A commentary on Hegel's logic

Citation preview

Digitized by tine Internet Arcinive in 2008 witii funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation

littp://www.arcliive.org/details/commentaryonhegeOOmctauoft

T

A

COMMENTARY ON

HEGEL'S

LOGIC

CAMBEIDGE

UNIVEESITY

PEESS

Eontion: FETTEE LANE, E.G. C. F. CLAY, Manager

anjinfautsl) : 100, PRINCES STREET Serlin: A. ASHER Utiojig:

AXD

CO.

F. A. BROCKHAUS

^ttu gork: G. P. PUTXAM'S SONS fiombatj anH ffialrtitta : MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd.

All rights reserved

f^s/c

^Y^A

COMMENTARY ON

HEGEL'S

LOGTC BY

JOHN DOCTOR

McTAGGART IN IN

LETTERS, CAMBRIDGE,

FELLOW FELLOW

ELLIS AND

LECTURER

OF

THE

McTAGGART OF

BRITISH

TRINITY

COLLEGE

ACADEMY

Cambridge : at the University Press 1910

(>

b

^

iM3

1'

2.7 H 3

Sr

r^S

STUDIES

IN

THE

STUDIES

IN

HEGELIAN

SOME

DOGMAS

S4J/£

AUTHOR

HEGELIAN OF

DIALECTIC.

COSMOLOGY.

RELIGION.

8s.

10s. M. net.

8s.

PREFACE /CHAPTERS

II, III, VIII, IX, and X of this book are

^^ based on articles which appeared in Mind (Oct. 1902; April, 1904; April and July, 1897; Jan. 1899; and April, 1900). In many cases, however, both the interpretation and the criticism as now published are materially different from the earlier versions. I am much indebted to my wife for her aid in reading this book in proof, and for many valuable suggestions, as also to Mr Bertrand Russell for his kindness in reading Chapter III, and for giving me much assistance in the treatment of the categories of Quantity. I owe much, too, to the criticisms and suggestions of the pupils to whom I have lectured on Hegel's philosophy.

Trinity College, Cambridge. January^ 1910.

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION PAGE

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Object of this book Previous writers on the same subject ..... Relative authority of the Greater Logic and the Encyclopaedia Terminology adopted in this book Errors of Hegel concerning the dialectic method. He exaggerates the objectivity of the dialectic process .... And also its comprehensiveness ...... Errors in particular transitions — sometimes caused by his failure to confine the process to the existent ... Sometimes by his desire to include conceptions of importance in science .......... Sometimes by confusion between categories and the concrete states after which they are named ..... Errors in Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (a) as to the transcendental character of the process (6) As to the change in method in the later categories . . The same continued (c) As to the relation between a Synthesis and the next Thesis

CHAPTER

1 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 8 10 11 11 12

II

QUALITY 14. 15. 16. 17.

Divisions of Quality /. Being. A. Being B. Nothing C. Becoming

18. Hegel's conception of Becoming does not involve change . 19. But the name suggests change, and is therefore misleading 20. Alterations in names of categories suggested .

17 13 17 15 20 19

CONTENTS

Vlll

PAGE

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

II.

Being Determinate. A. Being Beterniinate as Such (a) Being Determinate in General (6) Quality ........ (c) Something ........ Are the divisions of A. superfluous ? . Is the introduction of Pkirahty justified ? B. Finitiide. (a) Something and an Other (b) Determination, Modification, and Limit (c) Finitude The divisions within (&) are unjustified The Ought and the Barrier in Finitude . C. Infinity ........ (a) Infinity in General (6) Reciprocal Determination of the Finite and Infinite Being (c) Afiirmative Infinity ...... The treatment of Finitude and Infinity in the Encyclopaedia The same continued ///. Being for Self. A. Being for Self as Such, (a) Determinate and Being for Self .... Being for One ....... (0) One. The divisions of J. are unjustified . B. The One and the Many, (a) The One in Itself . The One and the Void (b) (c) Many Ones (a) Exclusion of the One C. Repulsion and Attraction, ..... (b) The one One of Attraction (c) The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction . Transition to Quantity

