed psychological orientation towards the other’, which contributes to healing, the development of a mutual understanding and increasing trust, along with the avoidance of conflict in the future.

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Reconciliation processes might involve the sharing of narratives about experiences of conflict. Such ‘truth-sharing’ can take place in commissions, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South Africa (SATRC). This Commission’s public hearings provided space for some to tell their story in the hope that this would be cathartic for both individuals and communities. ‘Truth-sharing’ can also take place in more localised ways. For example, the Gacaca hearings following the 1994 Rwandan genocide sought to hold individual Hutu people to account, but also to reconcile local communities. However, in practice, such romanticism around ‘revealing is healing’ obfuscates deep complexities. ‘Truth-sharing’ processes can be traumatic and stigmatising. Those who share their stories may experience a loss of ownership and find themselves reduced to symbols of suffering. Those involved may experience overwhelming guilt and isolation (including from within their own communities), or engage in the ‘truthsharing’ process in purely defensive ways. Where those affected by conflict fail to acknowledge the experiences of the ‘other’, it can further complicate attempts at reconciliation. In showing regret for harm caused, apologies can contribute to processes of reconciliation. These may take the form of statements and/or include the distribution of reparations. The value of apologies might be deeply subjective and difficult to quantify precisely, but they can still have symbolic and lived impacts upon those previously involved in conflict, both as perpetrators and/or victims. Apology can intersect with acknowledgement through the construction of museums and memorials, or in the creation of days of remembrance. Yet, apologies may also act as barriers to reconciliation where they are vague and obfuscatory, temporary, qualified or made ‘on behalf ’ of others less inclined to apologise, or where recipients feel that the apologies are politically motivated and neither heartfelt nor honest. Individualised apologies made by those with limited power might disguise the role of others with greater responsibilities for the harm caused. The timeliness of the apology might also impact upon its value, such as for those forced to wait until 2010 for a governmental apology for the deaths of 14 people killed by British army paratroopers in Derry, Northern Ireland, following ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 1972. Where apologies do not lead to substantive change, they may have limited value for those still affected by conflict. Processes of reconciliation might involve forgiveness – a change in attitude towards those who have caused harm, including the self. These may or may not be underpinned by religious faith. Forgiveness is not a necessary condition for reconciliation, yet its presence helps to re-humanise others, rebuild trust, repair relationships and contribute to further understanding (Minow, 1998). Like many other aspects of reconciliation, it cannot be imposed on individuals and communities, and attempts to do such things may result in further harm and trauma.

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Alternatively, reconciliation might be made possible through amnesia, through a forgetting of past conflict. Here, no attempt is made to uncover the truth of conflict and communities are instead required to ‘move on’. Such approaches might be well intentioned, born of a fear that engaging with the past might lead to further conflict or to hierarchies of victimhood. Alternatively, such purposeful forgetting may be politically expedient, underpinned by power relations and a desire to control the dominant narrative of the past. This may equally apply to the selective remembering of facets of conflict. Reconciliation involves former enemies making peace with the past in ways that do not threaten the future. The failure to reconcile following violence in the former Yugoslavia during the first half of the 20th century enabled nationalist leaders to manipulate historical memories and past traumas to fuel conflict in the 1990s. For Staub (2006), true reconciliation is a personal and political process requiring primarily grass-roots involvement and top-down support. In short, true reconciliation is a complex process involving the interactions between individuals and society. It does not emerge spontaneously at the end of conflict, and may not emerge at all. It is cultivated through a continual series of interactions and experiences requiring ‘positive peace’, shared understanding and the rebuilding of relationships. LISA WHITE See also: Conflict Resolution; Post-Conflict Resolution; Violence; War Crimes Readings Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, peace, and peace research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6(3): 167–91. Minow, M. (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and violence. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Staub, E. (2006) ‘Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory’, Political Psychology, 27(6): 867–94.

REFUGEE CONVENTION (1951)

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is the key United Nations (UN) legal document in

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defining who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of states. It was adopted at a special UN Conference on 28 July 1951 in Geneva. Initially, it was more or less limited to protecting European refugees in the aftermath of the Second World War, but the 1967 Protocol expanded its scope as the problem of displacement spread around the world. Both texts (the Convention and the Protocol) are the only global legal instruments that clarify the rights of refugees and the obligations of the 148 states that were, until 2015, party to one or both of these instruments. UN member states are free to choose the implementation of these instruments through their incorporation as binding texts into their domestic legal order (Sheeran and Rodley, 2013). A state can accede to the Convention at any time by depositing a so-called ‘instrument of accession’ with the UN Secretary-General. The Convention defines a refugee as a person who: is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution. People who fulfil this definition are entitled to the rights and bound by the duties contained in the 1951 Convention. Refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al, 2014). Migrants do not fit into the personal scope of the Convention given that they may leave their country of origin for many reasons that are not related to persecution, such as for the purposes of employment, family reunification or study. A migrant continues to enjoy the protection of his or her own government, even when abroad. The Convention includes a number of rights and also highlights the obligations of refugees towards their host country. Its cornerstone is the principle of ‘nonrefoulement’ contained in Article 33, which states that a refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she faces serious threats to his or her life or freedom. This protection may not be claimed by refugees who are reasonably regarded as a danger to the security of the country, or having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, or are considered a danger to the community. Other rights contained in the Convention include: • The right to freedom of religion (Article 4). • The right to access the courts (Article 16). • The right to work (Articles 17 to 19). 226

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• • • • • •

The right to housing (Article 21). The right to education (Article 22). The right to public relief and assistance (Article 23). The right to freedom of movement within the territory (Article 26). The right to be issued identity and travel documents (Articles 27 and 28). The right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting state (Article 31). • The right not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined, conditions (Article 32). The legal protection of refugees is primarily the responsibility of states. This may be done by an individual or group assessment as to whether they meet the definition in the Convention. Although the Convention does not prescribe a particular procedure for the determination of whether a person is a refugee, where an individual assessment is the preferred approach, any procedures must be fair and efficient (Gibney, 2010). The implementation of the Convention and its Protocol is monitored at the UN level by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was established on 14 December 1950 by the UN General Assembly. This agency is based in Geneva under the mandate to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). GABRIEL AMITSIS See also: Border Control; Hate Crime; Human Rights; Immigration; United Nations, The Readings Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K. and Sigona, N. (eds) (2014) The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibney, M. (2010) Global refugee crisis: A reference handbook (2nd edn). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC–CLIO. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Geneva: UNHCR. Sheeran, S. and Rodley, N. (eds) (2013) Routledge handbook of international human rights law. New York, NY: Routledge.

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RENDITION ‘Rendition’ is a legal term meaning to ‘hand over’ something or someone from one legal jurisdiction to another. In formal extraditions, from one country to another, it necessitates the adherence to rules, guaranteeing the due process of law. The practices of rendition in the ‘war on terror’ have involved agencies of the state and their militia supporters enacting abductions of ‘suspected’ terrorists, even from the streets of European nation states. Depicting the widespread illegal seizure and detention of thousands of terrorist ‘suspects’ as exceptional and rare occurrences, rendition is often misleadingly described as ‘extraordinary’. Rendition discards the legal rights of such ‘suspects’, semantically obscuring this by describing rendition as ‘extra-legal’, in preference to the more accurate classification ‘state criminality’. Purposely obscured by the hyped persona of discerning intelligence services, in actuality,‘what has emerged is a picture of international complicity in arbitrary detention, rendition, proxy detention and torture’ (Qureshi, 2009, p 365). Grey’s (2004) invaluable exposé of US rendition in its ‘war on terror’ identified broader Western ‘co-operation with regimes … which are criticised for their human rights record … [involving] a vast archipelago of prison camps and centres where America can carry out torture by proxy’. This unambiguous state criminality involves much more than merely ignoring the ‘technical barriers’ of the due process of law, as epitomised in this sinister summary of some Middle Eastern countries’ role in rendition: If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear – never to see them again – you send them to Egypt. (Grey, 2004) The West’s colonial and post-colonial relationship with previous colonies evidences its support for, and continued allegiances with, some outright despotic regimes, and their often habitually aggressive irredentism is all condoned as purportedly preventing extremism. In the Cold War, this focused primarily upon ostensibly Marxist nationalist extremists; contemporarily, it is purported Islamic extremists who preoccupy such counter-insurgency policies and practices. However, it is erroneous to excessively focus on the religious and sectarian dimensions of contemporary terrorism, which conveniently obscure the political aspirations and fundamental motivations of such groups, as evidenced when MI5’s behavioural science unit noted that, ‘far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could … be regarded as religious novices’ (Armstrong, 2014).

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The disingenuous depiction of this allegedly ‘new’ terrorism is a dangerous ideological facade behind which it is easy to detect distinct consistencies, policies and practices analogous with earlier counter-insurgency practices. This ideological reductionism to religious fundamentalism enables the belief in the exceptionalism of the current ‘crisis’, requiring practices such as rendition, portrayed as an unfortunate short-term necessity in the pursuit of security. As Rees and Aldrich (2005, p 913) posit: ‘Politicians on both sides of the world have been quick to seize upon the rhetoric of “new terrorism” because it mobilized elected assemblies, delivering enhanced budgets and robust packages of security legislation’. The massive extension of state powers and a willingness to utilise Western military might, often franchised to favoured despots through military aid, to overthrow other despots who were latterly our allies, in countries such as Egypt and Iraq, has wrought havoc on already unstable dubious states. Such post-colonial statelets fit uncomfortably into neoliberal modernity, having been concocted out of conquest, wherein a developed sense of national identity is succumbed to religious and ethnic identities, resulting in a predictable rejection of the rhetoric of globalisation when experienced only as neo-colonial subjugation. As Egypt and Palestine have exemplified, the fact that many so-called extremists and terrorists actually have widespread support for their policies comprehensibly queries Western depictions of asinine fanaticism. Militaristic and illegal practices, such as rendition and torture, obfuscate the political and social causes of terrorism and struggle to achieve liberation from despotic regimes and rulers, being, at best, haphazard exercises in containment. This is epitomised by Armstrong (2014): ‘The neoconservative ideology that inspired the Iraq war was delusory, since it assumed that the liberal nation state was an inevitable outcome of modernity’. Rendition is illustrative of the lengths beyond the rule of law that so-called liberal democracies are prepared to go in defence of their political and economic interests. Culminating in so-called ‘fundamental’ human rights being violated, as WikiLeaks has exposed, is a widespread readiness to ignore, circumvent and simply break the rule of law. LIAM McCANN See also: Counterterrorism; Human Rights; Insecurity; National Identity; Torture Readings Armstrong, K. (2014) ‘Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global terrorism’, New Statesman, 27 November. Available at: http:// www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudiarabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism 229

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Grey, S. (2004) ‘America’s gulag’, New Statesman, 17 May. Available at: http:// www.newstatesman.com/node/159775 Qureshi, A. (2009) ‘Researching rendition and torture in the war on terror: lessons from a human rights organisation’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(2): 365–76. Rees, W. and Aldrich, R. (2005) ‘Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?’, International Affairs, 81(5): 905–23.

RESISTANCE

Resistance ranges from the small, silent and personal through to the multitude, spectacular and momentous. Resistance may consist of violent or non-violent acts, be passive or active, hidden or open, verbal or physical, spontaneous or strategic, local or global, and frequently a combination of some or all (Pickering, 2002). Nonetheless, for something to be resistance, rather than just a random act, there have to be some defining features. Stanley and McCulloch (2013) establish four primary elements of resistance: opposition, intention, communication and transformation. Opposition is a central element of resistance. Resistance to state crime may oppose a regime, an economic system or particular practices, cultures, laws or events that are perceived as unjust, harmful or damaging. Some contend that the word ‘resistance’ should be reserved only for acts that constitute opposition to something. For instance, Abowitz (2000) contrasts acts that are an assertion of something with acts that are a resistance to something. In considering resistance to state crime, we argue that it should include assertive or creative acts, that is, opposition linked to resistance is not simply critique as it can also be productive or creative. Resistance can be about becoming or creating something – it may produce alternatives and new norms for harmful products or processes, such as the development of new energies to combat global warming; it may reinvigorate traditions or affirm values such as cultural identity, integrity or a sense of self (Blagg, 2008); and it can invoke a competing claim of universalism, or attempt to set the boundaries of a ‘viable’ or ‘liveable’ life (Butler, 2000). Intention is another crucial part of resistance. Resistance is opposition with social, moral or political intent (Abowitz, 2000). Intention, even if not directly articulated, is crucial. Without it, any act ‘against the state’ – from opportunistic rioting to all tax evasion – could be labelled resistance. We argue that to be resistance, an ‘event’ (or an omission) requires some level of consciousness or human agency. In resisting, people act on their conscience and put themselves ‘on the line’. Thus, intention reframes mere opposition into morally and politically meaningful acts (Giroux, 1983, pp 106–11). 230

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The third essential element of resistance is that it is a form of communication. Communicating, or sending messages, about state crime is a means to challenge ‘denial’ and state control over information. Yet, resistant communications cover a spectrum encompassing the spectacular, obvious, ignored, hidden and nascent. While some messages are overt – written on placards or unambiguous statements to dominant powers or bystanders – the communicatory nature of resistance may not always be clear. At times, quiet or personal acts of resistance may not be acknowledged or ‘read’, although they are nonetheless forms of resistance. Finally, the fourth element of resistance is transformation. Resistance is bound up with the ways in which people understand their capacity to make or oppose changes (Pile, 1997). It might take the form of: overthrowing a regime; holding the state accountable for its actions; challenging the state’s claim to truth; changing the socio-legal landscape to amend unjust laws or provide access to law; ‘answering back’ to colonising norms and values; reasserting positive values of care or dignity in society; changing the practices and values of state workers; or presenting individuals with an opportunity to take action and move beyond powerlessness. For resistance to occur, people must have some (even small) sense of agency or hope that things could be different. Resistance to state crime is emerging as an important aspect of state crime scholarship. The challenge of the future is to build on the emerging insights on state crime and resistance so that, as state crime scholars, we can confidently claim to have moved beyond being bystanders to participants in the struggle against state crime. ELIZABETH STANLEY and JUDE MCCULLOCH See also: State Crime; State Power; Violence Readings Abowitz, K.K. (2000) ‘A pragmatist revisioning of resistance theory’, American Educational Research Journal, 37(4): 877–907. Blagg, H. (2008) Crime, aboriginality and the decolonisation of justice. Sydney: Hawkins Press. Butler, J. (2000) ‘Competing universalities’, in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizet (eds) Contingencies, hegemony, universality. London: Verso. Giroux, H. (1983) Theory and resistance in education: A pedagogy for the opposition. London: Heinemann. Pickering, S. (2002) Women, policing and resistance in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Beyond the Pale. Pile, S. (1997) ‘Introduction’, in S. Pile and M. Keith (eds) Geographies of resistance. London: Routledge. 231

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Stanley, E. and McCulloch, J. (2013) ‘Resistance to state crime’, in E. Stanley and J. McCulloch (eds) State crime and resistance. London: Routledge.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was initially defined by an international commission in Canada in 2001 (Kuperman, 2009) and is the evolving principle that states have ‘the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (UN General Assembly, 2005, para 138). This principle also committed the United Nations’ (UN’s) member states to taking collective action through the Security Council should any state be found to be failing to protect their populations (Williams, 2013). Essentially, the principle of R2P argues that the concept of national sovereignty is not absolute, but a privilege that states earn by protecting their people (Kuperman, 2009). Consequently, if a state fails to protect its population, then the international community has a duty to intervene and violate the state’s sovereignty to protect the population that is at risk, often through military intervention. In an attempt to ensure that the R2P principle is not merely words, but deeds, the report of the UN Secretary-General ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ was published in January 2009 (UN Secretary-General, 2009). The report argued that the implementation of the strategy should rest on three pillars. First, it is the responsibility of a state to use the necessary and appropriate means to protect its own population from the incitement of, and commission of, the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second pillar is the commitment from UN member states to help each other fulfil this obligation, as well as supporting states in building the capacity to protect their populations. The final pillar refers to the wider international community’s responsibility to respond to such crises and events in a timely manner when national governments are failing to protect their populations. However, it must be remembered that R2P is primarily a political principle, rather than a legal rule, and hence it merely ‘calls upon legally recognised actors to respect already existing obligations under international law’ (Williams, 2013, p 160). There are a number of criticisms of the principle, not least that the principle was diluted prior to its adoption by the UN and, as such, adds little with regard to the use of force in international situations (Williams, 2013). Furthermore, there is the suggestion that R2P is little more than a slogan and overestimates what can be achieved by UN peacekeepers. There are also criticisms that it is too vague (Alvarez, 2008), that it is a veil for the neoliberal ambitions of the West (Chandler, 2004) and, in some cases, that the R2P principle actually causes 232

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genocidal violence that would not otherwise occur (Kuperman, 2009). There are also logistical problems with implementing the R2P principle in that the perpetrators often act more quickly than the interveners. Even if there is political will to intervene, it takes time to mobilise and deploy properly equipped forces and transport them to the relevant area (Kuperman, 2009). Despite initial concerns from contemporary international society, there have been significant steps in the principle being accepted. One of the key reasons for this was that advocates of the R2P principle were keen to distance the principle from the potential of humanitarian military intervention; indeed, in the documentation that sets out the UN’s R2P agenda, there is no reference to any potential use of military force without the prior authorisation of the UN Security Council (Williams, 2013). In addition, the R2P principle has shifted the focus from the interests of external actors to the responsibilities of rulers and states and the rights of victims experiencing mass atrocities. There have always been responsibilities on states to protect their own citizens; however, the R2P principle takes things further by clarifying how the international community should protect civilians where the state has not met its own obligations towards its own citizens. Hence, R2P should be judged on how it prevents crises in the future, rather than responding to them in the present. LINDA ASQUITH See also: Genocide; United Nations, The; United Nations Security Council; War Crimes Readings Alvarez, J.E. (2008) ‘The schizophrenias of R2P’, in P. Alston and E. MacDonald (eds) Human rights, intervention and the use of force. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 212–19. Chandler, D. (2004) ‘The Responsibility to Protect: imposing the liberal peace’, International Peacekeeping, 11(1): 59–82. Kuperman, A.J. (2009) ‘Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect’, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 10(1): 33–43. UN General Assembly (2005) ‘World Summit outcome document’, 60th Session A/RES/60/1. UN Secretary-General (2009) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, 63rd session A/63/677. Williams, P.D. (2013) ‘Humanitarian military intervention after the “Responsibility to Protect”’, in J. Apsel and E. Verdeja (eds) Genocide matters, ongoing issues and emerging perspective. London: Routledge, pp 150–71.

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RIOTS Riots are civil disorders, commonly characterised by the violent disturbance of a group targeted against authorities, properties or peoples. Riots typically and historically have involved vandalism, theft and the destruction of property, both public and private. They have frequently occurred in reaction to a perceived grievance or out of dissent, often amid the politically charged context of growing social dissatisfaction, perceived state oppression (taxation or conscription) or conflict between ethnic groups (race riots) or over religious or sectarian grievances. Riots can and do also arise for different reasons, as in the context of sporting events, such as football matches.They can also be tied to specific closed institutions such as prisons and immigration centres, such as the infamous prison disorder at HMP Manchester (Strangeways) in 1990. In England and Wales, the 18th century witnessed ‘endemic’ riots often over ‘politics’, ‘food’ and ‘religion’ (Gilmore, 1992). Historically, in England, riot was framed as a charge under the Riot Act 1714, whereby local officials had to make a proclamation ordering the dispersal of any group of 12 or more ‘unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together’. If the group did not disperse within an hour, those remaining who were gathered were guilty of a felony punishable by death. The Act had to be read out, and had to follow the precise wording. The Act served to indemnify anyone assisting with the dispersal against legal consequence and became most infamous in the wake of the 1819 ‘Peterloo massacre’ in Manchester, where Yeoman cavalry charged a political rally, resulting in several fatalities and countless injuries, events that undoubtedly built the momentum towards the introduction of formal statutory policing just a decade later. The contemporary offence of riot is a statutory, indictable-only offence (it can only be tried in the Crown Court), which falls under section 1(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 (in the US, riot is an offence under federal law). In England and Wales, it requires that 12 or more persons are present together, they must use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose, and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for their personal safety. The common purpose may be inferred from conduct; no person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene; and riot may be committed in private as well as in public places. Furthermore, for a charge of riot, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is required for the institution of a prosecution. Guidance to prosecutors makes clear that charges of riot should be reserved for the most serious cases, particularly those involving very serious injury to people or substantial damage to property (particularly where fire is involved), although, again, this varies and what constitutes the lesser offence of violent disorder (a 234

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less serious public order offence in the UK) and when the threshold for riot is reached in reality is a subjective one. For example, a serious violent clash between rival Hell’s Angels and Outlaw motorcycle gangs in Birmingham Airport in 2009 led to charges and participants being charged and jailed for riot offences, yet similarly serious violent clashes involving football ‘hooligan’ groups have not resulted in riot charges, but are instead prosecuted as lesser offences such as violent disorder or affray. There can be much debate about how riots originate, and the extent to which they are politically driven. For example, while some suggest that the recent 2011 English urban riots were inherently politically motivated (Newburn et al, 2015), other accounts question the nature of the ‘political’ in light of contemporary neoliberal consumer capitalism (Winlow et al, 2015). As riots inevitably bring to the fore issues of governance, social control and policing, academics have used them as a means of considering the multifaceted drivers of different disorders. Highly influential as part of this project has been social psychology, in particular, Reicher’s (1984) social identity model of crowd conflict, which focuses on the emergence and development of crowd conflict and on group processes, and Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘Flashpoints’ model, which considers how and why seemingly trivial incidents act as instigators for widespread social disturbances. JAMES TREADWELL See also: Civil Disorder and Unrest; Protest; Social Movements Readings Gilmore, I. (1992) Riot, rising and revolution: Governance and violence in eighteenth century England. London: Pinlico. Newburn, T., Cooper, K., Deacon, R. and Diski, R. (2015) ‘Shopping for free? Looting, consumerism and the 2011 riots’, British Journal of Criminology, 55(5): 987–1004. Reicher, S.D. (1984) ‘The St. Pauls riot: an explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 14: 1–21. Waddington, D., Jones, K. and Critcher, C. (1989) Flashpoints: Studies in public disorder. London: Routledge. Winlow, S., Hall, S., Briggs, D. and Treadwell, J. (2015) Riots and political protest. London: Routledge.

