A Century of Development in Taiwan: From Colony to Modern State 1800880154, 9781800880153

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A Century of Development in Taiwan

A Century of Development in Taiwan From Colony to Modern State

Edited by

Peter C.Y. Chow Professor of Economics, City College and Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Peter C.Y. Chow 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2021952128 This book is available electronically in the Economics subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781800880160

ISBN 978 1 80088 015 3 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80088 016 0 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Contents List of figuresviii List of tablesix List of contributorsxi Foreword: learning historyxii Edward Friedman Foreword: why start talking from 1920s?xviii Masahiro Wakabayashi Preface and acknowledgmentxxi PART I 1

INTRODUCTION

From colony to modern state: an overview of Taiwan’s path of development Peter C.Y. Chow

PART II

2

TAIWANESE IDENTITY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2

Taiwan’s international relations June Teufel Dreyer

3

From a province to a sovereign state: Taiwan’s political changes as reflected in the three critical years 1951, 1971 and 1991 Yi-Shen Chen

17

40

4

Rethinking Taiwanese ethnicity: notes on recent historical scholarship60 Lung-chih Chang

5

Identity in formation and transformation: dynamics of national identity change after Taiwan’s democratization Shiau-Chi Shen

v

73

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A century of development in Taiwan

PART III ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE 1920s 6

Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period: a miracle growth in prewar Taiwan Frank S.T. Hsiao

7

The path of Taiwan’s industrial development: from follower to innovator Peter C.Y. Chow

149

8

Money and banking in Taiwan: country identity and the top trade partner Hong-Jen Abraham Lin

179

95

PART IV SOCIETAL AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 9

The rise and fall of civil society movements in Taiwan: 1920–2020197 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao

10

A century of colonial education by Japan and the KMT/ ROC party-state, 1898–1997: a comparative study of the problems of Taiwan’s national identity Wan-yao Chou

11

Transformation of women’s status in Taiwan, 1920–2020 Doris T. Chang

PART V

220 243

LITERATURE AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN

12

The rise and fall of cultural theatre and new theatre, from the 1920s to the 1960s Yin-Chen Kang

13

Modern literature of Taiwan: between China and the world Michelle Yeh

14

Hybrid theatre: the origin and development of creative Taiwanese opera Jasmine Yu-Hsing Chen

266 291

307

Contents

15

A century of struggle over Taiwan’s cultural self-consciousness: the life and afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui and the Taiwan Cultural Association Fang-long Shih

Corresponding table of Wade-Giles/Taigi and Pinyin romanization of Chinese names and terms

vii

325

358

Index364

Figures 5.1

Self-identification of the populace in Taiwan, 1992–2020 

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5.2

National identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992­–2019

78

5.3

Taiwanese national identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2019

80

5.4

Chinese national identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2019

81

5.5

Patterns of national identity change in Phase I, 1992–2000

82

5.6

Patterns of national identity change in Phase II, 2001–2019

86

6.1

Industrial production (1902–1940) and growth rates (1905–1940) of Taiwan, five industrial sectors, million yen

100

6.2

Industrial production (1902–1940) and growth rates (1905–1940) of Taiwan during the Japanese period, three industrial sectors, million yen

101

6.3

Average values of five sectors, each of seven stages, 1902–1940, million yen

104

6.4

Average (discrete) growth rates of five sectors, each of seven stages, 1902–1940, percent

105

6.5

Production of the manufacturing sector of Taiwan, nine manufacturing industries, 1921–1942

108

6A.1 Nominal and real growth rates of prewar manufacturing industries of Taiwan and Japan

143

7.1

Distribution of labor employment by industrial sectors, 1952–2018159

7.2

Annual papers in CSI and EI per 1000 personnel, 1992–2018164

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Tables 5.1

Change in the unification–independence stances of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2020

77

5.2

ROC state and Chinese national identity in Taiwan % (N)

87

5.3

Attitudes on “one country, two systems” in Taiwan, 2001–2008

88

6.1

New products and the year of introduction after 1921 and the new companies after 1931

112

6.2

Sources of resources for Taiwan’s industrialization

121

6.3

New companies and their sources of materials after 1935

122

6.4

Heavy and chemical industrial products in Taiwan, 1944

124

7.1

Science and technology output indicators

163

7.2

Numbers of patents granted by US Patent and Trademark Office, 1999–2018

165

7.3

The top recipient countries of patents from the USPTO, 2014–18 166

7.4

RCA indexes for Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 2001–2019

167

7A.1 Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Taiwan and Japan in high technology export products, 2001–2019 176 7A.2 Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Korea and Japan in high technology export products, 2001–2019 176 7A.3 Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Korea and Taiwan in high technology export products, 2001–2019177 8.1

The banking system in different time periods

180

8.2

Major currencies used in several different time periods

186

ix

x

8.3

A century of development in Taiwan

Amounts of international trades (imports plus exports) of Taiwan with the top four trade partners (in million US dollars)

189

8A.1 List of banks in Taiwan bearing the names of the identity of Great China

195

10.1 School hours of National Language compared to the total for the six grades in common schools

223

12A.1 Dutch records about Chinese theatre in Taiwan during the 17th century

290

12A.2 Scripts about the Dutch colonial period (1624–1661)

290

Contributors Doris T. Chang, Wichita State University Lung-chih Chang, Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica Jasmine Yu-Hsing Chen, Utah State University Yi-Shen Chen, Academia Historica of Taiwan Wan-yao Chou, National Taiwan University Peter C.Y. Chow, The City College and Graduate Center, City University of New York June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami Frank S.T. Hsiao, University of Colorado, Boulder Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Academia Sinica Yin-Chen Kang, Fo Guang University, Taiwan Hong-Jen Abraham Lin, Brooklyn College, City University of New York Shiau-Chi Shen, Soochow University, Taiwan Fang-long Shih, London School of Economics and Political Science Michelle Yeh, University of California-Davis

xi

Foreword: learning history Edward Friedman1 Learning about Taiwan has led me to re-think history. A study of commerce in the West Pacific and Indian Oceans from 1620 to 17202 reveals that Taiwan and Hokkien people were a key hub of early modern maritime networks. They were central to the burgeoning world market. In addition, as detailed in the chapter by Doris T. Chang, Taiwan has been a leader in gender equality. Democratic Taiwan has a dynamic civil society. Also, as everybody knows, Taiwan has won international acclaim for its twenty-first-century success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Taiwan, the size of Massachusetts plus Rhode Island, continually surprises me with its world-class achievements. I first flew into Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, in 1964. I met fellow graduate students who intended to study the Chinese peasantry by going to villages on the island, which was just south of the Japanese island chain and just north of the Philippines island chain and 100 miles east of the continent of Asia across a deep-water strait. Social scientists assumed that, since the PRC (People’s Republic of China) was closed-off to researchers by Mao Zedong’s Leninist–Stalinist dictatorship, international scholars could best study the Chinese countryside, then home to 80 percent or so of the population of the PRC, by studying Taiwanese villagers. These excellent scholars did not fully appreciate what had long made Taiwan distinct. Wang-you Chou’s chapter details how much more involved Taiwan’s farm families were with the world economy. The Taiwanese also were much better educated than the village households in guerrilla era Mao’s base in China’s northwest hinterland. Most Taiwanese, Minnan language speakers of the Hokkien community, fled to Taiwan from highly commercialized Fujian province to escape cruel treatment by the Manchu military of the new Qing empire, which had in 1644 replaced the Sinicized Ming empire. These Hokkien Taiwanese, who began as commercialized Ming loyalists in the seventeenth 1 Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin; specializes in PRC foreign policy and village politics in the PRC. 2 Xing Hang, Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

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century, joined Hokkien settlers who had come to Taiwan earlier in the seventeenth century to work in new Dutch plantations. The militarily powerful Qing state, however, soon incorporated Taiwan late in the seventeenth century. The Qing empire, two centuries later, surrendered Taiwan to Meiji Japan after the Qing lost an 1894/1895 clash with the Meiji fought over imperial control of Korea. When a U.S.-led WW II coalition defeated Hirohito’s imperial military in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC (Republic of China) sent soldiers to Taiwan to accept Japan’s surrender. Over the prior half-century, as detailed in the chapters by Yin-Chen Kang and many other contributors to this volume, Taiwanese had been somewhat Japanized. This too made Taiwanese unlike Mao’s Chinese peasant base. My 1964 colleagues erred in thinking that studying Taiwanese farm households could reveal important truths about the hinterland peasants fighting in Mao’s armies in a Chinese civil war. Already in the seventeenth century, Confucian Ming loyalist Hokkien settlers of Taiwan, as Confucian Koreans and Confucian Japanese, imagined the Manchu warriors who founded a gunpowder empire of the Qing as Tartar barbarians. In contrast to these purportedly uncivilized shamanists who spoke a Siberian tongue, Koreans, Japanese and Taiwanese Confucians imagined themselves as the center of civilization, as Zhongguo, surely not Manchu barbarians (when Chinese Buddhists first went to India to copy the Sutras, they referred to India as Zhongguo, the center of civilization). It would be another 250 years before Zhongguo was understood on the Sinified Asian continent to mean a Chinese nation-state.3 Identity on Taiwan has long been a complex and contested matter. In 1964, researchers were not fully aware of the conflictful particularities of Taiwan identity formation. Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC government, which ruled Taiwan after losing a civil war to Mao’s military in 1949 and moving to Taiwan, legitimated itself on Taiwan as China. It held the China seat on the U.N. Security Council. In contrast to Mao’s atheist regime, which treated Confucianism as a reactionary obstacle to revolution, an ideology that had to be wiped out by Mao’s regime, Chiang’s government promoted Confucianism, the presumed essence of civilization and, therefore, imagined itself as the authentic China. But, in contrast to my 1964 fellow graduate students arriving in Taiwan, Chiang did not see Taiwanese, with their unique experiences, as Chinese. This history surprised me. When I first landed in Taipei, Chiang’s police boarded the newly arrived plane and confiscated all material written in Japanese. I was perplexed when they seized a Japanese language issue of Reader’s Digest since that journal

3 Bill Hayton, The Invention of China, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020.

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was a strong supporter of Chiang. To Chiang, however, Taiwanese had, under Japan’s colonial rule been Japanized. They now had to be de-Japanized. Chiang’s goal was to Sinicize the Taiwanese. Chiang did not see Taiwanese villagers as Chinese peasants. As the chapters by Frank Hsiao and many others illuminate, it was a fact that, going back to the Tokugawa reign in Japan, when Hokkien trade networks were deeply embedded in the port of Nagasaki, ties to Japan were important to the Taiwanese. Koxinga, whose largely Hokkien military defeated the Dutch on Taiwan in the seventeenth century, was born in Japan to a Japanese mother. Yet, as noted earlier, Hokkien on Taiwan also were Ming loyalist Confucians. Taiwan identity has long incorporated multiple influences. Taiwan’s economic modernization, making it second only to Japan in Asian wealth by the end of Taiwan’s existence as a colony of Japan, owed a lot to Japanese policies, as shown in the chapters by Peter Chow and other authors. More surprisingly, as revealed in the chapters by Michael Hsiao, Abraham Lin and others, Japanese policies unintentionally unleashed on Taiwan a growing consciousness among Taiwanese that they actually were neither Chinese nor Japanese. Taiwan increasingly was imagined as a unique place with its own destiny. People on Taiwan were Taiwanese, They adopted, adapted and localized cultural elements from Europe, the Hokkien community, Japan, Ming China, Hakka settlers and indigenous Austronesians. Taiwanese were profoundly multicultural. State and society in Taiwan were not always in harmony. Under barbarian Qing rule, Confucian Taiwanese were supposed to imagine themselves as Qingren, people loyal to the ruling Manchu Aisingioro imperial lineage. As part of the Japanese empire, the Taiwanese were supposed to be loyal to the world’s longest-lasting imperial lineage, which headed an Asian state widely admired for its incredibly rapid modernization. It would not be until the twentieth century that Taiwanese who had long identified with communities premised on a language, a lineage or a temple could identify with a passionate Taiwan-wide nationalism. Modern nationalism is a uniquely powerful identity far deeper than identities with distant, alien imperial lineages. A secure, democratic Taiwan nation, however complex the recent evolution of its democratic Taiwanese identity, as shown by Shiau-Chi Shen, can imagine itself as a rich, multicultural democratic society as the inevitable result of a deep and long history going back centuries. Such a national identity can absorb or deflect challenging events rather than be changed or undermined by them. It becomes a given that Taiwanese are multicultural democrats. As the American writer William Faulkner described the persistent and preservative power of cultural identity, “Memory believes before knowing remembers.” To Chiang’s KMT, however, Japanized Taiwanese were traitors. They had served Hirohito’s military empire as soldiers and administrators. For Chiang,

Foreword: learning history

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it was imperative that Japanized Taiwanese be Sinified, be Han-hua, become civilized, a notion similar to Taiwan’s formative anti-Manchu Confucian consciousness. To the Mainlander, anti-Japan Nationalists (KMT, Kuomintang) who started coming to Taiwan in 1945, Japanese were cruel invaders of the ROC whose brutal occupation from 1931 to 1945 had facilitated the 1949 civil war victory of the armies of Mao’s CCP (Chinese Communist Party) despite the enormous sacrifice of life by the KMT military in bravely resisting Hirohito’s military aggression. For the Mainlanders, the non-Chinese Taiwanese were not civilized. They had not become Hanhua, civilized Chinese, while Chinese, in contrast, had inherited a great ancient civilization. Taiwanese were imagined as primitive, an understanding that could not appreciate how Hokkien actually had long experienced themselves as uniquely civilized, going back to the age of Koxinga. Taiwanese experienced the Mainlander losers who fled to Taiwan after World War II as poor, undisciplined, corrupt, irrational, violent and backward. A clash between the two communities exploded on February 28, 1947. The KMT military imprisoned, tortured and slaughtered the civilian Taiwanese elite. Clearly, Taiwanese history was not Chinese history. This clash of identities in which the Mainlander KMT looked down on the Hokkien community pervaded the Taiwan I lived in during 1964, 1965 and 1966. It was quotidian. If I walked with a Mainlander colleague and came across a beautiful flower and commented, “What a beautiful flower,” the Mainlander immediately chided me: “Beautiful flower? Beautiful flower? There are no beautiful flowers on Taiwan. If you want to see a beautiful flower, go to the Mainland. China has beautiful flowers.” To Mainlanders, Taiwan lacked magnificence. It lacked civilization. Into the twenty-first century, many Mainlanders still hold this view. In the academy on Taiwan, many Mainlanders resist a curriculum that includes Taiwan culture. They don’t think Taiwan has much of a culture. They certainly could not appreciate a Taiwanese understanding of Hokkien Taiwanese as “the civilized” in contrast both to barbarian Manchu and to the violent and irrational Mainlanders. And yet, gradually, over a century, but especially since democratization began in 1988, a multicultural Taiwanese identity has come to pervade all the nation’s communities – Hokkien, Mainlanders, Hakka and Indigenous. The twenty-first-century CCP, however, understands this history of identity formation and transformation on Taiwan – from Ming to Qing to Japanese to KMT Chinese to multicultural Taiwanese – to suggest that, once the expansionist PRC annexes democratic, multicultural Taiwan, the Taiwanese will accept being superior Han Chinese as promoted by the CCP state. In this CCP view,

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the state is all-powerful. There indeed is much evidence that a totalitarian state can terrorize most of its subjects into conformity and complicity. But Taiwan’s new multicultural, democratic national identity is different from prior imperial or cultural identities and quite deep. In the Japanese colonial era, Hokkien speakers became aware that their mother tongue was painfully and unjustly marginalized by Japanese colonizers. Railing against the imperial occupier, Taiwanese sought self-rule. By the end of the 1930s, Mao’s CCP supported a Taiwanese national liberation movement seeking independence from Hirohito’s Showa era military empire. Taiwanese were and should be a nation. Despite Chiang’s subsequent policy of coerced Sinicization, indeed, in part in response to this coerced Sinicization, as Kang and others point out, a sense of being Taiwanese deepened and spread. The Chinese KMT dictatorship banned the Hokkien community’s Minnan language from many venues. Hokkien children regularly returned home from school reporting humiliating mistreatment by teachers for speaking their mother tongue. Mainlanders who grew up speaking Mandarin were privileged. I experienced this Taiwanese resentment of Sinicization at a rural wedding I attended in 1965. In the groom’s family where I joined a wedding banquet, I heard how Grandma stayed home to care for the little children who were too young for kindergarten, but she was kept from hearing her mother tongue, Hokkien, on the radio because of KMT language policy. The family was furious at the pain the Mainlanders inflicted on Grandma. Justice required embracing Taiwanese-ness and ending a prejudiced Sinic system that peripheralized the majority Hokkien community on Taiwan. A Chinese identity for Taiwan further lost its attractiveness in 1971–1972 when President Richard Nixon began normalizing USA relations with the PRC and Chiang’s government lost its seat representing China in the U.N. Taiwanese, including Mainlanders, began to re-think their historical roots. Some came to identity with Mao’s supposedly proletarian movement. But far more Taiwanese focused on Taiwan’s original settlers, the indigenous Austronesians whose language communities were spread from the South Pacific Islands to Madagascar at the western edge of the Indian Ocean, an identity having nothing in common with land-focused continental Chinese such as Mao’s peasantry. Taiwan’s history began on Taiwan. In contrast to most studies of Taiwan and most other countries, this volume has a chapter that tells the story of Taiwan’s indigenous communities. In fact, since democratization began in 1988, Taiwan has practiced one of the world’s most enlightened first people’s policies. I ran into indigenous Austronesian resentment of the Hokkien in 1966. I had joined a group of Mainland KMT stalwarts on a mailboat heading from Taitung on Taiwan’s Pacific Ocean east coast to Austronesian Orchid

Foreword: learning history

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Island and to Green Island, which held Taiwanese political prisoners going back at least to the 2/28 insurrection. During my short stay on Orchid Island, teenage Austronesian males, who had come out on the bay where the mailboat anchored, to row us to shore in a large outrigger canoe, returned at night to the elementary school gym on whose floor I was preparing to sleep (the island had no hotels or boarding houses). They were part of the modern world. They wore sneakers and were tied to the world by transistor radios. They wanted to know when the U.S. Marines would be returning to liberate indigenous people from the Mainlanders, by which term they meant the Hokkien who drove them from their land in the seventeenth century. Those U.S. Marines had stopped momentarily on Orchid Island in 1945 heading north to finish off Hirohito’s Empire, which then ruled Taiwan. Historical identity formation has long-term consequences. Opposed to Hokkien settler colonialism since the seventeenth century, Taiwan’s indigenous people tend to not vote today for the Hokkien-majority Democratic Progressive Party despite Taiwan’s multicultural democratic inclusivity, a world away from Han China’s genocidal amalgamationism meant to extinguish the cultural essence of minority identities in East Turkestan, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Taiwan is not China. It promotes human rights for all its people. In Taiwan, Christians, Buddhists, Taoists, Confucians and Indigenous all thrive. However, CCP irredentism threatens Taiwan’s historical humane achievements. PRC chauvinistic irredentism threatens to annex Taiwan, as detailed in June Dreyer’s chapter. The inhumanity unleashed by the neo-totalitarian CCP against people in the PRC, from Uyghurs to the citizens of Hong Kong, has been well covered by the international media. The CCP also seeks to replace Taiwan’s vibrant multiculturalism with Han racism. What is at stake is not just the fate of 24 million free Taiwanese. Han CCP ambitions, as Dreyer shows, are region-wide. And because the Indo-Pacific is the world’s most economically dynamic region, what threatens Taiwan is also a matter of global significance. The history of Taiwan, as revealed in the rich chapters of this broad-ranging, scholarly book, has long been, and continues to be, a matter of global significance.

Foreword: why start talking from 1920s? Masahiro Wakabayashi1 This book, edited by Professor Chow, is a volume of scholarly chapters that discuss the changes of Taiwan over the past century. Most chapters take the 1920s as a starting point of discourse. Since my field of research is Taiwan area studies, I would like to examine the meaning behind a starting point of the 1920s in Taiwan through the lens of area studies. The motivation to determine an area as the research object for a researcher should be his/her belief that there is more beyond geographic existence in the area. Thus, the basic tasks for researchers in area studies should be guided by questions like how does the “beyond geographical existence” come into being, and what is the position of such being in the modern world. Moreover, there must be an “origin” behind an area that caused researchers’ recognition of the area as being a worthy focus for area studies. In other words, studying the specific “origins” of the area, such as looking into “the (unique) origins of Taiwan,” is one of the essential ways of conducting Taiwan studies. Nevertheless, the choice of “which time in history as a starting point of discussion” would naturally affect the interpretation of the “origin.” According to my understanding, the chapters in this book, some more broadly and some more specifically, take the 1920s as the starting point for the discussion. It may be fair to say, this book is an academic work that explains “the origin of Taiwan” through various angles and approaches. Therefore, what does it eventually mean to take the 1920s as a starting point to discuss “the origin of Taiwan”? As far as the scope of modern history is concerned, it could be reasonable to start the discussion from a different time: We could choose either the late 1870s, when the Qing government considerably changed the policy towards Taiwan, or 1895, when the Japanese government launched a colonial rule in Taiwan. We could also take 1945 as the starting point when the Republic of China (ROC) was in power, or we could pick 1950 in which the territory of the ROC regime shrank to Taiwan. Therefore, what is the profound meaning of adopting the 1920s as the starting point?



1

若林正丈, March 15, 2021, Sagamihara, Japan. xviii

Foreword

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There are two clues. One is what the editor, Professor Chow, has pointed out: the 1920s is a turning point when Taiwanese intellectuals started to promote the unique enlightenment campaign. Several chapters in this book mention specific events that echo this opinion. The Taiwan Youth Monthly ( 臺灣青年月刊), which later developed into an essential platform to represent Taiwanese peoples’ voices, was published in 1920. One of the most important political campaigns, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會設置請願運動), launched in 1921; and in the same year, the Taiwan Cultural Association (台灣文化協會), the central organization that promoted enlightenment campaigns, was established in Taipei. This year (2021) is the 100th anniversary for the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament and the establishment of the Taiwan Cultural Association. I also agree with Professor Chow’s idea of taking the 1920s as a turning point of history. In terms of pragmatic results on politics, the various campaigns that took place in the 1920s achieved only a few effective fruits due to pressure and clever power manipulation of the colonial government. However, it did mark a unique era in the history of Taiwanese peoples’ mindsets. The political scientist Wu Nai-teh 吳乃德 has mentioned in his recent book that the period 1977–1987 was the “the best moment” for Taiwanese people before breaking from the one-party dominance system of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) (Wu Naiteh, The Best Moment of Taiwan 1977–1987 (臺 灣最好的時刻 1977–1987) Taipei: SpringHill Publishing, 2020). In line with this idea, the 1920s was the glorious era before the war, as in which Taiwanese intellectuals’ democratic spirits were awakened and thriving. I believe that the 1920s Taiwanese intellectuals’ resistance to the assimilationist ideology of the colonial regime that infiltrated from the top-down initiated the “Taiwan vision of democracy and autonomy,” which was an important spiritual heritage for the following generations. This spiritual heritage was echoed in the 1980s when the “Dangwai” 黨外 (outside of the KMT Party) democratic campaign, proposed the “Taiwan Vision of Democratic Self-determination.” Another clue is the historical view of “continuous colonization.” This historical view argues that the Japanese governance was undoubtedly a colonial rule and the Japanese Government-General of Taiwan represented the colonial regime; however, the Republic of China (ROC) that replaced Japan in dominating Taiwan after the war and before the democratization was also a colonial rule. Additionally, the authoritarian power of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) was another colonial regime. Such a viewpoint has been commonly expressed and widely accepted by Taiwanese historians in recent years. Although it is not explicitly mentioned, the authors of this book roughly adopt this historical view.

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Considering the above two clues together, taking the 1920s as the starting point in considering “the origin of Taiwan” can be read as a historical view of “decolonization.” It has been well known that the cultural enlightenment and the autonomy movements in 1920s Taiwan all emerged in a wave of national self-determination after World War I. At that time, the administrative system and various facilities of the modern country had begun to take shape in colonial Taiwan. In this context, Taiwan experienced the awakening of a new political consciousness, a new rising identity, and a later dream of democracy. The success of such a dream of democracy was once again a process of awakening during the new colonizers’ suppression after the war. Taiwan also has faced new challenges after the democratization. Such a narrative should be understood through the logic of “continuous colonization” in history. I personally believe that the phrase “colony” should be reserved for the subordinate regions that had been ruled by imperialism in world history, while not extending the concept of “colony” to refer to Taiwan in the postwar authoritarian period. However, distinct from the consideration based on a pure academic historical discipline, I believe that the historical view of “decolonization” can be one of the narrative strategies of reconsidering “the origin of Taiwan” and self-redefinition. Such a viewpoint can also inspire the understanding of Taiwan by the other in Taiwan studies. This should be one of the joys of reading this book.

Preface and acknowledgment In today’s interdependent world society, lessons in development should be viewed as a global public good, with success stories objectively assessed and widely circulated. A century of development in Taiwan is unique not only in economic but also socio-political terms. In fact, Taiwan’s transformation from a subjugated colony to a culturally rich, economically prosperous and politically progressive democracy is often overshadowed by its economic development from an agrarian economy to the high-tech hub of Asia. The “Enlightenment Movement” in the 1920s, exemplified by the establishment of the Taiwan Cultural Association and the movement of a “Petition of Establishing Taiwan Parliament” is arguably a historical turning point in Taiwan’s modernization. After numerous setbacks, both movements precipitated a series of social and political transformations that stoked Taiwanese self-consciousness, autonomy, and self-determination during the Japanese empire period. Despite subsequent repressive governance under the authoritarian regime in post-World War II, the Taiwanese nurtured distinct cultural, ethnic, and national identities, as well as strong democratic ideals in their struggle for nation-building. This book offers a critical review of the development of socio-cultural, economic, and national identity in Taiwan in the twentieth century and beyond. It is hoped that exploration of Taiwan’s development as a modern, industrialized democratic country will offer a compelling model of development across multiple academic disciplines and important policy implications in world development. This edited volume reflects the collective wisdom and in-depth research of distinguished scholars in diverse areas of Taiwan study. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to each author for their diligent research and writing, as well as numerous anonymous referees for constructive reviews on the manuscript. In addition, special thanks are due to Edward Friedman and Masahiro Wakabayashi for writing the foreword essays. The publication grant from Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and the Tsao Yun Ho Foundation is greatly appreciated. Of course, the views expressed in each chapter belong solely to each author and do not represent those of the funding institutions. As always, I want to thank all members of my family for their

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ongoing support, particularly through my final edits during the COVID-19 pandemic. Peter C.Y. Chow March 31, 2021

PART I

Introduction

1. From colony to modern state: an overview of Taiwan’s path of development Peter C.Y. Chow1 Taiwan has been in the global playing field since the Age of the Great Exploration in the 16th century, when it was named “Ilha Formosa,” meaning “beautiful island” in Portuguese. But its modernization arguably began with the enlightenment movement against Japan’s colonial rule in the 1920s.2 Most colonies became independent countries after the end of World War II, while few of them became modernized even after decades of their independence.3 Taiwan is one of the few, having become a modern state with remarkable achievements in its economic, socio-cultural, and political development. Hence the study of Taiwan’s path of development from colony to modernity is a significant subject in world development. Taiwan became a Japanese colony after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895. Japan’s colonial occupation in Taiwan faced strong armed resistance and attempted uprising from the people of Taiwan in the first two decades or so. After the 1920s, the Japanese colonial government implemented a “policy of assimilation” under the homeland extension principle to homogenize the people of Taiwan with the Japanese (He and Tsai, 2019, pp. 71–73).4 Meanwhile, the anti-colonial movement shifted from overthrowing colonial governance by force to peaceful pursuit through a cultural enlightening movement (Chou, 2019, pp. 138–142). In 1921, Taiwanese intellectuals initiated a Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament to set up a representative body for Taiwanese people under the colonial government.5 Leaders of the enlightenment also established the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA) on October 17, 1921, which “set up small libraries around Taiwan, arranged film-screening tours, published newspapers, promoted formal education, and introduced Western scientific knowledge to the country.”6 Both the petition movement of establishing a Taiwan parliament and the initiation of the TCA were arguably inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination, the May Fourth movement in China and the abortive Taishō  Democracy (1912–26) in Japan. 2

From colony to modern state

3

In spite of several setbacks and splits within as addressed in Chapter 15 by Shih, both enlightenments did lead to a series of socio-cultural and political movements in Taiwan. Since then, Taiwanese people were able to nurture their own indigenous cultural, ethnic identity, and to some extent Taiwanese nationalism within the colonial government, even though they were forced to be further Japanized under the Kōminka movement (皇民化運動) in 1937–45. Literally, the Kōminka movement was to make the people of Taiwan to become “real Japanese” and the loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor who was being worshipped as a god by Japanese people. It was designated not only to promote the Japanese language as the “national language” for Taiwanese people, but also to change Taiwanese religious practice to Japanese Shinto and even their names to become Japanized. However, the Japanization movement was terminated after the end of World War II as Taiwan became a province of the Republic of China (ROC).7 Due to the chaotic disruptions of post-war rehabilitation upon the arrival of the government of Republic of China (ROC) under Kuomintang (KMT), which led to the tragedy of the Incident of February 28th, 1947, Taiwan went through a short period of conflicting national identities in the immediate post war period in 1945–50 (Wu, 2016).8 During the authoritarian period under the KMT in 1949–87, Taiwanese people continued to struggle for more socio-political participation and nurture their own ethnic and cultural identity to differentiate themselves from the Han Chinese in China. After democratization gained its momentum in the 1990s under the leadership of President Lee Teng Hui (1923–2020), Taiwanese nationalism became more and more prevalent and became deeply rooted among a great majority of Taiwanese people.9 Politically, Taiwan transformed itself from a Japanese colony through a period of authoritarian regime under the KMT to a democratic country with regularized procedures of periodic elections for government turnover after the full-scale elections of the Legislative Yuan in 1992 and the direct popular election of the president in 1996. Economically, it transformed itself from an agrarian economy in the immediate post-WWII period to one of the high-tech hubs in the world by the end of the 20th century. Socio-culturally, the Taiwanese people have evolved from a repressed ethnic and national identity into a unique nationalism with a distinct multi-culture and Taiwan-centric civil society different from that of Communist China. Taiwan’s unique development path provides a compelling model that contrasts starkly with those of many developing countries. This book offers a critical review of the evolution of socio-cultural, economic, and national identity in the past century in Taiwan since the enlightenment movement in the 1920s. It has four major sections. The first section is on identity and political developments as well as international relations; the second is on economic

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A century of development in Taiwan

development. The third section focuses on educational and societal development, and the last is on culture and literature development.

TAIWANESE IDENTITY, NATIONAL BUILDING, AND ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS Taiwan has fulfilled all of the four qualifications of a statehood as decreeed in the Montevideo Convention of 1933.10 However, its unique international status is a puzzle for many who are not familiar with its national and ethnic identity. In Chapter 2, June Teufel Dreyer addresses Taiwan’s international relations, arguing that Taiwan’s place in the international system may be said to have been under threat since the day that Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the far larger and more populous People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. When, after a number of disastrous policies, the PRC began to prosper and its rule became consolidated, ever-larger numbers of global actors began to acknowledge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the sole legitimate government of China, breaking relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. As the momentum of de-recognition of the ROC increased, so as well did Taiwanese concerns that they faced a choice between international isolation or unwanted absorption into the PRC. Dreyer examines the strategies through which Taiwan has sought to establish itself as an independent actor in the international system and to resist a multi-dimensional assault by the Beijing government to reduce its freedom of action. These are inextricably intertwined with the democratization and emerging consciousness of an identity separate from that of either the Republic of China or China at large. China’s tactics against Taiwan have included shows of military might, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, intimidation, united front activities designed to destabilize Taiwan from within, and use of its economic power to reward those countries and individuals that support China’s claims on Taiwan while punishing those that do not. The Taiwan government has devised a number of counterstrategies designed to resist Beijing’s pressure, playing a weak hand well. In Chapter 3, Yi-Shen Chen focuses on three critical historical dates that shifted Taiwan from a province to a nation state. The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, concluded in 1951, stated that Japan renounced its territories’ claims to Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu), but did not specify which governments of China in Beijing or Taipei would receive it. This is because the US was unwilling to see Taiwan become a province of Red China in the wake of the fall of the exiled KMT regime. In consequence, first General MacArthur and then President Truman consequently declared the “undetermined status of Taiwan.”

From colony to modern state

5

It was after the US sought rapprochement with China and Henry Kissinger made his secret visit there in 1971 that the representatives of the ROC (Chiang Kai-shek) were expelled from the United Nations on October 25 of the same year. Having lost its international recognition at the UN, the KMT realized its legitimacy to recover the mainland was gone and it had to win popular support through internal reforms. Apart from regular supplementary elections held for the central representatives, as Chiang Ching-kuo came to power as premier in 1972, young Taiwanese elites were recruited into his cabinet and the Ten Major Construction Projects were launched. When President Chiang Ching-kuo passed away in 1988, he was succeeded by the Taiwan-born Vice President Lee Teng-hui, who later defeated his rivals within the KMT and was elected president in 1990 through the National Assembly. President Lee began a series of constitutional reforms, including abolishing the Temporary Provision of Mobilization to Eradicate the Communist Rebellion in 1991. This single action formally acknowledged the effective control of mainland China by the PRC, and ROC jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, and the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. Subsequently, President Lee successfully completed a series of constitutional amendments to hold a full-scale election of all members of the National Assembly in 1991 and Legislative Yuan respectively in 1992 as well a direct presidential election in 1996. The 1996 presidential election made Lee to become the first popularly elected Taiwanese president and symbolized Taiwan’s de facto autonomy as a separate political entity from PRC. Lee expressed his view in an interview with German media that a ‘special state-to-state’ relationship existed between Taiwan and China,11 a doctrine to which recently re-elected President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continues to adhere. In Chapter 4, Lung-chih Chang offers a synopsis of recent historical scholarship on the question of ethnicity in Taiwan. The formation of Taiwan’s multi-ethnic society can be traced from the interactions between states/ empires, Han immigrants, and plains aborigines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the territorial colonization and ethnic classification of upland indigenous peoples by Qing and Japanese regimes since late 19th century; and the ethno-genesis of Taiwanese consciousness in nation-building efforts of Japanese and Chinese regimes in the 20th century. Following the democratization process, Taiwan witnessed the ethnic movements of the indigenous Hakka peoples in the 1980s along with new initiatives for Southeast Asian immigrants since 1990s. He also introduces representative works on Taiwanese ethnicity from interdisciplinary approaches. The conclusion further reflects on the ongoing efforts and debates about transitional justice in contemporary Taiwan. In Chapter 5, Shiau-Chi Shen deals with the subject of which way to best characterize the dynamics of Taiwan’s national identity politics: the continu-

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A century of development in Taiwan

ing struggles of two antagonistic nationalisms, the conversion from orthodox Chinese identity to new Taiwanese identity, the triumph of pragmatism, or a chaotic society with confused national identity. Analyzing data from nine surveys conducted between 1991 and 2020, this chapter first depicts the trends in national identity of the general populace in Taiwan and identifies two distinct stages of identity change. The first stage is characterized by the rise and predominance of dual identities in the 1990s. The second is characterized by the waning of Chinese identity/nationalism since 2004. The phenomenon of dual identities raises a puzzling question for the study of nationalism: why the emerging Taiwanese national identity was compatible with orthodox Chinese nationalism. The decline of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan since 2004 poses another puzzle: why in the time of China’s rise and the increasing economic integration between the two sides of the Straits, Chinese national identity began to lose its appeal to the populace on the island. To answer these two puzzles, Shen examines the nature of both Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity and analyzes how they have negotiated with each other since Taiwan’s democratization.

FROM AGRARIAN ECONOMY TO INNOVATOR IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY Section III covers three most important aspects of Taiwan’s economic development since the 1920s. Although there is no universally accepted paradigm that can be duplicated in other countries, Taiwan’s economic development is usually considered as a role model for developing countries. Until the mid-1930s, the main driver of Taiwan’s economic development had been agriculture, through its comparative advantage of resources among the regions that comprised the early Japanese Empire. However, as Frank Hsiao addresses in Chapter 6, when the Japanese Empire grew rapidly in the early 1930s, the pace of Taiwan’s industrialization accelerated before the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. After 1939, for the first time in Taiwan’s history, the value of annual industrial production exceeded that of agricultural production (a turning point of economic development). With the increase in Japan’s military demand, the Taiwanese economy entered the war-stage after 1937, and industrialization progressed to heavy and chemical industries from the beginning of World War II until the end of the war in 1945. Since Taiwan, like Japan, is a naturally resource-poor country, Taiwan had to rely on foreign resources in order to develop heavy and chemical industries. From mid-1937, the Japanese-appointed Governor General of Taiwan promoted three basic slogans with three “ka (to promote),” namely, “Industrialization (Kōgyōka),” “Japanization (Kōminka),” and “Becoming the Go South Base (Nanshin kichika).” The last of these reflected the adjustment

From colony to modern state

7

of the Taiwanese economy and politics in response to Japan’s interests in, and later the military occupation of the Southeast Asia, i.e. “South China and the South Seas” (Nanshi Nanyō). Taiwan’s economic policy was therefore to search for, and to take advantage of, the resources available in Southeast Asia to promote Taiwan’s industrialization, especially heavy and chemical industries. In Chapter 6, Frank Hsiao uses available literature and statistical data to trace the process of prewar Taiwan’s industrialization. He then shows that Taiwan’s industrialization followed the rapid rise of Japan’s militarism, and analyzes the resources of Southeast Asia available for Taiwan’s industrialization. Chapter 6 closes with a brief review of Taiwan’s postwar economic development and its New Southward Policy undertaken by the Tsai Administration. Next, in Chapter 7, Peter Chow briefly highlights the colonial legacies that were relevant to Taiwan’s post-war development and then addresses the leader (Japan)–follower collaboration of industrial development in the “linked development” model in Asian countries (Gerald, 1998) since the 1960s. Taiwan evolved from a follower of Japan’s industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, emerging as an innovator in some high-tech sectors after the 1980s and coming to play a significant role in the global supply chains. Chow argues that Taiwan’s industrialization was far beyond the “following the leader” collaboration between mother goose Japan and the small geese in Akamatsu’s (1962) “flying geese model.” After the 1980s, Taiwan developed its own indigenous manufactures by linking itself with global supply chains. To demonstrate the status of Taiwan as an innovator in the 21st century, Chow uses the database of four categories of high-tech industries by OECD and US Patent and Trademark Office data on the number of patents granted to foreign countries to show Taiwan’s role in high-tech industry, so as to provide Taiwan’s experience of industrialization for developing countries. Capital formation and economic development are highly interdependent. In Chapter 8, Abraham Lin highlights the monetary and banking systems of Taiwan from 1661 to 2020. Lin briefly explores the history of different roles of banking and money and their role in capital formation for economic development. Taiwan has always had its own currency to represent its identity in different eras. Moreover, Taiwan has had certain degree of its monetary autonomy even under the Japanese colonial government. The banking system in Taiwan also has been developing in accordance with its overall economic developments. In pre-World War II periods when the Taiwan authorities wanted to emphasize the role of capital formation, they moved to adopt the gold standard system; when financial stability was emphasized after 1949, a gold standard-like (gold-dollar) system was considered. When the banking policies were prone to promoting international trades, Taiwan’s banking authority adopted the currency standard related to the major trade partners.

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A century of development in Taiwan

SOCIETAL AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Section IV deals with societal and educational development in the past century. In Chapter 9, Michael Hsiao depicts and analyzes the significant cycles of the rise and fall of Taiwan’s civil society momentum and organized movements between 1920 and 2020. Between 1920 and 1937, the Taiwanese landlord– merchant–gentry class and intellectuals began to launch organized civil society movements to demand self-governance through the petition of establishment of Taiwan Parliament movement and various social and economic reforms in Taiwan. In the end, these were suppressed due to the breakout of the Pacific War and the ultimate termination of colonial governance. There was a similar suppression on civil society under the exiled Nationalist (KMT) regime after the war until the mid-1970s, though a few individual intellectuals spoke out for reforms within the KMT regime in the 1950s and 1960s. In the mid-1970s, a new wave of cultural enlightenment movements was led by literary luminaries, singers, and social scientists in the raging “nativist literature movement,” “sing our song movement,” and “indigenization of social science movement” respectively. The same time also witnessed the birth of many newly published critical social and political magazines by the new breed of social and political activists calling for political liberalization and democratization. Beginning in 1980, large-scale civil society movements led to the first regime change from KMT to DPP rule in 2000. The primary goal of civil society movements was for democratization before 2000, and after 2000 it turned to democratic consolidation, democracy rescue, and national integrity from the external threat from Beijing. Michael Hsiao points out that it was the Taiwanese landlord gentry and intellectuals who led the civil society protest under the colonialism; and then after the war, the leading force of civil society activism changed to liberal new middle-class professionals and intellectuals. He concludes that the civil society finally achieved its collective goals to realize social reforms, political democracy, and regime change in a true modern state. Education is a particularly important infrastructure for crafting a nation state. In Chapter 10, Wan-yao Chou analyzes how a century of colonial education was carried out in Taiwan by Japan and the KMT/ROC party-state. In 1898, the Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan implemented a public elementary school system for Taiwanese children, teaching Japanese language and history; after the war, the KMT Government taught Chinese and Chinese history, but not until September 1997 was Taiwan’s history included in junior high school curricula. This chapter presents a basic understanding of the educational content offered to Taiwanese children during this period by two different ruling authorities. Comparisons are made between the two types

From colony to modern state

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of education with focuses on national language (meaning Japanese and later Mandarin), history, and ethics. In general, the Japanese colonial education was rich in heimat (here meaning Taiwan, 鄉土) materials, but the history of the island was almost completely absent from the readers, a vacuum that was filled by Japan’s history. In post-war Taiwan, there were very few homeland materials in the national language (now Mandarin). Taiwan, the homeland of the Taiwanese schoolchildren, was absent from their curricula, and what replaced it was an imagined “homeland in China.” History textbooks carried almost no history of Taiwan. Their main content was Chinese history, narrated from the perspective of Chinese nationalism. Some peculiar aspects of ethics and geography textbooks are also discussed briefly in Chapter 10. The final part deals with the issue of how party-state education came to “an end without ending” in the period 1997–2016. The century of colonial education from 1898 to 1997 shaped today’s Taiwan to a great degree and induced the complicated national identity problems of both those who regard themselves as Taiwanese and those who regard themselves as Chinese who desire future unification with China. Crafting nation building through education under colonial regimes has been a long and hard struggle for Taiwanese people. In Chapter 11, Doris Chang addresses Taiwanese women’s status in historical perspective. The advancement of Taiwanese women’s status has been remarkable in the past century. In this chapter, Chang focuses on the discussion of women’s status in three key areas—the education of women and girls, the status and participation of women in the workforce, and women’s political participation and leadership. Among all the numerous incremental gains of the past century, the attainment of political leadership was perhaps the greatest achievement of Taiwanese women. During the Japanese colonial era, women in colonial Taiwan did not have the right to the franchise. In 2016, Taiwan became the first Chinese-speaking society to elect a female president via the popular vote. By 2020, the percentage of female lawmakers in Taiwan’s legislature had reached 42 percent—the highest in Asia and one of the highest in the world. The advancement of Taiwanese women’s political power in the 21st century must be situated within the larger context of the gender mainstreaming policies implemented by Taiwanese government and political parties since the late 1990s. Chang also examines women’s political leadership and participation within the larger context of Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy and its contested national identities from 1920 to 2020. In the realm of educational attainment, most Taiwanese women and girls only received public education in the primary-school level during the Japanese colonial era. This phenomenon is fairly common in many other countries during the period before WWII. By the 2010s, more young women were

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graduating with college degrees than their male counterparts. Yet horizontal segregation of college majors and professions along gender lines still persists in contemporary Taiwanese society. Most young men choose to major in fields such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), whereas most women choose to major in liberal arts, education, and bachelor’s degrees that would prepare them for vocations in social services and health professions. As shown in this chapter, one can see that the training of women and girls in the healthcare professions really had its genesis during the Japanese colonial era. Although there is a significant progress on women’s social status in Taiwan, more needs to be done to achieve gender equality in a modern or even post-modern society.

LITERATURE AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT Section V focuses on literature and cultural development. In Chapter 12, Yin-Chen Kang addresses the development of new theatre in Taiwan. Bun-hua-kiok (cultural theatre) was the first modern theatre born in Taiwan and using Taiwanese language in the 1920s. The emergence of bun-hua-kiok resulted from the influence of Japanese modern theatre as well as the political and social movements of the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA) during the 1920s. Since the beginning of colonization, Japanese modern theatre has spread to Taiwan. The modern forms were practiced by Japanese troupes in Taiwan for two decades. Then in the early 1920s, when TCA launched a series of movements, members considered modern theatre as an efficient instrument for cultural enlightenment. The theatre performed by these members was called bun-hua-kiok. From the late 1920s, some Taiwanese dramatists went to Japan to learn modern theatre theory and skills. They returned to Taiwan with the newest knowledge of modern theatre and helped to develop bun-hua-kiok into a more mature form. This new form was called sin-kiok (new theatre). During the Second World War, the colonial government intended to take advantage of sin-kiok for propaganda. In the post-war period, sin-kiok eventually turned out to be a commercial product, although it was still often interfered with by the KMT government. When Tai-gi film (臺語片, Taiwanese movies) rose, some dramatists and players of sin-kiok participated in this industry with their experiences and training of the Japanese theatre. However, it declined and finally disappeared in the late 1960s due to policies of the KMT government that discriminated against the Taiwanese language, education, and media, thus effectively suppressing entirely indigenous Taiwanese culture and language. Nevertheless, this history was gradually rediscovered and valorized from the 1990s after indigenization was launched along with democratization. Its legacy has been continually expanded.

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In Chapter 13, Michelle Yeh provides an overview of the development of Taiwan literature in the context of evolving linguistic, socio-political, and cultural conditions. Yeh divides this development into five chronological periods. During the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), the continuity of classical poetry in Chinese existed alongside the burgeoning of modern literature—first in Chinese and later in Japanese. In the transition from the colonial period to the post-war period, Japanese literature was banned and émigré writers from mainland China played a leading role on the literary scene. Much of the May Fourth legacy, categorically labeled “communist,” was banned, while the KMT promoted nationalism, traditionalism, and anti-communism. However, some writers found an affinity with Western modernism and engaged in bold and innovative experimentation. In the 1970s, there was a reaction against modernism and the rise of nativism. The call for a return to Chinese culture and Taiwanese social reality was underscored by Taiwan’s setbacks in the international arena. The development culminated in the Indigenous Literature Movement of 1977. The ascendancy of nativism on the one hand, and postmodern experiments on the other in the 1980s and 1990s was described in the fourth period. In the 21st century, literature has thrived on the Internet, but literary papers publishing shrank. As nativism became institutionalized, Taiwan literature was seen as independent of Chinese literature and part of world literature. Taiwanese literature is increasingly translated for international readers, with Taiwan writers winning awards in the West. In Chapter 14, Jasmine Chen examines the origin and development of opeila (胡撇仔, the hybrid and creative performance) in Taiwanese opera (kua-a-hi 歌仔戲). Taiwanese opera, which shares similar performing conventions and repertoires with Chinese opera, is the traditional theatre initiated in colonial Taiwan. Taiwanese opera’s conventional performance encountered fundamental transformation when the Japanese government launched the Kōminka Movement (Japanization Movement) and banned Chinese-style theatres in the late 1930s. Due to this censorship, Taiwanese opera troupes adopted the Japanese “period drama” (jidai geki, 時代劇) and modern “new drama” (shingeki, 新劇) to cope with Japanese police’s inspections. The hybrid form of performance gradually composed a unique subgenre in Taiwanese opera: opeila; the phrase was phonetically adapted from the Japanese pronunciation of “opera” (o-pe-ra, オペラ) in Taiwanese Holo (also known as Minnan or Hokkien) vernacular. Opeila did not disappear after the Japanese colonial period but continued to develop in post-war Taiwan. Throughout the era of indoor commercial theatre in 1950s and outdoor performances since early 1960s, most Taiwanese opera troupes follow the etiquette of performing classical repertoires for matinees and opeila for evening performances. While it has been an essential subgenre of Taiwanese opera, opeila has received little

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attention from English scholarship regarding its historical background and hybrid transformation. This chapter articulates the significant context of opeila by discussing the hybrid theatre during and after the Japanese colonial period. Blending news archives with interviews of actors, this chapter shows how opeila not only mixed Japanese and Chinese culture but also integrated local creativity thereby transforming traditional Taiwanese opera. The last century has witnessed Taiwan people’s struggles over their self-consciousness, autonomy, and self-determination. Chapter 15, by Fang-long Shih addresses a century of struggles over Taiwan’s cultural self-consciousness through focusing on the life and afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui (1891–1931) and the Taiwan Cultural Association that he founded in 1921. Shih investigates Chiang’s vision that the TCA’s promotion of a modernized culture would strengthen the social health of the Han population to become culturally fit for survival in the contemporary world. Shih argues that though Chiang intended to rally TCA members’ self-consciousness as a colonized people, he did not prioritize nationalist self-consciousness—whether Chinese or Taiwanese. For 40 years after his death, memory of Chiang’s cultural initiatives died with him, both during Japanese wartime mobilization 1931–45, and, counterintuitively, during the KMT martial law period 1949–87. In the last 50 years 1969–2020, commemoration and memory of Chiang Wei-shui has been revived, with his initiatives in the 1920s being referred to as Taiwan’s “Self-conscious Age.” Shih criticizes the vehement arguments about his legacy, in which different sides sought to valorize him as an exemplar of their version of nationalist self-consciousness. Shih shows clearly the different forms in which contemporaries have made use of Chiang’s legacy and also the different convictions they read into Chiang to make their own points. Shih argues that ascribing nationalist motivations to Chiang is anachronistic, since he was an internationalist more than a nationalist, who saw modernizing culture as the way to cure Taiwan’s ill-health and who sought to generate zijue/ self-consciousness as Taiwan’s colonized Han population on an equal footing with being Japanese or Chinese. If anything, nationalist sentiments were a by-product, an unintended consequence, of his primarily cultural motivation.

CONCLUSION A critical review of a century of multi-dimensional developments in Taiwan reveals its unique path and trajectory of transforming from a Japanese colony to a modern state. According to World Economic Outlook, Taiwan was ranked as the top 15th country in GDP per capita by purchasing parity in 186 countries and areas (and independencies) in 2019 (International Monetary Fund 2020).12 Economic growth with equity is another miracle in Taiwan (Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 1979). The Gini coefficient,13 an index of measuring income distribution

From colony to modern state

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among households has never exceeded 0.3 prior to 1980s (Chow and Hsu, 2015). In spite of the inevitable deterioration of income equality after its drive for globalization in the past three decades, the Gini coefficient in Taiwan, according to Statista, was averaged at 0.3376 in 2015–19, compared with 0.4654 in China in the same period. In the 2020 annual report of the Freedom House, which assesses the conditions of political rights,14 Taiwan has a total score of 96 and is ranked as a “free country” in 2020 (Freedom House). By the “democracy index,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Taiwan as the top 11th globally and the top in Asia. In 2020 Taiwan, along with Japan (rank 21) and Korea (rank 23) was credited as “full democracy.” Other socio-cultural developments such as gender equality, multi-culture, and ethnicity in a civil society are also highly enviable. Taiwan’s development provides a compelling case study for comparative development. Many of its contemporary achievements, such as provision of national health insurance, initiatives of developing the newly innovative industries, attaining a significant role in the global supply chains, development of cutting-edge technology in semi-conductor industry, and successful tactics to put the coronavirus pandemic under control with only single-digit deaths up to March 2021, even after the outbreak in mid-May, total cases numbered 16,759 with 849 deaths among a population of 23.8 million by December 15, 2021, are yet to be explored due to space limitations of the book. Nevertheless, subsequent chapters of this book, written by renowned scholars in each discipline, have offered a good beginning and stimulus for future Taiwan studies.

NOTES 1.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Wan-yao Chou, June Teufel Dreyer, Frank S. T. Hsiao, Michael Hsiao, and Fu-Shan Huang for their suggestions and editorial assistances on this chapter. However, the usual caveat applies. 2. It is noted that, during the tenure of Governor Liu Ming-chuan in 1887–1891 under the Qing dynasty, Taiwan introduced a public school system, some light industries, and a built telegram and postal system, as well as a 28.6 km railway from Keelung (基隆) to Hsinchu (新竹). Chou (2019, p. 116) argued that what Governor Liu did in Taiwan was part of the “Self-Strengthening Movement” in the Qing dynasty. 3. Modernization has different meanings for different people. Chow (2002, pp.3–6) defined it as an increasing dominance of human beings over the natural environment on a scientific basis rather than superstition in the behavior norm in human society. Therefore, modernization is a set of socio-cultural, economic, and political transformations that are different from what were in the traditional society. 4. It was called the “Inland extension principle” (naichienchōshugi, 內地延長主義), which literally means an “extension of Japanese proper” to the colony of Taiwan. 5. There was a consulting body under the Governor’s office. But, until 1921, there was no Taiwanese in that organization. Meanwhile, there was no regular session

14

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

A century of development in Taiwan

for the Governor to consult with. See He and Tsai (2019, pp. 74–76). After several years of efforts, the petition failed. However, there was an election for municipal council in 1935, which was restricted to male voters and those who paid income tax. The second election for municipal councils was in 1939 and then was disrupted by the war. In 2001, the Taiwan government designated October 17 as the Taiwan Cultural Day. The citation in the text was a remark by Minister of Culture from Central News Agency Focus Taiwan on October 17, 2017 at https://​focustaiwan​.tw/​ culture/​201710170027, accessed on May 1, 2021. In Article 2(b) of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” However, it did not specify which country was the recipient despite the fact that Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (Pescadores) were occupied by the ROC government under the Allied Order then. Neither did it specify in the joint communique which established the diplomatic relations between Japan and China. It only stated that Japan fully understood and respected “the position of the PRC that Taiwan was an inalienable territory of the PRC.” In international law, there is no legal basis for China to claim its sovereignty on Taiwan. For legal reappraisal of the statehood of Taiwan, see Chiang and Hwang (2008). Wu (2016) argued that there were three competitive national identities during 1945–50 with three different identities of Taiwanese motherlands. Wu argued the first shift of identity was caused by transfer of territory at the end of WWII. A second shift of identity was caused by the 228 massacre in 1947. The outbreak of the Korean war caused another identity shift. According to the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 67 percent of the respondents identified themselves as “Taiwanese” whereas only 2.4 percent considered themselves as “Chinese” in July 2020. From Taipei Times. at https://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​News/​front/​archives/​2020/​07/​05/​ 2003739375, accessed on May 5, 2021. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention states, “the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. From Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: The Faculty of Law at https://​www​.jus​.uio​.no/​.​.​./​rights​-duties​-states​.xml, downloaded on February 20, 2021. From Teng Hui Lee, “Responses to Questions submitted by Voice of Germany,” July 9, 1999. See also interview with Deutsche Welle, via taiwandc.org, accessed on February 20, 2021. In Section 6.11, Chapter 6 of this book, Frank Hsiao even showed that, according to the IMF data of October 2015, Taiwan’s GDP per capita in the purchasing power parity (PPP) already surpassed that of Japan (in 2007), United Kingdom (in 2009), France (in 2010), and Germany (in 2014) and was poised to catch up with the United States. A Gini coefficient of “zero” means perfect equality, whereas “one” means perfect inequality. A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is a warning level of income inequality set by the United Nations. The five-year average was calculated from Statista at the website http:// www .Statisa .com/statistics/ 922574/ taiwan -gini -index/ China: Gini coefficient 2017 | Statista downloaded on March 6, 2021.

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REFERENCES Akamatsu, Kaname, 1962. “A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries.” The Developing Economies, 1, pp.3–25. Chiang, Huang-Chih and Jau-Yuan Hwang, 2008. “On the Statehood of Taiwan: A Legal Reappraisal,” in Peter C.Y. Chow (ed.), The “One China” Dilemma. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.57–80. Chou, Wan-yao, 2019. A History of Taiwan for Young People: Written for a New Generation and for Countrymen Young at Heart (少年台灣史). Taipei: The Jade Society Taiwan Interminds Publishing Inc.玉山社的英文名稱 (玉山社 in Chinese). Chow, Peter C.Y. (eds), 2002. Taiwan’s Modernization in Global Perspective. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. Chow, Peter C.Y. and Bo-Xian Hsu, 2015. “The Impacts of Economic Liberalization and Globalization on Income Distribution in Taiwan, 1985–2010.” In Monique Chu and Scott L. Kastner (eds), Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait in the Shadow of China. Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp.93–117. Fei, John, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Kuo, 1979. Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gerald, Adam F., 1998. “The East Asian Model Ladder: Virtuous Circles and Linkages in East Asian Economic Development.” In Adam F. Gerald and Shinichi Ichimura (eds), East Asian Economic Development. Westport, Connecticut: Prager, pp.3–18. He, Yi-Lin and Jin-Tang Tsai, 2019. Taiwanese People in the Japanese Period (台灣 人的日本時代). Taipei. The Jade Society Taiwan Interminds Publishing Inc. (玉山 社, in Chinese). International Monetary Fund, IMF, 2020. World Economic Outlook October 2020. Washington, D.C.: IMF. Statista, 2019. “Taiwan: Gini index 2019 | Statista” from http://​www​.Statisa​.com/​ statistics/​922574/​taiwan​-gini​-index/​, downloaded on March 6, 2021. Wu, Rwei-Ren, 2016. Three Motherlands: The Competition of National Identity in the Immediate Post War Taiwan, 1945–50 (三個祖國: 戰後初期台灣的國家認同競爭, 1945–1950), Institute of Sociology, Academic Sinica (in Chinese).

PART II

Taiwanese identity, political development, and international relations

2. Taiwan’s international relations June Teufel Dreyer TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1979 Taiwan’s existence as an independent state has been contested since October 1, 1949, the day when Mao Zedong stood on the rostrum at Tiananmen Square and proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Abortive attempts to take the island were at first inhibited by the absence of a true PRC navy1 and, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, by U.S. President Harry Truman’s decision to order America’s Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait. His successor, Dwight Eisenhower, reinforced the U.S. commitment when, in 1954, he signed a mutual defense treaty with the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC), then led by Chiang Kai-shek. Some nations chose to quickly de-recognize Chiang’s government in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC—since both governments claimed to be the sole legitimate rulers of a one China, dual recognition was impossible. These included the Nordic states, who espoused the principle of de facto versus de jure recognition. In this view, since Mao’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was effectively the government of China, the issue of whether the CCP ought legitimately to be in charge was irrelevant. Great Britain, fearing for the future of its sizeable investments in China as well as for its colony in Hong Kong, recognized the Beijing government on pragmatic principles. In the end, British industries fared no better than those of countries that did not recognize the PRC, with all being nationalized quickly. But there was no invasion of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Other nations that might have wanted to recognize the PRC were dissuaded from doing so by U.S. pressure. The PRC was then solidly aligned with the more powerful Soviet Union, raising fears that a tsunami of monolithic communism was about to overwhelm democratic capitalist states. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles paid several trips to Tokyo to argue against Japanese recognition. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, though both strongly anti-communist and pro-capitalist, argued that, for a country such as his that 17

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could prosper only through trade, it made sense to establish good relations with such a large neighbor. In the end, since U.S. aid was vital to many nations, including Japan, who were trying to revive the economies that had been destroyed during World War II, the American view usually prevailed. China’s potential as a huge market for the goods of capitalist countries was well understood, but the poverty of the country meant it had little purchasing power. The communist system provided few incentives to expand production, with its systemic weaknesses compounded by a succession of policy mistakes of which the Great Leap Forward of 1958, in which millions died of starvation, is the most egregious. The country had only barely recovered from the Great Leap Forward when Mao began the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Though less destructive to either the economy or the mortality rate than the Great Leap Forward, it nonetheless had a substantial impact on both. Nor was China behaving as a good international citizen. By 1957, a period of conciliatory behavior toward the developing countries that had begun at the Bandung conference three years earlier was replaced by a militant phase. Burkina Faso (then known as Upper Volta), Dahomey, and Kenya all broke relations with the PRC, accusing Beijing of meddling in their internal affairs with the aim of destabilizing their governments. The president of the Central African Republic ordered the expulsion of all Chinese in the country on grounds that the PRC was building a revolutionary army that was staffed by Chinese and pro-PRC nationals. A cache of arms and documents and a firing range had been discovered near the capital city, Bangui.2 In Latin America, China’s heretofore best friend Fidel Castro broke relations with Beijing, stating that he had not ended meddling by one foreign power (unstated but clearly referring to the U.S.) with another.3 And in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian government believed China responsible for supporting an abortive coup against it by the Communist Party of Indonesia.4 During the Cultural Revolution, foreign diplomats in Beijing feared for their lives, with the British embassy sacked and one British national killed. By the early 1970s, the violence of the Cultural Revolution was abating. Chinese diplomats returned to their posts; Britain received a formal apology for the death of its national. The Chinese government indicated that it was open for business and, despite the bad experiences of the past, foreign powers were interested. Early comers would secure a niche for themselves, while those that failed to move or were late in doing so risked being left out. Memories of their past difficulties with militant PRC policies having apparently faded, many newly independent countries voiced their support for the PRC’s entry into the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. Henry Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in 1971 was quickly followed by Taiwan losing its seat on the UN Security Council, and its expulsion from UN membership. Save for a rapidly dwindling number of states that continued diplomatic relations with

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the Republic of China, Taiwan had become a non-member of the international system. Japan and China established formal diplomatic relations in 1972. Chiang Kai-shek was in failing health, passing away in April 1975, adding yet another note of uncertainty to Taiwan’s international future. His son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, was fully aware of the regime’s vulnerability, but could do little to stay the momentum, particularly when, after a brief interregnum following the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping became the acknowledged leader of the PRC and accelerated the pace of industrialization. Under Deng’s aegis, the PRC was no longer communist in anything but name and had announced that it was not only open to the West and Japan but eager to engage with it. For a brief period, an unprecedented degree of freedom of speech was permitted, raising hopes that China would evolve into a prosperous liberal democracy and responsible member of the international system. In December 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced the normalization of relations with Beijing and the severance of ties with Taipei. At the insistence of Beijing, this involved abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty. There was a firestorm of protest in Washington, not so much over the normalization itself as over the terms of the agreement and the secrecy with which the negotiations had been carried out. Among other objections was that Carter, already at odds with Congress over other matters, made the announcement the day after legislators had left the capital for winter break. When lawmakers returned, they began deliberations on mitigating the effects of Carter’s fait accompli, resulting in the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979. Inter alia, the TRA stated that the absence of diplomatic recognition would not affect U.S. laws relating to Taiwan, that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be considered a matter of grave concern to the U.S., and that the U.S. would provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait.5 Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan vowed to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of China until Chiang Ching-kuo quietly told key members of Reagan’s support team that he did not want Taiwan to be an issue in the U.S. election campaign.6

TAIWAN BECOMES AN INTERNATIONAL ORPHAN In the end, Carter was a one-term president. While the victorious Reagan did not re-establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, he did make certain promises to it. Known as the “six assurances,” they are not to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, not to mediate discussions between Taiwan and the PRC, not to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC, not to change its longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over

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Taiwan, that there were no plans to revise the TRA, and that the 17 August 1982 communique with the PRC not be read to imply that the U.S. had agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.7 The net effect was to freeze the status quo and position the United States as guarantor of the stability of the cross-Strait impasse until such time as the two sides could agree to resolve their differences. Both ROC and PRC tried to change the status quo in ways favorable to themselves, while Washington maintained a policy it referred to as “strategic ambiguity,” to keep both sides guessing as to what its reaction to efforts to change that status quo might be. Chinese leaders were aware of, and uneasy about, the succession of leadership after Chiang Ching-kuo passed from the scene. The transition from Chiang Kai-shek to his son had been smooth: in the former’s later years, he had been in poor health and Chiang Ching-kuo gradually took over many of his father’s duties. Chiang Ching-kuo had already announced that no member of his family would succeed him, and pressure for a democratic government had been steadily building among the native Taiwanese who constituted the majority of the island’s population. Resentful to different degrees with the presence of the two million mainlanders who had arrived with the fall of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, they were demanding what they regarded as their rightful place in the political leadership. Democratization was inevitably Taiwanization, meaning that a population that had never lived in China and had no ties to it would be in charge. Beijing tried both carrot and stick. A conciliatory Message to Taiwan Compatriots the day that normalization took effect urged the compatriots to “join hands and work together for this glorious goal” of unification. As a gesture of goodwill, the PRC would stop bombing several small islands near China but held by the ROC. Cross-strait visits would be encouraged so that families could re-unite.8 The stick came in the form of warnings that Beijing would be compelled to invade should Taiwan declare independence, seek the support of another foreign power,9 or should there be chaos in Taiwan. The third referred to concerns that the death of Ching-kuo would trigger massive political unrest. In response to Beijing, Taiwan Premier Sun Yun-suan declared that unification was a possibility—albeit under the Republic of China—but that first China would have to democratize and develop. He made clear that this would take time: “A tower of nine stories begins with a heap of earth.”10 Chiang Ching-kuo, by then in his mid-70s and suffering from complications of diabetes, neatly skirted this third possibility by choosing a native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as his vice-president. Educated in Japan and the United States, Lee had been a popular mayor of Taipei. When, in January 1988, Ching-kuo passed away, Lee was able to overcome resistance from the old guard of elite

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mainlanders to assume the presidency with none of the disorder that would allow Beijing to act on its threat to invade.

LEE TENG-HUI AND VACATION DIPLOMACY Lee began a program of democratization that included de-sinicization and the establishment of a distinct Taiwanese sense of identity. While democratization was warmly greeted in Washington, the steps toward de-sinicization greatly displeased Beijing. In 1992, China’s National People’s Congress passed a law unilaterally annexing the many islands, including Taiwan, whose ownership it contests with other claimants. Although this had no practical effect, its message to the Lee administration was unmistakable. Whatever his private thoughts, Lee at no point during his time in office advocated ex officio that Taiwan declare independence, though he certainly made several provocative statements to the press that aides attempted to explain as miscommunications.11 In 1999, he angered the Chinese leadership by stating that he thought the PRC and Taiwan should be considered in “state-to-state relations or at least special state-to-state relations.”12 This certainly implied the existence of two separate independent states and, as the PRC media pointed out, violated the one China policy that both the PRC and ROC governments had long maintained, albeit with diametrically opposed views on the legitimate government of that one China. Lee also opened visits to China for family reunions. While portrayed as humanitarian gestures, there may have been other motives as well. As one government official told the author at the time, “[W]hen they [the family members from Taiwan] get there, they’ll thank the KMT for what we’ve done for them.” Cross-strait trade soon followed, with Taiwan typically running surpluses. This was to cause problems in the future, since the increasing volume of trade also increased the island’s dependency on China and gave the PRC a lever with which to pressure Taiwan. As this became apparent, Lee began a “go south” policy that urged businesses to establish ties with Southeast Asian states. While successful to some degree, it did not appreciably lessen Taiwan’s dependence on trade with China. As for relations with other countries, China exerted pressure on states with whom it had established diplomatic relations to refuse visits from Taiwan officials. Lee was able to at least partially circumvent these restrictions with “flexible diplomacy” or “vacation diplomacy”—i.e. presented not as official visits but as holiday getaways—mostly to Southeast Asian states. The first instance of this occurred in 1989, only a little over a year after Lee assumed the presidency. Accompanied by the foreign, defense, and economics ministers as well as several other high-ranking officials, this was the first overseas visit by an ROC/Taiwan head of state since former president Yen Chia-kan

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made a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia—with whom the ROC then had formal diplomatic relations—in 1977. A large backlit screen at the Westin Stamford hotel greeted “His Excellency the President and the First Lady of the Republic of China.” Singapore did not have formal diplomatic relations with either the PRC or the ROC at this time, but nonetheless its prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, greeted Lee Teng-hui formally, saying, “President Lee’s visit marks a milestone in the close and warm relations between us. It is an honor for Singapore to be the first country that President Lee has chosen to visit.”13 During the early months of 1994, high government officials paid visits to particular countries during which they happened to meet with their counterparts there, often on golf courses. Lee Teng-hui took an eight-day trip to the Philippines, Indonesia, Indonesia, and Thailand, meeting with, among others, President Fidel Ramos, President Suharto, and King Bhumibol.14 China reacted sharply, and eventually this effort to break out of diplomatic isolation became more constricted. Lee had his greatest successes in Japan, where his Japanese education and contacts as well as his love of golf facilitated access to the highest levels of Japanese government. Japan more than any other state has reason for concern about Taiwan being absorbed by the PRC; Yonaguni Island in Okinawa is only 67 miles from Taiwan, and Sino-Japanese rivalry has deep historic roots. In a March 1994 interview with his friend and prominent journalist Shiba Ryotaro, Lee mentioned having been Japanese for the earlier part of his life and spoke of “the sorrow of being Taiwanese.” Though the former was factually correct, since Taiwan had been a colony of Japan from 1895 until the end of World War II, Beijing accused Lee of being a traitor to his country, meaning China. Later and out of office, Lee was also able to visit Japan for medical reasons, meeting with both old friends and those sympathetic to his views. These included military men. By 1999, retired high-ranking officers of Japan’s Self Defense Forces were regular visitors to Taipei, exchanging views with their counterparts in Taiwan and arranging visits to tour Japanese military platforms.15 Some of Lee’s efforts, most notably an effort to rejoin the United Nations, failed. In 1995, Taiwan’s foreign ministry used the occasion of the UN’s 50th anniversary to up the ante, offering a billion dollars for a fund to aid developing countries if admitted as a member. A spokesman denied that this was an effort to buy membership, pointing out that the sum was equal to 0.44 percent of his country’s GNP whereas the average percentage of GNP allocated by industrial countries for development assistance was about 1.7 percent of GNP. Nonetheless, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dismissed the offer, saying that the UN’s General Assembly had passed a resolution, “Taiwan is part of China. There is no possibility that Taiwan will be admitted to the United Nations.”16

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Also in 1995, Lee succeeded in visiting the U.S. to accept Cornell University’s award for Alumnus of the Year, meeting with high-ranking U.S. officials but incurring the wrath of Beijing as expressed in a series of war games and missile firings in the Taiwan Strait in an apparent effort to disrupt Taiwan’s 1996 elections. This actually created more votes for Lee, upset Japan enough to seek a stronger alliance with the United States, and prompted President Clinton to dispatch two aircraft carrier groups—one of which, to Beijing’s chagrin, happened to be named the Independence—to the area outside the Taiwan Strait.

THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN ADMINISTRATION’S ATTEMPT TO EXPAND TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL SPACE Lee was succeeded by Chen Shui-bian, also Taiwan born and the first president to come from an opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). China refused to talk to Chen or to respond to the overtures he made during and after his election, and began to pressure Taiwan’s allies to switch sides. This gave Chen little choice but to give in to pressure from pro-independence elements of the DPP and its ideologically similar Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The latter had been founded by Lee Teng-hui; after his expulsion, Chen carried Lee’s indigenization program still further, verging on a declaration of independence when he said, “with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country …. Our Taiwan is not someone else’s local government. Our Taiwan is not someone else’s province.”17 While Chen’s supporters applauded him for speaking truth to power, his statement upset both relevant powers—not only China, but the United States in its capacity as guarantor of Taiwan’s freedom under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. After Chen pushed their tolerance still further by proposing a referendum on China’s missile buildup across the Taiwan Strait, President George W. Bush, with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at his side, criticized this as an attempt to change the status quo.18 In 2005, the National People’s Congress voted unanimously to authorize the use of military force against Taiwan if it seeks independence, with Premier Wen explaining the law in true Orwellian fashion as a way to ensure peace.19 An effort at a referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan failed due to the steep conditions for success that had been imposed by a KMT-dominated legislature. Since then, the emphasis has been on establishing a presence for Taiwan in the UN’s specialized agencies and other international organizations rather than on the parent entity itself. As communism diminished in all but name in the PRC and the Chinese state became increasingly powerful both economically and politically, a sense of pan-Han identity developed in some citizens, mainly those from mainlander

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background and supporters of the KMT; the PRC could work through such people. It could also put pressure on those with business connections to support PRC policies, most notably Beijing’s definition of the one China policy—that there is but one China, with its capital in Beijing, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Those with business dealings in China were required to declare their allegiance to the one China policy or cease their operations. Most complied, although it is impossible to know how many of the conversions were sincere. Taiwan’s position was further weakened after 9/11, when Washington sought Beijing’s support for the Global War against Terrorism.

THE MA ADMINISTRATION STABILIZES TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL SPACE: AT A PRICE The election of Hong Kong-born Ma Ying-jeou brought the KMT back to power, and a hiatus in cross-Strait diplomatic sparring. Ma’s efforts at cross-Strait cooperation included accepting the one-China policy, albeit after receiving a barrage of criticism, explaining that he meant that the one China was the Republic of China. There appeared to be an implicit truce in Beijing’s efforts to winnow away the remaining 23 countries that recognized the ROC as the government of China in return for a cessation of efforts that might lead to de jure independence while strengthening the economic ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As the Ma administration signed economic agreement after economic agreement with the PRC, misgivings at their implications grew among Taiwanese. Ma disclaimed that any political motivations existed behind the agreements, saying that they were simply economic in nature. His critics countered that they were in essence making Taiwan an appendage of China. A Ma skeptic, examining data from Taiwan’s Bureau of Trade showed that the rate of growth in Taiwan’s trade with China had shriveled since the signing of the much-touted Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and that net trade gains had been “anemic.” The once robust trade surplus Taiwan enjoyed had declined every year.20 Ma managed a modest increase in Taiwan’s international presence, although very much at the sufferance of the PRC. He was able to sign free trade agreements with Singapore and New Zealand, establish an additional consulate-equivalent in Japan, and sign a fisheries agreement, albeit concluded informally with the Japanese Fisheries Association. There seemed to be a tacit understanding between Beijing and Taipei that, in return for agreeing to trade agreements that deepened Taiwan’s dependence on China, Beijing would not seek to wean away the countries that still accorded formal diplomatic recognition to the ROC. A year after he had been in office, Taiwan was allowed to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), but only as an observer and

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only under the name “Chinese Taipei.” And unlike Hong Kong, which had legally become a part of the PRC in 1999, “Chinese Taipei’s invitation had to be issued annually, contingent on Beijing’s approval, a clear effort to condition good behavior.”21 The Ma administration also brought criminal charges against leading figures of the Chen administration in ways that struck those concerned with civil rights, including both his former mentor at Harvard Law School and international rating associations such as Freedom House, as backsliding. Still, Ma managed to win re-election in 2012, in no small part because of misgivings in Washington that DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen, a protégé of Lee Teng-hui whom he credited with helping to craft his special state-to-state relationship, would revive hostilities with China. These misgivings were not helped when, on the eve of the vote, the then 90-year-old Lee stood in front of tens of thousands of opposition supporters and delivered a fiery political speech, saying, “We all hope to establish a democratic, free, prosperous country that has human rights and dignities …. We don’t want to be bothered with unification, don’t want to be ruled by others and we’re proud to tell anyone we are Taiwanese. But that is not possible under the leadership of the current government.”22 Washington, initially relieved at both Ma’s re-election and the abatement in cross-Strait tensions, soon became alarmed at the erosion of the status quo and its implications for Taiwan’s continued de facto independence, especially since they took place against a background of steadily increasing Chinese defense budgets and assertive movements in the East China and South China seas. Already regarded as hostile to Japan before his election, Ma also alienated Tokyo by various actions including reiterating Taiwan’s right to the disputed Diaoyu/tai-Senkaku Islands, reviving the comfort women issue,23 and openly disrespecting the former and future prime minister Abe Shinzō during Abe’s visit to Taipei.24 When in 2014 Ma attempted to enact the controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA),25 intended as a follow-on to the already unpopular Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a largely spontaneous eruption of popular anger brought as many as 500,000 Taiwanese to the streets. Known as the Sunflower Movement, the mostly youthful protestors staged a peaceful 24-day occupation of the nation’s unicameral legislature, the Legislative Yuan. Tsai Ing-wen and her party swept to victory in the 2016 election, with the DPP gaining a solid majority in the Legislative Yuan for the first time.

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TSAI ING-WEN ATTEMPTS TO RESIST CHINESE PRESSURE TO ERASE TAIWAN INTERNATIONALLY In both of her inaugural addresses as well as in other venues Tsai emphasized the importance of expanding Taiwan’s international space. Beijing has made this difficult in a variety of ways. It first demanded the new president accept a controversial 1992 Consensus—that there is but one China with the mainland and Taiwan part of it, but two systems—that would have been anathema to her constituents. As Beijing must have known, Tsai could not accept this formulation. Among other issues, the agreement had been reached by the KMT without consultation with the opposition, and its creator later acknowledged that he had made up the term eight years after the meeting. In what must have seemed like a major concession to her supporters, Tsai accepted the “historical fact” of a meeting in 1992, but Beijing rejected it as “a failed test paper” and proceeded to take actions designed to further constrict Taiwan’s international presence. Salient among these was the end of the implicit truce on weaning away those states that still recognized the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China. Since Tsai’s election, 8 diplomatic partners have established diplomatic relations with the PRC: Gambia26 and Sao Tome in 2016; Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Burkino Faso in 2017; El Salvador in 2018; and the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019, leaving Taiwan with recognition from only 15 countries. How important this is to Taiwan’s survival, much less international standing, is debatable. The remaining countries confer a degree of legitimization on Taiwan and are useful in arguing its case in international organizations. However, all are small and, with the exception of the Vatican, minor players on the global scene. Most require handsome subsidies as the price of continued recognition, be it in the form of development projects or private payments to decision-making leaders. Leaders have been known to play Beijing against Taipei in a bidding war that Taipei must lose if Beijing is determined to lure away another country. Making the best of a sub-optimal situation, the Tsai administration has sought to preserve formal relations with its remaining partners while concentrating on strengthening informal ties with major powers. Among the administration’s notable successes are the upgrading of relations with Japan, which had become badly frayed during Ma Ying-jeou’s time in office. The embassy-equivalents of both countries were changed to more accurately reflect their duties, with Tokyo renaming its representative office from the largely meaningless Interchange Organization to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Organization. This implicitly elevated the two countries to equal status.27 A few months later, Taiwan renamed its

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Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Japan the Taiwan–Japan Relations Organization.28 The United States The Congressional support for Taiwan expressed in the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 has become more evident with the deterioration of U.S.–China relations. Several bills attest to this, as in May 2016, when, in a concurrent resolution of the 114th Congress “reaffirm[ed] the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States–Taiwan relations.”29 In a pointed and symbolically meaningful omission, the resolution did not mention the three communiques that had been agreed to by the U.S. and China, and were previously cited by both countries as governing relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Travel Act of 2018 expressed the sense of Congress that U.S. officials at all levels be allowed to travel to Taiwan to meet their counterparts, and permit high-level Taiwan officials to enter the U.S. “under respectful conditions” to meet their counterparts here. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), also in 2018, affirms the United States’ commitment to its partnerships with various countries, as well as Taiwan.30 Two years later, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) declared the sense of Congress that the U.S. government should support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as unofficial partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world, consider increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan and reducing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine Taiwan. It should be the policy of the United States to advocate Taiwan’s membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations.31 Support from the administration has been less predictable than that of Congress, with president-elect Trump taking a congratulatory telephone call from President Tsai and shortly thereafter declaring that the U.S. did not necessarily have to stick to its “one China” position, but then adding, “unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”32 Taiwanese concern that the country might be used as a bargaining chip for a Sino-American trade deal was magnified a few months later when Trump said he would want to consult with Chinese president Xi Jinping before speaking to Tsai again.33 According to former national security adviser John Bolton, the president repeatedly disparaged Taiwan’s significance, comparing it to the

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“tip of one of his Sharpies.”34 Despite Trump’s sometimes erratic behavior, strong bipartisan support in Congress and among several Trump appointees mitigated these fears and created the kind of momentum for legislation such as ARIA and TAIPEI. Whether because of America’s increasingly adversarial relationship with China or a belated realization that seeking the Chinese leader’s approval before taking action signified the U.S.’s subordination to the PRC, the administration’s policy since then has been more supportive of Taiwan. In 2018, the U.S. opened a long-planned $255 million embassy-equivalent in Taiwan which ambassador-equivalent Kin Moy described as “a tangible symbol that the U.S. is here to stay.”35 The Trump administration ended its predecessor’s delays in approving arms sales;36 as of August 2020, there were seven such sales to Taiwan, the latest involving the repair and recertification of PAC-3 missiles. A previous package included upgrades to Taiwan’s aging F-16 fighter planes. While the sales will do little to redress the military balance across the Strait, they are, like the opening of the embassy-equivalent, a symbol of support. So as well are the frequent passages of U.S. navy ships through the Taiwan Strait, which China—contrary to international law—insists is not an international waterway and therefore should not be traversed without Beijing’s approval. In August 2020, U.S. Secretary for Health and Human Services Alex Azar, arriving on an official U.S. government plane, became the highest-ranking American official to visit Taiwan since 1979, with Azar saying explicitly that his trip was intended to “show President Trump’s support for Taiwan, its democratic government, and the leadership it displayed in handling the coronavirus outbreak.”37 The Chinese government responded by sending planes to violate Taiwan’s air space. International Agencies World Health Assembly/World Health Organization Taiwan was able to attend the World Health Assembly in 2016 as a residual from the Ma administration, and framed its arguments for 2017 by emphasizing Taiwan’s state-equivalent status, its exclusion as a violation of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s constitution, and its rightful place in the global disease prevention architecture. However, China’s insistence that Tsai accept its interpretation of the alleged 1992 Consensus as a condition for inclusion prevailed, and Taiwan did not attend. The Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 provided another compelling argument for inclusion, backed by the U.S., the EU, and Japan. Although not explicitly mentioned, non-member Taiwan’s adherence to WHO’s norms of prompt reporting, transparency, and cooperation were in noticeable contrast to those of the PRC, and received international

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acclaim. However, facing certain failure, the Taiwan government withdrew its request.38 Interpol Taiwan was expelled from the International Criminal Police Organization, better known as Interpol, in 1984, when China was admitted. As a result, Taiwan’s police force is unable to access the organization’s databases on a wide range of topics including illicit arms records, terrorism, child trafficking, forensics, and lost and stolen travel documents.39 The head of its Criminal Organization Bureau has argued to no avail that maintaining global security and social justice must take precedence over regional, ethnic, and political differences. Much like its decision to behave as a member of the WHA/WHO even though not a member, it takes part in investigations of areas of common interest such as narcotics-related operations. In August 2018, Taiwan and the Philippines took part in a joint maritime operation that stopped 500 kilograms of amphetamines being smuggled from Malaysia and worked with South Korea to seize 112 kilograms of amphetamines being shipped out of Thailand.40 ICAO The International Civil Aviation Organization has excluded Taiwan from participation since 2013. Critics have pointed out that Taipei is an international transit hub and that its inability to take part in information sharing and logistical planning poses obstacles for air traffic safety. The Taipei Flight Information Region (Taipei FIR) covers 180,000 square nautical miles, and in 2019 provided over 1.53 million instances of air traffic control services and handled 58 million incoming and outgoing passengers in 2015.41 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pointed out the dangers not only to Taiwan but to international air travel, thus far to no avail.42 Pointing out that Taiwan’s inclusion would have had additional importance in slowing the spread of the Coronavirus has proved similarly unpersuasive. Under Chinese pressure, ICAO, whose head is a Chinese national, blocked Twitter users who make reference to Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, a move denounced by U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus as “outrageous, unacceptable, and not befitting of a UN organization.”43 Tourism Beijing also responded to Tsai’s election by advising the PRC’s tourist agencies—tantamount to an order in most cases—to cease arranging for group visits to Taiwan, and has since then several times discouraged individual visits as well. The number of visitors from China did drop sharply—down by 10.25 percent in 2016, 14.05 percent in 2017, and 1.53 percent in 2018, though increased by 2.6 percent in 2019, according to data from the ROC’s visitors’

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bureau.44 Though definitely meant as a threat and certainly impacting some tour group operators, the move did not appreciably impact Taiwan’s economy. Most of the arrivals came through tour packages that were booked in China, stayed in Chinese-owned hotels, and shopped at Chinese-owned souvenir shops. Many Taiwanese claimed to be happy, since the rudeness and unsanitary practices of the visitors were often criticized. On the plus side, the number of Japanese visits exceeded two million for the first time, and those from the 18 countries included in the New Southbound Policy (Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand) was up by 6 percent, with the total number of foreign visitors in 2019 up by seven percent.45 International trade relations46 Taiwan was able to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), albeit under the humiliating title of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,” with China later forcing the addition of “Chinese Taipei” in parentheses. Still, Taiwan has benefited from the most favored nation principle (MFN), which requires members to treat all WTO members equally, and whose provisions apply to over half of world trade flows. Taiwan is also a member of important regional economic bodies such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Due to Chinese objections, however, Taiwan’s president cannot attend so has sent surrogates. The country is unable to join the Beijing-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) under any conditions that would not involve abrogation of its claim to sovereignty. Taiwan has had limited success in establishing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) due to China’s opposition. Faute de mieux, policymakers have adopted a functional approach that seeks to deepen Taiwan’s de facto economic integration with the international system that it has achieved through outward investment and participation in global supply chains. Hon Hai Precision Industry, better known as Foxconn, has built factories in Wisconsin as well as in China and India and bought Japanese electronics giant Sharp; Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest semiconductor foundry, has plants in China and Arizona. Tsai’s new southbound initiative seeks to integrate Taiwan’s economy with those of South and Southeast Asia. Collectively, these initiatives comprise a strategy to globalize Taiwan’s economy while raising Taiwan’s profile in the international community. Other PRC actions aimed at constricting Taiwan’s international presence Under Chinese pressure, the name “Taiwan” has been removed from airline destinations, maps, and hotels. Trade offices have been moved, or had their

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names changed as, for example when, following a visit from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Nigeria ordered Taiwan to move its trade office from Abuja, the capital city, to a smaller facility in the commercial capital of Lagos.47 Chinese communities abroad have also been employed as conduits to influence their adopted countries’ policies in ways favorable to the PRC and unfavorable to Taiwan. Among their techniques are appeals to the pro-China feelings of ethnic Chinese citizens. Those who do not want to participate in these activities have reported efforts at intimidation. Australia has the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (APPCC);48 a similar institute exists in New Zealand.49 When a Japanese newspaper interviewed Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, the Chinese embassy in Tokyo lodged a protest.50 China has also insisted that Taiwanese who have been accused of crimes committed in a third country be “repatriated” to Taiwan, with those third countries complying for fear of retaliation. As a case in point, a group of Taiwanese who had been cleared of telecommunications charges in Kenya were deported to Beijing, hooded and handcuffed, aboard a Chinese plane. Taiwan, which does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing, could do nothing.51 Military As Chinese defense budgets have increased massively since 1989, the cross-Strait military balance that the Taiwan Relations Act mandated has been massively eroded in favor of the PRC. So far, PRC encroachments have been at the level of harassment rather than kinetic, but the harassment has become more frequent and more menacing. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) began regular flight training, which included having bombers circling Taiwan, after Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in 2016. When in June 2020 a U.S. military transport plane crossed over Taiwan, apparently in a gesture of support, the PRC’s defense ministry protested that the U.S. plane had not been authorized to fly over Chinese territory, and increased the number of PLAAF planes entering Taiwan’s air identification zone. There are fears that this is becoming the new normal, and could one day be the precursors of an actual invasion.52 Cybersecurity Taiwan’s official departments suffer from hundreds of successful internet attacks each year, the majority of them from China and some of them involving serious attacks on core systems. As far back as 2001, Taiwan began to introduce a national cybersecurity protection system, elevating its work to a Department of Cybersecurity in 2016. The Taiwanese military created the Information Communication Electronic Force Command to concentrate on cyberwarfare. And in 2018 a cyber academy was founded with the aim of creating cybersecu-

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rity professionals.53 In the following year, Taiwan and the U.S. held a five-day joint drill focusing on attacks from China and North Korea.54 According to a source interviewed by Reuters, the hackers have adopted new techniques, going through online platforms like Google and blogs, to hide themselves and give investigators the impression that the intrusion is a normal platform or tool and thus to ignore its background actions.55 Since Taiwan is only one victim of such attacks, it has been able to cooperate with other countries including Japan and the U.S. in workshops and symposia that discuss countermeasures thus enhancing, at least to a modest degree, its international presence. Disinformation In the runup to Taiwan’s 2018 local elections a few months later, there were reports of disinformation and suspected Chinese propaganda, leading to much concern with China’s information warfare. Previous discussions on the country’s defense had centered on kinetic military or cyber-attacks, but now began to focus on the deliberate manufacturing of false information and manipulation of public opinion initiated by China and abetted by domestic organizations who stood to gain were Beijing to succeed in incorporating Taiwan into the PRC. These disinformation attacks have had tragic consequences, as happened when Typhoon Jebi forced the closure of Kansai International Airport in September 2018, stranding many foreign travelers. Social media posts and instant messages appeared stating that the Chinese embassy was sending chartered buses to evacuate its citizens, and that Taiwanese would be allowed on the buses if they identified themselves as Chinese. After harsh criticism of his handling of the situation, Taiwan diplomat Su Chii-cherg committed suicide.56 It was later discovered that the messages were not only false but deliberately fabricated. Reaction was impressively quick. The Taipei government established sections on its websites to debunk rumors, and Taiwan’s Wunderkind Digital Minister Audrey Tang began an endeavor to build “memetic engineering” into governmental social media strategy.57 Many politicians ramped up their use of social media platforms like Facebook, LINE, Instagram, and Twitter to communicate with the public in real-time. In December, Minister Without Portfolio Lo Ping-chen introduced bills increasing the penalties against the “3 elements”—malicious, fake, and harmful—as the official guideline to identify and respond to disinformation that were swiftly passed.58 In a further expansion of Taiwan’s international presence, it co-sponsored with Japan, Sweden, and the U.S. annual workshops on disinformation.59 In her second inauguration speech in May 2020, Tsai stated that Taiwan needs to “strengthen our defenses against the threats of cyber warfare, cognitive warfare, and unrestricted warfare.” In civil society, academics and journal-

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ists have devoted more attention to the study and reporting of disinformation and information operations. Civic communities have stepped up their efforts to promote digital literacy, boost awareness on information manipulation, cultivate healthier consumption of online content, and build empathy into political communication.60 Destabilization from within Perhaps most disconcerting of all are the PRC’s efforts to destabilize Taiwan internally, in essence using Taiwan’s democratic ideals to destroy Taiwan’s democracy. With the once-powerful KMT in organizational disarray, the chief conduits for advancing the PRC’s message on unification have been an assortment of small groups, chief among which are the New Party and the Chinese Unity Promotion Party (CUPP). Although perfectly legal under Taiwan’s constitution and certainly not representative of the overwhelming majority of the island’s population, both the sources of their funding and their activities have come under intense scrutiny from the country’s law enforcement organizations. Investigators have raided the homes of pro-China New Party members on suspicion,61 later confirmed,62 that their activities have violated Taiwan’s National Security Act. Among other charges is that, with funds provided by Beijing, they have sought to organize a paramilitary youth group to further unification. The accused have been indicted and are awaiting trial. The CUPP’s chairman, Chang An-le, also known as the “White Wolf,” is an acknowledged former gangster. His son, a CUPP activist, and an associate were charged with attempted murder after CUPP members allegedly assaulted university students during a cross-Strait music event on their campus.63 In August 2018, judicial investigators raided Chang An-le’s home as well as the CUPP’s head office searching for evidence of funding from China to, among other activities, influence Taiwan’s November 2018 elections.64 Sometimes these efforts are directed toward harming Taiwan’s relations with other countries. As a case in point, in March 2018, after Japanese patrol boats forced out a Taiwanese fishing vessel that, according to the Japanese coast guard, illegally crossed a designated zone for fishing activities, a coalition of about 30 members representing, among others, the Concentric Patriotism Association (CPA), the Chung Hwa Baodiao (China [Association] to Protect the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands), and the Chinese Association of Friends of Okinawa protested in front of Japan’s de facto embassy in Taipei. China and Taiwan both claim the islands, which have been held by Japan since 1895. Since the agreement on fishing rights in the area was signed in 2013, under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, the group’s real intent seemed to be to discredit the Tsai administration and drive a wedge between it and Japan. One protestor was quoted as saying that “if Tsai is unable to protect the Taiwanese,

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we should ask China’s People’s Liberation Army to protect us,” while another waved the PRC’s flag.65 Beijing’s surrogate parties have also engaged in demonstrations on matters unrelated to China policy with the seeming intent of discrediting any initiative of the Tsai administration. Not all actions are peaceful: in August 2017, a sword-wielding attacker carrying the Chinese flag slashed a guard outside Taiwan’s presidential palace, and demonstrators have sometimes resorted to fisticuffs.66 Incentives designed to further unification have also been enhanced: in August 2018, Taiwan’s offshore island of Kinmen, also known as Quemoy, began importing its water from China, thereby increasing its vulnerability to PRC pressure, with the Chinese side also offering to provide Quemoy with electricity.67 The Taipei government reminded Quemoy officials that such a decision was the prerogative of the central authorities.

CONCLUSIONS Taiwan has responded to the diminution of its diplomatic partners and increasing pressure for unification from the PRC by emphasizing the success of its democratization, making efforts to maintain diplomatic ties with the remaining countries, and strengthening ties with major powers that no longer accord it diplomatic recognition. The Tsai administration has restored the good relations with Japan that had become strained under Tsai’s predecessor and signaled to the United States that, although unwilling to make any concessions to China that would undermine Taiwan’s claim to its sovereignty or its ability to function as an autonomous state, neither would she take any rash actions that might give Beijing an excuse to escalate hostilities that could force the U.S. to act. Taiwan has maintained its efforts to join international organizations. When rebuffed, as it typically is, Taipei has accepted the norms of the organizations and endeavored to behave as a good citizen of the global order on such matters as transparency, accountability, human rights, and freedom of the press. It regularly donates humanitarian aid, as in recent deliveries of made-in-Taiwan masks to countries afflicted by the coronavirus pandemic,68 and received international acclaim for its efficient handling of the pandemic. This is in sharp contrast with the persona of the PRC, whose assertiveness is directed not only against Taiwan but also in the East China and South China seas, and has arrested dissidents, tightened restrictions on religion, violated international standards of human rights, practiced secrecy in dealing with contagious diseases,69 and maintained a selective view of which provisions of international law it will abide by. In sum, though unable to compete with the PRC in either wealth or military power, and despite some losses, Taiwan has played a weak hand with skill.

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NOTES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Toward the end of the war, seeing which way the fighting was likely to end, some ROC navy ships defected to the PRC. The Chinese communist movement was based in the interior of China and, fighting on land, had no reason to develop a navy. Bruce Larkin, China and Africa 1949–1970. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 126–127. Yinghong Cheng, “Sino-Cuban Relations during the Early Years of the Castro Regime, 1959–1966,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3: 78–114 (July 2007), citation from pp. 105–106. Geoffrey B. Robinson, The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres 1965–66 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), pp. 206–207. At https://​www​.congress​.gov/​bill/​116th​-congress/​senate​-bill/​1678/​text. All webpages were accessed either on or within a day of the date they appeared. Chiang Ching-kuo was well acquainted with key members of Reagan’s team including Ray Cline, Jim Lilley, and William Schneider. The author, who had not previously met Chiang, was also part of the discussions. The “Six Assurances to Taiwan,” July 1982, Taiwan Documents, at http://​www​ .taiwandocuments​.org/​assurances​.htm National People’s Standing Committee, People’s Republic of China, January 1, 1979, in Beijing Review, January 5, 1979, pp. 16–17. At this time the PRC grudgingly accepted U.S. support for Taiwan for “historical” reasons. Sino-Soviet relations were bad, and a Soviet journalist/KGB agent, Victor Louis, visited Taiwan from time to time, hinting at the possibility of USSR support for the island. Japan, as the former colonial ruler of Taiwan and fondly remembered by many Taiwanese, was another concern for Beijing. Sun Yun-suan, “Moving Toward the Day of the Chinese,” Taiwan Today, August 1, 1981, at https://​taiwantoday​.tw/​news​.php​?unit​=​4​&​post​=​4893 Jane Rickards, Asiaweek correspondent in Taiwan at the time, supplied the author with a list of these, which include Asahi Shimbun, 1996; The Times of London 1997, The New York Times, 1998, and the (in)famous Deutsche Welle citation of 1999. Rickards also reports that Lee made an explicit comment on Taiwanese independence to The Times of London when the microphones were turned off. (Rickards’ correspondence with author, August 10, 2020.) See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “‘State-to-state’ tension rises again across the Taiwan Strait,” China Perspectives, No. 25 (September–October 1999), pp. 4–13 for a contemporary analysis of the statement and the controversy over it. No author, “Two ‘Asian Dragons’ as Cooperating Competitors,” Taiwan Review, May 1, 1989, at https://​taiwantoday​.tw/​news​.php​?unit​=​4​&​post​=​5426 No author, “China Lashes at Taiwan’s ‘Vacation Diplomacy,’” UPI, February 7, 1994, at https://​www​.upi​.com/​Archives/​1994/​02/​07/​China​-lashes​-at​-Taiwans​ -vacation​-diplomacy/​4724760597200/​ The author was present during several of these conversations, one of which concerned arranging for members of Taiwan’s then opposition party to tour a Japanese destroyer equipped with the Aegis combat system. Pamela Burdman, “PAGE ONE—Taiwan Offers 1$ Billion for Membership of the UN,” SFGate June 27, 1995, at https://​www​.sfgate​.com/​news/​article/​PAGE​-ONE​ -Taiwan​-offers​-1​-billion​-for​-3029570​.php

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17. Gerrit van der Wees, “President Chen: ‘One Country on Each Side,’” Taiwan Communique, No. 102, September 2002, p. 1, at https://​ www​ .taiwandc​ .org/​ twcom/​tc102​-int​.pdf 18. See, e.g., Paul Koring and Jeff Sallot, “Bush Criticizes Taiwan for Proposed Referendum,” Globe and Mail, December 10, 2003, at https://​ www​ .theglobeandmail​ . com/​ n ews/​ w orld/​ b ush​ - criticizes ​ - taiwan ​ - for ​ - proposed​ -referendum/​article18440050/​ 19. Text of interview with Premier Wen Jiabao, PBS News Hour, March 14, 2005, at https://​www​.pbs​.org/​newshour/​show/​chinas​-parliament​-passes​-legislation​ -authorizing​-use​-of​-force​-against​-taiwan 20. Michael A. Turton, “Ma Ying-jeou’s Legendary (Trade) Millions,” The Diplomat, May 24, 2016, at https://​thediplomat​.com/​2016/​05/​ma​-ying​-jeous​-legendary​-trade​ -millions/​ 21. Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan in the World Health Assembly: A Victory, With Limits,” Brookings, May 13, 2009, at https://​www​.brookings​.edu/​opinions/​taiwan​ -in​-the​-world​-health​-assembly​-a​-victory​-with​-limits/​ 22. No Author, “Obituary: Lee Teng-hui, former Taiwan President, 1923–2020,” Financial Times, July 29, 2020, at https://​finance​.yahoo​.com/​news/​obituary​-lee​ -teng​-hui​-former​-000000291​.html 23. Women who served the sexual desires of Japanese soldiers during World War II, some of whom appear to have been prostitutes, some sold to brokers by their penurious parents, and others seized. Although the Japanese government settled claims with groups from other countries, it has refused to do so with Taiwan on grounds that Taiwan was part of Japan at the time. 24. For details, see June Teufel Dreyer, “The Taiwan–Japan Relationship,” Orbis, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Fall 2016), pp. 592–608. 25. Taiwan’s financial and retail-related industries, which collectively account for about a quarter of the nation’s GDP, were predicted to be the primary beneficiaries of CSSTA. However, the agreement would also produce asymmetric competition between the PRC’s huge state-owned enterprises and Taiwan’s mostly small and medium-sized industries, did not adequately deal with service providers’ comparative advantages, and did not answer questions about potentially marginalized groups. See, e.g., JoAnn Fan, “The Economics of the Cross-Strait Services Agreement,” Brookings, April 18, 2014. See https://​ www​ .brookings​ .edu/​opinions/​the​-economics​-of​-the​-cross​-strait​-services​-agreement/​ for a more complete analysis. 26. Gambia had actually severed relations with Taiwan in 2013, but, presumably because of the implicit truce between the Ma and Xi administrations, Beijing had not reciprocated the arrangement until after Tsai’s election, but before her inauguration. 27. Reuters, “Japan Representative to Taiwan Says Bilateral Ties Are at Their Best,” Japan Times, January 3, 2017, at http://​www​.japantimes​.co​.jp/​news/​ 2017/​01/​03/​national/​politics​-diplomacy/​ japan-representative-taiwan-say s-bilateral-ties-best/#.WGv6Pn3Xulg 28. Chung Li-hua and William Hetherington, “No Ceremony for Japan Office in Taipei Renaming,” Taipei Times, April 17, 2017. At http://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​ News/​taiwan/​archives/​2017/​ 2003668887 29. H.Con.Res.88, May 17, 2016, at https://​www​.congress​.gov/​bill/​114th​-congress/​ house​-concurrent​-resolution/​88/​text

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30. S.2736 – Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017–2019), at https://​www​.congress​.gov/​bill/​115th​-congress/​senate​-bill/​2736 31. S.1678 – Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019–2020), March 26, 2020, at https://​ www​.congress​.gov/​bill/​116th​-congress/​senate​-bill/​1678/​text 32. Caren Bohan and David Brunnstrom, “Trump Says U.S. Not Necessarily Bound by ‘One China’ Policy,” Reuters, December 11, 2016, at https://​www​.reuters​.com/​ article/​us​-usa​-trump​-china​-idUSKBN1400TY 33. Euan McKirdy, “Trump Says He Would Consult with China’s Xi Before Speaking to Taiwan,” CNN, April 28, 2017, at https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us​-usa​ -trump​-china​-idUSKBN1400TY 34. Amy Qin, “As U.S. and Taiwan Celebrate a Bond, ‘China Responds with Screaming Jets,’” New York Times, August 10, 2020, at https://​www​.nytimes​ .com/​2020/​08/​09/​world/​asia/​taiwan​-us​-azar​-china​.html​?auth​=​login​-email​&​login​ =​email 35. Rebecca Tan, “The U.S. Government Has Opened a Huge New Facility in Taiwan, and China Isn’t Happy,” Washington Post, June 18, 2018, at https://​www​ .washingtonpost​.com/​ news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/18/the-u-s-government-ha s-opened-a-huge-new-facility-in-taiwan-and-china-isnt-happy/ 36. Edward White and Kathrin Hille, “US Agrees $330M Arms Sale to Bolster Taiwan Defense,” Financial Times, September 25, 2018, at https://​www​.ft​.com/​ content/​43a80396​-c05c​-11e8​-95b1​-d36dfef1b89a 37. Kate O’Keefe, “Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar to Visit Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2020, at https://​www​.wsj​.com/​articles/​ health​-and​-human​-services​-secretary​-alex​-azar​-to​-visit​-taiwan​-11596586653 38. Saira Asher, “Coronavirus: Why Taiwan Won’t Have a Seat at the Virus Talks,” BBC, May 17, 2020, at https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-asia​-52661181 39. International Criminal Police Organization, at https://​www​.interpol​.int/​en/​How​ -we​-work/​ Databases 40. Stanley Kao, “Keeping Taiwan Out of Interpol Only Helps the Criminals,” Washington Times, October 9, 2019, at https://​www​.washingtontimes​.com/​news/​ 2019/​oct/​9/​keeping​-taiwan​-out​-of​-interpol​-only​-helps​-the​-crim/​ 41. Stanley Kao, “Everyone Wins When ICAO Includes Taiwan,” The Diplomat, October 5, 2016, at https://​thediplomat​.com/​2016/​10/​everyone​-wins​-when​-icao​ -includes​-taiwan/​ 42. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) April 2011. At https://​www​.mofa​.gov​.tw/​enigo/​News​_Content3​.aspx​?n​=​6238587B9CCFA6AE​ &​sms​=​DE4C0FE1DE37E6E0​&​s​=​C5D4B23F26615366 and ibid., 2014 (no month), https://​www​.mofa​.gov​.tw/​ enigo/cp.aspx?n=DA453B2821FF0C19 43. Morgan Ortagus, “ICAO’s Outrageous Practice of Blocking Twitter Users Who Reference Taiwan,” U.S. State Department Press Statement, February 1, 2020, at https://​www​.state​.gov/​icaos​-outrageous​-practice​-of​-blocking​-twitter​-users​-who​ -reference​-taiwan/​ 44. Annual Statistical Report of Tourism, ROC 2019, p. 4, at https://​admin​.taiwan​.net​ .tw 45. Shu-fen Wang and Lin Kou, “Foreign Visitors to Taiwan Up 7% in 2019,” Focus Taiwan, January 6, 2020, at https://​focustaiwan​.tw/​society/​202001060014 46. For an in-depth examination of Taiwan’s international trade, see Peter Chow, “Taiwan in International Economic Relations,” in June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques

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deLisle (co-eds), Taiwan Under Tsai Ing-wen: Domestic and International Challenges (London: Routledge, 2021), Chapter 5. 47. Brendan Scott, Ting Shi, and Yinka Ibukun, “Nigeria Snubs Taiwan as China Pledges $40 Billion Investment,” Bloomberg, January 17, 2017, at https://​ www​.bloomberg​.com/​news/​articles/​ 2017-01-12/nigeria-closes-taiwan-office-i n-capital-abuja-china-says 48. Stephen Johnson, “How Front Groups for the Chinese Communist Party Are Using Feelgood Bushfire Fundraisers and Youth Nights to Cozy Up to Politicians and Wield Influence in Australia,” Daily Mail Australia, May 31, 2020, at https://​ www​.dailymail​.co​.uk/​news/​article​-8360451/​How​-Chinese​-Communist​-Partys​ -United​-uses​-Australian​-community​-groups​-spread​-propaganda​.html 49. See e.g., Anne-Marie Brady, “Supplementary Submission to the New Zealand Parliament Justice Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign Interference Activities, 2019,” The Guardian, January 23, 2020, at https://​ www​ .theguardian​ .com/​ world/​commentisfree/​2020/​jan/​24/​new​-zealand​-needs​-to​-show​-its​-serious​-about​ -addressing​-chinese​-interference 50. No author, “Chinese Embassy Tokyo Issues Protest Over Japan Daily Sankei Newspaper Interview with Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu,” Japan Times, June 29, 2018, at http://​www​.japantimes​.co​.jp/​news/​2018/​06/​29/​national/​chinese​ -embassy​-tokyo​-issues​-protest​-japan​-daily​-sankei​-newspaper​-interview​-taiwan​ -foreign​-minister​-joseph​-wu/​ 51. Dan Levin, “China to Prosecute Taiwanese in Fraud Case Despite Acquittals in Kenya,” New York Times, April 13, 2016, at https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2016/​04/​ 14/​world/​asia/​china​-to​-prosecute​-taiwanese​-in​-fraud​-case​-despite​-acquittals​-in​ -kenya​.html 52. No author, “Chinese Warplanes Make Threatening Flights around Taiwan,” Yomiuri, July 7, 2020, at https://​the​-japan​-news​.com/​news/​article/​0006657860 53. At https://​www​.washingtonexaminer​.com/​opinion/​op​-eds/​lets​-get​-serious​-about​ -us​-taiwan​-cybersecurity​-cooperation 54. Kg Chan, “Joint US–Taiwan Cybersecurity Drill Underway,” Asia Times, November 5, 2019, at https://​asiatimes​.com/​2019/​11/​joint​-us​-taiwan​-cybersecurity​ -drill​-underway 55. Jess Macy Yu, “Chinese Cyberattacks on Taiwan Government Becoming Harder to Detect: Source,” Reuters, June 15, 2018, at https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us​ -taiwan​-china​-cybersecurity​-idUSKBN1JB17L 56. Mari Saito and Yimou Lee, “Taiwan’s Representative in Japan’s Osaka Commits Suicide,” Reuters, September 15, 2018, at https://​www​.reuters​.com/​ article/​us​-japan​-taiwan/​taiwan​-representative​-in​-japans​-osaka​-commits​-suicide​ -idUSKCN1LV067 57. Iris Chiu, “Digital Minister Audrey Tang: Taiwan’s Genius and Her Unique Past,” Nippon.com, April 10, 2020, at https://​www​.nippon​.com/​en/​japan​-topics/​g00837/​ Tang, digital​-minister​-audrey​-tang​-taiwan’s​-genius​-and​-her​-unique​-past​.html. named one of the Top 100 global thinkers by Foreign Policy magazine, dropped out of school at 14, founded her own IT company when only 19, and then became a digital advisor to Apple on high-level artificial intelligence projects including the development of Siri. At age 33, she announced her retirement to spend the rest of her life doing what she enjoyed and responded favorably to Tsai Ing-wen’s invitation to join Tsai’s administration.