CHAPTER 47. Divisions of Quantity

22 22 22 24 25 26 28 29 28 29

31 31 32 32 34 37 35 37

38 38 39 40 40 40 41

III

QUANTITY

48. Hegel's knowledge of mathematics. The bearing of this question on the dialectic ........ 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

21

/. {Undivided) Quantity. A. Pure Quantity .... B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude Defects of this category C. Limitation of Quantity ....... //. Quantum. A. Nximher ....... Possibly all the Ones taken together are finite in number. Hegel ignores this possibility, but it does not affect his argument .......... 55. The relation of Quantum and Limit ..... 56. B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum, (a) Their Difference .

42 43 45 46 47 48 49

49 50 51

CONTENTS

IX PAGE

57. (b) Identity/ of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude. on a level, or is Intensive Magnitude higher ? 58. The latter view seems more probable 59. The instability of Quanta 60. (c) The Alteration of Quantum 61. C. The Quantitative Infinity, (a) Its Notion 62. {b) The Quantitative Infinite Progress 63. An objection discussed .... 64. (c) The Infinity of Quantum 65. Relations between Quality and Quantity . 66. ///. The Quantitative Ratio 67. A. The Direct Ratio . 68. B. The Inverse Ratio 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

Are these

52 57 54 55 58 60 61 62 62 63 64 64

C. The Ratio of Powers The transition to C. is unjustifiable And the whole of ///. is unjustifiable for more general reasons Suggested reconstruction The treatment of Quantity in the Encyclopaedia

65 66 68 70

CHAPTER

IV

MEASURE 74. 75. 76. 77.

Divisions of Measure .... . Criticism of the transition from Quantity The same continued Possible reasons for the error ......

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

/. The Specific Quantity. A. The Specific Quantum B. Specifying Measure, (a) The Rule .... (6) The Specifying Measure ...... Here a new conception of Measure is introduced illegitimately (c) Relation of both Sides as Qualities .... C. Being for Self in Measure ...... //. Real Measure. A. The Relation of Stable Measures . (a) Union of two Measures ...... (Z>) Measure as a Series of Measure Relations (c) Elective Ajfinity ........ B. Nodal Line of Measure Relations. Here we return to the conception of Measure abandoned in /. B. {b) . And do so by an illegitimate transition .... C. The Measureless ///. The Becoming of Essence. A. The Absolute Indifference B. Indifference as Inverse Relation of its Factors C. Transition to Essence

89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94. The treatment of Measure in the Encyclopaedia

.

71 73 72 76 74 77 75 80 79 78 80 81 81 82 83 87 85 84 86 89 88

CONTENTS

CHAPTER EHSENCE Of). !)) E.vtenial Reflection

....

((■) Determining Reflection ...... //. The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection. Idintity

Hotel's treatment of the Law of Identity IJut this Law is not specially connected with Hegel's category of TiliMitity ......... II. Difference, (a) Absohtte Di fere nee .... (/)) Varieti/ ......... Suggested alteration of argument Hegel's treatment of Qualities and Relations requires enlarge mont ..........

115.

llegors treatment discornibles

IKi. 117. 118. 11!). 1 -20. l-2\. l'2-2. 1:23. 124. 120. 1 -2(!. 1-27. 1-28.

(c) ()ppositio)i ........

1 -2;). 130. 131.

A

of the Principle of the Identity of In

(^riticisjn of the category of Opposition .... ('. Contradiction Suggested reconstruction of this category llogers treatment of the Law of E.xcluded Middle . ///. Orouuit A. Absolute Ground, (a) Fonn and Essence yb) Form and Matter ....... (c') Form and Content ....... B. Determined Ground, (a) Formal Ground (6) Real Ground The possibility of sophistry in Ground .... yc) Complete Ground C. Condition, (a) The Relatively Unconditioned . {b) The Absolutely Unconditioned i^c'^ Transition of the Fact into E.visfence .... Suixcostod rooonstruotion of Ground ....