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RISK While the notion of risk is centuries old, over the last three decades, it has assumed an increasingly important place in modern Western capitalist cultures. Risk is central to debates, policies and practices across a range of domains, including politics, crime and criminal justice, national security, welfare, the economy, and environmental management. Most accounts of the etymology of the English word ‘risk’ trace its derivation through Spanish and Portuguese in the 17th century. It is thought that risk was originally a maritime term used to describe the balance between gain and hazard in voyaging by sea to new lands.While the roots of ‘risk’ indicate the possibility of opportunity as well as loss, the acquisitive aspects are less pronounced in contemporary society, with talk about risk being predominantly oriented towards the avoidance of future harms. Derivational histories and transitions in meaning are important in understanding the role of risk in contemporary society, both in terms of its deployment by social institutions as a mode of categorisation, and in terms of the way in which it is perceived and managed by individuals in the course of everyday life (Mythen, 2014, p 11). Risk is a ‘real world’ phenomenon, but the frequency with which the concept is applied conveys much about the world and the social constructs used to understand it. Focusing on recent history, it is possible to connect the changing meaning of risk to particular incidents in the 1980s, such as the Chernobyl disaster and the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis. Further, growing awareness of the problem of global warming in this decade highlighted the failure of states to reduce environmental risks, fostering public distrust and challenges to the authority of expert systems. Today, trust in state institutions is far from absolute and public endorsement is contingent on satisfactory performance. It is true to say that studies of risk have typically been conducted differently in the natural and social sciences. In as much as risk was traditionally considered a phenomenon to be studied using technical modes of calibration in the natural sciences, the more recent ‘turn to risk’ in the social sciences has generated knowledge about the ways in which risks are constructed, experienced and regulated (Mythen, 2008). While advances in social psychology – most notably, the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 2000) – have drawn attention to the factors that shape individual perceptions of risk, two sociological approaches have sought to focus on the role of the state in the production and management of risks. First, the governmentality perspective, originating in the writing of the French social historian Michel Foucault (1991), seeks primarily to elucidate the relationship between risk and power. Building on Foucault’s work, modern governmentality theorists have emphasised the role of risk discourses in disciplining populations and bringing people to order (see Dean, 1999). Thus, dominant discourses – be 236

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they around crime, sexuality or health – place individuals in ‘subject positions’ that situate them in particular relationships with the state and encourage acquiescent patterns of thought and behaviour. In this way, health scares surrounding the ‘obesity epidemic’ invoke practices of body regulation, the threat of violent crime demands that adequate personal security precautions are undertaken, and so on. For Foucauldians, discourses of risk materialise in policies that have practical effects, responsiblising populations for risk management and producing prudential citizens who are active in making security decisions and choices. Second, the risk society thesis, devised and popularised by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992), charts an epochal shift from a stable ‘industrial modernity’ in which state institutions had the capacity to manage social, environmental and security threats, to a volatile risk society in which ‘mega-hazards’ such as global warming, terrorism and chronic financial crises render the nation state impotent. For Beck, the global and universal nature of such ‘manufactured risks’ not only undermines the capacity of the state to manage risks, but also has a galvanising impact on citizens, who begin to organise and campaign directly on single issues outside of the formal democratic political process. Beck posits that recognition of the interconnected nature of major global problems facilitates a shift from failed national approaches to a more progressive cosmopolitan approach through which key threats can be effectively addressed. GABE MYTHEN See also: Governmentality; Insecurity; State, The Readings Beck, U. (1992) Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage. Dean, M. (1999) Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. London: Harvester, pp 87–104. Mythen, G. (2008) ‘Sociology and the art of risk’, Sociology Compass, 2(1): 299–316. Mythen, G. (2014) Understanding the risk society: Crime, security and justice. London: Routledge. Slovic, P. (2000) Perception of risk. London: Earthscan.

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S SEMI-PENAL INSTITUTIONS At the commencement of the 19th century, the chief objective of the semi-penal institution was to provide a temporary shelter for the rescue and reformation of wayward women (Rafter, 1985). Once firmly established within port cities in the UK such as Liverpool and London, however, the semi-penal institution morphed into a disciplinary vehicle designed to identify ‘deviant’ working-class women for total surveillance.This was performed in an attempt to control women’s habits of prostitution and their unruly unfeminine behaviour via the use of ‘wholesome’, paternal, Christian discipline and feminising penal regimes.Throughout the latter half of the 19th century, working-class women were viewed as ideal candidates for incarceration within an interlocking network of semi-penal institutions comprising refuges, penitentiaries, reformatories, homes of help and asylums for the committal of crimes againstVictorian moral codes.The semi-penal institution, as described by Barton (2005, p 17), was the ‘third arena of social control, which [sat] between the “formal” discipline of the prison and the “informal” regulation of the domestic sphere’, sometimes being depicted as the ‘community’. Barton (2005, p 19) further elucidated that: For countless women over the past 200 years, being reformed or punished in the community did not refer to a form of supervision within the home or neighbourhood, but rather, it meant being incarcerated in an institution of some form.

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The semi-penal premise referred to the ‘paradoxical description’ of the institutions. They were not fully incarcerative in the sense of the prison, lacking the ‘visible symbols of exclusionary punishment such as high walls and locked cells’, but employed a homely and domesticated, yet punitive, environment (Barton and Cooper, 2013, p 140). Ignatieff (1978) theorised that the 19th-century establishment of the semi-penal institution was linked to a larger strategy of political, social and legal reform to re-establish order on a new foundation and to expand technologies of power, knowledge, discipline and social control. Within the social history of the punishment of women, reformist anxieties concerning the abilities of females to cope within a prison, combined with normative conceptions of ideal femininity and womanhood, created less punitive, yet more totalising, disciplinary regimes centred upon normalising fallen women to appropriate standards of feminine behaviour. This all-encompassing approach gave rise to the birth of the semipenal institution. The Victorian network of semi-penal institutions represented the archetypal method of dealing with a problem population by providing an alternative to traditional imprisonment via the use of differential treatment. This strategy, however, failed to consider mitigating circumstances that may have impacted upon working-class women’s lives, such as destitution, unemployment, ill health and poverty. State and non-governmental organisations concurrently attempted to halt women’s perceived threat to the existing social order. Although under the umbrella term ‘semi-penal’, each semi-penal institution offered a distinct method of reformation to reclaim the lives of fallen women. For example, the overarching aim of Liverpool Female Penitentiary (1809–1921), located on 67 Falkner Street, was to rehabilitate and reform prostitutes via Christian teachings and discipline. Barton (2005, p 9) argues that regardless of their main endeavour to regulate and ‘normalise’ criminal women, all semi-penal institutions ‘employed a combination of both formal and informal mechanisms of social control’. The punitive element of these instruments of control legitimated the moral treatment and reconditioning of females via regimes of feminisation, domesticity, infantilisation and religious instruction. The semi-penal institution provided an environment whereby a woman’s mind, body and soul could be morally restored to serve its original purpose as wife and mother. A ‘therapeutic discourse’ underpinned the progressive programmes and provided a strict daily routine where women’s behaviour and domestic outputs were scrutinised (Sim, 1994, p 115). Panoptic reforming techniques of surveillance were undertaken by both a head matron and sub-matrons, who were deemed crucial to the success or failure of an institution. The notion of the ‘respectable and honest working-class woman fitted in well with middle-class ideals of “working-class femininity” (diligent, maternal and domesticated)’ and provided an idealistic, moral goal towards which female prisoners could work throughout their period of confinement (Barton, 2005, p 76). The semi-penal institution, to the unknowing 240

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outsider, was a halfway house – a motherly place of refuge reserved for women abandoned by society. In reality, it employed more totalising rules, regulations and strict moral and religious discipline than prison regimes utilised to punish male criminals. Female prisoners in the semi-penal institution were reduced to child-like creatures, normalised to middle-class ideals of respectable womanhood and religiously indoctrinated on a daily basis. Women, however, were still able to exercise agency and frequently resisted and contested the penal regimes. KIRSTY GREENWOOD See also: Social Control; State Punishment; Surveillance Readings Barton, A. (2005) Fragile moralities and dangerous sexualities: Two centuries of semi penal institutionalisation for women. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing. Barton, A. and Cooper, V. (2013) ‘Hostels and community justice for women: the “semi-penal” paradox’, in M. Malloch and G. McIvor (eds) Women, punishment and social justice: Human rights and penal practices. London: Routledge, pp 136–51. Ignatieff, M. (1978) A just measure of pain. New York, NY: Pantheon. Rafter, N. (1985) Partial justice: Women, prison and social control. New Jersey, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Sim, J. (1994) ‘Men in prison’, in T. Newburn and E. Stanko (eds) Men, masculinities and crime: Just boys doing business?, London: Routledge, pp 100–17.

SOCIAL CONTROL

Social control is crucial in the understanding of any social life, and illuminates upon ways in which individual behaviours are regulated and patterned to form a normative social system. Early discussions of social control have appeared in the writings of Enlightenment thinkers, such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and social/political philosophers like Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Èmile Durkheim, Max Weber and Michel Foucault. In broad terms, social control is the mechanisms and processes through which society maintains social order, unity and peace. These mechanisms are used to enforce and regulate ‘standard’ behaviour in society and include, but are not limited to, shame, ridicule, sarcasm, persuasion and criticism (also classified as soft controls), and force, coercion, segregation and banishment (also classified as hard controls).

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Social control is exercised via various modes, which can be individual or institutional, formal or informal, and internal or external. Social control can be exercised by family, friends and tribes, as well as by organisations such as the state, religious bodies, schools and the workplace. The goal of social control is to create discipline mechanisms for ensuring conformity to established rules and norms. In an ‘ideal’ situation, social norms are internalised by individuals who are ‘socialised to accept the norms in which they live as right and good’ (Ferrante, 2015, p 148). When that socialisation fails, means such as ‘censorship, surveillance, and sanctions are used to convey and enforce norms’ (Ferrante, 2015, p 148). Power relationships then mould the minds of individuals within particular cultural contexts so that they follow the ‘rules’ of that society even when outside of the gaze of those with the power to punish for transgressions (Foucault, 1977). Social control can be divided into macro-forces and micro-forces. Scholars interested in the study of macro-forces focus on the formal control mechanisms, such as the law, policies, police, prisons and punishment, employed to maintain order (Sim, 2009). They tend to examine questions related to the role that the state, societal ‘elite’ and political and media institutions have in establishing the norms and rules that govern people, as well as in the creation of ways in which control can be assured. Scholars who focus on the micro-controls examine peer influence and socialisation, and the ways in which they facilitate or inhibit human actions. Since Foucault, the understanding of social control has increasingly become focused on regulating the behaviour of individuals or groups who are seen as criminal, deviant and vexatious. What is identified as criminal or deviant changes over time and varies across cultures. Similarly, the mechanisms employed to achieve controls, such as punishment, deterrence and prevention, vary in severity and scope. Such mechanisms were also historically adjusted to the needs of the broader society, for example, they changed with the process of industrialisation (Foucault, 1977). Nevertheless, the underlying objective is to enforce control over behaviour considered deviant in some sense by this wider society at a particular moment in time. From the 1980s onwards, the understanding of social control in eliminating ‘deviant’ behaviours was based on the work of two leading theorists (albeit from two different perspectives): Thomas Mathiesen and Stan Cohen. Mathiesen (1983) focused on the control of entire groups and categories of people through surveillance and technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) and computer-assisted intelligence. The use of group control measures turns discipline from open to hidden, out of individual range of vision, and makes it omnipresent. According to Cohen (1985), social control is an organised response to crime, delinquency and allied forms of deviant and socially problematic behaviour, which are actually conceived of as such in the reactive sense (after the act has taken place and actor identified) or in the proactive sense (to prevent the act from happening 242

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in the first place). In his view, control strategies are individualistic in nature and discipline lawbreakers or norm-breakers one by one rather than impact the behaviour of groups. Nevertheless, both agreed that instead of shrinking, social control measures continue to expand and strengthen, and spread into each and every corner of society. MONISH BHATIA and AGNIESZKA MARTYNOWICZ See also: Semi-Penal Institutions; State Punishment; Surveillance Readings Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of social control: Crime, punishment and classification. Cambridge: Polity Press. Ferrante, J. (2015) Sociology: A global perspective (9th edn). Stamford: Cengage Learning. Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish. London: Penguin Books. Mathiesen, T (1983) ‘The future of control systems – the case of Norway’, in D. Garland and P. Young (eds) The power to punish. London: Heinemann, pp 130–45. Sim, J. (2009) Punishment and prisons: Power and the carceral state. London: Sage.

SOCIAL HARM

Some scholars – notably, in and around what is known as ‘critical criminology’ – have argued that a disciplinary approach organised around a concept of ‘social harm’ may be more theoretically coherent and more politically progressive than a discipline organised around the state-defined notion of crime. An early statement of this approach, drawing on sporadic, but longer-term, work in and around criminology, can be found in Hillyard et al (2004).Therein, a social harm approach was considered in theoretical and methodological terms, and applied to a broad range of areas of social life, from migration and murder, to violence and victimisation. Several clusters of rationales were set out to establish a social harm approach, as distinct from criminology. Crime, it is argued, has no ontological reality, but is a category that has to be constructed through law’s complex (and often incoherent) reasonings, and reconstructed through the practices of institutions and agencies of the criminal justice system (Hillyard et al, 2004). Moreover, such constructions of crime simultaneously encompass many petty events and exclude many serious harms. Further, the category of ‘crime’ gives legitimacy to the expansion of crime control – that is, it supports the extension of processes that, on any stated 243

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rationale for them, do not work, but consistently inflict pain – indeed, generate social harm. Overall, ‘crime’ serves to maintain power relations and criminology, through its perpetuating of the myth of crime, fuels all of these processes. Importantly, it was further argued that criminology, since its very inception, has enjoyed an intimate relationship with the powerful. This relationship is determined largely by its failure to analyse adequately the notion of crime – and the disciplinary agendas set by this – which has been handed down by the state, and around which the criminal justice system has been organised. For some involved in this project, a social harm approach was designed as a corrective to the limitations of criminology; for others, it was an explicit attempt to develop a new discipline, quite separate from criminology, namely, ‘zemiology’, with its etymological roots in ‘xemia’, the Greek word for harm. Since the publication of Hillyard et al’s (2004) edited collection, numerous attempts to engage with the approach set out therein have emerged. One stream of work has sought to develop and operationalise a harm framework in the context of addressing harms caused by criminal justice systems and practices (Greenfield and Paoli, 2013). Others have attempted to develop distinct ontological approaches to defining harm, such as Yar’s (2012) framing of social harm within theories of recognition, or to develop a general theory of harm via analyses of narrative accounts of a diverse range of harming and being harmed (Presser, 2013). Other responses have been to dismiss social harm claims as over-introspection, as being clear about what is opposed rather than what is proposed, or as redundant since these add nothing to what critical criminologists already do. Recently, and notably, Pemberton (2015) has sought to refine the definition of social harm. Pemberton (2015, p 9) defines harms ‘as specific events or instances where “human flourishing” is demonstrably compromised’, a definition very much rooted within Doyal and Gough’s (1991) needs framework. This, in turn, generates a proposal that these harms can be categorised as ‘physical/mental health harms; autonomy harms; relational harms’ (Pemberton, 2015, p 9). In terms of the ‘social’, ‘socially mediated’ harms are viewed as ‘preventable harm’ insofar as they are either ‘foreseeable’ events or the result of ‘alterable’ social conditions (Pemberton, 2015, pp 9–10). This leads Pemberton to argue that harms are not inevitable, but determined by the forms of organisation that our societies take. In this way, he introduces the notion of ‘capitalist harm’ – harms that are inherent to the capitalist form of organisation – and develops a useful typology of harm reduction regimes, which draws upon, but supplements, a combination of existing varieties and models of capitalism literatures, and groups nation states according to the harm reduction/production features that they demonstrate.

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A social harm approach is very much a work in progress. There remain key issues with the definition of ‘social harm’, its theoretical justification, ontological bases and operationalisation. STEVE TOMBS See also: Corporations; Crimes of the Powerful; Critical Criminology and State Power Readings Doyal, L. and Gough, I. (1991) A theory of human need. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Greenfield, V. and Paoli, L. (2013) ‘A framework to assess the harms of crime’, British Journal of Criminology, 53(5): 864–85. Hillyard, P., Pantazis, C., Tombs, S. and Gordon D. (eds) (2004) Beyond criminology: Taking harm seriously. London: Pluto. Pemberton, S. (2015) Harmful societies: Understanding social harm. Bristol: Policy Press. Presser, L. (2013) Why we harm. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Yar, M. (2012) ‘Critical criminology, critical theory, and social harm’, in S. Hall and S. Winlow (eds) New directions in criminological theory. Abingdon: Routledge, pp 52–65.