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58. Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Cabinet Proposes Law Amendments to Counter Disinformation,” Focus Taiwan, December 13, 2018, at https://​focustaiwan​.tw/​ politics/​201812130018 59. Lin Chia-nan, “Global Workshop on Disinformation Opens in Taipei,” Taipei Times, September 11, 2019, at http://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​News/​front/​archives/​ 2019/​09/​11/​2003722074 60. Information Operations Research Group, Event Studies of Chinese Information Operations Against Taiwan, May 22, 2018, updated June 19, 2020, at https://​raw​ .githubusercontent​.com/​iorg​-tw/​documents/​master/​iorg​-model​-1​.pdf 61. Ben Blanchard and Jess Macy Yu, “Beijing Condemns Taiwan Probe into Tiny Pro-China Opposition Party,” Reuters, December 19, 2017, at https://​www​.reuters​ .com/​article/​us​-china​-taiwan/​beijing​-condemns​-taiwan​-probe​-into​-tiny​-pro​-china​ -opposition​-party​-idUSKBN1EE09H 62. Jason Pan, “New Party’s Wang, Others, Charged with Espionage,” Taipei Times, June 14, 2018, at http://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​News/​front/​archives/​2018/​06/​14/​ 2003694843 63. Jason Pan, “CUPP Members May Face Attempted Murder Charge,” Taipei Times, September 28, 2017, at http://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​News/​front/​archives/​2017/​ 09/​28/​2003679287 64. Agence France-Presse, “Taiwan Police Target Pro-Beijing ‘White Wolf’ in Donations Probe,” South China Morning Post, August 8, 2018, at https://​www​ .scmp​.com/​news/​china/​policies​-politics/​article/​2158801/​taiwan​-police​-target​-pro​ -beijing​-white​-wolf​-donations 65. Joseph Yeh, “Pro-Unification Activists Protest over Fishing Boat Incident,” Focus Taiwan, March 8, 2018, at https://​focustaiwan​.tw/​politics/​201803080008 66. No Author, “Taiwan Jails Man for Sword Attack on Presidential Guard,” www​ .thestandard​ The Standard (Hong Kong), March 23, 2018, at https://​ .com​.hk/​breaking​-news/​section/​2/​104754/​ Taiwan-jails-man-for-swor d-attack-on-presidential-guard 67. No Author, “Taiwan’s Kinmen Island Begins Importing Water from China,” Associated Press, August 6, 2018, at https://​ apnews​ .com/​ 44​ 646c1d8d73​ 4f2e860e3e​d237dc3741 68. The downside of this generosity was that the masks were delivered in the flagship carrier, China Airlines, leading many to believe that the masks were a gift from the PRC. Pressure to change the name of the airline, as well as passports, has been stymied by fears that Beijing would seize on the changes as tantamount to a declaration of independence. See, e.g., Chun Han Wong, “Taiwan Lawmakers Call for Rebranding Flagship Airline, Changing Passport Design,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2020, at https://​www​.wsj​.com/​articles/​taiwan​-lawmakers​-call​ -for​-rebranding​-flagship​-airline​-changing​-passport​-design​-11595433269​#:​~:​text​ =​In​%20resolutions​%20passed​%20Wednesday​%2C​%20Taiwanese​,Airlines​%2C​ %20the​%20island's​%20largest​%20carrier 69. Not only the coronavirus, but before that the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak in 2003, and prior to that HIV/AIDs.

3. From a province to a sovereign state: Taiwan’s political changes as reflected in the three critical years 1951, 1971 and 1991 Yi-Shen Chen I. INTRODUCTION President Tsai Ing-wen, who won re-election in January 2020 by a whopping 8.17 million votes, asserted in her first post-election interview with the BBC, “[W]e don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan), and we have our own system of running the country, and we do have a government and we have a military, and we have elections.”1 This is not the first time President Tsai has taken the position on the relationship between Taiwan and the ROC. During the presidential election, Tsai repeatedly brought up the concept of “Republic of China, Taiwan” on various occasions. Although such an argument on statehood is supported by Taiwan voters and is in line with the current trend of public opinion, it has been criticized by the Kuomintang (KMT) as a deceptive act of borrowing the shell of the Republic of China for “a reverse takeover,”2 and by some supporters of Taiwan independence as a betrayal of the ideals and a compromise with reality.3 President Tsai did not create the state discourse in the first place. As early as the 1990s, President Lee Teng-hui publicly described the status quo as “the Republic of China on Taiwan.”4 In his book New Taiwan’s Claims [新．台 灣的主張], Lee mentioned that, in the late 1990s, he sent Tsai Ing-wen (then a member of the Mainland Affairs Council) to the United Kingdom to consult with nine leading scholars of international law on the question, “Is Taiwan a sovereign and independent state?” Half of the answers were yes, and half of the answers were no. For example, the noted international law scholar James Crawford argued that the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) had never explicitly declared itself to be an independent state (Crawford, 2007: 40

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41

197–221). This shows that Taiwan is indeed a complex and unique country. Taiwan’s international law scholar Chen Lung-chu (陳隆志) put forward the theory of “evolutionary independence” and “effective self-determination” more than twenty years ago, arguing that Taiwan has already become an independent state after democratization in the 1990s (Chen Lung-chu, 2016: 83–91). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) even included this argument in its “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” in 1999. Under the status quo as defined by the DPP or Tsai Ing-wen, the national name is the Republic of China (Taiwan), but it is not subordinate to or representative of the sovereignty on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, and it opposes the one-China premise (Lee, 2015: 126). This is therefore obviously different from the KMT’s “One China, Respective Interpretations” (or the so-called 1992 consensus) and ultimate unification. The reason why Lee Teng-hui harshly criticized Ma Ying-jeou in New Taiwan’s Claims for betraying his country is because Lee believed that the two states dictum (or a special state-to-state relationship) is in line with Taiwan’s current situation and in Taiwan’s national interest. Ma Ying-jeou, who denies that the cross-strait relationship is state to state, is accordingly the one who seeks to break the status quo. If Taiwan is already a sovereign and an independent country, as defined by the DPP or Tsai Ing-wen based on reality, then when and how did Taiwan, which was incorporated as a province of the ROC after the end of World War II in 1945, become a “nation” mixed with the ROC? In my opinion, the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the defeat of the Dual Representation resolution in 1971, and the series of constitutional reforms initiated by Lee Teng-hui since 1991 were the key years that influenced the political development of Taiwan and led to the “Taiwan-ization of the Republic of China.” In the following sections, this chapter aims to clarify the status quo of the “Republic of China on Taiwan” by exploring the meanings and historical contexts of the three critical years. As the undecided status of Taiwan evident in the texts of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the KMT regime had to win popular support through internal reforms having lost its external legitimacy in 1971, and the year 1991 began the Taiwan-born President Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms followed by the direct presidential election and the two states dictum.

II.

1951: THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY AND THE THEORY OF TAIWAN’S UNDETERMINED STATUS

On December 1, 1943, the leaders of China, the United States and the United Kingdom met in Cairo and jointly released a communiqué, demanding that “all

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the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands [Penghu], shall be restored to the Republic of China” (Liang, 1973: 146–147). Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, issued on July 26, 1945 by US President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China (國民政府) Chiang Kai-shek, also states, “the conditions of the Cairo Declaration will be implemented” (ROC Foreign Affairs Research Association, 1966a: 2–3). On August 15, 1945, Japanese emperor Showa announced the unconditional surrender of the Japanese military via the Jewel Voice Broadcast (Gyokuon-hōsō), ending World War II. Under the wartime resolution of “Restoration to the Republic of China [歸還中華民國],”5 the US government helped the ROC occupy Taiwan. On October 25, Chen Yi (陳儀), the chief executive and garrison commander of Taiwan Province, accepted the surrender of Japan on behalf of Rikichi Andō (安藤利吉), Governor of Taiwan and Commander of the Tenth Front Army, at the Taihoku City Public Auditorium (now Zhongshan Hall). Chen issued the executive and garrison order NO. 1 on the same day to “take over the territory, people, jurisdiction, military facilities and assets of Taiwan and Penghu in a discretionary unified manner” (Zhang, 1990: 245). After the surrender ceremony, Chen Yi also announced in a speech broadcast that, “from now on, Taiwan and the Penghu islands are officially back to the territory of China. All land, people, and political affairs have been placed under the sovereignty of the National Government of the Republic of China” (Zhang, 1990: 201). Although the KMT-led government treated Taiwan as a lost territory to be recovered and made it a province of China, in the absence of a peace treaty with Japan, Taiwan was only under military occupation by the Allies, and not under Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan’s status must be determined by a peace treaty concluded between the victorious and defeated countries. The unilateral incorporation of Taiwan into the territory of the ROC by the KMT-led government was therefore a violation of the principle of military occupation and was legally invalid (Chen Lung-chu, 2002: 50).6 In particular, the February 28th Incident soon broke out due to the failure of the KMT in governing Taiwan. During this period, the US Consulate in Taiwan suggested to Ambassador John Leighton Stuart that immediate American intervention would be practicable solution, arguing, “American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans who believe representations at Nanking and direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese de jure sovereignty status.”7 However, the State Department did not consider the suggestion and held that Taiwan had been incorporated into the ROC in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, and though its sovereignty had not yet been formally transferred, the fact that the Chinese government had controlled the island was generally recognized (Finkelstein, 1993: 66).

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With the intensifying Chinese civil war and the defeat of the KMT, the US disappointment grew. Accordingly, US policy in China changed from supporting the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek to waiting for the dust to settle. On January 5, 1950, President Truman publicly announced his intention to abandon Taiwan and not to intervene in the Chinese civil war, which was tantamount to acquiescing in the occupation of Taiwan by the PRC (People’s Republic of China).8 The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, however. It reversed President Truman’s previous position. On June 27, Truman issued a statement (US Dept. of State, 1957: 2468), ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait, and implemented the policy of neutralizing (the Taiwan Strait) that would free Taiwan from immediate military threat from the PRC. At the same time, Truman also made the claim that Taiwan’s status remains undecided, which is very different from his January 5 claim that Taiwan is part of China. The political calculation behind is: the United Nations Charter explicitly states that the United Nations cannot intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. By not accepting the proposition that Taiwan was legally part of the ROC and adopting the position that “the status of Taiwan is not yet decided,” Washington could find a legitimate basis for its intervention.9 General Douglas MacArthur had been advocating that Taiwan must be defended from enemy nations before the Korean War. He once said from a political point of view, “[T]he political situation during the war when the Allies promised to hand over Taiwan to China after the war was completely different from what it is now. Morally, the United States should give the people of Taiwan the opportunity to decide their own future without the shackles of a communist police state” (Wang, 2008: 190–191). In early January 1951, John Foster Dulles was appointed as the official representative of the US President to the peace treaty with Japan and began the visiting and negotiation with various countries. After Dulles reached an agreement with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, the peace treaty gradually took shape. By this time, the US had abandoned its original proposal of leaving the Taiwan issue to the Big Four, or to the United Nations if the Big Four failed to resolve it; instead, it was in favor of maintaining Taiwan’s status as undetermined. The Peace Conference was finally convened in San Francisco on September 4, 1951 under the leadership of the United States and the United Kingdom, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty was formally signed on September 8. The text of the treaty was simply a declaration by Japan to relinquish Taiwan’s sovereignty, but it did not specify the attribution of the sovereignty.10 According to the six points agreed by the UK and the US in June after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it was up to Japan after its independ-

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ence to choose the government it thought could represent China with which to sign the peace treaty. The United States, however, preferred the government of the ROC as the representative of China. Therefore, the US put pressure on the Shigeru Yoshida regime, even going so far as to warn Japan that the US would not ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty if it did not sign the treaty with the ROC. Japan issued the “Yoshida Shokan (吉田書簡)” and concluded a peace treaty with the ROC under the pressure. The government of the ROC, which had the support of the United States, was also convinced to settle for the bilateral peace treaty with Japan. After more than two months of negotiations, the ROC and Japan finally concluded the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (abbreviated as the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty or the Taipei Peace Treaty) on April 28, 1952, 7 hours and 30 minutes before the entry into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It entered into force on August 5, 1952 through an exchange of letters.11 The bilateral treaty restated the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty regarding the attribution of Taiwan and Penghu, stipulating only, “Japan has renounced all rights, titles and claims to Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands.” Both the ROC and the PRC, which claimed to represent China and Taiwan as a part of China, obviously did not obtain the sovereignty of Taiwan. In short, from the San Francisco Peace Treaty to the Taipei Peace Treaty, the only stipulation on Taiwan’s sovereignty is Japan’s abandonment of Taiwan, and there is absolutely no explicit stipulation on the return of Taiwan to the ROC or the PRC. Not only did Japan, with whom the ROC signed the bilateral peace treaty, deny that the ROC had obtained sovereignty over Taiwan,12 but also the ROC’s Foreign Minister George Kung-chao Yeh (葉公超), who signed on behalf of the ROC, admitted that the return of Taiwan to the ROC had not been finally resolved.13 In the aftermath, the ROC became a beneficiary of the Cold War. With no external security concerns, the ROC was able to exercise white terror rule at home, and to use its huge military and police intelligence apparatus to wipe out dissidents, hinder freedom of assembly, association and speech, and defend the party-state system under martial law. It also maintained the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion that had already been declared before its retreat to Taiwan and continued to place the country in a state of civil war.14 With “anti-Communism and re-conquering the mainland” as the basic national policy, Taiwan was positioned as a “revival base” for counterattack and re-conquest. How Taiwan was positioned under the KMT governance can be seen in the following account from Chiang

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Kai-shek’s 1950 National Day commemorative letter to all fellow soldiers and compatriots: Since the concentration of the national army, our revival base Taiwan has been invincible. Particularly, Taiwan’s strong economic power is a guarantee of victory against Communism and the Soviet Union in the future. We all know that Taiwan is a small province in terms of land area. But its economic power is several times greater than any other affluent province on the mainland, as much as the five southeastern provinces or the five southwestern provinces. This is not only our strength to fight against the communists and the Russians, but also the basis for our self-reliance.15

At the Double Ten National Day Rally in 1966, Chiang Kai-shek also stressed, Fifty-five years ago, on this day in 1911, our Founding Father led the National Revolution to overthrow the Manchu Empire and established the Three Principles of the People and the Republic of China. Twenty years ago, the National Revolutionary Army restored the province of Taiwan, bringing all our compatriots to the motherland. It also built Taiwan into a model province for the Three Principles of the People and a revival base for counterattacking and restoring the Republic.16

The US perception of the status of Taiwan was different from that of Chiang Kai‐shek. Though the US reluctantly supported the ROC’s representation of China at the United Nations until 1971 due to the demands of Cold War international politics, Washington did not necessarily support Chiang’s policy of re‐conquering the mainland.

III.

1971: THE DEFEAT OF THE UN DUAL REPRESENTATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ROC STATUS QUO IN TAIWAN AND PENGHU

The change in US policy toward Taiwan and China did not occur suddenly in 1971 but was long in the making. For example, in 1959, the US Senate commissioned the Conlon Associates in California to complete and publish The Conlon Report, with a section on Northeast Asia written by Robert A. Scalapino, a professor at the University of California. In the chapter, “Communist China and Taiwan,” Professor Scalapino made bold recommendations, including the principle of “test and negotiate” with the Chinese Communist Party, allowing the PRC to enter the United Nations and become a permanent member, and recognizing the “Republic of Taiwan,” etc.17 However, both the KMT and the Beijing authorities were opposed to “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” to the end.

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As for the United Nations, from 1950 to 1970, the membership of the United Nations increased from 59 to 127 countries, of which 30–40 countries supported the PRC’s accession to the United Nations in the 1950s and 40–50 countries in the 1960s.18 In 1970, for the first time, those who supported the PRC among the 127 member states exceeded the number of those who opposed it, i.e. 51:49. However, the ROC government was still able to retain its seat for the time being due to the previous passage of the “Important Question (I.Q.)” Resolution by 66:52, which determined that any resolution to remove Chiang Kai-shek as the representative of China would require two-thirds of the member nations attending a UN General Assembly meeting to vote in favor of the resolution. The above-mentioned ratio of 51:49 refers to the Albanian-led resolution on the exclusion of Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives and the restoration of the legal representation of the PRC in the United Nations. The United States and the Republic of China, on their side, were opposed to the Albanian resolution by applying the I.Q. But on March 9, 1971, when Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs of the US Department of State, came to Taipei for a formal meeting with Undersecretary of the ROC Foreign Affairs H.K. Yang (楊西崑), he told Yang that the proposed I.Q. would probably fail at the next UN General Assembly. Brown also pointed out that the current thinking in the United States was that “a model of Dual Representation would be the best way to safeguard the position of the government of the Republic of China” (Wang, 2000: 338–339). Meanwhile, the Richard Nixon administration reversed its past policy toward China and moved closer to Beijing. The People’s Republic of China, which had long been hostile to the United States, also changed its attitude toward the United States, providing an opportunity for the thawing of Sino-US relations. Thus, while Nixon actively sought a rapprochement with the PRC, he received a goodwill response in return in 1970. In the summer of 1971, a secret visit to Beijing by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger signaled a shift in American strategy. The Dual Representation resolution contained a dual recognition model in which, while the US wanted to recognize the PRC, it was not willing to give up Taiwan. The decisive moment came on Oct. 25, when the I.Q. resolution was thwarted by a vote of 54-59, with 15 abstentions, and the Albanian-led resolution was passed by a vote of 76-35, with 17 abstentions. Before the Albanian resolution was put to a vote, ROC Foreign Minister Shu-kai Chou (周書楷) announced to the General Assembly, “the Chinese delegation has decided not to participate in any more meetings of the General Assembly,” and then he led the delegation out of the meeting. Theoretically, the Albanian resolution only refers to Chinese representations; it does not involve the issue of the Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands.

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If it hadn’t passed, the US Dual Representation resolution would have passed, which means the “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” might be recognized by the United Nations, and the issue of the status of Taiwan and Penghu would be resolved. In other words, as the implications of this Albanian resolution got teased out, the Dual Representation was not only a resolution to the problem of China’s representation, but it also affected the status of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. It would have changed the unrealized “Taiwan’s status is undetermined” position of the United States since the 1950s. Unfortunately, it did not materialize in the 1970s. The KMT regime, expelled from the United Nations and deprived of its external legitimacy, now considered it necessary to strengthen its internal legitimacy in order to compensate for its external blow. Therefore, in addition to massive economic investment and promotion of the “Ten Major Construction Projects (十大建設)”, the regime also began to carry out limited political reforms. For example, the KMT pushed for regular re-election of additional members of the Central Legislatures (增額中央民意代表) so that the proportion of “free region” (refer to Taiwan) representatives in the National Assembly would continue to increase. This change helped alleviate the contradiction [and tension] in representation caused by the need to maintain the regime’s legitimacy. Chiang Ching-kuo became Premier of the Executive Yuan in 1972; he began to promote young Taiwanese elites to the cabinet, increasing the original three Taiwanese members to seven (Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan, four Ministers of State, Minister of Interior and Minister of Transportation). He also appointed a Taiwanese (Hsieh Tung-min, 謝東閔) as Governor of Taiwan Province for the first time. Last, since 1979, the KMT Central Standing Committee increased year by year the number of Taiwanese members by holding important positions in the Committee (Masahiro Wakabayashi, 1994: 176–186). This is the only way to maintain the continued existence of the ROC in Taiwan. Masahiro Wakabayashi thus regarded the early 1970s as the time when the “Taiwan-ization of the ROC” was initiated.

IV.

1991: THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN

Chiang Ching-kuo died suddenly and Lee Teng-hui “accidentally” succeeded him as President in 1988. Two years later, Lee Teng-hui was determined to run for the next presidency out of a sense of duty. The first thing Lee had to do was to find a vice president candidate who was a waishengren (Chinese mainlander), would be accepted to the National Assembly, and could cooperate. That best candidate was Lee Yuan-tsu (李元簇), who was outside the KMT power center. But this decision was soon opposed by the KMT non-mainstream faction, including Executive Yuan President Lee Huan (李煥)

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and Defense Minister Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村). The opposition force intended to boycott the proposal in the KMT Provisional Central Committee Plenary Meeting on February 11, 1990 (Zou, 2001: 71–75). The Party went through a power struggle between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions (on which I will not elaborate here due to space limitations), and finally only Lee Teng-hui and Lee Yuan-tsu as the sole candidate to run for the presidential election. On March 21, 1990, Lee Teng-hui was re-elected as President by the National Assembly (Zou, 2001: 66–70).19 On the other hand, the newly established DPP (founded in 1986) gathered the anti-KMT forces from all sides of the dangwai (outside the party, 黨外) political movement. Through the influence of dangwai political magazines and mass movements, Taiwanese nationalism also gradually became a political ideal that could compete with KMT’s Chinese nationalism. Especially, after the self-immolation of Cheng Nan-jung (鄭南榕) in 1989, the March 1990 student movement, and the constitution-making movement initiated by Taiwan Association of University Professors in the spring of 1991, the DPP passed the Magna Carta of Democracy on June 20, 1990 as “a constitutional proposition at this stage of the National Conference (國是會議),” and also decided that the Party would continue to promote the constitution-making movement after the National Conference (Huang Huang-xiong, 1991: 302). On August 23, 1991, the DPP organized jointly with Taiwan Association of University Professors, the Presbyterian Church and other opposition groups the “People’s Constitution-making Convention (人民制憲會議)” at NTU Law School. On August 25, the People’s Constitution-making Convention passed the Draft of Formosa Constitutions (台灣憲法草案), which explicitly named “the Republic of Taiwan” as the official name of the country. On October 13, the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the DPP further ratified the party platform for Taiwan independence (referendum). Meanwhile, on December 26, 1990, the KMT Constitutional Reform Committee adopted a decision to take a single organ (the National Assembly), and two stages for its constitutional reforms: (1) The First National Assembly convened a provisional session in April 1991 to enact transitional provisions for constitutional amendments and repeal the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion; (2) In 1992, the second National Assembly after the general election in December 1991 convened a provisional session to enact the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (中華民國憲法增修條文) and repeal the transitional provisions. In 1991, the DPP and the KMT, then two major political forces in Taiwan, debated and contested in various ways the two proposals of constitution-making versus constitutional amendment. And the outcome was verified by the first general election in the National Assembly at the end of the year. Back then, the KMT obtained 71.9 percent of the vote shares, taking all 254 seats, while

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the DPP obtained 23.9 percent of the vote shares and only 66 seats. The KMT won more than three-fourths of the seats and took the constitutional amendment lead. The DPP claimed that the defeat in this election was a setback to its demand for Taiwan independence. Faced with the even more important second-term legislative election in 1992, the Party changed to the line of, “talking more about public policies and less about ideology.” Since the result of the election was a victory for Lee Teng-hui’s line, Lee then returned to the established system and sought to implement his ideals by relying on the KMT’s party-state system. On the one hand, Lee Yuan-tsu (李元簇) convened a constitutional reform group within the Party to push for constitutional amendments; on the other, Lee Teng-hui established the National Unification Council of the ROC (中華民國國家統一委員會) in the presidential office to carry out the major task of adjusting cross-strait relations (Zou, 2001: 332). After Lee Teng-hui became president, he and Chiu Chin-yi (邱進益), deputy secretary-general to the president, discussed several times the cross-strait communication mechanism. At that time, Chiu’s plan was to use the National Unification Council (國統會) as the decision-making level, with the Mainland Affairs Council (陸委會) as the executive body, and the semi-governmental and semi-private Straits Exchange Foundation (海基會) as the white glove. The reasons why Lee Teng-hui set up the National Unification Council were to pursue stable cross-strait relations, to reduce suspicion and internal disagreements, and to buy time for constitutional reforms. Therefore, Lee used “national unification” as a cover. In fact, Lee Teng-hui knew the conditions for unification were premature. The first meeting of the National Unification Council was held on October 7, 1990, and the Guidelines for National Unification (國家統一綱領) was completed in February 1991. In the Guidelines, there is no timetable for the short-, medium- and long-range three stages of unification, and the premise of unification is freedom, democracy, equal wealth and equality, which is tantamount to setting up a safety valve for unification. This is the first time in history that “the ROC has explicitly recognized in an official document that the two governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are located in different geographical areas, and are two separate political entities. The significance of this phase is quite considerable” (Zou, 2001: 181–183). It is noteworthy that Chiang Wei-kuo (蔣緯國), KMT senior member who yearned for reunification, did not take the Guidelines well. Chiang even said, “Can such Guidelines be called planning? The person who made the plan must be an insider. He knows very well how to obstruct reunification. That’s why he made this plan so that we can never achieve reunification” (Chiang, 2016: 297).

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In terms of US–Taiwan relations, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has governed US–Taiwan relations since 1979. The United States is concerned about Taiwan’s security but does not recognize Taiwan or the ROC as a nation; but Taiwan’s continued participation in the international community, in whatever capacity and in whatever manner, is still often influenced by US attitudes. For example, the Bush administration, under pressure from both houses of Congress, supported Taiwan’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in July 1991 (the ROC government tried to apply for accession in January 1990 under the name “The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” but did not succeed). The ROC’s attendance at the third APEC meeting in Korea in November 1991 was also made possible with the support of the United States. Between March and May 1995, the US Senate and House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in favor of President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit to the United States. President Clinton then reversed his position and allowed President Lee to attend the Cornell University Alumni Reunion in June of that year. The US decision came as a surprise to Beijing. Beijing accused the United States of creating two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan, and then launched a series of retaliation. As a result, the Clinton administration had no choice but to state categorically that future private visits by Taiwan’s top leaders to the United States would be “rare, infrequent” (Zhou, 1999: 210–218). The threat to Taiwan’s survival came primarily from China, and the help to counter this threat came primarily from the United States. In this regard, the most noteworthy aspect of the US–Taiwan relations during Lee’s presidency was President Bush’s announcement in 1992 of the sale of a series of sophisticated weapons to Taiwan, including 150 F-16 fighter jets, four E-2T Hawkeye aircrafts, as well as at the critical moment of the 1995–1996 missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, when the US sent an aircraft carrier strike group to the vicinity of Taiwan to warn the Chinese Communist Party in a concrete show of force that it should exercise restraint (Zhou, 1999: 228–230). Looking back at the history of 1991, democracy has become a major trend. We can gain several important insights from the analysis of the internal and external environment: (1) the KMT’s waishengren bigwigs, and the party-state throwback would all go down in history. The new leader of the Party would need to provide a new national discourse and a promise of democratic reforms if it is to win the support of a majority votes. (2) Lee Teng-hui amended the constitution through the representatives of the National Assembly elected by [the residents] of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the resulting system of additional provisions was like a constitutional revolution, creating the “Republic of China on Taiwan.” (3) 1991 was the year when the DPP turned the idea of Taiwan independence into its party platform. Since then, the Party began to transform into a full-fledged “election party [選舉黨].”

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The mainstream Taiwan independence discourse is also based on Professor Chen Lung-chu’s “(effective self-determination) Already Independent” theory (Chen Yi-shen, 2010: 131–169). The DPP in the 1990s could almost be seen to have become a “loyal” opposition party to the Lee Teng-hui government. (4) However, in the eyes of the United States and other major countries, neither Taiwan nor the ROC enjoyed sovereignty, was not an independent nation, and could not be treated fairly in the international community. As we all know, the main obstacle to the problem is the pressure from the People’s Republic of China.

V.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

After World War II, the US helped the National Government of the ROC occupy Taiwan as promised at the 1943 Cairo Conference. In the absence of a peace treaty with Japan, the KMT government arbitrarily designated Taiwan as a province of China. However, when the outcome of the 1949 Chinese Civil War became clear, the United States changed its mind and was reluctant to see the relocated KMT government in Taiwan on the brink of collapse, leaving Taiwan to become a province of Red China. Consequently, after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman declared that “Taiwan’s status is undecided” and made this position explicit in the terms of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. Although Taiwan’s status is undetermined under international law, the democratization led by Lee Teng-hui through six constitutional amendments in the 1990s has connotations of “nationalization.” (It would have been impossible for a local government to fully re-elect their country’s parliament and directly elect the president.) In addition, the DPP’s transition route for electoral considerations, which, in a nutshell, is a route that downplays the colors of Taiwan independence. As evidenced by its recognition of the ROC in its 1999 Resolution on the Future of Taiwan [台灣前途決議文], the DPP actually echoed the “special state-to-state theory”20 stated by Lee Teng-hui in an interview with Deutsche Welle in the same year. This process of Taiwan’s political development in the second half of the twentieth century was conceptualized by Masahiro Wakabayashi as the process of “Taiwan-ization of the Republic of China.” The government of the ROC, a foreign regime, merged with Taiwan, and the “Republic of China on Taiwan,” as President Lee Teng-hui repeatedly proclaimed, was born. In other words, Taiwan is no longer a province of the Republic of China, but a country. This stance is still followed by DPP President Tsai Ing-wen to this day. During her tenure, she has repeatedly and publicly proposed the concept of “Republic of China, Taiwan,” which can be seen as a continuation of Lee Teng-hui’s line. This concept is also gradually becoming a symbol of national identity for the majority of Taiwanese

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people. Recent surveys have indicated that over 50 percent of the public choose to maintain the status quo as the ROC, Taiwan. In addition, the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy endorses a vision that considers Taiwan a country and holds new potential for Taiwan’s integration into a regional security network.21 Among the international legal theories concerning Taiwan’s legal status, the “Chinese retrocession” and “status undetermined” theories view Taiwan as the object of an issue of territorial change being handled among international entities; so do discussions of postwar Taiwan in terms of whether or not it should be restored to China or whether or not it was already part of China. For example, having modified his earlier idea that Taiwan was an inseparable part of China, the late international law scholar Chiu Hungdah notably asserted the legal basis of the ROC claim to acquisition of sovereign territorial rights to Taiwan (Chiu, 2001: 3–10). On the one hand, although the international community currently accepts the “one China” principle, it has not indeed and cannot refute the existence of a space called Taiwan; on the other hand, sustaining the argument that Taiwan’s legal status is undetermined is already difficult given the impediment of the Taiwan people’s rejection, under circumstances in which they may freely express their views, of their right to exercise self-determination.22 The international law scholar James Crawford questioned the “criteria for statehood (國家性)” of Taiwan or the ROC on the grounds of historical remnants in the constitutions or additional provisions. But his legal basis is primarily based on the fact that the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has never explicitly declared itself to be an independent state, nor has it sought international recognition as such; instead, it has often expressed its position in vague and ambiguous statements that only reinforce the “tacit recognition” of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.23 There is a famous saying in international jurisprudence that goes like this, “a government is only recognized for what it claims to be.” In this regard, President Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s began to strengthen the popular support for Taiwan as a sovereign state through democratic reforms, and finally used the “special state-to-state theory” to explain Taiwan’s relationship with China. Later, during the administrations of DPP President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008) and President Tsai Ing-wen (2016–present), they refused to accept the so-called one-China principle or the 1992 Consensus, despite repeated intimidation by the Beijing government. In other words, the democratically elected Taiwanese presidents have clearly declared that Taiwan is an independent country. We can see from the above how important it is to elect the right national leaders while the ROC Constitution remains unchanged. The results of the elections are at least a sign of the will of the people and the direction where the country is heading. According to historical experiences, only a person with

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a sense of Taiwan subjectivity and historical mission and resilience can assume the responsibility of protecting the country’s sovereignty. Additionally, those in power must first demonstrate their ability to govern in terms of economic development and social justice in order to win sufficient popular support before they can continue to deal with the remnants of the Constitution of the Republic of China based on the principles of popular sovereignty (國民主權 原理). Hopefully in the near future, the two major political forces in Taiwan, the DPP and the KMT, would be able to find common ground between their differences and reach sufficient consensus so that when applying for membership in international organizations and demanding fair treatment from the international community, they would not offset themselves and would succeed in breaking through the Beijing government’s suppression and blockade. Only then can Taiwan be transformed from a “de facto independent” state to a fully independent state.

NOTES 1. “President Tsai Ing-wen interviewed by BBC,” Jan. 18, 2020, News Releases, Office of the President: https://​english​.president​.gov​.tw/​News/​5962 (downloaded and cited on Sept 4, 2020). 2. For example, on November 19, 2019, Kuomintang presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu stated, “the Democratic Progressive Party’s claim that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent country with a name called the Republic of China (ROC) is a form of deception. Or the common term is ‘a reverse takeover.’” “Han Kuo-yu: the DPP’s state discourse is a reverse takeover [韓國瑜: 民進黨國家論述是 借殼上市],” Nov. 20, 2019, United Daily News: https://​udn​.com/​news/​story/​ 12702/4175592 (downloaded and cited on Sept. 4, 2020). 3. As Shi Zheng-feng (施正鋒) pointed out, “the ROC, Taiwan” is in fact the “ROC-ization” of Taiwan, trapping Taiwan in the shackles of the ROC. Jin Heng-wei (金恒煒) even slammed Tsai’s statement as a complete overthrow of the DPP’s party platform: “In this moment, she is finally showing her true colors and ideology.” Shi Zheng-feng (施正鋒), “Column: Tsai Ing-wen’s ‘the ROC, Taiwan’ is like to get blood from a stone [專欄: 蔡英文的「中華民國台灣」就 是與虎謀皮],” Oct 14, 2019, Taiwan People News: https://​www​.peoplenews​.tw/​ news/​1de73552​-7a2c​-4201​-a931​-59079ed81cbb (downloaded and cited on Sept. 4, 2020). Jin Heng-wei (金恒煒), “Column: With Tsai Ing-wen, there’s no DPP [ 專欄:有了蔡英文哪還有民進黨]”, Oct. 17, 2019, The Liberty Times: https://​talk​ .ltn​.com​.tw/​article/​paper/​1325380 (downloaded and cited on Sept. 4, 2020). 4. Notable speeches include Lee’s 1995 alumni visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, where he delivered the “With The People Always In My Heart” speech. In the speech, Lee said, “Coming to the U.S. for the Cornell alumni Homecoming event is not only a personal honor for me, but more importantly, it is also an honor shared by the 21 million people of the Republic of China (Taiwan).” See “Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to give Olin lecture at Cornell University [ 總統在歐林講座演講],” Office of the President: https://​www​.president​.gov​.tw/​ NEWS/​22622 (downloaded and cited on Oct. 16, 2020).

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5. For the argument and discussion of the legal effects of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese surrender documents that do not establish Taiwan’s sovereignty over China, see Peng Ming-min (彭明敏) and Ng Chiau-tong (黃昭堂), Cai Qiu-xiong (蔡秋雄) translated, Taiwan’s Status in International Law [台灣在國際法上的地位] (Taipei: Yu Shan She玉山社, 1995), pp. 126–140. 6. For the argument and discussion of the legal effects of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese surrender documents that do not establish Taiwan’s sovereignty over China, see Peng Ming-min and Ng Chiau-tong, Cai Qiu-xiong translated, Taiwan’s Status in International Law, pp. 126–140; Chen Li-tong (陳荔彤), “Taiwan is no longer part of China [臺灣已非中國的一部 分],” On Taiwan’s Subjectivity [台灣主體論] (Taipei: Yuan Zhao元照, 2002), pp. 13–15. 7. “The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII, pp. 433–434. At https://​history​.state​.gov/​historicaldocuments/​frus1947v07/​d339 (downloaded and cited on November 1, 2020). 8. See “President Truman’s full statement to the press, January 5 [杜魯門總統一 月五日向新聞界發表聲明全文譯文],” January 5, 1950, U.S. Attitudes Toward Taiwan [美國對台灣之態度] (1949.11–1950.1), Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica collected, file no: 411.2/0043. 9. On October 20, 1950, Dulles, who was diplomatic adviser to the US State Department, met with the ROC Ambassador to the US, Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, to discuss the peace treaty with Japan, and explained to Koo that if the US also considered Taiwan to be Chinese territory, the issue of your government’s representation needed to be resolved and that by sending the 7th Fleet to protect Taiwan, the US was assuming leadership and would lose the basis to preside over this case. “Ambassador Koo and Dulles Exchange Views on the Peace Treaty’s Territorial Issues: The First Koo-Dulles Conversation [顧大使與杜勒斯關於和 約領土問題交換意見－顧杜第一次談話],” see ROC Foreign Affairs Research Association [中華民國外交問題研究會], ed., Relationship between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the China–Japan Peace Treaty [金山和約與中日和 約的關係] (Taipei: ROC Foreign Affairs Research Association, 1966), p. 6. 10. Article 2(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulates the following with respect to Taiwan: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” “Treaty of Peace with Japan [對日和約條約],” see ROC Foreign Affairs Research Association, ed., Relationship between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the China–Japan Peace Treaty, p. 94. 11. The process of signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan–China Peace Treaty, and the related verification, see Wang Jing-hong (王景弘), Power Politics and Taiwan: From Cairo to the San Francisco Peace Treaty [強權政治與台灣: 從開羅會議到舊金山和約] (Taipei: Yu Shan She [玉山社], 2008). 12. During the signing of the treaty, the Asian Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wajima Eiji (倭島英二), who was an important member of the Japanese compromise, stated in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee during the consideration of the treaty by the Diet that “the ultimate territorial rights of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands are still unclear.” Peng Ming-min and Ng Chiau-tong, Cai Qiu-xiong translated, Taiwan’s Status in International Law, pp. 174–175. Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ishihara Kanchiro 石原幹市 郎 also emphasized during the consideration of the treaty by the Foreign Affairs

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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

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Committee of the House of Representatives that, “in this peace treaty, although Japan has relinquished all authority over the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, it is a matter for the Allies to decide among themselves to which they [Taiwan and Penghu] belong, and no formal decision has yet been made on this point.” Dai Tian-zhao (戴天昭), Li Ming-jun (李明峻), translated, International Political History of Taiwan [台灣國際政治史] (Taipei: Qianwei [前衛], 2002), p. 386. On February 2, 1961, the Director of the Asia Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nakagawa stated the following before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives: “the San Francisco Peace Treaty only provided for Japan’s abandonment of Taiwan and Penghu, but did not specify that they [Taiwan and Penghu] should belong to the Republic of China. There is also no territorial clause in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and Japan does not explicitly state that Taiwan belongs to the ROC.” “Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of Japan on February 2, 1961 [一九六一年二月二日日本眾議院外交委員會第二號會議紀錄譯文],” Status of Taiwan [台灣地位問題] (1956.6–1964.2), Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica collected, file no: 602.1/89028. In 1952, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Mr. George Kung-chao Yeh, reported to the Legislative Yuan: “The delicate international situation makes them (Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands) not belong to us. Under the present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to us …. In the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, we have a provision that the residents of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, including legal persons, are Chinese nationals. In the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, we have a provision that the residents of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, including juristic persons, are Chinese nationals. In the future, when Taiwan and Penghu are returned to us, this clause may be used to fix the flaws.” Tan Shen-ge (譚慎格) ed., Reassessing the “One China” Policy: Challenges to the One-China Policy in U.S. Academia and Politics [重估「一個中國」政策: 美國學界、政界對一中政策的挑戰] (Taipei: Cai-tuan Fa-ren Qun-ce-hui (財團法人群策會), 2005), pp. 288–289. The Temporary Provisions as a constitutional amendment announced a state of emergency in response of the Civil War between the KMT and the CCP. The provisions largely extended the power of the president and provided means to suppress competition. “National Day Commemoration of the 39th Anniversary of the Republic of China to Compatriots of the Whole Country [中華民國三十九年國慶紀念告全國軍民 同胞書],” Zhong-zheng Wen-jiao Ji-jin-hui [中正文教基金會]. http://​www​.ccfd​ .org​.tw/​ccef001/​index​.php​?option​=​comcontent​&​view​=​article​&​id​=​1667:​0010​-45​ &​catid​=​228:​2014​-06​-12​-03​-16​-14​&​Itemid​=​256 (downloaded and cited on Sept. 7, 2020). “Speech for the Double Tenth National Day Celebration of 55th Anniversary [ 對慶祝五十五年雙十國慶大會致詞],” Zhong-zheng Wen-jiao Ji-jin-hui [中正 文教基金會] http://​www​.ccfd​.org​.tw/​ccef001/​index​.php​?option​=​com​_content​&​ view​=​article​&​id​=​2309:​0021​-20​&​catid​=​192:​2014​-06​-12​-03​-08​-29​&​Itemid​=​256 (downloaded and cited on Sept. 7, 2020). “References on International Issues: Recommendations in the China Section of the Conlon Report [國際問題參考資料: 康隆報告有關中國部份之建議] (1959),” U.S. Policy Toward China: The Conlon Report [美國對華政策－康隆報告] (1959.6–1959.12), Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica collected, file no: 401.1/0091.

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18. For a detailed list of numbers, see Hu Wei-zhen (胡為真), The Evolution of US “One China” Policy toward China [美國對華「一個中國」政策之演變] (Taipei: Taiwan Shang-wu Yin-shu-guan, 2001), p. 35. 19. The two competing elite factions in the KMT were in a broad sense called non-mainstream and mainstream factions. The majority of the former were conservative mainlanders, while President Lee and the majority of the Taiwanese in the KMT advocated political reform. 20. The main content is as follows: Since the constitutional amendment in 1991, cross-strait relations have been defined as state to state, or at least as a special state-to-state relationship, rather than as an internal “One China” relationship between a legitimate government, a rebel group, or a central government and a local government. “President interviewed by Deutsche Welle [總統接受德 國之聲專訪],” July 9, 1999, The Presidential Office of the ROC: https://​www​ .president​.gov​.tw/​NEWS/5749 (downloaded and cited on Sept. 7, 2020). 21. Fang-yu Chen and others, “What do Taiwan’s People Think about Their Relationship to China? A New Survey Delves More Deeply into Taiwanese Public Opinion toward the ROC, China, and the Nation’s Future,” May 29, 2020, The Diplomat: https://​thediplomat​.com/​2020/​05/​what​-do​-taiwans​-people​-think​-about​ -their​-relationship​-to​-china/​(downloaded and cited on Nov 10, 2020); “A record high percentage of people in Taiwan claim a Taiwanese identity but status quo remains the mainstream public opinion [台灣民意調查顯示: 台灣人認同創 新高 但維持現狀仍是主流民意],” July 14, 2020, BBC Chinese News: https://​ www​.bbc​.com/​zhongwen/​trad/​chinese​-news​-53391406 (downloaded and cited on Nov. 10, 2020); Howard Wang, “Taiwan’s Security Role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy,’ June 27, 2020, The Diplomat: https://​thediplomat​.com/​2019/​06/​taiwans​ -security​-role​-in​-the​-u​-s​-indo​-pacific​-strategy/​ (downloaded and cited on Nov. 12, 2020). 22. Chen Yi-shen (陳儀深) and others, eds., Taiwan’s International Status: History and Theory (Taipei: Taiwan Advocates, 2005), pp. 55–102, especially pp. 90–99. 23. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2 edition, 2007), the first two sections of Chapter 5, pp. 197–221. Crawford also discusses in this chapter the cases of the Vatican City, the Free City of Danzig, and Hong Kong and Macao since 1997.

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山和約與中日和約的關係]. Taipei：ROC Foreign Affairs Research Association, 1966b. Tan Shen-ge (譚慎格) ed. Reassessing the ‘One China’ Policy: Challenges to the One-China Policy in U.S. Academia and Politics [重估「一個中國」政策：美國 學界、政界對一中政策的挑戰].Taipei: Cai-tuan Fa-ren Qun-ce-hui, 2005. U.S. Dept. of State. American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955: Basic Documents. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1957. Wakabayashi Masahiro (若林正丈), Hong Jin-zhu (洪金珠) and Xu Pei-xian (許佩賢) translated. Taiwan: A Divided Nation and Democratization [台灣：分裂國家與民 主化]. Taipei: Yue-dan Chu-ban, 1994. Wang Jing-hong (王景弘). Power Politics and Taiwan - From Cairo to the San Francisco Peace Treaty [強權政治與台灣―從開羅會議到舊金山和約]. Taipei：Yu Shan She, 2008. Wang Jing-hong (王景弘). Taiwan from the Washington Archives [採訪歷史：從華府 檔案看台灣]. Taipei：Yuan Liu, 2000. Zhang Rui-cheng (張瑞成) ed. Planning for the Restoration of Taiwan and the Acceptance of Surrender and Handover [光復台灣之籌劃與受降接收]. Taipei: the KMT archives, 1990. Zhou Xu (周煦). U.S. Policy in East Asia after the Cold War, 1989-1997 [冷戰後美國 的東亞政策（1989-1997）]. Taipei: Sheng-zhi Wen-hua, 1999. Zou Jing-wen (鄒景雯) interviewed and recorded. Lee Teng-hui’s Confessions [李登輝 執政告白實錄]. Taipei: Yin Ke, 2001.

4. Rethinking Taiwanese ethnicity: notes on recent historical scholarship1 Lung-chih Chang I. INTRODUCTION For foreign visitors who take a ride on the Taipei MRT, many are impressed by the multi-lingual announcements using Mandarin, Hoklo, Hakka and English. It is a vivid epitome of contemporary Taiwanese multi-ethnic society. With the pluralistic landscape in mind, this chapter aims to explore the question of ethnicity in Taiwan from a historical perspective (Chang 2014). Based on recent scholarship on the subject (Chang 2008b), I first trace the historical trajectory and major junctures in the formation of Taiwan’s multi-ethnic society: from the interactions between states/empires, Han immigrants and plains aborigines during the age of maritime trade and agricultural settlements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the territorial colonization and ethnic classification of upland indigenous peoples by Qing and Japanese regimes in late nineteenth century; and the ethnogenesis of Taiwanese consciousness in nation building efforts of Japanese and Chinese regimes in the twentieth century (Chang 2008a). The second part of the chapter outlines major cases of ethnic and cultural revival in post-martial law Taiwan. I discuss important ethnic movements of the indigenous and Hakka peoples in the 1980s along with new initiatives for Southeast Asian immigrants since late 1990s. The third section introduces the representative works on Taiwan’s ethnic question by sociologist Wang Fu-chang, anthropologist Huang Ying-kui and historian Dominic Yang. These different views by veteran and young scholars signify the rethinking of Taiwanese ethnicity from interdisciplinary approaches. The conclusion further reflects on the ongoing efforts and debates on the subject of transitional justice in contemporary Taiwan. This recent scholarship represents a positive trend in the study of Taiwan’s ethnic relations that emphasizes the historicity and dynamics of the multi-ethnic society and sheds new lights on the research and rethinking of Taiwanese ethnicity in the global era. 60

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II.

THE FORMATION OF TAIWAN’S MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY: HISTORICAL SKETCHES

1.

From Aboriginal Island to Han Immigrant Frontier, 1600–1800

In 1697, Chinese literati Yu Yonghe wrote his Small Sea Travelogue (Pihai Jiyou） to record his visit to Taiwan. Yu travelled from Amoy via the Pescadores and arrived in a southern port near Taiwan prefectural city. In the travelogue Yu detailed his overland trip to the northern sulfur mines near Danshui and Keelung and his encounters with the island’s plains aborigines. Together with Chen Di’s Record of the Eastern Savages (Dongfa Ji) and other contemporary records, Yu’s travelogue became one of the most important texts for the study of Ming and Qing Taiwan (Teng 2004: 261–280). As John Shepherd explicates in his classic study on early Taiwan history, it is during the long seventeenth century that Taiwan has gradually transformed from an aboriginal island of deer hunting grounds to a Chinese immigrant frontier of rice paddy and sugarcane fields (Shepherd 1993). Shepherd points out that the successive regimes of the Dutch East India Company, the Ming-loyalist Cheng family and the Qing dynasty each devised policies to deal with the indigenous population, to control the migrant Chinese farmers and to balance the dual challenges of revenue and security on the Taiwan frontier (Chan and Pan 2001). By rediscovering the historical role of Taiwan’s plains aborigines, he affirms Taiwan as a strategic frontier of the Qing empire and further critiques the long-held academic misconceptions of “displacement scenario” and “neglect hypothesis” (Shepherd 1993: 2–8). Based on solid archival studies, he examines the similarities in aboriginal taxation and administration of the three regimes and further analyses the fluctuations in early Qing quarantine policies towards the spread of Han settlement in the eighteenth century. Comparing Taiwan with other Qing frontiers, Shepherd points out that Qing statecraft on Taiwan can be characterized by the cost–benefit calculus in the strategic decision making as exemplified by the evolution of the frontier land-tenure system and aboriginal land rights that accommodates interactions between the state, the Han settlers, and the aborigines2 (Shepherd 1993: 239–307; Ka 2001). 2.

From “Savage Border” to Aboriginal Territory, 1874–1945

In 1874, after nearly two centuries of Qing rule in Taiwan, a Japanese fleet with more than three thousand soldiers landed on the southern Lansgqiao region. It is not the first foreign presence that occurred in the border region after the

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opening of Taiwan’s treaty ports in 1860. The Sino-Japanese territorial and military crisis lasted for five months after intensive diplomatic negotiations in Taiwan, Fujian and Peking. Later known as the Mudanshe incident, the Qing court formally abolished the centuries old quarantine policy in the aftermath of the first overseas expedition of the modernizing Meiji government (Eskildsen 2019). As Paul Barclay points out, the dynamic relationship between the colonial state and indigenous peoples in Taiwan is reflective of the global transformation of imperial expansion and capitalist development in the long nineteenth century. Successive military colonization and civilizing projects of the late Qing and Japanese governments not only led to the territorialization of aboriginal Taiwan but also transformed the ethnic landscape of indigenous society. Following the classificatory efforts of pioneering Japanese ethnologists such as Torii Ryuzo, Ino Kanori and Mori Ushinosuke, the diverse upland settlements were sorted into a nine-tribe schema (Barclay 2018: 35). And the Japanese colonial state adopted various strategies from brokerage and intermarriage to brute-force guard line and policing to subdue the natives and extract the resources. By viewing the origins of Taiwan’s indigenism as long-term processes of supra-state, nation states and stateless peoples, Barclay further discusses the complicity among colonial administration, tourism industry and scholarly apparatus during the 1920s and 1930s in the ethnic typification, geobody construction and racialization of indigenous Taiwanese (Barclay 2018: 38–40; 190–249). To be sure, if the Lin Shuangwen rebellion of 1787 signifies the evolving relations between the Qing court, Han settlers and plains aborigines in frontier Taiwan, the Wushe rebellion of 1930 represents the changing power relations between the modern colonizing state and indigenous peoples in colonial Taiwan. From eighteenth-century Han Chinese agrarian settlements in plains regions to nineteenth and early twentieth century Japanese commercial and capitalist endeavors in the upland mountain areas, the colonial experience of the island’s indigenous peoples thus constitutes an important, if not indispensable chapter in understanding Taiwanese ethnicity (Hung 2009).3 3.

Becoming Taiwanese in between Japan and China: 1880s–1950s

Unlike those indigenous peoples of plains and uplands, decedents of Han immigrants witnessed the violent cycles of peasant rebellions and sub-ethnic feuds as well as the emergence of market towns and gentry families in Qing Taiwan. As the island became a maritime province in the 1880s amid international politics in East Asia, new residential identities of Taiwan gradual replaced native-place belongings of mainland that finally led to the establishment of a short-lived Formosan republic during the cession crisis of 1895. In the next

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half-century, Taiwan’s residents underwent colonial modernization, resistance and war, and dual sovereignty transition from Japan to nationalist China. As shown in Evan Dawley’s recent work on the northern port city of Jilong, the peculiar process of ethnogenesis of Taiwanese can been seen through the lived experiences of this colonial city (Dawley 2019). As colonized subjects, Taiwan’s residents were excluded from modern Japanese and Chinese state-building projects. Discouraged from developing an independent national identity, they were treated as ethnic groups defined by successive states as expressly non-national entities. Adopting a performative approach differing from textual studies, Dawley examines the enactment of identities of Taiwanese elite actors and their interactions with their Japanese or Chinese counterparts in the realms of local organizations, religion and social welfare. He argues that a Taiwanese ethnic consciousness emerged in Jilong during the period of Japanese rule and its immediate aftermath (Dawley 2019, 14–20). The historical process of immigration, colonization and re-colonization during the seven decades gave rise to two intertwined identities of local, urban Jilongese and regional, ethnic Taiwanese. And the multiple memories of post-war immigration, the 228 incident of 1947, white terror, martial-law rule reveal the process of Taiwanese ethnic formation in resistance against, and dialogue with, Japanese and Chinese nationalisms (Dawley 2019: 331–332, 348).4

III.

THE MAKING OF ETHNIC MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN

The lifting of martial law in 1987 can be seen as a turning point in the shift of political power that signified Taiwan’s democratization and the normalization of social landscape and ethnic relations. The current demographic composition of Taiwan’s 23 million population can be summarized as follows: indigenous Austronesian peoples 2.4%, Hoklo 69%, Hakka 16.2%, Mainlanders 5.5% and new immigrants from Southeast Asia ca. 5%. This multi-ethnic landscape is the result of different waves of immigration that contribute to growing diversity of Taiwanese society. As Michael Hsiao points out, the perception of Taiwan as an ethnically diverse national society of its own has gained ground since the 1990s. In his recent study on social movements and democratization since the 1980s, he further discusses the origins and impacts of Taiwan’s major ethnic movements (Hsiao 2019: 2). 1.

The Ethnic Movement of Indigenous Taiwanese

The indigenous people’s movement in Taiwan emerged in the 1980s. Fighting against economic disadvantage and social discrimination, the movement

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was self-initiated and mobilized by young educated intellectuals to address the problems facing their native society. Originated in the publication of the High Mountain Youth (Gaoshanqing) magazine in 1983, the movement was first launched by the Association for the Promotion of the Indigenous Rights in 1984 as the “rectification of names campaign” (zhengming yundong). Once considered as “savages” (fanren) and “high mountain tribes” (gaoshanzu), Taiwanese indigenous peoples have legally been renamed “indigenous peoples” (yuanzhumin) by the government in 1994. To be sure, Taiwan’s indigenous peoples number about 565,000 and are now divided into sixteen officially recognized ethnic groups (Hsiao 2019: 7–8). In addition to name rectification, the movement also demanded the return of communal hunting fields and traditional areas (huanwo tudi) in 1988. The campaign lasted till 1993 and received wide attention along with social and environmental movements. In 1996, the government established the Council of Aboriginal Affairs (later renamed as Council of Indigenous Peoples). In 2002, President Chen Shui-bian announced the signing of an equal treaty to establish a “new partnership” with Taiwanese indigenous peoples. The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (IPBL) was passed in 2005. A new public TV channel and a college of indigenous studies were also set up to promote indigenous languages and cultures (Hsiao 2019: 9–10). On August 1, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen offered an official public apology to the indigenous peoples on behalf of the ROC government. In this landmark event, Tsai announced new initiatives to correct the collective sufferings and predicaments of indigenous Taiwanese peoples. A special commission was set up in the Presidential Office to deal with issues concerning historical and transitional justice along with a new committee to evaluate the enforcement of the IPBL in the Executive Yuan. In addition to an indigenous legal service center to review possible contradictions between native customs and official statutes, the government also endeavored to resolve specific requests such as the nuclear waste on Orchid Island, the legal status of the Pingpu groups, traditional territories in land and sea areas, indigenous language development. The official apology and policy initiatives can be seen as a significant step towards the indigenous self-government movement in post-martial law Taiwan. 2.

The Hakka Ethnic Movement

The Hakka is an ethnic minority group in Taiwan since the Qing dynasty that has been discriminated by the majority Hoklo people. Many of them live in rural townships near the inner mountain regions. Numbering more than three million, the Hakka people are known for hard working in agriculture and public service and for not much engagement in commerce and business compared with their Hoklo counterparts. Hakka ethnic movement can be traced

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back to the founding of the Hakka monthly magazine in 1987. It was a joint effort among Hakka scholars, intellectuals and advocates to raise awareness of local cultural crisis and to enhance the collective political role of the Hakka people (Hsiao 2019: 11). In December 1988, a large-scale demonstration aiming at “Returning my mother tongue” was organized to protest against the unequal treatment of local dialects in official media policy that favors Mandarin. As a result of this movement, the government revised the Radio and Television Act and adopted the neutral term of “mother tongue” (muyu) to replace the derogatory word of “local dialect” (fangyan). Moreover, licensing approval was granted for newly established Hakka language radio stations to promote local culture programs. And primary schools in Hakka townships began to offer mother tongue language courses. In 2001, a Councils for Hakka Affairs was set up by the Executive Yuan, while a Hakka TV station was launched in 2003. New Hakka studies centers were established in major universities such as National Central University in Taoyuan, National Chiao Tung University in Hsinchu, and National United University in Miaoli. Meanwhile, the Hakka policy platform has become a major political issue in major national elections. The Hakka Basic Act was promulgated in 2010 (Hsiao 2019: 12) The development of the Hakka ethnic movement in post-Martial Law Taiwan can be seen as the product of the island’s democratization since the 1980s. Hakka intellectuals combined street protests, policy dialogues and political persuasion in their pursuit of collective identity and official recognition. In the 2016 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen listed her ten major Hakka policy platforms, summarizing many important goals of the movement: to officially recognize the Hakka language as one of the national languages; to upgrade the Hakka TV service into an independent public broadcasting group; to develop the Provincial Highway 3(Tai san xian) into a Hakka tourist route; to establish Hakka studies as the national Hakka knowledge system; and to set up a Taiwan-based Hakka international NGO. These positive responses by the DPP government on cultural promotion, community building, language preservation and education advancements reflect the main concern and major achievement of the Hakka ethnic movement (Hsiao 2019: 13). 3.

Ethnic Movement for New Trans-national Immigrants

Marriage and labor immigrants have become one of the major ethnic groups since early 1990s as result of global and transnational migration. It is estimated that there were more than 700 thousand foreign workers in Taiwan in 2018. Most of them came from Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand. Almost two thirds of them were males working in the manufacturing sectors while others worked as domestic care givers and household helpers (Hsiao

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2019: 13–14). Suffering from exploitative brokerage employment agencies and distortive media reports and stereotypes, these workers are vulnerable to discrimination and sometimes forced to run away. Meanwhile, there were about 550 thousand registered cases of cross-border marriage immigrants in Taiwan as of December 2018. Compared with those Chinese spouses who lived mostly in mainland China, there were roughly 420 thousand immigrant-through-marriage spouses residing in Taiwan. Many of them came from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. Under current regulations of the National Immigration Agency of the ROC, Southeast Asian spouses are entitled to apply for Taiwan citizenship after residing four years while Chinese spouses need to wait for six years before making application. Adding these to the above labor immigrants, the total number of marriage and immigrants to Taiwan amounts to nearly 1100 thousand that sociologists consider to be constituents of Taiwan’s new ethnic groups (Hsiao 2019: 15). In view of the structural disadvantage and lack of social and political resources of the two immigrant groups, many local Taiwanese NGOs have taken the initiative to provide necessary services such as language programs, life adjustment classes, after school childcare, marriage counselling and legal assistance. Among them, Christian missionary organizations and related NGOs were major supporters of those foreign workers along with other local human rights and labor organizations. Meanwhile, local women’s organizations such as the Trans Sisters Association (Nanyang Jiemei hui) offer assistance to marriage immigrants. Many of the active members are themselves marriage immigrants who adapted well and came to help their fellow sisters. There is a monthly magazine called 4-Way News (Sifang Bao), which was edited in six Southeast Asian languages and circulated free among immigrant groups. Taiwanese NGOs for marriage and labor immigrants mostly operate according to government regulations and therefore conservative and pro-establishment in nature. Different from those proactive and reform-oriented ethnic movements of the Hakka and indigenous peoples, these service-oriented organizations seldom advocate for policy reform or systemic change. It is also noteworthy that under the “New Southbound Policy” initiated in May 2016 by the DDP government, increasing attention has been paid to the education of the new generation of cross-national marriages between Taiwanese males and Southeast Asian female immigrants. It remains to be seen whether this new policy trend will exert long-term policy change and social impact on marriage and labor immigrants in Taiwan.

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IV.

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RETHINKING TAIWANESE ETHNICITY: THREE INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES

Shaped by the ethnic movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the discourse of “Four Major Ethnic groups” is based on new Taiwan-centered subjectivity and replaces the once hierarchical if not discriminatory relationship into a more pluralistic ideal that emphasizes difference and equality. As Taiwan transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democratic state, the institutional and ideological oppression to different minority groups gradually disappeared while the social and political significance of ethnic movement also changed in the civil society (Brown 2020). The following synopsis aims to offer an account of recent scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective. 1.

Rethinking Ethnic Studies in Taiwan

The question of ethnicity has peculiar political and social contexts in post-war Taiwan. Taiwanese sociologist Wang Fu-chang points out that not only has the conception of ethnic group (zuqun) changed over time, the major focus of ethnic policy has been shaped by different waves of social movements. More importantly, the significance of ethnic groups in post-martial law era has gradually faded in the new century following the democratization process. Combining both sociological and historical analyses, Wang traced the transformation of three major ethnic groups in contemporary Taiwanese society, namely the Hoklos, the Mainlanders (Waisheng ren) and the Hakka. 1.1 The Mainlanders: from regional to ethnic identities According to Wang, the emergence of Mainlander minority discourse can be traced back to the early 1970s when Chiang Ching-kuo began to promote young Taiwanese elites in the political realm. In the 1980s, second-generation Mainlander elites started to organize across old geographical/regional boundaries and mobilized diaspora Mainlanders from different Chinese provinces in national elections. The Mainlander minority discourse achieved major success in the 1989 legislative election and triggered the first open debate on provincial and ethnic issues (Wang 2018). 1.2

The Hakka: changing conceptions from cultural/regional to ethnic group The Hakka people in Taiwan has long been considered as a group consisting of common culture and language. Scholars also point out that the idea of a Hakka group first emerged in the Qing dynasty. Wang Fuchang’s research further indicates that institutional and social factors such as civil examination(ke ju),

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loyalist subject(yimin) and sub-ethnic feud(xie dou) contributed to the collective group identity of the Hakka that underwent significant transformation following the development of localized society during late Qing and Japanese colonial periods. The urbanization and industrialization in the post-war era resulted in the mass migration of Hakka from their native places. Advocating for cultural revival and language preservation, Hakka activists reconstructed new ethnic group identity in the 1980s and fought for recognition in the democratization process. 1.3 The Hoklo: from Han Chinese to Hoklo Taiwanese Compared with the minority groups of indigenous people and the Hakka, the Hoklo people constitutes the majority population in Taiwan. However, due to the discriminatory political measures of the KMT government after World War II and the privileged status of Chinese Mainlanders during the martial-law era, the Hoklo Taiwanese became the main opposition force in the democratization movement and initiated Taiwanese nationalist discourse to counter the official orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism. Meanwhile, the chauvinism of some Hoklo elites after the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986 has resulted in criticism from other ethnic groups such as the Hakka. In response, they no longer monopolize the usage of “Taiwanese” and adopted the pluralist discourse of “Four Major Ethnic groups” (Wang 2014). 2.

Rethinking Neo-liberalism and the Ethnic Question in Taiwan

No longer satisfied with the conventional paradigm of modernist ethnography, Taiwanese anthropologist Ying-kui Huang and his colleagues have been working on the impacts of neo-liberalism on Taiwan’s ethnic groups, governance, and the construction of the new order. Huang compared the different nature of pre-modern nation state, traditional imperial state, modern nation state, and the current neo-liberal state in Taiwan’s political history. Moreover, he endeavored to examine political intentions and governmentality of successive regimes and their respective forms of governance has shaped the characteristics of ethnic groups and their relations (Huang 2018). Drawing from the classic study of John and Jean Camaroff on ethnicity, culture and economy (2009), Huang further focuses on the new trends of commercialization and corporationization in contemporary ethnicity and the phenomenon of “ethnic-nation” in the neo-liberal global order. Although these developments offer new possibilities and open up forms of personal self-realization and quest for sentiment and entitlements, there are also accompanying costs and contradictions that led to deepening inequality and crisis of identification. Different from pre-modern dynastic empire and modern nation state, the nature of statecraft and governmentality change significantly

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under the neo-liberal political order, which is characterized by global financial capitalism and the high-speed internet, transportation and communication technology. The constant flows and exchanges of people, goods, capital and information across national borders and ethnic boundaries have resulted in de-territorialization and re-territorialization of human society. Meanwhile, the importance of ethnicity does not diminish with the rationalization and secularization of modernity. It is therefore for us to re-conceptualize the notion of ethnicity in the neo-liberal order by taking into account the complex interactions between global capitalism and nation states in the politics of difference and identity (Huang 2018: 3–19) As Huang points out, it is noteworthy that ethnicity in contemporary Taiwan has its outstanding features such as the linkage of individual and ethnic identity and the identification with multiple ethnic groups. More importantly, ethnicity in Taiwan today is gradually transitioning into something related to the construction of trans-ethnic, trans-regional and trans-social-cultural new order that involved new patterns of selfhood and sociality as well as new ways of knowing and knowledge production (Huang 2018: 359) 3.

Rethinking Trauma, Memory and Diaspora in Taiwanese Ethnicity

Scholar of migration studies Dominic Yang offers a sophisticated critique of Chinese diaspora in his latest work on the 1949 great exodus from China (Yang 2020). Combining rigorous archival research with new theoretical formulations, Yang re-examines the Mainlander (waishengren) experience in post-war Taiwan from the perspective of trauma, memory and identity. No longer subscribing to the conventional narrative of refugee story, Yang adopts the notion of social memory and makes use of oral history as supplements to documentary studies. He traces the historical trajectory of the Mainlander experiences in Taiwan and retells their complex memories in four major episodes, namely the refugee trauma and memory of Japanese invasion and Chinese civil war in the late 1950s, the cultural nostalgia of native places in China since the 1960s, the social trauma of homecoming in China in the late 1980s, and the search for new belonging and identity in Taiwan from the early 1990s. Looking at the production of social memory of different generations of Mainlanders in Taiwan, Yang argues that the 1949 great exodus emerges as the salient shared cultural trauma of all people of Mainlander descent in post-authoritarian Taiwan (Yang 2020: 16–19). Yang’s new perspective on Mainlander experience and identity formation offers important insights on contemporary Taiwanese ethnicity. The discussion on trauma, memory and diaspora not only deepens our understanding of Mainlander experience in post-war Taiwan but reshapes the notion of Taiwan’s

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multi-ethnic society in its contemporary context. To be sure, Yang emphasizes that the Mainlanders’ latency in narrating the great exodus is neither a return of the unconscious and its repressed memories in a psychological sense, nor is it just a contingent and instrumentalist response to present circumstances in a political or sociological sense. He therefore outlines the trajectory of successive social traumas of Mainlanders and considers the social production of memory or mnemonic regimes as their collective responses to mitigate their sufferings. The Mainlander stories in Taiwan thus offer vivid instances of historical traumas of non-Western nations and marginalized groups that should be understood and acknowledged in their own terms (Yang 2020: 28–30).

V.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

In January 2021, the ROC Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee held a literature exhibition in Taipei entitled “Reopening Dialogue on an Island without a Voice”. Set up by President Tsai Ing-wen after her official apology to Taiwan’s indigenous peoples on August 1, 2016, the Committee showcased its works on the collection of truth clarification documents, compilation of field studies, studies of historical documents and the implementation of social communication. The Committee works along with members from the Council of Indigenous Peoples that is responsible for coordinating and implementing indigenous affairs and policies and serves as a platform for the government and the indigenous peoples to negotiate on an equal footing (Chan 2019). Through the operation of the five task forces that focus on the issues of land, culture, language, history and reconciliation, the Committee has gradually elicited discussions and policy proposals regarding transitional justice issues, thus ensuring that new government policies take the perspectives of the indigenous peoples into account and allowing for the gradual development of multi-ethnic cultural values in Taiwanese society. Despite the ongoing debates on concrete policy of reconciliation, the above effort for indigenous transitional justice is exemplary of Taiwan’s new collective vision of achieving reconciliation, co-existence and co-prosperity among different ethnic groups. Studies on Taiwanese ethnicity will need to address this important issue in the coming future.

NOTES 1. I would like to thank Profs Edward Friedman, Peter Chow, Michael Hsiao and Shiau-chi Shen for their kindly encouragement and assistance. The opinions and possible errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

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2.

Ka Chih-ming (2001) disagrees with Shepherd’s rational state thesis and proposes his alternative interpretation of ethnic politics with special attention to historical contingency and path dependency. 3. The 1930 Wushe incident (Musha in Japanese) has become the focal point of historical commemoration in post Martial-law Taiwan, emphasizing the subjectivity, agency and diversity of indigenous peoples. See Berry 2020. 4. See Ching 2001 for related discussion from cultural studies perspective.

REFERENCES Barclay, Paul D. 2018. Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s “Savage Border,” 1874–1945. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press. Berry, Michael, ed. 2020. Musha Incident: A Reader in Taiwanese History and Culture. Taipei: Rye Field Publications. Brown, Melissa J. 2020. “Tigers on the Mountain: Assessing Is Taiwan Chinese? in 2018,” in Daffyd Fell and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, eds, Taiwan Studies Revisited. New York: Routledge, pp. 112–140. Camaroff, John L. and Jean Camaroff. 2009. Ethnicity Inc. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Chan, Su-chuan. 2019. Taiwan Yuanzhumin shi (History of Indigenous Taiwanese). Taipei: Yushanshe. Chan, Su-chuan and Ing-hai Pan, eds. 2001. Pingpu zuqun yu Taiwan rishi wenhuar lunwenji (Proceedings of symposium on the plains aborigines and Taiwan history). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica. Chang, Lung-chih. 2008a. “From Quarantine to Colonization: Qing Debates on Territorialization of Aboriginal Taiwan in the Nineteenth Century Taiwan,” Taiwan Historical Studies 15(4):1–30. Chang, Lung-chih. 2008b. “Re-imagining Community from Different Shores: Nationalism, Post-colonialism and Colonial Modernity in Taiwanese Historiography,” in Steffi Richter, ed., Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia. (New York: Campus Verlag) pp. 139–155. Chang, Lung-chih. 2014. “Island of Memories: Postcolonial Historiography and Public Discourse in Contemporary Taiwan,” International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 2(3):229–244. Ching, Leo. 2001. Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press. Dawley, Evan. 2019. Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City, 1880s to 1950s. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. Eskildsen, Robert. 2019. Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael. 2019. “The Making of Ethnic Movements in Taiwan: Origins and Impacts,” Occasional Paper No. 241, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Huang, Ying-kui, ed. 2018. Zuqun, guojia zhili, yu xinzhixu de jiangou (Ethnic Group, Governance, and the Construction of New Order). Taipei: Qunxue. Hung, Li-wan, ed. 2009. Guojia yu yuanzhumin: Yatai diqu zuqun rishi yanjiu (Nations and aborigines: history of ethnic groups in the Asia-Pacific region). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica.

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Ka, Chih-ming. 2001. Fantoujia: Qingdai Taiwan zuqun zhengzhi yu shoufan diquan (Aboriginal landlord: ethnic politics and plains aborigines land right in Qing Taiwan). Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica. Shepherd, John R. 1993. Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press. Teng, Emma Jinhua. 2004. Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wang, Fu-chang. 2014. “A Reluctant Identity: The Development of Hoklo Identity in Contemporary Taiwan”, Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 5:79–119. Wang, Fu-chang. 2018. “Studies on Taiwan’s Ethnic Relations,” International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1(1):64–89. Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan. 2020. The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Identity in formation and transformation: dynamics of national identity change after Taiwan’s democratization Shiau-Chi Shen1 As Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the late 1980s,2 the challenges to the authoritarian regime were settled while the disputes over the “stateness”3 of the island have been aggravated. Various polls and surveys conducted by different institutions all indicated that, after democratization, the national identity of Taiwan’s general public had experienced a sea change. The phenomenon of national identity change in a short period of time has gained great attention from the political arena as well as academia. How should this phenomenon of national identity change be understood? The first task is to detect the trend of Taiwan’s national identity change over the past two decades. Leading studies, nevertheless, present two very different pictures. One perspective, focusing on the decline of Chinese identity and the rise of Taiwanese identity, portrays the trend as the victory of the native Taiwanese nationalist movement. The other perspective shows that “maintaining the status quo” had replaced unification with the PRC as the dominant option of public preference for Taiwan’s future, thus portrays the trend as the triumph of realistic pragmatism. Which picture correctly depicts the trend of national identity change in Taiwan over the past three decades? What best characterizes the dynamics of national identity change after Taiwan’s democratization? Can the dynamics be understood as identity conversion or continuing struggles of the two antagonistic nationalisms, or the triumph of pragmatism/rationalism, or a post-colonial society with ambivalent national identity? This chapter is devoted to the task of characterizing the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. The task is the first step toward grasping the national identity problem (guojia rentong wenti) in Taiwan. Failure to envisage the dynamics of national identity change correctly would result in a misunderstanding of the process of national identity change itself, and its political implications, as well as the nature of the rising Taiwanese identity, and the forces that have caused the change. 73

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TWO COMMON BUT CONTRADICTORY PICTURES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE IN TAIWAN Specifying the trend of national identity change requires a good measurement to detect the national identity of the general populace. Students of nationalism share the view that the central problem of studying national identity in Taiwan is how best to conceptualize and measure national identity. They, nevertheless, have been unable to arrive at a consensus on these issues yet.4 Three different methods have been adopted in polls and surveys to measure the national identity of the public. The earliest strategy uses people’s self-identification as a proxy for popular national identity. It asks respondents the question: “Do you consider yourself to be a ‘Chinese’, ‘Taiwanese’, or ‘Both Chinese and Taiwanese’?”5

Source: Important Political Attitudes Trend Distribution, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.

Figure 5.1

Self-identification of the populace in Taiwan, 1992–2020

Figure 5.1 shows the trend of national identity change detected by this measurement. The trends were: the rapid decline of Chinese identity and the steady growth of Taiwanese identity. The group of people who identified themselves as Chinese dropped rapidly and has become marginal in the society. On the contrary, the group of people who identified themselves as Taiwanese rose and has become the majority of the society. In 1992, more people identified themselves as “Chinese” (around 26%) than “Taiwanese” (around 18%) (see Figure

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5.1). Ever since people who held a Chinese self-identity decreased rapidly: 17.6% in 1996, 12.5 in 2000, 7.2 in 2005, 3.8 in 2010, 3.3 in 2015, and 2.6 in 2020. Meanwhile, people who held a Taiwanese self-identity kept increasing: 24.1% in 1996, 36.9 in 2000, 45 in 2005, 52.7 in 2010, 59.5 in 2015; and in 2020, more than sixty% (64.3) of the population on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese (see Figure 5.1). Another common measurement uses people’s attitudes toward unification and independence as a proxy for people’s national identity. The question, “There are debates about Taiwan’s future. Some people favor Taiwan independence; others favor unification. What is your opinion about Taiwan’s future?” is posed to respondents.6 This measurement portrayed a picture very different from the previous one. Table 5.1 shows a less dynamic trend of national identity change. The trend was: the prevalent preference of “maintaining the status quo” over unification and independence. In 1992, the year when independence became a legitimate option for Taiwan’s future, most people preferred “unification” (45.1%) to “independence” (13%), and “maintaining the status quo” (25.4%) (see Table 5.1). Since then, Chinese national identity did drop rapidly. Within two years, in 1994, the size of the people who favored unification had cut by half to 20%. But what had risen was not people who favored independence (11.1%) but people who preferred “maintaining the status quo” (48.3%). Thereafter, “maintaining the status quo” was always the majority, 47.1% in 2000, 57.0 in 2005, 61.3 in 2010, 59.5 in 2015, and 54.6 in 2020 (see Table 5.1). Very different from the previous picture, Taiwanese national identity was neither dynamic nor popular. Over the past 26 years (1992–2018), the group of people who favored independence increased just over 7% (from 13% in 1992 to 20.1% in 2018). The group experienced major growth during the recent two years from 20.1% in 2018, to 26.9% in 2019, and to 32.1% in 2020, less than one-third of the population preferred Taiwan independence. Arguably a person self-identified as a Taiwanese is expected to be more forthcoming in supporting independence, while a person self-identified as a Chinese is more likely to endorse unification. Arguably a person self-identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese can go either way regarding his/ her stand on unification and independence. Thus, given the steady and significant trend toward Taiwanese self-identity, steady decline for both Taiwanese and Chinese identity, and drastic decline for Chinese identity shown in Figure 5.1, it is reasonable to expect substantially more support for independence than Table 5.1 shows. And yet, while there has been whopping decline in support for unification as expected, the slow if any increase in support for independence and strong and steady support for status quo are surprising. Why do the two measurements detect very different trends of national identity change? Why does one measurement find the rise of Taiwanese

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A century of development in Taiwan

self-identity among the populace and its preponderance in the society, while the other measurement found the stagnation of the Taiwanese independent movement and the majority favored neither unification nor independence. Which picture portrays correctly the trend of Taiwan’s national identity change over the past three decades?

TRENDS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE IN TAIWAN, 1992–2019 A possible explanation is that the fear of military retaliation from Beijing hinders people who hold Taiwanese national identity to opt for Taiwan independence. Using respondents’ preference toward unification and independence to measure their national identities might fail to detect their true attitudes because they might be concealed under some practical considerations. As for those inclined toward Taiwanese nationalism, in the face of the threat of military attack from Beijing if independence is declared, they would rather prefer the status quo to Taiwan independence for the time being. In the same vein, those inclined toward Chinese nationalism may also opt for the status quo rather than unification because China lags significantly behind Taiwan in terms of economic and political development. The intervention of these factors causes a great segment of people, whether inclined to Taiwanese nationalism or Chinese nationalism, to opt for the status quo. A measurement was developed by Nai-teh Wu (1993) aiming to eliminate those factors which contribute to pragmatic reasoning, and thus to induce the respondents to reveal their national identity. Two hypothetical questions were proposed, and each eliminated the obstacles preventing respondents from expressing their true attitudes toward unification and independence respectively. The first question asks the respondents, “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China declaring independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree?” The second question asks the respondents, “Some people say if mainland China were comparable with Taiwan in terms of the economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree?” Wu, then, cross-tabulated the replies from these two questions to differentiate four different groups: “Taiwanese nationalists” (those who support independence but disagree with unification), “Chinese nationalists” (those who support unification but disagree with independence), “dual identity” (those who support both unification and independence), and “status quo” (those who disagree with both unification and independence) (Wu 2012). Figure 5.2 portrays the trends of national identity change after Taiwan’s democratization detected by this measurement. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the fear of military retaliation from Beijing did prevent people who hold

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Identity in formation and transformation

Table 5.1

Change in the unification–independence stances of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2020 Unification

Maintaining the status

Independence

Non-response

quo 1992

45.1

25.4

13.0

16.6

1994

20.0

48.3

11.1

20.5

1995

22.0

41.8

11.6

26.3

1996

25.6

45.8

15.0

13.6

1997

20.7

48.2

17.2

14.0

1998

17.5

46.7

18.9

16.8

1999

20.4

48.8

19.8

10.9

2000

19.4

48.7

14.7

17.3

2001

20.8

51.0

15.5

12.7

2002

18.6

50.3

18.2

14.7

2003

13.2

52.6

21.3

12.9

2004

12.7

55.9

19.9

11.6

2005

14.1

57.2

20.3

8.5

2006

14.4

58.4

19.6

7.5

2007

11.6

55.6

21.3

11.4

2008

10.2

57.3

23.1

9.4

2009

9.5

60.7

22.0

7.9

2010

10.2

61.3

22.3

6.2

2011

10.3

61.2

20.2

8.2

2012

10.4

61.6

19.9

8.1

2013

11.1

58.9

22.9

7.2

2014

9.2

59.5

23.9

7.4

2015

9.6

59.8

22.2

8.8

2016

10.2

59.4

22.9

7.4

2017

12.4

58.4

22.3

6.9

2018

15.9

57.4

20.1

6.6

2019

8.9

57.6

26.9

6.5

2020

7.6

54.6

32.1

6.8

Source: 1992, Taiwan Social Image Survey,7 1994–2020: Important Political Attitudes Trend Distribution, Election Study Center, National Cheng-chi University8.

a Taiwanese national identity from opting for independence. Table 5.1 shows that, from 1992 to 2018, people who favored independence did not grow much, and this group had not constituted more than 25% over these 26 years (see Table 5.1). Figure 5.2, however, shows a very different picture. People who

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A century of development in Taiwan

were Taiwanese nationalists opting for independence made a great growth from 9.3% in 1992 to 44% in 2015 (see Figure 5.2). In addition to uncovering the growth and strength of Taiwanese nationalists, Figure 5.2 shows another two important dynamics that the other two measurements failed to capture. One is the rise and fall of the dual identity. Figure 5.2 indicates that what had grown most after democratization was the group of people who support both unification and independence. People with dual identities had increased from 25% in 1992 to 38.8% in 1996, and it is the dual identity, not Taiwanese nationalism, which had been the mode category of people’s national identity in the 1990s and the early 2000s (see Figure 5.2). The other dynamic was the growth of people who opt for neither unification nor independence. This group had decreased to a marginal number in the 1990s, from 11% in 1992 to 2.9 in 1996, 5.8% in 1998, 6.6% in 2000. However, this group has grown rapidly in recent years. These trends captured in Figure 5.2 demonstrate that the two popular measurements are inadequate to understand the change of national identity and national identity politics in Taiwan. What do these trends, namely the rise and fall of the dual identity and the recent rise of identifying with the status quo, tell us about the national identity politics?

Sources: 1992 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd poll of the 2nd term, Academia Sinica; 1996 – the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, Soochow University; 1998 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 3rd term, Academia Sinica; 2000 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2003 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 4th term, Academia Sinica; 2008, 2012 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2013 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 6th term, Academia Sinica; 2014–2019 – China Impact Survey, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

Figure 5.2

National identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992­–2019

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TWO PHASES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE: 1990–2000, 2001–2019 All of the three measurements share the same presumption that national identities are mutually exclusive. Based on this assumption, current studies locate a respondent’s national identity on a bipolar spectrum in which Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity are the two extremes. Under this assumption, these measurements cannot observe those people who do not see Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity as conflicting with each other and do not treat their national identities as an either/or choice. After relaxing the presumption of mutual exclusion, the trends of national identity change after Taiwan’s democratization indicate a very different picture of national identity politics in Taiwan. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 illustrate respectively the trend of Taiwanese national identity and the trend of Chinese national identity from 1992 to 2019. At first, Figure 5.3 shows a rapid rise of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s. People who had a Taiwanese national identity increased from 36.7% in 1992 to 64% in 1996 – that is almost 30% of growth within four years (see Figure 5.3). Secondly, different from all other measurements observing a rapid decline of Chinese national identity in the 1990s, Figure 5.4 reveals that Chinese national identity had remained in strength during the 1990s; the majority of the population had continued to withhold their Chinese national identity (56.9% in 1992, 59.9 in 1996, and 55.7 in 1998, and 57 in 2000) (see Figure 5.4). Last but not least, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 together depict a mode of change very different from the one depicted by other measurements. Findings from previous studies propose a nationalist mode of identity conversion. Information provided in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 suggests that the argument that Taiwanese identity had supplanted Chinese identity is incorrect. As these two figures show, the growth of popular approval of independence and the decline of popular acceptance of unification did not concur. That is to say, Taiwanese national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese national identity. Taiwanese national identity experienced its most significant growth during the period between 1992 and 1996, when Chinese national identity did not much decline. The majority of the population retained their support for unification, 56.9.5% in 1992 and 59.9% in 1996 (see Figure 5.4). Chinese national identity began to decline after 2000 (from 57% in 2000 to 42.8 in 2003, 33.1 in 2008, 29.2 in 2013, and 23.1 in 2019). However, the decline was not due to the triumph of the Taiwanese nationalist movement. During the period, popular support for independence did not grow. Taiwanese national identity also had experienced a decline as Chinese national identity did (from 62% in 2000 to 56.8 in 2003, 57.6 in 2008, 55 in 2013, and 47.4 in 2019) (see Figure 5.3). Leading studies present two very different pictures regarding the trends of national identity change in Taiwan. The identity conversion perspective,

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portraying a rapid decline of Chinese national identity and a rise of Taiwanese national identity, sees the trend of national identity change as the victory of the native Taiwanese nationalist movement. The static perspective, portraying a steady trend of “favoring status quo” predominance, claims that both independence and unification gained little support from Taiwan’s public, and most people had no particular national identity. This static perspective is challenged by the findings of a rapid surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s (see Figure 5.3) and a huge decline of the Chinese national identity since 2001 (see Figure 5.4). The identity conversion perspective is also under challenge. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that the growth of popular approval of independence and the decline of popular acceptance of unification did not concur. Both national identities are prevalent in the 1990s (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). A new perspective is required for analyzing the dynamics of national identity politics in Taiwan, one that can explain the relations between the two identities, as well as the forces behind the changes to national identity among the general population in Taiwan after democratization.

Notes: 1. Survey Question: “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China declaring independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree?” 2. Data sources: 1992 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd poll of the 2nd term, Academia Sinica; 1996 – the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, Soochow University; 1998 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 3rd term, Academia Sinica; 2000 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2003 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 4th term, Academia Sinica; 2008, 2012 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2013 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 6th term, Academia Sinica; 2014–2019 – China Impact Survey, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

Figure 5.3

Taiwanese national identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2019

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Based on the findings of Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, this chapter proposes to classify the change of national identity into two stages. The first phase is the period of the 1990s characterized by the dominance of the phenomenon of dual identities. The rise of Taiwanese national identity was not at the cost of Chinese national identity. Most people during this period did not see Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity as conflicting. Rather, they identified with both a Taiwanese nation and a Chinese nation. The period since 2001 is the second phase which witnessed the decline of the longstanding Chinese national identity. The dual identity group was no longer predominant, and the status quo group was no longer insignificant.

Notes: 1. Survey Question: “Some people say if mainland China were comparable with Taiwan in terms of economic, social, and political development, the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree?” 2. Data sources: 1992 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd poll of the 2nd term, Academia Sinica; 1996 – the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, Soochow University; 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 3rd term, Academia Sinica; 2000 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2003 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 4th term, Academia Sinica; 2008, 2012 – TEDS President Election Survey, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; 2013 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 6th term, Academia Sinica; 2014–2019 – China Impact Survey, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

Figure 5.4

Chinese national identity of Taiwan’s public, 1992–2019

PHASE I (1990–2000): RISE OF CIVIC NATIONAL IDENTITY The first phase is characterized as the rise of dual national identity, and lasted throughout the whole decade of 1990s. As illustrated by Figure 5.5, the change was caused mainly by a shift of attitudes among the orthodox Chinese nationalists concerning the issue of Taiwan independence. They acquired a new Taiwanese national identity. A small part of them discarded their previous

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A century of development in Taiwan

Chinese national identity to become Taiwanese nationalists. But most of them, having retained their Chinese national identity, acquired a new Taiwanese national identity. The thickness of the arrows in the graphs indicates the difference in size. The upward arrows show that the main direction of change in the first phase is the rise of Taiwanese national identity. The bold line in the first graph indicates that the main direction of change was from Chinese nationalist to dual national identity. It suggests the continual and stable presence of Chinese national identity, notwithstanding the rise of Taiwanese national identity.

Figure 5.5

Patterns of national identity change in Phase I, 1992–2000

The surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s cannot be fully explained by the Taiwanese nationalist movement because what is witnessed in this phase is not only the growth of Taiwanese nationalists but also the increase of people with dual identities. The phenomenon of dual identity raises several intriguing questions. Why was the rise of Taiwanese national identity not in conflict with orthodox Chinese national identity, but instead able to co-exist with it? What was the main force behind the rise of Taiwanese national identity if not the Taiwanese nationalist movement? And through what mechanism did this force affect national identity change? What was the nature of the nascent Taiwanese national identity? Under the authoritarian Kuomintang regime from the 1950s through the 1980s, Taiwan residents were taught to think of themselves as members of a Chinese nation of which Taiwan was one province. Under KMT ideology, this Chinese nation was conceived in terms of an “ethnic core” (Smith 1986). Even though the political unit “China” included a number of recognized ethnic minorities, the majority Han ethnic group was defined as ethnically homogeneous, as possessing the cultural attributes understood as authentically Chinese, and as defining the normative culture for the nation. Within Taiwan,

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83

except for small populations of indigenous peoples, both Taiwan-born and mainland-born residents were defined as members of the Han ethnic group. The emerging Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s in essence consists in a sense of belonging to the Taiwan-wide political community. But in reality this belonging is not based on prior-existent ethnic or cultural ties. What rose along with existing ethnic Chinese identity was a civic national identity founded not in common descent, language, and history, but in pride in and commitment to democratic institutions. The democratic constitution, democratic principles, and democratic ways of life became the basis of this emerging national identity (Kohn 1957; Smith 1983; Brubaker 1992). Its rise in the 1990s was very much an effect of democratization. Habermas argues that unconditional identification will be replaced by the dynamic processes of identity-formation. The dynamics of identity-formation constitute a collective learning process in which citizens are asked to reflect critically upon the existing traditions and institutions in the name of universal norms and principles. What is necessary for the formation of this identity is a public sphere where open-ended communication is able to exist (Habermas 1996). Taiwan’s democratic transition in the late 1980s made a public sphere available for the people on the island. With the lifting of martial laws in 1987, new laws were instituted to codify rights protected by the constitution. People were provided legal channels for public political expression and began to enjoy freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Institutionalization of democratic citizenship is the necessary condition for the population to participate in political life. But what was essential for the emergence of public space in Taiwan was the opening of elections on the national level. The two national representative bodies of the central government, namely the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, which had never been reelected in four decades, were open up to elections in 1991 and 1992 respectively. The mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities and the governor of Taiwan province, previously appointed by the central government, were elected by popular vote in 1994. And most importantly, the president was first elected directly by popular vote in 1996. Elections encourage widespread political participation. The populace on the island showed their enthusiasm. The voting turnout for the Legislative Yuan election in 1992 was 72%, for the first presidential election in 1996 it was 76%, and for the second presidential election in 2000 it was around 83%, which resulted in a power turnover. A by-product of the electoral reform was the rapid growth in amount and popularity of the television talk shows, which allowed politicians and pundits to discuss current political issues. Ordinary people were invited to call in to express their opinions on politicians, policies, and political issues. Many people watched these talk shows almost every evening. During the 1990s, general elections were held almost every year. The island-land wide elections created the public sphere, which was,

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A century of development in Taiwan

as Habermas pointed out, essential for identity formation. Popular political participation helped to form a common space and time among citizens of Taiwan. What people read and discussed were the same: the same statements from politicians, the same public policies, the same political issues and social events. The common space was congruent with the territory of the island. People saw their concerns and problems as occurring within the boundaries of the island. The solutions were also able to be found only in the framework of this island’s institutions. Through daily political practice, an identity and attachment to Taiwan as a legitimate political community is constantly formed among the citizens on the island (Billig 1995). At the core of the “we feeling” is a common faith in the democratic institutions and way of life, which is the product of democratic practice. Two turn-overs were fundamental. Trust in democratic institutions and in their fellow citizens is essential to people’s loyalty to the political community. It constitutes the foundation of the willingness to live together and to act cooperatively to solve communal problems. The practice of democracy has created a public sphere in which people on the island recognize and communicate with each other, and participate in the deliberation and resolution of Taiwan-wide affairs. The emergence of the public sphere has turned the island from a territory unit for residence into a political community and has made the inhabitants on the island into compatriots. The surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s cannot be fully explained by the native Taiwanese ethno-nationalist movement. As our data indicate, people acquired a new Taiwanese national identity without forsaking their orthodox Chinese ethno-national identity. What has emerged is a civic Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese civic nationalism is grounded in people’s recognition of the authority of a constitutional framework and their allegiance to the democratic process (Ciaran 2003; Müller 2007).

PHASE II (2001–2019): DECAY OF CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY The second phase is characterized as the diminishing of dual identity. The second phase covered the period from 2001 to 2019. During this phase, dual national identity no longer accounted for a large segment among the population. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the direction of change is from dual national identity to Taiwanese nationalist, and to status quo. This change was caused by the shift in attitude among those with dual identities concerning unification with China. They shifted their attitudes from supporting unification to opposing it. A part of them also changed their support to independence. The two leftward arrows show the pattern of national identity change, characterized by the decline of Chinese national identity. In this phase, the enduring presence of popular support for unification dwindled away. The decline of Chinese

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national identity cannot be explained by the rise of the Taiwanese nationalist movement since popular support for independence remained stable. What caused the spectacular decline of Chinese national identity, an identity that used to be a strong and stable ideological force in Taiwan? The wane of Chinese national identity and the decreasing popular support for unification happened in the period when China had become a rising power in the global market and when Taiwanese economy was increasingly integrated into the Chinese market. This phenomenon was puzzling as many studies suggest economic cooperation would have spillover effects into the political arena. The rise of China in the international economy and politics and Taiwan’s increasing economic dependency on the Chinese market would strengthen people’s Chinese national identity, causing them to support unification (Chu 2004). The dominant perspective is that the ascendant Taiwanese identity might be stifled by the rise of China and economic integration between two sides of the Strait. But what we have witnessed was that the rise of China with its growing economic power and international influence had not attracted the populace on the island to change their support for independence and lean towards unification. Instead, popular support for unification had decreased rapidly. In 2000, around 60% of the populace would support unification. The number had been cut almost half in 2008, when 33% of the populace supported unification. And the number kept decreasing: in 2019, only 23% of the populace would support unification. One possible explanation is cohort effects. Because of the bentuhua campaign following democratization, the young generation that were born after 1990 are the “natural independence generation” (tian ran du). They have no attachment to the Chinese nation. The alternation of the generations, that is the growth of the young generation together with the death of the old generation explains some part of the decline of popular support for unification. However, it cannot account for rapid change. As Figure 5.4 shows that within eight years (from 2000 to 2008), popular support for unification had dropped 24%. The rapid change was largely due to the shift in attitudes among people with dual national identities from supporting to opposing unification. How do we explain the puzzling state of affairs that the rise of China and the increasing embeddedness of Taiwan’s economy in the Chinese market has actually coincided with the waning trend of popular Chinese national identity in Taiwan? To answer this question, a major aspect of Chinese national identity in Taiwan needs to be brought to the fore. That is the bond to the ROC state.

86

Figure 5.6

A century of development in Taiwan

Patterns of national identity change in Phase II, 2001–2019

Nationalism, as defined by Breuilly, is a “political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1994, p.2). Although this definition contains two kinds of nationalism, one seeking state power and the other exercising it, Breuilly, like most scholars of nationalism, focuses mainly on nationalist oppositions to the state. In most studies of Taiwan’s national identity to date, the ROC state was targeted for elimination. When we focus exclusively on Taiwanese nationalists’ opposition to the ROC state, the relationship of the ROC state to Chinese national identity is easily overlooked. Chinese nationalism in Taiwan belongs to the other kind of nationalism, a state-led nationalism in which the ROC is the state both representing and creating the Chinese nation. Rejai and Cynthia distinguish between two historical patterns of nationalism based on the interplay between nation and state. The first pattern is the experience of the developed Western countries in which the sentiment of national identity developed prior to the crystallization of the structure of political authority. The relationship between nation and state is characterized by the nation’s precedence over and shaping of the state. The other pattern is the experience of many Asian and African countries. Therein, political sovereignty preceded national identity. The sequence is thus reversed: the state preceded and created the nation (Rejai and Cynthia 1969). Chinese nationalism follows the second pattern. The ROC state was the creator of the Chinese nation, employed to sustain state authority and to accelerate state-directed modernization. Fitzgerald argues that China is a “nationless state”; there is no concept of Chinese nation (Fitzgerald 1996). The notion of the “Chinese Nation” was created by the ROC state. For this kind of “state-nation”, the integrative cement is seldom cultural affinity. Rather, it resides in political and economic bonds. The political dimension of Chinese nationalism, however, has rarely been analyzed. The bond to the ROC

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Identity in formation and transformation

state that separates the outsider from the insider originates not from a sense of ethno-cultural identity but from the fear of subjugation by the communist China. The efforts by the PRC’s government to denounce the status of the ROC only strengthen this bond to the ROC state. Since the PRC’s nationalist agenda is so rigid and exclusive as to leave no room for the ROC identity, the PRC’s version of Chinese nationalism is perceived to be a unification dominated by communist dictatorship for those people with a bond to the ROC. Recognition of China’s rising power and its version of the “One China Principle” thus function to undermine the commitment to unification. The result is the waning of Chinese national identity on the island. The figures in Table 5.2 demonstrate that the ROC state, rather than the cultural Chinese nation, was the major object of identification for people with Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Even long after the seat for China in the Table 5.2

ROC state and Chinese national identity in Taiwan % (N)

Name after Unificationa 2003 ROC

Taiwanese

Dual

Status

Chinese

nationalist

identity

quo

nationalist

NA

67.0

NA

(280) PRC

NA

4.8

NA

(20) Chinese Federation

NA

7.9

NA

(33) Decided in the future

NA

20.3

NA

(85) Total

NA

100.0

NA

(418)

Total 55.9

62.4

(107)

(445)

2.0

3.6

(84)

(26)

6.8

7.4

(13)

(53)

35.3

26.5

(67)

(189)

100.0

100.0

(191)

(713)

International statusb 2000 Pursue ROC Status Suspend Such Effort Total

94.4

89.4

86.6

86.3

89.9

(288)

(390)

(71)

(208)

(957)

5.6

10.6

13.4

13.7

10.1

(17)

(46)

(11)

(33)

(107)

(305)

(436)

(82)

(241)

(1064)

Notes: a The questionnaire asked only those respondents who answered that they want unification the following question: “If, in the future, the two sides of the Strait would be unified, they should be unified under which name?” b The wording of the question: “Some people think the cross-Strait tension is due to our government’s effort to raise ROC’s status in the international arena; to prevent irritating the PRC, our government should suspend such effort (such as applying for joining the UN, diplomatic visits by the President). Other people think our government should keep the effort to gain international recognition, no matter what reaction the PRC would have. What is your opinion?” Sources: 2000 – the Presidential Election Survey; 2003 – Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 4th Term.

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A century of development in Taiwan

UN was taken by the PRC in 1971, and most countries in the world recognized the PRC as the state for China and established formal diplomatic ties with it, the idea that the ROC was the legitimate state for the Chinese nation still held sway in Taiwan among those who had Chinese national identity. In 2003, when asked, “If the two sides of the Strait are to be unified, what name should be adopted?” 67% of the respondents holding dual identities and 56% of Chinese nationalists picked the ROC. The PRC earned very little allegiance. Only 5% among those with dual identities and 2% among Chinese nationalists picked PRC for name of a unified China (see Table 5.2). Even excluding the choice of “Decided in the Future,” the percentages in the two groups were 6% and 3%. These figures might explain why the PRC’s proposal of the “one country two systems” formula, which had been applied to Hong Kong, showed very little popularity in Taiwan (see Table 5.3). In addition to favoring the ROC as the state for a unified China, those with Chinese national identity also strongly hoped to raise the status of the ROC in the international community. The respondents were asked in poll in 2000, “Some people think the tension in the cross-strait tensions comes from our government’s effort to raise the ROC’s status in the international community. To avoid irritating the PRC, our government should suspend such efforts (such as applying to join the UN, and diplomatic visits to foreign countries by the President). Other people think our government should keep up its efforts to gain international recognition, no matter what reaction the PRC would have. What is your opinion?” Table 5.2 shows that around 90% of those with dual identity and 86% of Chinese nationalists supported government’s effort to raise the status of the ROC state in the international community even if it will cause tensions in the cross-strait relationship (see Table 5.2). Table 5.3

Attitudes on “one country, two systems” in Taiwan,9 2001–2008 No opinion/ refuse Agree

Disagree

to answer

Total

2001.6

10.6%

75.2%

14.2%

N=1069

2002.7

10.8%

70.2%

19.0%

N=1091

2003.5

10.3%

72.6%

17.0%

N=1082

2004.7

9.4%

73.6%

17.0%

N=1153

2005.8

11.4%

72.6%

16.0%

N=1096

2006.5

13.3%

76.3%

10.4%

N=1068

2007.8

14.8%

67.8%

17.4%

N=1095

2008.8

8.1%

81.8%

10.1%

N=1094

Source: Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), http://​www​.mac​.gov​.tw/​np​.asp​?ctNode​=​6331​&​mp​=​1.

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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF CHINA’S RISE For the people in Taiwan, China’s rise was much more than a phenomenon involving a shift in the balance of power in international politics. What emerged with China’s growing economic and political power was the PRC’s exclusive Chinese nationalism, a nationalism that has inhibited Taiwan’s claim to any national identity (including the Chinese one) in the world community. If China’s rapidly expanding economy brought great opportunities for Taiwan’s economy, China’s rise was also a source of worry and concerns regarding the status of the ROC. Seemingly with the intention of making a reality of the concerns of the Taiwanese people, the Beijing government has been using its powerful position to challenge the ROC’s status in the international arena. One of the most salient cases may be China’s efforts to obstruct Taipei’s application for membership in the World Health Organization in 2003 in the midst of the SARS epidemic. The first case of SARS in Taiwan was found in early March 2003. The next month, a public hospital was closed down, and hundreds of its patients, nurses, and doctors were quarantined within the confines of the hospital. The epidemic became a statewide crisis. Taipei applied to the World Health Organization for membership in May, hoping that the sharing of information concerning the epidemic with the world medical community might be of some help to solve the crisis. The application was swiftly blocked by the Beijing government. Its representative, the Vice-Premier and Minister of Health Wu Yi, called Taipei’s application in her speech to the general assembly “a shameful farce.” “As a province of China,” she said, “Taiwan is not qualified to be a member nor to be an observer to participate the activities of the organization …. If Taiwan wants to participate in any activity of the WHO, it has to be under the permission and arrangement of Chinese central government.” Worse still, when asked by a reporter about the needs of 23 million people in Taiwan, a PRC official rudely replied, “It was already rejected.” “Who cares about you?” The story was widely reported in Taiwan’s media, and the film clip replayed many times on all TV channels. Two days later, Taiwan was listed by the organization as an infected zone. To people in Taiwan, these PRC officials’ comments were certainly a humiliation and caused fierce irritation. The frequent humiliation caused by the Beijing government and some of its people may significantly contribute to the growth of the Taiwanese nationalist movement (Dittmer 2005). What has been overlooked is that the PRC’s exclusive and rigid version of the “one China principle,” which it has promoted in hopes of forcing the island to identify with the Chinese nation, has ironically been damaging to the commitment to unification among those people who held a Chinese national identity in Taiwan. As this chapter has argued the essence of Chinese national identity in

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Taiwan is the bond to the ROC state. Beijing’s effort to denounce the status of the ROC would only strengthen the attachment to the ROC state. This mechanism was demonstrated by the overwhelming support among those people who held a Chinese national identity for efforts to raise the ROC’s status in the international community even if damaging to cross-strait relations (see Table 5.2). Moreover, Beijing’s behavior demonstrated to the people on the island that the PRC’s nationalist agenda is not only exclusive but also rigid in nature. The events in the wake of SARS showed clearly that, even on matters concerning the health of the whole population, the PRC would not allow any flexibility on the status of the ROC. Since the PRC’s Chinese nationalism leaves no room for ROC identity, in the eyes of those people who feel attached to the ROC, unification under the PRC’s nationalist agenda means domination by communist dictatorship. Both the recognition of China’s rising power and the dominance of the PRC’s version of “one China principle” are considerably damaging to the commitment of people in Taiwan to unification. These have also resulted in the waning of Chinese national identity on the island. As early as 1998, Hu Chi-chiang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KMT government, openly complained in a press conference that the Beijing government had been trying very hard to bully Taiwan in the international community. Its aim was to achieve a state of “Zero Diplomacy” on the part of the ROC. Hu also warned Beijing that its policy would only bring about “Zero Unification” for two sides of the Strait (United Evening News 1998/12/30). After 2000, under the DPP government, China’s bullying efforts were greatly escalated. To cite only a small number of incidents, Taiwan’s representatives to the WHO’s Conference on the Post-Tsunami Health Situation were rejected for attendance of the meetings in 2005, albeit with formal invitations and official registration. In 2005 the official titles of all of Taiwan’s representatives to the World Trade Organization were eliminated from the official roster book. In the 2006 annual report of the World Economic Forum, Taiwan’s membership name was changed into Taiwan, China. In the WTO’s Conference on the Fishery Subsidy in Geneva, Taiwan was listed as “Taiwan Province, China” in all official documents. In 2007 the high school students who had won two gold medals and two bronze medals in the International Biology Olympiad held in Canada wept in front of the press because Taiwan’s national flag was removed from the assembly hall. Similar stories were published once for a while in Taiwan’s media. They all lead to the growing popular understanding that unification with the mainland means domination by the PRC. It was also during this period that we witnessed a steady decline of Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Contrary to the conventional view that the rapid growth of the Chinese economy removed the practical obstacles to unification, and that a strong China would induce people in Taiwan to identify with it order to be citizens of a powerful nation, the fact is that a powerful China works only

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to diminish the Chinese identity among the general populace. Figure 5.4 illustrates that in the early 1990s when social scientists began to conduct national poll surveys on national identity, high percentages of respondents expressed that they would like to see unification with China under the favorable scenario of political and economic parity between Taiwan and the rest of China. By the year 2000, the percentage of those with a Chinese national identity remained roughly constant around 60%. But in the years after 2003, in what amounts to a radical break, this declined precipitously. It went down to 42.8% in 2003, 33.1% in 2008, 29.2% in 2013, 19.4% in 2016, and 23.1% in 2019.

CONCLUSION The empirical study of nationalism should start from the measuring of national identity. Only through appropriate measurement can we arrive at a correct explanation of the nationalist phenomenon, including its nature, basis, and the trends surrounding its change. Three different strategies to measure national identity have been proposed by Taiwanese scholars. One is measuring by self-identification as Chinese, Taiwanese, or both. Another entails measuring by preference for Chinese unification or Taiwan independence. This research uses a third strategy of measurement with some modification on the assumption that Taiwanese and Chinese national identities are not mutually exclusive. Four main categories of national identity are derived from this modified measurement: Taiwanese nationalists, Chinese nationalists, dual national identities, and status quo. The proposed method allows us to detect more clearly the trends and the dynamics of national identity change among the general populace in the country. More specifically, two different phases can be distinguished concerning the pattern of national identity change during the last two decades. The first phase, which roughly spanned the time from the democratic transition to the late 1990s, witnessed the replacement of dominant Chinese nationalism by dual national identity. It was the result of former Chinese nationalists, who did not forsake the Chinese identity they had long held, adopting a new Taiwanese identity. The second phase, roughly from 2001 to 2019, is characterized by the decline of Chinese national identity. To understand the nationalist politics of the country, it is contended in this chapter, one needs to understand these two different modes of national identity change, firstly the acquisition of a new Taiwanese national identity without giving up the old Chinese national identity, and then, the decline of Chinese national identity. These two different modes of change were the result of changes in the political environment, both domestic and international.