COXTENTS

CHAPTER

XI

VI

APPEARANCE PAGE

132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

152. 153. 154.

Divisions of Appearance /. Existence A. The Thing and its Properties .... {a) The Thing in itself and Existence (b) Property (c) The Reciprocal Action of Things B. The Constitution of the Thing out of Matters C. The Dissolution of the Thing .... Criticism of the categories of Existence . //. Appearance. A. The Law of Appearance B. The World of Appearance and the World in itself C. The Dissolution of Appearance .... ///. Essential Relation. A. The Relation of Whole Parts . The same continued B. The Relation of Force and its Manifestation, (a Conditionedness of Force ..... (6) The Solicitation of Force (c) The Infinity of Force ..... Criticism of the divisions of 5. Suggested reconstruction C. The Relation of Inner and Outer Note on the Difference between the Greater Logic and Encyclopaedia in the first two divisions of Essence Table of the categories according to the Greater Logic the Encyclopaedia ........ Account of the differences The same continued ........

CHAPTER

128 129 131 132 133 135 136 137 1,38 139 140 and

142 142 143

The 145 146 146 147 148 149 the and

150 152 153

VII

ACTUALITY

155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

Divisions of Actuahty /. The Absohiie. A. The Exposition of the Absolute Criticism of the conception of the Absolute . B. The Absolute Attribute Criticism of this category C. The Modus of the Absolute ....

155 156 157 159 160 160

CONTENTS

Xll

PAGE

161. //. Actuality 162 162. A. Contingency, or Formal Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity 162 163. The same continued 164 164. B.

Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Necessity 165. C. Absolute Necessity . . . . 166. ///. The Absolute Relation. A. The Relation 167. Suggested reconstruction of the argument by is reached

Possibility,

and

165 . . . .167 of Substantiality 168 which Substance 169

168. 169. 170. 171. 172.

Hegel's remarks on the philosophy of Spinoza . . .170 B. The Relation of Causality, (a) Formal Causality . . 171 The transition to Formal Causality is not justifiable . . 172 (6) Determined Causality . . . . . . .173 Hegel unduly ignores the differences between Formal and Determined Causality 175 173. He attempts to remove one such difference by asserting the identity of Cause and Effect. Criticism of this . . 176 174. The same continued 177 175. The same continued 179 176. The treatment of Causality in the £'/iCj/c^o/9aeo?ia . 177. The Infinite Series of Causes and Effects .... 178. 179. 180. 181.

(c) Action and Reaction ........ C. Reciprocity The infinity ascribed by Hegel to Reciprocity The treatment of Actuality in the Encyclopaedia

CHAPTER

. .

.

. .

.180 180 181 .182 . 183 . 184

VIII

SUBJECTIVITY

187 189

182. Divisions of Subjectivity ...... 183. The significance of the nomenclature in Subjectivity 184. The same continued 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191.

190 191 193

Hegel's assertion that Freedom is the Truth of Necessity /. The Notion. A. The Universal Notion Suggested reconstruction of the argument The same continued ....... B. The Particidar Notion The same continued C. The Individual

192. //.

The Judgment. A. Positive Judgment

The Judgment of Inherence,

194 195 196 197 198

(a) The .

198

CONTENTS

Xlll PAGE

193. Transition to the next category 194. Criticism of the transition .... 195. (6) The Negative Judgment 196. (c) The Infinite Judgment 197. The same continued

.... ....

200 201 202 202 203

198. B. The Judgment of Suhsumption . 199. The same continued

206 205

200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214.

208 208 210

(a) The Singidar Judgment .... (6) The Particular Judgment .... Transition to the next category (c) The Universal Judgment .... C. The Judginent of Necessity (a) The Categorical Judgment {b) The Hypothetical Judgment (c) The Disjunctive Judgment .... Transition to the next category D. The Judgment of the Notion, (a) The Assertoric Judgment {b) The Problematic Judgment (c) The Apodictic Judgment .... Criticism of the Judgment of the Notion The same continued ///. The Syllogism. A. The Qualitative Syllogism, (a) First Figure ....... 215. The first defect found by Hegel in this category 216. The second defect 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230.