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice has been theorised from competing perspectives for centuries; early theorists include Locke, Hume and Tawney. Later theorists include Rawls and his ‘justice as fairness theory’, and Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s theories of ‘capability’. Rawls (1971, p 302) identified two principles of social justice: first, ‘each person should have the right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with that of others and should enjoy fair equality of opportunity’; and, second, ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’. The key principles of social justice for Rawls are equality of opportunity and the redistribution of resources. Additionally, for Rawls, every person should be guaranteed certain freedoms regardless of his/ her social status. These freedoms include political liberties such as the right to vote. Rawls’ second principle of justice states that inequalities are tolerable in society as long as these inequalities still help the less fortunate, that is, everyone 245

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deserves an equal opportunity to achieve his/her goals. Thus, for Rawls, these principles are essential in order for justice as fairness to occur. However, there will always be limitations to citizens’ freedoms, and unfair inequalities will always be present in society. Sen (1999) focuses on substantive freedoms (or capabilities), such as the ability to live to old age or to participate in political life. These freedoms (capabilities) are ultimately related to human rights. Nussbaum (2000) expanded and elaborated Sen’s theory of capability; she argues that all human rights, understood as ‘entitlements to capabilities’, require governments to take positive action and not merely to refrain from doing harm. Thus, social justice is based on the idea of a just society – one that gives individuals and groups fair treatment and allocates just shares of societal benefits, placing emphasis on providing equality to all members of society. Social justice, therefore, requires that there is awareness of natural biases in societies so that everyone is provided with equal opportunities and resources. Social justice is a contested concept. There is disagreement among theorists as to what the concept actually means; however, a majority of theorists agree that equality underpins the concept. Additionally, the concepts of citizenship and legitimacy are important. Citizenship requires that people feel that they are equal before the law, and legitimacy requires confidence in the criminal justice system; this can only be achieved if people feel that they are of equal worth and are treated in that manner. Without these two concepts, social justice is undermined. As Cooke (2006, pp 21–22) asserts: if a society cannot guarantee ‘the equal worth of all its citizens’, mutual and self-respect and the meeting of basic needs, it cannot expect that all citizens will feel they have an equal stake in abiding by the law, and it cannot dispense justice fairly and enhance confidence in the law. Criminal justice as a system, institution and process can be cited as a domain where principles of social justice flourish or are curtailed – the idea that justice should not only be done, but also be seen to be done. Thus, due process means that the fair treatment of the individual defendant or suspect is both beneficial to, and indivisible from, the furtherance of social justice. Where due process is compromised, social exclusion and existing inequalities are perpetuated or even worsened. In addition, as Smith and Ireland (2006, p 142) assert: Genuine equality of opportunity is one of the key principles of social justice, which cannot be achieved merely by focusing on crime against the marginalised. It also requires due process. Thus, the furtherance of the social justice agenda cannot be achieved only by considering the impact of crime upon socially excluded groups as victims of crime, we

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must also consider the impact upon them as suspects and defendants of the criminal justice system. Finally, as Garside (2006, p 48) eloquently posits: ‘it would also mean acknowledging that social justice can only truly be achieved if society’s social and economic arrangements are themselves organised justly’. SHARON MORLEY See also: Citizenship; Civil Liberties; Human Rights Readings Cooke, D. (2006) Criminal and social justice. London: Sage. Garside, R. (2006) ‘Criminality and social justice: challenging the assumptions’, in B. Shimshon (ed) Social justice: Criminal justice. London: The Smith Institute, pp 40–9. Nussbaum, M.C. (2000) Women and human development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, R. and Ireland, S. (2006) ‘Due process and social justice: time to reexamine the relationship’, in B. Shimshon (ed) Social justice: Criminal justice. London: The Smith Institute, pp 132–43.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Despite the great diversity in size, duration and goals, social movements can be defined as ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities’ (Tarrow, 2006, p 4). The expression designates relatively spontaneous forms of collective action to defend or promote a shared cause usually acting outside the conventional institutional politics. Thus, the different sociological definitions of social movements identify four main distinctive features: the collective character of the political action; a purpose or an issue whose importance and need for support are recognised and shared by those involved in the action; an opponent against which the action is directed and the claim is made; and the contentious interaction with political institutions. Social scientists have only recently dedicated their attention to social movements. Studies of the emergence and dynamics of social movements emerged during 247

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the 1960s, also influenced by the important protest waves that characterised the decade in Western countries and as a result of an increased politicisation and direct involvement of academia. Until then, social movements were regarded in a negative light by social scientists. The expression, first coined by reformists and socialists in the 19th century, was mainly associated with the working class and labour movements; at the turn of the century, these were seen as irrational and dangerous phenomena mainly studied from the perspective of a ‘psychology of crowds’. Structural-functionalist theories in the post-war period were no less suspicious of those expressions of collective behaviour and focused on the link between social movements and ‘anomie’ and on mass movements calling for authoritarian leaderships. Another set of theories developed a social-psychological explanation for mobilisations, underlining the role of ‘relative deprivation’ and the mechanism of frustration–aggression. With the 1960s–1970s, the view radically shifted and new theories developed emphasising different aspects of social movements. Olson’s (1965) economic theory of collective action, interpreting social movements as rational and utilitymaximising actors, completely opposed the previous predominant approach focused on irrational behaviour and frustration. His theory strongly inspired new perspectives, such as the resource mobilisation school. The latter highlights group solidarity and networks as social-structural conditions for mobilisation. Resource mobilisation theories were criticised for not taking into account the influence of the external context and political environment on the strategies, organisation and opportunities of social movements. Those criticisms led to the emergence of a new strand of thought around the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’, developed by, among others, Charles Tilly (1978). Differently from the resource mobilisation approach, these theorists analyse variations in the political context and their impact on social movements, the way they organise, and their size, kind and ‘repertoire of contention’ (protest tools and action used by social movements). This approach has the advantage of allowing comparative studies in order to connect the study of protest movements to other aspects of conventional political activity and characteristics and the functioning of political systems. Some authors, such as Melucci (1989) and Touraine (1985), affirmed that new forms of mobilisation appeared since the 1970s, with features that fundamentally differentiate them from those of the previous decades. According to them, new social movements (NSMs) are characterised by a concern with individual identities and the quality of daily life rather than collective identities and wealth and power inequalities, as well as by a struggle for symbolic resources (recognition, autonomy, identity). Some examples are environmentalism, women’s movements, minority struggles and gay rights movements. Despite the relevant observation of changes occurring in post-industrial societies, many social scientists have highlighted the limits of such an approach and questioned the degree of ‘newness’ of NSMs. 248

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After 40 years, ‘social movements’ are now an established and flourishing area of study for the social sciences. Contemporary trends in research point to new approaches to the role of emotions in mobilisations, as well as to the online activism and social media use of movements in the digital age. FEDERICA ROSSI See also: Civil Disorder and Unrest; Civil Liberties; Protest Readings Melucci, A. (1989) Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual needs in contemporary society. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Olson, M. (1965) The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tarrow, S. (2006) Power in movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (1978) From mobilisation to revolution. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Touraine, A. (1985) ‘An introduction to the study of new social movements’, Social Research, 52(4): 749–87.

SOCIAL POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

‘Social policy’ is a term used to apply to the policies that governments use for welfare and social protection and also to the ways in which welfare is developed in societies, as well as to the academic study of the subject. The main focus of social policy is usually on the welfare state and the services it provides but, in a broader sense, it can apply to issues that extend far beyond the actions or remit of government. For example, it can include the means by which welfare is promoted and the social and economic conditions that shape the development of welfare. The curriculum of social policy as an academic discipline often includes a focus on human rights issues such as the right to life, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security, the right to respect for private and family life, the prohibition of discrimination, and the right to education. ‘Human rights’, in the most general sense, means rights that are believed to belong to every person. More specifically – and within the post-Second World War era – most people think of the United Nations framework of human rights, which was constructed around the acknowledgement that all people are entitled to be treated with basic humanity and that all governments should respect, protect and promote those rights. The ideology of human rights has historical and philosophical origins and is a multifaceted paradigm, but perhaps the notions 249

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of welfare and justice within human rights are generally thought of as being the most pertinent in relation to the focus and application of social policy. There is also a conceptual relationship between social policy and human rights since, arguably, social policy has an important contribution to make to the promotion and protection of human rights. A human rights-based approach can also be used to inform evaluations of such policies and processes; plus, it can act as a mechanism for ensuring effective participation and access to justice. Under a human rights-based approach, government plans, policies and programmes are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding obligations that are focused on empowering people themselves – especially the most marginalised within societies – to participate in the formulation of policies and ultimately to hold the policymakers accountable. Within some jurisdictions, a commitment to certain human rights aspects of social policy has led to the development of both social and economic rights, for example, the development in the UK of the welfare state and, more particularly, the National Health Service, paid for by taxes and available to all. This has not been the case in the US. Thus, welfare reform can often be based on human rights principles, but there is no consistency across jurisdictions in spite of some increasing acceptance within the policy areas of, for example, poverty, welfare, disability and discrimination. Ignatieff (2001, p 95) suggests that: rights are not the universal credo of a global society, not a secular religion, but something much more limited and yet just as valuable: the shared vocabulary from which our arguments can begin, and the bare human minimum from which different areas of flourishing can take root. Research by the World Bank (2008, p viii) suggests that: in practice a rights-based approach to social policy can be seen as incorporating … the definition and widespread communication of rights, entitlements and standards which enable citizens to hold public policy makers and providers to account for the delivery of social policy; the availability of mechanisms of redress where citizens can go if they are unable to enjoy specified entitlements or social minimums; a commitment to the equitable delivery of the specified rights, entitlements and standards to all on a universal basis and principles and standards derived from international human rights treaties. However, Dean (2007, p 1) argues that ‘social rights continue to be a relatively marginalised or qualified element of the human rights agenda and may be more 250

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effectively harnessed by way of a welfare rights approach based on a politics of needs interpretation’. KATE MOSS See also: Human Rights; World Bank Readings Dean, H. (2007) ‘Social policy and human rights: rethinking the engagement’, Social Policy and Society, 7(1): 1–12. Ignatieff, M. (2001) Human rights as politics and idolatry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Nelson, P. and Dorsey, E. (2015) ‘Who practices rights-based development? A progress report on work at the nexus of human rights and development’. Available at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/human_rights/2015/criticalreflections/2/ World Bank (2008) ‘Realising rights through social guarantees’. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/ Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164107324437/Realizing_ Rights_through_Social_Guarantees-web1.pdf

STATE, THE

A ‘state’, from a legal viewpoint, is a politically organised nation in a defined territory ‘capable to maintain its rights by bringing international claims; and to be responsible for its breaches of obligations’ (Crawford, 2012, p 115), or, in political science, is ‘a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1946, p 77). Definitions present the essence of the concept: legal, political, even sociological. Furthermore, the second concept summarises the view on the state by the discipline of sociology. In law, questions have been put forth on states’ rights and obligations, nationally and internationally, and the state’s power to create legally binding rules generating rights and obligations (to judge, punish, command), what has been called ‘legitimate political authority’ (Raz, 1990, p 3). Political science focuses on internal power and power vis-à-vis other states, subjects, actors and objects of international relations. The ‘state’, however, as part of the country in a federal state, is one of the legal and political divisions of this particular kind of state (eg the US), as established in the constitution of every country. ‘Constitutions’ establish powers and limits to the state, whether in one or various legal texts considered as part 251

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of the constitution, for example, the Constitution of the US, the Constitution of England and treaties establishing fundamental general rights. The state as a concept was created in the 15th century and has evolved since. In Greece and Rome, the state was less complex than is evidenced today. The concept of the ‘state’, the political and philosophical idea established by political thinkers like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau – was developed to organise a large number of nations in Europe. Authors like Machiavelli developed the idea of the state as an organisation achieving peace in countries and cities. Additionally, other nations were keen on the concept, not only because of peace, but also because it was based on a central power, and the concept later evolved to enact and be organised by legal rules from the sovereign. In the beginning, the concept was related to kingdoms, but it later changed to include territories, which were politically organised particularly after the 19th century. In this sense, many states during the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries were created under the rules of law, central power and peace established by the state. Many political thinkers expressed their ideas on the nature of the state, rights, obligations, evolution, currents elements and the current situation in the international community and in sociology. The main elements of any state are sovereignty, community and society (Loughlin, 2010, pp 183–208); features of any state today, without the concept of state previously explained, would not be configurated from a scientifical viewpoint. States are independent of other states. Such independence is political (government), economic and legal, and is developed in relation to other states and other international subjects and actors. Internally, independence by the three traditional powers of the State should be considered between and within powers: legislative, executive and judiciary, which are independent of each other with the exception of legal rules. Therefore, decisions on public policy and legal rules will be based on the ‘transparent’ exercise of sovereignty (without external or internal non-legal pressures): and ‘accountably’ (under legal control) established by law. Further, the state is subject to the rule of law, whether international or supranational. Rights and obligations, internally and internationally, have been changed from ‘autocracy’ and ‘absolutism’ to control by law. In the national legal system, states have evolved from absolute rights, from an absolute sovereignty, to the recognition of rights for subjects under the rule of law and recognition of basic rights, named ‘human rights’. The evolution of politics and law granted these rights to human beings, notably, in the 17th century with political declarations, as well as in the 20th century with humanitarian and human rights declarations and treaties. The ‘end’ of the state has been put forth by various authors due to the creation of supranational institutions (eg European Union), the idea of the ‘end of history’ 252

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due to common shared values finishing the state as an entity, and the neoliberal economic system established in most, if not all, countries (Fukuyama, 1992, p 39). However, the state remains as a legal and political system in all parts of the world. In addition, new insights on the state have been developed through ‘cultural and representational frames with structural and functional approaches’ (Sharma and Gupta, 2006, p 6). SERGIO PEÑA-NEIRA AND MANUEL TEROL See also: Constitutionalism; European Union; Human Rights; State Power Readings Crawford, J. (2012) Brownlie’s principles of public international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The end of history and the last man. New York, NY: Avon Books Inc. Loughlin, M. (2010) Foundations of public law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (1990) ‘Introduction’, in J. Raz (ed) Authority. New York, NY: New York University Press, pp 1–19. Sharma, A. and Gupta, A. (2006) ‘Introduction’, in A. Sharma and A. Gupta (eds) The anthropology of the State. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp 1–42. Weber, M. (1946) ‘Politics as vocation’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 77–128.

STATE CRIME

The majority of research on crime has primarily focused on street crime. Despite its pervasiveness, less attention has been given to the deviant, harmful, illegal and/ or wrongful actions of the state, hereafter referred to as state crimes. In general, state crimes include ‘cover-ups, corruption, disinformation, unaccountability, and violations of domestic and/or international laws. It also includes those practices that, although they fall short of being officially declared illegal, are perceived by the majority of the population as illegal or socially harmful’ (Ross, 2000 [1995], pp 6–7). State crimes cause more financial, human, property and environmental damage than street crimes. State crimes are typically not legislated as criminal and are beyond the purview of many law enforcement agencies. For example, these crimes are typically codified in regulatory, and international, rather than criminal, law.

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Since the late 1980s, a growing number of criminologists (eg Grabosky, 1989; Barak, 1991; Friedrichs, 1998a, 1998b; Ross, 2000 [1995], 2000; Rothe, 2009) have explored state crimes. Although the broad use of the term ‘state crime’ has been questioned, the concept is useful, and with cautious operationalisation, it can help explain the misdeeds of government institutions and agencies, powerful individuals acting in the name of the state, and those acting criminally as enabled by the state power with which they have been vested. Some of the criminological community and much of society have adopted a double standard regarding definitions of the words ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’. Crimes against the government (or society) have long been regarded as real crimes, that is, serious, harmful acts that are rightly criminalised and receive copious attention from the mass media (Barak, 1991). On the other hand, the abuse of power by the state, particularly in advanced industrialised democracies, is perceived as less egregious and is often designated as a necessary action, which receives erratic public attention. There is rarely a sustained appreciation of the vast harms resulting from the actions of government agencies and agents. The state and its lawmakers, managers and bureaucrats are not solely architects and enforcers of the law, but also significant players in law violations. Indeed, the state holds a unique position – it is both ‘a crime-regulating and crimegenerating institution’ (Barak, 1993, p 209). Given the realities of sovereignty and national security, most states, regardless of their ideological foundations or political-economic systems, seemingly could not survive without some form of secrecy, espionage and deception (Ross, 1992). The question then becomes: when do such actions violate the law, and whose law is being violated? In general, state crime consists of political corruption, illegal domestic surveillance, human rights violations, state violence and state-corporate crime. Each qualifies as a widely recognised and practised type of state illegality. State crime also includes the complementary action of repression, which combines several different actions embedded in a concept of state crime. Although the appropriateness of states’ responsibilities can and historically has been debated, crimes of commission and omission, as well as acts labelled ‘governmental crime’, ‘state crime’, ‘political white-collar crime’ (Ross, 2000 [1995], pp 4–6) and ‘state-corporate crime’ (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006), can be included. It is difficult to monitor state criminality: it is often difficult to detect; it is hard to prosecute individuals accused of perpetrating state crimes; and those charged often have considerable resources to mount a sustained defence (Ross and Rothe, 2008). These challenges, among others, make the study and analysis of this kind of crime challenging for those wishing clear-cut answers. JEFFREY IAN ROSS 254

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See also: Corruption; Crimes of the Powerful; State, The; State Power Readings Barak, G. (ed) (1991) Crimes by the capitalist state: An introduction to state criminality. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Barak, G. (1993) ‘Crime, criminology, and human rights: toward an understanding of state criminality’, in K.D. Tunnell (ed) Political crime in contemporary America. New York, NY: Garland Publishing Inc., pp 207–30. Friedrichs, D.O. (1998a) State crime (Vol. 1). Aldershot: Ashgate. Friedrichs, D.O. (1998b) State crime (Vol. 2). Aldershot: Ashgate. Friedrichs, D.O. (2000 [1995]) ‘State crime or governmental crime: making sense of the conceptual confusion’, in J.I. Ross (ed) Controlling state crime (2nd edn). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, pp 53–79. Grabosky, P. (1989) Wayward governance: Illegality and its control in the public sector. Canberra: Australia Institute of Criminology. Green, G.S. (1990) Occupational crime. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. Michalowski, R.J. and Kramer, R. (eds) (2006) State-corporate crime: Wrongdoing at the intersection of business and government. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press. Ross, J.I. (1992) ‘The outcomes of public police violence: a neglected research agenda’, Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development, 15(1): 1-12. Ross, J.I. (ed) (2000 [1995]) Controlling state crime (2nd edn). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Ross, J.I. (ed) (2000) Varieties of state crime and its control. Monsey: Criminal Justice Press. Ross, J.I. and Rothe, D. L. (2008) ‘Ironies of controlling state crime’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 36(3): 196-210. Rothe, D.L. (2009) State criminality: The crime of all crimes. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Sykes, G.M. and Cullen, F. (1992) Criminology (2nd edn). Toronto: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich.

STATE HARM

While one of the founding fathers of victimology, Benjamin Mendelsohn, in developing the discipline of victimology, was concerned to address all kinds of victimisations, including those committed by the state (especially genocide), a focus on these kinds of harms has, until recently, been of marginal concern for the disciplines of criminology and victimology. Yet, in calling for a radical victimology, Quinney (1972, p 315) observed that ‘victims of police force, the victims of war, the victims of state violence, the victims of oppression of any sort’ were legitimate areas of concern for such a perspective. Some victimologists have 255

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taken this call seriously and, framed by a human rights perspective, have used those standards as the criteria by which to explore the nature and extent of the harms caused when states contravene such rights or fail to recognise them (see, eg, the work of Elias, 1985). However, such interventions notwithstanding, and following Rothe and Kauzlarich (2014, p 6), ‘[d]efining a victim of state crime is dependent upon who is doing the defining’. Indeed, as Quinney (1972) himself commented, such definitions are by no means certain and are often arbitrary. Thus, what constitutes the nature of the harms produced by the crimes of the state involves entering what Rothe and Kauzlarich (2014, p 6) call a ‘definitional quagmire’.This can result in attention being focused on different kinds of harms reflecting the different definitions adopted. Here, following Weber (1948), it is taken as axiomatic that states have overwhelming power.That power includes the right to use violence or force (legitimately) in order to ensure the rule of law.This puts states in a position in which state action and/or inaction can result in harms being deliberately committed in the interests of the state, and/or harms resulting by a failure to act either in its interests or those of its citizens. In each case, such harms can be wide-ranging; in the first case, they can range from genocide to the harmful effects of economic policy; in the second case, they can result from the knowledge that harms are being committed by others (as in the case of the British government during the Rwandan genocide; see Cameron, 2013) or by default, as a result of non-knowledge. Moreover, states can act in concert with one another, resulting in mass harms and costs to those targeted by such action. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a good example. Justified on the back on what transpired to be false evidence in respect of non-compliance with United Nations Resolution 687 (the request for Iraq to disarm weapons of mass destruction), US and Coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003. The ‘shock and awe’ campaign that ensued lasted three weeks and killed more than 6,700 civilians (Iraq Body Count, 2013, available from https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/). From 2003 to 2013, over 149,000 civilians are reported to have been killed as a direct result of violence in Iraq (Iraq Body Count, 2014, available from https://www. iraqbodycount.org/database/). In addition, Levy and Sidel (2013) report the extent of injury and ill-health caused to Iraqis as a result of damaged infrastructure and displacement, with Hagan et al (2012) estimating the economic costs of the war to Iraq being somewhere in the region off USD239 billion. Moreover, when the costs to the Coalition forces (around USD4–6 trillion to the US alone; see Bilmes, 2013) are added to the costs of supporting veterans from the conflict (estimated by the US Department of Veteran Affairs to be USD57 billion in disability payments for 2012), it is easy to see that this kind of collusion can result in harms of phenomenal proportion – all of which resulted from state action of questionable legal status. This lends some weight to the assertion made by

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Rothe and Kauzlarich (2014) on the reach and the nature of state crime harms and human rights violations. SANDRA WALKLATE See also: Crimes of the Powerful; Genocide; Social Harm; State, The; State Crime; Violence Readings Bilmes, L.J. (2013) The financial legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How wartime spending decisions will constrain future national security. Budgets Faculty Research Working Papers Series. Harvard, MA: University of Harvard. Cameron, H. (2013) Britain’s hidden role in the Rwandan genocide. London: Routledge. Elias, R. (1985) ‘Transcending our social reality of victimisation: toward a victimology of human rights’, Victimology, 10: 588–605. Hagan, J., Kaiser, J., Rothenberg, D., Hanson, A. and Parker, P. (2012) ‘Atrocity victimization and the costs of economic conflict crimes in the battle for Baghdad and Iraq’, European Journal of Criminology, 9(5): 481–98. Levy, B.S. and Sidel, V.W. (2013) ‘Adverse health consequences of the Iraq War’, The Lancet, 381: 949–58. Quinney, R. (1972) ‘Who is the victim?’, Criminology, November, pp 309–29. Rothe, D. and Kauzlarich, D. (2014) Towards a victimology of state crime. London: Routledge. Weber, M. (1948) From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

STATE OF DENIAL

To be in ‘a state of denial’ is to block out or repress information or emotions. Being in denial is a conscious choice and, as a result, an individual may become indifferent, passive or unresponsive. In extreme circumstances, this can entail psychic numbing.The opposite of denial is acknowledgement.Acknowledgement means to respond through feelings such as anger, sympathy or compassion. It means to intervene and try to make a difference. Interventions include boycotting certain goods, signing a petition, joining an organisation or participating in a public demonstration. In the text States of denial (Cohen, 2001), the central concern of Cohen is how ordinary people deny or acknowledge the suffering of others.