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NOTES 1. This chapter is revised from chapters of my dissertation. Shen Shiau-Chi. 2013.  Democracy and Nation Formation: National Identity Change and Dual Identity in Taiwan, 1991–2011. Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University. The author is grateful to the comments of the three referees. 2. Studies on Taiwan’s political development have a consensus to define the breakthrough of democratic transition in 1986, the year when the opposition party was illegally founded, while the authoritarian regime decided not to suppress it. For studies on Taiwan’s political liberalization and democratic transition, please see Cheng 1989; Cheng and Haggard 1992; Chou and Nathan 1987; Lin 1998; Tien 1996; Wu and Cheng 2011). 3. The “stateness” problem, defined by Linz and Stepan, refers to the situation that “a significant proportion of the population does not accept the boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience” (Linz and Stepan 1996:16). 4. Shelley Rigger (1999/2000) has reviewed the different conceptualizations and measurements used in survey research to study Taiwan’s national identity. 5. The measurement was first introduced by Chang Mau-kuei and Hsing-Huang (Michael) Hsiao in 1987 in a survey of political attitudes among college students (Chang and Hsiao 1987). It was widely adopted in later opinion polls and surveys. 6. Using people’s attitudes toward unification and independence as the measurement of national identity is straightforward. It avoids the problems caused by different meanings inherent in the words of “Taiwanese” and “Chinese”. Nationalism, by Gellner’s definition, is a political principle which folds that a nation should have a state of its own. Therefore, Chinese nationalists demand for a unified Chinese state; while Taiwanese nationalists seek for an independent Taiwan state. 7. Question wordings of the 1992 survey: There are debates about Taiwan’s future. Some people favor Taiwan independence; others favor unification. What is your opinion about Taiwan’s future? 8. Question wordings of the 1994–2020 polls: There are different opinions about Taiwan’s future in relation to mainland China. Which of the following option do you prefer: “immediate unification,” “immediate independence,” “status quo now, unification later,” “status quo now, independence later,” “status quo now, decision later,” and “status quo indefinitely.” The “Unification” category combines the two options of “immediate unification” and “status quo now, unification later.” The “Independence” category combines the two options of “immediate independence” and “status quo now, independence later.” The “Maintaining the Status Quo” category combines the two options of “status quo now, decision later”, and “status quo indefinitely”. 9. Question wording: “Regarding cross-strait relation, China proposes ‘one country, two systems’, which treats Taiwan as their local government under the rule of the PRC. The ROC will no longer exist. Do you agree with the proposal of ‘one country, two systems’ or not?”

REFERENCES Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications. Breuilly, John. 1994. Nationalism and the State. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

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Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chang, Mau-kuei and Hsin-Huang (Michael) Hsiao. 1987. “The ‘Chinese Complex’ and ‘Taiwanese Complex’ of University Students: An Analysis of Self-Identification and Intermarriage Concepts (Daxuesheng de ‘zhongguojie’ yu ‘Taiwanjie’: ziwo rending yu tonghun guannian de fenxi),” China Tribune 289, pp. 34­–53. Cheng, Tun-Jen. 1989. “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” Word Politics 41 (4), pp. 471­–99. Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard, eds. 1992. Political Change in Taiwan. Boulder Lynne, CO: Rienner Publishers. Chou, Yangsun and Nathan, Andrew J., 1987. “Democratizing Transition in Taiwan,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 3, Article 1. Chu, Yun-han. 2004. “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 44 (4), pp. 484–512. Ciaran, Cronin. 2003. “Democracy and Collective Identity,” The European Journal of Philosophy 11 (1), pp. 1–28. Dittmer, Lowell. 2005. “Taiwan’s Aim-Inhibited Quest for Identity and the China Factor,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 40 (1/2), pp. 71–90. Fitzgerald, John. 1996. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1996. “Citizenship and National Identity.” In Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 421–61. Kohn, Hans. 1957. American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Lin, Chia-lung. 1998. “Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective,” Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Political Science Department, Yale University. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Müller, Jan-Werner. 2007. Constitutional Patriotism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rejai, Mostafa and Enloe H. Cynthia. 1969. “Nation-States and State-Nations,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (2), pp. 140–58. Rigger, Shelley. 1999/2000. “Social Science and National Identity: A Critique,” Pacific Affairs 72 (4), pp. 537–52. Smith, Anthony D. 1983. State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Tien, Hung-Mao, ed. 1996. Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Wu, Nai-teh. 1993. Party Support and National Identities: Social Cleavages and Party Competition in Taiwan (Guojia renting yu zhengdang zhichi: Taiwan zhengdang jingzhng de shehui jichu), Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica 74, pp. 33–61. Wu, Nai-teh and Tun-Jen Cheng, 2011. “Democratization as a Legitimacy Formula: The KMT and Political Change in Taiwan” in Political Legitimacy in Asia: Challenges for Leadership, John Kane, Haig Patapan (eds), New York: Palgrave, pp. 59–87. Wu, Nai-teh Wu, 2012. “Will Economic Integration Lead to Political Assimilation?” in National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan’s Competing Options and Their Implications for Regional Stability, Peter C. Y. Chow (ed.), pp. 187–202, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

PART III

Economic development since the 1920s

6. Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period: a miracle growth in prewar Taiwan Frank S.T. Hsiao 6.1 INTRODUCTION Japan governed Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. It is commonly held that, under Japanese colonialism, Taiwan was to benefit Japan by developing agriculture, especially rice and sugar, and in return Taiwan became the market for Japanese industrial products, thus completing the usual pattern of colonialism (Ho, 1978, p. 29; HH15, p. 267). Furthermore, it has been argued that the Taiwanese were discriminated against by the Japanese politically and economically, although their economic condition improved in general (Ho, 1978, 91–102; Grajdanzev, 1942). These overall views might be generally correct,1 at least through the mid-1930s. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the situation changed considerably after the mid-1930s, especially after Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Taiwan’s industrialization started in earnest to support Japan’s rise of militarism. It continued to the outbreak of the WWII (Pacific War) in 1941 until the end of the WWII. During these last two periods, Taiwan was no longer considered a colony that supplied only foodstuffs to Japan, but rather was treated almost as part of Japan Proper, as far as Japan's newly acquired territories in South China and the South Seas (Nanshi Nanyo,2 that is, South China and Southeast Asia) were concerned. Taiwan was to be fully industrialized with light and heavy industries and serve as Japan’s “unsinkable carrier” in the Pacific. As such, to our knowledge, while there are many studies on the industrialization of prewar Taiwan.3 They are mostly historical, qualitative, or anecdotal industry analyses, and devoid of macroeconomic, quantitative, and international comparison. This chapter contributes to the literature by studying Taiwan’s prewar industrialization, mostly quantitatively, and based on the author’s previous works. It also briefly investigates the effects of Taiwan’s 95

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prewar industrial development on the postwar Taiwanese economic development; and it serves to alter the established view of degrading Taiwan’s industrialization during the Japanese period and to point out that, in terms of the speed of industrialization, it was simply “miraculous.” In what follows, in Section 6.2, based on the available statistics, Taiwan’s production system is divided into five sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, fisheries, and others (including mining and livestock). To highlight the process of Taiwan’s industrialization, the process is divided into seven stages: Initial Stage, Early Stage, Transitional Stage, Prewar Stage,4 Quasi-War Stage, First War Stage, and Second War Stage. The chapter then presents the overview of the development of the five sectors through each stage with elaborated figures for illustration. In Section 6.3, to highlight the production in each stage, the average value and growth rates of production in each stage are calculated. Taiwan’s industrial growth during the Japanese period ranged from 8.7 to 25.5% for the five sectors. By prewar standards, Taiwan had a “miracle growth” of industrialization during the Japanese period. In Section 6.4, based on the available statistics, the manufacturing sector is subdivided into nine industries: Food products, Textile products, Metal products, Machinery products, Ceramics, Chemical products, Wood products, Printing and Book Binding, and Other products. The figure shows that all industries grew during the Quasi-War Stage, and accelerated exponentially in the First and the Second War Stages. Section 6.5 discusses the extent of industrialization in each industry in the manufacturing sector by finding the time a new product in each industry was introduced. In the early years, new products tended to be consumer oriented, and in the later years, they tended to be producer oriented. The rapid development of Taiwan’s industries could not have been achieved without two factors: internally, the existence of software and hardware infrastructures for industrial development; and externally, the rise of Japanese militarism and Japan’s interaction with the world powers. Section 6.6 reviews briefly these two factors for each stage during the process of Taiwan’s industrialization. Since both Taiwan and Japan proper are resource-poor countries, the need to acquire natural resources became urgent for the progress of industrialization. Thus, as Japan expanded its territories to Manchuria, North and South China, and the “South Seas,” the policy of “Industrial Taiwan and Agricultural South Seas” was envisioned. Section 6.7 discusses the kinds of natural resources Taiwan acquired, or planned to acquire, from other countries, especially from the “South Seas,” during the First and Second War Stages. More specifically, Section 6.8 shows how the individual companies depended on the domestic and foreign resources during the war stages.

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Section 6.9 shows the kinds of heavy and chemical products produced in Taiwan at the end of the war, classified by product categories, and the planned target production and actual production. The larger Japanese companies were taken over by the KMT (Kuomintang, or the Nationalist) government of China as the public enterprises, which exerted an enormous influence on Taiwan’s economy long after the war. The rapid industrialization could not be realized without an accumulation of human capital. Section 6.10 briefly reviews Taiwan’s employment structure and the education system before the war, and the existence of numerous small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs), which were the backbone of the success of postwar Taiwan’s export promotion policy. Section 6.11 concludes by reviewing the whole process of Taiwan’s industrialization. Beginning with the sugar industry, through forward and backward linkages, other industries and infrastructure were developed. The rise of Japan’s militarism gave rise to the heavy and chemical industries with resources imported from the South Seas. The postwar Taiwanese economy inherited the industries, infrastructure, and human capital, left over by the Japanese, and, through the triangle relationship between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States, realized its second miracle of economic development. Taiwan’s relation with the South Seas also changed. Southeast Asia was no longer viewed as the place to acquire natural resources, but as a region of Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment.

6.2

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER THE JAPANESE REGIME

Due to Taiwan’s unusually rapid industrialization during the Japanese period, and because the goal of Taiwan’s industrialization was to prepare Taiwan for Japan’s war efforts after its rise of militarism, this chapter proposes to divide the stages of Taiwan’s industrialization into seven stages in accordance with the various wars in which Japan had engaged. The wars were with Russia (Russo-Japanese War), Germany (WWI), China (the Sino-Japanese War), and the Allied Forces (WWII). The last three stages follow those of Kusui (1944, pp. 36–44). The seven stages are explained as follows (see Section 6.4 for details): 1. The Initial Stage (1895–1904). This is from the time Japan occupied Taiwan (5/1895) to the start of the Russo-Japanese War (2/1904), which was also a year before the end of the fiscal dependence of the Taiwan Government General (TGG) on the Japanese Central Government.

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2. The Early Stage (1905–1913). This is from the end of the Russo-Japanese War (9/1905) and the year of Taiwan’s fiscal independence (4/1905) to a year before WWI (7/1914). 3. The Transitional Stage (1914–1920). This is from the start of WWI (7/1914) to two years after the end of WWI (11/1918), when Japan experienced a post-WWI economic boom and then postwar economic crisis starting in (1920) (Inoue, 1965, p. 141; Nakamura, 1978, pp. 110–112). 4. The Prewar Sage (1921–1930). This is from the starting of the post-WWI crisis (1920) and the TGG’s remapping of the local governance districts (7/1920) to a year before the Manchurian Incident (7/1931). 5. The Quasi-War Stage (1931–1936). This is from the year of Manchurian Incident (9/1931) to a year before the Sino-Japanese War (7/1937). 6. The First-War Stage (1937–1940). This is from the Sino-Japanese War (7/1937) to a year before WWII (12/1941). 7. The Second War Stage (1941–1945). This is from the start of WWII (12/1941) to the end of WWII (8/1945).5 The seven stages are separated by the vertical solid lines in Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5. Figure 6.1 shows the annual values of five industrial sectors of Taiwan from 1902 to 1940 for each stage consecutively,6 based on the data from Okurasho (Japan Ministry of Finance) (1949, Table 90, pp. 110–111). Data before 1902 and after 1940 are missing in Okurasho (ibid.). However, we still can find the major features of Taiwan’s industrial development during the Japanese period from the available data. The five sectors are listed as follows: 1. Agriculture sector (denoted as 1Agr in Figures 6.1 and 6.2), which includes rice, sugarcane, sweet potato, tea, banana, pineapple, peanuts, tobacco, etc. In Figure 6.1, the annual value of agricultural sector is shown as the black solid line with black circle markers. It increased very fast and almost steadily from 56.2 million yen in 1902 to 541.4 million yen in 1940, an almost tenfold increase. Elsewhere it was shown that the Japanese developed agricultural products based on comparative advantage of Taiwan as compared with other Japanese colonies, not because Taiwan was a Japanese colony.7 It was also shown that the value of these products ranked very high in the world production (HH15, 274). Taiwan had a highly advanced agricultural sector in the world (ibid., p. 281). 2. Manufacturing sector (Mfg). In Figure 6.1, the value of the manufacturing sector is shown as a solid black line with white circle markers and is denoted as 2Mfg. It includes nine manufacturing industries:8 (1) textile, (2) metal, (3) machinery and tools, (4) ceramic and masonry, (5) chemicals, (6) wood and wood products, (7) printing, (8) food products, and (9)

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others (also see Section 6.4 and Figure 6.5). It increased by a multiple of 52, from 12 million yen in 1902 to 632.2 million yen in 1940. The annual value of the products of these nine industries in the manufacturing sector from 1921 to 1942 are shown in Figure 6.5 and are explained in Section 6.4. 3. As the lines in Figure 6.1 show, the agriculture and manufacturing sectors were the major industries in Taiwan during the prewar period. Other sectors, 3Forestry, 4Fisheries, and 5Others, which include livestock (cattle and hog) and mining (coal, gold, crude oil, and natural gas), are clustered at the bottom of Figure 6.1. They are very small compared with the first two sectors when they are measured by the same scale from the right-hand side (RHS) axis calibrated from 0 to 1,400 million yen. All the five lines and the columns show an increasing trend (also see Figure 6.2), especially, the upward trends of agriculture and manufacturing are outstanding. This is more the case after the Quasi-War Stage. Since, during the early periods, from 1902 to 1921, the product values of the five sectors in Figure 6.1 are rather small, the data from 1902 to 1921 on the upper left corner of Figure 6.1 are enlarged for clarity. The lines are measured from the left-hand side (LHS) axis (indicated by the large arrow), and calibrated from 0 to 200 million yen. Note that 3Forestry, 4Fisheries, and 5Others are still very small even after enlargement. The three are still clustered at the bottom of the figure and are indistinguishable. 4. The total value of outputs (denoted as 6Total) is the sum of the values of all these five sectors. It is shown from 1902 to 1940 as the white columns in Figure 6.1, with a slightly darker column for demarcation at the beginning of each stage. The number at the top of the column is the total product value of the five sectors in each year in million yen. The rapidly increasing trend of the total product, when all five sectors are added, is very clear in each stage, indicating an almost steady exponential growth of Taiwan’s production sectors. Note that each of the seven stages has a distinguished pattern of growth. The growth of the manufacturing sector appeared to be stagnant before 1914, but started to grow after the Transitional Stage (1914), slightly slacked in the Prewar Stage (1921), then accelerated greatly and steadily during the Quasi-War Stage (1931 and after), and accelerated even more steeply in the First and Second War Stages (1937 and after). Each stage clearly indicates different wars’ effect on Taiwan’s industrialization process. Due to the declaration of total war and the enforcement of a strictly controlled economy during WWII, the production in all sectors, and therefore the total product, should have grown much higher after 1941, namely, during the early Second War

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Sources: Okurasho (1949), p. 196, Table 135 (for WPI); other data, ibid., pp. 110–111, Table 90.

Figure 6.1

Industrial production (1902–1940) and growth rates (1905–1940) of Taiwan, five industrial sectors, million yen

Stage, until the time the allied air raids slowed down the production near the end of WWII. Since the values of the three sectors, namely, 3Forestry, 4Fisheries, and 5Others, are much smaller (see the clustered three lines at the bottom of Figure 6.1), the three sectors are redrawn separately in Figure 6.2, measured from the RHS axis, and calibrated from 0 to 70 million yen. Like Figure 6.1, the data from 1902 to 1921 in the upper-left corner are redrawn for clarity, measured from the LHS axis, and calibrated from 0 to 13 million yen. In Figure 6.2, 3Forestry is shown by a light solid line with white circle markers, 4Fisheries by darker solid line with square markers, and 5Others by dotted line with white triangle markers. These three sectors also show a clearly and remarkably similar upward trend like the agriculture and manufacturing sectors in Figure 6.1, especially after 1931. The 3Forestry product value increased from a mere 0.06 (million yen, same below) in 1902 to 27.7 in 1940,

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Sources: Okurasho (1949), p. 196, Table 135 (for WPI); other data, ibid., pp. 110–111, Table 90.

Figure 6.2

Industrial production (1902–1940) and growth rates (1905–1940) of Taiwan during the Japanese period, three industrial sectors, million yen

a whopping 462-fold increase; 4Fisheries products, from 1.4 in 1902 to 52.2 in 1940, a 37-fold increase;9 5Others products also increased from 2.0 in 1902 to 60.4 in 1939, a 30-fold increase. Note the steeper increases of all three sectors after 1931, especially the 5Others sector, as the 5Others sector included mining products. Thus, all five sectors increased tremendously during the Japanese period. Note that, the values in the figures are measured at nominal prices. If the effect of price inflation over time is considered, the increase must be deflated by the price index,10 and the increase might not be as spectacular as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. As shown below, this was not the case for Taiwan in the prewar period. As a preliminary investigation, the upper part of Figure 6.1 shows the Taipei average annual wholesale price index (WPI) from 1914 to 1940 (Okurasho,

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1949, pp. 196–197). It is shown by the heavy dotted line with white triangle markers and smaller bold italic data labels. Here the WPI in 1914 is taken as 100. It increased precipitously from 100 in 1914 to 257 in 1920, riding on the immediate post-WWI prosperity. Then came the severe postwar depression in the 1920s. The deflation period lasted until the end of Prewar Stage (1930). The WPI fell to a bottom of 136 in 1931. The economy then recovered in the next year, and the prices started to increase continuously during the Quasi-War and First War Stages (1931–1940). However, the WPI increased only up to 258 in 1940, the same value as the previous high of 257 in 1920. Thus, during the period from 1914 to 1940, for 25 years, the wholesale price index only increased 1.5 times, or, from 1920 to 1940, for 20 years, no price increase occurred. Apparently, so far as price is concerned, the economy was exceptionally stable. Inflation was not the problem.11 In fact, if the above WPI is used as a deflater of the manufacturing sector in Figure 6.1, the effect is merely depressing the output value in the Traditional Stage, increases the value in the Prewar Stage, and depresses the output value slightly in the Quasi-War Stage and the First War Stage, so the conclusion of Taiwan’s prewar rapid industrialization still holds (see Appendix A for the results from Shinohara’s study). Since the nominal value shows distinctively and dramatically the different stages of Taiwan’s prewar industrial evolution following Japan’s militarism, the product values in current price are presented in this chapter for visual appeal. Furthermore, the similarity of the rapidly upward trend of the total manufacturing and agricultural product values shown in Figure 6.1 justifies, or is the basis of, the rapid rise of prewar real GDP per capita (in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars), which is a measure of the standard of living of a nation. It was compiled by Maddison and was illustrated in HH17 (pp. 123, 180–186), as the manufacturing and agricultural sectors are the major components of domestic gross products in prewar Taiwan. Despite all the talk of exploitation of the Japanese colonial government, the rapid agricultural development and industrialization of Taiwan in general increased the standard of living of the Taiwanese during the Japanese period.12

6.3

STAGES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, AVERAGE VALUES, AND AVERAGE GROWTH RATES

To characterize each stage, Figure 6.3 shows the mean values of the products of each of the five sectors, with the corresponding data table attached below the figure for clarity. The three columns are the mean value of 1Agriculture (with white columns), 2Manufacturing (the columns with an upward slanted line pattern), and 6Total products (with filled black columns). They are measured from the LHS axis. Note the difference in scale between the two axes. The

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LHS axis is 20 times larger than the RHS axis. Thus, the scale of the columns is 20 times larger than that of the lines. The three lines in Figure 6.3 correspond to those in Figure 6.2 and are the mean value of 3Forestry (a dark slashed line with circle markers), 4Fisheries (a light solid line with square markers), and 5Others (a dotted line with triangle markers). These three lines are measured from the RHS axis. Average Output in Each Stage Figure 6.3 is a compressed version of Figure 6.1 and 6.2. It concisely reinforces our observation in Figure 6.1 that all the five sectors grew rapidly through each stage during the Japanese period. The simultaneous increases of the average value of each sector for all five sectors, except for a slight decrease in the 3Forestry sector (12.5 to 12.0 million yen from the Prewar Stage to Quasi-War Stage), clearly summarize the exponential increase of all sectors, especially the two major sectors, over the seven stages. The general upward trend of all sectors indicates that, during the Japanese period, Taiwan achieved “balanced growth” of economic development. In fact, the overall increase in average values in each stage, except during the 5Quasi-War Stage, is staggering. The attached table to Figure 6.3 shows that, from the 1Initial Stage (1902–1904) to the 6First War Stage (1937–1940), within 40 or so years, the total product value (the dark column) increased to more than 15 times of its initial value (71.1 to 1088.1, in million yen, same below), while the manufacturing and agricultural sectors (the white and the patterned columns), increased to almost 50 and 8 times (from 10.3 to 490.2, and from 57.4 to 489.1), respectively. Since the statistics for the sectors of forestry, fisheries, and others (the lines) were very low in 1902, by 1940, they increased to 230, 24, and 28 times of their initial value, respectively within 40 or so years.13 Note that, as shown in the upper part of Figure 6.1, in the early stages of development, the value of manufacturing was generally much smaller than that of agriculture. It temporarily exceeded that of agriculture (89.4 vs. 88.1) in 1916 during the First War Stage, but fell behind agriculture in the next year and continued falling below until 1939. In 1939, however, the manufacturing value increased to 570.8, while that of agriculture was 551.8. It continued to overtake the value of agriculture in the following years. The consistent overtaking of the value of the manufacturing products over that of the agricultural products is called “the turning point” in the theory of economic development. It is considered a milestone in development economics. In fact, after the war, the turning point was achieved again only after 1966.14

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Sources: Okurasho (1949), p. 196, Table 135 (for WPI); other data, ibid., pp. 110–111, Table 90; author’s calculation.

Figure 6.3

Average values of five sectors, each of seven stages, 1902–1940, million yen

Discrete Growth Rate of Output in Each Stage Figure 6.4 shows the average discrete growth rates15 of the five sectors in each stage. The structure, columns, and lines of Figure 6.4 are the same as those of Figure 6.3. The pattern of the change of growth rates over time is more revealing than those in Figure 6.3. It clearly shows that Taiwan’s industrialization has two distinct characteristics: one from 1895 to 1920, including our first three stages, and one from 1921 to the end of WWII, including our next four stages.

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Sources: Okurasho (1949), p. 196, Table 135 (for WPI); other data, ibid., pp. 110–111, Table 90; author’s calculation.

Figure 6.4

Average (discrete) growth rates of five sectors, each of seven stages, 1902–1940, percent

The 1Initial Stage shows negative growth for agriculture and manufacturing, the whole economy (6Total) also shows negative growth during the 1Initial Stage.16 However, the three recovered quickly, especially agriculture. All three columns reach the highest average growth rates during the whole Japanese period in the 3Transitional Stage (1914–1920). In this stage, the average growth rate of agriculture was a respectable 13.8%, that of manufacturing was twice as large, a whopping 30.1%, and that of the total economy was 18.2 (see the data table attached to Figure 6.4). It should be noted that, during the 4Prewar Stage (1921–1930), the growth rates of all the economic sectors became the lowest during the Japanese period after the Early Stage (1905). Three explanations can be given. Internally, these two periods coincided with the rise of the Taiwanese labor and farmer movements against the Japanese capitalism. The movements probably were

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influenced by Japan’s Taisho Democracy (see Section 6.4 below) and overlapping with the similar rise of the labor movements in Japan (Nakamura 1978, pp. 108–109). The general labor strikes and farmer protests resulted in the decrease in industrial productivity, and the growth of production slowed down. Externally, Japan’s post-WWI deflation and financial crisis of the 1920s (Nakamura 1978, pp. 111) had an impact on the Taiwanese economy, resulting in the bankruptcy of the Suzuki Company (Suzuki Shoten) and the financial crisis of the Bank of Taiwan, the largest industrial lending bank in Taiwan. Taiwan’s trade with Japan slowed down, as Taiwan’s industrialization had closely related to Japan (Shinohara, 1972a), decelerating the production growth. Third, the New York Stock Exchange collapsed in the fall of 1929, starting the unprecedented world economic crisis, depressing Japanese and then Taiwanese production (also see part (4) of Section 6.6 below). The Taiwanese economy recovered by the middle of the Quasi-War Stage (1931–1936) (see figures 6.1 and 6.5). It then grew exponentially and continuously until the middle of the Second-War Stage. Growth Rates of Each Sector during the Japanese Period In addition to the average growth rate in each of the seven stages, we calculated the discrete average growth rate, and also the continuous growth rate, of each economic sector for the whole Japanese period from 1905 to 1940 (see endnote 16). The average discrete growth rate (continuous growth rate in parentheses below, followed by the coefficient of determination R2) of agriculture from 1905 to 1940 was, all in percentage, 8.8 (6.3, R2 = 0.902,17 also shown in the legend box in Figure 6.1, same below), that of manufacturing was a whopping 15.0 (9.7, 0.887),18 and that of the “Total” products of five sectors was 10.1 (7.6, 0.924). Note that, considering Japan’s all-out war, we expect that the growth rates would have been much higher for 1941 to 1943 (as shown by the values of 1941 and 1942 in Figure 6.5). Thus, the total growth rates up to 1943 might be even higher for all sectors. For other three sectors, as shown in Figure 6.2, the discrete growth rate, and the continuous growth rate (in parentheses, same as above; also see the Legend of Figure 6.2) from 1905 to 1940 were no less impressive: for 3Forestry, 24.8 (17.0, 0.807); for 4Fisheries, 11.9 (9.7, 0.910); and for 5Others, 11.3 (8.3, 0.929), which includes the mining sector. In general, few countries can achieve such high growth rates in such a short time for all sectors of the economy.19 It was simply a miracle growth of the Taiwanese economy in the prewar period.

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107

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

Section 6.2 has shown that the main economic sectors in Taiwan during the Japanese period were agriculture and manufacturing. In a separate book, we have discussed Taiwan’s astonishing development of agriculture in detail (HH15, chapters 1 and 4). Thus, in this section, we discuss the growth of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. In Section 6.1, the manufacturing sector is divided into nine industries. Figure 6.5 shows the trend of nine manufacturing industries from 1921 to 1942, taken from20 TaiStat51 (1946, Table 269). We use TaiStat51 (1946) simply because it includes the two years of the last stage of Taiwan’s industrialization.21 The Food Industry and the Remainder Industry Figure 6.5 has two parts. In Figure 6.5(A), the stacked columns are measured from the RHS axis from 0 to 700 in million T$ (Taiwan Dollars), the slightly shaded lower columns show the values of food products at each year, and the white columns above the food columns are the values of all remaining eight industries excluding the value of food products. We shall call these eight non-food industries the remainder industry (to avoid a confusion with the 5Others sector in Figure 6.1). The values of the food products and the remainder products are shown by the numbers inside the stacked columns, respectively. Thus, the total height of a stacked column shows the total value of the manufacturing products (food industry plus the remainder industry) from 1921 to 1942 for each year, and the total value is shown by the number in bold face above the stacked column. It is clear from the height of the stacked columns in Figure 6.5(A) that the total values of the manufacturing products, after a long stagnation, started increasing gradually from the second part of the Quasi-War Stage, namely, Manchurian Incident of 1931, and accelerated greatly after the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. It grew tremendously during the First and the Second War Stage, indicating again that Taiwan’s industrialization grew along with the rise of Japan’s militarism. A closer look at the trend of the stacked columns in Figure 6.5(A) reveals that the acceleration of the value of the manufacturing sector is totally due to the acceleration of the remainder industries, as shown above the food industry column in Figure 6.5(A). Both are measured from the right-hand-side axis, as indicated by the short, filled arrow outside the legend. The upper white columns of the remainder industry (that is, other than the food industry)

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Source: TaiStat51 (1946), Tables 269­–278.

Figure 6.5

Production of the manufacturing sector of Taiwan, nine manufacturing industries, 1921–1942

increased, while the value of the agricultural processing industry remained flat from the middle of the First War Stage (1939) and up to two years of the Second War Stage. The total manufacture output continued to surpass the previous year and increased greatly, indicating the government’s total war policy of industrialization by developing industries other than the food industry. The legend of Figure 6.1 shows that the continuous growth rates of the manufacturing sector from 1905 to 1940 was 9.7%, and the legend of Figure

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6.5(A) shows that the continuous growth rate from 1921 to 1942 was 6.8%, which is lower since by 1921 Taiwan’s industrialization had been progressed. Nevertheless, both growth rates were still higher than those in other countries during the prewar period. For a ballpark comparison, Shinohara (1972b, p. 38) shows that, from 1912 to 1937, the continuous growth rate of the manufacturing industry in Japan was 6.8 (in %, 4.3 from 1881 to 1912, same below), the same as that of Taiwan. However, he also shows that those of other countries in the same period were much lower, namely, the USA, 2.9 (4.6); UK, 1.5 (1.7); Italy, 2.0 (3.9); Germany, 1.4 (4.2); Russia, for 1913–1937, 4.5, for 1880–1913, 4.7 (also see endnote 19 of this chapter). These data show Taiwan’s exceptional rapid industrialization during the prewar period (Appendix A3 gives detailed comparison with Japan). Composition of the Light vs Heavy and Chemical Industries Specifically, as shown in Figure 6.5(B), the heavy and chemical industries, namely, 5Chemicals, 2Metal, and 3Machinery in Figure 6.5(B), as defined by Minami (1986, pp. 131–133), started increasing after 1931, accelerated after 1937, and accelerated again precipitously after 1941, indicating the importance of the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War in Taiwan’s industrialization. In fact, this trend also followed Japan’s industrialization very closely.22 It should be noted that the acceleration of these industries was supported by the completion of “Asia’s largest hydroelectric generating station,” the Sun Moon Lake Station, in 1934,23 among other government and private electric generation stations (see Section 6.6). In addition to the heavy and chemical industries defined above, Minami (ibid.) also grouped 8Foods and 2Textile industries as the “light industries.” The upper dotted line of Figure 6.5(A) with black markers and data labels traces the development of Taiwan’s light industries as defined by Minami. The percentage of light industries in the manufacturing sector started from 75% in 1921 and decreased slightly to 73 in 1937, and slid down to 60 in 1942, as shown in Figure 6.5. In general, the composition of the light and heavy industries in Taiwan was, in percentage and in this order,24 in 1921 (75.0, 12.1); in 1937 (73.2, 15.6); and in 1941 (61.6, 25.1). Thus, Taiwan’s 1921 and 1937 compositions were comparable with those of Japan in 1900 (73.0, 15.9); and Taiwan’s 1941 composition was generally comparable with Japan’s in 1920 (58.5, 31.2) (ibid., p. 135, Table 5.15). If these comparisons hold, then Taiwan in 1941 had industrialized to the level of Japan in 1920 in about four years (from 1937 to 1941), while Japan achieved the same level in about 20 years (1900 to 1920), showing again Taiwan’s rapid catch-up industrialization during the First and Second War Stages.

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Despite the rapid industrialization, throughout all the stages shown in Figure 6.5, the percentage of the food industry in the total manufacturing industry continued to be high. Thus, the food industry, by taking comparative advantage of Taiwan being in the subtropical region (HH15, pp. 267–293), was the “leading sector” of Taiwan’s industrialization, one of the major patterns of the world industrialization process. This is like the case of Japan, in which textile industry,25 another composition of the “light industry,” not the food industry, was the leading sector during Japan’s early industrialization, as Japan produced a vast amount of silk26 (Minami, pp. 26–27, 131–135). Like the textile industry in Japan, other industries in Taiwan were developed through the linkage effects of the food industry, and eventually supported the Taiwanese economy, when the heavy and chemical industries were introduced in the later years (see Sections 6.8, 6.9, and Conclusion). Growth Rates of Remainder Industries The continuous growth rates, along with the coefficients of determination, for the eight remainder industries from 1921 to 1942, are shown in the legend of Figure 6.5(B). The three heavy and chemical industries have high growth rates: 2Metal, 13.7 (in %, same below); 3Machinery, 10.1; Chemical, 8.7. This is compared with the lower growth rates of the light industries: 1Textile, 6.9; 8Foods, 6.1. The rest of the industries are even lower in general: 4Ceramic, 4.7; 6Wood, 3.5; 7printing, 6.8, except 9Other industry, which has the growth rate of 9.2. The rapid development of the heavy and chemical industries after 1921, especially after the First War Stage (1937), is prominently shown in Figure 6.5(B).

6.5

INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRODUCTS DURING THE JAPANESE PERIOD

The general trends of the five economic sectors in Figures 6.1 to 6.4 and the aggregate development of the nine manufacturing industries in Figure 6.5, without seeing the figures, may not completely illustrate the extent of Taiwan’s industrialization. From the numbers alone, it may be easy to brush off Taiwan’s prewar achievements and conclude that there was a minimal industrialization during the Japanese period, and one can be led to the conclusion of “Agricultural Taiwan Industrial Japan” throughout the Japanese period, giving the credit of Taiwanese industrial development to the KMT government who came to Taiwan after the WWII. A detailed description of each industry in the manufacturing sector is needed to show the extent of industrialization. Instead of going over each industry in

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detail to find out the new products, we assume that a new product or a new industry appears and is listed for the first time in the statistical table after years of blank entries in previous years. Based on StatTai51 (1946), Table 6.1 shows27 the new products, which appeared after 1912. It shows that, for example, in the Food industry, beer production appeared in 1920, western cookies were introduced in 1916, etc. Some items might not be new. For example, it is not clear whether pork floss (or dried fish) in Table 6.1 was new in 1923 (or 1929), as these foods appear to be traditionally Taiwanese. Since they were not listed in the statistical table before 1923 (or 1929), the listed year might be the year in which the mass production occurred; or when the products were made in new factories with modern facilities for mass production, and recognized by the government. Note that some new products might have been made several years earlier and started to be listed in the statistical table only when they were produced in quantity. In addition to the new products listed in Table 6.1, many new companies, especially those related to the Japanese war efforts, were set up after the Quasi-War Stage (after 1931). A new company might have produced products that were essential for producing industrial or military equipment, not necessarily for public uses or household consumption. Thus, the list also includes the product of a new company and the year that a new company was established in Taiwan. This is also shown in each industry after the “(Companies)” designation in Table 6.1. For example, in the food industry, a new tea processing company was started in 1936, a new starch, candy, and confectionery company was established in 1937 and 1942, respectively. In Table 6.1, the first part of each of the nine industries shows the new products by product name mostly after 1921 (after the Transitional Stage), and the second part shows the name of the products of a new company established after 1931 (after the Quasi-War Stage).28 Comparing the difference in new products in the two stages, the new products produced during the Second Prewar Stage are more consumer and daily life oriented, and those produced during and after the Quasi-War Stage are more industry and military oriented, especially during the First and the Second War Stages. This indicates the different character of Taiwan’s industrialization during the prewar period. For example, in the 5Chemical industry, most of the new products were household oriented. Even the chemicals like calcium carbide (used for acetylene gas, lamps, and fertilizer), sulfuric acid (used for making other chemicals and fertilizer), denatured alcohol (used as a cleaning agent, fuel additive, solvent, etc.), and liquid carbon (used as a cooling agent and for food preservatives, storing, and softening) are used for household goods and food production. During and after the Quasi-War Stage, newer general-use products appeared in Taiwan’s chemical industry, like lime nitrogen (for fertilizer), ammonium

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Table 6.1

New products and the year of introduction after 1921 and the new companies after 1931

No.

Subindustry

New product (year of introduction)/New companies after 1930

8

Food

Beer 20; Western cookies 16; Pork floss, 23; Smoked liver, 23; Canned fruits and vegetables, 23; Bran, 23; Dried fish, 29; Pineapple and other fruit processing, 36; (Companies) Tea processing, 36; Starch, candy, confectionery, 37, 42; Soy sauce, 43; Fishery and ice making, 44.

5

Chemical

Medicine 17; Calcium carbide, 17; Sulfuric acid 21; denatured alcohol, 25; Taiwan white powder, 23; Perfume, 23; Animal oil, 21; Paper board, 23; Coating materials, 27; Sugarcane dregs pressed board, 31; Liquid carbon, 32; Western and printing paper, 34; Packing board, 38. (Companies) Lime nitrogen, 35; Papermaking, 35; Textile products, 37; Ammonium sulfate, 37; Bagasse pulp, 38; Salt making, 38; Caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, 38, 39; Pesticides, 39, 41; Japanese paper, paper products, 42, 44; Paint, 40; Medicine, 41, 43.

2

Metal and

Metal plate products, 18; Screws and accessories, 19; Construction hardware, 21;

3

machinery

Tin products, 23; Enameled Ironware, 19; Vehicles, 21; Ships, 23; Sword, knife, pocket knife, scissors, woodworking tools, 29; (Companies) Alumina, aluminum, 35; Iron alloy, 35; Zinc barged wire, 37; Ship internal combustion engine, 37; Mechanical engine, 37; Nickel, 38; Meter, precision instruments, 38; Cast steel, 39; Communication machine, 41; Agricultural equipment, 41; Can for canning, 41; Ironmaking, 41, 43; Hard chrome plating, 42; Standard bolt nuts, 43; Sand iron, pig iron, cast copper, 43; Wooden ship, 43.

9

Other

Lionworm products, 33; Feather products, 33; Asbestos products, 33; Sea shell

4

Ceramics, Soil

Clay pipe, 13; Glass, 15; Cement, 17; Refractory brick, 19; Safety tile, 21.

and Rock

(Companies) Cement, 31, 39, 42; Zenith pipe, and others, 38; Glassware, 39;

products, 36.

Glass products, Glass bottles, 39, 40; Tiles, Earthen pipe, 42. 1

Textile

Knitted socks, 17; Raw silk, 18; Single thread (Ramie, 21; Jute, 15; Others, 23); Dye, 21; Quilt cotton, 22; Embroidery, 23; Tatami Thread, 29.

6

Wood

(Companies) Lumbering, 19, 23, 36, 43; Furniture and Woodworking, 42; Water supply wooden pipe, 43.

7

Printing

(Companies) Printing, 16; Offset printing, 21; Letterpress printing, 42; Newspaper printing, 44.

Note: The number is the year an item or a new company appeared in the statistical table. Sources: TaiStat51 (1946), Tables 279–283 for items; Okurasho, 1952, pp.204–209, for companies.

sulfate (for fertilizer), and caustic soda (multiple uses in producing pulp and paper, alumina, soap, detergents, petroleum, and chemical production). The progress of Taiwan’s industrialization is more apparent in the metal and machinery industry. During the Prewar Stage, it produced mostly household

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gadgets, construction materials, vehicles, and ships. In the Quasi-War Stage, Taiwan then produced the ship’s internal combustion engine, mechanical engine, precision instruments, communication machine, and agricultural equipment. Furthermore, the basic materials of all these engines and other machines, like aluminum, cast steel, nickel, sand iron, pig iron, and cast copper, were all made in Taiwan, while some raw materials were, as shown in the Section 6.7, imported from other countries: Japan, China, and the South Seas. Meanwhile, as international opinion started to turn against Japan and the threat of larger war became apparent, light industries for daily necessities were developed for war-time self-sufficiency in Taiwan, to not rely on imports from Japan proper (Kusui, 1944, pp. 366–394; HH15, pp. 25–26, 50, 380, 507). Thus, the First War Stage was basically the period of Taiwan’s import substitution phase of economic development.

6.6

TAIWAN’S INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EACH STAGE

Up to now, we have shown Taiwan’s industrialization quantitatively. We found that the growth rate of the manufacturing sector during the prewar period was 15.0% for the discrete case, and 9.7% for the continuous case; see figures 6.1 and 6.5. We also found high growth rates of other four sectors and the nine industries of the manufacturing sector. They were “miraculous.” To achieve such high growth rates in a short time, hardware and software infrastructures, such as electric power plants, transportation, government policy, education, and R&D, must be in place to support the rapid industrialization. Furthermore, Taiwan’s industrialization was strongly influenced by the changes in economic and political conditions of Japan, and in turn, on Japan’s international position at each stage. In this section, we review briefly the institutional and international aspects of industrialization and the economic policy of the Taiwan Government General under the Japanese and the world environments during each stage of industrialization. 1. The Initial Period (1895–1904), from the establishment of the Taiwan Government General (TGG) (5/1895) to the end of the TGG’s fiscal dependence on Japan. During this period, the TGG established the following rules, system, and facilities: the local tax system (7/1898); the Enterprises Bond Law (3/1899) for the construction of railroads, irrigation, the Keelung harbor, official housing, etc.; the Bank of Taiwan (9/1899) to unify the financial and monetary system; a medical school (3/1899) to study subtropical diseases; tap water projects (starting from 8/1896) for drinking water;

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a normal school for teachers (10/1899) to start Japanese education; the Taiwan Sugar Cooperation (12/1900) for exports; Rules on Agricultural Use of Water and Irrigation (7/1901) to reduce the agricultural disputes and determine the rent for tax purposes; and the System of Weights and Measures (1902) to facilitate business transaction. The TGG adopted the “Proposal on the Improvement of Taiwan’s Sugar Industry” (9/1901) by Inazo Nitobe, which protected and encouraged the development of the sugar industry as the largest industry in Taiwan. The TGG also started the Monopoly Bureau to monopolize the production and sale of opium (4/1897), salt and camphor (1899), and tobacco (1905). The revenue from these monopoly products increased up to 40 percent of the TGG’s annual revenue during this period. All these were necessary preparations for securing government finance, promoting capitalistic development, and effective governance. 2. The Early Stage (1905–1913), from the end of Russo-Japanese War (9/1905) and the year of fiscal independence (4/1905) to a year before WWI. Taiwan’s fiscal independence was a relief for Japan, as Japan just concluded the Russo-Japanese War (1905), and they were suffering with high taxes and war mobilization. During this period, the TGG completed the Land and Population Surveys (3/1905), built the first electric generation station in Kizan (7/1905), completed Taiwan’s North–South Railroad (4/1908), started Taipei’s public bus service (1/1913), and completed the Ali Mountain Railroad (2/1911) to help the forestry industry. Japan annexed Korea as its territory (8/1910). 3. The Transitional Stage (1914–1920), from the outbreak of the WWI (7/1914) to two years after the end of WWI (11/1918), when the post-WWI economic prosperity turned into a depression in Japan (1920). During this stage, the TGG completed the East–West Highway (10/1918); established Taiwan Electric Power Company (TaiPower) (8/1919); published Taiwan Education Ordinance (1/1919); opened the Taiwan Business and Industry Professional School (1920). Japan had Rice Riots (1918) and the TGG reconsidered its rice policy. Stimulated by WWI, the TGG planned to develop a 100,000 KW electricity station from the Sun Moon Lake (8/1919, Lin, 1997, pp. 70, 74–78), ten times the actual need at that time, indicating the TGG’s intention of developing Taiwan’s industries. The plan was aborted (2/1923) due to economic repression after the WWI and because Japanese were busy developing their own industries in Japan (Takahashi, 1937, pp. 423–424). But it resumed and completed ten years later (10/1934, Lin, 1997, p. 123; also see (5) below). In this period, as a result of WWI, Japan occupied the South Sea Islands (Nanyo Gunto, currently North Mariana Islands etc. consisting of 14 islands), which were a territory of Germany (10/1914). The occupation

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stimulated Japan’s interest in the South Seas as a way to solve Japan’s overpopulation. The Treaty of Versailles (4/1919) awarded German holdings in China’s Shandong to Japan, which touched off China’s May 4th Movement. The conflict of interest between the United States and Japan in Southeast Asia deepened (Inoue, 1965, p. 152). 4. The Prewar Stage (1921–1930), from the time the TGG completed a large Taoyuan irrigation system (4/1921) to a year before the Manchurian Incident. Prince Hirohito visited Taiwan (4/1923), boasting about Taiwan’s social and economic progress and the importance of Taiwan to Japan. New Ponlai rice was introduced (1927) and started to be exported to Japan in large quantities. There were numerous industrial and agricultural labor disputes and strikes during this period. In the second half of the 1920s, 1924 to 1930, there were 340 labor-capital disputes involving 28,597 workers, and 626 tenancy disputes involving 8,530 farmers, with 436 unions involving 4,804 members (Hsiao and Sullivan, 1983). An example is the sugarcane farmers’ labor dispute (10/1925). The growth of industrial productivities slowed down (see Section 6.3). These events indicated the rise of strong labor and farmer movements against the Japanese capitalism. Labor dispute aside, the TGG established the Taiwan Imperial University (4/1928), one of the only nine imperial universities in Japan before WWII, to emphasize research in “South China and South Seas” affairs. After ten years of construction, the TGG completed the large-scale Kanan (嘉南) Irrigation System (4/1930), which irrigated a 16,000-hectare area. During this stage, the Japanese economy experienced a post-WWI deep recession after 1920. The recession spread to Taiwan, and in 1927, the Bank of Taiwan almost bankrupted (Ko, 1981, p. 120; Nakamura, 1978, p. 111). The crisis continued to the Wall Street Crash of 1929, distressing both Japanese and Taiwanese economies. Externally, the Nine-Power Treaty (2/1922) tried to head off Japan’s ambition in China, forcing Japan to return Shantung to China, but failed to prevent Japan from seizing Manchuria (1931) (ibid., p. 153). Partly to stimulate its economy, Japan started its road to imperialism. 5. The Quasi-War Stage (1931–1936), from the Manchurian Incident (9/1931) to a year before the Sino-Japanese War (1937). After the Incident, the Japanese militarism rose rapidly. The TGG dissolved the trade unions, although labor and farmer disputes continued. They were suppressed relentlessly, and the unrests ceased by 1934 (Hsiao and Sullivan, 1983). To invigorate the industries in concert with the Japanese military buildup, the TGG sponsored two study boards. The first one was the Ad Hoc Study Board of Industries (Rinji Sangyo Chosa Kai, 11/1930) to

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review Taiwan’s industrial policy. It recommended to increase production and exports of traditional products like sugar, tea, fruits, and canned pineapples, alongside developing coal and mining (Kusui, 1944, pp. 50–53). Up to the middle of this stage, the modern industries in Taiwan were still mainly producing the traditional products like camphor, opium, and alcohol, which belonged to the Government Monopoly Bureau (ibid. 65–66), and the major industrial productions were derivatives of the sugar processing industry, like alcohol, sugar refinery machines, machine repairing, and hemp and jute bags as containers for sugar and rice. The rest of the industrial products were produced by small-scale firms for local use, like cement, bricks, buckets, etc. (Takahashi, 1937, pp. 423, 430). The second one was the Study Board of Tropical Industries (Nettai Sangyo Chosa Kai, 5/1935). It proposed to import iron ore, bauxite, and rubber from the South Seas (Nanyo, mainly Indonesia and Malaysia), and to develop the island’s industries in accordance with the comparative advantage between Taiwan and these areas. This was the starting point of Taiwan’s heavy industrialization (ibid., p. 64). However, the main result from this recommendation was the establishment of the semi-official Taiwan Development Corporation (Taiwan Takushoku Kaisha, 11/1936). Its objective was to develop Taiwan as well as to render “economic help” and assistance to South China and the South Seas (Grajdanzev, 1942, 187; Kawaharahayashi, 2011; Kondo, 1996, Chapter 2). As the TGG completed the large-scale Sun Moon Lake Hydraulic Electric Station (10/1934), the abundant electricity enabled the opening of brand-new industries producing aluminum and iron alloy (1935), pulp (1935), oil and fats (1935), shipbuilding (1936), fertilizer (1937), etc. (Kusui, 1944, pp. 69–74). During this period, the Suao-Hualien Highway in the East Coast was completed (5/1935), and the Taiwan Expo was opened (10/1935) to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of Japanese Rule and achievements in Taiwan as a milestone. From 1935 to 1939, the value of agricultural products per farming household surpassed that of Japan’s by 50 percent (Ishikawa, 1972, p. 19). Internationally, Japan established Manchukuo (3/1932) and formed the Japan–Manchukuo Economic Bloc. Since Manchukuo had limited natural resources, Japan expanded its influence on (northern) China. The war with China became imminent. 6. The First War Stage (1937–1940), from the Sino-Japanese War (7/1937) to a year before WWII (or Pacific War, 12/1941). In response to Japan’s Central Government, the TGG promoted three “Ka’s”: Kogyoka, “industrialization”; Kominka, “Japanization"; and Nanshinkichika, “Go South Base (Bastion)” (5/1939) (Kusui, 1944, p. 85). Economically speaking,

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the first was to supply the military equipment, the second was to secure loyal labor force, the third was to use Taiwan as a base to acquire natural and mineral resources from South China and the South Sees (Nanshi Nanyo). To accelerate industrialization, the TGG completed the second Sun-Moon Lake Electric Power Generation Station (9/1937), and opened a new Taichung Seaport. The TGG implemented a Five-Year Plan of Productivity Expansion (Seisanryoku Kakuju Gokanen Keikaku, 1938). The plan corresponded broadly with Japan's Southward Policy and coordinated with Japan’s Productivity Expansion Plan Outline (Seisanryoku Kakuju Keikaku Yoko, 1/1939). For Taiwan, it was the beginning of its rapid advancement of heavy and chemical industries and its “Industrial Taiwan, Agricultural South Seas” policy. It emphasized metal processing and refinery, machinery (including weapons, airplanes, and automobiles), and chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Kusui, 1944, pp. 158, 168), while, partly due to increases in rice productivity in Japan and the accessibility of sugarcane from the South Seas, Taiwan's agriculture was reorganized to place more emphasis on special crops, like cotton, hemp and jute, castor oil, sweet potatoes, etc. During this period, Japan occupied Nanjing (1937) and established the Nanjing Government (1940). Japan also occupied the Spratly Islands and its surrounding islands (called Shinnan Gunto) in the South China Sea (1938). Domestically, Japan implemented the National Total Mobilization Law (Kokka Sodoin Rei) (1938), putting the national economy under strict control by its almighty government,29 and the TGG was no exception. The League of Nations imposed economic sanction against Japan (9/1938). The world powers formed what the Japanese called the “ABCD Encirclement” (or Blockade, 7/1941), and they limited and then banned exports of strategic materials like petroleum, engine oil, scrap iron, steel, rubber, etc. to Japan. Japan’s unexpectedly prolonged stalemate in China prompted Japan to adopt the Southward Movement Policy (Nanshinron) (in Ogikubo Kaidan, 荻窪会談, 7/1940) to prevent French and British aid to China. To counter the blockade, Japan proposed the “New Great East Asia Order” (Daitoa Sinchitsujo, 7/1940) and then the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Daitoa Kyoeiken) (7/1940). China’s Nanjing Government was established (1940). Japan declared the Japan, Manchuria, and China Economic Community (Nichi Man Shi Keizai Kyodotai or Blok), and later extended the idea of economic community to the South Seas (including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.; see endnote 2 of this chapter) and formed the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Area. The South Seas were then

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considered as Japan’s resources supply area and markets for the Japanese goods (Adachi, 2016). In view of the importance of Taiwan’s location as the bastion of Japan’s Southward Policy, for the second time30 after almost 45 years during the Japanese period, Admiral Hasegawa of the Japanese Navy was appointed as the 18th Taiwan’s Governor General (11/1940, Ko, 1981, p. 171). In the following year in 1941, Taiwan played an essential role in Japan’s Southward Policy. Taiwan was crucial in Japan’s early victory and occupation of South China and the South Seas in WWII (ibid., p. 180). In Europe, WWII started with Germany’s invasion of Poland (9/1939). Within a year, the Germans occupied most of the European countries. 7. The Second War Stage (1941–1945), from the Pacific War (12/1941) to the end of WWII (8/1945). Due to the intensive war efforts in Japan proper, and a severe shortage of ships, Taiwan was, while supplementing Japan’s war efforts, to achieve a totally self-sufficient economy, independent of Japan proper. The new emphasis was on producing necessities on the island, in addition to metal and machinery, some miscellaneous goods like candies, soy sauce, milk products, pencils, leathers, radios, batteries, etc. To mobilize the Taiwanese further, the TGG started the Association of Imperial Civil Service (Komin Hokokai, 4/1941; see HH15, Chapter 7) and a six-year compulsory education system (4/1943). Japan occupied much of major cities and areas in China. By May 1942, Japan occupied almost all the Southeast Asian countries. To accommodate the new “world order,” Japan abolished the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumusho) (9/1942) and placed TGG under Ministry of Internal Affairs (Naimusho), making Taiwan “the second Japan Proper” (Daini no Naichi). The Emperor elected three Taiwanese to represent Taiwan in the House of Peers (Kizokuin) (3/1945) (HH15, pp. 384–386) so as to abolish the discrimination against the Taiwanese. It was too late and too little for the Taiwanese. However, the promotion of Taiwanese political position had an important effect on the postwar 228 Incident in Taiwan; ibid., pp. 384–388). The turning point of WWII was the Battle of Midway (6/1942). Although the Great East Asia Conference (Daitoa Kaigi) was held in Tokyo (11/1943), the war started turning against Japan. The Cairo Declaration (11/1943) was followed by Allied air raids on Taiwan (11/1943), and then by massive strategic air bombing of Tokyo (11/1944). The subsequent raids destroyed almost half of the industrial facilities in Taiwan (HH17, p. 197), and Japan was no exception. Finally, Japan surrendered to the Allies (8/1945).

Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period

6.7

119

TAIWAN’S INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOUTHWARD ADVANCEMENT: “INDUSTRIAL TAIWAN, AGRICULTURAL SOUTH SEAS”

Figure 6.1 shows that, up until the First War Stage, the major economic sectors in Taiwan were in agriculture, followed by manufacturing, which was mainly based on agricultural products, like sugar, pineapples, tea, etc. The industry was developed through forward linkages like machine repair shops, textile industry for hemp bags, and railroad network. Figure 6.2 also shows that, until the Quasi-War Stage, the development of forestry, fisheries, and other sectors, including mining and livestock, were very minimal by comparison, especially mining. Although the Japanese found more than 80 kinds of mineral resources in Taiwan, like coal, petroleum and natural gas, gold and placer magnetite, copper, sulfur, limestone, etc., these products had limited reserves and could not be developed into large-scale production. However, Japan’s war efforts during and after the Quasi-War Stage made these minerals valuable for industrial development (Kusui, 1944, pp. 75–77). As indicated in the previous section, the completion of the Sun Moon Lake electric generation station, along with a relatively cheap labor supply, stimulated the rise of industries of light metal (aluminum and magnesium), iron (alloy), machinery, petroleum, pulp, sulphate, denatured alcohol, animal oil, etc. This is shown partly in the lower part of Table 6.2. In Table 6.2, the first two columns show the geographic area of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the main countries in the sphere. The third column lists the mining resources that Taiwan imported for its industrialization. The last column, in italic font, shows the other natural resources that Taiwan planned to import for further industrialization but interrupted by the war (TEY41, pp. 518–519; Kusui, 1944, pp. 177–178; HH15, pp. 194–196). The table shows clearly that most of the materials for these new industries had to be outsourced from the JMC (Japan, Manchuria, China) Economic Block and the South Seas, as shown in the list of countries and their available resources in Table 6.2 (Kusui, ibid.; HH15, ibid.). The table shows that almost all the “New Industries” (Shinko Kogyo) that used mineral products had to rely on imports from the countries outside of Taiwan. It should be noted that this lack of industrial resources and a reliance on imports were no different from the economic conditions after 1937 in Japan proper (Adachi, 2016). Japan also badly needed the essential raw materials like gasoline, iron ore, tin, rubber, etc. As such, the need for these essential war materials was one of the reasons for the establishment of the Great East Asia Economic Co-prosperity Sphere. The last row of Table 6.2 shows that, during this period, Taiwan could produce only electricity, industrial salt, etc., mostly for the light industries. The

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upper part of the table shows that the essential mineral products, like ferrites, nickel, iron ore, rubber, and petroleum, were to be imported from the South Seas and the JMC Economic Block, and Korea, which was a Japanese colony before WWII. By importing mineral resources from other countries in the South Seas, Taiwan, now viewed and integrated as the quasi-Japan proper in the Second War Stage (HH15, pp. 384–385; Kondo, 1996, chapters 3 and 6), could take advantage of its being close to the South Seas and would be fully industrialized. The basic idea was to achieve “Industrial Taiwan, Agricultural South Seas.” To promote agricultural South Seas, the TGG even planned to move 400,000 Taiwanese farmers to the South Seas over 10 years and transfer the idled rice milling machines to countries like the Philippines and Hainan Island (Kusui, 1944, p. 398). Over 300,000 Taiwanese youth went to Manchuria, China, and the South Seas as volunteer workers or soldiers, or “industrial soldiers,” to explore natural resources (Lin, 1997, p. 225). Their activities can be seen from an episode of the Taiwan Electric Power Company (TaiPower) (ibid., pp. 156–158). In 1941, the company sent 43 workers to the Philippines, 39 to Guangdong, and 20 to Hong Kong. In the Philippines,31 the TaiPower managed eight companies; in addition to producing electric power, they also produced natural gas and made ice (ibid., 157). A detailed monthly account of 1942 Taiwan’s contribution to the South Seas countries’ national reconstruction efforts can be seen in Kusui (1944, pp. 394–400), showing Taiwan’s deep economic, cultural, and social involvements with the South Seas during the First War Stage and the early Second War Stage when Japan was victorious.32

6.8

NEW INDUSTRIES AND SOURCES OF NATURAL RESOURCES AFTER 1935 TO THE END OF THE WWII

In the previous section, we studied Taiwan’s general dependence on the South Seas’ resources. This section examines how individual companies depended on domestic and foreign resources during and after the Quasi-War Stages. Table 6.3 highlights the type of products produced by some major “New Companies” (Shinko Kogyo Kaisha) after 1935 and the country origin of raw materials that the companies used (Okurasho, 1952, pp. 198–199). It shows a list of 19 companies, the companies’ location, the published capital amount in million yen, the year of companies’ establishments, and their sources of raw materials. Specifically, the table shows that ten companies were established in 1939 and three in 1940. Thus, they were new, created mostly for the war efforts. The investment amount ranged from 0.1 million yen for a glass manufacturing

Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period

Table 6.2 Region

JMC-Econ

Sources of resources for Taiwan’s industrialization Countries/Area

Actually imported

To be imported

Manchuria

Alunite (Aluminum), Magnesite

 

Northern China

Ferrites (Aluminum), Ceramic

 

Southern China

Alumite

Lead, Tungsten, Antimony

(Hainan Island)

Block and Korea

South Seas

121

Korea

(Tin, Iron ore) Special clay (for refractory tile)

Manganese

Magnesite (Magnesium)

 

Japan

Iron and steel scrap (Ferroalloy)

 

Burma

Chloantite (Nickel)

Petrorium

Vietnam

Iron ore

Tin, Tungsten

Philippines

Manganese

Iron ore

Malaysia

Rubber, Bauxite

Lead, Tungsten, Antimony,

Indonesia

Ferrites (Aluminum), Bauxite

Petronium, Tin, Iron ore,

(Aluminum), Garnierite (Nickel)

Lead, Tungsten, Antimony

Tin, Iron ore

Taiwan’s available resources Taiwan  

 

 

Electricity, Industrial salt, Coal, Gasoline and natural gas, Gold, Copper, Limestone, Sulfur, Pyrites (for Sulfuric acid), Clay, Scrap steel (from shipbreaking), hemp.

Notes: JMC = Nichii-Man-Shi = Japan-Machuria-China. The item in parentheses are the product using the resource imported. Sources: Kusui, 1944, pp. 177–178; HH15, pp. 195–196.

company to 77 million yen for the renewed electric power generation station at the Sun Moon Lake. The availability of a new electric power company in Eastern Taiwan revitalized Hualian as a new industrializing city, and it enabled the new industries to spread almost all over Taiwan, east and west, north and south, especially in Gaoxiong City in the south (see the “Location in Taiwan” column). Among these 19 new companies, eight companies outsourced its raw materials from countries outside of Taiwan, three from the South Seas. When WWII started, the Japanese plan was to quickly move to the South Seas and to occupy the Philippines, Singapore, etc. and bring resources from Indonesia (Nakamura (1978), pp. 139–140) and other Southeast Asian countries back to Japan and Taiwan for processing. Due to geographical proximity to the South Seas, Taiwan became an important military base for Japan, especially when Japan had severe shortage of cargo ships during the war.33 Japan’s victory was short lived. All these new industries operated only for several years, and many were partially or completely wrecked when the Allied

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Table 6.3  

New companies and their sources of materials after 1935

Products

Location in Taiwan

Invt

Yr

Country of Origin

K 1

Aluminium

Gaoxiong, Hualian

60

35

Indonesia

2

Metal

Gaoxiong

15

39

Manchuria and Taiwan

3

Magnesium

Gaoxiong

10

39

Manchuria and Taiwan

4

Nickel

Hualian

10

38

South Africa, Rhodesia

5

Alloy iron

Keelung

2

35

Manchuria

6

Electric Iron

Taipei

77

39

Vietnam, Philippines

7

Sulfur

Xinzu

10

37

Taiwan

8

Urea, Gypsum

Hualian

5

39

Taiwan

9

Phosphate

New South Islands

1

38

New South Islands

10

Fertilizer

Hualian

5

39

South Seas

11

Cement

Gaoxiong

5

39

Taiwan

12

Cement

Taipei

5

40

Taiwan

13

Sulfuric acid

Ruifang

10

39

Taiwan

14

Refractory brick

Gaoxiong

0.5

39

Kimoy Island

15

Glass

Jinwei

3

40

Taiwan

16

Glass

XinZhu

0.1

39

Taiwan

18

Power generation

Sun-Moon Lake

77

40

Taiwan

19

Power generation

Eastern Taiwan

30

37

Taiwan

Notes: K = Published capital; Yr. = Year of establishment. The names of the companies were omitted due to difficulty in translation. Source: Okurasho, 1952, pp. 198–199.

forces started air raids on Taiwan after the second part of 1943. Taiwan’s industrial production plummeted in 1945, as shown in the last column of Table 6.4.

6.9

HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN AT THE END OF THE WWII

With an ambitious industrialization plan to pursue the great war efforts in a very short period, it could be expected that some plans might fail, some might be unfinished, and some might even not start. The heavy and chemical companies and plants might be quickly assembled for the war efforts. While some pundits may say that, as a colony of Japan, Japan at most developed light industries, not heavy and chemical industries, nevertheless, Taiwan’s industrialization did advance to the era of heavy and chemical industries during the First and the Second War Stages.

Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period

123

Figure 6.4 shows the heavy and chemical industrial products produced in Taiwan in 1944, classified by the product category (Col. 2), the number of companies (denoted as No. of Com) producing the product (Col. 3), the product name (Col. 4), the target production (T), actual production (A) as of 1944, and the proportion of attained target production (A/T) as a percentage. Note that three companies produced raw iron; eight produced four different kinds of steel; three produced aluminum and magnesium; four produced copper, mica, and asbestos; and three produced aviation and ordinary gasoline, etc. The list is indeed impressive. All entries were measured in kilotons, except for items 6, 7, and 8, as noted. Note that items 6 and 7, petroleum and alcohol, achieved the production target of 100 percent, but that of other items varies. On average, the industries achieved 71% of their target production in 1944. The reason of underachievement is not clear. It might be due to being new establishments and/or because of the air raids.34 Naturally, to build such a heavy and chemical industry in Taiwan in a short time (see the year of establishment of some companies in the “Yr.” column of Table 6.3), some machines, or even a whole factory, might be imported from Japan (or from other developed countries). This is the “turnkey project industrialization,” one of the fast-paced methods of rapid technological transfer and industrialization in economic development, which has been practiced by many developing countries, even in the postwar Taiwan.35 There was nothing special about it. Furthermore, some products might have been exported to Japan for further processing or used to build airplanes, ships, etc. as part of a regional division of labor.36 It may be worthwhile to find the magnitude of the industries that the Japanese left in Taiwan. After the war, the KMT government planned to send 300 members37 of its National Resources Committee (NRC) to take over the companies and factories left by the Japanese. The NRC Chairman reported in March 1946 that, compared with other areas in China, the scale of factories in Taiwan left by the Japanese was larger. The NRC “decided to take over the largest and most important 10 industries, namely, sugar refinery (valued at 1,965 million Taiwan dollars,38 same below), electric generation (1,337), aluminum (284), petroleum (164), copper and gold (112), salt electrolysis (81), chemical fertilizer (61), cement (255), paper (364), machinery and shipbuilding (95).” These 10 industries consisted of the 29 largest companies in Taiwan in May 1946 (Zheng, et al., 1991, pp. 213–215). All of them, along with about 800 larger Japanese enterprises, were taken over by the central and local governments as public enterprises. In fact, at that time, the KMT government never operated such a large-scale sugar industry (China’s 0.3 vs. Taiwan’s 1.4 million tons per year at its peak,

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Table 6.4

Heavy and chemical industrial products in Taiwan, 1944 No.

   

 

of

Product names

Unit

Co.

 

 

Target

Actual

Percent

(T)

(A)

A/T

kiloton

kiloton

%

1

Raw iron

3

Raw iron, Nickel

37

12

32.4

2

Electrorefining

8

Silicone steel, Ferroalloy iron,

13

6

46.2

Coal

2.3

1.7

73.9

Manganese steel, Stainless Steel 3

Coal

4

Light metal

3

Aluminum, Magnesium

23

10

43.5

5

Non-ferrous metal

4

Copper, Mica, Asbestos, Zirconium

5.5

5.5

100.0

6

Petroleum

3

Aviation and ordinary gasoline

8.9a

8.9a

100.0

7

Alcohol

1

Ethanol, Hydrous alcohol

70a

70a

100.0

8

Fuel subtitute

1

Fuel subs. equipmt

700b

70b

10.0

1

Lime

10.4

3.1

29.8

equipmt 9

Chemical fertilizewr

10

Cement

2

Cement

400

240

60.0

11

Baked alkali

2

Baked alkali

11

7

63.6

12

Electret

1

Electret

12

7

58.3

13

Oxygen

4

Oxygen

600

515

85.8

14

Steel product

4

Nails, etc.

0.9

1.4

155.6

15

Refractory tiles

3

Refractory tiles

42

12.7

30.2

16

Major earth and

4

Limestone

381c

stone 17

Organic synthesis

1

Butanol

1

0.3

30.0

 

Total

45

 

1158.1

821.7

71.0

Notes: Note that the name of companies under the number of companies (No. of Co.) and their individual company target (T) and actual production (A) were omitted in the table. Some of the companies and scales are listed in Gao (2016), pp.152–153. a. Kiloliter; b. Number; c. No target listed. Note that the percent column of a and b in the original table did not match. The “Total” row does not include items in a, b, and c. Source: Okurasho (1947), pp. 101–105.

HH15, pp. 289–290), and it had no government-operated chemical fertilizer company in China (ibid., p. 283, footnote 27). Furthermore, while the specialty of the NRC was in operating electric generating plants, in 1947 when most of the wartime damages were recovered in China, the electric production capacity of the Taiwan Electric Power Company (TaiPower) was 213,555 (KW, same below), mostly generated by the hydraulic generation. In 1947, TaiPower was the second-largest electric

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125

power company in China, almost the same as the No. 1 Northeast Power Bureau (220,000) in Manchuria; both companies were taken over from the Japanese. Twenty-two other NRC-operated electric plants in China proper in 1947 were tiny, and almost all (20 out of 22 plants) used coal burning, with a capacity ranging from a mere 180 (in Xikang) to 82,900 KW (in Hebei) (Xie, 1992, pp. 155–156), averaging only 7,732 KW for 22 plants, a tiny 4% of the capacity39 of the TaiPower! Apparently, the experience and ability of the KMT technocrats were extremely limited. Since electricity is a basic infrastructure of industrialization, it would be interesting to compare other industries in China with those in Taiwan.40 41 The postwar reconstruction and recovery of the industries were helped by retaining about 7,000 Japanese technicians (28,000 if their families were included, out of a total of a half million Japanese in Taiwan at the end of the war).42 Even with the Japanese help, by the end of 1949, the value of the industrial production managed by the NRC in Taiwan, as compared with the “regular production values”43 during the Japanese period, the recovery rate of the industrial production had limited success. Except the 520% increase of the petroleum and the 94%, 97%, and 85% recovery rates for cement, chemical fertilizer, and electricity generation, respectively, the recovery rates for other industrial products were much lower, namely, electricity capacity, 67%; sugar, 63%; paper, 43%; caustic soda, 41%; and aluminum, 10% (Zheng, et al., 1991, p. 237). The slow recovery might be due to inflation and the raging civil war (ibid., p. 243), or the lack of technology or resources. In any case, fortunately for Taiwan, the Korean War broke out in June 1950, and US aid to Taiwan, including the technical assistance, was resumed in June 1951 (HH15, pp. 47–50, 55–59). The production of almost all industries recovered and reached the former Japanese level by 1952 (Zheng, et al., 1991, p. 244). From 1951 to 1965, the US economic aid amounted to about US$ 1.5 billion, about 67% of which went to the public enterprises, which were taken over from the Japanese, and consisted of a whopping 50% of Taiwan’s total industrial output during the 15-year period of US aid. The output weight of the public enterprises started decreasing after 1965, but it still maintained about 20% of the total industrial output after 1970 even until the 1990s (HH15, pp. 56–57, 62–64). The public enterprises, generally inefficient and corrupted, became the enclaves for the Chinese refugees (ibid., p. 70). Thus, along with the monopoly bureau (ibid., pp. 70, 388–389) and the wartime-controlled economy left over by the Japanese (ibid., p. 153), the Japanese prewar industrialization exerted an enormous influence on Taiwan’s domestic market long after WWII (ibid., p. 65).

126

6.10

A century of development in Taiwan

TAIWAN’S EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION STRUCTURE AT THE END OF THE WAR

Despite its importance to prewar Taiwan’s industrialization in the postwar period, some criticisms of Taiwan’s industrialization were that it was built by the Japanese under Japanese colonialism. Hence, it was a shadow industrialization to serve only the master country. Furthermore, it was done without the participation of the local Taiwanese,44 implying that the Taiwanese would not be able to continue prewar industrialization after the war. In the previous sections, it was shown that, contrary to the criticisms, prewar Taiwan’s industrialization was a serious, solid, and steady development, probably unsurpassed during the age of prewar colonialism,45 contributing to the steady growth of Taiwanese society and economy. Despite under the war time mobilization and hardship, Taiwanese still experienced the improvement of the standard of living in the prewar period.46 If the first point of the criticisms is about the problem of tangible aspect of industrialization (products and factories), the second point of the criticisms was related to the intangible aspect of industrialization (labor, employment, industrial structure, wages, finance, etc.). Due to the space limitation, the second point was discussed very briefly in this section, relying on the author’s previous research, and it solicits further studies. First, Taiwan’s prewar industrialization was similar to Korea’s prewar industrialization, which was also built by the Japanese under Japanese colonialism. Immediately after WWII, the Japanese technicians were quickly sent back to Japan, while North Korea received some help from the Russians.47 The postwar South Korea had developed as fast as Taiwan after the war (HH17, Chapter 7). Apparently, Koreans did manage the factories left by the Japanese without retaining Japanese immediately after the war. While more comparative analysis is needed, it appears that all other former colonies show that the local people were able to restart and manage the factories left over by the former colonial powers after liberalization. Second, as pointed out in Section 6.9, the “turnkey industrialization” and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing countries also employed foreign managers and technicians to manage and operate their factories. Thus, the criticism of industrialization without direct input of local managers and technicians appears to be irrelevant. More importantly, the question that should be asked is, in modern terms, whether the Japanese had left enough human capital for the postwar Taiwanese development. The space limitation does not allow us to analyze the number of Taiwan’s enterprises and employees in detail (as presented in Okurasho, 1947, 1949). It

Taiwan’s industrialization and Southeast Asia during the Japanese period

127

is enough to indicate that, by the end of the Japanese period, Taiwan already accumulated a large amount of high-quality and highly educated industrial and agricultural labor force for its postwar economic development and export activities. A.

Enterprises and Labor Force in Prewar Taiwan

By 1940, in the manufacturing sector, there were 82,773 Taiwanese employees; 35.7% of them (29,545) were Taiwanese women (Okurasho, 1952, pp. 201–202). On the other hand, there were 4,257 Japanese employees; 3.9% of them (that is, 168) were Japanese women. Clearly, the number of the Japanese working women was negligible.48 For both ethnicities, the total number of employees in 1940 was 87,030; 4.9% of them (4277) were Japanese (ibid.). Among them, within the manufacturing sector, slightly more than the half (46,578) of the employees of the Taiwanese manufacturing sector (82,773) were engaged in the food industry, and slightly more than a third of them were Taiwanese women (38.0%). The second largest employers of small (Taiwanese) enterprises were the ceramic industry, employing 10,410 workers (with 21.5% women, same below), followed by Others, 6,445 (73.1%); Chemicals, 4,462 (28.8%); Textile, 3,907 (72%); Machinery, 3,574 (1.6%); Printing, 2,828 (12.3%); Woods, 2,456 (5.4%); and Metal, 2,113 (12.3%) (ibid.). By 1945, in the manufacturing sector, there were 130,000 employees (including both Taiwanese and Japanese) working in 7,458 enterprises (including small and large ones)49 (Okurasho, 1947, pp. 76–78). Apparently, due to the total war and national mobilization efforts, the number of employees increased by about 40,000 in five years. Thus, about 123,500 Taiwanese employees (130,000 minus estimated 5% of the Japanese) in the manufacturing sector were the backbone of Taiwan’s postwar industrial development after the Japanese left Taiwan.50 They were the pillar of Taiwan’s small and medium enterprises (SME) in the postwar manufacturing industries. They contributed to the export activities in postwar Taiwan (HH15, pp. 135–136). B.

Labor Force in Prewar Taiwan

In addition to the manufacturing sector, if all the sectors of the economy are considered, according to the 1940 Taiwan Census (Liu, 1999, p. 3), the agricultural sector had 1,392K workers: fisheries, 31K; mining, 40K; manufacturing, 189K; commerce, 199K; transportation and communication, 48K; public and freelance, 70K; housework, 15K; and others, 116K. Thus, the total number of employees in the whole economy51 was 2,099K (ibid.). Since the Taiwanese

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A century of development in Taiwan

population in 1940 was 6,077K (Okurasho, 1949, p. 4), about one third (35%) of the whole population was employed. Thus, by the end of the Japanese period, Taiwan had already accumulated a huge agricultural and industrial reserve army for its postwar economic development. C.

Education of the Population

Surplus labor is one of the telltales of underdeveloped economy. Thus, the next question is what was the quality of this huge Taiwanese industrial army? It appears that there is no data showing directly the educational and skill levels of these employees. However, it may be inferred from school enrollments and graduates. Modern development theory suggests that, to achieve rapid industrialization, education in the form of human capital plays very important role. In 1944, there were 876,747 (=a, see below) Taiwanese (not counting Japanese) children enrolled in 908 elementary schools in Taiwan.52 (Okurasho, 1949, pp. 12, 16). On average, 80.76% of boys and 60.73% of the girls (average 71.17%) among the school age children were enrolled (ibid., p. 16). In addition, in 1941, there were 735,303 (=b) students in the Japanese Language Schools53 (Wu, 1985, p. 116). For one step beyond the elementary schools, in 1942, Taiwan had 21 middle schools with 6,624 Taiwanese student enrollments (not including Japanese students, same below), 20 girl’s middle schools (3,891), and 6 normal schools (296). There were many vocational schools:54 7 agricultural (2,539), 6 industrial (1,626), and 8 commerce (2,379). There were 4 higher vocational schools (280) and 73 business and industry supplementary schools (11,768) (Okurasho, 1949, pp. 19–23). Thus, there were 29,403 (=c) Taiwanese students in second level schools. The total number of the Taiwanese students, excluding those in Japanese Language Schools, were 906,150 (=a+c). Since the Taiwanese population in 1943 was 5,989,888 (ibid., p.5), the ratio of the Taiwanese student enrollment in 1943 was about 15.1%. From an international perspective, this ratio in Japan was 24.0% in 1940, that in the US was 21.9% in 1940, in England and Wales was 13.6% in 1930 (Minami, 1986, pp. 17–19). If the enrollment of the Japanese Language School is included (=a+b+c), the ratio becomes 27.4%, well above the three advanced countries in 1930–40.55 Thus, Taiwanese labor force was almost the same as, or even surpassed, the threshold of the educated and skilled labor achievements for developed countries by the end of WWII. After the war, many of these workers became “Laobans” (bosses) of massive small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (HH15, pp. 132–135; Gao, 2016, pp. 177–178 for examples). They spoke Japanese, read Japanese technical books and field journals, followed the Japanese businesses to expand

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the foreign markets, and even tried to compete with the former colonists (HH15, pp. 143–145). They were outward looking and warriors of exports activities that made the Taiwan’s export promotion policy a great success (ibid., pp. 145–150). D.

Contribution of the Taiwanese Labor in Postwar Development

The well-educated hard-working Taiwanese “tillers and toilers” played an important role in the postwar period. After the KMT government fled to Taiwan in 1949, it had to rely on Taiwanese farmers to feed about 2 million Chinese who fled from China (HH15, pp. 43–45, 73, 194), and Taiwan had to export sugar (from around 1954 to 1977) to earn foreign exchange (ibid., pp. 60, 67). After the early 1970s, textile (ibid., pp. 67–68, 138–141), and then, after the mid-1980s, electric and electronic products, became the major export items (ibid., pp. 108, 414–442). These major exports and other light industrial products were labor intensive products produced mainly by the Taiwanese small farmers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with Taiwanese employees. In fact, during the 1980s, unlike Japan or South Korea, almost two-thirds of Taiwan’s total exports were contributed by SMEs (ibid., p. 137). They were the bearers and vanguard of postwar Taiwan’s export activities. The much larger public enterprises made little, or only indirect, contribution to exports in the postwar period, even during the 1980s and beyond (ibid., pp. 325, 332–334).

6.11 CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, it is shown that Taiwan’s exceptionally rapid industrialization followed closely with Japan’s rise as a world power and its preparation for war efforts, from WWI (1914), Manchurian Incident (1931), the Sino-Japanee War (1937), and WWII. As the scope of the war escalated from the local to the regional and to the world, and the more Japan aquired its territories, the industrialization of Japan and Taiwan also escalated from light industries to heavy and chemical industries, especially the military/defence industries. Thus, Taiwan’s process of prewar industrialization can be characterized by Japan’s war efforts, and it progressed with a miraculous speed. The Virtual Cycle of Taiwan’s Industry and Agriculture Since Taiwan is located in the subtropical region, through R&D, the Japanese naturally and successfully developed agricultural products in Taiwan, like rice, sugarcane, sweet potato, tea, banana, pineaple, peanuts, salt, etc. (HH15, pp. 191–193; ibid., Chapter 4 for the world ranking of Taiwan’s agricultural

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products). The first effort of industrialization was naturally achieved through sugar companies, rice milling, fruit canning factories, not only for domestic use, but also mostly for exports. This is the early phase of the agricultural (primary) export promotion period. For the massive development of these industries, the backward linkage of industrialization, like chemical fertilizer and sugar refinary machine, had to be created, and new research was needed to improve sugarcane and rice production. The TGG’s early decision to develop and facilitate the modern sugar industry (HH15, p. 28) and to attract Japanese massive investment in the sugar industry fits into the big push (or big bang) model of economic development. The forward linkage was then created, transportation networks and industrial structures had established, trade with Japan had increased (Shinohara, 1972a), quality of factory workers had upgraded, more capital had been acquired,56 and new derivative industries from sugar and rice, etc., such as wine, alcohol, canned food, and chemical industries like waterfree alcohol, bagasse paper production, fuel substitutes, were developed (Gao, 2016, pp. 138–144). Similar backward and forward linkages were created for Taiwan’s native products like salt, camphor, and pineapple.57 The forward linkages in turn demanded more agricultural products, and Taiwan’s agricultural sector was flexible enough to supply more agriultural products by introducing new technologies (like new sugarcane vaiety and Ponlai rice and other innovations), increasing fertilization and improving irrigation system (HH5, p. 191, Chapter 4; Ishikawa, 1972). Thus, the agriculture, manufacturing, and trade58 sectors formed a muturally reinforcing virtuous cycle to develop Taiwan’s prewar economy before the Quasi-War Stage. Through more planning, education, and research and development (R&D) (see chronicles in Section 6.4), Taiwan achieved its first stages of industrialization by the time the Qusai-War Stage had started in 1931 (HH15, p. 193). With the success of the first stages of industrialization, when Japanese militarism rose rapidly during the Quasi-War Stage, Taiwan’s industrialization quickly accelerated, as shown by the exponential rise of all industry sectors, especially the manufacturing sector in figures 6.1 to 6.5. It continued to accelerate through the First and Second War Stages, from the light industries to the heavy and chemical industries,59 to support Japan’s war efforts. The economic policy for Taiwan after the First War Stage was to develop light industries for daily necessities to reduce its dependence on Japan (see Table 6.1). Taiwan entered into the import subsitution period of a self-sufficiency economy. The success of Taiwan’s industrialization was simply Taiwan’s prewar economic miracle.60 As the war progressed, and Japan was sanctioned by the world powers, the industrialization in Japan and Taiwan soon hit a bottleneck. The shortage and lack of major natural resources for advanced industrialialization directed

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Japan to the mineral-rich South Seas, and Taiwan, being located at the southernmost tip of the Japanese Empire, was no exception. Taiwanese industries were reorganized to use the resources from the South Seas (see tables 6.2 and 6.3). By the end of the war, while Allied air raids damaged about 42% of Taiwan’s industrial facilities (HH17, p. 197), with well-developed economy and well-established social and educational infrastructure, the Taiwanese economy was already at a stage of “precondition to take-off” and had “institutional readiness” for postwar rapid economic growth (HH15, pp. 198–199, chapters 1, 2, and 7; HH17, Chapter 7). Postwar Development and Prewar Legacy Immediately after the war, the KMT Government confiscated and combined larger Japanese-owned firms and banks into fifty or so public enterprises (HH15, pp. 197–198). The heavy new industries for the war efforts left by the Japanese became white elephants. The government had hard time deciding whether to spend scarce capital and precious foreign exchange to maintain the military industries (HH15, p. 197; Lin, 1968, p. 296). However, the fleeing of the KMT government from China to Taiwan in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 changed the outlook for the Taiwanese economy virtually overnight. The new heavy and chemical industries built by Japanese found their uses and the KMT Government continued the war-time strictly controlled economic system left by the Japanese. On the other hand, agricultural products, especially rice and sugar, continued to play a crucial role in re-establishing and stabilizing the immediate postwar Taiwanese economy in the 1950s and the 1960s (HH15, pp. 74–87, 116; Mizoguchi, 2008, pp. 114–115). After a painful delay, the Taiwanese economy took off again in the mid-1960s (HH17, p. 195), riding on the postwar’s newly developed technology (Bank of Taiwan, 1969). Old and new postwar labor intensive industries, like industries of cotton and then synthetic textile (from the late 1950s up to the 1990s, HH15, p. 107), shoes,61 tennis rackets, umbrellas, bicycles (in the 1980s, ibid., pp. 108, 359), home electric appliances, like rice cookers, B&W TV to color TVs (the 1970s to 1980s, ibid., pp. 415–420), and machinery, like sewing machines (from the 1960s up to the 1990s, ibid., p. 108), and then other machinery products like mini motors (in the 1970s to the 1980s, ibid.) were produced and exported. At various stages, Taiwan was one of the largest, if not the largest, producers of these products in the world. These are labor-intensive products produced mainly by the Taiwanese SME. At the same time, chemical products and petroleum products continued to contribute to the Taiwanese economy after the war.

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In later years, iron and steel and their products (after the 1980s) were produced and exported (ibid., p. 114). Entering the 21st century, Taiwan became one of the world’s largest producers of desktop and then laptop computers and computer equipments (such as DVD, monitors, keyboards, motherboards), semiconductors, etc. (from late 1990s to the 2010s and after, HH17, pp. 103–104, 272–274; HH20, pp. 161–167), riding on the recent information technology (IT) revolution (HH15, pp. 90, 93–101; HH20, chapters 4 and 5, pp. 272–276). Note the way the Taiwanese climbed up the technology ladder in each decade after WWII. Through the Japanese and American direct investment (HH15, pp. 118–125, 143; chapters 8, 9, pp. 555–560), and the opening of a large American market, and the formation of a Pacific trade triangle among Taiwan, Japan, and the USA (HH15, pp. 114–117), helped by the massive Taiwanese export-oriented private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ibid., pp. 127–141, 146, 350–361), along with well-educated (ibid., pp. 138–149, 540–742), well-trained (ibid., pp. 74–75, 199 fn), and hardworking Taiwanese labor (ibid., pp. 149, 364), Taiwan experienced an accelerated economic growth and entered into a period of high-tech industrialization (ibid., pp. 98–101, Chapter 3; HH17, pp. 265–277), totally different from the industrialization under the prewar Japanese regime. Taiwan today is a fully developed country. According to the IMF statistics, in terms of real GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Taiwan already surpassed Japan (in 2007), United Kingdom (in 2009), France (in 2010), and Germany (in 2014), and it is poised to catch up with the United States (Hsiao, 2016; HH17, pp. 255–256). This is Taiwan’s postwar economic miracle. The role of the South Seas, now Southeast and South Asia (SSA), for Taiwan also changed after the WWII. Instead of being the sources of the mineral and raw materials, in the early years of postwar period, Taiwan’s KMT government tried to woo the overseas Chinese, some from Southeast Asia, to invest in Taiwan. It was called Overseas Chinese Investment (OCI) (HH15, pp. 208–210). Before 1965, OCI was an important source of Taiwan’s inward foreign direct investiment, but its weight among other inward direct foreign investments, like those from the US and Japan, decreased drastically, and became negligible after 1980 (ibid.). As China opened its economy in early 1985, Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flocked to China to take advantage of its low wages, cheap land, cultural similarity, and geographical proximity (HH20, Chapter 2). At the same time, China increased its political pressure on Taiwan for annexation. Alarmed by the danger of too much economic reliance on China, President Teng-hui Lee (1988–2000) proposed a “Go South” policy in 1994. It was revived by President Shui-Bian Chen (2000–2008), but it relaxed during the era of President Ying-jeou Ma (2008–2016).

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When the current President Ing-wen Tsai took office in 2016, she proposed a “New Southward Policy” to increase investment on Southeast and South Asia, with some success (Marston and Bush, 2018). The basic objectives of these policies have been to divert Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment from China to Southeast and South Asia, and enhance trade and cultural relationships between Taiwan and this region. These are peaceful cultural and economic interactions, quite different from the prewar aggressive relations. The world’s economic condition and technology have changed drastically since the end of WWII. The recent pandemic disaster changed the outlook of the world economy once again. Taiwan now is at the crossroad of whether it can realize a third economic miracle in this ever-changing global economy.

NOTES 1. However, Takahashi (1937, pp. 6, 8–9) considered two reasons of Taiwan’s agriculture development before the 1930s. They were due to mutual advantage for both Taiwan and Japan, and also due to Japan was still at a half-agricultural half-industrial stage, and had no ability or technology to develop Taiwan’s industries. He then gave five reasons why Taiwan at the time of his writing was ready for industrialization. 2. The definition of Japan’s “Nanshi Nanyo (南支南洋)” changed over the years. So far as the Taiwan Government General (TGG) was concerned, Nanshi (South China) included Fujian (Amoy, Fuchou, Xiantou), Guangdong, and Hong Kong. Later, it included Hainan Island (1941); the Nanyo (South Seas) included today’s Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Borneo, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Kondo, 1996, pp. 66–67, 81). Sometimes, it also included Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. In this chapter, our concern is mainly the “South Seas”; and we also translate “Nanyo” as “South Seas” here. 3. See Hsu (1996), Gao (2016), and Lin (2017). Gao has extensive references. None includes the major references used in this chapter. 4. Note that, for simplicity, we call the Japanese period 1895–1945 the prewar period or the prewar industrialization. When we refer to the Prewar Stage (1921–1930), we will write the Prewar Stage with initial capital letters. 5. In December 1941, Japan’s Tojo Cabinet defined both the First and Second War stages (namely, the wars after 1937) as the Great East Asian War (Daitoa Senso). 6. In Okurasho (1949, p. 111), the 1940 datum for “5Others” (see the definition in paragraph (3) below) was missing. The data for 1936 to 1939 were, 28.7, 36.2, 50.0, and 60.4, respectively. Thus, using a linear (instead of exponential) extrapolation, the value of “5Others” in 1940 was estimated conservatively to be 70.0. 7. Before the Japanese occupation, from 1886 to 1896, Taiwan’s major products were rice, sugar, and tea. The major exports were tea (about 63% of total exports, same below) and sugar (27%), and “substantial quantities were exported to Japan” (Ho, 1978, pp. 14, 18). Taiwan’s major manufacturing industry before 1895, in addition to tea, was sugar. Its production method “was primitive until the Japanese modernized it” (ibid., pp. 18–20). After WWII, the KMT National Plan in 1946 still called for “agricultural Taiwan, industrial China.” Taiwan was to develop “agricultural exports and light industry,” especially sugar (HH15, pp. 289–230).

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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

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Thus, whether Taiwan was a Japanese colony, due to its subtropical location, the leading sector of Taiwan’s initial economic development would have been agriculture (question raised by Referee1). Note that, the Japanese literature uses the word “Kogyo” to mean both the Manufacturing sector (kogyo) and its nine subgroups, like the textile industry (boseki kogyo), the metal industry (kinzoku kogyo), etc. In this chapter, “sector” is used to denote the manufacturing sector and four other sectors in Figure 6.1, and “industry” is used for the nine subgroups of the manufacturing sector in Figure 6.5. The classification of the nine industries is based on the original data tables. Note that, while Taiwan’s production value of fisheries was very small compared with that of agriculture or manufacturing product, Taiwan’s fisheries sector was one of the largest in Asia, probably only next to Japan. It played an important role in Japan’s Southward Advancement through its oceanic research and nurturing and training of Japanese Navy. By the end of 1945, there were about 15,000 fishing boats, 10 percent of which used power; 43 ice-making firms; 13 fisheries processing factories; 21 freezing plants; 7 ship repairing companies; 1 fishing equipment manufacturing factory (Okurasho, 1947, pp. 95–97). Smallness does not mean it is not important. Lee (1968) calculated the trend of primary, secondary, and tertiary industries and their total (that is, Net Domestic Product, NDP) at the 1937 constant price (see HH15, p. 24). If agriculture and manufacture are taken as the primary and the secondary sectors (since the value of other sectors were very small by comparison, as shown in Figure 6.1), then, both sectors also show steep upward growth from 1911 to 1936, and decrease slightly after 1937, as the NDP deflator increased. In fact, Figure 6.1 shows that the Taipei City wholesale price index (WPI in Figure 6.1) from 1914 to 1940 did not change much. It only doubled in 25 years. Also see HH15 (p. 28), and Footnote 11 below. Inflation was not a problem under Japanese strict price control during the Second War Stage. Postwar hyperinflation occurred only after 1945 when the KMT government fled to Taiwan. One study showed that, using 1938 price as 100, the price index (in the parentheses below) in each year from 1943 to 1948 was 1943 (274), 1944 (460), 1945 (2,360), 1946 (9,457), 1947 (19,601), and 1948 (379,566), respectively. See HH15 (p. 28, Table 1.1). Also, see Appendix A of this chapter. Note that the real GDP per capita shown in HH15 (pp. 181, 185) was based on Maddison (see HH15, Chapter 7, for detail). While there were some revisions and discussions of Maddison’s data later, so far as Taiwan is concerned, the conclusion above still holds. For the calculation of Geary-Khamis dollars, see HH17, pp. 270–271. Referee3 suggested that, since all the measurements in the initial and early stages are not reliable, the calculation should start from the Early Stage (1905). In any case, the results of rapid increase would be similar (see the height of the columns). What the chapter wants to show is the almost smooth and rapid balanced exponential growth of all sectors (except 3Forestry). See below. Mizoguchi (2008, p. 94) stated that the accuracy of manufacturing data greatly improved after 1905, and the value of manufacturing products was published in “Taiwan Commerce and Industry Statistics” (Taiwan Shoko Tokei) after 1912 by the TGG. In 1966, the value of agriculture was NT$ 28,379 million yen, and that of manufacturing was NT$ 28,403 (TSDB, 1992, p. 41), respectively, both at 22.5 percent of GDP. After 1966, the manufacturing value continued to surpass the agricultural value.

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15. Since the data are consecutive. the growth rate here was defined as the usual annual discrete growth rate. 16. Note that, as shown in Figure 6.1, the data for the Initial Stage are available only for three years from 1902 to 1904. As in the previous footnote, Referee3 also suggested that the data in the Initial Stage were not reliable, and should start counting from the Early Stage (1905). Without loss of generality, we can simply ignore this stage. In fact, we have calculated both the discrete and continuous growth rates for the whole period from 1905 to 1940 in figures 6.1 and 6.2. Shinohara (1972a) data started from 1912. See Appendix A3 of this chapter. 17. The continuous growth rate for each of the five sectors is shown in the Legend box in parenthesis in figures 6.1 and 6.2. In both figures, the fist number is continuous growth rate, and the second number is R2, the coefficient of determination. 18. For the illustration of calculating the continuous growth rate for the manufacturing sector, see the exponential trend line for 2Mfg and the equation on the right side of Figure 6.1. It shows that the continuous growth rate of the manufacturing sector from 1905 to 1940 was 9.7 percent, with the coefficient of determination being 0.887, a good fit of the data. 19. According to Minami (1986, pp. 102–103, Table 5.2, based on seven year moving average of the production index), the growth rates of the manufacturing (mfg) production for Japan, the USA, and Germany (in this order in the parentheses below) during the three prewar periods were, (a) 1911–1920 (7.09, 3.05, not available), (b) 1921–1930 (4.71, 1.49, 4.68), (c) 1931–1940 (8.80, 5.34, 5.12), respectively. Other countries, namely, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Belgium, France, and the UK, had the mfg growth rates less than these three countries. In general, the growth rates of industries and GDP for other countries in the world during the prewar period were much lower than those of the postwar period. To show the magnitude of the postwar industrial growth rate, Shinohara (1965, p. 12) showed that the average annual growth rates (discrete or continuous unknown) of the manufacturing (mfg) sector from 1951 to 1963 for 12 years, the period of the postwar Golden Age of economic reconstruction and growth, were, in percentage, Japan, 14.2; Italy, 9.9; West Germany, 9.4; France, 7.0; the USA, 3.4; the UK, 2.7. Thus, Taiwan’s prewar average mfg growth rate of 10.3 (1902–1940, Figure 6.1) or 6.8 (1921–1942, Figure 6.5) was indeed comparable to postwar Golden Age and indeed miraculous by the prewar standard. The prewar low growth rates in the world are also reflected in the lower growth rates of prewar real per capita GDP (1911–1940, the value of the mfg products is one of its major components), which generally ranged from -3.8 to 5.06, mostly lower than 1.5, with an average of 1.09, for 56 countries in the world (HH17, pp. 181–183). 20. Note that TaiStat51 (1946) is used here since the data are available up to 1942. 21. The unit of measurement in TaiStat51 (1946) was Taiwan Yuen and that in Okurasho (1949) was Japanese yen. In 1946 the exchange rate between the two currencies was 1 to 1. Thus, the values of the manufacturing sector in figures 6.1 to 6.4, which is taken from Okurasho (1949, Table 90, pp. 110–111), are the same as the total values of manufacturing in Figure 6.5, which is taken from TaiStat51 (1946, Table 269, p. 778). In this chapter, we denote Taiwan Yuen as T$. 22. In Japan, heavy and chemical industries and urbanization expanded after WWI (1921) and accelerated after 1931 (Nakamura, 1978, pp. 103, 129–130). It appears that Taiwan’s industrialization was only one step behind that of Japan. See Appendix A3 of this chapter.

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23. In 1919, when the Sun–Moon Lake (日月潭) station started construction, the Japanese boasted it was the largest in Asia (Lin, 1997, p. 69). For the details of construction of this station and others, also see Lin (ibid., especially, pp. 68–169). 24. See the dotted line in Figure 6.5 for light industry; heavy industry was calculated separately. 25. For the (failed) effort of developing the textile industry in prewar Taiwan, see HH15, pp. 277, 291. 26. In Japan, from 1909 to 1914, about 47 percent of the manufacturing industry was cottage production; the rest was produced in factories. Even in 1930, it was 28 percent cottage and 72 percent factory productions. See Nakamura, 1978, p. 86, Table 8. 27. In Table 6.1, the company data are from Okurasho (1952), pp. 204–209. Others were compiled from TaiStat51 (1946), tables 279–284; tables for the Wood and Printing products are missing in the original statistics. 28. For each industrial sector, the first part is arranged from TaiStat51, tables 279–283, the second part under (Companies) is taken from Okurasho, 1952, pp. 204–209. For the second part, the company name, the location of the company in Taiwan, and the published amount of investment by the company are not listed. Note that the entries under (Companies) in the 1Textile and 9Other Sectors are missing in the Okurasho data, and the data for 6Wood and 7Printing sectors are missing in TaiStat51. 29. The almighty Law introduced conscription, fixed wages, set official prices for all commodities, and exerted direct total control of production, trade. It also controlled the distribution of all goods and rationed foreign currencies and financial funds to industries by the government for war efforts (Minami, 1986, pp. 155–156; Nakamura, 1978, 136–138). The law was often vaguely cited as Japan’s “Industrial Policy” as “a major reason for Japan’s rapid economic growth” (Minami, ibid.). 30. The first time was Admiral Sukenori Kabayama (樺山資紀), the first Taiwan Governor General (5/1895–6/1896). 31. The number of Taiwanese in the South Seas was large. When WWII ended, “On 24 December 1945 General MacArthur … permit return of approximately 12,000 Formosans from the Philippines” (MacArthur, 1966, p. 169). 32. There were several studies on the relation between Taiwan and the South Seas, not directly related to Taiwan’s industrialization. See Kusui, 1944, pp. 394–400; Kondo (1996), Chapter 2, especially pp. 138–139. 33. Nakamura (1978, p. 140). From 1941 to 1944, Japan produced, on average each year, 15,724 airplane bodies and 26,791 engines. In contrast, Japan produced only 109 ships on average each year during this period, with an average of 246,366 tons, that is, about 23,027 tons per ship (ibid., Table 30). Apparently, Japanese ships were underproduced. It is not clear whether this was due to the Japanese war plan taking advantage of Taiwan being close to the South Seas and ignored the problem of cargo shipping. 34. For the evaluation of postwar condition of the industries and reconstruction perspective, see the report by Morita (1979), pp. 45–49 and Okurasho (1947). 35. See Saad (2000), pp. 42–43. The main problem of a turnkey project is the lack of local technology capability and talents to operate the project. Foreign technicians must come to assist temporally or permanently. It appears this didn’t happen in Taiwan. The turnkey projects were also practiced in early postwar Taiwan when some old textile machines and factories (light industry) moved to Taiwan from China and Hong Kong (HH15, p. 65). Other examples are when Taiwan bought

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36.

37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45.

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a high-speed train system from Japan, Boeing airplanes, and advanced weapons from the USA. Some argued that Taiwan’s later industrialization was just moving “old” equipment from Japan to Taiwan, and that Taiwan produced and exported items to Japan for processing, a telltale sign of “colonialism.” This part disputes that argument. However, by 11/26/1945, only about 30 persons arrived in Taiwan, and 70 were still waiting for ships in Shanghai (Zheng, et al., 1991, p. 213). Considering the civil war was raging in China at that time and the eventual fleeing of the KMT Government to Taiwan, it might be the case that only a few experts actually arrived in Taiwan. For comparison of its magnitude, in 1940 and 1944, the annual government budget (revenue) of the TGG was about 269 and 711 million Taiwan dollars, respectively (TaiStat51, Table 333). In fact, Lin (1997, pp. 251–252) shows that TaiPower capacity reached 321,135 KW in 1944. Thus, China proper’s average electric generating capacity would be a tiny 2.4 percent of that of TaiPower at its maximum capacity. If the capacity of all personal electric power generations, 62,458 KW, were added, Taiwan’s total electric capacity reached whopping 383,593 KW in 1944. For the postwar recovery of TaiPower, see HH15, p. 61. It also appeared that, from the value of industrial production of the NRC in China in 1947, the NRC also had very limited or no experience in operating cement, paper, and machinery factories (Zheng, et al., 1991, p. 187). It would also be interesting to study the quality and experience of the members of Chinese who took over the Japanese companies in Taiwan after the war. The NRC was fully aware of the shortage of technical staff for factories. In 1942–1943, it sent 31 KMT advanced technicians to the USA for training for two years. Among them, six belonged to an electric power group. They returned to China in 1945. One of those evacuated to Taiwan was Sun Yun-xuan, who later became the CEO of TaiPower. Lin (1997, p. 219) felt that they were not as qualified technically as the local Taiwanese staff who had worked under the Japanese. They were sent back to Japan in several groups until May 1947 (Hsu, 2005, pp. 151, 170; Ko, 1981, 270–271). However, the number of retained technicians might be larger, “except for some 24,000 technicians … Formosa was cleared by 15 April 1946. By the end of 1946, those retained by the Chinese had been reduced to 11,000” (MacArthur, 1966, p. 173). In China, “Manchuria was cleared by the end of October 1946” But there were some retained technicians, the exact number was unknown (ibid., p. 158). Zheng, et al. (1991, p. 182) did not specify whether “regular” means the maximum value or average value or the year of measurement. Gao (2016, pp. 172–179) aptly pointed out that this argument is untenable by showing the importance of the Taiwanese participation in Taiwan’s industrialization process. This finding of Taiwan’s rapid prewar industrialization also explains the rapid prewar economic growth of Taiwan (and South Korea), as discussed in detail elsewhere (HH17, Chapter 7). Compared with the economic development of other prewar colonies under European countries, such as India (HH17, Chapter 5), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Tsurumi, 1982), Japanese colonialism appears to be different from European colonialism (HH17, p. 210).

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46. Elsewhere it was shown that Taiwan’s average real GDP per capita growth rate from 1911 to 1940 (the Prewar Period) was estimated variously as 1.18 (in %, same below), 1.26, or 1.65, ranked No. 19, 17, or 8, among the 49 countries in the world for which statistics existed and Angus Maddison had calculated. Japan was ranked No. 2 at 2.74, South Korea, No. 4 at 2.03, in the world (HH17, Table 7.1 and p. 188). Note the very low growth rates of all countries in the world in the prewar period. The prewar and postwar standards of growth rates were quite different (ibid., figures 7.1 and 7.2). 47. Information based on an email correspondence with a South Korean Scholar (2/2021). However, according to the MacArthur Report (1966, p. 162), “the Japanese nationals … except some 2,650 retained for labor were evacuated by 21 November 1945. … [The retainers were] to aid … in the repatriation, … except for key technical advisors, were evacuated by the end of March 1946” (parentheses added by the author). It is not clear how many were technical advisors among the 2,650 retainers, and when they returned home (28 April 1946?), but the number must be small. 48. The data in Ho (1978) are lower. In 1940, there were 76,139 male workers and 49,814 female workers in manufacturing sector, presumably including both Taiwanese and Japanese. 49. Based on Kojomeibo (Factory List), Mizoguchi (2008, p. 95) shows that, in 1940, there were 8,529 factories that hired more than five employees using power (including horses and cows), with 127,245 employees. Hence, if ALL the factories were included, the number of total employees might triple or quadruple this number. Also, see the distribution of factories by the number of employees during the Japanese period in HH15, pp. 348–350. 50. Using another dataset, we had estimated the number of Taiwanese factory workers at about 130,000 in 1941 (HH17, p. 201, footnote 31). For reference, the labor force of the SME in the manufacturing sector doubled to 252,000 in 1961 (HH15, p. 135). 51. Ho (1978, p. 326) listed 2,244K; Okurasho (1947, p. 78) listed 3,540K. 52. The enrollment is calculated as the sum of 867,009 “Taiwanese” and 9,738 “aborigines” in “ko gakko” (Okurasho, 1947, p. 16). Note that the sum differs slightly (866,361) from the one listed in Okurasho (ibid, p. 14). The enrollment does not include the 55,778 Japanese children in their own 155 elementary schools (called the “sho gakko”) (ibid., p. 15). 53. Although the Japanese language schools were for adult education, the knowledge of the Japanese language (and for that matter, any major second language) broadened people’s cultural perspective, sharpened the mind, enhanced multi-tasking, etc. This is a very important advantage in Taiwan’s early postwar period when Japanese technology and foreign investment flooded Taiwan. The Taiwanese could communicate directly with the Japanese, established joint venture, and read technical manuals directly, etc. (HH15, pp. 142–143, 198–199, 381, 432–441). 54. In addition to formal vocational schools, there were many company-based training centers and schools. As an example, by TaiPower, see Lin, 2012. 55. Note that, the ratios for Taiwan do not include about 10,000 Taiwanese received or enrolled in higher education and 2,500 Taiwanese enrolled in foreign colleges and universities, mostly in Japan (Wu, 1981, pp. 416–418; HH15, p. 30). 56. Lee (1968) pointed out that there was net capital outflow from the agricultural sector to the nonagricultural sector (mainly manufacturing) through land-rent payment and taxing by the government. Also see Hsiao (2020). This finding

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57. 58. 59.

60.

61.

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disputed the contrarian’s assertion that Taiwan’s prewar industrialization was achieved only through the investment by the Japanese zaibatsu. For a detailed illustration of forward and backward linkages and the relations between the public enterprises and the private SMEs in the textile industry in early postwar Taiwan, see the flow chart in HH15 (Figure 1.22, pp. 138–141). Taiwan had a large increasing balance of trade surplus every year from 1914 up to 1945 (HH15, p. 29). The general definition of light industries is less capital intensive, producing for end-users, like textile, food processing, consumer goods, furniture, etc. Heavy (or heavy and chemical) industries are more capital intensive, producing for other business and industries, like iron and steel making, machines and equipment, chemicals, shipbuilding and aircraft, ceramics, etc. Note that the early postwar writings about prewar economic development based on narrow Marxism or conventional colonial exploitation themes were too simple minded and untenable to explain the rapid economic growth of prewar Taiwan and its postwar economic development and growth. More comparative studies of colonies and colonialism in other areas of Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America are needed. This is one more reason why Taiwan Studies can contribute. For a latest advocacy of Taiwan Studies, see Keating (2021). Taking shoes production as an example, by 1980, Taiwan was the world’s largest exporter of shoes. In 1986, Taiwan produced 843 million pairs at the value of US $3.2 billion, with 1,190 factories and 159,617 employees (HH15, p. 359). The origin of the shoe industry was the grass hat industry that started in 1897 as sideline production (handicrafts) in rural area. By 1934, Taiwan produced 15.3 million hats, mostly exported to the USA (ibid.). In 1936, there were 88,732 registered sideline workers; 74,227 were women (ibid., p. 360); for the origin of Taiwan’s SME, see ibid., pp. 360–365. Mass production for exports were not unfamiliar for Taiwan’s rural industries.