{b) Second Figure (c) Third Figure {d) Fourth Figure Criticism of the Second and Third Figures Suggested reconstruction .... B. The Syllogism of Reflection, (a) The Syllogism of Allness (6) The Syllogism of Induction (c) The Syllogism of Analogy Transition to the next category Criticism of the Syllogism of Reflection . C. The Syllogism of Necessity, (a) The Categorical Syllogism {b) The Hypothetical Syllogism (c) The Disjimctive Syllogism .... The same continued

231. Hegel's conception of the Self-Diflferentiating Notion

211 213 213 214 217 215 217 218 218 218 220 221 222 224 224 225 225 226 228 228 229 230 231 232 234 236 236 237 238

XIV

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

IX

OBJECTIVITY

232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251.

Divisions of Objectivity Significance of the term Objectivity Transition from Subjectivity Proposed amendment of the transition ..... /. Mechanism. A. The Mechanical Object .... B. The Mechanical Process .(a) The Formal Mechanical Process (6) The Real Mechanical Process (c) The Product of the Mechanical Process .... C. The Absolute Mechanism, (a) The Centre . . The example given by Hegel is misleading .... The transition to Chemism in the Encyclopaedia . . (b) The Lato (c) Transition from Mechanism ...... //. Chemism. A. The Chemical Object B. The Chemical Process Transition to the next category ...... Criticism of this transition C. Transition from Chemism ....... Is there more than one Chemical Notion ? . . .

252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261.

III. Teleology The same continued The same continued The terms End and Means are misleading .... Are there more Ends than one 1 A. The Subjective End B. The Means . . ■ The first argument for the transition to the next category The second argument for the transition C. The Realised End

PAGE

. .

.

.

241 242 242 243 244 246 247 247 249 250 252 252 254 254 255 255 256 256 257 258

259 260 261 263 264 265 265 267 268 269

CONTENTS

CHAPTER THE

XV

X

IDEA PAGE

262. Divisions of the Idea .... 263. Transition from Objectivity . 264. /. Life 265. Hegel's view that there are many Organisms 266. His view that the Body is an inadequate manifestation of the Seele 267. A. The Living Individual 268. B. The Life-Process 269. C. The Kind . 270. Criticism of this category 271. The inadequacy of the manifestation is shown in Propagation and Death . 272. Which also provide the escape from this inadequacy 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280.

The same continued The same continued IL The Idea of Cognition The same continued Criticism of this category The same continued A. The Idea of the True The same continued

281. (a) Analytic Cognition, (b) Synthetic Cognition, Criticism of these categories 282. The transition to the Idea of the Good can be made without them 283. The transition further considered 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 3Q3. 294. 295.

B. The Idea of the Good Criticism of this category Hegel regards this category as higher than the Idea of the True And as involving the complete goodness of the universe Transition to the Absolute Idea The same continued ///. The Absolute Idea . The same continued The same continued The same continued This is the final category. The proof of this Is the Absolute Idea exemplified in any concrete state k now to us ? 296. Conclusion

272 272 274 275 •281 276 277 279 280

282 283 285 286 287 288 290 291 292 293 295 296 298 299 300 300 301 302 303 303 304 306 307 308 309 310

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

1. In this book I propose to give a critical account of the various transitions by which Hegel passes from the category of Being to the category of the Absolute Idea. I shall not describe or criticise the method which he employs, nor his applications of the results of the dialectic to the facts of experience. With these subjects I have dealt, to the best of my ability, in my Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic and Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. I hope that my present work may serve two purposes — that those students of Hegel who have read the Greater Logic may find it useful as a commentary, and that it may serve as an account of the Greater Logic for those who are prevented by want of time or ignorance of German from reading the original. 2. The dialectic process of the Logic is the one absolutely essential element in Hegel's system. If we accepted this and rejected everything else that Hegel has written, we should have a system of philosophy, not indeed absolutely complete, but stable so far as it reached, and reaching to conclusions of the highest importance. On the other hand, if we reject the dialectic process which leads to the Absolute Idea, all the rest of the system is destroyed, since Hegel depends entirely, in all the rest of the system, on the results obtained in the Logic. Yet the detail of the Logic occupies a very small part of the numerous commentaries and criticisms on Hegel's philosophy. They are almost entirely devoted to general discussions of the dialectic method, or to questions as to the application of the results of the Logic to the facts of experience. The M"^!.