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Cohen (2001) categorises different forms of denial. Personal denial – denial of our own suffering – is not necessarily problematic. Telling ourselves ‘vital lies’ may be essential, but the denial of the suffering of others is not acceptable. Official denial – denial organised by the state – is an attempt to make the suffering of others invisible. It has Orwellian overtones of a state controlling our thoughts and actions (Orwell, 1949). Cultural denial – where people collectively disavow truth – is a form of self-censorship in which people ‘live the lie’ so as not to stand outside community expectations. These forms of denial can be historical, where people deny events from the past, or contemporary, where people ignore the infamies of the present (Cohen, 2013 [1993]). For Cohen (2001), there are three main ways in which people deny knowledge of suffering: literal denial, interpretive denial and implicatory denial. Strategies of ‘literal denial’ deny validity to assertions that human rights infringements or atrocities actually occurred. Interpretive denial is way of giving an act or event less problematic interpretations. Implicatory denial arises when people recognise the reality of human suffering but deny any personal implications. Building on the insights of Sykes and Matza (1957), Cohen (2001) identified seven forms of implicatory denial, which he referred to as the ‘techniques of denial’. • Denial of responsibility: A person denies that they are fully or even partially responsible for the human suffering that they have witnessed or undertaken. It was not their fault, it was an accident or it was not intentional. The perpetrator, or observer, somehow claims ignorance for dealing with its consequences. • Denial of injury: What happened did not hurt. There was no or only limited damage caused. The action was harmless or the suffering created was insignificant. • Denial of victim: There is no identifiable victim of the action. The sufferer has lost their claims to being a victim by precipitating the action or undertaking an action that led to them being harmed. • Condemnation of the condemners: The person who is complaining should be condemned. They may be hypocrites, liars or not seen as a respectable person or an authority who can make such comments. • Appeal to higher loyalties: That the harm was done for the greater good. The suffering serves wider purposes, personal commitments, ties, bonds and beliefs. Somebody else is a more deserving person to be labelled victim. • Denial of knowledge: This is when people claim that they have no knowledge of certain events. There are gradations of knowing and there is a fine line between knowing and consciously not knowing. • Moral indifference: The suffering of the other is acceptable. There is nothing to be explained away. Moral indifference arises when people become desensitised to suffering, become emotionally overloaded or ideologically distance others as lesser beings.

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The techniques of denial have been applied to human suffering, from the Jewish Holocaust (Bauman, 1989) to the denial of prisoner rights by prison officers (Scott, 2008). For Cohen (2001), individuals and societies have a moral responsibility to help others in need. Human suffering must not be accepted irrespective of who the person is, where they are from or what they have done. He also warns of the danger of ‘intellectual denial’, where the moral foundations of truth and justice are denied by academics. It is never morally acceptable to deny the suffering of others. DAVID SCOTT See also: Censorship; Holocaust, The; Human Rights; Prisoners’ Rights Readings Bauman, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity. Cohen, S. (2001) States of denial. Cambridge: Polity. Cohen, S. (2013 [1993]) ‘Human rights and crimes of the state’, in J. Muncie and E. McLaughlin (eds) Criminological perspectives (3rd edn). London: Sage, pp 646–65. Orwell, G. (1949) Nineteen eighty-four. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Scott, D. (2008) ‘Creating ghosts in the penal machine’, in J. Bennett and B. Crewe (eds) Understanding prison staff. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp 168–86. Sykes, G. and Matza, D. (1957) ‘Techniques of neutralization: a theory of delinquency’, American Sociological Review, 22: 664–70.

STATE POLICY, RIGHTS AND MULTICULTURALISM

‘Multiculturalism’ is a political theory that seeks to balance individual autonomy with group rights for specific groups by seeking privileges or accommodations for groups as well as individuals. Multiculturalism also refers to a state of affairs in which a state contains multiple cultural groups (Raz, 1998). In practice, multiculturalism may be manifested in various ways, including exceptions to direct or indirect restrictions on the wearing of religious garb, support for language instruction, the promotion of ethnic or linguistic heritage, the accommodation of pluralistic legal systems and self-governance, or additional representation rights for minority groups (Shachar, 2000). Opposition to multicultural approaches or theories can be manifested in state policies that, for example, promote the assimilation of minorities or immigrants, restrict the use of non-national languages and restrict religious and cultural practices. Although multiculturalism is state policy in 259

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several countries, including Canada (where it is enshrined in the constitution) and Australia, opposition to multiculturalism frequently revolves around whether multiculturalism inhibits the integration of members of minority groups. As articulated by Kymlicka (1995), the most prominent scholar in this area, state approaches to cultures and societal groups can take various forms. In one form, ‘benign neglect’, the state neither promotes nor actively inhibits minority cultures, though it does protect individuals from discrimination (Kymlicka, 1995). Kymlicka (1995) rejects this approach for two reasons: first, the approach does not recognise that state neutrality frequently means the indirect promotion of majority culture; and, second, the approach does not effectively treat members of minority groups as equals. Individual choices are meaningful within the context of a person’s culture. If individuals do not feel that their culture is respected or if their culture is threatened, individuals will be inhibited from making meaningful choices and will lose a sense of ‘belonging’ that the majority may enjoy. Hence, protecting minority cultures is consistent with liberal autonomy because it places members of minority and majority cultures on equal footing to be autonomous. For that reason, state protection of minority cultures does not violate the liberal principle of treating each individual equally. While multiculturalists may accept the grant of special privileges, protections or rights to minority groups, they do not necessarily believe that every minority group warrants the same level of protection. For example, Kymlicka (1995) argues that a distinction can be made between national minorities and immigrants. National minorities include indigenous peoples as well as minority groups who share a culture and values that are distinct from the majority. While national minorities are persons who may have been forcibly absorbed into the state and who would appear to have a greater right to the survival of their cultures, new immigrants are persons who may be expected to both integrate with the majority culture and privately retain their prior culture. A central dilemma in multiculturalism is that even if minority groups are given special protections, the practices and values of minority groups may themselves be illiberal. For example, religious minorities’ attitudes towards gender may be sexist and, for that reason, the protection of minority cultures may disproportionately impact women (Okin, 1999). Kymlicka (1995) argues that multiculturalism and feminism are not opposed; rather, multiculturalists may still seek to promote a normative value of equality by example or incentives while according protections to minority groups. Raz (1998) argues that members of groups must enjoy a right to exit. Another compelling objection is that where the state delegates authority to minority groups in areas like the determination of boundaries of membership

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in the group or family law, this delegation can disproportionately and unequally affect women and yet still receive state sanction (Shachar, 2000). CHRISTIAN PANGILINAN See also: Citizenship; Multiculturalism; National Identity Readings Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Okin, S.M. (1999) ‘Is multiculturalism bad for women?’, in J. Cohen, M. Howard and M.C. Nussbaum (eds) Is multiculturalism bad for women?. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 1–16. Raz, J. (1998) ‘Multiculturalism’, Ratio Juris, 11(3): 193–205. Shachar, A. (2000) ‘On citizenship and multicultural vulnerability’, Political Theory, 28(1): 64–89. Taylor, C. (1994) ‘The politics of recognition’, in A. Gutmann (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 25–74.

STATE POWER

States have existed since ancient Egyptian times; however, the way the state exercises its power has changed, moving from the despotic power of the state in historical China and Roman times to the infrastructural power of the state in modern times (Mann, 1984). State power as a concept was first focused on in the late 19th century by philosophers such as Hobbes. In discussing governmental power, Hobbes (1651) argued that there needs to be a social contract between the state and citizens, whereby citizens give up some freedoms (and therefore power) in order for the state to protect them. Without this contract, life would be nasty, brutish and short. As a result of this, it can be argued that the state has power that it can use to control its citizens. Hence, the state has the power to socialise its citizens to see crime and community through the eyes of the state and therefore to see only particular forms of criminality as problematic. Furthermore, this Hobbesian view of the state sees the state as having a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. This is seen in the use of force within policing, and the removal of an individual’s liberty by courts and prisons. If an individual used force, or detained an individual for committing a crime, this would be seen as illegitimate, but the exact same behaviours by the state are accepted as legitimate because citizens have devolved their power to the state (Held, 1996). 261

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Deriving from Hobbes’s idea, a liberal view of state power argues that the state is necessary but its power should be restricted, focusing on the nature of the social contract between the state and citizen. Such an approach also examines the legitimacy of the state, arguing that the power of the state needs to be controlled in a way that enables states to perform their functions without falling into oppressiveness (Macdonald, 2008). Unfortunately, once legitimacy is established, it becomes uncontested and taken in good faith, and, as such, state power becomes problematic only when it is exercised outside the social contract (Smith, 2009). Continuing in the liberal tradition, the rational choice perspective sees state power as being concentrated on either the rules of the game (ie individuals obeying the law) or violence exercised by the state (when citizens do not follow the rules). As a result, state power is constructed through building trust and the use of incentives (Smith, 2009). States have an interest in developing good institutions and economies because this facilitates a private self-interest in limiting crime and corruption (Olson, 2000). However, this assumes that people make choices free from influence, and this approach does not consider how these choices may be shaped or limited by power relations. Equally, such thinking pays little attention to the historical development of power, or to the limited influence of democracy within many political stances (Smith, 2009). However, radical approaches acknowledge this influence and see the state as a coercive institution that effects ‘the interest of the capitalist class’, having a set of ‘ideological mechanisms which ensure that particular capitalist interests are presented as general or national interests and hence ensure the acquiescence of subordinate classes’ (Smith, 2009, p 66). Weberian responses to state power take the state and state power as a key determining feature of modern societies, and such approaches have concentrated on the nature of state power and how it is exercised. In taking this stance, Weber saw the state not as a monolith, but as an organisation with many sites of power, with a range of conflicting interests (Smith, 2009). This can be seen in the way that the state executes policies; the state is not separate from civil society, relying on groups or organisations within society to implement policies. Hence, state power is always partial as states never have complete success or agreement with their policies. In fact, it could be argued that: the state as such has no power – it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. (Jessop, 1990, pp 269–70) Hence, states use varying mechanisms and methods of intervention in order to assert their power, and such power is not an individual characteristic, but a

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sociological relationship, reflecting the wide range of institutions within the state that can affect individual lives. LINDA ASQUITH See also: Citizenship; Corruption; Democracy; State, The; State Violence Readings Held, D. (1996) Models of democracy (2nd edn). Cambridge: Polity Press. Hobbes, T. (1651) ‘Leviathan’. Available at: https://www.gutenberg.org/ files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm (accessed 15 February 2016). Jessop, B. (1990) State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place. Cambridge: Polity Press. Macdonald, T. (2008) ‘What’s so special about states? Liberal legitimacy in a globalising world’, Political Studies, 56(3): 544–65. Mann, M. (1984) ‘The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results’, European Journal of Sociology, 25(2): 185–213. Olson, M. (2000) Power and prosperity. New York, NY: Basic Books. Smith, M. J. (2009) Power and the state. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

STATE PUNISHMENT

Punishment, in essence, is the deliberate infliction of pain. A penal sanction can be understood as ‘state punishment’ if an authorised agent of the capitalist state with the aim of intentionally hurting a person who is believed to have committed a legally prohibited act initiates a harm that causes an offender pain (Scott, 2009). Philosophers, sociologists and legal scholars have questioned the circumstances under which a state should exercise the ‘power to punish’ and how much power is justified (Lacey, 1994; Hudson, 2003). An important principle when considering the legitimacy of state punishment is parsimony. Parsimony is a presumption of either non-intervention or the use of the most minimum restrictions possible in response to wrongdoing. A parsimonious approach dictates that the ‘onus of proof ’ falls on those justifying state punishment rather than upon those arguing for its diminution. If there is reasonable doubt that state punishment is not justifiable, then the presumption for less punishment should be accepted. There are four main ways of evaluating the legitimacy of state punishment: retributive; consequentialist; aretaic; and abolitionist. Each will be discussed in turn. 263

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Retributivists, such as Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, argue that we should punish because the guilty deserve to suffer. For retributivists, wrongdoers should be treated as ends rather than means, and, as a result, the social consequences of punitive sanctions, positive or negative, are deemed irrelevant. Retributivism focuses on an offender’s guilt and equates the penalty with the wrong done. There is, however, no opportunity for forgiveness or mercy in a retributive rationale. Further, retributivism cannot differentiate between the enforcement of good and bad laws and struggles to explain why an offender should be punished, what form that punishment should take or why the capitalist state should be given the power to undertake such harms. It indicates that there should be a response, and infers restoring balance, but does not explain why this should take the form of pain infliction (Scott, 2009). For consequentialists, such as Jeremy Bentham, state punishment is legitimate if it is efficient, does more good than harm and is the best available way of responding to human troubles, wrongs and conflicts. The three main consequentialist justifications are incapacitation, rehabilitation and deterrence. The difficulty is that state punishments may increase the capacity for crime and generate abnormal ideas and behaviours, and there is no scientific evidence that punishments have a direct impact on future lawful conduct. Further, consequentialist approaches have no inbuilt logic to prevent the punishment of innocent people or to ensure that the severity of the sentence is commensurate to the harm of the offence (Scott, 2009). Aretaic philosophies apply the ideas of virtue ethics to justify state punishment. This teleological justification focuses on the ends of punishment. Historically associated with Christian penal reformers, state punishments are to instil virtuous habits in immoral people consumed with vice. In the UK, Minister of Justice Michael Gove (2015–16) was a contemporary proponent of this approach. The problem is that aretaic justifications: conveniently ignore contradictions between pain infliction and many other virtues; promote the authoritarian imposition of virtue upon others; and ignore how wider social contexts and punishments generate ‘vice’. Abolitionists, such as Nils Christie and Angela Y. Davis, question the moral and political legitimacy of punishment. For abolitionists, state punishment is morally bankrupt. They argue that state punishment is a form of state violence resulting in harm, suffering and death, and hold to the principle that regardless of what a lawbreaker has done, two wrongs cannot make a right. State punishments are forms of authoritarian domination that create more problems than they solve. Prisons, irrespective of the good intentions of penal reformers, have failed to be places instilling good virtue. Abolitionists call for radical alternatives to prisons and punishment and a new transformative justice that can address social and economic inequalities alongside interpersonal conflicts. This means not just 264

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dismantling state punishments, but, at the same time, providing social housing, decent jobs, free education and health-care services (Davis, 2006). The virtues that abolitionists promote concern the ethics of care, meeting the needs of others and forgiveness and compassion for those who do us wrong. DAVID SCOTT See also: Capital Punishment; Habeas Corpus; Prisoners’ Rights; Social Control Readings Davis, A.Y. (2006) Abolition democracy: Beyond prison, torture and empire. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press. Gove, M. (2015) ‘The treasure in the heart of man – making prisons work’, speech delivered at Prisoners Learning Alliance, 17 July. Available at: https:// www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-treasure-in-the-heart-of-man-makingprisons-work (accessed 19 July 2015). Hudson, B.A. (2003) Understanding justice. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Lacey, N. (1994) State punishment. London: Routledge. Scott, D. (2009) ‘Punishment’, in A. Hucklesby and A. Wahidin (eds) Criminal justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 83–102.

STATE TERRORISM

When it comes to issues of security and insecurity, terrorism is one of the most contested concepts in existence. Yet, certainly in the contemporary context, it is one of the key driving forces behind foreign and domestic policy issues surrounding security.The lack of a universally acceptable definition of terrorism, not only between states, but also within, does not equate to an inability to provide a broad explanation of its core characteristics, and this is certainly true with regard to state terrorism.Terrorism is not simply a weapon of the physically weak or those perceived to have no political voice. To suggest this not only renders the notion of state terrorism redundant, but fails to consider the possibility that the recourse to asymmetrical tactics may have come about due to political or moral weakness or perceived vulnerability from, for example, opponents to the incumbent government. It is important to note that the label of ‘terrorist’, be it upon an individual, an organisation or a state, is one that is overwhelmingly bestowed by others. The negative connotations associated with the term ‘terrorism’ almost guarantee that 265

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no individual, organisation and/or state will self-identify as terrorist. Instead, they will choose adjectives with positive connotations that will resonate with their desired audience – typically, those for whom the use of political violence is undertaken on behalf of. These will include freedom fighters, liberators or, when it comes to the state, providers of state security, all of whose actions could be deemed ‘legitimate’ when set against those of ‘terrorists’. While contemporary discussions relating to the threat of terrorism tend to focus on non-state actors (bottom-up), throughout history, state-instigated terrorism (top-down) has occurred with far more regularity. Moreover, as Chaliand and Blin (2007) note, the lethality rate has been far higher. Indeed, the Anglicisation of the word ‘terror’ occurred in a period when the use of terrorism was considered a purview of the state. In his first-hand account of the French Revolution, statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke described Napolean Bonaparte’s use of irregular forces to suppress resistance as being a part of a regime de la terreur – or reign of terror. Further, individuals and/or groups may resort to the use of political violence – terrorism – in order to highlight a particular cause. According to Hoffman (2006, p 261), state-sponsored terrorism ‘is geared less to obtaining publicity than to pursuing specific foreign policy objectives’. Recent examples may include the brutal suppression of German-Jewish citizens in the 1930s, the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s and, in the same decade, during the disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. State terrorist actions, similar to non-state terrorist actions, are a tactic rather than a strategy or philosophy. As such, and when coupled with notions of proportionality enshrined in teachings of just war theories (particularly with reference to jus in bello – ‘justice in war’ – as opposed to jus ad bellum – ‘justice of war’), it is also possible to consider strategic aerial bombing by one state upon another during wartime as an act of terrorism. This is the case if it is considered disproportionate, as may have been the case during the mass bombing campaigns towards the end of the Second World War, culminating in the dropping of possibly the first and, more arguably, the second atomic bomb over Japan. One distinguishing characteristic of this form of political violence from others is the perceived (dis)proportionality of the act undertaken in the pursuit of a political objective. This, coupled together with selective hindsight, is what determines what is and is not an example of state terrorism. Recognising this – whether a state has or has not committed an act of terrorist violence (similar to individuals or groups) – is a pronouncement that will vary over the course of time and political realities. If terrorism is considered simply as the exploitation of fear in order to compel an adversary to capitulate to politically motivated demands regardless of whether the adversary is an individual, organisation or state, then it is possible to understand 266

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what state terrorism may be. In the absence of a universally agreed definition, state terrorism can be considered to be the use of irregular forces or, internationally agreed-upon, disproportionate methods to cause fear in an effort to achieve a political objective domestically or overseas. EDGAR B. TEMBO See also: Counterterrorism; Insecurity; Proportionality; Violence Readings Chaliand, G. and Blin, A. (2007) ‘Introduction’, in G. Chaliand and A. Blin (eds) The history of terrorism: From antiquity to Al Qaeda. London: University of California Press. Hoffman, B. (2006) Inside terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

STATE VIOLENCE

State violence is a form of coercive power producing violent outcomes. Any discussion of state violence requires consideration of the meaning of the terms ‘state’ and ‘violence’. A state is a configuration of alliances in a given historical conjuncture that mediates power relations and intervenes in social life. As an ‘institutional ensemble’ of different actors and partnerships, a state is not internally coherent, but rather a site of constant struggle and negotiation (Jessop, 1990). A state can always be reconstituted into new combinations of alliances and is constantly searching for new power-sharing relationships in order to maintain stability. As there are many different interests in society, such alliances are always tenuous, temporary, fragmented and contested (Jessop, 1990). Consequently, one of the key roles of a state is to manufacture consent and concretise alliances through ideological leadership – hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Poulantzas, 1978).A ‘capitalist state’ is always predicated upon both ‘consent’ and ‘coercion’. When consensus (the velvet glove) falters, the state will fall back upon its repressive apparatus (the iron fist) to maintain control. For Weber (2004 [1919]), the capitalist state is organised domination. It has a ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force’ (Weber, 1919, p 32, emphasis in original) as it holds the ‘specific means’ to lawfully authorise the use of violence. Violence can be defined as the physical/psychological injury, harm or death resulting from either an individual action or a given set of structural arrangements. Physical forms of violence involve direct action by specific actors with clear intent. However, state violence can also take less visible and more insidious 267

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forms, such as the socially organised deprivation of politically marginalised people through poverty or famine (Galtung, 1969; Scott, 2015). State violence can be deployed against other states through its own military forces or the sponsoring of military action by others, most notably, in times of war or in the colonialism of other territories. State violence is perpetrated against its own citizens through law enforcement agencies (police and prisons) and exclusionary social policies. State violence is used against the citizens of other nations wishing to settle in its territorial borders through immigration controls, and genocide can be perpetrated against ‘enemies within’ or against the ‘enemy’ in a different land. Given the nature and scope of state violence, a key question concerns the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence. Those who differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate violence point to the international and national treatises and laws governing the use of violence by a state. Those states who adhere to legal requirements undertake legitimate violence. Consequently, it is only through the breach of its own or international law that the use of violence by a state can be considered illegitimate. Transgressive states perpetrate ‘war crimes’ or ‘state crimes’. Many forms of state violence, such as the structural violence of poverty, are unlikely to fall within the remits of legal definitions of violence however. Acts of ‘war’ by the winning side – such as the bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Second World War – are only rarely defined as ‘war crimes’. Further, it is the state itself that has the monopoly to define the legal status of violence. State violence, whether by the police, military or the penal apparatus, will always be defended by state authorities as being exercised legitimately, whereas violent resistance by the people will always be considered as illegitimate and a threat to the state. State repression and legal violence walk together hand in hand. Indeed, for Poulantzas (1978), the law performs an integral role in organising and structuring physical repression. The law is ‘the code of organised public violence’ (Poulantzas, 1978, p 77, emphasis in original) and any perceived split between law and terror is ‘illusionary’. There can thus be no real distinction between legitimate and illegitimate state violence. The capitalist state is shot through with contradictions and legal loopholes, and state violence will always result in new acts of resistance from the people. Successful broad-based coalitions of resistance exploit contradictions and effectively challenge existing hegemonic alliances through alternative counter-hegemonic visions and the creation of new alliances and partnerships. DAVID SCOTT See also: State, The; Theories of the State; Violence; War Crimes 268

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Readings Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, peace, and peace research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6(3): 167–91. Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Jessop, B. (1990) State theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, power, socialism. London: Verso. Scott, D. (2015) ‘Eating your insides out’, Prison Service Journal, 201: 68–72. Weber, M. (2004 [1919]) ‘Politics as a vocation’, in D. Owen and T.B. Strong (eds) The vocation lectures (trans R. Livingstone). London: Hackett Publishing, pp 32–94.