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APPENDIX A1 Does Price Matter? The effects of price change on the values of the current products shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.5 were considered at the end of Section 6.2. From Wu and Gao1 (1991, Appendix 4), we took their recalculated annual WPI for 1914–1918, and used the annual average of their monthly data for the period 1919–1940. We then converted the base year to 1914. Their WPI from 1914 to 1940 is illustrated in Figure 6.1 as WPI-2, a dotted line with small black circles. The WPI-2 line is uniformly lower than WPI. Specifically, from 100 in 1914, it increased to 225 (257 for WPI, same below) in 1920, then decreased to the bottom of 123 (136) in 1931, and increased gradually again to 234 (258) in 1940, only 9 (or 1) point higher than the previous high of 225 (257) in 1920. Thus, from 1914 to 1940, for 26 years, the Wu-Gao WPI increased only to 1.3 times, or, from 1920 to 1940, for 20 years, the price increased only 9 (1) points.2 Thus, it shows again that before the Second War Stage, the prewar Taiwanese economy was indeed quite stable. Therefore, price does not matter.

APPENDIX A2 Comparison of Taiwan’s Nominal and Real Growth Rates More directly, Shinohara (1972a) used the manufacturing dataset of Figure 6.5 and reclassified some items of the nine industries, especially the ambiguous items in the 9Other Industry and added the Monopoly Bureau products, etc. After revision, he obtained the value of industrial products measured at current prices (ibid., p. 62, Table 13) and those measured at the fixed 1934–1936 prices (ibid., p. 65, Table 15) from 1912 to 1940. Like the method used in Figure 6.5, we calculated the continuous growth rates for each of the nine manufacturing industries in both tables given in Shinohara, and call them the nominal growth rate (TgrN) and the real growth rate (TgrR) for Taiwan, and illustrated separately as two panels (N and R) of columns in Figure A1 (ignoring the lines for the time being in Appendix A3) with the attached data tables. 1. Comparing between TgrN and TgrR, due to the stable price change, the general pattern (trend of fluctuation) of the current and the real growth rates for total value of the nine manufacturing industries are the same visually. For the nine industries, the correlation coefficient is r(TgrN, TgrR) = 0.848, standard deviation sdv(TgrN) = 2.335, sdv(TgrR) = 2.357,

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and coefficient of variation CV(TgrN) = 28.4, CV(TgrR) = 32.7. They are highly correlated, with almost the same sdv and CV. Thus, we may use either nominal or real series to represent Taiwan’s industrialization. 2. For the nine mfg industries, the averages (m) are m(TgrN) = 8.2 and m(TgrR) = 7.2. Thus, m(TgrR) for the nine industries average is 1% lower than those of m(TgrN), although sdv and CV are practically the same. 3. Similarly, for the total value of the mfg growth (the heavy bordered columns), the current rate is 6.6 and the real rate is 5.7 (see the circled number under the heavy bordered column in each panel). The difference is 0.9, similar to the difference measured by the average value above. Whether at 6.6 or 5.7, compared with other countries, including Japan, as shown in Section 6.4, Taiwan’s growth rate of the manufacturing sector was very high during the prewar period (although the data were taken for different range). 4. The difference of growth rates between nominal and real values depends on industry. From TgrN to TgrR, the growth rates increased in 4Ceramic by 1.0 (in %, same below); in 90thers by 0.3. All other growth rates decreased. The largest decrease occurred in 1Textile by –3.4; followed by 5Chemical –1.7 (see the data table below the chart).

APPENDIX A3 Comparison of the Growth Rates between Taiwan and Japan For comparison with Japan’s industrialization, the lines in Figure A1 show the nominal (N) and real (R) growth rates for prewar Japan (Shinohara, 1972b, pp. 6, 11), for the first period, 1874–1900, denoted as JgrIN or JgrIR or simply JgrI (shown as a dotted line with white triangle markers in both panels), and for the second period, 1900–1940, denoted as JgrIIN and JgrIIR, or simply JgrII (shown as a solid line with white circle markers in both panels).3 We make the following brief comparisons of the real growth rates of Japan with those of Taiwan. 1. To compare between TgrN and JgrIN, note first that the general patterns (trend and up and down) of current and real growth rates among Taiwan (TgrN and TgrR) and Japan (JgrIN and JgrIIN, JgrIR and JgrIIR) are also very similar, or having synchronization, visually. 2. However, the correlation coefficient (r) between the TgrR of nine industries of Taiwan and those of JgrIR is 0.134, and with those of JgrIIR is 0.480. The standard deviation is almost the same, that is, for (TgrR, JgrIR, JgrIIR) = (2.357, 3.671, 3.922), and CVs are (32.7, 63.9, 55.1). Thus,

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3.

4.

5.

6.

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TgrR series is closer to JgrIIR than JgrIR; that is, the pattern of Taiwan’s industrialization is closer to that of Japan 1900–1940 than that of Japan 1874–1900. This indicates that Taiwan is catching up with Japan. In terms of nominal total mfg growth rates, Taiwan (TgrN=6.6) is behind Japan in both periods (JgrIN=7.6 and JgrIIN=8.4). However, in terms of real total mfg growth rate, Taiwan (TgrR=5.7) is 1% higher than the first period of Japan (JgrIR=4.7), but 0.4% lower than the second period of Japan (JgrIIR=6.1). Thus, Taiwan’s degree of industrialization is generally higher than that of Japan in period I but only slightly lower than that of Japan in period II, as expected. In terms of the average growth rates of the nine industries, for nominal growth rates, TgrN, at 8.6 (%, same below), is 1.5 higher than that of JgrIN (7.1), but it is 1.1 lower than that of JgrIIN (9.7). For real growth rates, TgrR (7.2) is much (1.5) larger than JgrIR (5.7), but also slightly higher (0.1) than JgrIIR (7.1). Clearly, so far as the real growth rate is concerned, Taiwan’s industrialization already surpassed that of Japan in period I, and was catching up, or even the same, with that of Japan in Period II. Here again, if we consider Japanese industrialization is fast, Taiwan’s industrialization in real term is indeed a miracle growth (also see Section 6.4 for other international comparison). The asterisk on the right side of each industry number along the horizontal axis shows that Taiwan’s growth rate of industry (Tgr), say 2, is lower than that of the corresponding Japan’s industry, 2, in the second period (JgrII). Thus, Taiwan’s real growth rates of 8Foods, 3Machinery, 6Woods, 7Printing, and 9Others industries from 1912 to 1940 exceeded those of Japan’s from 1900 to 1940. In terms of real growth rates (the right panel), among the light industries (the two white columns in the right panel), Taiwan’s real growth rate of 8Food (6.0) far exceeded that of Japan’s in both periods, JgrI (3.5) and JgrII (3.0), but Taiwan’s real growth rate of 1Textile (5.4) fell far behind that of Japan in JgrI (10.5), and slightly in JgrII (6.4), clearly showing the difference in resource endowments and comparative advantages of the two countries. In terms of real growth rates (the right panel), among the heavy industries (the dark filled three columns), Taiwan’s real growth rate of 5Chemical (2.5) fell below those of Japan during both periods, JgrIR (3.2) and JgrIIR (5.6); Taiwan’s 2Metal (9.2) exceeded that in JgrIR (4.9), but fell greatly in JgrIIR (15.7). Taiwan’s 3Machinery (10.2) was higher than that of JgrIR (8.4), but the same as that of Japan in JgrIIR (10.2). In general, the growth rates of Taiwan’s heavy industries were lower than those of Japan, as expected.

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8. Among the rest of the industries, the comparison results of the real growth rates are mixed. Taiwan’s rates of 6Wood and 9others (9.2, 7.3) are much higher than those of Japan’s in both periods: JgrIR (1.6, 4.2) and JgrIIR (5.2, 3.2). However, Taiwan’s rate of 7Printing (8.0) was much lower than that of Japan’s in JgrIR (12.1) and slightly higher in JgrIIR (7.6). The condition is reversed for 4Ceramics. In this case, Taiwan’s rate (7.1) was much higher than Japan’s in JgrIR (3.3) but slightly lower in JgrIIR (7.4). 9. In general, Figure A1 shows that, in terms of prewar real and nominal industrial growth rates, Taiwan exceeded Japan in 8Food, 6Wood, and 9Other industries during Japan I and II periods, but lagged Japan greatly in the metal (and probably non-metal) industry. There could be more interesting observations. In conclusion, during the First and Second War Stages (after 1937), the Japanese saw the dual objectives for

Sources: Shinohara (1972a, 1972b).

Figure 6A.1

Nominal and real growth rates of prewar manufacturing industries of Taiwan and Japan

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Taiwan’s industries and economy to help its war efforts: to secure and enhance living and military resources for Japan as part of the Japanese Empire, and to reform and advance Taiwan’s industrial economy based on its semitropical and geopolitical positions different from those of Japan proper. It appears, and we have shown in this chapter, that Taiwan had achieved, although not completed, both objectives during the prewar period.

NOTES FOR THE APPENDICES 1. Also see explanation in Mizoguchi (2008, pp. 145, 154) suggested by Referee 2. 2. The means of the two series are, denoting WPI = 1, WPI-2 = 2, m(1) = 177.7, m(2) = 164.1, standard deviations are sdv(1) = 40.4, sdv(2) = 36.0, coefficients of variation are CV(1) = 22.7, CV(2) = 21.9, correlate coefficient is r = 0.9605. The two series are basically the same. Note that, according to Wu and Gao (1991), the annual WPI from 1941–44 was 245, 257, 274, and 308. Thus, there were price increase during the Second War Stage. We don’t have the production data from 1941–1944 in Figure 6.1. However, due to all-out war, we expect the real output to increase. 3. In Shinohara (1972b, pp. 6, 11), the tables contain the non-metal industry, which is not in Taiwan’s statistics. Thus, we did not include it in Figure A1 and the statistical calculation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is indebted to Professors Ikujo Ko, Shiou-Jeng Lin (Nan-jia Sheng), Masao Oda, Yongkul Won, Wen-hsing Wu, and Mr. Ping-yen Lin for discussions and help in data and literature search. The comments and suggestions from three referees of this chapter were very helpful. We also thank the Editor, Professor Peter C.Y. Chow, for his patience and encouragement. This paper synthesizes the findings of the author’s previous coauthored books (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2015, 2017, 2020). It concatenates the prewar and the postwar economic miracles of Taiwan and shows Taiwan’s historical continuity of industrialization. Naturally, all errors of omission and commission are the author’s.

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Xie, Yue-xun 薛月順 (1992). The Electric Industry Construction of the Resources Committee (1932–1949) (in Chinese). MA Thesis, Research Institute of History, National Cheng-Chi University, Taipei, Taiwan. Zheng, You-kui 鄭友揆, L. S. Chen 程麟蘇, and C. H. Hong 張傳洪 (1991). The Resources Committee of Old China, 1932–1949: Historical Facts and Evaluation (Jiou Zhongguo de Ziyuan Weiyuanhui: Shishi yu Pingjia), Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Publishing Co.

7. The path of Taiwan’s industrial development: from follower to innovator Peter C.Y. Chow I. INTRODUCTION Among the 186 economies in the World Economic Outlook 2020 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Taiwan was ranked as the top 35th by nominal GDP per capita at $24,827 in 2019. But in terms of GDP per capita by purchasing power parity (PPP), Taiwan was ranked as the top 13th country at $57,214 in the same year.1 Having transformed from an agrarian economy in the immediate post-war period to one of the largest producers of high-tech products in the world,2 Taiwan became one of the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in the 1980s. In development literature, few developing countries have transformed from low-income, backward agrarian economies to become NIEs within such a short period of time. The exploration of the path of industrialization in Taiwan, a significant subject for its uniqueness and its compelling case for comparative development, is highly relevant to developing countries. Taiwan is a trade dependent economy with total export and import exceeds more than 100% of its GDP after 2004. Industrialization in Taiwan is closely tied with its trade growth. Chow and Kellman (1994) studied the export-led growth in the four NIEs, i.e. Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, to explore the superiority of outward-looking, export-promotion development strategy to industrialize their economies.3 Chow (2002) further argued that Taiwan moved from dependency to interdependency by the end of the 20th century. Since much of Taiwan’s post-war super-economic performance during the 1960s to 1980s was arguably contributed by the “developmental state” (Tun-Jen Cheng, 1990) parallel with authoritarian regime,4 Chow (2012a) argued that authoritarian regime is neither necessary nor sufficient for economic development. Moreover, Chow (2018) argued that industrial development policy in Taiwan has shifted from sector-specific prior to the 1980s to 149

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macro management in accordance with its dynamic comparative advantage in the international market. Many developing countries inherited from colonial legacies as their initial condition to begin with. Taiwan is no exception. Nevertheless, except for the rigorous quantitative analysis by Hsiao and Hsiao (2015, chapters 4-5), few literatures written in English cover the colonial legacy on Taiwan’s economic development.5 This chapter will trace the path of Taiwan’s industrial development since the 1920s till 2020 and identify what lessons can be drawn from it to enrich literature in economic development. The rationale to review Taiwan’s development from the 1920s when Taiwan was a colony under Japan (1895–1945) is to examine the ripple effect of Japan’s industrialization on Taiwan. This is a unique initial condition for its development, which is different from many developing countries.6 After assessing the colonial legacy, the chapter will examine the evolving process from a follower of the industrial leader of Japan to an emerging innovator in some high-tech sectors after the late 1980s. It argues that Taiwan has moved from a follower to an innovator. Taiwan’s development is far beyond Akamatsu’s “flying geese model” (1962) of the “lead-follow” collaboration between the mother goose of industrialized country and the small geese of the followers.7 By contrast to the literature in Taiwan’s success story (Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1987), and the economic miracle (The World Bank, 1993) or its malaise, this study will evaluate the path of Taiwan’s industrialization over the past 100 years and to contribute to literature by providing Taiwan’s experience in the past century for developing countries. The approach in this study is to trace the path of industrialization by identifying the major industrial developments rather than exactly tracing it by chronological order. The chapter is organized in the following order: it first analyzes the colonial lingering legacy in the pre-war period as the initial conditions when Taiwan was under Japanese occupation in Section II. It is followed by the economic stabilization and industrial rehabilitation in the post-war period in Section III. The stage when Taiwan was a follower or imitator of development in tandem with Japan’s super-industrialization in the post-war period is in Section IV. In section V, it addresses how Taiwan developed its knowledge-based economy through innovation and upgraded itself from follower to innovator at the beginning of the 21st century. The final section is for summary and conclusion.

II.

JAPAN’S INDUSTRIALIZATION IN 1920–36 AND ITS RIPPLE EFFECT ON TAIWAN

The First World War bought Japan with a big bonanza in its economy with manufactures increased 1.65 times in the 1913–19 period. It was followed by a deflationary economy in 1920–29 and the Showa Recession in 1930–31

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(Ohno, 2006). However, Japan recovered from its recession sooner than other industrialized countries under expansionary fiscal and easy monetary policies from 1932–36, which was similar to but earlier than the “New Deal” of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Great Depression.8 Japan’s high growth in heavy and chemical industry (HCI) in the 1920–30 period included the development of chemicals, electrical and general machinery, rayon etc. The drive for HCI was boosted by its growth of hydraulic power, absorption of foreign technology and coordination of industrial linkages. By the 1930s, Japan reached the first stage of development,9 and produced most machines by herself (Ohno, 2006). The success of Japan’s industrialization in the 1930s was carried out by policy support of fiscal activism and tariff protection amid expansionary fiscal policy under Takahashi’s three-pillar economic policy.10 Japan’s industrial development enabled Taiwan to be benefitted from its “mother country” then.11 With Japan’s success in its HCI drive, some light manufactures such as textile and agricultural processed industries were developed in Taiwan. Meanwhile, a new type of conglomerates (zaibatsu) emerged in Japan and invested heavily in Taiwan (Ohno, 2006, chapters 6–9). Among them, Suzuki Shoten, a new trading company then, had big investment in Bank of Taiwan in sugar mills and monopolized the camphor (Ohno, 2006, p. 117). Prior to the 1920s, the colonial government in Taiwan conducted land and household surveys in 1905, forestry survey in 1910, established property rights of land to provide institutional infrastructure that was conducive to capital accumulation and government revenue (He and Tsai, 2019, pp. 49–58). Among major infrastructures, the Kanan irrigation reservoir in the southwestern part of Taiwan was built in 1920 and completed in 1930. It substantially increased the rice production afterward. The other notable big project was the hydroelectric power plant in the Sun Moon Lake, which was completed in 1934. The power plant had not only provided the energy supply for industrialization; its overcapacity also led to development of some electrified industries such as chemical, aluminum, metal and steel to consume the over supply of electricity (Hsu, 1998). Since arable land in Taiwan is only about one-third of its total territories, Taiwan developed a multiple crop farming in rice production to increase the food supply. According to Hsiao and Hsiao (2015), rice production increased six times, sugarcane 31 times and sweet potato 36 times in 1938 from the base in 1900. According to Lee and Chen (1979), the growth of gross value added in agriculture was 1.9% in the 1913–23 period, and 4% in the 1923–37 period. Lee and Chen also found that the source of agriculture growth in 1913–23 was contributed by the expansion of cultivated land. In the second metaphase during the 1923–37 period, the expansion of cultivated land and biotechnology, especially the innovation of the Ponlai rice hybrid had greatly contributed

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to the growth of agricultural production.12 Taiwan’s experience in agricultural development is consistent with development theory in that agricultural technology in land-scare and labor-abundant countries focused more on biological innovation whereas that in land abundant and labor scarce countries focused on mechanical innovation. Economies of scale is needed for sugar production. Large scale of sugarcane plantations from planting to refinery were built with Japanese capitals concentrated by three major Japanese conglomerates then.13 In 1926, sugar accounted for 40% of total Taiwan’s export.14 The monocultural production of rice and sugar greatly enhanced Taiwan’s agricultural development. Both products reached their peak in 1938–39 at 1.40 million tons and 1.39 million tons respectively, which was not restored until 1952–53 due to disruptions of the Second World War and the civil war in China. Agricultural development enabled Taiwan to move from self-sufficient cultivation to become a commercialized sector.15 It also became the primary source of foreign exchange revenues in the colonial and the immediate post-war periods. The colonial government initiated a “south forward policy” in the 1930s in conjunction with military expansion in South East Asia by the Japanese Empire as addressed in Chapter 6. As a result, much of Taiwan industrialization was tied with military demand. The newly developed industries were mainly in ferro alloys, aluminum, paper, chemical fertilizers and dehydrated alcohol, etc. They were followed by the establishment of iron, machinery, petroleum refining, and oils and fats in 1937. In 1939, the percentage share of industrial outputs in total outputs exceeded that of agricultural products (Liu, 1969). Along the development of the military-related industries in the 1930s, Kao (2016) argued that there was a simultaneous development of small–medium enterprises (SMEs) in the civilian sector by Taiwanese; those SMEs include a great variety of small enterprises in consumption good industry that was complementary with the heavy and chemical industry driven by large-scale ones for military purposes. The development of those small-scale Taiwanese civilian enterprises became the pioneers of the SMEs in the post-war period, which was the backbone of industrial development after the 1960s. According to Booth and Deng (2017), industrial output accounted for 21.3% of GDP in 1929, which was higher than the 18.5% in the Philippines, much higher than those in Korea (12.3%), Indonesia (15.6%) and India (13.5%) in the same year. On the contrary, the share of agricultural output in GDP in Taiwan was 42.2% in 1929, which was lower than the 56.1% in India and 52.3% in Korea, but was higher than the 32.5% in Indonesia, and the 39.1% in the Philippines.16 As a colony, Taiwan traded heavily with Japan. In the mid-1920s, its trade with Japan was three times that with the rest of the world. A typical pattern of colonial trade is to export primary commodity in exchange of manufactures.

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Rice and sugar were the major exports to Japan. Hsiao and Hsiao (2015, p. 300) argued that there was a dualistic trade structure of export of primary commodity parallel with the development of import-substitution industry during the colonial period. Some agricultural technologies were transferred from Taiwan to South East Asian countries when the “south forward policy” was incorporated with the “Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”. Other than agriculture, Japan also built some light manufactures in South East Asian countries to access the raw materials to compensate for the paucity of natural resources in Taiwan. This is the emerging regional division of labor in Akamatsu’s “flying geese model”, though he did humbly state that Japan was not ready for the leading mother goose (senshinkoku) to lead the flock yet. Historically, the eastern part of Taiwan is less developed than that in the western part. According to Yu-Ju Lin (2011), the exploration of eastern Taiwan, which was embarked upon after the “south forward policy” enhanced the diversification of agricultural sector by developing some tropical products that spread to South East Asia occupied by Japan then.17 It also explored forestry, mineral, metal and mining resources for military industry. Colonial exploration in Eastern Taiwan, though was primarily for military expansion for the Japanese Empire, had its legacy on Taiwan’s post-war development.18 From a development point of view, infrastructural establishments both physical and institutional, and development of commercialized agriculture, light manufactures, as well as heavy and chemical industry, are conducive to post-war industrialization.

III.

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PRE-TAKE OFF

The war destruction devastated Taiwan’s pre-war industrial development. In 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied and Taiwan became a province of the Republic of China. The price control during the war was lifted and the rampant inflation in Taiwan was aggravated after Taiwan’s economy was integrated with China which was under inflation spiral as well.19 The civil war between the Communist and the Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) further delayed the post-war rehabilitation in Taiwan because much of its resources were transported to China. During 1945–49, there were food shortages due partly to the arrival of 1.7 million of refugees and military personnel from China and partly to the shipment of rice and other food products to the mainland (Wu, 1997). Industrial output and infrastructures were destroyed by the Allied bomb during the 1944–45 period.20 Economic reconstruction was further complicated by the mission of recovering the mainland under the KMT-ruled government after 1949.

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As human capital is the key ingredient of industrialization, Taiwan’s unique case has made itself different from many developing countries that had near vacuum in manpower when they became independent.21 When Japanese technicians left Taiwan, there were inflows of technocrat from mainland China as part of the recovery and rehabilitation team. This group plus the indigenous Taiwanese technicians trained during the Japanese occupation period, especially the cohorts trained after the 1930s, filled up the gap of manpower for industrial development.22 This cohort of Japanese educated technicians also played an important role in absorbing the technology transferred from Japan after its economy took off in the 1960s. The KMT-ruled government took over Japanese enterprises as state-owned enterprises (SOEs),23 notably in electricity, cement, fertilizer, oil refinery, metal, aluminum and sugar refinery industries. Wu (1997) characterized the SOEs, over-regulation and reportedly corruption of government bureaucrats as “predatory economy”, which led to disastrous devastations in the immediate post-war period in 1945–50. Hyperinflation and government monopoly on cigarettes (and wine) caused the historic tragedy of the 228 Incident on February 28, 1947, followed by the massacre of nearly 20,000 Taiwanese intellectual elites and innocent citizens in the following months. For stabilization, the government issued a new currency of New Taiwan Dollars (NT$) at the conversion rate of 1 to 40,000 old Taiwan dollars on June 15, 1949.24 The government began to implement a “land to the tiller” program to abolish the absentee landlord in 1951–53.25 Under the program of land reform, the government compensated the landlord by granting them the shares of four SOEs and the peasant paid for the land to the government by installment in kind. Meanwhile, the government monopolized the supply of fertilizer. Hence, there is a “rice–fertilizer barter” system for the government, not only to secure the food supply to accommodate the population growth but also to extract the agricultural surplus from the farmers to generate capital accumulation for industrial development.26 In 1953, the industrial output resumed the pre-war peak and the government engaged in the first “Four-year Economic Plan”. Nevertheless, in terms of per capita income, Taiwan did not reach the pre-war level until 1960s because of rapid population growth due to the migrant inflows from China as noted before. The US aid arrived in Taiwan after the breakout of the Korean war on June 25, 1950. The US aid from 1950 to 1965 totaled $1.5 billion; more than half of the total aid was for military assistance. But US aid did help Taiwan to finance military expenditures, which accounted for 70–80% of its government budget then,27 and to cover its trade deficits before its export growth.28 Hence, Taiwan was able to escape from the bottleneck of the “two-gap” model in many developing countries, under which saving is less than investment and export is less than import.

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There is an historic episode that arguably could have significant impact on the priority of national development in Taiwan: Secretary of State Dulles of the US arrived in Taiwan and signed a joint communique with President Chiang Kai-shek on October 23, 1958. The communique states that the aspired mission of the Chiang government to recover the mainland should be pursued through the “Three Principles of People” taught by Sun Yat-sen rather than by force (military operation).29 In political economy of development, it is much more sensible for the authoritarian regime to justify its leadership by raising the living standard of its people through economic development rather than upholding the aspiration of recovering mainland that seemed grim among the general public. After that, US aid focused relatively more on economic development than military assistance. According to Hsu (2019a), the proportion of US aid in economic assistance was 42.6% in the 1961–67 period, compared to 32% in the 1956–60 period, even though economic assistance in the overall US aid is only 40% in the entire 1950–67 period. Upon the recommendation of US Agency for International Development (USAID),30 Taiwan government declared a 19-point Program of Economic and Financial Reforms, which included raising the savings, establishing the capital market and improving the investment environment. It also promulgated the “Statute of Encouraging Investment” to provide incentive for private investment in 1960. Initially, it was for a period of 10 years only, but was extended twice when it was replaced by the “Statute of Industry Upgrading” in 1990. The major difference between these two statutes is that government policy shifting from developing “target industry” to “functional support” for overall industrial development (Chow, 2018). Industrial developments after the arrival of US aid are mainly in cotton yarn, fertilizer, oilseeds, sugar, and food product (Hsu, 2019b). Many of those US-assisted industries were privately owned, which expedited the development of free enterprises. Despite various economic plans mapped out by the government, Taiwan’s path of industrial development is through “indicative planning” with more carrots than sticks and moved toward a mixed economy dominated by private enterprises; after 1958, the proportion of industrial outputs from private enterprises exceeded that from SOEs, and the trend continues as industrialization proceeds (Chu, 2010, pp. 60–61). By 2007, the percentage distribution of output produced by SOEs dropped to only 10% of total output. After controlling the inflation by the end of 1952 and the rehabilitation of infrastructure as well as production facilities around 1953, major achievements before the economy take-off are the reconstruction of those industries built in the pre-war period,31 and a revitalization of agricultural sector that dominated the growth of export in the first stage of export of primary commodity. Among them, rice and sugar accounted for more than two-thirds of total export in the

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1950–59 period.32 This is a typical trade pattern in most Latin American countries as the Prebish–Singer thesis addressed (Toye and Toye, 2003). But the path of Taiwan’s development is different from that in Latin America by dissociating itself from the “trade pessimism” school; Taiwan’s generated comparative advantage in labor-intensive, light manufactures export is attributed by its low wage rate, as many economists argued. Among them Scott (1979) and Wu (2020) both showed that the wage rate in Taiwan was a fraction as much as those in the US, Japan, Mexico and even Hong Kong. Nevertheless, one should note that, other than the supply of surplus labor from agriculture, the low wage rate was also significantly contributed by the low cost of food supply for urban industrial labor, the repressed labor movement and the negligence of environmental protection.33 The low cost of labor enabled Taiwan to develop its labor-intensive exports in the first stage of export-led growth. The drive for technological-intensive industry to pursue export-substitution by diversifying its export is to be examined in the next section.

IV.

TAIWAN AS A FOLLOWER IN THE LINKED DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA

In view of Rostow’s stages of economic growth theory (1962), Hsu (2019a) argued that Taiwan fulfilled the conditions for its economic take-off in 1963. Taiwan adopted the export-led development strategy in the mid-1960s shortly after its economic take-off.34 Given its paucity of natural resources and small domestic market for scale economy of production, Taiwan went through a noticeably short period of import-substitution and switched to export promotion in the early 1960s.35 Hence, the path of Taiwan’s industrialization is closely tied with its export growth and the changing composition of export commodity from labor intensive in the 1960s to technology intensive and knowledge intensive after the 1980s. As a trade dependent economy, the path of industrialization in Taiwan is arguably reflected in its changing trade structures. Meier (1995, p. 458) argued that industrialization in Asia was a process of “learning by exporting”, under which participating countries climbed up the “ladder of comparative advantage” from resource-based (rice) and unskilled labor-intensive (textile) sectors with initial “natural comparative advantage” to “creative comparative advantage” in such sectors as skilled labor and technology-intensive (machinery),36 as well as R&D intensive (computer) as the path of industrial development. Meanwhile, Gerald Adam argued there was a “common development process” in Asian countries that directly or indirectly tied with the “linked development” model (1998, p. 4). Therefore, the path of industrialization in Taiwan

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is a process of moving to the upper ladders in accordance with its dynamic comparative advantage along the line of regional division of labor. Applying the concept of Balassa’s “stage approach of comparative advantage” (1979), Chow (2012b) analyzed the shift of trade pattern resulted from structural change of industry, and the generalized path of industrialization in Korea and Taiwan in their respective developments in the post war period. Chow (2012b, pp. 4–6) found that there is a salient feature that industrial developments in both Taiwan and Korea were in tandem with Japan; when Japan moved to an upper ladder of developing steel and HCI in the 1960s, both Korea and Taiwan picked up the light, labor-intensive manufacture sectors such as textiles, transistor radio, bicycle, black-and-white TV sets etc. and exported to industrialized countries in Phase I. With a relatively low cost of labor compared with that in Japan, Taiwan, along with Korea, was able to generate its comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures to export those products in the first phase of industrialization. After the 1970s, when Japan moved to an upper ladder of technological-intensive sectors such as the automobile industry and machinery after the first energy crisis in 1973–74 (Kohama and Urata, 1988), Taiwan and Korea kept chasing behind Japan’s footstep by moving to an upper ladder of technological sophistication with some varieties in the second phase (II); while Korea developed its brand name of automobiles, Taiwan, due to the limit of domestic market for scale economy, chose to develop auto parts and machinery tools instead of manufacturing the whole passenger cars. Meanwhile, some South East Asian countries became the second tier of the followers chasing behind Korea and Taiwan when the wage rates in both countries went up in the 1970s.37 The sequential order of generalized process of industrialization based on comparative advantage is the thesis of the “flying geese model”. But, as Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) argued, technology hierarchies between Japan, the first tier of flying geese, notably Korea and Taiwan and the latest flying geese in South East Asian countries are quite different from one another. As a late industrialized economy, Taiwan is a follower that chased behind the trajectory of Japan’s post-war development through technology transfer from inward foreign direct investment (FDI), import of technology goods and “reversed engineer” with some indigenous product developments.38 In terms of industrial development strategy, Chow (2018) argued that Taiwan government engaged in sector-specific development policy aiming at the “target industry” prior to the 1980s; the government nurtured those targeted sectors with state-owned enterprises that played a supportive role for private enterprises. Of

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course, preferential policy on developing selected industries has its inevitable drawbacks (Smith, 1997, p.77). After the two energy crises in the 1970s, Taiwan began to engage in outward foreign direct investment (FDI), first invested in South East Asia in the early 1980s, then in China after its economic reform and openness in 1978–79. The Plaza Accord of currency realignment in 1985 forced Taiwan to expand its outward FDI first by migrating those labor-intensive industries and then the lower end of the higher-tech sector to South East Asia and China. Ozawa (1992) described it as an “augmented comparative advantage” type of outward FDI for the home country. Kojima (2000) argued it was a second round of the “flying geese” model of development under which Taiwan followed the footstep of Japan’s outward FDI, which began in the 1960s and accelerated after the mid-1980s. Hence, there is a triangular trade pattern among the NIEs, notably Taiwan and Korea, South East Asia and industrialized countries, which was the basis of regional division of labor (Chow, 2012b). Amid the FDI-trade nexus, there is a two-way of FDI after the 1980s with inward FDI more in technological-intensive sectors whereas outward FDI is seen more in the labor-intensive and lower end of high-tech products. Taiwan also shifted its status from a recipient to a provider of capital in the world economy. By the end of 2018, the stock of outward FDI was nearly 50% of GDP in Taiwan, compared with what were under 30% for Japan and Korea (Chow, 2021). There are various measurements of industrialization.39 A rule of thumb is that the first stage of industrialization occurs when the percentage of farming labor drops to less than half of total labor employment. If one accepts this thesis, one could argue that Taiwan reached the first stage of industrialization in 1961 when the percentage of labor employment in the primary sector fell below 50% of total labor employment as indicated in Figure 7.1 below. By comparison, it took about 65 years for Japan to reach the similar stage of development (Ito, 1992, p. 23). As industrialization proceeds in Taiwan, the ratio of labor force in the tertiary/service sector also overpassed that of the industrial sector in 1988. Figure 7.1 also shows two critical dates of industrialization: the first is the percentage share of industrial employment exceeding that of the primary labor in 1973 and the second is the percentage share of labor employment in the tertiary sector exceeding that of industrial labor in 1988. By the criteria of OCED, Taiwan would have joined the “club of industrialized countries” in the mid-1990s had the country not been barred by international politics.40

V.

TAIWAN AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATOR

The “flying geese” model was challenged in the late 1980s, not only that Japan had fewer and fewer sunset industries to pass over to the first tier of its

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Source: Author, data from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2019.

Figure 7.1

Distribution of labor employment by industrial sectors, 1952–2018

followers, but also more competition from the second tier of the followers in flock, notably China after its economic reform and openness. Hence, Taiwan must engage in indigenous innovation to develop technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries. This section will address innovation, technological advancement, and Taiwan’s performance in developing high-tech industry as a new stage of Taiwan’s industrialization.41 Industrial development requires a country to continually acquire technological capability in the dynamic process of technological innovation. Addressing the theory of industrial strategy, Pack and Westphal (1986) argued that governments in East Asia successfully adopted a “dual policy structure to promote their industrial developments”; for those sectors with static comparative advantage, the government took a neutral incentive scheme and let the market forces to work. Yet, for those sectors without static comparative advantage, governments in East Asia, notably Japan, Korea and Taiwan adopted selective incentive policies to promote their development. Wade (1990) characterized it as a synergy of government and market as a model of “governing the market”. Taiwan government played an important role, though in a lesser extent to that of Korea, in innovation and upgrading industrial structure. To promote innovation and industrial development, Taiwan government provided sound infrastructures, nurtured strong industrial clusters, and offered incentives to

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returning science and technology talents from overseas.42 Since it was funded by the government in 1973, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) has become one of the largest leading research and development institutions in the world. ITRI had not only engaged in research, but also incubated more than 270 high-tech companies ever since it was established. Among them, Taiwan Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s largest chip manufacturer split from ITRI. Hence, ITRI has multiple functions in original research, development of new product and process, and technology diffusion in upgrading Taiwan’s industrial development (Pack, 1992). In 1980, the government established the Science and Industrial Park in Hsinchu in Northern Taiwan, where two leading technology universities are located. The idea is to generate a research consortium and manufacture clusters to further technology advancement, similar to the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. Subsequently, several science industrial parks were established in Central and Southern parts of Taiwan.43 Those industrial parks cultivated more than 900 technology firms and enhanced Taiwan’s technology with global reputation as a leading hub in information and computer technology (ICT) in the world. Taiwanese leading firms in electronics and newly liberalized service industries are characterized as being “behave(d) a lot more like leading enterprises in advanced countries (first movers)” (Amsden and Chu, 2003, pp. 29–32). So, they were able to exploit the “second mover” advantage. With the leapfrogging strategy, Taiwanese leading firms that had not locked in the existing technology system, were able to develop the newly emerging high-tech and service sectors which had low-entry barriers.44 Mathews and Lee (2018) argued that a paradigm shift caused by the wave of new innovation in the “fourth industrial revolution” could be a crucial turning point for the latecomer economies.45 The challenge for those latecomer economies is whether to catch the window of opportunities in the innovation or falling into the middle-income trap. Hence, Taiwan embarked on its drive of developing the knowledge-based economy (Chen and Lee, 2004) in the 1990s, and engaged in its indigenous innovation. While pursuing the development of high-tech industry, Taiwanese firms must compete with world-class rivals globally. There are success stories of developing high-tech industries such as the pureplay foundries that have become the largest chip manufactures of the semi-conductor in the world. Yet, others such as dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) and chipset firms are less successful due respectively to economies of scale for the former and entry barriers in the hard disk (HD) production for the latter. The lesson is that industrialization in trade dependent economy must base on dynamic comparative advantage in the world market (Chow, 2018, pp.106–108). For Taiwanese foundries to secure original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and original design manufacturer (ODM) orders from those world-class

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fabless firms, they have to upgrade their technology through indigenous innovation for their international competitiveness (Chung et al., 2004, p. 197). In the ITC sector, Chow (2018, p. 109) argued that Taiwanese firms moved from the low value-added segment in manufacturing to higher value-added stages in IC design (R&D intensive) and testing/precision (technology intensive). From predominantly semi-conductor manufacturing prior to the mid-1980s, Taiwanese firms gradually expanded to product development in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the mid-1990s, they also engaged in global logistics to keep their international competitiveness in the global market (Schive and Chen, 2004, pp. 60–161). However, different from Korea, which manufactured brand-name high-tech products such as Samsung smartphone and laptop, most Taiwanese firms engaged in producing intermediates in the global supply chains with few exceptions such as Acer and ASUS laptops.46 Nevertheless, Taiwan also has provided some “hidden championship” products in parts and components in the global supply chains as indicated in Hsieh (2017). According to Asia Development Outlook, 2020, there are two types of innovation; the first one is “frontier innovation”, which is the pioneer of innovation in the world. The second is “catch-up” innovation, which is the first application in a “specific context” of an existing innovation. For late industrialized country as Taiwan, catching up innovation is much crucial than that of frontier innovation for rapid industrialization at the early stage. But, after decades of development, Taiwan must engage in frontier innovation by investing more resources in research and development (R&D). Although high-tech firms with scale economies of production play a major role in technology innovation, the transformation of SMEs to create the “hidden championship” in some sectors such as machinery and metal is also highly significant as well (Hsieh, 2017). Generally speaking, there are two major indicators of the inputs of innovation. The first one is R&D expenditure as percentage of total GDP. This ratio is a sign of the consortium of government and private engagement in R&D in driving for innovation. It increased from less than 1.7% in 1991 to 3.3% in 2017 in Taiwan whereas the average ratio for OECD countries was 2.37% in the same year.47 The other indicator is the number of R&D personnel per 1000 employment. By headcount, the number increased from 13.2 per 1000 employment in 2007 to 16.6 in 2019. By full-time equivalent (FTE), the number increased from 10.1 to 13.2 per 1000 employment in the same period.48 For innovation performance indicator, there are two major ones: the publication in science and technology journals and the number of patents. Based on head count and FTE of research personnel, the number of scientific papers published per researcher in the Science Citation Index (SCI) and Engineering Index (EI) journals in 1993–2017 is reported in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2.

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From Figure 7.2 below, one can find that the output of Taiwanese researchers increased steadily over time. They produced more research outputs in science than in engineer journals. The other indicator of innovation performance is the number of patents granted. Since Taiwan is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), its performance of innovation is not reported in the Global Innovation Index. The second best is to use the number of patents granted to foreign countries by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). There are four categories of patents: utility inventions, design, plant and reissued patents. Among them, the most important one is the utility patents that, according to USPTO definition, “may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”49 Table 7.2 reports the number of all categories of patents granted to Taiwan by the USPTO from 1999, the earliest date of data available to 2018. From Table 7.2, one can find that the number of utility patents granted to Taiwan increased steadily in the last two decades. The number of design patents also increased substantially as well. The last column of Table 7.2 shows the number of total patents per million people. The number of patents per million people increased from 204.87 in 1999 to 535.29 in 2015, with slight decline to 497.77 in 2018. Table 7.3 is an international comparison of patents granted to foreign countries by the USPTO in the 2014–18 period. One can find from the first column on Table 7.3 that, by the number of patents per million people, Taiwan is ranked in the top 4 in utility invention and in the total number of patents, in the top 5 in design patents, and in the top 6 in reissue of patents. For plant patents, Taiwan was ranked as the 31st in the same period. Therefore, it is fair to argue that Taiwan has moved from an imitator to an innovator since its economy took off in the 1960s. Of course, more studies are needed to address the development of newly innovated industries such as biotech, green energy, precision machinery, IoTs, new agricultural-tech and defense industry advocated by the Tsai Administration since 2016. However, most of Taiwan’s patents are in process technology, which is mainly for protection of intellectual property rights rather than for sales to foreign firms. Hence, in terms of balance of trade in technology, Taiwan still suffered from trade deficit. Data on trade in technology are available only after 1997. It is fragmented and the period is too short to do any sensible quantitative analysis.50 Yet, the ratio of export–import of technology trade has been improving from less than 0.1 before 2000. It reached to 0.23 in 2005 and 0.53 in 2017. One is inclined to conclude that technology innovation has been

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The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

Table 7.1 Year

Science and technology output indicators Annual papers

Annual papers

Annual papers

Annual papers

in SCI per 1000

in SCI per

in EI per 1000

in EI per 1000

personnel (FTE)

1000 personnel

personnel (FTE)

personnel (headcount)

(headcount) 1993

60

52

34

29

1994

71

61

43

37

1995

72

63

39

34

1996

74

64

42

36

1997

70

60

44

37

1998

82

67

38

31

1999

90

70

45

35

2000

92

70

51

39

2001

103

80

54

42

2002

95

70

48

36

2003

101

74

63

46

2004

104

77

79

59

2005

108

83

78

60

2006

114

86

81

62

2007

107

82

95

73

2008

121

93

94

72

2009

122

94

96

74

2010

120

93

96

74

2011

125

96

103

79

2012

123

95

90

70

2013

122

95

104

81

2014

117

91

94

74

2015

110

86

81

63

2016

107

85

74

58

2017

100

80

65

52

Notes: For 1993–1997 research personnel: FTE is the sum of researchers and technicians, while headcount equals FTE plus Supporting Personnel. Sources: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2019.

incredible as shown by the international comparison of the number of patents granted by the USPTO. But most innovation is not marketable internationally. To illustrate Taiwan’s trade performance in high-tech products, this study adopts the index of “revealed comparative advantage” (RCA) and compares them with those of Korea and Japan.51 If the RCA index for a country’s export

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A century of development in Taiwan

Source: Compiled by the author from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various issues.

Figure 7.2

Annual papers in CSI and EI per 1000 personnel, 1992–2018

of its ith product Xi is greater than “one” (RCAi>1), one can argue that the country has comparative advantage in that product group. Otherwise (RCA< 1), a country has no comparative advantage in Xi. The higher the RCA index, the greater the comparative advantage. Based on 6-digit of Harmonized System (HS) code, 194 products are classified as “high-tech” by the “Revision of the High-technology Sectors and Product Classification” in OECD.52 The RCA index of high-tech products for Japan, Korea and Taiwan is reported in Table 7.4 below. From Table 7.4, one can find that Taiwan’s comparative advantage in high-tech export in the world market has been increasing steadily since the beginning of the 21st century. It increased from 6.39 in 2001 to 35.08 in 2019. By comparison, Japan’s RCA index increased only modestly from 9.69 to 15.79 in the same period. To some extent, it reflects the two “lost decades” in Japan’s economy during the Heisei Recession (1990–2010). Nevertheless, Korean comparative advantage in high-tech export is greater than that of Taiwan after 2007; the RCA index for Korean high-tech export increased dramatically from 3.15 to 46.72 in the period during 2001–2019.Therefore, Korea became strong competitor not only for Taiwan, but also for Japan as well. To further examine the comparative advantage of high-tech products among Japan, Korea and Taiwan, this study also ran the Spearman rank coefficients

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The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

Table 7.2 Year

Numbers of patents granted by US Patent and Trademark Office, 1999–2018

Utility

Design

Plant

Reissue

Total

Total

Total Patent

Patent

Patent

Patent

Patent

Patent

Population

Per Million

(Million)

Population

1999

3,693

833

0

0

4,526

22.09

204.87

2000

4,667

1135

0

4

5,806

22.28

260.63

2001

5,371

1168

0

5

6,544

22.41

292.06

2002

5,431

1294

0

5

6,730

22.52

298.83

2003

5,298

1370

0

8

6,676

22.61

295.33

2004

5,938

1268

0

1

7,207

22.69

317.64

2005

5,118

870

1

4

5,993

22.77

263.20

2006

6,360

1553

1

5

7,919

22.88

346.16

2007

6,128

1355

0

8

7,491

22.96

326.29

2008

6,339

1423

0

17

7,779

23.04

337.67

2009

6,642

1114

10

15

7,781

23.12

336.55

2010

8,238

1348

2

47

9,635

23.16

415.98

2011

8,781

1086

2

38

9,907

23.23

426.57

2012

10,646

953

1

24

11,624

23.32

498.54

2013

11,071

1024

0

23

12,118

23.37

518.44

2014

11,332

908

0

14

12,254

23.43

522.92

2015

11,690

877

1

7

12,575

23.49

535.29

2016

11,541

906

3

13

12,463

23.54

529.44

2017

11,580

970

0

8

12,558

23.57

532.77

2018

10,933

793

0

16

11,742

23.59

497.77

Sources: Patents data are from USPTO Patent Data and Population data for Taiwan were from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2019, p. 27. Others were from the World Bank.

of the RCA index for each of these 194 high-tech products as reported in Appendix I. One can find from the three tables in Appendix I that, while the rank coefficients in the three pairs countries, Japan/Korea, Japan/Taiwan and Korea/Taiwan, are all statistically significant, the coefficient between Korea and Japan is much higher than that between Japan and Taiwan. Hence, one is inclined to conclude that in high-tech export, Korean comparative advantage is much more similar to Japan than to Taiwan.

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A century of development in Taiwan

Table 7.3

The top recipient countries of patents from the USPTO, 2014–18

PATENTS

FOREIGN

FOREIGN

FOREIGN PLANT

REISSUED

(ALL CATEGORIES)

UTILITY PATENTS

DESIGN

PATENTS ISSUED

PATTENTS

ISSUED TO FOREIGN

ISSUED

PATENTS ISSUED

2014–2018

TO FOREIGN

COUNTRIES

2014–2018

2014–2018

COUNTRIES 2014–2018

2014–2018 Country

Total

Country

Total

Country

Total

Country

Total

Country

Total

1

Japan

264,020

Japan

253,301

Korea,

10,402

Netherlands

1,223

Japan

402

2

Korea,

105,049

Korea,

94,384

9,998

Germany

443

Korea,

249

South South

Japan

South

South

3

Germany

70,418

Germany

65,358

China

6,696

Japan

319

Germany

76

4

Taiwan

61,592

Taiwan

57,076

Germany

4,541

Denmark

240

Canada

67

5

China

60,274

China

53,545

Taiwan

4,454

Australia

231

United

64

Kingdom 6

Canada

37,211

Canada

33,841

Canada

3,258

United

150

Taiwan

58

4

-

-

Kingdom 31

-

VI.

-

-

-

-

-

Taiwan

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The path of Taiwan’s industrial development, though unique by itself, provides a robust model for comparative development. During the colonial period, Taiwan benefitted from the ripple effect of Japan’s industrialization. Taiwan’s agriculture was developed to become a commercialized sector and major export commodity group parallel with modest progress in light manufactures. As Japan engaged in its military expansion in South East Asia after 1936, some resultant spillover effect from military-related industries spread to small and medium-sized enterprises, which became the backbone of its post-war development. Post-war rehabilitation in Taiwan was complicated by hyperinflation, the fiasco transition of governance, and the civil war in China. The US aid to Taiwan, though more in military assistance than economic development, helped to do away with the vicious circle of poverty and closed the two gaps between saving and investment as well as import and export commonly existing in many developing countries. After the economy took off, Taiwan adopted export-led growth to develop its labor-intensive industries in tandem with the trajectory of Japan’s footstep in its super post-war industrialization. The success of Taiwan’s export-led growth model provides an outstanding case for assessing the relative performance between outward-looking, export promotion development vs. inward-looking, import substitution strategies. As

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The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

Table 7.4

RCA indexes for Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 2001–2019 Korea composite RCA

Taiwan

Japan

composite RCA

composite RCA

6.39

9.69

2001

3.15

2002

2.35

8.33

7.06

2003

2.38

13.35

6.38

2004

3.14

21.12

7.27

2005

6.45

24.41

7.01

2006

9.44

27.52

6.02

2007

36.95

18.80

26.21

2008

30.20

22.99

24.55

2009

34.03

32.95

25.64

2010

42.01

43.98

23.84

2011

34.91

40.38

24.38

2012

36.68

37.85

22.93

2013

39.77

38.80

20.66

2014

39.64

37.29

20.23

2015

40.68

32.54

18.12

2016

41.95

29.47

17.35

2017

58.92

29.35

17.32

2018

71.51

32.06

16.61

2019

46.72

35.08

15.79

far as trade performance is concerned, Taiwan became a compelling case in the context of the East Asian model, in contrast with the model in Latin America. In the 1960s, Taiwan was an imitator of technology and a follower in the “flying geese” model chasing behind the footstep of Japan. The high growth in the 1960s to 1980s is due to Taiwan’s successful exploitation of its comparative advantage in the world market, which is in harmony with the regional division of labor in the “linked development” model in Asia. As Taiwan’s economy lost its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries and faced more competition from the second tier of the followers, Taiwan had to upgrade its industrial technology by engaging in indigenous innovation. The Taiwan model of governing the market enabled the country to avoid the “coordination failure”. Taiwan’s success in developing its high-tech industry provides a vivid empirical case for an agrarian economy to become a leading hub for innovation in some high-tech sectors. In terms of the number of patents granted by the USPTO, Taiwan is ranked high, more so in utility innovation than others in

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A century of development in Taiwan

the world. Nevertheless, much of its innovation is in process innovation rather than product innovation. Hence, Taiwan still has had a deficit in technology trade. Based on the 194 high-tech products at the 6-digit HS code defined by OECD, Taiwan’s comparative advantage in those products increased steadily in the past two decades. It surpassed the industrial leader of Japan but is behind the new giant of Korea. From a development point of view, Taiwan can be considered a role model of development from a follower of technology behind the industrial leader, becoming an innovator with modest success in patents received. At the end of the 20th century, Taiwan became a powerhouse of high-tech industry in the global supply chain, which provides concrete lessons in industrial development for many developing countries in their struggle of development.

NOTES 1. The ranking was made by Wikipedia based on IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2019. 2. In the early 1950s, rice and sugar were the two major exports that accounted for more than 60% of its total export to the world. In 2018, Taiwan became the world’s largest producer of 18 high-tech products such as motherboards, notebook computers, desktop computers, and integrated circuit foundries. Among them, 13 products had more than 40% of global market shares. For details of the product list and global market share in the second and the third largest worldwide, see Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2019, National Development Council, ROC (Taiwan). 3. By contrast, most Latin American countries engaged in inward-looking, import-substitution strategy, arguably inspired by the trade pessimism school, until the first energy crisis in 1973–74. Strictly speaking, structural transformation occurred notably in Korea and Taiwan because Hong Kong and Singapore are the entrepôt. Nevertheless, these four NIEs are generally referred to as the “four little tigers” or “four little dragons” in literature. 4. Taiwan was under Martial Law until 1987 before its democratization in the 1990s. 5. There are quite a few studies on Taiwan under Japanese occupation written in Chinese and Japanese. Among them, the work of Wen-kai Lin (2015) is a critique on the imperialist exploitation, colonial modernity and enclave economy schools on Taiwan’s industrial history in the colonial period. Song Ken Hsu (1998) is on Taiwan’s industrialization under Japanese occupation. Both were written in Chinese. 6. This study is to objectively evaluate the infrastructural establishments and initial industrial developments in the colonial period for Taiwan’s post-war industrialization. It does not imply any normative judgement on the benevolence of (or lack of) the colonial ruler, nor does it ignore the exploitation of colonial ruler and the comparador on Taiwanese people at all. 7. To rationalize the “flying geese model”, Kojima (2000) did a comprehensive study by developing the flying geese model into Kojima Model I-diversification and rationalization of industries, Model II-pro-trade oriented foreign direct investment and Model III-agreed specialization in regional integration. Meanwhile, Ozawa

The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

169

(2009) reformulated the flying geese model and explored the dynamic economic growth and financial development in Asia. Of course, as in many generalized theories, the relevance of the “flying geese model” to Asian development is criticized by Bernard and Ravenhill (1995). 8. From “Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression”, Bank of Japan Review, E-2. May, 2009. It is noted that these policies were implemented before John M. Keynes published his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936. 9. A rule of thumb of the first stage of industrialization is the farming labor accounted for less than half of total labor employment. According to Ito (1992, p. 23), the ratio of labor force in the primary sector was 47.7% in 1933–37. 10. Korekiyo Takahashi policy had three pillars during 1931–36: the first is departure from the gold standard and currency depreciation; the second is fiscal expansion financed by underwriting government bonds from the central bank; and the third is cutting the official discount by the Bank of Japan (Bank of Japan Review, 2009-E-2, pp. 6–8). According to Wikipedia, Prime Minister Abe cited Korekiyo Takahashi as an inspiration for his Abenomics policies: https://​en​.wikipedia​.org/​ wiki/​Takahashi​_Korekiyo (accessed on September 27, 2021). 11. It is noted that the distribution between Japanese and Taiwanese is far from being equitable. See Hsu (1998). 12. In 1926, Taiwan successfully innovated a new hybrid for its stick short-grained rice, ponlai by Eikichi Iso (磯 永吉, 1886–1972) and Megumu Suenaga (末永 仁, 1886–1939). Iso was referred to as the “father” and Suenaga as the “mother” of ponlai rice. From “Taiwanese rice has its roots in Japan”, https://​english​ .kyodonews​.net/​news/​2018/​06/​6878d2a62a6f​-feature​-taiwanese​-rice​-has​-its​-roots​ -in​-japan​.html (accessed on September 27, 2021). 13. These three firms Mitsu, Mitsubishi and Kato became cartelized and accounted for one half of the capital and arable land, as well as 75% of sugar products (He and Tsai, 2019, p. 53). 14. This is a typical colonial pattern of trade between the colony and its master country. It is noted that Taiwanese didn’t have regional comparative advantage in sugar production as its production cost of sugar was twice as much as that in Java, Indonesia then. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his contribution on this point. 15. Historically, Taiwan began to export some of its agricultural commodities to China during the Ch’ing Dynasty in exchange of other products that were not available in Taiwan. Hence, one could argue that Taiwan had a limited degree of agricultural trade before large scale of commercialization of agricultural commodities. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this contribution on this point. 16. Sectoral distribution of output in total GDP is one of the indicators of economic development. However, relative development between the Philippines, Taiwan, and other Japanese colonies in 1929 is beyond the scope of this chapter. 17. Among them, cotton and quinoa are typical products for Japan’s military need. 18. Yu-Ju Lin (2011) considered it as an “enclave economy” that was not linked with local economy. 19. According to Li (2005), the inflation rates based on 1945 as 100; in 1946, 1947 and 1949, they were 249%, 608% and 1141% respectively in Taipei. However, the inflation rate in Shanghai, a representative city in China was 504%, 1025% and 1819% respectively in these three years in the post-war era.

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A century of development in Taiwan

20. According to Hsu (2019a), based on the level in 1944, the power supply was cut to 32.74% in 1945, 24.84% in 1946 and 31.53% in 1947. 21. Although there was a discriminatory two-tier public-school system between the Japanese and Taiwanese children during the colonial period, the enrollment rate at primary school in Taiwan is one of the highest in Asia. By 1943, 81% of males and 61% of females school-aged children were enrolled in primary school in Taiwan. 22. Kao (2016) also analyzed the establishment of vocation schools and their affiliated vocation training programs since the 1930s to provide the basic technical education and vocational training at high school level, and those setting ups of engineering school at the college level. 23. Reportedly, some of these assets were confiscated as party asset for the KMT. It became a hot issue of transitional justice after democratization gained its momentum in the 1990s. 24. It was issued by Bank of Taiwan, the de facto central bank until 1961 before the Central Bank resumed its function. However, the Bank of Taiwan continued to issue the currency until 2000 before the Central Bank took over that function and declared New Taiwan dollar as a national currency. 25. Prior to that, the government implemented a “rent reduction policy” in 1949, which mandatorily reduced the rent paid by the peasant to three-eighths and retained five-eighths by themselves. The government also undertook “the sale of public land” to peasants since 1951 in several phases. Both policies had slowed the land speculation and cut down the price of land. 26. Zhao-yung Chen (2012) argued that the primary policy objective of the barter system was to secure a food supply for the civil war in China and to meet domestic demand, even though it did have a function of generating capital accumulation for industrial development. As the government overpriced the fertilizer and turned the terms of trade against the farmers, it was a hidden tax on the peasants. The system was abolished in 1972 upon the recommendation from Teng-hui Lee (1923–2020) as a minister without portfolio in the cabinet. 27. Until the 1960 fiscal year, the proportion of national defense expenditure in the government budget still accounted for 49.4%. Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2002, Table 9-3b. 28. According to Hsu (2019a), US aid accounts for 74% of Taiwan’s import during the period 1950–65. 29. Source: Department of State Press Release No. 634, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. No classification marking. Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1184–1186. 30. The eight-policy recommendation is cutting military expenditures, anti-inflation, tax reform, adopting a unified, realistic exchange rate, liberalization of foreign exchange control, establishing a public enterprises commission, establishing stock market and privatization of SOEs. Sources: Jacoby (1967, p. 134). 31. Notably in fertilizer, cement, garment industries and those electrified sectors. 32. The figure of the percentage share of sugar export in total export was from Hsu (2019b, table 3-3). The author figured out the ratio of rice export in total export from that table. Both items account for 72.17% of total export in 1950–54 and 67.63% in 1955–59. 33. It is noted that labor movement was repressed, and labor union existed only nominal terms. For details, see Chow (2012a). 34. Scott (1979) has detailed documentation on the government policies to promote export.

The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

171

35. The World Bank (1993) identified five stages of development in post-war Taiwan; land reform and reconstruction in the 1949–52 period, import substation industrialization in the 1953–57 period, export promotion in the 1958–72 period, industrial consolidation and new export growth in the 1973–82 period, and development of high technology and modernization after 1981. 36. The author is indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out that Taiwan’s electronics industry initially was labor intensive in the 1960s. Wu (2020, p. 10) calculated that the capital–labor ratio of electronic was 26.13 whereas that of textile was 44.48 in 1961. The development of electronic industry from unskilled labor intensive in the 1960s to skill-labor and capital-intensive intensive is a significant technology upgrading in Taiwan’s economy. 37. Song Ken Hsu (2019b) argued that Taiwan exhausted its agricultural surplus labor in 1968. However, since the demand for agricultural labor is subject to seasonal fluctuation such as seed spreading and harvest, more detailed analysis on the exhaustion of surplus labor in agriculture is needed. 38. It is noted that US direct investment increased after US aid terminated in 1965. Technology transfer from investment by US multinational corporations (MNCs) also significantly contributed to Taiwan’s development of its integrated circuit (IC) sector. An exemplary case is RCA investment to nurture Taiwan’s IC design. 39. Hsu (2019b) listed four indicators of industrialization: the ratio of industrial output in total output; the percentage of gross fixed capital formation in the industrial sector; the ratio of heavy industry in total industrial output; and the ratio of intermediates in heavy industry. 40. Korea joined the OECD countries in 1996. According to the OECD, “framework for the consideration of perspective members”, Taiwan is much more qualified than other countries that joined OECD after 2000. 41. OECD defined high-tech industries in terms of R&D intensities, “with those (such as ICT or pharmaceuticals) spending more than 4% of turnover being classified as high-technology, those spending between 1% and 4% of turnover (such as vehicles or chemicals) being classified as medium-tech, and those spending less than 1% (such as textiles or food) as ‘low tech’. High-tech industries include aerospace, pharmaceuticals, computers and office machinery, communication equipment, and scientific (medical, precision and optical) instruments. See https://​www​ .researchgate​.net/​publication/​235791785​_HIGH​_TECH​_INDUSTRIES​_AND​ _KNOWLEDGE​_INTESIVE​_SERVICES (accessed on September 27, 2021). 42. To encourage the development of new startups of high-tech industry, the government offered 20% of shares for returning science and technology talents and provided 31% of development fund with the rest from private funding. Therefore, those returning talents can control their startups as the major stakeholder. 43. According to Taiwan Business Topics, a magazine issued by American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan, “the Hsinchu Science Park focuses on semiconductors and optoelectronics, the Central Taiwan Science Park on precision machinery and optoelectronics, and the Southern Taiwan Science Park on medical devices and green energy.” At https://​topics​.amcham​.com​.tw/​2019/​03/​what​-are​-taiwans​ -science​-parks/​(accessed on September 27, 2021). 44. The development of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) had several cycles from 1K to 256K and then from 1 megabyte to 64 megabits. While Japan started from the 4th generation of DRAM cycles by developing its 64K, Korea and Taiwan, as latecomers, developed from newer generations of the DRAM cycles;

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A century of development in Taiwan

Korea started from its 64K and soon shifted to 256K, whereas Taiwan began to develop its 1 megabyte in the 1990s. 45. According to the World Economic Forum, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is “the digital revolution that has been occurring since the middle of the last century”. At https://​www​.weforum​.org/​agenda/​2016/​01/​the​-fourth​-industrial​-revolution​-what​ -it​-means​-and​-how​-to​-respond/​(accessed on September 27, 2021). 46. For the list of brand name products from the ICT industry in Taiwan, see Chow (2018, p. 111). 47. Data for Taiwan are from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2019. Data for OECD were from the website of OECD: https://​www​.oecd​.org/​sti/​msti2019​.pdf (accessed on September 27, 2021). 48. However, Lin and Lo (2015) argued that only R&D expenditure may provide biased information about the industry because some “intangible investment such as personnel training, marketing, and acquisition of software can make the technological innovation caused by R&D investments create more value.” Nevertheless, there is no time series data on intangible investment because those censuses are conducted once every five years. 49. At https://​www​.uspto​.gov/​patents​-getting​-started/​general​-information​-concerning​ -patents (accessed on September 27, 2021). For reissued patents, it is to reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application. 50. From Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2003, 2008 and 2019. The data are from Factory Adjustment and Operation Survey, conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The time series data are fragmented because the survey was not conducted in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. 51. RCA was first proposed by Balassa (1979). The formula is as follows: RCAij 

 Xij / Xi 

 Xwi / Xw 

X100 

Xij / Xwj X100 Xi / Xw

Xij= the ith product export by country j Xi = Xi = ∑j Xij;= total export of country j Xwi=∑iXij the total export of ith product in the world Xw = ∑i∑jXij = the total world export The composite Revealed Comparative Index for all product is a weighted average of RCAij

RCA=RCAIijX% of ith product in Country j’s total exports 52. The high-technology products list is based on the high-tech and product classification in Thomas Hatzichronoglou (1997, p. 9). The product, which was based on standard international trade classification (SITC) code, was converted to HS code 2017 by using VLOOKUP function. The trade data were from World Trademap (www​.trademap​.org, accessed on September 27, 2021). The list of the 194 high-tech products is available from the author upon request.

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REFERENCES Adam, F. Gerald, 1998. “The East Asian Development Ladder: Virtuous Circles and Linkages in East Asian Economic Development”, in F. Gerald Adam and Shnichi Ichimura, eds, East Asian Economic Development. Westport, CT: Prager, pp. 3–18. Akamatsu, Kaname, 1962. “A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries”, The Developing Economies, 1, pp. 3–25. Amsden, H. Alice and Wan-wen Chu, 2003. “Upscaling: Recasting Old Theories to Suit Late Industrialization”, in Peter C.Y. Chow, ed., Taiwan in the Global Economy: From An Agrarian Economy to an Exporter of High-Tech Products, Westport, CT: Prager, pp. 23–38. Balassa, Bela, 1979. “The Changing Pattern of Comparative Advantage in Manufacturing Goods”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 61, pp. 99–123. Bernard, Mitchell and John Ravenhill, 1995. “Beyond the Flying Geese and Product Life Cycle”, World Politics, 47 (2), 171–210. Booth, Anne and Kent Deng, 2017. “Japanese Colonialism in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of World History, March, pp. 61–98. Chen, Tain-jy and Joseph S. Lee, eds. 2004. The New Knowledge Economy of Taiwan. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Chen, Zhao-yung, 2012. “Rice-Fertilizer Barter System and Tenant-Landlord of Farming Land: The Statecraft and Farmers’ Rationality”, a paper presented at the annual conference Taiwan Sociology Association (in Chinese). Cheng, Tun-Jen, 1990. “Political Regimes and Development Strategies: Korea and Taiwan”, in Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds, Manufacturing Miracles, Patterns of Development in Latin America and East Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–24. Chow, Peter C.Y., 2002. “From Dependency to Interdependency: Taiwan’s Development Path toward a Newly Industrialized Country”, in Peter C.Y. Chow, ed., Taiwan in the Global Economy, From an Agrarian Economy to an Exporter of High-Tech Products. Westport, CT: Prager, pp. 241–277. Chow, Peter C.Y., 2012a. “Economy of Taiwan after the Lifting of the Martial Law: A Waning Developmental State?”, in David Blundell, ed., Taiwan Since Martial Law. University of California, Berkeley and National Taiwan University Press, pp. 597–629. Chow, Peter C.Y., 2012b. Trade and Industrial Development in East Asia: Catching Up or Falling Behind. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Chow, Peter C.Y., 2018. “Taiwan Industrial Policy in the Era of Globalization: From Sector Specific to Macro Management”, in Carsten Storm, ed., Connecting Taiwan, Participation–Integration–Impacts. London: Routledge, pp. 99–124. Chow, Peter C.Y., 2021. “Taiwan in International Economic Relations”, in June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle, eds., Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen: Domestic and International Challenges. London: Routledge, pp. 84–107. Chow, Peter C.Y. and Mitchell H. Kellman, 1994. Trade, the Engine of Growth in East Asia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Chu, Wan-wen, 2010. “First-Generation of Industrial Entrepreneurs in Postwar Taiwan”, Taiwan Historical Research, 17 (2), pp. 39–84 (in Chinese). Chung, Ching, Pwu Tsai and Sze-Yueh Wang, 2004. “US Semiconductor Patents Granted to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, in Tain-jy Chen and Joseph S. Lee (eds),

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The New Knowledge Economy of Taiwan. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 188–227. Hatzichronoglou, Thomas. 1997. “Revision of the High-Technology Sector and Product Classification”, OCDE STI Working Papers OCDE/GD(97)216 . He, Yi-Lin and Jin-Tang Tsai, 2019. “Taiwanese People in the Japanese Period” (台灣 人的日本時代). Taipei: The Jade Society 玉山社 (in Chinese). Hsiao, Frank S.T. and Mei-Chu Wang Hsiao, 2015. Economic Development of Taiwan. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. Hsieh, F. Michelle, 2017. “From Worker through Owner to Hidden Championship: The Transformation and Technology Innovation of Taiwanese SMEs, 1996–2011” (從黑手變頭家到隱形冠軍: 臺灣中小企業的產業升級與技術創新, 1996–2011), Weekly Report of The Institute of Sociology, Academic Sinica, no. 1572 (in Chinese). Hsu, Song-Ken, 1998. “Taiwan’s Industrial Policy under Japanese Occupation” (台 灣的工業政策: 日治篇), Proceeding of the National Science Council, Part C: Humanities and Social Sciences, 8 (2), pp. 349–371, April (in Chinese). Hsu, Song-Ken, 2019a. “On Taiwan’s Industrial Policy and Its Performance from the End of WWII to 1960” (試論台灣二戰後至 年的工業政策及其績效), unpublished paper written in Chinese. Hsu, Song-Ken, 2019b. “Taiwan’s Manufacturing Sector from 1960 to 2000” (台灣在 1960 至 2000年間的製造業), unpublished paper written in Chinese. Ito, Tokatoshi. 1992. The Japanese Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jacoby, N.H. 1967. U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-help, and Development. New York: Praeger. Kao, Shu-Yuan. 2016. History of Taiwan’s Industry (台灣工業史). Taipei: Wu-nan Publishing Co. (in Chinese). Kohama, Hirohisa and Shujiro Urata, 1988. “The Impact of the Yen Appreciation on the Japanese Economy”, Developing Economies, 26 (4), pp. 323–340. Kojima, Kiyoshi, 2000. “The ‘Flying Geese’ Model of Asian Economic Development: Origin, Theoretical Extensions, and Regional Policy Implications”, Journal of Asian Economics, 11, pp. 375–401. Kuo, Shirely W.Y., Gustav Ranis and John Fei, 1987. The Taiwan Success Story, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Lee, Teng-hui and Yueh-eh Chen, 1979. “Agricultural Growth in Taiwan, 1911–1972”, in Yujiro Hayami, V.W. Ruttan and Herman Southworth (eds), Agricultural Growth in Japan, Taiwan, Korea and the Philippines. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 60–62. Lin, Hui-lin and Mei-Lan Lo, 2015. “The Portfolio of Intangible Investments and Their Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese Manufacturing Firms”, Department of Economics, National Taiwan University. Lin, Wen-Kai, 2015. “Recent Progress of Researches on Taiwan’s Industrial History in the Japanese Colonial Period: From Imperialism to Colonial Modernization”, Taiwan Literary Document (台灣文獻 ), 68 (4), pp. 117–146. Lin, Yu-Ju, 2011. “Transformation of Colonial Frontier by National Policy Company” ( 國策會社與殖民地邊區的改造. Institute of Taiwan History, Taipei: Academia Sinica. Liu, Tching-Ching, 1969. “The Process of Industrialization in Taiwan”, Developing Economies. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​j​.1746​-1049​.1969​.tb00799​.xMathews, John and Keun Lee, 2018. “How Emerging Economies Can Take Advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution”, World Economic Forum, January 11. From https://​

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www​.weforum​.org/​agenda/​2018/​01/​the​-4th​-industrial​-revolution​-is​-a​-window​-of​ -opportunity​-for​-emerging​-economies​-to​-advance​-by​-leapfrogging/​ (accessed on September 20, 2021). Meier, Gerald. M., 1995. Leading Issues in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press. Ohno, Kenichi, 2006. Economic Development of Japan: The Path Travelled by Japan as a Developing Country. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co. Ltd. Ozawa, Terutomo, 1992. “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development”, Transnational Corporation, 1, pp. 27–54. Ozawa, Terutomo, 2009. The Rise of Asia: The “Flying-Geese” Theory of Tandem Growth and Regional Agglomeration. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pack, Howard, 1992. “Technology Gaps between Industrial and Developing Countries: Are There Dividends for Latecomers?” The World Bank Economic Review, 6, Issue suppl_1, 1, pp. 283–302. Pack, Howard and Larry Westphal, 1986. “Industrial Strategy and Technology Change”, Journal of Development Economics, 22, pp. 87–128. Rostow, W.W., 1962. The Process of Economic Growth. New York: W.W. Norton. Schive, Chi and Tain-jy Chen, 2004. “The Globalization of Business in Taiwan” in Tain-jy Chen and Joseph S. Lee (eds). The New Knowledge Economy of Taiwan. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA Edward Elgar. pp.150–167. Scott, Maurice, 1979. “Foreign Trade”, in Walter Galenson (ed.), Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 308–383. Singlemann, Joachim, 1978. “The Sectoral Transformation of the Labor Force in Seven Industrialized Countries, 1920–1970”, American Journal of Sociology, 83 (5), pp. 1224–1234. Smith, Heather, 1997. Industrial Policy in Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s: Winning with the Market. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Toye, John and Richard Toye, 2003. “The Origin and Interpretation of Prebisch–Singer Thesis”, History of Political Economy, 23, Fall, pp. 437–467. Twu, Jaw-Yann, 1997. “Rapid Growth of the East Asian Economies and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment. The Asian Growth Triangle: Structure, Change and Perspective”, RIS Discussion Papers at htpps://​ fdocuments​ .us (accessed on September 19, 2021). Wade, Robert, 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. World Bank, 1993. The East Asian Miracle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wu, Song-Min, 1997. “The Nationalist Government’s Economic Policy regarding Taiwan, 1945–49”, Taiwan Economic Review, 254, pp. 521–554 (in Chinese). Wu, Song-Min, 2020. “The Super Growth of Post-war Taiwan: Development of Electronic Industry”, Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, at http://​homepage. ntu​.edu​.tw/​~ntut019/​ltes/​Taiwan​-Growth​-2​.pdf (in Chinese) (accessed on September 20, 2021).

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APPENDIX I Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient of RCAij Indexes Table 7A.1

Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Taiwan and Japan in high technology export products, 2001–2019

 

R2

t-stat

p-value

2001

0.4541

***

7.0622

2.93E-11

2002

0.4249***

6.5040

6.61E-10

2003

0.3903***

5.8739

1.85E-08

2004

0.4180***

6.3754

1.33E-09

2005

0.4534***

7.0477

3.18E-11

2006

0.4140

***

6.3013

1.97E-09

2007

0.3148***

4.5961

7.79E-06

2008

0.3530***

5.2281

4.45E-07

2009

0.4546***

7.0714

2.78E-11

2010

0.3913***

5.8919

1.68E-08

2011

0.4571

***

7.1214

2.09E-11

2012

0.3998***

6.0430

7.72E-09

2013

0.4100***

6.2289

2.90E-09

2014

0.3598***

5.3441

2.56E-07

2015

0.3668

***

5.4625

1.44E-07

2016

0.3338***

4.9073

1.97E-06

2017

0.3099***

4.5166

1.10E-05

2018

0.3020***

4.3898

1.87E-05

2019

0.3182***

4.6502

6.16E-06

Note: *** Significant at 1%.

Table 7A.2

Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Korea and Japan in high technology export products, 2001–2019

 

R2

t-stat

p-value

2001

0.8454***

21.9351

0

2002

***

0.8804

25.7283

0

2003

0.8225***

20.0372

0

177

The path of Taiwan’s industrial development

t-stat

p-value

2004

***

0.8250

20.2273

0

2005

0.8031***

18.6740

0

2006

0.8071***

18.9413

0

2007

0.8057***

18.8465

0

2008

0.8038***

18.7197

0

2009

***

0.7883

17.7551

0

2010

0.8022***

18.6169

0

2011

0.7964***

18.2463

0

2012

0.7642***

16.4201

0

2013

***

0.7346

15.0024

0

2014

0.7911***

17.9211

0

2015

0.8159***

19.5528

0

2016

0.7621***

16.3101

0

2017

0.7207***

14.4056

0

2018

***

0.7319

14.8850

0

2019

0.7221***

14.4646

0

 

R2

Note:

***

Significant at 1%.

Table 7A.3

Spearman rank correlation coefficients of RCAij between Korea and Taiwan in high technology export products, 2001–2019

 

R2

t-stat

p-value

2001

0.4714***

7.4062

4.00E-12

2002

0.4657***

7.2911

7.83E-12

2003

0.4191***

6.3953

1.19E-09

2004

0.4574***

7.1273

2.02E-11

2005

0.4777***

7.5348

1.88E-12

2006

0.4869***

7.7231

6.11E-13

2007

0.3343***

4.9149

1.90E-06

2008

0.3720***

5.5530

9.26E-08

2009

0.4390***

6.7711

1.52E-10

2010

0.3907***

5.8815

1.78E-08

2011

0.3884***

5.8412

2.18E-08

2012

0.2988***

4.3387

2.31E-05

2013

0.3466***

5.1192

7.42E-07

2014

0.3141***

4.5847

8.18E-06

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A century of development in Taiwan

 

R2

t-stat

p-value

2015

0.3329***

4.8917

2.11E-06

2016

0.3021***

4.3911

1.86E-05

2017

0.2166***

3.0744

2.42E-03

2018

0.2887***

4.1776

4.47E-05

2019

0.2890***

4.1827

4.38E-05

Note: *** Significant at 1%.

8. Money and banking in Taiwan: country identity and the top trade partner Hong-Jen Abraham Lin I. INTRODUCTION Taiwan is known as a unique political and economic entity in East Asia. This is not only because of its rapid economic growth as one of the four little dragons in Asia in the late 20th century, but also because of its peculiar international status, as June Teuful Dryer addressed in Chapter 2 of this book. It operates under the political organization and constitution of the Republic of China, which is the government that retreated from mainland China to Taiwan after 1945. Taiwan was an essential hub of international trades in the East Asia in the 17th century and was conquered by the Qing Dynasty in 1683. After the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. This chapter addresses the issues of money and banking in Taiwan, where its status is always peculiar. It is not a country recognized by most nations of the world, but it has autonomy to choose the currency circulated and the banking system of the island. Although the authorities in Taiwan were changing through different time periods and regimes, the choice of currencies to a certain degree reflects the identity of Taiwan. In addition, the names of banks, particularly the newly established banks, indicate the identity of Taiwan during different time periods. Thus, it is interesting in presenting the history of money and banking in Taiwan and the corresponding transitions of different stages. The main topics are described as follows. The first part of the chapter explains the progress of the development of the banking system and how the names of banks reflected the identity of people in Taiwan. The second part of the chapter describes the currencies issued or used in different time periods and notes that the choice of the currency’s exchange policies was related to the needs of the top trade partner of Taiwan in that era. Finally, the third part of the chapter concludes with summarized histories of money and banking in Taiwan; and the issue of the country identity is highlighted. 179

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A century of development in Taiwan

Table 8.1

The banking system in different time periods Time Periods

Banking System

Bank 0.0

Before 1898

No modern banking system

Bank 1.0

1898–1945 Taiwan Banking Act

Japanese and Taiwanese banks in Japanese Taiwan

Bank 2.0

1946–1989

Chinese and Taiwanese banks in Kuomintang era Taiwan

Bank 3.0

1990–2000 ROC Bank Act

Taiwanese Banks in Taiwan

Bank 4.0

2001–current, after the First

Globalized Banks in Taiwan

Financial Reform

II.

BANKING IN TAIWAN

Taiwan’s banking system started during Japanese rule. The concept of modern banking has applied in Taiwan since then. The history of Taiwanese banking can be classified as the following eras. The time before the Japanese Rule is called Bank 0.0, the preliminary form of banking. After 1898, the Banking Act of Taiwan was passed. From 1898 to 1945, this can be named Bank 1.0, when the first modern bank was established in Taiwan. That is, Japanese and Taiwanese banks were created in Japanese colonial Taiwan. After 1945, many banks moved from mainland China to Taiwan, thriving along with the existing banks in Taiwan. This is the era of Bank 2.0. Specifically, Chinese banks were re-established or restored in Kuomintang era Taiwan. Bank 3.0 comprised new banks established after the new bank law was passed in 1989. That is, Taiwanese banks were established in Taiwan. And after the first financial reform in 2001, many small banks merged and form financial holding companies. This is the fourth picture of banking in Taiwan. We could name it Bank 4.0. It could be described as globalized banking in Taiwan. 2.1

BANK 0.0 and the Currencies Circulated

Before the Era of Japanese Colonial Rule (1895–1945), there was no bank of its modern definition in Taiwan. Some preliminary forms of banks such as houses of notes and remitters (Qien-Zhuang, 錢莊, printing the notes of silver, and Piau-Hau, 票號, remittance of money, both related to the silver association) existed in cities in Taiwan. Houses of notes were remitters and are different types of preliminary financial institutions. They issued notes, received deposits, sent payments and exchanged foreign currencies. Merchant houses were the financial intermediaries that use fund by foreign merchants to finance Chinese merchants. Some merchants took care of some financial functions such as deposits and loans. They were called Merchant Houses (Ma-Zhen

Money and banking in Taiwan

181

Guan, 媽振館).1 There were several features of these early forms of financial institutions. First, there was no concept of the required reserves, though they created money by printing notes and making loans. Second, there is no support or clear regulation from the central government or the central bank. Third, most of the transactions were tied to the trades, particularly the international trades. Thus, we can call them the BANK 0.0 version of Taiwan. 2.2

BANK 1.0 and the Banking System

A Japanese bank opened its first branch of Osaka Chun Li Bank2 in Keelung in 1895 right after the first Sino-Japanese War. BANK 1.0 was born after the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan passed the Taiwanese Bank Act. Under this Act, the Bank of Taiwan was established. The goals of the Bank of Taiwan are threefold: (1) issuing currency – the Taiwan Dollar; (2) supporting the development of industries in Taiwan;3 and (3) stepping southward policies.4 Therefore, the Bank of Taiwan functioned as the central bank of Taiwan and a commercial bank along with other banks. Among them, number (3) has its strong political purposes, as addressed in Chapter 6 by Frank Hsiao. This is also the first time that the modern concept of banking was considered. Even though some Taiwanese private banks emphasized more on the trading purposes in banking (e.g., in Chinese Mandarin Shin-Gao-In-Hang, in Japanese Kanji or Chinese: 新高銀行), the overall banking policy by Japanese colonial government focused on the capital formation. And most of funds came from the capital infusion of Japan.5 In the early stages of the Japanese rule (1896–1904), these banks first funded the industrialization of the agricultural-related factories and transportation.6 After the production of the agricultural sector increased, banks absorbed more responsibility of receiving more saved deposits of Taiwanese. This was especially revealed in the formation of the Taiwan Saving Bank. When the Japanese Empire was becoming more militarized in 1920s, the banks served for the channels for the economic or military expansion. The Hua Nan Commercial Bank (in Chinese Mandarin, Hua-Nan-In-Hang, 華南銀行) meaning the bank of the southern China,7 literary names southern China under the purpose for Japanese expansion toward Southern China. By the end of 1945, there were seven major operating banks in Taiwan. Out of the seven banks, the Bank of Taiwan, the Chang Hua Bank, the Taiwan Commercial and Industrial Bank, the Hua Nan Commercial Bank, and the Taiwan Saving Bank were Taiwan-based banks. The other two were Japan-based banks. We could observe that, among the Taiwan-based banks, three of them bore the names of Taiwan and the Chang Hwa is the name of

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A century of development in Taiwan

a city in Taiwan. In short, among seven operating banks in Taiwan, four of them (57.14%) bore the names directly related to Taiwan.8, 9, 10 2.3

BANK 2.0 and the Chinese Banks in Taiwan

Japan was defeated and surrendered to the Allied nations in 1945. After WW2, the Kuomintang (國民黨KMT, or Guomindang, the Nationalist) from mainland China occupied and took over Taiwan in 1945. The KMT government also took over both the public and private banks in Taiwan. The Bank of Taiwan also became the de facto central bank in Taiwan, although it still functioned as a commercial bank. After 1949, the Nationalist government retreated from the mainland to Taiwan and the Central Bank of ROC moved to Taiwan, too. The Central Bank of the ROC still existed in Taiwan from 1949 to 2000, but it did not issue currencies. This function of the Central Bank went to the Bank of Taiwan during this time period.11 Moreover, the Nationalist government moved major symbolic banks from China to Taiwan to demonstrate the sovereignty of the “central” Chinese government. Therefore, the existence of these state-owned banks is more for the political sense than the economic needs. These banks are Bank of China (later renamed as the International Commercial Bank of China, ICBC), Chinese Bank of Communication, and Chinese Farmers’ Bank, plus one privately owned bank, Shanghai Commercial Saving Bank. The new banks founded before 1980 were permitted as special cases, such as the Bank of Overseas Chinese, and the United World Chinese Commercial Bank 2.0. The environment of the Bank 2.0 was filled with the atmosphere of the “nationalism” of the KMT’s Republic of China when the “new” banks in Taiwan should bear or represent the names and/or spirit of the Republic of China. For instance, in the year of 1979, the ideology of the nationalist ROC in the field of banking might have reached its peak. The banks in Taiwan were as follows: the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd; the Export–Import Bank of ROC; the Hua Nan Commercial Bank; the International Chinese Business Commercial Bank; the Chiao-Tung Bank; the United World Chinese Commercial Bank; the Farmer’s Bank of China; and the Bank of Overseas Chinese – these were the banks that carried the name of the concepts of the Great China. i.e., Mainland China. The other six banks were the Land Bank of Taiwan, the Taiwan Business Bank, the Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, First Bank,12 and Chang Hua Bank. Therefore, the number of banks that carried the identity of the Great China was eight out of fourteen, 57.14 percent of total number of banks. The number of banks bore the names of Taiwan: “concept” was five out of fourteen (35.71 percent). Between 1949 and 1980, the financial system was guided and controlled by the central government of ROC in Taiwan. According to the regulation

Money and banking in Taiwan

183

before 1980, foreign banks cannot open new branches in Taiwan, neither can the capitalists in Taiwan establish new banks in Taiwan. Hence, the financial institutions that tied to the domestic economy and people’s daily life were the local credit unions, post offices, and farmers’ associations. Some of the credit unions were merged and re-organized as the medium–small enterprises banks. Therefore, the first meaningful new banks were established after the 1980’s liberation of the banking industry.13 2.4

BANK 3.0 and the Banking Proliferation

The 1980s witnessed the deregulation and liberalization in the banking industry in Taiwan along with the global trends of the open-door policies in the financial markets. There was a series of explosive financial scandals in the 1980s.14 The liberalization of the banking industry in Taiwan includes removing interest rate ceiling, adopting flexible (managed floating) exchange rate system, and allowing establishment of new banks. The new bank law passed in 1989 gave birth to 16 new privately owned commercial banks in 1990. The proliferation of the new banks has totally changed the landscape of the financial markets in Taiwan.15 Many new banks were the re-organized former local financial institutions such as farmers’ associations, credit unions, etc. This is BANK 3.0 in Taiwan. The new era of Taiwanese banks embarked upon in 1989 The deregulation of the 1989 Bank Act liberalized the fixed interest rates and gave permits to private capitalists to establish new banks. The interest rates of money markets and banking industry starts to float according to the market mechanism. The number of banks has increased from 24 state-owned banks in 1989 to 40 banks in 1991. The number of banks reached to 53 after the banking industry has been opened to entry for private capitals. The united monopoly of the state-owned banking market has been liberalized to allow more private or even foreign capitals to enter in the industry. The liberalization of the banking industry is also reflected by the names of banks. The names of banks do not have to be responsible for carrying the symbols or meanings of the Great China. The names of banks can be very regional (玉山銀行, E-SUN Bank, i.e., Mount Jade, the highest mountain in Taiwan) or very Chinese (中華商業銀行, i.e., Chinese Commercial Bank) or neutral to the identity of a nation such as Ta Chong Commercial Bank (i.e., 大眾銀行).16 2.5

BANK 4.0 and Bank Reforms

The problems of the proliferation of new banks have emerged in the late 1990s.17 The density of commercial banks in Taiwan reaches the recording

184

A century of development in Taiwan

high. The market size was not big enough to support the around fifty banks. In addition, foreign banks were allowed to operate in Taiwan to establish branches to compete with the domestic ones. The profit margins of banks in Taiwan shrunk.18 Therefore, bank reforms had become necessary. After 2001, the ROC government in Taiwan initiated the first and the second financial reforms to encourage the mergers among banks to make banks more competitive.19 The number of banks reduced and the banks were held by several large financial holding companies. These two reforms have dramatically changed the landscape of banks in Taiwan again. The purpose of a series of reforms is to enhance the competitive ability with globalized bankers from other countries. The first reform aimed to reduce the bad loans and increased the reserved capitals to make financial institutions safer; and the second reform attempted to reduce the number of financial holding companies by half to enhance the competitive strengths of banks. Most of the mergers were initiated by private bankers and across privately owned banks. The mergers between the state-owned and privately owned banks did not go smoothly. The goals of the first reform, reducing the number of the non-performing loans and increasing the reserved capital, have been achieved by improved efficiency of banks (Lee, Liang, and Huang, 2013; Hsiao and Lin, 2013) and the rising stock prices of publicly traded banks,20 but the goal of the second reform, reducing the number of the financial holding companies, was far away from the accomplishment.21 After mergers and acquisitions, the number of banks decreased from 53 (year 2001) to 37 (year 2008). In addition, the number of banks that convey the identity of the Great China decreased after these two reforms.22 It is the globalized banking in Taiwan. We may call it BANK 4.0. Comparing the banks in the 1979, we see 13 (Bank of Taiwan; Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, Ltd.; Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank Co., Ltd.; Bank of Kaohsiung Co., Ltd.; Citibank Taiwan, Ltd.; Standard Chartered Bank [Taiwan] Limited; Taichung Commercial Bank Co., Ltd.; HSBC Bank [Taiwan] Limited; Taipei Star Bank Co., Ltd.; Union Bank of Taiwan Co., Ltd.; Land Bank of Taiwan; Agriculture Bank of Taiwan; and Taiwan Business Bank Co., Ltd.) from the current 37 banks that bear the concept or identity of the whole Taiwan or a region of Taiwan. And three among these thirteen banks were basically foreign banks transformed to domestic banks by appending the name “Taiwan” to their original names (i.e., Citibank Taiwan, Ltd.; Standard Chartered Bank [Taiwan] Limited; and HSBC Bank [Taiwan] Limited). In other words, these three banks actually witness the globalization of the banking in Taiwan. The names express that they were foreign banks but converted to local ones. They do not convey the concepts of the Taiwan identity of people in Taiwan. That is, 10 out of 37 banks, 27.03 percent of them, deliver, or contain the concept of Taiwan or Taiwanese, a region.

Money and banking in Taiwan

185

Only three banks (the Export–Import Bank of ROC; the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd.; Hua Nan Commercial Bank, Ltd.; and CTBC Bank Co., Ltd.) now bear the name related to the Great China. This number is only 10.81 percent of the current banks, while the majority of the domestic banks bear the names neither related to Taiwan nor related to China. Here, from the names of domestic banks in Taiwan, we can observe that they are seeking the globalization of banking and their names tend to be neutral to the identity of Taiwan or China. Moreover, we can also observe that the proportion of banks that carry the identity of Taiwan has dropped from 35.7 percent in 1979 to 27.03 percent in 2008 and stays the same up to 2021, and the proportion of banks that carry “the Great China identity” has dropped from 57.14 percent to 10.81 percent.23 To sum up, the identity of people in Taiwan should be reflected by the changes of names of banks. People in Taiwan are neither seeking “Taiwan-ized” nor “Chinese-ized” from the name change of banks. Instead, the name change of banks reveals the tendency of globalization.24

III.

CURRENCIES ISSUED, EXCHANGE RATES, INTERNATIONAL TRADES, AND AUTONOMY OF TAIWAN

The history of the monetary system in Taiwan is stated as follows. Before the Qing Dynasty (清朝), under the reign of Kuoxinga (國姓爺, 東寧王國, the Kingdom of Tungning, or called 明鄭, Ming Zheng), people in Taiwan used multiple currencies, such as Spanish silver coins and Mexican silver coins and Chinese silver blocks. The Spanish and Mexican silver coins have already earned the trust of the merchants in the international trades in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. This coincides with the reality of the political autonomy of Taiwan. Koxinga, and its father Iquan Nicholas (一官, 尼可拉斯, or 鄭 芝龍, Zhi-Long Zheng) were the sea power with mixed military forces and merchants in Southeastern Asia. Their major concern was not to establish a dynasty. Instead, its goal was to maintain its especial economic and military status of international trades. As I mentioned before, under the reign of the Qing Dynasty, silver blocks and copper/bronze coins issued by the Qing Emperors were used. Some paper money from mainland Chinese territory also circulated. Although the Kingdom of Tungning issue bronze coins of the Ming Dynasty (永曆通寶, Yung-Li Tung Bao), the bronze coins of earlier emperors of the Ming Dynasty and Japanese bronze coins circulated at the same time. Hence, it is not the main purpose to issue its own money to claim the autonomy of the Kingdom of Tungning.25 In short, the currency system accepted in Taiwan was a commodity money system, silver based and international trades oriented. The silver base was well accepted by the multilateral

186

Table 8.2

A century of development in Taiwan

Major currencies used in several different time periods

Regime

Major Currency

Kingdom of Tungning

Yung-Li Tung Bao, Mexican

Years 1661–1683

Silver Coins, Silver Blocks, etc. Qing’s Taiwan

Qing’s silver blocks, bronze coins

1683–1895

and others Republic of Formosa

Republic of Formosa’s paper

1895

money was issued but not popular Japanese Colonial Taiwan

Taiwanese Yen (Silver Standard)

1895–1903

Japanese Colonial Taiwan

Taiwanese Yen (Gold Standard)

1904–1946

ROC moves to Taiwan

Old Taiwan Dollar, Currency of

1946–1949

Taiwan Province, Republic of China ROC in Taiwan

Quasi-Gold Standard for 18

1950–1951

months ROC in Taiwan

New Taiwan Dollar (issued by the

1951–1999

Bank of Taiwan) ROC in Taiwan

New Taiwan Dollar (issued by the

2000–Current

Central Bank of ROC)

trades across Japan, Spain, Portugal (including Macau), Dutch, Taiwan, and Chinese Qing Dynasty. The choice of the currency is related to the purpose of international trades that relied on the circulation of silver coins or silver.26 This international-trade oriented money/currency policy has been considered and adopted throughout the history of Taiwan. The currencies used in Taiwan include paper money and bronze/copper coins of the Qing Dynasty. The most acceptable currency was silver and most trades were computed based on the weights of silver. The bronze/copper coins were not the standard for the clearance of trades. They were used mainly in inner island transactions with small volumes.27 Taiwan kept its independent and unique currency starting with the Republic of Formosa (1895, or Taiwan Democratic Nation, 台灣民主國, Tai-wan Min Zhu Guo)28,29. The government of the Republic of Formosa was formed by people in Taiwan to resist the occupation of the Japanese army. It printed its own currency, but it did not sustain long. This was the first currency that Taiwan demonstrated its own autonomy as an entity. Eventually, this government was destroyed within one hundred and fifty days. And this government never got any recognition from other governments. Under the Japanese colonial government, although the exchange rate of Taiwanese yen and Japanese was 1:1, Taiwanese yen was first issued on the silver standard in order to make smoothly the regime-shift of currencies from

Money and banking in Taiwan

187

currencies of the Qing dynasty to the Japanese yen.30 The Bank of Taiwan first issued Taiwan yen by using silver as the reserves. From 1898 to 1903, the first banknote issued by the Bank of Taiwan was silver based in 1899. In 1904, the Bank of Taiwan started to issue gold-standard one-dollar bank notes. The circulation of the silver banknotes was abandoned till the end of 1909. Interestingly, under the Japanese rule, Taiwan did not use Japanese Yen as the circulated currency. Instead, it issued its own currency Taiwanese Yen (Chinese or Japanese kanji: 臺灣銀行券）from the 1890s to 1945. One main reason is that some earlier Taiwanese Governor-Generals regarded Taiwan as a fiscal burden. Not until the end of the Japan–Russia war in 1905 did the government budget in Taiwan become independent from the Japanese Empire. Hence, an independent monetary system under the Bank of Taiwan was designed and the monetary system of Taiwan was separated from that of Japan from the beginning of the Bank of Taiwan (1898).31 Taiwanese yen was issued with the silver reserves. That is, the Taiwanese yen’s value was pegged to Japanese yen as well as the market value of silver. The main reason is to make the new currency consistent with the most popular currencies used, such as silver coins and silver blocks. Before 1900, China was the largest trade partner on either import side or export side. From 1900 to 1905, China became the second-largest trade partner while Japan turned to be the top trade partner.32 In addition, the Spanish or Mexican silver coins were popular currencies during that time period in Taiwan. The Taiwanese yen with the silver standard should be a better choice for the international trades. Since the Japanese Yen was based on the gold standard in 1897, the colonial currency’s base in Taiwan is different from that of the currency of the mainland. The difference between the gold prices and silver prices in the international markets created an opportunity of arbitrage in between Japanese Yen (Gold Standard) and Taiwanese Yen (Silver Standard). Hence, the Taiwanese yen was issued on gold base after 1904.33 After 1904, Japan (Mainland), instead of China (Mainland) became the most important trade partner of Taiwan. Hence, the choice of the gold standard is surely good for the purpose of international trades. The Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT, or Guomindang, the Nationalist) occupied and took over Taiwan in 1945. The use of the Taiwanese yen was extended to the year 1946 during the transition of regimes. The function of the Bank of Taiwan stayed the same and Taiwan kept its monetary independence. That is, the Bank of Taiwan was the “Central Bank” in terms of the functions and the issuer of the currency. The society in Taiwan experienced turmoil in every aspect including money and banking from 1945 to 1949. Taiwan encountered the post-war hyper-inflation as addressed in Section II in Chapter 7.34 In 1949, the KMT regime lost almost all territories in Mainland China and retreated to Taiwan. Due to the hyperinflation, the main goal of the monetary

188

A century of development in Taiwan

policy for the KMT regime in Taiwan was to stabilize the value of currency. In addition, the KMT regime carried the gold reserves from mainland to Taiwan.35 Under the KMT regime in Taiwan, officially the legal tender was still the silver dollar (Yin-Yuan, 銀圓). In practice, Taiwanese in Taiwan used the New Taiwan Dollar, and to a certain degree, backed by the gold reserves held by the KMT government in Taiwan. This type of gold reserves may be called “quasi-gold-standard.”36 Although some researchers cast doubt on how much is the real impact of the gold reserves held by the KMT regime,37 the gold reserve to a certain degree helps stabilize the monetary system. At least it helped people build the confidence toward the newly issued “New Taiwan Dollar” psychologically. The KMT regime successfully deterred the post-war hyperinflation via this “quasi-gold standard” that lasted for 18 months.38 On the other hand, right after 1949 on the early stage, the exchange rate of the new Taiwan Dollar was fixed to the US dollar. Since the value of the US dollar was stable and linked to gold before 1971, this type of monetary policy helps stabilize the value of currency and trading with the US. Nevertheless, the stability of the value of currency (that is, anti-inflation) was the priority in choosing monetary system. The foreign exchange rate policy of the pegging US dollar contributed to the international trades when the US is the major international trade partner of Taiwan. Hence the choice of the policy is natural. The liberalization of the global foreign exchange markets in the 1970s and the deregulation of the banking markets of Taiwan in the 1980s fostered the deregulation of the foreign exchange markets. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system after the US denounced the convertibility of US dollar and gold, the Central Bank of ROC (Taiwan) allowed flexible exchange of the New Taiwan Dollar vs. the US dollar from July 1978 but still with strong intervention. After 1986, under the pressure that the US requested the openness of financial markets in Taiwan.39 Hence, Taiwan must lift the control of capital flows as dictated by a “Trilemma of International Monetary System”.40 The capital control of foreign currencies had been alleviated. Taiwan switched to “managed floating-rate system”. The liberalization and deregulation of the foreign exchange markets are highly related to the influences from the top trade partners, that is, the U.S. In the year 2000, the New Taiwan Dollar was defined as the national currency of the Republic of China. Its status as the national currency, not the regional currency, was clear. The Central Bank of ROC assumed the role of the true central bank that issues the national currency of the country in the same year. After Taiwan joined in the World Trade Organization, we have observed significant increase in international trades from 2001 up to 2017.41 The US kept its top trade partner status of Taiwan until 2002. Japan became the top trade partner of Taiwan in the years 2003 and 2004. Soon China replaced Japan as the top trade partner in 2005 and after (see Table 8.3). And the different

189

Money and banking in Taiwan

Table 8.3

Amounts of international trades (imports plus exports) of Taiwan with the top four trade partners (in million US dollars)

Year

China (Mainland)

Hong Kong

Japan

US

2002

18,731

34,803

40,003

46,395

2003

34,305

32,723

45,579

44,361

2004

53,614

35,178

58,275

51,421

2005

64,218

36,121

61,931

51,042

2006

77,286

39,364

63,357

56,314

2007

91,150

39,910

62,854

59,638

2008

99,051

34,375

64,906

58,217

2009

79,321

30,756

51,358

42,356

2010

114,142

39,800

71,355

57,840

2011

129,217

42,268

72,269

63,476

2012

124,024

41,076

67,860

57,964

2013

127,468

42,769

63,081

60,415

2014

133,963

45,507

62,108

64,371

2015

118,535

40,584

58,422

62,811

2016

117,723

39,584

60,091

60,483

2017

138,783

42,677

62,513

65,168

2018

150,288

42,810

66,952

72,595

2019

149,184

41,387

67,331

81,097

2020

166,024

50,203

69,282

83,029

Source: Website of the Ministry of Finance, Taiwan, ROC (2021), https://​www​.mof​.gov​.tw.

amount of trades between Taiwan and China and that between Taiwan and the US is becoming larger and larger. Taiwan will not adopt Renminbi as the major foreign exchange reserve until Renminbi becomes a key currency in the future.

IV. CONCLUSIONS This chapter has described the history of the development of the banking system and money/currency used by Taiwanese and the government in Taiwan. The banking system in Taiwan experienced regime shifts and financial reforms. The names of newly established or restored or re-organized banks signal the identity of the regimes in Taiwan of that time period. The reforms of the banking system were classified from Bank 0.0 to Bank 4.0. The transition of the whole reforms started with the Japanese and Taiwanese banks in

190

A century of development in Taiwan

Japanese colonial Taiwan, Chinese and Taiwanese banks in KMT-era Taiwan, and Taiwanese and global banks in Taiwan. The choice of currency systems is particularly associated with the needs of the top trade partners. The monetary systems changed from silver-standard (1890s–1903) to gold standard (1904–1930); and from gold standard to pegged to Japanese yen (1931–1945); and then from pegged to Japanese yen to pegged to US dollar; and from pegged to US dollar to flexible to US dollar now (2021). One exception is the quasi-gold standard from 1950 to 1951. Furthermore, the government authorities in Taiwan, from the Kingdom of Tungning, the Qing Dynasty, Japanese colonial rule, to the ROC government in Taiwan, may issue their own currencies of that time period to demonstrate its autonomy or identity. The fact that Taiwan has issued its own currencies under Japanese reign and Chinese KMT’s reign tells that Taiwan in history has its own specific economic and political status that issuing its own currency would meet its special needs in the multilateral trades and those of the autonomy of the government of Taiwan though the banks in Taiwan under Japanese reign were run by Japanese in Taiwan.42

NOTES 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

Please see Lee (1998), p. 7, para. 3, l. 1. Lee (1998), p. 6, para. 3, l. 3. Lee (1998). The second goal in the very beginning was only to support agricultural reforms via the Land Reform. After the militarization of Japan, banking in Taiwan started to fund more industrialization other than the agriculture-related industries in Taiwan. See Park and Kahm (2015) for the similar case and policies in Korea. And Matsuoka (1942) explained the financial problems of the banks in colonies during World War 2. Ho (1975), p. 429. Chang and Myers (1963). The investments of sugar production were from the Japanese private sugar companies and banks in Taiwan were responsible for providing loans for them. Lee (1998), p. 9, para. 1, ll. 4–7: because the Japanese Empire wanted to expand its economic power to the Southern China and Southeast Asia, Hua Nan Commercial Bank was established and named as “Hua Nan”. Nevertheless, the founder and the director of the board Lin, Xiong-Zheng (林熊徵, a Taiwanese intellectual representative of his time) might have the Great Chinese conscience in his mind. See Lee (1998), p. 9. Here the fact that the names of banks show the identity of Taiwan means the identity of people in Taiwan, including the Japanese emigrants to Taiwan. Many workers, particularly the management level, were “Japanese emigrants” who identify Taiwan as an extension of the mainland Japan and their homes. See Ho (1975), p. 429. McNamara (1986): “With the severing of ties with mainland it became clear that the Taiwanese had little sense of an indigenous political identity”, so the identity

Money and banking in Taiwan

11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

191

and sense of Taiwan started with the Japanese Rule. Ching (2001), p. 81, para. 2, “It is a truism that the notion of ‘Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwanese’ gained currency among the colonial elite during the 1920’s.” The central bank of a country in theory is the financial institution to issue the currency of the country and serves as all banks’ bank. But in Taiwan between 1949 and 2000, the central bank of the ROC served only for the second purpose, not print currencies for people in Taiwan. This is an exception among central banks all over the world. The First Bank merged, “Shin-Gao-In-Hang”, succeeded the Taiwan Saving Bank and Taiwan Commercial and Industrial Banks. The names of forerunners of the First Bank contained the concepts of Taiwan. In 1949, the First Bank was renamed as “Taiwan First Commercial Bank”, while the name changed again in 1976 to be “The First Commercial Bank” (without Taiwan) for the purpose of internationalization. Please see the website of the First Commercial Bank https://​www​.firstbank​ .com​.tw/​sites/​fcb/​1540896967016 (accessed on September 20, 2021). Yang and Shea (2014). Lee (1998), p. 19, para. 2. Yu and Wang (2005), p. 371. See Lee (1998), Yu and Wang (2005), and Yang and Shea (2014). Lee (1998), pp. 20–21. The other new wave of banking scandals rose. Taitung Medium Business Bank, Overseas Chinese Bank, Chungli Farmer’s Association, and Chang Hua Forth Credit Union were either bailed out or taken over, among several other cases. Also see Sato (2002) for the view that the financial institutions supported by the local factions may fall into scandals during democratization in Taiwan. Lin (2005), Lee, Liang, and Huang (2013), and Sato (2002). Sato indicates that the financial reforms and democratization created more bad loans in Taiwan. See Leou (2007) and Yang and Shea (2014). Yu and Wang (2005), p. 203, para. 2. Hwang and Wu (2006) address the issues of the second financial reform. The potential moral hazard problems and the too-strong market power were the concerns after the mergers of financial holding companies. See Yu and Wang (2005) and the appendix, Table 8.4. See Yu and Wang (2005), updated information on banks from the websites of each bank, and https://​zh​.wikipedia​.org/​wiki/​%E8​%87​%BA​%E7​%81​%A3​%E9​ %8A​%80​%E8​%A1​%8C​%E5​%88​%97​%E8​%A1​%A8 (accessed on September 20, 2021). The name changes of firms affect firm values. This also applies in the field of banking, too. See Green and Jame (2013). Andrade (2008). Domestic transactions in Taiwan were traded by using the silver and bronze currencies of the Kingdom of Tungning while some international trades still relied on the Spanish or Mexican coins. Please see Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620–1720 by Xing Hang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Andrade (2006). Ching (2001), p. 62, before the Japanese colonial rule, most people in Taiwan had the “Han-Chinese-ethnical” conscience. It says that the difference between the Taiwanese conscience and Fatherland conscience was not much in the early period of Japanese colonial rule. And p. 81 indicates that the Taiwanese identity became common in the 1920s among the Taiwanese intellectuals.