1

2

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

most elaborate of the expositions of Hegel's system — that which Kuno Fischer gives in his History of Philosophy — allows to the detail of the Logic less than one-ninth of its space. There are, however, two admirable accounts of the Logic, category by category — HegeVs Logic, by Professor Hibben of Princeton, and La Logique de Hegel, by the late M. Georges Noel, which is less known than its merits deserve. I owe much to these commentators, but my object is rather different from theirs. I propose, in my exposition, to give frequent references to the passages in Hegel's text on which I base my account, and to quote freely when necessary. When the meaning of the text is doubtful, I shall not only give the view which I think preferable, but shall discuss the claims of other interpretations. I shall also add a certain amount of criticism to my exposition. Professor Hibben follows the Encyclopaedia in his exposition, while M. Noel follows the Greater Logic^. I shall adopt the Greater Logic as my text, but shall note and discuss any point in which the EncyclojMedia differs from it. 3. The Greater Logic and the Encyclopaedia agree much more than they differ, but they do differ on variouS important points. Wlien this happens, the advantage is not always on the same side, but is, I think, more often on the side of the Encyclopaedia. But, whichever is the more correct, there is no doubt that the Greater Logic is much clearer. The Logic of the Encyclopaedia is excessively condensed. The treatment of the categories, as distinct from preliminary questions, is, in the Encyclopaedia, only one-fourth as long as it is in the Greater Logic. Some room is gained in the Encyclopaedia by the elimination of certain sub-divisions, and also by the omission ^ By the Greater Logic I mean the work published in 1812 — 1816. Hegel himself calls this simply the Loijic, but I use the adjective to distinguish it from the Logic which forms part of the Encyclopaedia. My references to the Greater Logic are to the pages of the complete edition of Hegel's works, in which the Greater Logic occupies Vols. 3, 4 and 5 (quoted as G. L. i., G. L. ii., G. L. iii.) published in 1833 — 1834. My references to the Encyclopaedia are to Sections, and in quoting from it I have generally, though not always, availed myself of Professor Wallace's valuable translation. When, in expounding the Greater Logic, I give references both to the Greater Logic and to the Encyclopaedia, the latter merely indicates that it is in this Section of the Encyclopaedia that the corresponding point is treated, and not that the treatment is the same as in the Greater Logic.

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

3

of the notes on mathematics which fill a disproportionate space in the Greater Logic, but in spite of this the categories in the Encyclopaedia are in some parts of the process crowded so closely together, that the arguments for the transition from the one to the other almost disappear. With regard to the relative authority of the two Logics, as expressing Hegel's final views, nothing very decisive can be said. The last edition of the Logic of the Encyclopaedia published by Hegel appeared in 1830. In 1831 he published a second edition of the Doctrine of Being in the Greater Logic. His death prevented him from carrying this edition further. It would seem, therefore, as if the Greater Logic was the best authority for the Doctrine of Being, and the Encyclopaedia for the Doctrines of Essence and the Notion. But many of the points in the Doctrine of Being in which the first edition of the Greater Logic differs from the Encyclopaedia are repeated in the second edition. We can scarcely suppose that in each of these cases Hegel had abandoned by 1831 the view he held in 1830, and returned to the view he held in 1812. And thus it seems impossible to attach any superior authority to the second edition of the Greater Logic. But if, to the end, he regarded the changes in the Encyclopaedia as improvements, at any rate he cannot have regarded them as very important, since he did not alter the second edition of the Greater Logic to correspond with then. The actual language, however, of the Greater Logic has a much greater authority than much of the language of the Encyclopaedia. For every word of the Greater Logic was written and published by Hegel himself. But in the Encyclopaedia a part of the supplementary matter added, with the title of Zusatz, to many of the Sections, is compiled from students' notes or recollections of what Hegel had said in his lectures ^ 4. A few points about terminology must be mentioned. The whole course of the dialectic forms one example of the dialectic rhythm, with Being as Thesis, Essence as Antithesis, and Notion as Synthesis. Each of these has again the same 1 Cp. the editor's Preface to the Logic of the Encyclopaedia in Vol. 6 of the Collected Works. 1—2