STOP AND SEARCH

There are a number of legal mechanisms that law enforcement officials have in order to enable them to undertake procedures commonly known as stop and search. Broadly speaking (and within a liberal-democratic context), these powers have been subject to the notion of reasonable suspicion, that is to say, a law enforcement official has a reasonable suspicion that an individual has either committed a crime – based perhaps on appearance and/or behaviour – or may be about to commit one. Under these circumstances, where a reasonable suspicion is applicable, the law-abiding majority would expect a law enforcement official to utilise the powers entrusted to them to both prevent and resolve criminal activity. Although limited, but evident, prior to the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, in the post-9/11 world, law enforcement agencies have taken on more of an intelligence-led, preventative function (previously the purview of clandestine intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the British Secret Intelligence Service). In doing so, law enforcement agencies have sought to extend their powers to prevent criminal activity. Following the commencement of a car-bombing campaign undertaken by the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the early 1990s, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 was amended in 1994 to include a provision for ‘suspicionless stop and searches in authorized areas’ (Lennon, 2015, p 47). In the year prior to 9/11, the Terrorism Act 2000 was enacted, geared primarily towards an alleviation of what was then a reduced threat (following the acceptance of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement) from Northern Irish-related terrorism. By 2009/10, there were three main powers in use by the UK that allowed for the stop and search of individuals. These came under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In contrast to the former, the latter Act does not require a constable to 269

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have a reasonable suspicion of terrorist activity, merely that they consider the stop and search to be ‘expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism’ (Terrorism Act 2000, section 44). In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a significant expansion in the use of stopand-search powers, both within the UK and the US. Delsol (2011) notes that in 1997/98, there were 8,000 searches compared to 150,000 in 2008/09 across the UK. During the early post-9/11 years, governments felt pressure, to varying degrees, to appear to be confronting the terrorist threat. Within the UK context, this, combined with the presence of suspicionless law enforcement powers, led ‘officers to fall back on generalisations and stereotypes about who is involved in crime – [and has resulted in] power be[ing] used extensively against black and Asian communities’ (Delsol, 2011, pp 20–1). According to the Ministry of Justice (2011), between 2006/07 and 2009/10, the largest increase in Section 44 stopand-search activity was recorded by those identified as Black (up 212%), followed by Chinese or Other (up 207%), Asian (202%) and White (115%). As Weber and Bowling (2013, p 1) note: [w]hile the pressure to monitor and control minority populations has always been a feature of police work, new and renewed fears about emerging and existing ‘suspect populations’ – often accompanied by new powers and technologies intended to control them – have arisen in the face of instability associated with rapid global change. From a law enforcement perspective, therefore, stop and search is considered the legal use of government powers to help prevent and resolve criminal activity. Its use is generally based on the reasonable suspicion of either the officer conducting the stop, or their superiors, that an individual and/or group of individuals either have undertaken or are planning to undertake criminal activity. The expansion of stop-and-search legislation, beginning in the 1990s and accelerating in the early 2000s, has resulted in widespread implementation against minority ethnic communities, primarily under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (later Section 47A of the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011). EDGAR B. TEMBO See also: Counterterrorism; Democracy Readings Delsol, R. (2011) ‘Stop and search – renewed powers, less accountability?’, Criminal Justice Matters, 86(1): 20–1.

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Lennon, G. (2015) ‘Precautionary tales: suspicionless counter-terrorism stop and search’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 15(1): 44–62. Ministry of Justice (2011) Statistics on race and the criminal justice system 2010. London: Ministry of Justice. Parmar, A. (2011) ‘Stop and search in London: counter-terrorist or counterproductive’, Policing & Society, 21(4): 369–382. Weber, L. and Bowling, B. (2013) ‘Introduction: stop and search in global context’, in L. Weber and B. Bowling (eds) Stop and search: Police power in global context. London: Routledge, pp 1–4.

SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance is the detailed watching and monitoring of the behaviour and activities of people and organisations, from sources such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, typically to influence, manage or protect them. It also includes the monitoring of information about people and organisations, from sources such as the Internet and telephone traffic. Surveillance can be used by governments, businesses and commercial organisations but also by criminal organisations to help plan and commit crime. In the social sciences, Michel Foucault has been the most influential theorist of the concept and extent of surveillance in contemporary society. Foucault (1926–84) examined and analysed the social changes brought about by the emergence of modern industrial society and his writing focused on issues surrounding knowledge, power and the human body. In this context, his main theme and focus was that of the ‘disciplinary society’, of the pervasive nature of social control and of the struggle of individuals against the power of society. Discipline and punish (Foucault, 1977), one of Foucault’s later works, focused on what he saw as the ‘problem’ of knowledge and power, and has become one of the key texts in the sociology of punishment. It is arguably Foucault’s most important and lasting study and demonstrates most clearly his major theme of power and domination, and how the elite dominate and control the rest of society. The historical issue that he set out to explain in this study was the change in the basic form of punishment that took place between the mid-18th and early 19th centuries. when, Foucault (1977) argued, the target of punishment changed – the emphasis moved towards changing the soul of the offender rather than just the body, and towards transforming the offender, not just avenging the particular crime. Foucault (1977) saw these developments as reflecting how power operates in modern society, with open physical force and the ceremonies and rituals associated with it being replaced by a much more detailed regulation of offenders. 271

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Foucault (1977) also tried to show that the imposition of punishment in modern societies, for example, through depriving people of their liberty, illustrated the differences and asymmetries of power just as much as it did in previous societies. Foucault (1977) saw an extension of power and domination occurring through the methods of surveillance that were part of the design of the new prison buildings of the time. The panoptican designed by Bentham was a prison building constructed so as to allow for the constant observation and monitoring of all its inmates. The aim of this design was to instil in the inmates the belief that they were under constant surveillance. Foucault saw the prison as illustrating the basic principle of punitive and disciplinary power: The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly … the major effect of the panoptican: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assumes the automatic functioning of power. (Foucault, 1977, pp 173, 201) To elaborate on this, the ‘panoptican principle’ is the principle of disciplinary regulation, and for Foucault (1977), this is the fundamental principle of social regulation in modern society. He sees society as a ‘carceral archipelago’, essentially a chain of institutions with all members subject to an overarching disciplinary regulation, including being liable to the suspension of their rights across all aspects of their lives. While such disciplinary regulation is most obviously and fully realised in the prison, it is also dispersed out from the prison to other areas of society. There are, of course, many other social institutions and organisations that regulate us and that could also be said to be in the business of surveillance. As well as obvious examples such as the police and security companies, schools and colleges monitor our educational progress, the Inland Revenue checks to see whether taxes have been paid, and social service agencies keep records on citizens’ uptake of services, to name a few. All of these forms of checking and surveillance have been massively helped by advances in video and computer technology that have extended the range and the ease with which information from people can be gained, stored and utilised. More generally, it could be argued that Foucault’s (1977) theorising overstates the extent to which people are disciplined and controlled in everyday life. While individuals are not free to do what they please, and while rules and laws are to be obeyed, this is not necessarily the same as being under constant surveillance. IAN MARSH See also: Democracy; Social Control; State Punishment 272

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Readings Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London: Allen Lane.

SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW

The 2013 Snowdon revelations on the surveillance practices related to the gathering of electronic communications data by the US National Security Agency and the UK’s General Communications Headquarters brought to international attention concerns over how national security state agencies were not giving due consideration to protecting personal data. This resulted in a legal battleground between state legislators and the judiciary.The European Union (EU) is a prime example of this, as seen in the decision-making of the EU’s court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in Digital Rights Ireland [2014] 3 WLR 1607 and Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] EUECJ C-362/14.In Digital Rights the ECJ found the EU’s 2006 Data Retention Directive, introduced to aid terrorism and organised crime investigations, invalid. Underpinning this decision was that the Directive was too vague, failing to lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question along with insufficient safeguards protecting personal data against the risk of abuse by the state.Acknowledging that data retention is an important strand in terrorism investigations, the ECJ stated that necessity alone is not enough and that surveillance authorisation applications must be specific in relation to the nature of the investigation. Instrumental here was that the Directive did not comply with the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (CFRF).The Treaty of Lisbon 2009 made the CFRF a legally binding document, ensuring that all EU institutions and member states apply the Charter’s principles when implementing EU law. Following the ECJ’s decision in Digital Rights, Holland, Sweden, Romania and Belgium’s respective courts held that their national legislation governing the surveillance of electronic communications breached EU law and was struck down. Due to the sunset clause in the UK’s Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the fact that the UK government was introducing the Investigatory Powers Bill in 2015, the High Court in R (on the application of Davis and ors) [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin) did not recommend that the 2014 Act be altered to meet with EU law. However, the Court held that the Act did not lay down clear and precise rules providing access to and the use of communications data, and that with there being no judicial scrutiny to assess if the access is necessary to attain the objectives pursued, the Act was inconsistent with EU law. The main EU provision underpinning the protection of personal data is the 1995 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC under which EU member states must ensure 273

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that personal data are processed fairly and lawfully. The Directive clearly states that personal data can only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and can not be processed in a way incompatible with these purposes. Following the ECJ’s decision in Schrems, it was this Directive that resulted in the ending of the Safe Harbour trade agreement between the EU and the US in October 2015 because, in essence, the US had no data protection legislation that would protect EU citizens’ personal data. States cite the reason for wanting access to Internet and communications service providers’ communications data as falling under the necessity to protect national security. This is due to terrorist groups’ use of encrypted communications, especially the Islamic State (IS) group’s sophisticated use of social media, where IS’s Twitter use is considered a portal for followers to access their wider communications systems that are used to radicalise and encourage people to carry out terrorist attacks. While the US has made amendments to its law with the Freedom Act 2015 and the UK is, at the time of writing, currently addressing this issue with the Investigatory Powers Bill, the necessity of protecting national security is not a carte blanche reason to trample upon personal data protection rights. Only if the legislation is specific and allows full judicial scrutiny can there be a balance between protecting the interests of national security and privacy rights. DAVID LOWE See also: Civil Liberties; Data Protection; Surveillance Readings Granger, M. and Irion, K. (2014) ‘The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital Rights Ireland: telling off the EU legislator and teaching a lesson in privacy and data protection’, European Law Review, 39(6): 835–48. Ingram, H.J. (2015) ‘The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 69(6): 729–52. Lowe, D. (2014) ‘Surveillance and international terrorism intelligence exchange: balancing the interests of national security and individual liberty’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(4): 1–21. Ojanen, T. (2014) ‘Privacy is more than just a seven-letter word: the Court of Justice of the European Union sets constitutional limits on mass surveillance’, European Constitutional Law Review, 10(3): 528–42.

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T THEORIES OF THE STATE The concept of the ‘state’ is one of the most deep-rooted answers that Western (originally European) social and political thought has ever offered to the question of how to organise the social body, how to transform a mass of individuals on a certain land into an ordered polity. Within ancient Greek thought, the state is typically conceptualised as a political representation of the highest expression of human nature. In Plato’s ideal polity, social classes assume political roles based upon their natural ethical constitution (political naturalism).To enable each class to be in a position consistent with their virtue would mean to create a ‘just’ state. Aristotle brings Plato’s political naturalism from a normative to a descriptive level, while he critically distances himself from the Platonic ideal state. He argues, in fact, that the city-state and political rule are ‘natural’ because human beings are by nature political animals. However, what follows is not the envisioning of an ideal polity, but an inductive analysis of historical constitutions in order to discern the best way of organising those who inhabit the city-state. Ancient political thought has deeply informed Western civilisation, even though we owe to post-Renaissance political theories the development of the current understanding of the state. Overall, these theories retain the ancient understanding of relationships between individuals’ moral constitution and states’ structure, adding, as a distinctive dimension for the explanations of the state’s genesis, the concept of ‘social contract’. Thomas Hobbes claims that the creation and conservation of the polity are based on individuals’ self-interests and selfpreservation. Individuals establish the state in order to exit the state of nature, 275

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whereby human life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 2012 [1651], XIII.9), by ceding their absolute freedom to the sovereign by contract. Like Hobbes, John Locke considers individuals as self-interested beings, provided of liberty by nature. The state of nature, however, is not an endless state of war, and therefore the social contract is only meant to establish a state guarantor of freedom and especially of private property, and can be overturned in case the state fails its mission. A more anthropologically optimistic account of humans’ moral constitution is offered by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He deems individuals as naturally cooperative in the state of nature. It is only the creation of private property that produces inequality and conflict. For this reason, Rousseau imagines a normative social contract that aims to remedy the social and moral evils caused by the exit from the state of nature in order to create the conditions for human flourishing. The fictional theory of the social contract, and the nature of the state that derives from it, has been criticised by contemporary political thought, starting from the Marxist theories expounded in the 19th century. Marxist approaches causally link the analysis of the state to capitalism as a system of class relations. In Marx’s economic stoicism the forces of production determine people’s production relations, which, in turn, determine all other relations, including the political. The state is then conceptualised as an expression of economic relations meant to secure the interests of the dominant class. Although Max Weber borrows widely from Marx’s writings, he adopts a critical approach to Marx’s idea of the modern state. He contests Marx’s view that the state organisation is a direct derivation of class activities, reducing class relationships to economic relations. Weberian approaches stress how the state constitutes an autonomous source of power that operates on the basis of institutional logics and dynamics, where class dynamics and capitalist imperatives play the same explanatory role as cultural, social or religious factors. More recently, during the second half of the 20th century, one of the main novelties within the theoretical elaborations of state has been the development of the governmental approach, inspired by Michel Foucault’s later works. This approach stresses the critical role of knowledge and political discourses in the constitution of the state, using a broad concept of technology that includes both material and symbolic devices, acting on the collectivity and the individual body. The second half of the 20th century has also seen the emergence of critical movements that advance theories of the state based on gendered, racialised and multicultural critiques, opening new understandings of political institutions’ authority and effects on civil society. Another group of theories of (or against) the state should finally be mentioned. This is the wide and heterogeneous constellation of anarchist perspectives that contest the very nature of the state as an oppressive apparatus of domination and 276

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exploitation of individuals. Authors such as William Godwin, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Emma Goldman advocate, in different ways and from different perspectives, a ceaseless critique of the state and for non-hierarchical, decentralised and self-governed alternative political institutions. The concept of the ‘state’ remains contested and intrinsically multifaceted, always open to new and rival reflections, and, as such, one of the most generative axes around which Western political and social thought has revolved ever since. GIUSEPPE MAGLIONE See also: Governmentality; State, The; State Power Readings Foucault, M. (2008) The birth of biopolitics. Lectures at the College de France, 1978–79. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Guerin, D. (2005 [1965]) No gods no masters: An anthology of anarchism. Oakland: AK Press. Harrison, R. (2003) Hobbes, Locke, and confusion’s masterpiece: An examination of seventeenth-century political philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobbes, T. (2012 [1651]) Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skinner, Q. (2002) Visions of politics: Volumes I–III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TORTURE

Torture is illegal under international law and by the majority of sovereign states’ domestic laws. The primary binding international regulatory regime relating to torture is the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter, the Convention), which came into force in June 1987. To date, 158 out of the 193 members of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly have either signed or ratified the Convention. A prohibition on torture is also included in the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners and Article Five of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Convention states that ‘the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession’ (United Nations, 1984). It should be emphasised that the international prohibition against torture includes not just physical abuse such as beatings, electric shocks, 277

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enforced stress positions, murder, rapes, sleep deprivation and waterboarding, but also the threat of physical abuse and, indeed, the use of drugs or so-called ‘truth serums’. In this sense, and under international law, the threat of mental abuse is considered in the same guise as that of physical abuse insofar as both constitute acts of torture. Contemporary debates surrounding the use of torture have tended to focus on two areas: first, the notion that torture should be permitted under exceptional circumstances; and, second, that some coercive practices are not torture, but rather considered forms of enhanced interrogation. In challenging the first notion, it is noted that, as Martin (2006, p 516) states, ‘officials have long agreed that torture produces bad intelligence because victims are likely to admit whatever the interrogator wishes to hear’. This first notion is predicated on what is frequently referred to as the ticking time-bomb scenario. This is where members of a state’s security apparatus are aware of a bomb plot and have a suspect in custody that, through conventional interrogation techniques, is refusing to divulge the location of the device. Supporters of the idea that prohibitions governing torture should be eased under exceptional circumstances point to such scenarios to support their case. The implications, however, of an adoption of such a rationale are profound, not least because ‘exceptional policies have constitutive effects upon society, which blur the distinction between “normal” law and “extraordinary” crime’ (Aradau and Van Munster, 2009, p 689). Moreover, a recently released report into a systematic programme of torture undertaken by the US in the years following the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks found that little, if any, useful actionable intelligence had been gleaned. Furthermore, the use of torture: not only highlights the weakness of the government in dealing with this threat in a manner conducive to the laws and regulations of the land and in accordance with international law, but also serves as recruiting sergeant for those considered sympathisers [of terrorist objectives]. (Tembo, 2014, p 64) Simply put, the use of torture further alienates those communities which individuals are purporting to act on behalf of. The second notion – that some practices of torture are merely enhanced forms of coercive interrogation – first gained traction in 2005. Under pressure from domestic quarters and the international community, the US Bush administration, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, reaffirmed their commitment to both domestic and international laws related to torture, but highlighted the ‘fact’ that some of the methods used did not constitute torture, but were, in actuality, enhanced interrogation. Although the semantic divide between torture and enhanced interrogation was later repealed in a series of Presidential directives by

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the successor to the Bush administration, it encouraged an ongoing debate over what is and is not torture and when, if at all, it is permissible. The systematic use of torture, it should be reaffirmed, is illegal. Ratner and Ray (2004, p 35) indicate that ‘[t]he claim that torture should somehow be justified is really an attack on the very dignity of humanity’. Regardless of the intentions and motivations, therefore, torture is the illegal use of mental and physical abuse to illicit information from an individual in custody or to trigger a reaction from elsewhere. EDGAR B. TEMBO See also: Civil Liberties; Human Rights; War Crimes Readings Aradau, C. and Van Munster, R. (2009) ‘Exceptionalism and the “war on terror”’, British Journal of Criminal Justice, 49(5): 686–701. Martin, G. (2006) Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues. London: Sage. Ratner, M. and Ray, E. (2004) Guántanamo. Moreton-in-Marsh: Arris Publishing Limited. Tembo, E. (2014) US–UK counter-terrorism after 9/11: A qualitative approach. London: Routledge. United Nations (1984) ‘Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’. Available at: http://www.unhcr. org/49e479d10.html

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The field of transitional justice (TJ) emerged in connection with the waves of democratic transitions that swept Latin America and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. How to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses left by a repressive regime in order to mark a clean break with the past and prevent the recurrence of violations, while not threatening the stability of the new order, was the central dilemma facing these fledgling democracies. As policymakers, scholars and human rights advocates met to reflect on the complex legal, political and ethical issues associated with these transitions, they drew guidance from similar past and contemporaneous experiences. Consensus was soon reached on the necessity for successor states to address the massive abuses of the previous regime in order to (re)assert democratic values, the rule of law and respect for 279

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human rights (Kritz, (1995). Human rights advocates stressed that international law imposes on transitioning states an obligation to prosecute and punish the most responsible perpetrators of past atrocities. It was also affirmed that emerging democracies owe both the victims of the previous regime and society as a whole a duty to disclose the truth about past violations, compensate the victims and reform corrupt state institutions. Amnesties were generally regarded as incompatible with these transitional duties because they grant impunity to human rights violators. By the mid-1990s, two sets of events influenced the development of TJ. On the one hand, the South African transitional experience, which entailed the granting of amnesties by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in order to induce human rights violators to disclose the truth about their crimes, was hailed as a success and contributed to the multiplication of truth commissions worldwide. On the other hand, the involvement of the international community in post-conflict efforts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, through the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, led to a broadening of the field of application of TJ as encompassing not only transitions from dictatorship to democracy, but also from war to peace. In addition, the accomplishments of these international tribunals reinforced the view of criminal justice as the most appropriate response to situations of mass violence. Since the turn of the 21st century, however, the TJ discourse has undergone further changes. First, there is a growing consensus that TJ responses to conflict or authoritarian situations should include multiple and complementary mechanisms (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena, 2006). Indeed, empirical studies have revealed that no TJ mechanism on its own brings about significant improvements in terms of democracy, adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights (Olsen et al, 2010). This emphasis on the need to adopt holistic transitional approaches, including elements of truth, justice, reconciliation, reparation and lustration, has permitted the TJ discourse to move past the peace versus justice and truth versus justice debates that divided researchers in the 1990s. Second, a recent trend in the literature considers that TJ should pay more attention to local needs and priorities (Shaw et al, 2010). In practice, this has entailed the increasing involvement of the affected communities in the design of TJ strategies, the inclusion of grassroots justice and reconciliation mechanisms into such strategies, and the creation of criminal tribunals comprising both international and domestic components. The TJ approaches that have been applied in Uganda, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia present good examples of these new trends as they involved a combination of different mechanisms and a mixture of international, national and local elements. Both of the policy developments identified have been promoted by the United Nations Secretary-General in his 2004 and 2011 reports on ‘The

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rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ (United Nations Security Council, 2004, 2011). JOSEPHA CLOSE See also: Human Rights; International Human Rights; Post-conflict Resolution Readings Kritz, N. (ed) (1995) Transitional justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Olsen, T.D., Payne, L.A. and Reiter, A.G. (2010) Transitional justice in balance: Comparing processes, weighing efficacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Roht-Arriaza, N. and Mariezcurrena, J. (2006) Transitional justice in the twentyfirst century: Beyond truth versus justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shaw, R., Waldorf, L. and Hazan, P. (eds) (2010) Localizing transitional justice: Interventions and priorities after mass violence. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. United Nations Security Council (2004) ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General’, United Nations Document S/2004/616. United Nations Security Council (2011) ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General’, United Nations Document S/2011/634.