192

A century of development in Taiwan

28. See Wright (2011), p. 113. 29. “Republic of Formosa. Most Short-Lived Government That Has Ever Existed”, Sacramento Daily Record-Union, Sacramento, 20 July 1895, p. 8. But the use of the currency was so limited. It was not circulated among the ordinary people during the year 1895. 30. The Central Bank of the Republic of China Museum: https://​museum​.cbc​.gov​.tw/​ web/​zh​-tw/​history/​develop (accessed on September 20, 2021). The first currency in Taiwan did not adopt the “currency board” commonly used in the British Colonies. Instead, Japanese established the Bank of Taiwan and issued currency on the silver base, which was used in Taiwan before the Japanese rule when the mainland Japan had already adopted the gold standard monetary system. 31. Chang and Myers (1963). Before the governor-general Kodama Gentaro in 1898, the colonial policies from the Japanese government used to be uncertain. One former governor-general Nogi had even considered selling Taiwan Island to France. Therefore, the central banking system of Taiwan was separated. 32. Yeh (2009), p. 265, Table 22. 33. Ibid. 34. See Financial Supervisory Commission of ROC, the history of banks in Taiwan, https://​history​.fsc​.gov​.tw/​History​?Type​=​%E9​%8A​%80​%E8​%A1​%8C​%E5​%B1​ %80 (accessed on September 20, 2021). 35. June 3rd, 1950. National History Archive No. 002-080109-00005-005. 1950年 6月3日, 收錄於國史館典藏《俞鴻鈞呈蔣中正臺灣銀行發行準備外匯暨黃金 儲蓄及收付各情形》第二頁, 數位典藏號, 002-080109-00005-005. 36. See Li (2005). It was a special gold-standard era, with 100 percent gold reserves, lasting for only 18 months from 1950 to 1951. This happened before the American Aids went to Taiwan. Here I name it “quasi gold standard” instead of the gold standard because Li is the only scholar who emphasizes on the fact of the delivery of gold from Shanghai to Taipei before 1949 was for the preparation of the gold standard system of the New Taiwan Dollar. 37. Ibid. 38. See Yu and Wang (2005) and the appendix, Table A8.1. 39. Yu and Wang (2005), p. 51. 40. A “Trilemma of international monetary system” is also called an “impossible Trinity”. It is referred to as the difficulty to achieve the three goals of a monetary system in the international environment. These three goals are an exchange rate stability, full financial integration, and an independent monetary policy. See Moffet, Stonehill, and Eiteman (2015). 41. See https://​www​.cbc​.gov​.tw/​tw/​cp​-538​-2337​-C05DD​-1​.html, The Summary of the Balance of Payment from the Central Bank of ROC (Taiwan) (accessed on September 20, 2021). 42. In terms of policies, Japanese Imperial government regarded Taiwan as the extension of the Japan mainland after 1898. Please see note 10.

REFERENCES Andrade, Tonio (2006), “The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624–1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion,” Journal of World History 17(4), pp. 429–450.

Money and banking in Taiwan

193

Andrade, Tonio (2008), How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Central Bank of the Republic of China Museum (2020), at https://​museum​.cbc​.gov​.tw/​ web/​zh​-tw/​history/​develop (accessed on September 20, 2021). Chang, Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myers (1963), “Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895–1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Asian Studies 22(4), pp. 433–449. Ching, Leo T.S. (2001), Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, first edition. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Green, T.C. and R. Jame (2013), “Company Name Fluency, Investor Recognition, and Firm Value,” Journal of Financial Economics 109(3), pp. 813–834. Hang, Xing (2015), Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620–1720. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ho, Samuel P.S. (1975), “The Economic Development of Colonial Taiwan: Evidence and Interpretation,” Journal of Asian Studies 34(2), pp. 417–439. Hsiao, Hsing-Chin and Mei-Hwa Lin (2013), “Taiwan Second Financial Restructuring and Commercial Bank Productivity Growth: M&As Impact,” Review of Accounting and Finance 12(4), pp. 327–350. Hwang, Dar-Yeh and Wu Wei-Hsiung (2007), “Financial System Reform in Taiwan,” Journal of Asian Economics 18(1), pp. 21–41. Lee, Lawrence L.C. (1998), “The Development of Banking in Taiwan: the Historical Impact on Future Challenges,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 6, Article 1. Available at: https://​digitalcommons​.law​.umaryland​.edu/​mscas/​vol1998/​ iss6/​1 (accessed on September 20, 2021). Lee, Tung-Hao, Lien-Wen Liang and Bor-Yi Huang (2013), “Do Mergers Improve the Efficiency of Banks in Taiwan? Evidence from Stochastic Frontier Approach,” Journal of Developing Areas 47(1), pp. 395–416. Leou, Cia-Feng (2007), “Financial Liberalisation and Democratisation: The Prolonged Reform of Taiwan’s State Owned Banks (1989–2005),” China Perspectives 1(69), pp. 83–93. Li, Shih-hui (2005), “The Currency Conversion in Postwar Taiwan: Gold Standard from 1949 to 1950,” Kyoto Economic Review 74(2), pp. 191–203. Lin, Ping-wen (2005), “An Empirical Analysis of Bank Mergers and Cost Efficiency in Taiwan,” Small Business Economics 25(2), pp. 197–206. Matsuoka, Kōji (1942), “Southern Economy: Its Currency and Financial Problems,” Kyoto University Economic Review 17(4), pp. 27–47. McNamara, Dennis L. (1986), “Comparative Colonial Response: Korea and Taiwan,” Korean Studies 10, pp. 54–68. Moffett, M.H., A.I. Stonehill, and D.K. Eiteman (2015), Fundamentals of Multinational Finance, 5th edition. London: Pearson. Park, Sung Jun and Howard Kahm (2015), “Sovereignty and Central Banking: Evidence from the East Asian Region in the Early 1900’s,” Global Economic Review 44(2), pp.  167–183, http://​dx​.doi​.org/​10​.1080/​1226508X​.2015​.1029506 Sacramento Daily (1985), “Republic of Formosa: Most Short-Lived Government That Has Ever Existed”, Sacramento Daily Record-Union, Sacramento, 20 July, p. 8. Sato, Yukihito (2002), “Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation”, Developing Economies 40, 226–251. 10.1111/j.1746-1049.2002.tb00914.x.

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A century of development in Taiwan

Wright, D.C. (2011), The History of China. London: ABC-CLIO. Yang, Y.H. and Shea, J. (2014), “The Changes and Transitions of the Taiwanese Financial Systems”, no.1 of the series of the development of the Taiwanese Financial Systems, Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance, 楊雅惠, 許嘉棟 (2014), “台灣 金融體制之變遷綜觀”,台灣的金融體制與發展系列之一 , 台灣金融研訓院. Yeh, S. (2009), “The Economic Development of Taiwan under Japanese Rule”, Bank of Taiwan Quarterly 60(4), pp. 234–236. 臺灣銀行季刊第六十卷第四期 日治時 代臺灣經濟的發展 葉淑貞, at https://​www​.bot​.com​.tw/​Site​Collection​Documents/​ resource​_103/​quarterly​_103/​60​_4/​quarterly60​_4​_09​.pdf p.234-236 (accessed on September 20, 2021). Yu, T. and C. Wang (2005), “The Transition of Taiwanese Financial Systems”, Ch. 2, pp. 28–34, and Ch. 3; 于宗先, 王金利 台灣金融體制之演變, Ch. 2, and Ch. 3, in 出版社聯經出版事業股份有限公司, 出版日期 線上出版日期.

195

Money and banking in Taiwan

APPENDIX Table 8A.1

List of banks in Taiwan bearing the names of the identity of Great China

Chinese bank in Taiwan

Restored

Merged to (with)

year

Merged year

1960

Mega International Commercial Bank

Chiao Tung Bank

1949

Mega International Commercial Bank

2006

The Export–Import Bank of ROC

1979

Existing

--

The Shanghai Commercial & Savings

1954

Existing

--

1975

Cathay United Bank

2003

1961

Citibank Taiwan, Ltd

2007

1966

Existing. But it is identified by the

--

International Commercial Bank of

2006

China (used to be “Bank of China” held by the KMT regime)

Bank, Ltd. United World Chinese Commercial Bank Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited Chinatrust Commercial Bank

name CTBC now. Farmers Bank of China

1949

Taiwan Cooperative Bank

2006

The Chinese Commercial Bank

1991

Closed

2008

PART IV

Societal and educational development

9. The rise and fall of civil society movements in Taiwan: 1920–2020 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao I. INTRODUCTION This chapter intends to depict and analyze the significant cycles of rise and fall of Taiwan’s civil society momentum and organized movements between 1920 and 2020, a century-long history. As early as the first few years of the 1990s, some sociologists began to pay their research attentions to the emergent large-scale social movements in the 1980s, the most recent rise and outbreak of Taiwan’s collective civil society activism after the end of the World War II (see Hsiao 1989, 1990; Hsiao and Ho, 2010). Notably among them, Hsiao (2019) has been following this wave of social activism all the way to the present. The four decades of this wave of social movements and political activism not only have paved the road to political liberalization and democratic transition, but have also led to the eventual first political regime change in 2000. Later in the mid-1990s, this author found it intellectually challenging to trace the historical change of state–society power relations between 1945 and 1980, and realized that the prelude to the 1980s large-scale social movements actually took place in the mid- and late 1970s, and that early social activism should not be ignored. The mid-1970s society’s activism focused more on raising culture-related awareness such as Taiwanese cultural indigenization, while the post-1980 society’s activism was more on social and political reforms and transformation. Soon after those two research endeavors, this author then started an even longer historical–sociological search. Taiwan’s prewar colonial history caught the attention of this author. A rich collection of materials written by historians about the 1920–1937 social and intellectual mobilization for social and political reforms under the Japanese colonialism were discovered and utilized for sociological inquiry. The 1920–1937 self-governance movements targeted the then Japanese colonial government in both Taipei and Tokyo. It is, of course, important to point out that the earlier 20 years of the Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1915 were full of violent protests and armed confrontation 197

198

A century of development in Taiwan

against the incoming Japanese colonial government. The violent unrest then gave way to the peaceful civil protest movements in and around 1920. The 1970s cultural enlightenment movements aimed at the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) authoritarian state fled from China. During the 1980s and afterwards, social protests and civil movements further confronted both the authoritarian KMT regime (1980–2000) and the democratic rule under the Democratic Progressive Party after the first regime change in 2000. Therefore, it is very illuminating to assert that, over the history of one century, Taiwanese leading individuals and their organizations from civil society have repeatedly mobilized themselves to demand and push different types of societal change and political reforms under three subsequent political regimes of colonialism, authoritarianism, and democracy. And the former two regimes both came from outside, while the democratic regime was home grown in Taiwan. The past century of 1920–2020 witnessed the above two surging civil society movements of 1920–1937 and 1980–2020, totaled 58 years, while in the remaining 42 years, Taiwan’s civil activism was suppressed by the respective colonial and authoritarian regimes. If the 5 years in the late 1970s were considered to be the overture to the full-fledged civil society momentum after 1980, then the rising activism period amounted to 63 years. Truly, the length of rising civil society activism was indeed longer than the demise of civil society forced over the past one hundred years. The formation and power of civil society dynamism were constantly induced to critically challenge the power of the existing states (regimes) so as to change state–state relations. The availability of civil society force and its capability to alter the state power indeed depended on the configuration of the state (regime)–society power dynamics (Keane, 1988; Hall, 1995; Migdal et al., 1994). To put it simply, the changing state–society relations are the grading analytical perspective used in this chapter in tracking the dynamics and development of Taiwan’s civil society organizational force over the past century. From this seemingly simple yet critical counting of civil society activism and mobilization, Taiwanese society can be characterized as a constantly self-mobilized one. The state–society power relations have been dynamic and ever changing. Such preliminary assertion should indeed have an interesting and crucial bearing on how we see the nature of Taiwanese society as a whole and the civil society force in particular. This chapter will be divided into the following parts. The first 1920–1937 civil society activism rise will be reviewed, then the postwar overture of the mid-to-late 1970s cultural enlightenment movements and the following second significant rise of civil society force foment since the 1980s are depicted. What to follow is the sociological characterization and comparison of the two civil society dynamism before and after the war in terms of a list of selected

The rise and fall of civil society movements in Taiwan: 1920–2020

199

analytical factors. Lastly, some tentative theoretical and policy conclusions will be made.

II.

A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE 1920–1937 SELF-GOVERNANCE MOVEMENTS UNDER COLONIALISM

During the first 20 years of Taiwan’s cession by the Ching Empire to the Japanese Imperial State, the legitimacy of the colonial government was seriously challenged and questioned by the local Taiwanese society. Many and constant guerrilla armed resistances took place in various parts of Taiwan, organized by both the Han immigrant settlers and the indigenous tribes. The very early armed force resisted by the Japanese were enraged by the Hakka local gentry class leaders (Lee, 2013: 183–185). Ironically, the short-lived Republic Taiwan (Republic of Formosa), a fake independent state that was still loyal to the Ching Empire, surrendered without fighting. Later, on the side of Han immigrants, the Taiwanese resistance were mainly organized by unregulated local grassroots forces. The leading leaders were Chien Ta-shih in the north, Ke Tieh-hu in the center, and Lin Shao-mao in the south. They were even called “three anti-Japanese braves”, but they then often compromised with the new Japanese ruler for exchange of immediate benefits (Lee, 2013: 191–194). Many rebels except a few of the armed unrest came from the underclass and marginal groups who did not necessarily believe in modern nationalism for their guerrilla actions. They could be characterized as a kind of traditional and feudalistic body inspired and caused by profound belief in “dynasty change” (Lee, 2013: 191–194). In addition, the indigenous peoples’ rebellions were even harder to be tamed by the Japanese military. Compared with the above Han people-initiated rebels, the indigenous tribes’ resistance was most mobilized to resist the outside invading force. After the large military crush of “Truku Expedition” in 1914 against the indigenous tribes, the island-wide guerrilla warfare against Japan were almost suppressed and pacified. The Japanese colonial government then progressively seized the control of Taiwan (Tai, 2007: 134–138). The decades-long guerrilla revolts from the local Taiwanese grassroots eventually failed to overthrow the Japanese rule, Taiwanese intellectual elites began to consider the alternative way of “resistance”. Around 1920, the Taiwanese intellectuals and local elites all in all accepted the status quo of the Japanese rule, and what they had in mind as the desired and feasible form of political reform was to maintain or raise the Taiwanese people’s political status and civil rights. They abandoned the armed force and violent means; instead, they began to adopt the peaceful civic movement strategy. Heavily influenced by popularized thoughts of “national self-determination” and “democracy” at

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that time, they immediately took these as the guiding ideologies to launch the next phase of public enlightenment movement. In 1920, a group of overseas Taiwanese students in Tokyo finally established the New People Association (新民會) and published a journal of Taiwan Youth (台灣青年) as the association’s organ for public education and social advocacy. Before that, they engaged in a decade-long debate over “assimilation rule vs. rule by special legislation” for Taiwan under Japanese colonialism. Eventually, the young Taiwanese intellectual elites studying in Japan reached a consensus, that colonial self-governance was the acceptable and feasible form. For such colonial self-governance to be realized, a separate colonial assembly should be established first (Chou, 2009: 169–173). Then an organized Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement (台灣議會請願 運動) was immediately launched in 1921 led by Lin Hsien-tang (林獻堂), a Taiwanese landlord–gentry class. This movement sent a total of 15 delegations of petition to Tokyo’s Japanese Imperial Assembly between 1921 and 1934. Based on the available data of the key 95 representatives of the movement leaders, it is quite clear that the majority consisted of landlords, medical doctors, lawyers, businessmen, managers, and reporters; all could be considered the upper, business, and professional class of that time (Chou, 1989: 210–223). Most of them were also the same intellectual elites who later played critical and leading role in the subsequent civil society movements. They made clear that such petition movement was not to set up a totally independent legislative body, but a local council to review budget for Taiwan and matters related to safeguard special protection of Taiwan residents. It is important to point out that this petition movement was primarily carried out by another civil society organization at that time, the Taiwan Culture Association (台灣文化協會), established by Chiang Wei-shui (蔣渭水), another key Taiwanese intellectual elite. Besides the petition advocacy, this Association also engaged in many other public enlightenment and social awareness activities. For example, they sponsored public seminars, reading classes, established bookstores, and youth organizations in various localities, organized island-wide cultural theatres, movies, and music concerts. Clearly, Taiwan’s Culture Association was the pioneering civil society organization initiated by intellectuals and advocating for multiple social, cultural, and political reforms in Taiwan’s modern history. At the inauguration, the membership was mainly composed of medical doctors, public school graduates, higher education students, and landlords. Similar to the above Assembly petitioners, the Association’s leaders were mostly landlords, journalists, professionals, small businessmen, and lawyers. Some of them had even studied in Japan previously. No membership or leadership came from labor and farmers (Chang, 1996: 136–137).

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Although cultural enlightenment was the stated goal of the Association, through the above variety of campaigns and activities, it nevertheless reached the objectives of raising the Taiwan public’s political awareness of and collective belief in national self-determination. The Japanese colonial government permitted the establishment of the Association on the grounds of its stated purpose to promote culture, and watched and monitored all the Association’s activities closely since its inception. As pointed out, the Assembly movement and the Association were in fact two sides of one coin. So, the Assembly movement was also kept under constant surveillance by the police of the colonial government. According to the police investigation report in 1925, the colonial government was already highly skeptical concerning the true motivation of the Assembly movement. They believed that the movement was actually aimed at Taiwanese national self-governance and self-determination, and even tended to promote the eventual separatism and de-colonialization. Under the close monitoring of the colonial government and its police force, the Assembly movement and the Association activities were cautiously conducted to avoid the political crush from the colonial ruler until the internal split of the Association due to ideological conflict in 1927. The 1920s were really marked by the foment of different modern social and political thoughts in Japan and China such as the above national self-determination, democracy, socialism, communism, and even anarchism. Through the diffusion and communication of the Taiwanese students studying in Japan, the different and conflicting ideologies were inevitably brought into Taiwan’s gentry landlords and intellectuals-supported Taiwan Culture Association and its associated Assembly Petition movement. The immediate impact and consequence were the disputes over the priorities and strategies of the Association’s future movement directions and activities. Two different factions were then formed: one was the moderate faction, and the other was the radical faction. The former took the Japanese colonial rule as a fact and believed in reform strategy. The latter believed in class struggles and nationalist liberation movement. In addition to the two evident ideological factions, emerging disputes over how the Association should steer and support the rising farmers movement, which direction China should take in the future, and what the future strategy should be for the frustrating Assembly movement thus far, had even deepened the division of the Association’s leadership structure. Plus, the colonial government seized the opportunities to employ tactics of provocation, instigation, and enticement among the dividing individuals and factions. The Association was finally split on January 3, 1927 (Chang, 1996: 145–149). The radical leftist faction controlled the power of the existing Association and changed it into the New Culture Society (新文協), while the moderate and

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rightist faction left the Association and established the Taiwan People’s Party (台灣民眾黨). Under the New Culture Society led by the leftist faction leader Lien Wen-chin (連溫卿) and Wang Ming-chuan (王敏川), the leadership structure was drastically turned into the hand of labor, farmer, businessmen, and the unemployed; only a very few landlords and doctors remained. The organizational line of movement strategies was then proletariat culture enlightenment and class struggle. Besides the frequent public lectures, cultural theatres, and staged demonstrations and protests, the society also supported and even dictated the development of Taiwan’s farmers protests movement throughout the later part of the 1920s. Therefore, it developed a quite close alliance with the leftist Farmers Union (農民組合, established in 1926). The two organizations even had overlapping membership. During the period of 1927–1930, both the New Culture Society and the Farmers Union experienced intra-organizational fight caused by the internal faction for pushing further extreme radicalization (Chen, 2013, 162–166). By January 1931, the leftist New Culture Society was penetrated by Taiwan Communist Party activists and eventually became its outside apparatus (Chang, 1996: 151–152). In December 1931, it was finally abolished by the colonial government because of its communist affiliation. On the other hand, the moderate faction left the Association and, under the leadership of Tsai Pei-huo (蔡培火) and Chiang Wei-shui, they later established Taiwan’s first political party, Taiwan People’s Party, in July 1927. Before the party establishment initiative, their original proposal was to set up the “Taiwan Self-Governance Association”, or the “Taiwanese Reform Association”. After compromise with the colonial government’s insistence not to use the phrases like “nationalism” and “liberation”, the official party platforms included: safeguard democratic politics, build a reasonable economic organization, and reform unreasonable social institutions. Chiang Wei-shui, a left-inclined moderate doctor within the intellectual class, was elected as the party chairman, and the party’s ideological and strategic line was to integrate nationalist movement and class movement. The Party with 197 members at the inauguration, was able to set up a total of 15 local branches in different localities of Taiwan in half a year. Over its three-years-and-seven-months tenure, the party launched a series of social and political protests against the establishment of state-owned Taiwan Development Company, opium sale, Japanese aggression in China, salary increase for Japanese colonial officials, and the mass revenge killing after the Wushe incidence. The Party even made public their protests to the League of Nations, which certainly embarrassed the colonial government (Lee, 1999a: 148–150). On the platform of social reforms, the Party also advocated for public education in eliminating opium, superstition, ghost money burning, wasteful temple celebrations, dowry, and mahjong game. It even launched

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a campaign to abolish the Chinese feudalist-inclined Taiwanese opera (歌仔 戲) showing in the public. To follow its class struggle line, the Party, especially under the insistence of Chiang Wei-shui, soon helped establish the Taiwan Federation of Labor Friends Unions (台灣工友總聯盟) in February 1928, to push for leftist labor movements. It also demonstrated the ideological change on the part of Chiang Wei-shui, a class struggle turn for Chiang indeed (Chien, 1991: 151–153). In such move, the party also made a strategic distinction from its competing organization, New Culture Society that had deeply involved the farmers movement. In the late 1920s, both New Culture Society and the Taiwan People’s Party had openly supported the grassroots farmers and labor protests movements, a very clear indication of the integration of class struggle with the overall civil society movements at that time. The Party’s radicalization with leftist turn worried many existing rightist elements, especially landlord and local capitalist members and leaders. After openly opposing Chiang Wei-shui’s class struggle party line without success, they quit the Party one by one. One such noticeable quitting elite was Tsai Pei-huo. The Tsai and his fellow former Party landlord leaders then took a moderate and conservative turn so to set up a new civil society organization called Taiwan Local Self-Governance Alliance (台灣地方自治 聯盟) in August 1930. It then also attracted quite a few Party members to join. They claimed that the Alliance would be accepted by the colonial officials to engage in reform within the system. Once again, this final split marked another separation move of the moderate faction from the existing civil society organization caused by the ideological conflict over the directions of struggle against colonialism. Without the moderate and conservative faction in the Party, Chiang Wei-shui took it as an opportunity to finally define its platform to be “a nationalist movement with labor and farmers classes as the core elements”, although facing resistance from his fellow party leaders and members. In February 1931, at the fourth party member congress, Taipei police broke in the session and announced the abolishment of the Taiwan People’s Party, 10 months before the New Culture Society was banned. What was left in the civil society by then was the newly formed Taiwan Self-Governance Alliance, brought into being by the right-wing landlord– gentry class. It submitted reform proposals to the colonial authority in 1934 on Taiwanese residents’ civil rights, the direct election of Taiwan local assembly, etc. Although in 1935, the colonial government enacted and permitted local election rights for Taiwanese above 25 years old, it was far less what the Alliance demanded. Facing this new political situation, the Taiwanese civil society leadership, consisting mainly of the landlords and capitalists, decided to move ahead to establish a new party and nominate their own candidates to

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run at the local election. Obviously, the election was unfair to the Taiwanese residents, and the results were disappointing to the Alliance. After failing to transform into a political party by the proposal made by Lin Hsien-tang, the Alliance declared its cessation to exist in the fourth general assembly in August 1936 (Chou, 1989: 154–155). At the same time the previous Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement was also officially terminated by the movement activists under the strong pressure from the Japanese colonial government in September 1934 after the failure of its 15 times of petition (Chen, 2013: 178–188; Chou, 1989: 151–154). On the other hand, the originally Tokyo-based weekly magazine since April 1923, Taiwan Minpao (台灣民報) was moved to Taiwan in August 1927. Its predecessor was the previously mentioned Taiwan Youth. It became the only public opinion organ and voice during the era of indigenous civil society activism and movements in Taiwan. The Minpao was associated with the moderate faction of the original Taiwan Culture Association, and its transfer from Japan to Taiwan was surprisingly approved by the colonial officials. The Minpao served to diffuse and propagandize the new critical thinking and rising social and political thoughts; it also supported all kinds of emerging activist movements in the areas of Assembly petition, cultural enlightenment, students, labor, farmers, and women. It also carried the responsibility for promoting new literature for the Taiwanese public. The Minpao and its successor Taiwan New Minpao (台灣新民報) were under colonial police’s constant surveillance and censorship. Such harsh policy of censorship re-occurred after the war during the KMT authoritarian rule. In 1937, Taiwan New Minpao’s Chinese edition was banned; in 1941, it changed its name into Hsin Nan News (興南新聞) to avoid being merged forcefully. But after that it was no longer the same. In 1944 it was eventually merged with other existing 5 Taiwanese news stations, to be named Taiwan Hsinpao (台灣新報) and it was completely under the colonial government’s control (Lee, 1999a: 142–144). By 1937, all the civil society activism and movement activities came to an end. The duration of 18 years, from 1920 to 1937, saw many streams of civil society movements led by the landlord merchant gentry class, professionals, and students, at different times, and different organizations demonstrated the self-initiation collective spirit to launch bottom-up protests and demands for nationalist liberation, social reforms, class struggle, and political administrative reformation under the Japanese colonialism. The movement history was marked with inspiration, the process was full of internal conflict and external pressure, and the end result was unfortunately frustrating. After 1937, the year of Sino-Japanese war, the colonial government began to enforce its robust “Japanization movement” (皇民化運動) so as to make sure the Taiwan’s colonial subjects could turn into royal Japanese imperial subordinates. Under the Japanization movement, the Taiwanese people and

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all local social groups were under serious surveillance and control, a series of indoctrination campaigns were enforced. The collective brainwash engineering includes religious conversion to Shintoism, Japanese name change, compulsory Japanese language speaking, and voluntary military service to fight for the Emperor. The Japanization in the period of 1937–1945, the compulsory assimilation policy, had further Japanized the Taiwanese society and cultures. It also erased the Taiwanization legacies brought about by the previous two decades of indigenous civil society movements. The civil society force was totally pacified and controlled, and no more activism was allowed.

III.

THE POST-WAR INDIVIDUAL INTELLECTUAL VOICES AND ENLIGHTENING MAGAZINES FROM THE 1960S TO THE MID-1970S

The similar condition of suppressed civil society also persisted after the war under the newly exiled Nationalist regime (KMT) from China in the post war three decades of martial law control (the era of white terror). Under the settler state of KMT, a dual policy of first de-Japanization and later de-Taiwanization was forcefully enforced and, as expected, no local civil society activism was ever permitted. The postwar Taiwanese society was best characterized as a “silenced civil society”, greatly affected by the 228 Massacre Incident in 1947. It was estimated that 18,000 to 28,000 local Taiwanese were arrested and killed during the mass killing and its aftermath purge. Among them, a significant number were social leaders and intellectual elites (Tai, 2007: 165). It was an absolutely immense blow to the Taiwanese civil society formation and activism. Later, the top-down land reform policies further deprived any social and economic potential ability to assist and sponsor civil society activism during the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Although a few individual and random voices for political reforms were heard, the quiescent civil society in the 1950s and 1960s was further haunted by the notorious “white terror” control. The most noted exceptions to the above suppressed social and political climate were first found in the daring outcry for political and democratic reforms from a few liberal Mainlander KMT elites led by Lei Chen (雷震) and his few fellow colleagues through the magazine, Free China (自由中國, established in November 1949) to voice their demands aiming at KMT party state. They specifically called for democratic institutions, opposition party, freedom of speech, nationalization of the army, judiciary independence, and normalization of education in the magazine’s editorials or authored articles. In the 1950s, Lei Chen and his fellow liberal intellectuals and Free China were of course targets of attacks by the KMT (Tai, 2007: 182; Wu, 2013). In 1960, Lei Chen and his fellow liberal KMT elites even moved to attempt forming an opposition party, the Chinese Democratic Party, for the second

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time in Taiwan’s modern political history. At this time, through the above Free China magazine, a group of local Taiwanese political elites joined force together. As expected, the KMT could no longer tolerate the opposing challenge posed by the Mainlander–Taiwanese elites alliance. Lei and his colleagues were arrested, Free China was banned, and the Chinese Democratic Party preparation was suspended. In retrospect, the principal agenda of Free China and the Chinese Democratic Party was more a solution to save and sustain the Chinese settler state in Taiwan than to establish a new democracy for Taiwan per se. At that time, an intellectual magazine had played the similar role of political enlightenment. One such intellectual magazine, Wen Hsing Magazine (文星), was published in 1957 and in the early 1960s. It played the enlightenment role for the college students and new generation of the intellectuals by introducing a new variety of progressive social, political, and literary thoughts from the West. One of its major contributions was to advocate freedom of speech in Taiwan. It could not escape the fate to be ultimately banned in 1965. One more important and daring intellectual elites’ individual effort occurred in 1964 when then Professor Peng Ming-min (彭明敏), a Taiwanese rising scholar trained by KMT also, published with his two students the Taiwanese Manifesto for Self-Rescue to seek the path of “One China and One Taiwan”. Peng and his students were arrested immediately; and in 1970 he escaped to Sweden for political asylum after he was released from jail. At the end of the 1960s, another similar magazine was published, in 1968. It was called The Intellectuals (大學雜誌) with the original idea of being a culture and thinking magazine; later it turned into a collective voice for social critique and political reforms, in 1970. In October 1971, it published a collective petition article entitled “National Affairs Critique”, co-authored by 15 magazine members. This critique touched upon a variety of critical issues in social, economic, political, and judiciary reforms. Later, right after the diplomatic setback of being expelled from the UN on October 25, 1971, the magazine further published a series of nine commentaries of national affairs in clearly demanding nine specific major reforms in January 1972. Its members also increased from 57 in 1971 to 109 in 1972 (Lee, 1999b: 82). It was an impressive grouping of young educated and intellectual individuals to collectively express their joint concern of Taiwan’s social reforms and political democracy. It did raise campus enthusiasm among college student activists. Such open outcry for political liberalization finally caught the KMT’s attention; and in 1973 the magazine members split, so was the end of the magazine. The magazine’s members then pursued their careers in very different ways, with some turning conservative to support Chiang Ching-Kuo’s KMT regime, some joining the opposition force later on, and some remaining in academia.

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As described, the above various short-lived intellectual foments in the 1960s and early 1970s were either virtually individualized without collective joint force or effective organizational backups, or limited to using magazines as the only tool to convey their reform intentions. The two primary approaches of intellectuals’ demands for change, though meaningful, had not reached substantive achievements in pushing actual political liberalization results. Their individual voices and magazines calling for political reforms unfortunately met with no response from the wider general public and therefore faced early brutal arrests or later skillful resistance from the authoritarian KMT regime.

IV.

THE CULTURAL INDIGENIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL MAGAZINES AFTER THE MID-1970S

The new wave of the cultural enlightenment movement began in the literature circle in 1976. A group of Taiwanese writers–novelists challenged the existing politicized anti-communist literature and modernist alienated literature and began to call for a new direction of “nativist literature” (or indigenous literature). The indigenous literature movement advocated the new literature paradigm to relate the writings and literature with people’s real life, social issues, and the history of this land. This literature movement then faced a strong resistance, and a series of political accusations were applied to the key movement activists/writers. The movement was accused for being unhealthy, anti-government, anti-social, pro-leftist, and communist fellow travelers. The heated debate over nativist literature lasted until the late 1970s, with the victory of the movement. Since then, Taiwanese literature has entered the era of new paradigm of social realism. The social realism of literature emphasized the organic association and link between the literature and the real Taiwanese society, its history, collective memories, underclass lives, social problems, and even politics. By then, Taiwan had begun to be taken as the subject of cultural and political identity, separating it gradually from China. At the turn of the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, the newly coined “indigenous (nativist) consciousness” actually referred to “Taiwanese consciousness”. Such literature movement also led to the creation of “new cinema” (新電影) in the 1990s. The above literature reform movement also extended to stage a “people’s song movement” (民歌運動) yearning for “singing our own songs” in facing and challenging the dominance of Western pop music. This music movement was very popular in college campuses, and it even created a whole new generation of singers. Furthermore, the above literature and music movements also inspired social scientists, especially sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, to

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engage in so-called “social sciences indigenization”, beginning in 1979, and it lasted to the decade of 1990s (Hsiao, 1982, 1995). The movement called for a new indigenous social science paradigm by which social scientific research and interpretation should be relevant to the social reality of Taiwan in both empirical and theoretical terms. To take sociology as an example, the indigenization of sociology witnessed the three turns. The empirical turn brought into the empirical research a sociological pursuit. The critical turn began to tackle and challenge the political taboos that prohibited studies on class, ethnicity and nationalism, social problems, social movements, and gender, and successfully turned the above issues to be the new dominant fields. The radical turn had finally transformed many new-generation sociologists into the activist public intellectuals who had been publicly advocating for Taiwan’s democratization since the 1980s. Finally, the period since the mid-1970s had also witnessed the birth of many newly published social and political magazines wherein the new breed of Taiwanese political activists and public intellectuals openly expressed their collective demands for democratic transformation through writings in the so-called “Dang-wai” magazines. These include: Taiwan Political Review ( 台灣政論), The Eighties (八十年代), Sino-Tide (夏潮), This Generation ( 這一代), Formosa Magazine (美麗島), Drumming Sounds (鼓聲), Spring Winds (春風), Formosa Island (蓬萊島), The Statesmen (政治家), Cultivate (深耕), Care Magazine (關懷), Progress Times (前進), Freedom Era (自由 時代), The Movement (新潮流), and Torch Fire (薪火). These magazines were very clearly inspired to go after Taiwan’s political democratization and their impacts were significant in both the scale and width of readership and their direct association with the mobilization of democratic movements (Peng, 2004: 714, 732–733). To look back, they were not only the magazines anymore; they were acting as the instruments for initiating social and political reform activities. The Formosa magazine-organized human rights rally on December 10, 1979 in Kaohsiung turned into a violent police–activists conflict with an aftermath of mass arrests of the activist leaders. The publicized trials of the alleged through television broadcast had a lasting impact on the general public, especially the younger generation and the growing new middle class. More and more of them were somehow emotionally mobilized either to get involved directly in the next phase of social and political movements or indirectly become supportive of diverse reform initiatives in the decade to come.

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V.

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A HISTORICAL SKETCH THE 1980–2020 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS FOR REFORMS AND DEMOCRACY

With the emergence of the first-generation urban-oriented middle class in the early 1980s (Hsiao, 2012b), more diverse reform-minded, new middle-class professionals such as lawyers, professors, medical doctors, and journalists spearheaded the development of self-initiated civic associations and foundations with their public engagement. This period also witnessed the beginning of Taiwan’s organized collective movements for pro-reform advocacy social movements and civic protests were autonomously organized, many of which pursued social reforms in nature, demanding various concessions and changes to concrete policies from the authoritarian KMT regime. During the decade of the 1980s, three waves of middle-class-based social movements and protests raged throughout the initial phase of democracy. The Decade of 1980s: Political Liberalization The first wave (1980–1986) started even before the lifting of martial law on July 15, 1987, with seven social reform agendas arising for the first time. During this wave, both endowment-centered foundations and membership-oriented associations were mushrooming. Under the existing law governing civic organizations, establishment of membership associations was tightly restricted and limited to one association of the same kind in one administrative city or county. However, the formation of endowment foundations was much less controlled. As a result, some groups of liberal professionals and intellectuals also opted to establish various related “operational foundations” to pursue their reform causes, such as the Consumers’ Foundation and the Awakening Foundation. The other noted associations established at that time were the Nature Conservation Alliance, Mountain Youth Magazine, Taiwanese Aborigines Rights Association, University Reform Association, and many locally based anti-pollution and self-rescue associations. Incidentally, the first home-grown democratic political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was also established during the first wave, on September 28, 1986. The second wave took place in one single year, 1987, with the emergence of another seven social movements advocating contentious social equity and political rights. The most important new middle-class, professional-backed civil society organizations in this wave were the Labor Legal Assistance Association (later changed to the Labor Front), the Teachers’ Human Rights Association, the Union for the Handicapped, and the Taiwan Human Rights Association. Even for non-middle-class protest organizations such as the

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Farmers’ Rights Association, the Mainlanders’ Home Visiting Association, and the Veterans’ Welfare Association, and the various labor unions, professionals, and scholars also offered timely aid, advice, and support (Hsiao, 1992, 1994; Liu, 2015). Without a doubt, they directly and indirectly contributed to pressure on the KMT state to lift the martial law in July 1987. The third wave emerged in the first few post-martial law years (1988–1990), which witnessed another ten social movements calling for a variety of ethnic, educational, judiciary, media, and parliamentary reforms. The most noticeable middle-class-initiated civil society organizations in that period were the Humanist Foundation, the Education Reform Alliance, the Political Prisoners’ Human Rights Association, Hakka Magazine, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU), the Non-Home-Owners’ Association, the Judiciary Reform Foundation, the Taiwan Journalists Association, the Intellectuals Anti-Military Interference Alliance, and many university campus-wide student activist groups. It is important to point out that, during the early post-martial law years of 1988–1990, the bans on free press and free formation of political parties were also officially lifted in January 1988 and January 1990, respectively. With the middle-class-initiated and -backed social movement mobilization during that decade, as mentioned earlier, Taiwan also saw the establishment of the first Taiwanese opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. This was followed by the lifting of martial law in 1987; the death of the political strongman, Chiang Ching-Kuo, in 1988; the abolition of the press ban in 1988; and the lifting of the ban on political parties in 1990. It is reasonable to assert that the collective protests and demands from the three consecutive waves of advocacy civil society organizations, initiated and supported by the liberal and progressive new middle class, made direct and indirect contributions to the above political liberalization and democratic transition for the whole decade of the 1980s. It is also important to point out that the dramatic increase of consciousness of ethnic politics among ethnic Taiwanese was found to be a crucial precipitating factor for the collective demand for democratic transition (Wang, 2008) Moreover, the major leadership and organizers of most of those “advocacy” civil society organizations clearly had new middle-class origins: university professors, lawyers, journalists, Christian leaders, high school teachers, and writers. The reserved army of the future new middle class—the university student activists—also took part in many of the listed social movements organized by the above-mentioned new liberal middle-class professionals and intellectuals. Nevertheless, the “Wild Lily” student demonstrations occupying Chiang Kai-Shek Square in downtown Taipei in March 16–22, 1990, demanding parliamentary reform and other democratic changes, was the most significant university student movement since World War II.

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The Decade of 1990s: Political Democratic Transition The decade of the 1990s can be characterized as the era that witnessed Taiwan’s actual democratic transformations, during which more and more visible and radical political demands were raised by many vocal civil society organizations for further political and constitutional changes. That decade even ended with the unprecedented political regime change in 2000, when the KMT regime was voted out and the DPP gained state power. It is crucial to point out that after the success of pushing for liberalization in the previous decade, a clear and open shift from the demand for social reforms to demand for institutionalization of political democracy was finally made in the 1990s. The publicized political agenda and demands included abolishing Criminal Code Article 100 on control on freedom of speech, abolishing the National Unification Guidelines—which advocated “One Taiwan, One China”—to join the UN with the name of Taiwan, “Saying No to China”, and advocating “anti-nuclear energy policy” and a “referendum on the fourth nuclear power plant”. Other less-political agendas also continued and expanded to demand for educational reforms, professional independence for journalists, and progressive legislation for social welfare policy changes. One critical observation during this decade was that those new middle-class activists and their advocacy civil society organizations have become more and more ready to develop a political alliance with the opposition party, DPP. It was a big step forward in Taiwan’s middle-class politics. They endorsed many causes put forward by DPP regarding social reforms and political democracy, openly supported favored DPP candidates, and even campaigned as the party candidates in the elections so as to forge a united front against the authoritarian KMT (Hsiao and Ho, 2010; Hsiao, 2012a). Three Democratic Regime Changes: 2000, 2008, 2016 The landmark achievement of a regime change could not have occurred without the support and campaign assistance of many of the engaged middle-class advocates and their pro-democracy civil society organizations. However, during the DPP’s first term of 2000–2004, the two former allies of middle-class-backed civil society experienced the mixed relations of “bittersweet” from “honeymoon” to “wait and see” to “disappointment”. Although some of the advocacy civil society leaders were appointed to membership in various governmental advisory committees such as labor, welfare, environment, ethnic, women, and culture policies, the advocates from welfare, environment, and labor were most frustrated and even resentful due to the hesitant and ambivalent positions on progressive reforms on the three general areas. The civil society activism after the DPP was in power came to add a new

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mission to monitor the democratic regime’s progressive social policies. Many liberal and pro-democracy middle-class intellectual leaders even severely criticized DPP for its inaction and failure to enforce necessary “transitional justice” directives so as to effectively overthrow KMT’s authoritarian legacy. Although DPP won the 2004 re-election with a small margin of victory, it had made little achievements on the significant social and political reform agenda during its second term between 2004 and 2008, as the opposition KMT again blocked nearly all reform initiatives in Legislative Yuan. The DPP government not only failed to break the political deadlock but also took a rather conservative stand to face political oppositions. Middle-class activists and many social movements leaders further criticized DPP for its betrayal of moral commitments and campaign promises. This is not to say that, during the DPP rule, nothing was achieved for democratic consolidation. In fact, democratic consolidation and deepening such as protection of freedom of speech and free association had been well safeguarded in 2000–2008. However, the liberal intellectuals and civil society activists were very angry at and frustrated about President Chen Shiu-bien’s family corruption scandals during his second term, and even became somewhat demoralized. The DPP government tried to regain the necessary public trust and support from civil society in its later years by promoting and enacting reforms long desired and sought by civil society movements and organizations, but all came too late to save it in the 2008 presidential election. In 2008, Taiwan witnessed the second democratic regime change when the authoritarian KMT re-installed its state power after its loss in 2000. To many pro-democracy liberal intellectuals and advocacy civil society groups, it was a depressing experience to see Taiwan coming under the rule of the once-authoritarian KMT again. Moreover, even the slim hope that KMT would transform into a new and genuine democratic party had not been met at all, even though it did win the election in 2012 for another term. Over the whole two terms of 2008–2016, KMT was constantly criticized for its ineffective policies to save Taiwan’s economy, its failure to remedy Taiwan’s worsening social inequality, its anti-democratic policy making style, its lack of political strategy in facing China’s economic and political threats, and, most seriously, its ideological bias to hard push for “one China” and “unification” stand. Out of deep frustration and resentment, the liberal middle-class advocates and their progressive civil society organizations recharged and reactivated themselves into a consolidated social and political force as early as 2009 only in the second year after KMT regained its power. Ironically, the declining middle-class activism and civil society force under the “unsuccessful” democratic DPP rule was once again resurrected under the “returned” authoritarian KMT regime. It is the sustained authoritarian KMT party-state resisting to transform itself into a true democratic state that had facilitated the

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rebirth of the middle class and civil society democratic alliance that had begun in the 1980s. One major feature of the resurrected middle class and civil society activism was to rescue the new democratic systems by demanding the monitoring and correcting the working of Legislative Yuan, the prohibition of improper policies on illegal assault of farmland, heritage, nuclear energy, and injustice in the army. The newly established new middle class-backed advocacy civil society organizations included Citizens’ Congress Watch, Losheng Preservation Alliance, The Rural Front, and Citizen 1985 Alliance. The existing social movement organizations on environment, social welfare, women, labor, ethnicity, judiciary reforms, educational reforms, and media reforms were even reactivated and reorganized to claim to march again during this critical period (Hsiao and Ku, 2010). Another significant feature of such reborn social force was to protect Taiwan’s national integrity and independence from the China threats starting with activist student protests against the visit of PRC envoy (Wild Strawberry Movement, 2008), followed by the protest against the attempt of pro-China business tycoon to gain a controlling share in local media (Anti-media Monopoly Campaign, 2012), and then ended with the large-scale students’ protest against the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan to push the cross-strait service trade agreement by occupying the Legislative Yuan for 24 days (Sunflower Movement). The last feature is related to its changing constituency of the revived new middle-class civil society activism. During the most recent revived civil society movements, in addition to those liberal intellectuals, professionals, and middle-class background civil society leaders who remained to be the major force, many organized student activists, writers, artists, musicians, film directors, and typical urban middle-class housewives were also mobilized to join this round of social and political activism. The new segments and groups of the new middle class were drafted into the proactive civil society movements during the whole period of 2008–2016. It was particularly interesting to witness the multi-memberships of the active participants in the case of the above-mentioned Sunflower movement. Although this was indeed a students-initiated “occupy movement”, many familiar and existing active middle class-organized civil society groups discussed above were also deeply involved in the movements as well. The middle-class civil society organizations that have actively been involved in Sunflower Movements included the Taiwan Association of University Professors, Awakening Foundations, the Taiwan Human Rights Association, Citizen Congress Watch, the Taiwan Labor Front, the Taiwan Rural Front, the Earth Citizen Foundation, Green Citizens’ Action Alliance, Taiwan Democracy Watch, and Citizen 1985 Alliance. They served to be around the occupied Legislative Yuan to support

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and protect the students who were inside for the whole period of the movement. It is, therefore, proper to characterize the Sunflower Movement as a complex “citizens’ movement” rather than a simple “student movement”. The immediate political consequences of the Sunflower Movement were the consecutive defeats of the authoritarian KMT in the November 2014 local elections and later the January 2016 Presidential and Legislative Yuan elections. The accumulated momentum generated by the rising civil society activism since 2008 had finally brought the KMT down for the third time, and offered another fresh opportunity to DPP to govern and consolidate the new democracy of Taiwan. The presidential and legislative election results have accelerated the pro-democracy momentum to bring Taiwan into a new era of political development and democratic consolidation. They have also demonstrated that a vibrant civil society has been established to safeguard Taiwan’s new democracy and national integrity. After the rough time of election defeat in the local elections in November 2018, DPP was surprisingly able to retain the presidential election and legislative election victories in January 2020. Behind the winning, many pro-Taiwan and pro-democracy civil society organizations and their leaders continued to play an endorsing and supporting role. In the final analysis, what made the liberal middle class and pro-democracy civil society links tick since 1980s was the presence of the viable political (opposition) party struggling for democratic regime changes. With the physical existence of democratic parties to challenge the authoritarian rule, the progressive new middle-class segments could then have rendered their political support to the rising democratic political party. And the pro-democracy civil society organizations could even have further forged vital and plausible strategic coalition for the historic moments of the initiation, consolidation, and even rescue of Taiwan’s new democracy.

V.

CONCLUSION: CHARACTERIZING AND COMPARING THE RISE AND FALL OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE PAST CENTURY

As stated at the outset, this chapter aimed to analyze the noticeable cycles of rise and fall of the civil society activism and mobilized movements in the past century of 1920–2020. From the above discussions, it is clear that the first wave of civil society activism or the rise of organized social movements took place in 1920–1937, targeting the Japanese colonial government for the purpose of colony’s self-governance and related social reforms. Then came the heavy suppression from the colonial regime preparing for the Pacific War; and for that, all civil society activities were completely banned. The fall or the

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suppression of civil society activism lasted for the remaining period of colonial rule and even sustained during the succeeding rule under the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party for the decades of the 1950s, 1960, and early 1970s. Even though some individual outcry for political reforms and pro-reform magazines within and around the Nationalist Party circle did exist in the 1960s and early 1970s, the temporary intellectual foment did not reach anywhere. After the mid-1970s, Taiwan began to witness the embryo of collective advocacy for Taiwanese cultural indigenization through literature, music, and social sciences. Moreover, the publications of many pro-social and political reform magazines around that time, originating outside of the Nationalist power circle, added the civil society pro-democracy pressure to demand systemic political transformation. The Formosa incident at the end of 1979 further mobilized the younger generation and liberal new middle class to get organized behind the banner of social reform movements and political democracy at the turn of 1980s. The five years of civil society dynamism in embryo was crucial and it could be described as the period of embryo activism of civil society. For the following four decades since 1980, Taiwan’s subsequent social reform movements and political democratic transformation were indeed the most significant manifestation of the rise of civil society activism in the postwar era. It began as the social reform movements in the 1980s, it turned into the movements for political democracy in the 1990s, and it finally succeeded in helping the first regime change ever in year 2000. For the following two decades after 2000, the civil society mobilization also experienced a few ups and downs as well as collective aspiration and frustration. Most importantly, the past twenty years witnessed the further remobilization after a short period of stagnation, so as not only to safeguard the consolidation of Taiwan’s new democracy, but also to rescue it from the increasing external threats and obstruction from China. In the following analysis, attempt will be made to characterize and compare the nature of the rise and fall of Taiwan’s civil society activism and social movements between 1920 and 2020. Specifically, the 63 years that observed two full waves of rising civil society in 1920–1937 and 1975–2020 are to be re-examined from a number of analytical perspectives. 1. The emergence of both waves of civil society movements have been greatly inspired and influenced by the new global thoughts and ideologies at the respective periods. The Taisho era of 1912–1926 was marked with socialism, communism, liberalism, and ethnic self-determination, while the 1970s and 1980s were distinctive for the diffusion of new discourses on democracy, freedom, gender and ethnic egalitarianism, environmentalism, and civil nationalism. The first wave of Taiwan civil society activism

216





2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

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beginning in 1920 was directly enlightened by the Taiwanese students studying in Tokyo and their organization’s magazine. The second wave of Taiwanese social movements in the 1980s and onwards was heavily inspired by the translated books and culture magazines carrying the new knowledges and thoughts as well as the returning intellectuals who studied in the West, especially in USA and UK, among others. The Taiwan experiences as manifested in the two waves of civil society activism and mobilized movements were in fact the actualization of the above two eras of global new thinking. The two waves of the rising social movements heavily suggested the influences of corresponding Taisho thoughts in Japan and the universal values and ideologies. The two waves of civil society movements were both led by the social elites and cultural leaders at their time. The first wave of social and political activism in 1920–1937 was predominantly initiated and organized by enlightened landlord gentry class, professionals, intellectuals, and students, while the social movements and political advocacy in the post-war era of 1980s and onwards were largely led by the liberal new middle-class professionals and intellectuals as well as students. Both waves of civil society activism and social protests were backed and led by different citizens’ free associations and grassroots organizations or political parties to engage in advocacy, dialogue, and persuasion against the targeted regimes. Those social movements organizations were in fact possessed of variant degrees of modern forms of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties. It is important to point out that, under the colonial rule, the Taiwanese civil society organizations of 1920–1937 experienced a sequence of internal ideological conflicts and organizational splits. The leftist vs. rightist ideologies as well as the radical vs. conservative political strategies were the usual source of conflict and split. However, after the war, within the civil society force and its social movement, organizations did not show major and clear ideological conflict and strategic split. A relatively united front of civil society activism was generally apparent. It could be accounted for by the lack of the clear and strong leftist ideology and its movement organizations since 1970s. Both waves of civil society movements in different periods utilized printed magazines as the cultural tools to diffuse their ideas, values, and political ideologies with the general public. The rise of two civil society movements, through 1920–1937 and 1980–2020, as well as one embryo activism in 1975–1980, had all taken the targeted political regimes directly for their appeals, demands, and protests. They were Japanese colonial regime before the war, the

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authoritarian Nationalist regime after the war, and the democratic state of Democratic Progressive Party after 2000. 7. Under Japanese colonialism, Taiwanese civil society activism and movements aimed to achieve self-governance and social reforms; a limited colonial electoral administrative reform was the target. After the war, under the settler state of Chinese Nationalist Party, the objectives of Taiwanese grassroots civil society activism and movements were social reforms, democracy, and political power indigenization. After the first regime change in 2000, the mission shifted to democratic consolidation, national integrity, and even democracy-rescue in facing the China threats. 8. As the evidence proved, there was no way for the local civil society force in 1920–1937 to achieve the genuine self-governance and effective social reforms under the Japanese colonial rule. The clear political obstacle facing the local civil society activism was colonialism. It also demonstrated that, under the settler state’s hard authoritarian control under the Chinese Nationalist Party, the individual intellectuals’ voice and magazines’ cultural influences could not made real change either in the 1960s or in the 1970s. It was only under the indigenizing (Taiwanizing) soft authoritarianism of the Nationalist party state that the civil society and organized movements could actually exert pressure to push for political liberalization and eventual democratic transformation and regime change in a true modern state. It should be pointed out clearly that, even after democracy was built and regime change was made, civil society force was still guarded to make sure the new democracy could be sustained. 9. Although there have been waves of the rising civil society activism and even similar streams of social movements over the past century, there was no clear ideological or succession or institutional memories of the social movements between the prewar and postwar periods. The postwar labor movement or farmer movement organizations and their leaders in the 1980s would not attribute or link their platforms and strategies to their prewar counterparts. The same for the successful postwar Democratic Progressive Party would not trace its historical root to the failed Taiwan People’s Party before the war either. Therefore, a century of civil society activism and social movements in Taiwan has also witnessed the breakdown rather than the continuity of its historical development. 10. Finally, the experience of Taiwan clearly demonstrated that the historical development of modern democracy after the 1980s requires three necessary crucial elements: progressive middle-class intellectuals, professional pro-democracy advocate civil society organization, and effective democratic political party. The Taiwan story can be a test case for the application and verification of such quadrangular links (middle class, civil society, political party, democracy) in theorizing the changing state–

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society relations and the making of democracy of other third-wave Asian democracies (Hsiao, 2020: 29–31).

REFERENCES Chang, Yan-Hsian, 1996, “The Establishment and Split of Taiwan Culture Association”, in Essays in Taiwan History (Vol. 2) (Chinese), pp.131–160. Taipei: Yushan Publications. Chen, Chui-Lian, 2013, The Dream of Self-Governance. Taipei: Acropolis Publisher. Chien, Jung-Ren, 1991, Taiwan People’s Party (Chinese). Taipei: Dao Hsiang Books. Chou, Wan-you, 1989, Taiwanese Assembly Petition Movements in Japanese Colonial Era (Chinese). Taipei: Independent News Publishing Co. Chou, Wan-you, 2009, Taiwan History Pictorial (Chinese). Taipei: Linking Book. Hall, John (ed.), 1995, Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1982, “The Structural Issues of the Sinicization of Sociology: A View from World System” (Chinese), in The Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research, pp.69–90, edited by Kuo-Shu Yang and Chung-I Wen. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1989, “An Analytical Framework of Taiwan’s Emerging Social Movements”, in Taiwan’s Emerging Social Movements, edited by Cheng Kuang Hsu and Wen Li Soong, pp.21–46. Taipei: Chu-Liu Books. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1990, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol. 24, pp.629–641. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1992, “The Labor Movement in Taiwan: A Retrospective and Prospective Look”, in Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle, edited by Denis F. Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau, eds, pp.151–167. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1994, “Political Liberalization and the Farmers’ Movement in Taiwan”, in The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences, edited by Edward Friedman, ed., pp.202–218, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1995, “Taiwan Sociology and Taiwan Society in Transformation” (Chinese), Chinese Journal of Sociology, Vol. 18, pp.1–15. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 1999, “The Indigenous Consciousness of Contemporary Taiwan’s Intellectuals” (Chinese), China Tribune, Vol. 265, pp.56–67. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 2012a, “Social Foundation of Political Vitality”, in The Vitality of Taiwan, edited by Steven Tsang, pp.37–56. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 2012b, “The First-Generation Middle Class in Taiwan: Culture and Politics”, in Taiwan Since Martial Law, edited by David Blundell, pp.243–262. Taipei: NTU Press. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 2019, “The Tripartite Links of Middle Class, Civil Society and Democracy in Taiwan: 1980-2016”, in Middle Class, Civil Society and Democracy in Asia, edited by Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, pp.23–38. London: Routledge.

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Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, 2020, “My Journey of Social Movements and Civil Society Research Revisited”, in Taiwan Studies Revisited, edited by Dafydd Fell and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, pp.15–33. London: Routledge. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael and Ming-Sho Ho, 2010, “Civil society and Democracy-making in Taiwan: Reexamining the Link”, in East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, Reversal, Non-Liberal Alternatives, edited by Yin-Wah Chu and Siu-Lun Wong, pp.43–64. London and New York: Routledge. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael and Chung-Hua Ku, eds, 2010, Taiwan’s Social Movements March Again (Chinese). Taipei: Chu-Liu Books. Keane, John (ed.), 1988, Civil Society and the State. London: Verso. Lee, Hsiao-Feng, 1999a, 100 Big Events in Taiwan History (Vol. 1) (Chinese). Taipei: Yushan Publications. Lee, Hsiao-Feng, 1999b, 100 Big Events in Taiwan History (Vol. 2) (Chinese). Taipei: Yushan Publications. Lee, Hsiao-Feng, 2013, 101 Q & A on Taiwan History (Chinese). Taipei: Yushan Publications. Liu, Hwa-Jen, 2015, Leverage of the Weak: Labor and Environmental Movements in Taiwan and South Korea. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds, 1994, State Power and Social Forces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peng, Lin-Song, 2004, “Dang-wai Magazines and Taiwan Democratic Movement” (Chinese), in Democratic Development of 20th Century Taiwan, edited by Taiwan Historica, pp.693–782. Taipei: Taiwan Historica. Tai, Pao-Tsun, 2007, The Concise History of Taiwan (Chinese–English bilingual edition). Taipei: Taiwan Historica. Wang, Fu-chang, 2008, “The Role of Ethnic Issues in Taiwan’s Democratization Transition” (Chinese), in Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 89–140. Wu, Nai-teh, 2013, The Failure of Freedom (Chinese). Taipei: Acropolis Publication.

10. A century of colonial education by Japan and the KMT/ROC party-state, 1898–1997: a comparative study of the problems of Taiwan’s national identity Wan-yao Chou A modern state shapes its people’s national identity largely through education. Modern school education, especially history teaching, is instrumental in shaping school children’s national identity. According to Ernest Gellner’s theory, three essential conditions for nationalism are social mobility, homogeneous culture, and egalitarianism.1 The classroom is where the cultural homogeneousness of a modern state most likely finds its born place. However, many former colonies were placed under the mother country’s educational system and experienced what Benedict Anderson described as “official nationalism,” a top-down, and under mother country’s control, process of “national identity” forming.2 This chapter aims to deal with the case of a colony, Taiwan, that experienced “official nationalism” twice in a century. The island of Taiwan was ruled by Japan as a colony from 1895 to 1945, and then, after Japan’s surrender in World War Two, the Allies entrusted the Republic of China (ROC) with the control of Taiwan. The control of Taiwan’s people has been designated as that of a “party-state,” because the ROC was controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (aka Kuomintang or KMT). Given that the party was above the state,3 this ruling authority may be called the KMT/ROC party-state. Martial Law was lifted in 1987, but three “evil” laws still existed,4 which with the Marital Law constituted the so-called “four big evil laws of the White Terror”—they together made the White Terror legally feasible such as civil civilians being jailed and tried in a military court and easily sentenced to long prison terms or death penalty. Meanwhile, the three assemblies of the ROC Congress were still in its first session without reelection until 1991 and 1992,5 and thus nicknamed “Congress Forever” (wan-nien kuo-hui) by anti-KMT activists. After a period of stormy political and social movements, from 1987 to 1992, the “Congress Forever” came to an end and 220

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the three “evil laws” were abolished. By electing the members of the second session of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, and the revision of the Article 100 of the Penal Law to the degree that guarantees freedom of speech, Taiwan started its course of democratization and becoming a free society.6 Whether the party-state rule could be regarded as a colonial rule may cause controversy, but in terms of education the school children of Taiwan could not study the history of the island either in the period of Japanese rule or under the rule of the KMT/ROC party-state. An education in which students had to study the history of rulers who came from abroad and not their own history is of the nature of a “colonial education.” In the year 1898, the Japanese Government-General of Taiwan implemented the public elementary school system for Taiwanese children, but not until September 1997 was Taiwan’s history included in junior high school curricula. This chapter aims to offer a basic understanding of the educational content offered to Taiwanese children during these one hundred years by two very different ruling authorities. This chapter will discuss Japanese colonial education in more detail and then bring in comparisons with education in the KMT/ ROC party-state. Its focus will be on three subjects that are more related to the shaping of national identity than others: National Language (meaning Japanese and later Chinese Mandarin), History, and Ethics (shūshin and later kung-min yü tao-te). The subject Geography will also be discussed briefly. In 1997, an unprecedented change in junior high curricula occurred, and then another change took place in 2006 when Taiwan history entered senior high schools as a one-semester subject course with an individual textbook, as in the Chinese history and world history courses. The changes brought fierce reactions from scholars and other people who continued to cling to the idea of the KMT/ROC party-state. The battles between proponents and opponents of the new curricula did not die down until May 2016. The latter part of this chapter will discuss these issues and reflect on the impacts of a century of colonial education on the collective mentality of the people on the island and the possible formation of a long-delayed national identity.

1.

AN ANALYSIS OF COLONIAL EDUCATION UNDER JAPANESE RULE

In this section the focus will be on the elementary school textbooks because only a very small percentage of Taiwanese children could have high-school education. The textbooks under review were used in the period 1923–1936 and left profound influence on their users of a generation most of which had solid Japanese education in their school age years and passed their formative years during the wartime period from 1937 to 1945. They belonged to “the wartime generation”7 and the majority could not have a Chinese education in postwar

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Taiwan. Under the rule of the KMT/ROC party-state they became functionally illiterate in the new society where Chinese Mandarin was the mandatory language in the public sphere. In the Japanese period, the territory of Taiwan was divided into the “Ordinary Administrative Region,” where lived Han Taiwanese, Plain Aboriginals, and a small portion of Aboriginal population, and the “Aboriginal Region,” where lived almost exclusively aboriginals.8 In the former, for elementary education the Office of Government-General of Taiwan adopted a dual educational system, where the schools for the Japanese children were called shōgakkō (primary school), while those for Taiwanese children kōgakkō (common school).9 The former was an extension of the school system in Japan proper. The system for Taiwanese children had its own curricula and textbooks that differed from its counterpart. Right from the outset of Japan’s taking over Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan set up a department for education in the newly incorporated territory, whose main task included compiling textbooks for teaching Taiwanese the Japanese language. From 1896 onward, a division in charge of textbook compilation was set up, either under the education department or parallel to it.10 Japanese rule of Taiwan went through four stages: (1) military suppression period, 1895–1902; (2) period of accommodation of native customs (kyūkan ōnzon, 旧慣温存), 1903–1917; (3) period of assimilation (dōka, 同化), 1918–1936; (4) period of imperialization (kōminka, 皇民化), 1937–1945.11 The guiding principles of textbook compilation closely reflected the policies adopted in the second to the fourth periods. Before 1937 colonial education in Taiwan was in major ways similar to that in Japan proper, placing high value on homeland love, patriotism, and modernization. Only in the final 8 years did the colonial authorities start to make Taiwanese “real Japanese.”12 The kōminka textbooks appeared late due to a time gap between compilation and usage, and those Taiwanese children who used them were soon to be re-educated by KMT/ROC’s school system, thus leaving much less influence upon Taiwanese as the previous textbooks did. The subjects of common school education included national language, Japanese history (later renamed “national history”), ethics, geography, arithmetic, science, drawing, singing, gymnastics, vocational training (jika), and sewing and housework. Chinese (kanbun) was listed as optional.13 The contents of the four subjects will be discussed in this order: national language, Japanese history (national history), ethics, and geography. The subject national language (the Japanese language) is the heaviest in terms of school hours. In six-year common schools,14 the first four years of the national language occupied more than half of school time. Table 10.1 shows the ratio of the subject’s class hours to the total hours per week; “m” and “f” indicate respectively male and female students as their school hours differed slightly. The two hours

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Table 10.1

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School hours of National Language compared to the total for the six grades in common schools

Grade

First

Second

Third

Fourth

Fifth

Sixth

Hours for National Language

12

14

14

14

10

10

Total school hours/per week

24

24

26

m27/f28

m30/f31

m30/f31

of optional Chinese are not included.15 Table 10.1 shows that the Japanese language class time was reduced to one third of the entire studying time in the fifth and sixth years of common school. The readers of the national language came in twelve volumes, two for each school year. Without looking at the readers used in common schools, one may guess that they would have a high percentage of teaching on “Japanese-ness,” but surprisingly this wasn’t so. More than four decades ago, the pioneer in the field of Japanese colonial education, E. Patricia Tsurumi observed that, before 1922, most of the common school readers’ material dealt with matters close to Taiwanese schoolchildren. There were many lessons about nature, scenery, school, good pupils, home, shopping, the post office, and adults at work. The settings of such lessons were all Taiwanese. Taiwanese children and adults were featured in the stories and the illustrations displayed Taiwanese scenery, houses, furniture, and clothing.16

She said that the Japanese language readers used during the 1920s and 1930s “continued to have a strong Taiwanese flavor.”17 The contents of readers used in this period attracted my special attention, inspiring my own analysis. The set of Japanese language readers used during the period of 1923–1936 had 300 lessons and totaled 1,212 pages, which can be sorted into categories. As a lesson may have more than one facet, it can be included in more than one category. The number in parentheses following each category indicates how many lessons belong to the category. 1. Japanese culture, history and geography (40) 2. Emperor-related and patriotism (19) 3. practical learning (68) 4. Taiwan-related matters (67) 5. ethical teachings (46) 6. labor-related matters (6) 7. China-related matters (5) If the first and second categories are grouped into “Japan-related matters,” they total 59 lessons. As a result, “practical learning” runs first, closely followed by “Taiwan-related matters,” whereas “Japan-related matters” is third.18

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The term “practical learning” is from Japanese jitsugaku (実学), the concept of which had a history tracing back to the Edo period, but its most influential advocate in Meiji Japan was Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). In his well-known and best-selling19 book An Encouragement of Learning (Gakumon no Susume), Fukuzawa says the learning he was advocating was “the practical learning that is closer to ordinary human needs” (ningen futsū nijiyō ni chikaki jitsugaku nari, 人間普通日用に近き実学なり).20 For the revolutionary meaning of Fukuzawa’s thought on “practical learning,” one may consult Maruyama Masao’s writing.21 Fukuzawa’s idea that core goal of education was to teach students “practical learning” realized in the education of Meiji Japan. What percentage of lessons was devoted to “practical learning” in the readers used in Japan proper is lacking in research. But, as E. Patricia Tsurumi pointed out in Taiwan, “much of the content of common school readers resembled the books used in primary schools, and indeed some of the lessons were almost identical,”22 it is safe to assume that it must have been rather high given it was the highest in colonial Taiwan. The Japanese readers are textbooks for teaching language, but instead of placing emphasis on training how to compose or write elegant essays, the contents of “practical learning” lessons carry “scientific” knowledge (an alternative translation for jitsugaku is “practical and scientific learning”).23 In the following paragraphs examples will be given.24 Lesson one, “Flowers” (hana), in volume three for the second graders is very short, but it introduces four flowers and their distinct features: they are gardenia, rose, lily, and periwinkle. The lesson’s illustration shows the four flowers among others.25 One assumes that teachers would lead the students to identify them. Lesson 18 “Scarab Beetle” in the same reader could be a description taken from a children’s encyclopedia. Nonetheless, one has to remember that this is a Japanese language reader, and the “scientific description” of the scarab beetle is wrapped in a daily life situation and ends up with an elderly neighbor who comes to the child protagonist’s house remarking that scarab beetles had made the harvest of pomelos very bad that year. This lesson introduces several new and complex Japanese expressions. As the language teaching progresses, lessons belonging to the category of “practical learning” introduce more and more plants, insects, animals, and natural phenomena, such as water, fire, air, and hot springs. Their titles include motion picture, fish farm, coal mining, house construction, camphor, rubber, salt and sugar, coal and oil, trawl net fishing, whaling, irrigation, and agriculture. The most noticeable are lessons on modern things and institutions: post office, telegraph, lighthouse, steamboat and train, electricity, hygiene, currency, printing, banks, industrial associations, and sugar factory. Other unexpected titles are division of labor (bungyō), price (bukka), carrier pigeon, school for deaf and mute, and Nobel Prize. Illustrations are an essential part

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of the readers. The lesson entitled “A Visit to a Sugar Factory” has a drawing of the diagrammatic structure of a sugar factory spread across the tops of two pages. It shows the process of how sugar cane comes in one end and goes out as sugar in packages at the other end.26 Other lessons not only convey “practical learning” in general; they are about Taiwan in particular. For example, there are “Taiwan’s Fruits,” “Agriculture in Taiwan,” “Taiwan’s Wood,” and “Taiwan’s Hygiene.” This leads us to the category of “Taiwan-related matters.” If “practical learning” was influenced by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the high percentage of “Taiwan-related matters” lessons in common school readers had to do with the concept or idea of heimat, which was introduced to Japan from Germany and constituted an essential part of Meiji education. The German term heimat, meaning homeland, was translated into Japanese as 郷土 (kyōdo). The idea of heimat brought into existence the heimat education movement (kyōdo kyōiku undō) in Meiji Japan, which emphasized teaching schoolchildren to know, love, and cherish their homeland. In 1915, the pivotal figure Hoshina Kōichi (1872–1955), a prominent scholar in the field of kokugo (national language or the Japanese language), criticized the great lack of heimat materials in the officially compiled schoolchildren’s readers.27 Under the influence of this movement, the new readers that started to be used for National Language in 1918 were rich in heimat materials.28 One of the five guidelines for compilation of this set of readers was to choose materials that would cultivate interest in countryside life.29 The readers used in Taiwan after 1923 followed closely their Japanese equivalent and therefore were abundant in heimat materials, and the heimat here was none other than Taiwan, in accordance with one of the compilation guidelines requests that teaching materials “cultivate particular interest in the island.”30 One may easily find lessons in which the landscape, animals, plants, fruits, customs, clothing, houses, and festivals can be identified as things of Taiwan. The 67 lessons of “Taiwan-related matters” were all-embracing, which can be grouped into seven themes: animals (including livestock) and vegetation, scenery of the countryside, life in the countryside, industries and natural resources, geographic landscape and places of interest, contrast of past and present, and historical figures related to Taiwan. In order to give the reader a concrete feeling of these heimat materials, this chapter will describe several lessons under each theme. The Meiji educators who advocated heimat education believed that a child who loves his homeland will love his country.31 Therefore it is important to draw the attention of school children to their homeland and evoke their affection for it. The titles of six lessons related to the first theme of animals and vegetation were myna, papaya, black drongo, longan and pineapple, pig, and water buffalo,32 introducing birds, fruit trees, and livestock that were common to the countryside life in Taiwan. Except for the lesson “Pig,” the five lessons

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come with drawings vividly depicting the objects. The “scenery of the countryside” theme depicted typical Taiwanese countryside scenery: duck-raising farms, transplanting rice seedlings, a banyan tree by a temple, bullock carts, and so on. The pastoral scene of the lesson entitled “Bullock Carts” is a sugarcane field. A road crosses the field and bullock carts carry different goods to or from a nearby town. The lesson ends with a lyrical description of the white sand by the feet of buffaloes, and the drivers cooling the buffaloes with water taken by a long scoop from a roadside stream. The final sentence concludes: “The autumn scene of the sugarcane field with bullock carts is anticipated.”33 The third theme, “Life in the Countryside”, includes driving crickets from a burrow with water, feeding chickens, harvesting rice, drying rice grains, shopping for Lunar New Year, washing clothes on a riverbank, and taking the laundry in before a thundershower. The lesson “Temple Fair” vividly depicts a festival in a drawing featuring the famous folk gods General Hsieh and General Fan, also called the Seventh Lord and the Eighth Lord, or more commonly in Taiwanese, the Big (Tall) Lord and the Short Lord. In their colorful costumes, they are often seen as a pair in a temple fair parade and particularly appealing to children. In this lesson, the boy narrator who has gone out with his brother to see the parade vividly describes the arrival of the Big Lord and Short Lord; he follows the parade to a street corner and then turns to visit a crowded temple that is rustling with activity. The lesson ends with everyone anticipating the start of a drama.34 Nine lessons can be listed under the theme of “industries and natural resources.” The former include tea, sugar, camphor, wood, agriculture, and fish farming; the latter, banana, citrus fruit (of different kinds), longan, pineapple, papaya, mango, watermelon, and bamboo. Seven of these nine lessons also belong to the category “practical learning.” For example, the lesson “Bamboo” introduces different kinds of bamboo in Taiwan and their characteristics and usage. A schoolchild who reads this lesson is expected to have a solid knowledge of Taiwan’s different species of bamboo and be able to identify them in daily life. This echoes Fukuzawa Yukichi’s idea of “practical learning that is closer to ordinary human needs.” The theme “geographic landscape and places of interest” has 15 lessons, providing knowledge of the nature, humanity, and geography of Taiwan. The lessons “Taiwan” and “Taihoku” (Taipei),35 would be suitable for a textbook of Geography. The lesson “From Taihoku to Heitō” (From Taipei to Pingtung) introduces Western Taiwan via a train tour, while school children learn about Eastern Taiwan by reading “Letters from Taitō” (Letters from Taitung).36 The ancient city Tai-nan (Tainan) is depicted in a school trip.37 In this set of readers, students also come to know other famous places of interest in Taiwan such as Jade Mountain, Mountain Sylvia, the Sacred Tree (near Mountain Ali), South Cape, and the railway to Mountain Ali.38 More general topics such

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as lighthouses, hot springs, rain and wind, and forestry are accompanied by illustrations of examples from Taiwan.39 Three lessons belong to the theme “contrast between past and present.” “Transportation in the Past,” “The Story of Irrigation,” and “Hygiene in Taiwan”40 show how life in the present has changed from the past as a result of the modernization of Taiwan. These three lessons can also be regarded as “practical learning.” There are also three lessons about “historical figures related to Taiwan,” namely Go Hō (Wu Feng), Tei Seikō (Cheng Ch’eng-kung), and General Kodama Gentarō.41 Go Hō was a real person, but the story that he sacrificed himself so the Tsou people would abandon their custom of head-hunting custom is no more than a legend. Tei Seikō was known as Koxinga in the West. The lesson mentions that his mother was a Japanese woman and places great emphasis on his loyalty to the Ming Dynasty. General Kodama Gentarō was the fourth Governor-General of Taiwan, and his governorship was the longest, from 1898–1906. His contribution to the development of Taiwan is one of the main points of the text. Readers may notice that lessons listed under “practical learning” (68) and “Taiwan-related matters” (67) overlap to some degree, but even after subtracting that overlap the total number of lessons is still much higher than that of “Japan related matters” (59). Nonetheless, teaching students to respect the emperor(s) and love Japan was an essential part of colonial education, and it seemed to be rather effective. Still, the high percentage of “practical learning” and heimat materials is by all means very impressive. “Taiwan-related matters” had a wide range, but one important element was missing. That was history. None of the lessons includes the history of this island except the one about Koxinga, and only at the end of that lesson is it mentioned that many Han people immigrated to Taiwan after Koxinga drove the Dutch off the island.42 This is the only bit of Taiwan’s history in this entire set of readers. It is not an accident, but a carefully planned strategy. One would not expect Taiwan history in Japanese language textbooks, but the history of Japan did appear in lessons in the category “Japan-related matters.” However, neither can one find the history of Taiwan in textbooks compiled for the two years of History taught in the fifth and sixth grades. History as a common school subject started in 1922. Then it was called “History of Japan,” but it changed to “National History” (kokushi) in 1935.43 Kitahata Gen’ei, a Japanese educator in Taiwan, rejected the idea that Taiwan history had any place in “National History.” He bluntly asserted, “in no case can it be said that the land called Taiwan is a subject (shutai). Our country (wagakuni, meaning Japan) must forever be the subject. The land called Taiwan is not the subject; it cannot be otherwise than that it forever exists as an object (kyakutai).”44 Nonetheless, given the knowledge that heimat education in Japan proper included the history of the place one regarded as one’s heimat,

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whether or not to teach Taiwanese children the island’s history was a valid question for some Japanese educators in Taiwan. One high-school teacher proposed to make a distinction between the pre-colonial and colonial periods in Taiwan history, so that the “dark (pre-colonial) period” might highlight the “bright (Japanese) period” by contrast.45 Such thinking is actually reflected in lessons that depicted differences between now and then. The content of heimat education in Taiwan included everything except the history of the island. To Taiwanese school children, Taiwan was a place without a past; the absence of its past was filled up by Japan history. Modern education is an unprecedented system of instruction in which same-aged children go to school spending the most precious hours of a day reading the same materials and following the same daily schedule. Thus, a homogeneous culture among school children is shaped. The studies on nationalism in the twentieth century tell us that the shaping of a homogeneous culture is an essential element of the formation of nationalism among a group of people, and modern education is an effective medium. Such homogeneity can only be found in, to use Gellner’s words,46 a school-transmitted culture rather than a folk-transmitted one. A basic assumption of heimat education is that love for one’s homeland leads to love for one’s kuni (country or state). The common school readers are full of “Taiwanese flavor,” which is even more localized than in the textbooks used in Japan proper. Why so? The above-mentioned Hoshina Kōichi once pointed out that a textbook compiled for use throughout Japan, an archipelago stretching from a frigid northern zone to the subtropics, could not contain much heimat material illustrating each region. Lessons about snow would be particularly engaging for children in the north, but they might not interest children in semi-tropical Kyūshū.47 Thus, the common school readers used in Taiwan ironically had more “local color” than those in Japan proper. This sheds light on two aspects of how such an education might affect its recipients. First of all, given the assumption of heimat education, Taiwanese school children were expected to love Japan as their kuni. The heimat education in Japan proper comprised two essential elements: geography and history. But for the children of Taiwan, all they learned about their island was that it was a geographical place in the context of Japan’s long history, very much like their counterparts in Japan proper learned about the kyōdo, a place with all the lovable things spatially and a grand history temporally. History was instrumental in the cultivation of national identity and love for the kuni, but Taiwan, in spite of being a lovable heimat, was a place without its own history, and therefore could not be the subject of one’s love for the kuni.48 It was assumed that the colonial children would unmistakably love Japan, and history witnesses to a great extent that this was indeed so.

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However, Taiwan after all was a colony of Japan and had just been incorporated into the empire for a brief period of time in comparison to other regions of Japan. A theoretical question one may raise is: Would the rigorous heimat education in Taiwan’s common schools beget something else, if the subject of love for kuni suddenly disappeared? This situation arose in the postwar period, which will be discussed later in this chapter. In terms of class time, Ethics ranked the third after National Language and Arithmetic. It was taught two hours per weekday from the first grade to the sixth grade.49 As Arithmetic had little to do with national identity and patriotism, Ethics became the second important subject in shaping the collective mentality of school children. First of all, the exemplary figures were fictional in the textbooks for grades 1 to 3, and their names are in the Taiwanese style such as A-jîn, A-bo̍ k, A-siù, and A-gio̍ k. Historical figures appeared in the third-grade textbook. Second, of the 33 real figures who appeared in the textbooks as moral examples for common school children, all but two were Japanese.50 The only two non-Japanese are the above-mentioned Go Hō and Sō Kin (Ts’ao Chin), a Ch’ing official from the mainland who constructed two irrigation canals for the people in Fengshan and was well respected. Third, the 31 Japanese figures included two from medieval Japan (chūsei), 17 from early modern times (kinsei), and 12 from modern times (kindai), especially the Meiji era.51 To call the fictional child protagonists by Taiwanese names was significant when compared with postwar textbooks; an issue that will be discussed later. An overall evaluation shows that the Ethics education in common schools was of good quality,52 and yet the colonial aspects are obvious in which morally admirable figures were all Japanese. One would assume that a child grew up unconsciously regarding the colonizer to be more admirable than the colonized. Like the subject of History, Geography was for the fifth grade and sixth grade and its readers also came in two volumes. At that time the Japanese empire consisted of eleven regions: Kantō, Ōu (now Tōhoku, the Northeast), Chubu, Kinki, Chūgoku, Shikoku, Kyūshū, Hokkaido, Karafuto (Sakhalin), Taiwan, and Chōsen (Korea). The first chapter, “The Great Empire of Japan,” was followed by lessons on the home region of students in more detail than the other ten regions. Accordingly, Taiwan’s school children learned “Taiwan” before the other regions in Geography readers, and Taiwan comprised three lessons. The reader ended with “A General Description of the Greater Empire.” Students learned from the readers that Mount Jade is the highest mountain of our country (wagakuni) and all the teaching materials constantly reinforced the consciousness that Taiwan was an integral part of Japan.53 To sum up, the colonial education was rich or even abundant in heimat (here meaning Taiwan) materials, but the history of the island was almost completely absent from the readers, a vacuum that was filled by Japan’s history.

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Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the education engendered a sense of Japan as an “imagined community” among colonial children, and to use Benedict Anderson’s terms,54 modern education was instrumental in forging an “official nationalism” in a colony by the colonizer. If given enough time, would Taiwanese became Japanese? One cannot answer the question, because Japan’s rule of Taiwan came to a sudden end on August 15, 1945, leaving its colonial subjects drifting toward an unknown future with all the marks of a solid colonial education left on the collective mentality of an entire generation of Taiwanese who had had a Japanese education.

2.

POST-WAR KMT/ROC PARTY-STATE EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies and the military occupation of Taiwan was entrusted by the latter to the Republic of China, which started KMT/ROC party-state rule of the island until 1992. The KMT/ROC educational authorities had decided that the education to be implemented in the Chinese “province” of Taiwan would follow the 1942 Curriculum Guidelines stipulated in China when Taiwan was still under Japan’s rule. The main purpose of education in Taiwan was set to be “de-Japanization” while carrying out “Sinicization” (Chung-kuo hua in Chinese Mandarin).55 In the beginning, textbooks were either those used in China or versions based on Chinese readers. Only after 1950 did textbooks for elementary schools gradually become unified and issued by National Institute for Compilation and Translation.56 The supreme guideline for elementary school education in postwar Taiwan was “The Three Principles of the People.”57 In contrast to the abundance of heimat (homeland) materials in common school National Language readers in the Japanese period, there were very few homeland materials in the National Language (now referring to Chinese Mandarin) and History textbooks.58 The content of the postwar readers was mainly political and ideological. The following lesson in the subject Society is an example. The lesson entitled “Good and Capable Government” (Hsien-neng te cheng-fu) started with the commencement at a school named Chung-shan (中山, referring to Sun Yat-sen) Elementary School. The school is located in a town called Chung-shan Hsiang. The lesson quoted the main points of speeches to students by Principle Wu, Township Councilman Hu, and Mayor Sung. The lesson came to a climax with Mayor Sung’s words: We have a great leader President Chiang, who leads us, exterminated the war lords, and unified China; he led the army and the people to fight against Japan and defeated it. Now, President Chiang and the government he leads are reinforcing

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military power, preparing to take back the mainland, and on the other hand enhancing economic construction and elevating the living standard of the people. Students who are about to graduate! You are good students in school, and should be good citizens after entering society, and under the capable and wise leadership of President Chiang, help to build a new China in accordance with “The Three Principles of the People.”59

The square marks indicate a blank space whenever President Chiang was mentioned to show the exclusive respect due to him; it was a traditional way of showing respect in writing, especially when the emperor and imperial matters were concerned. In a modern-day school reader, honorific blank spaces used for an elected president with definite terms was to deify Chiang Kai-shek. The text also tied Chiang Kai-shek to the ideology of the KMT. In this lesson, the town and the school were fictional, and the content carried almost no “practical learning” about a Taiwanese township. There was no subject Society in the Japanese period, but the information was in readers for National Language and Ethics. A lesson for lower graders in the former was entitled “Our Town” (Watashi domo no Sō), which presented a typical town in the countryside accompanied by a bird’s-eye-view illustration depicting all the features that a Taiwanese town would have: rice fields, small roads, a river, a school, houses, and trees.60 The lesson “A Peaceful Town” (Heiwa na Sō) for higher graders taught about how a town worked by offering more concrete knowledge about the number of households, population, tax-paying, the role of a school principal, hokō regulations, volunteer groups, and policemen. It also mentioned the readjustment of local administrative divisions island wide in 1920.61 In contrast, the above-mentioned KMT/ROC postwar lesson “Good and Capable Government” was filled with political propaganda and ideology. As to the subject History, the author chose to look at the first set of History textbooks compiled in 1960–1961 in Taiwan, which came in four volumes.62 Like History textbooks in the Japanese period, the postwar History readers carried almost no history of Taiwan, and their main content was Chinese history, leaving less than one fourth of the remaining space for Western history. There was a lesson “Cheng Ch’eng-kung” (Koxinga), which did not mention that his mother was Japanese, emphasized Cheng’s fighting against the Manchus, and taking back Taiwan that originally belonged to China. The text ended by saying Cheng represented “the traditional patriotism of the Chinese nation.”63 The abbreviated Western history appeared mainly in volume three, which can be summarized as “the history of world powers’ invasions of China” (lieh-ch’iang chin-Hua shih), while the Chinese history was narrated from the perspective of Chinese nationalism. There were lessons such as “The Great Yellow Emperor,” “The Great Confucius,” “The Spread of Chinese Culture,” and “The Three Great Inventions.” The last volume

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started with “Founding Father Mr. Sun Yat-sen” and ended with “Rebellion of Communists,” “Chiang Kai-shek the Savior of Our Nation,” “Heaven and Hell,” and “New International Situation after the War.” Heaven referred to Taiwan the base of the Republic of China, while Hell was Mainland China under the control of the Communists. The goal of History teaching was clearly stated in the “Editorial Essential Purposes” (pien-chi yao-chih): to strengthen the national consciousness of children and to cultivate patriotic spirit in children. In a modern state this was not unusual, but the passage continued to state, “The basis for the content of this book is in accordance with Founding Father’s bequeathed teachings and speeches of the President, and state policies,” reflecting the ideology of the KMT/ROC party-state. The Founding Father was Sun Yat-sen and the President was Chiang Kai-shek. The structure of History readers would be repeated in textbooks for junior high students. “Chinese nation” (Chung-hua min-tsu) was the core concept, which would last for over half a century.64 It remained the same for senior high school History textbooks as clearly proclaimed in the “Editorial Main Idea” that stated for the history of “home country” (pen-kuo) “pay special attention to the origin and formation of the Chinese nation, and the process of its territorial expansion; also changes in politics, society, and culture of all dynasties. Thus, to make the readers have wholesome knowledge of the Chinese nation and cherish it, and know the duties and hard work required for nation building and revival.”65 The lesson “Chiang Kai-shek the Savior of Our Nation” ends with the sentence, “President Chiang is loyal to the party and loves the country, fighting for the revolution, upholding Founding Father’s bequeathed teachings, and working hard to build a New China. He is the savior of the Chinese nation and the outstanding great man of the world.”66 The title the savior of the Chinese nation and great man of the world (min-tsu chiu-hsing, shih-chieh wei-jen) was conferred upon Chiang Kai-shek very early on.67 On April 5, 1975, a television reporter announced that Chiang Kai-shek, “the savior of the Chinese nation, the giant of the world, and the great leader admired by millions of people” had passed away on a day when lightning and storms seemed to symbolize “the shock to the universe and the mourning of heaven and earth.”68 In a word, the history textbooks in the postwar period were highly political and ideological with no place for Taiwan history. Although the History textbooks in the Japanese period had no Taiwan history either, the most obvious difference was that the Japanese common school National Language readers were abundant in heimat materials, whereas in postwar era Taiwan, the homeland of the schoolchildren, was absent from their curricula. What replaced their homeland was an imaginary “homeland in China,” as in a well-remembered school song: “Outside (meaning to the south of) the Great Wall is the homeland, the hearts of forty millions of compatriots are the same.”69

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If Japanese education taught colonial children to love their homeland Taiwan, postwar KMT/ROC education taught them to love the mainland as their real homeland. Taiwan was erased both spatially and temporally. It went without saying that a good student would become a whole-hearted Chinese nationalist. This issue will be discussed later when it comes to the problem of identity in today’s Taiwan. As mentioned previously, the guiding thought for education in postwar Taiwan was “The Three Principles of the People” and Ethics was no exception. The purpose of Ethics textbooks was to strengthen Chinese nationalism and “Chinese consciousness” (Chung-kuo yi-shih). Another peculiar feature of Ethics textbooks in all grades of schools was “the cult of the leader,” which elevated President Chiang Kai-shek to the status of a god whom students were taught to love, respect, and worship.70 Unlike Japan, the Republic of China was not a monarchy and had no sacred imperial household, thus the cult of Chiang Kai-shek was the antithesis of republican principles. It is no exaggeration to say that postwar ethical education was dictated by political goals.71 As mentioned before, fictional characters in Ethics readers in the Japanese period were called by Taiwanese style of addressing a child, such as A-jîn or A-gio̍ k. This style could not have appeared in a postwar reader. Almost all names for children appeared in a mainlander’s way,72 such as Hsiao-hua, Hsiao-ying, Hsiao-ming, and so on. Hsiao means “little,” a designator for “child” in Chinese Mandarin, similar to the suffixes -ie and -y in English names. Taiwan not only as a place had disappeared in school readers; its culture and languages were demoted and despised by the party-state’s omnipresent mechanism. It was rather common for a child to feel ashamed if addressed by a Taiwanese nickname such as A-so, while a Chinese Mandarin nickname such as Hsiao-so was a sign of high culture, bestowing a sense of elegance. The fictional nicknames Hsiao-hua, Hsiao-ying, and Hsiao-ming were everywhere, even in examples in Arithmetic textbooks.73 Taiwan in postwar Geography textbooks was one of 35 provinces of the Republic of China, as shown in the set of textbooks published in 1957.74 Similar to the Japanese period, the subject Geography was for the fifth and sixth grades. As depicted previously, Taiwan was one of eleven regions in the Japanese empire and the textbook started with Taiwan and gave it three chapters while the other ten regions were each allotted one chapter. This was a common practice in ordering the chapters of a geography textbook in the Japanese empire. In contrast, Taiwan occupied a very insignificant portion in the four-volume set of KMT textbooks. Volumes one to three contained chapters about different topics, and each had 18 lessons, 54 in total; volume four was basically the geography of foreign countries. Taiwan was only one lesson among 54. There were lessons for Nanking, Shanghai, Chungking, the Yangtze River, Wuhan, the Yellow River, the Great Wall and the Great Canal,

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Tientsin, Peping (Peking), and Tibet, but Taiwan had insignificant presence in early postwar Geography textbooks, not even given one thirty-fifth of the space.

3.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HOW PARTY-STATE EDUCATION CAME TO “AN END WITHOUT ENDING”

It is perhaps not easy for our reader to imagine that the history of an island was not taught to its inhabitants for over half a century (1945–1997), while the history of a place overseas was taught as if it were the island’s own history. A change finally came during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui when a course called “Knowing Taiwan” was introduced in junior high school curricula. The course comprised three parts: Taiwan’s history, geography, and society, each of which had its own textbook.75 This was the first time Taiwanese children studied the history of the island in classrooms and had individual textbooks for it. Although this course occupied only six class hours per week with two for each of the three themes and just for the first year, it led to tremendous protests from those who were pro-KMT/ROC party-state and pro-unification with China.76 Nonetheless, one has to bear in mind that the rest of the curricula remained almost the same as before. History teaching in senior high school did not change accordingly; there was still no place for Taiwan in its Chinese and Western history curricula. Nine more years passed before another big change brought about even fiercer protests from the KMT’s conservative wing.77 In 2006, under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, senior high schools started to teach Taiwan history for the first semester, and then Chinese history and Western history for the next three semesters. However, after Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency in 2008, he quickly used presidential power to overturn the “98 Curriculum Guidelines” (98 means 2009; hereafter 98 CG) for History and National Language. The guidelines for National Language were revised to the satisfaction of the 98 CG’s opponents and its implementation was delayed for one year. As to History, the ultimate goal of the pro-KMT forces was to abolish Taiwan history and incorporate it into the grand narration of Chinese history.78 Due to the unyielding efforts of several historians, the new conservative “101 Curriculum Guidelines,” which replaced the 98 CG, were delayed for three years. Toward the end of 2013 further efforts were made by the conservative forces to make the 101 CG to even more extreme. As the revisions were carried out in complete secrecy and had no legal basis, they caused a public uproar when they came to light in January 2014. In mid-2015 a movement called “Anti-black-box ‘Fine-Tuning’ Curriculum Guidelines” came into existence to oppose the implementation of the secretly revised new curriculum guidelines. Many high school students rose to voice their anger

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by themselves, saddened and radicalized by the suicide of Lin Kuan-hua, a 20-year-old vocational school student, on July 30.79 The “Black-Box” CG were abolished immediately after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party assumed the presidency on May 2016. In September 2020, the new 108 Curriculum Guidelines divided history into Taiwan history, East Asian history, and world history. Chinese history is now in East Asian history, a radical changing in Taiwan’s postwar history education. History teaching has been the focus and battlefield of curriculum reform since the 1990s, has undergone tremendous controversies, and finally brought about fundamental changes. In 2006 an essential change at the same time occurred when the subject Citizenship and Society replaced The Three Principles of the People, which had been in senior high school curricula for more than half a century. Nevertheless, the National Language course has remained almost unchanged. This China-centered subject is perhaps the most influential one, not only because it takes up most studying hours, but also because almost all different kinds of examinations, including those for civil servant and lawyer, require an ability test based on what is taught in National Language courses.

4.

MODERN EDUCATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF JAPANESE AND POSTWAR EDUCATION?

The controversies over curriculum guidelines in Taiwan usually involve the issue of national identity. Where one stands on the political spectrum almost always decides one’s attitudes to curriculum guideline reform. Wan Fu-chang used “Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness” (Chung-kuo i-shih vs. T’ai-wan i-shih), which can be loosely translated into “unification vs. independence” (t’ung tu) to describe the two opposing attitudes about the future of Taiwan,80 the spectrum of which is wide. On its two extreme stands “Unification” refers to Taiwan becoming a province of the People’s Republic of China, whereas “independence” means Taiwan should become an independent country, discarding the externally imposed outer casing of the Republic of China. A similar analytical framework appears in Vladimir Stolojan’s article in which he used the terms “pro-Taiwan independence” and “pro-unification.”81 Given the political struggle between the two forces in the past thirty years in Taiwan, this approach is valid to a great degree. Nonetheless, the rise of Taiwanese consciousness came much earlier than the curriculum disputes and it may be said that the disputes were the result of a long-term development of Taiwanese people’s identification with their homeland. Studies of colonial education in the Japanese period show that it had rich homeland materials and depicted the island in a very positive and

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even beautiful way, but there was no history of Taiwan, only the history of Japan. Under such education, school children were assumed to love their heimat and love Japan as their kuni (state or country). This could explain why those young Taiwanese who went to the war for Japan regarded themselves as Japanese and would later say, “I was a Japanese back then.”82 This “wartime generation,”83 which included former President Lee Teng-hui (1923–2020), had deep affection for their homeland Taiwan. A theoretical question can be raised: Where would their love for heimat go further or be elevated to when the Japanese rule suddenly ended in August 1945?84 The Republic of China might have won the loyalty of the Taiwanese, but the February 28th Massacre in 1947 completely ruined that possibility. And one has to bear in mind that the majority of the wartime generation were now too old to go back to school again. Most of them bore their love for the island covertly, and the opportunity for Taiwan to become their country was lost forever during the White Terror period (1949–1992) of the KMT/ROC party-state. The majority of Japanese-educated Taiwanese became illiterate in their own homeland because the KMT/ROC party-state carried out a strict “Chinese Mandarin only” policy. It was almost impossible for them to communicate in Chinese Mandarin beyond a basic survival level without formal schooling, so they were not influenced by the party-state’s education. The younger Taiwanese who received a thorough postwar education that had neither heimat materials nor a history of Taiwan were educated to regard the Mainland as their homeland and the ROC as the government for their patriotism. Not only was Taiwan no longer their homeland, but everything related to it, such as language and culture, was considered inferior. This could explain why the 45- to 65-year-old age group is mostly conservative, pro-KMT, and pro-unification. This age group was the most strongly influenced by the KMT/ROC party-state education, and contains a high concentration of the so-called “Han fans” (followers of Han Kuo-yu85).86 Under such dominant ideological education and strict political and social control, it is remarkable that an anti-KMT democratic movement emerged. However, this issue needs to be analyzed from various aspects and is beyond the scope of this chapter. Exceptions, such as anti-KMT activities, require explanations but not those expected outcomes in accord with principle, such as one’s loyalty to the state. An understanding of the two types of colonial education from 1898 to 1997 in Taiwan can help us anticipate the expected but not the unexpected. To sum up, the century of colonial education shaped today’s Taiwan to a great degree and induced the complicated national identity problems of both those who regard themselves as Taiwanese and those who regard themselves as Chinese and desire future unification with China.

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NOTES 1. Ernest Gellner says: “Our general argument might be re-stated as follows. Industrialization engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society, which consequently has egalitarian expectations and aspirations, such as had been generally lacking in the previous stable, stratified, dogmatic and absolutist agrarian societies.” Nations and Nationalism (Second Edition), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 72. 2. For a brilliant discussion of relations between official nationalism and imperialism, see Chapter 6, “Official Nationalism and Imperialism,” in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition, London and New York: Verso, 2006, pp. 83–111 and pp. 116–122. 3. Two of the KMT’s famous self-depictions are as follows: “The party leads the government” and “The party leads the army.” In the past several years, more and more archives show that in practice the KMT/ROC party-state worked as such. 4. The “four big evil laws of the White Terror” are Tung-yüan k’an-luan shih-ch’i lin-shih t’iao-k’uan (the Provisional Amendments for the Period of Mobilization of the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, 1948–1991), T’ai-wan-sheng chieh-yen-ling (the Martial Law for Taiwan Province, 1949–1987), Ch’eng-chih p’an-luan t’iao-li (Traitors Punishment Act, 1949–1991), and K’an-luan shih-ch’i chien-su fei-tieh t’iao-li (Reporting and Punishing Communists Act for the Period of Mobilization of the Suppression of Communist Rebellion 1950–1991). 5. The three assemblies are: the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan. The members of the Control Yuan became selected by the president and approved by the Legislative Yuan since 1992. 6. For a concise description of this process, see Wan-yao Chou, Chuan-hsing cheng-yi chih lu: tao-yü te kuo-ch’ü yü wei-lai (The Road to Transitional Justice: the Past and Future of Taiwan), Taipei: National Human Rights Museum, 2019, pp. 141–163. 7. “Chan-cheng ch’i shih-tai,” a term coined by Chou Wan-yao, has been adopted by researchers in the field of wartime history of Taiwan. See Chou Wan-yao, “Preface,” in her Hai-hsing-hsi te nien-tai: Jih-pen chih-min t’ung-chih mo-ch’i T’ai-wan-shih lun-chi (The Era of Going to the Sea: A Collection of Articles on Late Japanese Rule in Taiwan), Taipei: Asian Culture, 2003, p. ii. 8. In the “Aboriginal Region” (banchi) there was a much simplified school system called “Bandō kyōiku sho” (educational centers for aboriginal children) taught by policemen. Before 1922 in both the “Ordinary Administrative Region” (futsū gyūsei ku) and the “Aboriginal Region” there were kōgakkō (common school) mainly for aboriginals with the school name “XX banjin kōgakkō” (“XX Common School for Aboriginals”). However, the system was abolished in 1922 and no school would henceforth bear the name “banjin kōgakkō.” Nonetheless, in reality there were 29 common schools mainly for aboriginals in 1935, 24 of which were in the Ordinary Administrative Region and 5 of which were in the Aboriginal Region including the Musha kōgakkō in today’s Wu-she. See Taiwan Kyōiku kai, ed., Taiwan kyōiku enkaku shi (The History of Education in Taiwan), Taipei, Taiwan Kyōiku kai, 1939, pp. 480–481.

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9. The English translation follows E. Patricia Tsurumi. See her book Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 18, 32. 10. Taiwan Kyōiku kai, ed., Taiwan kyōiku enkaku shi (The History of Education in Taiwan), pp. 7, 14, 32, 81, 85, 100, 133. 11. Chou Wan-yao, “Li-shih de t’ung-he yü chien-kou: Jih-pen ti-kuo ch’üan-nei T’ai-wan, Ch’ao-hsien he Man-chou de ‘kuo-shih’ chiao-yü” (Integration and construction of history: ‘national history’ education in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria within the imperial sphere), in Chou Wan-yao, Hai-yang yü chih-min-ti T’ai-wan lun-chi (Oceanic and Colonial Taiwan: A Collection of Articles), Taipei: Linking Publishing, p. 263, and note 44 on pp. 263–264. 12. For the shifting of policies from dōka to kōminka, one may consult Chapter 3, “Between Assimilation and Imperialization: From Colonial Projects to Imperial Subjects,” in Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, Berkeley, LA, and London: University of California Press, 2001, pp. 89–132. 13. Chou Wan-yao, “T’ai-wan kung-hsüeh-hsiao chih-tu, chiao-k’e yü chiao-k’e-shu tsung-shuo” (A General Guide for the System, Subjects, and Textbooks of Common Schools in Taiwan), in Chou Wan-yao, Hai-yang yü chih-min-ti T’ai-wan lun-chi (Oceanic and Colonial Taiwan: A Collection of Articles), p. 207. 14. A small number of common schools offered only three- or four-year programs. 15. Chou Wan-yao, “T’ai-wan kung-hsüeh-hsiao chih-tu, chiao-k’e yü chiao-k’e-shu tsung-shuo” (A General Guide for the System, Subjects, and Textbooks of Common Schools in Taiwan), p. 209. 16. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, p. 138. 17. Ibid., p. 139. 18. Chou Wan-yao, “Shih-hsüeh chiao-yü, hsiang-t’u-ai yü kuo-chia jen-t’ung: Jih-chih shih-ch’i T’ai-wan kung-hsüeh-hsiao ti-san-ch’i ‘kuo-yü’ chiao-k’e-shu te fen-hsi” (Practical Learning Education, Love for Homeland, and National Identity: An Analysis of the Third Edition of ‘National Language’ Readers), in Chou Wan-yao, Hai-hsing-hsi te nien-tai (The Era of Going to the Sea), pp. 223, 226. 19. According to an estimate, one out of 160 Japanese read Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Gakumon no Susume (An Encouragement of Learning). See Fukuzawa Yukichi, Preface to Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979, p. 23. 20. Fukuzawa Yukichi, Gakumon no Susume (An Encouragement of Learning), in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū, Vol. 3, p. 30. 21. Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawa ni okeru ‘jitsugaku’ no tenkai: Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku kenkyū josetsu” (On the Turn of Fukuzawa’s ‘Practical Learning’: Preface to Studies on Fukuzawa’s Philosophy), in Maruyam Masao shū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 107–131. 22. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, p. 138. 23. Nishikawa Shunsaku, “Fukuzawa Yukichi,” Prospects: The Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, Vol. XXXIII, no. 3/4 (1993), pp. 493–506. Cited from: http://​www​.ibe​.unesco​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​fukuzawe​.pdf (viewed on August 20, 2020). 24. For a list of the 68 lessons in the category of “practical learning,” see Chou Wan-yao, “Shih-hsüeh chiao-yü, hsiang-t’u-ai yü kuo-chia jen-t’ung” (Practical Learning Education, Love for Homeland, and National Identity), pp. 237–239.

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25. Taiwan Sōtokufu, Kōggako yō kokugo tokuhon: dai ichi shu (National Language Readers for Common Schools: Type 1), Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2003 reprinted, vol. 3, pp. 1–2. 26. Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 130–131. 27. For his criticism, see Hoshina Kōichi, “Kyōdo kyōzai no toriatsukai ni tsuite” (On How to Handle Heimat Materials), in his Saikin kokugo kyōju ue no sho mon dai (Problems about Teaching National Language in Recent Times), Tokyo: Kyōiku sinchō kenkyū kai, 1915, pp. 292–300. 28. Chou Wan-yao, “Shih-hsüeh chiao-yü, hsiang-t’u-ai yü kuo-chia jen-t’ung” (Practical Learning Education, Love for Homeland, and National Identity), pp. 265–266. 29. Karasawa Tomitarō, Kyōkasho no rekishi: kyōkasho to Nihonjin no keisei (History of Textbooks: Textbooks and the Formation of Japanese), Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1956, p. 370. 30. Kusumi Eiichi and Fujimoto Genjirō, Kōgakō kakuka kyōjuhō [zen] (Teaching Methods for Different Subjects), Taihoku: Nitaka dō, 1924, p. 80. 31. Hoshina Kōichi, “Kyōdo kyōzai no toriatsukai ni tsuite” (On How to Handle Heimat Materials), pp. 293, 299. 32. Taiwan Sōtokufu, Kōggako yō kokugo tokuhon: dai ichi shu (National Language Readers for Common Schools: Type 1), vol. 2, pp. 43–45, 54–55, 56–58; vol. 3, pp. 47–50; vol. 4, pp. 24–25, 33–35. 33. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 22–24. 34. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 51–56. 35. Ibid., vols 7:5, pp. 14–17; 7:28, pp. 103–105. 36. Ibid., vols 6:11, pp. 38–41; 7:23, pp. 81–86. 37. Ibid., vol. 10:6, pp. 29–32. 38. Ibid., vols 10:4, pp. 20–21; 11:18, pp. 84–91; 9:1, pp. 1–3; 11:3, pp. 11–13; 10:12, pp. 51–56. 39. Ibid., vols 8:5, pp. 16–19; 9:16, pp. 68–69; 10:7, pp. 32–33; 10:8, pp. 33–37. 40. Ibid., vols 9:4, pp. 8–12; 9:7, pp. 17–20; 12:13, pp. 53–58. 41. Ibid., vols 8:25, pp. 98–102; 9:23, pp. 99–105; 12:15, pp. 63–68. 42. Ibid., vol. 9:23, pp. 104–105. 43. Ts’ai Hui-kuang, “Jih-chih shih-ch’i T’ai-wan kung-hsüeh-hsiao te li-shih chiao-yü: li-shih chiao-k’e shu chih fen-hsi” (Historical Education in Taiwan’s Common Schools during the Period of Japanese Rule: An Analysis of History Textbooks), MA thesis, National Taiwan University, 2000, pp. 15–18. 44. Kitahata Gen’ei, “Shotō kokushi kyōiku no honshitsu to sono shimei ni oite: Toku ni kōgakkō no kokushi ni oite [4]” (On the Nature of Elementary School Education and its Mission: Especially on National History for Common Schools, 4), Taiwan kyōiku 386 (September 1934), p. 30. 45. Suzuki Kizo, “Taiwan ni okeru kyōdo kyōiku no kachi” (The Value of Heimat Education in Taiwan), Taiwan kyōiku 417 (April 1937), pp. 2–10. 46. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 35. 47. Hoshina Kōichi, “Kyōdo kyōzai no toriatsukai ni tsuite” (On How to Handle Heimat Materials), p. 292; Wan-yao Chou, “Between Heimat and Nation: Japanese Colonial Education and the Origins of ‘Taiwanese Consciousness’,” in Sechin Y. S. Chien and John Fitzgerald, eds., The Dignity of Nations: Equality, Competition, and Honor in East Asian Nationalism, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006, p. 126. 48. Chou, “Between Heimat and Nation,” pp. 126–128.