4

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

moments of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis within it, and so on till the final sub-divisions are reached, the process of division being carried much further in some parts of the dialectic than in others. Hegel has no special name for the system formed of a Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. A name, however, is convenient, and I propose to speak of such a system as a triad. Being, Essence, and Notion I shall call primary categories ; their immediate divisions {e.g. Quality, Quantity, and Measure) I shall call secondary, and so on with smaller sub-divisions. One difficulty of terminology arises in writing about Hegel from the fact that he uses so many terms as names of particular categories that none are left to be used more generally. For example, to what does the whole dialectic process apply ? According to one view, the subject-matter of the process is what is commonly called Being or Reality. According to another view it is what is commonly called Existence. But Hegel has already appropriated these names. Being and Existence are the names of particular categories in the process, while Reality, according to Hegel, is a term only applicable after a certain stage in the process has been reached. {G. L. i. 120; Enc. 91.) Again, after a few categories we reach the result, which persists through the rest of the process, that the subject-matter under consideration is a differentiated unity. It would be very convenient to have a name by which to designate these differentiations, irrespective of the category under which we were viewing them. But here, again, every name is already appropriated. One, Thing, Part, Substance, Individual, Object — each of these is used by Hegel to indicate such a differentiation as seen under some one particular category. To find a name for more general use is not easy. To meet this difficulty so far as possible, I have always used a capital initial when a term indicates one of Hegel's categories, and a small initial when the term is applied more general ly^ I have distinguished in the same way between those of Hegel's categories which are named after concrete facts, and the concrete facts after which they are named — e.g. I have written Life when I meant Hegel's category, and life when I meant the biological state.

CH.

5. reasons method to one

I.

INTRODUCTION

5

With regard to the Logic as a whole, I believe, for which I have explained elsewhere \ that the dialectic used by Hegel is valid — that, if the categories do stand another in the relations in which he asserts them to

stand, he is entitled to pass from one to another in the way in which he does pass. And I believe that in many cases this condition is fulfilled, and that therefore, in these cases, the actual transitions which he makes are justified. The points on which I should differ from Hegel are as follows. In the first place I think that he falls into serious errors in his attempts to apply the results gained by the Logic in the interpretation of particular concrete facts. In the second place I think that he did not in all respects completely understand the nature of that dialectic relation between ideas which he had discovered. And in the third place there seem to be certain errors which vitiate particular stages in the process, I have considered the first of these points elsewhere ^ With regard to the second there are two fundamental questions as to which I believe that Hegel to some extent misunderstood the nature of the dialectic process. I think that he exaggerated * both its objectivity and its comprehensiveness. By his exaggeration of its objectivity, I mean that he did not merely hold that the dialectic process conducted us to a valid result, and that the lower categories of the process were contained, so far as they were true, in the Absolute Idea which synthesised them. So much he was justified in holding, but he went further. There is no doubt, I think, that he held that if that chain of categories, which was given by him in the Logic, was correct at all, it was not only a valid way of reaching the Absolute Idea, but the only valid way. He would have held it to be a priori impossible that two valid chains of dialectic argument, each starting from the category of Being, should each lead up to the Absolute Idea, so that the goal could be attained equally well by following either of them. And he would also have rejected the possibility of alternative routes over smaller ^ Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Chapters I. to IV., but cp. below, Sections 10—13. 2 op. cit. Chapter VII.