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U UNITED NATIONS, THE The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, replacing the ill-fated League of Nations, with the intention and increased determination of global powers to maintain international peace after the Second World War. As a membership organisation, it developed bureaucratic practices and procedures that embedded the influence of post-war powerful nations, but whose role, after 70 years, is increasingly questioned as global power structures have evolved. The UN has now expanded to 193 nations and while it has a notable, but often criticised, political role, its other activities as the premier global humanitarian organisation are more widely acknowledged (Langmore, 2015). The UN ‘system’ is organised around six Principal Organs: General Assembly, Security Council (SC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Secretariat, International Court of Justice and Trusteeship Council. The decision-making bodies of the General Assembly, SC and ECOSOC focus on global peace, security and economic and social policy, while the Secretariat and specialist agencies support administration and development functions. The Trusteeship Council supported small states before their independence and now has only an ad hoc role. The General Assembly provides the only forum whereby the 193 nations can meet and discuss global concerns; it has no power to enforce specific actions. It has been accused of being merely a ‘talking shop’ because every state wants to contribute to policy decisions, and consequently few really significant issues are resolved (Emerij, 2007). It has been relatively easy to reach a consensus

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on economic, social and humanitarian issues, but much harder to resolve global political problems. The Security Council exemplifies the paralysis of much of the political activity of the UN. Its five permanent members (P5), appointed in their role as great powers after the Second World War, are supplemented by 10 non-permanent members with a two-year term. The P5 resist attempts to reform the SC to make it more representative of its global constituency, fearing the loss of influence and protecting their national self-interests (Weiss, 2009). Although various models have been mooted to increase the size of the SC, reform remains unlikely because the proposals lack the potential to solve the problems of decision-making and securing agreement on the most significant of the world’s global political problems. The central functions of the UN system are funded by member states, based on their capacity to pay, as measured principally by national income. An ongoing concern within the UN is the partial payment of financial commitments by wealthy nations. The UN specialist agencies have various levels of funding support from the central administration, but most rely heavily on additional funding from countries who commit to join a particular agency. It is at the ‘grass roots’ of humanitarian action where the UN has had a real impact. Collaboration with international non-government organisations and local partners has produced positive results in saving lives, protecting families and nurturing welfare systems, as well as capacity-building in developing countries. A major achievement was unified support in the General Assembly between member states and UN agencies for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These MDGs coordinated development progress between 2000 and 2015, and their achievements have led to their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals (Malloch-Brown, 2015). While such goals are not binding, they provide an agreed agenda for continued action to reduce poverty and inequality worldwide. The UN is a development organisation under pressure. The humanitarian ‘landscape’ has become very crowded: there are now many other players delivering development, including governments and the private sector (Weinlich, 2011). Donors, including nations, prefer to fund specific activities in particular locations, which reflect their national priorities, so that their development assistance funding is earmarked for specific purposes (so-called multi-bi aid). Such funding deprives many UN specialist agencies of the flexibility to address human crises and development needs as they occur. Despite global recognition as the world’s major provider of aid, the complex relationship between agencies and activities in the UN has led to criticism of its effectiveness concerning high levels of bureaucracy, a lack of innovation, the insufficiency of response and, most of all, a lack of capacity to deal with global crises.

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The UN is acutely aware of its need to reform to keep the institution fit for purpose for the 21st century (Hendra, 2014). Its success and, some would argue, failure lies in its neutral forum, which sets out a broad mandate for development progress. Developing countries value the UN as a global organisation in which their voices are heard. However, developed countries have tended to resist the powerful coordinating role of the UN, which seems set against vested interests in the global North. The future of the UN will be decided by its membership, but political inertia and the lack of a blueprint for change suggest that minor adjustments are more likely than radical overhaul of this complex, diverse and unique organisation. GILL MILLER See also: Foreign Policy; Humanitarian Intervention; United Nations Security Council Readings Emerij, L. (2007) ‘Creativity in the United Nations: a history of ideas’, Development, 50(S1): 39–46. Hendra, J. (2014) Making the UN ‘fit for purpose’: Lessons learned from the ‘Delivering as One’ experience (Development Dialogue paper no.11. September 2014). Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. and Weiss, T.G. (2009) The UN: The challenges ahead (UN Intellectual History Project, briefing paper 5). Geneva: The United Nations. Langmore, J. (2015) ‘The attraction of the United Nations’, Social Alternatives, 34(1): 45–50. Malloch-Brown, M. (2015) ‘The UN is an under-funded, bureaucratic labyrinth – and a force for good in the world’, The Telegraph, 26 June. Available at: http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11699243/The-UN-is-an-underfunded-bureaucratic-labyrinth-and-a-force-for-good-in-the-world.html Weinlich, S. (2011) Reform of the UN development system: New multilateralist reform coalition needed (briefing paper 1). Bonn: German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Weiss, T.G. (2009) What’s wrong with the United Nations and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in November 1989 285

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and entered into force in September 1990. Its adoption followed several decades during which the movement to protect children from abuse, exploitation and insecurity gained traction, including through the adoption of the ‘Declaration of Geneva’ (also known as the ‘Declaration on the Rights of the Child’) by the League of Nations in 1924, the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Rights of the Child’ by the UN in 1959 and the incorporation of provisions regarding children in several UN human rights and humanitarian law treaties. During the 1979 ‘International Year of the Child’, a draft Convention was prepared, leading to the final adoption of the UNCRC two decades later. It was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by all states with unprecedented speed, with the exception of the US, which signed the treaty in 1995 (thereby indicating its intention to ratify). While the principles outlined in the international human rights framework apply to adults and to children, and children are explicitly mentioned in many instruments, the UNCRC consolidates and articulates children’s rights and provides guiding principles that shape the way in which children are viewed, thereby establishing ‘the necessary environment and means to enable every human being to develop to their full potential’ (UNICEF, 2014). The UNCRC defines a child as a person under 18 years of age. It highlights the primary role of parents and the family to care for and protect their children, as well as the obligations of the state to support them to carry out their duties and to protect parentless children. While laying down common standards for all children, it takes account of the different cultural, social, economic and political realities of individual states, allowing states flexibility to utilise appropriate means to implement the common rights for all children. Despite controversies at the drafting stage (including regarding freedom of religion and belief, the age of majority, and the prohibition of children from armed conflict), the UNCRC comprehensively underscores the indivisibility of rights and avoids the often unhelpful categorisation of rights by enshrining four ‘general principles’ intended to guide interpretation and national implementation of the UNCRC. These are: non-discrimination, ‘irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’; the primacy of the best interest of the child in all considerations and decision-making concerning them, including in judicial, administrative, legislative or social-welfare decision-making; the right to life, survival and development to be ensured to the maximum extent possible; and that the consideration of the child’s view in all matters affecting him or her be given due weight in accordance with age and maturity (OHCHR, 1997, p 2). The UNCRC calls for the provision of specific resources, skills and contributions necessary to ensure the survival and development of children to their maximum capability and the creation of means to protect children from neglect, exploitation 286

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and abuse. It requires states to: review legislation and ensure consistency with the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); establish mechanisms to monitor treaty implementation, such as an Ombudsman for Children; and ensure information collection processes are in place. Compliance with the UNCRC is monitored by the CRC, which meets three times per year and considers reports submitted by state parties. The CRC engages in constructive dialogue with state parties and cooperates closely with relevant UN bodies and specialised agencies. It undertakes discussion and study of thematic issues that can support the interpretation of the UNCRC (OHCHR, 1997; UNICEF, 2014). The UNCRC is supplemented by three additional Optional Protocols to increase the protection of children from involvement in armed conflicts and from sexual exploitation (both adopted in 2000). The year 2014 saw the adoption of the Protocol that allowed children to bring complaints directly to the CRC. While ratification has been viewed as a major success in that numerous nations have become signatories, the extent to which policy and practice is shaped by these changes continues to be a pressing area of current and future enquiry. KAREN MURPHY See also: Child Soldiers; International Human Rights; State, The; United Nations, The Readings OHCHR (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) (1997) ‘Fact sheet no. 10 (rev.1), the rights of the child’. Available at: http://www. refworld.org/docid/479477390.html Rehman, J. (2003) International human rights law: A practical approach. Harlow: Longman. UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund) (2014) ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_understanding.html United Nations General Assembly (1989) ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1577. Available at: http://www. un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has primary responsibility for the mandate of the United Nations (UN) to maintain international peace and security.The UNSC is the only body with the legal right to authorise intervention 287

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into a sovereign state. Chapter VI of the UN Charter authorises the UNSC to call for settlement of international disputes, and empowers it to investigate, assess and make recommendations in such disputes. Chapter VII gives the UNSC ‘teeth’, providing for economic sanctions, the disruption of communications and the severing of diplomatic relations under Article 41, and for ‘action by air, sea, or land forces’ under Article 42. The responsibility to provide ‘armed forces, assistance and facilities’ is shared – in principle – by all UN member states. UNSCmandated operations are conducted with the support of member states’ assessed contributions, and by the contribution of troops. In the first part of 2015, the top five contributors of troops were Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Rwanda, who together contributed over 35,000 of the 91,000 total. The UNSC has five permanent members, representing the victors of the Second World War. These permanent seats are held by the US, the Russian Federation (previously the USSR), China, the UK and France. Each of the permanent members (the P5) has a veto on substantive resolutions, except where they are party to the dispute. The UNSC also has 10 non-permanent members, elected to two-year, non-consecutive terms by the UN General Assembly. Election to the UNSC also takes into account ‘equitable geographical distribution’, with seats allocated to five regional groups. The UNSC meets regularly, and all members must have a representative available at all times. The presidency rotates on a monthly basis. The UNSC engages in a range of tasks, the biggest of which is peacekeeping. The deployment of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is generally authorised with reference to Chapter VII. In principle, mandated PKOs are consensual and impartial, with force only authorised in self-defence. However, the UNSC has often, in recent years, mandated peace-building operations, where the military requirements are more ambiguous and complex. The UNSC has approved 71 peacekeeping operations since 1946. Thirteen were mandated prior to the thawing of the Cold War in the late 1980s, with the remaining 58 mandated after 1988. There are 16 current operations, nine of which are in Africa. The proliferation of peacekeeping reflects both a surge in intra-state conflict in Africa, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s and beyond, and a limited break in the Cold War deadlock during which vetoes were often used. Between 1946 and 1988, the US used its veto on 51 occasions, with the USSR exercising its veto 90 times. Between 1988 and 2015, the US used its veto 27 times, with the Russian total standing at 13. It is of interest that China’s recourse to the veto has increased. China used its veto only once prior to 1997, and has vetoed eight resolutions (four of which pertained to the conflict in Syria) since then. This arguably reflects the state’s increasing power in the international system. Russia and China’s hold-out against resolutions on Syria reflect both a 288

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general anti-interventionist stance and particular relationships with the Syrian regime (Von Einsiedel et al, 2015). Since 2000, the US has consistently vetoed resolutions on its diplomatic ally Israel. The challenges of maintaining international peace and security relate, in large part, to the linked doctrines of sovereignty and non-intervention, which form the bedrock of international relations, and are upheld in Article 2 of the UN Charter. State self-interest in using the veto, the need for consent in peacekeeping and the enormous difficulties of authorising intervention in the absence of consent – as witnessed by the lack of consensus on Syria – all reflect the tension between sovereign state power and the idea of an effective international community. This also means that UN member states often lag behind in payment of the assessed contributions on which the UN depends. Frustratingly, it also limits the prospects for UNSC reform, which are limited due to the unwillingness of the P5 to give up their privileged positions. Furthermore, the UNSC’s heavy reliance on informal consultations of which there is no public record means that its agenda lacks transparency. The lack of any review mechanism also creates an accountability deficit, exacerbated by its unequal and unrepresentative membership. KELLY STAPLES See also: Peacekeeping and Capacity-Building; State Power; United Nations, The Readings UN (United Nations) (2015) ‘Security Council’. Available at: http://www. un.org/en/sc/ Von Einsiedel, S., Malone, D.M. and Ugarte, B.S. (2015) ‘The UN Security Council in an age of great power rivalry’, United Nations University Working Paper Series, Number 4, February. Available at: http://i.unu.edu/media/cpr. unu.edu/attachment/1569/WP04_UNSCAgeofPowerRivalry.pdf

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations (UN) on 10 December 1948, now Human Rights Day. It gives content to the Preamble of the UN Charter, which affirms the faith of UN member states in ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘the dignity and worth of the human person’.The UDHR is primarily concerned with civil and political rights, such as freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, rights to privacy and freedom 289

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of movement, freedom of religion and freedom of expression, and the right to take part in government.Articles 22–27 affirm a commitment to economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to paid work, reasonable working hours, an adequate standard of living and education. Although the UDHR is not legally binding, it forms part of customary international law. The rights affirmed in the UDHR were also later incorporated into the two legally binding instruments of the International Bill of Rights. The UDHR has had a substantial influence on domestic constitutions, and is vital to understanding the political and legal dimensions of the relationship between individuals and the state today. The UDHR reflects the desire, in the wake of the Second World War, to create the conditions for more peaceful international relations and to specify the legitimate limits to state power. Drafting of the UDHR was influenced by the developing notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the wake of the Nuremberg Trials, and by the 1776 Declaration of Independence of the United States, as well as to the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The UDHR presumes and asserts the inherent dignity and equality of all human beings. By asserting that human beings are ‘born free and equal’, the UDHR affirms the moral status of people by virtue of their humanity. This entails that rights are inalienable – they cannot be given or taken away. This draws on the Enlightenment claim that people are ‘ends’ in themselves and cannot be used as means to some other social good. It was also a response to the Holocaust, in which Jews and other minority groups were first stripped of their citizenship rights, leaving them vulnerable to exile, detention, torture and extrajudicial killing. The UDHR also draws on the concept of equality. It contains a range of provisions for equality and non-discrimination intended to limit the power of the state in the treatment of minority groups and to secure a degree of social equality and gender equality. The rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR are held to be interdependent and indivisible. Individual human beings are assumed to be entitled to each of the rights set forth, although, in practice, the social and economic rights referred to remain very unequally distributed, both within countries and across the world. However, the fact that rights often go unprotected or unfulfilled in practice does not necessarily undermine their moral universality. Indeed, the moral universality of rights serves as a tool with which to challenge governments who fail to respect, protect or fulfil these rights. Nevertheless, the rights in the UDHR are international, rather than ‘cosmopolitan’, in scope insofar as their enforcement depends on states. Furthermore, controversy surrounding universality remains. Some of the civil and political rights in the UDHR, for example, freedom of religion, remain particularly controversial (Donnelly, 2007). Critics have also questioned the 290

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relationship between civil and political rights and security; limits to freedom of thought and freedom of expression are routinely prescribed in domestic law with the aim of maintaining order, and torture is sometimes justified as a necessary means to achieving security. For advocates of universal human rights, however, the fundamental rights to life, liberty and security of the person ‘trump’ all other considerations. The view that morality is relative to culture, rather than universal, has also led to criticisms of the UDHR. Some take the view that freedom of religion is incompatible with Sharia law, and an alternative document, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, was drafted in response to this tension. Other critics have charged the UDHR with human rights imperialism given the heavy influence on drafting of the US representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, and the basis of the UDHR in Western liberal philosophy. In the 21st century, however, there is relatively little substantive disagreement on the content of the UDHR rights, and many have pointed to the place of universal human dignity in other moral theories. KELLY STAPLES See also: Human Rights; State Power; United Nations, The Readings Donnelly, J. (2007) ‘The relative universality of human rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29(2): 281–306. Donnelly, J. (2013) Universal human rights in theory and practice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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V VIOLENCE Violence is an abiding feature of the human condition and there are no societies or time periods in which interpersonal aggression, physical threat, assault, homicide and armed conflict have been absent, although their extent and intensity have varied. There is, however, currently a debate about the alleged ‘decline of violence’ (Pinker, 2012). Pinker draws on Norbert Elias’s civilising process thesis, claiming that one consequence of the change in ‘habitus’ between medieval and modern Europe was civic pacification and a decline in violence. These claims are subject to extensive debate. Like many social science concepts, the definition of violence is marked by controversy. It is not ‘one thing’, but rather a complex set of behaviours on physical, psychological, symbolic, interpersonal and collective levels. The most sustained violence is perpetrated by organisations rather than individuals, being exercised by the powerful on the powerless. There is a narrow, ‘minimalist conception’ and a contrasting, broader, ‘comprehensive’ definition (Bufacchi, 2005). ‘Minimalists’ regard violence narrowly in terms of physical force and ‘bodily harm’, which, for Collins (2008), is essential in order to understand how only some aggressive confrontations actually become violent. However, narrow definitions are criticised for ignoring the wider contexts of social relationships in which violence occurs, along with non-physical (especially psychological) harms. Proponents of the ‘comprehensive conception’, then, broaden the definition to include anything that impedes human realisation and violates the rights or integrity of the person, which is often judged in terms of outcomes rather than 293

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intentions, as with Galtung’s concept of ‘structural violence’. Thus, whenever people are denied access to resources, physical and psychological violence exists. A further distinction is often made between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ violence. ‘Instrumental violence’ is oriented to a specific goal, such as obtaining money by threats or keeping competitors off one’s territory, and will be used up to the point where the goal has been attained. ‘Expressive violence’, by contrast, is performed for intrinsic gratification and might express an underlying emotion such as hate or deriving a ‘high’ from violence. While Collins (2008) regards violence as difficult, requiring the overcoming of deep inhibitions, there may be a sensual gratification from violence during ‘moral holidays’, for example, when conventional constraints are removed. Expressive violence is relevant to the analysis of hate crime, which might have the instrumental purpose of intimidating victim groups, but can also be performed for the enjoyment of domination and cruelty in itself, leading to unbounded terror and sadism. An extreme example of this is genocide, but it is also manifest in instances of more ‘everyday violence’, including domestic violence. Indeed, while violence in intimate relations is often seen as a greater breach of social norms than impersonal violence, violence always involves violating boundaries of the self and could therefore be described as a kind of ‘grotesque intimacy’. The instrumental/expressive distinction has been widely criticised since, in practice, the two are often combined, but, even so, there might be an important analytical distinction to be made here. Violent actions do not occur independently of social divisions, boundaries, lines of power and state forms. The risk of victimisation from both interpersonal and collective violence is greater with deprivation, inequality, vulnerability and marginalisation (Ray, 2011, pp 63–82). More egalitarian societies generally have lower rates of violence, while the most unequal or those in acute social crisis have the highest rates. Further, violence is always gendered and men commit most acts of physical violence (see, eg, Wykes and Welsh, 2009). Globally, rape, forced marriage, domestic violence, ‘honour crimes’, trafficking, sexual assault and abuse are predominantly perpetrated by men against women. Many explanations refer to structural, cultural and economic gender inequalities, as well as cultural concepts of masculinity linked to dominance, honour and aggression, as causes of violence. In war and other armed conflicts, violence against women is common and rape is one of the most extreme expressions of the patriarchal drive towards masculine domination. Organised warfare is recent in human history and appears to have arisen with the expansion of state power and gender stratification (Malešević, 2010, p 295). Despite the widespread sentiment that violence is ‘senseless’, it always has ‘sense’ (meaning) within distorted conditions of power and domination. LARRY RAY

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See also: Collective Violence; Genocide; Rape as a Weapon of War Readings Bufacchi, V. (2005) ‘Two concepts of violence’, Political Studies Association, 3: 193–204. Collins, R. (2008) Violence: A micro-sociological theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Malešević, S. (2010) The sociology of war and violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pinker, S. (2012) The better angels of our nature: A history of violence and humanity. London: Penguin. Ray, L.J. (2011) Violence & society. London: Sage. Wykes, M. and Welsh, K. (eds) (2009) Violence, gender and justice. London: Sage.