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49. The subject Arithmetic was 5, 5, 6, 6, 4, 4 hours from grade 1 to grade 6. Chou Wan-yao, “T’ai-wan kung-hsüeh-hsiao chih-tu, chiao-k’e yü chiao-k’e-shu tsung-shuo” (A General Guide for the System, Subjects, and Textbooks of Common Schools in Taiwan), p. 209. 50. For a list of names of protagonists, fictional and historical, see Wang Chin-ch’ueh, Jih-chih shih-ch’i T’ai-wan kung-min chiao-yü yü kung-ming t’e-hsin (Taiwan’s Education for Citizens and Characteristics of Citizens in Japanese Period), Taipei: Taiwan Ku-chi, 2005, pp. 166–168. 51. For an analysis of these Japanese figures and their virtues, see Chou Wan-yao, “Chih-min-ti T’ai-wan ch’u-teng chiao-yü hsiu-shen-shu chung te mu-kuo tien-fan” (The Mother Country’s Models for Virtue in Ethics Textbooks of Elementary Education in Colonial Taiwan), in Chou Wan-yao, Hai-yang yü chih-min-ti T’ai-wan lun-chi (Oceanic and Colonial Taiwan: A collection of Articles), pp. 221–241. For the influence of Ethics on Japanese-educated Taiwanese, see Chou Wan-yao, “Shih-luo ti tao-te shih-chieh” (A Lost Moral World), in Chou Wan-yao, Hai-hsing-hsi te nien-tai (The Era of Going to the Sea), pp. 295–363. 52. Chou Wan-yao offers an evaluation of Ethics education based on survey materials, see her “Shih-luo ti tao-te shih-chieh” (A Lost Moral World), pp. 341–348. 53. Wan-yao Chou, “Between Heimat and Nation: Japanese Colonial Education and the Origins of ‘Taiwanese Consciousness’,” p. 125. 54. For a brilliant discussion of relations between official nationalism and imperialism, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 83–111. 55. Yeh Hsien-chun, “Er-tu’z shih-chieh chan-hou ch’u-ch’i T’ai-wan chih Chung-kuo-hua chiao-yü: Yi ch’u-teng chiao-yü wei-li” (Sinicization in Taiwan after World War Two, 1945–1949: A Case Study of Elementary Education), Taipei: Department of Education, National Taiwan Normal University, MA thesis, 1993, pp. 80–83, 136–137. 56. Ibid., p. 84. 57. “Elementary Schools” (Kuo-min hsüeh-hsiao), in the official website of National Academy for Educational Reserah (Kuo-li chiao-yü yen-chiu yüan tz’u-shu): https://​pedia​.cloud​.edu​.tw/​Entry/​Detail/​?title​=​%E5​%9C​%8B​%E6​ %B0​ % 91​ % E5 ​ % AD ​ % B8 ​ % E6 ​ % A0 ​ % A1 ​ & ​ s earch ​ = ​ % E5 ​ % 9C ​ % 8B ​ % E6 ​ % B0​ %91 ​ % E5 ​ % AD​ % B8​ % E6​ % A0​ % A1​ & ​ f bclid​ = ​ I wAR0ssieoM0E0Ga​ - ​ - gx1​ -gvoV9tHnZja9kqudTgROGCh7p5lbB6h8ZpfkIKU (accessed on September 20, 2021). 58. Yeh Hsien-chun, p. 85. 59. Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, ed., She-hui k’e-pen (Textbooks for the Subject of Society), Taipei: Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 68–70. 60. Taiwan Sōtokufu, Kōggako yō kokugo tokuhon: dai ichi shu (National Language Readers for Common Schools: Type 1), vol. 4:8, pp. 21–24. 61. In Japanese “chihō seido no kaisei.” Taiwan Sōtokufu, Kōggako yō kokugo tokuhon: dai ichi shu (National Language Readers for Common Schools: Type 1), vol. 10:21, pp. 91–96. 62. Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, ed., Kuo-ming hsüeh-hsiao li-shih k’e-pen (History Textbooks for Elementary Schools), vols 1, 2, 3, 4 (Taipei, Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, 1960, 1961, 1960, 1961). 63. Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, ed., Kuo-ming hsüeh-hsiao li-shih k’e-pen (History Textbooks for Elementary Schools), vol. 2, pp. 44–46.

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64. For the concept of “Chinese nation” in junior high school History textbooks, see Hsiao Jui-t’ing, “Hsien-tai Chung-kuo kuo-tsu te chih-shih chien-kou: Yi chan-hou kuo (ch’u)-chung li-shih chiao-k’e-shu ‘Chung-hua min-tsu’ lun-shu wei-li [1952-2010]” (Knowledge Construction of Modern Chinese Nation: A Case Study of Discourses concerning “Chinese Nation” in Junior-High-School History Textbooks in Postwar Taiwan), Tainan: National Cheng Kong University, MA thesis, 2012. 65. Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, ed., Kuo-min hsüeh-hsiao li-shih k’e-pen kao-chi ti-i-ts’e (History Textbooks for Higher Graders), Taipei: Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, 1952, vol. 1, p. 1. 66. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 44. 67. For instance, it was reported that ‘Uongu Yata’uyungana (Kao Yi-sheng) said that President Chiang was not only the savior of the nation but also the savior of the world. See Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 12, 1951. ‘Uongu Yata’uyungana (1908–1954), a leading figure of the Tsou people, was arrested in 1952 and executed with five elite aboriginals in 1954 in early period of the White Terror. 68. For the footage, see documentary film Khan Guán ê Tshiú (Hand in Hand), directed by Chuang Yi-tseng and Yen Lan-ch’uan, produced by Wu-mi-le Movie Company, 2011, time: from 1:29:42 to 1:30:19. 69. Pai Hung-po, “Chan-hou T’ai-wan ch’u-teng yin-yüeh chiao-yü chih yen-chiu: Yi yin-yüeh chiao-k’e-shu wei fen-hsi chih ch’ang-yü [1952–1968]” (Music Education in Elementary Schools in Postwar Taiwan, 1952–1968: An Analysis of Music Textbooks), Taoyuan: National Central University, MA thesis, 2011, p. 1. 70. Li Yi-ching, “Chan-hou T’ai-wan tao-te chiao-yüte fa-chang [1945–1991]: Yi te-mu te Hsüan-tse wei chung-hsin” (The Development of Ethics Education in Postwar Taiwan, 1945–1991: A Study of Selections of Virtues), Taipei: National Normal University, MA thesis, 2015, pp. 51, 72, 86–87, 135, 165. 71. Ibid., p. 85. 72. The only exception in Ethics textbooks of 1963 was A-mu, who was skinny and easily got sick. A-mu’s house was very dirty and unsanitary, while the house of his neighbor Hsia-hua was very clean but was bothered by flies and mosquitoes. Hsiao-hua and his parents helped A-mu to clean the dirty ditch and throw away garbage and A-mu thereafter became healthy and Hsiao-hua’s house was freed of flies and mosquitoes. See Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, Kung-min yü tao-te (Citizens and Ethics), Taipei: Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, 1963, vol. 9:14, pp. 27–28. 73. Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, ed., Kuo-min hsüeh-hsiao suan-shu k’e-pen kao-chi ti-er-tse (Arithmetic Textbooks for Elementary Schools), Taipei: Kuo-li pien-yi kuan, 1967, vol. 2. There were also Ta-hua, Ai-hua, Chien-kuo, Hsing-kuo, etc. 74. T’ai-wan sheng cheng-fu chiao-yü t’ing, ed., Kuo-min hsüeh-hsiao ti-li k’e-pen (Geography Textbooks for Elementary Schools), Taipei: T’ai-wan sheng cheng-fu chiao-yü t’ing, 1957. 75. For a comprehensive understanding of curriculum reforms after 1997, see Vladimir Stolojan, “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High School during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46:1 (2017), pp. 101–130. 76. For an analysis of protests surrounding “the Knowing Taiwan” course, see Wang Fu-chang, “Min-tsu hsiang-hsiang, tsu-ch’un yi-shih yü li-shih: ‘Jen-shih T’ai-wan’ chiao-k’e shu cheng-yi feng-p’o te nei-jung yü mai-luo fen-hsi” (National Imagination, Ethnic Consciousness, and History: Content and Context

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Analyses of the ‘Getting to Know Taiwan’ Textbook Disputes), T’ai-wan-shih yen-chiu 8:2 (December, 2001), pp. 145–208. 77. For the controversy, see Stolojan, “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High School during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” pp. 105–110. 78. In 1999 History textbooks used in senior high schools still only consisted of Chinese history and Western history, but a big change was that Taiwan history occupied four of the 19 chapters of Chinese history. The “revolutionary” change that took place in 2006 was that Taiwan history appeared in one individual volume and for one semester. 79. For more details about the “Fine-Tuning” Curriculum Guidelines and students’ anti- “Fine-Tuning” CG movement, see Stolojan, “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High School during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” pp. 111–118. 80. Wang Fu-chang, “Min-tsu hsiang-hsiang, tsu-ch’un yi-shih yü li-shih” (National Imagination, Ethnic Consciousness, and History), p. 145. 81. Stolojan, “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High School during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” p. 101. 82. To use Leo T. S. Ching’s words, they belonged to “those who once were Japanese.” See the introduction “Those Who Once Were Japanese,” in Ching, Becoming “Japanese”, p. 1. While Leo T. S. Ching emphasizes the processes of Taiwan’s residents becoming “Japanese,” about 20 years later a new book tries to present a case of residents of Keelung who were already “becoming Taiwanese” from late Ch’ing rule to early postwar period. See Evan N. Dawley, Becoming Taiwanese: Ethnogenesis in a Colonial City 1880s–1950s, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019. 83. This term refers to Taiwanese who were born between 1920 and 1930. For reference, see note 7. 84. To pursue a nation-state was not the choice of Taiwanese elite immediately after the war ended. Instead, a position was chosen, as Steven Phillips points out, “between formal independence and complete assimilation”; that is, local self-government. See Steven Phillips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations under Nationalists Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, Armonk, New York and London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 300. 85. Han Kuo-yu was the mayor of Kaohsiung from December 25, 2018 to June 12, 2020, when he became the first ROC mayor to be recalled by public vote. He aroused supporters’ fanatical responses when he was running for the mayorship of Kaohsiung. This phenomenon was called the “Han Tides” (Han-liu) and his supporters “Han-fen” (Han fans). During his mayorship he ran for the presidency in the election of 2020 but was defeated by Tsai Ing-wen of the DDP. Han was leading in polls before the Hong Kong protests and repression shifted support to Tsai. 86. This is based on the author’s long-term reading of various kinds of surveys and observations of Taiwanese society.

11. Transformation of women’s status in Taiwan, 1920–2020 Doris T. Chang The advancement of Taiwanese women’s status has gone through remarkable transformations in the past century. In this chapter, I will focus on the discussion of women’s status in three key areas—education of women and girls, status and participation of women in the workforce, and women’s political participation and leadership. Among all the incremental gains in the past century, attainment of political rights and leadership was perhaps Taiwanese women’s greatest achievement. During the Japanese colonial era, Taiwanese male property owners were granted the right to the franchise in the municipal elections of 1935. Taiwanese women were not granted the same right. Eight decades later, in 2016, Taiwan became the first Chinese-speaking society to elect a female president with the popular vote. By 2020, the percentage of female lawmakers in Taiwan’s legislature has reached 42 percent—the highest in Asia.1 The advancement of women’s political power in the 21st century must be situated within the larger context of the gender mainstreaming policies implemented by Taiwanese government and political parties. This chapter will also examine women’s political leadership and participation within the larger context of Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy and its contested national identities from 1920 to 2020. In particular, we will discuss the exceptional political careers of Hsieh Hsueh-hung, Hsiu-lien Annette Lu, Chen Chu, and Tsai Ing-wen within the context of Taiwan’s political transformation. In the realm of educational attainment, most Taiwanese women and girls only received public education in the primary-school level during the Japanese colonial era. By the 2010s, more young women were enrolled in institutions of higher learning than their male counterparts. Yet horizontal segregation of college majors and professions along gender lines persists in contemporary Taiwanese society. Most young men choose to major in fields such as sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), whereas most women choose to major in liberal arts, education, and bachelor’s degrees that would prepare them for vocations in social services and health professions. As we 243

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will see, the training of women and girls in the health professions really had its genesis during the Japanese colonial era.

EDUCATION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS In an effort to promote Taiwanese girls’ health and well-being, the Japanese colonial government collaborated with progressive Taiwanese elites to abolish the traditional practice of foot-binding in 1915. The collaboration extended to the enactment of the policy of encouraging girls to receive primary education in colonial public schools (kōgakkō) established for Taiwanese children.2 At the same time, admissions to elementary schools (shōgakkō) were restricted to the children of Japanese nationals in Taiwan. School attendance was a means for the Japanese colonial government to assimilate Taiwanese children into modern Japanese culture, becoming loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire. The goal of colonial education was to equip the Taiwanese population with basic literacy in Japanese language and skills so as to be competent workers in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. Whereas 98 percent of Japanese of both genders were attending elementary schools in 1926, only 43 percent of Taiwanese boys and 13 percent of Taiwanese girls were enrolled in public schools.3 By 1938, 34 percent of Taiwanese girls had been matriculated. As the Japanese colonial government intensified its assimilation policy in Taiwan to wage a total war in the Pacific Theater during the early 1940s, the matriculation rate of Taiwanese girls in public schools rose to 60 percent in 1943—the second highest in Asia.4 Although the Government-General’s Integration Rescript in 1922 instituted the policy of integrating Taiwanese and Japanese students into the same schools to promote cultural assimilation, most Taiwanese remained in predominantly colonial schools with a Taiwanese majority, while Japanese residents in colonial Taiwan attended schools with a Japanese majority. Despite the Integration Rescript mandated that ethnicity should no longer be a factor in admissions to middle and high schools, most colonial high schools and vocational schools for girls still admitted mostly Japanese applicants rather than native Taiwanese.5 Consequently, mass education of Taiwanese girls only remained on the level of primary education. Since the vast majority of Taiwanese in the colonial era belonged to the rural peasantry or the working class, only girls from the landed gentry and middle-class families could afford to send their daughters to get a high-school education. For the privileged few Taiwanese girls admitted to colonial high schools, the curriculum included Japanese, Confucian ethics, mathematics, natural sciences, music, physical education, sewing, and handicrafts. Looking at the colonial educational system from a perspective of the intersection of ethnic and gender inequalities, Taiwanese women and girls remained at

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the bottom rung of hierarchy in terms of educational attainment, although Taiwanese girls’ functional literacy had incrementally improved over time with increasing enrollment in colonial public schools.6 One of the few professions that admitted a significant number of women from both Taiwanese and Japanese background was the nursing profession. As early as 1899, the Nursing Association of the Japanese Red Cross was established in colonial Taiwan to recruit women into the nursing profession. From 1904 onwards, the three-year curriculum for nursing students included training in familiarity with the human anatomy, dissection, disinfecting methods, and paramedic skills for emergency rescue during both peace and war times.7 As it was in the West, nursing became a respectable profession for women in colonial Taiwan. The only institution of higher learning in colonial Taiwan, Taihoku Imperial University, strongly prioritized Japanese applicants over the native population. For higher education, a few Taiwanese women from the upper class would apply for admissions to women’s colleges in Japan’s home islands. Upon receiving their college and professional degrees, these women comprised an educated elite that entered a variety of professions in colonial Taiwan, such as civil service, teaching, journalism, and medicine.8 In both colonial Taiwan and Japan’s home islands, there were two schools of thought on educating women and girls. Some Taiwanese elites concurred with the colonial government that educating girls could raise the educational level of the entire family, since mothers played the primary role in socializing children to be good citizens. Based on this traditional perspective, girls should be socialized and educated to be good wives and wise mothers, good managers of household affairs, as well as loyal subjects of the Empire. On the other hand, there were progressive colonial intellectuals who argued from socialist and feminist perspectives. They advocated that girls should be educated with the aim of becoming financially independent and realizing their full potential as well-rounded human beings.9 A good example of a career woman who applied the knowledge and expertise she acquired in Japan to make a positive difference in her community is Tsai A-hsin (蔡阿信, 1899–1990). In 1915, Tsai’s wealthy stepfather sent her to study at the Tokyo Women’s Medical College. Upon Tsai’s return to Taiwan, she established her own hospital in 1925 in the city of Taizhong. Setting up one’s own private practice was a strategy for most Taiwanese physicians to assert their professional autonomy and circumvent the control and ethnic discrimination in the Japanese-dominated medical establishment. According to Ming-cheng Lo, Japanese-trained Taiwanese physicians were cultural hybrids positioned in between the scientific modernity of the Japanese colonizers and the traditional culture of their Taiwanese co-ethnics. As such, Taiwanese doctors were put in a contradictory situation where they served as

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agents of the Japanese state for bringing modern culture and medical science to the colony while playing the roles of leaders in the Taiwanese community.10 Tsai’s story exemplified this contradiction. Responding to the shortage of medical personnel in obstetrics, Tsai’s hospital created a seminar that trained as many as five hundred midwives to provide prenatal and obstetric care throughout Taiwan. During the Great Depression in the 1930s, her decision to ensure affordability of healthcare dramatically reduced infant and maternal fatalities in the community. Soon after Japan invaded China in 1937, colonial police would frequent the hospital to randomly select the trainees to be sent to the frontline as nurses in the Japanese army. Subsequently, Tsai had to terminate the training program in 1938 after most of her students quit attending the sessions.11 With the military defeat of Japan in World War II, Taiwan was brought under the control of the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government. Four years later, in 1949, the Chinese Communist troops defeated the KMT in the Civil War. The latter then retreated and set up an exile government in Taiwan. Between 1945 and 1949, nearly two million Chinese Mainlanders moved to the island to live alongside six million Taiwanese. Upon their arrival, Mainlanders were impressed with the high literacy rate and foundational education that most Taiwanese women and girls had received. They acknowledged that girls’ enrollment in colonial public schools in Taiwan was higher than any other province in mainland China. Since 58 percent of the Taiwanese population was literate in Japanese during the 1940s, some Mainlander commentators were impressed with the ability of working-class Taiwanese women to communicate in writing. But because of most Mainlanders’ anti-Japanese sentiment after eight years of resisting Japanese invasion (1937–1945), virtually no Mainlanders explicitly attributed the positive outcomes of Taiwanese women’s and girls’ functional literacy to Japanese colonial education.12 As part of the KMT government’s de-Japanization campaign, Mandarin Chinese soon replaced Japanese as the national language of Taiwan. Subsequently, speaking Japanese and native Taiwanese languages in schools was banned. Two decades later, in 1968, the KMT government instituted nine years of universal compulsory education in Taiwan. Although the middle-school curriculum went beyond six years of foundational education, the Confucian ideal of “virtuous wife, good mother” (xianqi liangmu) resembled that of the Confucian ethic of “good wife, wise mother” (ryosai kenbo) taught in colonial Taiwan during the Japanese Era (1895–1945). After Japan defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895, many progressive elites in China went to Japan to learn from its successful modernization program. The Chinese students were impressed by Japanese elites’ reinterpretation of the Confucian concept of “wise mother” to include an educated mother’s role in transmitting modern knowledge and the spirit of patriotism to her children for the goal of

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enhancing the nation’s wealth and power. Some of the KMT founders would incorporate this modern interpretation of “wise mother” in their conceptualization of women’s roles in modern Chinese family and society. Throughout the twentieth century, this modern interpretation of “wise mothers” influenced both Japanese colonial education in Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalist educational philosophy of women and girls.13 In both colonial Taiwan and the period of KMT rule, young single women were encouraged to work full time in factories and the service sector to contribute to economic development. Once they were married, they were expected to manage the household, educate their children, and engage in cottage industries on piece-work basis to supplement their family incomes.14 In this way, both regimes benefited from women’s unpaid housework and childcare at home. Governments in both periods created seminars to teach married women vocational skills that can supplement their family incomes, such as manufacturing handicrafts, tailoring, typing, and home economics. In 1988, a year after the KMT government lifted martial law in Taiwan, the Awakening Foundation, a leading feminist non-governmental organization, conducted a comprehensive textual analysis of elementary-school textbooks. Their study found that there was a lack of representations of professional women in these textbooks. Women were mostly depicted as homemakers doing housework. These anachronistic depictions of women’s traditional gender roles did not really reflect the realities of contemporary Taiwanese society. As early as 1971, women already comprised 35 percent of professionals and technical specialists in the workforce. In an effort to eliminate gender biases in the curriculum, the Awakening Foundation, in 1996, allied with educational reformers and progressive parents’ groups to exert pressure on the Taiwanese government to end its fifty-year monopoly over the compilation and editing of elementary-school textbooks. Teachers were given the freedom to choose textbooks that depict professional women as positive role models for schoolgirls. Boys and girls were also encouraged to share housework equally at home.15 A similar coalition of feminist lawyers and educational reformers drafted the Gender Equity Education Act and sent it to Taiwan’s legislature for deliberation. The final draft of the bill that passed the Legislative Yuan in 2004 stipulates that a gender-equity curriculum should be integrated into all levels of public education. Every university in Taiwan should offer gender studies courses. The law prohibits any discriminatory treatment against pregnant girls and sexual minorities in the school system. It also stipulates the creation of a Gender Equity Education Committee in the Ministry of Education, in every city and county government, and in every school and university in Taiwan, mandating that women should comprise at least 50 percent of the members in each committee. The Gender Equity Education Committee in every level of

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government and school is charged with implementing gender-equity policies and coordinating a gender-equity curriculum. The Committee in each school is also responsible for investigating cases of sexual misconduct on campus and for recommending appropriate punishment for offenders based on legal stipulations.16 Despite the institutionalization of gender-equity education committees, governments on both national and local levels, in an effort to respond to the demands from diverse public opinions and constituencies, have appointed both proponents and opponents of marriage equality and sex education into these committees. Consequently, some conservative perspectives, such as the implementation of abstinence-only education, have been inserted into the official agenda in recent years. Nevertheless, people in Taiwan have made great strides in educational attainment in the past 70 years. Whereas only an elite few from the upper crust of Taiwanese society could afford to send their sons and daughters to colleges and universities in Japan during the colonial era, 48 percent of Taiwanese between 25 and 64 years of age had at least a bachelor’s degree in 2016. The same year, women comprised 50.6 percent of the student body in Taiwan’s institutions of higher learning. In master’s programs, women were 45 percent of the student body in 2017, but only 33 percent of students in doctoral programs.17 The phenomenon of the higher the academic degree, the fewer the women illustrates that more work needs to be done to encourage young women to pursue doctoral degrees. According to the statistical data published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Education in 2017, women comprised 67 percent of university students majoring in education, 66 percent in humanities and fine arts, 60 percent in library science and social sciences, 58 percent in business and law, 74 percent in health professions and social work, and 58 percent in hospitality. Conversely, women comprised only 41 percent of students majoring in mathematics, statistics, and natural/physical sciences, 28 percent in computer and information sciences, and 17 percent in engineering.18 These statistics illustrated horizontal segregation of majors along gender lines. Whereas men were dominant in the STEM fields, women were concentrated in majors that pertained to professions that provided services to others.19 Women’s Status and Participation in the Workforce The concentration of women in service-oriented occupations began in the Japanese colonial era. Since the vast majority of women and girls from the working class and peasantry in colonial Taiwan only had functional literacy, many worked in female-dominated occupations in light industries or the service sectors. They were employed as hostesses, waitresses, and bargirls in

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restaurants and teahouses, while others worked as entertainers, musicians, sex workers, washerwomen, hairdressers, housekeepers, nannies, bus conductors, telephone operators, office workers, and store clerks in the service sectors. In the industries, Taiwanese women were employed as assembly-line workers in food-processing, sugar, tea, garment and textile industries. Based on Yamakawa Hitoshi’s analysis of several Japanese-owned industries in colonial Taiwan during the 1920s, Taiwanese women were paid only a quarter of the wages of their Japanese male counterparts for doing the same work, whereas Taiwanese males were paid about half of the wages of their Japanese male counterparts.20 This illustrates the inequalities of the colonial economy along both gender and ethnic lines. After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and northern China in 1937, the Japanese colonial government reinstated military rule in Taiwan from 1936 onwards to mobilize women and men for the industrialization of Taiwan’s war economy. Women were encouraged to participate in cottage industries or factory production of essentials as well as agricultural work. Since Japanese industrial and military planners during the Pacific War (1941–45) designated Taiwan as a naval base for its southward expansion to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, many factories were converted to make war essentials such as metals, fertilizers, coal, cement, alcohol, cigarettes, salt, canned foods, matches, paper, medicine, and hydroelectric power. As young men were sent to the battlefields, the colonial government called on women and high-school girls to fill in labor shortages in these key industries. Similar to the critical role that the celebrated Rosie the riveter played in the U.S. home front during World War II, some high-school girls in colonial Taiwan were selectively trained to repair insulation materials and weld broken wings of warplanes. On the other hand, the Japanese government still awarded model mothers who raised soldiers for the Japanese Empire. By exploiting women’s unpaid labor in the domestic sphere and paid labor outside the home, the colonial government’s emphasis on married women’s dual roles both at home and in war production further exacerbated their double burden during wartime mobilization.21 It also illustrated the various ways in which Taiwanese women’s labor was tapped to further the expansionist project of Japanese imperialism. After the defeat of Japan in WWII, Mainlanders from China began to move to Taiwan to govern the island in 1945 and thereafter. There was a general consensus among Mainlander observers that Taiwanese women by and large possessed a strong work ethic, the quality of perseverance, and the capability to be financially self-reliant. They were impressed by the fact that women were actively participating in all walks of life. It was particularly striking to them that some Taiwanese women worked in traditionally male-dominated occupations such as mining and construction work. These Mainlander commentators suggested that women in other Chinese provinces should emulate Taiwanese

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women’s work ethic. From a historical perspective, Taiwanese women’s participation in all walks of life could be seen as a consequence of Japan’s wartime mobilization. Since many Taiwanese men were drafted into the Japanese armed forces during WWII, women in the home front had no choice but to fend for themselves and meet the financial needs of their families.22 Whereas Taiwanese women were mobilized to engage in all sectors of imperial Japan’s wartime economy during WWII, the KMT government in postwar Taiwan idealized married women’s domesticity. From the 1950s onwards, the KMT party-state allocated most of its resources for military expenditure and economic development. It also created a Confucian family-centered welfare ideology that expected the family to be the primary unit in society that took care of the elderly and the young. This responsibility fell primarily on the shoulders of married women in the family. By tapping into women’s unpaid labor at home, the government did not have to allocate financial resources to create daycare centers and eldercare facilities. As a consequence of the regime’s policy, women’s labor force participation fell from 40 percent during the Pacific War in the early 1940s to just 33 percent by 1966.23 As the prospect of launching a military campaign to recover mainland China from Communist occupation faded over time, the KMT regime increasingly focused its attention on Taiwan’s economic development. To create an export-driven economy, the government encouraged young single women to join the workforce in labor-intensive light industries. Between 1966 and 1973, women’s labor force participation rose from 33 percent to 42 percent. The latter was comparable with the percentage during the height of total mobilization during the Pacific War.24 Due to the lack of affordable childcare services, many women quit their jobs upon giving birth to their first child. Before the passage of the 2001 Gender Equality in Employment Act, many pregnant women were laid off, so that employers would not have to provide them with maternity leaves. Typically, these women would not return to the job market again until their children were attending elementary schools. Because of age discrimination, middle-aged women who opted to re-enter the workforce tend to face more difficulties in finding employment than the younger age cohort. Due to the hiatus in their employment history, those who succeeded in finding employment would receive only two-thirds of the pay of their male counterparts for doing the same jobs. Some of these women would quit their jobs again in their mid-50s to take care of their elderly parents or parents-in-law. Without sufficient state subsidies for affordable childcare and eldercare services, this intermittent pattern of married women’s employment could be seen as a consequence of the patriarchal state’s designation of married women as primary caretakers in the family.25 It also illustrates the ways in which women workers can be discriminated against because of their family responsibilities, age, and gender.

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From the late 1970s onwards, the KMT regime sought to tap into homemakers’ labor for Taiwan’s industrialization. As a response to labor shortages in certain sectors of the island’s manufacturing economy, the government created mothers’ classrooms (mama jiaoshi) in many cities and localities to teach women handicraft skills for making toys, ornaments, and garments. Households can apply for micro-low-interest loans from the government to purchase machineries for making these items. Homemakers who worked in these living-room factories (keting gongchang) were paid on a piece-work basis. As these homemakers’ piecework was seen as supplements to their family incomes, their wages were not as high as those of typical factory workers on assembly lines. In this way, the state, the industries, and the family exploited women’s unpaid housework and underpaid piecework.26 Based on the analysis in Wei-hsin Yu’s study, working-class women were more likely to quit their jobs to take care of their family members full time than their middle-class counterparts in contemporary Taiwan. Since the government gave employers the permission to hire guest workers from Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, middle-class families with enough financial resources could hire foreign domestics to do their housework and take care of their elderly parents and small children. The labor of foreign housekeepers and caretakers freed up middle-class women to pursue their own careers and enjoy more leisure. Whereas middle-class women were more likely to remain employed without interruption, many Taiwanese working-class families do not have enough resources to hire full-time caretakers or send their children to private daycare centers. Consequently, some working-class women quit their jobs intermittently to take care of their newborns and elderly family members. Moreover, working-class factory jobs were more likely to be outsourced abroad than middle-class white-collar jobs. The difference between the employment trajectories of middle-class and working-class women exacerbates the income disparities between middle-class and working-class households in Taiwanese society.27 Due to the lack of affordable childcare and eldercare services for many working-class families, only 51 percent of Taiwanese women participated in the workforce outside the home. This was higher than women’s workforce participation in South Korea and Japan but lower than that of the U.S. and China. According to the statistics released by the Ministry of Labor in 2015, Taiwanese women made 85 percent of every dollar that men made for doing the same jobs.28 According to the socialist feminist perspective of Ts’ao Ai-lan, the alliance of industrial capitalism and patriarchy in Taiwanese society exploited women’s underpaid labor in the workforce and unpaid labor at home. That is, the patriarchal state benefited from women’s unpaid labor in raising children for replenishing the workforce of the capitalist economy. The lack of monetary

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reward for women’s labor at home was correlated with the lower wages that most women received for doing the same work as their male counterparts outside the home.29 In Taiwan’s transformation into an industrialized economy, an increasing number of semi-skilled blue-collar workers who worked on the assembly lines were middle-aged women. Whereas most female factory workers from 1966 to 1973 were young women in their late teens and 20s, young women who came of age in the mid-1970s and thereafter were more educated than the previous generation. They opted to work in white-collar professions and service jobs rather than on factory floors. With the introduction of temporary guest workers from Southeast Asia in the early 1990s to meet labor shortages in Taiwan’s manufacturing industries, many middle-aged Taiwanese women toiled alongside guest workers on the assembly lines. According to Anru Lee’s analysis of the mutually reinforcing relationship between patriarchy and industrial capitalism, Taiwanese factory owners took advantage of female guest workers’ marginal and transient status to keep the wages competitively low. Some small factory owners also utilized their female family members’ labor, so that they would not have to hire additional workers. By tapping into the above-mentioned sources of low-cost labor, some Taiwanese capitalists could still make a profit without outsourcing their assembly lines to Southeast Asia or mainland China.30 In an effort to ensure fair treatment of Taiwanese women workers and guest workers, feminist lawyers in Taipei’s feminist NGOs, such the Awakening Foundation and the Modern Women’s Foundation, drafted a bill in 1989 to ensure gender equality in the workplace. But due to opposition from industrialists, the executive branch of Taiwanese government did not present an alternative bill until 1999. In Taiwan’s bid to join the World Trade Organization, the government sought to raise the labor standard to meet the criteria of the international community. The government-sponsored bill was titled the Gender Equality in Employment Bill (兩性工作平等法草案). The content of the bill contained many of the legal provisions first proposed by lawyers in the feminist NGOs and also included some input from industrialists and the business sector.31 The Gender Equality in Employment Act that finally passed the Legislative Yuan in 2001 went through several amendments in the past two decades. It stipulates that employers would be fined for providing different or unequal benefits and pay to men and women for doing the same jobs. Employers were prohibited from discriminating against pregnant women in job applications and retention. Female employees are entitled to eight weeks of paid maternity leave. If an employee has worked in a company for at least six months, he or she is eligible to apply for no more than two years of unpaid parental leave to take care of a child who is 3 years old or younger. Each employee is also

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entitled to a week of unpaid leave to take care of his or her family affairs. To create a family-friendly work environment and accommodate employees’ childcare needs, companies with 100 or more employees are required to set up childcare services for employees with small children. Moreover, companies with 30 employees or more are required to publicize clear guidelines for the prevention, filing of complaints, investigation, and punishment of perpetrators of sexual harassment in the workplace.32 To implement the law, the Council of Labor Affairs, a ministry in the executive branch of Taiwanese government, was charged with creating a Commission on Gender Equality in Employment (CGEE) in the central government. Based on the mandate, the commission should have between five and eleven members, with at least two representatives from labor organizations. Under the leadership of Chen Chu, chairwoman of the Council of Labor Affairs (Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor), it was recommended that at least half of the members in the commission should be women. The commissioners also consisted of legal scholars trained in labor affairs and gender issues. Since the Department of Working Conditions in the Council of Labor Affairs is responsible for handling gender equality in employment affairs, its director was appointed as the executive secretary of the Commission. Similar to the organizational structure of the CGEE on the national level, each county or municipality was charged with creating its own commission within the Department of Labor in the local government. On the local levels, CGEEs monitor work units’ compliance with the law and investigate cases of alleged gender discrimination in the workplace. During the process of investigation, the employer is prohibited from retaliating against the complainant and has the burden of proving that the alleged mistreatment is not gender-based. If the complainant was dissatisfied with the decision rendered by the local CGEE, she can appeal her case to the CGEE on the national level to evaluate and decide on her case.33 The majority of gender-based discrimination cases that reached the CGEE on the national level pertained to alleged pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace. In cases of sexual harassment, both employers and perpetrators found guilty were liable for compensating the victims, if the employers had known about the pattern of behavior and failed to immediately intervene and correct it internally within the organization. Since employers who violated certain legal provisions in the Gender Equality in Employment Act only had to pay a modest fine, most of them opted to pay it. If employers, employees, or job applicants are not satisfied with the decisions made by the CGEE on the national level, they may appeal to the Committee of Administrative Appeals in the Executive Yuan and set in motion administrative lawsuit proceedings.34 Since the CGEE on the national level consists of competent legal experts and scholars familiar with labor laws and gender issues, the administrative court

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tends to defer to the decision already rendered by the CGEE. This system of filing job discrimination complaints greatly reduced the need for gender-based discrimination lawsuits, since lawsuits were seen as the last resort after other avenues of appeal were exhausted. Ever since the passage of the Gender Equality in Employment Act in 2001, instances of overt gender discrimination against female employees have significantly decreased in society. Compared with other countries, the effective implementation of Gender Equality in Employment Act in Taiwan has provided women with the most comprehensive legal protection against job discrimination in the Asia-Pacific Region.35 Currently, nearly half of the female employees in Taiwan work for small-sized companies with fewer than 30 workers. Since the Gender Equality in Employment Act mandated that companies with 100 or more employees should establish childcare services, the women employees of small companies are not eligible for company-sponsored childcare.36 Moreover, the glass-ceiling effect of “the higher, the fewer” women in positions of decision-making power in organizational hierarchies has been fairly typical of most institutions in both public and private sectors of the Taiwanese economy.37 Women’s Political Participation and Leadership Whereas there has been the systemic problem of “the higher, the fewer” women in leadership positions in the workforce, Taiwanese women have made significant strides in achieving positions of political leadership in the 21st century. These achievements were in stark contrast to women’s lack of voting rights under Japanese colonial rule. In the era of Taishō democracy (1912–1926), progressive Taiwanese elites created the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1921 to advocate for universal suffrage, modernize Taiwanese culture, retain the island’s cultural autonomy, and petition for the establishment of a local parliament for Taiwanese home rule within the legal framework of imperial Japan’s Meiji Constitution. This moderate liberal stance of reforming the colonial economy and politics was in stark contrast to the radical revolutionary approach of the Taiwan Farmers’ Union (TFU, 1926–1936) and the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP, 1928–1931). The TFU and TCP advocated for a united front of progressive Taiwanese from all strata of society to overthrow Japanese capital and the colonial government in order to achieve Taiwan independence. While women activists were involved in both moderate reformist and radical revolutionary wings of colonial Taiwan’s sociopolitical movements, it was in the radical revolutionary movements that women had achieved prominence in leadership positions.38 The most notable example of an exceptional woman in position of political leadership in colonial Taiwan’s revolutionary movement was Hsieh Hsueh-hung (謝雪紅,1901–1970). Orphaned at the age of 12, Hsieh’s relatives

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sold her to her first husband to be his concubine. At the age of 16, she escaped from the marriage and earned her living as a mill hand in a Japanese-owned sugar-processing factory. Her personal experiences during her formative years under the dual oppression of capitalist exploitation and patriarchal oppression would shape her political beliefs and activism. In the 1920s, she traveled to Moscow to study Marxist–Leninist revolutionary strategies at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East. It was in Soviet Russia that she befriended several communists from Japan that paved the way for the founding of the Taiwanese Communist Party in 1928 under the guidance of the Japanese Communist Party.39 As a student of Marxism–Leninism, Hsieh believed in the united front of progressive left-wing men and women in Japan proper and the colonies of Korea and Taiwan to overthrow Japanese imperialism and capitalism, so that Koreans and Taiwanese can achieve independence from Japanese colonial rule. She saw women’s liberation as subordinate to and dependent on the successes of anti-colonial proletarian movements. It is only through women’s active participation in these left-wing revolutionary movements that they could raise their political consciousness and achieve gender equality. Like other Marxist–Leninists, Hsieh had the overly simplistic assumption that the overthrow of capitalism and imperialism would automatically ensure gender equality in a new society. Thus, she did not believe in the need for an independent women’s rights movement separate from proletarian and anti-colonial movements. From her perspective, most Taiwanese women from the elite upper- and middle-classes of bourgeois women’s movements prioritized the improvement of their own status over that of the masses of women in the peasantry and the working class.40 Hsieh and others were instrumental in creating women’s departments in the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP) and the Taiwan Farmers’ Union (TFU) and integrated proletarian women’s movements into left-wing revolutionary organizations. The missions of the women’s departments were to provide women activists with Marxist–Leninist ideological training in revolutionary strategies and mobilize the masses of women for revolutionary activities. To meet women’s needs, the TCP and TFU advocated for an eight-hour work day, paid maternity leaves, and creation of childcare facilities to alleviate working mothers’ double burden. With the suppression of left-wing radicals throughout Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in 1929, many members of the TCP and TFU were either imprisoned or had to operate underground.41 After the Allied Forces dismantled the Japanese Empire in 1945 and brought Taiwan under the KMT regime’s control, the regime liquidated an entire generation of colonial Taiwan’s elites during the February 28th Massacre in 1947. Two years later, the KMT/ROC government set up an exile government in Taiwan after it was defeated by the Chinese Communist troops. In an effort

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to consolidate the KMT regime’s one-party dictatorship, in 1948 and 1949 it enacted martial law and amendments to the ROC Constitution. In order to maintain a semblance of participatory democracy under the KMT authoritarian rule, elections were regularly held on provincial, county, municipal levels. The KMT Women’s Working Committee was charged with providing Taiwanese women with talents and ambitions with leadership trainings. If they were to join the KMT, the party would nominate them to stand for elections, provide them with ample exposure in the state-run media and the resources to win the electoral races. Thus, the vast majority of women politicians were KMT members.42 Although the regime barred the creation of genuine opposition political parties, it permitted a minority of non-party-affiliated independent candidates to run for local offices. Since the 1947 ROC Constitution granted women the right to vote, these local elections have served the purpose of socializing Taiwanese women to participate in the party-state’s political process and thereby enhance their identification with the state.43 Contrary to the KMT government’s expectation that integrating more Taiwanese into the KMT’s political machine could ensure their loyalty to the authoritarian state, some dissident politicians used their electoral platforms to call for democratization. In 1971, the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the KMT government of the ROC as the legitimate government of China in the United Nations. As the KMT lost its legitimacy and prestige, more dissident politicians from the emerging middle class in Taiwan’s civil society began to join forces to challenge KMT’s monopoly over Taiwan’s political life.44 These dissident politicians coined the term “Dangwai” (黨外outside of the party) to name their democracy movement and signal their opposition to the KMT’s one-party rule. In December 1978, the United States severed its diplomatic relationship with the KMT and recognized the Communist government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China. In the midst of this diplomatic crisis, the KMT suspended the election indefinitely. This decision in turn motivated Dangwai politicians to launch the Formosa Magazine Publishing House (美 麗島雜誌社). It served as a platform for disseminating dissident ideas to the general public. Editors and writers of the magazine called for the revocation of martial law, the restoration of civil liberties, release of political prisoners, and acknowledgment of Taiwanese people’s right to self-determination in accordance with principles laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.45 In December 1979, Formosa staffers staged a mass demonstration in the southern port city of Kaohsiung to commemorate the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The government’s security police arrested dissident politicians and charged eight of the Formosa staffers for sedition. Among the eight that were court-martialed, Hsiu-lien Annette Lu ( 呂秀蓮, b. 1944) and Chen Chu (陳菊, b. 1950) were the only women. Both

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women were sentenced to 12-year prison terms and served about half of their sentences as prison cellmates before they were released. While in prison, the Amnesty International (AI) in West Germany adopted the eight Formosa staffers as prisoners of Conscience. In retrospect, Chen Chu’s close working relationships with AI activists in Japan and the West during the 1970s was instrumental in sustaining the pressure of Western governments on the KMT regime to secure their release from prison. In 1969, Chen Chu was the first woman to enter the inner circle of democracy movement in postwar Taiwan and was a highly effective communicator and organizer during her youth. She served as a recruiter of like-minded college students to canvass for dissident politicians and as the courier of confidential information among political dissidents throughout the island.46 By comparison, Annette Lu was the pioneer feminist of post-World War II Taiwan. In 1974, she published her seminal work, New Feminism (新女性 主義). The book was universally recognized as the main text of Taiwanese feminism in the 1970s.47 As a student of law, Lu deployed her legal knowledge to critique gender biases in the ROC civil code and family laws. In addition to raising the public’s awareness of the need for legal reform to advance gender equality, Lu also called for equality of women and men to receive higher education, employment opportunities, and hold political offices. She conceived of a reciprocal relationship between a woman and her society. Just as society conferred rights to its citizens, a woman, as a citizen of her national community, should contribute to society and fulfill her familial obligations. As a single woman, Lu nevertheless expected married women to be good mothers and wives at home and achieve excellence in their professional careers. In her attempt to integrate Confucian expectations of women’s ascribed gender roles at home and Western feminism’s call for women’s self-realization in the public sphere, Lu did not contemplate the double burden that career women could face at home and in the workplace. In this respect, Lu’s New Feminism was in many ways similar to colonial Taiwan’s feminist discourse, particularly among the moderate liberal intellectuals of the Japanese colonial era.48 Due to the ROC government’s concerted effort to suppress the study of Taiwanese history during the Japanese colonial era, there is no evidence to suggest that Lu in the 1970s was aware of feminist discourses in colonial Taiwan. In 1977, Lu made the decision to attend Harvard Law School. While at Harvard, she read books on Taiwan’s political history that were banned in the island. Lu then wrote a book titled Taiwan’s Past and Future (台湾 的過去與未來). In it, she envisioned Taiwanese people as consisting of Malayo-Polynesian indigenes, early immigrants from southeastern China from the 17th century onwards, and later immigrants from mainland China who arrived in Taiwan after 1945. For the unity and cohesion of the people, she called for an end to the ethnic divisions between these groups. She asserted

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that a person is Taiwanese as long as he or she lives in Taiwan, identifies with the island, and shares a common destiny with its future. Upon hearing the news that the Carter Administration was about to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, she contended that the ROC on Taiwan should peacefully coexist with the PRC on the mainland. Instead of claiming that the ROC is the sole legitimate government of China as the KMT had done, peaceful coexistence between the two ethnic Chinese states would ensure Taiwan’s long-term survival.49 At this critical juncture in Taiwan’s history, Lu returned to Taiwan to join the Dangwai. When the Formosa Magazine Publishing House was established, both Lu and Chen Chu assumed positions of deputy directors of the publishing house. After both of them were released from prison in the mid-1980s, Lu went abroad for medical treatment. Chen, in 1986, along with several other leading figures in the Dangwai movement, founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—postwar Taiwan’s first opposition party. The revocation of martial law in 1987 set in motion the island’s democratization and the movement to replace legislators elected in mainland China prior to 1949 with younger lawmakers representing constituencies in Taiwan. In the early 1990s, Lu was elected to represent her home county of Taoyuan in the Legislative Yuan, while Chen was elected to represent Kaohsiung in the National Assembly.50 In Taiwan’s feminist community, the abrogation of martial law in 1987 enabled feminist activists to lift their self-censorship, stage public demonstrations, and establish various NGOs advocating for the rights of women and girls. In addition to lobbying for the successful passage of the 1996 National Health Insurance Act, lawyers from feminist NGOs contributed to draft amendments to revising gender-biased family laws and authored Gender Equality in Employment Bill, Domestic Violence Prevention Bill, and Sexual Assault Treatment and Prevention Bill. Feminist activists then gathered signatures for petitions and lobbied the Legislative Yuan for the passage of these bills.51 As a nascent democracy with the vibrant political participation of civil society, Taiwanese citizens chose their president by popular vote for the first time in 1996. Four years later, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), an attorney who defended the detained Formosa staffers in 1979, was nominated to be the DPP’s presidential candidate for the Election of 2000. He chose Lu as his vice presidential running mate. Upon their victory, Lu became Taiwan’s first female vice president. In an effort to integrate more women into the mainstream of political leadership, the DPP, in 1996, raised the quota for nominating female electoral candidates from 10 percent as originally mandated by the ROC Constitution to 25 percent to stand for elections for seats in the Legislative Yuan. In 2000, the new government also appointed women to comprise a quarter of top ministerial posts. Chen Chu was appointed Minister

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of Labor. After stepping down from that position, she was later elected three times as the mayor of Kaohsiung. Mindful of women’s lack of representation in the upper echelon of the civil service bureaucracy, Chen promoted qualified women to comprise a third of leadership positions in the Kaohsiung municipal government.52 During the KMT Administration of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九, 2008–2016), lawmakers from all political parties in Taiwan passed the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Enforcement Act in 2011 to eliminate gender discrimination in the society based on the international standard codified in the 1979 UN Convention. To enforce and monitor its implementation, a dozen feminist NGOs allied with feminists within the government to lobby for the creation of the Department of Gender Equality (DGE). The following year, DGE was established as a ministerial-level cabinet in the Taiwanese government. Whereas its predecessor, the Commission for the Promotion of Women’s Rights, consisted of part-time advisers who met several times annually, the DGE has a full-time paid staff and gender-policy experts charged with the formulation and dissemination of gender-sensitive policies. The DGE also monitors governmental departments and various sectors of the society to ensure their compliance with gender-equity laws and policies.53 The institutional building of feminist activists both within and outside of the state to promote gender equality culminated in another major milestone. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文,b. 1956) was elected Taiwan’s first female president in a landslide, garnering 56 percent of the popular vote, and again with 57 percent of the votes in 2020. In retrospect, women in leadership roles such as Chen Chu and Annette Lu paved the way for Tsai’s political ascendancy within the ranks of the DPP. Unlike many female political leaders in Asian countries, Tsai was not from a political family. Growing up in Taipei, her father was the owner of a car repair shop and a real estate investor. Tsai studied law at Cornell Law School and eventually received her Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. Like Annette Lu, Tsai has been consistent in asserting Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty vis-à-vis the PRC in the mainland. In elections of 2016 and 2020, Tsai opposed the PRC government’s definition of Taiwan’s political status within the “One China, Two Systems” framework modeled after Hong Kong’s political status. To Tsai, accepting the framework would have demoted Taiwan to becoming a mere territory of the PRC. Instead, Tsai insisted that Beijing and Taipei should engage in Cross-Strait dialogues based on principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and parity.54 In an effort to reduce Taiwan’s overreliance on China for trade and investment, the Tsai Administration launched the Southbound Policy in 2016 to expand and deepen Taiwan’s economic and cultural ties with Australia, New

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Zealand, and countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Since the 1990s, approximately 180,000 women from Southeast Asia have married Taiwanese men. These new immigrants often faced discrimination in Taiwanese society. In an effort to overcome Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation in the international community, Tsai empowered these women and their children to be cultural ambassadors for the grass-roots diplomacy between Taiwan and their countries of origin. High-school students of Southeast Asian background in Taiwan were entitled to apply for government-subsidized trips to tour Taiwanese-owned factories in countries of their parents’ origin, with the future prospect of their return to these countries upon their graduation from college to assume white-collar positions in Taiwanese-owned companies while utilizing their bilingual skills.55 In addition to Tsai’s multicultural policy toward new immigrants from Southeast Asia, she was also credited for appointing seven new liberal justices to the Constitutional Court that paved the way for the legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan.56 In 2020, Forbes Magazine included Tsai as one of a handful of women political leaders that have effectively controlled the spread of COVID-19 in their respective countries. As of December 2020, Taiwan, an island with 23 million residents, only has fewer than 800 recorded cases of COVID-19 and seven deaths. Along with several female heads of state in northern Europe and New Zealand, Tsai’s government was praised for its early and decisive response to the coronavirus with consistent enforcement of public-health measures such as border control, targeted testing, contact tracing, and quarantine of COVID-positive and high-risk individuals from abroad. As a result of her government’s early response to prevent an outbreak, Taiwan stood as one of the few countries in the international community that had averted an economic lockdown.57

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Looking at women’s current status in political participation and leadership in comparison with their counterparts in colonial Taiwan, it can be said that this is the area where Taiwan has made the greatest progress. As colonial subjects of the Japanese Empire, Taiwanese women did not have the right to vote. After the ROC Constitution of 1947 granted women the franchise, some Taiwanese women joined the KMT to run for office within the political parameters set by the authoritarian regime. As the island democratized in the post-martial-law era, women electoral candidates from both the KMT and the DPP ran for offices. After years of implementing the quota system for nominating qualified female candidates to stand for elections, the percentage of Taiwanese female lawmakers in the national legislature in 2020 reached 42 percent. On the other hand, the fact

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that President Tsai, Vice President Lu, Chen Chu, and many other high-profile female politicians chose to remain single in order to pursue their political careers illustrated that gender double standard still persists in Taiwanese society. Since married women are still expected to be the primary caretakers of children and the elderly at home, staying single has been a personal choice that many female politicians still make in order to pursue political careers on the national level. In addition to incremental increases of women in positions of political leadership, educational attainment is another area where Taiwanese women have made significant strides. In the 2010s, the majority of young women below the age of 40 had earned college degrees. Yet most female college students still choose to major in liberal arts or fields pertaining to social services and health professions, whereas the majority of STEM majors are males. In an effort to close the gender gap in STEM, the Ministry of Education has already required high-school teachers and school counselors to participate in gender-sensitivity training. It was the expectation that they can then guide female students with the aptitude and interest in STEM to pursue these majors in universities. I would suggest that school counselors should also work with parents of female students with aptitude and interest in STEM to urge their daughters to pursue these areas of study. In addition, providing more scholarships for qualified high-school female students to pursue bachelor’s degrees in STEM could be an effective strategy for closing the gender gap. Due to the widening income inequalities in Taiwanese society, affordable childcare and eldercare services remained unattainable for many working-class families. With the allocation of more resources for eldercare and childcare services in the Forward Looking Infrastructure Development Program, the Tsai Administration is moving toward the right direction with the aim of alleviating working women’s double burden and encouraging more married women to participate in the workforce.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Cheng (2020). Yu (2004), pp. 406–407. Chang (2009), pp. 29–31. Yu (2004), p. 409. Chang (2009), p. 30; Yu (2004), p. 410. Yu (2004), pp. 410–411. Chang (2009), pp. 38–39. Ibid., pp. 31–32. Ibid., pp. 28–31; Yu (2004), pp. 408–409. Lo (2002), pp. 52, 82–83. Yang (1993), pp. 499–504. Yu (2005), pp. 179–183. Chang (2009), pp. 28, 64–66.

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14. Ibid., p. 159. 15. Ibid., pp. 124, 163. 16. Chang (2018), p. 350. 17. Department of Statistics (2018). 18. Ibid. 19. Chang (2018), p. 350. 20. Chang (2009), p. 33. 21. Ibid., pp. 40–44. 22. Yu (2005), pp. 180–183. 23. Chang (2009), pp. 43, 62. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., pp. 62–63; Cheng and Hsiung (1994), p. 325. 26. Chang (2009), pp. 63–64; Cheng and Hsiung (1994), pp. 343–349. 27. Yu (2015). 28. Central News Agency (2015). 29. Ts’ao (1989), pp. 178–181; Ch’en (1991), p. 11. 30. Lee (2004), pp. xiv–xv, 8, 111–62. 31. Chang (2009), pp. 146–148. 32. Laws and Regulations Database (2016). 33. Chiao (2008), pp. 155–160. 34. Ibid., pp. 159–160; Laws and Regulations Database (2016). 35. Chiao (2008), pp. 161–162. 36. Yu (2015). 37. Chiao (2008), p. 143. 38. Tsurumi (1977), p. 223; Chang (2009), pp. ix, 33–34. 39. Ch’en (1992), pp. 53–70. 40. Ibid. pp. 110–111; Hongnong gao (1928), p. 8; Yang (1993), pp. 366–377, 596. 41. Chen (1972), p. 491; Yang (1993), pp. 353–367, 506, 598–599. 42. Yu (2004), pp. 482–489. 43. Rigger (2001), p. 16. 44. Ibid., pp. 18–19; Rigger (1999), pp. 10–11; Ngo (1993), pp. 9–10. 45. Roy (2002), pp. 158–159, 170; Rigger (1999), p. 119. 46. Kagan and Chang (2015), pp. 74–82. 47. Chang (2009), p. 79. 48. Ibid., pp. 96–97, 105. 49. Ibid., pp. 101–102. 50. Kagan and Chang (2015), p. 75. 51. Chang (2009), pp. 154–155. 52. Kagan and Chang (2015), p. 93. 53. Kuo (2012). 54. Tsai (2020), p. 9. 55. Chung (2020), pp. 51–53. 56. Wittenberg-Cox (2020). 57. Chang (2018), p. 350.

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REFERENCES Central News Agency, 2015. “Gender Wage Gap Improved Slightly.” Available online: http://​www​.taipeitimes​.com/​News/​taiwan/​archives/​2015/​02/​28/​2003612436 (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Chang, Doris T., 2009. Women’s Movements in Twentieth-Century Taiwan. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. Chang, Doris T., 2018. “Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Policies in Contemporary Taiwan.” Journal of International Women’s Studies 19 no. 6, pp. 344–358. Available online: http://​vc​.bridgew​.edu/​jiws/​vol19/​iss6/​22 (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Ch’en, Fang-ming, 1992. A Critical Biography of Hsieh Hsueh-hung (謝雪紅評傳). Irvine, CA: Taiwan chubanshe. Ch’en, Su-hsiang, 1991. “The Melancholy Song of Women Workers” (女工姐妹的悲 歌). Awakening (婦女新知) 8 no. 115, pp. 10–11. Chen, Edward I-te, 1972. “Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914–1937,” Journal of Asian Studies 31 no. 3, pp. 477–497. Cheng, Ching-Tse, 2020. “Taiwan has the highest percentage of female lawmakers in Asia,” Taiwan News, 8 March. Available online: https://​www​.taiwannews​.com​.tw/​ en/​news/​3892956 (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Cheng, Lucie and P.C. Hsiung, 1994. “Women, Export-Oriented Growth, and the State: The Case of Taiwan,” in J.D. Aberbach (eds), The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 321–353. Chiao, Cing-Kae, 2008. “Employment Discrimination in Taiwan,” in New Developments in Employment Discrimination Law—2008 JILPT Comparative Labor Law Seminar, JILPT Report No. 6. Tokyo: The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, pp.  141­–180. Chung, Oscar, 2020. “Thicker Than Water,” Taiwan Review 70, no. 4, pp. 50–53. Department of Statistics, ROC Ministry of Education, 2018. Newsletter of Educational Statistics, No. 88, 18 April. Available online: https://​depart​.moe​.edu​.tw/​ed4500/​ News​.aspx​?n​=​07878DE436B77D08 (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Hongnong gao, 1928. “Women’s liberation movement and national liberation movement” (婦女解放運動與民族解放運動). Taiwan minbao (台湾民報), no. 220, p. 8. Kagan, Richard, and Doris T. Chang, 2015. “Chen Chu: a Cosmopolitan Leader for Human Rights and Democracy in Taiwan,” in Frank Jacob (ed.), ChiMoKoJa: Histories of China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, vol. 1. London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 73–100. Kuo, Grace, 2012. “Gender Equality Department Launched in Taiwan,” Taiwan Today, 2 January. Available online: http://​www​.taiwantoday​.tw/​ct​.asp​?xItem​=​183578​&​ CtNode​=​414 (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Kuo, Ming-Sung and Hui-Wen Chen, 2017. “The Brown Moment in Taiwan: Making Sense of the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case in a Comparative Light.” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 31 no. 1, pp. 72–149. Lee, Anru, 2004. In the Name of Harmony and Prosperity: Labor and Gender Politics in Taiwan’s Economic Restructuring. Albany: State University of New York Press. Lo, Ming-cheng, 2002. Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Ngo, Tak-wing, 1993. “Civil Society and Political Liberation in Taiwan.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 25 no. 1, pp. 3–15.

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Rigger, Shelley, 1999. Politics in Taiwan. London: Routledge. Rigger, Shelley, 2001. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Roy, Denny, 2002. Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ts’ao, Ai-lan, 1989. “The perspectives of a new generation of Taiwanese women” (新 時代台湾婦女觀點).Taibei: Qianwei chubanshe. Tsai, Ing-wen, 2020. “Inaugural Address of ROC 15th-term President Tsai Ing-wen,” Taiwan Review 70 no. 4, pp. 6–10. Tsurumi, E. Patricia, 1977. Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wittenberg-Cox, Avivah, 2020. “What do Countries with the Best Coronavirus Response Have in Common? Women Leaders,” Forbes, 13 April. Available online: https://​www​.forbes​.com/​sites/​avivahwittenbergcox/​2020/​04/​13/​what​-do​ -countries​-with​-the​-best​-coronavirus​-reponses​-have​-in​-common​-women​-leaders/​ #4b4891483dec (last accessed on 9 September 2020). Yang, Ts’ui, 1993. Taiwanese Women’s Liberation Movement under Japanese Colonial Rule (日據時代台湾婦女解放運動).Taibei: Shibao wenhua. Yu, Chien-ming, 2004. “Women’s movements in the Taiwan area” (台湾地區的 婦運), in Chen San-ching (ed.), The History of Women’s Movements in Modern China (近代中國婦女運動史), 2nd Edition. Taibei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, pp. 403–554. Yu, Chien-ming, 2005. “When Mainlanders Met Taiwanese Women: Female Discourses in Postwar Taiwanese Newspapers and Magazines, 1945–1949” (當外 省人遇到台湾女性: 戰後台湾報刊中的女性論述). Periodical of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 47, pp. 165–224. Yu, Wei-hsin, 2015. “Women and Employment in Taiwan”, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. Available online: http://​www​.brookings​.edu/​research/​ opinions/​2015/​09/​14​-women​-employment (last accessed on 9 September 2020).

PART V

Literature and cultural development in Taiwan

12. The rise and fall of cultural theatre and new theatre, from the 1920s to the 1960s Yin-Chen Kang Before 1987, when democratization was launched with the lifting of Martial Law in Taiwan, theatre staged by Taiwanese people was like other Taiwanese culture, which was often ignored or even suppressed by external regimes. In terms of early Taiwanese modern theatre, it rose and fell because of political factors. This is revealed in the history of two kinds of theatre, bun-hua-kiok (cultural theatre) and sin-kiok (new theatre). Nevertheless, it is valuable that, in this half-century of history, Taiwanese dramatists and language were on stage despite the control of external regimes. The formation of the two kinds of theatre in fact reflected an aspiration to be modern. It is part of the development of modern Taiwanese culture from the colonial period to the post-war period. Although the aspiration looked foiled in the post-war period, it never absolutely ended. This chapter uncovers the legacies of bun-hua-kiok and sin-kiok, which have been neglected for a long time. In this chapter, the phonetic transcription of a proper noun or a term that was created by Japanese writers, or mainly appeared in Japanese sources, will be in the Japanese Romaji. If a proper noun or a term was mainly used by Taiwanese, the phonetic transcription will be the Taiwan Romanization Phonetic Alphabet (臺灣閩南語羅馬字拼音方案). Using the two spelling systems also reflects the multilingual context of Taiwan. The term “Taiwanese” in this chapter refers to groups of people who were living in Taiwan before the Japanese colonial period; in other words, it does not include Japanese in Taiwan during the colonial period and Chinese mainlanders immigrating to Taiwan after the Second World War. Another term, Tai-gi, 台語, in the chapter refers to Taiwanese minnanyu (台灣閩南語), which was the mother tongue of the majority of Taiwanese.1 In the Japanese colonial period, Japanese kanji terms were also pronounced in Taiwanese minnanyu, since both Japanese and Taiwanese people shared a tradition of using Chinese characters.2

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1.

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JAPANESE MODERN THEATRE INTRODUCED TO TAIWAN

In Taiwan, the modernization in daily life was launched at the last phase of Qing ruling period such as establishment of electric lighting, railway, telecommunications and so on in a limited range (Wu, 2001). Lifestyles remained traditional. When it came to entertainment, until the end of the Qing ruling period, there was no evidence of the modern forms and content in theatre. Around the minnan 閩南 and hakka 客家 groups, traditional theatre from the Chinese mainland was popular. Aborigines had their own tradition of performing arts as well (Chiu, 2013). After the Japanese colonization began, the Governor-General Office introduced Japanese modern experiences from the Meiji Restoration and pushed modernization in Taiwan more efficient than the Qing ruler (Ng, 1994). Modernization gradually involved people’s daily lives and extended to the theatrical field. However, it was not carried out purposely and officially like the other modernizations by the Japanese colonial government. At the first stage, the Japanese who came with the colonial government to Taiwan brought their own theatre for their own comfort in the colony. Although some modern forms of theatre were imported by Japanese, they might not have been related to Taiwanese until Kawakami Otojiro 川上音二 郎 and Takamatsu Toyojiro 高松豐次郎 appeared in Taiwan. The story can be traced back to June 1895, when the Japanese army entered Tai-pak (Taipei) and began the colonization process. At the end of this year, the “soldiers’ theatre” (軍夫大寄席) had appeared in the city of Tai-pak. Then in January 1897, some small theatres were established in Tai-pak as well. Different kinds of performances were staged in these small theatres, including sōshi engeki 壯士演劇, which was especially noticeable (Lee, 2011). Sōshi engeki, also called sōshi shibai, literally “theatre of vigorous men,” was a product of “the Movement for Civic Rights and Freedom” (自由民権運動) in Japan. In 1888, an activist for this campaign, Sudo Sadanori 角藤定憲, created this kind of theatre in order to advocate his political ideals. Sudo wrote political fictions and adapted them to scripts. Later in 1891, another activist of the campaign, Kawakami Otojiro, created a similar kind of performance, shosei shibai 書生 芝居, literally “theatre of scholars.” Kawakami used it to criticize or satirize political or social phenomena (Ōzasa, 1985). Sōshi engeki or shosei shibai naturally exhibited modern themes, so both were viewed as the beginning of Japanese modern theatre. In brief, around eight to nine years after the birth of Japanese modern theatre, this initial modern theatre had been introduced to Taiwan. In the 1900s, sōshi engeki or shosei shibai had been developed into shimpa 新派, literally “new school” or “new style,” a more mature kind

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of modern theatre (Ōzasa, 1985). Shimpa did not serve a specific political purpose or campaign, but rather reflected the life and values of Meiji period.3 In Taiwan, performers or troupes continuously came from Japan. In 1908, when the railway that connected north and south of the island was completed and began to be operated, Japanese performances were not limited in Tai-pak any longer. Actors and troupes began to travel from north to south after they landed at Ke-lang (Keelung) port. All kinds of Japanese troupes visited Taiwan, and shimpa troupes came as no surprise. During the 1910s the number of shimpa troupes visiting Taiwan rose greatly. During the Taisho period, namely the 1910s to the mid-1920s, shimpa and kabuki were the two most popular kinds of Japanese theatre in Taiwan.4 Kawakami Otojiro, who was viewed as the pioneer and great master of shimpa, visited Taiwan twice. In 1902, Kawakami visited Taiwan for the first time to investigate the local customs and environment of Taiwan, in order to provide inspiration for his new play, a Japanese adaptation of Othello. In 1911, Kawakami led his troupe to Taiwan (Shih, 2010). Both of his visits were the most important events of the year in the Taiwanese theatrical circle. In other words, audiences in Taiwan were able to watch the shimpa master’s works with their own eyes. In 1909, Takamatsu Toyojiro 高松豐次郎 organized a troupe and named it Taiwan Seigeki 台灣正劇. He was very likely imitating Kawakami because when Kawakami produced his Othello, he named it seigeki 正劇, literally “legitimate theatre.” Kawakami’s Othello was staged in Taiwan in 1905 and 1909. The visits of Kawakami and his troupe were in fact invited by Takamatsu. Takamatsu described his goal very clearly. His productions would adopt Taiwanese themes, use Taiwanese languages and be performed by Taiwanese actors (Shih, 2010). Although shimpa was popular, it mainly served Japanese audiences in Taiwan. Perhaps Takamatsu wanted to create Taiwanese shimpa for Taiwanese audiences. The Taiwan Seigeki troupe was active from 1909 to 1915 (Shih, 2010). During this period, local Taiwanese theatre or theatre currently spreading from China were all traditional forms, all of which were developed before the 20th century. In other words, local audiences would not know what the “modern form” was. Perhaps Takamatsu considered there to be a business opportunity. Takamatsu can be seen as a magnate of the entertainment industry in Taiwan in those days. He not only organized the troupe, but he also built theatres in many cities for Japanese performances as well as films. Meanwhile, he ran an agency to introduce Japanese troupes to Taiwan and produce films (Shih, 2010). In the Japanese colonial period, a theatre manager would often be a troupe agent at the same time. Compared with other theatre managers as well as troupe agents, Takamatsu preferred to invite shimpa troupes to perform at his theatres while others also welcomed kabuki performances. It is reasonable to imagine that the performance style of

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the Taiwan Seigeki troupe would be shimpa. So far, the different development stages of Japanese modern theatre were all imported to Taiwan, including the initial and rough sōshi engeki, as well as mature and developed shimpa. Several years after shimpa had been imported from Japan, its Taiwanese version, Taiwan seigeki, appeared. Although it was created by Takamatsu, under the influence of Kawakami, it was meaningful for Taiwanese. It is the first time that Taiwanese actors, audiences, languages and themes were involved in modern theatre. Therefore, it can be viewed as the beginning of the modernization of Taiwanese theatre.

2.

TAIWAN CULTURE ASSOCIATION AND CULTURAL THEATRE (BUN-HUA-KIOK)

In 1921, the Taiwan Culture Association was founded in order to enlighten the masses. The association arranged a series of activities such as speeches, film screenings, summer schools and so on. It set up reading rooms in local branches and further published newspapers, Taiwan Minhō 台灣民報, literally the “Taiwan People’s News,” which was the only newspaper issued by Taiwanese people at that time. One of the most important founders, Lim Hian-tong 林獻堂, was a fan of theatre in his personal life. He was from a powerful family in middle Taiwan. The Lim family built stages in their great mansion and owned a private troupe. Lim Hian-tong often recorded the plays he saw in his diary and his interest in theatre was like that of other common Taiwanese. Although the common Taiwanese may not have been as rich as the Lim family, they had many opportunities to enjoy theatre, such as hiring troupes to celebrate family events or watching free performances at religious festivals. Therefore, it is not that surprising that members of Taiwan Culture Association came up with the idea of taking advantage of theatre, after organizing all kinds of other activities. In 1923, the Ting-sin Sia 鼎新社 troupe, literally “Innovation Company,” was organized in Changhua (Chiu, 1992). “Ting-sin” was from an idiom kik-koo ting-sin 革故鼎新, which means “to discard the old and establish the new.” The troupe’s name reflected its ambition: to reform society and theatre. It cooperated with the Taiwan Culture Association and was called bun-hua-kiok 文化劇 in Tai-gi, literally “cultural theatre.” Furthermore, bun-hua is the abbreviation for bun-bing khai-hua, which is a Japanese term bunmei kaika 文明開化 pronounced in Tai-gi. The term means “civilized and enlightened.” Bun-hua further extended the meaning of “modern” and “culture.” When this term was adopted as the name of the association, it not only reflected the aim to civilize and enlighten the Taiwanese masses, but also suggested that Taiwanese culture should be modernized. Therefore bun-hua-kiok implied

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a kind of theatre that was civilizing and enlightening by nature and could help to construct a modern Taiwanese culture. Bun-hua-kiok adopted Taiwanese languages for performance, since its ambition was to enlighten the masses. In the colonial period, all kinds of scripts, including those of traditional theatre, had to be translated into Japanese for censorship. However, these scripts were neither for rehearsal nor open to the public. Performance languages were not changed to Japanese. In fact, sometimes, troupes did not even have a script for rehearsal. There was only an outline of a story, and the lines of dialogue were improvised by actors. The situation of the later sin-kiok was the same (Shih, 2003; Chiu, 2008).5 In the 1920s, some Taiwanese writers and scholars began to discuss how to write Taiwanese languages (Yokoji, 2009). In terms of Taiwanese minnanyu and hakka, both are very different from Mandarin Chinese, and there was not a writing standard. Many speech sounds did not match Chinese characters, or their characters might be lost or unknown. Before the 1920s, Taiwanese writers who had received a traditional Chinese education used classical Chinese for writing, although classical Chinese was not an oral language. Nevertheless, from the 1920s, a new generation of Taiwanese writers who received modern education were gradually unsatisfied with this ancient writing system. They doubted whether the ancient writing could describe a modern society and modern ideas (Yokoji, 2009). From the early 1920s to the early 1930s, when bun-hua-kiok was active on stage, discussions or debates about writing Taiwanese languages were more and more vigorous.6 However, to the vexation of writers of Taiwanese literature, the debate did not appear around bun-hua-kiok dramatists. It seemed natural for them to use Taiwanese languages on stage. Later sin-kiok, commercial sin-kiok and Tai-gi film in the post-war period all continued to use Taiwanese languages, except during the Second World War, when Taiwanese languages were limited to some extent. After Ting-sin Sia, until the early 1930s, there were about 20 bun-hua-kiok troupes organized one after another all over the island, including Tai-pak, Ke-lang, Gi-lan (Yilan), Sin-tik (Hsinchu), Tai-tiong (Taichung), Tsiang-hua (Changhua), Tshau-tun 草屯, Bu-hong 霧峰, Pak-kang 北港, Tai-lam (Tainan) and Ko-hiong (Kaohsiung). These troupes were founded by members of the Taiwan Culture Association.7 Some also served as local branches of the Taiwan Culture Association (Lin, 2016). The Taiwan People’s News often reported on the performances and activities of these troupes. In addition, it would expose and criticize how the police, or sometimes other civil servants, obstructed performances. It would also publish theatrical criticism. The crit-

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icism revealed the motive behind the creation of bun-hua-kiok as well as the reasons “to discard the old and establish the new.” One critic wrote, In terms of the original Taiwanese theatre, even if we do not criticize it on the basis of the artistic level, but only evaluate it with the common sense of the society, we will still feel unsatisfied with it and expect it to be reformed. Their themes do not fit in with the trend. Their performances have lost the original appearance of theatre and have become mechanical actions (“Kua-a-hi tsuann-iunn ai kim?” 歌仔戲怎樣 要禁 (Why should kua-a-hi be prohibited?), Unknown, 1927, p.4).

In fact, this kind of claim was quite similar to that of the Japanese colonizers. In 1921, a judicial officer, Kataoka Iwao 片岡巖 considered local theatre unprogressive after analyzing its characteristics and comparing it with modern theatre. He criticized the actors of local theatre for lacking knowledge and artistic appreciation. Instead of having ambition to innovate, these actors and their teachers were only able to stick to the old ways (Kataoka, 1921).8 Although the aim of Taiwan Culture Association was to resist colonization, some members’ views of Taiwanese theatre were similar to those of the colonizers. However, it was not the first time that the Taiwanese elite had strictly criticized Taiwanese theatre. In the early 1910s, there had been an intellectual doing the same thing. Kua Ting-thiu 柯丁丑, who had studied at the Tokyo Music School (東京音楽學校), criticized actors of local theatre as incompetent and incapable of creating new plays. What they could do was merely repeat old works (Kua, 1913). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the colonized unconsciously accepted the colonizer’s values. It rather reflected the “modern values” during that period. While modernization was proceeding in all aspects of Taiwanese society, and writers or artists were exploring modern forms for Taiwanese literature and arts, there seemed no reason for the theatrical field to be stuck in a rut.9 A generation who were born in the colonial period and received modern systematic education especially possessed this kind of standpoint. The theatrical criticism of Taiwan People’s News almost reflect this standpoint. On the other hand, the older generation who had received to some extent a traditional Chinese education did not reject the traditional form of theatre. Lim Hian-tong and Lian Hing 連橫 are representative cases. Some previous studies consider the birth of bun-hua-kiok to have also resulted from a visit of a Shanghai troupe, Bin-hing Sia 民興社, in 1921. It was a bun-bing-hi文明戲 troupe, literally “civilized theatre” (Chiu, 1992). In fact, the birth of bun-bing-hi was influenced by shimpa as well. From the 1900s, a few Chinese students studying in Japan learned the modern style of shimpa (Chiu, 1992). Some of them organized modern theatre troupes when they returned to China. This kind of theatre was then called bun-bing-hi. Actually, these studies (Chiu, 1992) did not reveal the introduction and activities of

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Japanese shimpa troupes in Taiwan. This could cause a misunderstanding in suggesting that bun-hua-kiok was affected indirectly by shimpa. However, as indicated above, Taiwanese audiences were in touch with shimpa much earlier and for longer, and also much more directly, than Chinese audiences, since this modern style was mainly introduced to China through Chinese students returning from Japan and had been converted into a Chinese version. By the time of the bun-bing-hi troupe visit, shimpa had been performed in Taiwan for two decades. Furthermore, it is unreasonable either to consider that the birth of bun-hua-kiok was only caused by an accidental visit of a single troupe. A long-time neglect of Japanese theatrical activities in Taiwan led to the view that modern Taiwanese theatre was influenced by Chinese theatre, just like traditional Taiwanese theatre. However, in the colonial period, modern Taiwanese theatre was not only influenced first-hand by modern Japanese theatre, but it also influenced modern Chinese theatre. In fact, in 1910, a Taiwanese Lim Thian-ti 任天知 had gone to China to organize a shimpa troupe, the Evolvement Company (進化團). His troupe helped the development of Chinese bun-bing-hi (Kang, 2014). Therefore, the influence was in the other direction, from Taiwan to China.

3.

TAIWANESE DRAMATISTS WENT TO JAPAN

Bun-hua-kiok themes were modern issues, such as social class conflict, disputes between labour and capital, the freedom to choose one’s spouse, generation gaps in values, and so on (Chiu, 1992). In terms of forms, bun-hua-kiok tried to rely on lines of dialogue to compose a play, just like modern theatre in other areas, such as in Japan or in Europe. When bun-hua-kiok was presented to the public for the first time, it was fresh to Taiwanese audiences. However, as time went by, the “fresh” factor turned out to be a weakness. Cultural theatre tried to free itself from singing and dancing, both of which were essential elements to traditional theatre. Local audiences, however, were still used to traditional forms. Furthermore, participants in bun-hua-kiok lacked professional training of modern theatre, while there had been training systems with a long history in traditional theatre. A theatrical critic indicated: “There was no artistic characteristics in the performance of bun-hua-kiok, and no incidental music to create moods, either. Frankly speaking, it is dull and insipid. The current popularity of bun-hua-kiok is actually gained by being branded ‘culture’” (Mr. C, 1927, p. 12). Another critic even described bun-hua-kiok plays as “abnormal orations” (A Reporter, 1927, p. 14). Towards the end of the 1920s, bun-hua-kiok was declining (Chiu, 1992). How to improve forms and quality of bun-hua-kiok in order to rival traditional theatre became an important task to Taiwanese dramatists who were ambitious to modernize theatre in Taiwan. In the meantime, some dramatists

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went to Japan to learn modern theatre theory and practices. They returned to Taiwan with the newest knowledge of modern theatre and helped to develop bun-hua-kiok into a more mature form. Most of them chose Tokyo, which was the centre of performing arts in Japan. An earlier case was Tiunn Tshim-tshe 張深切, who went to Tokyo to study from 1917 to 1923. He participated in theatre performances for the first time in 1922. After returning to Taiwan, he joined the Taiwan Culture Association and then organized Burning Peak Youth Society in Tsaotun Troupe (草屯炎 峰青年會演劇團) in 1925. In 1930, he set up another troupe, Taiwan Theatre Study Association (台灣演劇研究會) (Lin, 2003). The representative person was Tiunn Ui-hian 張維賢, who was called “the first Taiwanese dramatist of new theatre” (新劇台灣第一人), and who went to Tokyo in 1928 where he studied at Tsukiji Sho Gekijo 築地小劇場 (Tsukiji Small Theater) (Zeng, 2003). It was established by Osana Kaoru 小山內薰 in 1924. Osana was unsatisfied that some influences from kabuki remained in shimpa. Tsukiji Small Theater aimed to get rid of shimpa style completely and to explore and experiment a newer form. Tiunn Ui-hian went to Tsukiji Small Theater only four years after its establishment. In general, Tsukiji Small Theater only allow each person to study in one department, but Tiunn Ui-hian, at his request, was permitted to study freely in every department, including stage direction, stage performance, stage lighting, stage effects and stage set design. At that time, Tiunn was the first and only Taiwanese student (Zeng, 2003). Perhaps managers of Tsukiji Small Theater were also willing to “enlighten the colony,” therefore especially gave preference to Tiunn. In addition to Tsukiji Small Theater, Tiunn often visited and stayed in The Tsubouchi Memorial Theatre Museum in Waseda University, founded in 1928 as well, to gain knowledge of theatre. He returned to Taiwan in 1930 and organized his troupe, Bin-hong Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue民烽演劇研究會 (People’s Beacon Theatre Study Society). In 1932, he went to Tokyo again for six months (Zeng, 2003). After Tiunn, there were others continuing to go to Tokyo to learn about theatre. Lu Soo-siong呂訴上, the first person to write a history of Taiwanese theatre in the post-war period (Lü, 1961), went to Tokyo three times before the war. On the second time, 1936, he studied in Tokyo Professional School of Photography (東京寫眞専門學校). Meanwhile he studied ventriloquism and makeup wearing in troupes. In 1938, he set up Silver Flower New Theatre Troupe (銀華新劇團) in Taichung. Later in 1940, Lu went to Tokyo for a third time. He entered the film department of Japan University. In addition to photography, he also learned acting from Mizutani Yaeko 水谷八重子 and Inoue Masao 井上正夫, both of whom were shimpa masters. He also immersed himself in performances in famous theatre, such as Meiji Theatre (明治座), Yuraku Theatre (有樂座) and Tokyo Theatre (東京劇場) (Chiu, 2004).

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Lim Thuan-tshiu 林摶秋 went to Tokyo in 1938. He studied in the subsidiary high school of Japan University and later entered Meiji University, in 1940. In those days, Lim often went to Mūran Rūju Shinjuku Za ムーラ ン・ルージュ新宿座 (Moulin Rouge, Shinjuku Theatre) in Tokyo to watch performances. This aroused his interest in creating scripts and further to try to submit his works to Mūran Rūju. On the eve of his graduation from university, he was hired by Mūran Rūju. He was responsible for script writing and stage direction. In 1942, the boss of Mūran Rūju recommended Lim to Toho 東宝, the famous film corporation up to now, to work for a short time. He studied film editing, photography, illumination, stage set design, makeup, stage property making, and so on. Lim returned to Taiwan and became one of the founders of Hoo-sing Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue 厚生演劇研究會 (Welfare Theatre Study Society) in 1943 (Shih, 2003). Kan Kok-hian 簡國賢 and Song Hui-ngoo 宋非我 both went to Tokyo in 1940 to study at the Tsukiji Small Theatre as well. Kan joined the Futaba Society (雙葉會) troupe after coming back to Taiwan (Zhong, 2006). Song was a member of Tiunn Ui-hian’s troupe Bin-hong before going to Tokyo. He especially paid attention to works of Tsukiji Small Theatre. After the Second World War, Song set up his own troupe, Sing-hong Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue 聖 烽演劇研究會 (Holy Beacon Theatre Study Society) (Lan, 2006). There were still other cases like Lu Hik-liok 呂赫若 and Tiunn Bun-huan 張文環, both of whom were well known as novelists, but they were also involved with modern theatre activities in Taiwan. Tiunn Bun-huan went to Japan in 1927 to study in Okayama High School (岡山中學校). He entered the literature department of Toyo University (東洋大學) in 1931 and returned to Taiwan in 1938 (Zhang, 2004b). Lu Hik-liok went to Tokyo in 1939 and entered the vocal music department of Musashino Academia Musicae (武蔵野音楽學校). Later, his teacher Nagasaka Yoshiko 長坂好子 recommended him to the Tokyo Takarazuka Company (東京宝塚劇團) to perform song and dance drama. He performed with the troupe at the Hibiya Theatre (日比谷劇場), Japan Theatre (日本劇 場), Toho Theatre (東宝劇場) and so on. He returned to Taiwan in 1942. Both Lu Hik-liok and Tiunn Bun-huan participated in establishing Hoo-sing in 1943 (Zhang, 2004a; Chiu, 2013). After the experiment of bun-hua-kiok during the 1920s, these dramatists went to Tokyo to learn modern theatre directly. Tsukiji Small Theater was especially the origin of shingeki 新劇, literally “new theatre.” Shingeki was introduced to Taiwan by Tiunn Ui-hian and was pronounced sin-kiok in Tai-gi. Compared with the shimpa troupe of Taiwan Seigeki, which was organized by Takamatsu, members of the colonial class, this was as a Taiwanese that Tiunn Ui-hian had learned sin-kiok and established the Bin-hong troupe by himself. From then on, sin-kiok became more popular than bun-hua-kiok and eventually replaced it in the 1930s. In fact, after Tiunn, other dramatists returning from

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Japan did not call their works bun-hua-kiok. Their works were generally called sin-kiok. To Taiwanese audiences, sin-kiok meant a mature and developed form of modern theatre, unlike the crudeness and roughness of bun-hua-kiok. Furthermore, the dramatists after Tiunn had less and less connection with the Taiwan Culture Association. This was not because the Taiwan Culture Association was dissolved in the early 1930s under the suppression of the Governor-General Office (Lan, 2006). The reason was rather that the dramatists immersed themselves in the essence of modern theatre and did not any longer consider modern theatre as a political tool. Tiunn Tshim-tshe’s case reflects this well. When he was organizing the Taiwan Theatre Study Association in 1930, his goal was to create “an art for arts,” instead of mainly for political campaigns, though he was a member of Taiwan Culture Association. This idea was even criticized by other members (Phok-kong-tsing, 1930). The trend for theatre to remove social or political campaigns followed the development of Japanese modern theatre.

4.

SIN-KIOK DURING THE WAR

In 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out. The colonial government banned traditional or classical theatre with Chinese cultural background. On the other hand, Japanese or modern style of theatre were still permitted to be staged freely. Many sin-kiok troupes appeared. Some were original kua-a-hi (歌仔戲) and hakka theatre (客家戲) troupes.10 They changed to stage sin-kiok in order to survive. This transformed kind of troupes were called “mixed fiber” (ファイバー) by the Taiwanese audiences, as a metaphor to describe a mixture characteristic. On the other hand, original sin-kiok troupes were called “pure cotton,” (純棉) as a metaphor of pure and orthodox style (Chen, 2010). Therefore, sin-kiok troupes increased rapidly. It is interesting that, before 1937, articles in Taiwan People’s News often doubted that the police intentionally allowed performances of kua-a-hi while obstructing bun-hua-kiok. Now the situation was reversed. Sin-kiok staged by Taiwanese was not suppressed any longer as a result of the war between Japan and China. Since the number of troupes rose and more Taiwanese dramatists were introduced to modern theatre from Japan, this period can be viewed as the development stage of Taiwanese modern theatre, while bun-hua-kiok in the 1920s can be viewed as the initial stage. However, after the outbreak of the Second World War, the colonial government went further with the control over theatre. Theatre was laid down in wartime regulations. In 1942, the Taiwan Engeki Kyōkai 台灣演劇協會 (Taiwan Theatre Association) was established under the orders of Kōmin Hōkōkai 皇民奉公會 (The People of the Empire Service Society), a wartime official institution. The Taiwan Theatre Association aimed to instruct and

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regulate troupes on the island. All kinds of troupes had to be certified by the association. After passing verification by the association, troupes would receive licenses and then were permitted to perform. Troupes without licenses were forbidden from any form of performances. Scripts also had to be certified by the association (Chiu, 1992). In the pre-war period, scripts were censored by police officers in each province; now they were censored uniformly by the office of security of the Governor-General Office. Additionally, the Taiwan Kōgyō Tōsei Kabushikikaisha 台灣興行統制株式會社 (Taiwan Performance Regulations Corporation) was set up as well. This was also a state institution, instead of a private business. The institution was responsible for issuing theatre schedules to troupes (Chiu, 1992). Before the war, although scripts had to be translated into Japanese for censorship, languages for performances on stage were not limited. When the Taiwan Theatre Association was established in 1942, it expected all troupes to perform in Japanese in five years, but this policy was impossible to be carried out. Of the certified sin-kiok troupes, there were only a tenth of troupes able to fully perform in Japanese. Japanese proficiency of actors of other troupes varied. The association was forced to accept this fact and adopt a hierarchical system (Chiu, 2013).11 Therefore, sin-kiok was often staged in Taiwanese languages even during the war. Despite all sorts of restrictions on theatre, there were about 40 registered troupes of sin-kiok. The number was much higher than that in the pre-war period. The colonial government did not prohibit sin-kiok because of its modern face. Furthermore, the government would take advantage of sin-kiok for propaganda. During the pre-war period, popular troupes would sometimes cooperate with governmental institutions or social groups to promote modern ideas, but these plays were not major roles on stage. After all, theatre was a part of entertainment, and earning profits was the most important priority for a troupe. During the war, the colonial government directly urged local and half-official youth societies (青年團),12 which had been organized before war, to stage sin-kiok. Sin-kiok staged by youth societies was called youth theatre (青年劇) in particular (Chiu, 1992; Shih, 2010). The colonial government intended to use youth theatre as a tool to propagate policies. Moreover, since the government prohibited traditional or classical Taiwanese theatre, it wanted to replace these entertainments with youth theatre, especially in the countryside, while other sin-kiok troupes might usually act in urban areas (Chiu, 1992). In 1941, Futaba Society, originally a youth society in Tho-hng (Taoyuan), began to present works. In 1943, they produced Mount Ali (阿里山). The play was written by Kan Kok-hian and was directed by Lim Thuan-tshiu. This work succeeded and drew people’s attention. Lu Hik-liok watched the play and quite approved of it. Later, the troupe was invited to stage the work again at the Memorial Night of Taiwan Culture Award (台灣文化賞記念の夕).

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Governor-General Hasegawa Kiyoshi 長谷川清 also attended the event and watched the performance (Shih, 2003).13 Another successful and important case of the Taiwanese sin-kiok troupe was Hoo-sing. Not belonging to the youth society system, it was organized by motivated Taiwanese intellectuals in 1943. Leading roles were Lim Thuan-tshiu, Tiunn Bun-huan, Lu Hik-liok, Lu Tsuan-sing 呂泉生, and so on. Lu Tsuan-sing studied at the Toyo College of Music (東洋音楽學校) from 1936 to 1939.14 They produced four works: Capon (閹雞), Takasago Hotel (高 砂館), Terrestrial Heat (地熱) and City Lights Seen from the Mountain (山か ら見える町の灯). Lim Thuan-tshiu was both playwright and director. Capon was adapted from Tiunn Bun-huan’s fiction of the same name.15 Lu Tsuan-sing was responsible for composing background music. The performance caused a sensation and newspaper critics were quite positive. However, the popularity and the Taiwanese colour of the works alerted the police to Taiwanese nationalism (Shih, 2003). However, under the theatre regulations, the works of Futaba and Hoo-sing were actually not the propaganda of the Governor-General Office. Even in a restricted environment, the dramatists still made an effort to explore the idea of “what real and good theatre was for the masses in Taiwan” and to put their ideas into practice. Debates and discussions about the essence and nature of Taiwanese modern theatre continued between Taiwanese dramatists as well as Japanese dramatists and scholars who were interested in this issue.

5.

SIN-KIOK IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

After Japan surrendered the colony of Taiwan, the KMT government from China took over Taiwan. Despite the end of the war, the newly arrived KMT government did not lift the theatre regulations. Scripts still had to be censored in advance. Censoring offices even increased to four (Jiao, 1994). It meant that a script could be censored four times, while in the colonial period, every script would only have been censored once. Contents were still forbidden from criticizing the current social or political issues otherwise the police would ban the plays. The Wall (壁) in 1946 is a representative case. The script was written by Kan Kok-hian in Japanese. Kan then translated it into Chinese. Song Hui-ngoo further translated it into Tai-gi and directed his troupe, Sing-hong, to stage the work (Zhong, 2006; Lan, 2006). The plot was that a wall separated two neighbouring families. On one side lived a profiteer, who took advantage of hyperinflation after war and became a parvenu. On the other side lived another family suffering the hyperinflation. The family’s house was in fact rented from the profiteer. One day, the profiteer decided to take back the house for himself to hoard more food and supplies. The family was poor, sick and going to be

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homeless. On the eve of when they were driven out, the father of the family poisoned the whole family. He shouted at the wall against the unfair society and hit his head against the wall to death. Meanwhile, at the other side of the wall, the profiteer and his wife were hosting a sumptuous party (Zhong, 2006). The Wall denounced the hyperinflation and collusion between government officials and business leaders after the KMT government began to rule Taiwan. According to Lim Thuan-tshiu’s memory, Kan Kok-hian and Song Hui-ngoo originally expected Lim to direct the play. However, Lim recognized its ‘red colour’ at first glance. He recalled that “the whole work could not be redder; at the end, when the leading role was dying, his blood was even spurting out all over the wall” (Shih, 2003, p.126). He was well aware of the strong left-wing political metaphor of the work. He tried to warn Kan and Song of the risks involved in presenting the play. After the first performance, critics in newspapers in Taiwan mostly evaluated the work positively. Replying to the popularity from the audience, the troupe planned to stage The Wall for another four more days. However, on the eve of the extra performance, it was prohibited by the police office in Tai-pak. The police claimed that it was on the orders of the Chief Executive Office (行政長官公署). The reason was that the script was not submitted for censorship before the performance and the content did not meet the social need. Relevant comments in newspapers disapproved of the official claim and did not believe the reason either (Zhong, 2006; Lan, 2006). Misfortunes never come on their own. Later the same year, Lim Thuan-tshiu’s work Island Hai-lam (海南島) was prohibited before its first performance. The content described how Taiwanese were conscripted and sent to the island of Hai-lam by the colonial government during the Second World War. The script did not pass the censors; the reason was that the plot was too gloomy. After this interference, Lim gave up theatre (Shih, 2003). In 1947, the February 28 incident (228) occurred. Song Hui-ngoo was arrested and put in prison for six months. Tiunn Tshim-tshe hid in the mountainous areas for nearly a year and survived, but he witnessed the death of many friends. From then on, he isolated himself from society. Tiunn Ui-hian was in Shanghai when the incident broke out. He was then sent back to Taiwan by the KMT government in Nanjing in order to investigate the incident. However, the mission failed in a state of utter chaos. Tiunn survived the military repression but some of his relatives and friends did not (Zeng, 2003). After the 228 incident came the White Terror period. Tiunn Ui-hian returned to Shanghai after the incident and then moved back to Taiwan in 1949, but he never immersed himself in sin-kiok again (Zeng, 2003). Also in 1949, Song Hui-ngoo left Taiwan for Japan and then went to China (Lan, 2006). Kan Kok-hian secretly joined the Taiwanese Communist Party after the incident; from 1949, he hid in the mountainous areas of Tho-hng to organize underground activities. In 1953, Kan was found and arrested and then executed in

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1954 (Zhong, 2006). What Lim Thuan-tshiu foresaw came true, unfortunately. Lu Hik-liok also joined an underground group. He fled to the mountains in 1950 and later died mysteriously (Zhang, 2004a). We find that these dramatists who studied in Tokyo were active until the 228 incident. Most of them either suffered the White Terror or gave up theatre. In other words, their theatrical life mainly existed in the Japanese colonial period, even in wartime. Sin-kiok with its strong social criticism was ended under the stricter oppression by the KMT government. The KMT government suppressed sin-kiok plays that criticized social affairs, while fostering the theme of “anti-communism and against Soviet Russia” (反共抗俄). Just like the Japanese colonial government in wartime, the KMT government took advantage of sin-kiok as a tool for propaganda. Also, like dramatists in wartime, some would cooperate with the government. Lu Soo-siong, who had run his own troupe in the Japanese colonial period, suggested that the KMT government should establish a Tai-gi troupe to perform anti-communist and anti-Soviet plays. The plan was supported by the KMT Party and Lu was responsible for organizing this troupe. Lu wrote and produced the play Return Liberty to Me (還我自由) for the troupe. The troupe travelled the whole island performing with the KMT party’s propaganda team. In addition to sin-kiok, Lu wrote scripts on the same theme for kua-a-hi as well. Lu called these propaganda works “scripts of national policy” (國策劇 本) (Chiu, 2004). Lu directly adopted the term “national policy,” which was created by the Japanese government in wartime. It suggests that to Lu, whatever the theme, these kind of plays were by their nature propaganda. The KMT government treated theatre in a similar way to the Japanese colonial government – controlling it or viewing it as a political tool. Moreover, even in wartime, there had been enthusiastic discussions or debates about theatre between Taiwanese and Japanese dramatists in Taiwan, but this climate disappeared under KMT rule. As freedom of speech was extremely curtailed, it was difficult to find debates between Chinese mainlanders and Taiwanese dramatists, even some of whom that were not implicated in the White Terror. Taiwanese dramatists were very cautious, avoiding disclosing their true opinions (Jiao, 1994). Sin-kiok dramatists went two ways. The first way, social criticism, had been disrupted. The ideal to enlighten the masses through theatre was impossible to be realized. The second way was cooperating with the KMT government in propaganda, like Lu Soo-siong. However, after Return Liberty to Me, Lu did not continue to create other sin-kiok works. The two above ways were more or less related to political ideas. Nevertheless, it did not mean that sin-kiok could only be performed for the two opposing political purposes, either resisting autocratic rule or obeying it. There was a third way: commercial sin-kiok. In an environment without freedom, it was especially valuable.

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Until the 1960s, there were more than 20 sin-kiok troupes active in Taiwan. These troupes travelled the whole island to perform. The schedule was usually 10 days in a theatre. Scripts still had to be censored by police offices. During the White Terror, troupes did not touch political or social issues. Playwrights collected sources from plays from classical theatre, fiction, Japanese film and social news. Generally speaking, the themes were not beyond family conflicts, romances, criminal cases or gang clashes (Chiu, 2008). Taiwanese intellectuals did not participate in the production of commercial sin-kiok, since they were persecuted or gagged. As a result, commercial theatre was popularized, like other traditional or classical Taiwanese theatre. Commercial theatre troupes even returned to follow the belief in traditional theatre in Taiwan. They imitated kua-a-hi actors and other traditional Taiwanese theatres in worshipping a theatrical deity, General Tian-too (田都元帥) (Chiu, 2008). If the dramatists of the Japanese colonial period had foreseen this phenomenon, they would have felt disappointed. After all, the modern theatre reform in Taiwan had grown from dissatisfaction with traditional or classical theatre. From the 1910s, there had been Taiwanese intellectuals, like Kua Ting-thiu, who considered it to be uncivilized. Throughout the 1920s to the 1930s, there were always criticisms about traditional theatre in the Taiwan People’s News.16 They would not have expected that the final stage of theatre modernization, commercial sin-kiok in the post-war period, to have returned to the starting point. In 1952, the Local Theatre Association of the Province of Taiwan (台灣 省地方戲劇協進會) was established. It arranged an annual local theatre competition. Troupes with licences were forced to attend the competition otherwise their licences would be revoked. Scripts for the competition were to be in accordance with anti-communist and anti-Soviet Russia themes, and undoubtedly it was a means of controlling theatre. Although sin-kiok troupes attended the competition, they never staged these scripts in commercial theatres (Chiu, 2008). That is, the income for troupes was from ticket sales, and to these troupes, anti-communist plays were not for earning a profit. These scripts were only staged for the local theatre competition, and the competition was not open to the public and there were no ticket sales. In other words, the jury was the only audience, and the competition became a mere formality. Of course, it was not that troupes meant to oppose the policy. It was naturally a result of the commercial mechanism. The commercial value of sin-kiok was revealed from this point.

6.

SIN-KIOK AND TAI-GI FILM

Film shooting in Taiwan was originated by Takamatsu Toyojiro, the organizer of Taiwan Seigeki, in 1907. He was entrusted by the Governor-General Office to shoot a documentary in order to exhibit to people in Japan how the

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Governor-General Office had modernized the colony. Commercial movies were first shot in Taiwan in 1922 by Shochiku (松竹), a famous film company. Taiwanese began to shoot commercial movies from 1925. However, until 1945, the number of commercial movies produced by Taiwanese were few, less than 10 (Ye, 1998). The Japanese colonial period saw the initial stage of the development for Taiwanese film. During this period, Taiwanese film was not related to bun-hua-kiok or sin-kiok. In the post-war period, from 1955, Taiwanese restarted production of commercial movies. These movies were all in Tai-gi and were called Tai-gi films in order to be distinguished from “national” (or, official, Mandarin Chinese) language films (國語片). By the 1970s, more than a thousand Tai-gi movies were released (Ye, 1999).17 Tiunn Tshim-tshe, Tiunn Ui-hian, Lim Thuan-tshiu and Lu Soo-siong, who had left the sin-kiok stage, took part in the film industry as well. All of them established their own companies and directed their own works. The scale of Lim’s enterprise was larger. In 1957, he established the Giok-hong Film Corporation (玉峰影業公司) and Oo-suann Studio (湖山製片廠), which became one of the most important studios for Tai-gi films (Ye, 1999; Shih, 2003). His company recruited trainees and conducted courses for them, including film introduction, analysis of masterpieces, performing, makeup, Tai-gi, literature, music theory, accompaniment, folk dance, ballroom dancing, and so on (Shih, 2003). Lim very likely relied on his experience in Toho. Tai-gi films obtained sources from sin-kiok, so the themes were similar to sin-kiok, such as family troubles, romances and criminal cases. Like sin-kiok, social news, classical theatre and Japanese films were material for Tai-gi films as well. Many producers even copied Japanese films without revising plots, roles and film titles. Themes and genres also included folklore, history, science fiction, action, whodunits, martial art, supernatural, musicals and comedy (Ye, 1999).18 The upsurge prompted sin-kiok actors to leave troupes for the film industry. Their sin-kiok training and experiences benefited Tai-gi films. When the craze faded, these actors would return to their troupes again (Chiu, 2008). In spite of the rise in output and the various themes, there were disadvantages for Tai-gi films. Just as there was censorship of sin-kiok scripts, there was film censorship as well. In addition to political and social issues, pornography, violence and immorality were banned. Censors were particularly strict on Tai-gi films. Even the standards of individual censors were different. Sometimes, a film would be aggressively cut, which made the plots incoherent (Ye, 1999). Although films were shot in a huge number, they were viewed as disposable products. Most film companies had no consciousness of preserving roll films. When movies were no longer screened, roll films were often sold to tailor shops to make stiff collars.

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Tai-gi films declined in the mid-1970s. Some scholars considered this to be a result of the upsurge in producing movies, which caused unhealthy competition (Ye, 1999). However, when the film industry rose in other areas of the world, the quantity of output was also huge, but this did not result in a decline of the industry. It would be contradictory to say that productive conditions led to decline. On the other hand, we should notice that, in the late 1960s, sin-kiok had been in decay. Popular kua-a-hi could not earn profit from commercial theatres any longer and troupes had to seek other performing opportunities.19 Then in the 1970s, traditional theatre, no matter what kind, declined as well (Lin, 2016). The Tai-gi film industry was just like the other kinds of entertainment for Taiwanese, and lost its popularity.

7.

THE DECLINE OF SIN-KIOK

From 1962 to 1971, three official TV channels started to broadcast. Private channels were banned until 1993 (Li, 1982; Lin, 1999). The emergence of TV universally affected film and theatre markets. The decline of Taiwanese theatre and film from the late 1960s was in the first place caused by the growth of broadcast TV. However, in the Taiwanese context, there were other crucial factors. When the KMT government took control of Taiwan, it immediately launched cultural and linguistic reconstructions. The KMT considered Taiwanese to be slavish, impure and an illegitimate Chinese due to their having lived under Japanese colonial rule, customs and language for the previous 50 years. To the KMT government, reshaping Taiwanese to be “pure Chinese” became a crucial project (Huang Ying-che, 2007). Moreover, after the KMT government was defeated in the civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it was anxious about the representative position of China. The KMT attempted to show that it was the only legal government of China; therefore, it became crucial for the KMT government to make Taiwan a real and orthodox China. In schools, Chinese history and geography were taught while Taiwanese parts were very few and marginal (Lin, 1988; Taiwan Historical Association, ed., 2003). The national language (國語), namely the Beijing dialect, or Mandarin Chinese, was enforced, while the native languages of Taiwan, no matter whether Tai-gi, Hakka or aboriginal languages, were all forbidden. If students spoke their native language in school, they would be publicly punished (Lin, 1988). When broadcast TV began, programmes in Taiwanese languages were limited to an hour a day (He, 2002).20 The discriminatory policies towards education and language degraded the native languages and culture of Taiwan. When the post-war generation in Taiwan came of age in the mid-1960s and 1970s, these new adult consumers of entertainment products might not consider Taiwanese entertainment to be

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as “superior” or “elegant” as those in the national language, especially those who were deeply impacted by KMT education. Sin-kiok, like other kinds of Taiwanese theatre and film, found it difficult to attract audiences among the newer generations. The strict limit on TV programmes in Taiwanese languages was another blow to sin-kiok. In addition to the loss of audiences, actors could hardly change their stage to TV, while many actors in national language troupes were promoted to perform in national language TV dramas, such as serialized dramas and soap operas (Wang, 2006), although some sin-kiok comedians might have had opportunities to play subordinate roles in national language TV drama. However, eminent Taiwanese actors were rarely invited to play major roles in TV drama (Chiu, 2008) and could only play minor or marginal roles, a metaphor of the fate of Taiwanese people. When Tai-gi films rose, sin-kiok actors were able to shuttle between film and theatre, but when the TV age came and took the place of commercial theatre and film, major actors directly lost their jobs and disappeared from public. Some studies have viewed this to be commercial influence (Chiu, 2008; Lin, 2016). However, the three channels before 1993 were not absolute commercial TV channels; the majority of shares were held by Taiwan Province Government, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education and Broadcasting Corporation of China, which belonged to the KMT (Wang, 2006). Therefore, instead of a commercial mechanism, the fatal factor was rather KMT policy towards this media.

8.

THE LEGACY AND MEANING OF SIN-KIOK IN HISTORY

Previous scholars considered sin-kiok to have left few legacies and did not affect the later theatrical development in Taiwan (Chiu, 2008). Narrowly speaking, this might be correct. After all, sin-kiok in the post-war period completely relied on a commercial market. It was never supported by the government before democratization and the nativization movements. Instead, the KMT government advocated and fostered national language theatre and film. At first glance, the history from bun-hua-kiok, sin-kiok and film to TV seems separate and fragmentary. However, there were always a few people who connected the different stages. Tiunn Ui-hian and Tiunn Tshim-tshe connected bun-hua-kiok, sin-kiok and film; Lim Thuan-tshiu and Lu Soo-siong connected sin-kiok and film. Many actors, directors, producers and script writers connected sin-kiok and film; some of them connected film and TV (Ye, 1999; Taiwan Film and Audiovisual Institute [TFAI], 2020). They might bring experiences and lessons from the former stage to the next stage. When the nativist culture movement was launched along with democratization in the 1990s, Taiwanese themes with Taiwanese languages were gradually adopted

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again in contemporary theatre, film and TV drama. Some senior actors of TV or film were invited to perform in these works. Some of them had been trained in sin-kiok troupes when they were young, while others who were involved with film had been trained by sin-kiok dramatists. Even if the inheritance is not particularly obvious, it does not mean that there is no legacy of sin-kiok. The original form of sin-kiok may have disappeared, but the revival of Taiwanese themes and languages in the post-liberalization era can be seen as a continuation of the spirit of sin-kiok. It is natural that national language theatre, film and TV drama attracted more attention, since they were all supported strongly by the authorities and occupied a leading position. However, even if Taiwanese were always placed in a subordinate position and were often suppressed before the native regime was established, they still took part in every developing stage of modern theatre and the mass media. In fact, many actors, directors or producers worked in film and TV industries their whole lives and were familiar to Taiwanese audiences. Most of them received official film or TV awards after democratization and nativization, especially after 2000 (TFAI, 2020). In their later years, their contributions have been eventually recognized and are considered integral. The life of one actress, Tan Siok-hong 陳淑芳, is a metaphor for the history of Taiwanese modern theatre, film and TV drama. She participated in theatre and Tai-gi film before the age of 20. After Tai-gi film declined, she continued to perform in national language film and TV drama, though always playing small supporting roles. When Taiwanese themes and languages featured in film and TV dramas rose again, she was invited to play increasingly important roles. In 2020, at the age of 81, she was shortlisted for Best Actress as well as Best Supporting Actress at the Golden Horse Awards (GHA, 金馬獎). Although she was a well-known actress to Taiwanese audiences over several decades, this was the first time she was shortlisted for the most important film award in Taiwan, while many actors and directors of national language films had accepted Lifetime Achievement Awards at a similar age. She won both prizes and set a GHA record. In an interview, Tan describes that in her stage life, she occasionally doubted why her performances were not seen, while she believed her acting not to be bad. “Nevertheless, the thought disappeared soon. I am an actor; I’ve been an actor my whole life. I should act well, even though others cannot see” (Chen, 2020).

NOTES 1. The native languages of Taiwanese still include Taiwanese hakka (台灣客家語) and a variety of aboriginal languages. As for sounds of Taiwanese minnanyu, there are seven tones with tone sandhi, in addition to vowels and consonants. Besides, it is divided into two pronunciation systems, thak-tsheh-im 讀冊音 (reading sound)

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and peh-ue-im 白話音 (colloquial sound). Reading sound is used for speaking proper nouns as well as reading articles, poetry or other writing texts. Colloquial sound is used in daily conversation. A native speaker will use different pronunciations of a word according to different linguistic contexts. Furthermore, there are different accents in different areas. As a result, a word would have two or more pronunciations. Most of Tai-gi terms in this chapter are pronounced with reading sound because they might be names, places, organizations or proper nouns. However, there are still exceptions. For example, kua-a-hi is a colloquial sound, and some surnames are pronounced with a colloquial sound as well (Wu, 1997). 2. Japanese kanji terms were also pronounced in Taiwanese hakka for the same reason. 3. Themes of shimpa might consist of wars with other countries, rebellions among the old samurai class, criminal cases, family troubles, romantic love, and so on. More and more actors and script writers participated in the creation of shimpa plays. Numerous realist fictions of the Meiji period, especially serial stories in newspapers, were adapted to shimpa scripts. 4. This phenomenon was quite similar to the condition in Japan. It shows that shimpa was representative of modern theatre at that time, while kabuki was representative of Japanese traditional theatre. 5. When there were only outlines for rehearsal, an actor’s ability for improvised performances became more important. 6. There were mainly three kinds of opinions. Early in the 1920s, Tshua Pue-honn 蔡培火 advocated a Latin phonetic alphabet of the Presbyterian church in Taiwan for writing. Then in the mid-1920s, Tiunn Ngoo-kun 張我軍 strongly promoted modern Chinese writing (白話文), which was based on modern Mandarin. However, the majority of writers or scholars neither gave up Chinese characters, like Tshua, nor even rejected the idea of writing Taiwanese languages, like Tiunn. They rather considered suitable phonetic symbols for speech sounds without Chinese characters originally, no matter whether a Latin alphabet, Japanese katakana or homophones of Chinese characters (Yokoji, 2009). 7. Lim’s family organized their own cultural theatre troupe and performed on stage as well (Chiu, 2013). 8. “Old ways” in Kataoka’s description means the old ways of performing, old scripts, old themes, and so on. 9. A similar dissatisfaction with kabuki also appeared in the process of the theatrical modernization of Japan. 10. Kua-a-hi is now often called Taiwanese opera. Its songs and music originated in the mid-19th century. In the 1900s, a primitive form, local kua-a (本地歌仔) appeared, and then in the 1920s, kua-a-hi troupes began to perform in commercial theatres. It reflected that kua-a-hi advanced to a mature form. Hakka theatre owns a similar history. Its primitive form, ban-te-hi (採茶戲) rose no later than the 1900s. Also, during the 1920s ban-te-hi developed into a mature form, namely hakka theatre (Lin, 2016). 11. Troupes were classified into a “special class,” which could perform in full Japanese, “first class,” in which over half could be performed in Japanese, and “second class” and “the third class,” both of which could use less than half Japanese (Chiu, 2013). 12. Youth society was a voluntarily social service group, which was encouraged and supported by every provincial government. Members were aged around 16 to 20, with at least elementary school education (Takenaka, 2009).