6

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

intervals — the possibility, e.g., of passing from the beginning of Quantity to the beginning of Essence by two alternative dialectic arguments. Now I do not assert that such alternative routes are to be found, but I cannot see that their possibility can be disproved. And, if there were such alternatives, I do not think that the dialectic process would lose its value or significance. In rejecting the possibility of equally valid alternatives, it seems to me that Hegel exaggerated the objectivity of the process as expounded by himself. 6. His exaggeration of the comprehensiveness of the dialectic lies in the fact that, having secured, as he rightly believed, an absolute starting point for the dialectic process in the category of Being, he assumed that this was not only the absolute starting point of the dialectic, but of all philosophy. No preliminary discussion was required, except negative criticism designed to remove the errors of previous thinkers, and to prevent misunderstandings. Nothing in philosophy was logically prior to the dialectic process. Here again there seems to be an error. For example, what is the subject-matter to which the whole dialectic applies ? It is, I think, clear that Hegel regards it as applying to all reality, in the widest sense of the term. But, when we examine various stages of the process it becomes clear that he is only speaking of what is existent, and that his results do not apply, and were not meant to apply, to what is held by some philosophers to be real but not existent — for example, propositions, the terms of propositions, and possibilities^ The apparent inconsistency is removed if we hold, as I believe Ave should, that Hegel, like some later philosophers, held nothing to be real but the existent. I do not mean that he ever asserted this explicitly. Probably, indeed, the question was never definitely considered by him, if we may judge from the fact that his terminology affords no means of stating it. (Reality and Existence, as used by Hegel, refer, as was mentioned above, to particular stages of the dialectic.) But it seems to me that the view that nothing ^ I had not realised this distinction with suiBcient clearness when I wrote my Studies hi the Hegelian Dialectic, but what is said there is not inconsistent with my present view. Cp. Sections 17, 18, and 79 of that work.

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

7

is real but the existent is one which harmonises with his general ] position, and that he would have asserted it if confronted with | the problem. But the view that nothing but the existent is real, whether right or wrong, is one which cannot be assumed without discussion. Itis a difficult and disputed point, and Hegel had no right to take a dialectic of existence as equivalent to a dialectic*' of reality until the question had been carefully considered.J Moreover, the absence of such consideration leaves Hegel's position, not only unjustified but also rather vague. Generally, as I have said, the categories seem clearly intended to apply to the existent only, but there are some steps in which he seems to change his position unconsciously, and to take the categories as applicable to some other reality in addition to the existent. There is another point on which preliminary discussion was needed a thing stands follows

and is not given. Hegel's arguments assume that, when stands in any relation to another thing, the fact that it in that relation is one of its qualities. From this it that when the relation of one thing to another changes, there is a change in the qualities of-each of them, and therefore in the nature of each of them. Again, it follows that two things which stand in different relations to a third thing cannot have exactly similar natures, and on this a defence might be based for the doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles. This is a doctrine of the greatest importance, and by no means universally accepted. It is possible to conceive a dialectic process which should contain a proof of it, but, so far as I can see, Hegel's dialectic does not contain any such proof, direct or implied. In that case he had no right to use the doctrine in the dialectic unless it had been proved in some preliminary discussion, and he does not give such a discussion. 7. Passing to the errors in certain particular transitions, there are some, I think, which cannot be traced to any general cause, but are simply isolated failures. But other errors appear to be due to certain general causes. In the first place some

errors have, I believe, been caused by Hegel's failure to realise explicitly that his dialectic is a dialectic of the existent only, and by his treatment of some categories as applying also to

8

CH.

I.