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W WAR See: Conflict Resolution; Militarism; Military Conflict; Political Crime; State Violence

WAR CRIMES

As established by international law, war crimes are ‘serious violations of humanitarian law, the branch of international law dealing with the conduct of an armed conflict whether international or non-international (such as civil wars or large-scale and protected armed clashes within a State)’ (Cassese et al, 2011, p 117). However, to be a war crime, crimes committed in a war should be considered ‘serious’, for example, beyond war’s rules of engagement and the movement of troops against non-military objectives in any form. War crimes are considered international crimes and have been described as a ‘most serious act of concern to the international community as a whole’ by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Roberts and Guelfs, 2000, p 673). Article 8 of the Statute includes as war crimes ‘[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’, ‘wilful killing’ and ‘torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments’ (Roberts and Guelfs, 2000, pp 675–80). Historically, the evolution of the concept of the state is related to 297

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war crimes. Until 1945, international law legitimated the engagement of states in wars if certain features were complied with, and ‘just’ war was declared by authorities (Lamb, 2013, p 104). After 1945, the state can declare war as an exception (United Nations, 1945, Art 2.4). Cassese et al (2011) establish the development of war crimes by depicting acts violating international customary law, treaties or conventional rules attaining international legal status of custom. The Statute distinguishes: crimes against an international treaty, crimes against customs of ‘international armed conflicts’, crimes against an international treaty in ‘armed conflicts of non-international character’ and crimes against law and customs of ‘non-international character’. The Statute uses ‘serious violations’ as a standard to define crime in the second and fourth cases, while the previous definition of this type of crime by international treaties is applicable to the first and third cases. The authority for declaring war has changed from emperors and kings to presidents, prime ministers and heads of state. However, it should be the highest authority, as explained by Raz (2002), of a country (Lamb, 2013). In this case, violations of the laws and customs of war provoke the international responsibility of the state (as an international subject) and individual criminal responsibility of the state’s agents for certain violations (United Nations, 2002, Art 8.1 ). Initiating a war outside the legal scope of self-defence might be an international crime but it is not a war crime as defined by the Statute. War crimes involve serious violations of conventional rules or international customary law and compromise the responsibility of the person who has infringed them. These crimes must be perpetrated in direct relationship to armed conflicts, whether international or not. Article 1 of the Statute, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, establishes an obligation of respect for their standards in all circumstances. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia specifies ‘armed conflict’ as a resort to armed force between states, protracted armed violence between governmental authorities vis-à-vis organised armed groups or within these groups: International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. (ICTY, 1995, para 70)

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The concept of war crimes has a multiple views but only one interpretation. Criminal law and international law for international crimes focus on these types of crimes but only the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be applicable as a methodology of interpretation of these international legal rules. Certainly, as Cassese et al (2011) pointed out, nobody can be prosecuted and condemned without a determined description of the crime committed (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege) and nobody is allowed to be condemned twice for the same crime (non bis inidem), and a clear respect for immunities is also necessary. However, these principles should complement the kind of rules to be interpreted and the rules of interpretation by international judges (Pena-Neira and Quiroga, forthcoming). On the other hand, with certain cynicism, war has evolved into a ‘legal institution’ (Kennedy, 2012, p 162) bringing legitimate power and justifiable death, creating a problem for international law. SERGIO PEÑA-NEIRA and TAMARA QUIROGA See also: International Criminal Courts; International Humanitarian Law; International Tribunals Readings Cassese, A., Acquaviva, G., Fan, M. and Whithing, A. (2011) International criminal law, cases and commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) (1995) The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2-X-1995. Kennedy, D. (2012) ‘Lawfare and warfare’, in J. Crawford, M. Koskenniemi and S. Ranganathan (eds) Cambridge companion to international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 158–83. Lamb, A. (2013) Ethics and the laws of war, the moral justification of legal norms. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis. Peña-Neira, S. and Quiroga, T (forthcoming) ‘Definición metodológica penal internacional versus internacional penal: el caso Lubanga’. Raz, J. (2002) ‘Introduction’, in J. Raz (ed) Authority. New York, NY: New York University Press. Roberts, A. and Guelf, R. (2000) Documents on the laws of war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations. New York, NY: United Nations. United Nations (2002) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. UN. Doc.A/Conf/.183/9. Rome: United Nations.

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WORLD BANK The World Bank (in full, the World Bank Group) is an international organisation affiliated with the United Nations (UN) and designed to finance projects that enhance the economic development of member states. The Bank is the largest source of financial assistance to developing countries (Hall and Midgley, 2004). It also supervises on behalf of international creditors and regarding the implementation of free-market reforms. Together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization, it plays a central role in overseeing economic policy and reforming public institutions in developing countries and defining the global macroeconomic agenda (Wade, 2002). The World Bank was founded in 1944 at the UN Monetary and Financial Conference (commonly known as the Bretton Woods Conference), which was convened to establish a new post-Second World War international economic system. The World Bank officially began operations in June 1946. Its first loans were geared towards the post-Second World War reconstruction of Western Europe, playing a major role in financing investments in infrastructural projects (Yeates, 2001). According to Wade (2002), voting power at the World Bank is based on a country’s capital subscription, which is based, in turn, on its economic resources. The wealthier and more developed countries constitute the Bank’s major shareholders and thus exercise greater power and influence. For example, at the beginning of the 21st century, the US exercised more than one-sixth of the votes, more than double that of Japan, the second-largest contributor (Wade, 2002). As developing countries hold only a small number of votes, for example, in the late 1990s, approximately 2% of votes were held by 25 African countries combined, the system does not provide a significant voice for these countries, which are the primary recipients of World Bank loans (Yeates, 2001). Coupled with this, there are a number of critical issues about its practices. For example, the World Bank pushed structural adjustment welfare programmes onto developing countries in the 1980s. Developing countries were coerced into budget cuts and austerity, retrenchments of social programmes, and strict monetary policies. This policy experiment occurred because of the leverage that these organisations had over developing countries, which were faced with balance of payments crises, massive debt and stagnant economies (Pritchett, 2005). The major reason that this unfolded is related to the debt crisis of the early 1980s, during which many developing countries were unable to service their external debt because of a slowdown in the world economy, high interest rates, a decline in commodity prices and wide fluctuations in oil prices, among other factors, 300

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which played a crucial role in the evolution of World Bank operations (Wade, 2002). The Bank had become increasingly involved in shaping economic and social policies in indebted developing countries. As a condition of receiving loans, borrowing countries were required to implement stringent ‘structural adjustment programmes’, which typically included severe cuts in spending for health and education, the elimination of price controls, the liberalisation of trade, the deregulation of the financial sector, and the privatisation of state-run enterprises (Pritchett, 2005). Although intended to restore economic stability, these programmes, which were applied in a large number of countries throughout the developing world, frequently resulted in increased levels of poverty, mounting unemployment and a spiralling external debt. In the wake of the debt crisis, the World Bank focused its efforts on providing financial assistance in the form of balance-of-payments support and loans for infrastructural projects such as roads, port facilities, schools and hospitals (Kapur et al, 1997). The World Bank also played a central role in overseeing free-market reforms in Eastern and Central Europe after the fall of communism there in the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms, which included the creation of bankruptcy and privatisation, were controversial because they frequently led to the closure of state-run industrial enterprises (Pritchett, 2005). ‘Exit mechanisms’ to allow for the liquidation of so-called ‘problem enterprises’ were put into place, and labour laws were modified to enable enterprises to lay off unneeded workers (Hall and Midgley, 2004). The larger state enterprises were often sold to foreign investors or divided into smaller, privately owned companies (Yeates, 2001). In Hungary, for example, some 17,000 businesses were liquidated and 5,000 reorganised in 1992/93, leading to a substantial increase in unemployment. The World Bank also provided reconstruction loans to countries that suffered internal conflicts or other crises, for example, the successor republics of the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. This financial assistance did not succeed in rehabilitating productive infrastructure, however. In several countries, the macroeconomic reforms resulted in increased inflation and an actual marked decline in the standard of living (Yeates, 2001). In summation, the World Bank is the world’s largest multilateral creditor institution, and, as such, many of the world’s poorest countries are reliant on it. Indeed, for many of the most heavily indebted poor countries, the largest part of their external debt, in some cases constituting more than 50%, is owed to the World Bank. According to Hall and Midgley (2004), the burden of these debts, which according to the World Bank’s statutes cannot be cancelled, has perpetuated economic decline throughout the developing world. JASON L. POWELL and PAUL TAYLOR See also: Globalisation; United Nations, The 301

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Readings Hall, A. and Midgley, J. (2004) Social policy for development. London: Sage. Kapur, D., Lewis, J. and Webb, R. (eds) (1997) The World Bank: Its first half century, 2 vols. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Pritchett, L. (2005) The political economy of targeted safety nets. Washington, DC: World Bank. Wade, R. (2002) ‘US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas’, Review of International Political Economy, 9(2): 215–43. Yeates, N. (2001) Globalization and social policy. London: Sage.

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X XENOPHOBIA See: Hate Crime; Immigration; Multiculturalism

303

Z ZEMIOLOGY See: Critical Criminology and State Power; Social Harm

305

Appendix: International campaign groups and sources of interest Alliance of NGOs on Crime and Criminal Justice: http://cpcjalliance.org/ American Society of Criminology (ASC): http://www.asc41.com/ American Society of Victimology: http://www.american-society-victimology.us/ Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en Anti-Slavery: http://www.antislavery.org/ Article 19 – Defending Freedom of Expression and Information: https:// www.article19.org/ Asian Criminological Society: http://acs001.com/ Asociación Latinoamericana de Derecho Penal y Criminología (ALPEC): https://www.facebook.com/Asociación-Latinoamericana-de-Derecho-Penaly-Criminología-ALPEC-219432988085013/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE Australasian Society of Victimology: http://www.victim.org.au/ Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology (ANZSOC): http://www. anzsoc.org/ Australian Institute of Criminology: http://www.aic.gov.au/ Australian Women Against Violence Alliance: http://awava.org.au/ British Institute of Human Rights: https://www.bihr.org.uk/ British Society of Criminology: http://www.britsoccrim.org/ Campaign Against Prison Slavery: http://www.againstprisonslavery.org/ Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies: http://www.caefs.ca/ Canadian Centre for the Victims of Torture: http://www.ccvt.org/ Canadian Criminal Justice Association: http://www.ccja-acjp.ca/ Centre for Crime and Justice Studies: http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/ Children of Prisoners Europe: http://childrenofprisoners.eu/ Chinese Society of Criminology: http://www.ccunix.ccu.edu.tw/~clubcrime/ Climate Change Database Clearinghouse: http://ccrm.vims.edu/climate_change/ index.html Council of Europe: http://www.coe.int/ Criminal Justice Alliance: http://www.criminaljusticealliance.org/ 307

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Criminological and Victimological Society of Southern Africa (CRIMSA): http://www.crimsa.ac.za/ Criminology Association of Ireland: http://criminologyireland.webs.com Crisis (UK): http://www.crisis.org.uk/ Critical Criminology: http://critcrim.org/ Critical Resistance: http://criticalresistance.org/ Croatian Victimology Society: http://inavukic.com/tag/croatian-victimologysociety/ Czech Society of Criminology (CKS): http://www.ok.cz/iksp/cks_o.html Dutch Society of Criminology: http://www.criminologie.nl Embrace – Child Victims of Crime (UK): http://www.embracecvoc.org.uk/ End Violence Against Women: http://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/ Equality and Human Rights Commission (UK): http://www.equalityhumanrights. com/ European Court of Human Rights: http://www.echr.coe.int/ European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control: http://www. europeangroup.org/ European Society of Criminology (ESC): http://www.esc-eurocrim.org European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA): http://fra.europa.eu/ Fair Trials: https://www.fairtrials.org/ Freedom from Torture: http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/ General Assembly of the United Nations (Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power): http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/40/a40r034.htm German Society for Interdisciplinary Scientific Criminology: http://www.giwk. de/ German, Austrian and Swiss Society of Criminology: http://www.krimg.de Green Criminology: http://greencriminology.org/ Hong Kong Society of Criminology: http://www.crime.hku.hk/HKUcrime%204/ HKUcrime/index.html Howard League for Penal Reform: https://howardleague.org/ Human Rights and Justice Group: http://www.justicegroup.us/ Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/ Humane Society of the United States: http://www.humanesociety.org/ Hungarian Society of Criminology: http://www.kriminologia.hu Indian Society of Victimology: http://www.oocities.org/ibcisv2004/ISV.htm Interdisciplinary Centre for Research on Victimology and Security: http:// www.cirvis.eu/ International Association of French Speaking Criminologists (Association internationale des criminologues de langue française [AICLF]): https://wp.unil. ch/aiclf/ International Bureau for Children’s Rights: http://www.ibcr.org/ International Committee of the Red Cross: https://www.icrc.org/ International Prison Watch Network: http://www.prisonwatchnetwork.org/ 308

Appendix: International campaign groups and sources of interest

International Society for Criminology (ISC): http://www.isc-sic.org/web/ International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies: http://www.istss.org/ Interpol Environmental Crime: http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/ Environmental-crime/Environmental-crime Italian Society of Criminology (Società Italiana di Criminologia): http://www. criminologiaitaliana.it Justice: http://justice.org.uk/ Liberty: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/ MADRE: http://www.madre.org/ Make Justice Work: http://www.makejusticework.org.uk/ Mexican Society of Criminology of the State of Nuevo Leon (Sociedad Mexicana de Criminología Capítulo Nuevo León): http://www.somecrimnl.es.tl NACRO (Crime Reduction Charity): https://www.nacro.org.uk/ National Immigration Forum (USA): http://immigrationforum.org/ Pakistan Society of Criminology: http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/ Penal Reform International: http://www.penalreform.org/ Policy Exchange (UK): http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/ Portuguese Society of Criminology (Sociedade Portuguesa de Criminologia): http://granosalis.blogspot.com/2008/05/infromao-da-sociedade-portuguesade.html Prison Reform Trust: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/ Prison Watch UK: http://prisonwatchuk.com/ Quebec’s Society of Criminology: http://www.societecrimino.qc.ca/ Redress: http://www.redress.org/ Reprieve: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/ Romanian Society of Criminology (SRCC): http://criminologie.org.ro/ South Asian Society of Criminology and Victimology (SASCV): http://www. sascv.org/ Spanish Society of Criminological Research (Sociedad Española de Investigación Criminológica [SEIC]): http://www.criminologia.net/ Statewatch: http://www.statewatch.org/ Stonewall: http://www.stonewall.org.uk Stop Violence Against Women (The Advocates for Human Rights): http://www. stopvaw.org/Stop_Violence_Against_Women Swiss Group of Criminology: http://www.kriminologie.ch/siteWeb/anglais/ anglais.htm The John Howard Society of Canada: http://www.johnhoward.ca Tokiwa International Victimology Institute (TIVI): http://www.tokiwa. ac.jp/~tivi/english/about/index.html UK Network of Sex Work Projects: http://www.uknswp.org/ Unicef: http://www.unicef.org.uk/ United (European Network Against Nationalism, Racism, Facisim and in Support of Migrants and Refugees): http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/

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United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: http:// www.unocha.org/ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: https://www.unodc.org/ United Nations Wildlife Enforcement Monitoring System Initiative: http:// wems-initiative.org/ United States Global Change Research Program: http://www.globalchange.gov/ Victim Justice Network (Canada): http://www.victimjusticenetwork.ca/ Victim Support (UK): https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/ Victimology Society of Serbia: http://www.vds.org.rs/indexEng.html Victims’ Rights Alliance: http://victimsrightsalliance.com/ Violence and Exploitation Research Program at the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC): http://www.aic.gov.au/ Vital Voices: http://www.vitalvoices.org/ Walk Free (Modern Slavery): http://www.walkfree.org/ Water Aid: http://www.wateraid.org/ War Child: https://www.warchild.org.uk/ World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/ World Society of Victimology: http://www.worldsocietyofvictimology.org/

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Convention, legislation, statute and treaty index American Convention on Human Rights 118 Anti-Bribery Convention 20, 44 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 90 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 118 Arab Charter on Human Rights 118 Arms Trade Treaty 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 82, 273 Chemical Weapons Convention 162 Convention Against Corruption 20 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 277–8 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 192 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field 153 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 119–21 Convention on the Law of the Sea 157 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 80, 103, 105 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 153 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 153 Convention on the Rights of the Child 130, 285–7

Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence 130 Crime and Courts Act 2013 90 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1984 269 Data Protection Act 1998 55–6 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 273 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 130 Environmental Modification Convention 162 Espionage Act 1917 (US) 91 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 32, 58, 78, 82–5, 118, 209–10, 215 Extradition Act 2003 90 Freedom of Information Act 2000 56 General Assembly’s Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) 26–7 Geneva Conventions (1949) 26, 132, 153, 161, 162, 277, 297, 298 Human Rights Act 1998 32–3, 56, 130, 209, 210 Identity Cards Act 2006 140 Identity Documents Act 2010 140 Immigration Act 1971 142 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 21, 73, 154, 215 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 73, 154 Mental Health Act 1983 57 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 68–9 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 202, 269 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 62 Prevention of Terrorism Act 1994 269 311

A companion to state power, liberties and rights Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 39 Prison Act 1952 210 Public Order Act 1986 234 Refugee Convention (1951) 11, 225–7 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 211–12 Riot Act 1714 234 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 26, 151–3, 297 Terrorism Act 2000 269–70 Treaty of Lisbon 273

Treaty of Versailles 37, 167, 168, 207

Subject index Page numbers of main subject entries are in bold

A abolitionists (and punishment) 264–5 Abowitz, K.K. 230 Abrahamsen, R. 213 Afghanistan 115 Agamben, G. 85, 86 Agozino, B. 144 aid 284 Aldrich, R. 229 Allison, G. 100 Amnesty International 1–3, 11, 22 anarchist perspectives of the state 276–7 ANC (African National Congress) 5, 6, 7, 8 Anderson, B. 137 Andreas, P. 17 animal rights 3–5 anti-apartheid movement 5–8 apologies (reconciliation) 224 Arab Spring 217, 218 Aradau, C. 278 Arendt, H. 86 aretaic philosophies 264 Aristotle 275 armed conflict see military conflict armed force, use of   jus ad bellum 159–61   jus in bello 161–3 armed forces   child soldiers 9, 26–8, 107–9   corps 42–3   disarmament and demobilisation 63–5   girl soldiers 107–9   and jus in bello 161–2   see also military conflict arms trade 8–10, 64 Armstrong, K. 228, 229 Assange, Julian 91

asylum 10–12 authoritarian populism 13–15

B Balkans 104, 222 Barak, G. 51, 254 Barber, N.W. 38–9 Barta, T. 106 Barton, A. 239, 240 Bauer, Y. 128 Bauman, Z. 110, 128 Beccaria, C. 211 Beck, U. 237 Begg, Mozzam 2 Beirne, P. 203 Benenson, P. 1 Bentham, Jeremy 3, 111, 134, 264, 272 Biason, L. 222 Biggs, S. 112 Blackstone, William 117 Blin, A. 266 border control 17–18 Boumediene v Bush 116 Bowling, B. 270 Box, S. 40 Boyle, K. 24–5 Bradford, B. 63 Breivik, Anders 179 bribery 19–20, 44 Brown, P. 47 Burton, J.W. 36