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13. The script of Mount Ali is lost. Its language is likely Japanese since it was performed in front of the Governor-General. A Japanese dramatist Matsui Tōrō 松居 桃樓 appreciated the work as well (Shih, 2003). 14. Since Hoo-sing was not as half-official as a youth theatre troupe, its legal status is like other verified sin-kiok troupes. However, the leading roles of Hoo-sing were especially young and famous in the Taiwanese cultural circles. It made Hoo-sing different from other sin-kiok troupes to Taiwanese audiences. 15. These scripts were written and staged in Japanese. A professor of Taihoku Imperial University (台北帝国大學), Takita Sadaharu 瀧田貞治, read the scripts before the performance and quite approved of the works (Shih, 2003). Takasago Hotel was published on Taiwanese Literature (台湾文學) in 1943. During the war, magazines and newspapers were forced to publish in Japanese. 16. These articles were likely written with pen names. Writers were likely to be members of the Taiwanese Culture Association since the Taiwan People’s News was an important space for them to advocate their ideals. 17. There were also hakka films released during this period, but the number was less than twenty (Ye, 1999). Films of aboriginal languages were lacked. 18. Kua-a-hi film was also an important branch of Tai-gi film. The first Tai-gi film was in fact a kua-a-hi film. Kua-a-hi films were produced by kua-a-hi troupes. Sometimes famous stars of kua-a-hi would be invited to play leading roles in other genres of film as well (Ye, 1999). 19. For example, troupes would perform in religious festivals or would sell medicine after their performances. These were all outdoor performances without ticket sales. The income of troupes were from the rewards paid by temples or medicine sales. Few actors were able to perform in kua-a-hi programmes on TV. The programmes were limited to half an hour daily (Lin, 2007, 2016). 20. The single hour could be further divided into two different half-hour programmes. One programme could be during the day and another after 9:30pm. Moreover, Tai-gi programmes were allowed to be broadcast on only one channel, therefore the three channels could only broadcast Tai-gi programmes by turns (He, 2002).

REFERENCES A Reporter 一記者. (1927). Kua-a-kiok e liu-pe 歌仔劇的流弊 (The maladies of kua-a-hi). Taiwan minhō, July 10, p. 14. Chen Hsing-ying 陳星穎. (2020). Guomin ama Chen Shufang: ‘Wo zheyisheng jiushi yanyuan. Wo yinggai yao yanhao; bieren kanbujian ye meiguanxi’ 「國民阿嬤」 陳淑芳: 我這一生就是演員, 我應該要演好, 別人看不見也沒關係 (Taiwanese Grandma, Tan Siok-hong: ‘I’ve been an actor my whole life. I should act well, even though others cannot see.’). Retrieved on February 7, 2021 from https://​www​ .twreporter​.org/​a/​2020​-taipei​-golden​-horse​-film​-festival​-chen​-shu​-fang Chen Yu-hsing 陳幼馨. (2010). Taiwan gezaixi de yixiang shijie--hupiezai biaoyan yishu jincheng 臺灣歌仔戲的異想世界:「胡撇仔」表演藝術進程 (The Fantasy World of Taiwanese Gezai Theatre: The Progress of Performing Arts in O-pe-la). Taipei, TW: Dawshiang. Cheng Wei-chung 鄭維中. (2006). Zhizuo Fuermosha--zhuixun xiyang gushu zhong di Taiwan shenying 製作福爾摩沙: 追尋西洋古書中的臺灣身影 (The Fabrication of Formosa: Images of Formosa in European Antique Books). Taipei, TW: Asif Book.

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Chiu Kun-liang 邱坤良. (1992). Jiuju yu xinju—Rizhi shiqi Taiwan xiju zhi yanjiu 舊 劇與新劇: 日治時期臺灣戲劇之研究 (Old Theatre and New Theatre: A Study of Taiwanese Theatre in Japanese Colonial Period). Taipei, TW: Zili. Chiu Kun-liang 邱坤良. (2004). Lü Sushang 呂訴上 (Lü Sushang) (Zishen xijujia congshu 資深戲劇家叢書 (A Series of Senior Dramatists)). Taipei, TW: The Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan. Chiu Kun-liang 邱坤良. (2008). Piaolang wutai—Taiwan dazhong juchang niandai 飄浪舞台: 臺灣大眾劇場年代 (A Roving Stage—the Age of Taiwanese Mass Theatre). Taipei, TW: Yuanliou. Chiu Kun-liang 邱坤良. (2013). Juchang yu daochang, guanzhong yu xinzhong─Taiwan xiju yu yishi lunji 劇場與道場, 觀眾與信眾─臺灣戲劇與儀式論集 (Performance Space and Sacred Space, Audiences and Believers: Anthology of Theatre and Ritual in Taiwan). Taipei, TW: Taipei National University of the Arts. He Yi-mou 何貽謀. (2002). Taiwan dianshi fengyun lu 台灣電視風雲錄 (A Record of TV in Taiwan). Taipei, TW: The Commercial Press. Huang Ying-che 黃英哲. (2007). Qu Ribenhua zai Zhongguohua: zhanhou Taiwan wenhua chongjian (1945–1947) 「去日本化」「再中國化: 戰後台灣文化重建 （1945–1947） (Uprooting Japan; Implanting China: Cultural Reconstruction in Post-war Taiwan (1945–1947)). Taipei, TW: Maitian. Jiao Tong 焦桐. (1994). Taiwan zhanhou chuqi de xiju 台灣戰後初期的戲劇 (Taiwanese Theatre in the Early Post-war Period). Taipei, TW: Taiyuan. Kang, Yin-chen. (2014). The Formation of Taiwanese Classical Theatre, 1895–1937 (doctoral thesis, SOAS, University of London, UK). Kataoka Iwao 片岡巖. (1921). Taiwan fuzoku shi 臺灣風俗誌 (A Record of Taiwanese Customs). Taipei, TW: Taiwan Nichinichi Sinpōsha. Kua-a-hi tsuann-iunn ai kim? 歌仔戲怎樣要禁? (Why should kua-a-hi be prohibited?) (1927, January 9). Taiwan minhō, pp. 4–5. Kua Ting-thiu 柯丁丑. (1913). Taiwan no geki ni tsuite 臺灣の劇に就いて (About Taiwanese Theatre). Taiwan Kyoikukai zasshi, 133, 57–62. Lan Bo-zhou 藍博洲. (2006). Song Feiwo 宋非我 (Song Feiwo) (Zishen xijujia congshu 資深戲劇家叢書 (A Series of Senior Dramatists)). Taipei, TW: The Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan. Lee Wan-ju 李宛儒. (2011). Taiwan no kindai geki no seisei katei: Nippon tochi soki no Taiwan de joen sare ta pure kindai geki no shoso 台湾の近代劇の生成過程:日 本統治早期の台湾で上演された「プレ近代劇」の諸相 (Generation Process of Modern Drama in Taiwan: Various Aspects of the Early Development). Engeki eizo gaku: Engeki Hakubutsukan gurobaru COE kiyo, 2011(2), 91–111. Li Zhan 李瞻. (1982). Dianshi zhidu 電視制度 (TV System). Taipei, TW: Sanmin. Lin Chun-fen 林純芬. (2003). Zhang Shenqie ji qi juben yanjiu 張深切及其劇本研究 (A Study of Zhang Shenqie and His Scripts) (Master’s thesis, Providence University, Taichung, Taiwan). Retrieved on February 7, 2021 from https://​ hdl​ .handle​ .net/​ 11296/​9j29qp Lin Ho-yi 林鶴宜. (2007). Cong tianye chufa—lishi shijiao xia de Taiwan xiqu 從田野出發—歷史視角下的臺灣戲曲 (Building on Fieldwork: An Historical Perspective on Taiwanese Traditional Theatre). Taipei, TW: Dawshiang. Lin Ho-yi 林鶴宜. (2016). Taiwan xiju shi 臺灣戲劇史 (A History of the Taiwanese Theatre). Taipei, TW: National Taiwan University. Lin Shin-feng 林信鋒. (1999). Youxian dianshi 有線電視 (Cable TV). Taipei, TW: Taiwan Book Store.

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Lin Yu-ti 林玉體. (1988). Taiwan jiaoyu mianmao 40 nian 臺灣教育面貌40年 (The 40 years of Education in Taiwan). Taipei, TW: Zili. Lü Su-shang 呂訴上. (1961). Taiwan dianying xiju shi 臺灣電影戲劇史 (A History of Cinema and Drama in Taiwan). Taipei, TW: Yinhua. Mr. C from Hsinchu 新竹C生. (1927). Bun-hua-kiok e put-hing 文化劇的勃興 (The Rise of Cultural Theatre). Taiwan minhō, March 13, p. 12. Ng Chiautong 黃昭堂. (1994). Taiwan Zongdufu 臺灣總督府 (Taiwan Government-General) (Huang Ying-che 黃英哲, trans.). Taipei, TW: Avanguard. Ōzasa Yoshio 大笹吉雄. (1985). Nihon gendai engekishi—Meiji．Taisho hen 日本現代演劇史—明治．大正篇 (A History of Japanese Modern Theatre: Meiji and Taisho Era). Tokyo, JP: Hakusuisha. Phok-kong-tsing 曝狂鐘. (1930). Tiunn Tshim-tshe soo in-to e Taiwan Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue tsiong kiann-lip to tsit-tiau loo? 張深切所引導的臺灣演劇研究會 將走入那條路? (Which way will Tiunn Tshim-tshe lead Taiwan Theatre Study Association to?). Taiwan minhō, October 18, p. 11. Shih Wan-shun 石婉舜. (2003). Lin Tuanqiu 林摶秋 (Lin Tuanqiu) (Zishen xijujia congshu 資深戲劇家叢書 (A Series of Senior Dramatists)). Taipei, TW: Taipei National University of the Arts. Shih Wan-shun 石婉舜. (2010). Banyan Taiwan: Rizhi shiqi Taiwan de juchang, xiandaihua yu zhuti xinggou (1895–1945) 搬演「台灣: 日治時期台灣的劇場, 現代化與主體型構（1895–1945）(Staging Taiwan: Theatre, Modernization and Subjectivity Formation of Taiwan during the Japanese Colonial Period 1859–1945) (doctoral thesis, Taipei National University of the Arts, Taiwan). Retrieved on February 7, 2021 from https://​hdl​.handle​.net/​11296/​c8u6m9 Taiwan Film and Audiovisual Institute 國家電影及視聽文化中心. (ed.). (2020). Taiyupian shiqi zhongyao renwu zhan 台語片時期重要人物展 (online exhibition of Important Workers of Tai-gi Film). Retrieved on February 7, 2021 from https://​tfi​ .openmuseum​.tw/​muse/​exhibition/​b8​8e8adb2905​8f1277b827​f00aef6da6 Taiwan Historical Association 台灣歷史學會. (ed.) (2003). Lishi yishi yu lishi jiaokeshu lunwenji 歷史意識與歷史教科書論文集 (Historical Consciousness and History Textbook). New Taipei City, TW: Dawshiang. Takenaka Nobuko 竹中信子. (2009). Rizhi Taiwan shenghuo shi— Riben nüren zai Taiwan．Zhaohe pian．Shang 日治台灣生活史—日本女人在台灣．昭和篇． 上 (A Life History of Taiwan in Japanese Colonial Period—Japanese Women in Taiwan, 1926–1945, I) (Tsai Lung-pao 蔡龍保 & Zeng Shuqing 曾淑卿, trans.). Taipei, TW: Readingtimes. Ts’ao Yung-ho 曹永和. (ed.) (1996). De Dagregisters Van Het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan, 1629–1662 (The Daily Registers of Zeelandia Castle, Taiwan, 1629–1662), Deel III:​1648–1655. Retrieved on February 7, 2021 from http://​taco​.ith​.sinica​.edu​ .tw/​tdk/​熱蘭遮城日誌/IIID/1651-11-11 Wang Wei 王唯. (2006). Toushi Taiwan dianshi shi 透視台灣電視史 (History of Taiwan TV). New Taipei City, TW: Zhongguo xiju yishu shiyan zhongxin. Wu Mi-cha 吳密察. (ed.) (2001). Taiwanshi xiaoshidian 台灣史小事典 (A Dictionary of Taiwanese History). Taipei, TW: Yuanliou. Wu Shou-li 吳守禮. (1997). Fuke fangyan zongzhi 福客方言綜志 (A Combined History of Hokkien and Hakka Dialects). Taipei, TW: Wu Shou-li. Ye Long-yan 葉龍彥. (1998). Rizhi shiqi Taiwan dianyingshi 日治時期台灣電影史 (The History of Taiwanese Movies during the Japanese Colonization). Taipei, TW: Yushan.

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Ye Long-yan 葉龍彥. (1999). Chunhua menglu: zhengzong Taiyu dianying xingshuai lu 春華夢露: 正宗臺語電影興衰錄 (Spring Flowers and Dew in a Dream: The Rise and Fall of Orthodox Tai-gi Film). New Taipei City, TW: Boyoung. Yokoji Keiko 橫路啟子. (2009). Wenxue de liuli yu huigui: sanling niandai xiangtu wenxue lunzhan 文學的流離與回歸: 三○年代鄉土文學論戰 (The Historical Analysis of the Taiwanese Nativist Literature Debate in the 1930s). Taipei, TW: Unitas. Zeng Xian-zhang 曾顯章. (2003). Zhang Weixian 張維賢 (Zhang Weixian) (Zishen xijujia congshu 資深戲劇家叢書 (A Series of Senior Dramatists)). Taipei, TW: Taipei National University of the Arts. Zhang Heng-hao 張恆豪. (ed.). (2004a). Lü Heruo ji 呂赫若集 (The Anthology of Lü Heruo). Taipei, TW: Avanguard. Zhang Heng-hao 張恆豪. (Ed.). (2004b). Zhang Wenhuan ji 張文環集 (The Anthology of Zhang Wenhuan). Taipei, TW: Avanguard. Zhong Qiao 鍾喬. (2006). Jian Guoxian 簡國賢 (Jian Guoxian) (Zishen xijujia congshu 資深戲劇家叢書 (A Series of Senior Dramatists)). Taipei, TW: The Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan.

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APPENDIX Table 12A.1

Year

1651

Date

11 Nov.

Dutch records about Chinese theatre in Taiwan during the 17th century Content About

Source Chinese

theatre

and

puppet theatre in Tayouan

 

Editor

De Dagregisters Van Het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan, 1629–1662a Gedenkwaerdig

1664

Ts’ao Yung-ho

曹

永和 (1920–2014)

bedryf

der

About theatrical activities of

Nederlandsche Oost-Indische

Chinese in Tayouan during the

Maetschappye, op de Kuste en

lunar new year festival

in het Keizerrijk van Taising

Olfert Dapper (1639–1689)

of Sina

b

Notes: a. It is a log of Dutch East-India Company in Formosa. The documents and files were collected and sorted by Ts’ao Yung-ho. b. It is a book edited by Olfert Dapper and published in 1670. Its English version was published in 1671 and the title was Atlas Chinensis being a second part of A relation of remarkable passages in two embassies from the East-India Company of the United Provinces to the vice-roy Singlamong and General Taising Lipovi and to Konchi, Emperor of China and East-Tartary (Cheng, 2006).

Table 12A.2

Scripts about the Dutch colonial period (1624–1661)

Year

Author

Work

1775

Johannes Nomsz

Anthonius Hambroek, of de belegering van Formoza, Treurspel

2012

Taiwanese Opera Troupe 台灣歌仔戲班劇團

Koeh Hoai-it 郭懷一 (Koeh Hoai-it)

13. Modern literature of Taiwan: between China and the world Michelle Yeh1 I. PREAMBLE I hope readers will forgive me for self-quoting. This is how I describe Taiwan in the opening of my introduction to Frontier Taiwan: An Anthology of Modern Chinese Poetry: Situated off the southeast coast of the Asian continent, with Japan and Korea to the north and the Philippines to the south, halfway between Shanghai and Hong Kong, Taiwan not only occupies an important strategic position in the western Pacific region but is also a nexus of diverse linguistic, economic, social, and cultural crosscurrents from Asia and other parts of the world. Over centuries of clashing and converging, these influences have shaped and continued to shape the society on the island.2

The literary development in Taiwan bears out the above observation. While I believe that no culture is completely impervious to outside influences, even under strict totalitarian regimes, Taiwan stands out for its remarkable openness and diversity. Before the twentieth century, Taiwanese literature was shaped by the language and culture of China under the Ming and Qing rule, as seen in the prose and poetry written in classical Chinese. Into the 1920s, foreign influences began to play a significant role in its development. Thus, the subtitle of the chapter refers to two dimensions of in-betweenness. Geographically, Taiwan is situated between mainland China and the rest of the Pacific region.3 Culturally, Taiwan represents a node of intersecting currents. In what follows, I will offer a brief overview of the formative impact of, and continuing interplay between, those diverse elements.

II.

BURGEONING MODERN LITERATURE

Taiwanese literature did not change overnight with the beginning of the Japanese colonial period in 1895. For example, classical Chinese poetry 291

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continued to be written by the elites and respected by society at large. In fact, it enjoyed the patronage of the colonial government since the genre had been practiced and held in high regard in Japan for centuries.4 In early modern times, many poetry societies existed in Taiwan. However, the situation changed as modern literature was introduced to Taiwan from mainland China and Japan. In 1920, a group of Taiwanese students in Tokyo established the New People Association (Xinminhui 新民會) and published the monthly Taiwanese Youth (Taiwan qingnian 台灣青年, later renamed Taiwan). Inspired by Liang Qichao (梁啟超, 1873–1929), a leading reformist in the late Qing and early Republican era, the journal promoted social and political reform, including the use of the vernacular language. Even though the island was ruled by Japan and public schools taught Japanese only, Taiwanese people from middle- and upper-class families learned Chinese in youth from private tutors or at private academies. The first generation of modern Taiwanese writers, such as Lai He (賴和, 1894–1943) and Zhang Wojun (張我軍, 1902–55), were well versed in Chinese and chose to publish in their native language. Born into a Hakka family in Zhanghua (Changhua 彰化) in central Taiwan, Lai He was trained as a medical doctor in Taipei in 1910–14, founded a clinic in his hometown in 1916, and practiced in Amoy (Xiamen) in south China in 1918–19. Inspired by the May Fourth Movement, he became a tireless advocate of New Literature in Taiwan through his creative writing in poetry, fiction, and prose; editing of the literary section of the most influential newspaper, Taiwanese People’s Daily (Taiwan minbao 台灣民報); and playing a leading role in the Taiwanese Culture Association. His best-known story, “The Steelyard” (Yigan chengzai 一桿稱仔) expresses sympathy and indignation on behalf of the poor in Taiwan. If the image of steelyard symbolizes fairness and law, the breaking of the steelyard by the Japanese policeman gives it a satiric twist. The protagonist—a tenant farmer who sells vegetables in town—suffers humiliation and persecution in the hands of the Japanese system represented by the police and the court. At the end of the story, he kills the policeman before committing suicide. For his pioneering work, Lai is regarded as the “father of modern Taiwanese literature” and the “Lu Xun of Taiwan.” A native of Taipei County, Zhang Wojun only received a primary education. In 1921, he went to Amoy to take up employment and on the side studied classical Chinese literature with a scholar, whose name Wojun (“my army”) he was to adopt as his pen name. Zhang became interested in modern literature after he moved to Beijing in January 1924 and wrote his first modern poem the following month. Between 1924 and 1946, he lived most of the time in Beijing, where he graduated from college and became a lecturer of Japanese at several universities. When he was a student at the Beijing Normal University, he studied with one of the most important writers of the May Fourth period, Zhou Zuoren (周作人, 1885–1967), who later wrote the preface to one of his

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translations of Japanese literature. Like Lai He, Zhang Wojun was a writer and a pioneer in introducing modern literature to Taiwan. In 1924, he published a series of essays to critique the stagnant and decadent literary scene.5 At the end of 1925, he published Love in a Tumultuous City (Luandu zhilian 亂都之 戀) in Taipei, the first book of modern poetry in Taiwanese history. Under the colonial policy, Taiwanese writers of the next generation were increasingly denied the opportunity to learn and publish in Chinese. As Japan started a full-fledged invasion of China in 1937, the government also launched a wholesale Japanization (Kōminka 皇民化) campaign, rewarding those citizens who adopted Japanese names and lifestyle. Chinese was banned and all writers could only publish in Japanese, even if many at home spoke Southern Hokkien or Hakka, the dialects of the two largest ethnic groups in Taiwan.6 Fluent in Japanese, many writers also went to Japan to study and were exposed to the literary currents there, such as Realism, Symbolism, Neo-Sensationalism (Shinkankakuha 新感覺派), and Surrealism.7 To give an example, Surrealism was born in Paris in 1924. Shortly afterwards it was introduced into Japan by the poet, painter, and designer Kitasono Katue (北園克衛, 1902–78) and the poet and literary critic Nishiwaki Junzaburō (西脇順三郎, 1894–1982). Poetry journals were founded, and art exhibitions toured all over Japan, in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. A young man from Tainan named Yang Chichang (楊熾昌, 1908–94) studied in Japan in 1932–34 and developed an interest in Surrealism. After he returned to Taiwan, he formed a poetry society with six fellow young poets and espoused Surrealism. They named the society Le Moulin (Windmill, Fengche 風車), which deftly combined native and foreign symbols. First, windmills were a common sight in Tainan at the time. Second, the image evoked Moulin Rouge, the famous Parisian cabaret, hence the association with Surrealism. Thirdly, according to Yang, who wrote under the pen name Shuiyinping (水 蔭萍), they hoped to bring in a breath of fresh air to the stuffy poetry scene. Unlike its Japanese counterpart, however, Surrealism as espoused by Le Moulin was marginalized on Taiwan’s literary scene, which was dominated by social realism. Lasting barely a year, the group made little impact and it was not until the 1990s that these poets, especially Yang’s poetry and poetic discourse, were rediscovered and translated into Chinese. In addition to critical studies, Le Moulin was the subject of a documentary of 161 minutes, written and directed by Huang Yali (黃亞歷) in 2016. The experimental style of the award-winning film brings to the fore the avant-gardism of the Taiwanese Surrealists. Taiwanese literature under Japanese occupation is linguistically, ideologically, and stylistically diverse.8 Besides the abovementioned writers and groups, Yang Kui 楊逵 (1906–85), who was arrested ten times for his participation in labor and farmers movements, was a socialist, humanitarian writer of

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multiple genres. As a fiction writer, Lü Heruo 呂赫若 (1914–50?) expressed compassion for the lower class; he was also active in theater and well versed in music. Finally, Long Yingzong 龍瑛宗 (1911–99) was widely exposed to world literature and found an affinity with Neo-Sensationalism in Japan on the one hand, and with Naturalism in Europe. If his early fiction deals with the despair of Taiwanese intellectuals, he went on to depict the resiliency of women in an oppressive society. While the Taiwanese were oppressed and discriminated against by the Japanese at home, those who went to mainland China had to endure distrust and even resentment because they were Japanese subjects. Worse still, during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937–45, Taiwanese people sacrificed for Japan; many men even made the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield. Having lived in both Japan and China through those years, Wu Zhuoliu (吳濁流, 1900–76) compared the Taiwanese to an orphan—abandoned by China on the one hand, and denied fair treatment by Japan on the other. Written in Japanese in 1943–45 and published in 1946 in Taipei, Orphan of Asia (Yaxiya de guer 亞細亞的孤兒) is a powerful allegory of the quandary Taiwan was in.

III.

POSTWAR MODERNISM

Sadly, the transition from Japanese colonialism to Chinese rule in 1945–49 did not inspire confidence and optimism. The retrocession of Taiwan to China was fraught with tensions linguistically and culturally. For Taiwanese writers, many had no choice but turn silent after the KMT banned Japanese, the only language they could write in, in September 1946. The situation was exacerbated by the February 28th Incident of 1947.9 Disillusioned with, and in protest against, the KMT rule, some writers simply gave up writing, while it would take others a decade or so to gain sufficient proficiency in Chinese to publish again. These writers are the “translingual generation” (kuayue yuyan de yidai 跨越語言的一代), a term coined by the poet and literary critic Lin Hengtai (林亨泰, 1924– ). Thus, the literary scene in postwar Taiwan was dominated by recent émigrés from mainland China, who also brought with them the May Fourth tradition. However, it was a diminished legacy at best. Having lost the civil war with the Communists, the KMT banned all writers who stayed on the mainland after 1949 and were now labeled “communist.” The only “safe” writers were either sympathetic to the KMT—e.g., Hu Shi (胡適, 1891–1962) and Liang Shiqiu (梁實秋, 1903–87)—or deceased—e.g., Xu Zhimo (徐志摩, 1897–1931) and Zhu Ziqing (朱自清, 1898–1948). As to Taiwanese literature prior to 1945, it was largely unknown to the émigrés because of the language barrier and the cultural policy. The backdrop to postwar literature is multifarious, consisting of the long war against Japan, the traumatic exodus from the mainland,

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restricted access to May Fourth literature, and little knowledge of Taiwanese literature. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that nostalgia for the homeland was prevalent. Qijun’s (琦君, 1917–2006) personal essays about her youth in China, Sima Zhongyuan’s (司馬中原, 1933– ) fantastic tales about ghosts and gallants, and Wang Lan’s (王藍, 1922–2003) wartime romances were among the most popular works. Such trends not only accorded with but often overlapped with the cultural policy of the KMT, which promoted “Anti-Communist Literature” and “Combat Literature” through literary organizations, periodicals, and prizes. Nevertheless, not all writers were content with the conservative literary scene. Inspired by foreign literature, especially Symbolism and Modernism from Europe, America, and Japan, some poets engaged in radical experimentation. A painter by training, Ji Xian (紀弦, 1903–2013), under an earlier pen name Louis (路易士), had established himself as a poet and had contributed to Les Contemporains (Xiandai 現代, 1932–35), an avant-garde journal edited by the poet Dai Wangshu (戴望舒, 1905–50) and two fiction writers Shi Zhecun (施蟄存, 1905–2003) and Du Heng (杜衡, 1907–64) in Shanghai. In 1954, Ji launched the Modern Poetry Quarterly (Xiandaishi jikan 現代詩季 刊) in Taipei and declared the “second revolution of New Poetry.” In his view, modern poetry should rein in lyricism with intellectualism, use no rhymes, and sever all relations with songs. The journal quickly became a magnet for aspiring poets. In 1956, Ji founded the Modernist School (Xiandaipai 現代派) and published the manifesto under the title “Six Tenets” (Liu da xintiao 六大 信條). Identifying with all avant-garde poetry in the West since Baudelaire (1821–67), he held that modern poetry was a product of “horizontal transplantation” rather than “vertical inheritance.” In other words, he envisioned a new poetry that emulated Western modernism and turned its back on the Chinese tradition. This tenet was not only controversial at the time but was to hover in the backdrop to future debates. Ji Xian and the Modern Poetry Quarterly inspired a new generation of poets and stimulated healthy competitions. In 1954, Qin Zihao (覃子豪, 1912–63), Yu Guangzhong (余光中, 1928–2017), and others founded the Blue Star Poetry Society (Lanxing shishe 藍星詩社), which sought to bring together Chinese lyricism and selected Western elements. The same year, three young officers stationed at a naval base in south Taiwan—Luo Fu (洛夫, 1928–2018), Zhang Mo (張默, 1931– ), and Ya Xian (瘂弦, 1932– )—founded the Epoch Poetry Society (Chuangshiji shishe 創世紀詩社). The Epoch poets went beyond the Modernist School to embrace Surrealism, although they had probably never heard of Le Moulin from the 1930s. The modernist movement from the 1950s through the mid-1960s represented a golden age in Taiwanese literature as it gave birth to many talented poets. Besides those already mentioned, Zheng Chouyu (鄭愁予, 1933– ) is a supreme lyric poet, Shang Qin (商

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禽, 1930–2010) is arguably the greatest prose poet in modern Chinese poetry, and Yang Mu (楊牧, 1940–2020) is a towering figure who has exerted significant influences on several generations of poets not only in Taiwan but also in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Similarly, fiction also underwent a modernist transformation. Xia Ji’an (T. A. Hsia 夏濟安, 1916–65) was a professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature at the National Taiwan University in 1950–59, a research fellow at the University of Washington and the University of California, Berkeley, in 1959–65, and a cofounder of the Literary Journal (Wenxue zashi 文學雜誌) in 1956. Through teaching and the journal, he mentored a new generation of fiction writers by opening their eyes to modernist Western fiction, which was distinguished by psychological complexity and stream of consciousness. Among his students, Bai Xianyong (Hsien-yung Pai 白先勇, 1937– ), Chen Ruoxi (Chen Jo-hsi 陳若曦, 1938– ), and Wang Wenxing (Wang Wen-hsing 王文興, 1939– ) went on to become internationally renowned writers. Published in 1971, Taipei Characters (Taibei ren 臺北人) by Bai Xianyong creates vivid portraits of recent émigrés from mainland China whose hearts and souls stay in the past—of youth, glory, and love—while their bodies live in the present characterized by decline, loneliness, poverty, or self-loathing. Chen Ruoxi wrote her first stories about rural Taiwan in college. After receiving an MA from the Johns Hopkins University in 1965, she moved to mainland China with her husband and lived there in 1966–73. After she managed to get out, she wrote a series of short stories based on her experience during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The first story, “Mayor Yin” (Yin xianzhang尹縣長) was published in Hong Kong in November 1974, which probably makes it the first work of fiction anywhere about the violent sociopolitical movement. Finally, Wang Wenxing is well known for his highly experimental language and meticulous craftsmanship. His first novel Family Catastrophe (Jiabian 家變), written in 1966–73, paints a brutally honest picture of the Confucian principle of filial piety in conflict with the reality of family relations, especially that between father and son, in modern society. In addition to the above, Qidengsheng (七等生, 1939–2020), literally “seventh-level student,” stood out as the modernist par excellence. “I Love Black Eyes” (Wo ai heinyanzhu 我愛黑眼珠), a short story written in 1967, takes place in a bizarre urban setting. The unemployed protagonist, who is to meet his wife at a movie theater, is stranded in a sudden torrential downpour. He saves a young prostitute and ignores his wife when she calls out to him. Even when she, rightly enraged, loses her footing and falls into the flood water, he chooses to care for the sick prostitute. When the water subsides, he parts way with the prostitute, without even telling her his real name, and goes home for some rest. The absurdist plot and the seemingly callous protagonist

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intimate an existentialist rejection of social and moral norms on the one hand, and the agency of free will on the other.

IV.

THE NATIVIST TURN

By 1970, modernist poetry was criticized for its opacity and pretentiousness. Soon it merged into the larger cultural current following a series of devasting blows in the international arena: the dispute over the sovereignty of Diaoyutai (釣魚台; Sensaku Islands in Japanese) in 1970, the withdrawal of the Republic of China from the United Nations in 1971, Henry Kissinger’s and Richard Nixon’s visits to the PRC in 1971–72, and Japan’s severance of diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1972. Not only did these events provoke outrage at the betrayal by the nation’s former allies, but they spurred an identity crisis, which led to intense introspections among the intellectuals. Modern poetry was critiqued as an example of slavish westernization, obscurantism, nihilism, and decadence. Instead, critics—including some writers—called for a literature that was rooted in Chinese culture, reflected Taiwanese society, and was accessible to the general public. This is the “Modern Poetry Debate” in 1972–73 triggered by the essays written by John Kwan-Terry (關傑明, 1939–93), a professor of English literature at the Singapore National University, and Tang Wenbiao (唐文標, 1936–85), a professor of mathematics educated in Hong Kong and the U.S.10 The debate led to a reorientation of poetry. Many poets “returned” to Chinese cultural roots on the one hand, and embraced realism in dealing with Taiwanese society on the other. For example, although the Bamboo Hat Poetry Society (Li shishe 笠詩社) had been founded in 1964 and initially aligned itself with modernism, its focus shifted to native reality in the 1970s. A group of young poets founded the Race of Dragons Poetry Society (Longzu shishe 龍族詩社) in 1971 identifying with the Chinese “national spirit.” In the mid-1970s, in an effort to create their own music, college students brought about the Campus Folksongs Movement. One of the students named Hou Dejian (侯德健, 1956– ) wrote the ballad “The Legend of Dragon” (Long de chuanren 龍的傳人) in 1978, which invoked ancient Chinese roots and longed for an “awakened” China. A similar transformation took place in fiction, with the Modern Poetry Debate serving as an antecedent to the Nativist Literature Debate in 1977–78.11 Many writers were now upheld as “nativist” even though almost all of them had come under modernist influence. Among them, Huang Chunming (黃春明, 1935– ), Wang Zhenhe (王禎和, 1940–90), and Chen Yingzhen (陳映真, 1937–2016) stood out. All three writers depict characters who are ordinary men and women, many of whom are from rural areas or struggle for

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a living. What distinguishes these writers is that their stories of human suffering are complex and nuanced, never sentimental or didactic. Huang’s “The Drowning of an Old Cat” (Nisi yi laomao 溺死一老貓) depicts the clash between tradition and modernity. On the one hand, the story laments the loss of communal ties to the pursuit of progress and materialism; on the other hand, the old way of life is far from idealized with its superstition, rigidity, and hierarchy. Moreover, the protagonist’s misplaced heroism and short-lived self-importance are treated with humor and satire. These qualities also abound in “The Taste of Apples” (Pingguo de ziwei 蘋果的滋 味) about the newfound fortune of a poor worker hit by an American military car. The unflattering picture of the worker’s family and the anti-climax of the children eagerly biting into an apple—something they could never afford on their father’s income—yet finding it not as sweet as they expected are both hilarious and sad. Finally, “Sayonara, Zaijian” (Shayonala．Zaijian 莎喲娜 啦．再見) is ruthless in exposing the protagonist’s moral dilemma when he is ordered by his boss to be the interpreter for a group of Japanese sex tourists on their trip around the island. When the early 1980s ushered in the New Cinema Movement, some of Huang’s stories were adapted into film to critical acclaim. At the macro-level, nativist literature not only responded but also contributed to the sociopolitical milieu of liberalization and democratization, which steadily gained momentum from the late 1970s on. On September 28, 1986, the first true opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or Minjindang 民進黨 for short), was founded. On July 15, 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國, 1910–88) decreed the lifting to martial law, which had been in place since May 19, 1949, and thus put an end to the era of White Terror. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝, 1923–2020) became the first native Taiwanese to be the president, and he went on to become the first president who was elected directly by the people in 1996. “Taiwanese consciousness,” which emerged in the 1980s to contest the “Chinese consciousness,” ascended to be the dominant ideology. Political reforms and democratic elections paved the way for the construction of a new Taiwanese subjectivity. Literature played a significant role in the nativist turn. As state censorship was lifted in the liberalizing atmosphere of the 1980s and 1990s, writers reflected on the repressed history of Taiwan. For example, poets wrote about such political taboos as the February 28th Incident and the 1980 murders of Lin Yixiong’s (林義雄, 1941– ) family; for the first time—and in ironic contrast to the politically correct poetry in the PRC—Taiwan saw the rise of “Political Poetry” (Zhengzhishi 政治詩). Expressions of discontent against the ancien régime also aimed at the hegemony of Mandarin and the discrimination against local dialects after 1949. Poets sought to write in their mother tongue, whether it was Hokkien or Hakka. Similar efforts were seen in fiction, where writers used a mix of Mandarin and Hokkien or Romanized Hokkien. The

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literature was part of a broader effort to recognize diverse cultures in Taiwan, including school curricula, literary prizes, and television networks in Hokkien and Hakka. Historical introspection takes a different approach in “Mountain Path” (Shanlu山路, 1983) by Chen Yingzhen. In the short story, after a young dissident was executed by the KMT for his Communist-leaning ideas and participation in the labor movement, the female protagonist pretended to be his fiancée and dedicated herself to caring for his poor family in a coal-mining village. She raised his younger brother like her own, who became a successful accountant in Taipei. When she learns in the newspaper of the release of her former fiancée, who was a friend and comrade of the martyred dissident in his youth, she is so guilt-ridden that she loses the will to live. She leaves behind a letter, which reveals that her own brother betrayed his friends and comrades in exchange for a lighter sentence. The titular image of “mountain path” refers to the steep, winding road to the young martyr’s home on the mountain. If the protagonist identified with the proletarian cause in her youth, she has grown accustomed to the capitalist lifestyle and has raised her brother-in-law the same way. Interweaving the past and the present, the story differs from most literary works at the time in that its critique does not aim at the KMT (even though the White Terror looms in the background); rather, it is a poignant reflection on idealism and betrayal, youth and corruption.

V.

HETEROGLOSSIA IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN

Besides the nativist introspection and the promotion of multiculturalism, another major development in post-martial law Taiwan was the rise of feminist consciousness. Such women writers as Liao Huiying (廖輝英, 1948– ), Xiao Sa (蕭颯, 1953– ), and Li Ang (李昂, 1952– ) stood out for their approach to women that was different from earlier times, especially as seen in the popular romances of Qiong Yao (瓊瑤, 1938– ). Under their pen, we see a broad spectrum of female characters from all age groups and backgrounds: a young professional refuses to be submissive to traditional values and proves her self-worth as an independent woman, a high school girl gets pregnant and commits suicide, a butcher’s wife endures years of abuse and ends up killing her husband. These stories challenge the traditional role of women and critique patriarchy. More than expressing sympathy for the plight of women, they assert female subjectivity.12 Literature in the 1980s and 1990s may be broadly defined as one of awakening and enlightenment. Besides political and gender issues, other hitherto marginalized groups also received attention from writers, including equal rights for indigenous peoples and homosexuals, care for veterans living in

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poverty, saving children from prostitution, and environmental protection and preservation.13 While the topic of a particular movement may vary, social conscience and the commitment to change have continued to this day. Instead of following the development of Taiwanese literature in a chronological order, I will focus on important themes in the past two decades. For centuries, Austronesian indigenes in Taiwan had been oppressed and discriminated against, regardless of who ruled the island. Much like native Americans, they were severely disadvantaged economically, educationally, and socially. In Taiwan, amelioration began with renaming. Instead of derogatory names such as “aboriginal savages” and “mountain peoples,” it was decreed in July 1994 that the native tribes be called “indigenous peoples” (yuanzhumin 原住民). In 1996, the ministry-level Council of Indigenous Peoples was established. Today, sixteen tribes are officially recognized, although two dozen or so remain unrecognized. Written in Chinese, indigenous literature tends to fall into two broad categories: first, fighting for the dignity and agency of indigenous peoples, and, second, describing indigenous experiences and lifestyles in close connection with nature.14 In “Regain Our Names” (Huifu women de xingming 恢復我們 的姓名), Malieyafusi Monaneng (馬列雅弗斯·莫那能, 1956– ), a poet of the Paiwan Tribe, describes indigenous peoples as “forgotten” by history, having lost their real names and struggling to survive on hard labor and prostitution. The poem demands that they be given back their names and stop “wandering on their own land.” Monaneng also published the first book of poetry by an indigenous writer in 1989 titled Beautiful Rice Ears (Meili de daosui 美麗的 稻穗). Another marginalized group that found its voice in the 1980s–90s was the LGBT community. In his early career, Bai Xianyong wrote a couple of short stories on the subject. In 1983, he published Crystal Boys (Niezi 孽子), the first full-length novel in Taiwan about the love and life of gays. In 1986, the first case of AIDS was diagnosed, which not only called widespread attention to homosexuality but also led to a movement demanding gay and lesbian rights. In February 1990, the first lesbian organization Between Us (Women zhijian) was formed. Throughout the 1990s, other organizations, journals, and conferences were devoted to homosexuality. On May 24, 2019, same-sex marriage became legal, making Taiwan the first Asian country to pass the law. As with the other sociopolitical issues in contemporary Taiwan, literature has not only reflected but also contributed to the LGTB movement.15 It is also worth noting that the Chinese terminology both echoes and departs from the English original. It is common in Taiwan to use the term Kuer (酷 兒), which is a Chinese transliteration of “Queer” in the LGBT discourse but does not have the negative root meaning of the word in English. In fact, the

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character “ku” means “cool” with all the positive connotations in colloquial American–English.16 An ophthalmologist by trade, Chen Kehua（陳克華, 1961– ) is the pioneer of Queer poetry.17 His poetry contains explicit descriptions of gay sex, often in a hyperbolic, satirical tone, as if to shock the reader. Written in 1995, “The Necessity of Anal Sex” (Gangjiao zhi biyao 肛交之必要) remains to this day the most famous poem in Queer literature. Chen, also a prose writer, painter, and photographer, has been a controversial figure in recent years for his misogynistic remarks. Under pressure, the editors of the first anthology of Queer poetry in Taiwan excised Chen’s poems. In 1994, Qiu Miaojin (邱妙津, 1969–95) published a novel titled Notes of a Crocodile (Eyu shouji 鱷魚手記, 1994). The first-person narrator Lazi (拉 子) is a young lesbian attending the National Taiwan University. Written in the form of journal entries, the semi-autobiographical novel presents her feelings, musings, and inspirations. Besides Lazi, the other narrator is the titular crocodile, who has to disguise its identity and dress up as a human. In June 1995, Qiu committed suicide in Paris where she had been a graduate student in psychology. The following year, Notes of a Crocodile won a major literary prize in Taiwan. Her last novel, written in an epistolary form, Last Words from Montmartre (Mengmate yishu 蒙馬特遺書, 1996) and her diary were published posthumously. Qiu is the most revered icon in the lesbian movement; crocodile and Lazi have become synonymous with closeted lesbians in mainstream society.18 The most ambitious work of Queer literature to date is arguably the trilogy written by Guo Qiangsheng (郭強生, 1964– ). A literature professor, prose writer, playwright, and theater director, Guo started writing fiction in high school. His trilogy consists of The Night Walker (Yexing zhi zi 夜行之子, 2010), The Man with No Hometown (惑鄉之人, 2012), and Broken Generation (Duandai 斷代, 2015). Time-wise, they range from the Japanese colonial period to the 9-11 terrorist attacks to present-day Taiwan. Geographically, they shuttle between New York City and Taipei. While love stories revolving around the gay protagonists constitute the main plot, the trilogy also muses on gender, politics, history, memory, and death. Although writings about nature have a long history in Taiwan, ecological consciousness advanced markedly in the 1980s. A nature writer and environmental activist, Liu Kexiang (劉克襄, 1957– ) started out writing about indigenous birds and won himself the humorous nickname “Bird Man” (Niaoren 鳥人). Through prose and poetry, he went on to record the natural history of Taiwan, compile the travel writings of Europeans and Japanese in nineteenth-century Taiwan, and write about his personal experiences in the field, expanding from birds and mountains to landmarks, small towns, and

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remote fishing ports. For his pioneering work, Liu is considered the “Father of Nature Writing in Taiwan.” Nature writing reached a new height with Wu Mingyi (吳明益, 1971– ) in the early twenty-first century. In fact, Liu Kexiang considers his work as representing a new paradigm. Wu incorporates multiple genres in a text—words, photographs, sketches—and adopts an interdisciplinary approach based on environmental sciences, theories of ecocriticism, Daoist philosophy, and an aesthetics that he calls “wildness.” His first-person, non-fictional prose seeks to transcend anthropomorphism, give agency to untamed nature, and critique the artificiality and damages of human-preserved nature. In 2000, Wu published A Record of Enigmatic Butterflies (Midie zhi 迷蝶誌). Taiwan was regarded as “the kingdom of butterflies” in the nineteenth century, boasting as many as 380 different kinds. As the book’s subtitle indicates, nature writing is far more than travelogue or reportage; it is “an attitude toward life” (yizhong shenghuo zitai 一種生活姿態). In 2003, Wu published another book about butterflies and edited Anthology of Nature Writing in Taiwan (Taiwan ziran xiezuo xuan 臺灣自然寫作選), the first anthology of its kind in Taiwan. Much of contemporary Taiwanese literature may be generalized as decentering and deconstructive in its orientation. Consistent with postmodern and postcolonial discourses that have been influential in Taiwan, these works problematize the Grand Narrative of any kind. In fiction, it lends itself to the mode of Magic Realism and meta-fiction. For example, Zhang Dachun’s (張大春, 1956– ) “The General’s Monument” (Jiangjunbei 將軍碑), collected in Four Fortunes Worries about the Country (Sixi youguo 四喜憂國) in 1992, interweaves reality with fantastic elements. Through time travel, we follow General Wu to the conflicts between the KMT and the Japanese, and between the KMT and the CCP, in the Republican era. Highlighting the discrepancy between appearance and reality at multiple levels—patriotism veils self-interest (the general), loyalty veils negligence (the general’s attendant), filial piety veils lies (the son)—the story undermines the Grand Narrative of the nation, history, or universal truth. In poetry, Xia Yu (Hsia Yü 夏宇, 1956– ) burst onto the scene in the early 1980s and garnered phenomenal success. Her first two books, titled Memoranda (Beiwanglu 備忘錄) and Ventriloquy (Fuyushu 腹語術) showed a highly individual sense of design, such as the size, shape, and color of the paper, the childlike handwriting, the sketches, the uncut pages, and her refusal to publish with commercial presses. In contrast to the mainstream of nativism and social conscience, her poems dealt with intimate experiences, didn’t shy away from irreverent or trivial images (e.g., hemorrhoid and pimples), blended allusions to classics and pop culture, and employed extensively collage, stream of consciousness, neologisms, and other devices. Xia has continued to push the boundary of “poeticity” and even signification in the ensuing collections,

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most notably Pink Noise (Fenhongse zaoyin 粉紅色噪音) in 2007, which used a computer translation software to generate poems in Chinese and English printed on transparencies. Nativism met postmodernism in Chen Li (陳黎, 1954– ). Living most of his life in Hualian on the east coast of Taiwan, Chen pondered the past and the present from the “edge of the island” (daoyu bianyuan 島嶼邊緣)—the title of his 1995 book of poetry. He drew widely on the geography, indigenous cultures, and colonial history of Taiwan to celebrate its beauty, marvel at its diversity, and memorialize its suffering. Like Xia Yu, he also consistently pushes the boundary of language, using the sound, shape, and meaning of Chinese words, typography, and pastiches to signify in new ways. “Lesson in Ventriloquism” (Fuyuke 腹語課) uses two simple sounds and typography to juxtapose the small yet beautiful (Taiwan) and the big bully (PRC).

VI.

LITERATURE GOES DIGITAL

If newspaper supplements, literary prizes, and poetry societies played a key role on the literary scene in the first three decades of the postwar period, their influence began to wane as the press and other mass media gained complete freedom and became more diversified in the late 1980s. With diversification came fierce competition. Literature as a publishing industry has struggled in the past two decades as the ecology of the literary field has shifted, in Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang’s words, from martial law to market law.19 One of the impactful factors in the shift is the emergence and thriving of digital literature. Since the 1990s, the site of digital literature has evolved from BBS (Bulletin Board System) and blog to Facebook, Instagram, Line, and others. More importantly, the new platforms have made possible new modes of creation, such as hyper texts and video poems. As early as 1996, Xu Wenwei (須文 蔚, 1966– ) created the first interactive poetry site, using Flash, JavaScript, and animation.20 And the veteran poet Su Shaolian (蘇紹連, 1949– ) launched the experimental multimedia and interactive site “Flash Superlit” (Flash 超 文學) in 1998 under the name Miro Casuo (Miluo. Kasuo 米羅.卡索). While the Internet provides a fertile ground for literature, it has proven particularly productive for poetry—typically short and easily comprehensible poems. For example, the extremely popular “Goodnight Poem” (Wan’an shi 晚安詩) gets its name from the fact that it gives viewers a moment of pleasure before they retire for the night. Another popular site is “Read a Poem for You Every Day” (Meitian weini du yishoushi 每天為你讀一首詩) on Facebook. The fact is that digital technology in various forms, ubiquitous and readily available 24/7, is responsible for the poetry renaissance that has been going on since 2012. Most “Instapoets” are young men and women; quite a few enjoy wide fame beyond cyberspace.

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While poetry is the dominant genre in digital literature, the platform has also proved productive for fiction and non-fiction prose. In 1998, Cai Zhiheng (蔡智恆, 1969– ) , a doctoral student at the National Cheng Kung University, serialized a novel titled The First Intimate Encounter (Diyici de qinmi jiechu 第一次的親密接觸) on BBS. Under the penname Punk Cai (Pizi Cai痞子 蔡), the novel was so popular that not only was it soon rendered in simplified Chinese and posted on a PRC BBS, but it found its way into print in Taiwan. Another successful example is Tengjingshu or Fujii Tree (藤井樹), the penname of Wu Ziyun (Neal Wu 吳子雲, 1976– ), who published a series of novels since 2000. Going beyond the digital format, he directed two films, respectively in 2016 and 2019, based on his own scripts. Even more popular is Nine Knives (Jiubadao 九把刀), the penname of Ke Jingteng or Giddens Ko (柯景騰, 1976– ). He has published novels online since 2000 and has achieved phenomenal success in multiple media, including television series, comic book, and cinema. The movie based on his story about his youth, You Are the Apple of My Eye (Naxienian, women yiqi zhui de nühai 那些年: 我們一起追 的女孩), was a blockbuster in the Chinese-speaking world and beyond.

VII. CONCLUSION Taiwanese literature has a long and deep history of cross-cultural and inter-regional interactions since the early twentieth century. It has not only been inspired and stimulated by literatures in mainland China, Japan, America, and Europe, but, more importantly, it has organically integrated them into native articulations. Another aspect of Taiwanese literature is increasing internationalization in the twenty-first century. As nativism has been deeply institutionalized in the educational, cultural, and political domains, Taiwan’s identity has been articulated in a discourse of binary opposition: pro-Taiwan means anti-China. As Taiwan moves farther away from China, critics and the establishment emphasize the international character of Taiwanese literature. In recent years, we have seen more and more translations, in various foreign languages, often with the support of state sponsorship or foundations in the private sector. For example, Columbia University Press has an ongoing series on “Modern Literature from Taiwan” edited by David Der-wei Wang. To date, it has published 26 books of fiction and poetry. The Center for Taiwan Studies at the University of California in Santa Barbara has published the biannual journal Taiwan Literature: English Translation Series since 1996, along with other translation series. Translations have made Taiwanese literature more visible around the globe and have contributed to the recognition of Taiwanese writers. Several writers, such as Yang Mu, Zhu Tianwen (Chu T’ien-wen 朱 天文, 1956– ), and Wu Mingyi, have won international prizes in Japan, the US, and Europe. It is unquestionable that Taiwanese literature is part of world

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literature, and it is foreseeable that appreciation of Taiwanese literature will continue to grow.

NOTES 1. I’d like to thank the “Poetry in Transition” project, led by Professors Henrieke Stahl and Christian Soffel, at Trier University, Germany, for its support. 2. M. Yeh, “Frontier Taiwan: An Introduction,” Frontier Taiwan: An Anthology of Modern Chinese Poetry, ed. M. Yeh & N.G.D. Malmqvist (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1. 3. For a history of premodern Taiwan, see: Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 4. For a comprehensive study of classical Chinese literature in Taiwan, see: Huang Mei’s 黃美娥, Gudian Taiwan: wenxueshi, shishe, zuojia lun 古典台灣: 文學 史，詩社，作家論 (Classical Taiwan: literary history, poetry societies, writers) (Taipei: Guoli bianyiguan, 2007). Poets would often gather in such posh restaurants as Jiangshanlou (Kang San Lau 江山樓) in Taipei and Baomeilou 寶美樓 in Tainan. 5. See: The Columbia Sourcebook of Literary Taiwan, ed. Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Michelle Yeh & Ming-ju Fan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 6. See: Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001). 7. Faye Yuan Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2003). 8. For a comprehensive study of Taiwanese literature in the Japanese colonial period, see: Pei-yin Lin, Colonial Taiwan: Negotiating Identities and Modernity through Literature (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2017). 9. For literary representations, see: Sylvia Li-chun Lin, Representing Atrocity in Taiwan: The 2/28 Incident and White Terror in Fiction and Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Berry, A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern Chinese Literature and Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 10. For key essays in the Modern Poetry Debate in 1972–73 and the Native Literature Debate in 1977–78, see The Columbia Sourcebook of Literary Taiwan, ibid. 11. For an insightful study of Taiwan’s transition from modernism to nativism, see: Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Modernism and the Nativist Resistance: Contemporary Fiction from Taiwan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). 12. Doris T. Chang, Women’s Movements in Twentieth-Century Taiwan (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009); Iris Hsin-chun Tuan, Alternative Theater in Taiwan: Feminist and Intercultural Approaches (Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2007). 13. For example: Fran Martin, Situating Sexualities: Queer Representation in Taiwanese Fiction, Film and Public Culture (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003); Karen Laura Thornber, Ecoambiguity: Environmental Crises and East Asian Literatures (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2012). 14. See: Taiwan’s Indigenous Writers: An Anthology of Stories, Essays, and Poems, John Balcom and Yingtsih Balcom, eds. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005).

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15. For a historical overview of LGBT literature in Taiwan, see: Ji Dawei (紀大 偉, 1972– ), A Queer Invention in Taiwan同志文學史: 台灣的發明 (Tongzhi wenxueshi: Taiwan de faming) (Taipei: Lianjing Publishing, 2017). According to Ji, queer literature appeared in Taiwan as early as the 1950s when Chinese translations of foreign works about homosexuality appeared in the literary supplement to the United Daily. 16. See the two books edited by Ji Dawei: Queer Revelation: A Reader of Queer Discourse in Contemporary Taiwan (Kuer qishilu 酷兒啟示錄: 臺灣當代Queer 論述讀本) (Taipei: Yuanzun wenhua, 1997) and Queer Carnival: A Reader of Queer Literature in Contemporary Taiwan (Kuer kuanghuanjie: Taiwan dangdai Queer wenxue duben 酷兒狂歡節: 台灣當代 Queer 文學讀本 (Taipei: Yuanzun wenhua, 1997). 17. The first Queer poetry anthology in Chinese is: Li Wen-chi 利文淇, et al., ed., Under the Same Roof: A Poetry Anthology for LGBT (Tongzai yige wuyan xia: tongzhi shixuan 同在一個屋簷下: 同志詩選) (Taipei: Heiyanjing wenhua, 2019). 18. Not all authors of Queer literature are lesbian or gay. A prominent example is Zhu Tianwen (朱天文, 1956– ) Notes of a Desolate Man (Huangren shouji 荒人手记, 1993), written in the form of a gay man’s diary. 19. Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004). 20. Xu is also a pioneer in the study of digital literature. See: Xu Wenwei, On Digital Literature of Taiwan: Theory and Practice of Digital Aesthetics, Transmission, and Teaching (Taiwan shuweiwenxue lun—shuwei meixue, chuanbo yu jiaoxue zhi lilun yu shiji 臺灣數位文學論─數位美學: 傳播與教學之理論與實際) (Taipei: Eryu wenhua, 2003).

14. Hybrid theatre: the origin and development of creative Taiwanese opera Jasmine Yu-Hsing Chen INTRODUCTION When I conducted my fieldwork on Taiwanese opera (also known as kua-a-hi or gezaixi 歌仔戲)1 in 2007–2009, I was always impressed by the lively performances. There was a vivid interaction between performer and audience. Unlike performances in the afternoon, which were mostly classical plays called koo-tsheh-hi 古冊戲 or koo-loo-hi 古路戲, and were repertoires based on books and legends promoting loyalty and filial piety, the evening performances were always full of energy. When night fell, colourful lights lit up the simple, outdoor stage. With the accompaniment of an electronic piano and jazz drums, the actors on stage sang pop songs and dressed in shining sequin robes, fancy suits, or colourful Japanese kimonos (kimono 着物 are traditional Japanese garments, and are also known as hefu 和服 in Chinese). This hybrid performance has been called “opeila” (oo-phiat-a “胡撇仔”). Although the value of opeila has not been recognized until the past couple of decades, this unique subgenre of Taiwanese opera has given life to memories common in grassroots, Taiwanese people. Opeila is one of the most concrete testimonies of a lively Taiwanese culture. This chapter examines the origin and development of opeila in Taiwanese opera. Taiwanese opera consists of two main subgenres: classical plays and opeila. Classical plays feature stylized movement patterns, old-style costumes, vocal singing, musical accompaniment, and other performance conventions found in traditional Chinese operas (xiqu 戲曲, literally “theatre [of] song”). On the contrary, opeila features fight scenes with Japanese swords, romantic themes, popular music played with Western instruments, and costumes integrated with foreign elements. In addition to occasional performances in theatres, contemporary Taiwanese opera perform mainly on outdoor stages near temples. During outdoor performances, most professional troupes adhere 307

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to the etiquette of performing “classical plays for matinees and opeilas for evening performances” (jit-ian koo-tsheh, ia-ian oo-phiat-a 日演古冊, 夜演 胡撇仔). While it has been an essential subgenre, opeila has received little attention from English academic discussion regarding its historical background and hybrid transformation. This chapter articulates the significant, historical context of opeila in Taiwanese opera by examining hybrid theatre during and after the Japanese colonial period. Although local aesthetics of opeila are better recognized in Taiwan after the turn of the century, the subgenre has been viewed as the perfunctory performance (oo-peh-phiat-phiat-e  烏白撇撇的, literally means “casually gesturing”) prior to the late 1990s (Hsieh, 2011). By blending news archives with fieldwork and interviews of actors, this chapter deciphers the diachronic development of opeila. The discussion also shows how opeila mixes Japanese and Chinese cultures while also integrating local creativity, thus, transforming traditional Taiwanese opera.

THE ORIGIN OF TAIWANESE OPERA Without considering how Taiwanese opera began in a multivariant environment within commercial playhouses, it is difficult to understand how opeila could integrate elements across varieties of cultures, genres, and styles. Taiwanese opera is a traditional theatre that originated in colonial Taiwan. The primary performance of traditional Taiwanese opera is similar to Chinese opera, which encompasses an abundance of theatrical elements such as storytelling, acting, dialogue, recitation, song, dance, pantomime, stylized movement, elaborate costumes, and makeup. In some plays, acrobatics and martial arts are also incorporated. The classical plays of traditional Taiwanese opera are mainly based on Chinese folklore and historical tales. What mainly sets Taiwanese opera apart from the other 300 plus regional forms of Chinese opera is the use of the Taiwanese Holo vernacular (also known as Minnan or Hokkien, the most common language spoken in Taiwan), local tunes, and musical instruments. Scholars have traced the formation of Taiwanese opera to the early 1900s in Yilan, Taiwan, with amateur performance groups who sang and acted with musical accompaniment (Tseng, 1988). The dance and folksong common to these amateur performances were predecessors of Taiwanese opera in a primitive form of loh-te-sau 落地掃 (literally, sweeping the ground [to make a stage-like space]). The earliest evidence of Taiwanese opera performed in theatres started in the mid-1920s, which was during the Japanese colonial period (Lu S., 1991). The rise of Taiwanese opera was highly related to the flourishing market of commercial playhouses in colonial Taiwan. The Japanese colonial period spanned from 1895 and ended in 1945. Colonial modernity, urbanization, and

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economic growth enabled Taiwanese people to engage in entertainment and consumption, which accelerated the prosperity of commercial playhouses. Commercial playhouses could be distinguished into two categories depending on their main target audiences. Most playhouses appealed to either Japanese or Taiwanese audiences. The commercial playhouses targeted Taiwanese audiences who commonly favoured Chinese operas. Among the various regional forms of Chinese operas, the Shanghai-style Peking opera (Haipai jingju 海派京劇) was extraordinarily popular in Taiwan. The Shanghai-style Peking opera featured magnificent visual effects. The innovative use of lighting, scenery, and stage mechanisms were advertised in newspapers to attract Taiwanese audiences. One of the best-known Taiwanese commercial playhouses in Taipei was the Ing-lok Theatre (Ing-lok-tso or Yongle zuo 永 樂座). The first program in the Ing-lok Theatre since its debut in 1924 was a Shanghai-style Peking opera troupe, Lesheng Peking Opera Troupe (Lesheng jingban 樂勝京班), which flaunted “new staging, performances in the air, colourful lighting, and gorgeous costumes” (Hsi, 1924). The performance of Lesheng maintained a full house in the Ing-lok Theatre for a month (“Xinpai,” 1924). In addition to Shanghai-style Peking opera, other Chinese operas competed against one another in attention-seeking stunts. One Teochew opera (Tio-tsiu-hi or Chaozhouxi 潮州戲) troupe advertised “brand-new realistic costumes of animal and sea-life” (“Yonglezuo,” 1924), and one ko-kah opera (ko-kah-hi or gaojiaxi 高甲戲) troupe even burned their sets with real fire for the show Burning Hundred Flowers Terrace (Chiu, 1992, p. 144). The commercial playhouses created a platform for diverse performances and provided an inclusive environment for fresh, innovative theatrical forms, such as Taiwanese opera. Under the thriving economy, local Taiwanese actors learned sophisticated performances, costumes, makeup, and repertoires performed in other well-established Chinese operas. By including new elements, Taiwanese actors embellished preliminary Taiwanese folksong and dance in their performances. The origins of Taiwanese opera gradually formed in commercial playhouses. Taiwanese opera developed rapidly in commercial playhouses because of its use of the local Holo (Hokkien) language, the common language spoken in Taiwan. In 1925, a newspaper report described that the market of Chinese operas in Taiwan was threatened by the emerging Taiwanese Opera (“Muzi,” 1925). Only two years later, Taiwanese opera became competitive with Peking opera and more profitable in commercial playhouses. Women were particularly drawn to the love stories and lower ticket prices in Taiwanese opera (“Yonglezuo,” 1927, p. 4). In 1930, Taiwanese opera quickly became popular throughout Taiwan. In Tainan, the bloom of Taiwanese opera caused the Peking opera popularity to shrink considerably (Hsiao, 1930). Catering to the audience’s preference has been essential in the success of Taiwanese opera.

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Innovative and adaptive business models are necessary when competing with other theatrical performances in commercial playhouses. Since Taiwanese opera originated from commercial playhouses, its business model catered to box office preferences.

THE ORIGIN OF OPEILA DURING THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD Taiwanese opera has undergone a fundamental transition since 1937 when the Japanese government systematically launched the Japanization policy (kominka seisaku 皇民化政策, also known as imperialization policy). The Japanization policy was tightly related to assimilation measures, yet the Japanization (kominka) further turned the assimilation from an ideologic project into a material and physical practice (Ching, 2001, pp. 89–132). Before the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), traditional Chinese opera and Taiwanese opera could perform freely in Taiwan. However, during the war, the Japanese government began actively controlling and censoring Chinese theatrical performances. Although Taiwanese opera is traditionally formed by locals in Taiwan, the costumes and performance conventions in Taiwanese opera were adapted from Chinese operas. This mistakenly pegged Taiwanese opera as a “Chinese legacy passed on before the colonial rule” (“Taiwan shibai,” 1938). During this era, the Japanization policy required all troupes in Taiwan to perform repertoires highlighting Japanese imperial ideals. A policy “banning drum and music” (jin guyue 禁鼓樂) forbade performances in Chinese or Taiwanese without official permission from the government (Hsu Y.H., 2004). In addition, the Japanese government requested all citizens concentrate manpower and material resources for the sake of the war. This drained funding for the arts. The considerable expenses of Taiwanese opera meant performances were regarded as “inappropriate and immoral entertainment” (“Daibutai,” 1938). Excessive spending on the arts went against the practice of austerity during wartime. Taiwanese opera was also banned due to the use of the Taiwanese Holo vernacular. Government officials enforced the use of Japanese as the “national language” to promote imperial consciousness (“Juantouyan,” 1938). Taiwanese opera had to fundamentally remodel its form and content. During this transition, the commonly adapted historical Chinese tales were changed to stories representing Japanese imperialism. Due to censorship and various restrictions during the Japanization policy, Taiwanese opera troupes had to change their performances to survive. At the beginning of the Japanization campaign, the Japanese government sent Japanese actors to Taiwanese opera troupes. The Japanese actors mentored Taiwanese actors, teaching techniques common in Japanese period drama (jidaigeki 時代劇), a historical subgenre centred on the prestige of military

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nobility in Japan (Fugeshi, 2008, pp. 254–255). Taiwanese actors mainly learned the featured “sword fighting” (chanbara チャンバラ) from Japanese period dramas. Upon returning to rehearsal, actors would practice movements and mimic stage fights using Japanese swords (Hsu Y.H., 2001. p. 43). Some Japanese period drama repertoires were adapted in Taiwanese opera with shared titles, such as Tange Sazen 丹下左膳, Kurama Tengu 鞍馬天狗, and Miyamoto Musashi 宮本武蔵. Japanese period drama highlighted the fight between good and evil, which coincidentally lined with traditional Chinese operas’ themes. Similarly, Taiwanese opera and Japanese period drama shared similar plots of ghosts, gods, love, and entanglements between human nature and justice. The imitation of Japanese period drama provided a convenient way for Taiwanese opera to cope with drama censorship. However, since Taiwanese audiences were not accustomed to the change, actors still secretly performed the new Japanese-style shows in the style of Taiwanese opera. The senior actor Chiang Wu-tung 蔣武童 recalled that performances under the Japanization policy were like a stowaway’s game. During the performances, the troupe would arrange guards at the entrance of the theatre. Once the police were close, the guards would immediately inform the actors. Actors would quickly change costumes, putting on Japanese kimonos, and switch from performing in Taiwanese to Japanese. After the police’s patrol passed, actors changed back into traditional costumes inherent to Taiwanese opera (Chen Y.C., 2005, pp. 188–190). Thus, many troupes claimed they had changed their performances to “refined repertoires” (kai-liong-hi 改良戲), but still incorporated Taiwanese opera elements whenever they had the chance. In addition to the adaption of the Japanese period drama, many Taiwanese opera troupes publicly advertised performances as “new drama” (shingeki 新劇, modern spoken drama) to cope with Japanese police inspections and permissions. The senior actor Lu Fu-lu 呂福祿 explained that typical Japanese period drama performance was too formalist to attract Taiwanese audience. To increase the box office sales, Taiwanese actors mimicked the modern performing elements in spoken drama and incorporated popular songs during performances (Lu F., interview, September 2008). Some repertoires adapted from news reports or criminal cases in the 1920s were also an inspiring recourse for Taiwanese opera’s transformation. These repertoires, such as The Case of Tainan (Tai-lam an 臺南案), The Na-tau Women (Na-tau hu 林投婦), and The Case of Quanzhou (Tsuan-tsiu ki-an 泉州奇案) (Taiwan Sotokufu Bunkyokyoku, 1928), integrated modern costume and “new drama” performance in Taiwanese opera. This enriched the performance of Taiwanese opera and became popular throughout the period of the Japanization policy. On the surface, Taiwanese opera appeared to be replaced by the “new drama,” but in fact, most troupes performed a hybrid style. Sometimes actors wore modern

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costumes, but the way of speaking, stepping, and acting was in line with traditional Taiwanese opera (Bi, 1941). Gradually, the performance became neither “new drama” nor Taiwanese opera but a mix of the two (“Taipei,” 1939). The Taiwanese opera artist Hsiao Shou-li 蕭守梨 recalls performances during the time, saying that Taiwanese opera actors wore Japanese costumes and held Japanese swords to perform Chinese historical tales. Sometimes actors switched the story setting from premodern to modern to trick the police. When police were near the playhouses, actors playing the emperor would suddenly become a company manager, and the minister became the clerk. Under new direction, actors sang popular songs accompanied by Western music rather than Taiwanese opera tunes (Wu and Wang, 2000, pp. 36–37). The hybrid performance intertwined the premodern and modern in a way that was both progressive and repressive. On one hand, the premodern background provided flexibility in replacing the traditional Chinese sword with a Japanese sword; on the other hand, the feudal relationship was replaced by commercial marketing and branding. As Taiwanese opera adjusted to change, performances became incoherent—actors were switching costumes and languages, as necessary. The changes in performance reflected Taiwanese society’s transformation towards modernity. The hybrid form of performance gradually composed a unique subgenre in Taiwanese opera: opeila. The phrase opeila, which was wildly accepted in Taiwan around the end of the war, was phonetically adapted from the Japanese pronunciation of “opera” (o-pe-ra オペラ) in Taiwanese. The actor Lu Fu-lu explained the phrase originated from Japanese artists who watched the hybrid performance and coined the term. Japanese artists shared with Taiwanese actors the term opeila, which was an art form similar to “opera”; the concept and the phrase “opera” being imported from Europe to Japan but was not quite the same. The hybrid form of opeila included singing and dancing different from the “pure spoken drama” and so should be reconsidered as “opera.” The phrase opeila gradually gained popularity and became the term of this specific subgenre of Taiwanese opera. After the Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese actors commonly used opeila when referring to a subgenre that mixed elements from Japanese period dramas, modern spoken dramas, and popular songs in Taiwanese opera (Chen Y.H., 2010, pp. 48–57). The term remained after the Japanese colonial period ended and the hybrid performance continued developing into new forms after the war.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OPEILA IN POST-WAR TAIWAN (I): IN COMMERCIAL PLAYHOUSES The popularity of opeila in post-war Taiwan reflected the flexibility of the performance and created the innovation needed in commercial playhouses. Opeila

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also mirrored many Taiwanese people’s nostalgic emotions and depression due to Chinese cultural centrism. After the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the ban on Chinese-style operas was lifted. Once again, Taiwanese opera bloomed in commercial playhouses. Although unemployment and high inflation rates were serious, Taiwanese people still looked to theatre performances as essential entertainment and a way to eliminate depression. Taiwanese opera was thriving among various popular performing arts that competed vigorously in playhouses (Yeh, 1995). In contrast, while many families could barely have regular meals, Taiwanese opera troupes were almost never short of daily meat dishes (Lu F., interview, August 2008). Watching Taiwanese opera was part of ordinary Taiwanese people’s lives during such a difficult time. The post-war “indoor-stage period” for Taiwanese opera emerged and continued into the early 1960s (neitai xi shiqi 內臺戲時期). This phase was recognized as the golden era of development for Taiwanese opera. Right after the war, most Taiwanese audiences missed traditional Taiwanese opera, and so classical plays became extremely popular in the late 1940s (Chen S., interview, 2008). However, the military officer of the Chinese Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang, KMT) decimated the local economy. The KMT was corrupt in their administration of Taiwan. They shipped resources across the strait to support the war effort in China. In 1947, February 28th, the KMT army led a massacre against the Taiwanese people (Edmondson, 2002). This created historical trauma for the Taiwanese people. The barrier of culture, language, and politics between Taiwanese people and Chinese governors caused numerous conflicts. The cultural repression became even more serious after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the whole KMT regime retreated to Taiwan. For the Taiwanese people, their new obligation was assisting the war effort to retake mainland China. The KMT was different from the Japanese imperialist movement because the Japanese government did not conduct strict language policy and censorship until the Japanization campaign, which was the last eight years of Japan’s fifty years of governance. This compares to the KMT government, which implemented the Martial Law right after they took over Taiwan and rapidly integrated Taiwan as an extension of the Chinese Civil War. The KMT’s Chinese cultural-centrism and the strict language policy systematically repressed the Taiwanese local culture and language. The KMT defined Mandarin as the only politically legitimate language and applied strict language policy in the education and public service systems. The new language policy suddenly made the generations who had received an education in Taiwanese and Japanese become “illiterate” (Hsiau, 1997). Many Taiwanese citizens missed the Japanese government. In addition, the cliché stories of classical plays made audiences lose interest. The actor Lu Fu-lu mentioned that, because of Taiwanese people’s nostalgic feelings and the need for alternative performances, opeila gradually became

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unexpectedly popular again in commercial playhouses (Lu F., interview, September 2008). After moving from China to Taiwan, the KMT instituted Martial Law governance and expected literary and artistic works—including theatre—to promote Chinese nationalism. The KMT government promoted Peking opera as the “national drama (guoju 國劇).” At the time, Peking opera served to entertain troops and boost the morale of soldiers (Wang, 2002). Expecting that Peking opera would strengthen regime legitimacy and authority, the KMT government generously supported the establishment of numerous “national drama” troupes in the armed forces and systematically valued mainland Chinese culture above Taiwanese culture (Guy, 2005). The privileged status of Peking opera was a stark contrast compared with the KMT recognized Taiwanese opera, as well as other forms of Chinese opera, which were considered “regional dramas” (difangxi 地方戲). The status of “regional dramas” was not comparable with the “national drama,” as they were minor and “peripheral,” which was a form of belittlement to the Taiwanese culture. The Japanese elements in opeila particularly reinforced the subgenre as a cultural taboo during the Martial Law period (1949–1987). Opeila became a “blind existence” of Taiwanese opera even through the lens of the regional drama. Throughout the forty-six years of the annual “Regional Drama Competition” (defang xiju bisai 地方戲劇比 賽) (1952–1998), opeila had always been absent, despite its wide popularity in local communities. The classical plays represented how Taiwanese opera were expected to look because of their similarity to Peking opera. If the KMT subordinated classical plays of Taiwanese opera to Peking opera, opeila was recognized as even more inferior in the government and scholarship’s opinion throughout the Martial Law period. The government’s disregard, nevertheless, did not hamper the development of opeila in commercial playhouses. At that time, Taiwanese opera troupes commonly scheduled ten-day periods to perform in one commercial playhouse and then another. Each day the troupe would arrange a matinee and an evening performance. Due to the popularity of opeila, the etiquette was to perform “classical plays for matinees and opeila for evening performances,” because evening performances usually attracted fuller audiences and larger profits. Although the KMT mainly invested resources in the Peking opera, the government did not take part in managing Taiwanese opera, because many government officials believed Taiwanese actors were less knowledgeable and unable to take part in politics (Lu F., interview, November 2008). The officers felt satisfied in performances as long as patriotic slogans supporting anti-Communism were included in the shows from Regional Drama Competitions (“Cong gailiang,” 1955). Taiwanese opera troupes historically had experience with adjusting their performances during the Japanese imperialist movement, so actors coped with official’s requests. When the government

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requested actors to attend lectures on how to promote Chinese nationalism in theatre, each troupe sent the least influential actor to attend (Min, 1955). Opeila was out of the government’s mind but did not disappear in post-war Taiwan. Rather, the flexibility of opeila enabled performances to go beyond the initial goal of avoiding Japanese police inspections to become a progressively hybrid performance. One significant transformation in opeila was the emergence of numerous chivalrous swordswomen. This was different from typical Japanese period drama, where men wielded swords and dominated powerful roles while women were cast as minor characters. The typical opeila repertoires in the early 1950s highlighted swordswomen (nuxia 女俠) instead (Chen Y.H., 2010, pp. 109–116). The plots often included damsels in distress seeking the support of swordswomen, who appeared on stage and rescued women in need. With the shift in gender dynamics, audiences marvelled at the strong capabilities of women. In Japanese period dramas, swordsmen’s fights were often driven by allegiance to political leaders, which can be contrasted to opeila, where swordswomen’s acts of revenge were commonly motivated by personal grievances and sympathy towards bullied women. For example, the opeila version of Tange Sazen shifted focus from the relationship between military commanders and retainers in the Japanese period drama to how the swordswoman Lim Siu-tsu 林秀珠 deals with the resentment between two families (Lu F., interview, November 2008). The performance resonated with women audiences’ empathy and the shows fought against negative stereotypes that women should be lachrymose and obediently bear a miserable fate. In addition to the rising popularity of swordswomen roles, women performing as men also became a major advertising point. Actresses performing as male protagonists (kunsheng 坤生, or nuxiaosheng 女小生) were the most appealing stars in each troupe (Lin, 2007, pp. 57–66). The swordswomen and women-performed male characters in opeila projected numerous female audience members’ romantic imaginations. The disruption of obedient femininity effectively expanded the audience members’ gender perspectives. By witnessing empowered female identities and gender configurations, audience members could explore their own sexual desires and bodily imaginations. The scenic design was another major feature of opeila in commercial playhouses. The commodious stage in commercial playhouses provided space for designers to play around with scenery designed to enrich shows. The senior scenic designer Hou Shou-feng 侯壽豐 recalled how sets enriched the theatricality of opeila performances. When performing repertoires like Miyamoto Musashi, the backdrop adopted Japanese elements to match the plot. The streetscape included Japanese houses, and domestic furnishings included tatami mats and sliding paper-grated doors, which were used to establish a Japanese-style room. Occasionally, during a scene in the show

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involving an assassination, audience members could usually see the shadow of a figure behind the Japanese-style paper door. The assassin would stab the figure behind the door with a sword, and then red lights and rapid drumming would create a strained, tense mood. The following scene would show the assassinated figure bleeding as they stepped out from behind the door (Hou, interview, 2008). The setting created a suspenseful effect and enabled opeila to exert more creative possibilities compared to traditional Chinese operas. The light-transmitting effect of the Japanese paper door, which was not possible in traditional Chinese operas, provided an excellent scene to portray an assassination. The hybrid performance demonstrated how opeila could absorb various elements that enriched the expressiveness of Taiwanese opera beyond the performance conventions of Chinese operas.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OPEILA IN POST-WAR TAIWAN (II): THE OUTDOOR STAGE The prosperity of Taiwanese opera in commercial playhouses gradually came to an end after the early 1960s due to the rise of new media, such as movies and television. Some playhouses transformed into movie houses, and some were closed. Numerous Taiwanese opera performers had to explore careers outside commercial playhouses. Some actors took advantage of the film trend and joined productions of Taiwanese opera movies or TV programs. However, film and TV job opportunities were extremely limited, so only a handful of actors could enter the industry and find success. The majority of actors were unable to join the film industry and had to acclimatize themselves to the transition from indoor playhouses to outdoor stages. Aside from commercial playhouses, the rewarding spiritual performance (choushenxi 酬神戲) on outdoor stages beside temples have been an essential part of Taiwanese religious tradition. Audience members have attended these shows to deliver gratitude to their god or to celebrate the god’s birthday. Before the 1960s, such outdoor performances were mainly puppetry, lan-than opera (lan-than-hi or luantanxi 亂彈戲, also known as pak-kuan-hi or beguanxi 北管戲), and amateur Taiwanese opera. Lu recalled that amateur troupes were organized by patrons who invited professional actors to teach children the performances and entertain the local community. Accompanying the decline of commercial playhouses, professional Taiwanese opera troupes gradually replaced lan-than opera and amateur shows. Taiwanese opera became the main force of outdoor Theatre (Lu F., interview, May 2009). Unlike the recorded classical plays screened on TV programs, the outdoor performances maintained the etiquette of performing “classical plays for matinees and opeila for evening performances.” During the 1960s, both Taiwanese opera TV programs and outdoor Taiwanese opera performances thrived. Actors on TV and on the outdoor stage

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separately shaped audiences’ memories of Taiwanese opera in different ways. Unlike classical plays broadcasted on TV, live performances on outdoor stages kept extending the possibilities of opeila. The transition from indoor commercial playhouses to outdoor stages pushed the transformation of opeila. First, the running schedule of a repertoire shrank from ten days to one to three days, so the performance had to be considerably condensed. To adapt to the tight schedule, new shows with shorter storylines were created. The accelerated pace of performances also changed the musical instrumentation of opeila. Western music accompaniment had been adopted in many records of Taiwanese opera songs since the Japanese colonial period (Hsu and Lin, 2007). During the post-war “indoor-stage period,” some Taiwanese opera troupes used popular songs in their performances. Most of these popular songs remained in the form of seven characters a line, similar to the traditional-style lyrics, and were mainly accompanied by traditional instruments. Western instrumental accompaniment was usually used when recording popular songs in advance, but the proportion of popular songs in Taiwanese opera was still very limited in this period (Liu, 2016, 154). The use of both Taiwanese and Mandarin popular songs increased significantly on the outdoor stage. The musician Lin Chin-chuan 林金泉 emphasized that, although the interspersion of popular songs was pretty free, it still had to match the plot and conform to the personality of the character (Lin, interview, 2009). Since more and more popular Taiwanese songs were included in opeila, Western musical instruments also gradually became popular after the mid-1970s. The actress Tsai Mei-chu 蔡美珠 recalled that musicians primarily added electric guitars in opeila performances, and then small horns and saxophones, and then electronic pianos. In response to the change of string and wind instruments, percussion was also adjusted. The jazz drum replaced the traditional single-skin drum and played a key role in controlling the rhythm of opeila performances. Different from the sound of a traditional single-skin drum, which is hard and sharp, the sound of a jazz drum is relatively soft and mellow. The jazz drum tended to create a more dramatic cadence. To match the sound of the jazz drum, performers’ movements were restrained, which was also different from the movement pattern in Chinese operas. That usually highlighted clean beats and struck poses (Tsai, interview, 2009). Traditional gongs and drums in Chinese operas usually guided the actor’s rhythm of movements, but the use of jazz drums created an impromptu performance in opeila. The beat must follow the performer’s lead, starting after the performer’s move but ending at the same time the performer finishes. The movements and music help the performer stand out (Hsu M.H., 2007, pp. 32–33). Audiences were moved by this effect, and so jazz drums quickly became an essential instrument in opeila. Second, the change of space—from the indoor to the outdoor—also shifted the audience’s visual focus from the stage setting to the performer’s costumes,

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hairstyle, and makeup. The atmosphere of opeila in the commercial playhouse was highly dependent on the stage setting. In addition to various Japanese-style scenes, some other tricks such as rain scenes with real water, burning scenes with real fire, and hell scenes with changing backdrops were fully incorporated in the spacious stage and staging mechanisms (Chen Y.H., 2010, pp. 185–194). However, the space of the outdoor stage was greatly reduced so it could only accommodate limited props. To deal with the diminished stage space, actors had to simplify their movements accordingly. The performer’s pose and costume became extremely important as it attracted the audience’s visual attention. The prosperous period of outdoor opeila performances occurred at the same time as when TV programs became popular in Taiwan. TV dramas thus inspired Taiwanese opera actors’ costumes and model designs in opeila. Typically, costumes in Chinese operas did not attempt historical accuracy but followed strict conventions, whereas the hybrid nature of opeila was flexible with various experimental styles of costumes, makeup, and hairstyles. Some troupes even performed gimmick shows deliberately set in foreign countries, which highlighted exotic movements. Generally, a foreign character wore Japanese kimonos, or Mongolian or Middle Eastern-style costumes. The thieves wore masks or sunglasses indicating face covering, while the harlequins would wear pettiskirts or other Western-style clothes. The culture of fans giving gifts to performers (tieshang 貼賞) has further encouraged leading actress’s competition for flashy costumes in opeila. It has been common for fans to present their favourite performers with cash, in a custom called “pecuniary reward” (shangjin 賞金). In response to the fan’s generosity and to show gratitude, protagonists of each troupe will invest heavily in their costumes (Yeh, 2011, pp. 66–69). Among various fancy costumes, the sequin robe was popular after the 1980s and has turned out to be the most representative dress of opeila. Costumes made by sequin fabrics had appeared in commercial playhouses (Yeh, 2011, pp. 44–46), but they became commonly popular on outdoor stages. The actress Tsai Mei-chu recalled that the innovative design of sequin robes originated in the 1980s. Once, she saw a piece of fabric with sequins, which was light, soft, and very eye-catching; however, the fabric was rare and very pricy. With an experimental mentality, she collaborated with the famous costume designer Chen Hsieh 陳血 to create a handmade sequin robe, which cost more than 40,000 Taiwanese dollars. At that time, the daily salary of Taiwanese opera actors was only about 120 to 150 dollars. Unexpectedly, the extraordinary visual effect of the sequin robe astonished audiences and other protagonists soon imitated the new design (Tsai, interview, 2009). Sequin robes thus replaced embroidered costumes and become the keynote of outdoor opeila clothing. The fancy clothing and makeup also symbolized a protagonist’s status and made the appealing point of opeila even more concentrated on the leading stars.

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Third, the shrunken space of outdoor stages pushed the change of opeila performance, from spotlighting lively fighting scenes to performances featuring less movement, such as romantic love stories. The spacious stage space in the commercial playhouses enabled performers to demonstrate various martial-art movements and Japanese sword fighting. However, actors had to restrict their fighting movements on outdoor stages. Performers who were good at fighting techniques could no longer commit fully to their roles, while protagonists who could adequately perform romantic love stories became increasingly popular (Yeh, 2011, pp. 70–72). Love stories of opeila, therefore, dominated the outdoor stage. Leading actresses who performed as male protagonists (dangjia xiaosheng 當家小生) continued to be the star of the troupe, so many named the troupe after the leading performer to appeal to fans. Romance stories in opeila are very different from classical plays. Typical love stories in classical plays mainly depict the romance between gifted scholars and beautiful ladies (caizi jiaren 才子佳人). Such themes in traditional Chinese operas were seldom in opeila. What replaced the ordinary Chinese romances were melodramatic entanglements of the character’s love and hate. They featured the protagonist’s emotional reactions to grievances, faithlessness, deceptions, and hopelessness. The dramatic contrast of a character’s emotion in opeila has broken the strict performing conventions of traditional Chinese operas. Unlike Peking opera, which purports itself to be high art, opeila does not give prominence to implicit narrative and acting. Rather, the opeila performance targets common audience members and focuses on entertainment. Thus, it is common to see a performer’s exaggerated and stylized body movements represent an emotion. For example, when acting the plot of lovesickness in opeila, the male protagonist might step onto the stage holding a silk handkerchief and sing an amorous song. During the interlude, he may gently stroke the handkerchief with his cheek, representing how the object reminded him of his loved one. The performance of a tryst between men and women would be even more thinly veiled. The man would use gestures to invite the woman to stay overnight with him and then directly hold the woman in his arms, then step down from the stage. Flirting scenes like this usually roused excitement in the audience.

EPILOGUE The development and transformation of opeila are based on “multiple representations” (chongceng de zaixian 重層的再現). The “multiplicity” means the development of opeila has never had a signal direction. Due to audience preference, the transformation of opeila has shown how performers cater their shows to have different impacts. In terms of the form, sometimes opeila includes gimmicks to please the audience while sacrificing the performance

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quality to save money. On the other hand, some performers invest heavily in costumes while insisting on a careful music design, the theatricality of plots, and vivid characterization that capture the character’s inner conflict. Thus, the perfunctory and diligent performances of opeila have coexisted and survived different approaches. There is no fixed definition that can fully cover the meaning of opeila, as opeila performances accentuate dynamic innovations. The “representation” of opeila combines elements from various cultural origins. The music, fighting movements, and choreography of performers in opeila have broken the conventions of traditional Chinese operas. However, the various foreign elements have gone through the process of localization in opeila. This localization demonstrates how the performers receive and transform foreign elements based on interactions with the local audience. Thus, the form of opeila is more of a “re-creation” than a reproduction of Japanese period dramas. Opeila also reflects Taiwan’s compressed condition of modernity, intertwined with a variety of global forces and transregional cultural exchanges. Accompanying the colonial modernity, Taiwanese literati have experienced a radical reshaping of new sensational intentions and literary practices (Huang, 2004). The hybrid form of opeila has embodied a grassroots experience of compressed modernity beyond the intellectuals’ visions. The new elements adapted in opeila during one time period may not be entirely passed on to the next, but the experience of re-creation accumulates and enriches further innovations of the performances. Opeila has always been advancing with the times, and its value has received attention after the turn of the century. In 2000, the National Center for Traditional Arts held the first Joint Performance of Taiwanese Opera on the Outdoor Stage. Since then, government resources have begun to actively and systematically support the creation of new plays from selected Taiwanese opera troupes. The selection criteria often prioritize innovation and creativity and encourage both performances in classical and opeila styles. The scale of these new plays for government-sponsored events is almost comparable to professional performances in modern theatres. Most of the troupes also arrange ticket sales for these new plays to be performed in theatres. Distinct from the impromptu performance of typical outdoor Taiwanese opera, the government-sponsored productions extrude the importance of the playwriting and script, which almost always symbolize the refinement of Taiwanese opera. However, opeila has featured the impromptu spark of improvization between performers. Whether performances following written scripts can retain the vitality of opeila has constantly been doubted (Chen Y.H., 2010, pp. 237–273). That said, opeila’s most valuable creativity has also been brought into full display in the interactive experience of modern theatre productions. In recent years, some troupes have created new plays combining various cultural elements and targeted audiences who mainly go to see perfor-

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mances in modern theatres. Works like The Storyteller and Her Dream (2020) and The Apocalypse of Darkness Warfare (2021), which respectively adapted the Japanese novel The Tale of Genji and Taiwanese comics, exemplify how Taiwanese opera can inclusively expand its possibilities. Since the production process of these modern theatre works is quite different from typical opeila, it seems to be controversial to include these new plays in the category of opeila. However, the innovative spirit of challenging conventions that opeila has represented over the decades has already been an essential part of Taiwanese opera. The hybrid performance of opeila is still in continuous development in the present day. The influence of Japanese period dramas has gone beyond the Japanese colonial period and extended into post-war Taiwan. The hybrid form of opeila combines Chinese operas, Japanese period dramas, modern spoken dramas, western films, and others. It is fair to say that opeila has not only been an essential part of Taiwanese opera, but the epitome of Taiwanese local creativity. Therefore, the origin and development of opeila have embodied the spirit of Taiwan’s cultural vitality.

NOTE 1.

For terms related to Taiwanese theatre, I use the English translation while providing the Holo (Hokkien) and Mandarin pronunciation with Chinese characters on their first appearance in the text. The only exception is the term opeila (the creative Taiwanese Opera, also known as opela), where I use the Holo pronunciation as a specific term, as it is the main subject of this chapter and has been adopted by several scholars (Silvio, 2009; Hsieh, 2011). For all other Japanese or Chinese terms, including those in quotations from written sources, I use the English translation and provide English romanization for the original pronunciation in Japanese or Mandarin with kanji/Chinese characters. For transliteration of Chinese names, the Wade-Giles system is used pertaining to Taiwan and the pinyin system for the People’s Republic of China. All translations from oral and written sources in Holo and Mandarin are my own.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Part of the content in this chapter has been published in Chinese in the author’s book Taiwan gezaixi de yixiang shijie: hupiezai biaoyan yishu jincheng 臺 灣歌仔戲的異想世界—「胡撇仔」表演藝術進程 (The Fantasy World of Taiwanese Opera: The History and Progress of “O-pei-la” Performance). Taipei, TW: Dawshiang, 2010.

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15. A century of struggle over Taiwan’s cultural self-consciousness: the life and afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui and the Taiwan Cultural Association Fang-long Shih1 The Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA, 台灣文化協會),2 is the first culture-based organization in Taiwan’s history. A month after its founding, in November 1921, Chiang Wei-shui (蔣渭水 1891–1931) publicized his Clinical Notes: Diagnosis of the Patient Named Taiwan. He diagnosed Taiwan Island as “suffering from cultural illness …. Age: 27 years old … a resident of … Taiwan, Japanese Empire … Ancestral home: Taiwan, Fujian Province, ROC …. Occupation: guardian at the forefront of world peace. Blood line: from the Yellow Emperor, Zhougong, Confucius and Mencius.”3 One hundred years on, in 2021, Taiwan has been subject to four centuries of colonial rule by Holland, Spain, and Japan, followed by semi-colonial rule in the KMT-run ROC. During the last century, Taiwan’s cultural development shifted in accordance with changed governmental policies: (1) from anti-Japanization to Japanization during Japan’s colonial rule (1895–1945); (2) from de-Japanization (qu-Ribenhua 去日本化) to re-China-ization (zai-Zhongguohua 再中國化)4 during the KMT’s authoritarian rule (1946–87); and (3) from de-China-ization to Taiwanization in the three decades since the end of martial law (1988–2020) (see Shih 2021). Cultural policies centered on colonial impositions and (de)constructions of “people’s sense of themselves” in Taiwan. The issue of “a sense of self” has been a question asked by generations of people in Taiwan: “Who are we?”, “Where are we from?”, “Where are we going?”, but crucially the meaning of “we” has changed over time. The last century has witnessed struggles over which senses of culture and self-consciousness should prevail on Taiwan. This prolonged struggle can be dated back to the Taiwan Cultural Association and Chiang Wei-shui, who called for awakening “Taiwan zijue (台灣自覺)”, which I translate as “Taiwan’s self-consciousness”. Since the 1990s, Taiwanization has been campaigning for constructing “Taiwan zhuti yishi (台灣主體意識)”, which I trans325

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late as “Taiwanese self-consciousness”. The development of the concepts from Taiwan zijue/Taiwan’s self-consciousness to Taiwan zhuti yishi/Taiwanese self-consciousness will be fully explained in the chapter. The TCA was founded in 1921 at the instigation of Chiang Wei-shui, who was a medical practitioner, writer, and politico-cultural activist. Chiang explained his motivation, saying: “We must generate zhijue/self-consciousness – being ethnic Han and Japan guomin/nationals, Taiwan people shall mediate between China and Japan …. This self-consciousness must be realized” (Chiang 1921c); the TCA was established “to promote Taiwan to a position of freedom, equality and civilization” (Chiang 1925a). The TCA has been depicted as a “trinity” (Liang 2007), consisting of (1) a self-conscious campaign for cultural modernization; (2) a self-determining “Petition Movement for a Taiwan Parliament (PMTP, 台灣議會設置請願運動)”; and (3) “a mediating agent ­– Taiwan People’s News (TPN, Taiwan Minpao) ­– for self-consciousness and awakening others” (Chiang 1925a). Written a century after the TCA’s establishment, this chapter critiques the life, demise, and afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui and the Taiwan Cultural Association. After four decades of being forgotten, Chiang and the TCA were brought back to life from the 1970s through public lectures, publications, and exhibitions. In this afterlife, the TCA era has often been identified as “an unprecedented Age of Zijue/Self-consciousness” in the history of Taiwan (Chiang Li-jung 2015). Chiang Wei-shui has been commemorated as “Enlightener of Taiwan’s Zijue/Self-consciousness”. An example is the exhibition and publication entitled The Age of Zijue/Self-consciousness: A Documentary of Chiang Wei-shui’s Historical Images held in 2009 in Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (Chiang Chao-ken 2009). This chapter has a double focus. Firstly I focus upon Chiang Wei-shui’s thoughts on culture and self-consciousness and his aspirations for the TCA. My second – and equally important – emphasis is to pay critical attention to how, over the last half century, key players have ascribed the enlightenment of Taiwanese zhuti yishi/self-consciousness to Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA. Therefore, in looking back at the 1920s, the focus has been upon Chiang Wei-shui in particular (even though it is a moot point as to his being the central figure in the TCA) and upon the TCA rather than other organizations, because from contemporary stances, it has loomed largest in selective memories of the 1920s (cf. Huang 2014). In this chapter, I offer a contemporary history of how Chiang’s afterlife has been belatedly endowed with politico-cultural significance. I examine how different protagonists have (mis)represented him from their contemporary perspectives. I demonstrate how commemoration and memory are problematic and contentious issues in political discourse. This chapter has two parts and five sections. Part One examines the life of Chiang Wei-shui

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and the Taiwan Cultural Association and comprises: (1) Chiang Wei-shui’s early life 1891–1921 and development of his thoughts on Taiwan’s culture and self-consciousness; (2) the TCA era 1921–27 with a focus on its context and agenda; (3) the TCA’s split into offshoots and their continuance till they ended in 1931. Part Two examines the afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA from their demise in 1931 till the present day, with particular attention to how both have been resuscitated from 1970s onwards. Their afterlife is divided into a period of silence followed by revival, (4) 1931–1987 demonstrating the official forgetting in the war-time of Japanese colonial rule and Kōminka (1931–45) followed by quasi-war under KMT authoritarian rule and re-China-ization (1945–87); (5) 1969–2020 examining the various ways in which renewed significance has been attributed to Chiang and the TCA during Dangwai democratization, Taiwanization and beyond, comparing what the contemporary term Taiwanese (cultural or national) “zhuti yishi/self-consciousness” signifies when applied retrospectively to the 1920s Taiwan’s “zijue/self-consciousness”.

1.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHIANG WEI-SHUI’S SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Chiang Wei-shui had himself been born into a religious family in Yilan, Taiwan, in 1891. In 1895, when he was 4 years old, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Taiwan was a Japanese colony for fifty years (1895–1945). Its colonial policy can be divided into three different approaches: (1) military suppression, 1895–1915; (2) Dōka: “assimilation,” 1915–37; (3) Kōminka: “Japanization,” 1937–45. A separate policy was implemented for “the governance of aborigines”. In contrast to naichijin (inlanders) as “the Japanese from Japan proper”, the Han population of Taiwan were labelled “hontōjin (islanders)” – second-class subjects under Japan’s colonial rule. Even lower in status were Taiwan’s indigenous population, labelled Takasago People. Han People were denigrated as “chankoro (Qingized slaves)” and indigenous people as savages. The purpose of Japan’s rule was primarily to exploit Taiwan for its resources, especially tea, camphor, rice, and sugar (Ho and Tsai 2019). The island colony was subject to the Governor-General of Taiwan as its highest authority. In the face of a political reality of separation from China, the Han people of Taiwan, originally from China, experienced a process of changing, searching, and reconstructing their self-consciousness. Chiang Wei-shui’s life-history is indicative of this dynamic process with its contradictions and ambivalences. His father was renowned for his prowess in fortune-telling at the City God Temple of Yilan, a center for spirit possession. Identifying himself as Han Chinese, his father paid for Chiang Wei-shui to have private tuition with

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a renowned Chinese classicist (xiucai). He received a solid foundation in the Confucian classics, reinforcing his Han identity. Additionally, he was being prepared as a spirit-medium/dangki, with a view to inheriting his father’s position (Huang 1978a). Two years after China abolished the “Imperial Examination System” in 1905, Chiang Wei-shui aged 16 attended Japanese public/elementary schools in Yilan, mainly for children aged 7–13. Wei-shui appreciated the importance of modern education and studied hard. He completed the six-year curriculum in three years, becoming fully attuned to “this age of science”. Aged 20, he was admitted to the “Taiwan Sotokufu Medical School”. In his first college year, Chiang Wei-shui joined the Taiwan Branch of the “Chinese United Alliance” founded by Sun Yat-sen, who became his admired model, both as a medical practitioner and for his ambition not only to restore people’s health, but also societal and national health. Aged 30, he founded the TCA. The stance of the TCA was to engage in non-violent opposition to Japanese colonization. In his 1921 Clinical Notes, Chiang Wei-shui diagnosed Taiwan patient as suffering from cultural illness, and described its condition in these diagnostic terms: Taiwan inherited intelligent characteristics from a line dating back to the Yellow Emperor …. As a child during the Ming dynasty, he had a strong body, a clear mind, and firm will … but due to the toxic policies of the Qing Dynasty … his health weakened, and … his moral integrity deteriorated …. Under treatment by the Japanese Empire … there has been a slight recovery. Unfortunately, due to 200 years of poisoning, his condition is chronic and there is no easy cure. He remains morally corrupt, … his life lacks a spiritual dimension; his symptoms include … uncouth customs, superstitious beliefs, superficial thinking, … inferiority, ignorance … a depressed mind, feeling lifeless (Chiang 1921b).

In his diagnosis of Taiwan’s cultural illness, Chiang identified Taiwan people as of Han blood. He blames the toxic policies of the Manchu-Qing government for “uncouth customs, superstitious beliefs,” while Chinese culture in the Han-Ming dynasty exhibited intelligent characteristics. He dismissed popular religion and customs as “backward” – an obstacle to developing a more progressive modern culture. Describing Taiwan as “a retarded child in this global cultural era”, Chiang operated the TCA as an immediate and appropriate way of dealing with Taiwan’s symptomatology and pursuing Taiwan’s cultural modernization. From his recognition of “a slight recovery” under Japanese treatment, we can detect that Chiang saw Japan as a potential role model for modernization. His prognosis was to use the opportunity afforded by Japanese suzerainty to strengthen the health of the Han population on the island by promoting modernized culture; in social Darwinian terms, to strengthen Taiwan’s

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cultural fitness for survival and for the population to become “complete human beings”.

2.

THE TCA ERA: CONTEXT AND AGENDA

The Taiwan Cultural Association was founded on October 17, 1921. In the TCA’s Constitution, the first sentence stipulated its primary aim as “advocating a progressive Taiwan culture.” To mark its establishment, Chiang Wei-shui composed this TCA anthem: We are all yellow people of Asia, Mediating between Han and Japanese. Heaven has sent us a mission, mandating us urgently To advance culture, revitalize morality, cultivate capabilities. Seeking permanent peace in East Asia, friendship between China and Japan, We must act as a chain, linking brothers in harmony, Uniting all nations of East Asia to forge a great alliance, To generate a civilization side by side with the West. Preventing war between yellow and white, Peace in the world, We bring benefit to all under heaven; how could we give in to despair? But hope the mission will finally be completed, happily for the people of the world. Long live the world and mankind, Taiwan’s reputation forever fragrant. (Chiang 1921a) Chiang regarded Taiwan people as Japan nationals of Han/Chinese ethnicity. Inspired by Greater Asianism prevalent in Japan, Chiang positioned Taiwan as a transnational mediator between China and Japan charged with maintaining peace in East Asia and the world. Chiang enjoined “Taiwan people to rouse from their deep sleep … keep pace with the world’s population, to achieve civilization, to enjoy rights and thereby become complete human beings” (Chiang 1925a). The purpose of the TCA was primarily “to advance Taiwan culture, and cultivate Taiwan people … enabling them to accomplish the mission of peace-keeping …. The Cultural Movement is the only treatment for Taiwan’s ills. The TCA is an organization that pays special attention to implementing this treatment” (Chiang 1925b). The TCA also had a political aim to “adopt a stance of national self-determination, enacting the enlightenment of the Islanders, and seeking legal extension of civil rights” (written by Lien Wen-ching; see Lin Po-wei 1993a). Chiang Wei-shui chose Lin Hsien-tang (林獻堂 1881–1956) as Premier (總理), while he himself served as full-time Director. Both jointly told the Japanese

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authorities at the launch that the TCA would not engage in politics nor become a political movement. In actuality, the TCA and PMTP were a “double-track movement”, a combination of cultural self-consciousness and political self-determination. Chiang contributed his Da-an clinic in Dadaocheng in Taipei as campaign headquarters, while Lin mobilized his gentry resources in central and southern Taiwan. Context Dadaocheng rose in the aftermath of subethnic fighting between Quanzhou and Tongan (collaborated with Zhangzhou) groups in 1853. In 1858, it became a Treaty Port. In 1885, Liu Ming-chuan, the Qing Governor of Taiwan, built Taipei Railway Station there. By 1895, Dadaocheng had already become a hotbed for international ideas (Alsford 2017). It was thus fertile territory for the cultivation of the 1920s New Cultural Movement. The TCA intellectuals sought to engender a degree of unity and self-conscious among the Han population in the face of the Japanese colonists. Lin Hsien-tang was born into one of Taiwan’s two most wealthy families in the Qing Dynasty. The Wufeng Lin Family were granted substantial land and monopoly in trading camphor for assisting the Qing government’s pacification of armed rebellions. Lin’s father, a ju-ren level scholar, gave his son a Classical Chinese education in their own family school. Aged 18, Lin took charge of the family’s prosperous camphor business. In 1907, Lin met Liang Qi-chao (梁啟 超 1873–1929) in Japan, where Liang had gone in exile. Asked what Taiwan should do, Liang replied: “China is incapable of rescuing Taiwan. It would be best to follow the example of those Irishmen [whose efforts to gain an Irish parliament] … [involved] colluding with British ruling and opposition parties” (see Huang et al. 2012). Lin Hsien-tang was never educated under the Japanese system, never spoke Japanese in public and never wore a kimono. The landlord gentry class Lin and the lower class Chiang shared an emphasis on their Han consciousness in the face of Japanese colonial assimilation. Lin, though, did not hark back to Ming times, and was less critical of the Qing. The 1921–27 TCA was run during what is known as the “Taishō Democracy” period (1912–26), when Japan had shifted to parliamentary politics relatively subject to public opinion allowing some tolerance of cultural enlightenment. This coincided with the emergence of the first generation of Taiwan intellectuals educated at universities in Japan, where many developed a cosmopolitan vision, considering Taiwan in the context of world colonial history. They were interested in post-WWI ideologies, such as social Darwinism, modernism, and Lenin’s theory of imperialism. They were encouraged by US President Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of the principle of national self-determination:

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“National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent” (Wilson 1919). In the process of developing self-consciousness and self-determination, the primary problem was whether or not to be assimilated. Most Taiwan intellectuals advocated a special status for Taiwan and resisted assimilation policies that treated Taiwan as “an extension of ‘inland’ Japan (Naichi enchō shugi)”. In 1920, the Journal Taiwan Youth was founded in Tokyo. In its inaugural issue, Akira Izumi, Japanese professor on colonial theory and Wilson’s doctrine, wrote a congratulatory paper, titled “To Taiwan islanders”. In this, he advised, “you need to be conscious that Taiwan is not the Taiwan of the Governor’s Office, but Taiwan islanders’ Taiwan” (Wu 2019). Izumi’s pronouncement, later modified as “Taiwan is Taiwan people’s Taiwan”, became the only common position that could have linked all factions in anti-Japanese assimilation for the next decade. It also imagined Taiwan’s self-consciousness. While ideas for self-determination by means of a Taiwan people’s parliament were promoted in Taiwan Youth, Lin Hsien-tang took the lead in petitioning for a Taiwan Parliament (see Huang Fu-san et al. 2012). In December 1920, Lin and 178 Taiwan-resident supporters signed and filed a petition in Tokyo; this was promptly rejected. Since its establishment, the TCA served as an alternative yet complementary mechanism for petitioning for a Taiwan Parliament. Agenda The TCA initially had over 1,000 members, mostly local gentry, landlords, public school graduates, medical practitioners, and higher educated intellectuals; some of them had studied in Japan (Chang 1996). The TCA was the provenance of intellectuals thought best capable of diagnosing and curing Taiwan’s cultural illness. In his “Clinical Notes”, Chiang Wei-shui’s diagnosis indicated “a chronic disease due to paucity of nutrients of knowledge”. Immediate and appropriate treatment was required, otherwise the consequences could be fatal. Chiang’s five-element prescription for the patient Taiwan needed to involve “regular schooling; supplementary education; admission to preschools; establishment of libraries; and participation in newspaper reading societies” (Chiang 1921b) – the full dosage of these measures to be taken continuously for a minimum of 20 years. The TCA established local branches across Taiwan – except indigenous areas – with intellectuals at the helm. The stated intention was to help the uneducated acquire modern and progressive knowledge. Aside from TCA newsletters, they ran a cultural bookstore, set up a newspaper reading room for each branch, and organized “cultural lecture tours”. They devised a summer program held in Lin Hsien-tang’s family school, which otherwise continued

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with an emphasis on classical Chinese education. They promoted new plays and film screenings, touring to various places in an effort to represent what they conceptualized as the new era to Taiwan people. New subjects included Taiwan and Western history and philosophy, modernity, language and education reform, cultural enlightenment, women’s issues, public health, legal knowledge as well as national self-determination, liberal democracy, socialist ideas, parliamentary politics and criticism of colonial policy. Significantly, the TCA intellectuals tended to position themselves with respect to international concerns of colonized peoples, rather than with nationalist issues. In 1923, Chiang Wei-shui and other TCA members co-founded Taiwan People’s News, which replaced the discontinued Journal Taiwan Youth, 1920–23. TPN was published in Tokyo and then shipped to Taiwan till 1927 when it was approved to be published in Taiwan. Chiang’s Clinic served as an office for distribution and later as headquarters. It was issued weekly, aimed at “enlightening our island culture, kindling the vigor of our compatriots, and striving for Taiwan’s well-being” (Lin 1923). It was “the only mouthpiece for Taiwan’s people”. Inspired by Hu Shih’s (胡適) advocacy of “my hand writes my mouth”, TPN promoted new “vernacular Chinese for its unity of speaking and writing” (Tsai 2020: 41). By 1924, the TCA had established 13 Newspaper Reading Societies potentially for readers of all levels of society, serving as a library for people throughout Taiwan to learn of their modern ideas fit for the new world. Taiwan People’s News was subjected to severe censorship by the Japanese authorities with as many as seven or eight consecutive issues being banned (Lin 1993b). Through the publication and dissemination of TPN, the TCA was seeking to form what Benedict Anderson (1983/2006) has termed an “imagined community” of its “Taiwan compatriot” readers, promoting vernacular Chinese as the written language they would have in common, as well as the newspaper’s shared discursive content. This is part of a process of imagining Taiwan’s people as having self-consciousness and challenges in common, as subject to Japan’s colonial modernity. After two more petitions were rejected, Chiang Wei-shui and others applied to set up an “Alliance to Urge for a Taiwan Parliament”, which, although deemed legal in Tokyo, was ruled illegal in Taiwan, reflecting the lesser tolerance of the colonial regime. In 1923, 99 Alliance members – mostly professional elite who had studied in Japan – were arrested for violating the “Police Public Security Law”. Eighteen including Chiang were tried in court. This shocked public opinion in Japan. Several Japanese lawyers went to Taiwan to provide legal assistance. Defending against the charge of “asserting ‘Taiwan

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has 3.6 million Zhonghua Minzu/Han People’ in petition leaflets”, Chiang countered: The prosecutor does not understand the difference between guomin/nationals and minzu/a people’s ethnicity …. Ethnicity is a matter of anthropological fact …. Even after Taiwan people have become Japan nationals, [it is impossible] for them to convert to being people with Japanese ethnicity. Taiwan people are clearly “Zhonghua Minzu ji Han Minzu [Chinese People are Han People]”. No one can deny this fact. … Taiwan people belong to the Han cultural group … one of thirteen ethnic groups within the Japan Empire (Chiang 1924).