INTRODTJCTION

some have more And, that

non-existent reality. This is unjustifiable, for he would no right to pass in this way from the smaller field to the extensive, even if the more extensive field were in being. as I have said, it seems implied in his general treatment there is no such wider field, but that existence is co-extensive with reality, in which case any attempt to apply the dialectic beyond existence is obviously mistaken. 8. Another general cause of error may be found in a desire to introduce into the dialectic process as many as possible of the conceptions which are fundamentally important in the various sciences. It is, doubtless, a fortunate circumstance when a conception which is important in this way does occupy a place among the categories of the dialectic. For then the dialectic will assure us that such a conception is neither completely valid of reality, nor completely devoid of validity — an important result. Moreover, its place in the dialectic process shows us how much, and in what respects, its validity falls short of the validity of the Absolute Idea, and whether it is more or less valid than those other conceptions which are also categories of the dialectic. And this also may be of much importance. But there is no reason to believe that this fortunate state of things will always occur. We have no right to anticipate that every category of the dialectic will be a conception of fundamental importance in one or more of the particular sciences. Nor have we any right to anticipate that every conception of fundamental importance in a science will be a category of the dialectic. In several cases I think that Hegel has distorted the course of his argument, and made an invalid transition, moved by an unconscious desire to bring into the process some conception of great scientific importance \ 9. This is connected with another source of error, which

arises from Hegel's practice of designating many of his categories by the names of concrete states which are known to us Thus we find a category of Attraction by empirical experience. 1 It has lately been objected to Hegel's treatment of Quantity that it does not include the conception of Series, which is of such great importance in mathematics. If the dialectic process can go from Being to the Absolute Idea without passing through the conception of Series, then the omission of that conception is no defect in the dialectic. But this truth is obscured by Hegel's anxiety to bring all important scientific conceptions into the dialectic process.

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

9

and Repulsion, and categories of Force, Mechanism, Chemism, Life, and Cognition^. This practice does not necessarily involve any error in the dialectic process. For when Hegel names a category in this way, he does not suppose that he has deduced, by the pure thought of the dialectic, all the empirical details which can be determined with reference to the corresponding concrete state. He merely expresses his belief that the category is manifested - in a special manner by the concrete state whose name it bears. For example, in giving a category the name of Mechanism he does not assert that it is possible to determine by the dialectic process any of the laws of the finite science of Mechanics. All that the use of the name implies is that, when we perceive the existent in such a way that it appears^ to include bodies obeying the laws of Mechanics, then the category in question will be manifested with special clearness in the facts as they appear to us. There is thus nothing unjustifiable in the use of such a nomenclature, and it has the advantage of making the meaning of the category clearer, by informing us where we may look for clear examples of it. But in practice it turns out to be extremely difficult to use such names without being led by them into error. There is, in the first place, the possibility of choosing a wrong name — of taking a concrete state which manifests the particular category less clearly than another state would, or which itself manifests more clearly some other category. But this is a mistake which, so far as I can see, Hegel never makes. But there is a second possibility. The concrete states which give their names to the categories contain, as has been said, much other content beside the categories in question. Hegel does not suppose that the dialectic process could help him to 1 The use of logical terms as names for the categories of Subjectivity is an example of the same practice, though in this case the conceptions are not borrowed from empirical knowledge. But, relatively to the dialectic process, they are concrete, for the logical processes, which give the names, have characteristics not to be found in the categories which they exemplify. Cp. Chapter VIII. 2 Such a perception would, of course, be held by Hegel to be more or less erroneous. Nothing really exists, according to his system, but Spirits. Bodies only appear to exist.

10

CH.

I.

INTRODUCTION

deduce this other content. But in practice he sometimes confuses the two sides — the pure conception which he had deduced, and the remaining content which he had not. And thus he introduces into the dialectic process, in connection with certain categories, some characteristics illegitimately transferred from the concrete states after which they are named. In Judgment, in Syllogism, in Life, in Cognition, we find sub-divisions introduced and transitions made, which rest on characteristics which are found in the judgments and syllogisms of ordinary logic, in the life of biology, or in the cognition of psychology, but which have no justification as applied to the categories of the dialectic. These cases, of course, lend support to the theory, which I have discussed elsewhere \ that the dialectic process, while professing to be a process of pure thought, does, in fact, always rest on empirical elements illegitimately introduced. But the categories of the process which are named after concrete states are comparatively few, and it is not in all of them that an illegitimate element has been transferred to the category. In several of those cases where the illegitimate transference has taken place, it seems to me that the process, so far from being dependent on the transference, would have g