C Cameron, A. 42 Camp X-Ray 115 Canada 142–3, 216

312

A companion to stateIndex power, liberties and rights capacity-building 200–1 capital punishment 21–3 Carpenter, C. 104 Carrabine, E. 113 Carrera, S. 55 Cassese, A. 105–6, 298, 299 censorship 23–6 Chafetz, J. 198 Chaliand, G. 266 Chesler, P. 130 child soldiers 9, 26–8, 107–9 children’s rights 285–7   child soldiers 9, 26–8, 107–9 China 288–9 Chu, S.K.H. 222 citizenship 28–9, 86, 142, 246 civil disorder and unrest 30–1, 33–5, 217–19, 234–5   and the police 62, 202 civil liberties 31–3, 38–9, 273–4 Code of Ethics (College of Policing) 78–9 Cohen, S. 242–3, 257–9 collective violence 30–1, 33–5, 217–19, 234–5 Collins, R. 293, 294 colonialism 40, 143–4, 170, 184 conflict see military conflict conflict resolution 35–7   international tribunals 156–8   peacekeeping and capacity-building 199–201   reconciliation 223–5   see also post conflict resolution consequentialist approaches to punishment 264 constitutionalism 38–9 Cooke, D. 246 Cooper, V. 240 corporate crime 40–1, 50–1, 75–7 corporations 40–2   bribery 19–20   corporate crime 40–1, 50–1, 75–7   corruption 44–6   crimes of the powerful 50–2   environmental protection 75–7   green criminology 112–14   transnational 110, 144 corps 42–3 corruption 40, 44–6, 254   bribery 19–20 counterterrorism 46–8   and constitutionalism 39   and drones 66–8   Guantánamo Bay 115–16   and habeas corpus 118   and human rights 32–3   and rendition 228–9   and stop and search 269–70   and surveillance of electronic communications 273, 274   and torture 278   see also terrorism coups 48–50

Crawford, J. 150, 251 crime   corporate crime 40–1, 50–1, 75–7, 113   green crimes 112–14   hate crime 122–4   organised crime 191–3   political crime 203–6   of the powerful 50–2   and social harm 243–5   state crime 253–5 crime control 173–5 crimes of the powerful 50–2   see also crime criminology   critical 52–4   green 112–14 critical criminology and state power 52–4 critical security studies 146 cultural diversity 178–81 cultural property 119–21, 162 cultural relativism 131, 135 Cutler, A.C. 214

D data, and intelligence 147–9 data protection 55–7, 273–4 Davis, David 32 De Brouwer, A. 222 De Waard, J. 213 Dean, H. 250–1 death penalty 21–3 deaths in psychiatric detention 57–9 Delsol, R. 270 demobilisation and disarmament 63–5 democracy 59–61   and protests 217–18 democratic policing 61–3, 78 denial 257–9 Digital Rights Ireland 273 disarmament and demobilisation 63–5 dispute settlement 156–8 Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO) 157 Dobra, A. 125 Donnelly, J. 155 Doogan, K. 188 Dover, R. 148 drones 66–8 drug control 68–70 drug trafficking 70–2 Duffy, H. 87–8 Dupont, B. 213 duty of care 72–4 Dyer, E. 131

E East India Company 40 Elbe, S. 221–2 Enloe, C. 175, 176 environmental protection 75–7, 112–14, 162 Environmental Protection Agency (US) 76 Equality and Human Rights Commission 58

313

A companion to state power, liberties and rights Estes, C. 112 ethical policing 77–9, 202 ethnic cleansing 79–81, 127–8 European Code of Police Ethics 78 European Court of Human Rights 33, 82, 83–5 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 273–4 European Union 85–7   border control 17   Court of Human Rights 33, 82, 83–5   data protection 55–6   ethical policing 78   European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 32, 58, 78, 82–5, 118, 209–10, 215   extradition 89   surveillance of electronic communications 273–4 exceptional state 87–9 executions 21–3 extradition 89–92

F feminism   and democracy 60   gendercide 103–4   and multiculturalism 260–1   and pornography 24–5   and security 93–5   see also women feminist security studies (FSS) 93–5 Ferrante, J. 242 Ferrell, B.R. 118 Fitzpatrick, J. 88–9 food security 95–7 forced migration 97–9 foreign policy 99–101 forgiveness 224 Foucault, M. 111, 236–7, 242, 271–2, 276 Frankfurt School 52 freedom of speech 23–6, 197, 198 Gallagher, A. 136 Garside, R. 247 Gberie, L. 107 gender   gendercide 103–5   and militarism 43, 93–5   and violence 294   see also feminism; women gendercide 103–5 genocide 105–8   and ethnic cleansing 80–1   and gendercide 103, 104   Holocaust 127–8   Rwanda 151, 208, 221–2, 222–3, 224 Gentry, C.E. 93–4 Gerstenfeld, P.B. 123 Gillan and Quinton v UK 32–3 girl soldiers 107–9 Giroux, H. 230 globalisation 109–10, 144, 170, 184 Goldblatt, D. 109–10

314

Goodman, M. 148 governmentality 111–12 Gramsci, A. 124–5 Grant, T. 150 green criminology 4, 75–6, 112–14 Grey, S. 228 Griffiths, J. 169 Grundy-Warr, C. 18 Guantánamo Bay 115–16, 118 Guelf, R. 297 Guild, E. 55 Gupta, A. 253 Gutman, R. 132–3

H habeas corpus 117–19 Hagan, J. 256 Hague convention 119–21, 162 Hague Law 162 Hall, A. 301 Hall, S. 14, 126 harm 243–5, 255–7 Harvey, D. 110, 144 Hasinoff, A. 25 hate crime 122–4, 294 Hayek, F.A. 188 hegemony 124–6 Held, D. 109–10 Higate, P. 42 Hilberg, R. 127 Hill, C. 99 Hillyard, P. 243–4 Hilpold, P. 168 HIV/AIDS 221–2 Hobbes, T. 134, 261–2, 275–6 Hobsbawn 188 Hoffman, B. 266 Holocaust 105, 106, 127–8 honour violence and killings 129–31 Howe, Z. 121 Hudson, B. 52 human rights 134–6   Amnesty International 1–3   children’s rights 285–7   civil liberties 31–3   duty of care 72–4   Equality and Human Rights Commission 58   European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 32, 58, 78, 82–5, 118, 209–10, 215   European Court of Human Rights 33, 82, 83–5   exceptional state 87–9   international human rights 154–6, 157–8, 285–7   prisoners’ rights 209–11   prisoners’ rights post-custody 211–13   proportionality 215–17   and social policy 249–51   and the state 252–3   transitional justice 279–81

A companion to stateIndex power, liberties and rights   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1, 24, 82, 135, 154–5, 277, 289–91 human trafficking 136–8 humanitarian intervention 132–3 Hunneyball, P.M. 197 Huntington, S. 49 Huysmans, J. 146

I identity cards 139–41 Ignatieff, M. 240, 250 immigration 141–3   border control 17–18 imperialism 142–5, 184 imprisonment see prisoners; prisons information   data protection 55–7   intelligence 147–9 INQUEST 57–8 insecurity 145–7   see also security intelligence 147–9 International Association of Police Chiefs 79 International Bill of Rights 154, 290 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 153–4 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 149–50, 157, 159 international criminal courts 26, 27, 151–2, 297 international criminal law 151–2, 157–8 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 79–80, 151, 298 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 151, 208, 222–3 international human rights 154–6, 157–8, 285–7 international humanitarian law 132–3, 152–4, 162, 222–3, 298–9 International Military Tribunals 151 International Relations (discipline of) 94, 145, 186 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 157 international tribunals 156–8 interrogation 115–16, 228, 278–9 Iraq 177–8, 256 Ireland, S. 246–7 Islamic State 67, 274

J Janis, I. 100 Jefferson, T. 202 Jenkings, N. 43 Jessop, B. 262 Johnston, H. 34–5 Jones, A. 104 judicial review 38, 118 jus ad bellum 159–61 jus in bello 161–3 just deserts 216

K Katz, R. 76 Kauzlarich, D. 256 Kean, H. 4 Keane, J. 59 Kelling, G. 14 Kerr, D. 112 King, Martin Luther 30 Kleinig, J. 216 Korff, D. 56 Kundnani, A. 180 Kymlicka, W. 260

L labour trafficking 136–7 League of Nations 167–9 legal accountability 61 legal pluralism 169–71 Lennon, G. 269 lethal injections 22 Levi, P. 127 Levy, B.S. 256 Lieberman, B. 80 Lincoln, Abraham 59 Locke, J. 134, 276 lustration 208

M MacKinnon, C.A. 106 mafia 191–2, 193 Major, John 14 Mann, M. 81 Marshall, T.H. 28–9 Martin, G. 46, 278 Marx, K. 276 mass incarceration 173–5 Mathiesen, T. 242–3 May, T. 180 McCulloch, J. 230–1 McGhee, D. 122 McGrew, A. 109–10 McKinnon, Gary 91 McMurray, R. 75 media   and censorship 23–6   and corruption 45   social media 45, 197–8, 274 Melucci, A. 248 Mendelsohn, B. 255 mental health 57–9 Merton, R.K. 205 Messerschmidt, J. 203 Midgley, J. 301 migration   forced migration 97–9   immigration 141–3 militarism 175–6   feminist security studies (FSS) 93–5 military conflict 177–8   child soldiers 9, 26–8, 107–9   coups 48–50   disarmament and demobilisation 63–5

315

A companion to state power, liberties and rights   feminist security studies (FSS) 93–5   humanitarian intervention 132–3   international humanitarian law 152–4   jus ad bellum 159–61   jus in bello 161–3   rape (as weapon of war) 221–3   war crimes 297–9   see also conflict resolution military coups 48–9 Millennium Development Goals (UN) 156, 284 Moran, R. 205 Mozambique 64–5 multiculturalism 178–81, 259–61

N national identity 183–5 national security 46–8, 185–7 Nduwimana, F. 221 neoliberalism 24, 40, 111–12, 125–6, 183, 187–9, 196 Nicaragua case (ICJ) 150, 159 Nigeria 75–6 Northern Ireland 179, 202, 269 Nuremberg trials 151, 207 Nussbaum, M.C. 246 Nye, J. 100

O Occupy Wall Street 218 OECD, and bribery 20, 44 Olson, M. 248 organised crime 191–3

P Pakistan 66–7 panoptican 111, 272 paramilitary groups 195–7 parliamentary privilege 197–9 parsimony (and punishment) 263 peacekeeping and capacity-building 35–7, 199–201, 288 Pearce, F. 50 Pemberton, S. 244 Perraton, J. 109–10 Perry, B. 122, 123 personal data 55–7, 273–4 Phillipson, C. 112 Pinker, S. 293 Plato 275 pluralism, legal 169–71 Polanyi, K. 187–9 police   deaths in custody 58   democratic policing 61–3, 78   ethical policing 77–9, 202   and proportionality 216   violence 201–3 Police and Crime Commissioners 62 political crime 203–6

pornography 24–5 post-conflict resolution 207–9   disarmament and demobilisation 63–5   reconciliation 223–5   transitional justice 279–81 Poulantzas, N. 268 prisoners   of conscience 1–2   duty of care to 72–3   Guantánamo Bay 115–16   and habeas corpus 117–19   rights of 209–11   rights of post-custody 73, 211–13   sentencing of 216   state punishment 263–5 prisons   and governmentality 111   mass incarceration 173–5   semi-penal institutions 239–41   state punishment 263–5   and surveillance 271–2 private security 213–15 proportionality 215–17 protests 30–1, 33–5, 217–19, 234–5, 247–9   and the police 62, 202 psychiatric detention, deaths in 57–9 punishment 21–3, 263–5, 271–2 Putnam, R. 100

Q Quinney, R. 255, 256 Quinton, P. 63 Qureshi, A. 228

R R v Oakes 216 radicalisation 180, 228 Rajaram, P.K. 18 Ramsey, S. 75 rape (as weapon of war) 107–8, 221–3 Rasul v. Bush 116 Ratner, M. 279 Rawls, J. 245–6 Ray, E. 279 Ray, L.J. 294 Raynor, P. 211 Raz, J. 251, 260 realism 14 realist international relations 145–6 reconciliation 223–5 Rees, W. 229 Refugee Convention (1951) 225–7 refugees 11, 86, 97–8, 225–7 Regan, T. 3–4 regulatory capture 76–7 rehabilitation of offenders 211–12 Reicher, S.D. 235 Reinhardt, S.R. 118 rendition 228–30 reparations 207, 208 representative democracy 59–60 resistance 30–1, 230–2

316

A companion to stateIndex power, liberties and rights Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 232–3 retributivism 264 Richards, J. 147 Right to Development (UN) 156 riots 30–1, 234–5 risk 236–7 Roberts, A. 297 Robinson, G. 211 Robinson, W.I. 144 Rogaly, B. 137 Ross, J.I. 203, 205, 253, 254 Rothe, D. 256 Rousseau, J-J. 276 Rwanda 151, 208, 221–2, 222–3, 224

S Said, E. 144, 184 Sassen, S. 213 Schmid, A. 47 Schnaiberg, A. 75 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner 273, 274 Schwartz, P.M. 55–6 Scraton, P. 14 security   feminist security studies (FSS) 93–5   insecurity 145–7   national security 185–7   private security 213–15 Seferiades, S. 34–5 self-defence 160 semi-penal institutions 239–41 Sen, A. 246 Sengupta, A. 156 sentencing 216 sexual exploitation 136, 137 Shapiro, S. 76 Sharlach, L. 222 Sharma, A. 253 Sidel, V.W. 256 Sierra Leone 64, 107, 108, 222 Sim, J. 240 Simon, D. 76 Singer, P. 3 Sinha, A. 26 Sjoberg, L. 93–4 small arms 9–10 Smith, M.J. 262 Smith, R. 246–7 Snowden, Edward 91 social control 241–3   censorship 23–6 social harm 243–5 social justice 245–7 social media 45, 197–8, 274 social movements 247–9   anti-apartheid movement 5–8 social policy and human rights 249–51 Solove, D.J. 55–6 South Africa   anti-apartheid movement 5–8   truth commissions 224, 280 Stahl, R. 176

Stanley, E. 230–1 state, the 251–3   democracy 59–61   theories of the state 275–7 state crime 253–5   political crime 203–6   resistance to 230–1 state harm 255–7 state of denial 257–9 state of emergency 87–9 state policy, rights and multiculturalism 259–61 state power 251–3, 261–3   authoritarian populism 13–15   civil liberties 32–3   constitutionalism 38–9   coups 48–50   crimes of the powerful 50–2   and critical criminology 52–4   European Union 85–7   foreign policy 99–101   governmentality 111–12   hegemony 124–6   proportionality 215–17   resistance to 230–2   state crime 253–5   theories of the state 275–7 state punishment 21–3, 263–5   see also prisoners; prisons state terrorism 265–8 state violence 267–9 Staub, E. 223, 225 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 9 Stockton, D. 186 stop and search 269–71 Stretesky, P. 75 surveillance 271–3 surveillance of electronic communications 273–4 sustainability, food production 96 Sustainable Development Goals 284

T Tamanaha, B. 170 Tarrow, S. 247 Tembo, E. 46, 47, 148, 278 terrorism   and gender 93–4   state terrorism 265–8   see also counterterrorism theories of the state 275–7 Thirlway, H. 149 Thompson, E. 125 Tilly, C. 34, 248 torture 73, 115–16, 134, 228, 277–9 Touraine, A. 248 transitional justice 207, 279–81 transnational corporations 144 transnational crime 192 transnational protests 218 Transparency International 44

317

A companion to state power, liberties and rights Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South Africa 224, 280 truth commissions 208, 224, 280 Turk, A.T. 205 Tzu, Sun 147

U United Nations 283–5   and arms trade 8   and child soldiers 26   and children’s rights 26, 285–7   and conflict resolution 36–7   and corruption 20   and ethical policing 78   and ethnic cleansing 79–80   and food security 95   and genocide 105   and humanitarian intervention 132–3   International Court of Justice (ICJ) 149–50, 157, 159   and international criminal courts 151–2   and international human rights 154–6   and international tribunals 156–8   and jus in bello 161–3   and organised crime 192   and peacekeeping and capacity-building 199–201, 288   and police powers 216   and prisoners 72–3   and refugees 11, 98, 225–7   and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 232–3   Security Council 284, 287–9   and torture 277–8   and transitional justice 280–1   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1, 24, 82, 135, 154–5, 277, 289–91   and use of force 159–60 United Nations Charter 159–160, 288, 289 United Nations Security Council 284, 287–9 United States   anti-apartheid movement 7   arms trade 9   border control 17   capital punishment 22–3   corporations 41   counterterrorism 46–7   data protection 55–6   drones 66–7   environmental protection 76   extradition 91–2   Guantánamo Bay 115–16, 118   health care and neoliberalism 112   imprisonment 173–4   torture 278–9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1, 24, 82, 135, 154–5, 277, 289–91 universalism 134–5 utilitarianism 3, 134

V

Vile, M.J.C. 38 violence 293–5   and civil disorder and unrest 30–1   collective violence 33–5   honour-based 129–31   by the police 201–3   riots 234–5   state violence 267–9 Vlachova, M. 222

W Wacquant, L. 188–9 Waddington, D. 235 Wade, R. 300 war crimes 26, 27, 80, 297–9 Warrener, L. 108 Warren, M.A. 103–4 weapons   arms trade 8–10, 64   international humanitarian law 153   limits to 162 Weber, L. 270 Weber, M. 251, 256, 262, 267, 276 Whyte, D. 41 Wieviorka, M. 34 Wilkinson, P. 47 Williams, M.C. 213 Williams, P.D. 232 Wilson, J. 14 Winter, T. 43 Wise, S. 4 women/girls   gendercide 103–4   girl soldiers 107–9   honour violence and killings 129–31   and human trafficking 136   and multiculturalism 260–1   pornography 24–5   rape (as weapon of war) 221–3   and security studies 93–5   and semi-penal institutions 239–41   and violence 294 Woodward, R. 43 World Bank 250, 300–2 World Trade Organisation 157 Wright Mills, C. 44

X xenophobia 303

Y Yar, M. 244 Young, R.J.C. 143 Yugoslavia 80, 104, 151

Z zemiology 244, 305 Zuev, D. 183 Zweifel, M. 9

Van Munster, R. 278 victimology 255–6

318

“An interdisciplinary toolbox of theories, concepts, perspectives and institutional insights that are fundamental to grasping the complexities of human rights, civil liberties and their relationship to state activity and inactivity.” Ross McGarry, University of Liverpool, UK “The concision and insightfulness of this volume will be of tremendous value to all those who need a compact account of the topics listed.” Brice Dickson, Queen’s University Belfast, UK

It will be suitable for undergraduate and postgraduate students on a variety of courses such as Criminology, Criminal Justice, International Relations, Politics, Social Policy, Policing Studies, and Law, as well as other researchers in these areas. Sharon Morley is Deputy Head of Department of Social and Political Science and senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Chester, UK. Karen Corteen is a senior lecturer in criminal justice at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Paul Taylor is Deputy Head of the Department of Social and Political Science at the University of Chester, teaching criminology and criminal justice. Jo Turner is a senior lecturer and Programme Leader for criminology at the University of Chester, UK.

Morley, Turner, Corteen and Taylor

Laid out in a user-friendly A–Z format, it includes entries from expert contributors with clear direction to related entries and further reading. The contributors critically engage with the topics in an accessible yet challenging way, ensuring that the definitions go beyond a simple explanation of the word or theme.

a com panion to

s tate power, liberties & rights

Ed it e d b y

Interest in the study of state power, civil liberties, human rights, and statesponsored crime is growing and there is a need for a book which brings these topics together. This book, part of the Companion series, provides succinct yet robust definitions and explanations of core concepts and themes in relation to state power, liberties and human rights. The entries are bound by their interrelatedness and relevance to the study of crime and harm and the volume draws on established and emerging commentaries from other social and political disciplines.

a compan ion to S tat e p ow er, li b ert i e s & r igh ts

“An insightful volume by an international team of scholars, worth reading by anyone concerned with state power and responsibility for civil liberties and human rights.” Sheying Chen, Pace University, USA

Ed i t e d b y

Sharon Morley Jo Turner Karen Corteen Paul Taylor

criminology ISBN 978-1-4473-1034-1

www.policypress.co.uk @policypress

PolicyPress

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