All the defendants were judged not guilty, but the Japanese prosecutor appealed; in the second trial, 13 were convicted – 6 fined, and 7 imprisoned; the defendants, in turn, appealed, but in the third trial the verdict of the second trial was upheld. Chiang Wei-shui was jailed in “Taipei’s North Police Station” for 114 days, known as the “Violation of Police Law” incident. Prison Diaries written by Chiang and others were published in Taiwan People’s News, creating a new genre for Taiwan of “prison literature”. Also, a new stance of the colonized was formed: the readers of TPN saw Chiang and his fellows as failed “heroes”, which contrasted to that of the colonizers, viewing them as “criminals”. The TCA’s iconic “Cultural Lecture Tours” increased in number, spreading beyond the cities to rural locations. Lectures were frequently delivered in local languages, held in temple forecourts. The lectures were treated as a lāu-jia̍t (bustling with noise) festivity; firecrackers – traditionally to ward off evil spirits – were exploded, boldly challenging Japanese police censorship. When “Japan” was criticized, the police immediately ordered the speaker to step down. A second speaker continued till he, too, was ordered to step down … like a ‘relay’ sequence of speakers. Most speakers reportedly signed off with mocking humor: “You know what I want to say, and why I’m going to hold my tongue”, provoking audience laughter and applause (cf. Wu 2001). TCA intellectuals learned modernization from their colonial overlords, and then sought to use modernization against the Japanese authorities. The Japanese, in turn, were wary of the TCA’s activities. They implemented censorship, banning, or limiting the scope of events and publications, and imprisoning key proponents. Chiang Wei-shui was imprisoned more than ten times. Each time he was released, he was welcomed as a hero with a fanfare of firecrackers. In both 1925 and 1926 there were more than 300 lectures (Lin 1993c: 106). Sales of TPN increased to 20,000 in 1926 (Chiang Chao-ken 2015); circulation reached a significantly greater number of readers. Lin Hsien-tang presented the parliament petition 15 times between 1920 and 1934, more than 12,000 signatures in total (Hsiujuhistory 2003a).

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Although efforts to have a Taiwan parliament proved futile, Taiwan saw a gradual development of self-determination. These cultural initiatives formed part of a process of forging a self-consciousness among the TCA members and those they influenced. An imagined community of the colonized was gradually (being) created.

3.

THE TCA’S SPLIT AND OFFSHOOTS

In the wake of WWI, and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the stress on change through parliamentary politics and liberal democracy, of the sort advocated by the TCA and the PMTP, was under challenge in Europe and beyond, including in Japan and China where communism and other leftwing ideas gained a foothold. The TCA split in 1927, with its two offshoots – the Taiwan People’s Party (台灣民眾黨 TPP) and the New TCA – continuing till both were terminated in 1931. This period coincided with the 1927 “Shōwa Financial Crisis” and the 1930–31 “Shōwa Recession” (see chapters 6 and 7 in this book). Taiwan’s peasants were exploited increasingly by Japan’s capitalization of agriculture. Disputes between workers and capitalists accordingly intensified. The TCA’s cultural lectures had reached out to peasants and workers. By 1927, the TCA itself faced a challenge from within. Its committee had gained a disproportionate number of communists, brought in by two of its founding members Lien Wen-ching (連溫卿1895–1957) and Wang Min-chuan (王敏 川 1889–1942), both Japanese-influenced communists. This infiltration provoked Chiang and Lin to leave the TCA and found the Taiwan People’s Party instead. Lien and Wang reorganized as the “New TCA” (Lu 1990: 171–76). Thus, the TCA ended with an ideological divide between communists and parliamentarians. The New TCA’s manifesto declared “willingness to be an organization perpetually fighting for peasants, workers, small businessmen and petty bourgeoisie” (written by Lien Wen-ching see Lin Po-wei 1993a). They actively supported the “Taiwan Peasants’ Assembly” which had been founded in 1926 by Chien Chi (簡吉1903–51) (Lu 1990: 176–82). Lien Wen-ching set up “the Taipei Machinery Workers’ Union” in 1927 although it was never established islandwide (Kuo 2021). In 1928, the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP) was founded in Shanghai. The Sixth Comintern Congress (1928) revised its united front policy and this gave the newly established TCP an opportunity to control the New TCA. Lien Wen-ching was expelled in 1929 (Lu 1990: 147–51). This left Wang Min-chuan as the dominant force in the New TCA as it became a subsidiary organization under the TCP. The TCP was the only organization which advocated Taiwan’s independence at that time (Lu 1990: 117).

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The Taiwan People’s Party was the first political party established by Taiwan people under colonial rule. It continued the campaign for parliamentary politics, organizing lecture tours, renamed as “mass lectures”. Chiang Wei-shui set up the “Taiwan Workers’ Federation” in 1928, the first island-wide union in pursuit of workers’ interests with 65 affiliated groups (Hsiujuhistory 2003b). Chiang’s primary concern was to unite farmers and workers – 80% of the island’s population – with intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie to form a “national movement (全民運動)”. In launching the TWF, Chiang asserted: “compatriots must unite, unity is power” (Chiang 1927), Taiwan’s compatriots should consolidate as one colonized class of people. Chiang Wei-shui designed a TPP flag in January 1929, which he later modified. Both versions drew on the ROC flag, composed of blue sky, white sun, and red soil representing Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of “Nationalism”, “Democracy”, and “People’s Livelihood”. The first TPP flag combined the same three colors: blue signifying the national movement; red the class movement; and white at the center representing the brightness of the sun (Chang 2011). In the revised TPP flag, three stars replaced the white sun, representing the TPP’s own three principles: (1) “ensuring people-oriented politics”; (2) “establishing reasonable economic organizations”; and (3) “reforming or abolishing the defects of society”. The first principle aligns with the petitioning for Taiwan to have its own parliament – ensuring people-oriented politics in parliamentarism. The second principle accords with the New TCA focus on establishing reasonable economic organizations for workers’ and peasants’ interests. These two principles parallel Sun’s second and third principles of democracy and people’s livelihood. However, Chiang omitted Sun’s first principle, nationalism, instead emphasizing the TCA’s cultural agenda of modernization. In my interpretation, although involving and invoking self-consciousness as a colonized class of people, his formulation did not equate to nationalism (whether Chinese or Taiwanese) nor did it equate to either a socialist or a liberal self-consciousness. Chiang emphasized improving political and economic conditions for Taiwan’s colonized people by modernizing culture to make – Taiwan is Taiwan people’s Taiwan – fitter for the contemporary world. Chiang’s strategy drew Taiwan’s domestic issues to the attention of an international audience. One example is that, in January 1930, the TPP reported to the League of Nations about Japan’s franchise system for trafficking opium in Taiwan. The League of Nations came to Taiwan to investigate the issue and the Japan authorities were forced to amend the policy. Another example is that the TPP exposed the inhuman treatment of Taiwan’s indigenous Seedig people, during the 1930 Wushe incident. Chiang Wei-shui and some TPP members who revealed news of the massacre and disclosed the colonial regime’s use of poisonous gas in violation of international law. As a result, Japan was crit-

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icized and under international pressure, Taiwan’s Governor-General, Ishizuka Eizō, and others were forced to resign in January 1931. This was a significant intervention by Chiang, reaching out beyond the Han population to voice concern for the plight of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. Just one month later in February 1931, the new Taiwan Governor-General terminated the Taiwan People’s Party. Six months later, Chiang Wei-shui died of typhoid on August 5. His “Mass Funeral” was organized by the banned TPP Committee on August 23. Chiang’s coffin was covered by TPP flag in his original design. Eighty Japanese Special Higher Police monitored the funeral. Chiang’s deathbed declaration was not allowed to announce. The procession started out from his Da-an Clinic, passed the former TCA headquarters, its cultural bookstore and the former TPP headquarters. More than 5,000 mourners, all wearing black hemp patches on their sleeves, marched in rows of four. Hundreds of members of the Taiwan Federation of Workers volunteered to escort the funeral procession. A silent, black-and-white film documented the unprecedented number of mourners and sought to demonstrate “the immortality of Chiang Wei-shui’s spirit”. A Posthumous Collection of Chiang Wei-shui’s Writings (1931) was compiled and published by the TPP Committee. But copies of the film and all but two copies of the book were confiscated, leading to the mocking assertion that “Wei-shui, even when dead, scares Taiwan’s Governors” (Chiang 2020).

4.

THE FORGETTING OF CHIANG AND TCA DURING JAPAN’S KŌMINKA AND THE KMT’S RE-CHINA-IZATION ERAS

Within one month of Chiang Wei-shui’s death, Japan had invaded Manchuria, September 18, 1931. Wang Ming-chuan, Chien Chi and other communists were immediately arrested and jailed. The Taiwan Communist Party ceased to operate. Both offshoots of the TCA were expunged in 1931. For five decades, Taiwan endured a period of war during Japanese colonial rule (1931–45) followed by quasi-war under KMT authoritarian rule and martial law (1945–87). Five Decades of War-footing Japan’s 15-year hostilities started with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, escalated into the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), and WWII on the Pacific Front (1940–45). The entire Japan empire was mobilized for war. As a colony, Taiwan was increasingly incorporated into the Japanese Imperial wartime system. To prepare Taiwan’s population for the war effort against China, the assimilation policy was intensified into the “Kōminka” campaign, 1937–45.

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After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Taiwan “reverted” to the ROC run by the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government led by Chiang Kai-shek. After “retrocession”, people on Taiwan welcomed the return of their “orphan island” to its “Fatherland China”. Former TCA and TPP members expressed willingness to facilitate the KMT takeover. The welcome extended to the KMT soon proved to be naively optimistic. In 1946, the KMT governor instantiated a distinction between benshengren (“provincial natives” or Taiwanese) and waishengren (“provincial outsiders” or mainlanders). Benshengren referred to the Han population resident on the island before 1945, while waishengren came to Taiwan 1945–49 from China with the exiled KMT regime. The language barrier and cultural gap between benshengren and waishengren combined with trade monopoly, serious inflation, and corrupt politics. Together, these issues ignited into a clash between civilians and the KMT regime, the 1947 “2.28 Incident” (see Chen and Hsueh 2020). Benshengren/citizens protested and petitioned only to be met with machinegun fire. Civil unrest spread across the island. Impromptu militia were formed of former Japanese servicemen, student draftees, farmers, and leftists (including Chien Chi, leader of the 1926 Taiwan Peasants’ Assembly). They resisted at various localities, collectively known as “Taiwan United Self-determination Squad.” Throughout Taiwan, “2.28 Incident Settlement Committees” were set up by local leaders (including Lin Hsien-tang, formerly TCA Premier, who led the Taichung Settlement Committee). Given their local knowledge of Taiwan, they proposed reforms and offered to help as cultural and political intermediaries and peacemakers with the KMT. This offer soon proved to be sorely ill-judged. The KMT carried out “military pacification”. They killed those they called “rebels”, mostly benshengren elite and intellectuals, more than 20,000 by some estimates. Martial law was imposed. In 1949, finally defeated by the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime – almost 1.7 million waishengren, mostly soldiers – evacuated to Taiwan. In exile, Chiang Kai-shek continued ruling as he had on mainland China, and made wartime preparations for the “Reconquest of the Mainland”. The KMT implemented the White Terror and applied “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion”. After 15-year wartime footing under the Japanese, retroceded Taiwan was subjected to another “wartime” alert, pressuring the population “to adopt a wartime life-style and prepare for re-taking the Mainland” under four decades of martial law (Shih 2006: 272).

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“Wartime” Cultural Measures Kōminka literally “making people subjects of Japan’s emperor” involved “making Taiwan people Japanese”. Crucial cultural measures included reforming language, education, religion, customs, national consciousness, and surnames. It was a campaign to radically alter the cultural self-consciousness of Taiwan’s people, eliminating symbols of Chinese identity, to inculcate identification with Japan – deemed necessary because Taiwan’s people shared ancestry, languages, and culture with their Chinese enemy. In 1942 Japan built a branch of “Yasukuni Shrine” named “Taiwan’s Gokoku Shrine” in Taipei (Tsai 2010). It commemorated those naichijin/Japanese and Islanders/ Taiwanese who died serving Japan in its Sino and Pacific Wars. This was the supreme state religious institution on Taiwan, the crux of de-China-ization efforts to inculcate Japanese identity, encouraging Taiwan people to sacrifice their lives for Japan as their nation. The KMT derided benshengren as “Japanized slaves” due to their fifty-year colonization. Although “Chinese compatriots”, they were treated as second-class citizens. Waishengren were spuriously credited with “victory in the anti-Japanese war”. They spoke various dialects, but were imagined having a shared interest as members of the ruling class and a common self-consciousness as anti-Japanese and as “Zhongguoren/Chinese”. Benshengren were to be subject to re-education and not treated as equals with waishengren until duly “de-Japanized and re-China-ized” (Huang 2007). When China’s Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, the KMT campaign for their re-China-ization of Taiwan was intensified, a cultural war effort against the PRC known as the “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” (Lin 2005). The Temporary Provisions and the Renaissance Movement were both crucial to the KMT’s claim to legitimacy and authoritarian control, reliant on military and cultural parameters respectively. The re-China-ization and the Renaissance Movement aimed to make Taiwan’s people citizens of the ROC nation, to convert them into the KMT’s version of Chinese. In 1969, the KMT demolished Japan’s “Gokoku Shrine”, and constructed its own ‘National Revolutionary Martyrs’ Shrine” on the same site to commemorate those waishengren and benshengren who died serving the KMT wars against Japan and the CCP. This was the supreme national religious institution, the crux of de-Japanization efforts to inculcate the KMT’s version of Chinese identity, encouraging Taiwan people to sacrifice their lives for the ROC nation fighting against communists. The KMT’s rule was in some aspects as “foreign” as Japanese colonial rule, and so has been termed “settler colonialism, a colonialism without mother country” (Wu 2002: 211). Its “de-Japanization and re-China-ization” was invertedly analogous to the Kōminka campaign for “de-China-ization and

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Japanization”. The Kōminka campaign intended to transform Taiwanese into Japanese, while the KMT’s re-China-ization sought to transform Taiwanese into what they defined as “real Chinese”. Aside from surnames, the KMT’s re-China-ization cultural measures were almost a clone of the Japan’s Kōminka measures. The Forgetting of Chiang and TCA In Japan’s 15-Year War and Kōminka period, Chiang Wei-shui, the TCA and other members disappeared into obscurity. Most activists were imprisoned throughout the war years, including Wang Ming-chuan (1931–38) and Chien Chi (1931–41). Cultural forms of self-consciousness did not resurface in any meaningful way. Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA were dead, buried, and officially ignored. In the KMT martial law and re-China-ization period, most TCA members were killed or went missing during the 2.28 Incident and subsequent White Terror period (1950–91). Any who survived cooperated with the KMT or, if not going into exile, became politically quiescent for the rest of their lives. As for the TCA’s dramatis personae: (1) Chien Chi survived the war years in Japan’s prison, but in 1951 was executed by the KMT for his “communist involvement”; (2) expelled from the New TCA in 1929, Lien Wen-ching became politically quiescent (which saved him from execution by the KMT) till he died in 1957, but was an influence on his nephew, Huang Hsin-chieh; (3) Wang Min-chuan died four years after release from Japan’s prison in 1942. In 1946, his tablet was placed in the KMT’s “Martyrs’ Shrine”, honored as an “anti-Japanese hero”, but removed in 1958 when he was re-labelled a “Taiwan Communist bandit” (Wang 1987); (4) although a moderate in his outlook, Lin Hsien-tang was listed as a “Traitor to China”, due to having been Head of a Settlement Committee, but KMT friends saved him from imprisonment. He went in exile to Japan, and was only returned posthumously to Taiwan. Such swings of imposed senses of self – from being “Qingized slaves” to “Japanized Taiwanese” to “Japanized slaves” to “re-China-ized Taiwanese” were paradoxical and contradictory. Given Chiang Wei-shui’s identification with Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles, there might have been an expectation that the KMT would seek to revive and promote his legacy. However, Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA remained unexhumed in official KMT discourse till Taiwanization, subject to deliberate cultural amnesia. Chiang Wei-shui’s own self-consciousness is not easily aligned with such historical impositions. His thinking on what might now be labelled “national consciousness” was ambivalent at best. Yet, the afterlife “remembering” of Chiang Wei-shui has endowed him with subscribing to a contradictory range of “national consciousnesses”.

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1960s–1970s Self-conscious Movement In 1963 students, mainly waishengren, at National Taiwan University launched a “Zijue/Self-conscious Movement”, declaring “Don’t let history judge us as a decadent and selfish generation” (cf. Hsiau 2010: 66–76). The historian Li Ao (李敖 1935–2018) enjoined “the lost generation of young people … to wake from their sleep … become their own masters … to save and build the country… for their vision not to be confined to this small island, but to look forward to the restoration of the mainland” (1963: 11). The “Self-conscious Movement” along with the Renaissance movement fizzled out in the end of the 1970s when the PRC became internationally recognized replacing the ROC. Yet, as late as 1979 “Self-conscious Movement” activists were proclaiming that “we should each hand-on-heart say ‘I am Zhongguoren/Chinese.’ That’s something about which we students must be self-conscious!” (Yin 1979). Unsurprisingly, no link was made to Chiang Wei-shui’s “Self-conscious Movement”. The 1960s–70s waishengren youth epitomized KMT self-consciousness – a trinity of de-Japanization, anti-communism, and re-China-ization – with Chinese nationalist/patriotic sentiment for retaking the lost Mainland. Rather, the 1920s Chiang Wei-shui’s self-consciousness – was a different trinity of ethnic Han, Japan’s national, and colonized class – seeing cultural modernization with an international outlook for healing Taiwan’s ills.

5.

TAIWAN CULTURAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: DANGWAI DEMOCRATIZATION, TAIWANIZATION, AND BEYOND

Also in the 1970s, another group of students, intellectuals and politicians, mostly benshengren, referred to as Dangwai (黨外 outside the [KMT] party) activists, became publicly dissatisfied with the KMT’s suspension of democracy on the pretext of war-preparation for recovering the Mainland. They published Dangwai magazines criticizing the KMT’s authoritarian rule and petitioning for a properly representative democracy for the people of the only territory remaining under ROC rule – Taiwan. In the martial law period, all publications had to be licensed by the KMT, were subject to party-state censorship, and the editors at risk of imprisonment. In a broad sense, Dangwai magazines can be dated back to the waishengren-run Free China (1950–60) and Wenxing (文星 1957–65) followed by leftist China Tide (夏潮 1976–79). Contributors from these three magazines participated in the “Self-conscious Movement” mentioned above. Taiwan Political Review (台灣政論 1975 August–December), New Generation (這一代雜誌 July 1977 to December 1978), The Eighties (八十年代 1979 June–December)

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and Formosa Magazine (美麗島 August–November 1979) were the primary benshengren publications. Their print runs were short due to KMT censorship as severe as for the TCA’s Taiwan People’s News under Japanese rule. Apart from the pro-communist China Tide, these Dangwai magazines all espoused anti-communism, democracy, and freedom. However, they had contrary consciousnesses of self, leading to post-martial law arguments about “Chinese consciousness” versus “Taiwanese consciousness”. 1970s Revival In contrast to those waishengren youth who advocated a “Self-consciousness Movement” anchored on their “Fatherland China”, the benshengren postwar generation called for a “return to reality”, rooted in Taiwan. The latter formed a Dangwai political movement that paralleled the 1970s Xiangtu Literature Movement, “embracing local soil and caring for reality” (see Chapter 13 in this book). Through the 1969 Amendment of “Temporary Provisions”, the KMT held the first supplementary elections for Legislative Yuan and National Assembly members, all representing Taiwan Province. This gave an opportunity for benshengren to participate in parliamentary politics, developing into the Dangwai democratic/opposition movement. In the 1970s both Xiangtu and Dangwai movements probed the issue of “Taiwan’s xing/self-consciousness” reviving that aspect of Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA’s legacy, even though anathema to the KMT party-state at that time. Huang Hsin-chieh (黃信介 1928–99) and Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥 1938–) were pioneer Dangwai politicians. Huang was influenced by his uncle Lien Wen-ching, founder of the New TCA. In the 1969 first supplementary election campaign for legislators, Kang spoke for candidate Huang making the first public mention of Chiang Wei-shui in four decades, the first move to breaking the silence and breathing new life into Chiang and the TCA. Huang was elected and became the only Dangwai lifelong legislator. Kang was elected as councillor 1969–72 and legislator 1973–84 and 1987–90, later recalling, “In my election speech, I attributed several campaign ideas to Chiang” (New Generation 1977: 59–60). Huang and Kang co-founded the first benshengren-run magazine, Taiwan Political Review. It played the leading role in the strategic development of the Dangwai campaign. Four of its only five issues included an article on Chiang Wei-shui and/or the TCA. In the final issue, Yeh Jung-chong, Lin Hsien-tang’s secretary in the 1920s, wrote a piece entitled “Revolutionist Chiang Wei-shui”, depicting him as “yearning for revolution and admiring the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen … None of the other leaders of the national movement could match him” (Yeh 1975: 77–8). In 1977, commemorating the 46th anni-

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versary of Chiang Wei-shui’s death, New Generation magazine published the first roundtable discussion of his lifetime contribution. A fellow-townsman of Chiang Wei-shui, Huang Huang-hsiung (黃煌 雄 1944–) researched the 1920s in great detail, to discover from the TCA’s buried history, a meaningful sense of self-consciousness which the first Dangwai generation and movement could draw upon. Huang published: (1) Pioneer of Taiwan’s Enlightenment: Chiang Wei-shui, his first biography (self-published edition 1976, 1978; revised edition 1992); and (2) Taiwan Compatriots’ Anti-Japanese History, focusing on the 1920s movements (self-published edition 1977; revised 1992). He drew a link between the 1970s outside-the-KMT movement and the 1920s anti-Japanese movements. In his view, “[Sun Yat-sen] brought the national consciousness of Taiwan compatriots to a climax giving new hope”, while “Chiang Wei-shui … applied nationalist sentiment most thoroughly and consistently” (1978a: 229, 238). Huang indicated “the 1920s modern national movement led by Chiang in Taiwan” paralleled the 1900s modern national movement led by Sun in China, referring to Chiang Wei-shui as “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen” (1978a: 261–82). Since the KMT were Sun Yat-sen followers, he suggested that the Dangwai should follow Chiang’s lead. He advocated the KMT and Dangwai activists should transcend their party and provincial differences to devote themselves to the pursuit of democracy (1978b: 8–22). The 1970s Dangwai generation mostly positioned themselves as “not only Taiwanese, but also Chinese”, testifying that the KMT’s re-China-ization education had had some success. Sociologist Hsiau A-Chin (蕭阿勤) criticizes Huang for projecting his own internalized KMT self-consciousness – “Zhonghua Minzu/Peoples of China” – onto Chiang Wei-shui (Hsiau 2010: 319–30). Historian Wu Rwei-ren (吳叡人) adds that the KMT and Huang used the term “Zhonghua Minzu” as citizens of China/ROC as a nation, but Chiang uses the term as a subject of Japan as a nation. Thus, Chiang’s notion of “Chinese People who are Han People” implies ethnic/cultural rather than politico-nationalist identity (Wu 2019). In 1979, Lin Cho-shui published a piece in The Eighties, claiming, “the Hoklo and Hakka people of Taiwan province who used to live in the Zhongyuan (Central Plains, origin of Chinese civilization) … still cherish their ancestors …. The cultural and political self-consciousness movements surged [in the 1920s] … with Zhongyuan culture as its spirit.” Lin urged that benshengren and waishengren “shall work together to safeguard our traditional culture, and to successfully build Taiwan into a new cultural center … the most prosperous society in our nation’s several thousand years” (Lin 1979: 24). The first Dangwai generation strove for a meaningful democracy for the ROC on Taiwan, acknowledging benshengren also as Chinese and sharing Chinese culture, and demanding benshengren citizenship to be fully recog-

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nized as equal to that of waishengren. Although Huang Huang-hsiung and Lin Cho-shui were in tune with the KMT re-China-ization sentiment, a significant difference in my estimation is that they emphasized the incorporation of Taiwan’s Han population and their culture (Hoklo and Hakka) as equally Chinese. By this cultural inclusiveness, Chiang Wei-shui, Huang and Lin prioritized democracy (as a universal value) over (Chinese) nationalism. Through Formosa Magazine, the Dangwai movement resorted to a different method of campaign, going on the streets for democracy. On December 10, 1979, International Human Rights Day, they marched for human rights and democracy for the first time in post-war Taiwan. Their public lectures – celebrating the 31st anniversary of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights – turned into a clash with the military police. Forty members were charged with offences and the military court convicted eight core members (including Huang Hsin-chieh) of treachery, arousing the attention of international public opinion. Several human rights organizations provided legal assistance. The defendants and their lawyers put up an ebullient defence, just as had Chiang Wei-shui in similar circumstances. The Dangwai activists used printed press in the form of Dangwai magazines – somewhat akin to the TCA’s Taiwan People’s News – as a vehicle to campaign for a Taiwan parliament representing the island’s constituents. The Dangwai magazines served as the site for enlightening people, recruiting followers, training members, raising financial resources, mobilizing mass movements, and campaigning for local elections. Through running magazines, the Dangwai movement created an “imagined community” of its “outside the KMT Party” readers, promoting the history of Taiwan they had in common, shaping Taiwan’s self-consciousness and promoting self-determination. This is evident in the 1986 founding of Taiwan’s first major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, echoing a key TPP ambition as perhaps Chiang Wei-shui and other PMTP members’ most important legacy. Post-1987 Afterlives Martial law was ended in 1987. Newspaper bans were lifted and Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988. Cheng Nan-jung (鄭南榕 1947–89), who advocated “100% freedom of speech”, self-immolated in 1989 resisting the accused rebellion for his statement on promoting Taiwan’s independence. “The Period of National Mobilization” terminated in 1991. “The Act of Punishing Rebellions [including advocates of communism and Taiwan’s independence]” was abolished in 1991, combined with the amendment of “Article 100 of the Criminal Code” in 1992. The White Terror finally came to an end (Hsueh 1999).

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The full-scale re-election of legislators was first conducted in 1992, followed by the direct Presidential election in 1996. Taiwan completed a non-violent transition to democracy in the 1990s, with increasing Taiwanese zhutixing/self-consciousness and political nativization, known as “Bentuhua/ Taiwanization” (Shih 2012). Taiwan’s self-consciousness underwent a dramatic change with 1990 as the hinge-point: Before 1990, most people (including Dangwai activists) embraced being Taiwanese in co-existence with being Chinese. After 1990, more and more people openly identify as solely Taiwanese. The politics of identity was becoming the dominant bone of contention. In 1991, Wang Hsiao-po (王曉波 1943–2020) founded Straits Review Journal as the China Tide Association’s mouthpiece to “carry forward the patriotic tradition of Taiwan compatriots and develop the theory of peaceful reunification of the Chinese nation” – understood as including communist China. In contrast, that year, the DPP added the “Taiwan’s Independence” first clause of its charter: “Establishing a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan: … Taiwan’s sovereignty is independent and does not belong to the PRC … nor does its remit include mainland China”. This clause was initially crafted by Lin Cho-shui, and is indicative of a change from his 1979 Zhongyuan sentiment to his 1990s Taiwanese nationalism. In tandem with these changes to Taiwanization and democratization, the afterlife and legacy of Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA were given heightened significance. In 1991, the Kaohsiung DPP-run County government held the first official commemoration of Chiang Wei-shui, followed by an academic conference. Huang Huang-hsiung gave a paper that was criticized by Historian Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲 1947–2014). Chang’s comment was that “though Chiang Wei-shui sympathized with the Chinese revolution and learnt its strategies, it would be inappropriate to say that he was pro-Chinese … Chiang wasn’t a figure who would return to China, but a local Taiwanese activist” (Chang 1991, cf. Hsiau 2010: 266). Huang accepted this criticism. Huang Huang-hsiung also changed his viewpoint from his 1970s, “being both Taiwanese and Chinese” to his 1990s Taiwanese nationalist stance. In 1991, Huang made a significant contribution to the production of the DPP’s “Draft Constitution of Taiwan”, stating, “Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to all of Taiwan’s people; the new Constitution applies to Taiwan and its 20 million people …. The President is directly elected by the citizens of the whole country” (cf. Huang 1991). Concurrently, he made significant revisions to the 1992 editions of his 1976 and 1977 publications. Whereas in the 1970s Huang regarded Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA as pioneers of the whole Chinese modern national struggle, in the 1990s Huang viewed Chiang as a model only for the Taiwanese modern national movement. These revisions incorporated “de-China-ization” and Taiwanization, for example: (1) omitting his 1976 depiction of “Chiang Wei-shui [as] a great anti-Japanese hero of Zhonghua

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Minzu/Peoples of China” (cf. Hsiau 2010: 269); (2) substituting “ethnic Han” for his 1977 term “Zhonghua Minzu/Peoples of China” (cf. Hsiau 2010: 273). Thus, Chinese politico-nationalist identity was replaced by Han ethnic/cultural identity. In the 1992 edition of Chiang’s Biography, Huang’s viewpoint also altered: “Oppressed Taiwan compatriots, consciously or unconsciously, had gradually developed a self-consciousness of being Taiwanese. That movement – generated from Taiwanese consciousness and representing Taiwanese demands – was thus named the Taiwanese national movement” (Huang 1992a: 10–11). In the 1992 edition of Taiwan Compatriots’ Anti-Japanese History, Huang’s opinion changed too: “Although Taiwanese modern national movement showed strong identity with Han people, Han identity should not be regarded as the movement’s ultimate goal …. We must not deny the position of Taiwanese modern national movement as the zhuti/agent …, not as a mere tributary of China’s modern national movement” (Huang 1992b: 4–5). Thus Chiang Wei-shui was commemorated as representing Taiwanese zhuti yishi/self-consciousness and nationalism. I argue that Chiang Wei-shui was not preoccupied with (proto-)nationalist formulations of “self-consciousness”, whether Chinese or Taiwanese. For Chiang, “Taiwan” was a geographical term without implying collective consciousness of/for all Taiwanese people. His term “Taiwan compatriots” referred only to Taiwan’s Han population. It was not until 1994 when Lee Teng-hui proposed a notion of “New Taiwanese” that indigenous peoples were included. Lee Teng-hui (1923–2020) succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as the first benshengren/native President (1988–2000), and in 1996 became the first elected President. Taiwanization involved the coinage “Chinese people becoming Taiwanese”, that is, making Chinese a constituent component of what he called “New Taiwanese” – the modern, democratic citizenry of ROC on Taiwan. In 1994, Lee stated, “in the past 400 years, the people of Taiwan have been treated as feizhuti [having no agency] …. We are now nurturing “New Taiwanese”; “regardless of benshengren and waishengren distinctions, anyone who identifies themselves with Taiwan will be considered as genuine Taiwanese” (Lee 1994). On August 1, 1994, the ROC constitution was amended, changing the term “gaoshanzu/mountainous peoples” to “yuanzhumin/indigenous peoples”. For the first time a Taiwan government recognized its indigenous population as the “original inhabitants of Taiwan”. Also, for the first time, indigenous peoples were recognized on an equal footing with the Han population – the TCA’s notion of “Taiwan people” had not included yuanzhumin. Lee’s notion of “Taiwanese” supplemented Taiwan as a geographical term by extending it to “the collective consciousness of all Taiwanese people”, replacing “provincial origins” as the crucial criterion of “identity” with a less primordial more plural notion or “imagined community” (Anderson 1983)

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defining the range of its own citizenry. In 1996 Lee asserted: “Building a greater Taiwan is the driving force behind the establishment of the new “Zhongyuan, Central Plain” … only by developing the place we are living in now – Taiwan – can we take care of mainland China, and look outward to the international world” (Lee 1996). This seemed to reference Lin Cho-shui’s view of Taiwan’s connection with Zhongyuan in his 1979 article. However, Lee used an ambiguity with the phrase Zhongyuan – referring to China’s origin while literally meaning “a central plain” – to reassert Taiwan’s tie to China, although turning from China-centric to Taiwan-centric policies. In 1997 a controversial new course Knowing Taiwan became part of the Junior High School curriculum. For the first time the school curriculum included Taiwan’s 400-year history of “complex international relations with Holland, Spain and Japan, all countries that occupied Taiwan, and gave … the island’s culture the color of a country [foreign to China]” (see Corcuff 2002: 87). The 1895–1945 period was rephrased as “Japan’s governance” rather than “Japan’s occupation”. The TCA was mentioned briefly, but there was no mention of Chiang Wei-shui. This new Taiwanization approach was criticized by pro-communist advocates of unification with China for subscribing to “a new-fangled Japanese imperialist standpoint”. Philosopher Wang Hsiao-po complained that, “under the pretext of ‘knowing Taiwan’, they have tampered with Taiwan history textbooks forcing the younger generation of Taiwan to undergo a new imperial [Kōminka/Japanization] brainwashing” (Wang 1998). At National Taiwan University, Wang ran a counter-course Taiwan People and Taiwan’s Self-consciousness seeking to “restore Taiwan people’s [lost Chinese] national identity and self-identity”. He also compiled counter-historical materials about what he regarded as “the real history of Taiwan – the history of Chinese nationalists’ struggle against Japanese imperialism and colonialism” (Wang 2012). His 1988 compilation of Chiang Wei-shui’s writings added to the 1931 posthumous collection. Wang highlighted Chiang Wei-shui as the staunchest Chinese nationalist who led a national movement based on Taiwan’s working class. For Wang, Chiang represented Taiwan’s patriotic tradition, which was devastated by Kōminka/Japanization. In his Introduction to Wang’s 1988 compilation, historian Lee Shih-wei (李 世偉) sided with Wang’s claim – through his reading of Chiang’s 1927 article “A National Movement Based on the Agricultural and Working Class” – that Chiang Wei-shui was a pro-communist advocate of Chinese nationalism (Lee 1999). Then, Lee used the fact that the Japanese authorities had accused Chiang of, and had him imprisoned for, “promoting Chinese national consciousness” as recorded in Police History (警察沿革志) as evidence of “Chiang’s Chinese nationalist identity and patriotist sentiment” (Lee 1999).

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By contrast, literary scholar Chen Fang-ming (陳芳明) argued that Chiang’s focus on enlightenment was “to arouse Taiwan people’s [self-consciousness], expose cultural differences between Taiwanese and Japanese, and criticize differential treatment of the two races” (Chen 2017). In my view, Wang and Lee project their own notion of “Zhonghua Minzu” – Peoples of China including Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Uyghur and Tibetan Peoples – onto Chiang Wei-shui. For Chiang, Zhonghua Minzu was Han People only. Although identifying as Han People in his resistance, Chiang did not advocate Taiwan’s secession from Japanese rule. His hopes were, rather, for a modernized culture that would heighten the self-consciousness of individuals as individuals per se, and better position the people of colonized Taiwan vis-à-vis Japan and China. If anything, (proto-)nationalist sentiments were a by-product, an unintended consequence, of his primarily cultural motivation. In 1999, the DPP made the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future”, which replaced its “1991 Taiwan’s Independence Clause”. It stipulated, “Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state …. Any change in Taiwan’s status quo must be decided via a referendum of all Taiwan’s citizens.” The recourse to referendum allowed the DPP to echo 1920s calls for self-determination, and to remove fear/obstacle to gain votes. Next year, Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first DPP President, remaining in office till 2008. In 2001 on the 70th anniversary of his death, Chiang Wei-shui was recognized by the state for the first time when President Chen spoke of Chiang and the TCA as representative of “the spirit of Taiwan”: “We Taiwanese are always willing to sacrifice our lives and are not afraid of being jailed, sitting in a dark prison. One person following another, one generation passing to another, striving for … self-determination” (Chen 2001). He said that he would remedy popular ignorance of Chiang through educational reform. To mark the TCA’s founding 80 years before, Chen Yu-hsiu (陳郁秀), Chairwoman for the Cultural Development Council, designated October 17 as “Taiwan Culture Day”. She thereby promoted the link between Taiwanese cultural self-consciousness and Taiwan’s state status. Chiang Chao-ken (蔣朝根), Chiang Wei-shui’s grandson and a primary school teacher, did not learn much about his grandfather from his family as they mostly avoided mentioning his name. Only after reading Huang’s books, did he become aware of his grandfather’s activism and place in history. Moved by his grandfather’s writings, deeds and personality, Chao-ken retired in 2001 to devote himself to collecting and exhibiting memorabilia related to Chiang Wei-shui’s life. In 2003, he curated his first exhibition entitled “A Self-conscious Age: the Taiwan People’s Party”. The exhibition in Taipei’s 228 Memorial Hall displayed original diaries, notes, letters, telegrams, minutes of meetings, leaflets inter alia (see Chuang 2003).

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Post-2005 Afterlives Ma Ying-jeou became Taipei Mayor (1998–2006), the KMT Chair (2005–07; 2009–14) and Taiwan’s President (2008–16). In his 1998 mayoral election campaign, Ma claimed, “I am a New Taiwanese who drinks Taiwan’s water and eats Taiwan’s rice!” Since taking office, he has purposely linked the history of Taiwan with that of the KMT. In 2005 Mayor Ma’s Cultural Bureau bought the copyright for the 74-year-neglected film of “Chiang Wei-shui’s Mass Funeral”, adding narration, subtitles, and a comparison of past and present. Bureau Director Liao Hsien-hao (廖咸浩) composed a poem as its new frontispiece, merging Wei-shui’s name with the Wei river of China’s origin in Zhongyuan. That year, Mayor Ma attended the launch of Wang Hsiao-po’s Addendum to his 1988 compilation of Chiang Wei-shui’s writings. Both Ma and Wang had participated in the 1970s self-consciousness campaign for ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands. Wang emphasized Chiang’s yearning for his Fatherland China, making much of the fact that his coffin was covered by the quasi-ROC flag. He claimed that the motivation for his 2005 Addendum was to “use Chiang Wei-shui’s spirit and Taiwan’s patriotic tradition to enlighten Taiwan people who he deemed were deceived by Japanized advocates of Taiwan’s independence” (Wang 2005). Ma said, “Chiang Wei-shui was a secret member of the KMT [as he had joined the Chinese United Alliance, the KMT’s predecessor]. His brilliant achievements in the national movement have led to both “blue/pro-KMT camp” and “green/pro-DPP camp” giving him high praise as “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen’”. Ma highlighted “Chiang Wei-shui's virtue is not the ‘property’ of one faction or one party. The personality of such a great historical figure should be regarded as the common glory of Taiwan people” (as recorded in Huang 2005). Also in 2005 on the 60th anniversary of Taiwan's retrocession, as KMT Chair, Ma published a commemorative article in Straits Review entitled “Reviewing the Model of the Sages and Rebuilding the Spirit of Taiwan”. Simultaneously, huge portraits of those he defined as “Taiwan’s anti-Japanese sages” (including Chiang Wei-shui) were hanged outside KMT headquarters. Ma claimed a line of inheritance from Chiang, admiringly stating: “In 1927, Chiang Wei-shui and others established the “Taiwan People’s Party” and deliberately designed its flag to be similar to the ROC’s … as a bentu political movement it was tantamount to the founding movement of the ROC” (Ma 2005). In April 2006, Chiang’s biographer, Huang Huang-hsiung, published the third edition of his biography of Chiang Wei-shui, and revised its title to “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”. Huang again changed his viewpoint from his 1990s Taiwanese nationalism to a new emphasis on Chiang’s link with the KMT,

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re-invoking “re-China-ization” by: (1) reverting to his 1976 depiction of “Chiang Wei-shui [as] a great anti-Japanese hero of Zhonghua Minzu/Peoples of China”; and (2) re-instating his 1977 term “Zhonghua Minzu/Peoples of China” omitted in his 1992 edition. In his new Preface, Huang highlighted, “This is the first time that the KMT has expressed its most sincere respect for “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”… Chiang Wei-shui has become a historical figure respected by both the KMT and the DPP” (Huang 2006). In May 2006, Chiang Wei-shui’s family together with Huang Huang-hsiung established “the Chiang Wei-shui Cultural Foundation” to “advance Taiwan culture, and ‘cultivate artistic appreciation’” (cited from the original TCA article, see Liang 2007) so as to continue the aspirations Chiang had for the TCA”. Chiang Chao-ken served as Executive Director. Pianist Chiang Li-jung (蔣理容), Chiang Wei-shui’s grand-niece, acted as Deputy Director. The Foundation promotes cultural policies, research, assets, and Taiwan’s cultural industry in ways that encompass but go beyond the TCA’s remit. In August 2006, Vice President Annette Lu (DPP), Premier Su Chen-chang (DPP) and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) attended the 75th anniversary of Chiang Wei-shui’s death, Taiwan’s two major political parties for the first time joined to commemorate Chiang’s legacy. In the 2007 Presidential campaigns, the Chiang Wei-shui Foundation staged a debate over “the Contemporary Significance of Chiang Wei-shui” involving KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Frank Hsieh (謝長廷). Ma argued that Chiang Wei-shui should be viewed as a spiritual symbol for the KMT’s connection with Taiwan bentu (本土), while Hsieh saw Chiang Wei-shui primarily as representing Taiwan people’s “opposition both to dictatorship and to foreign regimes” (implicating both Japan and the KMT) (Lin 2007). Unsurprisingly, they did not reach a consensus. KMT and DPP had, and continue to have, divergent interpretations. Their views of Chiang and the TCA are shaped as much by presentist consciousness of political considerations as by Chiang’s actual aspirations and achievements. In 2010, President Ma instructed the Bank of Taiwan to issue NT$10 coins with a head-portrait of Chiang Wei-shui – previously, only Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had been commemorated this way. In 2011, an epic musical – 渭水春風 “The Impossible Times” – telling the story of Chiang Wei-shui and his politico-cultural enlightenment, was performed in the National Theatre to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the ROC. It was lauded as “a classic play for the ROC’s centenary”. Performed in the Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre complex, the musical represented the shift from Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarianism and re-China-ization to a democracy open to Chiang Wei-shui. The play’s main refrain was, “Who are we?” “Taiwan is our name!”

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The Taiwan People’s News resumed publication as an online newspaper in 2014. Next year, the TPN reported a forum on Taiwan Culture Day ironically titled “How ‘Taiwan’s sages’ welcomed and/or refused cooperation with the KMT”. Historian Chen Yi-shen (陳儀深) criticized Ma for using Chiang Wei-shui to construct a KMT view of Taiwan History limiting the epithet “Taiwan sages” soley to anti-Japanese activists with a China connection (see Lin 2015). I argue that, although following Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Wei-shui never advocated Taiwan as part of China. Ma played on a self-consciousness of “being both Chinese and Taiwanese”, a duality in which Chinese is the “real identity” and Taiwanese is only ancillary. He sought to justify the KMT not as “foreign regime” on Taiwan by promoting Chiang as a KMT member. Ma misrepresented Chiang Wei-shui’s internationalist stance – that Taiwan could have a mediating role between Chinese and Japanese to keep peace in East Asia – in narrowly Chinese nationalist terms. Although Chinese nationalists depicted Chiang as “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”, some Marxist scholars have argued for a heterodox version of Chiang, saying that in the final year of his life, Chiang turned his back on being a disciple of Sun Yat-sen’s reformist doctrine to espouse the communist view that class struggle would be needed to create a better society. Chao Hsun-ta (趙勳達) makes much of Chiang’s utterances near the end of his life. In the 1930 Fourth Congress, Chiang’s amendment to the TPP guidelines stated: “Today’s Great Depression manifests the biggest crisis of capitalism …. The capitalist economies of imperialist countries have fallen into decline. The socialist economy of the Soviet Union is rising” (cf. Chao 2013: 149). On his deathbed (August 5, 1931), Chiang declared, “Taiwan’s social movement has entered the Third Phase, and victory of the Proletariat is imminent”, which Chiang equated with “the liberation of [Taiwan] compatriots” (Chao 2013: 151). This perspective on Chiang does not represent him as primarily a nationalist, but measures him in accordance with his end-of-life leftist political stance. In my view, Chiang cannot be reduced to being simply an exponent of rightist or leftist self-consciousness, as he prioritized his ideas of progress and equality for cultural modernization to strengthen the social health of the Han population to become culturally fit for survival in the contemporary world. Political independent and medical practitioner, Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was elected Taipei Mayor in 2014 and again in 2018. To awaken Taiwanese political awareness, he sought to give voters a choice other than the KMT and DPP while embracing the (CCP’s) idea of “one family sentiment on both sides of the Taiwan Straits”. Before the 2019 Presidential election campaigns, Ko founded his own party named after Chiang’s “Taiwan People’s Party”. Chiang Wei-shui’s grandniece countered, “[Ko’s TPP] can’t claim any inheritance from Chiang Wei-shui or any connection with the Chiang Wei-shui Foundation.” Ko retorted, “The TPP is not exclusive to Chiang Wei-shui,

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nor … any of his descendants …. The TPP is of historical significance and is of significance once more in this new era” (Fang 2019). Ko’s ideas and his new TPP did not gain popular support, and, in the end, he did not stand as a Presidential candidate. Post-2016 Afterlives The DPP regained Taiwan’s Presidency when Tsai Ying-wen was elected in 2016 and again in 2020. Tsai sees Taiwan as a “tianrandu/naturally independent” state in which Chinese culture is a natural part of Taiwan’s culture. But this does not necessarily extend to advocating formal independence or pursuing full de-China-ization. Responding to Ko’s TPP, Tsai invoked a 1920s phrase, “Taiwan is Taiwan people’s Taiwan.” On Taiwan Culture Day 2016, President Tsai extended congratulations for a trinity of celebrations: the Da-an Clinic’s centenary; the TCA’s 95th anniversary; and the cultural bookstore’s 90th anniversary. She asserted, “The TCA has enlightened people’s desire for knowledge, culture, freedom and democracy, and pursuit of Taiwanese zhutixing/self-consciousness.” Her cultural governance would “start from humanistic concern, aspire to the spirit of the TCA, and build a new era of ‘Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance’” (Lin 2016). This echoed Chiang Wei-shui, who regarded Taiwan’s cultural movement as a “Cultural Yun [Artistic] Renaissance” (文運復興) (Chiang 1921d). President Tsai’s Minister of Culture, Cheng Li-chun (鄭麗君), affirmed: “The TCA era was the age of constructing Taiwanese zhuti yishi/self-consciousness … giving rise to the new literature movement, bringing in western political, economic, scientific and other trends of thought, and using cultural power to go deep into the grassroots as a driver for societal transformation” (Lin 2016). In 2016, Taiwan Culture Day was expanded into “Taiwan Culture Month” with activities spanning the whole of October. Programs included (1) “Dadaocheng International Art Festival” reconstructing the 1920s culture and arts at Dadaocheng, the base of Taiwan’s Renaissance; (2) an exhibition tour of oil paintings based on Chiang Wei-shui’s historical photos; (3) a cantata called In Those days, Chiang Wei-shui was in Prison performed by Taipei Philharmonic Chorus and Symphony Orchestra with lyrics creatively derived from Chiang’s prison diaries. In May 2018, President Tsai established the “Transitional Justice Commission” seeking to restore historical truth of the 2.28 Incident and White Terror and promote social reconciliation. Chiang’s biographer, Huang Huang-hsiung was appointed Chair of the TJC as he was considered one of only a few Dangwai politicians respected by both “blue/pro-KMT” and “green/pro-DPP” camps. However, historian Chen Tsui-lien (陳翠蓮) criticized Huang for “making use of Taiwan history, consuming Chiang Wei-shui

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… for personal advantage in his official position”. She listed Huang’s changing views of Chiang: from (1) his 1976 emphasis of Chiang’s resistant spirit; to (2) his 1992 highlighting of Chiang’s Taiwanese nationalism (Huang was elected in 1993 as Legislator of the DPP); and to (3) his 2005 connecting Chiang with the KMT (Huang was nominated in 2008 by Ma as member of Control Yuan) (Chen 2018). In actuality, as TJC Chair, Huang did not gain full support from both camps, and resigned after just four months following the so-called “Eastern Depot Incident” (東廠事件). In October 2018, the Taiwan New Cultural Movement Memorial Hall was completed on the site of “Taipei’s North Police Station” where Chiang Wei-shui and others had been imprisoned, thereby neatly symbolizing the shift of emphasis from politics to culture. The Memorial Hall is a pivotal site for preserving the PMTP’s and TPP’s legacies and propelling the TCA’s “New Cultural Movement” forward into the future. The site foregrounds Taiwan people’s resilience in their struggles over the past century: “though Chiang and other TCA members were physically confined here, [this building now tells how] cultural self-consciousness can never be incarcerated” (Chang 2018). Cheng’s cultural policy under Tsai’s presidency, 2016–20, marked a potentially significant shift in attitude to Chiang Wei-shui: it seeks to move beyond the politics of national identity – to transcend the binary re-China-ization vs. Taiwanization conflict – by ascribing to and developing Chiang’s primary emphasis on a modernized progressive culture. For Chiang in the 1920s, the TCA aspired to heal the ills of Taiwan’s then-colonized society and generate zijue/self-consciousness as Taiwan’s colonized Han population on an equal footing with being Japanese or Chinese. Under Tsai’s Presidency and Cheng’s Ministry, the TCA has been re-valorized as a key catalyst for Taiwanese all-inclusive cultural zhutixing/self-consciousness, with the TCA claimed as the inspiration for facilitating the redirection from a narrow focus on the binary oppositions of Taiwan’s national identity politics toward a non-binary stance on cultural pluralism and diversity.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: ONE CHIANG WEI-SHUI’S LIFE GRANTED WITH SEVERAL AFTERLIVES In 1969, after four decades during which he had been dead, buried and forgotten, Chiang Wei-shui and the TCA were brought back to life, initially by benshengren campaigners Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang. But in reviving them, Chiang Wei-shui’s life and the TCA were granted several afterlives, a range of selective memories and legacies. In particular, although in his lifetime Chiang did use the term “Zhonghua Minzu” (中華民族) and “zijue” (自覺), in his afterlives, the focus has often been narrowed to a specifically

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“minzu yishi/national self-consciousness” (民族意識), provoking vehement arguments about how the term “national” (民族) should be interpreted. These four contrasting paradigmatic representations of Chiang Wei-shui still haunt present political debates.　 1. In the Dangwai period, campaigners for democracy within the KMT party-state system portrayed Chiang as a pioneer model for a united front for democratic struggle. He was appropriated as an icon of being “both Taiwanese and Chinese”. He was used to advocate a duality in which Taiwanese are equally Chinese. 2. After lifting martial law, Taiwanese nationalist advocates of Taiwan’s independence portrayed Chiang as an exemplary fighter for Taiwanese national self-consciousness. He was depicted solely as Taiwanese, a symbol for “Taiwanese zhutixing/self-consciousness” (主體性) and Taiwanese nationalism (國族主義). 3. Chinese nationalist advocates of unification with China lauded Chiang as “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen” – thereby a key symbol of Taiwan’s link with the KMT/ROC – and subjected Chiang to Zhonghua Minzu/Peoples of China, his true nationality. Chiang was used to advocate a duality in which being Chinese was the marked term while being Taiwanese was submerged as supplementary. 4. Communist adherents and Marxist scholars depicted Chiang Wei-shui as a leftist icon. The anti-Japanese activities led by Chiang were re-described as a national liberation movement based on Taiwan’s working class. Chiang was thereby used to promote Marxism and communism. Chiang Wei-shui’s views on (1) Zhonghua Minzu (for Chiang, limited to Han People); and (2) zijue (for Chiang, self-consciousness limited to Taiwan’s Han population) do not match current precepts of (1) Zhonghua Minzu (all Peoples of China, including Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Uyghur and Tibetan Peoples); and (2) zhuti yishi (a self-consciousness that is inclusive of all Taiwan’s peoples, including benshengren, waishengren, yuanzhumin, and “new immigrants”). He was – of course – a person of his time, not of ours. Chiang’s afterlives are mixed, often contradictory, and more complicated than the above reductions to key representations suggest. After being ignored for four decades, the last half century has seen the revival of several ghostly representations of Chiang Wei-shui appropriated as significant symbols in the identity politics of post-martial law Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen as President from 2016 highlighted a substantially different Chiang Wei-shui, using the 1920s phrase “Taiwan is Taiwan people’s Taiwan” to promote Chiang’s abiding interest in cultural development rather than a narrow Taiwanese nationalist consciousness. Her discursive shift

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was to remember Chiang as an advocate of a modern, progressive culture of self-consciousness (encompassing individual and collective, but not necessarily nationalist, senses of self) to highlight her own pluricultural sense of Taiwanese citizenship (cf. Shih, 2021). In my estimation, Tsai’s innovation was to see culture and self-fashioning as a process (not a fixed entity), as a combination and moving resultant of different component elements (which awkwardly might be labelled indigenous, Hoklo, Hakka, “Ming Chinese”, “Qing Chinese”, Japanese, “KMT-run ROC Chinese”, Taiwanese, Western, Southeast Asian). This is an approach acknowledging that “culture” and self-fashioning are not or should not be regarded as fixed, static, reified and bounded as a sort of “national property” and “political capital”; rather, it treats them ecumenically as plural, changing, diverse and, thereby, democratic. To conclude, in this chapter I have demonstrated how Chiang Wei-shui’s life has been “selectively remembered and commemorated” as different afterlives from perspectives informed by presentist political factors rather than referencing his actual achievements. The reconfiguration of Chiang Wei-shui has been selective as to which aspects of his thinking have been deemed most important, largely bypassing whether he should be reckoned liberal, rightist, leftist or communist. The significance of the historical legacy attributed to Chiang is indicated by the vehemence of disputes over how his (nationalist or protonationalist) “zijue/zhuti yishi/self-consciousness” is to be represented and commemorated. This echoes what the film Rashomon has denoted: “History was not found at the time of its occurrence, but was reconfigured at the time of discovery” (dir. Akira Kurosawa 1950).

NOTES 1. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephan Feuchtwang, Stuart Thompson, and reviewers for their comments and Ms Minly Sung and Jen Su for their support in providing resources to access research materials for this chapter. 2. I translate as the Taiwan Cultural Association rather than the Taiwanese Cultural Association to indicate that, in the 1920s, Taiwan was a geographical term. There was no collective consciousness of all Taiwanese people, including indigenous peoples, until the 1990s, when Lee Teng-hui proposed a notion of “New Taiwanese”. 3. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Chinese texts are my own and all italics are my own highlights. 4. The term “re-China-ization” (Zai Zhongguohua) is coined here in order to differentiate it from the more commonly used English term “re-Sinicization” or “re-Sinification” (ZaiHan/Huahua 再漢/華化). “Sinicization” or “Sinification” refers to instilling “Chineseness” conventionally in the cultural sense (Han/ Zhonghua Wenhua 漢/中華文化), whereas “re-China-ization” better encapsulates the two Chiangs’ (Kai-shek and Ching-kuo) policy idea of re-establishing a Taiwan “Chineseness” specifically in both the political structure and nationalist culture of the Republic of China.

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Long-Term Perspective”, in June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle (eds), Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 284–311. Tsai, Chin-tang (2010) “臺灣的忠烈祠與日本的護國神社/靖國神社之比較研 究”, Bulletin of Taiwan Historical Research, NTNU. 3: 3–22. Tsai, Hui-pin (2020) “1920 年代臺灣文學更新中”, 少年福爾摩沙遇見1920. Wang, Hsiao-po (ed.) (1987) 王敏川選集. Straits Academic Press. Wang, Hsiao-po (1998) “蔣渭水全集: 編後記”, Straits Review 94. Wang, Hsiao-po (2005) “補遺編後記”, 蔣渭水全集. Straits Academic Press. Wang, Hsiao-po (2012) “欣見長江後浪推前浪”. 我們的歌是青春的火焰. Straits Academic Press. Wilson, Woodrow (1919) Wilson’s Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances. Feb. 11. Wu, Rwei-ren (2002) “Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism”, in S. Corcuff (ed.), Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 196–218. Wu, Rwei-ren (2019) 台灣非是台灣人的台灣不可 (2) : 蔣渭水的民族觀, 自治運動 與同化的爭論. At https://​whogovernstw​.org/​2019/​08/​01/​rweirenwu7/​#comments (accessed on May 21, 2021). Wu San-lien Foundation (2001) “台灣文化協會的使命.” At http://​www​.twcenter​.org​ .tw/​g03​_main (accessed on May 21, 2021). Yeh, Jung-chong (1975) “革命家蔣渭水”. Taiwan Political Commentary 5: 76–79. Yin, Ying (1979) “由美國留學生所點燃的中國青年自覺運動”, 台灣學生運動 1949–1979. Taipei: Longtian.

Corresponding table of Wade-Giles/Taigi and Pinyin romanization of Chinese names and terms

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

Amoy (E-mng台語 Taigi)

Xiamen

廈門

Bin-hing Sia (台語Taigi)

Minxing She

民興社

Bu-hong (台語Taigi)

Wufeng

霧峰

Chang-ting Frank Hsieh

Xie Changting

謝長廷

Chen Chu

Chen Ju

陳菊

ch’ien-chuang

qianzhuang

錢莊

Ch’ing

Qing

清

Ch’ing dynasty

Qing dynasty

清朝

Ch’ing-jen

Qing ren

清人

Chiu Chin-i

Qiu Jinyi

邱進益

Chang An-le

Zhang Anle

張安樂

Chang Yen-hsien

Zhang Yanxian

張炎憲

Chang-hua (Tsiang-hua in 台語Taigi)

Zhanghua

彰化

Chao Hsun-ta

Zhao Xunda

趙勳達

Chen Fang-ming

Chen Fangming

陳芳明

Chen Hsieh

Chen Xie

陳血

Chen Jo-hsi

Chen Ruoxi

陳若曦

Chen Lung-chih

Chen Longzhi

陳隆志

Chen Shui-bian

Chen Shuibian

陳水扁

Chen Tsui-lien

Chen Cuilian

陳翠蓮

Chen Yi

Chen Yi

陳儀

Chen Yi-shen

Chen Yishen

陳儀深

Chen Yu-hsiu

Chen Yuxiu

陳郁秀

Cheng Ch’eng-kung / Koxinga

Zheng Chenggong

鄭成功

Cheng Li-chun

Zheng Lijun

鄭麗君

358

359

Corresponding table

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

Cheng Nan-jung

Zheng Nanrong

鄭南榕

Cheng-ming yün-tung

Zhengming yundong

正名運動

Chiang Ch’ao-ken

Jiang Chaogen

蔣朝根

Chiang Ching-kuo

Jiang Jingguo

蔣經國

Chiang Kai-shek

Jiang Jieshi

蔣介石

Chiang Li-jung

Jiang Lirong

蔣理容

Chiang Wei-kuo

Jiang Weiguo

蔣緯國

Chiang Wei-shui

Jiang Weishui

蔣渭水

Chiang Wu-t’ung

Jiang Wutong

蔣武童

Chien Chi

Jian Ji

簡吉

Chiu Hungdah

Qiu Hongda

丘宏達

Chou Shu-kai

Zhou Shukai

周書楷

Chu Tien-wen

Zhu Tianwen

朱天文

Chung-hua Min-tsu

Zhonghua Minzu

中華民族

Chung-hua pao-tiao

Zhonghua baodiao

中華保釣

Chungking

Chongqing

重慶

Chung-kuo

Zhongguo

中國

Chung-kuo hua

Zhongguohua

中國化

Chung-kuo i-shih

Zhongguo yishi

中國意識

Chung-shan

Zhongshan

中山

fan-jen

fanren

番人

fang-yen

fangyan

方言

Fu-pao chih sheng

Fubao zhi sheng

富堡之聲

Gi-lan (台語Taigi)

Yilan

宜蘭

Hakka

Kejia

客家

Han Kuo-yu

Han Guoyu

韓國瑜

Han-hua

Hanhua

漢化

Hau Pei-tsun

Hao Bocun

郝柏村

Hou Shou-feng

Hou Shoufeng

侯壽豐

Hsi-k’ang (Hepei Province)

Xikang (Hebei Province)

西康（河北省）

Hsia Yü

Xia Yu

夏宇

Hsiao Shou-li

Xiao Shouli

蕭守梨

Hsiau A-chin

Xiao Aqin

蕭阿勤

Hsieh Hsüeh-hung

Xie Xuehong

謝雪紅

Hsieh Tung-min

Xie Dongmin

謝東閔

hsien-neng te cheng-fu

xianneng de zhengfu

賢能的政府

Hsin-kao yin-hang

Xingao yinhang

新高銀行

360

A century of development in Taiwan

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

Hsinchu (Sin-tik 台語Taigi)

Xinzhu

新竹

Hsing Nan News

Xing Nan News

興南新聞

Hsiu-lien Annette Lu

Lü Xiulian

呂秀蓮

Hu Shih

Hu Shi

胡適

Hua-nan yin-hang

Huanan yinhang

華南銀行

Hualien

Hualian

花蓮

huan wo t’u-ti

huanwo tudi

還我土地

Huang Hsin-chieh

Huang Xinjie

黃信介

Huang Huang-hsiung

Huang Huangxiong

黃煌雄

kai-liong-hi (台語Taigi)

gailiangxi

改良戲

Kan Kok-hian (台語Taigi)

Jian Guoxian

簡國賢

Kanan

Jianan

嘉南

Kang Ning-hsiang

Kang Ningxiang

康寧祥

Kao-shan-tsu

Gaoshanzu

高山族

Kaohsiung (Ko-hiong 台語Taigi)

Gaoxiong

高雄

Keelung (Ke-lang 台語Taigi)

Jilong

基隆

Kinmen/Quemoy/Kim-mn̂ g (台語Taigi)

Jinmen

金門

Ko Wen-je

Ke Wenzhe

柯文哲

ko-kah-hi (台語Taigi)

gaojiaxi

高甲戲

kua-a​-hi (台語Taigi)

gezaixi

歌仔戲

Kok-seng-ia (台語Taigi)

Guoxingye

國姓爺

Kua Ting-thiu (台語Taigi)

Ke Dingchou

柯丁丑

kung-min yü tao-te

gongmin yu daode

公民與道德

kua-chia jen-t’ung wen-t’i

guojia rentong wenti

國家認同問題

Kuomintang (KMT)

Guomindang

國民黨

lan-than-hi (台語Taigi)

luantanxi

亂彈戲

lao-pan

laobun

老闆

Lee Ao

Li Ao

李敖

Lee Huan

Li Huan

李煥

Lee Kwan Yew

Li Guangyao

李光耀

Lee Shih-wei

Li Shiwei

李世偉

Lee Teng-hui

Li Denghui

李登輝

Lee Yüan-ts’u

Li Yuancu

李元簇

Lei Chen

Lei Zhen

雷震

Liao Hsien-hao

Liao Xianhao

廖咸浩

lieh-ch’iang ch’in-Hua shih

lieqiang qinhua shi

列強侵華史

Lien Heng (Lian Hing 台語Taigi)

Lian Heng

連橫

361

Corresponding table

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

Lien Wen-ch’ing

Lian Wenqing

連溫卿

Lim Siu-tsu (台語Taigi)

Lin Xiuzhu

林秀珠

Lim Thian-ti (台語Taigi)

Ren Tianzhi

任天知

Lim Thuan-tshiu (台語Taigi)

Lin Tuanqiu

林摶秋

Lin Chin-chuan

Lin Jinquan

林金泉

Lin Hsien-t’ang (Lim Hian-tong 台語Taigi)

Lin Xiantang

林獻堂

Lin Kuan-hua

Lin Guanhua

林冠華

Lo Ping-ch’eng

Luo Bingcheng

羅秉成

loh-te-sau (台語Taigi)

luodisao

落地掃

Lü Fu-lu

Lü Fulu

呂福祿

Lu Hik-liok (台語Taigi)

Lü Heruo

呂赫若

Lu Soo-siong (台語Taigi)

Lü Sushang

呂訴上

Lu Tsuan-sing (台語Taigi)

Lü Quansheng

呂泉生

Ma Ying-jeou

Ma Yingjiu

馬英九

Mao Tse-tung

Mao Zedong

毛澤東

Matsu

Mazu

馬祖

min-tsu chiu-hsing, shih-chieh wei-jen

minzujiuxing, shijieweiren

民族救星，世界偉人

mu-yü

muyu

母語

Nanking

Nanjing

南京

oo-phiat-a (台語Taigi)

hupiezai

胡撇仔 (オペラ opera;

P’ing-p’u tsu

Pingpu zu

平埔族

p’iao-hao

piaohao

票號

Pai Hsien-yung

Bai Xianyong

白先勇

Pak-kang (台語Taigi)

Beigang

北港

pak-kuan-hi (台語Taigi)

beiguanxi

北管戲

Peking

Beiping (Beijing)

北平（北京）

pen-kuo

benguo

本國

pien-chi yao-chih

bianji yaozhi

編輯要旨

Pingtung

Pingdong

屏東

Ponglai mi

Penglai mi

蓬莱米

Song Hui-ngoo (台語Taigi)

Song Feiwo

宋非我

Su Chii-cherng

Su Qicheng

蘇啟誠

Suao-Hualien

Suao-Hualian

蘇澳-花蓮

Sun Yat-sen

Sun Zhongshan

孫中山

Sun Yun-suan

Sun Yunxuan

孫運璿

Taiwan i-shih

Taiwan yishi

臺灣意識

opeila)

362

A century of development in Taiwan

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

t’ung-tu

tongdu

統獨

Tai-gi

Taiyu

台語

Tai-lam (台語Taigi)

Tainan

臺南

Tai-tiong (台語Taigi)

Taizhong

臺中

Taipei (Tai-pak 台語Taigi)

Taibei

臺北

Taitung

Taidong

臺東

Taiwan Min-pao

Taiwan Minbao

台灣民報

Taiwan New Min-pao

Taiwan New Minbao

台灣新民報

Tan Siok-hong (台語Taigi)

Chen Shufang

陳淑芳

tangwai

dangwai

黨外

Teng Hsiao-p’ing

Deng Xiaoping

鄧小平

Tien-tsin

Tianjin

天津

Ting-sin Sia (台語Taigi)

Dingxin She

鼎新社

Tiunn Bun-huan (台語Taigi)

Zhang Wenhuan

張文環

Tiunn Ngoo-kun (台語Taigi)

Zhang Wojun

張我軍

Tiunn Tshim-tseh (台語Taigi)

Zhang Shenqie

張深切

Tiunn Ui-hian (台語Taigi)

Zhang Weixian

張維賢

Ts’ao Chin

Cao Jin

曹謹

Ts’ai P’ei-huo（Tshua Pue-hue/Tshua

Cai Peihuo

蔡培火

Ts’ao-t’un

Caotun

草屯

Tsai Ah-hsin

Cai Axin

蔡阿信

Tsai Ing-wen

Cai Yingwen

蔡英文

Tsai Mei-chu

Cai Meizhu

蔡美珠

Tung-ning

Dongning

東寧

tsu-ch'ün

zuqun

族群

wai-sheng-jen

waishengren

外省人

wan-nien kuo-hui

wannian guohui

萬年國會

Wang Hsiao-po

Wang Xiaobo

王曉波

Wang Min-ch’uan

Wang Minchuan

王敏川

Wang Wen-hsing

Wang Wenxing

王文興

Wen Chia-pao

Wen Jiabao

溫家寶

Wen Hsing

Wen Xing

文星

Wu Juei-ren

Wu Ruiren

吳叡人

Wu Nai-teh

Wu Naide

吳乃德

Yang Hsi-k’un (H.K. Yang)

Yang Xikun

楊西崑

Yeh Kung-ch’ao (George Yeh)

Ye Gongchao

葉公超

Pue-honn）

363

Corresponding table

Wade-Giles / Taigi (Taiwanese)

Pinyin

Traditional Chinese

Yen Chia-kan

Yan Jiagan

嚴家淦

yin-yüan

yinyuan

銀元

Yü Yung-he

Yu Yonghe

郁永河

yüan-chu-min

yuanzhumin

原住民

  (This corresponding table is contributed by Kevin Zhichen Dong)  

Index A Record of Enigmatic Butterflies, 302 aboriginal language, 282, 284, 286 actresses performing as male protagonists (kunsheng 坤生, or nuxiaosheng 女 小生), 315 Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, 48 AIDS, 300 Albanian resolution, 46 Allies, 220, 230 Air raids on Taiwan, 100, 118, 121, 123, 131 America’s Seventh Fleet, 17 see also Seventh Fleet Andō, Rikichi p. 42 Anderson, Benedict, 220, 230 Anthology of Nature Writing in Taiwan, 302 Anti-black-box ‘Fine-Tuning’ Curriculum Guideline, 234 anti-communism and against Soviet Russia, 279 anti-KMT activists/anti-KMT democratic movement, 220, 236 Anti-media Monopoly Campaign, 213 Article 100 of the Penal Law, 221 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 30, 50 (The) Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), 27 August 17, 1982 communique, 20 Bai, Xianyong, 296 Bamboo Hat Poetry Society, 297 Bank of Taiwan, 106, 113, 115, 131, 151, 170 Barclay, Paul, 62 BBC, 40 BBS, 303 Beautiful Rice Ears, 300

Becoming the Go South Base (Nanshin kichika), 6 Benshengren 337–338, 340–342, 345, 352–353 bentuhua 85 Bin-hing Sia (民興社), 271 Bin-hong Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue (People’s Beacon Theatre Study Society, 民烽演劇研究會), 273–274 “Black-Box” CG, 234–235 Blue Star Poetry Society, 295 Broken Generation, 301 bun-bing-hi (文明戲), 271, 272 see also civilized theatre bun-hua-kiok, 10, 266, 269, 270–275, 281, 283 see also cultural theatre Burning Peak Youth Society in Tsaotun, 273 Bush, George H.W. p. 50 Cai, Zhiheng, 304 Cairo Conference, 51 Cairo Declaration, 42 Camaroff, John and Jean, 68 Campus Folksongs Movement, 297 Capon, 277 Chang, Sung-sheng Yvonne, 303 Chang, Yen-hsien (張炎憲) 344 Chen, Chu (陳菊), 243, 253, 256–261 Chen, Fang-ming (陳芳明), 347 Chen, Kehua, 301 Chen, Li, 303 Chen, Lung-chu, 41, 42, 50 Chen, Ruoxi, 296 Chen, Shui-bian, 23, 52, 234 Chen, Tsui-lien (陳翠蓮) 351 Chen, Yi, 42 Chen, Yi-shen (陳儀深), 350 Chen, Yu-hsiu (陳郁秀), 347

364

Index

Chen, Yingzhen, 297 Cheng, Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga, Tei Seikō), 227, 231 Cheng, Li-chun (鄭麗君), 351–352 Cheng, Nan-jung (鄭南榕), 48, 343 Chiang, Ching-Kuo, 19–20, 47, 206, 210, 298 Chiang, Kai-shek, 5, 17, 230–233, 241 Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, 20, 42–45 Chiang, Wei-kuo, 49 Chiang, Wei-shui (蔣渭水, 1891–1931), 12, 200, 202–203, 325–329, 331–333, 335–336, 339–354 Chief Executive Office, 278 Chien, Chi 334, 336–337, 339 (re-)(de-)China-ization 325, 327, 336, 338–340, 342, 344, 349, 351–352, 354 China Tide (夏潮) 340–341, 344 China’s National People’s Congress, 21 Chinese Civil War, 313 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 4, 17, 302 Chinese consciousness, 233, 235 Chinese nation, 231–232, 241 Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), 220, 313 “Chinese Mandarin only” policy, 236 Chinese opera (xiqu 戲曲), 307 Chiu, Chin-yi, 49 Chou, Shu-kai, 46 Churchill, Winston, 42 City Lights Seen from the Mountain, 277 civic national identity, 81, 83, 84 Civil Aviation Organization ( ICAO), 29 civil society movements, 8 see also movements civilized theatre, 271 see also bun-bing-hi classical plays (koo-tsheh-hi 古冊戲 or koo-loo-hi 古路戲), 307 Clinton, Bill, 50 coefficients of determination (R2), 110 Cold War, 44, 45 Colonial(ism), 95, 98, 120, 126, 134, 137, 139, 325, 327, 330–333, 335–336, 338, 346 colonial education, 221, 222–223, 227, 229, 230, 235–236

365

common school (kōgakkō), 222, 223–225, 227–230, 232 continuous colonization, xix Communist China, 3 comparative advantage, 6, 98, 110, 116, 143, 157, 164, 166–67 augmented comparative advantage, 158 “creative comparative advantage”, 156 dynamic comparative advantage, 150, 157, 161 ladder of comparative advantage, 156 “natural comparative advantage”, 156 “revealed comparative advantage” (RCA), 163 stage approach of comparative advantage, 157 static comparative advantage, 159 conglomerates (zaibatsu) new type of conglomerates, 151 Congress Forever, 220 Conlon Associates, 45 Consensus 1992 Consensus, 26 see also one China Coronavirus pandemic, 13, 260 Cornell University Alumni Reunion, 50 Council of Aboriginal Affairs/Indigenous Peoples, 64 Council of Hakka Affairs, 65 countries Belgium, 135 England and Wales, 128 France, 132, 135 Germany, 97, 109, 114, 132, 135 Italy, 109, 135 Japan, see Japan (in separate entry) Russia, 97, 109 Sweden, 135 UK, 109, 135 USA, 109, 125, 128, 132, 135, 137, 139 Covid-19 pandemic, 28 see also Coronavirus pandemic Crawford, James, 52 criteria for statehood, Taiwan, 52

366

A century of development in Taiwan

Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), 25 Crystal Boys, 300 cultural indigenization movement, 207–208 cultural theatre, 266, 269, 272, 285 see also bun-hua-kiok Cultural Revolution, 296 Curriculum Guidelines 98 Curriculum Guidelines (98 CG), 234 101 Curriculum Guidelines, 234 108 Curriculum Guidelines, 235 curriculum reform, 235

virtuous cycle, agriculture and industry, 130 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 33 Diaoyutai, 297 digital literature, 303–304 displacement scenario, 61 Dragons Poetry Society, 297 Du Heng, 295 dual identity 76, 78, 81, 82, 84, 88, 91 Dual Representation, 46, 47 Dulles, John Foster, 43 Secretary of State Dulles, 155 dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), 160, 171

Dadaocheng (大稻埕) 330, 351 Dai Wangshu, 295 Dangwai (outside the party), xix, 48, 327, 340–344, 351, 353 “Dang-wai” magazines, 208 Dawley, Evan, 63 (The) decade of 1980s: political liberalization, 209–210 (The) decade of 1990s: political democratic transition, 211 decolonization, xx Deng, Xiaoping, 19 developmental state, 149 democracy index, 13 democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 5, 8, 23, 41, 48–53, 198, 209, 210, 217, 235, 258–259, 298 Democratic transition, 91, 197, 210–211 democratization, 73, 78–80, 83, 85, 266, 283–284 development plan Ad Hoc Study Board of Industries, 115 Five-Year Plan of Productivity Expansion, 117 Study Board of Tropical Industries, 116 development policy big push, 130 export promotion, 130 Industrial Taiwan, Agricultural South Seas, 117, 120 precondition to take-off, 131 technology transfer, 123, 132 turnkey project, 123, 126, 136

ecological consciousness, 301 economic miracle postwar Taiwan, 132 prewar Taiwan, 96, 113, 129–30, 135 education colonial, 221, 222–223, 227, 229, 230, 235–236 common school (kōgakkō), 222, 223–225, 227–230, 232 Gender Equity Education Act, 247–248 Japanese language School, 138 labor force, highly educated, 127 middle school, prewar Taiwan, 128 primary school (shōgakkō), 222, 224 professional, prewar Taiwan, 114 ractical learning, 223, 224–227, 231 school enrollments, prewar Taiwan, 128 vocational school, prewar Taiwan, 128, 138 of women and girls, 243–248, 261 Epoch Poetry Society, 295 Ethics, 221–222, 229, 231, 233, Ethnic group (zuqun), 67 export-led development strategy, 156 growth, 149, 156, 166 export promotion, 156, 166, 170 Facebook, 303 Family Catastrophe, 296 February 28th Incident of February 28th, 3, 154

Index

228 incident, 278, 279 2.28 Incident Settlement Committees, 337 228 massacre, 14, 255 financial crisis, 106 First World War, 150 see also war flying geese model, 7, 150, 153, 157–159, 166, 168 foreign direct investment (FDI), 126, 132 inward, 157 outward, 158 Formosa Formosa Constitutions, 48 Ilha Formosa, 2 Formosa Magazine (美麗島), 341, 343 Formosa Magazine Publishing House (美麗島雜誌社), 256–258 Four Fortunes Worries about the Country, 302 Free China (自由中國), 205–206 free trade agreements (FTAs), 30 Fujii Tree, 304 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, 224-, 226 Futaba Society, 274, 276 GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 102, 134–35, 149, 161, 169 per capita, 12, 102, 134, 149 in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 132 Geary-Khamis dollars, 102, 134 Gellner, Ernest, 220, 228 Gender Equality in Employment Act (兩 性工作平等法), 252–254, 258 Gender Equity Education Act, 247–248 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 50 General Tian-too, 280 Geography, 221–222, 226, 229, 233–234 Giddens Ko, 304 Gini coefficient, 12–14 Giok-hong Film Corporation, 281 global supply chains, 7, 13, 161, 168 Go Hō (Wu Feng), 227, 229 gold standard system, 7, 186, 187–188 Golden Horse Awards, 284

367

Great Depression, 151 Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 153 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 117 Great Exodus 1949, 69 Great Leap Forward of 1958, 18 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 18 growth Japan and Taiwan, 142 miracle, 95–6, 106, 113, 129, 135, 142 negative, 105 growth rate growth, economic, rapid, 131, 136, 139 continuous, 106, 108–109, 110, 135 difference in prewar and postwar periods, 138 discrete, 104, 106, 135 exponential, 130 GDP per capita, 138 Guidelines for National Unification, 49 Guo Qiangsheng, 301 Hakka, 5, 267, 270, 275, 284–286, 298–299 hakka theatre, 275, 285 Han 326–329, 330, 333, 336–337, 340, 342–343, 345, 347, 350, 352–353 Han Chinese, 3 Han fans, 236 Han Kuo-yu, 236 hard disk (HD), 160 Harmonized System (HS), 164, 172 Hasegawa, Kiyoshi, 277 Hau, Pei-tsun, 48 heimat, 9, 225, 227, 228–229, 236 heimat education, 225, 227–229 heimat education movement, 225 heimat materials (homeland materials), 225, 227, 230, 232, 235–236 Heisei Recession (1990–2010), 164 Hibiya Theatre, 274 hidden championship, 161 History, 221, 227, 229, 230–232, 234 Hokkien, 298–299 Holo (Minnan or Hokkien), 308

368

A century of development in Taiwan

Hoo-sing Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue (Welfare Theatre Study Society, 厚生演劇研究會), 274, 277, 286 Hoshina, Kōichi, 225, 228 Hou, Dejian, 297 Hsiau, A-Chin (蕭阿勤) 342 Hsieh, Tung-min, 47 Hu, Chi-chiang, 90 Hu, Shi, 294 Huang, Chunming, 297 Huang, Hsin-chieh (黃信介) 339, 341, 343, 352 Huang, Huang-hsiung (黃煌雄) 342–344, 348–349, 351 Huang, Yali, 293 human capital, 97, 126, 128 “I Love Black Eyes”, 296 IC design, 161, 171 Identity Chinese identity, 6 dual identities, 6, 245–246 national identity, 6, 254–260 new Taiwanese identity, 6 “Important Question (I.Q.)” Resolution, 46 import-substitution, 156, 166, 168, 170 indicative planning, 155 Indigenous Literature Movement, 11 indigenous peoples, 299–300 indigenization, 10 indoor-stage period (neitai xi shiqi 內臺 戲時期), 313 “Industrialization” (Kōgyōka), 6 intangible aspects, 126 tangible aspects, 126 women’s role, 249–252 Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), 159 industry heavy and chemical, 97, 109–10, 117, 122–23, 129–31, 135–36 see also heavy and chemical industry light, 110, 133, 136 new products, 96, 111 nine, 99, 107, 111, 113–34, 141–42 remainder, 107 sugar industry, 97, 114, 123, 130 textile, 110, 119, 134, 136, 139

industrial growth “Industrialization (Kōgyōka), 6 Information and computer technology (ICT), 160, 171–172 Information technology (IT) revolution, 132 infrastructure hardware, 96, 113 software, 96, 113 innovation “catch-up” innovation, 161 frontier innovation, 161 International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), 29 Ing-lok Theatre (Ing-lok-tso or Yongle zuo 永樂座), 309 Inoue Masao, 273 International Biology Olympiad, 90 internationalization, 304 Internet, 303 Island Hai-lam, 278 Japan, 95–98, 106, 109, 110, 113, 123, 126–138, 141–144 colony and colonialism, 98, 120, 134 militarism, 96–97, 102, 107, 115, 130 rice riots, 114 Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc, 116 Japan-Manchuria-China Economic Block, 119 Japan Theatre, 274 Japanese Colonial Era female education, 243–246 professional women, 245–246 women’s political participation and leadership, 243, 254–255 women’s workforce participation, 248–250 Japanese education, 221, 230, 233 Japanese “period drama” (jidai geki, 時 代劇), 11, 310 Japanese Shinto, 3 Japanization, 293 (de-) Japanization, 230, 325, 327, 338–340, 346 Japanization (kominka seisaku 皇民化) movement (皇民化運動), 3, 204, 310

Index

see also Kōminka Movement Ji, Xian, 295 Jilong, 63 Jitsugaku, 224 see also practical learning John Kwan Terry, 297 kabuki, 268, 273, 285 Kan, Kok-hian, 274, 276, 277, 278 Kanan irrigation reservoir, 151 Kang, Ning-hsiang (康寧祥), 341, 352 Kataoka Iwao, 271, 287 Kawakami Otojiro, 267, 268 kik-koo ting-sin (革故鼎新), 269 see also Ting-sin Sia Kissinger, Henry, 5, 46, 297 Kitasono Katue, 293 KMT (Kuomintang), 3, 4, 5, 10–12, 17, 21, 24, 26, 32, 40–42, 44–48, 50–51, 53, 82, 97, 110, 123, 125, 129, 131–34, 137, 153, 182, 187, 188, 190, 195, 220, 232–234, 236, 277–279, 282–283, 299, 302 KMT-ruled government, 153–154, 170 KMT/ROC party-state, 8, 220–222, 230, 231–234, 236 “Knowing Taiwan”, 234, 241 Ko, Wen-je (柯文哲) 350 Kodama Gentarō, 227 ko-kah opera (ko-kah-hi or gaojiaxi 高甲 戲), 309 kōgakkō, 222 see also common school Kōmin Hōkōkai (The People of the Empire Service Society), 275 Kōminka (皇民化運動), 3, 6, 222, 327, 336, 338–339, 346 Kōminka Movement (Japanization Movement), 11 Korean war, 17, 43, 51, 154 see also War Koxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung, Tei Seikō), 227, 231 Kua, Ting-thiu (柯丁丑), 271, 280, 287 kua-a-hi (歌仔戲), 11, 271, 275, 279, 280, 282, 285–287 Kuer (酷兒), 300 Kuni, 227, 228, 229

369

labor disputes, in prewar Taiwan, 115 Labor Friends Unions (台灣工友總 聯盟), 203 Taiwan Workers’ Federation, 335 women workers, Japanese, 127 women workers, Taiwanese, 127 Labor Friends Unions (台灣工友總 聯盟), 203 Lai, He, 292 lan-than opera (lan-than-hi or luantanxi 亂彈 戲), 316 land to the tiller, 154 Last Words from Montmartre, 301 law National Total Mobilization, 117 Taiwan Education Ordinance, 114 Le, Moulin, 293 leading sector of economic development Japan, textile industry, 134 Taiwan, food industry, 134 Lee, Huan, 48 Lee, Teng- hui, 3, 5, 14, 21, 40–41, 48–53, 170, 234, 236, 298, 345, 354 Lee, Yuan-tsu, 47–49 Lei, Chen (雷震), 205 Legislative Yuan, 3, 5, 83, 221, 243, 247, 258, 260 Les Contemporains, 295 “Lesson in Ventriloquism”, 303 LGBT, 300 Li, Ang, 299 Lian, Hing, 271 Liang, Qichao, 292 Liang, Shiqiu, 294 Liao, Huiying, 299 Liao, Hsien-hao (廖咸浩), 348 Lien, Wen-Chin (連溫卿), 202, 329, 334, 339, 341 Lim, Hian-tong, 269, 271 see also Lin Hsien-tang (林獻堂), 200, 204, 329–331, 333, 337, 339, 341 Lim, Thuan-tshiu, 274, 276, 277–279, 283 Lin, Cho-shui 342–344, 346 Lin, Hengtai, 294 Lin, Kuan-hua, 235

370

A century of development in Taiwan

Lin Shuangwen Rebellion, 62 Lin, Yixiong, 298 Linkage of industrialization backward, 97, 139 effect, 110 forward, 119, 130 linked development model, 7, 156–167 Literary Journal, 296 Liu, Kexiang, 301 Local Theatre Association of the Province of Taiwan, 280 see also Regional Drama Competition loh-te-sau 落地掃 (sweeping the ground [to make a stage-like space]), 308 Long, Yingzong, 294 Louis, 295 Lü, Heruo, 294 Lu, Hik-liok, 274, 276–277, 279 Lu, Hsiu-lien (Hsiu-lien Annette Lu 呂秀 蓮), 243, 256–261 Lu, Soo-siong, 273, 279, 281, 283 Lu, Tsuan-sing, 277 Lu, Xun, 292 Luo, Fu, 295 Ma, Ying-jeou, 24, 41, 234, 348–349 MacArthur, Douglas, 43 General MacArthur, 4 Mainland Affairs Council, 49 maintaining the status quo, 73 75 Malieyafusi Monaneng, 300 Mainlander (waishengren), 63, 69, 70 Mao, Zedong, 4, 17, 19 Mandarin, 9, 298, 313 manufacturing sector/industry 1textile, 98, 110, 119, 129, 131, 134, 136, 139 2metal, 98, 112, 117–19, 134, 143, 145 3machinary and tools, 98, 112, 118–19, 123, 131, 137 4ceramic and masonry, 98, 127 5chemicals, 98, 111, 139 6wood and wood products, 98 7printing, 98 8food products, 98, 107–108, 110–11, 127, 130, 139 9others, 96, 99, 103, 127, 136 sugar industry, 97, 114, 123, 130

martial law period 1949–87, 12, 168, 220, 256–258 Maruyama, Masao, 224 Matsui Tōrō, 286 May Fourth, 292 May Fourth legacy, 11 May Fourth movement, 2, “Mayor Yin”, 296 Meiji Theatre, 273 Memoranda, 302 Memorial Night of Taiwan Culture Award, 276 Merchant House, 180 mfg, see manufacturing sector/industry, 98, 135, 141–42 Miro Casuo, 303 mixed fiber, 275 Mizutani Yaeko, 273 modern “new drama” (shingeki, 新劇), 11 Modern Poetry Debate, 297 Modern Poetry Quarterly, 295 Modernism, 11 Modernist School, 295 Modernization, 2, 13, 326, 328, 333, 335, 340, 350 Montevideo Convention of 1933, 4, 14 Mount Ali, 276, 286 “Mountain Path”, 299 movement, cultural and language Campus Folksongs, 297 cultural indigenization, 207–208 heimat education, 225 Indigenous Literature, 11 nativist literature, 8 New Cultural, 330, 352 “sing our song”, 8 people’s song (運動), 20 Wild Strawberry, 213 movement, political and socioeconomic anti-KMT activists/ anti-KMT democratic, 220, 236 civil society, 8 Japanization (kominka seisaku 皇民 化) (皇民化運動), 3, 6, 11, 204, 310 May Fourth, 2, 11, 292 Petition for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, xix, 2, 8, 254, 326, 330, 334, 352

Index

Self-Strengthening, 13 social (civil society), 197, 208–210–217 social movements (civil society movements), 197, 208, 210–217 Southward, 7, 117, 152–153, 259–260 Sunflower, xix, 213, 214 Taiwan Assembly Petition (台灣議 會請願運動), xix, 2, 8, 200, 204, 254, 326, 330, 334, 352 Wild Strawberry, 213 Mudanshe incident, 62 Mūran Rūju Shinjuku Za (Moulin Rouge, Shinjuku Theatre), 274 Mutual Security Treaty, with USA 19 Nagasaka Yoshiko, 274 Nai-teh Wu, 76 see also Wu, Nai-teh Nationalist (KMT) regime, 8 National Assembly, 5, 83 National Conference, 48 National drama (guoju 國劇), 314 National History, 222, 227 national identity, 73, 74, 75, 220–221, 228–229, 235–236 national identity changes, 73, 74, 76, 82, 84, 91 national language, 3, 9, 221–223, 225–235, 282–284 national language film, 281 national policy, 279 National Resources Committee (NRC), China, 123–25, 137 National self-determination, 199, 201 National Unification Council of the ROC, 49 nativism, 10, 11, 302, 303–304 Nativist Literature, 207 Debate, 297 movement, 8 nativization, 283–284 natural independence generation (tian ran du), 85 nature writing, 302 Neglect Thesis, 61 Neo-Sensationalism, 293

371

new companies (新興会社), 111–12, 120 New Cultural Movement, 330, 352 New Culture Society (新文協), 201, 202–203, 334–335, 339, 341 New Deal, 151 new drama (shingeki 新劇, modern spoken drama), 11 New Generation (這一代雜誌) 340–342 New People Association (新民會), 200 New Southward Policy, 7, 259–260 New Taiwan Dollars (NT$), 154 new theatre, 266, 273–274 see also sin-kiok New York Stock Exchange, 106 Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), 149, 158, 168 Nine Knives, 304 Nishiwaki, Junzaburō, 293 Nixon, Richard, 46, 297 Notes of a Crocodile, 301 NRC, see National Resources Committee, 123, 124–25, 137 OECD, 7, 158, 161, 164, 167, 171–172 official nationalism, 220, 230 Okurasho (Ministry of Finance, Japan), 98, 100, 101, 104–105, 112, 120, 122, 124, 126–28, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138 One China one-China principle (the 1992 Consensus), 52 Principle, 87, 90 Respective Interpretations, 41 “One Taiwan, One China” 211 status quo, 73, 75 two Chinas, 45–47, 50 one country two systems, 88 Oo-suann Studio, 281 opeila (胡撇仔, the hybrid and creative performance), “opera” (o-pe-ra, オペラ) 11, 12, 307 original design manufacturer (ODM), 161 original equipment manufacturer (OEM), 161 Orphan of Asia, 294 Osana Kaoru, 273 Overseas Chinese Investment (OCI), 132

372

A century of development in Taiwan

party-state, 220–21, 233, 236 pecuniary reward (shangjin 賞金), 318 Peking opera (jingju 京劇), 309 Peng, Ming-min (彭明敏), 206 People’s Constitution-making Convention, 48 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 4, 5, 14, 17, 20–21, 24, 26, 28–29, 31–34, 43–46, 303 people’s song movement (民歌運動), 207 “period drama” (jidai geki, 時代劇), 11 Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, xix, 2, 8, 254, 326, 330, 334, 352 see also Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement Pink Noise, 303 Plain Aboriginals, 222 Political Poetry, 298 political liberalization, 197, 206, 207, 209, 210, 217 Ponlai, 169 rice hybrid, 151 postmodernism, 303 practical learning, 223, 224–227, 231 Prebish–Singer thesis, 156 price does not matter, 140 index, 101, 102, 134 stablity, 140 primary school (shōgakkō), 222, 224 principles of popular sovereignty, 53 public enterprises, postwar Taiwan, 97, 123, 125, 129, 131, 139 purchasing power parity (PPP), 149 see also price pure cotton, 275 Qidengsheng (七等生), 296 Qijun (琦君), 295 Qin, Zihao, 295 Qing, 5, 13, 179, 185–187, 190 Qiong Yao(瓊瑤), 299 Qiu, Miaojin(邱妙津), 301 quadrangular links (middle class, civil society, political party, democracy), 217–18 Queer, 300–301

R2 = coefficients of determination, 106, 135 R2, see coefficient of determination, 110 Rashomon (film) 354 realism, 297 refined repertoires (kai-liong-hi 改良 戲), 311 “Regain Our Names “, 300 regime changes, 211, 214 regional dramas (difangxi 地方戲), 314 Regional Drama Competition (defang xiju bisai 地方戲劇 比賽), 314 Republic of China (ROC), 3, 4, 5, 14, 40–47, 49–53, 153, 180, 182, 184–186, 188–191, 192, 220, 230, 232–233, 235–236 ROC state, 86, 87, 90 on Taiwan, 4, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 40, 41, 50, 255–259 Republic of Formosa (台灣民主國)186, 192, 193, 199 Resolution on the Future of Taiwan, 51 resources mineral, in Taiwan, 119 Return Liberty to Me, 279 “revealed comparative advantage” (RCA), 163, 164, 172 rewarding spiritual performance (choushenxi 酬神戲), 316 RHS axis, the right-hand side axis, 100, 103, 107 rice–fertilizer barter, 154 Roosevelt, Franklin D, 151 Rostow’s stages of economic growth theory, 156 same-sex marriage, 300 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 4, 14, 41, 43–44, 51, 54–55 SARS, 89–90 “Sayonara, Zaijian”, 298 Scalapino, Robert A., 45 science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), 10, 243, 248, Science and Industrial Park, 160 sector, economic

Index

1Agr, Agriculture, 95–6, 98–9, 100–03, 105–08, 113, 115–17, 119–21, 130–34, 136 astonishing development, prewar, 107 Special crops, 117 2Mfg, Manufacturing, 96, 98–100, 102–03, 105–09, 110, 113, 119–20, 127, 130, 133–6, 138, 141, 144 3Forestry, 99–100, 103, 106, 114, 119, 134 4Fisheries, 99–101, 103, 106, 127, 119 5Others, 99–101, 103, 106–07. 133 seigeki, 268, 269 see also Taiwan Seigeki self-consciousness, 12, 325–327, 330–332, 334–335, 338–348, 350–354 self-determination, 254–259, 329–332, 334, 337, 343, 347 Woodrow Wilson’s, 2 “Self-conscious Age”, 12 self-identification 74 91 Self-Strengthening Movement, 13 semi-conductor industry, 13 Seventh Fleet, 43 Shang, Qin (商禽), 295 Shanghai-style Peking opera, 309 Shepherd, John 61 Shi, Zhecun, 295 shimpa, 267, 268–269, 271–274, 285 shingeki, 274 see also sin-kiok Shochiku, 281 shōgakkō see also primary school, 222 shosei shibai, 267 Showa Recession, 150 Shuiyinping, 293 Silver Flower New Theatre Troupe, 273 sin-kiok, 10, 266, 270, 274, 275–284, 286 see also new theatre Sing-hong Ian-kiok Gian-kiu Hue (Holy Beacon Theatre Study Society), 274, 277 “sing our song movement”, 8 Sinicization, 230 Sima Zhongyuan 295

373

small–medium enterprises (SMEs), 127, 138–39, 152, 155, 161, 166, 170 labor intensive products, 131 Sō Kin (Ts’ao Chin), 229 social movements (civil society movements), 197, 208–210–217 Song Hui-ngoo, 274, 277–278 sōshi engeki, 267, 269 see also sōshi shibai sōshi shibai, 267 see also sōshi engeki South Seas (Nanyo), 95–97, 113, 115–17, 119–21, 131–33, 136 and South China in WWII, 118 south forward movement policy, 117 policy, 152–153 Soviet Union, 17 special state-to-state theory, 5, 51–52 stages of industrialization, Taiwan 1Initial, 96, 97, 135 2Early, 96, 98, 105, 114, 134–35 3Transitional, 96, 98–9, 111, 114 4Prewar, 96, 99, 102–03, 111–12, 115, 133 5Quasi-War, 96, 98–9, 102–103, 106–107, 111, 113, 115, 119, 120, 130 6First-War, 96–8, 102–103, 108, 110, 113, 116, 119–20, 130 7Second-War, 96, 98–9, 106–109, 111, 118, 120, 122, 130, 134, 140, 143, 145 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 154, 157, 170 state-nation, 86 Straits Exchange Foundation, 49 Straits Review 344, 348 Stuart, John Leighton, 42 Su, Shaolian, 303 Sudo Sadanori, 267 Sun Moon Lake Electric Generation Station, 109, 114, 116–17, 119, 121 Sun, Yat-sen, 230, 232, 326, 328, 335, 339, 341–342, 348–350, 353 Sunflower Movement, 213, 214 Suzuki Company, 106 swordswomen (nuxia 女俠), 316

374

A century of development in Taiwan

Tai-gi, 266, 269–270, 274, 277, 279, 281–286, 288–289 Tai-gi film (臺語片, Taiwanese movies), 10, 270, 281–284, 286 Taihoku City Public Auditorium (now Zhongshan Hall), 42 Taipei Characters, 296 Taishō Democracy (1912–26), 2 Taiwan 228 Incident, 118 air raids, allied, 100, 118, 121, 123, 131 balance of trade surplus, 139 economies in the 1950s 1960s, 131 Japanese technicians retained after the war, 125–26 population, 128 rural industries, 139 standard of living, prewar, 126 Taichung Seaport, 117 Taiwan Expo, 116 Taiwan Studies, 139 total-war policy, 108 war-time self-sufficiency, 113 Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement (台灣議會請願運動), 200, 204 Taiwan Association of University Professors (TAUP), 48 Taiwan Communist Party (TCP), 202, 254–255, 334 Taiwan Cultural Association, TCA, xix 2, 10, 12, 200, 254, 269–273, 275, 325–337, 339, 341–347, 349, 351–352 Taiwan Culture Day, 14, 347, 350–351 Taiwan Electric Power Company (TaiPower), 114, 120, 125, 137–38 Taiwan Government General (TGG), 8, 18, 34, 97, 113, 120, 133, 137 Government-General of Taiwan, 221–222 Governor-General Office, 267, 275–277, 280, 281 Taiwan history (history of Taiwan), 221, 227–228, 232, 234–235, Taiwan Engeki Kyōkai (Taiwan Theatre Association), 275 Taiwan Federation of Labor Friends Union (台灣工友總聯盟), 203

Taiwan Kōgyō Tōsei Kabushikikaisha (Taiwan Industrial Regulations Corporation), 276 Taiwan’s legal status, 52 Taiwan Local Self-Governance Alliance (台灣地方自治聯盟), 203 Taiwan Minhō, Taiwan Minpao (台灣民 報), 204, 269 see also Taiwan People’s News Taiwan Parliament, 326, 331–332, 334, 343 Taiwan Peasants’ Assembly, 334, 337 Taiwan People’s News (TPN), 269–271, 275, 280, 286, 326, 332–333, 350, 352 see also Taiwan Minhō Taiwan People’s Party (台灣民眾黨), 202, 203, 217, 334–337, 343, 350–352 Taiwan Political Review (台灣政論), 340–341 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31, 49 Taiwan’s Renaissance, 351 Taiwan Seigeki, 268, 269, 274, 280 see also seigeki Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 23 Taiwan Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 30, 160 Taiwan Theatre Study Association, 275, 288 the Taiwan Vision of Democratic Self-determination, xix the Taiwan Youth (台灣青年), Taiwan Youth Monthly, Journal of Taiwan Youth, xix, 200, 204, 331–332 Taiwan Workers’ Federation, 335 see also labor Taiwanese consciousness, 235, 298 Taiwanese opera (kua-a-hi 歌仔戲), 11, 307 Taiwanization, 325, 327, 339–340, 344–346, 352 Taiwanization of the Republic of China (ROC), 41, 47 Takamatsu Toyojiro, 267, 268, 280 Takarazuka, 274 Takasago Hotel, 277, 286 Takita Sadaharu, 286

375

Index

Tang, Wenbiao, 297 Tei Seikō (Cheng Ch’eng-kung, Koxinga), 227, 231 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion, 44 Ten Major Construction Projects, 5, 47 Teochew opera (Tio-tsiu-hi or Chaozhouxi 潮州戲), 309 Terrestrial Heat, 277 TGG, Taiwan Government General, 97, 113–18, 120, 133–34, 137 “The Drowning of an Old Cat”, 298 The Eighties (八十年代), 340, 342 The First Intimate Encounter, 304 “The General’s Monument”, 302 The Impossible Times (musical 渭水春 風), 349 The Intellectuals (大學雜誌), 206, 210 “The Legend of Dragon”, 297 The Man with No Hometown, 301 The Night Walker, 301 The “six assurances”,, 19, 26 “The Taste of Apples”, 298 The Wall, 277–278 Three democratic regime changes, 211–214 Three Principles of People, 155, 230, 231, 233, 235 Ting-sin Sia, 270 (鼎新社) see also kik-koo ting-sin Tiunn Bun-huan, 274, 277 Tiunn Ngoo-kun, 285 Tiunn Tshim-tshe, 273, 275, 278, 281, 283, 288 Tiunn Ui-hian, 273- 274, 278, 281, 283 Toho, 274, 281 Tokyo Theatre, 273 “trade pessimism” school, 156 traditionalism, 11 transportation East–West Highway, 114 North–South Railroad, 114 Suao-Hualien Highway, 116 Trans Sisters Association(Nanyang Jiemei hui), 66 Truman, Harry S., 4, 42, 43, 51 Tsai, A-hsin (蔡阿信), 245–246

Tsai, Ing-wen (蔡英文), 5, 26, 40, 41, 51–53, 235, 243, 259–261, 351–355 Tsai Administration, 7, 34, 259–261 Tsai, Pei-huo (蔡培火), 202, 203 Tshua, Pue-honn(蔡培火), 285 Tsubouchi Memorial Theatre Museum, 273 Tsukiji Sho Gekijo (Tsukiji Small Theater), 273–274 Tsurumi, E. Patricia, 223, 224 TV, 282, 283, 284, 286–288 two Chinas, 45–47, 50 unification vs. independence, 235 United Nations, 5, 18, 22, 45–47 UN Security Council, 18 United Nations Charter, 43 US Agency for International Development (USAID), 155 US aid, 154–155, 166, 170–171 US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 7, 162, 167 Ventriloquy, 302 Waishengren, 337–338, 340–343, 345, 353 Wakabayashi, Masahiro, 47, 51 Wang, David Der-wei, 304 Wang, Hsiao-po (王曉波), 344, 346, 348 Wang, Fuchan, 67 Wang, Lan, 295 Wang, Ming-Chuan (王敏川), 202, 334, 339 Wang, Wenxing, 296 Wang, Yi, 31 Wang, Zhenhe, 297 War First World War, 150 Korean war, 17, 43, 51, 125, 131, 154 Manchurian Incident, 98, 107, 109, 115, 129 Pacific War, 95, 109, 116, 118 Russo-Japanese, 97, 114 Sino-Japanese, 95, 97–8, 107, 109, 115–16

376

A century of development in Taiwan

WWI, 97–8, 102, 106, 114–15, 129, 135, 150 WWII, 95, 97–100, 104, 110, 115–16, 118, 120–22, 125–26, 128–29, 132–33, 136, 152 wartime generation, 221, 236 Welle, Deutsche Broadcasting company, 51 Wen Hsing Magazine (文星), 206 White Terror, 220, 236, 278–279, 280 Wholesale Price Index (WPI) Taipei City, 134 WPI, Wholesale Price Index, 100–102, 104–105, 134, 140 “Wild Lily” student demonstrations, 210 Wild Strawberry Movement, 213 World Health Assembly (WHA), 24, 28 World Health Organization (WHO), 28, 89–90 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 162 World Trade Organization (WTO), 30, 90 World War II, 3, 6, 18 before WWII, 9 post World War II, 3 education of girls, 244 see also education female education, 246–248, 261 pre-World War II, 7 the Second World War, 10 women’s political participation and leadership, 243, 255–261 women’s workforce participation, 250–254, 261 women during wartime mobilization, 249–250 women education, 243–248, 261

political participation and leadership, 243, 254 workforce participation, 248–254, 261 Wu, Mingyi, 302 Wu, Nai-teh xix Wu, Rwei-ren (吳叡人), 15, 342 Wu, Yi, 89 Wu, Zhuoliu, 294 Wu, Ziyun, 304 Wushe Rebellion, 62 Xia, Ji’an, 296 Xia, Yu, 302 Xiao, Sa, 299 Xu, Wenwei, 303 Xu, Zhimo, 294 Ya Xian, 295 Yang, Chichang, 293 Yang, Dominic, 69 Yang, H.K., 46 Yang, Kui, 293 Yang, Mu, 296 Yeh, George Kung-chao, 44 Yeh, Jung-chong 341 Yoshida, Shigeru, 44 Yoshida Shokan, 44 You Are the Apple of My Eye, 304 youth society, 276 youth theatre, 276, 286 Yu, Guangzhong, 295 Yuraku Theatre, 273 Zhang, Dachun, 302 Zhang, Mo, 295 Zhang, Wojun, 292 Zheng, Chouyu, 295 Zhou, Zuoren, 292 Zhu, Tianwen, 304 Zhu, Ziqing, 294